The Principle of Shum and the Role 
of the Umma in Islam 

Fazlur Rahmun * 

Muslims, or at least the vast majority of them, have been very vocal 
about the necessity of establishingan Islamic state in the world, or, if i t  is 
not possible, to set up a unitary Islamic state, at least, several Islamic 
states. The idea of an Islamic state has many implications touching both 
the form and the substance of the state and raising questions like unity 
and multiplicity of such states, the nature of legislation and source of 
power and whether or not i t  ought to be a democracy. In this paper, I 
shall discuss only this last question which immediately concerns only the 
form of the state but which has obvious far-reaching consequences for 
substantive issues as well-for example, the source of power and the 
nature of legislation. 

But, although Muslims have been very anxiously expressing the need 
for an Islamic state, there is little consensus on any of the basic matters 
mentioned above, the least on the issue to be discussed in this paper, viz., 
the form of an Islamic state. Yet, the absolutely fundamental importance 
of the issue cannot be denied since it centrally involves the question of the 
Muslim Umma and the nature of its role in a n  Islamic state. We will first 
try to delineate the bearing that the teaching of the Qur’an has on the 
subject, then briefly characterize both the views of the classical Muslim 
jurists and the practice of the historic community. Then, we will give the 
essentials of the current positions and, finally, indicate our conclusion. 

The Qur’an formally announced the establishment of the Muslim 
community in Madina in connection with three events: the declaration of 
the incumbency of the Hajiof the Ka’ba upon Muslims, the declaration of 
the duty of Jihad and the change of the Qibla from Jerusalem to the 
Ka‘ba. We will not go here into the question of the timing of these events 
because it has no direct bearing on our present problem. I t  is sutficient to 
point out that the pilgrimage was the first to be announced, then 
probably came Jihad and then the change in the Qibla. Be t h a t  as it may, 
the Haji and Jihad are treated in close approximity to each other in S u r a  
22 (al-Haji), while the Haji and the Qibla change appear close to each 
other in Sura 2 (al-Baqara), the two Suras being contemporary o r  closely 

*Dr. Rahman is a professor of Islamic Thought at the University of Chicago. 

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A 

a p p r o x i m a t e  in time. All t h e  t h r e e  e v e n t s  a r e  m u t u a l l y  closely 
connected. 

It is also quite obvious that all these three have a direct bearing on the 
community’s life and constitution. And it is, therefore, hardly surprising 
but perfectly natural that in both places the Qur’an talks about the 
Umma and its task and function. The function of the community is 
proclaimed by the Qur’an to be a “median community” so that it can be a 
“witness upon mankind”, i.e. mediate their extreme positions and 
balance these out: “And even so have We appointed you as a median 
commufiity that you may be witness over men” (11,142). Most probably 
what the Qur’an has immediately in mind is the middle position or 
balancing effect of the Muslim community as between the immobility or 
rigidity of Jewish particularism on the one hand and the excessively 
“accommodating” nature of Christianity on the other. But, of course, this 
immediate objective of the Qur’an can and must be extended by the 
principle of q i y a s  to other extremes, for example, t h a t  between 
Communism and Capitalism. The term “witness” here, as the Qur’an 
commentators remind us, has reference to the balance of the two sides of 
a scale. The idea, then, is that Muslims a r e  the scale or the judge whereby 
extremes are to be determined and they a r e  also the modifiers whereby 
those extremes a r e  to be smoothed out. The former is an intellectual or 
diagnostic function, while the latter is an operational one. 

