Toward a Philosophical Approach of the
Hermeneutics of the Qur’an

Aliaa Ibrahim Dakroury
Abstract

Although claims questioning whether religious sacred books can
be “translated” or not have been heard for quite some time, they
have increased with the emergence of globalization and the
increasing openness and flow of information due to modern
technology. In the context of the relationship between hermen-
eutics and communication, one could argue that interpreting the
Qur’an is an interesting case study for many reasons. Among
them is the number of debates and discourses that have been
raised both for and against its translation. Another reason, per-
haps one of the largest barriers according to some religious
Muslim groups, is that the Qur’an is fundamentally revealed and
written in Arabic, and, therefore, its true meaning cannot be
translated into another language. Certain verses, such as “It is a
Qur’an in Arabic, without any crookedness (therein): in order
that they may guard against evil” (28:39), have been presented to
support this argument.1

Introduction
What is hermeneutics? Etymologically, the term hermeneutics comes from
the Latin hermeneuin or hermeneutica, which mean the “process of medi-
ating meaning that proceeds from the outside to the inside of the meaning.”2
Along these lines, one could see hermeneutics as not simply translating or

Aliaa Ibrahim Dakroury is a doctoral candidate in the Communication Program, School of
Journalism and Communication, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada. The author would like
to thank Karim H. Karim, School of Journalism and Communication, Carleton University, for
his constructive criticism and writing recommendations, and to acknowledge the feedback of
the attendees and organizers of the First Regional Conference of the Association of Muslim
Social Scientists (Toronto 2003), which enhanced the writing of this paper.



16 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 23:1

uttering a meaning, but rather as explicating and interpreting a given text’s
spirit and inner meaning. I will begin to illustrate this study’s importance
by pointing out the amount of controversy surrounding the issue of inter-
preting the Qur’an. Following that, I will propose a possible philosophical
foundation for a hermeneutics of the Qur’an through synthesizing two dif-
ferent streams of the approaches to the philosophy of hermeneutics. The
first one will be the Muslims’ collective appropriation and understanding,
as seen through two exegeses: those of al-Ghazali (1058-1111) and
Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905). The second will be the western perspec-
tive through the standing points of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) and
Jürgen Habermas (1929- ). The study will conclude by discussing a possi-
ble position that one can adopt when dealing with the issue of interpreting
a sacred text, in general, given their “sensitivity,” especially for its follow-
ers and believers.

The Problematic
This study’s problem is represented in the following two passages. The first,
by Kenneth Cragg, says that

[The] Qur’an is an ancient document, remote and uncongenial, suited
only to sheikhs and specialists. Even the sympathetic reader, who is exter-
nal to its people, will perhaps be dubious. It could be that he has already
found his interest baffled and frustrated for lack of the necessary clues.3

On the other hand, Sayyed Hosein Nasr, argues that 

[The Qur’an] is the tissue out of which the life of a Muslim is woven; its
sentences are like threads from which the substance of his soul is knit.4

Indeed, these claims are important signals, as they highlight the bound-
aries of language and the importance of not approaching a given language
(even a sacred one) only from a single approach, such as the literal, philo-
sophical, or linguistic approach. Instead, one must possess the Heidegger-
rian fore-understanding before starting to interpret a text, especially a sacred
text that occupies a unique position, as the Qur’an does for Muslims. The
non-being (i.e., unfamiliarity) with the Arabic language, its style, and the
Islamic faith may be one of the barriers to a true interpretation of the Qur’an.
In his book The Sublime Qur’an and Orientalism, Mohammad Khalifa
explains some of the reasons behind this. For example, he says that
Orientalists may see the Qur’an’s literary style as



… mechanically repetitious, of limited lexical range, filled with clumsy
syntax, unjustifiable pleonasm and rhetoric embellishment in many parts
and with ellipsis and hysteron proteron in many others.5

He adds that others found that the Qur’an contains “‘many literary
defects’; filled with ‘obscure sentences and strange words’ ... ‘faults of
grammar and style’ ... ‘wearisome jumble, crude, and incondite.’”6 Among
the reasons for this lack of understanding, as Khalifa explains, are the differ-
ences between how Arabic sentences, and their counterparts in English and
other languages, are constructed. Thus, an English reader can easily find the
Qur’anic text “clumsy” if it has not been interpreted and understood clearly,
or find it repetitive and full of rhetoric, whereas an Arab reader would find
the text uniquely constructed and beautiful. According to Khalifa, al-
Baqillany says, in his Miracle of the Qur’an, that “no one could appreciate
its miracle like the well-versed Arabic linguists.”7

Another interesting point raised by Khalifa is that a particular text’s
beauty and perfection is not totally up to the reader, especially if he or she is
not familiar with its type, language, and genres. He says that it is not appro-
priate or fair to compare the Qur’an with other works, such as Homer’s The
Iliad and The Odyssey or those of Shakespeare, for he believes that these
works, although unique pieces of poetry and drama, were aimed at entertain-
ing readers. Contrary to this, the Qur’an is not “intended to entertain or
amuse. It was revealed as a guide for worship, a code for behavior, good tid-
ings for the believers who do benevolent work.”8 Besides, he adds, the
Qur’an is also a source of joy, happiness, and satisfaction for Muslims who
lived centuries ago as well as for those who live today. Clearly, the Qur’an
is a special book for its people.

