Justifying Islamophobia: A Post-9/11
Consideration of the European Union

and British Contexts
Christopher Allen

Abstract

Immediately prior to the events of 9/11, the United Nations
(UN) officially recognized the proliferating climate of anti-
Muslim and anti-Islamic prejudice, discrimination, and hatred –
Islamophobia – as being as equally repellent and unwanted as
anti-Semitism and other global discriminatory phenomena. The
9/11 tragedy, however, somewhat overshadowed this recogni-
tion, resulting in the continued proliferation of anti-Muslim and
anti-Islamic sentiment and expression. 

This study explores how and why Islamophobia was manifested
following 9/11, contextualizes how elite voices across British
and European societies have considered Islamophobia to be fair
and justified. In considering the wider findings of the European
Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia’s monitoring of
Islamophobia, this study explores how “visual identifiers” have
underpinned changes in attitude and reactions to Muslims across
the fifteen European Union (EU) member nations at a largely
pan-European level. 

The second section develops these ideas, analyzing three of the
report’s primary themes – Muslim visuality, political landscapes

Christopher Allen is currently finalizing his doctoral studies at the University of Birmingham,
where he is researching the phenomenon and discourse of Islamophobia in Britain. He was
coauthor of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia’s “Summary Report
into Islamophobia in the EU after 11 September 2001,” and has since written widely on
Islamophobia and British Muslims. He has several publications forthcoming and is chairman
of the Religions in Britain Research Organisation (RIBRO).



(incorporating institutional political elites as well as grassroots
politics), and the media – each one approached from the per-
spective of the United Kingdom. This study concludes by sug-
gesting that 9/11 has made Islamophobia more acceptable,
which has enabled its expressions, inferences, and manifesta-
tions to locate a newer and possibly more prevalent societal res-
onance and acceptability. Ultimately, this new development
goes some way to justifying Islamophobia and negating the
UN’s recognition of this problem. 

Introduction
Just a few days before 9/11, an event occurred that has since been lost in
the fog of urgent history and the rhetoric of hyperbolic overstatement: The
UN’s formal recognition of Islamophobia, thereby establishing anti-
Muslim and anti-Islamic prejudice, discrimination, and hatred and placing
it alongside other equally discriminatory and exclusionary phenomena,
such as anti-Semitism and anti-Roma.1 Therefore, prior to 9/11,
Islamophobia was considered a growing global phenomenon that required
immediate action to combat its spread. As the conference proceedings note,
accepting anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic sentiments and attitudes was now
being seen as normal.2 Consequently, and against the supposed norm of
common perceptions today, anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic expression and
hostility were as much a distinctly pre-9/11 phenomenon as a post-9/11
phenomenon. As such, much of what has been identified and recorded since
that day was in evidence both before and after 9/11, albeit in varying
degrees and manifestations. How official recognition of Islamophobia and
various governmental and transglobal processes would have responded and
fought such a growing climate of anti-Muslimism – a cancer, as one British
politician has described it3 – can only now, in a completely different global
context and order, be imagined.

In an attempt to further contextualize and balance current ideas and
understandings of Islamophobia, this study asks how and why Islamophobia
was manifested after 9/11 before contextualizing this in ways that consider
how Islamophobia has, despite formal UN recognition, been seen to be fair
and justified across different sectors of society. Split broadly into three
interrelated sections, the first section focuses upon the research undertaken
by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC)
and its Summary Report on Islamophobia in the EU after 11 September
2001.4

2 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 21:3



Beginning with an overview of the report, this study highlights and
considers its most relevant findings and conclusions gleaned from the fif-
teen EU member nations. Across the EU’s breadth, a vast difference of
experience and manifestation became apparent, for there was no entirely
homogenous “European” response to Muslims. However, since the
research program was, and indeed remains, the largest project analyzing
Islamophobia anywhere in the world, its findings are very relevant to iden-
tifying the phenomenon’s causes. The second section analyzes three of the
report’s main themes, considered in terms of a mini-case study from a
British perspective. The first explores Muslim visuality. The second ana-
lyzes political landscapes, incorporating institutional political elites as well
as grassroots and street politics, before concluding briefly with an overview
of the media. The middle section, therefore, considers how the macro-
themes identified at a pan-European level translate into the micro-themes
and manifestations in the national context.

The concluding section asks to what extent 9/11 has afforded Islamo-
phobia a greater societal weight, whereby such expressions have located
newer and a possibly more resonant societal acceptability. Ultimately,
though, the conclusion answers whether Islamophobia has become
increasingly justified since 9/11 and, if so, how. In this context, justify is
employed in a literal way: that ideas, expressions, and attitudes are pre-
sented in ways that are seen to be just, right, or reasonable. As such, the
question underpinning this section is: Has 9/11 – the event, its aftermath,
and its legacy (i.e., understanding, interpretation, and response) – made
expressions of anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic sentiment appear to be right
and reasonable in a post-9/11 world? It is hoped that by doing so, the argu-
ments supporting this study will provide the necessary clarity required to
better frame the topic of Islamophobia in a post-9/11 world and stimulate
further debate.

The EUMC Report
The EUMC Report was the synthesis of 75 nationally focused reports, five
from each EU member state, that closely monitored reactions against, and
any changes of attitude toward, Muslims following the 9/11 attacks. Of these
reports, the first 15 were commissioned within 24 hours of the attacks,
putting in place the necessary mechanisms to closely track the situation
faced by Muslims across each EU member state. The project ended at the
end of the 2001 calendar year. As there was little, if any, concrete evidence

Allen: Justifying Islamophobia 3



at the beginning of the project’s implementation of any changes in attitude
or anti-Muslim backlash, the immediacy of this response points to a sense of
expectation, or even inevitability, that such a reaction would ensue. 

In recognizing the response of the various European presidents and
prime ministers who took immediate action to stress that neither “Islam”
nor “Muslims” per se had perpetrated the attacks, the report noted an
almost unspoken acknowledgement that a clear and unequivocal preemp-
tive response was required.5 Unfortunately, despite the attempts by some of
Europe’s political elite to diffuse the situation, the summary report con-
cluded that “Muslims became indiscriminate victims of an upsurge of both
verbal and physical attacks following the events of 11 September.”6 From
its findings, a new dynamism emanating directly from the 9/11 attacks saw
manifestations of anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic expression become more
extreme, explicit, and widely tolerated. 

Violence, Aggression, and Identified Changes in Attitude
Insofar as violence, aggression, and changes in attitude, the report con-
cluded that across the EU spectrum, incidents involving a negative or dis-
criminatory act against Muslims or a material entity associated with Islam
were identified. Numerous mosques, cultural centers, and Islamic schools
were either targeted or threatened. Probably the most distasteful incident
occurred in Exeter, where seven pig heads were impaled on spikes outside
of a mosque and what was purported to be pigs’ blood was smeared over its
outside and entrance. What emerged across the EU, however, was that irre-
spective of the identified and documented levels of violence and aggres-
sion, the underlying causes were, as the report termed it, “visual identifiers”
of either Muslims or Islam, or both.7 While these were not necessarily the
reason for such changes or attacks, they were the single most predominant
factor in determining who or what became the foci for any retaliatory action
or reaction. The visual identifiers provided a seemingly societal stimulant
that offered an outlet for the venting of rage, revenge, or any other deni-
gratory sentiment or action. 

