The Paradox between Women’s Educational Attainment and Social Mobility in the Middle East and North Africa Elhum Haghighat Abstract Modernization theory predicts a strong correlation between increased access to education and positive changes in women’s social status and eventual social mobility. In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, women’s increased access to education deviates from the expectations of the modernization perspective. While the MENA region is going through a modernization process, improvements in women’s social status still lags due to limited opportunities in the job market and their exclusion in the political arena. Introduction The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region defies modernization theory’s expectations that increased education and reduced fertility rates lead to higher employment placements and improved social mobility for women. Working from the premise of modernization’s theory of societal transition and the role of formal education as a stepping stone toward work, ______________________________________________________________________ Elhum Haghighat, Associate Professor and Chair, Political Science and Sociology Department at Lehman College, The City University of New York, specializes in economic development, political and social change, gender politics, women’s social status in the Middle East region, and the demography of the Middle East. Her recent book is titled Women in the Middle East and North Africa, Change and Continuity. In addition, she is the author of numerous peer-reviewed articles and reports. She is in process of writing her second book, which is about the gender politics and recent political upheavals in the Middle East. The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 29:360 access to societal resources, and upward mobility ‒ I trace the path of edu- cating women in the MENA region. It is generally assumed that a society’s investment in education pays off in the creation of more jobs and a better educated workforce. Contrary to expectations, the MENA regions invest- ment in education is not contributing to the economic growth of the region, which is experiencing economic stagnation and regional political conflicts. I address the issues of gender disparity in education, which in the MENA region has narrowed significantly, and declining fertility rates. I then juxtapose those advances against the disproportionately high unem- ployment rates for men and women and the dramatic income disparity be- tween men and women. While it would be encouraging to be able to point to increased education and declining fertility rates as indicators of a vigor- ous process of modernization, that does not seem to be true for the MENA region. Unfortunately for women, education and lower fertility rates do not predict improved social status unless there are employment opportunities to complete the picture ‒ and that aspect of the modernization process in the MENA region, the creation of job opportunities, is following a different trajectory from the modernization process that has occurred in the West. Background on Modernization Theory In demographic and development literature, modernization theory has pro- vided the dominant theory for explaining the ways in which societies reach economic prosperity. According to modernization theory, as societies be- gin to evolve from the preindustrial agricultural stage to the industrialized urbanized stage, and eventually to the postindustrial stage, step-by-step transformations are expected. Countries are defined as modern based on their degree of industrialization.1 Modernization also transforms a soci- ety’s intellectual and technological properties, and helps the members of the society take greater control of nature and their environment.2 During the transitions, occupational structures and job opportunities change3 and educational opportunities increase for all citizens. Attendant with these demographic changes are changes to a society’s values and norms. Transformations such as these can bring more prosperity and com- fort to women’s lives, especially when they are followed by reduced fertil- ity and fewer domestic responsibilities. Interestingly, women’s participa- tion in the labor force declines during the early transitional stages (from preindustrial agriculture to industrial manufacturing economy) and picks up momentum when the society enters the postindustrial service economy stage. As the formal labor market grows during the early stages and agri- cultural sector jobs decline, more women leave agricultural work. How- 61Haghighat: The Paradox ever, the absence of jobs for women in the early manufacturing economy leads to an overall decline in women’s employment.4 Later on, with job growth in the service and white-collar occupations, women’s labor force participation increases again.5 The transition from a preindustrial agri- culture economy to an early industrial urbanized economy, and later to a postindustrial economy, is explained by modernization theorists as having a U-shaped effect on women’s labor force participation. Thus, there is a curvilinear rather than a linear relationship between economic development and female employment.6 When women’s employment declines during the transition from a preindustrial agricultural economy to an industrial economy, changes also take place with respect to their domestic and family responsibilities. In pre- industrial societies, women are able to combine domestic and childcare re- sponsibilities with market work (that is, carpet and basket weaving, small- scale farming). Industrialization and urbanization divide the home and work spheres (work is done in an urban setting removed from the domestic residence). Because domestic responsibilities remain primary to women, the physical separation of work and home constrains their opportunities to participate in the market. Therefore, their rate of participation in the labor force declines.7 By the time a society reaches the late-stage industrializa- tion phase and is moving into the post-industrialization stage, women have benefited from more education and reduced fertility rates. These improve- ments, aligned with more job opportunities, facilitate women’s increased participation in the labor force.8 Modernization theory predicts a strong correlation between access to education and positive changes in women’s social status and upward social mobility. Modernization Theory on the Impact of Education for Women Modernization theorists argue that formal education plays a central role in modern societies, and credentialism (acquiring education with degrees and diplomas) becomes an important stepping-stone toward job opportunities, access to societal resources, and a successful life.9 Policymakers also argue that an educated society is a more productive and affluent one, especially in regions such as the MENA where poverty is not as deep as in other de- veloping regions.10 They also acknowledge that improving education and employment opportunity helps improve women’s lives more effectively and easily than changing other factors that require deeper cultural interven- tion.11 For example, studies show that educated women use contraceptives significantly more frequently than illiterate women. The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 29:362 The UN Population Fund reports that countries that have made so- cial investments in education, health, and reproductive services experience faster economic improvement and slower population growth.12 Farzaneh Roudi-Fahimi and Valentine Moghadam list the benefits of female educa- tion on women’s empowerment and gender equality: • As the rate of female education rises, fertility, population growth, and