Westernization, Mahmud II,
and the Islamic Virtue Tradition

Seyfettin Er£ahin
Abstract

The Ottoman reforms of the nineteenth century sought a recon-
ciliation between Islam and western civilization. The ulama
played a key role in this process by supporting the reformers’
desire to bring Islam closer to the needs of the age and of the
empire. The reformers, chiefly Sultan Mahmud II and his close
friends, gained the ulama’s support to such an extent that the
Shaykh al-Islam wrote a treatise to persuade the masses to accept
the reforms. Applying the traditional virtue literature to the
Ottoman dynasty, he presented Sultan Mahmud II as an ideal
caliph-sultan. This effort helped to westernize the traditional
Ottoman political structure and society. 

Introduction 
In the Muslim world, rulers have traditionally needed the ulama’s coopera-
tion for at least two reasons: the religious leaders’ ability to confer legiti-
macy upon the political ruler and to serve as intermediaries between the
rulers and the ruled in order to calm restive elements and win acceptance for
unpopular measures. Throughout Islamic history, the ulama have been
divided when faced with such a choice. The official ulama (al-`ulama’ al-
rasmi) have always been on the side of authority, stability, and peace. Some
claim that such support has an economic aspect: since the rulers have paid

Seyfettin Er£ahin is a graduate of Ankara University, Faculty of Divinity (1984). He
obtained his M.A. in Middle Eastern studies (University of Mannchester, 1990) and Ph.D.
in social sciences (Ankara University, 1996), and currently serves as an assistant professor/
lecturer at Ankara University’s Faculty of Divinity. His main interests are relations between
the state and the ulama during the Ottoman Empire’s period of modernization. 



their salaries, they have tried to legitimize the official policy in the eyes of
the masses by citing the Qur’an: “... killing [in this sense stability or author-
ity] is preferable to anarchy” (Qur’an 2:217). On the other hand, the non-
official ulama (al-`ulama’ ghayr al-rasmi), who have been economically
independent of the government and have no official post, have often been
outspoken critics of the rulers, based on their interpretation of another verse:
“… commanding right and forbidding wrong both at the individual and the
governmental level” (Qur’an 3:110).

Since the state and religion always needed each other, these two spheres
formed an uneasy partnership (with the ruler holding up the upper hand) to
preside over Islamic society. In essence, this unwritten contract required the
ruler to grant the ulama certain privileges (e.g., semi-autonomous control
over judicial and educational institutions, a voice in or a veto over policies
affecting the religious establishment, and a share of the country’s wealth) in
return for their support. 

The ulama’s political and economic power declined whenever the rulers
created a centralized bureaucracy and secularized the justice and education
systema. Vulnerable or weak regimes invariably protected their flanks by
consolidating the religious leaders in a variety of ways, such as publicly
deferring to their elevated social status, conferring with them on a regular (if
largely ceremonial) basis, participating in Muslim feast days (Ramadan) and
activities, constructing and endowing mosques and religious schools, and
especially by avoiding governmental violations of religious conventions.
Even those administrations that decided upon a policy of westernization and
secularization tried to work out tactics to retain the ulama’s support – or at
least to neturalize their potential opposition.

The Reforms of Mahmud II
After its armies suffered heavy defeats at Europe’s hands, the Ottoman
Empire embarked upon an internal reform program inspired by European
models. Acknowledging the fact that they were behind Europe in military
terms, the Ottomans first sought to reform the army. Therefore, Mahmud II
(reigned 1808-39) carried on the military reforms initiated by his predeces-
sor. In 1826, with all ranks of the ulama behind him, he eliminated the
Janissary corps and organized the Asâkir-i Mansure-i Muhammadiya.1 After
this, he began to widen his reforms to encompass the empire’s financial,
administrative, educational, and even social and cultural spheres.

38 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 23:2



To provide the necessary financial resources for his reform program,
from 1813 onward he gradually put all official and non-official waqf (char-
itable foundation) revenue under the care of the Awkâf-i Humayun Nezareti.
This was accomplished in 1831.2 In addition, he managed to make the ulama
and some Sufi leaders employees of the government. Mainly for economic
purposes, the Muqata’at Hazinesi (a new military treasury) took over and
administered the most important and larger iltizams (the farming out of tax
collection). A similar treasury, the Tershane Hazinesi, was established to
support the navy. Some economic burdens were imposed on shops and mar-
kets, such as the holy war taxes (rusumat-i jihadiyye).3

Mahmud II devoted an increasing amount of attention to education and
opened training centers for the new army and the hassa (military) corps.
Despite strong opposition, he sent the first group of 150 students to
European countries (e.g., England, France, Prussia, and Austria) in 1827.4 To
a large extent, his educational reforms sought to create new educated elite
along western lines as an alternative to the madrasa-educated elite (viz., the
ulama).

As for social reforms, Mahmud II started by changing the soldiers’
appearance and, later on, that of the civilians. In 1826, western tunics and
trousers were formally accepted as the uniform of the Asâkir-i Mansure.5
After some hesitation among the ulema and other state dignitaries, in 1828
the sultan ordered the ulema to sanction a new head-gear (the fez),6 and they
complied. In addition, an 1829 edict imposed regulations concerning the
clothing worn by the different estates within the empire. According to this
edict, all state employees but the ulama, who were allowed to keep the tra-
ditional dress, now had to wear the fez, frockcoats (jubbe or harvani),
trousers, and black leather boots.7

Meanwhile, Ottoman palaces and the pashas’ houses (Pasha Konaklari)
started to be decorated and furnished with European-style furniture.8 Western
social manners and habits began to appear, especially in the social life of the
upper-class state dignitaries who had started enjoying western-style entertain-
ment and recreation as well. For example, inside the foreign embassies
Ottoman men began dancing with the wives of foreign ambassadors.9 In addi-
tion, the sultan introduced European protocol for receiving foreign diplo-
mats10 and even ordered the officials to trim their beards or shave them off
completely.11 European saddles became fashionable and symbols of rever-
ence in Instanbul.12 Before Mahmud II’s edict, Monday and Thursday used to
be holidays; now, only Thursday was recognized as a holiday by government
offices.13

Er£ahin: Westernization, Mahmud II, and the Islamic Virtue Tradition 39



Mahmud II improved communications for his centralization policy and
propaganda campaign. In 1831, the empire’s first Turkish newspaper,
Takvim-i Vekayi, was published to explain “the internal and external affairs
of the Exalted State and changes.”14 Finally, we should mention that in 1832
hanging the sultan’s portrait in government offices became compulsory.
Although the majority of the ulama considered this a violation of the
Shari`ah, a portrait of Mahmud II was sent to the Shaykh al-Islam’s office.15

Opposition to the Reforms
It is quite understandable that Mahmud II was in a difficult position. Various
segments of Ottoman society did not approve of his adoption of European
social and cultural practices, for these reforms threatened, to a certain extent,
their social, political, and economic interests and status. Moreover, they
engendered ideological arguments in society. Given an appropriate opportu-
nity, the resentful sections were ready to express their anger and concern
regarding the reforms.16

After the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-29, self-criticism began in the cap-
ital. On the one hand, the sultan and his reformist group thought that more
reforms were needed to strengthen the army. On the other hand, his oppo-
nents believed that the army’s failure was a result of imitating infidels.17 As
pointed out earlier, the economic consequences of confiscating the waqf rev-
enues pushed low-ranking ulama into the opposition. Lutfi reports that in
1829, many imams and wa’izs criticized the reforms during Ramadan; as a
result, quite a number of ulama were exiled.18 In 1829 and 1830, many of the
dissatisfied ulama supported and joined the rebels all over the empire.19 The
softas (madrasa students) also strongly opposed the reform program.20

The Sufi orders opposed the reforms because they viewed them as hav-
ing a negative impact upon their religious activities and economic interests.21
Having suppressed the Janissaries, Mahmud II obtained a fatwa that accused
the Bektashi order (the Janissaries’ spiritual ally) of being heretics and so
was able to abolish them.22 Accused of sympathizing with the Bektashis,
some ulama and members of the elite were also exiled.23 The Mujaddidiyah
and the Khalidiyah branches of the Naqshibandiyah order’s emissaries,
shaykhs, and a number of its adherents were also exiled on the charge of forc-
ing people to join their order.24

The Sufis publicly protested the reforms. For instance, in 1829 during a
Friday prayer attended by Shaykh al-Islam Abdulwahhab Efendi and other
state dignitaries, a strange dervish cursed the shaykh al-Islam, accusing him

40 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 23:2



of influencing the sultan to adopt false rites.25 Another dervish, Shaykh
Sachli, stopped Mahmud II on the road and shouted at him: “Infidel sultan!
God will demand an accounting for your blasphemy! You are destroying
Islam and drawing down upon us the curse of the Prophet!”26