It is no surprise, therefore, that when these visual identifiers held such
primacy in determining who or what became targets for discrimination,
abuse, violence, and aggression, Muslim women in particular – possibly the
most visually identifiable religious adherents in contemporary Europe –
became the primary target. In Britain, an 18-year-old Muslim woman in
Slough was beaten by men wielding baseball bats for apparently no other

4 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 21:3



reason than being identified as a Muslim. At the same time, the British
press was reporting that many women wearing hijab or other traditional
Muslim attire had been spat upon and verbally abused. 

The report also stated that other Islamophobic incidents could be iden-
tified in Denmark, where a Muslim woman was thrown from a moving taxi;
in Germany, where Muslim women had their hijabs torn off; and in Italy,
where a bus driver repeatedly shut the bus’ doors on a Muslim woman,
much to the amusement of an onlooking and cheering crowd. Many simi-
lar instances were recorded elsewhere. Interestingly, in those countries
where Muslim women rarely wear traditional attire (e.g., Luxembourg), no
incidents were reported as being targeted toward women. In this particular
setting, however, the focus shifted toward Islam’s more physical visual
identifiers. For example, Luxembourg’s sole Islamic center was vandalized
and attacked.

Nor were Muslim men exempted from this process. In line with the
heavy media rotation of images of Usama bin Laden and the Taliban, turban-
wearing men became indiscriminate targets, as people identified – some-
what inaccurately – turbans as a visual identifier of Muslims. As a result,
the number of reported attacks against Sikh men rose. However, this can
only be attributed to ignorance and misinterpretation, rather than any rise in
anti-Sikh behavior or attitudes. Similarly, bearded men, again including
Sikhs, were also attacked, although to a much lesser degree than other
forms of targeting. Indeed, these are the everyday visual symbols across
society that normally would be ignored or unnoticed. However, in the
immediate aftermath of 9/11, a London taxi driver who had some Islamic
motifs in his car was hospitalized following a horrific attack by some of his
passengers. Apparently, they visually identified and subsequently associ-
ated him with the 9/11 tragedy.

The last aspect relating to visual identifiers was the attacks on Islam’s
physical entities  (e.g., mosques, schools, cultural centers). Included in this
were general threats, vandalism and material damage, and more serious con-
cerns, such as bomb and death threats. Across Britain, as indeed elsewhere,
many Islamic schools closed for several days due to the fear of threats being
carried out or the possibility of spontaneous attack. At times of prayer also,
many mosques increased security and many local police authorities agreed
to increase patrols in response to requests from some Muslim communities
that had received threats of violence and worse.

In conclusion, the report stated that prejudice and distrust appeared to
extend to all individuals who somehow looked like Muslims, irrespective

Allen: Justifying Islamophobia 5



of whether or not they were indeed Muslim. Consequently, the role of such
visual aspects of Islam and Muslims cannot be overlooked, because embod-
ied within the now readily recognized and acknowledged common identi-
fiers is an underlying view that uni-dimensionalizes all Muslims through the
common denominator of Islam. Moreover, this view simultaneously infers
that all Muslims bear some form of collective and homogenous responsibil-
ity. One way of elaborating upon this, if somewhat coarsely, is to consider
the old British racist adage that “all blacks look the same.” In the contem-
porary setting now emerging from the discourses and processes of this
greater receptivity to Islamophobia, that same adage might more appropri-
ately be reworded as: “All Muslims are the same.”8

Measures of Anti-Islamic Actions and Reaction
The post-9/11 period in Europe also saw an upsurge in ethnic xenophobia,
especially those that were either historical or preexistent to 9/11, as well as
those that were either nationally or regionally constrained.9 Although this
happened across the EU spectrum, different manifestations were identified
in different settings based upon the Muslim communities themselves and
their particular histories, nationalities, status, and ethnic backgrounds. As the
report put it, 9/11 provided a catalyst of fear that sought to reaffirm and
renew old – and, indeed, enhance new – prejudices that exaggerated the
potential of the perceived “enemy within.” The impetus of a greater aware-
ness, a previously unacknowledged vulnerability, and a fear and dread of
both old and new enemies, all of which were being supported and reiterated
in both the media and political spheres, contributed to and compounded the
problem. The report, however, suggested that both latent and active preju-
dices found a catalytic reinvigoration.10 So in Spain, for example, the wide-
spread survival in Spanish folklore of “el Moro”11 found greater credence,
where a greater emphasis on “el Moro’s” Muslimness became readily appar-
ent. Similarly in Greece, centuries old enemies that were previously
described as either Turkish or Albanian were being described as Turkish
Muslims or Albanian Muslims. 

The distinctions between religion and ethnicity, therefore, became
increasingly blurred, and the primacy of an enemy’s Muslimness, whether
relevant or not, was stressed in order to reinvigorate and reaffirm historical
foes, albeit in a contemporary frame of reference and understanding. Thus,
these types of xenophobia were not anything new and were distinctly pre-
9/11 phenomena. However, through the overlapping of Muslimness and the

6 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 21:3



previously racialized or ethnicized “Otherness” that such enemies previ-
ously had, those existing fears and attributes were subsequently reinforced
and, transitionally, found an increased resonance through a seeming confir-
mation of those previous fears and beliefs, albeit somewhat inactive or sup-
pressed. The atavistic stereotypes of historical enemies – the historical
“Others” that much of Europe and European society had defined itself in
opposition to – that were deeply embedded in the experience and culture of
various races, nationalities, and communities were being reinvigorated, and
possibly rejustified, by contemporary events. 

Reactions by Opinion Leaders
As mentioned previously, most European leaders sought to preempt an
expected anti-Muslim backlash in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11
tragedy. Most assumed a high profile, especially the Irish Taoiseach Bertie
Aherne, and the British and German prime ministers, Tony Blair and
Gerhard Schroeder, respectively. Many were keen to stress that while
Muslims had seemingly perpetrated the terrorist acts, those Muslims did
not reflect or represent the peaceful nature of “true” Islam.12 Only one polit-
ical leader, Italy’s Silvio Berlusoni, declared, but later retracted, his affir-
mation of western culture’s supremacy over its Islamic equivalent. Many of
these same political leaders, among them President Bush, also emphasized
that any retaliatory attack or the ensuing “war against terror” was neither a
war against Islam nor a war against Muslims per se. 

