God Beyond
the Boundary-Stones of Thought

Abbas Ahsan

Abstract

In this paper I make the case for epistemic relativism: the radical 
view that all human knowledge/truth is relative. I extend the ap-
plication of epistemic relativism to include necessary laws such as 
the laws of logic. I argue that the truth of such laws are relative to 
human thought, which are ultimately instances derived from our 
experiences. These experiences act as limitations to which we are 
conceptually bound. As a result of this, we cannot apprehend God’s 
omnipotence. This includes God’s maximal power in being able to 
perform logically impossible actions. Our epistemic inability to 
conceive of such logically impossible actions is therefore testimony 
that God transcends the laws of logic. 

Introduction: Defining Omnipotence
Attempting to define the term ‘omnipotent’ by referring to a common En-
glish dictionary may not seem too difficult. Why should it? You pick up a 
dictionary, search for the word and your enquiry should reveal something 
like, ‘all-powerfulness’, ‘almighty’, ‘having unlimited power’, etc. Such char-
acterizations would, at least to some extent, cognitively satisfy the layper-
son (that is, of course, if such a person is not seeking anything beyond the 
vernacular). The dictionary, in this context, would have succeeded in ex-
pressing a given meaning. It would have revealed a fairly common—albeit 

Abbas Ahsan is a doctoral researcher at the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of 
Religion, situated at the University of Birmingham (UK). His current research fo-
cuses on the methodology and the possible application of analytic philosophy in 
the Islamic tradition.

Ahsan, Abbas. 2020. “God Beyond the Boundary-Stones of Thought.” American Journal of Islam and 
Society 37, nos. 3-4: 50–97 • doi: 10.35632/ajis.v37i3-4.593
Copyright © 2020 International Institute of Islamic Thought



 51

an un-philosophical or philosophically superficial—definition of the term 
which the inquirer had been seeking. This seems fine—at least in isolation 
from any associated matters. It is only when we begin to associate the term 
‘omnipotent’ with a god when the issue becomes apparent. 

Many theists maintain that divine omnipotence is an essential attri-
bute of God. Believing that God is all-powerful would have to imply that 
He is capable of doing all things. On the face of it, this would exclude any 
and all exceptions. On such grounds, God would possess absolute power 
and will, allowing Him to do everything that He so chooses. However, this 
hardly settles the matter. What exactly would it mean for God to possess 
such comprehensive power? What would possessing such power comprise 
and entail (that is, for God to have the ability and will to perform anything 
at all)? If there are no conceived limits to God’s power and will, would it 
imply that He is able to carry out tasks that are casually, logically, and con-
ceptually impossible? Would God, if He chose to, be able to change the 
past, or create a stone so large that He could not lift, or square the circle? 
The answers to such questions do not appear to lie within the definition 
of the term ‘omnipotence’ itself—at least not if you subscribe to semantic 
internalism. On the contrary, even if one were to subscribe to a semantic 
externalism, the matter would be far from being resolved. In the latter case, 
the manner in which the putative meaning of a given term is conceptu-
alized and applied to that which it denotes would be prone to oscillating 
between degrees of vagueness in virtue of the agent. With respect to both 
semantic internalism and externalism, the definition of ‘omnipotence’ can 
be considered in one of two ways. It will either mean:

That God possesses maximal power relative to all his creation. This par-
ticular concept would not allow God to perform any state of affairs, but 
only those which are (logically) possible (i.e. conceivable). Determining 
such states of affairs would be subject to the agent (mind-dependent); or,

That God literally possesses the power to bring about and perform abso-
lutely any state of affairs whatsoever; this includes necessary and impos-
sible (i.e. inconceivable) states of affairs also. Determining such states of 
affairs would not be subject to the agent (mind-independent).

The former view represents the term ‘omnipotence’ to be relative to 
minds that are cognisant of the very term. In the case of God, His om-
nipotence is proportionally determinable in virtue of His creation. This 
position does not allow God do perform or bring about absolutely any 

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52 The American Journal of Islam and Society 37:3-4

state of affairs. It broadly restrains God to a cognitivist understanding of 
religious language. This in turn makes God susceptible to a whole host of 
philosophical categories, such as grammar, definability, existence, matters 
of fact, explanatory hypothesis, inferences, probability, conceivability, etc. 
An overarching category which God would be susceptible to and confined 
by, in this respect, would include the laws of logic. Consequently, He would 
be unable to perform any logically impossible and/or inconceivable acts. 

The latter view refers to God’s power in an absolute sense; one which 
is not relative to anything. This would also include that He has the ability 
to do the logically impossible, i.e. carry out contradictory actions. In ear-
ly modern (Western) philosophy this understanding is attributed to René 
Descartes, the French philosopher, mathematician, and scientist. In a series 
of letters1 (around eight) to various individuals, Descartes implied that God 
is the creator of eternal truths and is able to perform anything whatsoever. 
For Descartes, it did not matter whether such acts are contradictory and 
therefore inconceivable for human minds to comprehend. God simply has 
the ability to perform them. Interpretations of Descartes suggestions infer 
that he did not hesitate to believe that God’s power was one without any 
limit. Since God created all the eternal truths, they (along with all other 
necessary truths) are actually contingent. Thus, God could alter them how 
and when He willed in whichever manner He willed to do so.2 This in-
cludes God’s ability to perform actions that would defy the laws of logic. 
Of course, there have been many objections to this view, since it entails an 
outright rejection of the law of non-contradiction.

The law of non-contradiction is formally expressed as ¬ (α ∧ ¬α): 
namely, it cannot be the case that both α and not-α. Regardless of the actual 
truth value of the variable α, according to this law, the formula on the whole 
would always be true. This is because a statement and its negation can-
not both be true at any one time. The truth of this matter holds no matter 
what the actual facts of the world may be. This kind of truth is commonly 
known as a tautology. Likewise, a contradiction (the result of defying the 
law of non-contradiction) would always be false no matter what the actual 
facts of the world may be. Adhering to the law of non-contradiction would 
therefore impose a genuine constraint on the way in which one conceives 
the structure of reality.3 The law of non-contradiction prohibits one from 
accepting/asserting the existence of a contradictory matter or state of af-
fairs, subsequently barring one from accepting/asserting its truth.4 On this 
view, God cannot bring about a state of affairs that is contradictory. Doing 



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so would not only be a rejection of the law of non-contradiction but would 
present a distorted view of our conception of reality or reality itself. 

When the issue is presented like this, namely, in a logical context, it be-
comes hard-hitting. From this perspective accepting or rejecting the law of 
non-contradiction would dictate as to whether we conceive of a consistent 
or inconsistent view of reality and God’s ability, respectively. This is certain-
ly the case if the law of non-contradiction is considered to be self-evidently 
true, irrespective of what one thinks and how the facts of the world might 
turn out to be. However, Descartes seems to be drawing our attention to-
wards something very different. For Descartes, eternal truths (which may 
be inclusive of arithmetic and the laws of logic) do not entirely enjoy a 
mind-independent status. Truths of this nature are not to be considered in 
the way they commonly are. 

It is God, according to Descartes, who has created all the eternal truths. 
His power is of the kind which allows Him to do so. His ability and will to 
create such truths implies that He transcends them. This means that God 
is neither confined nor compelled to act in accordance with such truths. If 
God happens to create a contradictory state of affairs and we fail to con-
ceive of such states of affairs, then our inability to do so would be a manifes-
tation of our conceptual limitations—not God’s. Our conceptual inability 
does not restrain God’s omnipotence in being able to perform those very 
actions.5 Descartes is supposing that God cannot have any limits. He is in-
finite. Moreover, this would imply that the finite human mind would fail in 
conceiving of this God in His entirety. Brink writes,

Therefore, Frankfurt has seen, it is a mistake to seek a logically coherent 
explication of Descartes’ assertions on God’s ability to make contradic-
tions true or change the eternal truths. For this would mean to try to 
comprehend the incomprehensible, which is not only impossible and 
unnecessary, but even impious. (Brink 1993, 8)

In light of the above it appears that much of the controversy surrounding 
the concept of omnipotence, or more specifically adopting a specific ex-
planation of omnipotence, needs to be distinguished as to whether it can 
be attributed to God in its full sense or not. For if you maintain that om-
nipotence is maximal power, but yet still constrained by logical possibility, 
then it would entail that the definition of maximal power is rather one of 
limited power. This line of thought would appear to be somewhat unfitting 
to the nature of a traditional omnipotent God. Alternatively, if you uphold 
the idea that omnipotence is maximal power, which is not constrained by 

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54 The American Journal of Islam and Society 37:3-4

logical possibility, then this would result in absolute power. We can then 
categorize these into the following two notions: 

God is conceivable in His true state and so are His actions. This would 
make Him finite on the grounds that we, His creation, would be capable 
of conceiving of Him. Consequently, He would not be able to perform all 
tasks whatsoever, because whatever is conceivable to us must be a logical 
possibility. Otherwise, logically impossible acts are rendered inconceiv-
able to us; or,

God is inconceivable in His true state and so are His actions. This would 
make Him infinite and absolute. He would transcend the conceptual 
ability of His creation. Consequently, He would be able to perform all 
tasks, logically impossible or not. We would not be able to conceive or 
apprehend Him or His actions in any delimited sense. 

I will argue the latter point in the course of this paper. I shall demonstrate 
that God is omnipotent in the sense that He is able to perform all acts re-
gardless of whether we are able to conceive of them or not. The failure of 
our capabilities in conceiving of those acts does not imply that they are 
‘impossible’ in themselves as states of affairs but only to the confines of 
our human reasoning. Thus, the implications of a logically impossible act 
would not be inherently impossible for God. Instead, its concept and lin-
guistic association to our intellect fails to correspond with any analogous 
thought process or states of affairs in the actual world. 

In particular, I will present why it is that we fail to conceive and ap-
prehend logically impossible states of affairs. This would in turn reveal that 
since we are constrained to certain laws of logic, we cannot infer particular 
truths as ‘absolute’ and ‘necessary’. Inferring that certain truths are absolute 
and necessary would require us to apprehend the true nature of absolute-
ness and necessity (in their entirety). However, we cannot do so. This is 
because the human mind is finite and incapable of generating any original 
thought. Thoughts cannot exclusively be dissociated from human experi-
ences. It is the complex association between our thoughts and experiences 
that contribute to what have become commonly known as the boundary 
stones of thought. This would include our thoughts about what have been 
termed ‘absolute’ and ‘necessary’ truths. I shall argue that they too are rel-
ative to human thought. In extension of this claim, I shall infer that all 
human knowledge is relative. So when we make the claim that ‘God cannot 
do the logically impossible’, then that claim too is relative to variations in 



 55

reference frames and conceptual schemas. It would not, therefore, make it 
‘impossible’ for God to perform all acts, as He is an infinite and absolute 
being. Instead, such matters would contribute to exhibiting our very own 
limited mental capacities.

I do not anticipate elaborating on the very notion of God Himself from 
a theological perspective. Nor do I associate the God in question to any one 
of the monotheistic religions. The reason for this is twofold. First, this is a 
philosophical study which predominantly focuses on epistemic and meta-
physical matters to do with logical laws and the boundaries of thought. It 
anticipates applying the findings of this study to a particular theological 
problem that is to do with God’s omnipotence. It does not engage with 
theological discourse beyond the point related to the problem of God’s 
omnipotence. Some may consider this an inadequate way to address such 
a theological problem, while others may deem it theologically irrelevant 
and/or redundant. I think the charge of theological inadequacy and irrel-
evance seems to be slightly misplaced in a philosophical study such as this 
one. That is, of course, not to overlook the theological end to which such 
a philosophical approach is being applied. Moreover, a serious theologian 
would acknowledge the significance of contemporary modes of philosoph-
ical thought. For some theologians philosophical thought may even take 
precedence over matters of theology. Theologians who fall into this camp 
hold that the manner in which philosophical thought is understood and 
subsequently applied to theological matters would contribute (and perhaps 
even shape) the kind of theology one engages in. Second, the notion of God 
that I have in mind, as well as the argument I hope to construct, is open to 
any one of the monotheistic religions to adopt. Although I make an indirect 
reference to the Islamic tradition in passing, I leave my argument open for 
members of the Christian and Jewish traditions to adopt if they so choose 
to do so.