infant and child mortality rates fall and family health improves. • Increases in girls’ secondary school enrollment are associated with increases in women’s participation in the labor force and increased contributions to household and national income. • Women’s increased earning capacity has a positive effect on child nutrition. • Children—especially daughters—of educated mothers are more likely to be enrolled in school and attain higher levels of education. • Educated women are more politically active and better informed about their legal rights and how to exercise them.13 The Arc of Education for Women in the MENA Region In the West, formal education emerged as an important feature of modern- ization in the early decades of the nineteenth century. Schools were estab- lished in different parts of Europe and the United States with the goal of providing access to formal education for most children. As the industrial economy expanded, an educated and knowledgeable workforce was need- ed; preindustrial societies did not have a need for educated individuals with knowledge of abstract subject matters (such as math, science, and litera- ture), whereas industrial and postindustrial knowledge-based economies increasingly needed an educated and literate population. The advent of formal and mass education in the modern MENA re- gion is both indirectly and directly connected to the influence of the West and the era of colonization. Broadly speaking, during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, children from elite families in the MENA region would receive religious and language lessons from private tutors, or from places called maktab (similar to a school but lessons were conducted on a one-on-one basis with a tutor). Overall, access to modern education was restricted to a select few and mainly reserved for the sons of the elite. Fur- thermore, the colonizers were not keen on educating the masses since the belief was that intellectual development would lead to the colonizer’s loss of political influence and control.14 63Haghighat: The Paradox But the Western influence had an impact in countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, and Iran. Each country made investments in a handful of their elite children by sending them to European countries to learn about the latest technologies and ways of life. Ultimately, when the students returned to their own countries, this had the effect of diffusing knowledge about the West. Local schools, especially those modeled on European schools, such as the Tunisian Polytechnic School of Bardo (modeled after the French Ecole Polytechnique), also had a significant impact on disseminating knowledge about the West.15 In countries such as Iran, schools were avail- able for non-Muslim girls in the 1830s, but political resistance from Is- lamic clergy prevented the schooling of Muslim girls until the first decade of the twentieth century. Muslim girls were kept illiterate or, in the case of the children of the elite, tutored privately at home. Even though the schools were available, there was limited support from families to send their daughters to school. The first school in Iran that opened its doors to Muslim girls was es- tablished in Tehran in 1899. These schools were attended by daughters of the elite and progressive middle class Iranian families, whereas for decades prior to 1899, non-Muslim girls (middle class Christian, Zoroastrian, Jew- ish) had been attending the few missionary schools that were available to them.16 Up until the schools opened, daughters of the Muslim elite would often receive some basic education by private tutors in subject matters such as Persian literature, religious studies, French language, and French litera- ture. Mitra Shavarini and Guity Nashat’s description of Iran’s history of ed- ucation for women was representative of the history of women’s education in other parts of the MENA region.17 In many of these countries, especially ones under the direct influence of colonizers ‒ such as Lebanon, Egypt, and Tunisia ‒ bilingualism among elite families became widespread by the late nineteenth century. It was a way to learn about Western cultural practices and technological advancements, and a way for the children of the elite to distinguish themselves from others by claiming a higher status and a higher level of literacy and knowledge of the Western cultures. In different parts of the MENA, political leaders attempted to “mod- ernize” their countries during the first part of the twentieth century by giv- ing women more access to societal resources such as formal education. In the 1920s and 1930s, Reza Khan in Iran, Ataturk in Turkey, and Habibullah Khan in Afghanistan tried to implement programs to modernize their coun- tries. Important aspects of their modernization process were to give women more rights and provide access to schools for Muslim girls. Mass educa- tion for girls was also accompanied by an attempt to de-institutionalize the Elewa: Articulating “Responsibility” as a Prerequisite for the Arab Spring 64 practice of hijab. These leaders had the difficult task of convincing religious authorities that modern secular education did not clash with the Sharīʻah and, furthermore, it would not “contaminate” the minds of young women who were sent abroad to study at European colleges. These leaders saw women’s education as one of the main avenues to Westernize/modernize their countries, and they challenged the structure of patriarchal and tribal relations. These leaders as well as their successors continued to experience resistance from rigid fundamentalist Islamist forces for decades to come. After World War II, and particularly between the 1950s and the 1970s in the MENA region, there was a dramatic rise in the popularity of edu- cating young women. Girls were integrated into gender-specific school systems throughout most of the MENA. In the 1970s, political upheav- als in different parts of the region mounted strong opposition to giving girls and women access to education and to the presence of women in the workforce. For example, in Iran during the 1979 Islamic revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini, women were among the most loyal revolutionary fighters against the Shah’s regime. Afterward, however, they were the first to be sent home and deprived of their access to education and employment. Eventually, Iranian women and girls recovered some access to educational institutions after the government “Islamicized” education in schools and universities. Women were allowed access as long as the educational insti- tutions followed the strict rules of the Islamists. In Afghanistan, women have always been subject to strict tribal and patriarchal rules, and their social status was complicated by a low level of economic development and a high rate of poverty. Their oppression be- came even more extreme, however, under the U.S.