While some might suggest that such changes in attitude toward
Muslims and any Islamophobic backlash against their communities across
the EU might have been heightened by such circumstances, or indeed may
need to be contextualized by the growing urgency of military retaliation,
such arguments need to be countered by the numerous and quite categori-
cal denials by political leaders of all nationalities and political persuasions
to reassure Muslims and non-Muslims that any retaliation was not a “war”
against either. Across much of the EU, public sentiment was largely against
military action, so any suggestion that the context of war might have sought
to justify Islamophobia during this period must be balanced by the leaders’
rhetoric and guidance at the time.

This positive situation immediately following 9/11, however, gradually
changed as the unequivocal support for indigenous Muslim communities
appeared to waiver when several mainstream political groups sought to
exploit the climate of increased fear and mistrust for political gain. In

Allen: Justifying Islamophobia 7



Denmark, the general elections that shortly followed the attacks focused on
immigration and the role of “foreigners.” Due to the increasing acceptance
in Denmark that the descriptors “Muslim” and “foreigner” were largely syn-
onymous, the resulting situation was one of political rhetoric characterized
by increasing Islamophobia, where anti-Muslim campaigning became
rooted in the growing popularity of a societal need to protect Danish iden-
tity and culture. One consequence was that the Dansk Folkeparti was
reported to the police for hate speech crimes. Similarly, in The Netherlands
– and outside the remit of the EUMC Report – the assassinated Pim Fortuyn
found posthumous political success largely by campaigning on the threat
that Muslims posed to the Dutch not only because of their monolithically
perceived collective responsibility for 9/11, but also because of the threat to
the liberal Dutch lifestyles that Islamic culture was alleged to present. 

While considering the role of opinion leaders, the report also noted the
inroads that far-right and neo-Nazi groups made following 9/11 and their
resulting influence on the shaping of political ideas and issues. While it is
necessary to differentiate between the role of “street” political groups, such
as in Spain, where loosely described political “skins” undertook “Muslim-
bashings” as part of their racist ideology, other groups that were neither main-
stream nor “street” found unprecedented success. The British National Party
(BNP) is a particularly good example, for it emerged largely from the rem-
nants of a disillusioned street political group: the NF. Over the past few years,
however, it has attempted to shed that image in order to re-present itself in
terms of a quasi-legitimate political force, particularly since 9/11. Its evolu-
tion and Islamophobic campaigns are considered later in this study.

Nonetheless, across the entire EU, far-right groups from “street”
through “quasi-legitimate” to “mainstream” found a greater platform from
which to publicize their views, messages. and arguments. A recurrent image
in this resurgence was the suggestion that Europe’s “Christian” identity and
heritage were being replaced by a far more covert Islamic one: Muslims
were an internal threat who, through high birth rates, asylum seekers, and
proliferating immigration, were insidiously attempting to infiltrate and con-
quer Europe. Trying to prove this, some groups began to use Berlusconi
iconically as the only European leader brave enough to speak the truth about
Muslims. Much of this was presented via the Internet and other electronic
communicative mediums, where a dramatic rise in anti-Muslim, far-right-
inspired activity was noted. As the report concluded, evidence suggested that
the distance between the acceptability of the mainstream and the previous
unacceptability of the more extreme far-right was decreasing, and that those

8 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 21:3



same highly inciting and dangerous anti-Muslim messages were finding a
more consensual and sympathetic ear in many European societies. 

The media were also included in the report’s discussion on opinion
leaders, due to their contribution to the processes that shape and determine
common opinions and ideas. Without providing too much depth, given that
this research area has seen some excellent research over the past few years,13

the role of the media remains both contentious and highly debatable. The
report itself, however, duly concluded that there was very little evidence that
the media had a largely positive or negative impact, or any impact whatso-
ever. None of the 75 reports submitted clearly suggested that the media
either directly or indirectly caused, or were responsible for, any reported or
identified act of aggression or significant change in attitude. 

However, and in spite of this, the media’s role should not be devalued,
for they play a very important role in formulating and establishing popular
perceptions and conceptions in the public sphere. This has been docu-
mented quite extensively in more detailed expositions of the media. So
when certain media represent Muslims negatively or stereotypically –
sometimes as an almost necessary and integral part of their coverage – in a
climate that is already volatile and fraught with fear, issues of responsi-
bility and accountability should be called to the fore. The report concluded
that while no evidence suggested that the media was influentially causal,
neither could it be completely dismissed nor removed from the equation.

Concluding the EUMC Report
When identifying the EUMC Report’s broad findings, it is imperative to note
that while the report was the culmination of the largest-ever monitoring pro-
ject of Islamophobia, it did have its failings. One of these may have been the
exclusion of the context and setting provided by the then-emerging backdrop
of the “war on terror.” However, while this is a valid observation, for the pur-
pose of this study the focus is restricted solely to the report’s findings. While
this means that some areas of identified concern and weakness will remain
outside this study, it is hoped that the debates and concerns acknowledged
here about Islamophobia, as well as its existing subjectivities and discourse,
will be aired and responded to in greater detail elsewhere. Nonetheless, the
report did highlight and pick out some very pertinent trends and themes that
must be considered further in order to achieve a better understanding of the
processes and manifestations of anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic sentiment and
expression. This recognition underlies the second part of this paper. 

Allen: Justifying Islamophobia 9



The British Context
In the British context, some interesting correlations and considerations can
be explored to assess the extent to which 9/11 has justified Islamophobia.
In doing so, three particular themes emerge: visuality, political rhetoric, and
the media. 

They’re All the Same
In reflecting the wider European landscape, Muslim communities are the
second largest faith community in Britain as well the most visually recog-
nizable, for traditional Islamic attire is readily identifiable in most towns
and cities.14 As has been noted elsewhere, this visual difference has caused
a wider demarcation of difference that embodies a sense of otherness and
inferiority to emerge15: more precisely, an otherness and an inferiority to the
“norms” of British society. At the same time, the socioreligious icons of
Islam and Muslims with which this visual identification has evolved have
also acquired a far greater immediacy of recognition, one that is contextu-
alized and understood in almost entirely negative and detrimental frames.
So, with the catalytic impetus of 9/11, this situation intensified and deteri-
orated simultaneously: intensifying because this same visual identification
came under greater scrutiny at the same time as becoming increasingly rec-
ognizable, while simultaneously deteriorating because this same visual dif-
ference also became the focus underpinning the denigratory and violent
attitudes and acts that began to manifest themselves. Such a process, there-
fore, would appear to both reinforce and, to some extent, perpetuate each
phenomenon.

Those post-9/11 reificationary processes have both “newly established”
and “reestablished” Muslims as chimerical “Others,” drawing upon recent
events as well as the legacy of anti-Muslimism endemic to the wider
European setting. Consequently, since 9/11 British Muslims have found
themselves increasingly identified in predetermined and bipolar ways, and,
more dangerously, have to do the same in terms of self-definition as well. As
Ziauddin Sardar has suggested, Muslims are now identified as either “ter-
rorists” warring against the West or “apologetics” defending Islam as a
peaceful religion.16 However,  society’s populist and widespread monolithic
and negative immediacy of visual recognition of Muslims, in addition to the
subsequent demarcation of difference that this recognition entails, has led to
the following situation: Both types of Muslim in the post-9/11 climate have,
through this uni-dimensional lens of acknowledgement and recognition,

10 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 21:3



become increasingly non-differentiated visually. As a result, the two poles
have become virtually identical. Consequently, all Muslims are character-
ized by the same negative and stereotypical attributes of the first bipolar def-
inition: All Muslims have the capability to either be terrorists or, at least, be
supportive of terrorism. 

