Editorial

Elements of a Prophetic Voice of
Dissent and Engagement

In your hands is another thematic issue of AJISS, one that consists of two main
contributions that address the Islamic tradition’s prohibition of the homosexual
act. Jonathan A. C. Brown’s essay analyzes the authenticity of pertinent hadith
traditions, whereas Mobeen Vaid’s essay explores the Qur’anic perspective.
Both articles had their origin in presentations by a number of scholars at a col-
loquium held at the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) in Herndon,
VA, on November 1-2, 2015. Although an earlier version of Vaid’s essay is
available online, its original intent and thematic complementarity with Brown’s
essay on hadith merit its inclusion here. Together, they make crucial contribu-
tions to the scholarship that has reopened the question of how the Islamic scrip-
tural and jurisprudential traditions view this particular sexual practice. In the
same workshop, I presented my reflections on the stakes of the rise of new pro-
homosexual (or at least neutral) laws and cultural formations for Muslim schol-
arship as well as politics, which I share in a modified form in this editorial
essay. In keeping with this issue’s theme of sexual ethics, we also include David
Finn’s critical and extensive evaluation of Aysha Hidayatullah’s important Fem-
inist Edges of the Qur’an (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). 

Scholarship does not always need to address burning issues; however,
scholarship on Islam is often unable to provide the quiet anonymity that serious
scholars often crave. What is at stake for American Muslims in the wake of
the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2015 Obergefell decision on gay-marriage, the me-
teoric rise of homosexual assertiveness over the last few decades in the country,
and the sea-change – let’s label it “homonormativity” – in cultural and intel-
lectual norms that this decision has ushered in? As Muslims around the world
are avid consumers and targets of American culture, norms, policies, and wars
on terror – not to mention presidential sermons about the essence of Islam –
the repercussions of its culture and norms in this era of globalization and Amer-
ican hegemony are not limited to American Muslims. Yet no one is more di-

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rectly affected by the former, nor better placed to most intimately understand
and critically evaluate its imperatives or exports. IIIT’s aforementioned collo-
quium intended to do precisely that. 

This editorial seeks to frame the political as well as religious issues raised
by homonormativity and suggest why and how Islamic norms, despite their
origins in what was, as Dreher and his likes have argued (see below), a radically
different time and place, remain relevant. As a minority residing under non-Is-
lamic legal norms, Western Muslims may be justified in disarticulating their
political and legal stances from their moral, cultural, and religious lives. With-
out claiming to offer political advice or critique, I wish to highlight the stakes
involved in Western Muslims’ support for or opposition to same-sex marriage
and in the arguments proffered for these positions.

One index of the stakes of the Obergefell decision can be found in the
sobering words of Rod Dreher, an American Christian and editor of The Amer-
ican Conservative magazine, who writes in his bestselling The Benedict Option, 

The advance of gay civil rights, along with a reversal of religious liberties
for believers who do not accept the LGBT agenda, had been slowly but
steadily happening for years. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Obergefell decision
declaring a constitutional right to same-sex marriage was the Waterloo of
religious conservatism. It was the moment that the Sexual Revolution tri-
umphed decisively, and the culture war, as we have known it since the
1960s, came to an end. In the wake of Obergefell, Christian beliefs about
the sexual complementarity of marriage are considered to be abominable
prejudice – and in a growing number of cases, punishable. The public
square has been lost.1

Whether this is all mere hyperbole remains to be seen; however, the unde-
niable fact that a large number of conservative Americans felt this way served
as one of several reasons why many voted against the Democrats in the fateful
2016 presidential election. The ongoing electoral upset is epoch-making indeed,
and yet it only reinforces trends long underway in American politics toward
cultural liberalism and political conservatism. After citing the declining reli-
giosity among young Americans (one in three 18-to-29-year-olds have put re-
ligion aside), Dreher turns to those who claim to be religious and finds even
greater cause for concern. A 2005 sociological study of American teenagers
from a wide variety of backgrounds found the most common religious views,
regardless of the formal affiliation and denomination, to be a “mushy pseudore-
ligion” that the researchers labeled Moralistic Therapeutic Deism (MTD). It
has five basic tenets: 

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● A God exists who created and orders the world and watches over human
life on earth;

● God wants people to be good, nice, and fair to each other, as taught in the
Bible and by most world religions;

● The central goal of life is to be happy and to feel good about oneself;
● God does not need to be particularly involved in one’s life, except when

he is needed to resolve a problem; and
● Good people go to heaven when they die. 