-backed mujahedeen. In the 1970s, Islamist resistance groups rallied in Kabul demanding that women be prevented from holding any public office, enforcing the return of the hijab, and ending coeducation in schools. When the Soviet Union pulled its troops from Afghanistan in 1989 and the mujahedeen took power, ordering women out of political life was among their first changes. Then, they threatened women and girls to abide by oppressive rules, such as wearing a full burgha. Frequently, families were ordered to pull their daughters out of school. These actions created an even larger gap between the number of boys and girls receiving educa- tion. When the fundamentalist (originally supported by the United States and Pakistan) Taliban regime emerged in 1993, the suppression of women reached its most extreme point in the history of Afghanistan. Women were forbidden to work and forced to leave their jobs and schools. They had to become completely invisible in public life and were forbidden to be seen 65Haghighat: The Paradox outside of their homes. The U.S. government’s invasion of Afghanistan, after September 11, 2001, toppled the Taliban and allowed women back in public spaces. Eventually, some girls returned to school. However, Af- ghanis, especially Afghani women, continue to suffer from centuries of poverty and an absence of economic development. Their oppression is still visible in their low social status and particularly in their high levels of il- literacy. Patterns of Education in the MENA Region after the 1970s Gender disparity in education is an ongoing problem in many parts of the developing world, although an overwhelming majority of the countries in the MENA have narrowed gender gaps in literacy (a larger gap remains in rural areas). In Iran and Kuwait, for example, female college enrollments frequently exceed male enrollments. The gender gap at the primary school level has narrowed or disappeared in almost all parts of the world, but it is still pronounced at the secondary school and tertiary level.18 Promoting and expanding formal education has been closely linked to ideals of democ- racy, and is seen as an effective strategy to reduce poverty in developing societies. The overall trend seems to indicate that the gender gap in school- ing is slowly closing, but there is still much progress to be made. Until the late 1970s, the MENA region had one of the highest illiteracy rates in the world compared with other less-developed nations. Three de- cades later, there have been some improvements: 42 percent of women (age fifteen or older) and 22 percent of men (age fifteen or older) were still illiterate in the region, but the rates were comparable to other less-devel- oped countries; 34 percent of women and 19 percent of men in other less- developed nations were still illiterate by the year 2000 (refer to Table 1). For the year 2000, there are countries that still report a very high illiteracy rate for both men and women fifteen years or older (includes the older and younger generation). Countries such as Morocco, Yemen, and Iraq show an unusually high rate of illiteracy among their women ages fifteen or older – 64 percent, 75 percent, and 77 percent respectively. In contrast, a female illiteracy rate of 20 percent or less is reported for Bahrain, Jordan, Ku- wait, Lebanon, and Qatar. The rate has been dramatically reduced for the younger generations (ages between fifteen and twenty-four) for both men and women as it is explained in detail in the text below. The data in Table 1 compares illiteracy rates between men and women. The data are listed for each gender by individual MENA countries, dif- ferent world regions, age groups, and date range. Group 1 compares illit- The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 29:366 eracy rates for men and women fifteen years of age and older in 2000. This group is a snapshot of the entire adult population of each country/region and serves as the baseline for comparing changes that took effect over the four years between 2000 and 2004. Group 2 (column three) shows the il- literacy rates of men and women, ages fifteen to twenty-four years, during the period of 2000–2004. By contrasting the first and second groups, we can determine the rate and direction of change in illiteracy, which serves as an indicator of the change in education. By restricting the second group to the fifteen to twenty-four age group, we can focus on progress made by those most likely to be in or having just completed the education process ‒ that is, the education level of the entire population (group 1) compared to the education of the younger generation of fifteen to twenty-four-year-olds. Examining Table 1, we can draw several conclusions. Among the countries making up the MENA region, we see that from group 1 to group 2, there is an increase in literacy (or a decline in illiteracy) in every country. Considering the MENA region as a whole, the overall illiteracy rate among women declined in the 2000–2004 period as compared to the years up to the year 2000. The world illiteracy rate among women (last line in Table 1) shows a global reduction in the 2000–2004 periods as compared to the years up to the year 2000. Table 1 also allows us to rank the MENA region among different re- gions of the world. The comparison ranks the reduction in female illiteracy in the MENA as third, behind Latin America and the category of less-de- veloped countries. MENA is ahead of Africa only in reducing the female illiteracy rate. Comparing the world to the category of less-developed na- tions, the change is almost the same. In 2000–2004, the younger generation of women and men (between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four) in both the MENA region and the less-developed countries had a lower percentage of illiterates among their population (23 percent of women and 11 percent of men in the MENA region and 19 percent of women and 12 percent of men in less-developed countries). The reduction in illiteracy among the younger generation is an indication that these countries’ governments are providing better access to education, and perhaps also an indication that there is a societal shift in thinking about the relevance of education for women. Almost all the countries in the MENA region report that nearly all of their children (both boys and girls) are enrolled in primary school (refer to Table 2). It was seen that 91 percent of girls and 100 percent of boys were enrolled in primary school in year 2000. Omani and Yemeni girls still fall behind their coun- terparts (71 percent and 61 percent, respectively) but other countries show near perfect statistics for male and female primary school enrollment. 67Haghighat: The Paradox Table 1: Selected Literacy Indicators in the MENA Region We can conclude that roughly half of the MENA countries have suc- ceeded in significantly reducing illiteracy among their younger generations of women and men (nine of the eighteen countries within the MENA region report illiteracy rates of less than 10 percent for both boys and girls aged fifteen to twenty-four years). Those countries are Bahrain, Iran, Jordan, Ku- Sources: Farzaneh Roudi-Fahimi and Valentine M. Moghadam, Empowering Women, Developing Society: Fe- male Education in the Middle East and North Africa (Washington, DC: Population Reference Bureau, November 2003), www.prb.org/publications/policybriefs/empoweringwomendevelopingsocietyfe- maleeducationinthemiddleeastandnorthafrica.aspx?p=1. Group 1 Group 2 % Illiterate (15 years or older), 2000 % Illiterate (ages 15-24), 2000-2004 Literate women as % literate men (ages 15-24), 2000‒2004 Country Female Male Female Male Algeria 43 24 16 7 91 Bahrain 17 9 1 2 101 Egypt 56 33 37 24 85 Iran 31 17 9 4 95 Iraq 77 45 71 41 49 Jordan 16 5 1 1 100 Kuwait 20 16 7 8 102 Lebanon 20 8 7 3 96 Libya 32 9 7 0.05 94 Morocco 64 38 42 24 79 Oman 38 20 4 0.5 98 Qatar 17 20 3 7 102 Saudi Arabia 33 17 10 5 96 Syria 40 12 21 5 96 Tunisia 39 19 11 3 93 Turkey 24 7 6 1 95 United Arab Emirates 21 25 6 13 108 Yemen 75 33 54 17 60 REGION MENA 42 22 23 11 - Africa 48 30 31 19 - Latin America/ Caribbean 14 11 4 5 - North America - - - - - More Developed - - - - - Less Developed 34 19 19 12 92 World 31 17 18 11 92 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 29:368 wait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Qatar, and Turkey. Iraq, Yemen, Morocco, and Egypt still have a significant population of women in the fifteen to twenty- four age bracket (ranging from 71 percent in Iraq to 37 percent in Egypt) who are illiterate (Table 1). The illiteracy rate