The hyperbolic climate of fear and threat posed by 9/11 caused
Muslims to be characterized, according to the same demarcation of differ-
ence, in terms of “them” and “us,” where a distinct lack of differentiation
was allowed to permeate “them.” So, when the media reported the alleged
threat posed by “sleepers” or “fifth columnists,” all Muslims were seen, due
to their homogenously attributed “Otherness,” as both realistically and con-
ceptually capable of posing such threats. This only exacerbated the climate
of fear and suspicion. In fact, this occurred not only with the local proxim-
ity of British Muslims, but also with respect to the international scene
with global proximity, where the largely external global perceived threat of
the “green menace” or the “axis of evil” became as equally understandable
and indistinguishable in the localized setting of Britain. Hence, Muslim
men who resembled Usama bin Laden however insignificantly (i.e., having
a beard or wearing a turban), were attacked thousands of miles away from
his presumed location because that same visual difference transcended geo-
graphical boundaries and proximities. As a result, all Muslims, along with
the visual identifiers of Islam, were transformed into legitimate targets for
hatred and abuse. 

In an attempt to offer some theoretical framework, I refer to Martin
Barker’s authoritative work on “new racism.”17 Following the legislative
protection afforded to minority communities and ethnic groups in the early
1980s – protection that is still not afforded to British Muslims because var-
ious governments have failed to close the anomaly in a law that does not
accommodate multiethnic religious communities – people such as Barker
began to acknowledge a shifting of foci away from the more traditional
markers of race to the newer and legislatively unprotected markers based
upon cultural and religious difference. This demarcation of difference has
now attained an immediacy of recognition. However, unlike older forms of
racism, this new racism sought to elaborate upon the differences identified
in much less explicit ways. In other words, the markers of difference do not
underpin explicit hatred and hostility; rather, they implicitly infer and estab-
lish direct challenges and threats, where “difference” challenges and threat-
ens “our way of life.” This demarcation of difference, therefore, appears to
be underpinned by differences that are either unacceptable or incompatible

Allen: Justifying Islamophobia 11



with the “norms” of society, the norms relating to “us” and definitely not to
“them.”

The evolution of such a theoretical understanding can be seen in the
post-9/11 period, where the visuality of Islam and Muslims has been clearly
presented in terms of being incompatible with the norms of “our” society
and “our way of life.” In today’s populist understanding, the “threat” that
Muslims are seen to present – not just in terms of terrorism or the widely
convoluted “clash of civilizations” theory – is one that has myriad manifes-
tations. As such, questions about state Islamic schools, freedom of speech,
the role of women, radicalism or “bin Ladenism,” as such a phenomenon has
recently been described,18 and community cohesion are now just a few of the
issues that have caused the Muslim “difference” to be seen as threatening, or
at least as challenging, the “British way of life.” Given that 9/11 has cast a
vast shadow over these issues, and indeed continues to fog and confuse these
and other situations, the seriousness of the British Muslims’ situation can be
readily acknowledged. 

The markers of difference that are seen as challenging the British way
of life are also the same markers of difference that demarcate Muslims. As
such, that which is different is also problematic, and that which is prob-
lematic is also challenging: a self-perpetuating and self-reinforcing cycle.
Therefore, the impact of 9/11 has both heightened awareness of these dif-
ferences or problems, depending upon one’s particular perspective, and has
subsequently intensified the issues many times over. And so as the threats
and challenges are now seen to be much greater than ever before, a sense
of justification emerges, one that suggests that rather than Islamophobia
being a sentiment of unfounded hostility, such anti-Muslim and anti-
Islamic hostility and hatred are now an informed reality. So when anti-
Muslimism is disseminated in the public domain, a greater receptivity to
such ideas not only means that they have become increasingly normalized,
but also that a greater rationalism has emerged. And with rationalism comes
the understanding that such rationalism is founded upon beliefs and atti-
tudes that appear to be correct. 

I.S.L.A.M.: Intolerance, Slaughter, Looting, Arson,
and Molestation of Women
Similar processes can be identified elsewhere, for ever since 9/11 the BNP
has sought to bolster its own racist views and to acquire societal legitimacy.
Both of these have been undertaken on the back of an increasing recep-

12 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 21:3



tivity to Islamophobia in the British, particularly English, domain. Much of
this has consisted of such highly inciting behavior as encouraging insult,
provocation, and abuse, as well as employing language and images that
encourage and invigorate hatred. However, the BNP has always stressed the
legality of its actions, referring to the legislative anomaly that allows a win-
dow of opportunity for explicit anti-Muslimism without prosecution. 

Under its most successful political campaign, entitled “Islam out of
Britain,” the BNP declared its clearest goal of exposing “the threat Islam
and Muslims pose to Britain and British society” by publishing a leaflet
entitled “The truth about I.S.L.A.M.” In this leaflet, “I.S.L.A.M.” was
employed as an acronym for “Intolerance, Slaughter, Looting, Arson, and
Molestation of Women.”19 Widely distributed, it used highly inflammatory
reasons for justifying hatred toward Muslims, suggesting that “to find out
what Islam really stands for, all you have to do is look at a copy of the
Koran, and see for yourself … Islam really does stand for Intolerance,
Slaughter, Looting, Arson, and Molestation of Women.” Dismissing those
apologetics that Sardar identified as one-half of the bipolar representative
Muslims, the BNP selectively quoted the Qur’an in order to paint the most
despicable picture of Muslims, adding – in clear new racist rhetoric – that
“no-one dares to tell the truth about Islam and the way that it threatens our
democracy, traditional freedoms and identity.” 

The BNP went on to suggest that understanding the Qur’an could pro-
vide a context for both the 2001 Bradford disturbances in the north of
England20 and 9/11, two events that it stressed were inextricably linked. By
clearly linking these events – the local and the global – the differences that
were seen in one context became attributed to all. In addition, as with the
globally and locally perceived threats that the BNP suggested that Muslims
were posing to British norms and that were already being increasingly
rationalized across society, as acknowledged by the EUMC Report, any dif-
ferentiation became even more blurred. 

The BNP also rooted this “problem” into the context of Islamic theol-
ogy, where an “anti-kafir” framework sought to both reinforce and codify
the demarcation of difference between “Muslims” and “kafirs” – in more
simplistic terms, “them” and “us” – as being rather more derivative of
Muslims or Islam than it was of the BNP. This shifting of focus was such
that the BNP could suggest that this “them and us” dichotomy did not come
from them or non-Muslims, but from the Muslims themselves. For the
BNP, Islam caused the problems; the BNP was merely highlighting it for
the benefit and well-being of British society. The functional capability of

Allen: Justifying Islamophobia 13



“new racist” forms to focus on differences that allegedly challenge and
pose threats as cover and smokescreens to actually perpetuate and encour-
age hostilities and hatreds, thus become clear.