I initiate my discussion by presenting and arguing for the notion of 
epistemic relativism. Subsequently, I apply the idea of epistemic relativism 
to various forms of truths in order demonstrate its viability. Thereafter, I 
apply the notion of epistemic relativism to the idea of God, or more pre-
cisely to the notion of omnipotence. 

1. Relativism
Relativism in general argues that points of view have no absolute truth or 
validity. Instead, they only have relative and subjective value according to 
differences in perception and consideration. Prior to taking a closer look at 

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56 The American Journal of Islam and Society 37:3-4

this definition it is worth noting that there are two overlapping character-
isations of what has been termed ‘relativism’. These include the following: 

Relativism about propositional truth: whether a proposition is true is not 
an absolute fact. Propositions can be true relative to some contexts of 
assessment, and false relative to others; and,

Relativism about utterance truth: whether an utterance is true is not an 
absolute fact. Utterances can be true relative to some contexts of assess-
ment, and false relative to others. (Shirreff and Weatherson 2017, 789)

There is a subtle difference parting the two types of relativism; which one of 
these constitutes a proper form of relativism is disputable. It is not always 
apparent as to which one of these is being defended or refuted by authors. I 
suppose it is natural to think that those engaging with relativism are doing 
so with the first type (relativism about propositional truth) in mind. I too 
shall engage with this type, since it appears to be the kind which is relativ-
ism proper. Yet there may be instances where an overlap between the two 
types becomes unavoidable. Krausz, for instance, has presented a definition 
which appears to represent the former type. He suggests that,

Relativism claims that truth, goodness, or beauty, is relative to a refer-
ence frame, and no absolute overarching standards to adjudicate between 
competing reference frames exists. (Krausz 2010, 13)

In regards to these ‘reference frames’, he further suggests,

Relativists hold that several incompatible non-converging reference 
frames, in terms of which we perceive and understand the world, could 
exist. At the boundaries of pertinent reference frames, where grounds 
for evaluation unique to those frames exhaust themselves, we have no 
absolutist way to adjudicate between contending frames. No absolute 
frame-neutral grounds for adjudicating between frames exist. For the 
relativist, where standards of evaluation are exhausted at the bounds of 
reference frames, the search for pertinent absolute standards makes no 
sense. (Krausz 2010, 14)

Not only does this suggest that we cannot have an absolute way of adju-
dicating between contending frames; it also implies that there exist no 
grounds for adjudication between frames at all. This would rule out or deny 
the possibility and acquisition of absolute standards of knowledge. Thus, 
the absolutists’ worry becomes apparent where, if such is the case, then 



 57

you would be inviting arbitrariness, anarchism, or nihilism. No worthwhile 
goal of inquiry would exist. 

I shall return to such objections shortly. At present I shall focus on ex-
actly what a ‘reference frame’ is, prior to investigating whether any grounds 
for adjudication exist. According to Krausz (2010), reference frames come 
in many varieties and their usage tends to vary upon the interests and pur-
poses of individuals. The comprising elements range from concepts to sit-
uations, personal thoughts and ideas to cultural, religious, and historical 
perspectives. Occasionally we may not even be able to distinguish what 
a particular reference frame consists of (i.e. what content or constituting 
element it should include and what it should exclude). The boundaries are 
not clear-cut in any decisive manner. Consequently, each and every aspect 
of that particular reference frame cannot be easily categorized. 

You may, for instance, have two traditions whose boundaries range 
from being significantly equivocal, to being partially imprecise, to being 
difficult to delineate altogether. Moreover, the diversity of the issue seems 
to broaden when some people are relativists in respect to one aspect of a 
given tradition and not another. For instance, some may adopt a relativist 
view with respect to conceptual schemas yet not with respect to civilizations 
or individuals. These relativists are referred to as ‘local’, as they conform to 
only some reference frames. On the other hand, those who apply a relativist 
view to all reference frames are referred to as ‘global’. The above-mentioned 
elements which constitute reference frames are neither exhaustive nor ex-
clusive. Rather they can depend on the individual’s experiences, which may 
significantly vary. 

Some relativists who seek to arbitrate and conform to a method of ad-
judication may resort to a significantly modified view of Kant (1996, 2007).  
The implication from the latter view is that whatever we experience, it takes 
on form in virtue of certain reference frames. This suggests that the di-
verse apprehension and understanding of the many variations of reference 
frames is a result of the experiences we accumulate in the course of our lives. 
Kant further emphasizes that the mind arranges and enforces concepts on 
sensory data which determine the form taken by our experiences of the 
world. Basic concepts are provided by the mind with which it organizes 
and interprets experience. The mind does not merely receive information; 
it actively organizes it to make sense of this information. Consequently, 
the world as we conceive it represents an order that the mind constructs. 
This process encapsulates all spatial, temporal, and causal orders which are 

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58 The American Journal of Islam and Society 37:3-4

manifestations of the logical procedure of all possible forms of judgment. 
However, despite Kant’s understanding of how we conceive and make sense 
of our experiences of the world, he discards the relativists’ claim that the 
content of experience is relative to numerous and possible forms of refer-
ence frames. For Kant, although experiences give rise to various reference 
frames, it is not relative to those variations. This is because Kant thinks that 
the logical structure of all possible forms of judgement is basic and unique 
in the sense that it rejects diversity. Thus, necessary and universal condi-
tions for the possibility of experience exist, because for Kant,

although all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow 
that it arises from experience. [He further suggests] … there really exist 
in our knowledge such necessary and in the strictest sense universal, and 
therefore pure, a priori judgments. (Kant 2007, 37-39) 

The apprehensions of worldly experience which we encounter are invari-
ably mediated through ‘forms of intuition’ or ‘categories’. These, for Kant, 
are the necessary elements of all knowledge. In the absence of these a priori 
categories, Kant suggests that encountering an experience of the world it-
self would be impossible.

If this is the case, then it should follow that there must exist some meth-
od of adjudication between reference frames. That is, even if these a priori 
categories do determine the fact of actually encountering an experience of 
the world, as Kant puts it, there still, in this case, needs to be some decisive 
factor which acts as an adjudicating element. However, there just doesn’t 
seem to be one! The mind, for Kant, plays a crucial role in determining how 
we actually perceive reality. In absence of the mind we really cannot know 
what is out there. Nonetheless, the essential question is not how or what 
role the mind actually plays in perceiving reality or shaping experiences in 
a way that allows us to make sense of the world. Instead it is whether there 
is a fixed and decisive way in which we come to perceive reality in the way 
we do. Is there an adjudicating method which our mind refers to when 
making sense of the world in the way it does? Thus, the dispute with Kant is 
not how (in a descriptive sense) the experiences we encounter are actually 
perceived. Rather, it is how (in a prescriptive sense of a fixed method) an 
indeterminate process of selecting our (certain) experiences gives rise to 
absolute truths. 

Krausz expresses his contention with Kant’s view by suggesting that—
although it may provide us with some idea of how we conceive of our 
experiences—it does not dissolve the relativist’s fundamental issue. That 



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is, Kant’s view fails in offering a decisive method of adjudicating between 
reference frames. Krausz writes,

even if Kant is right that the structure of the world as we experience it is 
imported into that experienced world by our perceptual and cognitive 
resources, we would still not have the resources necessary to adjudicate 
between reference frames. All that Kant’s resources would provide are 
the conditions necessary for us to experience the world at all. While 
Kant’s categories may be necessary and universal for the possibility of 
experiencing objects as objects that they come to be, it does not follow 
that those categories determine the characteristics that individuate them 
or the conditions that adjudicate between admissible and inadmissible 
objects of knowledge. (Krausz 2010, 19) 

Nonetheless, Kant’s position would not deter the relativist from their view 
that no absolute standards of knowledge exist. This is simply because there 
exist no grounds for adjudication between reference frames. How then 
might one gauge or determine with any degree of certainty the validity of 
any proposition? What elementary factors would fundamentally influence 
such thought processes? 

The causes for this diversity in the patterns of thought rest on varia-
tions in concepts (granted differences in language, historical milieu, cul-
ture, economic status, etc.). The possible patterns of thought of an individ-
ual who makes any given judgment would depend on that very individual’s 
‘conceptual schema’. This involves the cognitive elements of concepts such 
as beliefs, laws of logic, etc. Davidson expresses the role of conceptual sche-
mas as

ways of organising experience; they are systems of categories that give 
form to the data of sensation; they are points of view from which individ-
uals, cultures, or periods survey the passing scene. (Davidson 2010, 140)

If our ‘cognitive procedures’ (i.e., modes of thought) rely on available and 
accessible cognitive resources, then to say that truth is relative to patterns of 
thought would be to say that truth is relative to conceptual schemas. Runzo 
has emphasized the same point by asserting that

thought and patterns of thought are only possible in virtue of a back-
ground context of presuppositions and assumed concepts. There is no 
such thing as a (literally) utterly isolated thought. A thought is a thought 
in the context of other possible thoughts, and of the cognitive resources 
which make those thoughts possible. (Runzo 1986, 35)

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60 The American Journal of Islam and Society 37:3-4

However, why might one suppose that truth is relative to conceptual 
schemas? What reasons would a relativist propose to substantiate such a 
position? The fundamental idea rests on the presupposition that there is 
not a singular set of facts about the world (in contrast to William James). 
James (see Runzo 1986) suggests that if there are true ideas (i.e., which 
correspond to reality), then there must only be one set of facts about the 
world. Irrespective of what is thought to be true by people who happen to 
think about things differently, “facts about the world” are immutable. From 
this perspective you shall have some people who uphold true knowledge 
(in which facts actually correspond to reality), and others who uphold false 
knowledge (in which facts fail to correspond to reality). It is this success 
and failure to correspond to reality which, for James, is the determining 
factor by which we are able to obtain decisive facts about the world. 

Opposing James’ view, a relativist would either have to reject the idea 
that there is a corresponding relationship between matters of fact and the 
world (or reality), or that there is only one way the world is. Let us focus 
on the latter of these. The relativist would have to provide evidence that 
there is not a singular set of facts about the world. Let us first ascertain two 
underlying assumptions upon which this claim would rest:

That there exist no neutral facts about the world to which we have access. 
Additionally, similar to what Kant proposed, there are no facts which 
are completely autonomous of minds, even though they may be discov-
ered by minds. In other words, facts are not just simply read off from the 
world which we perceive and experience, but instead, the world to some 
extent constitutes the facts as we read them in virtue of our schemas; or

That the mind can create more than one adequate construction of the 
facts about the world. This assumption asserts that while facts are, in 
part, a construction of the mind, there is no correct or decisive man-
ner in which the mind should actively impose this constructive element. 
Consequently, there is no single correct manner that the facts about the 
world should actually be. 

The above assumptions are indicative of at least two matters which are 
responsible for determining our view of reality. Firstly, the possible con-
stituting elements of reality are not merely determined by how the world 
actually projects itself onto its observer (call this the external factor). In-
stead this needs to be coupled with the manner in which the recipient goes 
on to perceive the world in virtue of their conceptual scheme (call this the 



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internal factor). One factor cannot be entirely discounted at the cost of the 
other. This begs a question, bringing us to the second matter. How do our 
minds (advertently or inadvertently) adjudicate between external and in-
ternal factors in a manner that draws the required balance, allowing for us 
to make sense of reality? That is, if both the external and internal factors 
are integral in contributing to what we may refer to as perceptive and even 
conceptual knowledge, then such contributions must in some way be pro-
cessed in arriving at that knowledge. This means our minds must undergo 
some process in virtue of which we able to arrive at consistent views of 
reality which ultimately gives rise to such modes of knowledge. 

Davidson (2010) argues that the whole idea of conceptual schemas is 
incoherent. The issue rather is one of translation, as he suggests that the ini-
tiative for understanding the thought of others is equivalent to the initiative 
of finding our own words for those thoughts or, in other words, translating 
the words of others into our own. That is, we can (to some extent) articulate 
in our own words what others think. What Davidson is making apparent 
here is a linguistic diversity which demonstrates and echoes significant dis-
similarities in style and value (although differences in points of view would 
not make any sense if there is no common coordinating system onto which 
to plot them). He therefore proposes that we require some considerations 
that would fix the parameters in order to conceptually contrast one view 
from another. Davidson insists that we need to be able to decisively refer to 
some set of adjudicating laws. More importantly, such laws are required to 
authenticate our judgement or knowledge.