among women over fifteen is still high in several other countries in the MENA where women are roughly twice as likely to be illiterate as men in that same age group.19 Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary Education Patterns in MENA As stated earlier, in many of the MENA countries the gender gap in provid- ing education for the younger generation is closing. Most children in the region are enrolled in primary school (91 percent of girls and 100 percent of boys). But not all countries have been able to provide equal access to secondary school enrollment. Only 62 percent of girls and 71 percent of boys were enrolled in secondary school. Countries such as Libya and Bah- rain have an impressive 91–108 percent20 rate for secondary school enroll- ment ‒ while Syria, Morocco, and Yemen show rates of 42, 36, and 27 percent, respectively, for female enrollment in secondary school. However, in the two decades between 1985 and early-to-mid-2000, many countries experienced an increase in the enrollment of both male and female students in secondary school (refer to Table 2). For example, in 1985, 57 percent of women in Libya were enrolled in secondary school compared with 108 percent in year 2000. Oman and Tunisia provide other great examples. In 1985, only 18 percent of girls in Oman and 32 percent in Tunisia were enrolled in secondary school; by 2000, 78 and 81 percent of girls were enrolled in Oman and Tunisia, respectively. Almost all countries have improved male and female secondary schooling since 1985. There are some fluctuations for countries such as Syria and Lebanon but the decline is not consistent. The one consistent decline for secondary school enroll- ment, for both boys and girls, is in Iraq. Iraq has failed to improve second- ary school enrollment for boys and girls since 1985 (the enrollment has de- creased). The reason for this decline could be due to its depressed economy and continuous political conflicts and wars during the past two decades. Women’s share of university enrollment is impressive in some of the Arab Gulf countries (Saudi Arabia, 56 percent; Oman, 58 percent; Bahrain, 60 percent; Kuwait, 68 percent; and Qatar, 73 percent) and low for Yemen and Iraq (20 percent and 34 percent, respectively). In countries where wom- en make up the majority of the university population, it is because men seek greater social status by leaving the country to attend foreign universities.21 69Haghighat: The Paradox Table 2: Selected Education Indicators in the MENA Region % Enrolled in Primary School, 2000 % Enrolled in Secondary School 1985 1993‒1997 2000‒2003 Country Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Algeria 107 116 44 59 62 65 74 69 Bahrain 103 103 97 98 98 91 99 91 Egypt 96 103 50 72 73 83 85 91 Iran 85 88 36 54 73 81 75 79 Iraq 91 111 39 68 32 51 29 47 Jordan 101 101 - - - 87 86 Kuwait 95 93 87 95 66 64 88 83 Lebanon 97 101 60 61 84 78 81 74 Libya 117 115 57 61 - - 108 102 Morocco 88 101 28 42 34 44 36 45 Oman 71 74 18 35 79 80 78 79 Qatar 104 105 86 79 66 68 93 88 Saudi Arabia - - 31 48 57 65 65 73 Syria 105 113 48 68 40 45 42 47 Tunisia 115 120 32 46 63 66 81 78 Turkey 96 105 30 52 48 68 66 86 UAE 99 99 55 55 82 77 82 77 Yemen 61 96 - - 14 53 27 65 MENA 91 100 - 50 60 62 71 World - - 43 54 55 63 62 67 Africa - - 23 33 32 38 36 41 Latin America/ Caribbean - - - - - - 90 83 North America - - 97 97 98 99 93 95 More Developed - - 94 93 102 99 103 101 Less Developed - 31, 44 44 47 57 55 61 Women as share of university enrollment (%), 2000 Public Education as share of Total Government Expenditure (%) Country Algeria - 16 Bahrain 60 12 Egypt - 15 Iran 47 18 Iraq 34 - Jordan 51 20 Kuwait 68 14 Lebanon 52 8 Libya 48 - Morocco 44 25 Oman 58 16 Qatar 73 - The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 29:370 Families with the financial resources prefer to send their sons to Eu- ropean and American universities not only to learn the latest technology, but also to increase their social status with the foreign degree. Daughters, however, are still kept close to the family home and so are more likely to populate the local universities. The number of sons in the wealthy states going overseas for a university is enough to skew the data comparing local university attendance by gender. In general, governments in MENA countries spend a high percentage of their GDP on education.22 As noted earlier, statistics reflect the region’s improvement in literacy rates during the past three decades ‒ all boys and over 90 percent of girls have been enrolled in elementary schools. Ad- ditionally, 62 percent of girls and 71 percent of boys were reported to be enrolled in secondary school in the year 2000 (Table 2). Education and Declining Fertility Rates Education has been shown to affect a wide range of behaviors such as the postponement and timing of marriage, the number of children conceived, and the participation of women in the labor force (John Bongaarts23 refers to education as one of the proximate determinants of fertility24). The rela- Saudi Arabia 56 23 Syria - 14 Tunisia 48 20 Turkey 41 15 UAE - 20 Yemen 21 22 REGION MENA - - World - - Africa - - Latin America/ Caribbean - - North America - - More Developed - - Less Developed - - Sources: Women of Our World. 2005. Population Reference Bureau, Washington, DC., www.prb.org/ Publications/Datasheets/2005/WomenofOurWorld2005PDF255KB.aspx. Farzaneh Roudi-Fahimi and Valentine M. Moghadam, Empowering Women, Developing Society: Female Education in the Middle East and North Africa (Washington, DC: Population Reference Bureau, November 2003), www.prb.org/publications/policybriefs/ empoweringwomendevelopingsocietyfemaleeducationinthemiddleeastandnorthafrica. aspx?p=1. 71Haghighat: The Paradox tionship between education and fertility has been closely studied and sug- gests that women’s education does not necessarily produce similar results in every society but is “conditioned by socioeconomic development, social structure, and cultural context, as well as by a society’s stage in the fertility transition.”25 J. Harvey Graff argues that education has a more substantial impact on the “psychological modernity” of people in societies that are experiencing industrialization.26 Psychologically, men and women begin to accept the idea of limiting family size, and controlling fertility, which leads to a subsequent decline in population growth. Kamran Asdar Ali, in his ethnographic study of urban and rural communities in Egypt, came to the same conclusion ‒ that people’s more modern attitudes and think- ing processes are the main reason they take advantage of family planning services that lower fertility rates.27 Robert Freedman finds a consistent cor- relation between education and literacy, and demographic outcomes such as fertility rates.28 Bangladesh, a majority Muslim nation and one of the most populous Muslim countries is an anomaly. Bangladesh still struggles with a low level of female literacy, but through effective family planning programs, the country had succeeded in lowering its fertility rate despite its still high mortality rate. It is estimated that 45 percent of Bangladeshi couples use contraceptives, therefore, the fertility rate has dropped despite the still low female literacy rate.29 Bangladesh is considered an exceptional case but the literature shows a strong case for the education-low fertility connection. When women in the upper educational range are compared with wom- en in the lower range across one society, fertility is substantially lower among better-educated women.30 Teresa Castro Martin reports on the re- sults from the World Fertility Survey (WFS) and Demographic Health Sur- vey (DHS) and concludes that, in general, societies with limited literacy and limited schooling