American Journal of Islam and Society Vol 40 No 1-2.indb


77

Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s Jurisprudence of 
Priorities: A Critical Assessment

M U R I E  H A S S A N

Abstract
According to Yusuf al-Qaradawi – a prominent Muslim jurist 
of the contemporary period, the jurisprudence of priorities is 
intended to mitigate excess and negligence in legal reasoning. 
This article examines the fundamental principles of the juris-
prudence of priorities as propounded by Yusuf al-Qaradawi in 
relation to the foundational sources of Islamic law. The purpose 
of this article is to dissect the constituent legal principles of the 
jurisprudence of priorities and critically evaluate their valid-
ity and coherence against the textual and rational evidences of 
Islamic law. This article argues that the fundamental principles 

Murie Hassan has MA degrees in Islamic Studies (2018) and Classical Arabic 
(2021) from Charles Sturt University, Australia and traditional training in the 
Islamic sciences. Murie is a PhD candidate (2020-2023) in Islamic Studies with 
the University of Melbourne, Australia. His research interests include legal 
theory, exegesis and contemporary Islamic thought.

Hassan, Murie. 2023. “Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s Jurisprudence of Priorities: A Critical Assessment.” 
American Journal of Islam and Society 40, nos. 1-2: 77–120 • doi: 10.35632/ajis.v40i1-2.3190
Copyright © 2023 International Institute of Islamic Thought



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of the jurisprudence of priorities are validated in the sources of 
Islamic law, and do facilitate the mitigation of excess and negli-
gence in legal reasoning.

Keywords: Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Islamic law, jurisprudence, ijti-
had, fiqh, shariah

Introduction and a Review of Literature

A prominent contemporary Muslim jurist – Yusuf al-Qaradawi (d. 
2022) posits that Muslims have become complacent and stagnant in the 
modern period.1 In important respects, al-Qaradawi considers Muslims 
themselves to be responsible for their own failings. One such failing, 
according to him, is the negligence of what he considers to be the Islamic 
priorities. Following a long line of prominent premodern and modern 
scholars,2 al-Qaradawi is credited with reviving a discourse known as 
the jurisprudence of priorities (fiqh al-awlawiyyāt) in the contemporary 
period in order to address the prevalent imbalances of priorities and 
disorder3 in legal reasoning (ijtihād). For al-Qaradawi, the jurisprudence 
of priorities is:

…of the utmost degree of importance, for it treats – from an 
Islamic legal perspective – the problem of disorder and imbal-
ance in evaluating and arranging thoughts and acts. It tackles the 
issue of prioritising matters; what should be considered primary 
and what is relegated to a secondary position in the scale of the 
divine commandments and prophetic teachings.4

According to al-Qaradawi, the objective of his thesis is to, “serve the 
purpose of moderating thought, correcting attitudes and laying down the 
basis”5 for the jurisprudence of priorities. The underlying principle of the 
jurisprudence of priorities (i.e., the principle of priority) was advocated 
(without its designated term of fiqh al-awlawiyyāt) by a number of ear-
lier scholars – such as Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d. 505/1111) and Ahmad 
ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728/1328) in the premodern period, and Muhammad 



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ʿAbduh (d. 1905) and Muhammad al-Ghazali (d. 1996) in the modern period.6 
However, it was Yusuf al-Qaradawi who took a particular interest in the 
form and function of the jurisprudence of priorities in the modern period.7

Al-Qaradawi’s work in Arabic, Fī Fiqh al-Awlawiyyāt: Dirāsah 
Jadīdah fī Ḍawʼ al-Qurʼān wa-al-Sunnah,8 translated in English as 
Jurisprudence of Priorities9 is the first book written to address this con-
cept of prioritisation using the specific term of fiqh al-awlawiyyāt (the 
jurisprudence of priorities). In this work, al-Qaradawi aims to lay down 
“the basis”10 of the jurisprudence of priorities and briefly articulate its 
fundamental principles (uṣūl). The second work by al-Qaradawi that 
treats the jurisprudence of priorities (to a lesser degree than the former) 
is in Arabic titled, Awlawiyyāt li-l-Ḥarakah al-Islāmiyyah,11 and trans-
lated into English as The Priorities of the Islamic Movement in the Coming 
Phase.12 In both works, al-Qaradawi advances principles of the jurispru-
dence of priorities in brief and evaluates various priorities of Islamic 
thought, such as devotional matters, mundane matters, education, prop-
agation, and the Islamic polity. Nonetheless, al-Qaradawi asserts in his 
primary work, “I cannot claim that this is a comprehensive study. Rather, 
it only opens the door and paves the way for more work.”13

The literature concerning the jurisprudence of priorities written in 
the English language remains rather scarce. According to a group of 
Malaysian scholars,14 al-Ghazali is credited with reviving the jurispru-
dence of priorities concerning devotional practices in his magnum opus, 
The Revival of the Religious Sciences (Iḥyāʾ ʿ Ulūm al-Dīn).15 Another group 
of Malaysian scholars have attempted to provide a definition:

Fiqh of Priorities means the most appropriate way of under-
standing the rulings that are in conformity with the objectives 
of the religion through achieving the most important and ben-
eficial benefits [sic], warding off the evils or the lesser harm of 
them [sic], as well as observing the results that maybe caused 
by these rulings.16

Despite being far from comprehensive, the definition depicts the 
jurisprudence of priorities primarily in relation to the securing of the 



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objectives of Islamic law (Shariah). However, in comparison to literature 
in the English language, the treatment of the jurisprudence of priorities 
in the Arabic language is relatively advanced, yet also remains somewhat 
scant. Arab scholars appear to have extracted the general principle of 
priority (as a theoretical framework) and applied it to various aspects 
of Islamic law.

A sampling of current writing in Arabic on the jurisprudence of 
priorities shows a range of approaches to the subject, and different 
authors foreground different elements. Muhammad al-Wakili in Fiqh 
al-Awlawiyyāt: Dirāsah fī al-Ḍawābiṭ17 studies the jurisprudence of 
priorities in the perspective of legal parameters (ḍawābiṭ) within the 
genre of legal maxims (qawāʿid fiqhiyyah), which delineates circum-
scriptions to legal variables of Islamic law. Al-Wakili notes that sources 
of Islamic law (maṣādir al-sharīʿah) and their legal evidence (adillah 
sharʿiyyah) concerning their evidentiary value (ḥujjiyyah) ought to be 
prioritised in the order of the Qurʾan, Sunnah (the prophetic precedent), 
ijmāʿ (scholarly consensus) and qiyās (analogical deduction). Another 
scholar, ʿ Abd al-Salam ʿ Iyadah ʿ Ali al-Karbuli, in his Fiqh al-Awlawiyyāt 
fī Ẓalāl Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah al-Islāmiyyah18 argues that higher objectives 
of Islamic law (maqāṣid al-sharīʿah) as an independent legal theory (or as 
a source of Islamic law in its own right) ought to have priority over other 
rational sources of Islamic law such as analogical deduction (qiyās). Here, 
al-Karbuli emphasises the prioritisation of various benefits (maṣāliḥ) 
and harms (mafāsid), such as public benefit/harm having priority over 
individual benefit/harm and collective benefit/harm having priority 
over independent benefit/harm. By contrast, Hassani Muhammad Nur 
Muhammad in his Fiqh al-Awlawiyyāt fī al-Sharīʿah al-Islāmiyyah: 
Dirāsah fī al-Qawāʿid wa-al-Ḍawābiṭ wa-al-Taṭbīqāt al-Muʿāṣirah19 
focuses on the jurisprudence of priorities in relation to the ranking of 
acts (marātib al-aʿmāl), and argues for the prioritisation of acts according 
to the precedent of the pious-predecessors (al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ). He argues 
that benefits and harms also should be gauged and prioritised according 
to the precedent of the first three generations of Muslim scholars in the 
formative period of Islam. Another example is the work of Muhammad 
Hammam ʿ Abd al-Rahim Malham, who in his Taʾṣīl Fiqh al-Awlawiyyāt: 



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Dirāsah Maqāṣidiyyah20 broadly addresses the priorities of the higher 
objectives of Islamic law. In Taʾṣīl Fiqh al-Awlawiyyāt wa-Taṭbīqātuhu 
fī Majāl Ḥifẓ al-Ḍīn fī al-Siyāsah al-Sharʿiyyah21 he argues that among 
the five universal objectives (al-kulliyyāt al-khams) of Islamic law, the 
preservation of religion (ḥifẓ al-dīn) has priority under the Islamic judi-
ciary policy (al-siyāsah al-sharʿiyyah). A cursory glance suggests that 
most contemporary literature, including those referenced above, if not all 
works on the jurisprudence of priorities are based on al-Qaradawi’s the-
oretical framework found in his primary work Jurisprudence of Priorities.

An analysis of the existing literature on the jurisprudence of priori-
ties further shows that, although there is a substantial application of the 
principle of priority in areas of Islamic thought, there is a lack of research 
into the fundamental principles underpinning the jurisprudence of pri-
orities itself. This raises a number of questions including: What are the 
constituent legal principles of the jurisprudence of priorities in the first 
place? Is each constituent legal principle of the jurisprudence of prior-
ities congruent with the sources of Islamic law? Are they substantiated 
by textual sources of Islamic law? In order to answer these questions, 
this article evaluates the validity and coherence of key principles of 
the jurisprudence of priorities as propounded by Yusuf al-Qaradawi in 
the light of the sources of Islamic law. The goal of this article, then, is 
to explore the legal-theoretical (uṣūlī) nuances of the jurisprudence of 
priorities to a further degree than previous research. At the same time, 
this analysis does not concern itself with the application of the juris-
prudence of priorities to any particular legal issue (masʾalah fiqhiyyah) 
within the ancillaries of jurisprudence (furūʿ al-fiqh), but rather focuses 
on dissecting the fundamental principles of the jurisprudence of priori-
ties (uṣūl fiqh al-awlawiyyāt).

Primarily from al-Qaradawi’s writings, this article isolates six fun-
damental principles of the jurisprudence of priorities. First, the concept 
of priority (al-awlawiyyah) where a variable is prioritised over another 
according to the sources and principles of Islamic law. Second, the con-
cept of rank (al-marātib) where a variable outranks another (according to 
criteria of merit accredited in the sources of Islamic law) while the out-
ranking variable has priority over the outranked variable in value. Third, 



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the concept of sequence (al-tartīb) indicates a series of actions necessary 
to accomplish a particular objective where the preceding action has pri-
ority over the succeeding action in accomplishing the objective. Fourth, 
the concept of gradualism (al-tadarruj) indicates a succession of stages 
necessary to advance from the lesser to the greater in progress where 
the preceding stage takes priority over the succeeding stage in accom-
plishing the desired result. Fifth, the concept of centrism (al-wasaṭiyyah) 
proposes to assume the middle position between two opposing extremes 
where the middle position has priority over the two extreme positions in 
harmonising extremism. Sixth, the concept of balance (al-muwāzanah) 
indicates weighing out two variables and prioritising either the most 
beneficial or the least harmful out of the two. The culmination of these six 
principles consolidates the fundamental principles of the jurisprudence 
of priorities, which advocates argue mitigates excess and negligence in 
legal reasoning. The following is an evaluation of each of these princi-
ples in connection to the jurisprudence of priorities as conceived of by 
Yusuf al-Qaradawi.

