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Averroës’ Takfīr of al-Ghazālı̄: Ta’wīl and Causal Kufr 

Saja Parvizian 

 

Bio note 

Saja Parvizian is Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies at 

Coastal Carolina University. His primary research and teaching interests lie in early modern 

philosophy and classical Islamic philosophy. 

 

Abstract 

Al-Ghazālı̄ famously claims in the Incoherence of the Philosophers that al-Fārābī 

and Avicenna are unbelievers because they hold philosophical positions that 

conflict with Islam. What is less well-known, however, is that Averroës claims in 

the Decisive Treatise that al-Fārābī and Avicenna are not unbelievers; rather, al-

Ghazālı̄ is the true unbeliever for writing the Incoherence of the Philosophers. In 

this paper, my aim is to present a sustained reconstruction of Averroës’ legal and 

philosophical argument for why al-Ghazālı̄ is an unbeliever. The crux of Averroës’ 

argument is that al-Ghazālı̄ has expressed false allegorical interpretations of 

scripture to unqualified persons, which has caused them to fall into unbelief. By 

being causally responsible for other people’s unbelief, al-Ghazālı̄ is an unbeliever 

as well.  

 

Introduction 

Is al-Ghazālı̄ an unbeliever (kāfir)? To some, this question might seem misguided, offensive, or 

even heretical. Al-Ghazālı̄ is supposed to be the ‘Proof of Islam’ (ḥujjat al-Islām) as he helped 

define orthodox Islam, bringing clarity to the religion in a time of much confusion and strife in 

the eleventh century. In his spiritual autobiography, Deliverance from Error (al-Munqidh min al-

Ḍalāl), al-Ghazālı̄ describes how he defeated the philosophers, refuted misguided sects such as 

the Ta‘līmites, clarified Ash‘arite theology, and experienced the realities of Sufism. Al-Ghazālı̄, 

then, must be a Muslim.1 

So, how could such a question even be raised? In his infamous work, the Incoherence of 

the Philosophers (Tahāfut al-Falāsifa), al-Ghazālı̄ claims that the so-called ‘Islamic 

philosophers’ are kuffār:  

I have seen a group who, believing themselves in possession of a distinctiveness 

from companion and peer by virtue of a superior quick wit and intelligence, have 

rejected the Islamic duties regarding acts of worship, disdained religious rites 

pertaining to the offices of prayer and the avoidance of prohibited things, belittled 

the devotions and ordinances prescribed by the divine law, not halting in the face 

of its prohibitions and restrictions. On the contrary, they have entirely cast off the 

reins of religion through multifarious beliefs, following therein a troop ‘who turn 

 
1 I employ the following abbreviations for primary texts: ‘IP’: Incoherence of the Philosophers [Tahāfut al-Falāsifa] 

(Tr. Marmura, cited by page); ‘DC’: Decisive Criterion [Fayṣal al-Tafriqah] (Tr. Jackson, cited by page); ‘DE’: 

Deliverance from Error [al-Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl] (Tr. McCarthy, cited by page); ‘MB’: Moderation in Belief [al-

Iqtisād fı̄ al-I‘tiqād] (Tr. Yaqub, cited by page); ‘DT’: Decisive Treatise [Faṣl al-Maqāl] (Tr. Hourani, cited by 

page/Arabic drawn from the Butterworth edition); ‘II’: Incoherence of the Incoherence [Tahāfut al-Tahāfut] (Tr. 

Van den Bergh, cited by page); ‘FR’: Faith and Reason [al-Kashf ‘an Manāhij al-Adilla] (Tr. Najjar, cited by page); 

‘Q’: Qur’ān (Tr. Jones, cited by chapter and verse number).  

 



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[men] aside from the way of God and wish it to be crooked and who disbelieve 

(kāfirūn) in the world to come’. (IP: 2; Q. 11:19)  

Al-Ghazālı̄’s distal target is Aristotle—a kāfir by default—but his immediate concern is al-Fārābī 

and Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā).2 According to al-Ghazālı̄, al-Fārābī and Avicenna are no more than 

“reliable transmitters and verifiers” of Aristotle, “their leader” (IP: 4; see also DE: 63). They are 

not doing anything philosophically novel, rather, they are merely regurgitating Aristotelian 

philosophy. As such, “there is no basis for their unbelief (kufrihum) other than traditional, 

conventional imitation (taqlı̄d)” (IP: 2).3 Al-Ghazālı̄ identifies twenty theses of the Islamic 

philosophers that are in tension with Islam. Seventeen of these theses are innovative (bid‘a) and 

thus heterodox; however, three of them are unorthodox and constitute unbelief (kufr) itself (IP: 

10-11; DE: 66). According to al-Ghazālı̄ in the Decisive Criterion (Fayṣal al-Tafriqa), 

“‘unbelief’ (kufr) is to deem anything the Prophet brought to be a lie (takdhīb)” (DC: 92; see also 

MB: 199, 243-249). Thus, al-Ghazālı̄ is claiming that three theses of al-Fārābī and Avicenna 

contradict, in a problematic way, what the Prophet said, which entails that they believe that the 

Prophet was a liar. These theses are: (1) the world is eternal, (2) God only knows universals and 

not particulars, and (3) there is no bodily resurrection (IP: 226). Thus, al-Fārābī and Avicenna 

are kuffār (DE: 66, DC: 109-110, MB: 244-245).4  

 However, al-Ghazālı̄ did not have the final say on whether al-Fārābī and Avicenna were 

Muslims. Averroës (Ibn Rushd) systematically responds to al-Ghazālı̄ in the Incoherence of the 

Incoherence (Tahāfut al-Tahāfut), defending al-Fārābī and Avicenna. Although Averroës 

ultimately disagrees with many details of al-Fārābī and Avicenna’s philosophical positions, he 

nonetheless attempts to dismantle al-Ghazālı̄’s refutations, showing that he is confused about al-

Fārābī and Avicenna’s arguments, and ultimately too about the true Aristotelian positions on 

these theses.5 Here, I am not concerned with this aspect of the debate, as there is a growing 

literature on al-Ghazālı̄’s refutations and Averroës’ counterarguments.6 Instead, I want to draw 

attention to a neglected claim that Averroës makes in the Decisive Treatise (Faṣl al-Maqāl), 

namely, that al-Fārābī and Avicenna are not kuffār; rather, al-Ghazālı̄ is the true kāfir simply 

because he wrote the Incoherence of the Philosophers.  