Davidson moves on to suggest that conceptual schemas may be identi-
fied with languages—or rather, a set of languages—which express the same 
schema. Thus as conceptual schemas differ, so do languages. (Granted, 
speakers of different languages may share similar or even identical con-
ceptual schemas.) This would imply that studying the art and criteria of 
translating languages is a way of understanding the criteria of identity for 
conceptual schemas. Nevertheless, he asks, could we say two people have 
different conceptual schemas if they speak languages which fail to be trans-
lated to one another? In reply he states,

In what follows, I consider two kinds of case that might be expected to 
arise: complete, and partial, failures of translatability. There would be 
complete failure if no significant range of sentences in one language 
could be translated into one another; there would be partial failure if 

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62 The American Journal of Islam and Society 37:3-4

some range could be translated and some range could not. (Davidson 
2010, 142)

In regard to the case of complete failure, he writes that,

nothing, it may be said, could count as evidence that some form of activi-
ty could not be interpreted in our language that was not at the same time 
evidence that that form of activity was not speech behaviour. (Davidson 
2010, 142)

So for Davidson, if one language has the capability of entirely being trans-
lated into another, then no real differences of conceptual schemas can lie 
behind those languages. On the other hand, if one language cannot be fully 
translated into another, then in such a case a substantive difference of con-
ceptual schemas would be implied. 

Blackburn (2010) quite rightly refers to this position as a kind of 
“linguistic imperialism”, by which anything said in late-twentieth-centu-
ry American terms should not make sense whatsoever (simply because 
speakers of the same language can possess radically different conceptual 
schemas). Consider an English-speaking, late-twentieth-century American 
astrophysicist who expresses a phrase or a term which may not be entire-
ly understood to an English-speaking, late-twentieth-century American 
astrologist. Alternatively, consider those possessing the same conceptual 
schema who happen to speak quite different languages in order to express 
those schemas. The disparity in both cases impedes the sort of correspon-
dence that is sought and seen as necessary in order to communicate. 

Blackburn further highlights the concern of implicit verificationism: 
the somewhat unpopular philosophical concept which asserts that the pos-
sibilities we are unable to verify as obtaining, cannot qualify as real pos-
sibilities at all. A more concerning feature of this type of verificationism 
arises when we are required to translate unverifiable content with the aid 
of our language. In such cases the manner in which we obtain some ade-
quation of the content of our minds would hinge (although not entirely) on 
how satisfactorily we are able to linguistically represent that content.

For if we consider the enterprise of learning we realize that the art of 
learning is not merely an act of translating. Take for instance a student who 
would like to verify whether the content taught by the instructor actually 
makes sense. Making sense of the content would not only include trans-
lating it into a mediatory language or expressing it in alternative modes. 
Instead, this profound undertaking involves expanding and changing 



 63

conceptual repertoires. Discovering new vocabularies, concepts, and theo-
ries and expanding different avenues of understanding various phenomena 
all contribute towards making sense of what is taught. An exclusive focus 
on translation would fail to provide meaningful context in being able to 
make sense of taught and/or acquired knowledge.

Davidson presents an argument which attempts to undermine each 
metaphor of this equation. He writes against the idea of a scheme ‘orga-
nizing’ experience; quite reasonably, he notes that it is only “pluralities” 
which get organised. If, for instance, you were tasked to organize smaller 
sets of shoes and shirts in the absence of a larger set, say a closet, then 
such a task would be somewhat bewildering. Of course, Davidson does not 
mean to imply that such a trivial task would be made impossible in the 
absence of a closet. Rather his analogy seeks to draw our attention to the 
point that although some languages may contain terms that are not equiv-
alent across other languages, there exists certain features that are common 
between them. It is the existence of such common features that creates for 
the possibility to determine and decipher identity claims. Despite the fact 
that you and I may have our own differing ways of strategically and aesthet-
ically organizing the same closet, there exists a common feature making 
each of us alike in some way, namely, dealing with sets of shoes and shirts. 
Similarly, although you and I may be using different languages to imply the 
same thing, we in turn would be dealing with the same set of conceptual 
definitions.

In reply to Davidson, Blackburn says (while attacking the notion of 
‘fitting experience’),

Davidson seems to detach language too far from the detailed, piecemeal 
procedures of verification that are part and parcel of our lives. He is even-
tually left with the unconvincing substitute of covering our beliefs with a 
snowy mantle of truth, leaving their particular and individual footing in 
experience of no importance (hence the claim to have destroyed any final 
allure of empiricism). (Blackburn 2010, 167-168)

Blackburn’s reason for making the above claim is based on the assumption 
that we need not associate the conceptual schemas with the ‘organize’ met-
aphor. This is because shifts in language and theory do not actually play a 
part in altering experience. Rather, it is experience that shapes experience. 
Take listening to a particular tune that is played using a musical instrument, 
for instance. You hear and experience a set of fixed notes being played in 
an arranged manner. Thereafter, you have (subconsciously) retained an 

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64 The American Journal of Islam and Society 37:3-4

experience of the set of notes played in this tune. Now suppose you hear 
the same set of notes being played by the same musical instrument for a 
second time. However, upon this occasion, the set of notes being played 
are arranged in a slightly altered manner. Consequently, you have retained 
an experience of a different pattern of notes played. As a result, you have 
experienced two different tunes composed by the same set of notes and 
using the same musical instrument. The only difference is that each of the 
sets of notes were played in different sequences. I could only recognize that 
a change existed after having heard and retained the experience of hearing 
at least one of them (irrespective of the order). At each and every instance 
my experience appears to be the determining factor in demarcating pres-
ent experiences and previously retained ones. In such cases, change is not 
really determined or effected by shifts of language, concepts, or theories. 
Rather, it is a former experience which influences and shapes the latter. 
Thus experience seems to take precedence over our conceptual schemas in 
influencing our experiences. 

But what is it, then, that makes experiences and utterances of a rela-
tivistic nature true? Davidson refers to our thoughts being drawn from a 
minimalist view of truth. This implies that nothing general or abstract can 
be said about truth. In other words, any given sentence, providing it locates 
a definite issue, can only be said to be true if it is translatable into my own 
language (i.e., by the terms which that sentence provides). You may come 
across a foreign sentence which you cannot translate, and as a result cannot 
determine its truth or validity; however, you can envisage a translation en-
abling you to identify the content of that sentence. That would inform you 
as to what would count as its truth (or truth-maker).

However, it is difficult to see how this line of thought yields a stan-
dardized truth which offers an association between two different minds. 
The problem is not with what the minimalist says—that no ‘thing’ makes 
sentences true, and furthermore that it is also true that I cannot say exactly 
what makes a foreign language true (or false, for that matter) unless I know 
what it means. Despite whatever certainty these two points carry, neither of 
them brings us any closer to rejecting the possibility of a significant disas-
sociation between two separate minds. The cognitive processes involved in 
each would appear to be fixated onto different versions of how they perceive 
the world. It is these variations in perception which the account of concep-
tual schemas is attempting to demonstrate in theory. Discarding concep-
tual schemas would imply that some other sort of invariable theoretical 



 65

framework subsists to which reference can be made for adjudicating and 
authenticating all experiences and utterances. As a matter of fact, this is 
precisely what the relativists deny. The relativists’ idea can be represented 
in the following manner:

For all X-judgments, some feature, F, of an X-judgment is relative to Y

If that is actually the case, suggesting that all judgments (and/or truth) are 
relative, then the general objections would be those raised by Putnam and 
Rorty:

If all truth is relative, then the truth of the premises of this argument are 
only relative. and the conclusion is only true for someone who already 
holds it, or is inclined to hold it. Were this the case, the argument would 
be inconsequential; and

Second, it is plausible to suppose that there is more than one adequate 
way to conceive of what is possible, because of the impressive plurality 
of conceptual schemas, past and present, and the pragmatic success of so 
many actual schemas as well as the probable future success of a virtually 
limitless plethora of possible future schemas. Thus it seems most plausi-
ble to conclude that there are alternative, adequate sets of facts about the 
world. (Runzo 1986, 38)

The first objection emphasizes that relativism is incoherent or rather 
self-defeating: if it attempts to support its claim relatively, then it would 
simply beg the question; if it attempts to do so non-relatively, then it would 
require giving up the concept which it is theorizing. This objection can be 
represented in the form of the knowability paradox, which can be formal-
ized as follows:

The Knowability Paradox: ∀p (p→◊Kp) ⊢ ∀p (p→ Kp)

If all truths are knowable in principle, then it logically follows that each 
truth is (at some point in time) known. A proposition stating an unknow-
able truth would also be knowable. To demonstrate the commonality be-
tween the knowability paradox and the objection against relativism as stat-
ed above, we can alter the K (the epistemic operator) with R to represent 
relativism. In such case we would have: 

The Relativism Paradox ∀p (p→◊Rp) ⊢ ∀p (p→ Rp)

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66 The American Journal of Islam and Society 37:3-4

If all truths are relative in principle, then it logically follows that each truth 
is (at some point in time) relative. If all truths are relative in principle then 
there cannot be any un-relative truths. A proposition stating an un-relative 
truth would also be relative. The paradox is apparent. 

In reply to this objection it would be helpful to acknowledge that an 
argument for relativism would amount to an argument against absolutism. 
Epistemically, absolutism asserts that there is (or exists) only one correct or 
authoritative fundamental standard (though possibly comprised of various 
constituting components) for assessing epistemic merit. It further concedes 
that this manner of assessment has not possibly been adopted by any per-
son in its entirety. Thus, this standard seeks to determine epistemic appro-
priateness, not merely for beliefs but also the rules for adopting particular 
beliefs. However, it seems almost unavoidable that you shall eventually 
encounter two competing beliefs (or rules) which appear equally justified. 
If this is the case, then according to this authoritative standard you would 
simply have to suspend judgement. This would compel one to abandon 
the matter at hand whereby no likely resolve would be possible on rational 
grounds. 

Relativism, however, supports contrasting views while denying epis-
temic absolutism altogether. Ironically, supporting contrasting views 
against the absolutist does not appear to place the relativist in any better 
position. For such views, irrespective of whether they are in support of 
relativism or in opposition to absolutism, would fail to be defensible for 
determined relativists. Conversely, supporting absolutism and opposing 
relativism would equally fail to be defensible positions for determined rel-
ativists. The charge an absolutist may advance against the relativist is that 
no absolute overriding adjudication standards actually exist. Consequently, 
there would be no worthwhile goal of inquiry. Moreover, it would diminish 
the possibility of progress in knowledge and force the relativist to resort 
to arbitrariness, anarchism, or nihilism. During this charge, the absolutist 
may firstly make it apparent that standards of adjudication do exist (for 
them at least) which the relativists fail to acknowledge. Secondly, they may 
take solace in their optimism toward and perseverance in seeking those 
standards. Thirdly, they may seek to demonstrate the possibility of advanc-
ing in knowledge during their pursuit of such standards of adjudication. 

The relativist, on the other hand, would need to demonstrate that the 
absolutist’s optimism is, below the surface, nothing more than an epistemic 
illusion; that it fails to deliver successful results. But how are the relativists 



 67

to establish such a claim? There is a further issue which makes this demand 
more difficult to meet: any argument against the absolutist would imply that 
the relativist is committed to definite claims. At this point it would seem 
that the best a relativist could hope for in repudiating the absolutist claim is 
proposing that the absolutist’s position is implausible. Such implausibility 
would be one that significantly rests on indeterminate optimism. That is the 
kind which appeals to hollow promises and a deep-rooted dissatisfaction 
in offering substantive adjudicating standards. However, this is far from an 
easy task. In fact, the likelihood that the relativist would fail the absolutist’s 
challenge increases.

The relativist’s frustration towards the absolutist, however, cannot be 
trivialized. One way to appreciate this is to consider the distinction between 
deflationist and inflationist accounts of truth. The deflationist account of 
truth is representative of an insubstantive truth theory, while the inflation-
ist account of truth is representative of a substantive truth theory. I do not 
propose a strict analogy between deflationism/inflationism and relativism/
absolutism. Nonetheless, relativists may express their frustration about the 
absolutists by referring to notable features that distinguish deflationism 
from inflationism. More importantly, I hope to demonstrate that the rela-
tivists’ frustration bears epistemic weight against the absolutists. 