The Relevance of the Qur’anic Text for Muslims
In order to have a clear view of the importance of approaching the hermen-
eutics of the Qur’an, one should first draw a picture of this text’s central-
ity from a Muslim perspective and belief. For example, Muslims see the
following verse as an example of the Qur’an’s linguistic uniqueness:

Verily, were humanity and jinn assembled to produce the like of this
Qur’an, they could not produce its like, though the one should help the
other. (17:88) 

However, secular claims have been raised asking that the Qur’an be
“opened” to both history and literature. For example, Cragg argues: “If the

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18 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 23:1

ultimate is reserved from access, how can its ultimacy be known?”9 What
does this mean? Could this, according to Muslims, be possible or accept-
able? In fact, Muslims view the Qur’an as the spoken scripture that is pow-
erfully applied and practiced in their societies through recitation (qira’ah).
William Graham, in his book Beyond the Written Word, argues that what
makes a book “sacred” is its people’s belief and conception of it as such;
interestingly, this is exactly how Muslims perceive the Qur’an, as a work of
literary “matchlessness” (i`jaz).10

One part of its i`jaz, according to this viewpoint, is that the literal mean-
ing is incapable of clarifying and representing the Qur’an’s unique and ulti-
mate meaning: “Every word carries a world of meaning within itself, and
there is never a complete ‘horizontal’ and didactic explanation of its con-
tent.”11 Moreover, even if the literal written meaning is not obvious (i.e., for
those who cannot read or write), the sounds’ presence and the essence of
God’s words will exist through their ears and hearts. Graham12 explains that
Muslims possess this “sense of sacrality, or baraka (‘blessing’), of the very
sounds of the holy text as something that seems to penetrate into every cor-
ner of the Islamic world.”13 Plainly, the concept of barakah is difficult to
explain logically and literally. 

In general, the Qur’an’s content may be classified into three main
themes: the “doctrinal message,” which sets up the ethical and moral
boundaries of the human relationship. This theme has been interpreted as
the Shari`ah (Islamic law); the “historical narrations,” which refer to the
stories of different prophets, people, places, and similar material; and
“divine magic,” which is hardly interpreted and literally understood in our
modern age. The only possible way to do so is through a metaphysical
understanding.14

This issue is far more complex than can be stated within the limitations
of this article. However, one must mention here that even those Muslim
philosophers’ interpretations of the Qu’ran that are accepted within the west-
ern spectrum are viewed with doubt by some traditional Muslim commen-
tators who claim they are significantly less involved in the Qur’anic text
than the theologians and shaykhs. For example, Hamdi Zakzouk accuses Ibn
Khaldun of misinterpreting the core point of the hermeneutics of the Qur’an
when, at one point in one of his commentaries, he says that “all Arabs can
interpret the Qur’an.”15 Zakzouk adds that Ibn Khaldon oversimplifies the
duty of interpreting the Qur’an. Such criticism truly indicates how important
the Qur’an is to Muslim believers.



A Look from the Inside: Patterns of Muslim
Interpretations of the Qur’an
The uniqueness of Muslim interpretations and the complete rejection of the
Orientalists’ approaches to the Qur’an is most apparent in Khalifa, who
clearly outlines the prerequisites for its interpretation and explanation
(tafsir). He argues that al-Tabari (c. 839-923), a founding father of Qur’anic
tafsir, maintains that the “true belief of the interpreter is the basis of any pos-
sible and acceptable interpretation.”16 Ironically, he adds that if the person is
not honest with himself/herself in life and does not believe in God, how can
we possibly trust him/her in interpreting God’s word and secrets? Another
interesting perspective raised in this book is that the author takes the “other”
perspective by studying the Qur’an in both its historical and literal perspec-
tives. He says clearly: “Those Orientalists’ main aims are to prove evi-
dently that the Qur’an is not the word of God.”17

Finally, Khalifa argues that according to the consensus of Muslim the-
ologians and jurisprudents, fifteen different conditions must be met before
interpreting the Qur’an. The most important conditions that might be rele-
vant to this study are knowledge of Arabic (lughah); grammar (nahw); and
meanings, denotation, and allegory (ma`ani and rumuz); and Qur’anic reci-
tation (qira’ah).

Now, I will look at two different interpretations18 of the Qur’an to
demonstrate the range of interpretations that is possible even by those who
fufill the traditional Muslim understandings of the above prerequisites: a
metaphysical pattern as seen in al-Ghazali’s hermeneutics, and a rational
pattern as found in Abduh’s hermeneutics. Of course, these patterns do not
represent the entirety of Muslim approaches to the Qur’an. However, I have
chosen to focus on them because I think they represent, to a great extent, a
model of unresearchable Muslim intellectual effort to read, think, and reflect
the Qur’an’s true meaning and i`jaz.

Looking at the possible variety within Muslim spheres of interpretation
enhances my arguement that non-Muslims, under the right conditions
(explained below), may also contribute to Qur’anic interpretation in ways
that a Muslim audience would accept.

