American Journal of Islam and Society Vol 39 No 3-4.indb 57 Beyond Maṣlaḥah: Adab and Islamic Economic Thought S A M I A L - D A G H I S T A N I Sami Al-Daghistani is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Norwegian School of The- ology, Religion and Society in Oslo (MF); an Associate Faculty Member at the Brooklyn Institute for Social Research (BISR) in New York; and a Research Scholar at the Middle East Institute (MEI) at Columbia University. He is the author of Ethical Teachings of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī: Economics of Happiness (2021) and The Making of Islamic Economic Thought (2022), a co-editor of Plu- ralism in Emergenc(i)es (Review of Middle East Studies, 2021), and translator to Slovenian of Ibn Ṭufayl’s Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān (2016) and Ibn Baṭṭūta’s Riḥla (2017). Acknowledgements: This paper was part of the “Theory and Uses of Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿa” symposium organized by the International Institute for Islamic Thought (IIIT) in collaboration with the American Journal of Islam and Society (AJIS). I would like to express my thanks to the organizers of the symposium, Ovamir An- jum and Shuruq Naguib, and their team for putting together a wonderful work- shop and for their support, to Mohammad Hashim Kamali for his keynote address, and to the fellow participants for their input. I would also like to thank the two blind reviewers, Ovamir Anjum, and Basit Kareem Iqbal for all their comments and suggestions, as well as to the AJIS editorial team for the publication process. al-Daghistani, Sami. 2022. “Beyond Maṣlaḥah: Adab and Islamic Economic Thought.” American Journal of Islam and Society 39, nos. 3-4: 57–86 • doi: 10.35632/ajis.v39i3-4.2988 Copyright © 2022 International Institute of Islamic Thought 58  A M E R i C A N J O U R N A L O F i S L A M A N d S O C i E t Y 3 9 : 3 - 4 Abstract This paper focuses on maṣlaḥah (benefit or well-being) and adab (righteous behavior or character) as ethically intertwined con- cepts that are discussed by classical Muslim scholars in relation to the acquisition of wealth (kasb) and overall economic engage- ment. Particularly in certain works of al-Shaybāni (d. 805), al-Muḥāsibī (d. 857), Ibn Abī al-Dunyā (d. 894), al-Māwardī (d. 1058), and al-Ghazālī (d. 1111), personal piety is closely related to righteous economic behavior under the banner of adab’s moral stipulations. In light of al-Ghazālī’s understanding of economic provision as part of his overall theory of eternal happiness (saʿādah), the concept of maṣlaḥah can be analyzed in the context of adab as an extension of Sharīʿa law. While maṣlaḥah is from a legal standpoint crucial for safeguarding economic activities and preserving wealth, concomitantly, in this paper I treat maṣlaḥah as a derivative of adab and its holistic vision of human nature. In particular, I address what constitutes economic provision as an ethical endeavor in selected classical texts; and how the concept of adab preserves and enhances economic behavior as conceived by classical Muslim scholars. Introduction Islamic economic thought, tradition, or philosophy is usually described as pertaining to (classical) Muslim scholars’ theories and evaluations of different concepts and ideas in a transhistorical epistemological framework that would often encompass the fields of ethics, law, and theology. For some contemporary scholars, Islamic economic thought predates modern Islamic economics and finance, yet the two seem to have different methodological and epistemological frameworks within which they operate.1 I analyze the importance and relevance of classical scholars’ ideas, approaches, and strategies to acquisition of wealth and other related economic processes within Islamic intellectual history and ethics. In contrast to conventional wisdom in economics which elevates A L- d A G H i S tA N i : B E Y O N d M A Ṣ L A Ḥ A H  59 self-interest and individual preferences of consumerism,2 the classical texts analyzed below stress communal ways of living, concerns of equity, and redistributive justice. The theoretical accounts and economic phi- losophy extrapolated from a few selected classical scholars attest to a different and much more complex consideration of the economic in com- parison to how it has been commonly understood in the modern period. By allowing gains and curtailing excessive behavior, these texts show- case that moral virtue and personal discipline curbs social inequality and economic intemperance, and that personal piety manifests also in market governance. Previously,3 I have focused on the development of the legal discourse and the importance of maṣlaḥah in preserving economic activities in classical and contemporary contexts. This paper, however, takes a differ- ent turn, by analyzing economic provision or acquisition of wealth (often referred to as kasb) in a few ethical-economic texts. I read these texts by focusing on maṣlaḥah (benefit or well-being) and adab (righteous behavior) as ethically intertwined concepts, whereby personal piety is concurrent with the curtailment of (economic) exorbitance. Although maṣlaḥah is important for safeguarding economic activities and encour- aging frugal earning patterns by preserving one’s wealth, concomitantly, I explore the relationship between maṣlaḥah and the overall ethos of adab as extension of Sharīʿah’s law. This entails also a study of other equally important yet neglected conceptualizations that complement ethical- ly-driven economic engagements, often expressed through the stations or maqāmāt, such as wara’, zuhd, faqr, sabr, tawakkul, riḍā, and taffakur, since these conceptualizations necessitate an ethical self (as a set of one’s moral traits) when engaging with commerce and business. First, I posit that maṣlaḥah as conceived in al-Ghazālī’s Mustaṣfā can be appraised as an ethical concept in being an embodiment of Sharīʿah law that informs his overall moral epistemology and ethical system found also in Iḥyā’. Second, I do not claim that Sufism or Sufi literature discussed in this paper provides all answers to various economic predicaments in Islamic tradition – after all, many scholars who wrote on economic issues were not Sufis themselves but only resorted to particular conceptualizations – but rather that adab is an overarching term that corresponds to maṣlaḥah 60  A M E R i C A N J O U R N A L O F i S L A M A N d S O C i E t Y 3 9 : 3 - 4 and hence complements the study of economic thought by offering vistas for analyzing economic engagements as part of cultivating the inner self and maintaining a virtuous character. I will predominantly concentrate on the understanding of kasb (and zuhd as renunciation) in economic affairs and think conceptually and critically about maṣlaḥah as an ethical category that concurs with adab’s more holistic vision of human nature regarding economic provision and welfare. This will help me placing the idea of earning a righteous living within a broader metaphysical context that was by many classical Muslim scholars conceptualized as a technique of self-examination. The major theme of this paper is hence concerned with the question of what constitutes economic provision as an ethical endeavor in selected classical texts, and how the concept of adab preserves and enhances economic behavior as conceived by selected classical Muslim scholars. In the first part, I consider maqāṣid and maṣlaḥah as laid out by al-Ghazālī (d. 1111). Given that al-Ghazālī’s Mustaṣfā min ‘Ilm al-Uṣūl4 was produced toward the end of his life – which according to Ahmed El Shamsy employs a teleological approach also in legal reasoning – it could be also read in tandem with his previous works and in the broader context of merging ethical predispositions with legal deliberations, noticeable also in his economic thought. Following that, I analyze cer- tain classical scholars who wrote on zuhd and kasb, such as al-Shaybāni (d. 805), al-Muḥāsibī (d. 857), Ibn Abī al-Dunyā (d. 894), al-Māwardī (d. 1058), and al-Ghazālī, to establish a link between preservation of wealth (māl) and general well-being (maṣlaḥah), under the banner of adab as a moral reconfiguration of individual conduct. On the History of Islamic Economic Thought and Maṣlaḥah Early Muslim societies were well acquainted with trade. The narrations depicting the prophet Muḥammad and several of his companions as merchants, familiar with Mecca’s trading routes, testifies to Qur’an’s favorable approach to commerce.5 There are several theses in academic circles explaining “Islam’s” occupation with commence and trading. While some scholars assert that early Muslim society developed a A L- d A G H i S tA N i : B E Y O N d M A Ṣ L A Ḥ A H  61 rudimental form of market economy by advocating accumulation of capital and robust system of investments,6 others claim that Muslim culture never developed the institution of corporation and other finan- cial mechanism due to the restricting nature of Islamic law.7 Both theses are incorrect in assuming only one particular and overarching narrative in explaining a composite economic history, spanning centuries, be it accumulation of wealth or, on the other hand, Sharīʿah’s alleged rigid- ity in managing economic affairs. As open as Muslim scholars were to other cultures in various fields, including (economic) philosophy, it is not surprising that some scholars integrated Ancient Greek ideas into their systems, especially Aristotle’s (d. 322 BC) and Bryson’s (d. 5th cen- tury BC) thought.8 Yet, for Muslim scholars, who surpassed their Greek counterparts in analyzing economic postulates, economic thought was intricately related to the Qur’anic text and the legal-Sufi intellectual output, encompassing the nature and limits of accumulation of wealth and general well-being within the discourse of economic gains and poverty as a spiritual principle. Those scholars’ polyvalent approach to economic thought – given their legal, theological, and Sufi orientation – pinpoints to a complex and multifaceted economic philosophy that cannot be simply explained by asking whether profit-making was licit or not. For many classical scholars, ethical-economic behavior is expressed through a moral understanding of human relationship9 (tied to various concepts, such as Sharīʿah, adab, akhlāq, and so forth) that theorized economic engagements geared toward higher ends. In addition to the Qur’an and Sunna,10 which provided Muslim society with a moral cos- mology, pre-modern Muslim scholars expanded on concepts that were usually associated with the legal discourse. The term to describe household management or oikonomia is often referred to‘ilm tadbīr al-manzil,11 with roots in Aristotelian philosophy, which pertained to family-based management of a household that can be extended also to society at large. Especially in the 9th and 10th centuries, various Greek texts were translated into Arabic, which had an impact also on the development of economic philosophy of some of the major Muslim philosophers, such as Ibn Sīnā and Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī.12 Tadbīr al-manzil formed, in addition to ethics (‘ilm al-akhlāq) and politics (‘ilm al-siyāsah), 62  A M E R i C A N J O U R N A L O F i S L A M A N d S O C i E t Y 3 9 : 3 - 4 practical philosophy, whose underlying norm was justice (‘adl). However, classical Muslim scholars expanded on those topics, theorizing on market, fair price, development of industries, supply and demand, and other phe- nomena, often linking the macro-economic relations with the ethical self and the Divine law. What we nowadays call “economics” or “economic science”13 has rather little in common with oikonomia (oikos as house- hold, and nomos as law; as management of household affairs) and was in classical Islamic texts from the 8th to 13th centuries founded upon a rather different epistemological footing, often invoked through kasb as earning or acquisition of wealth, infāq or spending, and iqtiṣād14 and their ethical (adabi) dimension. Acquiring (or dealing with) wealth was hence neither a pure technical matter nor a legal obligation, but primarily a moral engage- ment15 that hearkened to the process of introspection and encompassed both individual and communal or governmental affairs. Such an idea of the ethical self was closely knitted with economic development in works by, for instance, al-Shaybānī (Kitāb al-Kasb), Ibn Sīnā (al-Siyāsah), Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (Akhlāq-i Nāṣirī), and al-Ghazālī (Iḥyā’ ‘Ulūm al-Dīn), inex- tricably related to the spiritual qualities of iqtiṣād and kasb. Instead of looking into specifics of commercial laws, in this section, I focus on the concept of maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah (or the purposes of Islamic law) and maṣlaḥah that have been discussed at length within Islamic history and legal studies, yet rarely explained in ethical-economic terms. Given that the contemporary understanding of the concepts of maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah and maṣlaḥah have remained primarily in the backdrop of the legal discourse, they have been seldomly discussed in the context of cos- mological and metaphysical doctrines of adab. Barter exchange, property rights, acquisition of wealth, and other economic mechanisms for the above-mentioned scholars employ both material or worldly and non-ma- terial or spiritual meanings, and are part and parcel of the Qur’anic metaphysical system that undergirds large parts of their reasoning. The concept of maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah was structurally introduced by al-Juwāyni (d. 1085), and developed by al-Ghazālī (d. 1111), ʿIzz al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Salām (d. 1243), and al-Shāṭibī (d. 1388), to name but a few scholars.16 In the 11th century al-Juwāyni developed maqāṣid accord- ing to the categories of necessities. He proposed five levels of maqāṣid: A L- d A G H i S tA N i : B E Y O N d M A Ṣ L A Ḥ A H  63 necessities (ḍarūrāt), general needs (al-hājah al-ʿammah), moral behavior (al-makrumāt), recommendations (al-mandūbāt), and specifics.17 As a theologian, an adherent of taṣawwuf, and, in essence, an ethicist, in his Mustaṣfā al-Ghazālī elaborated on the maqāṣid in the context of safe- guarding the five categories of faith (dīn), human self (nafs), intellect (‘aql), offspring (nasl), and wealth (māl).18 Since the maqāṣid are implicit in texts, the very idea of preservation of the five categories explicates not only legal but also ethical concerns. The claim that maqāṣid entails the gist of Sharīʿah’s moral law presupposes that it deals with ethical aspects of legal norms, whereby ideas of justice and social welfare are contextualized as metaphysical axioms. Preservation of the five cate- gories, including the preservation of wealth (ḥifẓ al-māl),19 hence takes into consideration economic and commercial activities such as allocation of wealth, circulation of money, and intentions behind one’s economic actions, which are viewed as ethically driven endeavors. While objectives stay the same, the means to attain them need to be thought anew and are thus always contemporary. The five rules of one’s actions are meant to measure Sharīʿah in the Qur’an, Sunna, and ijmāʿ. Although a nominal Ashʿarī,20 in Mustaṣfā al-Ghazālī concedes that not all human acts are specified by the Divine law, which also raises the question of whether God is the sole imposer of obligations,21 and what is the role of the ethical self in this process. Unlike Muʿtazilites, who hold that reason recognizes and determines good and evil, al-Ghazālī posits that reason cannot create rules for one’s actions, since it is Sharīʿah that classifies acts.22 Yet, in line with his moral epistemology, the ethical self is nurtured through an array of techniques embedded in various stations of the soul, while human benefit underpins the sacred law. It is through the textual sources that al-Ghazālī implements the spirit of the law as guiding principles of his overall ethical theory of happiness. After identifying the objectives of the law (maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah), a cause is valid if it corroborates the policies of those objectives.23 The legal rules, however, are for al-Ghazālī never disassociated from their underlying benefit, in that the a priori structures of the law are attained through inductive reasoning and the concept of appropriateness (munāsaba), as well as through techniques of self-examination, such as tawbah, wara’, zuhd, and faqr. 64  A M E R i C A N J O U R N A L O F i S L A M A N d S O C i E t Y 3 9 : 3 - 4 Maṣlaḥah as common good or well-being has been referred to as the basis of the methodological principles of Islamic law (uṣūl al-fiqh) and was specified in the cases where the foundational texts, the Qur’an and Sunna, were silent on particular matters. Maṣlaḥah denotes prohibition or permission on the basis of whether it serves the public good in a com- munity.24 The application of the concept has become more prominent in the modern period due to its importance to contemporary legal issues. Al-Juwāyni conceptualized maṣlaḥah, whereas al-Ghazālī expanded on the term also in the context of economic thought. More specifically, for al-Ghazālī, maṣlaḥah as an integral part of maqāṣid means observing and fulfilling objectives of the lawgiver.25 In Iḥyā’, he clearly states that fiqh is an ethical category that was with time made to refer only to the technical side of the law. Al-Ghazālī informs us that fiqh has become a specialized branch of fatwas and waqfs, on small details about them, and excessive debates surrounding them… The meaning of fiqh in the first period was, however, undisputedly linked to the science of the path of the hereafter, knowledge of the details of harmful matters of the self, that which corrupts human action, understanding of indulging in the wickedness of the world, perseverance for reaching the grace of the hereafter, and [God’s] fear’s domination over the heart.26 In the context of legal reasoning explicated in Mustaṣfā and his eth- ical system developed in Iḥyā’, he weaves his Sufi inclinations into legal theory, since applying maṣlaḥah in various economic activities seems to be a prerequisite. For instance, al-Ghazālī asserts that the value of human labor does not rest on the idea of gaining profit, whereas the production of necessities for the common good is perceived as a social and individual obligation (farḍ kifāya). It is hence safe to state that human conduct is seen in light of benefit and disutility (maṣāliḥ/mafāsid) permeated by the moral law. This presupposes that righteous economic