Verse 40 of S u r a  XXII states, “Those (are Muslims) who, when We give 
them power on the earth, shall establish prayers, pay Zukat, command 
good and prohibit evil-and to God belongs the end of the affairs.”Verse 
110 of S u r a  I11 says to the same effect, “You are the best community 
produced for the humankind for you command good and prohibit evil, 
and you believe in God.” The task of the community, then, is to establish 
on the earth a n  order by effectively prohibiting evil and commanding 
good on the basis of belief in aone and unique God. That this order will be 
a socio-political one but erected on a valid and viable ethical basis is, I 
think, obvious from the wording of both these passages of the Qur’an. In 
fact, the task of establishing such an order and the functioning of the 
community as a “witness” over mankind are fundamentally interde- 
p e n d e n t  a n d  n e i t h e r  is p o s s i b l e  w i t h o u t  t h e  o t h e r .  

The verses cited above talk about the role of the Muslim community in 
the world at large; they do not talk about the internal constitution or 
structure of the Muslim community. However, verse 103 of Sura I11 has 
often been interpreted as referring to the internal structure of the 
community. The verse reads, “Let there be of you a community who call 
(people) to virtue, command good and prohibit evil-these shall be the 
successful ones.” Here, the words “Let there be of you a community”are, 
so far as the Arabic is concerned capable of meaning either, “Let you be a 
community” or “Let there be from among you a community or a group.” 
Often taking the words in the latter sense, it has been contended that the 
Qur’an is here referring to the group of learned ones among Muslims, the 

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religious leadership whose task i t  is to call people (Muslims) to 
righteousness, command good and prohibit evil. It is difficult to see, 
however, how the Qur’an could confer upon the religious leadership the 
duty and the privilege of commanding and prohibiting. Since in the 
other verses discussed above, this phrase refers to a general socio- 
political function, it is hardly likely that here it refers to religious 
leadership. I t  is far more likely that this verse, like the other two, also 
refers to the task of the Muslim community on the globe, viz., of building 
an ethically based socio-political order on the earth. 

There is no doubt that the Qur’an envisages and calls upon Muslims 
that they produce such people from among themselves as would develop 
an insightful understanding of the Faith. “Why should there not t u r n  u p  
from every division (of Muslims) a group in order that they might 
understand the Faith deeper and, when they return to their people, they 
might admonish them so that their brethren can also improve their 
conduct by desisting (from possible mistakes)”-IX, 122. It is obvious 
enough from this verse that the task of the religious leadership is to 
acquire a deep understanding of the Faith and then to teach and preach 
it. If this function can be called “commanding good and prohibiting evil” 
in some sense, then they can be called “People who command good and 
prohibit evil,” but this does not apply in any meaningful sense in which 
the community as a whole has been given that title or the sense in which 
the duly constituted political or administrative authority in Islam has 
been called “ulu’l - a m r ”  by the Qur’an (IV, 59: IV, 83). 

Indeed, the task devolving upon the religious leadership is double, viz. 
the acquisition of correct and meaningful knowledge of the Faith and its 
diffusion through teaching and preaching. They do not constitute a n  elite 
any more than does any other functional group vis-a-vis the community. 
Indeed, in the eyes of the Qur’an the idea of elitism is so abhorrent t h a t  it 
explicitly and unequivocally states t h a t  all Muslims (= mu’mins) a r e  the 
bearers of the responsibility of “prohibiting evil and commanding good,” 
including both men and women. “Believing men and believing women 
a r e  friends and supporters of each other; they command good and 
prohibit evil, establish prayers, pay Zukut and obey God and His 
Messenger-these a r e  the ones upon whom God is going to have His 
mercy; God is mighty and wise” (IX, 71). 

Since this verse speaks about the mutual support and friendship of 
Muslims, i t  certainly can be seen as regulatory of the internal 
relationship within the community. But here “commanding good and 
prohibiting evil” is stated to be the duty and privilege of every’Muslim 
male and female. There is not the slightest suggestion of a n  elite that can 
arrogate to itself this particular function either in the name of superior 
knowledge, understanding or wisdom. This is both a re-statement and 
corroboration of what the Qur’an often states to be the sole basis of 
mutual relationships among Muslims as members of the community, viz. 
active good will for and cooperation with each other. “Those who believe 