Sher presents five central elements of the deflationary theories of truth 
which are representative of the insubstantive account. These are central el-
ements argued by Horwich:

1. Frustration with past attempts to develop substantive theories of truth; 
2. Satisfaction with a trivial theory of truth;  
3. Identification of the theory of truth with a single and simple definition 
schema;        
4. Narrow conception of the role of truth in our cognitive life; and 
5. Bold adequacy claim (Sher 2016, 819-820)

The first of these elements, quite frankly, manifests the deep-rooted 
dissatisfaction that the deflationists have mounted against the inflationists. 
This is primarily motived by the latter’s ineptitude and failure to provide a 
substantive theory that captures the underlying essence of truth. The de-
flationists’ frustration stems from the incompetency of the inflationists in 
providing satisfactory answers, which were thought to be subtle and pro-
found, to fundamental questions surrounding truth. In fact, according to 
the deflationists the very pursuit of inquiring into the nature of truth has 
been exhausted. They have reached the limits of analysis to the extent that 

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68 The American Journal of Islam and Society 37:3-4

“hardly any progress has been made towards achieving the insight we seem 
to need” (quoting Horwich in Sher 2016, 820).

The second of these elements can be considered a consequence of the 
first. Given the inflationists’ failure to provide a substantive account of 
truth, the deflationists’ despair has led them to settle with a trivial account 
of truth. On this view, we needn’t trouble ourselves with attempting to deci-
pher the underlying essence of truth with the aid of profound philosophical 
investigation. Truth should be considered a vacuous (non-substantive) no-
tion which does not require metaphysical grounding.

The third of these elements sheds further light on how the triviality 
of truth is captured. Being able to identify and capture truth instances for 
the deflationist is simple. The method is confined and neatly expressed by 
the equivalence schema: (ES) <p> is true if and only if p, which is logically 
expressed as: T ↔ <p>. Trivial instances that are expressed by this schema 
are instances of deflationary truth. A common example is “it is true that 
snow is white if and only if snow is white.”

The fourth of these elements expresses the domain in which deflation-
ary truth bears value. Given that deflationary truth is metaphysically vacu-
ous and therefore trivial, its value is exclusively logical. This means that the 
truth-value which the deflationist would arrive at would possess no more 
meaning than what the equivalence schema allows. Although this helps 
the deflationist arrive at a truth-value in a particular sense, it is one which 
would impede us from attaching any significant meaning to the truth-value 
in question. Nonetheless, for the deflationist this is hardly an issue. In fact, 
this very situation makes the concept of truth invaluable: “For it enables 
the construction of another proposition, intimately related to the one we 
can’t identify, which is perfectly appropriate as the alternative object of our 
attitude” (quoting Horwich in Sher 2016, 820).

The fifth of these elements sums up the implication of the fourth ele-
ment with a universal claim. “Referring to his own version of deflationism, 
‘minimalism,’ Horwich says: [O]ur thesis is that it is possible to explain all 
the facts involving truth on the basis of the minimal theory. (Ibid.: 6–7, my 
italics) The entire conceptual and theoretical role of truth may be explained 
on this basis. (Ibid.: 5)” (Sher 2016, 820).

The deflationist then seems justified in expressing their frustration in 
the manner they have. Of course, I do not propose that the way in which 
this frustration has been expressed justifies the deflationists’ position. I am 
making a more modest claim: that such expressions of frustration are not 



 69

trivial, and cannot be ignored by the inflationist. Likewise, the relativists’ 
objections are not trivial, and cannot be ignored by the absolutist. Nev-
ertheless, the relativists still appear disadvantaged, though much of their 
objections have chastened the absolutist’s confidence. Yet they are under no 
compulsion to meet the demands of the absolutist in substantiating their 
position. The burden of proof does not solely lie with them. Neither of these 
two positions, strictly speaking, has privilege over the other. 

It is only when this balance is disrupted that we witness unwarranted 
demands. This is what happens when the absolutists demand evidence from 
the relativist. (If and when such demands fail to be met, then the relativist 
position is declared incoherent.) Even so, the relativists are required only 
to present their position, not to persuade the absolutists. It is unreasonable 
that a position only becomes coherent if one succeeds in satisfying one’s 
opponent. 

Krausz (2010) has referred to such a presentation of a position as of-
fering “ampliative” rather than “determinative” reasons. Ampliative reasons 
are those rationales provided without seeking to convince others to adopt 
the same view, in contrast to determinative reasons. One might argue that 
the only reason for providing motives of such kind is to convince others. 
However, due to the fundamentally different frameworks which absolutism 
and relativism rest upon, it would be near impossible for proponents of ei-
ther to adopt the other’s views. Providing ampliative reasons to substantiate 
one’s own position is sufficient.

However, if the relativists present reasons only good enough to sup-
port their own views, which do not on argumentative grounds correspond 
to any common substratum between them and their opponents, then these 
reasons would be exclusive to them alone. This would imply that relativ-
ism is a somewhat private or personal view rather than an idea which has 
rational (or empirical) evidence to substantiate its fundamental position 
and which could appear plausible to others. This would severely restrict 
the possibility of attaining universal consensus or acceptability. Nor should 
this consideration be limited to the relativist alone. We may accept and 
adopt a fundamental principle on inadequate grounds of rationale; if that 
is the case then many notions of thought which we preserve would be pri-
vate or personal. Take religious beliefs, for instance. Various beliefs do not 
follow a strictly logical or rational form of thought. However, the absence 
of clear logical evidence or rational thought (or any form of evidence) does 
not eradicate or even diminish its credibility for individuals or groups. We 

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70 The American Journal of Islam and Society 37:3-4

presume that beliefs need be “justified”, in the sense of presenting an argu-
ment to defend and substantiate them. However, Goldman quite interest-
ingly proposes that,

I do not even assume that when a belief is justified there is something 
“possessed” by the believer which can be called “justification”. I do as-
sume that a justified belief gets its status of being justified from some pro-
cesses or properties that make it justified. In short, there must be some 
justification-conferring processes or properties. But this does not imply 
that there must be an argument, or reason, or anything else, “possessed” 
at the time of belief by the believer. (Goldman 2008, 334)

Goldman suggests two points in the above passage. First, there exist some 
process or properties that make a belief justified. Second, justifying a belief 
would not necessarily mean presenting an argument or a set of reasoning, 
but rather would mean referring to some process or properties. The believ-
er’s belief would not need to convince his/her opponents but convince the 
believer him/herself in what he/she believes to be true and thus justified. 
We can present this in the following manner:

If P believes Q at T, and Q is indubitable for P at T, then P’s belief in Q at 
T is justified

Again, we have arrived at some sort of personal and private way of think-
ing, one that does not have to conform with any particular ground rules in 
order to substantiate its position. We could correctly assume relativism to 
be in a similar position, not requiring an argument or a certain set of rea-
sons to validate its position. In relation to this, Luper (2004) suggests that 
relativists making a case for relativism need not abide by the non-deadlock 
principle (i.e., that each side in a dispute must present their argument on the 
basis of assertions acceptable to the opposing side), whereas the absolutists 
must in fact abide by it. For the relativists intrinsically suppose that the 
non-deadlock principle is antithetical to their case, and discard anything 
that supports it. Therefore, accepting the non-deadlock principle would bar 
the absolutists from asserting that relativism is actually incoherent. 

The second objection to relativism quite forcefully asserts that the plu-
rality of views which relativism endorses would imply that either, amongst 
these views there is an absolute or definite way to conceive the world; or, 
(somehow) the plurality of views together in collaboration with one an-
other would formulate one absolute or definite way to conceive the world. 
A common feature of both these views is that there exists, among all the 



 71

alternative modes of thinking about the truth, a fixed set of facts about the 
world. As much as this objection may appear to be a decisive blow against 
the relativists, it simply misses the point of what relativism is proposing 
altogether. Relativism does not propose to offer a list of all the possible ways 
of conceiving the world. Neither does it seek out an absolute or definite cri-
terion from among those possibilities for arriving at the actual truth. What 
this particular epistemic position infers is that the correctness of judgments 
about matters of truth would vary depending on those who are making the 
judgments. Since each and every individual’s disposition and level of cog-
nition varies, the knowledge perspectives I am exposed to and acquainted 
with (whether it be gender, class, sexuality, self-understanding, religious 
belief, aesthetic value, and so on) result in the alternative versions of truth I 
encounter. The more versions of truth I encounter—whether by stumbling 
across them in total coincidence or in advancing a strategic inquiry—the 
more my current position of truth would be challenged. Consequently, 
with there being many alternative versions of truth, there is no set criterion 
or method of adjudication between such truths that ultimately allows for 
an absolute truth.

2. The Application of Relativism
Thus far I have discussed what relativism proposes and how it manages to 
uphold its constituting features. I shall now like to discuss the application 
of relativism and the extent to which it can be applied to statements that 
are considered true. First, I shall clarify the ‘statuses’ of statements to which 
we apply a relativistic method. Runzo (1986) has categorized the statuses 
of statements into two groups, namely, first-order and second-order.6 This 
categorization is in a linguistic context and should not be confused with 
the logical context. He emphasizes that it is crucial to distinguish a relativ-
ist’s conception of truth between these two types of statements. First-order 
statements are those used in an object language to refer to actual or possible 
states of affairs. For instance, statements like “today is 21°C” or “if I went to 
the moon…” are first-order statements. On the other hand, second-order 
statements are those about the object language rather than in the object lan-
guage. These statements use a particular language in order to refer to and 
make statements (whether meta-logical or meta-linguistic) about formal 
properties of that language. For instance, asserting the law of non-contra-
diction (no proposition or statement can be both true and false at the same 
time) is a second-order statement of this type.

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72 The American Journal of Islam and Society 37:3-4

In considering these two types of statements, it becomes clear that we 
can only apply a relativistic account to first-order statements, not to sec-
ond-order statements. For example, if I stated that “today is 21°C,” then this 
statement from a relativist’s perspective would only be true depending on 
the context (i.e., the reference frames as well as the conceptual schemas) in 
which it is perceived. According to the relativist this statement would not 
manage to present an absolute fact about the matter it aims to express. This 
is primarily due to the varying contexts in which it can be perceived. This 
much a relativist would be able to assert. 

However, the case with second-order statements is very different. To 
demonstrate, let us take the example mentioned above (the law of non-con-
tradiction). If such a law is also subjected to a relativistic account, it would 
compromise the very criteria that constitute relativism. This would include 
jeopardizing features such as reference frames and conceptual schemas, 
and would ultimately risk undermining the relativist’s own position. Runzo 
refers to those relativists who are bold enough to apply their account to 
second-order statements as ‘epistemic relativists’:

I will use ‘epistemic relativism’ to refer to any position about second-or-
der statements which holds or implies that the correctness or incorrect-
ness of judgements about the nature of, or the criteria for, truth or for 
semantic meaning or for how knowledge is acquired varies with who is 
making the judgment. (Runzo 1983, 40)

In what follows he further suggests that if the authenticity or correctness 
of any view is itself relative to one’s own schema, then in consequence, de-
ducing a criterion which aids in successfully building a theory of truth, or 
defining terms by giving them a meaning, or more generally the acquisition 
of knowledge, would be futile. It’s not surprising to encounter such futile 
consequences since epistemic relativism seems to clearly abandon all types 
of fundamental criteria. If such a position “liberates” itself from all adju-
dicating criteria it would then bring us back to the arguments previously 
leveled against relativism, namely, that this line of thought would seem to 
defeat the whole purpose of having a theory about the nature of truth. So, 
this form of relativism is abandoned not only because it makes incoherent 
claims but also because it simply fails to deliver a theory of truth.

Given such criteria, these severe consequences are apparent in the 
bold assertion that “all truth is relative”, which intends to relate to every 
form of truth that may be accessible or known. They are even more explicit 
when considering modalities (that is, modal instances which are expressive 



 73

of extensional terms such as possibility and necessity). We resort to these 
types of statements when we talk of states of affairs that could or must oc-
cur (within the domain of possibility and necessity, respectively). The oc-
currence or non-occurrence of such states could be determined in one of 
three ways: either in virtue of causal laws and how they (are perceived to) 
operate and impact the physical world; or in virtue of the laws of logic and 
how we may think about them; or, more fundamentally, in virtue of how we 
acquire the meanings of terms and the manner in which we use those terms 
to denote matters of the world. Here are some examples that fall into each 
of these categories, respectively:

Causal Logical Conceptual
Possibility Necessity Possibility Necessity Possibility Necessity
Example:

‘it is possible 
to dissolve 
sodium 
chloride in 
H²O’

Example:

‘it is nec-
essary that 
nothing 
can travel 
faster than 
the speed of 
light’

Example:

‘it is possible 
that nothing 
ever existed 
in the uni-
verse’

Example:

‘it is nec-
essary that 
every giraffe 
is identical 
to itself ’

Example:

‘it is possible 
that some 
animals 
which we 
refer to as 
species of 
birds are 
flightless’

Example:

‘it is nec-
essary that 
if John is a 
bachelor, 
then he is an 
unmarried 
man’ 

For the sake of relevance let us consider logical and conceptual neces-
sities and possibilities. In order to obtain a somewhat nuanced distinction 
between both of these categories it would be worth making mention of 
alternative terms used in the domains of semantics and epistemology. This 
is not only to make apparent the differences between them but to avoid 
confusing them with one another. Let me begin with the domain in which 
these terms largely concern us, namely, metaphysics. A necessary state-
ment is a statement that is true in all possible worlds. This is represented in 
the language of modal logic as: □ A. Necessary statements are contrasted 
with impossible statements. Impossible statements are false in all possible 
worlds. Contingent statements, on the other hand, are true in only some 
possible worlds. This is represented in the language of modal logic as: ◊ A.