The Principle of Priority (awlawiyyah):  
The precedence between two things

Al-Qaradawi claims that the purpose of the jurisprudence of priorities 
is to “reconcile or control the two opposing extremes of excessiveness 
and negligence.”22 Al-Qaradawi elaborates on the functions of the juris-
prudence of priorities:

The unimportant is not preferred over the important, nor is pri-
ority given to the less important over the more important, the 
outweighed over the preponderant, or the less noble over the 
noble or best. Instead, that which deserves priority should be 
given its due primary status, and that which is secondary is to 
be relegated to a secondary position. The small should not be 
magnified; nor should the significant be belittled. Everything 
should be put in its position with a straight balance, without 
excess or negligence.23



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In simpler terms, according to al-Qaradawi the function of the juris-
prudence of priorities is: “It tackles the issue of prioritising matters; what 
should be considered primary and what is relegated to a secondary posi-
tion in the scale of the divine commandments and prophetic teachings.”24 
Therefore, the principle of priority, which is the underlying theorem of 
the jurisprudence of priorities concerns prioritising one variable over 
another in relation to importance, calibre, urgency, utility and suitability. 
The key Qurʾanic text that requires analysis in this regard is:

Those of the believers who sit still, other than those who have a 
(disabling) hurt, are not on an equality with those who strive in 
the way of God with their wealth and lives. God hath conferred 
on those who strive with their wealth and lives a rank above 
the sedentary. Unto each God hath promised good, but He hath 
bestowed on those who strive a great reward above the seden-
tary. (Q 4:95 trans. Pickthall.25)

In the above verse, the activist is ranked above the sedentary even 
though both are believers. However, while the activist is praised as being “a 
rank above,” the sedentary is not criticised for being a rank below. Rather, 
the sedentary is a rank lower in comparison to the activist. This is indicated 
clearly by the statement, “Unto each God hath promised good, but He hath 
bestowed on those who strive a great reward above the sedentary.” The 
verse does indicate that activism, which takes a maximalist approach is 
superior to quietism, which is a minimalist approach. However, it is note-
worthy that religious minimalism is not blameworthy according to this 
verse. This assertion is supported by the agreed-upon (muttafaq ʿalayhi) 
report in which a man from Najd questions the Prophet Muhammad about 
the bare-minimum requirements of the religion, to which the Prophet’s 
response was to guard the five pillars of Islam. The man then replies, “By 
God! I will neither do less nor more than this. God’s Messenger said, “If 
what he said is true, then he will be successful” (Bukhari: 46).26 Hence, 
the principle of priority relegates through legal reasoning two related 
or comparable legal variables27 into primary and secondary positions. In 
other words, the principle of priority relegates through a process of legal 



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reasoning two legal variables in order and/or rank, one above the other 
while what was relegated to a secondary position is neither trivialised nor 
dismissed. Subsequently, what immediately comes to mind concerning the 
principle of priority is its similarity to the concept of outweighing (tarjīḥ) 
of evidence in Islamic legal theory (uṣul al-fiqh).

Muhammad Hashim Kamali (b. 1944) explains that “conflict (taʿāruḍ) 
occurs when each of two evidences of equal strength requires the opposite 
of the other. This means that if one of them affirms something, the other 
negates it at the same time and place.”28 However, logically, a genuine 
conflict can only occur between two probable evidences (adillah ẓanni-
yyah), and only seeming conflict occurs between definitive evidences 
(adillah qaṭʿiyyah).29 Consequently, outweighing (tarjīḥ) of evidence 
occurs in legal reasoning when there is conflict and contradiction of 
two evidences between which there is a distinguishable feature of rank.30 
If there is no distinguishable feature of rank between two evidences, 
this situation is considered one of equivalence (taʿādul) and therefore 
devoid of the possibility of reconciliation, and this logically cannot occur 
between two definitive evidences or between two probable evidences.31 
Equivalence cannot logically occur between two definitive evidences 
because objectively there cannot be duality in proof (ḥujjah) on a single 
matter (masʾalah). Similarly, equivalence cannot logically occur between 
two probable evidences because all probable evidences are indefinite and 
must have a distinguishing feature of rank. Outweighing, on the other 
hand, distinguishes evidence into one that outweighs (marjūḥ) the other 
evidence, that is, the outweighed (rājiḥ). The evidence that outweighs is 
stronger than the outweighed in terms of evidentiary value determined 
through legal reasoning. Moreover, outweighing and the preference of a 
particular evidence over another in legal reasoning occurs after exhaust-
ing all means of reconciliation. However, what is evident here is that 
the concept of outweighing is not equivalent to the principle of priority. 
Outweighing is preferring one evidence over another due to a conflict 
between them which results ultimately in discarding the outweighed 
evidence. According to al-Qaradawi, “preference [outweighing] entails 
neglecting one of the two texts and giving priority to the other over 
it.”32 Unlike outweighing, the principle of priority ranks and prioritises 



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legal variables into primary and secondary positions while what is rele-
gated to a secondary position is neither trivialised nor discarded. While 
outweighing is restricted to legal evidence, the principle of priority is 
unrestricted and versatile, and deals not only with legal evidences but 
with a variety of legal variables. Notwithstanding, prioritisation of legal 
variables can only be achieved according to a certain criterion of values.

The Principle of Ranks (marātib):  
Designating variables according to their merit

Al-Qaradawi claims:

I have earlier…called it fiqh marātib al-aʿmāl [jurisprudence of 
ranking acts], by which I mean putting everything, whether rules, 
values, or acts, in its due status… based on the correct legal criteria 
derived from the light of divine revelation and sound intellect.33

I once titled this study fiqh marātib al-aʿmāl [jurisprudence of 
ranking acts], and a few years ago I chose to title it as fiqh al-aw-
lawiyyāt [jurisprudence of priorities], for the latter is a wider, 
more comprehensive, and expressive title.34

From the above statements, we can deduce that the jurisprudence of 
priorities encompasses the principle of ranks, and the latter is a constit-
uent principle of the former. The interrelationship between the principle 
of priority and the principle of rank is a straightforward one, and the 
objective is:

[D]istinguishing between what Islamic Law gives priority to and 
what it considers secondary or less important, between what it 
emphasizes and what it makes optional, and between what Islam 
assigns great value to and what it degrades.35

Marātib, in the context of jurisprudence indicates ‘ranks’ in the sense 
that it is a hierarchy of things (ashyāʾ) according to their due status or 



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merit. What is meant by ‘due status or merit’ is a benchmark, that is, a 
grading deduced according to the Qurʾan, the prophetic precedent and 
sound intellect. The Qurʾan and Hadith speak of rankings (of some-
thing better in comparison to another) with regards to certain matters 
of which most cases are recommendations (mandūbāt). For example, 
Moses reasoned with the Jews of his time saying: “Would you exchange 
what is better for what is less?” (Q 2: 61 trans. Saheeh Intl.36), and, in a 
supplication of optimism: “Perhaps our Lord will substitute for us [one] 
better than it” (Q 68:82 trans. Saheeh Intl.). The Qurʾan contains many 
sentences and phrases of rankings inclusive of asmāʾ al-tafḍīl (com-
parative nouns) in the morphological pattern of afʿalu which indicates 
a comparison of two while ranking one above the other. The English 
equivalent is the suffix ‘er’ in the sense of ‘better,’ ‘truer,’ or ‘righter’ 
compared to another thing. 

In the following examples of Qurʾanic texts, the comparative noun 
khayr (better) is used to distinguish and rank one thing above another. 
The Qurʾan considers those who participate in battle and spend their 
wealth in circumstances of difficulty and necessity to be higher in rank 
than those who go into battle and spend their wealth in circumstances of 
ease and want: “Those who spent and fought before the victory are not 
upon a level (with the rest of you). Such are greater in rank than those 
who spent and fought afterwards” (Q 57:10 trans. Pickthall). In another 
verse, the activist (who struggles) is ranked above the quietist: “God 
hath conferred on those who strive with their wealth and lives a rank 
above the sedentary. Unto each God hath promised good, but He hath 
bestowed on those who strive a great reward above the sedentary” (Q 
4:95 trans. Pickthall). Charity in secret is ranked above charity in public: 
“If you disclose your charitable expenditures, they are good; but if you 
conceal them and give them to the poor, it is better for you” (Q 2:271 
trans. Saheeh Intl.). The Qurʾan asserts that, in the choice of marriage, 
“a believing slave woman is better than a polytheist, even though she 
might please you.” (Q 2:221 trans. Saheeh Intl.).

The Prophet Muhammad also reportedly ranked the characteristics 
of an extrovert Muslim above that of an introverted Muslim: “Indeed 
when the Muslim mixes with the people and he is patient with their 



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harm, he is better than the Muslim who does not mix with the people 
and is not patient with their harm” (Tirmidhi: 2507; Ibn Majah: 4032). 
The popular (mashūr) report that is recorded in major Hadith collec-
tions indicates that there are ranks in faith: “Faith has some seventy 
odd branches, the most virtuous of which is saying lā ilāha illā llāh (no 
deity but God), and the least of which is removing bones from the road” 
(Abu Dawud: 4676). Reportedly, the Prophet Muhammad further ranked 
the easier option in matters. As Aishah bint Abi Bakr (d.58/678) the wife 
of the Prophet Muhammad reports: “The Messenger of God was never 
given the choice between two things but he would choose the easier of 
the two, so long as it was not a sin” (Muslim: 6045). With regards to the 
primary sources of Islam, the Prophet Muhammad reportedly said: “I 
have left two things with you. As long as you hold fast to them, you will 
not go astray. They are the book of God and the Sunnah of his Prophet” 
(al-Muwaṭṭaʾ: 2640). Scholars concur that the order in which the sources 
are mentioned is indicative of their respective ranks.

Islamic legal theoreticians (uṣūliyyūn) are unanimous in ranking the 
Qurʾan above the Sunnah of the Prophet.37 This ranking is not only in 
the authenticity of their transmission (thubūt) but as sources of Islamic 
jurisprudence. The ranking of transmitted-textual evidence (adillah 
naqliyyah) follows the hierarchy stipulated above, which is texts of the 
Qurʾan followed by texts attributed to the prophetic precedent.38 Next 
to the Qurʾan and the prophetic precedent, the majority of Islamic legal 
theoreticians rank scholarly consensus followed by analogical deduc-
tion as secondary sources of Islamic law. Secondary sources of Islamic 
law – both scholarly consensus and analogical deduction are considered 
rational evidence (adillah ʿ aqliyyah). Therefore, Islamic legal evidence is 
ranked in the order of primary sources followed by secondary sources 
and transmitted-textual evidence followed by rational evidence.

Al-Qaradawi argues that equivocal texts (mutashābihāt) should be 
understood in light of unequivocal texts (muḥkamāt), where the latter 
has priority over the former.39 Al-Qaradawi’s emphasis is not on the 
theological connotations of mutashābihāt in contrast to muḥkamāt, but 
rather concerning the priority of clear texts (wāḍiḥāt) over unclear texts 
(mubhamāt) in the legal-theoretical perspective of clarity and ambiguity 



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of expressions (al-wuḍūḥ wa-al-ibhām fī al-alfāẓ). This implies that 
definitive texts (qaṭʿiyyāt) should be prioritised over probable texts (ẓan-
niyyāt) in legal interpretation. The Qurʾanic texts are ranked according 
to their clarity (wuḍūḥ) and ambiguity (ibhām). Clear texts are ranked 
variously according to their measure of clarity, while unclear texts are 
ranked variously depending on their measure of ambiguity.40 The pro-
phetic precedent as an independent source of Islamic law is ranked in the 
order of legislative Sunnah (sunnah tashrīʿiyyah) followed by non-leg-
islative Sunnah (sunnah ghayr tashrīʿiyyah).41 The prophetic precedent 
in its transmission (riwāyāt) is further ranked in the order of recurrent 
(mutawātir), popular (mashūr) and solitary (āḥād) – reports (sing. khabar 
pl. akhbār) and normative conventions (aʿmāl). In terms of authenticity 
(ṣiḥḥah), reports are ranked in the order of ṣaḥīḥ (sound), ḥasan (good) 
and ḍaʿīf (weak). Especially with regards to the legal interpretation of 
Hadith, al-Qaradawi argues that consolidation and reconciliation (al-jamʿ 
wa-al-tawfīq) should assume priority over outweighing (tarjīḥ).42 This 
implies the priority of understanding the generality and specificity 
(al-ʿumūm wa-al-khuṣūṣ) of a report through other independent reports 
and related transmissions over the enactment of individual reports. The 
reports of the four rightly-guided caliphs (al-khulafāʾ al-rāshidūn) i.e. 
Abu Bakr ʿAbd Allah ibn ʿUthman (d. 13/634), ʿUmar ibn al-Khattab (d. 
23/644), ʿUthman ibn ʿAffan (d. 35/656) and ʿAli ibn Abi Talib (d. 40/661) 
are ranked above the reports of other Companions (ṣahābah)43 as the 
Prophet Muhammad reportedly said: “adhere to my precedent (Sunnah) 
and the precedent (sunnah) of the rightly-guided caliphs” (Tirmidhi: 
2676; Abu Dawud: 4607; Ibn Majah: 42).

