American Journal of Islam and Society Vol 38 No 3-4.indb


36

From Islamic Modernism to Theorizing 
Authoritarianism: Bin Bayyah and the 

Politicization of the Maqāṣid Discourse

Y O M N A  H E L M Y

Abstract
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, modernist Islamic 
reformers have proposed more “objectives of Islamic law” or 
maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah and argued that the maqāṣid-oriented 
approach indicates that Islamic priorities include the modern 
principles of democracy, social justice, human rights, and gov-
ernment accountability. This paper considers the evolution of 
maqāṣid and its relationship with the traditional framework of 
uṣūl al-fiqh. Subsequently, it addresses how the new maqāṣid 
discourse has been politicized. It analyzes the use of maqāṣid 
by Shaykh ‘Abdullah Bin Bayyah in his recent declarations 

Yomna Helmy is a Teaching Associate at the Centre of Islamic Studies at the 
University of Cambridge.  Her primary research and teaching interests lie in 
social Islamic thought and ethics in the fields of Hadith and Quranic Studies.

Helmy, Yomna. 2021. “From Islamic Modernism to Theorizing Authoritarianism: Bin Bayyah and 
the Politicization of the Maqāṣid Discourse.” American Journal of Islam and Society 38, nos. 3-4: 
36–70 • doi: 10.35632/ajis.v38i3-4.2934
Copyright © 2021 International Institute of Islamic Thought



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concerning the UAE’s policies against regional democracy. This 
paper argues that Bin Bayyah’s interpretation of maṣlaḥah (legal 
benefit) and his adoption of the idea of absolute obedience to the 
ruler (walī al-amr) are not based on the traditional interpreta-
tion of the sacred texts that have been adopted by Salafists and 
Traditionalists. Rather, it is deeply rooted in the maqāṣid dis-
course and rational reasoning related to Islamic modernism. The 
article includes a comprehensive examination of Bin Bayyah’s 
justifications, as based on two basic points: first, the priority 
of peace as a higher objective (maqṣid) of sharī‘ah than rights 
and justice; second, the verification of the ratio legis (taḥqīq 
al-manāṭ). This paper argues that this ideological interpretation 
could shift the purpose-oriented basis of maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah to 
result-oriented objectives, which focus on specific ideologies to 
satisfy contradicting political ends.

Introduction

A widely-used term in the field of Islamic law is maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah. It 
was initially used with reference to the betterment (maṣālih) of man-
kind, under the guidelines of the classical Islamic legal heritage that 
was expounded by al-Ghazālī.1 However, by the beginning of the twen-
tieth century, a new trend developed with regards to the adoption of 
the maqāṣid-oriented approach. This was related to the increase in the 
number of maqāṣid and promotion of alternative interpretations, as both 
religious scholars and modernists viewed these interpretations as the 
ideal approach for adapting sharī‘ah to the modern context.

Though the modern scholars of maqāṣid have distinct perspectives, 
it can be argued that most of them have similar ideas, such as the sug-
gestion to expand the scope of the maqāṣid beyond the five Ghazālian 
objectives of sharī‘ah by highlighting ‘public interest’ and ‘well-being’ 
and rejecting the literal readings of sacred texts. They also propose that 
the application of maqāṣid should be expanded beyond the boundar-
ies of Islamic law, and developed in line with new religious rulings 
that are consistent with the modern context.2 This raises the question 



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of whether the maqāṣid-oriented approach is serving its purpose. 
This paper, therefore, evaluates the traditional approach of maqāṣid 
against how it has been utilised since the revival of the theory at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. Subsequently, it analyzes Shaykh 
‘Abdullah bin Bayyah’s latest fatwās and declarations concerning the 
UAE’s normalized relations with Israel and the UAE’s policies against 
regional democracy. It aims to demonstrate how the new maqāṣid dis-
course has been politicized, modified, and re-structured to promote 
authoritarianism.

Evolution of Maqāṣid al-Sharī‘ah

Maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah refers to the higher objectives of sharī‘ah, aimed 
at promoting public benefit and preventing potential harm.3 This sec-
tion focuses on the main contributions and developments of the theory. 
Interestingly, the studies on maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah have been based on var-
ious phases of development. They are either traditional, which is roughly 
between the eleventh and fifteenth century, or from the late nineteenth 
century onwards. However, the twentieth century was a period when 
there was an intensive application of the theory of maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah 
by modernist Islamic reformers and thinkers, who considered values 
such as democracy, social justice, good governance, and human rights 
as ‘Islamic’ objectives and priorities.4

Considering the prevalence of the maqāṣid-oriented approach 
in modern Islamic literature—and with requests for its adoption as a 
foundational framework to develop new Islamic legal rulings that are 
consistent with the contemporary context—it is important to examine 
how such a traditional tool was developed in the contemporary world 
to meet the demands of its advocates. This could aid with understanding 
how this same approach could be utilized by different scholars with 
contradicting decisions and outcomes. Moreover, it is essential to exam-
ine the ‘pre-maqāṣid’ era, as well as the contextual background of the 
formative period with regards to the uṣūl al-fiqh (legal theory), since the 
birth of maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah cannot be separated from the development 
of uṣūl al-fiqh.



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Pre-Maqāṣid Era

The comprehensive history of maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah can be traced to the 
early stages of Islam, when various verdicts of the Qurān and prophetic 
teachings were being revealed. Their objectives and wisdom were gen-
erally accepted and understood by the first generation of Muslims, as 
this historiography narrates.5 For instance, the second caliph ‘Umar ibn 
al-Khaṭāb is a notable example of someone issuing verdicts based on the 
objectives of sharī‘ah. His administrations and decisions on conquered 
lands, spoils of war, ḥudūd (capital punishment), and the marriage of 
non-Muslims were sometimes explicitly premised on public interest or 
maṣlaḥah.6

Somewhat later, after the era of the Prophet’s Companions, when 
Muḥammad b. Idrīs al-Shāfi‘ī (d. 204/820) composed al-Risālah, he posited 
the principles and guidelines that form the broad framework for sharī‘ah. 
Al-Shāfi‘ī was concerned to justify how Qur’ān, Sunnah, Consensus, and 
Analogy (qiyās) act as the legal bases of the derivations of the rulings. 
The result was what many have referred to as the “legal theory” of uṣūl 
al-fiqh.7 Although several academics have debated al-Shāfi‘ī’s status as 
progenitor of the science of uṣūl al-fiqh and indeed more broadly ques-
tioned its beginnings,8 nonetheless al-Shāfi‘ī is often regarded by Muslim 
sources as its “founder”.9 Al-Shāfi‘ī’s methodology limited rational rea-
soning to qiyās; however, he argued against the traditional jurists at that 
time, who rejected the use of reasoning to engage with the scriptures.10 
Ahmed El-Shamsy maintains that jurists’ approaches before al-Shāfi‘ī 
often relied on communal traditions, and it was al-Shāfi‘ī’s model that 
introduced a scientific interpretative system with the exclusive authority 
of textual sources and also independent from communal practices. Thus, 
El-Shamsy concludes that the legal theory, as developed by al-Shāfi‘ī and 
further expanded by his students, was adopted by other jurists and led 
to the formation of the four recognized legal schools (namely Ḥanafī, 
Mālikī , Shāfi‘ī, and Ḥanbalī).11

Like with those of the first Muslim generation, maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah 
was embodied and reflected in various legal verdicts made in the four 
schools of Islamic jurisprudence, but within the limits of uṣūl al-fiqh. 



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Al-Raysūnī argues that the Mālikī school was particularly concerned 
with promoting human benefits and preventing potential harm and cor-
ruption under the name of istiṣlāḥ, and sometimes in the name of qiyās.12 
Other schools also employed maṣlaḥah but under different names, such 
as the term istiḥsān used by the Hanafīs13 and the term ikhālah (con-
vincing opinion) used by the Shāfi‘īs.14 The Ḥanbalīs, however, at least 
declaratively emphasized that human reason is unable to achieve moral 
knowledge independently of the four sources of law. According to this 
position, good is what God ordered and evil is what he prohibited. Based 
on this, a maṣlaḥah is legitimate only if it is derived from the revealed 
law.15 Although Mālikīs were more welcoming to the consideration of 
maṣlaḥah than others, al-Qarāfī (d. 1285) noted that the jurists of all 
schools made use of it as they all tested rulings’ munāsabah (suitability), 
which is in turn the basis of maṣlaḥah.16 Some justified their consider-
ation of maṣlaḥah as a tool of attending to legal purposes.17 However, 
many scholars directly incorporated it into their methodology as the base 
of qiyās. Such consideration would allow maṣlaḥah a tenuous yet notable 
space in classical legal reasoning.18 According to Bin Bayyah, the rela-
tionship between maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah and uṣūl al-fiqh was seen through 
several legal approaches that mediated the development of maqāṣid 
al-sharī‘ah, such as reasoning by analogy (qiyās), juridical preference 
(istiḥsān), and public interest (maṣlaḥah).19 However, maqāṣid itself was 
not considered a separate topic and did not receive special attention 
until the eleventh century, when scholars developed the most extensive 
records of the theory’s applications.