This is not to be confused with the distinction made between what is 
analytic and what is synthetic within the domain of semantics. Analytic 
is true in virtue of its meaning while synthetic is true in virtue of the way 
the world is. Likewise, these distinctions are not to be confused with what 

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74 The American Journal of Islam and Society 37:3-4

is a priori and what is a posteriori within the domain of epistemology. A 
priori are known to be true independent of experience while a posteriori 
are known to be true in virtue of experience. This leaves us with logical 
necessity and possibility. It is more than often agreed that logical necessi-
ty and possibility are grounded in metaphysical necessity and possibility. 
This means that if a statement is considered to be logically true then it is 
necessarily true and if it is logically false then it is necessarily false in the 
metaphysical sense.

In most cases then logical necessity is what determines metaphysical 
necessity. We could then say that although the universe could have turned 
out differently, there are some ways the universe could not have turned out 
at all. For instance, there are many possible worlds differing from one an-
other; however, it cannot be the case that there is (or we could conceive 
of ) a world in which 2+2=7. It could not also be the case that you both 
do exist and do not exist in this (or any other) world. We refer to these 
types of truths as ‘necessary truths’, because they are necessary in every 
possible world and cannot be conceived of otherwise. On the other hand, 
we can say that a state of affairs is logically or conceptually possible, if there 
is some possible world in which it obtains (or actualizes). Take for instance 
the statement that “all giraffes have short necks in a possible world.” This 
is logically and conceptually possible. It could very well be the case that all 
giraffes are short-necked in some world other than this one. The notion 
of logical possibility is broadly inclusive of conceptual, metaphysical, and 
causal possibilities. Therefore, if something is logically impossible it cer-
tainly cannot be conceptually, metaphysically, or causally possible.

Perhaps a useful way to illustrate the expanse of logical possibility is 
in virtue of what is called “logical space,” a term drawn from Wittgenstein 
(though he never defined it).7 Aranyosi comments,

Wittgenstein, who introduced the phrase to philosophy in the Tracta-
tus, never defines logical space, yet we get a clear and intuitive idea of 
what it is supposed to be, namely, the space of all possibilities. If that is 
true, then we are immediately pushed to explain what possibilities are 
and what it means to say that logical space is the space of all possibilities. 
Traditionally, it is propositions that are taken as bearers of the modal 
properties of possibility, necessity, impossibility and contingency, and 
these modal notions are in turn explained by appeal to truth at a possible 
world. Logical space, then, is, according to current orthodoxy, a space of 
possible worlds, and possibilities are propositions true at some possible 



 75

world, hence, belonging to logical space. Impossibilities will be proposi-
tions that are not true at any possible world; hence, they are not in logical 
space. Contingencies will be propositions that are possible but false at 
some worlds. Necessities will be propositions that are true at all possible 
worlds. (Aranyosi 2013, 9) 

Let us now return to epistemic relativism. In light of the modal machinery 
introduced above, epistemic relativism would have to concede that not all 
truth is relative. That is because epistemic relativism cannot evade logical 
space and compromise necessary truths while resorting to variations in 
conceptual schemas and reference frames. Suppose it did (or attempted to) 
compromise necessary truths in this manner; could it justify the absurdity 
it results in? Let us take a necessary truth, namely, the law of non-contra-
diction. In the formula ¬ (α ∧ ¬α), regardless of the actual truth value of the 
variable α, the formula on whole would always be true, simply because a 
statement and its negation cannot both be true at any one time. Irrespective 
of all conditions, this law is a necessary truth which cannot be otherwise in 
all possible worlds. We may also say that this law is an absolute truth, for its 
truth obtains in virtue of the way in which it is conceived by every possible 
conceiver situated in every possible world. 

The epistemic relativist may interject at this point by arguing that the law 
of non-contradiction is actually relative to conceptual schemas and reference 
frames, and thus not a necessary truth. This would imply that there are possi-
ble instances in which the law of non-contradiction can be rejected. But that’s 
not all. Applying epistemic relativism to the law of non-contradiction would 
not only be rejecting what the law posits but would also be open to accepting 
truth-value gaps and gluts—kinds of indeterminate semantic values, if you 
like. This acceptance of truth-value gaps and gluts, which is usually associ-
ated with First Degree Entailment Logic (FDE), is where the epistemic rela-
tivist may find some hope. By being paracomplete and paraconsistent, FDE 
logic is able to entertain the maximum available truth-values in comparison 
to both classical and alternative sub-classical logics.8 A paracomplete theory 
is able to sustain some meaningful and declarative statements that are neither 
true nor false. Statements of this kind are referred to as ‘gappy’ since they 
fall into the gap between truth and falsity. A paraconsistent theory is able to 
sustain some meaningful and declarative statements that are both true and 
false. Statements of this kind are referred to as ‘glutty’ since they fall into the 
intersection of truth and falsity. Thus, the introduction of non-classical logic 
affords the epistemic relativist some hope of maintaining their position with 

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76 The American Journal of Islam and Society 37:3-4

respect to the law of non-contradiction. They are able to maintain their po-
sition while circumventing the charge of inconsistency and/or irrationality.

Of course, an attempt to salvage the consistency and rationality of epis-
temic relativism by appealing to a system of logic that is able to accommodate 
truth-value gaps and gluts sounds a little cheap. That is not to say that there 
is no case to be made for epistemic relativism under the guise of a paracon-
sistent logic, such as FDE logic. I think there is plausible scope for epistemic 
relativism to explore that route. Similarly, there is also plausible scope for 
epistemic relativism to explore logical nihilism in this regard. Logical nihil-
ism can be presented in at least two ways, as Cotnoir has stated:

Logical Nihilism 1 There’s no logical consequence relation that correctly 
represents natural language inference; formal logics are inadequate to 
capture informal inference.

Logical Nihilism 2 There are no logical constraints on natural language 
inference; there are always counterexamples to any purportedly valid 
forms. (Cotnoir 2018, 303)

He argues for and presents a plausible case for the second type of logical 
nihilism. A major proponent of that second type is Gillian Russell, whose 
argument is as follows:

To be a law of logic, a principle must hold in complete generality.

No principles hold in complete generality.

There are no laws of logic. (Russell 2018, 308)

My aim is not to reconstruct and represent Russell’s or Cotnoir’s arguments 
here. I mean simply to indicate that non-classical logic and/or logical nihilism 
may provide resources for the epistemic relativist to defend their position. 

Aside from appeals to paraconsistent logic and/or logical nihilism, 
one of the reasons an epistemic relativist may present in maintaining his/
her position would be the possibility of variation in reference frames and 
conceptual schemas. According to epistemic relativists, necessary truths 
irrespective of their status are also subject to conceptual schemas and refer-
ence frames. But how would this argument make sense in defying the law 
of non-contradiction?

As mentioned above, necessary truths are particular matters of fact 
which cannot be conceived of otherwise. To put it differently, they are such 



 77

truths that once they are acquired, it is impossible by any method of thought 
to conceive of their converse. The antithesis of the law of non-contradiction, 
for instance, would be a contradictory instance: a square circle, a four-sided 
triangle, a married bachelor, or two straight lines that enclose a space. We fail 
to conjure a mental representation of these contradictory instances, no mat-
ter how hard we try. Such failure may be a representation of the limits of our 
thought. Alternately, such limits may be a consequence of internal matters to 
do with how our brains are hard-wired, or a consequence of external matters 
like how we are socially nurtured. How we comply with the law of non-con-
tradiction here becomes of paramount importance. Efforts to contravene this 
law, under our conventional systems of thought, amount to being illogical 
and/or irrational—and indeed are equated with rejecting thought altogether. 

There is little doubt that the law of non-contradiction has been upheld 
as high orthodoxy throughout Western intellectual history,9 with a few no-
table exceptions.10 The same goes for the most part of Islamic intellectual 
history (see also Zolghadr 2019).11 Even today this attitude shapes the pre-
dominant mode of thought in the Anglosphere. Aristotle himself postulat-
ed a defence of the law of non-contradiction in book Γ of the Metaphysics. 
Yet for Priest (2006), it is not clear what Aristotle’s arguments are meant to 
establish, nor how, exactly, his postulated arguments establish a defence of 
the law of non-contradiction. Regardless of that specific issue, which Priest 
details in an interesting fashion, the history of logic does beg the question 
of its grounds. That is to ask, what is the basis of these laws’ intuitive appeal?

Locke speaks of an intuition that grants man the logical capacity to ex-
ercise reason without knowing how to construct a syllogism (Locke 2015, 
Book IV, paper xvii, §4). We can appreciate this intuition when considering 
a child who, despite having had no schooling in formal logic, has his/her 
first encounter with arbitrating in matters of syntactical consistency. Given 
that such a child has had at least some exposure to an environment which 
is indicative of deductive reasoning, he/she shall possess a “pre-theoretical 
but still developed sense of what follows from what” as Rumfitt (2015) puts 
it. It is this intuitive sense of deduction that instinctively grants an individ-
ual the aptitude to appreciate syntactical consistency. It acts as the pre-the-
oretical foundation against which one can, in the most generic sense, de-
termine whether a given logical system is syntactically consistent. Rumfitt 
is thus persuaded that classical logic occupies a default status. Such logic 
is then codified by a set of foundational principles which conform to our 
“intuitive sense of deductions.”12 The conformity between such principles 
and our “intuitive sense of deductions” allows us to acknowledge the kind 

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78 The American Journal of Islam and Society 37:3-4

of structure and form in virtue of which we are able to determine what fol-
lows from what, namely, syntactical consistency. Any attempt to obtain this 
type of consistency would entail conforming to the laws of logic, simply 
because defying the laws of logic would lead to syntactical inconsistency. 
Of course, whether this conformity is one which completely corresponds 
to our intuition or bears epistemological gaps is an interesting question.13 
Nevertheless, the idea that there exists some association between the laws 
of logic and our intuition grants a significant status to the laws of logic. This 
status is particularly espoused by classical logic on the basis that the laws of 
logic are fundamental axioms in virtue of which it operates.

This begs a further question. Do the laws of logic actually possess a 
superior status over other laws? Let us take natural laws as an example. 
The law of universal gravitation, for instance, offers an explanation as to 
why every object attracts every other object with a force that, for any two 
objects, is directly proportional to the mass of each object and inversely 
proportional to the square of the distance between the two objects. This law 
would thus explain why a marble falls to the ground from any given height. 
Of course, the explanation offered would not account for some discrete 
form of essence of the marble which would ultimately be responsible for its 
downward movement. To put it in Kant’s terms, the law would not propose 
to disclose a distinct realm of noumena which would reveal the inherent 
nature or inner reality of that marble. Although the law of gravity succeeds 
in positing a quantifiable gravitational force acting between all bodies, it 
does not explain exactly how the force propagates through space. This was 
precisely Newton’s frustration with the law. He was unable to offer a satis-
factory explanation as to how the force of gravity so pervasively transmits 
between bodies that were separated by space. (Of course, the force of at-
traction very much exists, albeit at a distance.)