Sunni Muslims are unanimous that the address ‘rightly-guided 
caliphs’ include the four rightly-guided caliphs. However, Shiʿi Muslims 
consider only the cousin of the Prophet Muhammad, ʿAli, as the legit-
imate rightly-guided caliph among the four rightly-guided caliphs 
recognised by Sunnis. Nevertheless, Sunnis and Shiʿa both agree on the 
report in question (Tirmidhi: 2676; Abu Dawud: 4607; Ibn Majah: 42) 
despite the disagreement on the legitimacy of individual caliphs. Sunnis 
consider most Companions of the Prophet Muhammad to be rightly 
guided and their legal opinions to be a precedent authoritative in Islamic 



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law.44 Moreover, the reports of prominent Companions, inclusive of ten 
select Companions,45 are ranked above other Companions due to their 
stature and seniority. Earlier scholars, that is, the Predecessors (al-salaf) 
are ranked in the order of the Companions, Successors (tābiʿūn) and 
Followers (tabiʿ tābiʿūn) due to their moral superiority and proximity to 
the prophetic tenure, as the Prophet Muhammad reportedly said: “The 
best of people are my generation, then those who come after them, 
then those who come after them” (Muslim: 6472).46 Therefore, the ear-
lier scholars (al-salaf) are ranked above the later scholars (al-khalaf) in 
scholarly authority.

According to al-Qaradawi, the principle of rank must be according to 
the Qurʾan, the prophetic precedent and ‘sound intellect,’ as already stip-
ulated. The Qurʾan and the prophetic precedent are transmitted sources 
(riwāyah) while ‘sound intellect’ refers to rational sources (dirāyah). 
Transmitted sources are transmitted texts (naql) while rational sources 
indicate the use of the intellect (ʿaql) through logical means. Reasoning 
inculcates scientific (ʿilmī), philosophical (falsafī) and logical (manṭiqī) 
analysis, and inference (istidlāl) through deductive reasoning (istinbāṭ) 
and inductive reasoning (istiqrāʾ).47 Deductive reasoning includes ana-
logical deduction and consolidation and reconciliation of Qurʾanic texts 
and Hadith. Inductive reasoning includes extracting general principles 
(qawāʿid kulliyyah) such as the objectives of Islamic law. Necessary 
objectives (ḍarūriyyāt), exigent objectives (ḥājiyyāt) and enhancive 
objectives (taḥsīniyyāt) are ranked in descending order of importance 
where the preceding objective has priority over the succeeding one.48 
Hence, ‘sound intellect’ concerns legal reasoning through transmitted 
sources as well as rational sources. However, the ubiquitous contention 
posable against the principle of ranking (or any objective deduction for 
that matter) is the philosophical argument of subjectivity and relativity 
in the determination of what is better than another. The ubiquitous phil-
osophical contention is – how can one objectively determine the rank 
of one matter over another?

From a legal-theoretical point of view, the need to rank matters 
(or legal variables) according to a certain benchmark is a necessity for 
legal reasoning. However, from a pragmatic point of view, postmodernist 



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philosophical contentions regarding subjectivism and/or relativism are 
difficult to counter through objective responses, given that subjectivism 
and relativism are based on the hypothesis that one objective truth does 
not exist.49 However, al-Qaradawi’s benchmark according to “legal cri-
teria derived from the light of divine revelation and sound intellect,”50 
may nevertheless impose some objectivity in legal reasoning. Despite 
Muslims in general being united around some fundamental sources and 
principles of Islamic law, while differing in subsidiaries, what constitutes 
“sound intellect” is untenable in definitive terms. Notwithstanding, for 
the majority of Muslims the well-established benchmark of ‘according 
to the Qurʾan, the prophetic precedent and the scholarly consensus’51 
in this order may establish a commonly agreeable formula to determine 
what is better than another (beyond that which may be indefensible 
legal-theoretically). If scholarly consensus is also objectively untenable, 
as argued by some scholars,52 then, ‘according to the Qurʾan and the 
prophetic precedent’ may be the agreeable yardstick of objective truth 
and reality for Islamic legal reasoning. However, legal reasoning is not 
confined to ranking sources of knowledge in connection to epistemology, 
but it also inculcates procedure and sequence in analysing sources of 
knowledge in connection to methodology.

The Principle of Sequence (tartīb):  
Series of actions to accomplish a particular objective

Legal reasoning does not only concern the ranking of legal variables, 
but includes the execution of actions (ʿamal) according to a sequence 
(tartīb) that is appropriate (munāṣib) to achieve a particular juristic 
objective. Islamic legal theoreticians considered ‘appropriate’ to mean 
“that which brings benefit (maṣlaḥah) according to the objectives of 
Islamic law.”53 However, it is noteworthy that ‘appropriate’ in connec-
tion to sequence is not equivalent to ‘better’ in connection to rank. 
Rather, sequence purports an appropriate succession in the execu-
tion of acts, whereas rank purports a hierarchy of things according to 
their value. Simply defined, sequence indicates the appropriate order 
in which actions are executed. Nonetheless, the precedent for Muslims 



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in both rank and sequence of acts ought to be according to the Qurʾan 
and the prophetic precedent.

The very first chapter of the Qurʾan teaches to supplicate: “It is 
You we worship and You we ask for help” (Q 1:5 trans. Saheeh Intl). 
In this, the appropriate sequence of action is to demonstrate devotion 
before imploring for aid. This demonstrates the appropriate sequence of 
action through which the objective of imploration is achieved. Moreover, 
the Qurʾan consistently maintains the sequence of transcendental suc-
cess – which is to consolidate faith before doing good works: “who 
believe and do good works” (Q 2:25; 103:3). This recurring sequence 
in the Qurʾan does not appear in its reverse order. Despite the specific 
theological implication of this text, the general implication is that dis-
cernment (maʿrifah) precedes action (ʿamal) in an appropriate sequence. 
Diyaʾ al-Din al-Juwayni (d. 478/1085) defines jurisprudence (fiqh) as “the 
discernment of legal rulings ascertained through the exercise of legal rea-
soning” (maʿrifat al-aḥkām al-sharʿiyyah alladhī tharīqu-hā al-ijtihād).54 
Hence, the competence to exercise legal reasoning and the understanding 
of Islamic jurisprudence is a prerequisite to issuing legal opinions (iftāʾ). 
Arguably, if an inappropriate sequence of legal reasoning is exercised, it 
may lead to excess and negligence in legal opinions. One way in which 
excess and negligence in legal reasoning can occur is when an inappro-
priate sequence is applied to resolve conflict (dafʿ al-taʿāruḍ) between 
two probable evidences (adillah ẓanniyyah).

All four traditional legal schools agree on the implementation of 
four procedures to resolve conflict of evidence.55 The majority of legal 
theoreticians inclusive of Malikis, Shafiʿis and Hanbalis agree upon a 
particular sequence in the implementation of those agreed-upon proce-
dures for the resolution of two conflicting evidences (taʿāruḍān).56 The 
sequence according to the majority is as follows. The first procedure, 
the consolidation and reconciliation between two conflicting evidences 
(al-jamʿ wa-l-tawfīq bayna al-taʿārudayn) includes: specification of the 
general (takhṣīṣ al-ʿāmm), qualification of the absolute (taqyīd al-muṭlaq), 
clarification of the cryptic (bayān al-mujmal), elaboration of the concise 
(tafṣīl al-mujmal) and augmentation (tazīd) of related texts. The second 
procedure, the outweighing of one evidence over another (al-tarjīḥ bayna 



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al-dalīlayn) can occur either due to one evidence having a high prob-
ability (ghalabat al-ẓann) or due to the availability of supplementary 
evidence from another source in the form of supporting evidence of the 
primary evidence. The third procedure, the abrogation of one evidence 
to the retention of the other (naskh aḥad al-dalīlayn), where the latest 
operative ruling (of one evidence) abrogates the older obsolete ruling 
(of the other evidence). The fourth procedure is the suspension of both 
evidences (tasāquṭ al-dalīlayn), which is applicable when all objective 
methods of conflict resolution have failed and the abandonment of both 
conflicting evidences to seek other means of legal reasoning has become 
necessary. While Hanafis agree with the aforementioned four procedures 
of conflict resolution, they differ only in the sequence of their execution.

According to Wahbah Mustafa al-Zuhayli (d. 2015), the Hanafis only 
differ in the sequence of execution i.e., outweighing as the first proce-
dure instead of reconciliation, followed by abrogation and suspension.57 
However, the Hanafi giving of precedence to outweighing over reconcili-
ation seems to be an exception rather than the norm according to Hanafi 
inclined works of legal theory such as that of ʿ Abd al-Wahhab al-Khallaf 
(d. 1956)58 and Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee (b.1945),59 which fail to men-
tion this exception. Upon closer examination, Hanafis give precedence to 
outweighing over reconciliation only when there is an exception to out-
weigh a solitary report (khabar al-āhād) by another solitary report based 
on the consideration of general principles such as “repelling injury” 
(dafʿ al-ḍarar) and “securing benefits” (jalb al-manāfiʿ).60 According to 
al-Zuhayli, Hanafis would outweigh the report containing a prohibition 
(muḥarram) over the report containing a permissibility (mubīḥ) and the 
report containing an inhibition (māniʿ) over the report containing a req-
uisition (muqtaḍī).61 Nonetheless, it is safe to conclude that, in normal 
circumstances, the four schools seem to agree on both the procedures in 
conflict resolution of legal evidence and the sequence of their execution. 
However, al-Qaradawi reemphasises the well-established priority of rec-
onciliation over outweighing specifically in the case of conflict between 
two sound (ṣaḥīḥ) reports owing to their superior evidentiary value. 
According to his epistemological position on the credibility of Hadith, 
two ṣaḥīḥ reports can only complement or supplement one another and 



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cannot conflict with each other because two facts, or factual reports, 
cannot contradict each other.62 Al-Qaradawi reasons:

When it is possible, without artifice and arbitrariness, to do that 
by combining and reconciling the two texts so that one can act 
according to both together, then it is better than recourse to 
preference [outweighing] between the two. It is better because 
preference [outweighing] entails neglecting one of the two texts 
and giving priority to the other over it.63

It is noteworthy that the implementation of a systematic legal 
procedure in the conflict resolution of legal evidence according to an 
appropriate sequence can mitigate excess and negligence in legal reason-
ing while enhancing the utility thereof. However, apart from following 
proper procedure, legal reasoning also involves implementation in suc-
cessive stages.

The Principle of Gradualism (tadarruj):  
Successive advancement from the lesser to the greater

Al-Qaradawi explains: “what we mean by ‘jurisprudence of priorities’ is the 
relegation of each thing [or matter] to its due status; neither postponing 
what deserves preponement nor preponing what deserves postponement.”64 
The purpose of gradualism is to avoid detriments arising from both extremes 
of undue haste and undue delay in executing actions. It is well-established in 
the Islamic tradition that the Qurʾan was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad 
gradually, in successive stages, and not all at once, so that the Shariah is 
received, disseminated, and implemented at the most appropriate juncture.

And those who disbelieve say, “Why was the Qurʾan not revealed 
to him all at once?” Thus [it is] that We may strengthen thereby 
your heart. And We have spaced it distinctly”; “And [it is] a 
Qurʾan which We have separated [by intervals] that you might 
recite it to the people over a prolonged period. And We have 
sent it down progressively.” (Q 25:32; 17:106 trans. Saheeh Intl.)