have high fertility rates, but as societies advance and education becomes more available fertility, rates start to drop.31 In most societies, women who are more educated use modern contraception more frequently than women who are less educated: [In Latin America] women with no formal schooling have, on average, six to seven children, whereas highly educated women have fertility levels analogous to those found in the developed world, in the range of two to three children. . . . [In the sub-Saharan African region,] the association between female education and fertility appears weakest . . . prior studies have attributed this atypical pattern to the dominance of physiological factors in a context of natural fertility. In the absence of conscious birth control, education has the potential of increasing fertility as a result of reduced breastfeeding and postpartum abstinence.32 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 29:372 The Relationship between Education and Employment in the MENA Region According to modernization theory, education is expected to pull more women into the labor force, but statistics in the MENA region show other- wise. Table 3 shows patterns of women’s employment and unemployment from 1980 to 1990 and 2000–2004. In fifteen out of eighteen cases, female labor force participation has increased between 1980 and 2004. In Turkey, we see a steady decline. In Egypt and Lebanon, we see an initial increase between 1980 and 1990 followed by a decline by 2004. The same data, grouped by region, shows that overall in the MENA region female labor force participation has increased, as is also witnessed in the United States. The lowest rate of female employment in the MENA region in 2000–2004 belongs to United Arab Emirates (13 percent) and Saudi Arabia (15 per- cent). The highest rates are reported for Iran (33 percent), Algeria, Leba- non, and Syria (all 30 percent). Female labor force participation for the MENA region is as low as 27 percent. Despite the relative levels of rising employment for women, unemployment rates in the MENA region for both men and women are among the highest in the world indicating a high de- mand and a low supply of jobs. In Iran, women’s employment rate is 33 percent ‒ the highest in the region (still low compared to countries in other regions) ‒ and the female unemployment rate is over 20 percent. In Syria, the labor force participation of women is 30 percent, and the unemploy- ment rate for women is 24 percent (a pattern similar to Iran). While the un- employment rate in high income countries is slightly lower for women than for men (6.8 percent for men and 6.6 for women in the United States) ‒ in the MENA region, women’s employment rate is much lower than men’s. The highest recorded unemployment rates among these countries belong to Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, and Syria. These countries also have a higher percentage of college educated women among their younger popu- lation (with the exception of Iraq), once again countering modernization’s theory of a positive correlation between higher education and higher labor force participation. Income disparity between men and women in the MENA region is even more prevalent (Table 3). For example, Kuwaiti men earn three times more than women; Omani men, four times more; Saudi men, five times more. In contrast, there is a much smaller gap between men and women’s earnings in the United States, Norway, and Sweden. As of year 2000, about 27 percent of women in the MENA region are reported to be employed, which is the lowest rate when compared with other regions (Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin American, and North America). 73Haghighat: The Paradox Within the MENA region, despite higher achievements in educating wom- en and lowering fertility rates, the female unemployment rate is still dis- proportionately high relative to men. A society’s investment in education is generally assumed to pay off in the creation of more jobs (mainly in the nonagricultural sector) and better- educated individuals in the workforce. For a society to receive returns on its investments on education, it needs to facilitate the building of a skilled and flexible labor force. Contrary to expectations, the MENA region’s sub- stantial investment in education has not been paying off as expected. There is little evidence that education has contributed to economic growth in the region.33 The Arab Human Development Report (2002) indicates that one in five Arabs still live on less than $2 a day.34 Over the past twenty years, growth in income per person at an annual rate of 0.5 percent was lower than anywhere else in the world except in sub-Saharan Africa. Stagnant economic growth together with a fast-growing population ‒ in spite of cur- rent declining fertility rates (the MENA region is still in the midst of the consequences of earlier unchecked fertility rates) ‒ has contributed to high unemployment. About twelve million people, or 15 percent of the labor force, are unemployed in the Arab world.35 Therefore, despite their great improvements in education, the unemployment rate especially among the educated is high, in some cases an astounding 15–20 percent. The Unfortunate Disconnect between Education and Social Status and Paid Employment In the MENA region, we see declining fertility rates and increased educa- tion markers of modernization, and an indication of improved social sta- tus. However, in the region, these advances are accompanied by economic stagnation and regional political conflicts. The high rate of women’s access to secondary and higher education in most of the MENA region is impressive, although much improvement is still needed. According to modernization theorists and based on the experi- ence of many Western societies, women who are more educated are more empowered women. They claim that as educational access for women im- proves it creates more favorable conditions for women to enter the labor force. Social and cultural changes ‒ such as marrying at a later age, de- clining fertility rates, and a demand for a more educated labor force ‒ all contribute to a larger supply of female workers. The demand for a more The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 29:374 Table 3. Selected Indicators of Employment for Men and Women Country Estimated earned income (PPP US$), 2001 Income disparity between men and women* (in %) Female Male Algeria 2,784 9,329 30 Bahrain 7,578 22,305 34 Egypt 1,970 5,075 39 Iran 2,599 9,301 28 Iraq — — — Jordan 1,771 5,800 31 Kuwait 8,605 25,333 34 Lebanon 1,963 6,472 30 Libya — — — Morocco 2,057 5,139 40 Oman 3,919 17,960 22 Qatar — — — Saudi Arabia 4,222 21,141 20 Syria 1,423 5,109 27 Tunisia 3,377 9,359 36 Turkey 3,717 8,023 46 United Arab Emirates 6,041 28,223 21 Yemen 365 1,201 30 Country Estimated earned income (PPP US$), 2001 Income disparity between men and women* (in %) Female Male Algeria 2,784 9,329 30 Bahrain 7,578 22,305 34 Egypt 1,970 5,075 39 Iran 2,599 9,301 28 Iraq — — — Jordan 1,771 5,800 31 Kuwait 8,605 25,333 34 Lebanon 1,963 6,472 30 Libya — — — Morocco 2,057 5,139 40 Oman 3,919 17,960 22 Qatar — — — Saudi Arabia 4,222 21,141 20 Syria 1,423 5,109 27 Tunisia 3,377 9,359 36 Turkey 3,717 8,023 46 United Arab Emirates 6,041 28,223 21 Yemen 365 1,201 30 75Haghighat: The Paradox Country Estimated earned income (PPP US$), 2001 Income disparity between men and women* (in %) Female Male Algeria 2,784 9,329 30 Bahrain 7,578 22,305 34 Egypt 1,970 5,075 39 Iran 2,599 9,301 28 Iraq — — — Jordan 1,771 5,800 31 Kuwait 8,605 25,333 34 Lebanon 1,963 6,472 30 Libya — — — Morocco 2,057 5,139 40 Oman 3,919 17,960 22 Qatar — — — Saudi Arabia 4,222 21,141 20 Syria 1,423 5,109 27 Tunisia 3,377 9,359 36 