behavior is part of the higher objectives of Sharīʿah, whereby one tries to increase maṣlaḥah or general well-being instead of utility in a conventional sense. Such a perception of economic activities further indicates that wants A L- d A G H i S tA N i : B E Y O N d M A Ṣ L A Ḥ A H  65 are replaced with needs, and that all activities must be seen as means to achieve goals toward increasing the welfare of an individual or a community. In other words, if acquiring wealth is a necessary human endeavor, seen also as a religious obligation, it conveys a message that an individual act has also broader social effect. However, if economic postulates are treated as wants and predicated upon exclusionist poli- cies, such as hoarding of money, counterfeiting of coins, and selling or buying illicit goods,27 then maṣlaḥah decreases in public sphere, for those policies can cause disturbances in the market. This narrative suggests that maṣlaḥah operates within the ethical-economic frame by fulfilling needs and regulating wants. In what follows, I take a closer look at the history of adab in its ethical understanding as virtuous traits of character and an extension of Sharīʿah law. I argue that adab is an overarching term that is comprehensive of maṣlaḥah, in how it informs righteous economic behavior, especially in the works of al-Ghazālī and other ethicists who discussed economic provisions and financial transactions through the kasb-zuhd discourse. Adab and Righteous Earnings Classical legal scholars, Sufis, and theologians, such as al-Shaybānī (d. 805), al-Muḥāsibī (d. 857), Ibn Abī al-Dunyā (d. 894), Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj al-Ṭūsī (d. 988), al-Māwardī (d. 1058), al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī (d. 1108), and al-Ghazālī, wrote about earning a righteous living and partaking in a com- munal exchange of goods, and encouraged fair market prices. While not all scholars belonged to the tradition of taṣawwuf or referred to maṣlaḥah directly, they examined the notion of well-being or common good when discussing economic behavior. In those texts economic endeavors are interlinked with personal discipline intended to curb excessive (eco- nomic) behavior, and personal piety informs broader socioeconomic relations. Sufi figures such as Ibn al-Mubārak (d. 797), al-Sulamī (d. 1106) and al-Qushayrī (d. 1074) referred to the spiritual stations of maqamāt and the virtuous traits of character, which is important for our discus- sion on adab and the development of ethical-economic genre through kasb-zuhd discourse. In the following pages, I showcase some of those 66  A M E R i C A N J O U R N A L O F i S L A M A N d S O C i E t Y 3 9 : 3 - 4 scholars and their economic philosophy. While numerous Sufis analyzed, described, and proscribed how one should behave in accordance with the normative etiquette of Islam,28 in this section I do not position Sufism on a pedestal but rather refer to the mechanisms of kasb and zuhd to explain the intricate relation between ethical behavior and economic predica- ments. Texts penned by certain Sufi thinkers are often normative and instructional, emphasizing self-discernment, scrupulousness, and inner worldly asceticism, in order to overcome vicissitudes in personal life and in society. It is impossible, however, to discuss moral predicaments in economic affairs without addressing them in the context of adab and its polyvalent human functions. In the premodern period, adab was (along with the hadīth tradition) perceived as the basis for the Sharīʿah’s normative system. Adab as the non-prophetic tradition was the quintessential (practical) wisdom that traveled through generations. Between the 8th and 9th centuries CE it became regarded as Islamic etiquette, cultivated by both courtiers and literati.29 While the term adab etymologically relates to da’b as custom or habit and carries both an ethical and practical meaning as “high quality of soul, good upbringing, urbanity and courtesy,” after the 7th century it acquired also an intellectual meaning,30 as the sum of knowledge that makes one courteous.31 In the classical period, adab carried polyvalent functions, some of which designate it as social education, traditional mannerism, shaping of character, or even literature. The term adab and its derivatives demonstrate an understanding of integrative moral education, pertaining to courteous or righteous behavior, good char- acter, nobility, and human tendency of eruditeness. Despite not being a Qur’anic term, it was very much rooted in the religious text and its ethical norms, and hence functioned in various domains – from siyāsah, to literature, to economic thought. Salvatore maintains that adab helped in providing a significant nexus between the cultiva- tion of the self, on the one hand, and general ideas of integration of the body politic, on the other. This happened not only because adab provided an ethical grammar to the high bureaucracy, but also due to its frequent association with discourses on the ‘circle of justice’.32 A L- d A G H i S tA N i : B E Y O N d M A Ṣ L A Ḥ A H  67 Adab is then a method rather than a norm33 applicable to all seg- ments of human life, often under the banner of Sharīʿah’s moral law that includes also the pursuit of economic well-being. During the Islamic revivalist period in the 18th-19th century, adab became disassociated from Sharīʿah’s normativity, since Muslim reformists transformed it into an the value of “civilized” behavior, whereas nowadays it is closely associated with akhlāq or ethics. Unlike adab, however, akhlāq became prevalent in the modern period, in part also due to the rise of political Islam and its more puritan interpretations.34 It is well established that adab as socio-moral chivalry was also the foundation of Sufi practice.35 Adab can, among various other defi- nitions, mean fulfilling God’s order, maintaining good character and manners,36 performing righteous deeds, activity directed toward the outer world (ẓāhir) and the inner self (bāṭin),37 as well as human inter- action.38 These forms of attitudes allow one to pursue the maṣāliḥ in this world, while striving on one’s spiritual quest, for perfection, and for “unveiling” (mukāshafa) of Divine presence on the path toward the hereafter. The well-known Sufi al-Sulamī stated that “All of Sufism is [nothing but] adab. For each mystical moment (waqt) there is an adab; for each [spiritual] state there is an adab; for each station [of the mystical path] there is an adab. Whoever follows adab will achieve the status of the real men (rijal) [of the mystical path].”39 The outward actions are thus bound to inner certitudes. In other words, in the context of adab, one’s daily economic activities, including purchases, sales, participation in barter exchange, and dealing with money or wealth in general, mirrors one’s inner predisposition, moral behavior, and social responsibilities. The spiritual stations of maqāmāt, such as tawbah (repentance), wara’ (watchfulness), zuhd (renunciation), faqr (spiritual poverty, as in absence of desire), ṣabr (patience), and tawakkul (trust in God), along with taqwā (piety or consciousness of God) were analyzed from the jurispruden- tial-ethical standpoint as part of larger economic discourse. Maqāmāt can be obtained through a rigorous spiritual exercise and devotion through daily activities, as an aspect of one’s religious life. Only when the first spiritual stage has been acquired can another be reached. In the context of financial and commercial activities, the stations of wara’, zuhd, and 68  A M E R i C A N J O U R N A L O F i S L A M A N d S O C i E t Y 3 9 : 3 - 4 faqr are of particular importance, for they showcase the relationality between one’s religious strivings and economic postulates. This relation- ality further provides an insight into the correlation between earning or acquisition of wealth (kasb) and extramundane detachment (zuhd).40 While nafs (self or soul) can index the power of human ego through desires, lust, cravings, and inclinations toward that which is harmful, it also describes the human spirit that has the ability to comprehend, and is hence associated with the heart (qalb) as a spiritual organ.41 The highest level of nafs is al-nafs al-muṭmaʾinna, as a complete reliance on the Divine, by attaining contentment (rāḍiya) and satisfaction (riḍāʾ).42 However, one purifies one’s heart also by purifying one’s wealth through engaging in righteous economic activities, such as providing for one’s family and paying zakāt.43 According to the Khurāsānī Sufi al-Qushayrī, nafs as the human soul, including its deficiencies, has two categories – those that one acquires and those that are intrinsic to human being.44 By introducing various Sufi figures, in his Epistle al-Qushayrī holds that wara’ as scrupulousness is the beginning of abstention or renunciation,45 an act of consideration better than fasting and praying,46 and an aware- ness to avoid greed.47 The apparent historic tension between zuhd and kasb as opposite conceptualizations generated a lively discussion on their affectability for righteous economic behavior. The term zuhd, however, must be seen in its Islamic context, since it does not mean a total rejection of the world (as it has been often interpreted through Christian notion of abstinence) but diverse views of inner-worldly