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The interrelation between gradualism and the principle of priority 
is that the preceding stage has priority over the succeeding stage with 
respect to time. In other words, a steady advancement toward a desired 
outcome, progressing stage by stage without delay or haste is gradual-
ism. Gradualism is connected to the principle of sequence specifically 
in relation to the appropriate and suitable time at which matters ought 
to be executed and implemented. The relationship between the principle 
of gradualism and the principle of ranks (and the principle of priority) 
is that what should be postponed or preponed based on what is ranked 
higher or lower according to the sources of Islamic law. In other words, 
what is ranked higher should be preponed (and prioritised) over what is 
ranked lower and what is ranked lower should be postponed over what is 
ranked higher. Furthermore, recommended matters should be postponed 
over obligatory matters, while permissible matters should be postponed 
over recommended matters. In the perspective of legal objectives classi-
fied according to their demand; necessary objectives (ḍarūriyyāt) should 
be preponed (and prioritised) over exigent objectives (ḥājiyyāt) while 
exigent objectives should be preponed (and prioritised) over enhancive 
objectives (taḥsīniyyāt). Exigent objectives should be postponed over 
necessary objectives, while enhancive objectives should be postponed 
over exigent objectives.

Hashim Kamali explains that, “Gradualism is pragmatic and is in line 
also with the Qurʾanic principle of removal of hardship” (rafʿ al-ḥaraj), 
and the Qurʾan affirms that “God intends for you ease and does not 
intend for you hardship” (Q 2:185 trans. Saheeh Intl.). Facilitating ease 
(taysīr) and alleviating hardship was the prophetic precedent according 
to numerous Hadith, such as “verily, the religion is of ease,” “you have 
been sent to make things easy and not to make them difficult,” “Make 
things easy for the people and do not make things difficult for them” 
(Bukhari: 39, 220 & 4314). Aishah reportedly said:

Verily, the first verses to be revealed were from the shorter chap-
ters at the end of the Qurʾan. In them is mentioned Paradise and 
Hellfire, until people were firmly established upon Islam and 
verses of lawful and unlawful were revealed. If the first verse 



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to be revealed was ‘do not drink wine,’ they would have said, 
‘we will never stop drinking wine.’ And if the first verse to be 
revealed was ‘do not commit adultery,’ they would have said, ‘we 
will never stop committing adultery’. (Bukhari: 4993)

According to Jasser Auda, the prophetic methodology (minhāj 
al-nabī) was to implement religious matters gradually in order to facili-
tate ease and not impose difficulty (mashaqqah) upon people.65

As traditionally understood, the prohibition of intoxicants was sup-
posed to have been imposed gradually according to a weak (ḍaʿīf) report 
with multiple chains (Tirmidhi: 3049, Nasaʾi: 5542). Despite the weakness 
of this report, the logic of gradualism thereof is acceptable with some 
level of certainty. Accordingly, the first stage; is an acknowledgement that 
there is some benefit in the source of intoxicants: “And from the fruits of 
the palm trees and grapevines you take intoxicant and good provision” 
(Q 16:67 trans. Saheeh Intl). The second stage is an admonition that the 
harm caused by intoxicants exceeds that of its benefit: “They ask you 
about intoxicants and gambling. Say: In them is great harm, and a benefit 
for mankind; but their harm is greater than their benefit” (Q 2:219 trans. 
The Monotheist Group). The third stage is an admonition to refrain from 
praying in a state of drunkenness and mal consciousness. However, it is 
also an exhortation to pray while in a state of God-consciousness: “O you 
who have believed, do not approach prayer while you are intoxicated until 
you know what you are saying” (Q 4:43 trans. Saheeh Intl.). The fourth 
stage is an advancement of a rationale for the categorical prohibition of 
intoxicants:

O you who have believed, indeed, intoxicants, gambling, [sacri-
ficing on] stone alters [to other than God], and divining arrows 
are but defilement from the work of Satan, so avoid it that you 
may be successful. Satan only wants to cause between you ani-
mosity and hatred through intoxicants and gambling and to 
avert you from the remembrance of God and from prayer. So 
will you not desist? (Q 5:90-91 trans. Saheeh Intl.).



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According to Hashim Kamali, a primary objective (maqṣad) of the prin-
ciple of gradualism is the alleviation of hardship through which turmoil 
(fitnah) is mitigated.66 The word fitnah, which could mean trial, test, trib-
ulation, turmoil, and hardship can have different connotations depending 
on its context. Nonetheless, fitnah can arise due to negligence caused by 
hastiness. The Qurʾan claims that “Man was created of haste,” “and man is 
ever hasty” (Q 21:37; 17:11 trans. Saheeh Intl.). Therefore, the Qurʾan sug-
gests that exercising patience ought to be the first response to fitnah: “And 
We have made some of you [people] as a trial (fitnatan) for others – will 
you have patience?” (Q 25:20 trans. Saheeh Intl.); “Rather, your souls have 
enticed you to something, so patience is most fitting” (Q 12:83 trans. Saheeh 
Intl.) and the Prophet Muhammad reportedly said: “Verily, patience is at 
the first stroke of a calamity” (Bukhari: 1283). Hence, Kamali posits that 
gradualism facilitates the means (fatḥ al-dharāʾiʿ) to benefits and inhibits 
the means (sadd al-dharāʾiʿ) to harms.67 Kamali further explains:

[I]n the formative stages of Islam, the rules of prayer and alms-
giving (ṣalāh, zakāh), fasting, and many of the penalties were 
revealed gradually. The Qurʾanic revelations on wine drinking 
illustrate gradualism in their three separate stages: it was dis-
couraged during the performance of prayer (ṣalāh) to begin with, 
and then through persuasive advice that drew attention to its 
harmful effects generally, and it was finally prohibited alto-
gether. Most of the prescribed penalties, known as ḥudūd, were 
similarly revealed after due preparation to facilitate a congenial 
environment for their reception.68

Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi (d. 790/1388) writes in connection to addressing 
the Lawgiver’s intent (ḥukm al-shāriʿ) in evading fitnah by exercising 
gradualism in the implementation of penalties for infringements:

It is related from ʿ Umar ibn ʿ Abd al-Aziz that his son ʿ Abd al-Ma-
lik said to him, “Why is it that you do not implement the rules 
(of the Shariah)? By God, it will not bother me if in matters of 
truth the pots begin to boil between you and me.” ʿUmar said to 



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him, “My son, do not be in such haste. God condemned khamr 
(wine) twice in the Qurʾan, and then prohibited it the third time. 
I am afraid of imposing the truth on the people all at once for 
they will reject it all at once, and this will lead to a trial (fitnah)69

Another objective of the principle of gradualism is to successively 
pursue truth and perfection even if one will fall short of ascertaining it. 
Concerning the objective pursuit of truth, the Qurʾan urges to “say: It 
may be that my Lord guideth me unto a nearer way of truth than this” 
(Q 18:24 trans. Pickthall). Since knowledge of absolute truth and reality 
is consigned to God, the Qurʾanic philosophy of pursuing truth and real-
ity seems to align with post-positivism and critical realism in modern 
Western philosophy, which advocates objectivism in the pursuit of truth 
and reality even though absolute truth and reality are unascertainable.70 
Therefore, the principle of gradualism inclines towards ‘probabilism’ 
rather than ‘relativism’. Regarding objective pursuit towards perfection, 
the Prophet Muhammad reportedly said: “…so, do not be extreme! and 
(yet) seek near-perfection!” (Bukhari: 39). The pursuit of ‘that which is 
better’ is addressed in multiple Qurʾanic verses (Q 16:125, 41:34, 6:152, 
17:34) with the phrase “bi-llatī hiya aḥsanu (with that which is better) 
and Q 17:9 which reads “li-llatī hiya aqwamu (for that which is righter).71 
The comparative nouns (ahsanu and aqwamu) indicate a comparison of 
two, where their English equivalent could be the suffix ‘er’ in the sense of 
‘better’, ‘truer’ or ‘righter’. Hence the objective of the principle of grad-
ualism, a key component of the jurisprudence of priorities as advanced 
and articulated by al-Qaradawi, is to advance from a former state to a 
better state consistently and persistently and is affirmed in the Islamic 
legal sources and tradition. However, perhaps the most well-known prin-
ciple associated with al-Qaradawi is that of centrism, discussed next.

The Principle of Centrism (wasaṭiyyah):  
Occupying the middle position between two opposing extremes

The concept of centrism is both generic and specific. The generic aspect is 
understood to be Islamic centrism (al-wasaṭiyyah al-islāmiyyah), which 



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implies moderation (iʿtidāl) against all forms of excessiveness (ghulūw) 
or extremism (taṭarruf). By contrast, the specific aspect is understood 
as the centrist methodology (minhāj al-wasaṭiyyah), which endeavours 
to occupy a theoretical midpoint (wasaṭ) between opposing extremes in 
the methods of extracting legal rulings (ṭuruq istinbāṭ al-aḥkām al-sharʿi-
yyah) and argued to be the better course of legal reasoning.72 The generic 
concept of centrism, which indicates moderation in matters, is a general 
principle (qāʿidah kulliyyah) well-established through definitive evidence 
from textual and rational sources.73 By contrast, what constitutes mod-
eration in a technical or ideological sense, and how it is specifically 
applied in legal reasoning is a scholarly concern.74 Here, the analysis is 
primarily concerned with the specific and the legal-theoretical aspect 
of centrism, that is, the concept of occupying the middlemost (tawassuṭ) 
position between two opposing extremes in legal reasoning where “the 
farthest point from the two extremes”75 that is argued by al-Qaradawi 
to be the best position in jurisprudence.

The main Qurʾanic verse (Q 2:143) advanced in support of centrism, 
in three well-known English translations is as follows: “Thus We have 
appointed you a middle nation” (Marmaduke Pickthall); “And thus we 
have made you a just community” (Sahih International); “And thus have 
We willed you to be a community of the middle way” (Muhammad Asad). 
The implication “a community of the middle way” is attributed to the 
Arabic phrase ‘ummatan wasaṭan’ which literally means ‘a middlemost 
nation’.

According to the exegetical prophetic report (Bukhari: 4487) con-
cerning the verse Q 2:143, the idiomatic meaning of the word ‘wasaṭan’ 
in the phrase ‘ummatan wasaṭan’ received (samāʿī) by the convention 
(waḍʿ) of the Arabs primarily signifies ʿ adl (justice, equitability, fairness) 
and khayr (better, choicest).76 By the convention of the Arabs, the phrase 
‘ummatan wasaṭan’ can mean ‘a just nation’, ‘an equitable nation’ or ‘a 
choicest nation’ indicative of a praiseworthy community.77 Therefore, 
the interpretation of ‘ummatan wasaṭan’ to allude to ‘a middle path’, 
‘centrism’ or more specifically, to a situation between two extremes is 
speculative (ẓannī) and not definitive (qaṭʿī). Kamali further explains that: 
“It is not necessary perhaps that there must be two extremes or two sides 



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to a mid-most position.”78 However, it is a matter of fact that Q 2:143 lies 
exactly in the middle of its chapter (2) – al-Baqarah which consists of 
286 verses. According to Kamali, although the verse of centrism being 
the ‘middle verse’ is coincidental to non-Muslims, for Muslims it may 
be an indication for inductive reasoning.79

The Qurʾanic verse “And those who, when they spend, are neither 
prodigal nor grudging; and there is ever a firm station between the two” 
(Q 25:67 trans. Pickthall) discourages opposing extremes of extravagance 
and niggardliness, while encouraging to choose the middle position, 
because “there is ever a firm station between the two” and “generosity 
comes in the middle of stinginess and extravagance.”80 Among premodern 
scholars,81 the exegete Muhammad al-Qurtubi (d. 671/1273) comments 
on Q 2:143:

The middle avoids excess and falling short and is praiseworthy… 
In a Hadith we find, “The best of matters is the middlemost 
of them.” ʿAli said, “You must take the middle way. The high 
descend to it and the low rise to it.” Someone who is from the 
middlemost of his people is one of the best of them.82

Among modern scholars, Muhammad Husayn Tabatabaʾi (d. 1981) 
comments on the verse:

They were made a “medium nation” to “be witnesses for the 
people”. What does it mean? “Medium” is a thing in the centre, 
neither to this side nor to that”; “God has made this ummah a 
“medium”, by giving them a religion which leads them to the 
straight and upright path, in the middle – inclined neither to 
this side nor to that”; “This ummah then is the medium and 
well-balanced one; it is a criterion to judge and weigh both sides 
of extremes. It is, therefore, the witness for all the people who 
have deviated from the middle way going to this side or that.”83

Moreover, al-Qaradawi argues that the Qurʾan points to the middle 
path of moderation between extremes in all its teachings. For example, 



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moderation between: the empirical and the metaphysical (2:3-4), revela-
tion and reason (4:82; 38:29), conjecture and gullibility (2:111), physicalism 
and pantheism (3:191-190), atheism and polytheism (25:3), determinism 
and fatalism (13:11), idealism and realism (91:7-10), individualism and 
communalism (3:104), materialism and spiritualism (28:77), stagnation 
and haste, the vociferate and the mute (31:19), prohibition and permission 
(16:116; 5:87), jurisprudence and asceticism (chap. 107), polygamy and 
celibacy (4:3), exaggeration and underestimation (4:171), indulgence and 
abstinence (7:31-32), extravagance and miserliness (25:67), cowardice and 
aggression (2:190), unwary and tyranny (42:39-40).84 Notwithstanding, 
al-Qaradawi is considered to be the primary disseminator of the concept 
of centrism in the modern period.