Support of the High-ranking `Ulama
Carrying out a successful westernization reform program in a traditional
Islamic society required the ulama’s participation and support. Mahmud II
won them over, along with some other segments of society, by following
two systematic strategies. First, he personally and deliberately followed a
religious policy of building up and restoring a considerable number of
mosques, wakfs, and tekkes (Sufi lodges); frequently attended Friday prayer;
sometimes issued firmans calling upon the people to observe their religious
duties27; made an Islamic primary education mandatory for all children; and
gave poor ulama positions as imams in his new army and doubled their
salaries when they grew restive.28 Second, he seems to have decided to use
the ulama’s legitimate power and role as intermediaries with the general
public. Fortunately, their attitudes toward the reforms were largely deter-
mined by the realities of their time rather than the ideals of Islam. Over time
and in view of certain political, economic, and social developments, they
generally sanctioned all of the proposed reforms, quoting such legal maxims
as “necessity permits what is prohibited,” the “lesser evil,”29 and “public
interest requires one to act in this way.”30

The ulama also gave constructive responses to the sultan’s direct appeal
to his subjects by citing the traditional virtue literature (the Fadhail). This
genre of literature, which glorified and exalted the Ottoman dynasty’s struc-
ture and basic characteristics, had been around from the very beginning. By
focussing on the caliphhate in these books, an effort was made to implement
some traditional religious terms in order to legitimate the dynasty. The main
objects of this literature were to glorify and legitimate the Ottoman dynasty
in the eyes and judgment of it subjects; in other words, to use Islam as a
political tool.31

For propaganda processes, Mahmud II ordered Shaykh al-Islam Sayyid
Yasincizade Abdulwahhab Efendi to write a treatise in which the theory of
obedience to and the virtue of the Ottoman dynasty would be explained in
terms of the virtue literature.32 In response, Abdulwahhab introduced his the-
ory by collecting twenty-five hadith and writing some comments under the
title of Khulastu’l-Bayan fi ‘Itaati’s-Sultan.33 Its date of publication, 1247/

Er£ahin: Westernization, Mahmud II, and the Islamic Virtue Tradition 41



1831, is very important, for at this time the sultan’s authority was being
threatened by the opposition. Upon its completion, the treatise was distrib-
uted within Istanbul as well as the empire’s main cities.34 It apparently made
a considerable contribution to instituting the theory of obedience to the
caliph-sultan in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire, for its arguments
reappeared in the time of Abdulhamid II (reigned 1876-1909).35

There is no doubt that, to a large extent, the theory of obedience has
been exploited by autocratic regimes throughout Muslim history. In the
cases of Mahmud II and Abdulhamid II, the empire and the authority of its
sultans were threatened by internal and external events. Therefore, they
wanted to secure their position and pull the empire together. In Mahmud II’s
centralization policy and Abdulhamid II’s pan-Islamic policy, such a theory
was desperately needed to persuade the people to obey and stand by the
caliph-sultan, their legitimate ruler.

Making a Westernized Reformer Caliph-Sultan
The Necessity of a Ruler
Seeking to support this centralization policy, Shaykh al-Islam Abdulwahhab
first established the necessity for a ruler and then moved on to prove Mahmud
II’s fitness for this position. Finally, he concluded that it is a religious obliga-
tion to obey such a Muslim ruler in the matter of his reforms.

Abdulwahhab opened his argument with the medieval Islamic theory
that human beings are social or political beings (hayavan-i madani) who
must cooperate in order to meet each other’s requirements. Al-Ghazzali (d.
505/1111) made the same argument, stating:

... men [and women] had to live in a society and were exposed to quarrels
and conflict. Therefore, they need a principle of power (sultan) to guide
them and to arbitrate in their disputes. Such a principle required a norm
(qanun) to enable differences to be solved and decisions based on law to
be imposed.36 

Abdulwahhab accepted the same argument, stating that “human beings
are in need of solidarity and cooperation between each other, because every
one has different abilities in issues of livelihood and continuation of life in
many ways.”37 This statement reflects “the idea of different crafts,” which
was explained by al-Razi (d. 606/1209), such as agriculture for producing
food, weaving for making clothing, building for creating houses, and poli-
tics for arranging human affairs in an orderly manner38:

42 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 23:2



[The] existence of this solidarity depends solely on civilization (tamad-
dun)39 and human society. But the character of the human race is different;
particularly, ordinary people lean towards evil (sharr) and depravity
(fesad). This, therefore, causes depravity and disorder (fesad and khalal) in
the social order within a short time. This means the suspension of God’s
ordinances (ahkâm) concerning the `umrân of the world40 and existence of
mankind for a while. It is therefore necessary for some defined general
principles (usul kulliye) for this world and the hereafter to maintain the
continuity of the human race and civilization of the world. For this reason
God has sent the Messengers and revealed the Books to give order to the
world and to the human race, and for the welfare of mankind. He has put
down ordinances (ahkâm): instructions (awâmir) and restrictions (zawâjir)
concerning the human affairs and fixed punishments (hudud) for the
crimes of oppressors (zalims) and sinners (fasiqs) and clarified lawful
(halal) and unlawful (haram) in accordance with the rules of wisdom (al-
hikam) on behalf of all creatures and in conformity with the necessity of
time and aptitude (isti`dad, in Turkish text mesalih).41

It could be said at this stage that he was trying to establish a base for mak-
ing a reformer or renewer caliph-sultan by emphasizing the ahkam’s con-
formity to contemporary conditions and human welfare. As will be recalled,
Islamic jurists often state that the “ahkam will undeniably change over the
course of time.”42 This legal maxim appeared almost three decades later in the
collection of the empire’s civil codes: the Majalla.43 Abdulwahhab continued
his explanation: “Consequently, Allah has authorized a just caliph of the
Ottoman dynasty (Al-i Osman) to implement the fixed punishments, the
administrative issues (siyasa) and the obligation of jihad for the sake of Allah
to raise His word until the last day.”44

In medieval Islamic political thought, the necessity of a ruler was
accepted. However, there was a dispute as to whether reason or revealed law
dictated the necessity. The jurists claimed that the Shari`ah dictated the
necessity of a ruler, whereas the philosophers justified this idea via the use
of reasoning.  According to the former, the Shari`ah must be implemented
by one who is divinely authorized to enforce its ordinances. The Qur’an also
states: “Obey God and His Messenger and those in authority among you”
(4:59). Therefore, obedience is divinely imposed upon believers, and it is
clear that those in authority are the imams.45 Given this, the jurists insisted
that the Divine had made the imamate necessary, for the imamate had been
established to replace prophecy in defending the faith and administering the
world.

Er£ahin: Westernization, Mahmud II, and the Islamic Virtue Tradition 43



In the light of this explanation, Abdulwahhab accepted the jurists’ argu-
ment on the grounds that “God has delegated caliphs to implement the ordi-
nances, administrative affairs, and the obligation of jihad.”46 On the same
matter, he quoted a saying of the Prophet: “Religion and (temporal) power
(sultan) are twins. Therefore, religion is the foundation and the sultan is
guardian. Without the foundation the sultan is torn down, and without the
sultan the religion will be destroyed.”47

Making Mahmud II an Ideal Ottoman Caliph-Sultan
His Titles
Having established the basis for the necessity of a ruler, Abdulwahhab moved
to the next step: establishing the caliph-sultan as acceptable to the Shari`ah
and calling upon the masses to obey him. In his address to Mahmud II,
Abdulwahhab combined the traditional Turkic-Persian titles with Islamic
ones, along the same lines as the Ottoman dynastic theory, which was
developed and completed by the mid-sixteenth century.48 He adhered to a
rather formal and traditional style of presentation, listing the sultan’s titles,
as follows:

sultanu’l-ghuzât va’l-mujahidin (the sultan of fighters on behalf of Islam),
khalifetu’l-haliqa fi’d-devrân (the caliph for the creatures of all times),
emiru’l-mu’minin (the commander of the believers), imamu’l-muslimin
(the leader of Muslims), munawwiru eriketi’l-khilafa (the illuminator of
the caliphal throne), muzayyinu seriri’s-saltana (the embellisher of the
throne of power), afkhâmu’l-khawâqin (the most illustrious of khaqans),
zill Allahi fi’l-ard (the shadow of God on Earth), sahipkiran (the lord of a
fortunate conjunction), mujaddidu’l-erkâni’l-dawla (renewer of the state’s
pillars), sâhibu’l-shawkah (the lord of might), hâfizu’l-bilâd (the guardian
of the lands), nâsiru’l-ibâd (the helper / ally of the creatures), ̀ azamu salâ-
tini’l-ard (the greatest sultan in the world), ghawsu’l-Islam wa’l-muslimin
(the helper of Islam and Muslims), suratu’l-amn wa’l-aman (the aspect of
security and protection), and mahdi-i akhir zaman (the savior of the End
of Time).49

It is useful to focus on some of them. For example:
GHAZI (WARRIOR). As Abdulwahhab stated, the sultan is the sultan of

the guzah (sing: ghazi), the one who wages jihad or ghazah (battle) for the
sake of Islam. From the early years, the Ottoman sultans considered them-
selves leaders of a religious war (ghazah) against non-Muslims.50 The foun-
dation of the Ottoman Empire on the border with Byzantium gave this idea

44 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 23:2



a particular force and immediacy. As the Shari`ah makes jihad an obliga-
tion on the Islamic community, by waging war on Christian Byzantium, the
Ottoman sultans fulfilled God’s command as well as the duty of ghazah.
This idea gave legitimacy to their rule and a raison d’être to the empire
itself.51 It might be that by emphasizing the ghazah idea, Shaykh al-Islam
Abdulwahhab tried to give the empire’s Muslim subjects, who had suffered
from military defeats, confidence that Mahmud II was the sultan of the
ghuzah who would always succeed in his military campaigns against the
non-Muslims.