A Metaphysical Hermeneutic: Al-Ghazali
Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, known among Arabs as Hujjat al-Islam19 and Zayd
al-Din,20 is a founder of the metaphysical approach to the hermeneutics of
the Qur’an. If one could summarize this approach in one word, it would be

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20 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 23:1

“love.” Al-Ghazali is in love with his God and believes that this true love
will direct him to knowledge of God and the hidden and mysterious signs in
His word: the Qur’an. In his landmark Al-Munqidh mi al-Dalal (The
Deliverer from Error), he states: “I truly believe, as if I have seen, that there
is no power unless He, The Higher, The Greater Giver, gives.”21

Zakzouk describes his approach as saving the readers and believers
from falling into the Homeric Skylla monster. Al-Ghazali experienced two
major crises of skepticism that ended, according to him, when he came to
know the “truth”: Islam.22 Furthermore, Abul-Quasem underlies the bottom
line in al-Ghazali’s theory of interpretation: In general, the theme of 

… all revealed religions is that man is incapable of solving all the prob-
lems of his life through his reason (`aql) alone and therefore needs guid-
ance from God on both the theoretical and practical levels.23

Consequently, al-Ghazali questions how a human being can understand
the Qur’an’s true meaning when he or she is not a fully capable creature.
Hence, he adopts a metaphysical approach coupled with questions of ration-
ality and the boundaries of human reason to know God through His word.
Thus, al-Ghazali opposes rhetoric and its philosophers, especially Muslims,
for “its [philosophy’s] deficiencies are more than its benefits.”24 According
to him, Sufism cannot, on its own, understand and know God unless it com-
bines theory and practice. In addition, Sufism is superior to many philosoph-
ical approaches, because that which cannot be reached by human reason and
its scientific capabilities can be reached and totally understood by Sufism’s
feeling, taste, and love.25

Here, it is important to mention that al-Ghazali also opposes what he
calls “the expounded” philosophy, such as that of al-Farabi and Ibn Sina’.
He argues that they were very certain about the world’s eternity and, more-
over, that they have not properly conceived and completely understood the
Prophet’s physical resurrection during his isra’ and mi`raj. Rahman explains
this point:

Al-Ghazali also asserts, rightly, that metaphysical speculation does not
possess the certainty or demonstrative force of mathematical proposi-
tions. But he goes on to say, wrongly, that since the philosophy of these
men is harmful to faith so must their scientific works also be shunned –
since the latter tend to create goodwill in the students toward the philoso-
phers (who were, of course, scientists too) and predisposes them to accept
their philosophy!26



Al-Ghazali approaches the Qur’an by admitting that there are several
levels of literal meaning associated with its words, sounds, and letters. He
adds that some of those meanings are clear while others are not. Moreover,
God’s speech has four different levels of meaning: inward (batin), outward
(zahir), ending (hadd), and beginning (matla`ah). An example of his inter-
pretations would be useful in this context:

Tell [people]: If the ocean became ink for [transcribing] the words of my
Lord, surely the ocean would be exhausted before the words of my Lord
came to an end, even though We augmented it with the like of it. (18:109)

He explains that if an ordinary non-believer and a non-lover of God
were to read this verse, he or she would be incapable of understanding the
kind of heavenly “measurement” indicated. Mental capacities are limited
and cannot explain all that His words mean, even the “smallest” one, such
as “He.” He adds that the Qur’an’s ultimate meaning is certainly within the
invisible world (malakut) only. In addition, since this example is beyond our
human sensorial and mental systems, the only way to understand it is
through “spiritual insight” (nur al-basirah). In his Mishkat al-Anwar (The
Niche for Lights), al-Ghazali explains that:

Nature is a dark one, for it has no knowledge, nor perception, nor self-
consciousness, nor consciousness, nor light perceived through the medi-
um of physical sight ... this veil is, as it were, [the] self-centered ego, and
[the] lusts of darkness; for there is no darkness so intense as slavery to
self-impulse and self-love.27

As part of his esoteric exegesis, al-Ghazali doubts the translation’s abil-
ity to channel the meaning. He says that “the translation (tarjamah) of its
words … is not sufficient for an understanding of the realities of its mean-
ings (haqa’iq al-ma`ani).”28 Al-Ghazali summarizes his method of exegesis
by setting some prerequisites. For instance, he believes that four “veils”
inhibit a true understanding of the meaning of God’s word: the pronuncia-
tion of the letter (using the mouth and the tongue); taqlid (blind following),
or merely following a school of thought while not sincerely committing to
its doctrines; darkness and rust (sada) of the heart, defined as when people
insist upon committing sin despite knowing that it is not right, a state that
prevents one’s heart and mind from opening up to a true Qur’anic interpre-
tation; and when a man [or a woman] has read the outward exegesis of the
Qur’an and has formed the belief that Qur’anic sentences have only those
meanings which have come down by tradition [of] other exegetes.29

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22 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 23:1

In his Kitab Jawahir al-Qur’an (Jewels of the Qur’an), al-Ghazali sum-
marizes his doctrine of interpretation after being asked about the benefit of
employing allegories in the Qur’an, since they embody, to some extent, clear
indications of what is true and correct:

Know that every benefit lies beyond these indications, for these are a sam-
ple presented here in order that you may know by them the definition of the
road to spiritual meanings of the invisible world through the traditional
words, so that the doors of the unveiling of the meaning of the Qur’an may
be opened [to you] and the methods of diving in their seas may be known.30

Rational and Modern Hermeneutics:
Muhammad Abduh31
Another important example of the Muslim interpretation of the Qur’an is
that of Muhammad Abduh. His way of thinking and method of exegesis
were affected mainly by his experience as a political activist. He was intro-
duced to modern and progressive thoughts primarily by Jamal al-Din al-
Afghani (1838-97), a political leader and activist: 

Through al-Afghani Abduh was introduced to the outlook of Europe and
awakened to an interest in the situation of Islam in the contemporary
world.32

Accordingly, Abduh supported the struggle against the British occupiers of
Egypt. For him, religion was not just a matter of worship; in addition, it was
a way of life. Therefore, he reads and interprets the Qur’an in a different way
than his predecessors did. 