Al-Qaradawi claims that in the mid-20th century he “came to this 
concept after establishing unshakable evidence that it represents the 
essence of Islam.”85 Al-Qaradawi explains wasaṭiyyah to “mean modera-
tion of being in the middle of two parallel sides so that none of these two 
sides will have more impact and cause harm or injustice to the other.”86 
Al-Qaradawi argues for a broad spectrum of centrism (wasaṭiyyah) i.e., 
the middle path of moderation in all matters concerning Islam,87 which he 
calls Islamic centrism (al-wasatiyyah al-islāmiyyah). He believes that it 
is an obligation upon Muslims to apply centrism to all matters of Islamic 
sciences, be it theology, jurisprudence, or other disciplines. He calls his 
method of legal reasoning the centrist methodology (minhāj al-wasaṭi-
yyah).88 Al-Qaradawi also advocates adopting the middle position 
between ‘the emulators of the old’ (fi’ah tashabbahat al-qadīm) and ‘the 
embracers of the new’ (fi’ah tabannat al-jadīd).89 Al-Qaradawi further 
argues that, when issuing legal opinions, a legist (mujtahid) must assume 
the middle position between the inclination to extreme liberalism (ittijāh 
al-ghulūw fī al-tawīʿ) of the deconstructionists (al-mutaḥallilūn) and the 
inclination for constriction and austerity (ittijāh al-taḍyīq wa-al-tash-
dīd) of the puritans (al-mutazammitūn).90 He argues that Muslims must 
persist to become “a nation (ummah) occupying a position between 
the extremist deviations to the right and left,”91 by which he means to 
consciously avoid both puritanical and liberal extremisms. Therefore, 
the centrist methodology advocates consciously occupying the middle 



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course of moderation in Islamic thought which would mitigate excess 
and negligence (al-ghulūw wa-al-taqṣīr) in Islamic jurisprudence.

Al-Qaradawi calls his approach to jurisprudence the centrist juris-
prudence (al-fiqh al-wasaṭī).92 Al-Qaradawi reasons that there are two 
prevalent schools of Islamic jurisprudence.93 The first school excesses 
towards particular textual injunctions (al-nuṣūṣ al-juzʾiyyah) while 
neglecting their universal objectives (kulliyyāt) by which he means an 
ultra-textualist methodology. The second school, according to al-Qa-
radawi, excesses toward universal objectives seeking “the spirit of the 
religion” (rūḥ al-dīn) while neglecting particular textual injunctions 
which prescribe particular rulings (aḥkām juzʾiyyah).94 For al-Qarad-
awi, both these methods are excessive and negligent of the cumulative 
objectives of Islamic law which counterbalance both universal and par-
ticular rulings. Therefore, according to him, a third school, the school 
which occupies the middle position “between universal objectives and 
particular textual injunctions (bayna maqāṣid al-kulliyyah wa-al-nuṣūṣ 
al-juzʾiyyah)” is “the school of moderation (al-madrasah al-wasaṭi-
yyah).”95 To al-Qaradawi, the centrist methodology of jurisprudence”:

[N]ever overlooks the partial texts of the Qurʾan or Sunnah on 
the supposition of maintaining the spirit of Islam and the objec-
tives of the Shariah. On the other hand, it does not disregard 
the collective objectives of the Shariah by adopting the literal 
meanings of the texts.96

Jasser Auda argues that centrism can be perceived as an antithesis 
of dualism.97 As per the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, “dualism consid-
ers reality to consist of two irreducible elements or modes.” In our case, 
according to Auda:

It simply involves that any philosophical question maybe pre-
sented as a choice between two logical conclusions and there 
can be no third alternative. Debate ensues between two extreme 
opposites and each debater tries hard to prove their point and 
refute their opponent’s argument.98



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From the formative period to the modern period, the Islamic legal 
tradition is laden with such dualism. This dualism in the legal tradition 
is characterised by the distinction between the methodology of the 
jurists (ṭarīqat al-fuqahāʾ), that is, the methodology of the Hanafi school 
(ṭarīqat al-ḥanafiyyah) and the methodology of the theologians (ṭarīqat 
al-mutakallimīn), that is, the methodology of the Shafiʿi school (ṭarīqat 
al-shāfiʿiyyah).99 The jurists’ method is distinguished by their extrap-
olation of practical rulings of law (furūʿ al-fiqh) from the Kufic legal 
tradition of Iraq. On the other hand, the theologians’ method empha-
sised formulating the general theory of law (uṣūl al-fiqh) through a 
theoretical and philosophical study of law.100 The Hanafi school derived 
their legal principles (uṣūl) from legal precedents (furūʿ) of Kufa where 
legal principles are subsequent and subservient to legal precedents. 
On the contrary, the Shafiʿi school formulated legal principles in order 
for legal rulings to be derived therefrom where legal rulings are sub-
sequent and subservient to legal principles.101 Consequently, Hanafis 
would give preponderance to the induction (istiqrāʾ) of general prin-
ciples from the Qurʾan and Sunnah which coincided with Kufic legal 
precedents while restrained from deducing legal rulings directly from 
the Qurʾan and Sunnah. In contrast, Shafiʿis would give preponderance 
to the deduction (istinbāṭ) of legal rulings directly from the Qurʾan 
and Sunnah according to formulated legal principles while refraining 
from adhering to any particular regional legal tradition and its legal 
precedents.102

Hanafis are considered rationalists or proponents of opinion (ahl 
al-ra’y) owing to their giving preponderance to analogical deduction 
and inductive reasoning of textual injunctions, whereas Shafiʿis are con-
sidered textualists (ahl al-naql) or proponents of reports (ahl al-ḥadīth) 
owing to their giving preponderance to Hadith studies and deductive 
reasoning of textual injunctions. A specific example of dualism is the 
outright rejection of normative conventions (ʿamal) by the Shafiʿis and 
the outright rejection of the divergent implicature (mafhūm al-mukhāla-
fah) in textual implications (al-dalālāt) by the Hanafis.103 The fact of the 
matter is that dualism in legal reasoning can be based on subjectivity 
and partisanship. Therefore, it may be possible to objectively adopt a 



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middle path of moderation by integrating divergent approaches to legal 
reasoning which may increase the efficacy and utility of legal opinions.

Since what was perceived as the maturity and the saturation of 
Muslim legal schools (madhāhib) in the premodern period, breaking the 
shackles of partisanship, several legal theoreticians and their respective 
works attempted to combine the methodology of the jurists and the 
methodology of the theologians into one unifying legal methodology i.e., 
“the later scholars’ methodology of integrating the two [earlier] meth-
odologies (ṭarīqat al-mutaʾakhkhirīn bi-al-jamʿ bayna al-ṭarīqatayn).”104 
By unifying the two methodologies, the theoretical conception of law 
through its sources is integrated with legal precedents transmitted via 
legal traditions and, specific rulings (aḥkām) and legal causes (ʿilal) of 
textual injunctions derived from deductive reasoning are integrated with 
their applicable general principles derived through inductive reasoning. 
The point of note here is that adopting a middle path of moderation in 
legal reasoning may be achieved by integrating two legal methodologies 
(al-jamʿ bayna al-ṭarīqatayn) from which scholarly disagreement (ikhtilāf 
al-ʿulamāʾ) may be reconciled.

As per al-Qaradawi, scholarly disagreement is a natural phenome-
non,105 and the most objective and accurate approach to legal reasoning is 
by adopting the middle path between extreme legal opinions. In a case of 
difference of opinion on a particular issue where both opposing opinions 
are permissible (mubāḥ), the centrist opinion between the two opposing 
opinions should fall under recommendation (mandūb). In other words, if 
the centrist opinion which takes a middle course between the two oppos-
ing opinions brings benefit or prevents harm then it is recommended 
in Islamic law. Hence, Armando Salvatore postulates that, according to 
al-Qaradawi, both the means (wasīlah) and the end (maqṣad) of centrism 
is the principle of welfare (al-maṣlaḥah) [which includes both securing 
benefit and preventing harm].106 For al-Qaradawi, then, centrism appears 
to be a universal principle comparable to the principle of welfare. Legal-
theoretically what follows is that the determination of a centrist legal 
opinion is subject to legal principles: “the alleviation of hardship and 
the facilitation of ease” (rafʿ al-ḥaraj wa-al-taysīr) and “the prevention of 
harms and the securement of benefits” (darʿ al-mafāsid wa-jalb al-manāfiʿ) 



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according to the sources of Islamic law. Th erefore, for al-Qaradawi the 
objectives (maqāṣid) of centrism include the alleviation of hardship, 
the facilitation of ease, the prevention of harm and the securement of 
benefi t by avoiding extremisms in legal reasoning. Inversely, the afore-
mentioned legal principles are the means or the instruments (wasāʾil) in 
actualising centrist legal opinions. Since “prevention of harms” is a nec-
essary objective (ḍarūriyyah), “the alleviation of hardship” is an exigent 
objective (ḥājiyyah) and “facilitation of ease” is an enhancive objective 
(taḥsīniyyah),107 centrism should serve to actualise the higher objectives 
of Islamic law. Th eoretically, by its very purpose of mitigating extreme 
disagreements, centrism aspires to actualise unity instead of uniformity.

According to al-Qaradawi, “wasaṭiyyah is the centre for unity.”108

He elaborates:

Th e centre of the circle in its middle allows for all lines to meet at 
it. Th e idea that is wasaṭ provides the meeting points which is the 
point of balance and moderation. Hence, whenever there is extrem-
ism, we are bound to fi nd intellectual disagreement. Th e intensity 
of this disagreement depends on the intensity of extremism. On the 
other hand, tawassuṭ and iʿtidāl (moderation) provides the centre 
for intellectual disagreement. Th us, extremist groups and ideas 
create disagreements and diff erence among members of the one 
ummah, whereas moderate ideas do not usually cause that.109

Figure 1 – Centre of Unity



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As depicted in figure 1, centrism or the middle path of moderation is 
the median of opposing extremes. Hypothetically, at the midmost point 
– extremisms, dichotomies, and disagreements are minimal, reconciled, 
harmonised, or compromised. The farther from the centre, the farther 
from centrism, hence, the increase in disagreement. The outer extremity 
of the circle represents the farthest point away from the centre/centrism 
– the highest point in disagreement. Therefore, the middle position [of 
moderation] represents the optimum point of unity. Theoretically, legal 
opinions at this station will facilitate benefit and ease and inhibit harm 
and difficulty. In other words, centrism by evading all forms of extrem-
ism is purported to secure maximal benefits while incurring minimal 
harm in line with the objectives of Islamic law. A legal opinion at this 
juncture is facilitating and moderating against each opposing opinion. 
Theoretically, certain knowledge (ʿilm al-yaqīn) such as of scholarly 
consensus of legal opinions and definitive evidence will situate in this 
quadrant. Therein lie the strongest evidence which is most facilitating of 
ease and benefit. Further from this midmost point is predominantly the 
realm of probable knowledge (ʿilm al-ẓann) such as valid differences of 
scholarly opinion and probable evidence. Therein lie strong evidence of 
relatively less facilitating of ease and benefit. The furthest quadrant from 
the midmost point consists of doubt (shakk) and hypothetical knowl-
edge (ʿilm al-wahm) such as that of minority (aqalliyyah) opinions and 
hypothetical evidence (adillah wahmiyyah). Therein lie weak evidence 
which is the least facilitating of ease and benefit. Therefore, the centrist 
opinion has the highest priority among legal opinions.