The author highlights the unsettling vindication of these results in the experi-
ences of American Christians at large: “America has lived a long time off its
thin Christian veneer, partly necessitated by the Cold War … [t]hat is all finally
being stripped away by the combination of mass consumer capitalism and lib-
eral individualism.”2

The decades-long ideological shift has made homosexuality not merely an
issue of personal choice, but also the newest frontier of human rights, the de-
cisive definition of what it means to be on the right side of history. Late-modern
capitalism and its favored ideology of liberal humanism have finally moved to
banish the last remnants of interdiction, sanctity, and prohibition from the sov-
ereign path of individual desire. 

But, one might ask, have not Muslims in the West lived in substantial num-
bers for nearly half a century alongside norms that violate their own? Why
should Western Muslim intellectuals and ulama not treat this recently estab-
lished homonormativity as just another such norm? What is it about this issue
that poses a greater challenge to people of faith than, say, general sexual promis-
cuity and non-marital sexual relations? 

Some reasons may be suggested as to why the stakes are higher. Homo-
normativity has arguably sealed the fate of the founding blocks of the American
society that had been based upon a bedrock of Christian (lately dubbed “Judeo-
Christian”) norms and that have been under attack since the 1960s.3 Barack
Obama, who presided over this sea-change during his presidency, expressed
the uneasiness of this shift well when he wrote, on the same page of his memoir
The Audacity of Hope: Thoughts on Reclaiming the American Dream, “our
law is by definition a codification of morality, much of it grounded in the Judeo-
Christian tradition” and yet “Whatever we once were, we are no longer just a
Christian nation; we are also a Jewish nation, a Muslim nation, … and a nation
of nonbelievers” (p. 218). One may note the paradox reflected in these words:
The same category of “non-Christian” that makes room for nonbelievers also
affords breathing space to Muslims. 

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There is little point in disputing the fact that the opposition to homonor-
mativity is often accompanied by an inveterate hatred for Islam and Muslims,
an all-encompassing cruelty to all who are not white males, and both planet-
threatening and willful ignorance. Lone voices (such as Professor Robert
George, see below), notwithstanding, the complicit silence of American con-
servatives is deafening. To Muslims who simply wish to avoid ending up in
concentration camps or that American bombs would stop incinerating ever
more people and referring to them as “collateral damage,” allying with the right
appears suicidal. Fateful ironies loom over any options American Muslims may
adopt. Pious Muslims cannot avoid seeing the Faustian overtones of the bargain
they have struck with the left, often by simply keeping silent. The legacy of
black resistance and the civil rights movement, whose masterful deployment
fuelled the politics of gay rights, also remains American Muslims’ only haven.
Yet what has made the United States more hospitable to Muslims at a cultural
level than Europe is precisely its lingering Christianity and conservatism, the
same forces that, in their current forms, are bent on annihilating them.

Homonormativity aggravates the distance between Islam’s foundational
socio-familial makeup and the American legal establishment, such that devout
Muslims will be even more likely (whether individually or communally) to
construct a cocoon for themselves, thereby disengaging from the larger society
as the Orthodox Jews and the Amish have done. The assimilated Muslim main-
stream will then become increasingly torn between Islam and the United States,
a situation that can only lead them down the path of marginalization and alien-
ation familiar to European Muslims. “All of Germany’s Muslim MPs voted in
favour of same-sex marriage,” reads the title of a news-piece from the Inde-
pendent, “whereas German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, leader of the Christian
Democratic Union, has faced criticism for opposing the bill and announcing
that ‘marriage is between a man and a woman.’”4

To many religious American Muslims, the new sexual and gender norms
heighten the cost of integration. Whereas anti-racism has been wholeheartedly
Islamized as a cause that creates cross-cultural connections and anti-sexism
has been embraced in a qualified form, normalizing homosexuality could shake
the very foundations of Islamic moral community – unless, of course, this new
chasm is met by the creation of sustainable and peaceful prophetic intellectual
and counter-cultural movements and alliances.