Another important characteristic of his approach is to achieve reform
and progress in religion, especially in two realms: al-Azhar University33 and
in the exegesis of the Qur’an. Before him, most Qur’anic commentaries
were centered mainly on the grammatical structure, the tradition of Prophet
Mohammed (hadith), and Arabic. Abduh rejects most of these “given” and
“unquestioned” tafsirs. The Qur’an was not only representing the literal
aspect, he believes, for:

On the Last Day God will not question us on the commentators on how
they understood the Koran, but he will question us on his Book which he
sent down to guide and instruct us.34

Here, one can suggest that Abduh’s approach, to a great extent, refutes
the claims that Islam (and the Qur’an) contradicts the progressive and mod-



ern method of interpretations. The modernity project, which began in
eighteenth-century Europe, has attacked society’s existing sociopolitical and
epistemological forms in the name of the superiority of human reason.
Interestingly, its impact on the Arab world assumed two different forms:
adopting the project’s core beliefs through social reform,35 and completely
rejecting it (the asalah [authenticity] trend) and asserting the authenticity of
Muslim culture. Among those who defended and adopted those parts of the
project that seemed to be convenient were al-Afghani and Abduh. While
Abduh accepted Mohamed Ali’s (1805-49) reform project, he rejected the
British-promoted secularization on the ground that it was a real threat to
Islam and national identity:

… Islam should be the moral basis of a modern and progressive society,
but that it could not approve everything done in the name of moderniza-
tion ... A Muslim society could adopt European ideas and sciences with-
out abandoning Islam itself.36

In fact, Islam is not against modernity and its claim that human reason
must be used. Thoroughout its text, the Qur’an calls for and supports many
of the very aspects that the modernity project rejected and fought, such
as mass deception, magic, and myths. It also asserts the importance of
using human reason and knowledge as a way to know God and be a good
Muslim.37

Hence, using one’s practical sense when interpreting is also a core
characteristic of Abduh’s exegesis. In other words, he wrote his exegesis
in a way designed to simplify and interpret God’s word for ordinary peo-
ple, for at that time Egypt’s literacy rate was very low. The traditional
tafsir38 did not have useful answers to many of the contemporary questions
being asked by ordinary people and the intellectuals who had made contact
with the “West” through public missionary schools in France, England,
and other European countries. Abduh wanted religion to be involved in their
life, instead of remaining an abstraction and existing only in the mosques’
sphere.

In general, one could say that “rationality” is the main theme of
Abduh’s interpretation. Arguably, this inference may be derived from the
previous discussion on the relationship between Islam and modernity, for
he uses his reason and injects it into his exegesis of the Qur’an, especially
when dealing with the “given” tafsirs.39 One thing that should be clarified
here is that Abduh confirms and asserts the use of reason when interpreting
the Qur’an. However, this does not mean that he disregards the importance

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24 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 23:1

and significance of revelation in his exegesis. In fact, he uniquely combines
both the revelation and the use of reason as the Muslim source of hidayah
(guidance), an example of which can be seen in the following verse: 

There is no God but He, the Living, the Eternal; He has sent down to you
the Book (Qur’an) with Truth, confirming what was before it, and He sent
down the Torah and the Evangel aforetime as a guidance for the people,
and He sent down the Furqan. (3:1-4)

The traditional and most widely known interpretation of furqan is that
of being a synonym for the Qur’an,40 or that the Qur’an distinguishes
between truth and falsity. Such classical commentators as al-Zammakhshari,
al-Razi, and al-Tabari have slightly different viewpoints. Abduh interprets
furqan as “reason.” From a western perspective, representing a clear-cut
modern version, Jansen argues that “Abduh seems to have replaced revela-
tion by reason.”41 This is refuted by Abd Allah Shehata, a famous Egyptian
commentator, who says that Abduh’s viewpoint regarding the relationship
among reason, revelation, and hidayah is clear: Both human reason and rev-
elation are important sources, but they should “intertwine” (yatawafaka).42

Another important rule in Abduh’s exegesis, one that Jansen and oth-
ers have criticized, is his admission and acceptance of some “hidden” and
“un-explained” meanings of the Qur’anic text. Abduh says that we should
not attempt to interpret an unknown meaning (mubham) in the Qur’an.
Some of his followers even wrote a book called Manhaj al-Imam fi al-
Mubham (Muhammad Abduh’s Doctrine in the Unknown Meaning).
Therefore, here one could find a position on the interpretation of the
Qur’an, as presented by Abduh and others, that suggests that even with a
rational exegesis of the Qur’an, one should not stick to the very obvious
meaning due to the possibility of an internal or hidden one left by God for
them to ponder.43

In the end, one could summarize Abduh’s approach to interpreting
the Qur’an as rational. In fact, he even says that we have to use the Qur’an
to interpret its meaning: tafsir al-Qur’an bi al-Qur’an.44 Another assertion
describes the preconditions of a true interpretation:

The true Muslim in the judgment of the Qur’an is he [she] who is unblem-
ished [khalisan] by the defects of associating others with God, sincere
[mukhlisan] in his [her] actions and having faith, of whatever religious
community [millah] he [she] might be, and in whatever time and place he
[she] might be found.45



Western Hermeneutical Examples:
Is There a Possibility?
In this part, a very complex and challenging analysis will be introduced as a
possible philosophical approach to the hermeneutics of the Qur’an by taking
a non-Muslim theory of interpretation through a discussion of approaches
from two western hermenenutical philosophers: Martin Heidegger (1889-
1976) and Jürgen Habermas (1929- ). This will be followed by synthesizing
elements of their philosophies that might be useful for producing a “true”
interpretation of the Qur’an. One advantage of presenting these two exam-
ples is to prove that ethical conduct, even if articulated by a non-Muslim
interpreter, would be accepted in interpreting the Qur’an. Al-Ghazali and
Abduh advocated the same ideas in their own approaches. 