The Formative Period of the Maqāṣid

According to al-Raysūnī, the Ḥanafi scholar al-Ḥakim al-Tirmidhī (d. 
probably 298/910) was the foremost jurist to dedicate a full book to 
maqāṣid in his work titled “The Objectives of Prayers,” and he was among 
the earliest jurists to explain the underlining purposes (al-‘ilal) of Islamic 
legal verdicts by using experiential and figurative methods.20 Similarly, 
al-Balkhī (d. 322/933) devoted his book al-Ibānah ‘an ‘ilal al-Diyānah 
to explaining the purposes underlying Islamic juridical rulings. Later, 



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more scholars explained the wisdom and purposes of different Islamic 
legal injunctions, such as al-Qaffāl al-Shāshī (d. 356) in his book Maḥāsin 
al-Sharī‘ah, and al-‘Āmirī (d. 381) in his book al-I‘lām bi Manāqib al-Is-
lam.21 However, it has been argued that their works do not provide an 
epistemological and methodological framework for the maqāṣid and 
Islamic legal theory of uṣūl al-fiqh. Their significance, rather, lies in the 
explanation of the virtues and the divine wisdom behind specific rules 
of Islamic law.22

The theory of maqāṣid and its applications were more fully mani-
fested by Abū al-Ma‘ālī al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085).23 He is regarded as the 
architect of the three categories of maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah, namely neces-
sities, needs, and luxuries,24 a categorization which was widely adopted 
and accepted by subsequent jurists.25 Al-Juwaynī’s disciple al-Ghazālī 
(d. 505/1111) introduced the five higher objectives of sharī‘ah, namely 
religion, life, intellect, offspring, and property. These five refer to the 
essential priorities that should be preserved for the religious and social 
well-being of individuals, as their absence could result in corrupted and 
chaotic lives. Based on this, anything that protects these five priorities 
are considered maṣlaḥah (benefit), and whatever does not protect them 
is its opposite, namely mafsadah (harm).26 The concept of maṣlaḥah 
was discussed extensively by al-Ghazālī and was then integrated into 
the framework of legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh), as it legitimized new rul-
ings and allowed jurists to address everyday occurrences that are not 
mentioned in the textual sources of the law.27 To explain the consider-
ations of maṣlaḥah, al-Ghazālī divides it into three types: maṣlaḥah that 
the sharī‘ah acknowledges and is therefore undoubtedly authoritative; 
maṣlaḥah that is rejected by sharī‘ah and is consequently plainly inad-
missible; and finally, maṣlaḥah that is neither acknowledged nor rejected 
by the sharī‘ah. Al-Ghazālī was critical of maṣlaḥah as an independent 
source of legislation apart from the Qurān, Sunnah, and Consensus, but 
he did validate it if it would promote any of the five higher objectives of 
sharī‘ah.28 He also asserted that it must be certain and universal (meaning 
that it must encompass all Muslims).29

These five higher objectives of sharī‘ah were accepted by almost all 
subsequent jurists, such as al-Āmidī (d. 631/1233),30 al-Qarāfī, al-Rāzī (d. 



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1209), and al-Taftazānī (d. 793/1390).31 Although a number of scholars 
continued to contribute to the development of the maqāṣid, it is believed 
that, till the thirteenth century, most of the literature that was written 
on the discourse of maqāṣid after al-Juwaynī and al-Ghazālī were mostly 
repetitions or explanations of what both scholars had contributed to the 
theory.32 This conception was then revised and expanded in the four-
teenth century by Ibn Taymiyyah and was developed as a new theory 
of Islamic law by al-Shāṭibī.33

The Iraqi and Ḥanbalī jurist Najm al-dīn al-Ṭūfī (d. 1316) was among 
the most prominent jurists who challenged the traditional reservations 
about the authority of maṣlaḥah. Al-Ṭūfī witnessed the traumatic impacts 
of the devastating Mongol invasions that the Muslim world endured 
during the thirteenth century. He was occupied with the idea of bring-
ing Muslim jurists together, and he found in maṣlaḥah a tool that could 
promote shared ground among jurists, based on their common interests.34 
He argued that since the validity and the importance of the consider-
ation of maṣlaḥah were clearly affirmed and derived from the survey 
and scrutiny of the Qur’ān and Sunnah,35 the authority of maṣlaḥah as 
a source of legislation should not be limited to scriptural resources. He 
concluded that if a divine text or consensus differed regarding maṣlaḥah, 
then they should be understood in light of those considerations, and not 
the opposite. Consequently, al-Ṭūfī argues that maṣlaḥah is stronger than 
consensus, because some scholars have questioned the authority of con-
sensus as a valid source of law, unlike maṣlaḥah, which boasts unanimous 
agreement. Therefore, al-Ṭūfī places maṣlaḥah above all other sources of 
law.36 Moreover, he asserted that the determination of maṣlaḥah relies on 
the considerations of custom (‘ādah) and reason (‘aql). Accordingly, he 
demanded that Muslim jurists use their reasoning to study the reality of 
their societies to determine what benefits society and what society itself 
perceives to be beneficial.37 Al-Ṭūfī’s position regarding the determination 
of maṣlaḥah thus departed from al-Shāfi‘ī’s theory of uṣūl al-fiqh and 
al-Ghazālī’s criteria of maqāṣid, such as the compatibility with scriptural 
text and a direct connection to the five higher objectives of sharī‘ah.

Al-Ṭūfī’s position was based on the famous ḥadīth and legal maxim, 
“There should be neither harming (ḍarar) nor reciprocating harm (ḍirār).” 



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Given this essential principle, he argued that maṣlaḥah (not the scriptural 
resources) must be the basis for the legitimacy of all Islamic legal ver-
dicts.38 Although al-Ṭūfī’s theory of maṣlaḥah received a lot of criticism 
from scholars of his time, it came to enjoy a new prominence among 
modern scholars and reformers at the beginning of the twentieth century. 
His treatise on maṣlaḥah was published by Rashīd Riḍā in al-Manār in 
1906, with the annotations of the Syrian reformer Jamāl al-dīn al-Qā-
simī (d. 1332/1914), who played a great role in popularizing al-Ṭūfī’s 
discourse.39 (We will return to modern contestations of this argument.)

The fourteenth century, however, was a time of relative peace and 
political stability in the Muslim world, which facilitated intellectual pro-
duction. The Andalusian Mālikī jurist Abū Isḥāq al-Shāṭibī (d. 790/1388) 
resumed the development of the theory of maqāṣid. He markedly 
improved the notion of maṣlaḥah, establishing it as a methodology for 
overcoming the rigidity instructed by literalism and qiyās.40 Al-Shāṭibī 
advocates that “The sharī‘ah was put up for the promotion of the maṣāliḥ 
of the believers.”41 However, as ‘Abdallah Darāz, the commentator on 
al-Shāṭibī’s book al-Muwāfaqāt, states, al-Shāṭibī reconstructed three 
major elements of the theory of maqāṣid. First, he treated maqāṣid 
al-sharī‘ah as a visibly recognized legal entity. Second, he considered 
human objectives as another perspective of the whole theory. Third, 
he established methods and guidelines for identifying and considering 
the maṣlaḥah.42 Al-Shāṭibī recognized the significance of the concept of 
maqāṣid and was sought to reconstruct the body of uṣūl al-fiqh to fit it, 
which became the unifying theme of problems and subjects that were 
discussed independently of each other. With his suggestions, maqāṣid 
became the axis of uṣūl al-fiqh. The objectives of the sharī‘ah were now 
to be extracted from the texts through a process of induction, not by 
deduction.43 The inductive reasoning proposed by al-Shāṭibī is signifi-
cant for its opposition to the classical deductive method associated with 
al-Shāfi‘ī’s theory, which had come to prevail in most of Islamic legal 
reasoning. However, it is important to maintain that al-Shāṭibī’s affir-
mation of inductive methods to explore the maṣlaḥah did not mean 
that he advocates a freewheeling exercise of human reason. Al-Shāṭibī 
strictly asserts that he does not call for abstract reasoning on morality 



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or utility and that human reason cannot determine what is maṣlaḥah 
independently of divine texts.44

Modernist Approaches to the Maqāṣid: New Priorities and Reinterpretation

Toward the end of the 13th/19th century, the theory of maqāṣid emerged 
again as a central topic within different forums and dialogues of Islamic 
modernism. Muslim modernists and reformers were concerned about 
how the approach of expounding and implementing Islamic law did 
not match the major changes within Muslim societies. They called for a 
rethinking of the legality and compatibility of the traditional framework 
of the four sources of the law (the Qurān, the Sunna, Consensus, and 
Analogy) and, therefore, shifted toward maṣlaḥah and the purposes of 
the divine law as a basis for law-finding. Juridical opinions turned away 
from looking for the maṣlaḥah of individuals and, instead, explored its 
relevance to wider areas of law and public policies.45 It is important 
to note that such calls for reforming the methodological resources of 
Islamic law were expressed during a period of great social, political, and 
economic turmoil in the Muslim world.46 Ottoman jurists began conver-
sations rethinking long-established methods of legislation, in order to 
promote modernization against the downfall of the Ottoman Empire.47 
These conversations continued among reformists in Egypt, Morocco, 
Tunisia, and Syria. Similarly, various Muslim governments proposed 
reform initiatives that resulted in major transformations in areas of edu-
cation as well as the economic and legal codes that were initially heavily 
dependent on Western models. Such transformations resulted in the 
revival of the classical doctrine of maqāṣid.48

During his visit to Tunisia, Muḥammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905) came 
across the work of al-Shāṭibī and encouraged his students to benefit 
from his theory in their struggle for reform. Al-Shāṭibī’s seminal trea-
tise al-Muwāfaqāt was then published and edited by ‘Abduh’s student 
‘Abdullah Drāz (1894-1959), and subsequently became a major source 
for the modern Islamic debate on the maqāṣid. Tunisian modernist 
scholar Muḥammad al-Ṭāhir Ibn ‘Āshūr (1886–1970) and the Moroccan 
Muḥammad ‘Allāl al-Fāsī (1910–1974), perhaps under the influence 



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of ‘Abduh and his student Rashīd Riḍā (1865–1935), took this project 
further.49 It has been argued that reformers like al-Qāsimī, al-Fāsī, and 
Rashīd Riḍā played a vital role in popularizing the discourse of maṣlaḥah 
through the emerging printing press, not only by reproducing and rein-
troducing al-Ṭūfī and al-Shāṭibī’s work, but also by empowering a new 
generation of reformers and scholars to engage with the traditional dis-
course of maqāṣid and improve it for social change.50