self-contemplation,48 linked to piety, that include also socioeconomic engagements. One of the earliest accounts on zuhd in Islamic tradition was the writings of Ibn al-Mubārak, who stated that zuhd means that one should live in the world without being part of it.49 Furthermore, for al-Qushayrī zuhd is associated with wisdom, for that which is prohibited is an obligation, whereas renouncing that which is lawful is a virtue. They also say that having little property – provided that the servant of God endures his condi- tion patiently, satisfied with whatever God has apportioned for him and content with what God bestows upon him – is better A L- d A G H i S tA N i : B E Y O N d M A Ṣ L A Ḥ A H  69 than living comfortably and lavishly in this world, for God Most High urged His creatures to abstain from this world, when He said: “The enjoyment of this world is little; the world to come is better for him who fears God.”50 He asserts that zuhd derives from the Qur’anic passage “In order that you not despair over what has eluded you and not exult [in pride] over what He has given you. And Allah does not like everyone self-deluded and boastful,”51 because one who renounces “does not delight in anything he has of this world, nor is he sorry about losing something of it.”52 Renunciation is germane to feeling unremorseful about losing one’s pos- sessions and to having an absolute trust in the Divine order. Al-Qushayrī narrates that ‘Abd al-Wāhid ibn Zayd said that “Renunciation is to give up both the dinar and the dirham,”53 pinpointing that zuhd is about giving away one’s belongings.54 Al-Qushayrī states that he heard from Shaykh al-Sulamī that “True Reality is that the servant of God is independent of anything except God and its mark is not being in need of any provi- sions” and “poverty is a clothing that brings about contentment (rida), if one has realized its true meaning.”55 Purifying one’s wealth is conjoined with emptying of mundane possessions by embracing (spiritual) poverty (faqr).56 Of course, such an attitude does not convey that wealth is a sin or that profit is illicit, but rather that one has to constantly reexamine one’s own attachment to the material world and reassess (economic) matters at hand. For al-Sulamī and al-Qushayrī, faqr pertains to renounc- ing the world (zuhd) and the ego, by equating wealth with poverty. In ethical-economic genre, zuhd is closely associated with kasb as earning, wealth as māl, and faqr as spiritual poverty. Al-Shaybānī’s Kitāb al-Kasb was among the first to study not only legal but also traditional and ethical themes of economic engagement,57 arguably merging legal precepts of Sharī’a with moral reverberations of the notions of wealth and poverty. For al-Shaybānī, who very much focused on zuhd yet opposed those Sufis (mutakashshifa) who completely resorted to its teachings as a total submission to God and hence neglected their social (and economic) life, kasb as individual or collective activ- ity must be considered for the public good (maṣlaḥah). Any work on 70  A M E R i C A N J O U R N A L O F i S L A M A N d S O C i E t Y 3 9 : 3 - 4 the law of sale already contains a degree of renunciation, meaning that zuhd is more about avoiding that which is harmful and pursuing that which is licit, rather than a wholesale asceticism.58 Al-Shaybānī holds that kasb as righteous earning contributes toward the common good, since through it one can provide, first, for one’s own family, and second, for the community.59 Kasb pertains to basic needs and necessities, such as food, clothing, and shelter.60 In this context, one’s daily and practical obligations are aligned with religious and spiritual commitments, as kasb becomes a necessary endeavor:61 “Permissible earning is in the category of cooperation in acts of devotion and obedience.”62 Since hoarding and collecting wealth is harmful, abstaining from such acts means devoting time to licit earning in cooperation with others,63 in line with spiritual purification.64 Kasb is intrinsically related to relying on God (tawakkul),65 by also diverging from wastefulness, extravagance, boastfulness, and accumulating wealth.66 Wasting food pertains not only to material but also to spiritual extravagance; hence, al-Shaybānī states that wasting food would be an illicit act. Kasb also means providing food, clothing, and shelter to others, if one can do so. By stating various fiqh maxims (e.g., whatever are the means to facilitate wājib is itself wājib), al-Shay- bānī gives precedence to and deems preserving wealth as a sacrifice for future generations. Al-Muḥāsibī’s al-Makāsib wa al-Wara’ is also a text on ethical-eco- nomic thought, whereby financial transactions (muʿāmalāt) are analyzed in the context of watchfulness (wara’), renunciation (zuhd), reliance on God (tawakkul), and spiritual introspection (muḥāsaba). Al-Muḥāsibī, who was a Shāfiʿī jurist and a Sufi whose intellectual influence can be also found in al-Ghazālī’s Iḥyā’, believed that when engaging in economic activities and earning a living, one should also exercise mindfulness, remembrance of God (dhikr), and closeness to God (al-taqarrub), and should purify one’s hearth (ṭahārat al-qulūb) from harmful and unlawful deeds67 while relying on God’s sustenance (rizq).68 Al-Muḥāsibī “inte- grates the theological (kalāmī), legal (fiqhī) and ethico-spiritual (ṣūfī) dimensions of earning a livelihood,”69 by analyzing the processes of pur- chasing and selling, how to earn a living and provide for others, as part of virtue ethics. By navigating the worldly life, one must keep balance A L- d A G H i S tA N i : B E Y O N d M A Ṣ L A Ḥ A H  71 between miserliness and expenditure in preserving one’s dignity. This pertains to engaging in activities in a proper manner by adhering to scru- pulousness (wara’) in commerce and crafts. In Kitāb Taʾdīb al-Murīd, he further describes an educational scheme (taʾdīb) on how to govern one- self throughout the day, including economic postulates indicating that kasb is to be obtained first and foremost by one’s fair earnings. Moreover, in Kitāb al-Waṣāyā al-Naṣāʾiḥ al-Dīniyya,70 al-Muḥāsibī examines the impact deeds have on the soul and the so-called Islamic psychology (ʿilm al-nafs al-islāmī), paying a considerate attention to wealth. Since the origin of happiness is God-consciousness or taqwā (like what al-Ghazālī believed), the basis of one’s discontent is love of the worldly life or ḥubb al-dunyā. The accumulation and desire of wealth or lavish expenditure (isrāf) prevents one from being careful and economical in one’s suste- nance as well as from being miserly (bakhīl). Ibn Abī al-Dunyā provides a similar account in Iṣlāḥ al-Māl, ana- lyzing zuhd in relation to kasb by theorizing commerce as a bifurcated activity that pertains to this world and the hereafter. He divides eco- nomic themes into several fields. The first part of the book addresses licit acquisition and positive functions of wealth, acquiring money, securing a righteous livelihood, and different types of craftsmanship, whereas the second focuses on saving money (qaṣd al-māl) and basic human necessities such as foods and clothing, inheritance, and the notion of poverty. The motivations for earning a livelihood are both individual, such as overcoming poverty, and communal, such as helping others in need or managing a vocation. Ibn Abī al-Dunyā perceived wealth as both belonging to the material and the moral realm, while addressing spiritual qualities of human economic behavior. He analyzes beneficial functions of money as a divine generosity.71 Instead of passively indulg- ing in solitude, zuhd presupposes a rather dynamic engagement with daily obligations, including earning a living in whose core is the vision of the eternal life.72 Charity has to be given by everyone who possesses money,73 however, saving money is a virtue on its own right, because it can benefit others, while unnecessary spending might bring upon harm.74 Ibn Abī al-Dunyā maintains that high prices of goods at market can translate into miserliness; therefore, a seller or buyer is permitted 72  A M E R i C A N J O U R N A L O F i S L A M A N d S O C i E t Y 3 9 : 3 - 4 to withdraw from a trading agreement. Earning a livelihood by ethical means translates into providing also for others, which is a form of jihād.75 Thus, both wealth and poverty can become causes of great distress and trouble if not handled with spiritual care.76 Al-Māwardī’s Adab al-Dīn wa al-Dunyā deals not only with legal injunctions, but also with the cultivation of personal virtuous (adab). The book covers three subjects, namely adab al-dīn (virtues of religious conduct), adab al-dunyā (virtues of mundane conduct), and adab al-nafs (virtues of personal conduct). With this text al-Māwardī showed how to balance (wasaṭ) revelation with reason, law with morals, and legal prescriptions with ethical manners, relying on logic (‘ilm al-manṭiq), empirical research (al-tajriba), and introspection (al-mushāhada). Adab as a moral education is for al-Māwardī the discipline of body, mind, and soul, associated with cultivating economic awareness in terms of securing just conduct at markets, minimizing harm when engaging with barter exchange, and providing for one’s family. The source of adab is reason (‘aql) and upbringing.77 Adab al-dunyā is inextricably related to economic provision and one’s