Apart from pro-gay Muslim activists, two kinds of Muslim opinion leaders
have encouraged indifference to the country’s shifting sexual mores and gender
norms, which I labeled above as “homonormativity”: (1) those who strategi-
cally prioritize the community’s civil rights over religious concerns and (2)
those who postulate a sharp separation between the political sphere and social

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mores and who hope to be “outside” even while being “inside” the country,
perhaps even advocating that the community selectively disengage from the
larger culture. Some versions of this option rely on a logic of pragmatic reci-
procity. Others have invoked the pluralistic model of pre-modern Islamic tol-
erance of or indifference to the objectionable practices of other communities
to argue that a similar indifference may be justified in this case. 

The presuppositions underlying this logic invite further questions. Many
scholars of the modern state point out its ability to penetrate and reshape its
society’s culture; modern states are not empty political shells, but active agents
that shape norms. Supreme Court decisions are not merely temporary dispute
resolutions between opposing groups governed by legal formalism, but are ac-
tual articulations of norms based on political views that, unless actively chal-
lenged, define ethics and morality for American society.5 Unlike the pre-modern
Islamic world, in which society governed itself through a communally
grounded legal tradition that communities could interpret and negotiate, the
modern state governs the individual inside and out. Such critics argue that the
role of law, culture, and state in the United States cannot be wished away and
that the pre-modern Islamic posture of political apathy, which perhaps once
made sense in the context of legally pluralistic and minimally intrusive gover-
nance, cannot be used to justify Muslim indifference to these tectonic shifts in
the American landscape. 

It is no wonder, then, that for the vast majority of American Muslim indi-
viduals and institutions, American cultural norms are the backdrop and justifi-
catory framework within which Islamic norms are reformed and selected, and
not the other way around. According to one recent poll, for instance, 42% of
American Muslims showed support for gay marriage.6 A 2007 PEW poll re-
vealed that 27% of American Muslims supported homosexuality as a lifestyle
and that 61% opposed it. According to the same poll, 50% of Muslims were
unsure as to whether the Qur’an was literally true. Another survey put the num-
ber of American-born Muslims who abandon Islam at 23 percent. All else being
equal, this rate of loss, about half that of Christians, will in all likelihood in-
crease in the next generation due to greater assimilation.7

A passive acceptance of homonormativity among conservative Muslims
(as among Christians) may be accompanied by vague hopes of a reversal of
trends or by a pessimistic view that, morally speaking, the United States is a
lost cause, that it is fast traversing the path of decadence already trod by Europe
and that there is no stopping it. Regardless, those concerned with the effects of
American foreign policy abroad and with political and social justice at home
find little choice but to align themselves with the left. Alternatively, some con-
servative Muslims may ally themselves with conservative Americans in their

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moral dissent against the dissolution of sexual and social mores. Princeton Uni-
versity professor and influential Catholic intellectual Robert P. George is a rare
and unheeded advocate of such an alliance with American Muslims.8 A healthy
development of principled conservative interfaith discourse at a political level
might have helped temper the right’s antipathy toward Islam. The recent swing
of American politics in the ultra-right direction appears to have dampened any
such hopes for the time being.