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and mutually admonish each other with steadfastness and mutual 
mercy” XC, 17). Again, “Those who believe, do good works and support 
each other by admonishing with the truth and with steadfastness“(CII1, 
3). On cooperation, we have in S u r a  VI, verse 2, “Cooperate on the basis of 
goodness and warning each other against moral peril and do not 
cooperate on the basis of wrongdoing and transgression.” The Qur’an 
had prohibited secret cliquing of groups that schemed against others, 
particularly against the Prophet and his policies. These were the 
“Hypocrites” and their fellow-travelers. In LVIII, 8, the Qur’an 
reiteratehits prohibition on secret cliquing and then goes on in verse 9, 
“0 believers, if you do hold private and secret meetings, do not plan on 
the basis of wrong-doing and transgression and disobedience of the 
Prophet, b u t  plan on the basis of righteousness and warning each other 
against moral peril.” My point in bringing these verses is that the Qur’an 
envisages the Muslim community internally as a perfectly egalitarian, 
open society based on good will and cooperation, without elitism and 
without the mentality that generates secret conspiracies. Of course, the 
anti-Islamic prohibitions on conducting the community’s political or 
other aspects of life in the open daylight and, therefore, forcing people to 
hold secret meetings is condemnable by the self-same verses of the 
Qur’an, no matter how self-righteously these prohibitions a r e  clamped 
upon the community in the name of Islam or in the name of patriotism. 
Both such secret meetings and such bans are utterly in opposition to 
what the Qur’an envisions to be the internal life of the community, viz. a n  
open, egalitarian society of active good-will and cooperation. Quite apart 
from the fact that such bans are manifestly anti-Qur’anic, they are, of 
course, counter-productive and self-defeating as repeated experiences 
have shown. How many Muslim countries today can claim to be such 
open societies? I n  the interests of the solidarity of the community, such 
measures may well be resorted to on a very temporary basis, but to make 
i t  a permanent or semi-permanent device flies directly into the face of 
the Qur’an. 

The points we have made so far a r e  (1) that the Qur’an has defined the 
task and the function of the Muslim community, viz. to erect a certain 
kind of social-political order on the earth and to balance out extremes on 
the globe, (2) t h a t  so far as the internal life and constitution of the Muslim 
society is concerned, i t  is relentlessly egalitarian and open, smacking of 
no elitism and no secretism, and (3) that the basis of the internal life and 
conduct of society is mutual active good-will and cooperation. The Qur’an 
tolerates ru) distinction between one believer and another, male and 
female, in their equal participation in the life and conduct of the 
community and in any aspect thereof. Now, in perfectly logical harmony 
with this vision, the Qur’an laid down the principle of shura guiding the 
decision-making process of the community. Shura was a pre-Islamic 
democratic institution of the Arabs, whereby the important tribal 
decisions were made collectively. Normally, it was the elders of the tribe, 

4 



representing the member-groups of the tribe who were directly involved 
in the decision-making process. There has grown, over the centuries in 
Islam, a terrible misconception as to the nature of shuru due to 
misguided and misleading practices and structures adopted from the 
outside without adapting them to the ethos of Islam. I t  is widely held that 
shuru means that one person, the ruler, consult such men as, in his 
judgment are repositories of wisdom and then may or may not accept 
their advice. First of all, this picture totally misconceives the structure 
shuru presupposes. The Qur’an states, while talking about the 
characteristics of the believers, “Those whose affairs are decided by 
mutual consultation (umrqhum shuru buinuhum)” (XLII, 38). Shuru, 
then, does not mean that one person asks others for advice but, rather, 
mutual advice through mutual discussions on an absolutely equal 
footing. This implies directly that the head or the chief executive cannot 
simply reject the decision arrived at through shuru. 