As a direct consequence of the inroads made by the far-right and soci-
ety’s deepening receptivity to anti-Muslim ideas and expressions, and in
identifying how visual markers of difference were being used in the con-
temporary climate, Muslims were targeted by other minority communities.
Following anecdotal evidence that youth groups of Indian descent in
Manchester were adopting an overtly Hindu identity to deflect any potential
anti-Muslim backlash, the BNP capitalized upon this and exploited intra-
“Asian” tensions by issuing an audio resource entitled Islam: “A Threat to
Us All.”21 This venture, undertaken in conjunction with fringe Sikh and
Hindu organizations, was set up to provide “insider” validation (by which
one must assume this means “Asian”) of both its own skewed view of Islam
and the need to rid Britain of Muslims. As the press release stated, it sought
to: 

Give the lie to those who falsely claim that we are “racists” or “haters.”
We sympathise and identify with every people in the world who want to
secure or preserve a homeland for themselves, their traditions and their
posterity. And we demand and strive for that same basic human right for
the native English, Scots, Welsh, Irish and Ulster folk who together make
up the British.22

The markers of difference and the subsequent demarcation of Muslims
from all others is both clearly present and in line with new racist theories,
for in addition to focusing upon the differences that the BNP and others
purport to be threatening “us” and “our way of life,” they also denounce
any claims that they themselves are racists. The employment of new racist
rhetoric and perspectives therefore allows disclaimers to be made that, ini-
tially, are difficult to refute. One way of seeing through this is to acknowl-
edge that the BNP does not identify or include its Sikh and Hindu partners
in what it defines to be “British.” Nonetheless, when communities that can
be identified in terms of racialized markers unite to further demarcate
Muslims, they highlight the hatred for Muslims that exists across contem-
porary British society while also locating an indicator to further suggest
that an increasing receptivity toward Islamophobia is apparent. 

Consequently, so great was the need to demarcate themselves from
Muslims, that those Sikh and Hindu groups found adequate justification to
join forces with an overtly racist organization that had, in very recent his-

14 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 21:3



tory, targeted Sikh and Hindu communities on the basis of their skin color,
rather than their religion. So great was their unifying anti-Muslim hatred, a
single common denominator, that other contentious and previously opposi-
tional factors were ignored or overlooked. Islamophobia, therefore,
whether from the perspective of the BNP, fringe Sikh or Hindu groups, or
the growing numbers voting for the BNP, found within this anti-Muslim
expression and rhetoric something that they felt was justified.

A justified Islamophobia in the post-9/11 period has been integral to the
BNP’s recent unprecedented growth and success. Emanating entirely from
the success of their openly anti-Muslim campaigns in areas close to or with
heavily Muslim populated areas in the north of England, the BNP has found
a much wider quasi-legitimacy. As a result, its members have seen their
party’s popularity mushroom into one that seemingly presents a justified
alternative and, more worryingly, an apparently real opportunity for success
in local, national, and European elections. Targeting their seats directly and
specifically, the BNP now has a total of 18 elected councillors across the
United Kingdom, from Grays in the south, through Sandwell and Dudley in
the Midlands, to its stronghold in Burnley in the north, where it holds eight
seats on the local council. And on the back of these anti-Muslim successes,
other far-right groups that previously had been largely ineffectual and pri-
marily “street” focused have been reinvigorated. Consequently, such groups
as the NF, Combat 18, the White Wolves, and the White Nationalist Party
have developed similar anti-Muslim campaigns. 

So, as the EUMC Report stated, the gap between the opposite poles of
the extreme political right and the political left, at least when concerned
with attitudes and perceptions of Muslims, appears to have become closer
in the British context. With similar sentiments, the apparently center-left
Home Secretary David Blunkett verbally attacked those young British
Muslims in Bradford, who were campaigning peacefully against the harsh
sentencing of their friends and family convicted of involvement in the 2001
disturbances, by openly calling them “whining maniacs.” 

In addition, Blunkett ensured widespread media coverage when he
aired his endorsement of the more “rational” claims of the assassinated Pim
Fortuyn, suggesting that Muslims should accept and assimilate into “our
culture” and “our ways,” and that immigrants and asylum seekers – a group
that the EUMC Report suggested was becoming increasingly interchange-
able and indistinguishable from Muslims in the post-9/11 period – were
“swamping” our schools.23 Echoing similar suggestions made by the then-
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher some 20 or so years earlier, this particu-

Allen: Justifying Islamophobia 15



lar statement by Thatcher was deemed to be a formative moment in the
development and transition of the “new racist” ideologies of the early
1980s.24 Could Blunkett’s equivalent statement, therefore, be the precursor
that confirms the phenomenon of anti-Muslimism as the “new” racist ide-
ology emergent in the early twenty-first century? 

Similar accusations of anti-Muslim rhetoric could be posited against
other British politicians and politically evolved scenarios, including those
such as Peter Hain MP, who suggested that it was the Muslim communi-
ties’ own isolationist behavior and customs that created the climate in
which the far-right was able to expand and grow. Thus, the victims were
responsible. Quite unprecedentedly, in this last statement Hain chose to
describe Muslims as “immigrants,” despite their having been settled in
Britain for at least the past three or four decades. It is also interesting that
Blunkett used the descriptor of “immigrants” to refer to those communities
that were “swamping” schools, possibly highlighting the interchange and
ease of recognition of terminologies and identifiers now in circulation. 

In addition, the British government’s post-9/11 Crime and Anti-
Terrorism Bill 2001 has been used to instigate numerous unfounded, yet
institutionally endorsed, dawn raids that have failed to produce results;
overblow scares, including the uncertainty surrounding a ricin find; and
agree to Muslims being imprisoned without trial in London’s Belmarsh
prison and in Guantanamo. Furthermore, it has  ensured that charges of a
wider institutionalized and center-left-inspired anti-Muslim ideology have
emerged in the British context. Conversely, however, some far-left political
groups have found some unlikely bedfellows in several British Muslim
groups that opposed the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and recently formed
a political coalition under the banner of Respect.