In the Decisive Treatise, Averroës argues for a novel criterion for being a kāfir: if 

someone is causally responsible for another person committing kufr, then they are by extension a 

 
2 In the Deliverance from Error, al-Ghazālı̄ clearly claims that Aristotle, Plato, and Socrates are kuffār: ‘they all 

must be taxed with unbelief’ (DE: 62-3).  
3 For an account of al-Ghazālı̄’s conception of taqlı̄d as an inferior form of knowledge, see Griffel (2005). For a 

discussion of whether al-Ghazālı̄ really rejects Avicenna’s philosophy, see Janssens (2001). For an account of 

Avicenna’s reception of Aristotle, see Gutas (1988: 149-158). Al-Ghazālı̄ also claims that al-Fārābī and Avicenna do 

not practice basic Islamic rituals. Averroës denies this in the Incoherence of the Incoherence, claiming that the 

Islamic philosophers do not dismiss the Islamic rituals (II: 359). 
4 Al-Ghazālı̄’s Incoherence of the Philosophers undoubtedly had a profound impact on the trajectory of Islamic 

philosophy. Commentators are divided, however, on whether al-Ghazālı̄ caused a decline in Islamic philosophy. For 

commentators who claim that al-Ghazālı̄ caused a decline, see Munk (1859: 2:512); Renan (1852: 22-4); and Watt 

(1962: 117). For commentators who claim that al-Ghazālı̄ did not cause a decline, or at least that such a view is 

exaggerated, see Griffel (2009); Leaman (2008); Pines (1937: 80); and Sabra (1987).  
5 Interestingly, Averroës actually thinks that the alleged proofs of al-Fārābī and Avicenna, like al-Ghazālı̄’s, fail to 

meet demonstrative standards. Thus he claims that the Incoherence of the Incoherence could have equally been 

called the ‘Incoherence of both parties together’ (II: 258).  
6 For discussions of al-Fārābī and Avicenna’s original arguments, see Butterworth (1992); Marmura (1960, 1962); 

McGinnis (2014); and Vallat (2011). For al-Ghazālı̄’s refutations of al-Fārābī and Avicenna, see Bahlul (1992); 

Dougherty (2008); Griffel (2009); and Moad (2015a, 2015b). For Averroës’ counterarguments, see Belo (2006); 

Bello (1989); Fakhry (2001); Kukkonen (2000); and Leaman (1988).  



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kāfir as well. Call this ‘causal kufr’. According to Averroës, by writing the Incoherence of the 

Philosophers as a popular book—that is, a text written in a rhetorical and dialectical style—al-

Ghazālı̄ exposed (false) allegorical interpretations (s. ta’wīl, pl. ta’wīlāt) of scripture to the 

masses, and thus became responsible for mass kufr, particularly amongst the rhetorical and 

dialectical classes of believers.7 Therefore, al-Ghazālı̄ is a kāfir.8  

It must be stressed that Averroës is using the term ‘kāfir’, as applied to al-Ghazālı̄, in a 

unique and certainly odd sense. On the standard view, a kāfir is someone who, at the cognitive 

level, has problematic beliefs in relation to Islam (Izutsu 2004: 135-144).9 Call this ‘cognitive 

kufr’. Indeed, this is how al-Ghazālı̄ understands ‘kufr’: it is to deem—i.e. believe or judge—that 

the Prophet lied about something.10 As we will see, Averroës has a novel analysis of cognitive 

kufr, which bears a unique relation to his account of causal kufr. For Averroës, cognitive kufr is 

indexed to one’s intellectual capacities, and thus there are varying epistemic norms for kufr. 

Cognitive kufr for someone of the rhetorical or dialectical class is not necessarily cognitive kufr 

for someone of the demonstrative class (i.e. the philosopher). Roughly put, while someone from 

the rhetorical class ought not deny apparent meanings in scripture, the philosopher is obligated to 

deny apparent meanings in favor of allegorical meanings. The reason why al-Ghazālı̄ is a kāfir, 

however, is not because he commits cognitive kufr. Indeed, Averroes implies that al-Ghazālı̄’s 

assent to false allegorical interpretations in the Incoherence of the Philosophers is not what 

makes him a kāfir. There are excusing conditions for the theoretical errors of the scholars. 

Rather, al-Ghazālı̄ is a kāfir because he has led those who are unqualified to engage in allegorical 

interpretation, which is cognitive kufr for them.11 These distinctions will be explained in more 

detail below. The point of stressing Averroës’ unique usage of ‘kāfir’ at the outset is so that we 

do not expect Averroës to argue that al-Ghazālı̄ is a kāfir because he argues for false allegorical 

interpretations. When Averroës claims that al-Ghazālı̄ is a kāfir, he has this specific non-

cognitive sense of kufr (causal kufr) in mind. 

 
7 While many of the details of this argument in the Decisive Treatise have been discussed by commentators, to the 

best of my knowledge, there is only one commentator who explicitly acknowledges that Averroës claims that al-

Ghazālı̄ is a kāfir, namely, Iysa Bello. His discussion is limited to a couple paragraphs, in which he writes: ‘Ibn 

Rushd pronounces Ghazālı̄ to be “an unbeliever on account of his summoning people to unbelief” by expressing 

false allegorical interpretations concerning the principles of Islam to the masses in rhetorical and dialectical books’ 

(1989: 71). Catarina Belo also acknowledges the causal claim, but she does not explicitly draw out Averroës’ 

conclusion that al-Ghazālı̄ is a kāfir; rather, she links it to the Ash‘arites (2013: 34; cf. 2016: 288-9). Neither 

commentator reconstructs the details of the causal claim. For general discussions of the Decisive Treatise, see Belo 

(2016); Heller-Roezan (2006); and Mahdi (1994).  
8 Averroës makes a separate claim that al-Ghazālı̄ was wrong to call al-Fārābī and Avicenna kuffār given al- al-

Ghazālı̄’s own criteria for kufr in the Decisive Criterion (DT: 53). I will not address in any detail the differences 

between Averroës and al-Ghazālı̄’s conceptions of kufr, as my aim is to focus on Averroës’ account in the Decisive 

Treatise. For a discussion of the differences between Averroës and al-Ghazālı̄, see Griffel (2002).  
9 For a detailed account of different senses of ‘kufr’, see Brentjes (2016).  
10 Interestingly, Averroës comes fairly close to affirming this kind of view of cognitive kufr in the Incoherence of 

the Incoherence: ‘if he expresses a doubt concerning the religious principles in which he has been brought up, or 

explains them in a way contradictory to the prophets and turns away from their path, he merits more than anyone 

else that the term unbeliever should be applied to him’ (II: 360). This statement is not inconsistent with the analysis 

of cognitive kufr in the Decisive Treatise, as explained below. Averroës modulates al-Ghazālı̄’s conception of kufr 

by arguing that what it means to say the Prophet is a liar will shift depending on one’s intellectual capacities.  
11 As will be explained below, al-Ghazālı̄ would still be causally responsible for causal kufr obtaining amongst the 

masses even if his allegorical interpretations were true. This is because the rhetorical and dialectical class should not 

engage in allegorical interpretation at all.  

 



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Some important clarifications about the aims and scope of this paper. The primary aim of 

this paper—getting Averroës’ neglected argument up and running—is more philosophical than 

historical in orientation. Of course, there are many historical questions that can be raised about 

Averroës’ condemnation (takfı̄r) of al-Ghazālı̄. For example, how was Averroës’ takfı̄r received 

by his contemporaries? Did al-Ghazālı̄ actually cause the masses to fall into kufr? For the most 

part, I will not deal with these sorts of questions. My goal is to provide a sustained philosophical 

reconstruction of Averroës’ takfı̄r, by fleshing out his account of causal kufr. Finally, I will not 

provide an independent answer to the question of whether al-Ghazālı̄ is a kāfir, as I believe to do 

so properly would take us beyond the scope of the present project.  

