The Foundation of Knowledge

Louay Safi
Herndon, VA: The International Institute of Islamic

Thought, 2014. 214 pages.

The interlinked nature or interconnected dimension of al-‘ulūm al-Islāmīyah
(Islamic sciences), which comprise such areas as syntax, morphology, seman-
tics, linguistic philosophy, logic, legal theory and jurisprudence, prosody, rhet-
oric, exegesis, hadith, and one or two related others, has arguably remained
an unsung story in contemporary scholarship. Such an interesting feature of
Islamic traditional knowledge should not be obscured, especially in view of
the centrality of such areas of learning to uṣūl al-fiqh (the science of Islamic
jurisprudence), which cannot be a functional whole if any of them are absent.
The work under review, The Foundation of Knowledge, has done creditably
well by not only underscoring such interconnectedness, but also by analyzing
(somewhat comparatively) the classical Muslim and modern western methods
with a view to exposing the inadequacy of established methods before at-
tempting a creative synthesis of the two.

Despite the rigor involved in his analysis, however, Safi arguably starts on
a somewhat contradictory note by claiming that “the synthesis offered ... is not
concerned with bringing harmony between the two traditions, but aspires to
integrate the knowledge received from revelation with the one gained from
human experience” (p. 14). For a book addressing the foundation of knowl-
edge, which is essentially grounded in philosophy – especially its sub-area of
logic – one wonders how a “synthesis” can be associated with “integration”
but divorced from “harmony.” Yet the book’s objective is unmistakable in Safi’s
emphasis on “the need to guard against distortions caused by the specific values
and presuppositions espoused by individual scholars, as well as the importance
of bringing critical analysis to scholarly research underscoring the need to crit-
ically engage both modern and traditional scholarship” (p. 11). 

The work is divided into four parts. In Part I, “The Inadequacy of the Es-
tablished Methods,” the author traces modern thought to the struggle for su-
premacy between the pre-modern religious tradition and the Enlightenment,
which was a philosophical tradition. He argues (1) that the modern tradition’s
systematic nature culminated in the development of scientific theories and re-
search methods in various areas of social sciences, but failed to record such
progress in its attempt to explain value systems through the aid of such theories
and methods; (2) that this limitation of empiricism and positivism stimulated

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the curiosity of postmodern writers, whose denial of the possibility of pursuing
truth amounts to “placing rationalism on equal footing with irrationalism, and
drawing no distinction between morality and immorality” (p. 18); and (3) that
Islamic thought advanced long before modern western rationalism and long
ago strove “to limit human rationality to the examination of empirical reality
and the analysis of sensory data” (p. 18). 

It is interesting to note in this chapter that Islamic thought has always un-
dermined human reason, as evident in al-Ghazali’s Tahāfut-al-Falāsifah and
works by other Muslim thinkers. Safi shows the inadequacy of empiricist
methods (pp. 18-20), the insufficiency of anchoring knowledge in pure reason
(pp. 20-22), and the deficiency of limiting reason to empirical truth (pp. 22-
25). Making a case for what he calls “transcendental rationality,” which he
describes as “an alternative approach to knowledge and truth, whereby reason
and received texts do not stand to negate each other, and neither can claim
final authority” (p. 27), Safi claims to have “attributed the inadequacy of tra-
ditional methods to three factors, namely, being exclusively legalistic, being
overtly linguistic, and being excessively atomistic” (p. 28). However, while
even a cursory glance can reveal that the first two claims are correct, a metic-
ulous look can hardly see where the author alludes to the “excessively atom-
istic nature” of the traditional methods anywhere in the chapter. 

Part II, “Classical Muslim Methods,” comprises chapters 2, 3, and 4.
Chapter 2 discusses textual analysis in connection with the rules of direct in-
ference. A careful look reveals that it may aptly be described as an analysis of
al-Imam al-Shafi‘i’s seminal Al-Risālah. The author identifies the text (naṣṣ)
and deductions therefrom (istinbāt) as the two sources of meaning featured
in Al-Risālah. Similarly, he identifies bayān (clarification) and qiyās (analogy)
as the titles under which al-Shafi‘i discussed textual interference. The author
equally identifies ikhtilāf (disagreement) and ijmā‘ (consensus) as al-Shafi‘i’s
two main classifications of the knowledge produced through bayān and qiyās.
He asserts that al-Shafi‘i’s intellectual exploits in uṣūl-al-fiqh are applicable
to other fields of scientific research and illustrates this by claiming that bayān,
which later developed into ‘ilm al-ma‘ānī (semantics), was employed in such
areas as tafsīr al-Qur’ān (Qur’an interpretation) and al-naqd al-adabī (literary
criticism). Safi seems to be at his best in this chapter, where he analyzes the
essential procedures used by classical Muslim scholars under the rubric uṣūl
al-fiqh.

In chapter 3, the author proceeds to the rules of systematic inference, which
address logical analysis as pursued by Muslim scholars in their interpretation
of reality. He relies on credible Islamic sources in his attempt to define science

Book Reviews 79



(ta’rīf al-‘ilm), articulate the place of logic (manṭiq) among early Muslim
philosophers and dialecticians who divided its study into two parts, namely, the
study of taṣawwur (concept) and of taṣdīq (validation), and then sub-divided
the latter into the study of qaḍīyah (proposition) and qiyās (syllogism). How-
ever, Safi points out that this categorization is not universally embraced, alluding
to the difference between Ibn Sina’s notion of taṣdīq, which is merely associated
with qiyās, and al-Ghazali’s conception thereof, which is associated with
qaḍiyah. The numerous examples provided by the author to demystify the in-
tricacies of logical reasoning constitute a remarkable strength of this chapter.