While some of these examples are far from being as explicit and incit-
ing as those that the BNP and others have made on the opposite, far-right
political pole, it is clear that while political allegiance is different, the moti-
vations and ideas underpinning the rhetoric is not, for the demarcated dif-
ference of Muslims lies at the root of the perceived “problem.” Whether
such claims of institutionalized Islamophobia are valid remains open to
debate or, even to an extent, irrelevant, due to the immediacy of recognition
and the acknowledgement of difference. With the growing receptivity to
anti-Muslim ideas and expressions, and the sense of justification, in line
with the success of the BNP, it appears that what is being played out, either
rhetorically or legislatively, seems to fit into a wider and societally consen-
sual understanding of a justified hostility and suspicion toward Muslims

16 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 21:3



and Islam. This observation appears to be confirmed by a poll, commis-
sioned by the Islamic Society of Britain, that revealed that 84 percent of the
British population was more suspicious of Muslims following 9/11.25 Such
a widespread acceptance of this suspicion, when contextualized by the
growing popularity of the BNP’s and similar claims, as well as the shifting
rhetoric of the center-left government in a heightened climate of fear and
mistrust, appears to suggest that such a view or belief would not be diffi-
cult to locate or to be something widely perceived as unjust, wrong, or
unreasonable. On the contrary, many would suggest quite the opposite. 

I Am an Islamophobe and Proud
The language, terminology, and ideas circulated in the public domain relat-
ing to Muslims did not emerge only from the political elites. However, as
the EUMC Report suggested, the validity of the anti-Muslim messages that
are disseminated through the media should not be underestimated. The con-
temporary representation of Muslims as largely monolithic and non-differ-
entiated groups that stereotypically embody the same immediacies, differ-
ences, and demarcations as elsewhere, are quite relevant to how contempo-
rary society views and understands them. Consequently, the media’s role in
the immediate post-9/11 era must be considered in order to understand how
it possibly sought to influence and shape popular British perceptions.

Baroness Thatcher’s condemnation of Muslim leaders in The London
Times, for example, in which she insisted that all Muslims take responsi-
bility for the attacks,26 expanded upon Sardar’s observation that all Muslims
are interpreted in wholly bipolar understandings. For Thatcher, the assump-
tion was that if you do not apologize, then you support terrorism, reflecting
President Bush’s you are either “for us” or “against us,” and less explicitly,
the “them” and “us” differentiation that the demarcation of Muslim differ-
ence embodies. Then, a few days later in the same newspaper, an article
entitled “This war is not about terror, it’s about Islam”27 praised Thatcher’s
stance and confirmed that “Western” fears about Islam were justified
because “some three quarters of the world’s migrants in the last decade are
said to have been Muslims,” and that these  “escapees, victims, scapegoats,
malefactors and ‘sleepers’ are awaiting their moment.”28

Similarly, and in equally homogenous terms, it spoke of “the Islamic
mind,” explaining that while westerners were honorable, “Islamic” fighters
were not, for they combine “crude weapons” with “appalling violence” and
prefer “ambush, surprise, treachery and deceit.”29 Rooted in Huntington’s

Allen: Justifying Islamophobia 17



clash of civilizations thesis,30 while simultaneously employing Crusader
and Orientalist terminology, it described the perpetrators of 9/11 as
“appearing suddenly out of empty space like their desert raider ancestors,”
the descendants of “the horse riding raiders before Mohammed.” Not only
did the writer stress the contemporary climate’s differences, but, in so
doing, he also stressed the uniformity and absence of change throughout
history. In short, he was drawing upon an eternalized narrative in which the
threat that Muslims and Islam are purported to have posed to “us” histori-
cally is again being posed today – the contemporary being a mere recur-
rence of an ongoing history and, in opposition to the rhetoric of political
leaders, a “war” against Islam.

Other sections of the media highlighted different avenues of thought,
such as how Muslim difference presented challenges to “our” liberal ways
of life. In the Guardian, Polly Toynbee reiterated her distaste for Islam and
Muslims in her “Last chance to speak out.”31 Having previously aired her
views in the Independent by declaring “I am an Islamophobe and proud,”32

Toynbee mirrored the BNP, despite being politically on the polar opposite,
by providing highly selective Qur’anic verses to reinforce her arguments.
Having noted what she described as the “blood curdling words of the
Prophet,” she employed exactly the same Qur’anic references as the BNP
did in its “I.S.L.A.M.” leaflet to support her views as to why Muslims
should be seen as a threat. A similar situation arose in a Daily Telegraph
editorial, which reiterated the exact phraseology of the BNP’s “Islam: A
Threat to Us All” leaflet in order to dismiss Islamophobia when it set out to
give “the lie to this imaginary Islamophobia” by extolling the virtues of the
British, who were much more “Islamophilic” instead.33

Yet one article highlights perfectly the interaction and interchange of the
immediacy and negative understandings associated with the demarcated dif-
ference projected onto Muslims, the implicitness of mainstream political
rhetoric to identify and make the same inferences about Muslims as the far-
right, and the role that the media plays in disseminating such ideas in the pub-
lic domain: in other words, the justification of Islamophobia in the contem-
porary setting. In a Daily Telegraph article written by Norman Lamont,34 the
former Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer, he established that ongo-
ing immigration was bringing about a loss of European identity, an assertion
that he supported by praising the ideas of the assassinated Fortuyn. 

Lamont then went on to deride Prime Minister Blair for carrying a
Qur’an, due to the confusing impact that it had on the British about their own
sense of identity. For Lamont, the Qur’an obviously did not fit into his con-

18 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 21:3



struct of what constitutes British identity, because, as he goes on to explain,
“we are forced to accept that people living in Britain cannot adhere to the val-
ues of one community,” before adding that “individuals cannot be left alone
in their chosen communities, if that involves forced marriages, polygamy,
book-burning, supporting fatwas and even fighting against our armed
forces.” He suggests that these obstacles – or demarcations of difference, to
use terminology that has been used previously – are the stark dangers that cer-
tain communities pose to the British. In order to make his point absolutely
clear, he states that it is not the “West Indians, Africans and Indians” that have
failed in their part of building a successful multicultural society, nor is it these
that are presenting a challenge to the “British way of life.” It is, instead, those
communities that are left unnamed that Lamont clearly sees as being the pri-
mary threat and challenge to “our way of life.” Incidentally, Lamont does not
specifically name Muslims or Islam once in this article.

Yet the article clearly refers to Muslims, for Lamont uses socioreligious
icons – visual identifiers, for want of a better term – that are immediately
recognizable in today’s society. Not surprisingly, they are also the same
obstacles that are seen as presenting the challenges suggested by him. And
while some might suggest that these icons could relate to Pakistani commu-
nities only, Lamont’s reference to the Qur’an and the other equally recog-
nizable identifiers of “Muslims” and “Islam” insists that “Muslimness” is
primary. And with that same “Muslimness” comes the homogenous and
indistinguishable premise upon which contemporary understandings are
founded. For Lamont, then, the failings and threat to “our” multicultural
society are attributable to one community only: the Muslims, who challenge
the very fabric of the British way of life. 