Turkey 3,717 8,023 46 United Arab Emirates 6,041 28,223 21 Yemen 365 1,201 30 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 29:376 educated labor force in modernizing societies is generally assumed to work in women’s favor since modernization also increases women’s access to better jobs, but that can only happen if jobs are available. As of the year 2000, women’s formal employment in the MENA region was as low as 27 percent. Mirna Lattouf attributes this low employment rate to women’s lack of improved social status..36 For example, she examines women’s social sta- tus in modern Lebanon and identifies several factors contributing to their lack of economic success despite their high level of education. Historically, modernization has occurred in conjunction with industrialization ‒ a suc- cessful process of growth and diversification due to a growing domestic economy through the export of goods and services. She argues that eco- nomic stagnation and regional political problems led the government to run campaigns to legitimize discrimination against women and force women to operate within the traditional cultural framework ‒ in the home and with limited social power. Lattouf states that: Despite low rates of return on education for women in terms of employment income, families educate their daughters with the idea of finding them more suitable husbands. A woman with a higher level of education and choice of a husband can achieve a higher social and financial status. Education Sources: Women of Our World. 2005. Population Reference Bureau, Washington, DC., www.prb. org/Publications/Datasheets/2005/WomenofOurWorld2005PDF255KB.aspx. The World Bank Group, GenderStats, Database of Gender Statistics, http://devdata.-worldbank.org/ genderstats/genderRpt.asp?rpt=profile&cty=BHR,Bahrain&hm=home. REGION/ECONOMIC CATEGORY MENA - - - Lower middle income High income United States 26,389 45,540 58 77Haghighat: The Paradox is not a stepping-stone to greater autonomy for women, but rather a way to achieve a higher level of social status, but still as a dependant. Advocating women’s rights is connected directly with the West and national disloyalty. Women and men are bombarded by popular messages in the regional media that stress traditional gender roles, where it is emphasized that women’s primary roles are housewife and mother. Her employment is portrayed as unimportant to her and her family despite her level of educational achievement. Education and employment changes initiated at the institutional level will work only if they are administered along with socialization tactics to change attitudes and behaviors of people on a personal level.37 Lattouf’s observation of why families support their daughters’ higher educational attainment despite the questionable rate of economic return is about the relationship of women to men; families support their daughter’s higher education as a way to improve their daughter’s chances of finding a suitable husband of a similar or higher social status, which in turn adds to the families’ collective social status.38 A similar study by Mitra Shavarini reveals similar constraints on wom- en in Iranian society.39 In 2003, a notable 62 percent of women compared with 38 percent of men passed the national college entrance examination called Konkur, indicating that a larger percentage of women are applying to college and are more eligible than men. Closing the educational gender gap and surpassing men in attending and receiving post-secondary degrees is an achievement for Iranian women. However, the advances in educa- tional attainment do not correlate to an increase of women in the workforce or an increase in social status except by extension through a good marriage. In her study of female college students, Shavarini describes the experi- ences of women in present day Iranian institutions of higher education and the challenges female students face in their everyday life.40 Shavarini tries to answer two main questions in her ethnographic study: what role does higher education play in the lives of Iranian women? ‒ and what are the experiences of Iranian women at these institutions? Shavarini posits that women’s ability to gain access to higher education at an increasing rate is explained in part by the “Islamic packaging” of higher education. She states that women’s access to colleges “reveals that college has become the only viable institution through which young Iranian women can alter their public role and status.”41 Here is a quote from one of her respondents: The only right women find that is granted to them and is encouraged is the right to an education. . . . In today’s Iranian society, women are considered “second-class citizens.” They have no rights; no place in The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 29:378 society, there is a place for women’s rights. Going to the university has become the only thing that we are allowed to do.42 Many of the women interviewed by Shavarini had the full support of their families to obtain a higher education. However, the support and promotion of a college experience for women by their families was often mentioned as a way to improve their daughter’s chances of finding a suit- able husband of similar or higher social status. Many of these women were aware they were facing societal discrimination when it came to finding jobs even with their higher education degrees. The discrimination is a con- sequence of living in an economically depressed country such as Iran, with a high inflation rate and a high rate of unemployment. Men are given pri- ority in access to jobs and therefore highly qualified women with college degrees are unable to find suitable employment. Discrimination against women is partially an expedient response to the faltering economy and has its roots in history and culture. For the most part, in a patriarchal society men are the breadwinners, and many women are dependent on the male members of their family ‒ including fathers, brothers, uncles, husbands, and sons. From a political standpoint, it makes sense to ensure that men are not facing competition from women for jobs especially where there is a scarcity of work. The deep historical roots of the patriarchal social structure within this system lead to discriminating against women in the la- bor force, which is further compounded by economic stagnation, political conflicts, and global events. The rate at which the new jobs are created lags behind the growth in the number of young people entering the job market. The MENA region suffers from an unusually high rate of unemployment not only for women but for men as well. In 2006, the unemployment rate for men and women averaged 10 and 17 percent, respectively.43 The un- employment rate is further complicated by age; the younger generation of men and women are experiencing even higher unemployment rates in the MENA region than the older age groups. Faraneh Roudi-Fahimi and Mary Mederios Kent express this concern: While less than 15 percent of young men and women were unemployed worldwide, the ILO estimated that just over 20 percent of young men and just over 30 percent of young women in MENA were unemployed in 2005. The situation is particularly dire for members of MENA’s youth bulge in some countries. More than 40 percent of Algeria’s young men and women were unemployed in 2005, which may be why so many Algerians are emigrating [sic] to Europe and elsewhere in search of jobs. Between 21 percent and 31 percent of young men were unemployed in Tunisia, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and several other MENA countries, 79Haghighat: The Paradox along with between 29 percent and 50 percent of young women. Qatar, with a labor force dominated by foreign male