The law of gravity mathematically accounts for the downward move-
ment of the marble every time it is dropped. The explanation offered is 
empirically successful within what we might call a scientific remit. The law 
then is a generalization which offers an explanation as to why objects with 
any given mass are influenced by a downward force. In sum it proposes 
to express the way in which nature works. The laws of logic are similar in 
this respect; they are expressed by the calculi in a manner which offers a 
generalized view as to what ought to follow from what, namely, logical con-
sequence. The laws of logic are formulated to account for and distinguish 
correct arguments from incorrect ones. Does this then mean to suggest that 



 79

the laws of logic are equally empirical generalizations? In response to such 
a query, Peregrin states,

there are two ways in which the rules can be considered normative. First, 
they are normative in the sense that what they generalize are already 
rules. Their instances are correct arguments—they are correct not be-
cause we logicians proclaim them as correct, they are correct before any 
logical theory is in play; they are such because human linguistic practices 
are essentially rule-governed. Logic is thus supposed to pick up rules that 
already govern our reasoning, though in their natural form they are im-
plicit, and it is only logical theory that makes them explicit.

Moreover, the laws of logic are normative also in the second sense, in 
that they can be used as standards of assessment and criticism of actu-
al argumentation. This is because what we do when we articulate them 
is not only to bring their implicit predecessors into the open but rather 
also to “finalize,” streamline, and extrapolate them to the regions where 
they were not really operative. This is what happens during the process of 
moving toward a reflective equilibrium.

Given this, we cannot really say that logic addresses a reality behind the 
surfaces of natural languages. It builds on some very general rules (pro-
to-rules?) that are constitutive of our linguistic practices but employs its 
huge apparatus to transform these implicit rules into something clear, 
unambiguous, and potentially binding …

In this sense, I think that the status of the laws of logic is similar to that 
of natural laws (despite all the other dissimilarities): they do not bring to 
light a hidden reality behind appearances but rather bring a system to the 
appearances (to “save” them, as the Ancients would put it). Of course, the 
system cannot be chosen deliberately, it must fit the appearances—but 
there is no reason to think that it was there, as such, all the time already 
before we established it. (Peregrin 2020, 7)

Peregrin makes an interesting case for how we should think of the 
laws of logic. Such considerations seem to demonstrate that these laws do 
not possess the realist privilege they are commonly granted. Neverthe-
less, I shall now like to look at what distinguishes the laws of nature from 
the laws of logic. The former demonstrate how the physical world oper-
ates by resorting to regular observations of natural phenomena.14 These 

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80 The American Journal of Islam and Society 37:3-4

are regularities in the workings of nature; take for instance the three laws 
formulated by Kepler after he discovered the regularities which governed 
planetary motions. Newton introduced the notion of gravitational force, 
which determines the movement of bodies under the system of forces ex-
erted on them. Let us take a general regularity that is categorized as a law 
of nature, namely, planetary movement in elliptical orbits around the sun. 
Let us very simply conceive of this law in reverse or, more freely, otherwise: 
that planets don’t revolve around the sun in ellipsis but rather in triangular 
motions. Although this may result in a physical impossibility, it is not a 
logical one. It is not at all difficult to conceive of the planets in our solar 
system orbiting the sun in a triangular motion. In contrast, I am not able to 
conceive of the reverse or negation of the laws of logic at all. So what exactly 
is the distinguishing factor which allows my mind to transgress the law of 
nature in any given state of affairs, but not the laws of logic?

We observe the laws of planetary motion as absolutely binding on the 
celestial bodies themselves. They would obtain regardless of whether man 
had discovered the science of astronomy and formulated these regular ob-
servations into symbolic formulae or not. It follows that although man has 
acquainted himself with the study of astronomy and managed to view the 
matters of fact with the aid of mathematical calculations, his experience 
of those laws are known to him solely by observation and therefore are 
totally independent of his knowledge about them. In other words, acquir-
ing knowledge about these regularities does not influence them in any way 
whatsoever. However, this is not the case when it comes to the laws of logic. 
They seem to come into operation as soon as man begins to think. They are 
directly initiated and influenced by the one who engages in the process of 
thinking. Furthermore, they are unlike the laws of nature, which conform 
to physical phenomena, in conforming to conceptual matters and the man-
ner in which the thinker thinks. If a law (as in the case of a natural law) 
is independent of a thinker’s thought altogether, then its reversal can be 
conceived of; whereas if it is subject or bound to a thinking process, it can-
not be conceived of otherwise. A similar criterion is deduced by Mansel, 
whereby he suggests that

A law which is not binding upon me as a thinker may at any time be 
reversed, without affecting my mode of observing the same agents un-
der their new condition. And I have no difficulty in conceiving such a 
reversal as at any moment possible, because, antecedent to experience, I 
had no internal bias which required the recognition of the existing law 



 81

rather than any other. I have only to discard an adventitious knowledge. 
(Mansel 2012, 90) 

Probing why the laws of logic cannot be reversed or conceived of otherwise 
requires investigation into the nature of thought itself. This means leaving 
the province of logic or at least considering its interface with language. I 
might be rationally compelled to say something like my diary cannot have a 
black and white cover at the same—but the cognitive failure to comprehend 
such a case would not constrain me from linguistically affirming it. I am 
able to articulate a postulation of a possible contradiction, though I may 
not be able to conceive of it. This can be extended to other contradictory 
matters such as my ability to linguistically affirm the possibility of a square 
circle, a four-sided triangle, a married bachelor, two straight lines that en-
close a space, and so on. 

If it is the case that I have the capacity to express and articulate logi-
cally impossible states, although they are inconceivable to me, could I then 
go further and articulate an exclusively original thought (or statement)? 
That is, not the kind which is bound by a logical possibility or impossibility 
but one that is free from experience altogether? This would be inquiring 
whether my mind allows me to think independently of the laws of logic. 
Before answering this question it would be important to make a distinction 
between conception and imagination, as one may be under the impression 
that to contemplate an anomalous object or thought would be an original 
thought. In order to have a valid conception of a horse, for instance, I must:

a. Be acquainted with the various constituting features of the animal and 
their correct meanings in order to arrive at the definition of a horse; and

b. Be able to combine those constituting features in a representative man-
ner to form a visualization in my mind in order to adequately conceive 
of it. 

The combination of a and b forms a concept which not only lies in my mind 
but also corresponds to a reality or my previously acquired experience in 
some way. 

Imagination, on the other hand, is possible without one of these two 
points (a or b). It can be said to be an arbitrary formulation of memories 
without conforming to any systematic method. For example, I at this mo-
ment in time have in my mind the notion of a centaur. My conception of a 
centaur is one where I envisage the upper body of a man biologically attached 

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82 The American Journal of Islam and Society 37:3-4

to the lower body of a horse. This method of thought has violated b, one of 
the two points which formulate a concept mentioned above. In this case I 
have combined two known meanings and what they denote in successfully 
envisaging a biological amalgamation of a human and a horse. Therefore, the 
process of imagining combines known meanings and what they denote in 
random ways that are devoid of any systematic process. Imaginations have 
no relation to objects that exist in the real world. In the centaur case, I already 
possess a concept of a man and also of a horse. I randomly take the mean-
ings of these concepts and what they denote and arbitrarily combine them to 
formulate a thought. The resulting features which make up this thought fail 
to correspond to this creature as a whole in reality. At the most it remains a 
mythical creature that is an object of possible perception. 

We thus come to understand that in order to formulate both concep-
tions and imaginal objects we fundamentally need to know the meanings 
of particular properties and objects. Both involve arranging properties and 
objects in certain ways. If the arrangement is systematic and corresponds 
to reality in some way, then it forms a concept. If the arrangement is ran-
dom and fails to correspond to reality, then it forms an imaginal object. But 
what would allow us to apprehend such meanings? We need both objects of 
knowledge and a means of perceiving them, prior to formulating concepts/
imaginal objects. This is frequently described as requiring some kind of 
experience (irrespective of its comprehensiveness) of a particular property 
or object, which would elicit an initial cognitive reaction and subsequently 
give rise to a concept. This would mean that human thought, on the whole, 
is subject to one’s experience.

Having arrived at this point, let us return to the question posed earlier. 
Is it possible to articulate an exclusively original thought, one which is unre-
stricted by logical possibility or impossibility? That is, is it possible to conceive 
of an original thought that is free from experience altogether? If the thought 
we refer to is only operative within the domain of possible experience, as es-
tablished above in the discussion of conceptualization/imagination, then the 
answer appears to be negative. This statement may not suffice in presenting 
a comprehensive insight into the dynamic complexities of exactly how the 
mind actually operates, i.e. in the causal sense or the varying dispositional 
states we find ourselves in. Nevertheless, it seems sufficient enough to estab-
lish the finitude of the human mind and thought processes, in that it makes 
apparent the limited capacity it bears in a finite terrain of experiences. Mansel 
has also conceded the same point. He emphasizes how the human mind is 
restricted in its method of thought. He states that, 



 83

Experience tells us what is, but not what must be… If by experience is 
meant all that is presented in any mode of intuition, matter and form 
included; and if the question is understood to mean, Can we contemplate 
in thought any object which has never been presented as an element in 
any mode of intuition? The answer must undoubtedly be given in the 
negative. (Mansel 2012, 245)

The term ‘experience’ must be taken in a broader meaning here: it is not 
confined to external sensory perception but is inclusive of both external 
and internal modes of human operation. It includes all that which the 
mind is conscious of from an inner and outer perspective (i.e., referring 
to the laws of logic as well as the phenomena of matter). In other words, 
all of knowledge itself is derived from experience. Therefore, we can say 
that there is no thought that can be generated in the mind which is totally 
independent of experience. 

However, if experience is the exclusive source in virtue of which we ac-
quire all of our knowledge, and our manner of perceiving these experiences 
significantly varies due to reference frames and conceptual schemas, then 
what would we make of intuitive knowledge or a priori statements? Are we 
to abandon them altogether? As I have previously discussed, if an epistemic 
relativist were to conform to a set of fixed principles (necessary truths) to 
arrive at absolute truths or statements, he/she would have to discard his/
her own fundamental principles. That position would no longer be strictly 
relativist. The epistemic relativist thus appears to be in a dilemma between 
preserving their relativist account or discarding it altogether. 

Although we have already dealt with this objection when discussing 
first and second order statements, I wish to present a supplementary ar-
gument to strengthen the case for the epistemic relativist. This time I shall 
refer to previously mentioned terms that lie within the domains of seman-
tics and epistemology. Let us begin by identifying the distinction between 
Kant’s analytic and synthetic a priori judgments: 

Analytic judgements are those which contain nothing in the predicate but 
what has already been implied in the subject. For example, “all husbands 
are men” or “all bodies are extended.” These are second-order statements. 

Synthetic judgments are those in which the predicate contributes to the 
subject what is not already entailed therein. For example, to take Kant’s 
own examples, “all bodies are heavy” or “all bachelors are happy.” These 
are first-order statements. 

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84 The American Journal of Islam and Society 37:3-4

There is much controversy as to whether logical inferences are ana-
lytic and a priori. In spite of this controversy let us consider the law of 
non-contradiction to be analytic and a priori. This is the view of those who 
are exceptionalists about logic. In this case the law of non-contradiction 
would be, what we might call, a self-evident truth. One way to consider 
what a self-evident truth amounts to, is to compare it with the definition 
of an argument.15 The common way to think of an argument is that it is a 
combination of a conclusion (a proposition) and reasons (premises) to sup-
port that conclusion. Carefully considering such arguments, we realize that 
there can be conclusions that stand completely on their own, independent 
of any reasons to support them. This would be the case when nothing con-
travenes the conclusion and therefore it can be upheld without any reasons. 
This sort of conclusion is referred to as a self-evident truth. 

The law of non-contradiction has long been deemed such a self-evi-
dent truth. More specifically, it is considered a kind of truth which has no 
opposing reasons to reject it or even call it into question. This means ev-
erything supports it while nothing contradicts it. Modus Ponens and Mo-
dus Tollens are clear examples of this. The validity of such argument-forms 
serve as basic inferential rules that are representative of the fundamental 
laws of logic. The validity of both these argument-forms are just as funda-
mental as the laws of logic that they stand for. Moreover, if the conditional 
premises that make up the forms of these arguments are true, then their 
conclusion cannot be otherwise. Given that the forms of these arguments 
are clear representations of the laws of logic, their validity is certain. This 
qualifies the law of non-contradiction and the law of excluded middle as 
self-evident truths that must always be true and cannot be false.