Along with the lack of differentiation associated with populist percep-
tions of Muslims, Lamont’s article insists that all Muslims become incorpo-
rated into his particular frame of reference. Consequently, as was also the
case with the BNP, the present government, and numerous other voices in
the media, all Muslims become the problem not because Lamont has said so,
but because of what he has not said. So immediate and embedded is the
Muslims’ difference, as well as their homogeneity, that everything evolves
from this very difference. The EUMC Report concluded that Muslim visu-
ality did not explain why such individuals and communities became subject
to prejudice, abuse, and violence, because of what is embedded and under-
stood by this visual identification rooted in a demarcated difference. In fact,
it is this same visuality and difference that underpins, rationalizes, and sub-
sequently justifies such attitudes. The emergent line of thought is con-

Allen: Justifying Islamophobia 19



sensual in both its premise and message, as well as in its means to sub-
stantiate its reasoning and justification.

Muslims, therefore, do not need to be named, but their difference does.
Similarly, the EUMC Report indicates that the attacks occurred not because
someone had to be Muslim or a building had to be Islamic, but merely
because their visual identification – rooted in difference – suggested that
they were. Thus, this difference neither explains nor justifies why
Islamophobia occurred or occurs, but highlights how its embeddedness and
receptivity affect understanding and recognition. Given this, Islamophobia
– whether anti-Muslim, anti-Islamic or both – is not explained or better
understood from this particular perspective. In fact, more theoretical decon-
structions need to be undertaken in order to achieve this. However, it does
offer an insight into the catalysts, processes, and motivations underlying
and influencing such manifestations and attitudes. 

Just, Right, and Reasonable
The situation since 9/11 is a complex one that cannot easily be conceptual-
ized, one in which individual and group subjectivities continue to question,
sometimes rightly, what might legitimately constitute Islamophobia and even
whether such a thing as “Islamophobia” actually exists. Attitudes to the
events themselves and their ongoing impact, however, quite clearly continue
to catalytically underpin a climate of heightened tension, increased fear, and
greater suspicion with the hyperbolic overstatement and overblown exagger-
ation that also continue to emerge from the metaphorical fog still rising from
the Twin Towers and the ongoing military action and acts of terrorism. 

The situation faced by European Muslims is such that they are increas-
ingly under the spotlight, not only by the media and the political institutions,
but also by the larger European community, especially in the wake of terror-
ist atrocities on the European mainland, irrespective of who is behind those
and other attacks. Similar processes have also occurred in Britain, and
Muslim communities have expressed their concern not only about the climate
of hostility, but also about the way in which their lives and communities are
increasingly framed in terms of problematization and criminalization. As was
suggested following the disturbances in the north of England and the subse-
quent sentencing of those involved after the events of 9/11, many saw this as
a clear illustration that Muslims and their communities were no longer going
to be seen on purely equitable terms with other communities, and that every-
thing connected to them would be dealt with in terms of law and order.35

20 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 21:3



With Islamophobia already causing global concern prior to 9/11, fol-
lowing the overshadowing influence of the attacks themselves and the ever
widening post-9/11 receptivity to such ideas, much of what has emerged
since has merely codified and reinforced ideas and attitudes that were
already pre-existent across British and other societies. For many, contrary to
the pre-9/11 Runnymede report on Islamophobia, which authoritatively
stated that the phenomenon was a “dread … of all or most Muslims … [an]
unfounded hostility towards Islam,”36 Islamophobia contemporarily would
appear, at least in some ways, to be nothing of the sort. Rather, it was a hos-
tility according to which the fears, dreads, and hostilities appear to be
largely seen as both wholly founded and largely justified. So while this dis-
parity in understanding with the report’s conclusions may have been in evi-
dence prior to the catalyst provided by 9/11, it has been further exacerbated
since. In this scenario, therefore, one might conclude that negative views,
understandings, and attitudes toward Muslims and Islam – while not reach-
ing the actual level of abuse and violence – were already evident in some cir-
cles and understandings. From this, it might be reasonable to suggest that
Islamophobia was already being justified irrespective of 9/11 anyway.

With regard to the visuality of Islam and Muslims, alongside the iden-
tifiers highlighted in the EUMC Report, in Britain these same identifiers
have become clearly established and interpreted in ways that demarcate not
only difference but also differences that are in contention with the norms of
British society, as was seen at the time of The Satanic Verses affair and the
First Gulf War. The success of the BNP and its anti-Muslim campaigns,
therefore, has not been countered by the mainstream political parties
through highlighting the failings and inaccuracies of its message, but rather
by the BNP’s continued movement toward a more hard-line, almost xeno-
phobic perspective. 

This negative perspective has seen such issues as immigration and asy-
lum seeking – both comprising individuals and communities that overlap
with representations and understandings of Muslim communities – become
daily and oft-repeated news stories that continue to increase the fears,
threats, and suspicions that both politicians and the media have exaggerated
and sensationalized in equal measure. For example, the news media has
reported heavily on the growth and vociferousness of fringe Muslim groups
with anti-western and isolationist ideologies that, in turn, have gone some
way to both shape and simultaneously reaffirm public fears and concerns
that have been subsequently – and quite inappropriately – attributed to all
Muslims without discrimination. 

Allen: Justifying Islamophobia 21



As mentioned earlier with regard to the media, so embedded and nat-
ural are the negative frames of reference within which Muslims and Islam
are understood, portyated, and re-presented, that for many people in the
media, grossly undifferentiated anti-Muslimism is in no way problematic.
Across all of these spheres and domains in the British context – as indeed
were identified across the broad spectrum of the EU too – the same mes-
sages and justifications underpin them: that it is Muslims, their inherent dif-
ference, uni-dimensionalism, and incompatibility with “normal” values and
“normal” ways of life that are reason enough to view Islamophobia and
anti-Muslimism as acceptable. 

With greater receptivity comes greater acceptability and homogeneity,
with greater acceptability and homogeneity comes normality across a wider
sphere of understanding, with normality comes the recognition that some-
thing occurs naturally, and with issues of naturalization comes the com-
monsense adoption of such ideas as being the truth or reality. This truth then
becomes universally diffused through society’s elites and across its diver-
sity, sustained not only by the media and political rhetoric, as has been
highlighted here, but also by the millions of daily speeches and acts that go
far beyond the realms of this particular study. Reciprocally, this same
embeddedness within society sees Muslim difference as natural and taken
for granted, thereby normalizing Islamophobia. And, it is this normalization
in the wider understanding that makes the continuation and suggestion of
such anti-Muslim ideas and expressions acceptable. This acceptability of
inherent difference then allows Muslims to be seen in entirely homogenous
and uni-dimensional terms. Whichever way the process is observed, the
result remains the same: Islamophobia embodies a distinct understanding
of implicit justification. 

Whether considered at the level of the UN, the EU, or at the more
specifically localized level of the British context, the phenomenon of any
post-9/11 Islamophobia appears to be consequentially problematic.
Through 9/11’s occurrence, this one day became the rupture through which
Islamophobia has become interpreted and framed, and has since been
understood as the primary source of such sentiment – an understanding that
has simultaneously sought to justify such sentiment, hostility, and hatred on
this basis alone. This same rupture has also insisted that the acknowledge-
ment and recognition given to this phenomena prior to 9/11’s tragic events
be dismissed and overlooked, whereas the actions and undertakings of a
few people have had highly detrimental consequences for all Muslims.
Consequently, as the UN conference noted just days before 9/11,

22 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 21:3



Islamophobia was already a proliferating phenomenon that was harmful to
all Muslims across the globe. At this time, though, this same proliferation
would appear to be accepted an unchallenged.