Martin Heidegger’s Dasein (Being-in)
Martin Heidegger, a German philosopher and phenomenologist, can be
seen as an important contributor to modern hermeneutical thought. Many
scholars argue that he is responsible for the shift in thinking regarding
hermeneutics as a philosophical discipline. Before him, hermeneutics sought
to achieve either an epistemological goal (discovering the foundation of
human knowledge) or a methodological goal (searching for tools that lead to
objective knowledge). In fact, Heidegger was more interested in answering
the question of “Being,” since he wanted to explain the “ontological” condi-
tions and status of human knowledge: “Heidegger turns hermeneutics analy-
sis toward the question of Being.”46

Heidegger’s general philosophical view of hermeneutic’s role can be
applied in our discussion of a non-Muslim interpreter of the Qur’an. Jean
Grondin states:

I believe it can be shown that Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity is
intended to be [a] hermeneutics of everything that is at work behind state-
ments.47

Hence, the Heideggerrian perspective does not just look at the exact
words, statements, or texts; rather, it is arguably meant to describe the process
of understanding “before” interpreting, a matter that is not contrary to the
Muslims’ high esteem and respect for the Qur’an. According to Heidegger,
the western interpreter would understand the “Being” of the Qur’anic text
before he or she attempted to explain or interpret it.

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26 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 23:1

Grondin emphasizes this point, as he explains that fore-understanding is
a deeper concept than a causal, superficial type of understanding. For Hei-
degger, it is equal to the mastery of understanding:

Thus we might say that an athlete “understands” or knows how to play
soccer. By this we do not mean some knowledge, of course, but a largely
unexpressed capacity, a mastery, indeed an “art.”48

Another important feature of Heidegger’s hermeneutics is his focus on
transparency. This issue is far more important in interpreting a sacred text in
general, and more particularly in the case of the Qur’an:

It is necessary to make our own situation transparent so that we can appre-
ciate precisely the otherness and alterity of the text – that is, without
allowing our unelucidated prejudices to dominate the text unwittingly and
so conceal what is proper to it.49

This idea has always occupied a primary place in the Muslim perspec-
tive on the interpretation of “others,” such as the case with the Orientalists,
whom Muslims attack for not understanding the Qur’anic text and accuse
of not “Being” transparent enough to interpret it correctly and acceptably.
Heidegger explains that this concept of transparency in his “Being and
Time”:

We choose this term [transparency] to designate “knowledge of the Self”
in a sense which is well understood, so as to indicate that here it is not a
matter of perceptually tracking down and inspecting a point called the
“Self,” but rather one of seizing upon the full disclosedness of Being-in-
the-world throughout all the constitutive terms which are essential to it,
and doing so with understanding.50

Another important attribute of Heidegger’s hermeneutics that is relevant
to the topic of this study is the concept of meaning. For him, meaning is not
prior to understanding; rather, it follows understanding. Hence, he describes
three types of understanding: fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception.
Fore-having (Vorhabe) is the degree of involvement with the “Being” itself.
For example, if we take the Qur’an, fore-having would be one’s knowledge
of Arabic, as it brings understanding. So, how can a person who wants to
interpret an Arabic text, while he or she does not know Arabic, possibly
achieve an accurate understanding? Fore-sight (Vorsicht), defined as the dif-
ferent opinions and attitudes that we already have “before” our exposure to
the text, can be seen in one’s knowledge of Arabic grammar and linguistics.



Interestingly, these states of understanding are similar to al-Ghazali’s pre-
requisites, as he describes how much the pre-understanding of Arabic and
linguistics are necessary to interpret the Qur’an. The third stage of hermen-
eutics is fore-conception (Vorgriff). He argues that knowledge and pre-
understanding of the text-content is contingent upon our own familiarity
with the type of text.

Meaning is the “upon which” of a projection in terms of which something
becomes intelligible as something; it gets its structure from a fore-having,
a fore-sight, and a fore-conception.51

Finally, Heidegger writes that when interpreting a text (or a message in
general), one should always look to the “other” side, for meaning is not uni-
directional; rather, it runs in a “shared” direction:

... any answering counter-discourse arises proximally and directly from
understanding what the discourse is about, which is already “shared” in
Being-with.52

Heidegger was accused of representing an “elitist” perspective in her-
meneutics,53 of only focusing on the “Being” and thus not being concerned
with the social context. I agree with this viewpoint, but at the same time
acknowledge that he is certainly adding to hermeneutics. If he has con-
centrated on the ontological “Being” in his philosophy, he also has high-
lighted the importance of fore-understanding,” which is very important
for an interpreter of a sacred text to understand the other peoples and their
cultures.

Jürgen Habermas’ Hermeneutics and Action 
Our final stop is Jürgen Habermas, the German critical theorist and philoso-
pher. One should shed some light on his thought and philosophy before dis-
cussing his contribution to hermeneutics in general, and the use of his
Theory of Communicative Action (TCA) to solve part of the debate con-
cerning a possible approach to the hermeneutics of the Qur’an. Primarily,
one can see the influence of Kantian philosophy as one of the essential parts
of Habermas’ tendency toward moral assertion in the realms of truth, beauty,
and justice – the main areas of debate in the modernity project.