Given this, the epistemic relativist would say, if man is bound to such 
necessary and self-evident truths such as the law of non-contradiction, 
then surely it must be the case that the necessity of such truths along with 
their validity can be determined in virtue of themselves (without referring 
to external premises). But would that even be possible? Any attempt to de-
termine the truth of such matters would compel us to transcend the very 
limits sanctioned by that law we are trying to affirm. It is, as Wittgenstein 
aptly put it, “in order to draw a limit to thinking we should have to be able 
to think both sides of this limit (we should therefore have to be able to 
think what cannot be thought)” (Morris 2008, 352). This would imply that 
man has the cognitive capacity and the intellectual means to apprehend a 
knowledge which transcends the absolute itself. The very fact that one can 



 85

infer that something is absolute or necessary in-and-of-itself would indicate 
the capability to exceed the boundaries of that absoluteness or necessity (in 
that one would have to be able to discern whether or not something meets 
that standard of absoluteness and necessity). However, this is impossible 
because whatever is presented in “intuition” and represented in thought is 
nothing more than finite. Allow me to cite Mansel once more:

So long as the relation between subject and object exists in conscious-
ness, so long each must limit the other. The subject is distinct from the 
object, and the object from the subject, and neither can be the universe. 
Nay, the object itself can only exist, as such, under the conditions of lim-
itation and difference: it can be discerned only as one out of many; as 
implying the existence of other things besides itself; and hence, again, 
as a finite portion of the universe. The infinite cannot be an object of 
human consciousness at all; and it appears to be so only by mistaking the 
negation of consciousness for consciousness itself. (Mansel 2012, 247)

The ‘infinite’ then is a term we employ in language which expresses the 
negation of human thought, or rather makes explicit its limitations. It is 
much like referring to something as ‘inconceivable’. This does not mean 
that that which is infinite and inconceivable to us is indeed non-existent. To 
assert that something is infinite and inconceivable is in actual fact to make 
apparent the limits of our thought. Such assertions would not be matters 
of fact about the external world but affirmations of the limits of our cogni-
tive capacity. This does not eradicate the possibility for the inconceivable to 
actually exist. It could be said that terms such as ‘absolute’ and ‘necessary’ 
are inconceivable in themselves. They are inadequate in providing what are 
actual absolute and necessary truths. Furthermore, the “truths” they infer 
would only be relative to human thought (derived from experience). 

Synthetic statements and judgments, on the other hand, require 
more than the concept which stands as the subject. Such statements and 
judgments add to our knowledge in some way. It is said that all empirical 
statements are synthetic. These types of a priori judgements actually do not 
trouble the epistemic relativist at all; as we have discussed above, such judg-
ments would be referred to as first-order statements in which relativism 
can be applied. Nevertheless, to substantiate the relativist’s position further, 
if synthetic judgements are based on empirical data, then they simply can-
not represent absolute or necessary truths of any kind. This is because, if 
any statement is arrived at by observation (however regular or precise), it 
could be argued that

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86 The American Journal of Islam and Society 37:3-4

1. The observer who makes the observation is subject to conceptual sche-
mas. Thus, his/her observation would be relative to variations in refer-
ence frames and conceptual schemas.

2. The problem of induction, as famously highlighted by Popper (1963), 
who emphasized that such a dogmatic belief in science is explicitly pre-
disposed to a psychological propensity instead of a rational one. Popper 
found the method of induction to be inadequate as a justification for sci-
entific knowledge. 

3. Lastly, although an empirical law may state for example the alterations 
of night and day, it does not by any means assert more than an invariable 
regularity which has been observed to take place. By affirming the ob-
servational fact that the earth rotates on its axis once every twenty-four 
hours and thus we witness the alteration of night and day, it does not 
imply that my belief in such a continuing and regular motion of observed 
order or natural phenomenon would be explained to me by these ob-
servations alone. It may be some constitution of various thoughts which 
gives rise to such a belief, or some law of thought which my mental cog-
nition is compelled to abide by. Therefore, following this line of thought 
would mean the law in question is of mind rather than of matter.

Hence, the epistemic relativist would succeed in establishing that 
observational or empirical modes of data are subject to personalized ex-
periences (i.e., relative to reference frames and conceptual schemas). The 
epistemic relativists would then conclude by asserting that our experienc-
es are in essence the exclusive source of acquiring knowledge. As we have 
demonstrated that all experiences and truth are relative, then so must be 
the case with our knowledge. More importantly, it must be conceded that 
there exist laws of logic to which our minds are strictly compelled in con-
forming to all circumstances. After all, we have no alternative method of 
thought to resort to. Even if (hypothetically speaking) an alternative meth-
od does exist, we do not possess the cognitive capacity to embrace such a 
method of thought, since it would mean transcending the current laws of 
logic to do so. It would therefore follow that our inferences, which are made 
in conformity to these laws, would only allow us to conceive and apprehend 
those thoughts and objects dependent on them. Of course, conforming to 
these laws would by no means imply that that which we cannot conceive 
of is non-existent. This is because, as I have demonstrated, that statement 
would only be relative to the laws it was made in accordance to.



 87

3. God and Logically Impossible Tasks
In virtue of what I have discussed so far, can we then imply that God can do 
the logically impossible? That is, can epistemic relativism be applied to the 
idea of God—and more specifically, to the notion of divine omnipotence in 
a manner that allows for God to do the logically impossible? To determine 
this, let us begin by the following intuitive thoughts on the matter: either it 
would be held that

God cannot do the logically impossible. In such a case God is constrained 
by the laws of logic (as well as time and space) just as His creation is; or,

God can do the logically impossible. In such a case we cannot conceive of 
such states of affairs (and how they can actualize).

Armed with the arguments that I have presented in favor of the epistemic 
relativist, I shall state the following reasons for the latter position: 

(i) If our entire mode of thought is subject to certain laws, such as the 
laws of logic, it would follow that we cannot think otherwise. From this 
perspective the limitation of thought which we are bound by should not 
be supposed as one which lies in the object of our thought but rather in 
the thinking subject itself. Thus, if it is implied that according to the laws 
of logic God cannot accomplish tasks which defy this law (to which our 
thought is bound), it would be an incoherent statement. This is because 
when we make a claim of this kind it is based on a demonstrative statement 
and not a fact. It must be understood that no matter of fact can be a matter 
of demonstration. 

What this means is that for ‘demonstration’ it would be essential that 
its object can be constructed from within. This would be a construct of the 
various forms inherent in our own mental constitution. Take thinking of 
a particular necessary truth, for example. It would fundamentally involve 
some cognitive activity in our minds. With the aid of the various experi-
ences that we have acquired over a period of time, we are able to present 
a demonstrative formula which aims at substantiating the very necessary 
truth in question. This can only take place with me actually conceiving it to 
be so. Consequently, it is constructed internally. However, a fact is one that 
subsists independent of me thinking about it in any way. Let me take the 
same example I gave earlier about the planets revolving around the sun in 
elliptical orbits. This is a fact of nature. Regardless of anyone thinking about 
it or even failing to think about it, it would not influence its state of affairs 
in any way whatsoever.

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88 The American Journal of Islam and Society 37:3-4

If we apply demonstrative matters in order to evaluate and determine 
God’s omnipotence, then it would imply that this application would require 
us to construct a creature of the human imagination. Irrespective of the 
kind of God we end up envisaging in this regard, it would be an imagina-
tive process that is bound by the very same laws with the aid of which we 
could only have formed and conceived of Him. Such an imitative process 
would be little more than conjured thoughts amalgamated in virtue of pre-
viously-acquired experiences in the course of our finite lives. This would be 
contrary to God’s actual nature. For if God is absolute and infinite in His 
essence and His attributes, then our conception cannot apprehend Him in 
any sense. This is because human conception is only possible within the 
limits of possible intuition and experiential accumulation. 

(ii) We may attempt to understand the finite limits of human appre-
hension from another perspective. Our thoughts are fundamentally subject 
to some sort of linear succession. (Regardless of whether you consider this 
a mental succession that is exclusively a product of the mind, or absolute, 
or even an ordered succession of events, it is nevertheless subject to the 
concept of time.) Every object which we can conceive of and be cognisant 
of is in some way subsisting through the passage of time. This is why we 
are able to distinguish a former state from its latter and vice versa, because 
that object occupies a particular interval in time. When an object succeeds 
from one state to another in the domain of time, and can be distinguished 
from its earlier state to its latter by the passage of time itself, then it is con-
tingent and finite. The distinguishing feature between any two given states 
would be the duration and time that has elapsed. Even a pendulum which 
oscillates between two positions, however precise its return, would be dis-
tinguished from its former state by the passage of time.

Granting this temporal condition, time itself can be apprehended as fi-
nite since we can conceive of its parts in successive moments, allowing it to 
be divisible. We can conclude that all objects conceivable to humans must 
exist in time. Otherwise any object representing the true nature of the abso-
lute or infinite could not be apprehended by the human mind. This would 
suggest that the true apprehension of God as an infinite and absolute divine 
being would be impossible for any human mind to truly (fully) apprehend. 
Therefore, if we fail to apprehend God, it would be absurd to suppose that 
He is unable to do the logically impossible—because something consid-
ered ‘impossible’ or even ‘illogical’ would be considered as such by human 
thought. It would not imply that that thing is ‘impossible’ in itself. 



 89

(iii) We have previously discussed and concluded that the human mind 
is incapable of generating exclusively original thought. This is because we 
are constrained by particular laws of logic. Given this, attempting to con-
struct a thought of God or even how He manages to accomplish particular 
acts which appear logically impossible to us, would result in the negation 
of thought altogether. It would follow that since we cannot apprehend God 
(in His true state) by employing our cognitive abilities within the limited 
confinements of the laws of logic, God must transcend the laws of logic. In 
other words, God is by no means constrained by such laws in His ability 
to either exist (in virtue of His essence and attributes alike) or act. For an 
epistemic relativist such a claim would not be incoherent or irrational. This 
is because any claim which infers that this is incoherent or irrational would 
be self-defeating in virtue of the God in question. The one who attempts to 
criticize the transcendence of God would have to resort to the laws of logic 
in some way to get off the ground. It is precisely this appeal to logical laws 
in virtue of the God in question where the epistemic relativist would gain 
the upper hand. However, if we imply that God is over and above logic, it 
does give rise to certain difficulties. I shall refer to two of these and provide 
a brief response to each.

1. It would entail that all logical (and rationally based) proofs of God’s 
existence would become redundant; and

2. It would further mean that we cannot make any inferences about God 
at all on rational grounds. God would be unknowable and utterly unique.

In response to the first objection I would propose that we require a sub-
stantial revaluation of the role of logic in theological matters. This would 
primarily be an inquiry which seeks to determine questions such as those 
aptly raised by A.J. Cotnoir. For example, how should considerations of the 
limits of human reason influence our theological methodology? That is a 
central question spanning the history of theology, of course, but it is partic-
ularly pressing in the context of contemporary analytic theology. What is 
the role of logic in theology? What principles of logic are open to revision 
based on theological considerations (Cotnoir 2019, 508)?

To gain a broad view on the position of logic, Cotnoir proposes two 
opposing views: exceptionalism and anti-exceptionalism. Exceptionalism 
is the view that logic possesses a special status. It is analytic and always 
known a priori. Anti-exceptionalism is the view that logic does not possess 
any particular special status. It is not analytic, and isn’t always known a 

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90 The American Journal of Islam and Society 37:3-4

priori. Much of my discussion on epistemic relativism in this paper has 
clearly favored an anti-exceptionalist view of logic. I believe it is such a 
view which manages to articulate the correct role of logic in theological 
discourse. Since our thought processes are bound by the rules of logic, the 
latter should be applied to theological discourse in a procedural sense and 
not a substantive sense. 

Acknowledging the limits of exceptionalism entails considering the fol-
lowing: an argument’s soundness arises from having valid and true prem-
ises; and truth is itself dependent on statements that correspond to reality. 
It thus appears that the soundness of a logical argument would comprise of 
(1) demonstrative proofs and (2) facts or truths which correspond to reality. 
As mentioned earlier, demonstrative proofs that are based on argumentative 
forms, which possess the ability to prove particular cases, are not equivalent to 
truths based on correspondence to reality (facts). Demonstrative statements 
are a construct of the various forms inherent in our own mental constitution. 
Therefore, to exclusively apply demonstrative methods in order to arrive at a 
sound argument would be inadequate. As demonstration is confined to the 
limits in which our minds are able to think, it would not be plausible to apply 
such methods of reasoning in proving the existence of God in His true nature, 
as He is above logic and reason altogether. 