Since the UN’s declaration and the subsequent intensification of anti-
Muslim and anti-Islamic phenomena, the situation has clearly, and some
would say, continued to deteriorate. Whether at the level of the UN, the EU,
or of individual nations, the phenomenon of Islamophobia and anti-
Muslimism need to be addressed as much today as they did prior to the
events of September 2001. Consequently, the recognition proffered by the
UN just three years ago must not go unheeded or ignored. Until the phe-
nomenon is engaged with seriously and openly while pursuing a clear
objectivity, the levels of anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic inference, hostility,
and hatred may become ever more homogenously naturalized and normal-
ized. Given that further acts of atrocity are likely, it is essential that action
be taken across all levels of international, regional, and national gover-
nance, and that any future atrocity not be allowed to justify hinder, or
detract from combating any form of prejudice, discrimination, or hatred.
Indeed, it is essential that no form of prejudice, discrimination, or hatred be
seen as right, reasonable, or just. Unfortunately, through the processes high-
lighted and the rupturing effect of global events, it would seem that
Islamophobia – the prejudice, discrimination, and hatred of Muslims and
Islam – is, in fact, starting to be seen as all of these.

Notes

1. “World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia,
and Related Intolerance,” 31 August–8 September 2001, Durban, South
Africa.

2. United Nations, World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination,
Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance: Declaration and Program of Action
(New York: United Nations, 2002).

3. John Denham MP, speaking at the “Understanding Islamophobia” confer-
ence, University of Westminster, 29 September 2001

4. Christopher Allen and Jorgen Nielsen, Summary Report into Islamophobia in
the EU Following 11 September 2001 (Vienna: EUMC, 2002). This report
will be referred to from hereon as the EUMC Report.

5. Ibid., 43
6. Taken from the EUMC’s press release at the launch of the report’s publica-

tion, 15 May 2002.
7. Allen and Nielsen, EUMC Report, 34-37.

Allen: Justifying Islamophobia 23



8. Christopher Allen, “From Race to Religion: The New Face of Discrimination”
in British South Asian Muslims: A Post-September 11 Study, ed. Tahir Abbas
(London: Ashgate, forthcoming).

9. For a more detailed exposition of this section’s findings, see Allen and
Nielsen, EUMC Report, 40-41.

10. Ibid., 40.
11. Nino Del Olmo Vicen, “The Muslim Community in Spain,” in Muslim Com-

munities in the New Europe, eds. Gerd Nonneman et al. (Reading: Ithaca,
303-14), 307.

12. For a good introductory analysis into the institutional employment of such as
“true” Islam in the post-9/11 setting see, Laurent Bonnefoy, “Public
Institutions and Islam: A New Stigmatization?” ISIM Newsletter no.13,
(2003), 22-23. 

13. See, for example, the work undertaken by Elizabeth Poole as regards the
representation of Muslims in the British media. Elizabeth Poole, Reporting
Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims (London: IB Tauris,
2002). See also the website of the Forum against Islamophobia and Racism
(FAIR) for information about their media monitoring of the British press
and production of a daily digest for all relevant coverage, both positive and
negative.

14. At the time of the Census in 2001, the UK’s Muslim population numbered
1,591,126, a total of 2.7 percent of the population. Thus, Muslims were the
second largest religious population after Christians. For more information,
see the Office of National Statistics website at www.statistics.gov.uk.

15. A good introduction to this area of research can be found in Pnina Werbner
and Tariq Modood, eds. Debating Cultural Hybridity: Multi-cultural
Identities and the Politics of Anti-Racism (London: Zed, 1997).

16. Ziauddin Sardar, “The Excluded Minority: British Muslim Identity after 11
September,” in Reclaiming Britishness, eds. Phoebe Griffith and Mark
Leonard (London: Foreign Policy Centre, DATE), 51-56.

17. Martin Barker, The New Racism (London: Junction, 1981).
18. A term first identified as being in common use and understanding at the

“Islamophobie en Suisse? Eclairages europeens” colloqium at the University
of Geneva, 18 October 2003.

19. This leaflet was widely distributed across parts of the UK, where there was a
high percentage of Muslim communities from early 2001 through mid-2002.
It was also available at the party’s website, although it was removed once the
BNP was reported to the House of Lords Select Committee on Religious
Offences in October 2002. The BNP also removed all links to its “Islam out
of Britain” campaign. In addition to this leaflet, a full range of other equally
inciting literature was readily available at the website. At the beginning of
2004, the website contained several essays on “Islam” and “Muslims.” See
www.bnp.org.uk.

24 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 21:3



20. Throughout the summer of 2001, several disturbances erupted across the
north of England. The instigators were primarily young Muslim men of South
Asian descent. These events occurred primarily in Bradford, Burnley, and
Oldahm; smaller occurrences were also witnessed in Hanley and Leeds.
Despite various official reports on the disturbances, the role of the far-right
(including the BNP) was largely dismissed as irrelevant to the tensions that
emerged. However, the BNP was actively campaigning in all of these areas
during these disturbances, and BNP leader Nick Griffin had been addressing
a meeting of supporters in Bradford the night before the Bradford distur-
bances. Incidentally, these were the worst disturbances of their kind in recent
British history. For a fuller consideration of the Bradford disturbances and its
aftermath, see Christopher Allen, Fair Justice: The Bradford Disturbances,
the Sentencing, and the Impact (London: FAIR, 2003).

21. This resource was widely distributed to the media and received significant
media coverage throughout 2001 and 2002. At the present time, though, and
as with the earlier mentioned anti-Muslim literature, this resource is very dif-
ficult to obtain due to the BNP’s actions following the House of Lords Select
Committee.

22. BNP Press release, dated 22 December 2001 (London).
23. Allen, Fair Justice.
24. Barker, The New Racism.
25. “Attitudes towards British Muslims.” This poll was conducted by YouGov on

behalf of the Islamic Society of Britain (London), on 4 November 2002.
26. The London Times, 4 October 2001.
27. Ibid., 7 October 2001.
28. The London Times, 4 October 2001.
29. In this war of civilizations, the West will prevail. The Daily Telegraph, 8

October 2001.
30. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World

Order (London: Simon and Schuster, 1998).
31. The Guardian, 5 October 2001.
32. Cited in The Runnymede Trust, Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All

(London: Runnymede Trust, 1997), 12.
33. “Islamophilia,” The Daily Telegraph, 12 October 2001.
34. “Down with Multiculturalism,” Ibid., 8 May 2002.
35. Allen, Fair Justice, 46.
36. The Runnymede Trust, Islamophobia, 1-4.

Allen: Justifying Islamophobia 25