From a legal-theoretical point of view, there are three primary con-
tentions against the principle of centrism. The first contention is that 
centrism in its technical sense is not supported by definitive textual 
evidence.110 The above analysis finds that the concept of centrism pur-
ported as the ideal position which lies between two opposing extremes 
is a definitive principle that is derived (mushtaqq) from, induced (mus-
taqraʾ) from, and accredited (muʿtabar) in – the sources of Islamic law. 
Moreover, the principle of centrism in its legal-theoretical sense is argu-
ably a universal principle applicable to the entire Muslim population 
rather than a particular principle (qāʿidah juzʾiyyah) applicable to a 



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segment of the Muslim population, even though the practical deter-
mination of the opposing extreme is a subjective deduction prone to 
disagreement and error. The second contention is that the enactment 
of textual injunctions of the Qurʾan and the prophetic precedent by 
default facilitates centrism. Moreover, Islamic law is argued to function 
independently, through which the end result is purported to be centrism. 
This is also the primary argument advanced against the principle of 
welfare as an independent legal principle.111 It is conceivable that Islamic 
law would function independently of the principle of centrism, and that 
centrism in its technical sense, may not be mandatory to be incorpo-
rated in legal reasoning. However, there is strong evidence to suggest 
that it is recommendable to achieve a better course of legal reasoning. 
The third contention is that centrism opens the door to compromising 
the enactment of textual injunctions in favour of a derived principle 
(i.e., centrism).112 This analysis finds that compromising textual injunc-
tions in favour of derived principles is by definition not centrism, rather, 
legal reasoning through textual injunctions and derived principles in a 
balanced way without excessively inclining towards one or the other 
is centrism because centrism facilitates opposing extremes of neither 
textualism nor rationalism, of neither deductive reasoning nor inductive 
reasoning. The principle of centrism, as advocated by al-Qaradawi in 
his schema for the jurisprudence of priorities, also relates closely to his 
understanding of balance.

The Principle of Balance (muwāzanah):  
Weighing out the preponderant between two variables

Yusuf al-Qaradawi claims that the jurisprudence of balancing interests 
(fiqh al-muwāzanāt) is not only closely related to the jurisprudence of 
priorities, but the former is a constituent legal principle of the latter:

The fiqh of priorities is related to the fiqh of balances, and in 
certain domains, the two overlap or run parallel to each other, 
as a counterbalance that may lead to a certain priority, and thus 
fall under the fiqh of priorities.113



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However, this segment of the analysis is focused on dissecting the 
principle of balance which is the underlying theorem of the jurispru-
dence of balancing interests. Al-Qaradawi claims that the principle of 
balance is supported by Qurʾanic texts.114

The Qurʾan indeed elucidates in multiple verses (Q 101:6-10; 23:101-
103) that on the judgement day human works are weighed and measured 
according to a scale of comparison:

And the weighing [of deeds] that Day will be the truth. So those 
whose scales are heavy – it is they who will be the successful. 
And those whose scales are light – they are the ones who will 
lose themselves for what injustice they were doing toward Our 
verses. (Q 7:8-9 trans. Saheeh Intl.)

In the context of this verse, the word mawāzīnu (scales) akin to 
the subject terminology muwāzanāt (balances) of the same root (w-z-
n) means a weighing scale that compares two things to determine the 
greater of the two. The two things compared in this context are good 
deeds and evil deeds.115 Tabatabaʾi elaborates:

What will be weighed on scales are the actions of the people 
based on the following verses: (1) We shall set up the scales of 
justice on the Day of Resurrection, and no soul will be wronged 
in the least. Even if it be the weight of a mustard seed, We shall 
produce it and We suffice as reckoners (21:47). Based on this verse, 
“scales” are part of God’s “reckoning,” and reckoning pertains 
to actions. (2) So whoever does an atom’s weight of good will see 
it, and whoever does an atom’s weight of evil will see it (99:7-8). 
These verses are even clearer evidence, because they talk about 
the weight of ʿamal (action, work, deed), both good and bad.

Tabatabaʾi further points out that weighing does not necessarily 
imply that individual good deeds and evil deeds are equivalent in weight 
as if one good deed is equal to one evil deed.116 So what this implies is 
‘relative weight’ of which deeds are weighed both qualitatively according 



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to their magnitude and quantitatively according to divine determination. 
As the Qurʾan states: “If you avoid the major sins which you are forbid-
den, We will remove from you your lesser sins” (Q 4:31 trans. Saheeh 
Intl.) and “God will replace their evil deeds with good [deeds]” (Q 25:70 
trans. Saheeh Intl.). Moreover, the prophetic reports state that: “Verily, 
the good deeds remove the evil deeds” (Bukhari: 526) and “good deeds 
will be rewarded ten times to seven hundred times for each good deed 
and a bad deed will be recorded as it is” (Bukhari: 41 and 42; different 
wording in multiple reports in Muslim: 334-338).

The principle of balance and scaling can be found in human nature, 
which consists of both good and evil. Thus, human beings consist of a 
combination of good and evil residing in themselves on varying scales. 
However, the good person is not he who has all but good within himself, 
nor is the evil person who has within himself all but evil. Rather, the 
distinction between a good person and an evil person (according to the 
divine scale) depends on which deed (good or evil) outweighs the other 
in comparison (good vs. evil). The indication in this verse is that, on the 
day of judgement, the victors are those whose good deeds outweigh their 
evil deeds, while the losers are those whose evil deeds outweigh their 
good deeds on the scale of divine determination. In the above example, 
the discussion is about the good and bad that reside within animate 
objects, though the Qurʾan also speaks of weighing out the good and 
bad that reside within inanimate objects.

To elaborate, the Qurʾan puts the indulgence in gambling and intoxi-
cants through a pros and cons analysis – in theory, a cost-benefit analysis. 
The Qurʾan states: “They ask you about intoxicants and gambling. Say: In 
them is great harm, and a benefit for mankind; but their harm is greater 
than their benefit” (Q 2:219 trans. The Monotheist Group117). The ratio-
nale of this verse indicates that indulgence in gambling or intoxicants 
consists of both benefits and harms. However, according to the Qurʾan, 
their harm outweighs their benefit. Firstly, it is imperative to vindicate 
this claim to deduce the reason why the Qurʾan isolates these two indul-
gences, especially as a pair.

Scientific and statistical “studies confirm that gambling and alcohol 
consumption co-occur”118 and “concurrent gambling and drinking may 



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lead to greater negative consequences than either behavior alone.”119

Indulgence in both intoxicants and gambling is addictive by defi nitive 
scientifi c evidence which shows that they lead to alcoholism and patho-
logical gambling.120 Indulgence in gambling and intoxicants are shown to 
increase patt erns of violent behaviour.121 Th e probability and reality of 
losing money in gambling are signifi cantly higher than the probability and 
reality of earning money from it. In other words, the losers in gambling 
are signifi cantly higher than the successful thereby. Similarly, intoxicants 
are shown to cause more harm than benefi t physiologically and psycho-
logically. Studies leading to this conclusion are too numerous to reference. 
Th us, the harm caused by indulging in alcohol and gambling supersedes 
that of its benefi ts – is nearly a scientifi c and statistical consensus.

Consequently, if we examine the principle of balance in the afore-
mentioned Qu rʾanic verse (2:219), within the variable (intoxicant or 
gambling) are two inherent opposing qualities of negative and positive. 
Th e negative qualities are harms and the positive qualities are benefi ts. 
Th e priority of the principle of balance, in this case, is to avoid the 
variable within which harms outweigh benefi ts. Th erefore, the rec-
ommendation in legal reasoning is to adopt the variable within which 
benefi ts outweigh harms. However, the determination of benefi t and 
harm and their prioritisation ought to be according to the benchmark of 
the Qu rʾan, the prophetic precedent and scholarly consensus.

Figure 2 – Scale of Balance

In reference to fi gure 2, the solid horizontal line sitt ing perpendicular 
to the triangular fulcrum represents the neutral position of a variable 



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within which benefi ts and harms are equivalent (1:1 ratio). Benefi ts and 
harms equalling is a hypothetical, logically impossible scenario. Th e 
favourable decision is of which the benefi ts are greater than its harms 
(B>H & H<B), and the unfavourable decision with regards to a variable is 
of which the harms are greater than its benefi ts (H>B & B<H). Moreover, 
the harms and benefi ts of a variable are determined both quantitatively 
and qualitatively. In other words, a variable can be determined to be 
benefi t-dominant due to its quantity or a variable can be determined to 
be harm-dominant due to its quality. For example, with regards to the 
fi nal judgement (Q 7:8-9), the judgement can be said (for illustration 
purposes) to be predominantly a quantitative one weighing good deeds 
against evil deeds quantitatively. Whereas, with regards to alcohol and 
gambling (Q 2:219), the judgement can be said (for illustration purposes) 
to be predominantly a qualitative one weighing against benefi ts and 
harms qualitatively. Nonetheless, theoretically, the principle of balance 
is both textually and rationally substantiable.

Figure 3 – Priority in Maintaining Balance

In reference to fi gure 3, the Benefi ts (B) and the Harms (H) of a legal 
variable are hypothetically higher and lower depending on its inherent 
or acquired qualities. In the unlikely event where benefi ts and harms 
are equivalent, “harm may not be eliminated by its equivalent (al-ḍararu 
lā yuzālu bi-mithlihi)”122 because “preventing harms has priority over 
securing benefi ts (darʾ al-mafāsid awlā min jalb al-manāfi ʿ)”.123 Here there 
are three possible scenarios to consider. First, the balance between the 
benefi ts and harms of a given legal variable. Second, the balance between 



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harms against harms of a given legal variable. Third, the balance between 
benefits against benefits of a given legal variable. With reference to the 
first scenario represented by axis (B, H), the legal variable in which 
benefits are greater than harms (B>H) has priority over the variable in 
which harms are greater than benefits (H>B). In the second scenario rep-
resented by axis (H1, H2), the legal variable in which harms are greater 
has priority (H2>H1) because “harm must be eliminated (al-ḍararu 
yuzāl)”124 and “a greater harm is eliminated by [tolerating] a lesser one” 
(al-ḍarar al-ashadd yuzālu bi-al-ḍarar al-akhaff).125 In the third scenario 
represented by axis (B2, B1), the variable in which benefits are greater 
has priority due to the necessity of securing benefit. In al-Qaradawi’s 
jurisprudence of priorities, the principle of balance is articulated more 
fully as a jurisprudence of balancing interests (fiqh al-muwāzanāt).