piety. Al-Māwardī cautions that one must take something from this world (dunyā) that will be beneficial for the hereafter (ākhira). This includes work (‘amal), since there is no work in the hereafter.78 He considers business and trade as part of two basic human activities, namely agriculture and production. He divides human occupation into three types. The first involves active or rational thinking (ṣināʿa al-fikr), and includes governmental and sci- entific posts, which are highly regarded. The second involves actions (ṣināʿa al-ʿamal), and includes farmers and blue-collar workers. The third involves both active thinking and actions (ṣināʿa al-fikr wa al-ʿamal), and includes secretaries and construction workers. One of the conditions for the (moral) revival of the human being (al-aṣlaḥ al-insān) is having sufficient financial means (al-mādda al-kāfiya). Financial security means obtaining that which grows on its own, such as plants and animals. In order to obtain commodities and economic resources, one must utilize management skills. In this context, kasb as work leads towards securing financial means (al-mādda) and human needs (al-hāja) in two ways – either through trading (tijāra) or A L- d A G H i S tA N i : B E Y O N d M A Ṣ L A Ḥ A H  73 industry (ṣināʿa).79 On the other hand, zuhd means that the one who performs introspection (muḥāsaba) is afraid of one’s own passions and hence retreats to poverty (faqr) rather than focusing on riches (ghinā). Al-Māwardī bases his reasoning on the Qur’anic injunction indicat- ing that if one is satisfied with small provision (rizq), God would be pleased with his (limited) contribution.80 The moral revival of the human being also means meeting economic needs of members of the commu- nity, and encompasses behavioral patterns that extend to oneself and others. Aspects of obligations towards the self include piety, practicing self-control, avoiding wastefulness and boastfulness, refraining from envy, affluence, and so forth.81 Obligations toward family and members of the community involve helping those in need or in debt as well as practicing tolerance, forgiveness, and trying to meet others’ economic needs.82 Moral integrity also means practicing moderate economic behavior and includes giving charity (ṣadaqa) as a manifestation of one’s piety in order to attain happiness.83 Giving charity prevents harmful tendencies in business and trading and can be enacted either by providing assistance by exercising generosity or by being kind to others in both words and deeds. The aim of financial help or owning property is not to be wasteful or boastful but to obtain a level of efficiency and social cohesion. Social inequalities, al-Māwardī informs us, are a natural progression; however, they can be advantageous only if there is cooperation between different groups of people. Although al-Māwardī believes in a particu- lar social strata system that is based on God’s wisdom, human beings can turn their differences into benefits by focusing on their work, to provide for basic needs and to avoid disputes. Governmental authority is required to guarantee an equitable distribution of income. To create a welfare society, the governmental authority regulates and manages public finances, revenues, security of society, levies zakāt and fa’i, and provides benefits to the members of the community from the treasury. A righteous governmental authority is, however, not a technology of governance that fashions virtuous subjects according to its own laws but rather is based on subjects’ pious behavior. State institutions led by the head of the governmental authority is needed not only to enforce rules 74  A M E R i C A N J O U R N A L O F i S L A M A N d S O C i E t Y 3 9 : 3 - 4 but also to create harmony in the community. While the governmental authority is meant to provide for public welfare, it cannot do so without the support of the private sector. In other words, both the governmental authority and the members of the community have the obligation to preserve and enact a particular moral character and integrity to meet the needs of the economy. One of the pinnacles of the ethical-economic genre is certainly al-Ghazālī, who provided a detailed account of economic engagements by combining both philosophical reasoning and Sufi conceptualizations in the context of his theory of eternal happiness (saʿādah). Saʿādah permeates his theological, legal, and Sufi thought, and it encompasses also the very concept of maṣlaḥah as benefit. He often references other Sufi scholars, including al-Muḥāsibī and al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, when discussing economic ideas. Al-Ghazālī’s economic thought is primarily found in the third book of the second volume of the Iḥyā’, titled Kitāb Adab al-Kasb wa al-Maʿāsh.84 It is centered on the concept of eternal happiness (saʿādah) in light of his science of the hereafter (‘ilm ṭarīq al-ākhirah);85 it is part of his overall ethical system or moral epistemol- ogy aimed at reviving the lost religious sciences of the day. Economic activities, which one is expected to perform daily,86 form part of this system. Eternal happiness is achieved through self-examination and self-knowledge that cleanses the self from worldly desires, in whose core is also commercial life. Al-Ghazālī asserts that poverty means being independent from worldly desires,87 while at the same time maintaining a “healthy” engagement with the phenomenal world. One who is close to God is either a person who performs obligatory acts and avoids sins, one who profits from God’s grace and voluntarily performs good deeds (iḥsān), or a person who falls short in performing obligatory acts.88 Such division extends to one’s relation with other members of society. He asserts that throughout the day one should occupy oneself with that which is beneficial in the afterlife and with gaining (economic) provi- sions that assist one in achieving eternal happiness in the hereafter. If one cannot occupy oneself with such acts when associating with people, then one should instead seek solace in solitude. Since the very object of trade and commerce is two-fold – either to gain subsistence or wealth89 A L- d A G H i S tA N i : B E Y O N d M A Ṣ L A Ḥ A H  75 – al-Ghazālī upholds that iḥsān must be practiced in the market as an act of generosity. He cautions that one should take only that much of goods from this world as is necessary for one’s life,90 and that the level of consumption must be balanced between necessity and extravagance.91 Since the ultimate goal of trade and commerce is for al-Ghazālī not gain- ing profits for the sake of making money, but the remembrance of the hereafter, one has to provide for oneself, one’s family, and community.92 In the context of his overall ethical system, al-Ghazālī holds that counterfeiting of coins (dīnārs and dirhams) is prohibited since it can affect market rates.93 He affirms that man lusts for money and that taints his righteous character. Māl is one of the five necessities (al-ḍarūrīyāt) that Sharīʿah provides for, safeguarding righteous conduct against any temptation (fitna).94 While money has been created in order to fulfil basic human needs, one should seek balance when dealing with it and avoid miserliness (excessive restriction on expenditure) and extravagance (excessive spending of wealth).95 Accordingly, economic activities extend to provision of basic human needs – such as food, clothing, and shel- ter96 – which are in accordance with Sharīʿah’s law in order to improve one’s general well-being. In Kimiyā, al-Ghazālī puts forward the idea that gaining profit is licit if particular conditions are met; trading with illicit goods is illicit, for one can trade only with one’s possessions.97 Yet, since having wealth also opens the door for possible enjoyment of illicit pleasures, he constantly draws attention to the fact that money does not possess an intrinsic value. Rather, its value lies in how it facilitates exchange of commodities.98 The value of money is hence related also to labor as a means to achieve higher ends: The creation of dirhams and dīnārs is one of many bounties of God. Every aspect of economic activities relies on dealings with these two types of money. They are two metals that have no intrinsic benefit on their own; nonetheless, people need them, so that they can use them as [as a medium] for exchange for food, clothing, and other goods. Sometimes, one needs what one does not own and one owns what one does not need.99 76  A M E R i C A N J O U R N A L O F i S L A M A N d S O C i E t Y 3 9 : 3 - 4 One can take a similar approach in regard to the concept of siyāsah as public policy, which was also informed by adab’s narratives of good governance and statecraft. Many great adab anthologies contain literary chapters dealing with siyāsah. Siyāsah was treated together with maṣlaḥah in legal manuals, theological treaties, and Sufi texts100 in terms of advising rulers how to acquire power, distribute wealth, and fund public operations through. In this context, adab functions to form virtues of self-restrain and good governance, pertaining to securing the economic, social, and religious life of the community. According to Salvatore, siyāsah “circumscribes a borderline area of human activity that is both legitimized from within the jurisprudential dimension of the shari’a