In the beginning, one should start by illustrating how Habermas under-
stands hermeneutics. He opines that hermeneutics is related not only to a
written text, but that it consists of

Dakroury: Toward a Philosophical Approach of the Hermeneutics of the Qur’an 27



28 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 23:1

… any meaningful expression – be it an utterance, verbal or nonverbal, or
an artefact of any kind, such as a tool, an institution, or a written docu-
ment – can be identified from a double perspective, both as an observable
event and as understandable objectification of meaning.54

For Habermas, using hermeneutics to serve the methodology of the
social sciences is a core interest. This idea is very consistent with his affil-
iation to the Frankfurt School and critical theory, the main aim of which is
to research and critically study social sciences. 

Consequently, Habermas has a different view of how language is used
than, for example, Hans-Georg Gadamer, who sees it only as a medium. He
says that “language is not only an object in our hands, it is the reservoir of
tradition and the medium in and through which we exist and perceive our
world.”55 On the contrary, Habermas views it as an integral part of the social
world. Therefore, his project can be summarized by the close relationship
that he proposes between “language” and “action” in order to enable her-
meneutics to move to what he calls the “unfinished project of the enlighten-
ment.” Hence, understanding a given language, as John Thompson explain-
ing Habermas’ notion of “action” by saying that it “implies being able to act,
and be involved in it in order to master it.”56 In other words, he wants to run
philosophy and the social sciences through his TCA:

From the vantage point of my own research interests, I see such a coop-
eration taking shape between [the] philosophy of science and [the] history
of science, between speech act theory and empirical approaches to prag-
matics of language.57

Habermas questions how we can possibly interpret a text in order to
understand it while the understanding itself embodies a “distorted” com-
munication. From the term distorted, one can infer that the message com-
municated between a sender and a receiver is not interpreted correctly, or,
in other words, that the meaning intended to reach the receiver is not the
same one that the receiver receives from a message. Therefore, Habermas
says that one can see how the issue of “truth” is crucial in interpretation.
It is clear that I am using Habermas’ notion of “validity claims” as his pre-
conditions for a non-distorted communication in order to interpret a sacred
text. In his TCA, Habermas specifies that in order to communicate a mes-
sage, one should meet the following conditions of purity, sincerity, and
truthfulness:



I shall develop a thesis that anyone acting communicatively must, in per-
forming any speech action, raise universal validity claims ... insofar as he
wants to participate in a process of reaching understanding, he cannot
avoid raising the following ... validity claims. He claims to be
a. Uttering something understandably.
b. Giving [the hearer] something to understand;
c. Making himself thereby understandable; and
d. Coming to an understanding with another person.58

Hence, in our discussion of interpreting a sacred text such as the Qur’an,
the interpreter should, according to Habermas, understand it first in order
to interpret it correctly, and, at the same time, have the hearer “accept” the
interpretation. This issue is very important as, practically speaking, hermen-
eutics is not just the interpretation of a meaning, but rather the interpretation
of an “acceptable” meaning for the respondent. More importantly, if the
interpreted text is the word of God, it would be highly important to accept
and understand this interpretation. Habermas clarifies:

The speaker must choose a comprehensible expression so that [the]
speaker and [the] hearer can understand one another, the speaker must
have the intention of communicating a true proposition content ... so that
the hearer can share the knowledge of the speaker. The speaker must want
to express his intentions truthfully so that the hearer can believe.59

In summary, the Habermassian preconditions for a non-distorted com-
munication that has been articulated according to his TCA is very important
when interpreting a sacred text, even though he has been accused of being
Eurocentric, something which I do not deny, as he himself said:

I do not believe that we, as Europeans, can seriously understand concepts
like morality and ethical life, person and individuality, or freedom and
emancipation, without appropriating the substance of the Judeo-Christian
understanding in terms of salvation.60

Nevertheless, at the same time, what he is really after is certainly what
we, as communication and social scholars, are seeking to find in different
communication media interpretations, especially from the “other” perspec-
tive: Can we see purity, sincerity, or truth in interpreting news stories? Ergo,
if the West cannot interpret news with fairness and transparency, how can
Muslims or other non-western peoples possibly “accept” western interpreta-
tions of their sacred book, a book that is their soul and life? In my opinion,
Habermas’ Ideal Speech Situation, the utopian component that he believes

Dakroury: Toward a Philosophical Approach of the Hermeneutics of the Qur’an 29



30 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 23:1

is embodied in all human lingusitic communication and that hopes to repre-
sent a model for freedom and equity in societies, is not found in many of our
contemporary interpretations and, according to the Muslim perspective, also
is missing from the interpretation of the Qur’an and of Muslim cultures and
traditions.