The Jurisprudence of Balancing Interests (fiqh al-muwāzanāt)

The jurisprudence of balancing interests is the juristic methodology of 
prioritising benefits and harms according to the objectives of Islamic 
law. 126 The jurisprudence of balancing interests includes inhibiting the 
means of harm and facilitating the means to benefit. The jurisprudence 
of balancing interests has three fundamental prioritisations. First, the 
prioritisations between harms, where that which has greater harm has 
priority over that which has lesser harm. Second, the prioritisations 
between benefits, where that which has greater benefit has priority over 
that which has lesser benefit. Third, the prioritisations between benefits 
and harms, where that which forfeits greater harm has priority.127

The legal maxim “harm must be eliminated” is unanimously accepted 
as a primary objective of Islamic law. The Qurʾan advocates thus, “repel 
evil with that which is better” (Q 23:96 trans. Pickthall). Even though 
eliminating harm is a primary objective of Islamic law, eliminating harm 
should not cause equal or greater harm as a result. When ʿUmar ibn 
al-Khattab suspended the application of a prescribed Qurʾanic penalty128 
for theft due to famine,129 he enacted the legal maxim “a greater harm 
is eliminated by [tolerating] a lesser one.”130 The harm that is inflicted 
or forfeited to eliminate another harm must be proportionately less in 



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magnitude. On this basis, a series of legal maxims have been established, 
such as “harm may not be eliminated by its equivalent,” “harm and retal-
iation by harm is not allowed (lā ḍarar wa-lā ḍirār)”131 and “harm is to be 
eliminated within reasonable bounds” (al-ḍarar yudfaʿu bi-qadr al-im-
kān). Moreover, if we are confronted with two harms, as the legal maxims 
state “the lesser of two harms is chosen (yukhtār ahwan al-sharrayn aw 
akhaff al-ḍararayn),”132 and “to repel a public harm a private harm is 
preferred (hutaḥammalu al-ḍarar al-khāṣṣ al-dafʿ ḍararin al-ʿāmm).”133 In 
this sense, a series of priorities within harms can be inferred. Imminent 
harm is given priority over eventual harm. Public harm is given priority 
over private harm. Collective harms have priority over individual harms. 
Sizable harm is given priority over minuscule harm. Lasting harm has 
priority over temporary harm. Regular harm has priority over irregular 
harm.

As far as the ranking of benefits is concerned, Muhammad al-Tahir 
ibn ʿAshur  (d. 1973) categorises benefits (masāliḥ) into public benefit 
(maṣlaḥaḥ ʿāmmah) and private benefit (maṣlaḥaḥ khāṣṣah) where the 
former has priority over the latter, and evident benefit (ḥaẓẓ ẓāhir) and 
obscure benefit (ḥaẓẓ bāṭin) where the former has priority over the lat-
ter.134 Similarly, religious benefit has priority over worldly benefit, an 
imminent benefit is given priority over an eventual benefit, collective 
benefit has priority over individual benefit, a sizable benefit is given 
priority over a minuscule benefit, long-term benefit has priority over 
short-term benefit and regular benefit has priority over irregular benefit.

Al-Shatibi further observes that “induction through the sharīʿah 
implies that there is no maṣlaḥah in which there is no mafsadah, and 
vice versa.”135 What this implies is that, in most cases of the real world, 
variables consist of a combination of both benefits and harms as in the 
Qurʾanic example of gambling and alcohol already analysed. Nonetheless, 
the norm (ʿāzimah) is that “preventing harm has priority over securing 
benefit.” However, al-Shatibi argues that “when the interest turns out to 
be predominant under normal circumstances if compared to the mafsa-
dah (injury), then it is desirable in the eyes of the law (sharʿ).”136 In other 
words, if the benefit of a variable far exceeds that of its harm or if the 
harm is insignificant compared to its benefit, it “is desirable in the eyes 



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of the law.” Therefore, the exception (rukhṣah) to the norm is by way of 
another legal maxim that states “small and incidental harm is tolerated 
for the sake of a great and lasting benefit, and a certainly guaranteed 
benefit must not be wasted for fear of an illusory harm.”137 Thus, accord-
ing to al-Qaradawi, “if the benefit is predominant and greater than the 
harm, the matter will then be permissible and legalised, regardless of the 
small harm it causes.”138

Conclusion

Dissecting the jurisprudence of priorities, as advocated by al-Qaradawi, 
into its constituent underlying principles enables the understanding 
of its legal-theoretical nuances. The principles of the jurisprudence of 
priorities are substantiated by definitive textual evidence of the Qurʾan 
and the prophetic precedent. Legal-theoretically, principles of the juris-
prudence of priorities are definitive, accredited and universal principles. 
The principles of the jurisprudence of priorities can not only fall under 
the genre of legal maxims but can also fall under the genre of legal-theo-
retical maxims (qawāʿid uṣūliyyah) due to their pertinence to legal theory 
in addition to their applicability to jurisprudence. The objectivity of the 
jurisprudence of priorities may be achieved through prioritising legal 
variables according to the Qurʾan, the prophetic precedent and schol-
arly consensus. Each principle of the jurisprudence of priorities has an 
evident relationship to each other in securing the objectives of Islamic 
law. Legal principles of the jurisprudence of priorities cumulatively 
seem to facilitate ease, secure benefit and repel harm – aligned with 
the objectives of Islamic law. Thus, from a legal-theoretical perspective, 
this analysis finds the jurisprudence of priorities with its constituent 
legal principles to be a recommendable procedure to mitigate excess and 
negligence in legal reasoning.



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Endnotes
1 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, The Priorities of the Islamic Movement in the Coming Phase, trans. 

S. M. Hassan Al-Banna (Swansea, UK: Awakening, 2002), 2–4.

2 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Fiqh of Priorities, trams. Khaled Wady (Cairo, Egypt: New 
Vision, 2012), 270-311; Al-Qaradawi, The Priorities of the Islamic Movement in the 
Coming Phase, 30-32.

3 Al-Qaradawi, Fiqh of priorities, 9-11.

4 al-Qaradawi, vii.

5 Al-Qaradawi, vii.

6 Al-Qaradawi, 270–311.

7 Al-Qaradawi, vii.

8 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Fī Fiqh al-Awlawyyāt: Dirāsah Jadīdah fī Ḍawʼ al-Qurʼān 
wa-al-Sunnah, 2nd ed. (Cairo, Egypt: Maktabah Wahbah, 1996).

9 Al-Qaradawi, Fiqh of Priorities.

10 Al-Qaradawi, Fiqh of Priorities, vii.

11 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Awlawiyyāt Li-l-Ḥarakah al-Islāmiyyah, PDF (Doha, Qatar: 
www.al-qaradawi.net, 1990), https://www.al-qaradawi.net/sites/default/files/pdf/
ae3a5-awlwiat-elhrakaalislamia.pdf.

12 Al-Qaradawi, The Priorities of the Islamic Movement in the Coming Phase.

13 Al-Qaradawi, viii.

14 Basri Ibrahim et al., “Imam Al-Ghazali’s Thoughts on the Jurisprudence of Priorities 
in Ihya’ Ulum Al-Din,” The Social Sciences (Pakistan) 11, no. 20 (2016): 4833–39.

15 Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, Mukhtaṣar Iḥyāʾ ʿUlūm al-Dīn, trans. Marwan Khalaf, 2nd 
ed. (Nikosia, Cyprus: Spohr, 2014), 29.

16 Abdel Wadoud Moustafa Moursi El-Seoudi et al., “Fiqh of Priorities in the Light of 
the Purposes of Sharee’ah,” The Social Sciences (Pakistan) 7, no. 6 (2012): 821, https://
doi.org/10.3923/sscience.2012.821.826.

17 Muhammad Wakili, Fiqh al-Awlawiyyāt: Dirāsah fī al-Ḍawābiṭ (Herndon, USA: IIIT, 
1997).

18 ʿAbd al-Salam ʿ Iyadah ʿ Al Al-Karbuli, Fiqh al-Awlawiyyāt fī Ẓalāl Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah 
al-Islāmiyyah, 2nd ed. (Damascus, Syria: Dar Taybah, 2014).

19 Hassani Muhammad Nur Muhammad, Fiqh al-Awlawiyyāt fī al-Sharīʿah al-Islāmi-
yyah: Dirāsah fī al-Qawāʿid wa-al-Ḍawābiṭ wa-al-Taṭbīqāt al-Muʿāṣarah (Cairo, 
Egypt: Dar al-Yusr, 2014).

20 Muhammad Hammam ʿAbd al-Rahim Malham, Taʾṣīl Fiqh al-Awlawiyyāt: Dirāsah 
Maqāṣidiyyah Taḥlīliyyah (Amman, Jordon: Dar al-ʿUlum, 2008).



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21 Muhammad Hammam ʿAbd al-Rahim Malham, Taʾṣīl Fiqh al-Awlawiyyāt 
wa-Taṭbīqātuhu fī Majāl Ḥifẓ al-Ḍīn fī al-Siyāsah al-Sharʿiyyah (UK: Al-Bayan 
Center for Research and Studies, 2015).

22 Al-Qaradawi, Fiqh of Priorities, viii.

23 Al-Qaradawi, 3.

24 Al-Qaradawi, vii.

25 Marmaduke Pickthall, The Meaning of the Glorious Koran: An Explanatory Translation 
(London, UK: George Allen & Unwin, 1930).

26 This article will consistently follow the direct hadith numbering of the six major 
collections of Hadith by Darussalam publications.

27 Legal variables are anything that which pertains to Islamic law, such as in al-Qa-
radawi’s words “everything, whether rules, values or acts” Al-Qaradawi, Fiqh of 
Priorities, 3.

28 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, 3rd ed. (Cambridge, 
UK: ITS, 2003), 455.

29 Kamali, 456.

30 Muhammad Hussein Abdullah, Al-Waadih Fee Usool Ul-Fiqh: The Clear Principles 
of Islamic Jurisprudence, 2nd ed. (CA, USA: CreateSpace, 2016), 582, 593; Kamali, 
Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, 458–59.

31 Abdullah, Al-Waadih Fee Usool Ul-Fiqh: The Clear Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, 
582–88.

32 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Approaching the Sunnah: Comprehension & Controversy, trans. 
Jamil Qureshi (Herndon, USA: IIIT, 2006), 113.

33 Al-Qaradawi, Fiqh of Priorities, 3. The original translator had translated the Arabic 
word ‘marātib’ into English as ‘order’. However, the appropriate translation of 
marātib in this context would be ‘ranking’ in the sense of ‘hierarchy’. From the 
same root r-t-b the Arabic word tartīb is the conventional word for ‘order’ in the 
sense of ‘sequence’. An example is the title Asrār Tartīb al-Qur’ān (Secrets of the 
Order of the Qur’an) by Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti (d. 977/1505) – a book elucidating the 
miraculous nature of the sequence within the texts of the Qur’an.

34 Al-Qaradawi, vii.

35 Al-Qaradawi, vii-viii.

36 Saheeh International, The Qur’ān: Arabic Text with Corresponding English Meanings 
(Jeddah, KSA: Al-Muntada Al-Islami, 2007).

37 Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, 78–81; Wahbat al-Zuhayli, al-Wajīz fī 
Uṣūl al-Fiqh (Damascus, Syria: Dar al-Fikr, 1999), 40.

38 Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, 78–81.



116    A M E R i C A N  J O U R N A L  O F  i S L A M  A N d  S O C i E t Y  4 0 : 1 - 2

39 Al-Qaradawi, Fiqh of Priorities, 36.

40 Sukrija Husejn Ramic, Language and the Interpretation of Islamic Law (Cambridge, 
UK: ITS, 2003), 65–138.

41 Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, 67–69.

42 Al-Qaradawi, Approaching the Sunnah: Comprehension & Controversy, 113–15.

43 A Companion (ṣaḥābī) of the Prophet Muhammad for Muslims is the Christian 
equivalent of an Apostle of Jesus. There is record of around 3000 names of 
Companions in Muhammad al-Qurtubi’s Istīʿāb fī maʿrifat al-Aṣhāb. However, every 
Companion was neither a ḥadīth transmitter (rāwī) nor a jurist (faqīh), and promi-
nent Companions who are authoritative transmitters (ruwāh) and jurists (fuqahāʾ) 
are less than 100 in number.

44 Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, 313–22.

45 Prominent Companions include the ten select Companions i.e., The Ten Granted 
Paradise (al-ʿashrah al-mubashshirūn bi-al-jannah) whose authority is reported 
have been attested by the Prophet Muhammad himself. They include the four right-
ly-guided caliphs, Talhah ibn ʿUbayd Allah (d. 36/657), al-Zubayr ibn al-ʿAwwam 
(d. 36/656), ʿAbd al-Rahman ibn ʿAwf (d. 34/654), Saʿad ibn Abi Waqqas (d. 55/674), 
Saʿid ibn Zayd (d. 52/671), Abu ʿUbaydah ibn al-Jarrah (d. 18/639). This attestation 
is transmitted in two reports: (Abu Dawud: 4649; Tirmidhi: 3747).