Ibn ‘Āshūr proposed for maqāṣid to be independent of uṣūl al-fiqh in 
a new scientific discipline. Asserting that Islamic legal theory is inade-
quate and generally revolves around the technicalities of the law-finding 
process, Ibn ‘Āshūr argued that the classical legal theory failed to attain 
or serve the purpose of the sharī‘ah. He, therefore, rejected the idea that 
the rules of uṣūl al-fiqh are certain (qaṭ‘iyyah) and explained his worries 
about the differences in opinions between the jurists.51 By adopting a 
maqāṣid-oriented approach, Ibn ‘Āshūr sought to define the certain objec-
tives of the sharī‘ah, against which the validity of Islamic legal rules can 
be weighed. Therefore, Ibn ‘Āshūr added new objectives and priorities of 
law to the theory of maqāṣid, such as moderation, freedom of thought, 
maintenance of order, freedom, and equality.52 While Ibn ‘Āshūr’s major 
motive for maqāṣid was to expand the scope of the objectives of sharī‘ah 
so that it covered all areas of positive law, particularly financial trans-
actions and the judiciary, other reformers (such as al-Fāsī, who was a 
political activist and a Muslim scholar) aimed to show secular reformers 
the progressive nature of Islamic law and to assure Islamic traditionalists 
of its compatibility in the process of postcolonial state-building. Al-Fāsī’s 
significant addition to the traditional theory of maqāṣid was the inclusion 
of human rights as the essence of the higher objectives of sharī‘ah.53

Rashīd Riḍā also suggested additional higher objectives of sharī‘ah, 
including reason, awareness, wisdom, evidence, freedom, self-suffi-
ciency, political and economic reform, and women rights.54 As previously 
mentioned, Riḍā was one of the first modern legal reformers who was 
attracted to al-Ṭūfī’s model of maṣlaḥah. However, he further departed 
from the traditions by asserting that the maqāṣid approach should be used 
without any traditional limitations related to uṣūl al-fiqh.55 Riḍā asserted 
that it is a common misconception that the traditional jurists questioned 



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the authority of maṣlaḥah as a legal source; in fact, in Tafsīr al-Manār, 
Riḍā affirmed that traditional jurists such as al-Shāfi‘ī, al-Qarāfī, and 
al-‘Izz ibn ‘Abd al-Salām considered principles like “no harming, nor 
reciprocating harm” (which was al-Ṭūfī’s main principle on maṣlaḥah) 
alongside the legal maxim “the harm is to be removed and the benefit is 
to be preserved” as the main reference to deal with new political, judicial, 
and military matters. Riḍā wrote that traditional jurists restricted the use 
of maṣlaḥah to the limits of uṣūl al-fiqh out of fear that such principles 
might be abused by oppressive rulers to satisfy their desires or legitimize 
their autocratic policies in the name of maṣlaḥah. Therefore, to limit the 
scope of ruler’s misuse of maṣlaḥah, Rashīd Riḍā argued that traditional 
jurists had opted for deriving all legal rulings directly from the textual 
resources, closing the door to the potential politicization of maṣlaḥah. 
Yet oppressive rulers never failed to find jurists who would justify their 
tyranny and legitimize their oppression; therefore, Riḍā argued, the ideal 
way to prevent such politicization is not in denying the idea of maṣlaḥah 
or limiting it. Rather, one must refer such matters to ahl al-ḥall wa al-‘aqd 
(those who loosen and bind), which according to Riḍā includes contem-
porary equivalents to classical jurists among its members. They must act 
as a binding check on the ruler’s use of maṣlaḥah.56

Many modernist scholars and jurists supported the maqāṣid-oriented 
approach for different aims.57 They argued that this approach enabled a 
more genuine and adaptable contribution to contemporary Muslim soci-
eties and governments, based on Islamic purposes and goals, and without 
any restrictive reliance on the Islamic legal methodologies.58 However, 
in a critique of the implications of the new approach to maqāṣid, Wael 
Hallaq points out that the adoption of the maqāṣid-oriented approach 
has westernized most Arab societies.59 Hallaq argues that the modernist 
discourse of maqāṣid is a new development that was not adopted by 
traditional scholars, including al-Shāṭibī. To him, only al-Ṭūfī might be 
a possible forerunner to the modernists’ discourse. Hallaq further claims 
that modernists and reformers’ understanding is predominantly based 
on the notions of maṣlaḥah, public interest, and necessity. In his opinion, 
this is a utilitarian approach that runs against the traditional interpreta-
tion of Islamic law. He argues that modernists modified and restructured 



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classical Islamic legal theory to support their approach, making the law 
nominally Islamic and fundamentally utilitarian.60

Likewise, Opwis argues that modernists, who wrote on maṣlaḥah 
from the 1940s until the 1960s, were engaged with the secular legal 
system and were willing to reshape the traditional body of Islamic 
law. They adopted al-Shāṭibī’s theory of maqāṣid, whereby maṣlaḥah 
is utilized as an independent legal indicant. Opwis believes that, if fully 
applied, this utilization of maṣlaḥah could potentially shift the traditional 
body of Islamic legislation as well as some of its theological doctrines.61

Nevertheless, though the maqāṣid-oriented approach did not receive 
much attention from traditional scholars who generally did not support 
the idea of excluding uṣūl al-fiqh from the jurisprudential practice, it was 
considered by modernists and reformists as a tool that offered jurists the 
opportunity for more subjectivity and flexibility with the texts. More 
recently, with the growth in secular legislation in modern nation-states, 
many contemporary modernist and jurists support the maqāṣid-oriented 
approach for different aims and goals. They argue that this approach 
allows for a more genuine and adaptable contribution to contemporary 
Muslim societies and governments based on Islamic purposes, without 
having to rely on the enormous Islamic legal methodologies, and thus, 
this aids in evading the literalism and the limitations of uṣūl al-fiqh and 
makes the sharī‘ah more accessible.62

Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī (b. 1926), one of the highest-profile maqāṣidī 
scholars, promoted an approach called “Wasaṭiyyah” (moderation), 
which can be wielded against autocracies and extremist groups alike.63 
He adopted a transnational approach to Islamic law and the Muslim 
world and utilized media and technologies to spread his thoughts, which 
also allowed him to engage in issues affecting Muslims in Europe and the 
Middle East.64 He also established the European Council for Fatwā and 
Research and the International Union of Muslim Scholars in recognition 
of the biases found within government-controlled centres of learning. 
Like Rashīd Riḍā, al-Qaraḍāwī also proposed extending al-Ghazālī’s 
five-fold classification of the higher objectives that the sharī‘ah pro-
tects. He suggested that the priorities of sharī‘ah should include social 
welfare support, human dignity, peace, rights, freedoms, and justice.65 



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Al-Qaraḍāwī argues that the traditional catagorization of maqāsịd lacks 
important objectives related to the protection of human rights and dig-
nity against autocracy and injustice. He writes that traditional jurists 
considered such crucial objectives to be supplements rather than treating 
them as the essence of all legal rulings.66

Similarly, Muḥammad al-Ghazālī (1917-1996) added justice and 
freedom to the list of higher objectives. He stressed that justice is the 
ultimate purpose behind the divine revelation, which requires the law 
be established to control governments by preventing those in power 
from encroaching on the liberties and freedoms of citizens.67 Tāha Jābir 
al-‘Alwānī (1935-2016) also added the concept of developing civilization 
on earth;68 Kamālī added economic growth, as well as research and devel-
opment in science and technology.69 On the other hand, ‘Attia expanded 
the five higher objectives of sharī‘ah to twenty-four objectives, which 
are prioritized across four different realms: the individual, the family, 
the ummah, and the rest of wider humanity.70

Contemporary modernists do not only suggest expanding the scope 
of the five higher objectives of sharī‘ah, they also offer new interpreta-
tions to al-Ghazālī’s five objectives. For instance, Rachid al-Ghannouchi 
(b. 1941), the leader of Tunisia’s Ennahda Islamist politica party, rein-
terpreted the objective of ‘preserving religion’ to ‘Freedom of faith’ and 
‘Freedom of belief’, arguing that the right of religious minorities to exer-
cize their religion and promote it is also to be guaranteed.71 Al-Qaraḍāwī 
also reinterpreted the preservation of intellect to regard the right of 
education and learning, rather than the classical understanding of pro-
tecting the mind from all types of intoxications.72 Likewise, the Egyptian 
academic Jāsser ‘Auda (b. 1966) proposed that the early concepts such as 
preservation of religion, life, mind, honour, and money must be reinter-
preted into such maqāṣid as protecting human rights, freedom of faith, 
family care, the pursuit of knowledge, and economic development.73 A 
more radical approach was introduced by the Swiss intellectual Tariq 
Ramadan. He argues that juristic adaptation of the maqāṣid-oriented 
approach is also inadequate for providing answers to Muslims’ problems 
in light of the modern contexts and realities. He, therefore, advocates 
a radical transformation of sharī‘ah into a framework of ethics rather 



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than preserving it as a system of legal norms.74 Ramadan’s reform pro-
posal suggests that God revealed twin books, namely the Qurān and the 
Universe, and that both ‘books’ equally constitute a source of the higher 
objectives of sharī‘ah and applied ethics.75

According to David Warren, though Ramadan’s theory of the two 
revelations acknowledges Islamic legal authority in articulating the 
maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah, it also promotes a non-juristic trend by giving 
non-jurist specialists equal authority in formulating new legal opin-
ions.76 Interestingly, a similar call was proposed by al-Qaraḍāwī, 
who advocated that non-jurist expertise be involved with jurists in 
the law-finding process, which he described as “partial ijtihād” (ijti-
hād juz’ī).77 According to Johnston, the modernists’ emphasis on the 
maqāṣid-oriented approach, as opposed to the traditional interpretation 
of the scriptural resources, is likely to promote a non-jurist trend that 
will lead to the marginalization of the ‘ulamā. Johnston argues that 
this trend will only be promoted by access to new media because of 
the democratization of knowledge.78 Opwis argues that such a trend is 
also a result of the modernists’ inability to reconcile the epistemology 
of the classical legal theory with that of the objectives of sharī‘ah.79 
Like the other modernists, Ramadan also expanded the number of 
maqāṣid to more than forty objectives, among them, the preservation 
of an individual’s dignity, integrity, personal development, health, and 
inner balance.80 Moreover, following al-Qaraḍāwī’s step, Tariq Ramadan 
and Jāsser ‘Auda jointly formulated the Research Centre for Islamic 
Legislation and Ethics (CILE; Markaz Dirāsāt al-Tashrī‘ al-Islāmī wa 
al-Akhlāq) in Qatar, with the aim of developing a practical spirit that 
transforms the science of maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah from theory to practice in 
all spheres of life. (Ramadan’s initiative of setting up a maqāṣid-oriented 
research center for Muslim modernists and reformers based in Qatar 
was seen by some Western studies as being driven by security policies 
that aim to gain the approval of the West, who desire a moderate Islamic 
vision for the Middle East.81)

Regardless, like the first generation of reformers, the new lists of 
maqāṣid are claimed to be based on a comprehensive reading of the texts 
and through adopting an integrated overview, rather than relying on the 



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body of fiqh literature in the schools of Islamic law. The reformers assert 
that maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah remains vibrant and subject to developments 
based on the priorities and realities of each era.82 This methodology has, 
therefore, shifted the maqāṣid discourse and allowed it to overcome the 
authority of uṣūl al-fiqh, while highlighting the higher values and prin-
ciples of the textual resources. As a result, Islamic rulings will continue 
to be based on the new and constantly changing lists of higher objectives 
and priorities.