The circumstances under which the classical doctrine of shuru, along 
with the entire doctrine of caliphate developed, producing the 
misconceptions referred to just now, are essentially historical in nature 
and cannot be attributed to the Qur’an. So far as the prophetic period is 
concerned, the mainstay of all authority was obviously the Prophet 
himself, obedience to whose decisions was expressly and repeatedly 
made binding upon Muslims by the Qur’an itself. After him, and 
particularly during the period of the rapid expansion of the domain of 
Islam, and, of course, due to this very phenomenon, shuru was an 
informal affair wherein the Commander of the Faithful consulted an 
inner circle comprising leading individuals among the companions of 
the Prophet. Formalization or institutionalization of shuru into anything 
like an assembly was made impossible by the exigencies of continuous 
wars both because of the swiftness with which conquests and 
subjugation of territories and their people were made and the problems 
that demanded urgent decisions were military in nature. During the 
Umayyad rule, these war exigencies were not confined to external 
expansion but included internal consolidation as well since the entire 
Umayyad period witnessed incessant rebellions entailing the necessity 
of politico-military consolidation. Besides, rule by the Umayyad House, 
altered the very character of the early Caliphate and imposed its own 
political logic where shuru, far from facilitating the participation by the 
community at large, became restricted to those who supported the 
Umayyad regime. In fact, shuru, vanished into that very cliqying which 
had been condemned by the Qur’an-only, this cliquing was the work of 
the successful group, vis. the rulers. It was the development of an 
administrative structure which now supplied the link between the rulers 
and the ruled, only this link worked essentially from the top downward 
as opposed to shuru which worked in the reverse. 

The institution of bai’u or the oath of obeisance for the validation of a 
new caliph, however, continued to operate during the Umayyad rule. 



This period also saw the early development of Islamic law and legal 
theory at the hands of certain exceptionally gifted and pious individuals 
who thereby gained prominence and respect in the eyes of the 
community. The results of this legal creativity were subsequently 
implemented through the state judicial system during the Abbasid 
period when legal schools were formed and consolidated. The classical 
Islamic theory of state also developed during the Abbasid rule. While the 
Shi’a evolved the doctrine of the infallible Imam as the supreme religious 
guide and ruler-a doctrine close in spirit to (and probably also in line 
with) the, ancient Iranian ideas of Divine Kingship, the Sunni 
theoreticians emphasized the elective nature of the Caliph’s office and 
his function being restricted to that of the chief executive of the 
community. Though they differed with regard to the question of how 
many constitute an effective electoral college to choose a caliph, they, 
nevertheless, held fast to the principle of election. The community could 
wrest its rights from the Caliph in case he usurped them and would not 
listen to advice and warning, and, indeed, he could also be lawfully 
deposed. 

Those people in whose hands rested the election and advice of the 
Caliph were generally seen to be men with effective voice in the public. 
These were called “people of losening and binding (ah1 al-hall wal- 
’aqd).” Since the principle of shura had been abandoned and had not been 
allowed to develop into a self-sustaining institution, clearly, an appeal to 
the “people of losening and binding” was the only alternative under the 
circumstances. Of course, what basically vitiated the Sunni political 
institution was the insistence of the theoreticians-for which 
legitimation was sought from obviously concocted traditions and other 
dicta-that rebellion even against tyrannical rule was prohibited by 
Islam. Yet, the only real way to stop rebellions and break-down of law and 
order-the real reasons behind the Sunni position-was to evolve the 
principle of shura into some practical form. This was not to be. We need 
not tarry further to consider later political developments, the age of the 
Sultans and the rise of empires in Islam in the later medieval period. 
What we have said should be enough to illustrate the yawning chasm 
between the ideals of the Qur’an and the historical reality where there 
was no direct participation whatever by the community at large in the 
affairs of the state. We must now make some relevant comments on the 
contemporary scene. 