KHALIFAH (POLITICAL SUCCESSOR TO THE PROPHET). In the treatise,
Mahmud II was proclaimed to be the khalifetu’l-haliqa fi’d-devran (the
caliph for the creatures of all times), emiru’l-mu’minin (the commander of
the believers), imamu’l-muslimin (the leader of Muslims), and munawwiru
eriketi’l-khilafa (the illuminator of the caliphal throne). It is obvious in the
Khulasa that Mahmud II is the caliph of all Muslims and sat on the throne
of al-khilafat al-kubra,52 a phrase that was generally used by some strict
jurists only in connection with the first four political successors (caliphs) of
the Prophet. This emphasis on the sultan’s caliphate was the treatise’s main
theme. In this crucial time, Ibnu’l-Annabi also emphasized the rightness of
Mahmud II’s caliphate by more or less the same arguments.53

When the Ottomans reached the zenith of their glory in the sixteenth
century, each sultan, as head of a Muslim empire, required spiritual and
divine approval and developed the theory of the Ottoman caliphate.54 In
1541, Grand Wazir Lütfi Pasha, who was the key person in this process,
composed the Khalasu’l-Ümme fi Marifeti’l-Eimme, a treatise that firmly
defined and established the caliphate of the Ottoman sultans while denying
by means of various religious arguments the classical theory that the ruler
must be of Qurayshi origin.55

After the war with Russia (1768-74), the treaty of Kuchuk Kaynarja
named the Ottoman sultan as caliph, thereby asserting the caliph’s religious
authority over the Tatars in the Crimea. From this time onward, the sultans
frequently adopted this title to exert religious influence upon their Muslim
subjects and to use as a political weapon against rebels within the empire.
As the case of Khedive Muhammad Ali of Egypt indicates, Muslim rebels
seem to have had some religious and political arguments to justify their
actions against the caliph-sultan. His son Ibrahim Pasha, after invading
Syria in 1831, decided to march into Anatolia. But before doing so, he
received a fatwa from the mufti of Aleppo to depose the caliph. By spread-
ing such a fatwa inside Anatolia and Istanbul, he hoped that a popular revolt

Er£ahin: Westernization, Mahmud II, and the Islamic Virtue Tradition 45



would unseat the caliph.56 One of the reasons for emphasizing Mahmud II’s
rightful claim to the caliphate was to respond to this development.

ZILL ALLAH (SHADOW OF GOD). Abdulwahhab addressed Mahmud II as
zill Allah zillul-lahi fi’l-ard (the shadow of God on Earth), a phrase that also
appears in the Hadith literature.57 Muslim rulers had used this title since the
beginning of Islam, having borrowed it from the Sassanid political tradition
to claim that God supports the ruler and sanctions all of his actions. In the
Ottoman virtue literature, zill Allah is attributed the sultans.58 It is quite
understandable why Mahmud II was addressed by this title: As recounted
above, he had been accused of being an “infidel sultan” (Gavur sultan). This
title reminded his detractors that he was still within Islam and the Shadow
of God, and that whatever comes from him also comes from God. All of his
reforms were, therefore, in accordance with God’s will.

MAHDI (SAVIOR). Mahmud II was called the Mahdi, thereby reflecting
the popular eschatological belief that a Muslim savior will appear at the end
of time.59 However, he was not the first sultan to bear this title. For example,
Selim I was described as the Mahdi-i Akhir zaman (the savior of the end of
time).60 Most probably, this idea was introduced into the Ottoman virtue liter-
ature by Abdurrahman el-Bistami el-Hurufi (d. 1454), author of a pamphlet
entitled Miftahu’l-Cifri’l-Cami.61 The Ottoman Empire had been suffering
from a series of military defeats since the 1760s, and there was an expecta-
tion that the mahdi would save the empire. Given that this idea was already
quite common among the bureaucrats and military officers,62 the public was
ready to accept such a savior. By attempting to modernize the empire’s army
in order to restore the Muslims’ pride, Mahmud II was a good candidate for
being presented as an expected mahdi on the horizons of the empire.

MUJADDID (RENEWER OF THE RELIGION). The idea of a mujaddid grew
out of a prophetic hadith contained in Abu Dawud’s collection: “At the
beginning of each [Islamic] century, God Most High will send to the Muslim
community someone who will renew its faith and sovereignty” (Sünen-
Melahim 1). Several Ottoman sultans before Mahmud II had been given this
title. Lütfi Pasha, who used this hadith to glorify the Ottoman dynasty,
assumed that the most recent “renewers of the faith” were Osman Bey who,
at the beginning of the eighth Islamic century, had restored Islam after the
conquests of the pagan Mongols; Mehmed I (reigned 1413-21) who, at the
beginning of the ninth Islamic century, had revived the faith after the
destructions of Timur; and Selim I (reigned 1512-20) who, at the beginning
of the tenth Islamic century, had defeated the Safavid “infidel,” Shah
Isma`il, and upheld the Shari`ah.63

46 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 23:2



According to M. Es’ad, apart from those mentioned above, Sultan
Mahmud II is the mujaddid of the laws of Islam by virtue of renewing mat-
ters relating to religion, the imperial council (divan), the scribe (kalemiya),
and the army (sayfiya) at the beginning of the thirteenth Islamic century.64
There is no doubt that Mahmud II was the renewer of the laws of Islam
(mujaddid al-qawanin al-Islam) and of the pillar the state (al-arkan al-
dawlah).65 Here again, the title sought to respond to the public’s resentment
of the reforms; in other words, Mahmud II cleared the way for a new path
for the Ottoman Empire by renewing the old Ottoman system.

The titles of Mahmud II represented the heroic and honorific epithets
traditionally ascribed to the Ottoman dynasty, even though the empire’s
political and military situation made it impossible for him to fulfill their
promise. However, this tendency has been continuous in the Middle East,
even though it has declined very sharply for the last two centuries. Small
and local successes, even military coups, made various Middle Eastern
rulers “heroes” and “saviors” of the ummah and encouraged them to bear
such titles. It was particularly common during the wars of independence
directed against western colonialism for almost all Muslim rulers to be
called by Islamic-nationalist titles, such as qaid-i `azam (the exalted
leader), za`im al-ummah (the leader of the ummah), in spite of their humil-
iating circumstances.

Despite some traditional Turkic titles in the treatise, one cannot claim
that Abdulwahhab was appealing to the nationalist sentiments of the
empire’s Turkish population, for at the beginning of the nineteenth century
and despite the fact that nationalist movements had started among the
empire’s non-Muslim communities in the Balkans, nationalism still had not
gained any ground among its Muslim inhabitants. Since Islam was the only
way to keep the Muslim subjects together, it would have been foolish to play
on such sentiments in order to invite Muslims to obey their universal caliph-
sultan.

His Personal Qualifications
As far as the caliph’s qualifications are concerned, the well-known Sunni
political theory of al-Mawardi (d. 450/1058) stated that the caliph must be
just (`adil) in his dealings with his subjects; have sufficient religious knowl-
edge (`ilm) to exercise independent reasoning (ijtihad); be brave and coura-
geous (najdah wa shaja`ah) to protect the Islamic territories and wage jihad
on the non-believers; be able to hear, see, and talk perfectly and be free of

Er£ahin: Westernization, Mahmud II, and the Islamic Virtue Tradition 47



any physical disabilities; be broad-minded regarding the empire’s adminis-
tration; and, finally, be a member of the Quraysh tribe.66

In the Ottoman political tradition, the fundamental qualification for the
sultans was the individual’s worthiness to fill the position. The Ottomans
believed that simple succession proved that the sultan was worthy of the
crown; however, the sultan may grow old, feeble, or corrupt and thus lose
his worthiness to serve. Following this orthodox Sunni line, Abdulwahhab
presented Mahmud II as an almost-perfect ruler, namely, the caliph-sultan,
to his subjects67:

1. In all physical and spiritual aspects, Mahmud II is perfect. He is
unequalled and unique (adimu’l-misal), and his creation is in the excel-
lent form of the human race with all of its perfections (fitrat’u’l-`aliya wa
kamalatu’l-insaniyya).