In the wake of the Arab spring, the maqāṣid-oriented approach 
emerged once again as a trend among Islamic modernist reformers, 
in response to decades of political repression, poor governance, and 
autocracy. After decades of ingrained authoritarianism, many reformers, 
thinkers, and activists asserted democracy, freedom, good governance, 
human rights, and justice as Islamic objectives and priorities, rather than 
the application of the classical sharī‘ah law. Additionally, as opposed 
to most of their predecessors, the second-generation of maqāṣid-ori-
ented reformers like Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, Jāsser ‘Auda, Aḥmad al-Raysūnī 
(b. 1953), Tariq Ramadan, ‘Abdullah bin Bayyah, Muḥammad Na’īm, 
and others encouraged positive relationships with the Western world. 
Through their maqāṣid-oriented approach, they adopt the notions of 
Islamic democracy, justice, and human rights in their own socio-po-
litical orders. They gained broad constituencies, including Muslims 
and non-Muslims, secularists, and religious individuals, by developing 
maqāṣid-oriented approaches based on these objectives.83

Overall, modern scholars of maqāṣid have distinct perspectives and 
it can be argued that most of them share similar ideas. For instance, as 
detailed above, they expanded the scope of the maqāṣid beyond the five 
Ghazālian objectives of the sharī‘ah by highlighting ‘public interest’ 
and ‘well-being’ and rejecting literal readings of sacred texts. They also 
proposed that the application of the objectives of the law should be 
extended beyond the boundaries of Islamic law, by re-interpreting the 
law’s purpose in light of modernist values, to ensure they remain com-
patible with modern realities. Some also proposed involving non-jurist 
experts in the process of law-finding; some utilized media, technologies 
and institutions to spread their modern maqāṣid discourse.



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Even so, the use of the maqāṣid-oriented approach as a tool for intro-
ducing legal change was, and still is, debatable. Technically, the debate 
is about the constant increase of the objectives and priorities of the law, 
which differ from one scholar to another. This raises questions, including 
how these objectives can be prioritized and re-interpreted when conflicts 
arise between them. Also, to what extent can such re-interpretation 
and prioritization of maqāṣid affect the authority and credibility of this 
theory, if it turns it into a tool for those with contradictory ideological, 
social, and political inclinations? In addition, what is the most acceptable 
methodology to apply the maqāṣid-oriented approach in a contempo-
rary era, without being subject to scholars’ subjectivity? These broad 
questions motivated this paper, which address how the new maqāṣid 
discourse has been politicized in light of the recent declarations and 
fatwās by ‘Abdullah bin Bayyah concerning the UAE’s normalized rela-
tions with Israel, and the UAE’s policies against regional democracy.

The following section examines how ‘Abdullah bin Bayyah’s prior-
itization of maqāṣid and interpretation of maṣlaḥah were deeply rooted 
in the Muslim modernists’ modes of reasoning. Though the maqāṣid-ori-
ented approach has been used by many reformers to articulate various 
forms of democracy, this paper argues that Bin Bayyah re-purposed this 
approach to support a modernist authoritarianism.

Bin Bayyah and the Politicization of the Maqāṣid Discourse

‘Abdullah Bin Bayyah (b. 1935) is a prominent Mauritanian maqāṣidī, 
who is a well-recognized politician and jurist in both the Middle East 
and the West. He has worked with various Arab governments and media 
organizations that promoted his fatwās as authoritative. Bin Bayyah was 
previously the deputy head of the Union of Muslim Scholars. He resigned 
from this post shortly after the Egyptian military coup in 2013, as autoc-
racies in the region bolstered their positions against Arab revolutions.84 
He is the founder of several initiatives, including the ‘Muslim Council of 
Elders’ and the ‘Forum for Promoting Peace in Muslim Societies’, which 
are funded by the UAE. He is also a member of the Islamic Fiqh Council 
and the European Council for Fatwā and Research, which is a council of 



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Muslim jurists who discuss Islamic law to ensure that it is compatible 
with the lives of Muslims in Europe. Recently, Bin Bayyah was appointed 
as the chair of the newly established UAE Fatwā Council.85

As a background to Bin Bayyah’s latest views, it is important to 
note that his ideas do not exist in the abstract or the realm of pure legal 
theory. Bin Bayyah’s allegiance to and relations with the UAE reflect his 
political positions and views regarding regional democracy. After the 
Arab Spring, the UAE has attempted to counter the changes occurring in 
the region and hinder the ongoing call for democracy. It appears that the 
UAE believes that such transformations would challenge the country’s 
status quo, and possibly stimulate reformists to oppose its domestic and 
regional policies. Therefore, the UAE has promoted autocratic political 
actors to prevent such transformations from occurring. Asides from pro-
tecting the country’s authoritarianism, the UAE also aspires to be the 
predominant regional hegemon; therefore, the country promotes Islamic 
scholars like ‘Abdallah Bin Bayyah for its geopolitical influence.86

In theorizing the political and philosophical foundations of his 
discourse, Bin Bayyah initially explained the challenges and reality of 
Muslims today in his book Tanbīh al-Marāji‘ ‘alā Ta’sīl Fiqh al-Wāqi‘. 
According to Bin Bayyah, the condition of Muslims in the current era 
is characterized by two extremes. First, a modernist subjective call 
that seeks to imitate prevailing forms and adopts very flexible rational 
approaches, whereby the end justifies the means as a necessary path-
way for any renaissance project. Second, a traditional and religious call 
that ignores the modern contextual reality and, thus, does not allow 
any modern interpretation and implementation of Islamic law address-
ing modern challenges.87 According to Bin Bayyah, this bifurcation is 
a result of the impact of colonialism and the challenges that Muslims 
encountered after the downfall of the Islamic state at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. He also argues that the establishment of the modern 
nation-state has impacted various aspects of Muslims’ lives, including 
political, financial, educational, and legal domains.

According to Bin Bayyah, the Arab revolutions were motivated by 
western values that contradict Islamic principles. He opines that Muslim 
modernists and reformers have confused the values of Western democracy 



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with those of Islamic models. Bin Bayyah argues that western values of 
democracy are based on the “Hegelian model”, which promotes the idea 
of “destruction for reconstruction”. Based on this assumption, Bin Bayyah 
concludes that western models of democracy oppose the Islamic princi-
ples of promoting public interest maṣlaḥah and preventing harm, and then 
states that the ends do not justify the means.88 Bin Bayyah also criticizes 
calls for the revival of the Islamic tradition. He asserts that such projects 
are impractical efforts to revive an imagined past.89

Bin Bayyah defines maqāṣid as the spirit of sharī‘ah that is derived 
from the fundamental resources of the Lawgiver, as well as those objec-
tive purposes attained by intellectual reasoning and interpretations.90 
However, in contrast to modernist reformers, Bin Bayyah believes that 
uṣūl al-fiqh and maqāṣid are interconnected and cannot be separated.91 
This paper now examines Bin Bayyah’s recent fatwās and declarations, 
as well as his recent political discourse, and argues that—despite his 
difference in conclusions—Bin Bayyah’s deployment of maqāṣid is based 
on a form of reasoning that is curiously related to the modernist Muslim 
reformers’ discourse.

‘Abdullah bin Bayyah’s politicization of the theory of maqāṣid can be 
accounted for by two legal means. The first is the subjective prioritization 
of the maqāṣid of sharī‘ah to legitimize and justify autocratic policies. 
The second is a specious process of verification of the ratio legis (taḥqīq 
al-manāṭ). Ḥākim al-Muṭairī, a Kuwaiti academic and a political activist, 
argues that traditional Muslim scholars adopt a common approach when 
theorizing authoritarianism, namely, to apply the old jurisprudential 
themes (crystallized during the the caliphate period of Islamic civiliza-
tion) to serve as a guideline for legal arguments under the modern state. 
With such an approach, a ruler is considered identical to the caliph, who 
must be heard and obeyed. He is also the authority who solely specializes 
in policymaking, as determined by the old jurisprudence. This approach 
has long been adopted by Salafist and Traditional authoritarian schol-
ars for decades. These groups always used the literal interpretations 
of specific texts to provide legitimacy to autocracy.92 Interestingly, Bin 
Bayyah adopts a different (maqāṣidī) approach to achieve the same pur-
pose (despite his method’s modern outlook).



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Prioritization of Maqāṣid al-Sharī‘ah

According to Bin Bayyah, Muslim modernist reformers and activists 
are responsible for the political fires that were ignited and the blood-
shed which was caused by invoking Islamic traditions to support their 
demands for democracy. He argues that these groups failed to under-
stand the contextual reality of the modern state. Interestingly, Bin 
Bayyah argues that modern states vary in their political foundations 
and the relationship between citizens and the powers that govern them, 
or between the powers themselves, differ more than the standards of the 
pre-modern context. Thus, according to Bin Bayyah, “this necessitates 
a new reality that has new requirements and conditions and demands 
a different perception to review its purposes and solve its inquiries.”93

As Jāsser ‘Auda argues, the modern approach of maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah 
is focused on the prioritization of legal benefits, which sharī‘ah recog-
nizes and aims to achieve at various levels.94 Bin Bayyah’s proposal is 
constructed on this idea of prioritizing the maqāṣid. He argues that the 
maqṣid (objective) of peace is more important than the maqṣid of justice. 
In 2014, during his opening speech at the Forum for Promoting Peace 
in Muslim Societies in Abu Dhabi, and using a maqāṣidic language, Bin 
Bayyah stated that, “The value of peace has priority over the value of 
rights. This is not to minimize the importance of justice; rather, it is to say 
that peace offers the opportunity to attain more rights than those granted 
by war.”95 This statement illustrates that despite Bin Bayyah’s traditional 
understanding of the theory of maqāṣid, he does not reject the modern-
ists’ rationale for introducing new objectives. Rather, he modifies and 
re-purposes their approach. Though he acknowledges the maṣlaḥah of 
preserving human rights and justice, he also contends that this maṣlaḥah 
contradicts the importance of maintaining peace and social stability. 
Therefore, considering that he believes that the preservation of peace 
ranks higher than that of democracy and justice, he argues that the 
maṣlaḥah of preventing revolution and opposition against rulers should 
prevail.