Since about the mid-nineteenth century, prominent leaders of 
reformist thought in Islam have argued that in order to implement Islam 
in the public sector, rule must be established in accordance with the will 
of the people. One consideration that weighed particularly heavy with 
reformers like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani was that without the 
participation of the people in the government, Muslim states cannot 
become strong enough to withstand the pressures of the expanding West. 
Rulers without public support and confidence gave in easily to the 

6 



demands of the Western powers. Secondly, for purposes of internal 
progress and development,without which Muslim states must also 
remain weak, the willing participation of the people was equally 
required. Namik Kemal, in his discussion of shura, raises more 
theoretical questions about the legitimacy of rule without the approval of 
the people: if a person sets himself up as a judge merely on the strength of 
his own declaration without appointment by a competent authority, his 
claim is regarded as invalid, but how about a person who declares 
himself to be a ruler, wages war and peace on behalf of people and levies 
taxes on them, yet all without their consent? 

Both of these considertions, viz. the question of progress and of the 
legitimacy of rule have obviously basic Islamic relevance. The notion of 
progress is new, although the idea of the general well-being and 
prosperity of the people is very old. The notion of progress is a modern 
differentiation of this idea of general well-being. As for the question of 
legitimacy, its importance had been fully realized by Muslim political 
theorists from the beginning. But it is notorious how, pressed by the 
brute facts of historical realities, these theorists came frankly to 
recognize the validity of the principle of “usurpation of power” or seizure 
of rule. Let us try to picture, if we can, the distance between the Qur’anic 
demand of “rule by mutual consultation (amruhum shura bainahum)” 
and the principle of the validity of usurpation of power. It is in this 
background that the real Islamic relevance and import of the principle 
of democracy insisted upon by al-Afghani and Namik Kemal is thrown 
into bold relief. 

The most serious objection raised against the introduction of a 
democratic form of government by its opponents was that the general 
masses, being ignorant and unenlightened, cannot be expected to elect 
the right kind of representatives. And, equally, the representatives 
chosen by the masses, since they themselves will be, for the most part, 
ignorant cannot be expected to discern right from wrong and legislate 
correctly. This objection was, to my knowledge, first advanced by those 
Turks who sought to defend the imperial power of the Sultan against the 
protagonists of constitutionalism. To this objection, Namik Kemal gave a 
general reply that in the various districts (wilayets) of the Otoman realm 
one can find people with enough wisdom and practical sense to be able to 
carry on the business of the state successfully. A similar controversy 
occurred more recently between the Egyptian scholars ‘Abd al-Hamid 
Mutawalli and Muhammad al-Ghazali. Al-Ghazali, replxing to the 
tirade against democracy and general franchise (in his Mabdd’al-Shura 
fi’l-Islam), based upon the argument from the ignorance of the masses, 
insisted that the common man can very well decide whether, for 
example, a certain w a r  should be waged or not and whether a certain 
proposed tax is fair or not. 

The crux of the matter on this issue, however, came to the fore clearly 
in the thought of Muhammad Iqbal in his critique of democracy as 

7 



practiced in t h e  West. Iqbal was undoubtedly a democrat both in his 
impulse and his thought (even though, in the recent debate in Pakistan, 
some people have attempted to underline Iqbal’s hope or faith in some 
kind of a supreme leader or superman expressed in some of his poetic 
statements); yet he bitterly denounced Western democratic systems. 
Now, t h e  essence of his criticism of t h e  democracies of the West is t h a t  
these are secular, i.e. Western societies aim only at accomplishing 
materialistic ends through their democratic set-ups and the average 
Western man is devoid of any vision of a higher moral social order. This is 
precisely’ what Iqbal means by Western secularism which he perceived 
developing from the very genesis of Christianity with its principle of 
“rendering unto Caesar what is Caesar’s due and unto God what is God‘s 
due.” 