46 Another report supposes the Prophet Muhammad to have said: “The Fire shall 
not touch the Muslim who saw me, or saw one who saw me” (al-Tirmidhi: 3858). 
However, this report is ḥasan gharīb – good syet an odd report according to the 
conditions of al-Tirimidhi, where even though the chain is intact (muttaṣil), it is 
only narrated by a single Companion Musa ibn Ibrahim al-Ansari. Therefore, this 
report is used as supplementary evidence only.

47 Tariq Ramadan, “Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation” (NY, USA: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 41–80.

48 Al-Qaradawi, The Priorities of the Islamic Movement in the Coming Phase, 28.

49 Stephen R. C. Hicks, Exploring Postmodernism: Skepticism and Socialism from 
Rousseau to Foucault, Expanded (US: Ockham’s Razor, 2014), 33-34,40,44,78,189.

50 Al-Qaradawi, Fiqh of Priorities, 3.

51 Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, 11–14.

52 Kamali, 255–58.

53 Musfir ibn Ali Ibn Muhammad al-Qahtani, Understanding Maqāṣid Al-Sharʿīah: A 
Contemporary Perspective (Herndon, USA: IIIT, 2015), 10.

54 Abu al-Maʿali al-Juwayni and Jalal al-Din al-Mahalli, Sharḥ al-Waraqāt, trans. Musa 
W. Furber (n.p: Islamosaic, 2014), 2.

55 Al-Zuhayli, al-Wajiz fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh, 244.



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56 Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, 458–59.

57 Al-Zuhayli, al-Wajiz fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh, 245.

58 Abdelwahab Khallaf, The Science of the Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence: The 
Methodology of Islamic Law, trans. Mouhsine El Hammioui (Beirut, Lebanon: Dar 
Al-Kotob Al-Ilmiyah, 2017), 377–81.

59 Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee, Islamic Jurisprudence (KL, Malaysia: TOP, 2003), 322–24.

60 Al-Zuhayli, al-Wajīz fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh, 246.

61 Al-Zuhayli, 246.

62 Al-Qaradawi, Approaching the Sunnah: Comprehension & Controversy, 113.

63 Al-Qaradawi, 113.

64 Al-Qaradawi, Awlawiyyāt Li-al-Ḥarakah Al-Islāmiyyah, 39.

65 Jasser Auda, A Critique of the Theory of Abrogation, trans. Adil Salahi (Leicestershire, 
UK: The Islamic Foundation, 2019), 90–96.

66 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, The Middle Path of Moderation in Islam: The Qur’ānic 
Principle of Wasaṭiyyah (NY, USA: Oxford University Press, 2015), 52.

67 Kamali, 52.

68 Kamali, 52.

69 Abu Isḥaq al-Shatibi, The Reconciliation of the Fundamentals of Islamic Law, trans. 
Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee, vol. II (Reading, UK: Garnet, 2014), 71.

70 Laura Killam, Research Methodology Simplified: Paradigms, Axiology, Ontology, 
Epistemology and Methodology (Sudbury, Canada: Author, 2013), 11, 35–37.

71 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Islamic Moderation and Renewal, ed. Mohamed Ajmal Bin Abdul 
Razak Al-Aidrus, trans. Hassan Ahmed Ibrahim, Hassan Abdel Razig El-Nagar, and 
Idris Salim El-Hassan (KL, Malaysia: ISTAC, 2013), 205–7.

72 Al-Qaradawi, Islamic Moderation and Renewal, 24.

73 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, The Middle Path of Moderdation in Islam: The Qur’ānic 
Principle of Wasaṭiyyah (NY, USA: Oxford University Press, 2015), 10; Al-Qaradawi, 
Islamic Moderation and Renewal, 43–50.

74 Sagi Polka, Shaykh Yūsuf Al-Qaraḍāwī: Spiritual Mentor of Wasaṭī Salafism, Modern 
Intellectual and Political History of the Middle East (NY, USA: Syracuse University 
Press, 2019), 5–8.

75 Al-Qaradawi, Islamic Moderation and Renewal, 12.

76 Al-Qaradawi, Islamic Moderation and Renewal, 13–22; Ismaʿil ibn ʿUmar Ibn Kathir, 
Tafsir Ibn Kathir, ed. Safiur-Rahman al-Mubarakpuri, Abridged, vol. I (Riyadh, KSA: 
Darussalam, 2000), 422–24.

77 Mahmud Sulayman Yaqut, Iʿrāb al-Qur’ān al-Karīm (Alexandria, Egypt: Dar al-Maʿri-
fah al-Jamiʿah, 2011), 241.



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78 Kamali, The Middle Path of Moderation in Islam: The Qur’ānic Principle of Wasaṭiyyah, 14.

79 Kamali, 27–28; Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Shari’ah Law: An Introduction (Oxford, 
UK: Oneworld, 2008), 296.

80 Al-Qaradawi, Islamic Moderation and Renewal, 11.

81 Al-Qaradawi, 65–93.

82 Muhammad al-Qurtubi, Tafsīr al-Qurṭubī, ed. Abdalhaqq Bewley, trans. Aisha 
Abdarrahman Bewley, vol. 5 (Bradford, UK: Diwan Press, 2020), 384.

83 Muhammad Husayn Tabatabaʾi, Tafsīr al-Mīzān, ed. Amina Inloes, trans. Tawus 
Raja and Sa’id Akhtar Rizvi (Sydney, Australia: Tawheed Institute, 2020), 153–54, 
https://almizan.org/.

84 Al-Qaradawi, Islamic Moderation and Renewal, 25–52.

85 Al-Qaradawi, 1–2.

86 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Islamic Moderation and Renewal, ed. Mohamed Ajmal Bin Abdul 
Razak Al-Aidrus, trans. Hassan Ahmed Ibrahim, Hassan Abdel Razig El-Nagar, and 
Idris Salim El-Hassan (KL, Malaysia: ISTAC, 2013), 14.

87 Al-Qaradawi, 25–41.

88 Bettina Gräf and Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen, eds., Global Mufti: The Phenomenon of 
Yūsuf Al-Qaraḍāwī (NY, USA: Columbia University Press, 2009), 213.

89 Gräf and Skovgaard-Petersen, Global Mufti, 220.

90 Gräf and Skovgaard-Petersen, 221-22.

91 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, The Lawful and The Prohibitted in Islam, trans. Syed Shukry 
Kamal El-Helbawy, M. Moinudin Siddiqui (Selangor, Malaysia: IBT, 1995), 13.

92 Gräf and Skovgaard-Petersen, 216.

93 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Dirāsah fī Fiqh Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah: Bayna Maqāṣid al-Kulliyyah 
Wa-al-Nuṣūṣ al-Juzʾiyyah, 3rd ed. (Cairo, Egypt: Dar al-Shuruq, 2008), 39–42.

94 El-Mesawi, 97–104.

95 Al-Qaradawi, Dirāsah fī Fiqh Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah: Bayna Maqāṣid al-Kulliyyah 
wa-al-Nuṣūṣ al-Juzʾiyyah, 40–42.

96 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Fiqh of Muslim Minorities: Contentious Iussues & Recommended 
Solutions, trans. Al-Falah Foundation (Cairo, Egypt: Al-Falah Foundation, 2003), 8.

97 Auda, A Critique of the Theory of Abrogation, v–xv.

98 Auda, v.

99 Al-Zuhayli, al-Wajīz fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh, 17–19.

100 Khallaf, The Science of the Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence: The Methodology of 
Islamic Law, 28–29.

101 Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, 9–10.



H A S S A N :  Y U S U F  A L- Q A R A d A W i ’ S  J U R i S P R U d E N C E  O F  P R i O R i t i E S     119

102 Ramadan, “Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation,” 41–58.

103 Auda, A Critique of the Theory of Abrogation, viii–ix.

104 Al-Zuhayli, al-Wajīz fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh, 19.

105 Al-Qaradawi, Islamic Moderation and Renewal, 15.

106 Gräf and Skovgaard-Petersen, Global Mufti: The Phenomenon of Yusuf al-Qaradawi, 
239–44.

107 Al-Zuhayli, Al-Wajīz Fī Uṣūl Al-Fiqh, 219–23.

108 Al-Qaradawi, 24.

109 Al-Qaradawi, Islamic Moderation and Renewal, 24.

110 Al-Qaradawi, 99.

111 Abdullah, Al-Waadih Fee Usool Ul-Fiqh: The Clear Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, 
234–49.

112 Al-Qaradawi, Islamic Moderation and Renewal, 127.

113 Al-Qaradawi, Fiqh of Priorities, 25.

114 Al-Qaradawi, 28; Al-Qaradawi, The Priorities of the Islamic Movement in the Coming 
Phase, 21–22.

115 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, The Study Quran (NY, USA: HarperOne, 2015), 408.

116 Tabatabaʾi, Chap. 7, 9-10.

117 The Monotheist Group, The Qurʾan: A Monotheist Translation (USA: Brainbow Press, 
2014).

118 Grace M. Barnes et al., “Gambling and Alcohol Use Among Youth: Influences of 
Demographic, Socialization, and Individual Factors,” Addictive Behaviors 24, no. 6 
(1999): 763.

119 William R. Corbin and Jessica M. Cronce, “Effects of Alcohol, Initial Gambling 
Outcomes, Impulsivity, and Gambling Cognitions on Gambling Behavior Using a 
Video Poker Task,” Experimental and Clinical Psychopharmacology 25, no. 3 (2017): 
175.

120 Xiaochu Zhang, Jie Shi, and Ran Tao, eds., Substance and Non-Substance Addiction, 
vol. 1010, Advances in Experimental Medicine and Biology (Singapore: Springer, 
2017), 47–49.

121 Zu Wei Zhai et al., “Gambling, Substance Use and Violence in Male and Female 
Adolescents,” Journal of Gambling Studies 36, no. 4 (2020): 1301–24, https://doi.
org/10.1007/s10899-020-09931-8.

122 Kamali, Shari’ah Law: An Introduction, 147.

123 Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, The Mejelle: Being An English Translation of Majallah 
El-Ahkam-l-Adliya And A Complete Code of Islamic Civil Law, trans. C. R. Tyser, D. 
G. Demetriades, and Ismail Haqqi Effendi (KL, Malaysia: TOP, 2003), Art. 30.



120    A M E R i C A N  J O U R N A L  O F  i S L A M  A N d  S O C i E t Y  4 0 : 1 - 2

124 Kamali, Shari’ah Law: An Introduction, 144.

125 Kamali, 147.

126 Naji Ibrahim, Fiqh al-Muwāzanāt Bayna al-Naẓriyyah wa-al-Taṭbīq (Beirut, Lebanon: 
Dar al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 2002), 27; ʿAbd al-Majid Muhammad al-Suswah, Fiqh 
al-Muwāzanāt fī al-Sharīʿah al-Islāmiyyah (Dubai, UAE: Dar al-Qalam, 2013), 13; 
Al-Qaradawi, Fiqh of Priorities, 25–26; Al-Qaradawi, The Priorities of the Islamic 
Movement in the Coming Phase, 17–18.

127 Al-Qaradawi, Fiqh of Priorities, 25; Al-Qaradawi, The Priorities of the Islamic 
Movement in the Coming Phase, 17–18.

128 “[As for] the thief, the male and the female, amputate their hands in recompense 
for what they earned [i.e., committed] as a deterrent [punishment]…” (Q 5:38 trans. 
Saheeh Intl).

129 Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, 354.

130 Kamali, Shari’ah Law: An Introduction, 147.

131 Pasha, The Mejelle: Being An English Translation of Majallah El-Ahkam-l-Adliya And 
A Complete Code of Islamic Civil Law, Art. 19

132 Pasha, Art. 29

133 Pasha, Art. 26

134 Ibn ʿAshur, Treatise on Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah, 96–109.

135 Al-Shatibi, The Reconciliation of the Fundamentals of Islamic Law, II:34.

136 Al-Shatibi, The Reconciliation of the Fundamentals of Islamic Law, II:22.

137 Al-Qaradawi, Fiqh of Priorities, 28.

138 Al-Qaradawi, 28.