Interestingly, the maqāṣid-oriented approach has been developed 
by many modern reformers to articulate Islamic modernist forms of 



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democracy and to promote the values of justice and accountability. 
For instance, according to al-Ghannouchi, freedom and justice are 
divine duties that people are not allowed to give up or be deprived of. 
Al-Ghannouchi advocates that such rights are owned by God and human 
beings are only their trustees; these rights must be preserved according 
to the will of the owner. Accordingly, for al-Ghannouchi, it is a religious 
duty to reject autocracy, oppose tyranny, and fight for freedom, justice, 
and democracy.96 Surprisingly, Bin Bayyah uses this same approach to 
support modernist authoritarianism. Bin Bayyah’s prioritization of peace 
over justice aims to establish a modern jurisprudential and legal frame-
work that offers the required legitimacy for countering Arab revolutions 
and hindering Islamic modernists’ demands for democracy and account-
ability. Furthermore, Bin Bayyah argues that the Islamic framework for 
good governance is not connected to democracy and, therefore, he con-
siders this an imperfect framework. Applying the concept of maṣlaḥah, 
Bin Bayyah argues that Muslim societies in the Middle East are not yet 
ready for democracy and “any calls for democracy in such a situation 
is actually a call of war.”97 His assertions serve as a reminder of the 
false dilemma (me or chaos) echoed by many authoritarian rulers in the 
region, from Mubarak in Egypt to Assad in Syria.

This use of maṣlaḥah by Bin Bayyah not only directly supports 
authoritarian politics; it also shows that he perceives Muslim nations to 
be under a legal emergency status. He makes no suggestions about when 
it will be possible to restore a state of normality. His statement makes it 
clear that the vocabulary of avoiding war and remaining in obedience 
was inherited from the historical rhetoric of the caliphate state. The 
traditional Salafist discourse used this period (its difference from our 
ruined present) as a constant reference against revolution. However, Bin 
Bayyah re-introduces such discourse in the new, modern approach of 
maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah. Despite his claims to the contrary, Bin Bayyah does 
not offer another political approach for the modern political systems 
that he rejects. Rather, he promotes the long-held principle of classical 
fiqh, which states that rebellion against a ruler should be prohibited, and 
there should be ‘no opposition against the ruler’.98 This principle was 
perceived as the highest Islamic political principle by the Salafists and 



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the Traditionalists, who determined the citizen-ruler relationship based 
on literal interpretations of the scriptural resources. On the other hand, 
modernist scholars of maqāṣid distinguish between pacifist rebellion 
and armed insurrection. They argue that the legitimacy of rebellion is 
profoundly linked to the motivation behind it and how it occurs. Based 
on their opinions, an armed and violent rebellion to capture power differs 
from a defenceless one. They also argue that rulers’ legality, and whether 
they are just or not, also contributes to the legality of the opposition.99 
Regardless of these nuances, Bin Bayyah’s interpretation of maṣlaḥah 
expands the prohibition against political opposition to include all kinds 
of revolutions and rebellions. In his book titled The Culture of Terrorism, 
Bin Bayyah quotes Ibn Qudāmah and other scholars, arguing that if a 
group of people attempts a rebellion, they should not only be subdued 
but should also be killed. Bin Bayyah thus holds a startlingly traditional 
viewpoint about revolts against an established ruler.100

Historically, traditional scholars promoted absolute obedience to 
avoid wars and to prevent competitors from seeking the post of caliph. 
Gradually, absolute obedience to rulers became a principle of Islamic 
politics. A good Muslim was then considered one who refrains from caus-
ing fitnah (rebellion and chaos) in demanding rights like a public bay‘ah 
(contract in a form of an oath of allegiance to a leader), or the practice 
of shūrā (consultation) by rulers. A major consequence of this quietist 
shift is that citizens’ roles in the bay‘ah are marginalized, as it becomes 
exclusive to a few people to legitimize authoritarian rulers. Accordingly, 
this transformed the ruler’s quality from a wakīl (deputy or agent) whom 
citizens could legally dismiss from their position; to a wali (a guardian) 
who cannot be removed.101 In this way, it can be argued that the use of 
the maqāṣid approach by Bin Bayyah alters the nature of rulership in the 
modern Islamic political theory, transforming it from a conditioned legal 
relationship that could be ended or revoked, to a paternal relationship 
that is natural and unchangeable. It also shifts the theory’s emphasis on 
the priority of justice, rights, and democracy, to giving priority and legal 
backing to avoid opposition and maintain authoritarianism.

Although Bin Bayyah’s views seem to be that peace can only be 
attained through authoritarianism, it is important to note that his previous 



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books and interviews (before the Arab Spring) suggest an alternative. 
For instance, in The Culture of Terrorism Bin Bayyah regards justice and 
good advisory governance as significant approaches for seeking a solu-
tion to political conflicts. He provides doctrinal evidence that centers on 
the value of justice and the way that just governance can aid in reducing 
disturbances. For example, he refers to the fifth rightly-guided Caliph 
‘Umar bin ‘Abd al-‘Azīz, when he wrote to his deputy, after hearing about 
the revolt of the Kharijaites: “put off the fire of sedition with justice.”102

Bin Bayyah has acknowledged that injustice is one of the main rea-
sons for injustice and that promoting an environment of justice could 
aid in stemming any form of chaos. However, most of his views on the 
importance of justice changed after he became ally with the UAE. He 
now argues that political values like human rights, justice, and freedoms 
need to be sacrificed to establish peace. Concurrently, he completely 
ignores other Islamic traditional principles, such as “speaking truth in the 
presence of a tyrant ruler” and “commanding good and forbidding evil”.

taḥqīq-al-manāṭ and Theorizing Authoritarianism

In 2010, Halim Rane, an Australian academic, conducted a study on the 
impact of the maqāṣid-oriented approach on Islam-West relations. His 
study showed that the West perceives the maqāṣid-oriented approach, 
which adopts modern universal values and objectives, as an approach that 
is more recognizable and identifiable than the traditional version of the 
theory, which offers literal and classical interpretations of sharī‘ah and 
Islamic governance. Halim further maintains that the maqāṣid-oriented 
approach enhances positive relations between the Muslim world and the 
West. He affirms that this is because the higher objectives determined 
by a maqāṣid perspective are often acceptable by everyone, regardless of 
their beliefs.103 However, Rane’s study suggests that the maqāṣid-oriented 
approach does not necessarily result in a complete adoption of policies 
that are propitiatory or compatible with the West. Based on his study, the 
key issue that causes a lot of debate between the contemporary generation 
of maqāṣidī reformers and the West is the Israel-Palestine conflict. This is 
related to the inculcation and adherence to certain objectives and values, 



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such as justice, freedom, peace, and independence.104 Thus it appears that 
Bin Bayyah is the first contemporary jurist to adopt the modern maqāṣid 
discourse as an approach for legitimizing normalization with Israel and 
for promoting authoritarian agendas.

Following the announcement of the peace deal between UAE and 
Israel, Bin Bayyah, in his role as the President of the Emirati Fatwā 
Council, affirmed that “international relations and treaties are amongst 
the actions that fall within the policy-making specialisation of the ruler 
solely.”105 Though this declaration appears to be related to the premod-
ern discourse, whereby only a ruler had the power to make treaties 
with foreign powers and formulate public policy, the declaration adopts 
the modern approach of maqāṣid. As already mentioned, Bin Bayyah’s 
declaration indicates that he views the modern approach of maqāṣid as 
one which promotes absolute obedience to the ruler under the rubric of 
the “fiqh of reality”.

Interestingly, Bin Bayyah’s proposal is based on what is known in 
the field of uṣūl al-fiqh as taḥqīq al-manāṭ (verifying the ratio legis). From 
a classical point of view, taḥqīq al-manāṭ is considered by scholars of 
uṣūl al-fiqh to be an independent mode of reasoning, which is related 
to the exercise of verifying the presence of the basis or ratio (‘illah or 
manāṭ) of an established legal ruling or principles of law to apply it on 
new cases or situations. The basis could be explicitly established from 
the texts, agreed upon by scholars, or achieved by ijtihād.106 Al-Shāṭibī 
explains the process of taḥqīq al-manāṭ by stating that “reasoning by 
taḥqīq al-manāṭ means that the verdict is ascertained from the author-
itative sources; however, verification is required to determine its basis 
(maḥal al-ḥukm). Such as in the verdict when the sharī‘ah stated: ‘and 
take for witness two persons from among you, endowed with justice’ 
(Q. 65:2): despite that the meaning of justice is known, jurists are still 
required to verify the person who acquire such attribute.”107 According to 
al-Shāṭibī’s explanation, the process of taḥqīq al-manāṭ could be devided 
into three stages. First, to identify the legal ruling from the established 
sources. Second, to examine the basis of the new case to determine if it 
is relevant to the established ruling. Third, to apply the legal ruling to 
the facts of the cases to come to a valid legal verdict.