2. Mahmud II has perfect intelligence. He bewilders all other minds
(muhayyiru’l-ukul), and the level of his intelligence in science and spir-
itual knowledge is unique (mertebe-i akli ilm u irfanda sabik-i fazail-i
ula). His miraculous orders and decrees are in accord with the canoni-
cal text (i.e., the Qur’an) and reason (emir wa irade-i kerametleri
muvafik-i menkul wa makul).

3. Mahmud II has religious and spiritual knowledge (`ilim wa `irfan). His
`ilm enables him to exercise independent reasoning (ijtihad). In contem-
porary literature, he is praised as a mujtahid.68 In the Sufi tradition, ̀ irfan
indicates semi-divine knowledge that is superior to `ilm. According to
this tradition, `irfan cannot be formally studied, but only taught by God
or a spiritual teacher (murshid). If someone attains `irfan, he or she
becomes an `arif (a Gnostic).69 Mahmud II was frequently presented as
a spiritual Sufi leader able to perform miracles (karamah).70 The aim of
this literature seems to have been to persuade the disciples of the vari-
ous Sufi orders to accept his reforms.

4. Mahmud II has the wisdom of Plato (hikmat Eflatun).71 The Platonic
political legacy expressed in Plato’s Republic and Laws, as well as in
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, was introduced into the Islamic envi-
ronment by such Muslim philosophers as al-Farabi (d. 958), Ibn Sina (d.
1037), and Ibn Rushd (d. 1198), who modified and then adopted it.72

As head of an empire based on Islam, Mahmud II initiated a reform
movement along western lines. Therefore, it is quite understandable why
“the wisdom of Plato” was added to his qualifications: It seems that he

48 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 23:2



wanted to be seen as a ruler who knew the wisdom of Plato, one of the
important formative elements of western civilization that, to some extent,
he wanted to adopt. Although Abdulwahhab added two more elements
(i.e., `irfan and hikmah al-Eflatun) to the jurists’ theory, he remained
within the bounds of Islamic political thought.

5. Mahmud II has a good intention: to enliven the religion and implement
the prophetic tradition (niyet-i hayriyeleri ihya-i din wa icra-yi sünnet).
His most important thoughts and concerns are for the security and order
of the poor and the empire’s subjects (ehem-i efkari wa endisheleri amn
u asayish-i fukara wa raiyya).

6. Mahmud II wishes to implement justice and equity, organize the army
for jihad, and improve the lands and comfort of creatures (muradlari
adl u dad wa tanzim-i cünd-i cihad ile imar-i bilad ve eriha-i ibad). His
just policies are designed to improve and ensure the ummah’s prosper-
ity (siyaset-i adliyesi müsltezim-i salah ve falah-i umma). The quality of
`adl became almost inseparable from Mahmud II, and he was given the
title “adlî.”73 Several institutions were entitled “`adlî” (referring to
Mahmud II), such as the Divan-i Ahkâm-i Adliyya (the Council of
Juridical Enactments) and the Mekteb-i Maarif-i Adliyya (the School of
Education). 
In the Islamic tradition, justice is regarded as one of the most important

qualifications and aims of a Muslim ruler. This was also true of the Ottoman
rulers. It is claimed that Mahmud II personally protected his people from
such governmental excesses as predatory taxation and the corruption of local
officials. For the Ottomans, the ruler could only guarantee this justice if he
had absolute power; otherwise, he would be dependent on others and so sub-
ject to corruption himself. Absolute authority, then, was required to establish
a just government and laws rather than elevating the ruler above the law, as
Europeans have interpreted the sultanate. To ensure adalet, the  Ottomans set
up a number of practices and institutions in the central government sur-
rounding the sultan. In the Ottoman Empire, it was accepted, at least theo-
retically, that the fundament of the state/power is justice (Mülkün temeli
adalettir).74

Apparently, the emphasis on justice here was intended to persuade the
public. As pointed out, Mahmud II confiscated wakfs, timars, and the lands
of the âyans (notables) and derebeys (tribal chiefs). Moreover, he changed
the class structure within Ottoman society. This policy might have engen-
dered the feeling that such people were treated unjustly and that Mahmud II

Er£ahin: Westernization, Mahmud II, and the Islamic Virtue Tradition 49



was, therefore, an unjust ruler. However, Abdulwahhab presented Mahmud
II as the most suitable ruler for his own time. 

His Duties 
Within the realm of administration, the theologians enumerated the caliph’s
main duties. For example, al-Balqillani (d. 404/1013) stated that the imam
was obligated to defend the ummah against its enemies, enforce the fixed
punishments (hudud) mentioned in the Shari`ah, restrain oppression and
redress grievances, divide the revenues (fay’ [booty] and zakat) among the
Muslims, and make the pilgrimage safe.75 Al-Mawardi developed this state-
ment by adding the following responsibilities: to undertake jihad, fix
stipends (`ataya), seek out trusted persons, appoint advisers, oversee affairs
both personally and carefully, and protect the ummah from disorder and
sinfulness.76

In the Ottoman political literature, almost all of these main duties were
applied to the caliph-sultan.77 Abdulwahhab follows the same line, giving a
long list of duties that the caliph must fulfill, which he generally referred to
as the sultan’s goals: To enforce the fixed punishments (iqamat al-hudud),
revive the religion and perform the sunnah (ihya’ al-din wa ijra’ al-sunnah),
provide comfort for the poor and the empire’s subjects (rahat al-fuqara’ wa
al-`ibad), serve the religion and the state (khidmat al-din wa al-dawlah),
provide security for the general public (amn al-ra’yah), reorganize the army
of jihad (tanzim jund al-jihad), provide goodness for the millah (religious
community) and salvation for the ummah, undertake the state’s administra-
tion (tadbir al-mulkiyah), and enforce punishments (iqamat al-siyasah).78

Here, three concepts need explanation: dawlah, tadbir, and siyasah.
Dawlah basically means to turn, to alternate. Over the centuries, this concept
acquired the additional meanings of dominion, state, and realm: a ruler’s
kingdom, such as Dawlat-i Osmaniyya, which referred to the house of
Osman.79 Throughout the nineteenth century, it seems that all of these mean-
ings were used. However, at the end of that century, the meaning of dawlah
was fixed as “state.” In this process, the Sened-i Ittifaq of 1808, signed
between Mahmud II and the âyans, has been regarded as one of the impor-
tant steps in separating the state from the ruler by such contemporary histo-
rians as N. Berkes.80 It was thought that the Sened did not mention the sul-
tan in terms of being a party, but only as a dawlah.81

It seems that in the treatise, the state’s dependence on the sultan was
indicated by the phrase “the axis of your personality means religion and

50 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 23:2



state” (kutb-u zat-i shawkatlari medar-i din u dawlah).82 And yet the sep-
aration of the state and the sultan was described in such a way as “the body
of state founds a new soul with the new military and administrative
kanuns” (jism al-dawlah wajada ruhan jadidan bi tajdid al-gawanin
al`askariyya ve bi ihya al-usul al-mulkiyya).83 The term tadbir means
organization, management, regulation, and administration in Islamic polit-
ical thought. In this sense, al-Baqillani stated that tadbir al-jaysh (the
organization of the army) is among the imam’s duties.84 Al-Mawardi also
declared that the caliph must know the tadbir,85 that is to say, the issue of
administration. 

As for the concept siyasah, the political literature uses it to refer to man-
aging human affairs. In Islamic law ta`zir (discretionary chastisement) has
been described as al-siyasat al-shar`iyah.86 In the Ottoman context, accord-
ing to U. Heyd, siyasa “… in its widest sense, it seems to denote ‘punish-
ment’ in general, which may include strokes and punishment. As a technical
term, however, it generally means either execution or severe corporal pun-
ishment or both.” He also states that “it refers to a punishment inflicted in
accordance with the shari`a as well as one decreed by the ‘kanun.’ Also,
penalties not in conformity with the shari’a and inflicted by secular author-
ities are often said to be carried out siyaseten, i.e. ‘as an administrative pun-
ishment.’”87 In this sense, Abdulwahhab used the phrase “by committing the
crime of disobedience, some people deserve the wrath of God and the pun-
ishment of the Padishah” (siyasat-i padishahiyya)88 for those groups that
oppose the reforms.

