The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences Vol. 5, No. 2, 1988 283 

Book Review 

Political Power & The Arab Oil Weapon: The Experience 
of Hve Industrial Nations 

Roy Licklider, University of Califoniia Press, Berkeley, 1988, pp. m + 343. 
Licklider selected an interesting topic and in spite of the logistical problems 

that face such a study, he has done a remarkable job. His book is a wealth 
of information and a record on a very contemporary issue. 

It is history which is still unfolding. The “oil weapon” was a treasure 
in the Arab arsenal. They used it and realized its worth. The deployment 
of the “oil weapon” by the Arabs also showed them how helpless they were 
although they thought the “lifeline” of the industrial world- oil -was under 
their control. 

Licklider’s book is seemingly weak in many areas because he has had 
to depend on personal interview. It is not unusual for politicians and others 
to deny statements or remarks made in such conversations. Also, Licklider 
appears to be acting as “gatekeeper” by seeming to use only that portion of 
the information he gathered which comfortably satisfies his thesis. 

The author has included some useful observations. For instance he has 
mentioned that Japan apologized to Israel for the Lod Airport incidence and 
sent a delegation to the Arabs to apologize for apologizing to Israel. These 
and many facts related by Licklider demonstrate now immoral the industrial 
nations are especially in the case of Britain-the real father of the Zionist 
entity. But more importantly such happenings reflect the helplessness of the 
Arab countries: they knew that the industrial nations were deploying double 
standards but they swallowed these bitter pills because they did not have any 
alternatives. 

Licklider’s book also brings into focus an important aspect of world politics 
which is that no one can win an argument using a single weapon. The Arabs 
had but oil to deploy. They did not fathom the reach of the doctored Christian 
mind that has made people believe in the righteousness of the creation of 
a state for the Jews. In fact this belief is so strong that the West considers 
it a “moral” duty to support this entity without harboring any moral qualms 
about the Palestinians diaspora. 

The “friendly” and “non-friendly” labels granted to the industrial countries 
by the Arabs is another manifestation of their weakness. It is clear from 
facts gathered by Licklider that although the Arabs fired their shot they did 

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284 TheAlRelicanJouraaloflrlamicsocialsciences WL 5, No. 2, 1988 

mtwamttokiurhe~~becauseintbiscasethegoodhealthofthisenerny 
vms tbe very basis oftheir survival. 

The skimpy nxdrs that emqed fnwn the use of the “oil weapon” also 
briagoatthefactthatin~ofalldurtwassaidtheArabswlerellotunited 
nor did they constitute a d force 

Like a good jomrrali Licktidet bas not Lnade axy subjective statement 
bat the’”s’’he &ed &mmst&d that Arab pclwers, in spite oftheir 
==e- w a  subjed k, U.S axzciim-dter Zionistcamion 
thrr#rghtheageracy Orl-ktry W i ,  aGmnm-born Jew. It d d  make 
anintemmg * study to kmk into the & of Kissinger during the oil crisis. 
I%WaSKbhgCXS&iClCXXWX@O * nwilibtheai&dingoftheNWxgated 
that hced N b n  b hand over U-S. 

The picture that emrges irs that ihe U.S. skpberded the industrial p(4~pe~s 
ttmugh &eir relationships witla the Arabs and these Miastrial powers are 
’so very dependent on the U.S. In effect, we see industrial pwem acting in 
cahesion lilue agahyan>nndtkir big star9 the U.S IAkalsoseehowpersonaI 
ism- d legadarms, (leaden l&e T-) affect policy. 

his book, IkWider has n d  certain “Plp-Arab” shifts in policies 
a€* i n d u e  nations. ?b this reviewer these “shift” seem meaningless. 
As a matter of fact, these naions only carried out some “Band-Aid measures“ 
ta help satisfy the Arab misses and shore up the regimes in Arab lands yet 
continued carry out their pm-Zionist policies which we= and are tied 
go their inkrnal and external strategic, economic, and political interests. The 
hct is that the major players in this game, the Gulf states, are W y  run 

which are much mom amcemed about retaining their seat of power 
than restoring the rights of the Paleshian people who are not looked at very 
f o d y  ly most of them. This iakmal paranoia is encouraged and cultivated 
by the industriai powers who stand b gain fmm it economically and politically. 
Therefore, we see that these weak ”shifits” were really “gains.” 

LicUder’s book makes good wdmg especially for Muslim political 
scieatlsts. They should be able b derive many lessons from it. While it tells 
them, frrnn a Western pen, of the immorality of the industrial powers, it 
also tells them about the weakness in the Muslim armor. It tells them about 
the Ead that the oil weapon has not helped in any way to “humanize” Muslims 
because whatever “concessions” or ihiW have been carried out, they were 
yery supefiicial and done only to make immediate gains. 

The author’s bibliography is impressive. One wishes that he would have 
included an agenda about his interviews to bestow authenticity as to when 
and where the discussions were carried out. 

policy b Kiss‘hger. 

Omar Bin Abdullah 
International Institution 
of Islamic Thought