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According to Bin Bayyah, taḥqīq al-manāṭ requires a deep diagnosis 
of the wāqi’ (reality) to understand the legal cause behind the verdict, and 
subsequently apply it to the current context. Accordingly, Bin Bayyah 
argues that the concept of wāqi’ is the appreciation of how the modern 
context differs from the context wherein Islam was revealed. Therefore, 
wāqi’ should be considered as part of the legal verdict. Moreover, Bin 
Bayyah suggests that there are three major elements of contemporary 
failures, namely a failure of identifying reality, a failure of identifying 
the impact of reality on verdicts, and a failure of recognizing the proper 
methodology to deal with reality.108

In his book Tanbīh al-Marāji’, Bin Bayyah raises the question of who 
has the authority of taḥqīq al-manāṭ, or the authority to verify the legal 
cause. To answer this question, Bin Bayyah reinterprets the concept of 
ijtihād (independent human reasoning in sharī‘ah law) by subdividing 
it into three groups. The first is ijtihād in issues concerning individuals, 
whereby they are left to decide and exercise their faith, based on the 
verification of their reality. He illustrates with the example of an ill 
individual who determines by themselves whether they are too sick to 
fast during the month of Ramaḍān or not. The second is ijtihād regard-
ing newly-emerging issues, such as financial transactions, which are 
supposed to be referred to specialized committees. The third is ijtihād 
related to the duties of al-sulṭān al-akbar (the grand ruler). These include 
the declaration of war, peace treaties, and governance, which should all 
be left exclusively to the ruler. Accordingly, it seems that Bin Bayyah is 
advancing an anti-jurist approach. He argues that, since jurists do not 
make decisions for the sick individual, they should also not be consulted, 
in any legal or constitutional way, during the ruler’s decision making. 
This is because, according to Bin Bayyah, jurists do not understand the 
full reality or the implications of certain decisions, nor do they know 
a ruler’s hidden motivations, which could be difficult to understand.109

In contrast, even modernists who adopted maṣlaḥah as an inde-
pendent source of legislation were aware of the traditional skepticism 
related to the potential politicization and violation of maṣlaḥah by those 
in power. As mentioned earlier, Rashīd Riḍā asserted that the utilization 
of maṣlaḥah is the right of the Ummah through the role of people who 



60    A M E R i C A N  J O U R N A L  O F  i S L A M  A N d  S O C i E t Y  3 8 : 3 - 4

loose and bind, and should not be undertaken by the rulers solely. Riḍā 
argued that this basic principle of governance is the greatest political 
reform that the Qur’ān affirmed in a time when all nations were ruled 
by autocratic rulers, and it was the practice of the prophet and the four 
guided caliphs. However, Riḍā also noted that some traditional jurists 
made this only a recommendation, without any obligatory status, to 
satisfy the will of rulers and kings.110

Although Bin Bayyah addresses the questions of why we need to 
identify the reality, and who has the authority to identify the reality, 
one of the limitations of his explanation is that it does not address the 
question of how reality should be dealt with. On the other hand, in 
one of his fatwās, Bin Bayyah asserts that one of the methodological 
defects that have resulted in significant crises in the Muslim world is 
the use of texts without paying attention to the spirit and the maqāṣid 
of the law. He further argues that such methodological defect occurs on 
three different stages. These include the stage of ta’wīl (textual inter-
pretation), which addresses the question of ‘what’ the verdict is on a 
specific issue, based on the textual interpretation; the stage of ta‘līl (ratio-
nal reasoning), which addresses the question of ‘why’, based on the 
maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah; and the stage of tanzīl (application), which answers 
the question of ‘how’ the verdict should be applied, based on contex-
tual realities.111 Paradoxically, Bin Bayyah suggests that the ruler has 
all-inclusive authority with regards to policymaking and deciding on 
political relations. However, once again, he does not attempt to identify 
the qualities of such rulers, which qualifies them to deal solely with the 
three stages of ijtihād; nor does he address their legal duties or the pro-
cess of their appointment. Bin Bayyah’s approach, therefore, has failed 
to verify the ratio legis or identify the reality.

Despite the fact that Bin Bayyah’s lectures and books highlight the 
importance of the “fiqh of reality,” his arguments overlook the dramatic 
transformation and changes that have occurred to political structures 
in the shift from the sultanic state to a modern nation-state, and from 
an individual’s rule to the rule of institutions. Yet, when he defines the 
modern state, Bin Bayyah adopts Max Weber’s theory, which claims that 
the state has the right to use physical coercion and oppression within a 



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given territory, with the conditions of transparency and fair use of this 
right. In what reads as a clear criticism of just such an approach, ʻAbdul 
Ḥamīd Abū Sulaymān (1936-2021) points out that “when contemporary 
jurists function in the same manner and possibly repeat the old instruc-
tions verbatim, there is a lack of appreciation for the changes that have 
taken place.”112

The modern maqāṣid-oriented approach was mainly developed by 
Islamic reformers and modernists, who introduced new branches of fiqh 
like fiqh al-aqalliyyāt (the fiqh of minorities),113 fiqh al-wāqi‘ (the fiqh of 
reality), and fiqh al-ma’alāt (the fiqh of results and consequences).114 They 
regarded the modern nation-state and its requirements as a basis of modern 
Islamic law. Therefore, they argue that a state’s legality is determined by 
the will of the nation, including its jurists, who previously established or 
had some impact on judicial, economic, and political policies. Thus, they 
believe that the authority to establish legislation should continue to belong 
to the nation, rather than the ruler. Therefore, modernists maintain that 
Islamic legality is established on political systems based on elected repre-
sentatives.115 This paper has attempted to examine the process by which 
Bin Bayyah now uses the same means for contradicting purposes.

Why Maqāṣid?

Even though Bin Bayyah adopts the modernist model of maqāṣid and cer-
tain elements of the maṣlaḥah discourse, his elaboration reflects many of 
the Quietist Salafists’ concerns.116 One may ask why Bin Bayyah decided 
to use the modern approach of maqāṣid to present such a traditional 
position. If the effective results of his assertions resemble those of the 
Quietist Salafists, who promote strict obedience to Muslim rulers and 
silence on political matters, then one wonders why Bin Bayyah did not 
simply justify his position using the traditional doctrine that relies on 
literal interpretations of the texts.

Over the last decade, the Quietist Salafists have loudly proclaimed 
their loyalty to the figure of the ruler, critical of both western democracy 
and Muslim modernist reformers. During the Arab Spring in Egypt, 
Libya, and Syria, they did not support the revolutionary uprisings and 



62    A M E R i C A N  J O U R N A L  O F  i S L A M  A N d  S O C i E t Y  3 8 : 3 - 4

enjoined Muslims to avoid any revolts against their presidents, and even 
described them as Kharijites.117 Moreover, the Quietist Salafists have 
developed solid connections with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states in gen-
eral. Many Gulf states have benefited from their discourse in maintaining 
their power and authority. For example, Saudi Arabia has for several 
decades used Salafist think-tanks against ‘Panarabism’ and ‘Nasserism’ 
and, subsequently, Iranian Shiite revolutionism.118 Likewise, in the UAE, 
the Quietist Salafists were previously given limited support to undermine 
the Muslim Brotherhood’s political activities, which were considered a 
threat to regional stability.119 However, after the Arab Spring, they were 
gradually excluded from the political and social scene, particularly in 
the UAE. This exclusion was more evident after the conference held 
in Chechnya in August 2016, which was titled “Who are Sunnis?”, and 
was partially funded by the UAE. It is reported that over two hundred 
Sunni scholars were invited, but none of them were Salafis. The closing 
statement during the conference introduced a new definition of the broad 
Sunni “family,” which indirectly criticized the Salafists for being intol-
erant of other Sunni groups recognized during the conference, such as 
Ṣūfīs. Hence, the Salafists were excluded from the definition.120

Therefore, it can be deduced that regardless of the Quietist Salafists’ 
unconditional support to the ruler and their opposition to any type of 
rebellion, they appear to have become more defensive and marginalized 
after the Arab uprisings. A likely explanation is that their doctrine is 
considered by the UAE as possibly rigid and incapable of adopting a 
programme of religious moderation, which the UAE is trying to sell to 
the West.121 Even so, the UAE appears to seek the appropriation of the 
Salafists’ traditional narrative, which guarantees absolute obedience and 
forecloses the possibility of political rebellion, while reshaping it in the 
modern framework of a maqāṣid-oriented approach. This then shores up 
the UAE’s juridico-political convictions and advances its political image, 
which is based on peace and modernism, and promotes its credibility 
in international relations. In fact, Bin Bayyah’s appropriation and polit-
icization of the maqāṣid-oriented approach could be the catalyst for a 
new ideological force to surpass Islamic legal modernism: a modernist 
authoritarianism that opposes democracy and justice in an Islamic idiom.



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Conclusion

This paper has argued that the ideological utilization of the maqāṣid dis-
course has shifted the theory’s objective from its purpose-oriented basis 
to result-oriented and utilitarian reasoning. With the ever-increasing 
number of maqāṣid, the constantly changing priorities, and the absence 
of appropriate guidelines, the maqāṣid approach has become an ambig-
uous and loose methodology. This has resulted in its misapplication or 
misuse to achieve different outcomes. Indeed, Bin Bayyah’s subjective 
reinterpretation and prioritization of the maqāṣid-oriented approach to 
satisfy utilitarian objectives could result in a failure to effectively reform 
legal theory. It could also reduce the opportunity to make it pragmatic 
and relevant to the values of modern society—which was its stated aim. 
Even more, it also threatens the legitimacy of the maṣlaḥah discourse, 
which has been used to support autocracy and act against human rights.



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Endnotes
1 Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, al-Mustaṣfā min ‘ilm al-uṣūl (Riyadh: Dār al-Maymān, 2004), 

174.

2 ‘Abdil-Ilāh al-Qāsimi, Madkhal ‘Ām li-Dirāsah al-maqāṣid (Cairo: Dār al-Kalimah, 
2015), 16.

3 Tariq Ramadan,  Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 59.

4 Jasser ‘Auda,  Maqāṣid al-Sharī‘ah as Philosophy of Islamic Law: A Systems 
Approach (United Kingdom: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2008), 144.

5 Muḥammad Hāshim Kamālī, An Introduction to Sharī‘ah (Kuala Lumpur: Ilmiah 
Publishers, 2006), 130.

6 Aḥmad al-Raysūnī, Imam al-Shāṭibī’s Theory of the Higher Objectives and Intents of 
Islamic Law (United Kingdom: Islamic Book Trust, 2006), 38-45.

7 Joseph Schacht, The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence, repr. ed. (United 
Kingdom: Clarendon Press, 1953), 1. Also see Wael Hallaq, History of Islamic Legal 
Theories: An Introduction to Sunni Uṣūl al-Fiqh (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), 21.