The Theory of Obedience to the Caliph-Sultan
It is clear that throughout Islamic history, only a few caliphs ever fulfilled
the conditions demanded by the political theorists. What would be the way
out for them under these circumstances? Al-Ghazzali’s response clarifies the
ulama’s attitude:

There are those who hold that the imamate is dead, lacking as it does the
required qualifications. But no substitute can be found for it. What then?
Are we to give up obeying the law? Shall we dismiss the kadis, declare
all authority to be valueless, cease marrying and pronounce the acts of
those in high places to be invalid at all points, leaving the populace to live
in sinfulness? Or shall we continue as we are, recognizing that the ima-
mate really exists and that all acts of the administration are valid, given
the circumstances of the case and the necessities of the actual moment?89

Er£ahin: Westernization, Mahmud II, and the Islamic Virtue Tradition 51



In general, the majority of the jurists preferred any kind of stable author-
ity to civil strife (fitnah) in order to preserve the ummah’s unity. They
demanded that all subjects obey the ruler, whether or not he fulfilled the
required conditions. To legitimize their arguments, they generally quoted the
following Qur’anic verses: ‘Rebellion (fitnah) is greater (more dangerous)
than murder (qatl)” (2:217) and “Allah forbids all shameful deeds, injustice.
and rebellion (baghiy)” (16:90).90

A considerable number of hadiths enshrining the duty of obedience to a
Muslim ruler were also put into circulation. Abdulwahhab, as mentioned
above, collected and interpreted twenty-five of these traditions that had been
used by earlier jurists for the same purpose. For example, some of them
appeared in Kitab al-Kharaj, which is attributed to Abu Yusuf (d. 179/798).
The most well-circulated among them is “Fear God and obey Him. Even if
a flat-nosed, shrunken-headed Abyssinian slave is invested with power over
you, hearken to him and obey him”91 Another very common one is: “One
who obeys God obeys me [the Prophet], and one who obeys the imam obeys
me; one who rebels against me rebels against God, and one who rebels
against the imam rebels against me.”92 Another typical example is “If the
imam is just, then reward is due to him and gratitude from you; if he is tyran-
nical, then the burden of sin is his and it is yours to be patient.”93

From the translations of some of these hadiths into Turkish, which
Abdulwahhab then interpreted in his treatise, it seems that there was some
appeal to the people’s Islamic sentiments rather than to their Turkish-Persian
sentiments. For instance, he translated sultan as padishah-i Islam or ima-
mu’l-muslimin, and zill Allah as the Shadow of God.94 It seems that this incli-
nation in both the translation and the interpretation was designed to respond
to the religious criticism and concern about the institution of the caliphate
and its decrees.

Having introduced these hadiths, Shaykh al-Islam Abdulwahhab went a
step further: He sought sanctions from the Qur’an to legitimize obedience to
the present caliph-sultan. He quoted the well-known verse: “Obey God, obey
the Messenger, and obey those in authority among you” (4:59), adding that
“according to the ulama of religion, ulu al-amr means the caliph of Islam.”95
For the same purpose, he provided some Sufi traditions saying that Ibn al-
Arabi (d. 638/1240) had stated that if the sultan is kamil (perfect in personal-
ity and character), he is the pole of the world (qutb); if he is ghayr al-salih
(imperfect), he is the saint (sing. badal, pl. abdal). Abdulwahhab declared
without any hesitation: “Thank God that our sultan is the greatest sultan (al-
Sultan al-`Azam); he is the pole of the time (qutb al-zaman).”96

52 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 23:2



He continued to glorify the Ottoman dynasty by quoting the sayings of
the Prophet and the Sufis. He included the following hadith, which appears
in the collections of al-Bukhari and Abu Dawud: “There will be a group of
people among my ummah who are in the right path.” He commented that,
according to the researchers, “a group of people” means “the House of
Osman.”97 Another hadith, which appears in Ibn Hanbal’s Musnad, is that
“Verily, Constantinople will be conquered. The commander of this conquest
is the best commander, and the army is the best army.” There is no doubt that
Constantinople was conquered by the House of Osman. These two hadiths
show, asserted Abdulwahhab, the empire’s virtue and continuity.98

He included some Sufi comments on the following verse: “And verily
we have written in the Scripture (the Psalms of David), after the Reminder.
My righteous servants will inherit the earth” (21:105). Here, Abdulgani al-
Nablusi commented “that it is a sign from the Qur’an about the sultans of the
Ottoman dynasty; the words `ibad al-salihin refer to the House of Osman.”99
Shaykh Salah al-Din Safadi and Imam Yahya ibn `Aqb, most probably
another two Sufis, commented that “the Ottoman sultans are the most right-
eous sultans and the most virtuous after the Companions of the Prophet.”100

After interpreting the verses, the hadiths, and the comments of Sufis con-
cerning the people’s obedience to the sultan and the sultan’s glory,
Abdulwahhab concluded that “all these hadiths demonstrate the obedience
imposed upon every believer to the imam of the Muslims, even if the sul-
tan is tyrannical (jabir) or sinful (ja’ir)”101 “It has been proved from
hadiths, the Qur’an, and the Sufi writings,” he continued, “that the Shari`ah
arranged divine ordinances for affairs of religion and of the world. To obey
its performer, therefore, is an obligation upon Muslims. According to rea-
son and the canonical texts, it is also obligatory to keep on praying for the
life of the sultan and his dawlah”102 Moreover, having reminded his people
that the sultan’s ancestors conquered the lands and countries and enlight-
ened them with the light of monotheism and the faith of Islam, Abdulwah-
hab stated that “this also gives the sultan a right to demand obedience from
his subjects.”103

Clearly, Mahmud II was presented as a traditional Muslim caliph-sultan
in terms of his titles, duties, and qualifications. The reasons for this could be
that the ulama still saw him as a traditional Muslim leader, that Mahmud II
wanted to be presented in this way, or that public opinion was not ready to
see or accept any leader except the caliph-sultan. It seems that the last state-
ment had some grounds in Istanbul for, as mentioned above, some groups had
shown their disapproval of any change in the social, military, and political

Er£ahin: Westernization, Mahmud II, and the Islamic Virtue Tradition 53



spheres as well as in the sultan’s appearance. Furthermore, logically, only a
Muslim caliph-sultan could demand obedience from his Muslim subjects. 

Abdulwahhab also directed some accusations against the opposition
groups by calling them the common people (awam-i nas), because of their
supposed ignorance, forgetfulness, and probably weak faith. First, they did
not know about the affairs of the world (umur-i dünya) and the rights of the
caliph (hukuk-i halife), namely, his legislative power and the demand of obe-
dience from his subjects. Second, they were not unaware of the country’s
public interest (mesalih-i dawla). Therefore, they were causing civil strife,
disorder, and rebellion (fitnah, fasad, and baghah).104

Conclusion
The Ottomans inherited a rich mixture of political traditions from vastly dis-
parate ethnic groups: Turks, Persians, Mongols, and Mesopotamians, and, of
course, from Islam. The Ottoman Empire, like those earlier ones founded by
the Turks, the Mongols, and the various Mesopotamian peoples, rested on
the principle of the monarch having absolute authority.

It could be said that Islam and the state supported each other in the
Ottoman Empire. Shaykh al-Islam Abdulwahhab made a reformer caliph-
sultan along western lines with an addition of Islamic and other traditional
values, since Mahmud II was in great need of such support. Beyond any
doubt, the reformers of that time faced the problem of how to transform a
traditional medieval Muslim society and empire into a modern one. In this
respect, the ulama were the vital element in executing such a policy. The best
strategy for the sultan and his reform-minded officials to follow was, first of
all, to somehow persuade the ulama and thus acquire their approval for any
reform. The ulama would then convince the empire’s Muslim subjects that
the proposed reforms did not violate Islamic norms.

Let’s ask the following question: Was there any alternative ideology or
system to the ulamas’ interpretation of the sacred texts, say, in the sixteenth-
century Ottoman Empire? It seems very unlikely. It was also highly unlikely
that any elite group in Istanbul would be willing to follow Europe. Even
though the reform process had started earlier, at the end of the eighteenth
century the picture clearly changed. Based on actual experience, the Otto-
mans were well aware that Europe was superior to their empire in every
aspect. Furthermore, there was an elite group within the empire with whom
the sultan wanted to secure the empire by strengthening it both militarily and
in other areas by adopting European practices. They believed that the only

54 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 23:2



way to prevent the empire from declining further was to follow the Euro-
pean example.

Under these circumstances, Shaykh al-Islam Abdulwahhab, as head of
the ulama, was in a difficult position. It seems that he had to make a historic
decision concerning the empire’s survival: whether to survive in the modern
era by participating in the process of westernization or turn back to the past
and defend its legacy. He chose the first option and tried to catch up and
thereby control the political, social, and intellectual developments that had
become inevitable. Along with the top official ulama, he did this as far as
possible within the scope of Islam by participating in policymaking and jus-
tifying decisions via Islamic maxims.