workers, has relatively low unemployment for young men, but high unemployment for young women.44 To illustrate the level of women’s low status despite their high educa- tional attainment, Shavarini describes the experience of a female engineer- ing student in the highly competitive Tehran Polytechnic Institute.45 The female student expresses disappointment and a degree of anger with the discrimination she experiences each day and the lack of prospects for her future: My battle starts the minute I walk out of my home each morning. As I am waiting to catch a ride, I endure honks and lurid comments by passing male motorists; during the ride I am made offers of sigha [temporary marriage]. At the university gate, I am stopped and told that my makeup and hijab are important and in class my comments are dismissed or discredited by my male peers and male professors as “emotional female viewpoints.” Do I think I will find a job after I graduate? What man in this society is going to take me, take us [women], seriously enough to hire us?46 There is no doubt that women’s improved access to higher education is a monumental achievement. On the other hand, if their status is not im- proved on a societal level, their higher education credentials will not help them get far in the job market. As Shirin Ebadi ‒ the Iranian human rights lawyer, activist, and the winner of the 2003 Nobel Peace Prize ‒ concluded, “higher education is paradoxical: it both limits and expands women’s pos- sibilities in Iran.”47 In the MENA region, the effect of greater access to education for wom- en deviates from the expectations of the modernization perspective. Mod- ernization theory shows a strong relationship between increased access to education and positive changes in women’s social status and eventual social mobility. While the MENA region is going through a moderniza- tion process, the results do not exactly mirror the West. In the countries of the MENA, modernization is complicated by a strong patriarchal culture, the overlap of religion and government, and the absence of a diversified economy. While we would like to be able to point to increased education and declining fertility rates as indicators of a vigorous process of modern- ization, in the MENA region these factors do not seem to be contributing to women’s improved social status and increased social mobility. Women’s social status in the MENA countries has been and continues to be conditioned by the economic and political realities of the region. When expedient, Islam and historical traditions of patriarchy have been The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 29:380 engaged as frameworks and justifications for controlling the population. However, in MENA countries where we see a more diversified economy, Islam has not been an altogether limiting influence. Studies of the mod- ernization process have shown that women’s status improves when they become essential to the financial system ‒ when the unstoppable forces of a growing and a diversified economy are able to provide jobs at least equal to the demand. This theme is reflected in the studies by Djavad Salehi- Isfahani.48 Although his discussion is centered on the size and distribution of the population in Iran, and the effects this will have on economic and social development in the next few decades ‒ his reasoning is applicable to all MENA countries experiencing a “youth bulge.” Hope, according to Salehi-Isfahani, lies in the government changing the country’s base of economic growth from oil to “human capital.” The oil industry, based on a finite quantity of a natural resource, produced a financial windfall for the Iranian economy ‒ but not a sustainable eco- nomic model. This is also true for the other major oil-producing nations such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. The transi- tion from an oil export economy to a human capital economy is paramount. All MENA countries with declining fertility rates must make a rapid in- vestment in their human capital and create a diversified economic base for sustainable growth before the current youth bulge reaches retirement (estimated around 2040). At that point, there will be a smaller cohort of working contributors to care for a larger elderly population. Investment in human capital today and diversification of a sustainable economy away from just an oil-based industry will provide tomorrow’s generations with stability and prosperity. And it seems clear that an exclusively oil-export- based-economy can have adverse effects on women’s status. It is possible to predict a substantial improvement in women’s social mobility in the MENA region if the region is able to move away from the reliance on oil exports and focus on an investment in human capital and a diversified economy with ample jobs. With the population growth under control, and women already attaining higher education, regional stability and prosperity lies in continued and intelligent modernization. Most im- portantly, women’s status would improve by virtue of the natural economic forces that would ensue from stability and economic diversification. Notes 1. A. Inkles and D. H. Smith, Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974); Wilbert E. Moore, World Modernization: The Limits of 81Haghighat: The Paradox Convergence (New York: Elsevier, 1979); T. Parson, The System of Modern Societies (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1971). 2. C. E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization (New York: Harper and Row, 1966); N. Black and A. Cottrell, Women and World Change (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1981); Marion J. Levy, Modernization and the Structure of Societies: A Setting for International Affairs (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966; and A. Rustow Dankwart, A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization. (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 1967), 1‒5. 3. Changes in the occupational structure of a society often occur when a society transitions from agricultural production to manufacturing, service, and knowledge industries. The types of jobs change and so do the opportunities available to both men and women. 4. Richard Anker, and Catherine Hein, eds. 1986. Sex Inequalities in Urban Employment in the Third World (London: MacMillan Press, 1986); Ester Boserup, Women’s Role in Economic Development (London: Allen and Unwin, 1970); Ann Oakley, Women’s Work (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1974); M. P. Ryan, Womanhood in America: From Colonial Times to the Present (New York: New Viewpoints, 1975); Louise A. Tilly and Joan W. Scott. Women, Work and Family. (New York and London: Routledge, 1978). 5. Peter Evans and Michael Timberlake, “Dependence, Inequality, and the Growth of the Tertiary.” American Sociological Review 45 (1980): 531‒52; Jeffrey Kentor, “Structural Determinants of Peripheral Urbanization: The Effects of International Dependence,” American Sociological Review, 46 (1981): 201‒211; and M. Semyonov, “The Social Context of Women’s Labor Force Participation: A Comparative Analysis,” American Journal of Sociology 86 (1980): 534‒50. 6. Ester Boserup, Women’s Role in Economic Development (London: Allen and Unwin, 1970); Elhum Haghighat, “Culture, Development and Female Labor Force Participation: Disaggregating Different Sectors.” International Review of Sociology 12, no. 3 (2002): 343– 62; Haghighat, “Determinants of Female Labor Force Participation: A Focus on Muslim Countries,” International Review of Sociology- Revue Internationale de Sociologie, 19, no. 1: 103–125; Valerie K. Oppenheimer, “The Female Labor Force in the United States: Demographic and Economic Factors Governing its Growth and Changing Composition,” Population Monograph Series, no. 5. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1970); and Fred C. Pampel and Kazuko Tanaka. 1986. “Economic Development and Female Labor Force Participation: A Reconsideration,” Social Forces 64, no. 3 (March 1986): 599–619. The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 29:382 7. Richard Anker, and Catherine Hein, eds. Sex Inequalities in Urban Employment in the Third World (London: MacMillan Press, 1986). 8. E. Jelin, “Migration and the Labor Force Participation of Latin American Women: The Domestic Servants in the Cities.” Signs 3 (1977): 129–41; J. Nash, and H. I. Safa, Sex and Class in Latin America (New York: Praeger, 1976); M. Semyonov, “The Social Context of Women’s Labor Force Participation: A Comparative Analysis,” American Journal of Sociology 86 (1980): 534–50; Harold L. Wilensky, “Women’s Work: Economic Growth, Ideology and Social Structure,” Industrial Relations, 7 (1968): 235–48; and M. D. R. Evans and Helcio U. Saraiva, “Women’s Labour Force Participation and Socioeconomic Development: Influences of Local Context and Individual Characteristics in Brazil,” The British Journal of Sociology 44, no. 1 (March 1993): 25–51. 9. Randall Collins, The Credential Society: An Historical Sociology of Education and Stratification (New York: Academic Press, 1979). 10. Willem Van Eeghen and Kouassi Soman. 1997. “Poverty in the Middle East and North Africa” (1997), www.worldbank.org/mdf/ mdf1/menapoor.htm. 11. Teresa Castro Martin, “Women’s Education and Fertility: Results from 26 Demographic and Health Surveys.” Studies in Family Planning, 26, no. 4 (July–August 1995): 187–202 and Partha S. Dasgupta, “Population, Poverty and the Local Environment,” Scientific American 272, no. 2 (1995): 4045. 12. UN Population Fund (UNFPA), State of World Population 2002: People, Poverty, and Possibilities (New York: UNFPA, 2002). 13. Farzaneh Roudi-Fahimi and Valentine M. Moghadam, Empowering Women, Developing Society: Female Education in the Middle East and North Africa (Washington, DC: Population Reference Bureau, November 2003), 4. 14. Akkario Abdeljalil, “Education in the Middle East and North Africa: The Current Situation and Future Challenges,” International Education Journal 5, no. 2 (2004): 144–53 and Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Knopf, 1993). 15. Akkario Abdeljalil, “Education in the Middle East and North Africa: The Current Situation and Future Challenges,” International Education Journal, 5, no. 2 (2004): 144–53. 16. Guity Nashat, ed. Women and Revolution in Iran (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983) and Mitra Shavarini, “Wearing the Veil to College: The Paradox of Higher Education in the Lives of Iranian Women,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 38 (2006): 189–211. 83Haghighat: The Paradox 17. Ibid. 18. UN Population Fund (UNFPA), State of World Population 2002: People, Poverty, and Possibilities (New York: UNFPA, 2002). 19. Jennifer Olmsted, “Is Paid Work the (Only) Answer? Neo-liberalism, Arab Women’s Well-being, and the Social Contract,” Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies 1, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 112–39 and UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), Progress of Arab Women: One Paradigm, Four Arena, and more than 140 Million Women, (2004), www.arabwomenconnect.org/docs/PA W2004- beginning.pdf. 20. The fact that 108 percent of women are enrolled in secondary school needs clarification. Normally this data would come from the number of women in secondary school divided by the number of women of secondary school age (maximum =100 percent). However, since we have added women beyond secondary school age who have reentered the secondary school system to further their education, we have a numerator greater than the denominator which results in a greater than 100 percent attendance. 21. Farzaneh Roudi-Fahimi and Valentine M. Moghadam, Empowering Women, Developing Society: Female Education in the Middle East and North Africa (Washington, DC: Population Reference Bureau, November 2003), http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/mna/mena. nsf/Attachments/k4d+op-ed-Eng/$File/k4d+op-ed-English.pdf. 22. Jean-Louis Sarbib, “Building Knowledge Societies in the Middle East and North Africa” (paper presented at Knowledge for Development: A Forum for Middle East & North Africa, Palais du Pharo, Marseilles, France, September 9, 2002), http://lnweb18. worldbank.org/mna/mena.nsf/Attachments/k4d+op-ed-Eng/$File/ k4d+op-ed-English.pdf. 23. John Bongaarts, “A Framework for Analyzing the Proximate Determinants of Fertility,” Population and Development Review 4, no. 1 (1978): 105–32. 24. Proximate determinants or intermediate variables of fertility were first introduced by K. Davis and J. Blake. (“Social Structure and Fertility: An Analytic Framework.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 4 [1956]: 211‒35) and have been used extensively by demographers, public health experts, economists, and sociologists to explain fertility patterns in different countries. It is an analytic framework for understanding causes of fertility reduction or increase. Davis and Blake argued that any social factor influencing changes in the fertility level of a society has to work through the eleven intermediate variables that are placed into three distinct groups. They listed the three groups as exposure to sexual http://www.arabwomenconnect.org/docs/PA W2004-beginning.pdf http://www.arabwomenconnect.org/docs/PA W2004-beginning.pdf The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 29:384 25. Teresa Castro Martin, “Women’s Education and Fertility: Results from 26 Demographic and Health Surveys,” Studies in Family Planning 26, no. 4 (July–August, 1995): 187–202. 26. J. Harvey Graff, “Literacy, Education, and Fertility, Past and Present: A Critical Review,” Population and Development Review 5, no.1 (March 1979): 105–140. 27. Kamran Asdar Ali, Planning the Family in Egypt: New Bodies, New Selves (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2002). 28. Robert Freedman, “Asia’s Recent Fertility Decline and Prospects for Future Demographic Change,” Asia-Pacific Population Research Reports, no. 1 (January 1995): 1–28. 29. Ibid. 30. Teresa Castro Martin and Fatima Juarez, “The Impact of Women’s Education on Fertility in Latin American: Searching for Explanations.” International Family Planning Perspectives 21, no. 2 (1995): 52–57 and Mary Beth Weinberger, Cynthia Lloyd, and Ann K. Blanc, “Women’s Education and Fertility: A Decade of Change in Four Latin American Countries,” International Family Planning Perspectives,15, no. 1 (1989): 4–14. 31. Teresa Castro Martin, “Women’s Education and Fertility: Results from 26 Demographic and Health Surveys,” Studies in Family Planning 26, no. 4 (July–August 1995): 187–202. 32. Ibid. 33. Mustapha Nabli, Conference on Higher Education in the Middle East and North Africa: Challenges and Opportunities for the 21st Century. Institute de Monde Arabe. May 23, 2002, World Bank Group, Middle East and North Africa, www.arab-hdr.org/publications/other/ahdr/ ahdr2002e.pdf. 34. Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, The Arab Human Development Report 2002. Creating Opportunities for Future Generations (New York: UNDP, 2002), www.arab-hdr.org/ publications/other/ahdr/ahdr2002e.pdf. 35. Ibid. 36. Mirna Lattouf, Women, Education, and Socialization in Modern Lebanon (New York: University Press of America, 2004). 37. Ibid., 17. 38. Ibid. intercourse, risk of conception, and likelihood of live birth. Background factors such as educational attainment work in conjunction with intermediate variables of fertility to reduce or increase fertility.