The paper is divided up as follows. In the next section, I first explain Averroës’ account 

of the status of philosophy in relation to the law. This argument is standard fare for those familiar 

with the Decisive Treatise, but I replicate it here (in broad strokes) as it is foundational to 

understanding Averroës’ takfı̄r. I then examine Averroës’ account of allegorical interpretation of 

scripture. I focus on the scope and norms for allegorical interpretation, and distinguish the three 

classes of believers. Finally, I reconstruct Averroës’ account of causal kufr, and identify three 

interrelated senses of causal responsibility involved in causal kufr: evidential responsibility, 

epistemic responsibility, and moral responsibility. With this framework in place, I explain 

exactly how al-Ghazālı̄ can cause an unqualified person to fall into cognitive kufr. I close with an 

analysis of how philosophy and religion are ‘milk-sisters’, and a brief defense of al-Ghazālı̄. 

 

Averroës Takfīr 

Averroës’ takfı̄r of al-Ghazālı̄ consists of the following argument:  

1. Anyone who expresses allegorical interpretations (true or false) to unqualified persons is 
a kāfir.  

2. Al-Ghazālı̄ expresses false allegorical interpretations to unqualified persons in the 
Incoherence of the Philosophers.  

∴    Al-Ghazālı̄ is a kāfir.  
The argument is valid. The justification of these premises, however, is a complicated story. The 

crux of the argument is premise (1). Though I will minimally explain why Averroës is committed 

to premise (2), let us grant him this premise. This is because explaining why Averroës thinks that 

al-Ghazālı̄ presents false allegorical interpretations is a further project on its own, requiring (1) 

examination of Averroës’ counterarguments in the Incoherence of the Incoherence and (2) 

empirical evidence that unqualified persons were actually exposed to al-Ghazālı̄’s false 

allegorical interpretations. Thus, my focus will be on premise (1), which is justified by Averroës’ 

account of causal kufr. To unpack causal kufr we must understand the norms for allegorical 

interpretation of scripture, that is, who is and is not qualified to engage in allegorical 

interpretation. 

 

Falsafah and Sharī‘ah  

Our point of departure is Averroës’ conception of philosophy (falsafa), and its status in Islamic 

law (sharī‘a).12 According to Averroës, philosophy is “nothing more than the study of existing 

beings (al-mawjūdāt) and reflection on them as indications of the Artisan (al-ṣāni’)” (DT: 44). If 

the law urges us to reflect on existent beings, then philosophical inquiry is either obligatory 

 
12 For accounts of Averroës’ views on sharī‘ah, see Yildiz (2016) and Taylor (2012).  



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(wājib) or recommended (mandūb). Averroës cites numerous verses in the Qur’ān that call to 

such a reflection.13 For example:  

Reflect, those of you who have eyes. (Q. 59:2)  

Do they not consider the camels and how they have been created, and the heaven 

and how it was raised? (Q. 88:17-18; see also Q. 7:185; 6:75)  

According to Averroës, such verses show that philosophy is obligatory: “the Law has rendered 

obligatory the study of beings by the intellect (al-naẓr bi-l-‘aql) and reflection on them” (DT: 

45).14 The kind of philosophy that the Qur’ān calls to can be viewed as encompassing all 

branches of philosophy, both theoretical and practical. However, Averroës seems to have in mind 

specifically metaphysics, for he claims that the Qur’ān is calling us to reflect on the nature of 

existent beings insofar as they are indications of the existence and nature of God.15 

Averroës’ next step is to identify the best method for conducting philosophy: “we are 

under an obligation to carry on our study of beings by intellectual reasoning (bi-l-qiyās al-‘aqlı̄)” 

(DT: 45). But since philosophy is “the most perfect kind of study” it must employ “the most 

perfect kind of reasoning”, that is, “demonstration” (burhān). Mastery of demonstrative 

reasoning requires us to know the different kinds of syllogisms and the conditions for their 

validity and invalidity, and how demonstrative reasoning is different from “dialectical, rhetorical, 

and fallacious reasoning” (ibid.).16  

How exactly should we go about learning logic? Averroës claims that “it is difficult or 

impossible for one man to find out by himself and from the beginning all that he needs of that 

subject” (ibid.). It would be imprudent, then, to try to reinvent the wheel when it comes to logic. 

Instead, “we ought to seek help towards our goal from what has been said by such a predecessor 

on the subject, regardless of whether this other one shares our religion or not” (DT: 46-7). 

Averroës has in mind ancient philosophers, particularly Aristotle, who have identified the 

various kinds of syllogisms and established standards for their validity and invalidity. But this 

does not mean that we should blindly follow ancient logicians. Rather, we should accept what is 

correct from their work, reject what is incorrect, and more importantly, try to make progress in 

the study of logic (DT: 47).  

After having mastered logic, we are in a position to engage in philosophical inquiry. Here 

too, however, it would be imprudent to start from scratch. Just as in logic, we also need to look 

to ancient philosophers:  

[W]henever we find in the works of our predecessors of former nations a theory 

about beings and a reflection on them conforming to what the conditions of 

demonstration require, we ought to study what they said about the matter and 

what they armed in their books. (DT: 48)  

Averroës makes a strong claim regarding the study of ancient philosophy: “it is evident that the 

study of the books of the ancients is obligatory by Law, since their aim and purpose in their 

books is just the purpose to which the Law has urged us” (ibid.). Muslims must study, at the very 

 
13 In the Decisive Treatise, Averroës is primarily concerned with the relationship between philosophy and the law 

(sharī‘a). However, ‘law’ seems to be a general term referring to law and its textual sources (Qur’ān and hadı̄th). 

Thus, Hourani also translates ‘sharī‘a’ as ‘scripture’ as well. For our purposes, I do not see any significant 

differences here. I will use ‘law’, ‘scripture’, and ‘Qur’ān’ interchangeably.  
14 For a detailed account of why Averroës thinks that philosophy is obligatory, see Leaman (1988: 144-160).  
15 Though Averroës comes close, he does not claim that since philosophy is obligatory, rejecting philosophy is kufr. 

Why this is the case will be made clear below. Al-Kindı̄, however, does draw out this implication. For a discussion 

of al-Kindı̄ on the relationship between philosophy and Islam, see Adamson (2007: 22-25) and Janssens (2007).  
16 For an account of medieval Islamic conceptions of syllogisms, see Lameer (1994). 



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least, the works of Plato and Aristotle. However, the study of ancient philosophy, and philosophy 

more generally, is obligatory only for “anyone who is fit to study them”, that is, Muslims who 

unite two qualities: “natural intelligence” and “religious integrity and moral virtue” (ibid.). 

Preventing a person who meets these qualifications from studying philosophy would be to block 

them from the “door of theoretical study that leads to the truest knowledge (ḥaqq al-ma’rifa) of 

Him” (ibid.). However, like the study of ancient logic, we should not blindly follow the ancients 

in their metaphysical positions. We should accept what accords with demonstrative reasoning, 

reject what does not, and make progress in metaphysics. 

 

Burhān and Ta’wīl 

For Averroës, sharı̄‘a sanctions philosophy as an independent theoretical activity: philosophical 

truths can be identified without consulting, say, the Qur’ān.17 Indeed, if qualified, one is 

obligated to seek this distinct avenue to truth. But what about the claims the Qur’ān makes about 

existent beings? What should the Islamic philosopher do when confronted with a different 

metaphysical framework in the Qur’ān? According to Averroës, while there may be prima facie 

conflicts between philosophy and scripture, there cannot be ultima facie conflicts:  

[W]e, the Muslim community, know firmly that demonstrative reflection does not 

lead to differing with what is set down in the Law. For truth does not oppose 

truth; rather, it agrees with and bears witness to it. (DT: 50)  

There cannot be any real contradictions between philosophy and scripture, because 

demonstrative truth is not essentially different from scriptural truth. Scriptural claims are subject 

to the same epistemic standards as philosophical claims.18 Nonetheless, it does seem that 

philosophy contradicts scripture. How, then, do we reconcile apparent tensions?  