If we consider that the reform policy’s goal was to adopt western eco-
nomic, military, and administrative practices into an Islamic society, it
becomes easy to understand the ulama’s attitude toward the reform move-
ment. One could say that in this process of adoption, the ulama’s main con-
cern was, as the representatives of Islamic civilization, to soften the impact
of this new civilization and present it as complying with the needs of mod-
ern times. From the Tanzimat period (1839-76) onward, this became their
task. In this respect, the Ottoman ulama of the nineteenth century were on
the defensive.

Furthermore, they might have realized that the internal weakening of
their corps made it impossible for them to resist such a policy. Additionally,
it could be speculated that the high-ranking ulama who were short-sighted
did not realize that this process of western-inspired reform eventually would
destroy the Islamic nature of the Ottoman Empire and society. It could also
be speculated that Islam is still strong enough and can play a constructive
role in modern Turkey’s efforts to join the European Union, for it can once
again serve as a means of legitimating the desired reform programs in the
eyes of the Turkish public. 

Endnotes

1. For a well-documented study of the ulama’s attitude toward Mahmud II’s mil-
itary reforms, see U. Heyd, “The Ottoman Ulama and Westernization in the
Time of Selim III and Mahmud II,” Studies in Islamic History and
Civilization, Scripta Hierosolymitana, no. 9 (Hebrew University, Jerusalem)
(1964): 63-96; A. Levy, “The Ottoman Ulama and the Military Reform of
Sultan Mahmud II,” in Asian and African Studies, vol. 7: The Ulama in
Modern History, ed. Gabriel Bear (Jerusalem: Israel Oriental Society, 1971),
13-39.

Er£ahin: Westernization, Mahmud II, and the Islamic Virtue Tradition 55



2. J. R. Barnes, An Introduction to Religious Foundations in the Ottoman Empire
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1987), 72-73, 76; Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of
Modern Turkey (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), 92.

3. S. J. Shaw and E. K. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Tur-
key, vol. 2: Reform Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey,
1808-1975 (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 28.

4. The Naval Engineering School (Muhendishane-i Bahr-i Humayun) and the
Army Engineering School (Muhendishane-i Berr-i Humayun), opened by
Selim III, were enlarged to include military technical education in 1827. In the
same year, an Army Medical School (T¦bhane-i Amire) was opened. O. M.
Ergin, Turkiye Maarif Tarihi (Istanbul: Eren Pub., 1940), 2:127-28, 256-80;
Lewis, Modern Turkey, 83; E. Z. Karal, Osmanl¦ Tarihi (Ankara: Türk Tarih
Kurumu Pub., 1961), 5:162.

5. For the firman concerning the regulations of the new uniforms for the Mansure
on different classes, see Lutfi, Tarih (Istanbul: 1290 AH), 191-93. The new uni-
forms were introduced to lighten the soldiers’ clothes during war and peace
(Asâkir-i Mansure elbisesinin takhfifi ... sefer ve hadarde). Ibid, 255; Lewis,
Modern Turkey, 99.

6. Lutfi, Tarih, 255, Lewis, Modern Turkey, 100.
7. For the text of the decree, see Lutfi, Tarikh, 2:269, Lewis, Modern Turkey, 101.
8. Lewis, Modern Turkey, 101.
9. A. Cunningham, “Startford Canning and the Tanzimat,” in Beginning of Mod-

ernization in the Middle East in the 19th Century, eds. W. R. Polk and R. L.
Chambers (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), 253.

10. Lewis, Modern Turkey, 106.
11. I. Engelhart, Türkiye ve Tanzimat: Devlet-i Osmaniyenin Tarih-i Islahat¦, trans.

from French by A. Resadi (Istanbul: 1328 AH) 19; N. Berkes, The Development
of Secularism in Turkey (Montréal: McGill University Press, 1964), 122.

12. Engelhart indicates that even the grand vizier, who avoided using the European
saddle, fell out of favor with Mahmud II. Engelhart, Türkiye ve Tanzimat, 19.

13. Lutfi, Tarih, 3:100; However, in 2:55, Lutfi reports that “once there was no
holiday in the Porte (Bab-i Ali), the government offices had to be open every
day. But the civil servants of the Imperial Treasury had their holiday, Thursday.
Therefore Thursday was decided as a holiday for all government depart-
ments.” See also Lewis (Modern Turkey, 101), who states that it was adopted
from France. 

14. Masalih-i dakhiliya ve kharijiya-i Devlet-i `Aliyye ve tebdilat. Lutfi (Tarikh,
3:109) cited the first editorial of the Takvim-i Vekayi.

15. Lutfi (Tarih, 5:50-51) provides an account of hanging the first portrait of the
sultan in the Selimiye K¦shlas¦. With a big state ceremony, the portrait was
hung on the wall after the ulema and shaykhs had prayed.

16. For example, as the historian and statesman M. Nuri Pasha states: “Because of
the lack of a regular army, the Russians won the war (referring to 1829) and

56 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 23:2



came to Edirne. In Istanbul, the remaining Janissaries and their disgraced
accomplices ascribed this defeat to the destruction of the Janissaries and the
failure of the new army. Therefore, they made anti-propaganda and even
dared, to some extent, to demonstrate against the authorities in the streets of
Istanbul.” M. Nuri Pahsa, Netayic’ul Vukuat, pub. N. Çagatay (Ankara: Türk
Tarih Kurumu Pub., 1987), 3-4:297.

17. Heyd, Ottoman Ulama and Westernization, 70-71.
18. Lutfi, Tarikh, 2:144.
19. For instance, in his Ramadan sermons in the Eyub mosque, the Bosnian mudar-

ris publicly accused the sultan and his reformists of being unbelievers (kuffar)
and was exiled. The mufti of Tosya and some ulama supported the local rebels.
See Lutfi, Tarih, 2:169, 3;146; Heyd, Ottoman Ulama and Westernization, 71.

20. Quoted from Heyd, Ottoman Ulama and Westernization, 73.
21. When the Evkaf Nezareti was established, it controlled tightly the revenue of

the Sufi orders’ waqfs. In times of need, the Nezaret used its control to sup-
press the orders. Furthermore, it started to give salaries to the orders’ heads,
thereby making them state employees and civil servants. This practice reduced
the shaykhs’ dignity and influence among the masses. I Gunduz, Osmanl¦larda
Devlet-Tekke Münasebetleri (Ankara: Seha Publication, 1983), 15. The author
provides some information about the Sufi shaykhs’ complaints of the sultan’s
policy toward them.

22. For the ulama’s arguments against this order, see M. Es’ad, Uss-i Zafer
(Istanbul: 1243/1827), 207-21; S. Farughi, “The Tekke of Haci Bektas: Social
Position and Economic Activities,” International Journal of Middle Eastern
Studies, no. 7 (1976): 201-02.

23. S. Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press,1962), 230.

24. For this order’s activities, see B. Abu Manneh, “The Naqshibandiyya-
Mujaddidiyya in the Ottoman Lands in the Early 19th century,” Die Welt des
Islam, no. 22 (1982): 21-25.

25. Pekmezci delisi nam mejzub Cuma günü Süleymaniye camiinde Shaykhul-
islam Efendi’ye ‘Seni sakal¦ndan sürümeli, padishah¦ayine-i bat¦la al¦sht¦rd¦n’
diye bag¦rd¦. Lutfi, Tarikh, 2:94; Heyd, Ottoman Ulama and Westernization,
73.

26. Quoted from R. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire (Princeton: 1963), 31.
The same dervish in Lutfi’s Tarih appears as a wa’iz in Istanbul. He was exiled
because of his criticism of the new regulations (nizamat-i jadiyda), 2:144.

27. For instance, a firman calls people “Shariat-i Islamiyyenin esasi ve din-i
mubin-i Ahmediyyenin `imad, bina, me`ash ve me`adi olan bes vakit namazin
cevami`i sharifte cemaatle eda ve daire eshab-i iman tarikiyle kanak-larda
cemaatle namaza mudavemet eylemeleri.” See Lutfi, Tarih, 2:66. For Mahmud
II’s internal religious policy, see Heyd, Ottoman Ulama and Westernization, 90-
94; Abu Manneh, “Naqshibandiyya-Mujaddidiyya,” 29-33

Er£ahin: Westernization, Mahmud II, and the Islamic Virtue Tradition 57



28. This practice not only provided jobs for imams and wa`izs, but also pleased the
softas, who numbered several thousand in Istanbul. Most of them were poor
and had to wait a long time to get a job. M. C. Zilfi, “The Ilmiye Registers and
the Ottoman Medrese System prior to the Tanzimat,” in Contributions a
l’Histoire Economique et Sociale de l’Empire Ottoman (Collection Turcica III)
(Paris: 1983), 323. Zilfi estimates the number of the softas at more than 5,000-
6,000; Heyd’s estimation is about 5,000. Reed gives their number as over
50,000. H. A. Reed, “Ottoman Reform and the Janissaries: The Eskinci
Layihasi of 1826,” in Social and Economic History of Turkey, 1071-1920, eds.
O. Okyar and H. Inalcik (Ankara: 1980), 197.