Chapter 4 reads more like an extension of chapter 3 in several respects.
The major difference is that whereas the former focuses on logic, the latter con-
cerns itself with metaphysics, in connection with science. The author exposes
the limitation of rational arguments, reproduces the philosophers’ argument
(pp. 99-101) as presented by al-Ghazali in his Tahāfut al-Falāsifah, and ana-
lyzes his objection to it, rather systematically and extensively (pp. 102-08).
Safi complements his analysis by engaging with Ibn Rushd’s refutation of al-
Ghazali and other Muslim mutakallimūn who employed an admixture of the
typology of argument used in the study of religion and for understanding nature.
Ultimately, the chapter exposes how the mutakallimūn successfully employed
Greek logic to deflate the project of Muslim philosophers and provides an im-
pressive account on how notable Muslim scholars like Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn
Khaldun followed al-Ghazali in rejecting Greek philosophy. The chapter shows
that classical Islamic methods have a great potential for re-establishing an ef-
fective methodology for social research, but may have little to offer action
analysis and inference, which is why carefully examined aspects of modern
western scholarship may be embraced for integration.

Part III, “Modern Western Methods,” contains two chapters (5 and 6). In
chapter 5, Safi relates how western thinkers embraced Muslim misgivings
about Greek logic around the fifteenth century. According to him, Francis
Bacon (1561-1626) had already tried to formulate an alternative methodology
for western scholarship. The author explains Bacon’s two sets of principles
as sine qua non to the intellect’s understanding of reality: (1) intimate or in-
herent and (2) external. He critically analyzes Bacon’s argument that external
principles cannot be trusted because they are subject to error and distortion
(pp. 127-30), alongside the five methods of induction expounded by John Stu-
art Mill (1806-73). While engaging critically with John Locke’s (1632-1704)
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689), he argues that the human
mind is blank at birth and only derives its ideas from experience, which is the
foundation of knowledge. 

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Safi regards Locke as one of the very few western thinkers to have con-
fronted the question of revelation in a rather unequivocal manner. The author
obviously is at his best when he painstakingly demonstrates how David Hume’s
(1711-76) argument causes a crisis, which was later solved by Immanual Kant
(1724-1804). According to Safi, the question of whether or not divine revelation
is a credible source of knowledge can only be answered by “intellectually com-
petent persons who have had a profound and meaningful encounter with claims
of revelation in both totality and specificity” (p. 151). 

Chapter 6 further pursues the modern western methods and focuses on
the naturalistic methods and the peculiarity of social studies. Thus Emile
Durkheim (1858-1917) and Karl Popper (1902-94) receive adequate attention.
The author highlights Durkheim’s principal rules for studying social phenom-
ena, namely, that the sociologist must disregard all preconceptions, that only
phenomena definable by empirical features can be the subject of scientific re-
search, and that the sociologist exclude all data that originate from the mani-
festation of social phenomena in individual consciousness (pp. 153-58). He
also underscores the five characteristics of Popper’s philosophical foundation
of knowledge, namely, conjecture, evaluation for reliability, empirical testa-
bility, tentative verifiability, and consistency with subsequent scientific dis-
coveries (pp. 159-68). The deficiency of the modern western methods, which
are incapable of transcending their immediate environment or physical sur-
roundings, as exposed by Popper, constitutes a good rationale, in terms of the
author’s argument, in favor of the need to embrace a transcendental reality
for a meaningful understanding of nature.

In Part IV, the author describes his proposed methodology as one with
the potential to fulfill a dual role of both analyzing complicated social phe-
nomena and attempting an informed and systematic derivation of principles
from revelatory sources. He attributes the exclusion of transcendental knowl-
edge from modern western scholarship as a product of equating revelatory
sources with ungrounded metaphysics, which was accorded the status of “a
rival body of knowledge, contradistinguished to the body of knowledge
deemed to be true by reason” (p. 173). In analyzing the metaphysical presup-
positions of empirical knowledge, the author declares that scientific activities
are impossible without transcendental presuppositions. 

He ventures to correct a possible misconception that the modern western
exclusion of revelation from the realm of science is a product of the denial
that it makes assertions about the nature of reality. Conversely, he insists, this
exclusion is based on the claim that only empirical reality can be ascertained.
Safi’s proposed unified methodological model, it should be noted, is charac-

Book Reviews 81



terized by five interconnected procedures, namely, “analysis of text/phenom-
enon into its basic components, grouping of similar statements/actions under
one category, identification of the rules that unify various categories, identi-
fication of general rules and purposes that govern interaction of various cate-
gories, and systematization of the body of rules obtained through the previous
procedures” (p. 193). 

This valuable book presents a sophisticated, comparative, contrasting,
and synthetic analysis of traditional Islamic scholarship and modern western
Islamic sciences. The author’s scholarly insights make it a rewarding read.
Scholars in the Islamic sciences and western-oriented disciplines would find
it inestimable, despite the numerous misprints and few linguistic errors: that
that (that) p. 18; by little and little (little by little) p. 21; bedrock foundation
(superfluous: simply bedrock or foundation) p. 22; occupy (occupies) p. 29;
the study of methodology (also superfluous: methodology or the study of
methods) p. 30; ikhtilāfistinbāt (istinbāt) p. 36). The meaningful endnotes,
rich bibliography, and virtually all-encompassing index are among this book’s
numerous strengths.

Saheed Ahmad Rufai
Dean, Faculty of Education 

Sokoto State University, Nigeria
ahmadrufaisaheednew@yahoo.com

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