The demonstrative truths that philosophy identifies can relate to scripture in two ways. 

First, scripture might be silent about an existent revealed by demonstration. This is not a 

problem: “if it is unmentioned there is no contradiction” (ibid.); one can simply accept the 

demonstrative truth about the existent. However, if scripture does mention an existent, there are 

two possible scenarios: “If Scripture speaks about it, the apparent meaning of the words 

inevitably either accords or conflicts with the conclusions of demonstration about it” (ibid.). If 

the apparent meaning of scripture is in accordance with a demonstrative truth, there is also no 

problem because scripture is straightforwardly confirming the demonstrative truth. However, if 

the apparent meaning of scripture prima facie conflicts with a demonstrative truth about an 

existent, then there is a tension. In such a case, Averroës claims scripture must be interpreted 

allegorically. Averroës defines “allegorical interpretation” as follows:  

The meaning of ‘allegorical interpretation’ (al-ta’wīl) is: extension of the 

significance of an expression from real to metaphorical significance, without 

forsaking therein the standard metaphorical practices of Arabic, such as calling a 

thing by the name of something resembling it or a cause or consequence or 

accompaniment of it, or other things such as are enumerated in accounts of the 

kinds of metaphorical speech. (ibid.)  

 
17 I am disagreeing with Strauss’ view on the relationship between philosophy and the law. According to Strauss, 

philosophy is not a freely sanctioned activity for Averroës; rather, it is bound by the law (1995: 88). As I understand 

Averroës, however, philosophical truths can be accepted without reference to the law.  
18 For further discussion of the principle that ‘truth does not oppose truth’, see Taylor (2000) and Fakhry (1968).  



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An allegorical interpretation provides a metaphorical reading of a text, in conformity with the 

proper norms for metaphorical expression in Arabic.19 The aim is to provide a metaphorical 

reading of scripture that will agree with a particular demonstrative truth. For example, there are 

verses in the Qur’ān that make reference to God’s hands (Q. 48:10). A literal reading is 

philosophically problematic, because it would ascribe corporeality to God and make God similar 

to creation (Q. 42:11). Thus, one should allegorically interpret references to the hands of God as 

an expression of, say, God’s power. Such allegorical interpretations are in part justified, because 

an allegorical interpretation of one part of scripture will always be confirmed or almost 

confirmed by the apparent meaning of another part of scripture:  

[I]f scripture is considered carefully, and the rest of its contents searched page by 

page, there will invariably be found among the expressions of Scripture 

something that in its apparent meaning bears witness to that allegorical 

interpretation or comes close to bearing witness. (DT: 51)  

But this raises an important question: why did God not reveal scripture in a way such that it 

literally expresses all demonstrative truths?  

There are two interrelated reasons for why scripture conceals demonstrative truths. First, 

the contradiction between apparent meanings in scripture is a pedagogical device intended by 

God:  

The reason why we have received in Scripture texts whose apparent meanings 

contradict each other is in order to draw the attention of those who are well 

grounded in science (al-‘ilm) to the interpretation (al-ta’wı̄l) that reconciles them. 

(Ibid.)  

By having prima facie contradictions, scripture is designed to steer those who are qualified—i.e. 

“well-grounded in science”—to the allegorical interpretations that reconcile the tension. Second, 

the presence of apparent meanings is required because they are suited to the intellectual 

capacities of those who are not grounded in science, and thus cannot assent to allegorical 

interpretations. To understand this second reason, we must discuss the scope and norms of 

allegorical interpretation.  

According to Averroës, everyone agrees that allegorical interpretation of scripture is a 

valid practice (DT: 51). The point of contention is the scope of allegorical interpretation; that is, 

which verses admit of allegorical interpretation, and which verses do not (ibid.). One solution is 

to follow consensus (ijmā’) amongst the Muslim community regarding the scope of allegorical 

interpretation:  

It may be objected: ‘There are some things in Scripture that the Muslims have 

unanimously agreed to take in their apparent meaning, others [that they have 

agreed] to interpret allegorically, and others about which they have disagreed; is it 

permissible, then, that demonstration should lead to interpreting allegorically 

 
19 A point of interest here is that Averroës seems to accept al-Ghazālı̄’s rule for allegorical interpretation: “the rule to 

follow in this type of speculation is the one Abu Ḥāmid adopted in The Book of Distinction (i.e. Decisive Criterion)” 

(FR: 129-130). What Averroës is specifically referring to is al-Ghazālı̄’s distinction between five levels of existence 

indicated in scripture, and how one might be justified—via proof—to move from one kind of existence to the next 

through allegorical interpretation (DC: 96-107; see also DT: 59). The disagreement between al-Ghazālı̄ and 

Averroës is whether the philosophers’ ‘proofs’ justify them in offering allegorical interpretations of higher levels of 

existence. For discussion of al-Ghazālı̄’s rule for allegorical interpretation, see Griffel (2015); Kemal (2003: 207-

220); and Moosa (2005: 191-208).  

 



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what they have agreed to take in its apparent meaning, or to taking in its apparent 

meaning what they have agreed to interpret allegorically?’ (DT: 52)  

A worry raised in this passage is that philosophical inquiry will conflict with consensus by 

leading the philosopher to allegorical interpretations about verses in scripture that should be 

taken in their apparent meaning. In principle, Averroës accepts ijmā’ (ibid.).20 However, he 

claims that unlike practical matters (al-‘amaliyyāt), “unanimity on theoretical matters (al-

naẓariyyāt) is never determined with certainty” (ibid.). Averroës justifies this claim as follows:  

[I]t is not possible for unanimity to be determined on any question at any period 

unless that period is strictly limited by us, and all the scholars (al-‘ulamā’) 

existing in that period are known to us (that is, known as individuals and in their 

total number), and the doctrine of each of them on the question has been handed 

down to us on unassailable authority, and, in addition to all this, unless we are 

sure that the scholars existing at the time were in agreement that there is not both 

an apparent and an inner meaning in Scripture, that knowledge of any question 

ought not to be kept secret from anyone, and that there is only one way for people 

to understand Scripture. (ibid.)  

To establish consensus about whether and how to allegorically interpret scripture three 

conditions must hold. First, we must know who all the scholars are that have taken an 

interpretive stance on a given theoretical text. Second, we must know their interpretive stance on 

that theoretical text. Third, it must be the case that the scholars agree that allegorical 

interpretations of theoretical texts should not be kept secret from anyone. With regard to the first 

and second conditions, Averroës thinks they are epistemically impossible to establish, because 

there always might be some scholar and their allegorical interpretation that escapes us. At first 

glance, the third condition might not seem relevant. However, in order to establish consensus in 

the Muslim community about a theoretical matter, it must be the case that the scholars thought 

that allegorical interpretations should not be kept secret from anyone.21 Allegorical 

interpretations must be available to everyone, both scholars and laymen, in order to establish 

consensus. Averroës says this condition cannot be met:  

[I]t is recorded in Tradition that many of the first believers used to hold that 

Scripture has both an apparent and an inner meaning (ẓāhir wa bāṭin), and that the 

inner meaning ought not to be learned by anyone who is not a man of learning in 

this field and who is incapable of understanding it. (ibid.)  