8 See Joseph Lowry, “Does Shafiʻi Have a Theory of ‘Four Sources’ of Law?” in Studies 
in Islamic Legal Theory, ed. Bernard Weiss (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 23–50. Lowry con-
siders al-Shāfi‘ī‘s Risālah as a book that aims “to eliminate the apparent conflicts” 
between Qur’an and Sunnah. It thus intended to defend the prophetic ḥadith  and 
to develop a coherent vision of the framework of the law. See Joseph Lowry, Early 
Islamic Legal Theory: The Risālah of Muḥammad Ibn Idrīs al-Shāfi‘ī (Leiden: Brill, 
2007), 23, 359; see also, Wael B. Hallaq, “Was al-Shāfi‘ī the Master Architect of 
Islamic Jurisprudence?” International Journal of Middle East Studies 25, no. 4 (1993): 
587-605. Hallaq does not consider al-Shāfi‘ī‘s Risālah a true work in uṣūl al-fiqh, and 
he gives precedence to Ibn Surayj and his disciples by assigning them a primary 
role in its formation; see also Wael Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 128.

9 Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfi‘ī, The Epistle on Legal Theory, trans. Joseph Lowry (New 
York: New York University Press, 2013). See also George Makdisi, “The Juridical Theology 
of Shāfi‘ī: Origins and Significance of Uṣūl al-Fiqh,” Studia Islamica 59 (1984): 8-9.

10 Hallaq, History of Islamic Legal Theory, 22.

11 Ahmed El Shamsy, The Canonization of Islamic Law: A Social and Intellectual History 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 4.

12 Al-Raysūnī, Imam al-Shāṭibī’s Theory of the Higher Objectives, 38-45.

13 For a definition of istiḥsān by a Ḥanafī jurist, see Abū Sahl al-Sarakhsī, al-Uṣūl, ed. 
Abū al-Wafā al-Afghāni (Cairo: Dar al-Ma’rifah, 1973), 199-215.



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14 Muḥammad Abū Zahra, Tārīkh al-madhāhib al-islāmiyyah (Dār al Fikr al-‘Arabī, 
1963), 355.

15 Felicitas Opwis, “Maṣlaḥa in Contemporary Islamic Legal Theory,” Islamic Law and 
Society 12, no. 2 (2005): 182-223, at 188–189.

16 Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfī, Sharḥ tanqīḥ al-fuṣūl, ed. Ṭāhā `Abd al-Ra’ūf Sa`d (Cairo: 
Dār al-Fikr, 1973), 303, 394, 446.

17 For example, Abū Bakr Aḥmad al-Jaṣṣās’s (d. 370 A.H.) treatise Uṣūl al-Jaṣṣās dis-
cussed the importance of attaining maṣlaḥah in several contexts, such as when 
dealing with the issue of naskh, abrogation: al-Fuṣūl fi al-Uṣūl (Jordan: Turūth For 
Solutions, 2013).

18 Hallaq, History of Islamic Legal Theories, 112–113, 168–174, 214–231, 261; Opwis, 
Maṣlaḥa.

19 ‘Abdallah Bin Bayyah, ‘Alāqat maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah bi-uṣūl al-fiqh (London: 
Mu’assasat al-Furqān li al-Turāth al-Islāmī, Markaz Dirasāt Maqāṣid al-Sharī‘ah 
al-Islāmiyyah, 2006), 131-135.

20 Al-Raysūnī, Imam al-Shāṭibī’s Theory of the Higher Objectives, 5-7.

21 Ibid.., 8. He devotes the sixth chapter of his book to the wisdom and virtue of wor-
ship in Islam.

22 Mohamad El-Tahir El-Mesawi, “From al-Shāṭibī’s Legal Hermeneutics to Thematic 
Exegesis,” Intellectual Discourse 20, no. 2 (2012): 192.

23 Muḥammad Hāshim Kamālī, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (Kuala Lumpur: 
Ilmiah Publishers, 2000), 401.

24 Al-Juwaynī, ‘Abdul al-Malik Ibn ‘Abdullah, al-Burhān fi Uṣūl al-Fiqh (annotated by 
‘Abdul-‘Adhīm al-Dīb) (Qatar: Wazārat al-Shu’ūn al-Dīniyyah, 1980), 183.

25 Hallaq, History of Islamic Legal Theories, 39.

26 Opwis, “Maṣlaḥa.” 

27 al-Raysūnī, Imam al-Shāṭibī’s Theory of the Higher Objectives, 63-64.

28 al-Ghazālī, al-Mustaṣfā, 413-430.

29 Ibid., 477.

30 al-Āmidī, al-Iḥkām fī Uṣūl al-Aḥkām, ed. Syed al-Jamīlī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ara-
biyyah, 1984).

31 El-Mesawi, “From al-Shāṭibī’s Legal Hermeneutics to Thematic Exegesis,” 194.

32 Aḥmad al-Raysūnī, al-Baḥth fī Maqāṣid al-Sharī‘ah (London: Al-Furqān Islamic 
Heritage Foundation, 2005), 20.

33 Ibid., 89.

34 Najm al-dīn, al-Ṭūfī, “Adillat al-shara‘ wa taqdīm al-maṣlaḥah fī al-l-mu‘āmalāt ‘alā 
al-naṣ,” al-Manār 9 (1906-7): 763.



66    A M E R i C A N  J O U R N A L  O F  i S L A M  A N d  S O C i E t Y  3 8 : 3 - 4

35 Ibid.,754-758. 

36 Ibid., 753-764.

37 Najm al-dīn al-Ṭūfī, al-Ta‘yīn fī Sharḥ al-Arbai‘īn (Egypt: Al Rayān Foundation for 
Publishing,  1998), 239.

38 Ibid., 237-280.

39 Ahmed El Shamsy, Rediscovering the Islamic Classics: How Editors and Print Culture 
Transformed an Intellectual Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020), 
198. Al-Ṭūfī articulated his manifestation in al-Risālah with a great detail when he 
was interpreting ḥadīth 32 of al-Nawawī’s (d. 676/1277) forty ḥadīths. Al-Qāsimī 
(d. 1332/1914) published the Risālah in a new version selecting parts of the inter-
pretation which were related to maṣlaḥah, including footnotes and three treatises 
called Risālah fī al-Maṣlaḥah al-Mursalah, all under the name of Majmū’ Rasāil fī 
Uṣūl al-Fiqh in Beirut in 1324/1906. Rashīd Riḍā then published the Risālah with 
al-Qāsimī’s annotations in al-Mānar, volume 9, no. 10 (1906).

40 Hallaq, Islamic Legal Theories, 136.

41 Al-Shāṭibī, Al-Muwāfaqāt fī Uṣūl al-Sharī‘ah, with explanations by A. Drāz (Cairo: 
Dār al-Ḥadīth, 2005), 8.

42 Ibid., 5-6.

43 Ḥammadi al-‘Ubaydi, Al-Shāṭibī Wa Maqāṣid al-Sharī‘ah (Beirut: Dār Qutaybah, 
1996), 173.

44 Al-Shāṭibī, Al-Muwāfaqāt, 1:27: “the function of reason is to find out maṣlaḥah from 
the textual resources and to extrapolate its meanings, but human reason cannot inde-
pendently decide what is maṣlaḥah and what is not. Judgements of what is good must 
be in light of the Islamic Law itself. There is no room for independent human reasoning.”

45 Opwis, Maslaha, 184.

46 Felicitas Opwis, “New Trends in Islamic Legal Theory: Maqāṣid Al-Sharī‘a as a 
New Source of Law?” Die Welt Des Islams 57, no. 1 (2017): 7-32. See also, M. Masud, 
Shāṭibī’s Philosophy of Islamic Law (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, 1995), 86.

47 Wael Hallaq, “Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?” International Journal of Middle East 
Studies 16, no. 1 (1984), 3-41. 

48 Opwis, Maslaha, 186. See also Halim Rane, “The Impact of Maqāṣid al-Sharī‘ah on 
Islamist Political Thought: Implications for Islam–West Relations” (2013), 350.

49 See Drāz’s introduction to Muḥammad Isḥāq al-Shāṭibī, al-Muwāfaqāt, ed. ‘Abd 
Allah Drāz  (Beirut: Dār al-Ma‘ārifa, 1996), 1:16.

50 El Shamsy, Rediscovering the Islamic Classics, 198; see also Hallaq, Islamic Legal 
Theories, 214–231.

51 Muḥammad al-Ṭāhir Ibn ‘Ashur, Maqāṣid al-Sharī‘ah al-islāmiyyah, 3rd ed. (Tunisia: 
al-Sharikah al-Tūnisiyyah li’l-Tawzi’, 1988), 5-8. 



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52 Ibid., 95-100 and 130-135.

53 Muḥammad ‘Allāl al-Fāsī, Maqāṣid al-Sharī‘ah al-Islāmiyyah wa Makārimuhā, ed. 
Ismā‘īl al-Ḥasanī, 2nd ed. (Cairo, Dār al-Salām, 2013), 348.

54   Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā,  al-Waḥy al-Muḥammadī: Thubūt al-Nubuwwah bi 
al-Qur’an wa Da‘wat al-shu‘ūb al-Mansiyyah ilā al-Islām: dīn al-insāniyyah wa 
al-salām, 3rd ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Manār, 1985), 275-390.

55 Ibid., 221.

56 Muḥammad  Rashīd Riḍā, Tafsīr al-Manār  (Lebanon,  Dār al-Ma‘rifah), 7:197-198 
(commenting on Q. 5:101-2).

57 Such as the Lebanese Subḥi Maḥmaṣānī (d. 1986), the Moroccan ‘Allāl al-Fāsī (d. 
1974), and the Sudanese Maḥmud Muḥammad Ṭāha (d. 1985).

58 Kamālī, An Introduction to Sharī‘ah, 257.

59 Wael Hallaq, “Maqāṣid and The Challenges of Modernity,” al-Jāmi‘ah 49, no. 1 (2011): 
11.

60 Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories, 224.

61 Opwis, Maṣlaḥa, 220-221.

62 Kamālī, An Introduction to Sharī‘ah, 258.

63 Al-Qaraḍāwī defines wasaṭiyyah as “a balance that equilibrates the two opposite 
ends, in which neither ends stand alone with its supremacy or banish its counter-
part; in which nether ends take more than it deserves and dominates its opponent” 
(Kalimāt fī al-wasaṭiyyah al-islāmiyyah wa ma‘ālimihā (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 
2011)).