tradition and escapes it for delin- eating a separate field demarcating the autonomy of rulers from a too rigid application of religious norms.”101 If the political power of the rulers was, in theory, operating within the Sharīʿah, then siyāsah has to be considered as an extension of the moral law102 and pinpoints an inner-worldly human behavior that informs daily activities, including economic life. In Iḥyā’, the adab of the self and the adab of the socioeconomic life coincide, for the cultivation of the self leads toward establishing civil ethic that can be facilitated by a ruler and hence reflected in an Islamic polity. Al-Ghazālī’s notion of siyāsah describes the intricate relation between the ruler or governance and maṣlaḥah as common good or welfare. He claims that the meaning of siyāsah must improve human affairs by guiding people to the righteous path, in order to obtain sal- vation both in this world and in the hereafter (ṭarīq al-ākhirah). Siyāsah is then associated with the economic preservation and ruler’s manage- ment over it.103 The main principles of just policy are justice (‘adl) and good governance, whereas oppressive policy expounds self-interest and unjust reign. In Naṣīḥat al-Mulūk,104 composed initially in Persian for Sulṭān Muḥammad b. Malikshāh (proclaimed in 1099) of the Saljūq Empire, al-Ghazālī informs us that Islamic governance has the task to ensure just economic activities while exercising Sharīʿah-mandated obligations.105 In discussing the spiritual life of a ruler,106 al-Ghazālī claims that a ruler is obligated to obtain prosperity for his people and should cooperate with ‘ulamā’. The responsibility of the ruler and the intervention of the A L- d A G H i S tA N i : B E Y O N d M A Ṣ L A Ḥ A H  77 governmental authority is grounded on the basis of regulating economic conduct and facilitating secure conditions for trading. Siyāsah as a polit- ical regulation and maṣlaḥah as common good were to be considered in the context of the institution of ḥisbah, which also encompasses supervision of markets and financial practices in markets.107 While Islamic governance practiced supervision of markets by sanctioning fraudulent transactions and unlawful contracts, the mechanism of the ḥisbah institutions varied according to different regions and eras. What stayed the same, however, was the very nature of ḥisbah, which was run by a muḥtasib or a public auditor who supervised transactions, prices, advertisements, and weights, not only as legal enforcements but also as moral behavior.108 Various scholars wrote on its mechanisms, describing the role and responsibilities of a muḥtasib, and providing manuals on how to monitor illicit activities in markets, such as forestalling and inflating the prices of goods in times of scarcity. The role of the muḥtasib was in al-Ghazālī’s view to ensure supply and provision of necessities and to promote justice through assuring price control in times when necessary.109 In this setting, Islamic governance is founded not only on legal-political but also (and essentially) on ethical foundations sus- tained by the very Muslim community that supports its governmental system.110 Adab as the inner disposition of the soul and the practice of self-ex- amination geared toward spiritual proximity to the divine on the path toward the hereafter is hence part of al-Ghazālī’s science of unveiling (‘ilm al-mukāshafa) found in the Iḥyā’111 and his overall understanding of piety, which pertains to both the adab of the inner self and the adab of a wider community. It encompasses voluntary acts as virtuous traits of character and is neither a term reserved specifically for the tradition of taṣawwuf nor it is disassociated from jurisprudence. The theoretical consideration of adab as a moral formulation correlates to the practice of renouncing excessive economic gains within the context of the puri- fication of the heart,112 and is often invoked together with maṣlaḥah as benefit. Al-Ghazālī cautions that spiritual guidance based on the ethos of adab is ultimately about tawakkul and inward consciousness of the Divine that brings about poised character.113 78  A M E R i C A N J O U R N A L O F i S L A M A N d S O C i E t Y 3 9 : 3 - 4 Conclusion In the classical texts discussed above on ethical-economic genre, Sharīʿah and adab are fluid categories and not shielded monoliths. Mechanisms such as charity (ṣadaqah) and the alms-tax (zakāt) and institutions such as chari- table trust funds (waqf) and supervision of markets (ḥisbah) were conceived in the works of al-Shaybānī, al-Muḥāsibī, Ibn Abī al-Dunyā, al-Māwardī, and al-Ghazālī not only within the legal realm of maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah, the preservation of common good (maṣlaḥah), and policy-oriented governance (siyāsah sharʿiyyah), but were also articulated through the conceptualization of adab as the moral practice of attaining the hereafter. Ethical questions formed the gist of economic thought in those deliberations, including by cultivating adab (often in ways subsumed by Sharīʿah normativity). Questions of economic justice (‘adl), prohibition of usury (ribā), and just governance (aḥkām al-sulṭāniyyah) were dis- cussed in legal texts, theological works, and Sufi treaties. Those scholars believed that implementing justice was crucial for providing welfare to the community. This was not only a matter of legal injunction or politi- cal decision, but rather an ethical issue embedded in how one performs and cultivates righteous character. Acquiring wealth, redistribution of goods, participating in trade, and supervising market regulations were conceived in relation to stipulating maṣlaḥah also in the context of the stations of maqāmāt, such as renunciation of the world (zuhd), spiri- tual poverty (faqr), and trust in God (tawakkul). While commercial laws (muʿāmalāt) were studied as legal injunctions, they complemented acts of worship (ʿibādāt). It is against this background that wealth and earning a living were conceptualized together in light of the divine. From this vantage point, we can deem Islamic ethical-economic thought not simply an amalgamation of legal rules and economic obli- gations but rather a multidimensional process rooted in an overarching concept of adab. There, personal traits are constantly foregrounded through the intricacy of moral principles. A L- d A G H i S tA N i : B E Y O N d M A Ṣ L A Ḥ A H  79 Endnotes 1 See Sami Al-Daghistani, The Making of Islamic Economic Thought: Islamization, Law, and Moral Discourses (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2022). 2 For more on the comparison between conventional and Islamic economics, see Waleed Addas, Methodology of Economics: Secular vs. Islamic (Kuala Lumpur: International Islamic University Malaysia, 2008). 3 Sami Al-Daghistani, “Semiotics of Islamic Law,  Maṣlaḥa, and Islamic Economic Thought,” International Journal for the Semiotics of Law 29 (2016): 389–404. 4 Al-Ghazālī, Mustaṣfā min ‘Ilm al-Uṣūl, 4 vols. (Medina: Sharika al-Madīna al-Mun- awwara li al-Ṭabā‘at, 2008). 5 See e.g. Qur’an 4:29-30; see also Michael Bonner, “Poverty and Economics in the Qur’an,” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 35, no. 3 (2005; special issue on Poverty and Charity: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, ed. Mark Cohen): 391-406. 6 Benedikt Koehler, Early Islam and the Birth of Capitalism (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015). 7 Timur Kuran, “The Absence of the Corporation in Islamic Law: Origins and Persistence,” American Journal of Comparative Law 53 (2005): 785-834.  8 Abdul Azim Islahi, “The Myth of Bryson and Economic Thought in Islam,” Journal of King Abdulaziz University: Islamic Economics 21, no. 1 (2008): 57-61. 9 On Sharī‘a’s moral law and its cosmological imprint, see Sami al-Daghistani, The Making of Islamic Economic Thought. On “mystical Shar‘ism” see Wael Hallaq, The Impossible State (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013). 10 See Qur’an e.g. 4:58, 11:84, 16:76, 43:15, etc. 11 See e.g. Ibn Manzur, Lisān al-‘arab, s.v. 12 For Aristotel’s and Bryson’s influence in Ibn Sīnā’s economic thought, see e.g. Nurizal Ismail, A Critical Study of Ibn Sina’s Economic Ideas (MA thesis, International Institute Islamic Thought and Civilization, 2012); Yassine Essid, A Critique of the Origin of Islamic Economic Thought (New York: E.J. Brill, 1995), 186. 13 The philosophy of economic growth, barter exchange, and other economic mecha- nisms were in Islamic tradition embedded in a particular framework that cannot be simply replicated or reinstalled in the contemporary era, due to the loss of a quintes- sential paradigm that has occurred with the onslaught of colonialism and modernity. For more on the colonial impact on the social, political, and intellectual life in Muslim societies, see e.g. Wael Hallaq, Sharī‘a (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). For more on modern Islamic Economics, see e.g. Muhammad Akram Khan, What Is Wrong With Islamic Economics? Analysing the Present State and Future Agenda (Cheltenham, UK; Edward Elgar); Asad Zaman, “Re-Defining Islamic Economics,” in Basic Concepts, New Thinking and Future Directions in Islamic Economics, eds. Taha Egri & Necmettin Kizilkaya (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015), 58-76. 