Consensus cannot be established if the scholars believe that the true inner meanings should only 

be expressed to a select, qualified few.  

We are now in a position to fully explain the second reason why scripture does not 

express all demonstrative truths in an apparent manner. In short, it is because God has designed 

scripture to appeal to a diverse range of intellectual capacities:  

The reason why we have received a Scripture with both an apparent and an inner 

meaning lies in the diversity of people’s natural capacities and the difference of 

their innate dispositions with regard to assent. (DT: 51)  

 
20 For an account of consensus in Islam, see Hamid Ali (2010).  
21 Averroës is unclear about whether consensus is amongst the Muslim community as a whole, or just the scholars. 

As I read him here, consensus must hold amongst the Muslim community, which includes scholars and laymen. This 

explains the third condition: consensus cannot be established in the Muslim community because inner meanings are 

not disclosed to laymen. 



9 

 

According to Averroës, “the purpose of Scripture is to teach true science and right practice,” 

which is primarily done through demonstrative, dialectical, and rhetorical judgments. Most 

people however, given their limited intellectual capacities, are not suited to the demonstrative 

method. And “since it is the purpose of Scripture simply to teach everyone” (DT: 64), the most 

common methods present in scripture are dialectical and rhetorical. This is not problematic, 

because God has “appointed for every Muslim by the method of assent (al-taṣdīq) that his 

temperament and nature require” (DT: 49). Believers, then, must assent to an understanding of 

scripture that is appropriate to their intellectual capacities. Some must assent to apparent 

meanings, while others must assent to some combination of apparent and inner meanings.  

Averroës thus distinguishes three classes of believers, based on their methods of assent 

(DT: 65). First, the rhetorical class (al-khiṭābiyūn) consists of laymen, who are swayed by 

rhetoric and imagistic representations. They must only assent to apparent meanings.22 Second, 

the dialectical class (al-jidliyūn) are the theologians, who “either by nature alone or by nature 

and habit” have a better understanding of scripture because they are using a higher form of 

argumentation (ibid.). Nonetheless, they too must assent to apparent meanings, and ought not 

engage in allegorical interpretation via dialectic. Third, there is the demonstrative class (al-

burhāniyūn) who “by nature and training” are qualified to engage in allegorical interpretation 

(ibid.). These are the scholars and philosophers, whose allegorical interpretations “ought not to 

be expressed to the dialectical class, let alone to the masses” (ibid.).  

 

Causal Kufr 

Here are the facts on the ground: there is a disagreement between al-Ghazālı̄, al-Fārābī, and 

Avicenna about certain allegorical interpretations of scripture. For Averroës, these disagreements 

are not problematic. This is because, as we saw above, there is no sound consensus about the 

right allegorical interpretations, and “we ought not to call a man an unbeliever for violating 

unanimity in cases of allegorical interpretation, because no unanimity is conceivable in such 

cases” (DT: 53). Moreover, it is also not problematic that one or more of these scholars might be 

wrong in their allegorical interpretation (DT: 60). Indeed, Averroës thinks that all three 

philosophers are ultimately in error, although al-Fārābī and Avicenna are closer to the truth. 

According to Averroës, “it seems that those who disagree on the interpretation of these difficult 

questions earn merit if they are in the right and will be excused [by God] if they are in error” 

(DT: 57).  

However, while error concerning allegorical interpretation is excused for the 

demonstrative class, it is not excused for any other class of people (whether it concerns 

theoretical or practical matters). The claim is not that unqualified persons are not excused for 

giving false allegorical interpretations. Rather, the claim is that unqualified persons should not 

engage in allegorical interpretation at all. As Averroës writes: “he who makes judgments about 

beings without having the proper qualifications for [such] judgments is not excused but is either 

a sinner or an unbeliever” (DT: 58).  

More specifically, Averroës distinguishes three types of scriptural texts, and the 

conditions for being excused or blamed for error about them (ibid.). First, there are texts that 

must be taken in their apparent meaning by everyone irrespective of class. These are texts 

concerning practical matters and principles of religion (uṣul al-dı̄n), for example, that prayer is 

obligatory and that there is happiness in the next life (DT: 59). The apparent and true meaning of 

 
22 See Kemal (2003: 224) for Averroës’ views on rhetoric, dialectic, and demonstration.  

 



10 

 

these texts can be understood plainly by all three classes, thus allegorical interpretation about 

them is blameworthy. Second, there are theoretical texts that must be taken in their apparent 

meaning by the rhetorical and dialectical classes but must be interpreted allegorically by the 

demonstrative class. It is blameworthy for the rhetorical and dialectical classes to interpret them 

allegorically, and blameworthy for the demonstrative class to take them in their apparent 

meaning (ibid.). Third, there are texts whose status is unclear as falling under the first two types 

above, thus literal or allegorical interpretation of these texts by a qualified scholar of the 

demonstrative class is allowed, and excused if it is erroneous (DT: 60). 

By establishing unique epistemic obligations for each kind of believer, Averroës 

implicitly offers a novel conception of cognitive kufr with respect to theoretical matters. No 

believer, regardless of class, can deny practical matters and principles of religion. However, 

when it comes to theoretical matters, cognitive kufr—and correspondingly faith or belief (imān) 

—is indexed to one’s intellectual capacities. While it would be cognitive kufr for a person of the 

rhetorical class to deny an apparent meaning of a theoretical text, it is not cognitive kufr for a 

scholar to deny the apparent meaning of that text in favor of an allegorical interpretation. Thus if 

one were to ask Averroës, ‘what is kufr with respect to theoretical matters?’, he would not 

respond like al-Ghazālı̄ does, by enumerating a list of theoretical beliefs that contradict the 

Qur’ān. Rather, he would first identify what kind of believer the questioner is based on their 

intellectual capacities, and then proceed from there to identify what that believer should assent 

to.23 In addition to these variable norms, it is important to note that, for Averroës, cognitive kufr 

with respect to theoretical matters does not track falsity. That is, a theoretical belief is not kufr 

because it is false (although it may be false). A philosopher can assent to false allegorical 

interpretations, and still be a Muslim. Indeed, although Averroës defends al-Fārābī and 

Avicenna’s status as Muslims, he is clear that they are wrong in many of their philosophical 

positions. Moreover, the rhetorical and dialectical classes are obligated to assent to apparent 

meanings of theoretical texts which are, strictly speaking, false by demonstrative standards. 

The upshot, then, is that Averroës actually has no problem with there being a difference 

of opinion between al-Ghazālı̄, al-Fārābī, and Avicenna about the three theses. What is 

problematic, however, is that al-Ghazālı̄ exposed his allegorical interpretations of the creation of 

the world, God’s knowledge, resurrection and so on in a popular book—the Incoherence of the 

Philosophers—accessible to believers from the rhetorical and dialectical classes.24 It must be 

emphasized that Averroës’ worry is not that al-Ghazālı̄ exposed false allegorical interpretations. 

He would be equally guilty if he exposed true ones: “true allegories ought not to be set down in 

popular books, let alone false ones” (CT: 68). Given that members of the rhetorical and 

dialectical classes are obligated to assent to apparent meanings, allegorical interpretations should 

be expressed only in demonstrative books, and these demonstrative books should not be made 

available to the unqualified. By writing about allegorical interpretations in a popular book, the 

scholar does something quite pernicious. That is, he leads unqualified persons to cognitive kufr. 