64 David H. Warren, Rivals in the Gulf: Yūsuf Al-Qaraḍāwī, ‘Abdullah Bin Bayyah, 
and the Qatar-UAE Contest Over the Arab Spring and the Gulf Crisis (N.p.: Taylor & 
Francis, 2021).

65 Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, al-Madkhal li dirāsat al-sharī‘ah al-islāmiyyah (Cairo: Maktabat 
Wahbah, 1990), 75.

66 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Dirāsah fī fiqh maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah: Bayna al-maqāṣid al-kulliyyah 
wa al-nuṣūṣ al-juz‘iyyah (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 2006), 27.

67 Gamāl Eldīn ‘Attia, Towards Realization of the Higher Intents of Islamic Law: Maqāṣid 
al-Sharī‘ah: A Functional Approach (London: The International Institute of Islamic 
Thought, 2007), 116-149; Kamālī, An Introduction to Sharī‘ah, 98.

68 Ṭahā Alwānī, Afalā Yatadabbarūna al-Qur’ān (Cairo: Dār al-Salām, 2010), 62.

69 Kamālī, An Introduction to Sharī‘ah, 201.

70 ‘Attia, Towards Realization of the Higher Intents of Islamic Law, 116-149.

71 Rāchid al-Ghannoūchī, Al-Ḥurriyāt al-‘āmmah fī al-dawlah al-islāmiyyah (Beirut, 
1993), 44.



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72 al-Qaraḍāwī, Dirāsah, 30.

73 ‘Auda, Maqāṣid al-Sharī‘ah as Philosophy of Islamic Law, 25.

74 Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), 54.

75 Ramadan, Radical Reform, 89.

76 David Warren, “Doha—The Center of Reformist Islam? Considering Radical Reform 
in the Qatar Context: Tariq Ramadan and the Research Center for Islamic Legislation 
and Ethics (CILE),” in Maqāṣid al-Sharī‘ah and Contemporary Reformist Muslim 
Thought, ed. Adis Duderija (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 85-89.

77 This was part of al-Qaraḍāwī’s wider appreciation of the reality of modern issues, 
which as he argues are too complex for an individual jurist to deal with. Therefore 
al-Qaraḍāwī advocates collective ijtihād (ijtihād jamā‘ī), by which the efforts of a 
team of experts from different fields replace the efforts of individuals. See Yūsuf 
al-Qaraḍawī, al-Ijtihād al-Mu‘āṣir bayna al-Inḍibāt wa al-Infirāṭ (Cairo, 1998), 50, 
103.

78 David Johnston, “Yūsuf Qaraḍāwī’s Purposive Fiqh: Promoting or Demoting the 
Future Role of the ‘ulamā’?” in Maqāṣid al-Sharī‘ah and Contemporary Reformist 
Muslim Thought, 60.

79 Felicitas Opwis, Review of Adis Duderija (ed.), Maqāṣid al-Sharī‘a and Contemporary 
Reformist Muslim Thought: An Examination, in Islamic Law and Society 23, no. 1/2 
(2016): 141-146.

80 Ramadan, Radical Reform, 181.

81 Warren, “Doha: The Center of Reformist Islam?” 89.

82 Kamālī, An Introduction to Sharī‘ah, 201.

83 Rane, “The Impact of Maqāṣid al-Sharī‘ah,” 338.

84  Usaama al‐Azami, “‘Abdullah bin Bayyah and the Arab Revolutions: Counter‐rev-
olutionary Neo‐traditionalism’s Ideological Struggle against Islamism,” The Muslim 
World 109 (2019): 343-361.

85 Biography at the Official Website of Shaykh ‘Abdallah Bin Bayyah, http://binbayyah.
net/english/bio/.

86 For more on Bin Bayyah’s alliance with the UAE, see al‐Azami, “‘Abdullah bin 
Bayyah and the Arab Revolutions,” which addresses how Bin Bayyah’s discourse 
serves the UAE goal of expelling Islamist activity from the region. On the idea 
of branding for international security purposes as a driver for the relationships 
between scholars and regimes, see Warren, Rivals in the Gulf.

87 Bin Bayyah, Tanbīh al-Marāji‘, 9.

88 Ibid., 10.

89 Ibid.



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90 ‘Abdullāh Bin Bayyah, Mashāhid min al-maqāṣid (Riyadh: Dār Wujūh, 2010), 165.

91 ‘Abdullāh Bin Bayyah, ‘Alāqat maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah bi uṣūl al-fiqh (Cairo: al-Mu’as-
sasah al-Saūdiyah, 2006), 30.

92 Hākim al-Muṭairī, “al-Ḥurriyyah aw al-Ṭūfān” (Beirut: Arabic Foundation for 
Studies and Publication, 200). For more about the Caliphate in Islamic political 
thought, see also Ovamir Anjum, Politics, Law, and Community in Islamic Thought: 
The Taymiyyan Moment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), xiii.

93 Bin Bayyah, Tanbīh al-Marāji‘, 10.

94 Jāsser ‘Auda, al-Dawlah al-Madaniyyah, Nahwa Tajāwuz al-Istibdād ma‘a taḥqīq 
maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah (Arab Net For Research And Publications, 2015), 17.

95 “A Call to Intensify Peace Efforts,” The Official Website of Shaykh ‘Abdallah Bin 
Bayyah, http://binbayyah.net/english/a-call-to-intensify-peace-efforts/.

96 Al-Ghannoūchī, al-Ḥurriyyāt, 51.

97 “Ḥilf-al-Fuḍūl,” Bin Bayyah’s Speech, Forum for Promoting Peace Conference, 
December 8, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8dTslRil0UA.

98 Bin Bayyah, Tanbīh al-Marāji‘, 109.

99 Khaled Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 4.

100 ‘Abdullah Bin Bayyah, al-Irhāb al-tashkhīs wal-ḥulūl. Mawqif al-Islam min al-ghulu 
wa al-taṭarruf (Riyadh, 2012), 37.

101 al-Muṭairī, al-Ḥurriyyah aw al-Ṭūfān, 177-178. See also Anjum, Politics, Law, and 
Community in Islamic Thought, xiii. Anjum argues that the quietist attitude towards 
those in power was and is the predominant strand among the traditional Muslim 
scholarly elite. He argues that this apolitical and legalistic tendency was not because 
of jurists’ lack of involvement with power, but rather because of the absence of a 
sustained effort to theorize power and because of a historical process in which Islam 
became depoliticized.

102 Bin Bayyah, al-Irhāb al-tashkhīs wal-ḥulūl, 9.

103 Halim Rane, “Trends in Muslim Political Thought: Redefining Islam in the Socio-
Political Context,” E-International Relations, April 16, 2010,

https://www.e-ir.info/2010/04/16/trends-in-muslim-political-thought-redefining-is-
lam-in-the-socio-political-context/.

104 Ibid., 6.

105 Wam, “UAE Fatwā Council: International Relations and Treaties are Inclusive Authority 
of Wali al-amr,” August 18, 2020, https://www.wam.ae/ar/details/1395302862326.

106 Aḥmad Ḥasan, Analogical Reasoning in Islamic Jurisprudence: A Study of the Juridical 
Principle of Qiyas (New Delhi: Adam Publishers & Distributors, 2007), 354.  



70    A M E R i C A N  J O U R N A L  O F  i S L A M  A N d  S O C i E t Y  3 8 : 3 - 4

107 Al-Shāṭibī, al-Muwāfaqāt, 361-362.

108 Bin Bayyah, Tanbīh al-Marāji‘, 71.

109 Ibid., 83.

110 Riḍā, Tafsīr al-Manār, 7:197-198 (commenting on Q 5:101-102).

111 ‘Abdallah Bin Bayyah, “Fatwā on The Importance of The Maqāṣid Methodology,” 
The Official Website of Shaykh ‘Abdallah Bin Bayyah, http://binbayyah.net/arabic/
archives/3841.

112 ʻAbdul Ḥamīd Abū Sulaymān, Towards an Islamic Theory of International Relations: 
New Directions for Islamic Methodology and Thought (United States: International 
Institute of Islamic Thought, 1993), 77.

113 See Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, Fiqh al-Aqalliyyāt al-Muslimah (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 
2001). See also Ṭāhā Jābir Fayyāḍ ̒ Alwānī, Towards a Fiqh for Minorities: Some Basic 
Reflections (United Kingdom: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2010). See 
also Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 
2000), and many articles by Khaled Abou El Fadl on the fiqh of minorities.

114 For more about “Fiqh al Ma’alat,” see al-Qaraḍāwī, Dirāsah, 14, 20.

115 Louay Safi, “The Islamic State: A Conceptual Framework,” American Journal of 
Islamic Social Sciences 8, no. 3 (1991): 132.

116 Quietest Salafis are more commonly referred to by the quasi-pejorative designation 
of “al-Jāmiyyah,” or the followers of Muḥammad Amān al-Jāmī (d. 1994). They 
are also referred to as the Madkhaliyyah, referring to al-Jāmī’s student Rabīʻ bin 
Hādī al-Madkhalī. For more on the different strands of Salafism, see Roel Meijer 
(ed.), Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement (United Kingdom:  Oxford 
University Press, 2013).

117 Hassan Mneimneh, “The Spring of a New Political Salafism?” Current Trends in 
Islamist Ideology 12 (Hudson Institute, 2011), 33.

118 Alexei Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia (London: Saqi Books, 1998), 469.

119 Ḥasan Noorhaidi, “Saudi Expansion, The Salafī Campaign and Arabised Islam in 
Indonesia,” in Kingdom without Borders: Saudi Political, Religious and Media Frontiers, 
ed. Maḍāwī al-Rasheed (London, 2008), 275.

120 Kristin Smith Diwan, “Who Is Sunni?: Chechnya Islamic Conference Opens Window 
on Intra-Faith Rivalry,” The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, September 16, 
2016, https://agsiw.org/who-is-a-sunni-chechnya-islamic-conference-opens-win-
dow-on-intra-faith-rivalry/.

121 Mneimneh, “The Spring of a New Political Salafism?” 32-33.