In summary, one should mention that it is problematical to assume that
western approaches are presumably acceptable to Muslims. Rather, assum-
ing that these approaches to the hermeneutics of the Qur’an have their own
ways of reading, thinking, understanding, and situating themselves, and that
they reflect this understanding in purity and sincerity, it might encourage
acceptance of the non-western viewpoint. This argument is summarized by
Khaled Abou El Fadl, who says that if a “western” author wants to interpret
and understand the Muslim’s text, he or she

… should resist the temptation to co-opt and essentialize the Muslim
experience in order to service a debate ... one should start with the Muslim
experience and then carefully consider the ways that [western intellectu-
als] might be utilized in the service of the Muslim experience.61

Conclusion
The preceding discussion suggests that the Qur’an can be interpreted accu-
rately by a non-Muslim interpreter. However, many Muslim scholars and
Muslims in general, given their high esteem for the Qur’an and its signifi-
cant presence in their live, might totally reject this conclusion. However, the
argument raised here does not contradict either the Muslim perspective and
its respect for the Qur’an or the thirst for knowing what the Qur’an is say-
ing from a non-Muslim standpoint.

It is not suggested here that Muslims should accept secular claims and
open their holy book to history so that it can be analyzed and interpreted as
any other book. In reality, what I am trying to do is to alter the “alien” image
that Islam has acquired recently as a result of the West viewing it as “other”
and vise versa, and the Muslim fear of allowing anyone other than them-
selves to read, understand, and interpret the Qur’an – provided, of course,
that such people meet the religious prerequisites of interpretation discussed
above. As Edward Said affirms:

… almost without exception, no writer on Islam in the West today reck-
ons explicitly with the fact that “Islam” is considered a hostile culture, or
that anything said about Islam by a professional scholar is within the
sphere of influence of corporations and the government.62



Therefore, Said asks western scholars and Orientalists for more “under-
standing” and knowledge of both Islam and Islamic culture on the one hand,
and the social world on the other, so that they can acquire a clear-cut picture
of what Islam is, rather than depending on how the western media has inter-
preted it, especially the stereotypes propagated since the era of colonization.
He adds, and I (along with several Muslim perspectives) agree with him, that
“motives” are the true determinants of a true interpretation: “For interpreta-
tions depend very much on who the interpreter is, who he or she is address-
ing, what his or her purpose is in interpreting.”63 Indeed, Said himself is an
example of my argument, as he was a non-Muslim scholar whose work on
Islam found a receptive audience in the Muslim world.

What I have argued and suggested in this article, academically at least,
is a possible philosophical approach or guideline for interpreting the
Qur’an. If the western interpreter is pure, sincere, and truthful (Habermas);
transparent (Heidegger); knows the culture (Gadamer); and really wants to
know and understand Islam, then his or her interpretation of the Qur’an will
be accepted. 

Endnotes

1. This meaning is repeated in different forms throughout the Qur’an. See, for
example, 41:2-3, 20:111, 12:2, 43:3, and 39:28.

2. Jean Grondin, Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics (New Haven and
London: Yale University Press, 1994), 21.

3. Kenneth Cragg, The Mind of the Qur’an: Chapters in Reflection (London:
Ruskin House, 1970), 13.

4. Sayyed Hosein Nasr, Ideals and Realities of Islam (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 1966), 42.

5. Mohammad Kahlifa, The Sublime Qur’an and Orientalism (London:
Longman, 1983), 20.

6. Ibid., 20.
7. Ibid., 21.
8. Ibid., 22-23.
9. Cragg, Mind of the Qur’an, 15.
10. Ibid., 13.
11. Nasr, Ideals and Realities, 48.
12. Here, it is interesting to note that Graham says that one his friends began

each day by listening to the Qur’anic recitation on Radio Pakistan while liv-
ing in East Africa. When Graham asked him why he did so, although he
could not understand the complete Qur’anic recitation, his friend told him
that the recitation’s barakah would permeate his house. William A. Gra-

Dakroury: Toward a Philosophical Approach of the Hermeneutics of the Qur’an 31



32 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 23:1

ham, Beyond the Written Word: Oral Aspects of Scripture in the History of
Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 104. It is impor-
tant to mention here that many mistakenly believe that Arabic is a “sacred”
language because the Qu’ran was revealed in it. The fact is that the Arabic
used in the Qur’an in particular is a sacred language, as Muslims believe,
for they are the words of God. Nasr clarifies this point: “Arabic is sacred in
the sense that it is an integral part of the Quranic revelation whose very
sounds and utterances play a role in the ritual acts of Islam.” Nasr, Ideas
and Realities, 44. 

13. Graham, Beyond the Written Word, 104.
14. Nasr, Ideals and Realities, 50-51.
15. Hamdi Zakzouk, Buhuth wa Dirasat fi Daw’ al-Qur’an al-Karim (Studies and

Researches in the Light of the Glorious Qur’an) (Cairo: Al-Awkaf Ministry,
2002), 13.

16. Abdel Rahman Ibrahim Khalifa, Dirasat fi Manhaj al-Mufassirin (Studies in
the Interpreters’ Approaches) (Cairo: Al-Azhar University Press, 1997), 39.

17. Ibid., 68.
18. One should mention here that there are important interpretations of the Qur’an,

such as the Sufi approach, in which the approach looks at the inner, mystical,
or psycho-spiritual dimension of Islam and its holy text. 

19. There is no accurate translation of this word. However, its meaning denotes a
person’s great involvement with and dedication to an issue, a thought, or a
principle.

20. The ornament of religion.
21. Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, Al-Munqidh min al-Dalal (The Deliverer from Error)

(Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-`Almiyah, 1961), 77.
22. Zakzouk, Buhuth wa Dirasat, 200-01.
23. Mohammad Abul-Quasem, The Recitation and Interpretation of the Qur’an:

Al-Ghazali’s Theory (Malaysia: The University of Malaya Press, 1979), 9.
24. Al-Ghazali, Al-Munqidh min al-Dalal, 103.
25. Zakzouk, Buhuth wa Dirasat, 206-09.
26. Fazlur Rahman, Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual

Tradition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), 34.
27. Abu Hamid al-Ghazzali, Mishkat al-Anwar (The Niche for Lights), trans. W.