By doing this the scholar becomes a kāfir as well. This is premise (1) of our master argument. 

Recall that it states that “anyone who expresses allegorical interpretations (true or false) to 

unqualified persons is a kāfir.” As Averroës puts it:  

 
23 For an account of theological beliefs that everyone must hold according to Averroës, see Mensia (2019: 31-37).  
24 Al-Ghazālı̄ discusses allegorical interpretations in a number of his books. However, it is clear that Averroës has 

the Incoherence of the Philosophers in mind when he speaks of a ‘popular book’ of al-Ghazālı̄, because in the 

Decisive Treatise he is responding primarily to al-Ghazālı̄’s takfīr in the Incoherence of the Philosophers (DT: 53).  

 



11 

 

But anyone who is not a man of learning is obliged to take these passages in their 

apparent meaning, and allegorical interpretation of them is for him unbelief 

because it leads to unbelief. That is why we hold that, for anyone whose duty it is 

to believe in the apparent meaning, allegorical interpretation is unbelief, because 

it leads to unbelief. Anyone of the interpretative class who discloses such [an 

interpretation] to him is summoning him to unbelief, and he who summons to 

unbelief is an unbeliever. (DT: 61)  

Averroës justifies premise (1) with two interrelated definitions of kufr. The first kind of kufr is of 

the cognitive variety. Call it ‘local kufr’.25 More specifically:  

Local Kufr: If an unqualified person, U, engages in allegorical interpretation, then U 

commits cognitive kufr and is a kāfir.26 

In local kufr, the unqualified person who engages in allegorical interpretation is a kāfir in the 

cognitive sense, i.e. they commit cognitive kufr. The second kind of kufr is parasitic on the first 

kind. Call it ‘causal kufr’. More specifically: 

Causal Kufr: If a qualified person, Q, exposes allegorical interpretations to an 

unqualified person, U, then Q is a kāfir, because Q is causally responsible 

for local kufr obtaining in U.27 

The qualified person who exposes allegorical interpretations to an unqualified person is a kāfir in 

a non-cognitive—i.e. causal—sense. The astute reader, however, will note that Averroës does 

not use causal language in the passage above. All he says is that summoning someone to kufr 

makes one a kāfir. Similarly, Averroës writes:  

[H]e is an unbeliever on account of his summoning (da‘ā) people to unbelief (al-

kufr). (DT: 66)  

[He] who turns people away (al-ṣād) from Scripture is an unbeliever (kāfir). (DT: 

67)  

Though not explicit, there are causal connotations to the Arabic terms used here for 

‘summoning’ and ‘turning away’.28 For example, al-ṣād also means repelling or driving away. 

Moreover, for systematic and charitable reasons, the best reading of ‘summoning to unbelief’ is 

‘causing unbelief’. Mere summoning—e.g. pronouncing an allegorical interpretation to an 

 
25 In denoting this kind of cognitive kufr as ‘local’, my intention is to capture the sense in which this kind of kufr 

obtains for one person, as opposed to obtaining from a relation between two people (as in causal kufr).  
26 What does it mean to ‘engage’ in allegorical interpretation? Averroës is not clear. There are three possibilities: (1) 

offering one’s own allegorical interpretations, (2) studying allegorical interpretations, and (3) reading about 

allegorical interpretations. My speculation is that Averroës has in mind (1) and (2); he would not think that mere 

reading of allegorical interpretations would automatically make one a kāfir.  
27 There is one place in the Decisive Treatise where Averroës seems to imply that the scholar who exposes 

allegorical interpretations to unqualified persons falls into cognitive kufr as well: “both he who expresses it and he to 

whom it is expressed are led into unbelief” (DT: 66). However, I think Averroës is misspeaking here, for as we will 

see below, it is clear that there is no change in the scholar’s beliefs. The only sense in which the scholar commits 

cognitive kufr is that he has caused cognitive kufr to obtain in another person. What Averroës should have said is 

that the “one who expresses the allegorical interpretation, and the one to whom it is expressed become kuffār.” 
28 There exists one text, however, where Averroës uses explicit causal language in describing what al-Ghazālı̄ has 

done: “But by expressing those false beliefs to the masses, they have been a cause (sababā) of perdition to the 

masses and themselves, in this world and the next” (DT: 66). Since the reason for the perdition of the masses in this 

life and the next would be their unbelief, if al-Ghazālı̄ is the cause of their perdition, this must be vis-à-vis his being 

the cause of their falling into unbelief. Such a text, coupled with the analysis of what summoning to unbelief 

amounts to below, provides good evidence that Averroës does ascribe to causal kufr. 



12 

 

unqualified person—is too weak a condition for being a kāfir. A scholar has to do more work. 

What exactly that is will be explained in detail below.  

How exactly do local kufr and causal kufr obtain? Regarding local kufr, Averroës writes:  

When something of these allegorical interpretations is expressed to anyone unfit 

to receive them—especially demonstrative interpretations because of their 

remoteness from common knowledge—both he who expresses it and he to whom 

it is expressed are led into unbelief. The reason for that [in the case of the latter] is 

that allegorical interpretation comprises two things, rejection (ibṭāl) of the 

apparent meaning and affirmation (ithbāt) of the allegorical one; so that if the 

apparent meaning is rejected in the mind of someone who can only grasp apparent 

meanings, without the allegorical meaning being armed in his mind, the result is 

unbelief (al-kufr), if it [the text in question] concerns the principles of religion. 

(DT: 66; see also DT: 61)  

We can disambiguate three different ways in which local kufr obtains. First, in this passage, 

Averroës claims that engaging in allegorical interpretation leads to a destruction of appropriate 

belief for a person of the rhetorical or dialectical class. Here is how it works. Assenting to an 

allegorical interpretation involves two cognitive acts: (1) the rejection of the apparent meaning 

of a text, and (2) the affirmation of the allegorical meaning. In the ideal case—that is, the case of 

the philosopher or qualified student—the apparent meaning is rejected and replaced by an 

allegorical meaning via demonstration. However, if someone is unfit to understand the 

allegorical meaning—they are not trained in logic—then their initial belief in the apparent 

meaning of scripture, one that was appropriate to their intellectual capacities, has been destroyed, 

and no appropriate belief has been put in its place. I think this is the primary sense in which local 

kufr obtains. Indeed, Averroës has this sense in mind when discussing God’s self-knowledge in 

the Sixth Discussion of the Incoherence of the Incoherence:  

The problem concerning the knowledge of the Creator of Himself and of other 

things is one of those questions which it is forbidden to discuss in a dialectical 

way, let alone put them down in a book, for the understanding of the masses does 

not suffice to understand such subtleties, and when one embarks on such 

problems with them the meaning of divinity becomes void (baṭala) for them and 

therefore it is forbidden to them to occupy themselves with this knowledge, since 

it suffices for their blessedness to understand what is within their grasp. (II: 215)  

However, I think that there are two other ways that local kufr can obtain on the rejection-

affirmation model. Second, it is possible that the apparent meaning is rejected and the allegorical 

meaning armed; however, the allegorical meaning is neither understood nor justified by 

demonstration. Third, it is possible that the apparent meaning is rejected and the allegorical 

meaning affirmed; however, while the allegorical meaning is understood, it cannot be 

demonstrated. Though he does not make it explicit, I think that Averroës wavers between these 

three options in the Decisive Treatise. This is not inconsistent. All three options amount to local 

kufr, because an epistemic norm is being violated. We should, then, take a disjunctive approach: 

the way that local kufr obtains will depend on the kind of believer that is attempting the 

allegorical interpretation. 