29. Al-darurat tubih al-mahzurat and ahwan-i sharrayn, respectively. These legal
maxims are from A. Cawdat’s Tarih, as quoted by Heyd, Ottoman Ulama and
Westernization, 89.

30. àcab-¦ maslahat böyle iktiza eder. I. Sungu “Mahmud II ‘nin Izzet Molla ve
Asakir-i Mansure Hakkinda bir Hatt¦,” Tarih Vesikalar¦, no. 1 (1941): 168.

31. Some important virtue literature books on the Ottoman dynasty are as follows:
A£¦kpa£azade, Tevarih-i Al-i Osman (n.p.: n.d.); Ne£ri, Cihannuma (n.p.: n.d.);
Lütfi Pa£a, Khalasu’l-Ümme fi Marifeti’l-Eimme (Sülaymaniya Library, Yeni
Cami, 1182 AH); Andulgani Nablusi (d. 1143/1731), Talaatu’l-Behiyya fi
Muluki’d-Dawlati’l-Osmaniyya (n.p.: n.d.) (one of the most referred-to
works); and Abdurrahman al-Bistami, Miftahu’l-Cifri’l-Cami (Tr. into Turkish
by Shaykh Burhaneddin, manuscript, Sulaymaniya Library, Hafid Efendi 179,
n.d.). Abdulwahhab also refers to the following ones: Muhyiddin Ibnu’l Arabi,
(d. 638/1240), Al-Shajaratu’l-Nu’âmaniyya, (n.p.: n.d.); Shaykh Salahuddin es-
Safedi, Sharhu Shajaratu’n-Numaniyya, (n.p.: n.d.); àmam Yahya b. ‘Aqab,
Sharhu’l-Daira, (n.p.: n.d.); and Shayhk Mustafa as-Sad¦q¦, Al-Muazzinu bi’t
Tarab fi’l- farq¦ bayna’l-Ajam wa’l-Arab, (n.p.: n.d.). Mer’i ibn Yusuf (d.
1033/ 1624) Qaladidu’l-’Ikyan fi Fadhaili Al-i Osman, trans into Turkish by
Shaban b. Shifai (n.p.: n.d.). Mer’i ibn Yusuf was a prominent Hanbali jurist
of seventeenth-century Egypt who tried to legitimate the Ottoman dynasty in
the eyes of the empire’s Arab subjects. See Eyüp Öztürk, “Osmanli Tarih-
çiliginde Fezâil Edebiyati: Mer’i ibn Yusuf’un Kalâidü’l-Ikyan fî Fezâili Al-i
Osman Örnegi,” MA thesis (Ankara: 2004)

32. In this process, Mahmud II’s close ally Mehmed Es`ad Efendi wrote Uss-i
Zafer (Istanbul, 1248/1828) for general reading in lisan-i asr (simple Turkish).
Also àbnu’l-Annabi (Muhammad ibn Hüseyn el-Hanefi of Algaria) wrote a
treatise to legitimize Mahmud II’s military reforms: Es-Sa’yu’l-Mahmud fi
Nizami’l-Cunud (Süleymaniya Libray Esad Efendi: 1885). It was translated by
M. Es’ad Efendi under the title Al-Kawakibu’l-Mas’ud fi Kawkabati’l-Cunud,
(Süleymaniye Library, Es’ad Efendi, 2363).

33. Shaykh al-Islam Sayyid Yasincizade Abdulwahhab Efendi, Khulastu’l-Bayan
fi ‘Itaati’s-Sultan (Istanbul: 1247/1831). This treatise was written in Arabic
(parts 1-15) and Turkish (parts 16-31). Both parts are almost the same. 

58 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 23:2



34. In this respect, the treatise was expounded upon by a prominent scholar, the
mufti of Baghdad Alusi (Ebu’s-Sena Mahmud Shihabuddin ibn Abdullah) (d.
1270/1853) to address Arab public opinion, under the title Al-Bayanu al-
Sharhi’l-Burhan fi ‘Itaati’s-Sultan. He wrote this book at the request of Ali
R¦za Pasha and presented it to him. Munir Hasan, “Alusi’nin Shia’ya Kar£¦
Reddiyesi,” MA thesis (Ankara: 2002), 40.

35. Some of them are are follows: (1) Ahmed Midhad Efendi, Tavzih-i Kelam ve
Tasrih-i Meram (Istanbul: 1296/1880); (2) Es-Seyyid Muhammad Ebu’l-Huda
Efendi of Hama-Syria, Da’i’r-Reshad li Sebili’l-Ittihad ve’l-’Ink¦yad, tr. into
Turkish by Kudsi Efendizade Abdulkadir of Aleppo (Istanbul: after 1880).
The same author also wrote another pamphlet, En-Nafahatu’n-Nabawiyya fi
H¦d-mati’l-Kh¦lafeti’l-Hamidiyyati’l-Osmaniyya (manuscript, n.p.: n.d.); (3)
Mehmed Fevzi Efendi, the Mufti of Edirne, En-Nasayihu’l-Fawziyya fi’l-
Ed’iya ve’l-Madayihu’l-Seniyya (Istanbul: after 1885). Mahmud b. Hamza
Efendi of Damascus, Al-Burhan ‘ala Bakai Mulki Beni Osman ila ‘Akhiri’z-
Zaman (Istanbul 1304/1886), tr. into Turkish and popularized by Bereketzade
Ismail Hakk¦ Efendi, Baka-y¦ Saltanat-¦ Osmaniyya (Istanbul: 1332/1913);
(4) Ahmad Hafzi Efendi (ex-mufti of Yemen), Hilafet ve Cihada Dair Kirk
Hadis (Istanbul: 1307/1890); (5) Yusuf ibn Ismail en-Nabhani, (head of the
Beirut Law Court), El-Ahadisu’l-Arbain fi Vucubi Ta’ati Emiri’l-Mü’minin
(Beirut: 1312/1893); (6) Nazif Sururi, Khilafat-i Mu’azzama-i Islamiyya
(Istanbul: 1315/1899). He compiled almost the same hadiths used by
Abdulwahhab and reinterpreted them to suit the political conditions of the
time. He says that “the meanings of these hadiths were written by one of the
very great ̀ ulama, the late Abdulwahhab Efendi, and published by him for the
interest of Islam”; (7) Zaki, ‘Alam-i Islamiyyat (Istanbul: 1316/1900); (8) Es-
Sayyid Muhammad Arif (a famous `alim of Damascus), El-Hakku’l-Mubin fi
Ahadisi ‘Arbain fi Man Kharaja ‘an Taati Amiri’l-Mu’minin wa Shakka
‘Asa’l-Muslimin (Damascus: 1318/1900). For more information, see Ismail
Kara, ed. Hilafet Risaleleri (Treatises on the Caliphate), vols. 1-3 (Istanbul:
2002-03). 

36. Quoted from A. K. S. Lambton, State and Government in Medieval Islam
(Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press: 1985), 108. Also see al-Ghazzali, Al-
Iqtisad fi al-I`tiqad (Egypt: n.d.), 197-99. For Fakhr al-Din al-Razi’s argument,
see ibid, pp. 132-33; for Ibn Khaldun’s, see ibid, 156; for al-Farabi’s, see E. I.
J. Rosenthal, Political Thought, 126.

37. Abdulwahhab, Khulasa, 3.
38. Lambton, State and Government, 132.
39. This word appears in Tursun Bey’s Tarih-i Ebu’l Feth “temeddun örfümüzce

ana shehir, köy oba denir,” ed. M. Tulum (Istanbul: Fetih Pub., 1977), 12 
40. In Ibn Khaldun’s theory, `umran means human civilization and social organi-

zation. Lambton, State and Government, 156.
41. Abdulwahhab, Khulasa, 17.

Er£ahin: Westernization, Mahmud II, and the Islamic Virtue Tradition 59



42. On this discussion, see Ibn Abidin, Resail (Beirut: n.d.), 2:125; S. Mahmasani,
Falsafa al-Tashri’ fi al-Islam (Beirut: 1371/1956), 50.

43. Ezman¦n tegayyuru ile ahkamin tegayyuru inkar olunamaz.
44. Abdulwahhab, Khulasa, 4.
45. The Mu’tazilah also follow the line of the Muslim philosophers. For this argu-

ment, see R. Levy, The Social Structure of Islam (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 1957), 284; Rosenthal, Political Thought, 28, 39.

46. Abdulwahhab, Khulasa, 4.
47. Ibid., 9; cf. al-Ghazzali’s exposition Al-Iqtisad, 197-99. For Mustafa Ali’s

argument, see C. H. Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman
Empire: The Historian Mustafa Ali (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press:
1986), 302. 