H. T. Gairdner (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1924), 159.
28. Nicholas Heer, “Abu Hamid al-Ghazali’s Esoteric Exegesis of the Koran,” in

The Heritage of Sufism: Classical Persian Sufism from Its Origins to Rumi
(700-1300), ed. Leonard Lewisohn (Oxford: Oneworld, 1999), 241. 

29. Abul-Quasem, The Recitation and Interpretation, 72.
30. Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, Kitab Jawahir al-Qur’an (Jewels of the Qur’an),

trans. Muhammad Abul Quasem (Kuala Lumpur: The University of Malaya
Press, 1977), 62. 



31. Abduh, born in a small town northern Egypt, began his education with reli-
gious studies and continued it at al-Azhar University. He had several careers:
a teacher, a journalist, a judge, and, finally, a mufti.

32. Jane Smith, An Historical and Semantic Study of the Term “Islam” as Seen in
a Sequence of Qur’an Commentaries (Montana: Scholars Press, 1975), 185.

33. As a result of his efforts and thoughts, al-Azhar University was divided into
three faculties: Islamic Law (Shari`ah), theology (Usul al-Din), and the Arabic
language (al-Lughah al-`Arabiyah). J. Jansen, The Interpretation of the
Qur’an in Modern Egypt (Leiden: E. J. Briill, 1974), 77-78.

34. Ibid., 19.
35. This was the case in Egypt, when Khedive Muhammad Ali sought to reform

education by sending various education missions to western countries and
reformed different aspects of social life, such as industry and agriculture.

36. Derek Hopwood, “Introduction: The Culture of Modernity in Islam and the
Middle East,” in Islam and Modernity: Muslim Intellectuals Respond, eds.
John Cooper, Ronald Nettler, and Mohamed Mahmoud (London: I.B. Tauris,
1998), 6.

37. In many verses, the Qur’an gives an indication of this issue, amng them 2:102
and 114:1-7. As for the importance and use of reason, see, for example, 79:26.

38. Abduh summarizes the crisis of the traditional interpretation of the Qur’an
during his early education: “I spent a year and a half ... without understanding
a single thing ... the teachers were accustomed to use technical terms of gra-
mar or jurisprudence which we did not understand, nor did they take any pains
to explain their meaning to those who did not know it.” Jansen, The Interpreta-
tion, 29.

39. For example, consider his tafsir of “He frowned and turned away, because the
blind man approached him. Yet for all you knew, [O Muhammad,] he might
have grown in purity, or have been reminded [of the truth], and helped by this
reminder” (80:1-5). The traditional interpretation is that the blind man needed
to ask the Prophet something or wanted to confess a sin. Abduh maintains that
the blind man was actually asking for knowledge. Ibid., 21.

40. The Arabic translation of furqan comes from the verb (or origin) faraqa,
yafruqu, means “to distinguish” or “to differentiate.” 

41. Ibid., 22.
42. Ibid., 23, n. 20.
43. Here, an example would clarify the difference between Abduh and other com-

mentators: “Whenever Zachariah entered the sanctuary to see her [Mary], he
found beside her provisions. He asked: ‘Oh Mary, how did you acquire this?’
She replied: ‘It is from Allah; Allah provides for whom He wills’” (3:1-4).
Many commentators were intent on describing the miraculous things in
Mary’s sanctuary, while Abduh insists that this is not the real, rational mean-
ing of this verse. Rather, he thinks that the important thing here is to realize

Dakroury: Toward a Philosophical Approach of the Hermeneutics of the Qur’an 33



34 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 23:1

that God’s power allows Him to do whatever He wills, regardless of any
human or rational thought.

44. Ibid., 33.
45. Smith, An Historical and Semantic Study, 192.
46. Gayle L. Ormiston and Alan D. Schrift, eds. The Hermeneutic Tradition: From

Ast to Ricoeur (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 15.
47. Martin Heidegger, “Being and Time,” in ibid., 90.
48. Grondin, Introduction, 93.
49. Heidegger, “Being and Time,” 119.
50. Ibid., 124.
51. Ibid., 137.
52. This argument was related to the relation between hermeneutics and culture.

For more information, see Rui Sampaio, www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Cult/Cult
Samp.htm. 

53. Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (Cam-
bridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1990), 23.

54. Hans-Georg Gadamer, “On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflec-
tion,” in Hermeneutics and Modern Philosophy, ed. Brice Wachterhauser
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), 286. 

55. John B. Thompson, Critical Hermeneutics: A Study in the Thought of Paul
Ricoeur and Jürgen Habermas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1981), 81.

56. Jürgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society (Boston: Bea-
con Press, 1979), 16.

57. Ibid., 2.
58. Ibid.
59. Gerard Delanty, “Habermas and Occidental Rationalism: The Politics of

Identity, Social Learning, and the Cultural Limits of Moral Universalism,”
Sociological Theory 15, no. 1 (1997): 38.

60. Ibid., 38
61. Khaled Abou El Fadl, And God Knows the Soldiers: The Authoritative and

Authoritarian in Islamic Discourses (Lanham, MD: University Press of
America, 2001), 99.

62. Edward Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine
How We See the Rest of the World (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981), 158.

63. Ibid., 154.