Let us now turn to how causal kufr obtains. We must start off by noting that there is no 

corresponding cognitive exchange when causal kufr obtains. Although the scholar causes an 

unqualified person to engage improperly in allegorical interpretation, the scholar actually 

maintains their own assent to allegorical interpretations, which they are obligated to hold (even if 



13 

 

these allegorical interpretations are ultimately false). If we were to examine their cognitive 

states, then, we would find that there is no kufr at the level of belief. Thus, causal kufr obtains 

not because of a problematic theoretical belief on the part of the scholar, but because of a 

problematic practical action.  

What exactly is causal responsibility here? How can a scholar be causally responsibly for 

someone of the rhetorical or dialectical class, say Zayd, committing cognitive kufr? Averroës 

does not fill in the details. I propose that we distinguish three interrelated senses of causal 

responsibility involved here: evidential responsibility, epistemic responsibility, and moral 

responsibility. By ‘evidential responsibility’ I mean responsibility for providing the evidence, on 

the basis of which the cognitive kufr obtains. By ‘epistemic responsibility’ I mean responsibility 

with respect to inference, justification, and understanding. Finally, by ‘moral responsibility’ I 

mean who should be blamed or even punished for the cognitive kufr.29 

It seems that these three kinds of responsibility are jointly necessary and sufficient for a 

scholar to be causally responsible, in the fullest sense, for Zayd’s cognitive kufr. Evidential 

responsibility is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for being causally responsible for 

someone else’s cognitive kufr. The scholar must be connected to the allegorical interpretations to 

be held responsible for Zayd’s cognitive kufr. But this is not sufficient for causal kufr to obtain. 

Zayd can come across allegorical interpretations of a scholar, but for some reason choose to not 

engage in allegorical interpretation (see footnote 26). Epistemic responsibility is a necessary—

and possibly sufficient—condition for being causally responsible for cognitive kufr. The relevant 

sense of epistemic responsibility for us here concerns whether some independent person can be 

held epistemically responsible for the formation of another person’s assent to allegorical 

interpretations. This might seem counterintuitive, for surely I alone am the source of my 

inferences, justifications, and understanding. But I believe such a scenario can obtain if one 

exerts epistemic influence on another person’s inferences, justifications, and ultimate 

understanding of allegorical interpretations. Finally, there is moral responsibility. It seems that 

moral responsibility is a necessary condition for causal responsibility, but it merely obtains in 

virtue of evidential responsibility and epistemic responsibility. That is, if one is evidentially and 

epistemically responsible for another person’s cognitive kufr, then one is necessarily morally 

responsible as well. To see how Averroës thinks that al-Ghazālı̄ is responsible in these three 

senses we must turn to premise (2) of the master argument.  

Premise (2) of the master argument states that “Al-Ghazālı̄ expresses false allegorical 

interpretations to unqualified persons in the Incoherence of the Philosophers.” Averroës is 

clearly committed to this premise:  

Allegorical interpretations, then, ought not to be expressed to the masses nor set 

down in rhetorical or dialectical books, that is, books containing arguments of 

these two sorts, as was done by…. (DT: 66; see also DT: 61)30  

Therefore, allegorical interpretations ought to be set down only in demonstrative 

books, because if they are in demonstrative books they are encountered by no one 

but men of the demonstrative class. But if they are set down in other than 

demonstrative books and one deals with them by poetical, rhetorical, or dialectical 

methods, as Abū Ḥāmid does, then he commits an offense against the Law and 

 
29 On moral treatment of kuffār, see Griffel (2001) and Hoover (2009) 
30 Here, Averroës is explicitly referencing al-Ghazālı̄, as his full name is ‘Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad 

al-Ghazālı̄’.  



14 

 

against philosophy, even though the fellow intended nothing but good. (DT: 61; 

see also DT: 66)  

For Averroës, al-Ghazālı̄ is clearly evidentially responsible for Zayd’s cognitive kufr. What is 

noteworthy, however, is how this evidence is expressed, as this reveals why al-Ghazālı̄ is 

epistemically responsible. According to Averroës, the Incoherence of the Philosophers is not a 

demonstrative book, but a popular book,31 because it discusses allegorical interpretations through 

rhetoric and dialectic.32 Suppose Zayd, who picks up the Incoherence of the Philosophers, is 

from the rhetorical class. This implies two things: (1) Zayd’s intellectual disposition is such that 

he will be swayed by rhetoric, and (2) Zayd should only assent to apparent meanings of scripture. 

Let us consider how local kufr would obtain for Zayd under the second possibility discussed 

above, namely, rejecting an apparent meaning and arming a misunderstood and unjustified 

allegorical meaning. Since the Incoherence of the Philosophers examines allegorical 

interpretations through rhetoric, Zayd should actually be able to follow much of al-Ghazālı̄’s 

argumentation. Zayd will make inferences that will lead him to believe, mistakenly, that he 

understands a particular allegorical interpretation and that he can prove it. Consequently, Zayd 

will abandon his assent to former apparent meanings, and now affirm a misunderstood and 

unjustified allegorical interpretation. This is local kufr. So, who is epistemically responsible for 

Zayd’s cognitive kufr, al-Ghazālı̄ or Zayd? In an obvious sense, Zayd is epistemically 

responsible for the cognitive kufr, as he is the immediate cause of his own misunderstanding. 

However, Averroës would claim that the real culprit here is al-Ghazālı̄ because he has put Zayd 

in a compromised epistemic position. Zayd would not have been epistemically compromized if 

al-Ghazālı̄ had restricted his audience to the demonstrative class. Al-Ghazālı̄ has put Zayd in a 

cognitive situation where he can follow al-Ghazālı̄’s rhetoric, and is now rejecting apparent 

meanings and replacing them with allegorical meanings. In this way, al-Ghazālı̄ exerts epistemic 

influence on Zayd’s belief formation vis-à-vis his mode of presentation and authority as a 

scholar. Thus, al-Ghazālı̄ has a share in the epistemic responsibility. Given that al-Ghazālı̄ is 

evidentially and epistemically responsible for Zayd’s cognitive kufr, it follows that he is also 

 
31 It is important to note that al-Ghazālı̄ actually claims that he is engaging in demonstrative reasoning. Al-Ghazālı̄’s 

whole aim is to show that the philosopher’s demonstrations fail on their own terms, through using their own logical 

tools against them. He claims he “will dispute with them in this book in their language—I mean, their expressions in 

logic” (IP: 9). Averroës claims that despite al-Ghazālı̄’s intentions, al-Ghazālı̄ failed to provide demonstrations, and 

is actually engaging in rhetoric and dialectic. For example, in response to al-Ghazālı̄’s objections to the first proof 

for the eternity of the world, Averroës writes: “this argument is sophistical” (II: 3). For al-Ghazālı̄’s views on 

demonstration, see Griffel (2016).  
32 It is not clear whether al-Ghazālı̄’s intended audience is the masses, as Averroës claims. In the Third Introduction 

to the Incoherence of the Philosophers, al-Ghazālı̄ seems to imply that his audience is anyone who thinks highly of 

al-Fārābī and Avicenna: “Let it be known [that] our objective is to alert those who think well of the philosophers and 

believe that their ways are free from contradiction by showing the [various] aspects of their incoherence” (IP: 7). 