We have shown that truth is relative to the variations in reference frames 
and conceptual schemas; and furthermore, that our minds are restrained by 
particular laws of logic. Consequently, we cannot conceive of any cases inde-
pendent of experience. Given this, any logical argument we present would be 
also be relative. Therefore, logic itself would be relative to what we are, and 
the dimension to which we are referring. This should not be construed to 
discard the use of logic altogether. Instead, it should be taken as giving logic 
its rightful place. It attempts to show where logical arguments would fail to 
be applicable and why. In light of what we have mentioned so far, and in the 
absence of any alternative, it is impossible to simply reject logic—by which 
after all we are strictly bound and compelled to think.

The second objection states that if God transcends logic then we are 
unable to make any meaningful inferences about Him. God, in this sense, 
shall be unknowable to us. It should be made clear that this objection is not 
a demand for any specific argument for God's existence. Instead, it seeks to 
inquire how we are to make inferences of any kind about God without the 
appeal to logic. More specifically, it seeks to know how we can plausibly infer 
that God can or cannot do the logically impossible if He transcends logic.



 91

Let us first understand that since we cannot generate an exclusively 
original thought that is independent from experience, then we must have 
acquired the notion of God from somewhere. The subsisting idea of God 
in the conscious mind of man could not be said to have emerged solely 
from whim or imagination. The reason for this, as we have previously men-
tioned, is because the process of imagination combines known meanings 
and properties in random ways that are principally devoid of any systematic 
process. Therefore, in order for the imagination to be able to generate a true 
idea of God (that is, in His true sense) it must have the ability to apprehend 
absolute and infinite ideas (since God in His true sense is absolute and in-
finite). However, this is not possible, as we have demonstrated throughout 
our discussion. But then from where have we acquired this idea?

At this point in our inquiry we may choose to appeal to a (monothe-
istic) revealed religion. I suppose the appeal would specifically be towards 
that religion which is inclusive of the following advice:

God (great and glorious) is too exalted to be known by the intellect’s [pow-
ers of] reflection and rational consideration (naẓar). An intelligent person 
should empty his heart of reflection when he wants to know God by way 
of witnessing (mushāhada). The one with high aspiration should not learn 
this [kind of knowledge] from the world of imagination (‘ālam al-khayāl), 
which contains embodied lights (al-anwār al-mutajassada) that point to 
meanings beyond them. For imagination causes intellectual meanings (al-
ma‘ānī al-‘aqliyya) to descend into sensory forms (al-qawālib al-ḥissiyya), 
just as knowledge [appears] in the form of milk, the Qur’ān in the form of a 
rope, and religion in the form of a shackle. (Rustom 2014, 129)

Conclusion
In the course of this paper I have established that all human knowledge 
is relative. Furthermore, this relativity extends far enough to even include 
absolute and necessary truths. Therefore, when one makes the claim that 
God cannot perform logically impossible tasks because it would defy nec-
essary truths such as the laws of logic—then this claim is only as correct 
and as valid as the one who asserts it, for man’s mind is limited to the finite 
and submissive to the particular laws of logic. Therefore, the inferences 
made in conformity to the laws of logic would only allow us to conceive 
and apprehend those thoughts and objects dependent on them. However, 
the existence and compulsion in conforming to these laws would by no 
means imply that that which we cannot conceive of is non-existent. This is 

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92 The American Journal of Islam and Society 37:3-4

Endnotes

1. I refer in particular to two letters; the first addressed to Mersenne (dated 
April 15, 1630) and the second addressed to Henry More (written on Febru-
ary 5, 1549).

2. This view, however, is challenged by Richard R. LA Croix (1984), who argues 
that it is wrong to actually attribute this claim to Descartes. I will not dwell 
on this debate, but I will run with the general thought which is asserted by 
Harry Frankfurt (1977), who attributes to Descartes the belief that God is “a 
being for whom the logically impossible is possible.”

3. This is a view that Tahko has defended, clearly stating that “I will also de-
fend the status of LNC as the best candidate for a fundamental metaphysical 
principle—if there are any principles which constrain the structure of reality, 
then LNC is certainly our most likely candidate” (Tahko 2009, 32).

4. The so-called Bar-Hillel-Carnap paradox has already suggested, a half cen-
tury ago, the clash between the notions of contradiction and semantic infor-
mation: the less probable a statement is, the more informative it is, and so 
contradictions carry the maximum amount of information, and in the light 
of standard logic are, as a famous quote by Bar-Hillel and Carnap has it, “too 
informative to be true”. This is a difficult philosophical problem for standard 
logic, which is forced to equate triviality and contradiction, and to regard all 
contradictions as equivalent, as the following example illustrates. If two auto 
technicians tell me that the battery of my car is flat, and its electrical system 
out of order, and add all the (potentially infinite) statements about car elec-
trics, I have an excessive amount of information, including a huge amount 
of irrelevant information. Classically, this trivial amount of information is 
exactly the same as the information conveyed by the car technicians telling 
me a contradiction, such as the battery of my car is flat and that it is not flat. 
However, if one of the car technicians tells me (among his statements) that 
the battery is flat, and the other that the battery is not flat, between them 
they are contradictory, but now I know where the problem is! (Carnielli and 
Coniglio 2016, 2).

5. I am referring to a letter addressed to Mesland in which he makes mention 
of God not having any limits and our minds being finite.

because, as we have demonstrated, that statement would only be relative to 
the laws it was made in accordance to.

Hence we learn the important lesson that the provinces of reason and 
faith are not coextensive; that it is a duty, enjoined by reason itself, to 
believe in what we cannot comprehend. (Mansel 2012, 247)



 93

6. It should be noted here that upon this particular instance I have not referred 
to these statements as a priori analytic and synthetic statements, because I 
will pursue them as such shortly after. I do not intend to imply that both 
these notions of truth (i.e., first- and second-order statements and a prio-
ri analytic and synthetic statements) are essentially different in any way by 
discussing them apart. However, in doing so, I only hope to substantiate my 
position (that of the epistemological relativist) by providing two different 
replies for the same argument. 

7. The notion of “logical space” was first introduced by Wittgenstein during his 
stay in Krakow in autumn 1914 while he was serving in the Austrian army. 
The considerations that finally led to the idea of an abstract space whose in-
ternal structure represents all the logic that underlies our ordinary language 
are well preserved in the first two wartime notebooks (MS 101, MS 102). 
They belong to a rapidly developing series of ideas which also includes an 
early version of the picture theory of proposition. They form an important 
part of the preliminary work for the Tractatus, the first draft of which—the 
so-called Prototractatus (preserved in MS 104)—Wittgenstein started to 
write down some time later in summer 1915 (Pilch 2017, 15-16).

8. FDE logic is probably the most versatile model of sub-classical logics, in the 
sense that it is inclusive of both paracomplete and paraconsistent systems. A 
logical theory is paracomplete if it recognizes a case c such that c ⊭1 A and 
c ⊭0 A, for some sentence A. Likewise, a logical theory is paraconsistent if it 
recognizes some case c such that c ⊨1 A and c ⊨0 A, for some A. The terms 
“paracomplete” and “paraconsistent”, from the Greek word “para” (beyond), 
imply that we are moving beyond having only complete or consistent cases 
(Beall and Logan 2017, 178-179). The consequence of being both paracom-
plete and paraconsistent is that it does not impose exhaustion and exclusion 
(respectively) on its predicates. Classical logic, conversely, imposes both ex-
haustion and exclusion, significantly constraining its interpretative power 
with respect to predicates. Imposing exhaustion means that classical logic 
does not recognize any possible instance in which an object fails to be in ei-
ther extension or anti-extension of a predicate. In such cases there is no pos-
sible instance in which a predicate fails to be either true or false of an object. 
Imposing exclusion means that classical logic does not recognize a possible 
instance in which an object falls into both the extension and anti-extension 
of a predicate. In such cases there is no possible instance in which a pred-
icate is both true and false of an object. As a result of this classical logic is 
only admitting of cases that are complete and consistent. This eliminates the 
possibility of entertaining truth-value gaps and gluts. 

  This is where FDE logic has a greater advantage. By being paracomplete 
and paraconsistent, FDE logic is able to entertain the maximum available 
truth-values, in contrast to both classical and alternative sub-classical logics. 
A paracomplete theory is able to sustain some meaningful and declarative 

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94 The American Journal of Islam and Society 37:3-4

statements that are neither true nor false, that is, statements which are re-
ferred to as “gappy”. A paraconsistent theory is able to sustain some mean-
ingful and declarative statements that are both true and false, that is, state-
ments which are referred to as “glutty”.

9. This attitude has not merely persisted as part of the intellectual legacy, but 
is actively reasserted as “an entrenched ‘unassailable dogma’ of Western 
thought” (Beall 2004, 3). 

10. Exceptions can be found in Western intellectual history, although
With the exception of Hegel and his fellow-travellers, and whilst 
Aristotle’s opinion on nearly every other matter has been over-
turned—or at least challenged—nearly every Western philoso-
pher and logician has accepted the authority of Aristotle on this 
matter. There is hardly a defence of the Law since Aristotle’s, 
worth mentioning. (Priest 2006, 7)

 However, attempting to locate personalities or remote instances to this end 
within Islamic intellectual history proves unviable. After failing to find some 
material/resources on this matter, I contacted four foremost historians of 
Islamic philosophy and logic (Khaled El-Rouayheb, Tony Street, Peter Ad-
amson, and Ahmed Alwishah). I asked whether they could kindly direct 
me to some reading material on Arabic logicians who attempted or actually 
engaged with a system of logic while either rejecting the law of non-contra-
diction and/or considering the principle of explosion to be invalid. In their 
responses, though they noted the importance of the inquiry, they could not 
suggest any secondary literature or Arabic logicians who questioned the 
principle of non-contradiction outright. (El-Rouayheb did comment that 
some scholars who discussed the liar paradox were willing to suggest that 
‘What I say is false’ is both true and false, though this appears to have been a 
minority opinion.)

11. “According to Ibn Sīnā, a demonstration transfers truth, certainty and ne-
cessity from the premises to the conclusions. Premises or first principles are 
generally divided into two parts, the first principles for all sciences are called 
common principles (al-uṣūl al-muta‛ārafa), and the first principles for every 
special science called postulates (al-uṣūl al-mawḍū‛a). For example, “whole 
is bigger than [its] part” or “contradiction is impossible”, etc are common 
principles, and “the shortest line between two points is a straight line” is a 
postulate for the science of geometry. Ibn Sīnā has a vast investigation in his 
different writings on the ways common principles are acquired by the mind. 
A class of these common principles the called as awwaliyyāt, are acquired 
only through the intellective faculty. These are propositions that are obvi-
ous for the intellective faculty and accepting them is necessary. The above 
two examples of the common principles are of this category. Contrary to the 



 95

common principles, which are certain, the postulates are susceptible of doubt 
(mashkūk)” (Ardeshir 2008, 58).

12. “This, it seems to me, provides the strongest reason for according default 
status to classical logic, for—with only one class of exceptions—classically 
valid arguments conform to our intuitive sense of deductions whose conclu-
sions follow from their premisses. Setting aside the exceptions, the classical 
natural deduction rules seem, when we first meet them, to codify norms 
of deductive reasoning that we have implicitly followed for years” (Rumfitt 
2015, 15).

13. “Weininger, however, thinks that obeying the laws of logic is something we 
ought to do precisely because it belongs to the strict moral duties we have 
toward ourselves. He thereby holds that logic is intrinsically categorically 
normative (and thus falls under 4A), but for reasons quite different from 
those found in the moral science conception of logic. According to the moral 
science conception, logic is intrinsically categorically normative because it is 
based on rationality itself (hence rationality is intrinsic to logic) and is also 
an integral part of human morality, namely the part that consists in justify-
ing moral judgments and decisions, including direct moral arguments and 
reflective equilibrium” (Hanna 2006, 205-206).

14. “It is important to distinguish between laws of science and laws of nature. 
Laws of nature are those empirical regularities which govern the natural 
world around us, irrespective of whether or not intelligent beings possess 
knowledge of these regularities or whether or not an appropriate symbolic 
representation for at least some of these regularities has been developed... 
Laws of science, by contrast, are those regularities of the natural world which 
are known to us and which have been cast in appropriate symbolic forms. 
Laws of science may be subject to various kinds of modification” (Weinert 
1995, 4-5).

15. I refer to this statement because it can be said to be an “absolute truth” as 
well as a necessary truth, where it is not only true in every possible world but 
further is conceived as such by every possible conceiver.

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