80  A M E R i C A N J O U R N A L O F i S L A M A N d S O C i E t Y 3 9 : 3 - 4 14 Iqtiṣād from qaṣada, meaning “purpose,” “justice,” “aim,” “direction,” “objective.” 15 See e.g. Adi Setia, “The Restoration of Wealth: Introducing Ibn Abī al-Dunyā’s Iṣlāḥ al-Māl,” Islamic Sciences 13, no. 2 (2015): 93; idem, “The Meaning of ‘Economy’: Qaṣd, Iqtiṣād, Tadbīr al-Manzil,” Islamic Sciences 14, no. 1 (2016): 120-121. 16 For al-Shāṭibī, maqāṣid is the attainment of good and prevention from evil, pre- senting the core of Sharī‘a’s law. See also al-Ṭūfi’s (d. 1316) account of maqāṣid in Najm al-Dīn al-Țūfī, Risālat fī Ri’āyat al-Maṣlaḥah, N/A, 1993, 139 as at Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (Cambridge: The Islamic Text Society, 2005), 242; and ʿIzz al-Dīn Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām, Qawāʿid al-Ahkām fī Maṣālīh al-Anām (Cairo: Maktabah al-Kulliyāt al-Azhariyyah, 1991). 17 Al-Juwāyni, Kitāb al-Irshād ilā Qawāṭi‘ al-Adilla fī Uṣūl al-I‘tiqād; Al-Juwayni, A Guide to the Conclusive Proofs for the Principles of Belief, trans. Paul E. Walker (UK: Garnet Publishing, 2001); Jasser Ouda, Maqāsid al-Sharī‘a (Herndon, VA: IIIT, 2008), 17. 18 Al-Juwāyni, Kitāb al-Irshād, vol. 1, 286-287. Prior to al-Ghazālī and al-Juwaynī, al-‘Āmirī presented the concepts with which the latter two operated. 19 See for instance al-Ghazālī’s categorization of maqāṣid also in relation to economic provision and kasb. Al-Ghazālī, Iḥyā’ ‘Ulūm al-Dīn (Beirut: Dār al-Ma‘rifah, 1982,), vol. 2. 20 Ash‘arīs believe that all human acts are created by God, often invoked through the following Qur’anic verse 37:96: “While Allah created you and that which you do.” 21 Aḥmad Zakī Mansūr Ḥammād, “Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī’s Juristic Doctrine in Mustaṣfā min ‘Ilm al-Uṣūl” (Phd diss., University of Chicago, 1987), vol. 1, 17. 22 Ibid. 23 See e.g. Ahmed El Shamsy, “The Wisdom of God’s Law: Two Theories,” in Islamic Law in Theory, eds. A. Kevin Reinhart and Robert Gleave (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 31. 24 Abdul Aziz bin Sattam, Sharia and the Concept of Benefit: The Use and Function of Maslaha in Islamic Jurisprudence (London: I.B.Tauris, 2015). 25 See al-Ghazālī, al-Mustaṣfā, Vol. 1. 26 Al-Ghazālī, Iḥyā’, Vol. 1, 32 as at Sami Al-Daghistani, Ethical Teachings of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī: Economics of Happiness (London: Anthem Press, 2021), 70. 27 Al-Ghazālī, Iḥyā’, Vol. 1, 17; see also Vol. 2. 28 See e.g. al-Sulamī, Kitāb Adab al-Suhba, ed. Meir Kister (Jerusalem: Israeli Oriental Society, 1954); Bernd Radtke, R. Sean O’Fahey, and John O’Kane, “Two Sufi Treaties of Ahmad Ibn idris,” Oriens 35 (1996): 143-178; Bernd Radtke, Adab al-muluk: Ein Handbuch zur islamischen Mystik aus dem 4/10. Jahrhundert (Beirut: Beiruter Texte und Studien, 1991); al-Sarraj, Kitāb al-Luma‘, ed. Kamil Mustafa al-Nihawandi (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 2001). 29 For more, see e.g. Armando Salvatore, “Secularity through a ‘Soft Distinction’ in the Islamic Ecumene? Adab as a Counterpoint to Shari‘a,” Historical Social Research A L- d A G H i S tA N i : B E Y O N d M A Ṣ L A Ḥ A H  81 44, no. 3 (2019): 35-51; Barbara Daly Metcalf, “Introduction,” in Moral Conduct and Authority: The Place of Adab in South Asian Islam, ed. Barbara Daly Metcalf (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 1-20. 30 The Encyclopaedia of Islam (Leiden: Brill, 1996), s.v. adab, 175. Its naissance is asso- ciated with the writings of Ibn al-Muqaffa‘ (d. 756). 31 See also Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-‘Arab (Qom: Adab al-Hawza, 1984), s.v. adab, 43 f. 32 Salvatore, “Secularity through a ‘Soft Distinction’ in the Islamic Ecumene?” 40. 33 Salvatore, “Secularity through a ‘Soft Distinction’ in the Islamic Ecumene?” 41; Seeger A. Bonebakker, “Adab and the Concept of Belles-lettres,” in ʻAbbasid Belles- lettres, ed. Julia Ashtian, T. M. Johnstone, J.D. Latham and R. B. Serjeant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 16-30. 34 See Cathérine Mayeur-Jaouen, ed., Adab and Modernity: A Civilising Process? (Leiden: Brill, 2019), 31. 35 See e.g. Alexander Knysh, Sufism: A New History of Islamic Mysticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), Chapter 5; on the definition of adab, see The Encyclopaedia of Islam (Leiden: Brill, 1996), s.v. 36 Knysh, Sufism, 138. 37 Ibn Khaldūn, Shifā’ al-Sā’il wa Tahdhib al-Masā’il, ed. Muhammad Muti‘ al-Hāfiz (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1996). 38 See al-Ghazālī, Iḥyā’, Vol. 2; al-Ghazālī, Al-Ghazālī on Islamic Guidance, trans. Muhammad Abul Quasem (Selangor, Malaysia: National University of Malaysia, 1979). 39 Al-Sulamī in Knysh, Sufism, 139; see also al-Sulamī, Kitāb Adab al-Suhba, ed. Meir Kister (Jerusalem: Israeli Oriental Society, 1954). 40 See e.g. Setia, “The Restoration of Wealth,” 82-83. 41 For a detailed account of the nafs and tazkīya in the Qur’an and Islamic intellectual history, see e.g. Gavin Picken, Spiritual Purification in Islam: The Life and Works of al-Muḥāsibī (London: Routledge, 2011), 123-167. 42 Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah stated that the nafs can achieve tranquility if it under- goes the process from doubt to certainty, from ignorance to knowledge of God, from heedlessness to remembrance of God, from deceit to repentance and truthfulness, and from boastfulness to submission and humility. In relation to the purification of the heart, Ibn Taymiyyah states that tazkīya means to make something pure (zakiyyan), either in essence or in belief. See Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, al-Rūḥ, ed. Muḥammad ʿAlī al-Qutb and Walīd al-Dhikrā (Beirut: al-Maktabah al-ʿAṣriyyah, 2000), 259; Ibn Taymiyyah, Majmūʿ Fatāwā Shaykh al-Islām Aḥmad Ibn Taymiyyah (Riyadh: Matābi’ al-Riyāḍ, 1963), Vol. 10; see also Picken, Spiritual Purification in Islam, 138-139, 149. 43 Al-Tirmidhī (d. 869), who as a jurist and a Sufi scholar synthesized Islamic theol- ogy, mysticism, and cosmology, wrote on training the self, holding that one must 82  A M E R i C A N J O U R N A L O F i S L A M A N d S O C i E t Y 3 9 : 3 - 4 perform voluntary work, seek salvation in the hereafter, fight against lust for power, and discipline the soul by purifying oneself. The nafs is for al-Tirmidhī the “‘land’ (arḍ) of debauchery, inclined to carnal appetite after carnal appetite and desire after desire; it does not gain calmness nor does it gain stability. Its actions vary, none of them resembling the other; one time it is servitude and another it is divinity, one time it is surrender and another it is domination, one time it is incapacity and another it is capability. So, if the soul is contented and disciplined, it will become obedient.” Muḥammad b. ʿ Alī al-Tirmidhī, Nawādir al-Uṣūl (Istanbul: n.p., 1876), 201 as at Picken, Spiritual Purification in Islam, 153. Moreover, for al-Ghazālī, nafs has two meanings: that of anger, sexual and carnal appetite, which has to be battled, and that pertaining to human essence and spiritual qualities. 44 Al-Qushayri, Epistle on Sufism, trans. Alexander Knysh (Reading, UK: Garnet Publishing, 2007), 109. 45 Ibid., 130. 46 Ibid., 131. 47 Ibid., 132. 48 Knysh, Sufism, 170-174. 49 For one of the earliest and most comprehensive Sufi works in the zuhd genre, see Ibn al-Mubārak, Kitāb al-Zuhd wa al-Raqā’iq (Riyad: Dār al-Mi‘rāj al-Dawliyya, 1990). Knysh holds that the work praises humility and seclusion, yet it steers away from an extreme understanding of trust in God (tawakkul). See also Feryal Salem, The Emergence of Early Sufi Piety and Sunnī Scholasticism (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 105-138. 50 Al-Qushayri, Epistle on Sufism, 134. 51 Qur’an, 53:27. 52 Al-Qushayri, Epistle on Sufism, 134. 53 Ibid., 136. 54 Al-Junayd also stated that it relates to “keeping your hands free from possessions and your heart from attachment [to this world]” (ibid.). 55 Ibid., 282. 56 Al-Qushayri, Epistle on Sufism, 129 f. 57 Al-Shaybānī, Kitāb al-Kasb (Ḥalab: Maktabah al-Maṭbu‘āt al-Islāmiyyah, 1997). 58 Michael Bonner, “The Kitab al-Kasb attributed to al-Shaybani: Poverty, Surplus, and the Circulation of Wealth,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 121, no. 3 (2011): 414. 59 Al-Shaybānī, Kitāb al-Kasb, 70; Adi Setia, “Imam Muḥammad Ibn al-Ḥasan al-Shay- bāni on Earning a Livelihood,” 105. 60 Al-Shaybānī, Kitāb al-Kasb, 36. 61 Ibid., 71. A L- d A G H i S tA N i : B E Y O N d M A Ṣ L A Ḥ A H  83 62 Idib., 164. 63 Ibid., 135. 64 Ibid., 136. 65 Ibid., 83, 93. 66 “Al-israf wa al-saraf wa al-makhila wa al-tafakhur wa al-takathur.” Michael Bonner, “The Kitab al-Kasb attributed to al-Shaybani,” 418. 67 See Adi Setia, Kitāb al-Makāsib (The Book of Earnings) by al-Hārith al-Muḥāsibī (751-857 C.E.) (Kuala Lumpur: IBFIM, 2016). 68 Al-Muḥāsibī, al-Makāsib wa al-Wara‘ (Beirut: Mu’ssasah al-Kutub al-Thaqāfiyyah, 1987), 42. 69 Adi Setia, “Al-Muḥāsibī: On Scrupulousness and the Pursuit of Livelihoods: Two Excerpts from His al-Makāsib wa al-Wara‘,” Islamic Sciences 14, no. 1 (2016): 73. 70 The title bears two names. For more about the background of the book, see Picken, Spiritual Purification in Islam. For al-Muḥāsibī’s economic analysis, see al-Muḥāsibī, Kitāb al-Waṣāyā, ed. ʿAbd al-Qādir Aḥmad Aṭā (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1986). 