In the light of this, we are now ready to resume discussion of the point 
we started out with in this paper, viz. that of the status and role of the 
Muslim Umma. We have just seen that Iqbal rejected Western 
democratic systems because of the disorientation of Western societies in 
ethical and spiritual terms. It is not their democratic forms and 
processes where they are in error but in their orientations and value 
systems. Now, this should not be the case with the Muslim Umma which 
by its very constitution and by definition is charged by the Qur’an with a 
certain global moral task. It is tragic to see before our eyes the very logic 
of Iqbal’s argument being twisted. All too often our leaders and thinkers 
a r e  found stating that because Western democracies are in some 
fundamental way wrong, therefore, democracy is wrong and Islam does 
not approve of democracy. The fact is that if the Muslim Umma is just 
like other societies, including the Western, then we must frankly admit 
that the Muslim U m m a  is not in existence, since the takk that the Qur’an 
has formulated, it has cast squarely upon the shoulders of the Umma and 
not upon those of a n  elite thereof. The most capital mistake made by such 
leaders is to equate, surreptitiously and esilentio the Muslim community 
and its task with other secular communities and their goals. Is this fair to 
the Muslim community and its responsibilities? The point I wish to make 
is t h a t  Muslims instead of looking at other communities and peoples and 
jumping to conclusions by drawing wrong analogies therefrom, must 
first look to Islam and to their own selves and attempt to put their own 
house in order. Whether or not other societies have goals and ideals and, 
if they do, what these goals and ideals are, is not the Muslims’ concern at 
this stage. 

But, despite what we have said, there a r e  apparent reasons why these 
mistaken analogies are drawn by so many of our leaders, often e Silentio 
as we have stated. The reason is that, although the Muslim community is 
explicitly charged with performing certain tasks and certain goals, 
Muslim masses, by and large, a r e  said to be ignorant of these tasks and 
goals and, because of their lack of proper awareness of the meaning of 
Islam, have became assimilated to the condition of non-Muslim societies. I 

8 



wish to remind ourselves once again that if the Muslim community at 
large has permanently and hopelessly lost the Islamic vision of life, then 
we must admit that the Umma Muslima does not exist. If this is so, then 
no amount of self-styled elites, political, religious, or intellectual can save 
the situation for Islam, for the Qur’an has reposed its charge and its t r u s t  
in the Muslim community alone and does not talk about elites. If, 
however, there is hope, as the present writer firmly believes to be t h e  
case, that the situation can be redeemed by making the community fully 
aware of the meaning of Islam, then, surely, the first task that devolves 
upon the Muslim intellectuals and leaders is to attend to the business of 
the reconstruction of the Umma and its reconstitution in an Islamically 
meaningful way. This task can neither be avoided nor delayed except on 
pain of utterly defeating Islam. 

It is obvious that this task cannot be achieved overnight, but achieved 
it must be. We are not here to apportion blame for the derelict state of the 
Umma among the various segments of the society, particularly 
governments and the religious leadership. It is a process that has 
occurred over long centuries and undoubtedly the historical 
phenomenon of the fast expansion of Islam, without the necessary 
spiritual adjustments of the converts to the new Faith, is responsible for 
it. If this task is undertaken in earnest, this will start a momentous 
remedial historical process in reverse. I n  the meantime, the 
participatory association of the Umma, through directly ascertaining 
the will of the Umma, in decision-making in the political and legislative 
life of the community can neither be rejected nor postponed. Those who 
advocate such a course of action a r e  wittingly or unwittingly guilty of 
rendering Islam null and void, while God wishes to establish Islam on 
earth. 

Let us once again hearken to the already quoted words of the Qur’an: 
Wu umruhum shuru buimhum. And let us ponder first of all the phrase 
“amruhum,” their affair(s), i.e. the affair does not bl.eong to an 
individual, a group or a n  elite, but it is “their common affair” and belongs 
to the community as a whole. Next, let us consider the command: shuru 
buinuhum, i.e. (their common affair) is to be decided by their common 
and mutual consultation and discussion-not by an individual or a n  elite 
whom they have neither elected nor sanctioned. What else is the Qur’an 
saying except that Muslims constitute a n  egalitarian and effective 
community or a brotherhood of equals? 

. 

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