This statement suggests that al-Ghazālı̄’s target audience are people who already have some familiarity with al-

Fārābī and Avicenna’s works, which would presumably exclude the masses. That al-Ghazālı̄ would not want laymen 

to engage the Incoherence of the Philosophers is suggested by the following statement in the Deliverance from 

Error: “the perusal of the philosophers’ books must be prevented on the score of the deceit and danger they contain” 

(DE: 70). This suggests that only the qualified student or scholar should engage the Incoherence of the Philosophers, 

because only they can intellectually handle philosophy. As such, an available response to al-Ghazālı̄ might be to 

argue that he never intended the Incoherence of the Philosophers to be read by the rhetorical class. If so, then 

Averroës’ takfı̄r would be misplaced.  

 



15 

 

morally responsible. Consequently, al-Ghazālı̄ is causally responsible in the fullest sense for 

Zayd’s cognitive kufr, and commits causal kufr.33 

Given premise (1) and premise (2) of the master argument, it follows conclusively that al-

Ghazālı̄ is a kāfir:  

As for the man who expresses these allegories to unqualified persons, he is an 

unbeliever on account of his summoning people to unbelief. This is contrary to 

the summons of the Legislator, especially when they are false allegories 

concerning the principles of religion, as has happened in the case of a group of 

people of our time. For we have seen some of them thinking that they were being 

philosophic and that they perceived, with their remarkable wisdom, things that 

conflict with Scripture in every respect, that is [in passages] that do not admit of 

allegorical interpretation; and that it was obligatory to express these things to the 

masses. But by expressing those false beliefs to the masses, they have been a 

cause (sababā) of perdition to the masses and themselves, in this world and the 

next. (DT: 66)  

The man who has been a “cause of perdition to the masses” here is clearly al-Ghazālı̄. It is 

surprising, however, that there is not a single line in the Decisive Treatise where Averroës 

explicitly says ‘al-Ghazālı̄ is a kāfir’. If Averroës is committed to premises (1) and (2) of the 

master argument, then why does he not explicitly draw out the conclusion? My conjecture is that 

Averroës find himself in somewhat of a bind given his own commitment to allegorical 

interpretations being discussed exclusively in demonstrative books. Due to the nature of 

Averroës’ critique, it seems that the matter of al-Ghazālı̄’s kufr should only be discussed with the 

scholars—not the masses. However,  

If it were not for the publicity given to the matter and to these questions that we 

have discussed, we should not have permitted ourselves to write a word on the 

subject; and we should not have had to make excuses for doing so to the 

interpretative scholars, because the proper place to discuss these questions is in 

demonstrative books. (DT: 62)  

Since al-Ghazālı̄ made public takfīr of al-Fārābī and Avicenna, Averroës finds it necessary to 

respond in a public work as well in order to clear the air. Yet, Averroës is still careful in 

concealing his considered position. Only those who are trained in logic will be able to draw out 

the conclusion of the master argument. Perhaps Averroës saw a danger in overtly making takfīr 

of al-Ghazālı̄. Al-Ghazālı̄ was such a prominent and well-received Muslim scholar, that 

explicitly calling him a kāfir in a public work would possibly turn away the rhetorical and 

dialectical classes from Islam. But this is precisely Averroës’ problem with al-Ghazālı̄. Thus, 

Averroës treads lightly.34 

 

Conclusion 

In our epigraph, Averroës claims that “philosophy is the friend and milk-sister of religion” (DT: 

70). Once again, Averroës is indicating the legal relationship between philosophy and religion. In 

 
33 Causal kufr does not have to be committed intentionally. For Averroës, al-Ghazālı̄ actually commits causal kufr 

unintentionally: “the fellow intended nothing but good” (DT: 61). But he had the opposite effect: “by this procedure 

he wanted to increase the number of learned men, but in fact he increased the number of the corrupted not of the 

learned!” (Ibid.). 
34 This raises an important question: since Averroës’ takfı̄r is a theoretical matter, does its truth depend on 

consensus? In other words, is Averroës’ takfı̄r tentative? 



16 

 

sharī‘a, milk kinship (riḍā‘a) is established when non-biologically related infants are breastfed 

by the same wet nurse (Parkes 2005). In what sense, then, is philosophy the ‘milk-sister’ of 

religion? Philosophy and Islam are ‘non-biologically related’ in that they have different origins: 

the former originates in ancient Greece while the latter originates in the Arabian peninsula. 

Nonetheless, they have the same ‘wet nurse’ in that they are both nurtured by reason, or perhaps 

more specifically, the active intellect (al-‘aql al-fa‘āl).35 Thus, they are family, or as Averroës 

puts it: “companions by nature and lovers by essence and instinct.” Philosophy is essential to 

Islam because demonstrative proof is the path to unveiling the truth of theoretical matters in the 

Qur’ān. Conversely, Islam is essential to philosophy because it clarifies relevant practical 

matters, that is, it helps one cultivate the moral virtue necessary for philosophical inquiry.36 Al-

Ghazālı̄ misses this point and “injures” philosophy, but more importantly, he injures the very 

thing he aimed to protect, namely, Islam.  

Averroës was certainly justified in his concern that the Incoherence of the Philosophers 

would lead Muslims to “slander philosophy” (DT: 61), thus stifling philosophical and religious 

progress within the Muslim world. But perhaps Averroës went too far. He could have vindicated 

the status of philosophy and defended al-Fārābī and Avicenna without making takfīr of al-

Ghazālı̄. Of course, Averroës is a Mālikī legal scholar, and his philosophical and legal case 

against al-Ghazālı̄ must be taken seriously.37 But given al-Ghazālı̄’s established status within 

orthodox Islam, it is imperative to see whether al-Ghazālı̄ can be defended against this charge.  

I briefly want to put pressure on the viability of causal kufr. The Qur’ān suggests that individuals 

alone are responsible for their actions:  

If they say you are a liar, say, ‘To me is my work and to you is your work. You 

have no responsibility (barī’ūna) for what I do and I have no responsibility (barī) 

for what you do.’ (Q. 10:41; see also Q. 6:52)  

Now consider the following verse, specifically about kufr:  

Those who disbelieve (kafara) bear the consequences of their disbelief (kufruhu). 

(Q. 30:44, translation modified; see also Q. 17:15)  

This verse seems to be a counterexample.38 Even if Zayd is in some sense led to cognitive kufr 

by al-Ghazālı̄, the true cause of the cognitive kufr is Zayd, for he alone is epistemically 

responsible for his beliefs as a free epistemic agent. More work must be done to fill out the 

details here, but these kinds of verses might show that Averroës’ account of causal kufr is 

problematic, and thus could get al-Ghazālı̄ off the hook. 

 

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35 Broadly put, for the Islamic philosophers the active intellect is the giver of forms, and has an important role in 

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36 For a brief account of how allegorical interpretation involves moral and spiritual exercises, see Azadpur (2011: 

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37 For an introduction to Averroës’ legal work, see Dutton (1994). 
38 I say ‘seems’ because Averroës might say that although this verse impugns Zayd, it does not rule out that al-

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