71 Ibn Abī al-Dunyā, Iṣlāḥ al-Māl (Beirut: Mu’assasah al-Kutub al-Thaqāfiyyah, 1993), 33. 72 Ibid., 41. 73 Ibid., 33, 46, 48. 74 Ibid., 100. 75 Ibid., 73. 76 Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj al-Ṭūsī (d. 988) in Kitāb al-Luma‘ discusses seven maqāmāt (spiritual stations) that relate to economic activities. The first is tawbah (repentance), which corresponds to the awareness of the Divine presence in one’s heart (qalb) and brings about spiritual uplift. The second is wara‘ (watchfulness or abstention), pertaining to self-reflection and self-restraint. The third is zuhd (renunciation) as a precaution against worldly endeavors. The fourth is faqr (spiritual poverty) as denying excessive behavior such as spending, in order to achieve spiritual thrust and contentment. The fifth is ṣabr (patience) that has to be practiced in trading activities, which brings about spiritual endurance. The sixth is tawakkul (trust in God), which means devoting oneself to the higher order, encompassing both ma‘rifa and ‘amal, while the final station is riḍā’ (pure contentment) as a submission to qaḍā (fate). Exercising those maqāmāt are essential for attaining what classical scholars refer to as righteous economic behavior and underlines the importance of moral attitude toward wealth. Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj al-Ṭūsī, Kitāb al-Luma‘ fī al-Taṣawwuf, ed. Reynold Alleyne Nicholson (Leyden: Brill, 1914), 43-52. 77 Al-Māwardī, Adab al-Dīn wa al-Dunyā, 41, 370. 78 Ibid., 211-213. 84  A M E R i C A N J O U R N A L O F i S L A M A N d S O C i E t Y 3 9 : 3 - 4 79 The known ways of earning or makāsib are based on agriculture, animal products, benefits from trading, and benefits from industry. Ibid., 335. 80 Ibid., 347. 81 Ibid., 352. 82 Ibid., 251-262. 83 Ibid., 180-188. 84 See the English translation al-Ghazālī, The Book of the Proprieties of Earning and Living, trans. Adi Seita (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Banking & Finance Institute Malaysia, 2013). 85 For a more detailed discussion of al-Ghazālī’s economics, see al-Daghistani, Ethical Teachings of Abu Hamid al-Ghazālī. 86 Al-Ghazālī, Bidāyat al-Hidāya, 90; al-Ghazālī, The Beginning of Guidance, 54. 87 See al-Ghazālī, Iḥyā’ ‘Ulūm al-Dīn, Vol. 4. 88 Al-Ghazālī, Bidāyat al-Hidāya, 91-92. 89 Al-Ghazālī, Iḥyā’, Vol. 2, 63. 90 Al-Ghazali, The Revival of Religious Sciences, 100; see also al-Ghazālī, Iḥyā’, Vol. 2. 91 Al-Ghazālī, Iḥyā’, Vol. 2, 1. 92 Al-Ghazālī, Bidāyat al-Hidāya, 90. 93 Al-Ghazālī, Iḥyā’, Vol. 2, 68. 94 Al-Ghazālī, Iḥyā’, Vol. 3, 231. 95 Al-Ghazālī, Iḥyā’, Vol. 2, 1. 96 Al-Ghazālī, Mizān al-‘Amal (Cairo: Dār al-Ma’ārif, 1964), 377. 97 Al-Ghazālī, Iḥyā’, Vol. 2; al-Ghazālī, Kimiyā, 474. 98 Ashqar & Wilson, Islamic Economics: A Short History, 248. Money should not be spent for its own sake: al-Ghazālī, Iḥyā’, Vol. 3, 278. 99 Al-Ghazālī, Iḥyā’, Vol. 4, 91. 100 See, for instance, Fawzi M. Najjar, “Siyāsa in Islamic Political Philosophy,” Islamic Theology and Philosophy: Studies in Honor of George F. Hourani, ed. M.E. Marmura (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984), 92-110; al-Māwardī, Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyya (Cairo: al-Babi al-Halabi, 1973); al-Ghazālī, Nasihat al-Mu- luk: al-Ghazali’s Book of Counsel for Kings, trans. F.R.C. Bagley (London: Oxford University Press, 1964). 101 Armando Salvatore, “The Islamicate Adab Tradition vs. the Islamic Shariʿa, from Pre-Colonial to Colonial,” Working Paper Series of the HCAS “Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities,” Leipzig, March 2018, 14. 102 Hallaq, The Impossible State, 67. 103 Al-Ghazālī, Iḥyā’, Vol. 2, 10-11, 53, 55. A L- d A G H i S tA N i : B E Y O N d M A Ṣ L A Ḥ A H  85 104 On the discussion about the authorship of Naṣīḥat al-Mulūk, see e.g. Patricia Crone, “Did al-Ghazālī Write a Mirror for Princes? On the Authorship of Nasīḥat al-Mulūk,” Jerusalem Studies of Arabic and Islam 10 (1987): 167-197; Carole Hillenbrand, “A Little-Known Mirror for Princes by al-Ghazālī,” in Words, Texts, and Concepts Cruising The Mediterranean Sea: Studies on the Sources, Contents and Influences of Islamic Civilization and Arabic Philosophy and Science: Dedicated to Gerhard Endress on his Sixty-Fifth Birthday, ed. Gerhard Endress, Arnzen Rüdiger, and J. Thielmann (Leuven: Peeters, 2004); Ann K.S. Lambton, “The Theory of Kingship in the Nasīḥat al-Mulūk,” The Islamic Quarterly 1 (1954): 47-55. 105 Al-Ghazālī, Counsel for Kings, ix, xviii. 106 Ibid., xxxviii. 107 Including Abū Yūsuf (d. 798), al-Shaizarī (d. 1193), al-Ghazālī, and Ibn Taymiyyah. Abū Yūsuf’s Kitāb al-Kharaj, which is essentially a classical text on fiqh, discusses kharaj (collected taxes), ʿushūr (a tithe payable by Muslims), and ṣadaqāt (alms) in light of state governance’s fiscal policy while providing advice to rulers based on religious law. For Abū Yūsuf, the ruler is responsible for the general welfare of the people. In his letter to the caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd he asserted that providing for the (general) welfare of the people and preventing forms of hardships constitutes one of the basic objectives of Islamic governance. This includes also providing social goods for the development of the economy and fair distribution of income from taxes. What determines the functioning and executing of such objectives is for him nested in the moral code of Islamic governance. See e.g., Muhammad Khalid Masud, “The Doctrine of Siyāsa in Islamic Law,” Recht van de Islam 18 (2001): 3; Abū Yūsuf, Kitāb al-Kharaj (Beirut: Dār al-Ma‘rifah, 1979), 61, 64; Abū Yūsuf, Kitāb al-Kharaj, trans. A. Ben Shemesh (Leiden: Brill, 1969); ‘Abdur Raḥman bin Naṣr Al-Shaizarī, Aḥkām al-Ḥisbah (Beirut: Dār al-Thaqāfa, n.d.). 108 See e.g. Islahi, Contribution of Muslim Scholars to Economic Thought and Analysis. 109 Al-Ghazālī, Iḥyā’, Vol. 2, 312. Normal price was considered the market price. Al-Ghazālī holds a similar view, as with Ibn Hazm (d. 1064), who was one of the proponents of the imposition of taxes in times when the government is facing resource deficiencies. For Ibn Hazm, a ruler (in the name of Islamic governance) should provide what is nowadays called a basic standard of living—food, clothing, and shelter. To remedy poverty, the ruler has to regulate disproportionate levels of income, while providing enough to fulfill basic needs. Similar to al-Ghazālī’s view on good governance is Ibn Taymiyyah’s notion of siyāsah, which is grounded in the Qur’anic promulgation of faith and good deeds. Islamic governance ought to act as a trustee in order to facilitate justice in community. A just ruler aims to eliminate corruption and (political) incompetency, while striving to secure ruler’s good character. Ibn Taymiyyah holds that ḥisbah must act in accordance with the Qur’anic statement of promoting the good and forbidding the harmful, who encour- aged one’s active role in economic affairs, while diverting from hoarding of wealth 86  A M E R i C A N J O U R N A L O F i S L A M A N d S O C i E t Y 3 9 : 3 - 4 and food supplies. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya also thought of ḥisbah and siyāsah as a constitutive part of Sharī‘a. See Qur’an 3:104; al-Ghazālī, Iḥyā’, Vol. 4, 72; Ibn Taymiyyah, Al-Ḥisbah fī al-Islām, 14 (Cairo: Dār al-Sha‘b, 1976); Ibn Qayyim al-Jaw- ziyya, Zād al-Ma‘ād (Cairo: Matba‘ah al-Miṣrīyah, n.d.), 15; Ibn Hazm, al-Muhalla (Cairo: Matba‘ah al-Nahdah, 1347 A.H/1928 A.D.), Vol. 2 and 6. 110 In addition to al-Ghazālī, al-Māwardī believed that the institution of ḥisbah has its origins in the Qur’an. Even though al-Māwardī did not introduce the concept of maṣlaḥah in relation to economic thought, his al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah explores siyāsah as governmental ordinances in the function of a religious leader (imām) who aims at securing and preserving legal matters in the community. A ruler is supposed to preserve religion, uphold justice, manage wealth, and enforce law fairly, among other things. The dimension of justice (‘adl) is based on reciprocity between govern- mental authority and community and predicated upon creating welfare for oneself and community. As a founding principle of governance of virtue, justice is associ- ated with an attitude that ranges between excess and miserliness. See al-Māwardī, al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah (Cairo: al-Babi al-Halabi, 1973), 3-4; Christopher Melchert, “Māwardī’s Legal Thinking,” Al-ʿUṣūr al-Wusṭā, 23 (2015): 68-86. Texts dealing with legal matters, such as electing a leader of the community, preserving market func- tions, and applying penal codes, are, however, encapsulated in a religious vision of a community. This is well narrated in al-Māwardī’s Adab al-Dīn wa al-Dunyā. See al-Māwardī, Adab al-Dīn wa al-Dunyā (Beirut: Dār al-Minhāj, 2013). 111 For more on the notion of unveiling and ethics of happiness, see al-Ghazālī, Al-Iqtisād fī al-iʿtiqad (Damascus: 2003); al-Ghazālī, Mīzān al-‘Amal (Cairo: Dār al-Ma‘ārif Press, 1964); al-Ghazālī, Bidāyat al-Hidāya (Beirut: Dār al-Bashar al-Is- lāmiyya, 2001); al-Ghazālī, The Beginning of Guidance, trans. Abdur-Rahman ibn Yusuf (Santa Barbara: White Tread Press, 2010). 112 See al-Ghazālī, Iḥyā’, Vol. 2. 113 Al-Ghazālī, Bidāyat al-Hidāya, 44; al-Ghazālī, The Beginning of Guidance, 23.