48. For a critical exposition of this theory, see C. Imber, “The Ottoman Dynastic
Myth,” Turcica, no. 19 (1987): 7-27.

49. Abdulwahhab, Khulasa, 5, 21.
50. Mer’i ibn Yusuf also praises the Ottoman sultans for their efforts in ghazah and

jihad. See his Kalâid, folio 20b.
51. It is interesting that Mustafa Kamal Ataturk, founder of the secular Turkish

Republic, also used the title ghazi. For the development of the idea of ghazah
in the empire and Paul Wittek’s criticism on the classical theory of this idea, see
C. Imber “Paul Wittek’s ‘De la Defaite d’Ankara a’la Prise de Constantinople,”
Osmanl¦Arast¦rmalar¦(Journal of Ottoman Studies), no. 5 (1968): 65-86. 

52. Abdulwahhab, Khulasa, 2-3.
53. See Ibnu’l-Annabi, Es-Sa’yu’l-Mahmud fi Nizami’l-Cunud.
54. The Ottoman sultans used the title khalifah even before Selim I. Inalc¦k, “Padi-

shah,” Islam Ansiklopedisi (Milli E=itim Bakanl¦=¦ Pub.), 9:491-95.
55. Grand Wazir Lütfi Pasha, Khalasu’l-Ümme fi Marifeti’l-Eimme (Sülaymaniya

Library, Yeni Cami, 1182 AH). This treatise was translated by H. A. R. Gibb as
“Lutfi Pahsa on the Ottoman Caliphate,” ORIENS, no. 15 (1962): 287-95.

56. A. L. Marsot, Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali (Cambridge, NY: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1984), 224-26.

57. Al-Muttaqi, Kanz al-`Ummal (Aleppo: 1391/1971), 6:3-90; Khulasa, 9-10.
58. See Badri Dishad, Muradname, ed. Adem Ceyhan (Istanbul: Kültür Bakanl¦=¦

Pub., 1997), 1:209-10; Enveri, Dusturname: Osmanl¦Tarihi K¦sm¦, ed. Necdet
Öztürk (Istanbul: Akademi Pub., 2003), 46; Tursun Bey, Tarih-i Ebu’l Feth,
197; Oruc Bey, Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, ed. N. Ats¦z (Istanbul: 1972), 17.

59. D. B. Macdonald, “al-Mahdi,” Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam (Leiden: E. J.
Brill, 1961).

60. Lutfi Pasha, Tevarih-i Al-i Osman (Istanbul: 1343), 13.
61. Abdurrahman el-Bistami el-Hurufi, Miftahu’l-Cifri’l-Cami (Süleymaniya

Library, Hafid Efendi, folio 179, leaf number164a.)
62. Sungu, Mahmud II, 170; Heyd, Ottoman Ulama and Westernization, 76.
63. Lütfi Pasha, Tawarikh, 11.

60 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 23:2



64. Es’ad provides a long discussion proving that Mahmud II was the Mahdi of
his time. See his Uss-i Zafer, 174-77.

65. Abdulwahhab, Khulasa, 5.
66. Al-Mawardi, Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyah (Egypt: 1973), 6.
67. Mer’i ibn Yusuf praises the Ottoman sultans almost with the same qualifica-

tions. See Kalâid, folio 62a.
68. Es’ad, Uss-i Zafer, 177.
69. M Z Pakalin, Osmanl¦ Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlügü (Istanbul: Milli

E=itim Bakanl¦=¦ Pub., 1953), 2:80; A Golp¦narl¦, Tasavvuftan Dilimize Gecen
Deyimler ve Atasözleri (Istanbul: 1977), 25.

70. Khulasa, 5.
71. Ibid., 6.
72. For this legacy, see Rosenthal, Political Thought, 113-21.
73. For a discussion on Mahmud II’s title adli, see N Berkes, Development of

Secularism, 94-95. In Ottoman history, Bayazid II and Mehmed III were also
known as adlî. A. D. Alderson, The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1956), 112.

74. In the Ottoman political tradition, the circle of justice (daire-i adalet) is the
main pillar of sovereignty and power. See K¦nal¦zade Ali Efendi, Dawlat wa
Aile Ahlak¦, ed. Ahmet Kahraman (Tercüman Pub., n.d.), 283. This maxim
appears in the Kutadgu Bilig of Yusuf Has Hajib (in the time of the Karahanid
Turkish dynasty), Rashid R. Arat, ed. (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Pub., 1998),
verses 2056-59. The Ottoman chronicles use the phrases reayaya adalat
da=¦tt¦(he distributed justice to the subject) or raayaya adl ü dad itti (he ruled
the subjet with justice) about the Ottoman rulers. A£¦kpa£azade, Tevarih-i Al-i
Osman, 135; Ne£ri, Cihannuma, 1:119, 313, 314. The sultans still emphasized
justice toward the end of the empire. For example, under Mahmud II’s succes-
sor Abdulmajid (1839-61), there was a maxim on an Ottoman medal in French
Justice Egale Pour Tours (Equal justice for all). Selim Deringil, àktidar¦n
Semboleri wa àdeoloji, tr. G. Ça=al¦(Istanbul: 2002), 37.

75. Al-Baqillani, Al-Tamhid (Cairo: 1947) 185-86.
76. Al-Mawardi, Ahkam, 15-16.
77. For example, Defterdar Sar¦ Mehmed Pasha (d.1129/1717) writes in his

Nasa`ih al-Wuzera: “He (the imam) should make affluent the condition of the
governed (terfih-i ahwal al-ra’aya); carry out the injunctions of the illustrious
holy law (ijra-i ahkam-i sharif gharra); protect the boundaries of the Muslims’
territory (sadd thughur-i inha wa ijra); and delegate some of his functions to
a wise vizier such as to protect the poor and to take care of the state affairs.”
W. L. Wright, tr. and ed. Ottoman Statecraft: The Book of Counsels for Viziers
and Governors, Nasa’ih ul-Vuzera wa al-Umara of Sari Mehmed Pasha the
Defterdar (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1971), 64.

78. Abdulwahhab, Khulasa, 6. Most of these virtues and aims were attributed to
the Ottoman sultans by Mer’i ibn Yusuf, Kalaid, folio 10b. 

Er£ahin: Westernization, Mahmud II, and the Islamic Virtue Tradition 61



79. Rosenthal, “Dawla,” Encyclopaedia of Islam2. For changes in the meaning of
dawlah in the nineteenth-century Middle East, see A. Ayolon, Language and
Change in the Arab Middle East (New York: Oxford University Press: 1987),
82.

80. For his argument, see Berkes, Development of Secularism, 90-94.
81. Halil Inalcik, “The Nature of Traditional Society,” in Political Modernization

in Japan and Turkey, eds, R. E. Ward and D. A. Rustow (Princeton, NJ: Prince-
ton University Press, 1964), 52.

82. Abdulwahhab, Khulasa, 20.
83. Ibid., 6-7.
84. Al-Baqillani, Tamhid, 181-83.
85. Al-Mawardi, Ahkam, 6.
86. A. I. Doi, Shari’ah: The Islamic Law (Indianapolis: American Trust Publica-

tions, 1982), 96-112. For the Ottoman usage of ta`zir, see Joseph Schacht, An
Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986 [reprint]),
96.

87. V. L. Menage, ed. Studies in Old Ottoman Criminal Law (Oxford: 1973), 259-
60. See A. Mumcu, Siyaseten Katl (Ankara: 1963) for the usage of the term;
also see M. Z. Pakal¦n, Osmanli Tarih Deyimleri, 2:240. 

88. Abdulwahhab, Khulasa, 22.
89. The quotations are from Al-Iqtisad, 107, as translated by R. Levy, Social

Structure, 291.
90. On this discussion of the jurists, see H. Siegman, “The State and Individual in

Sunni Islam,” Muslim World, no. 54 (1964): 14-26.
91. Abu Yusuf, Kitab al-Kharaj (Cairo: 1352/1933), 9; al-Bukhari, Al-Sahih, tr. M.

Muhsin Khan (Beirut: n.d.), 9:192; Abdulwahhab, Khulasa, 10.
92. Abu Yusuf, Kitab al-Kharaj, 9; Abdulwahhab, Khulasa, 10-11.
93. Abu Yusuf, Kitab al-Kharaj, 10; Abdulwahhab, Khulasa, 9.
94. Abdulwahhab, Khulasa, 22-23.
95. Ibid., 12.
96. Ibid., 12.
97. Ibid., 13.
98. Ibid., 13.
99. Abdulgani Nablusi, Manzume min Mesâmi-i Âl-i Osman (Istanbul: Lala Ismail

libr, n.d.) 607, folio 5.
100. Abdulwahhab, Khulasa, 13.
101. Ibid., 13.
102. Ibid., 13.
103. Ibid., 7-8.
104. Ibid., 7, 14, 19, 30.

62 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 23:2