***
In addressing the challenges raised by homonormativity and the emergence of
those Muslims who advocate for it, scholars must explore a number of inter-
related fronts. The traditional Islamic case against sodomy, conventionally un-
derstood as being unanimous, needs to be explored afresh at both the legal and
ethico-philosophical levels. But the applicability of these norms to the phe-
nomenon of contemporary homosexuality requires great caution. In order
to make a compelling moral and ethical case for the continued relevance
and soundness of Islam’s norms, scholars must examine the historical condi-
tions that enabled homosexuality’s rise as well as the context, meaning, and
implications of the relevant pre-modern prohibitions. Finally, such scholarship
cannot disregard the human cost of whatever conclusion it reaches or recom-
mendations it makes, and must consider the pastoral and political strategies
that Muslims can use to respond to this new homonormativity in an ethical,
compassionate, and effective fashion. The two contributions featured in this
issue, focused as they are on the exegetical task, are important steps in an on-
going discourse. 

In broaching the challenges involved in formulating Muslim intellectual,
political, and social responses to homonormativity, we must recognize that tra-
ditions of faith in God are tied to divine interdictions whose reasons, they be-
lieve, are not always discernible to the human intellect. These interdictions and
the social order they envision stand in the way of modernity’s evisceration of
all limits – limits not just on sexual conduct but also the environment; con-
sumption; aesthetics and beauty; the human body; the realm of passions, de-
sires, and emotions; and interpersonal ethics. Catholics call it “the natural law”;
Islamic law has notions of fiṭrah and a natural order of ease and human felicity
that is believed to be built into the Sharia.9 But this divinely ordained and thus
“natural” social order (a contradiction in secular terms), in which marriage is
tied to procreation, chastity, and honor, and, more broadly, the virtues of self-
restraint, humility, and charity are desirable, is fundamentally at odds with the
political and economic order of unbridled self-interest and systematic trans-
gression that defines capitalism (as many economic philosophers from Adam
Smith to J. Maynard Keynes10 have reiterated). 

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Editorial xi

The conditions of late-capitalist modernity, sometimes called postmoder-
nity, are structurally suited to such transgression because once projects of tran-
scending natural limits (from the bio-technological refashioning of humans to
cloning and age-defying technologies) are normalized, any ethical and creedal
system grounded in respecting those natural limits is made to seem irrelevant
and irrational. If procreation is undesirable for a planet that is already held to
be overpopulated, a lifestyle that seeks pleasure without procreation, whether
heterosexually or homosexually, is preferred. Similarly, where a secular welfare
state bureaucratically manages all insurances and goods previously furnished
by God, the family and community, ranging from laws and guidance to safety
nets, marriage and family become inexplicable burdens. Put differently, homo-
normativity is structurally related not only to ethical and religious decline and
the political success of a vocal minority, but also to the fundamental dynamics
of late-modern politics and economy. 

Muslim thinkers have been only too willing to rethink Islam in a way de-
signed to fit into the (often seemingly erratic) developments of the twentieth
century, first the welfare state and then neoliberalism, rather than effectively
questioning these developments. This post-hoc approach to change is a result,
I argue, of the lack of a political philosophy that could help them envision the
larger interests of Islam and its community and help replace the tired language
of “catching up with the times” with discourses better grounded in Islam’s own
vision. Note that I do not mean here merely the maqāṣid-based approach to
fiqh, which although certainly helpful, in the absence of further checks and bal-
ances, can equally be used to justify the instrumentalization of Islamic law for
any externally imposed ends. If fiqh chooses not to theorize political life in a
fashion grounded in a coherent vision, then it nonetheless becomes politicized
– but in a way that is reactionary and ethically irrelevant.

The Limits of Consent and the Autonomy of the Self
The key issue underpinning homonormativity is consent. Any kind of sex is
ultimately permissible, under this vision, so long as it is consensual. Consider
the advice given by professionals to those who suffer from “virtuous pe-
dophilia”: to exercise restraint, remain virtuous, and not act on their desire.11
Thus, the concepts of self-control, abstinence, refraining from acting out one’s
desire, and living without sexual fulfillment until one’s death are not foreign
to the liberal world. What makes this case different from homosexuality, how-
ever, is the presumption that children are incapable of expressing consent. And
yet intractable philosophical as well as legal problems continue to afflict the
conceptualization of consent.12 As feminist and political theorist Carole Pate-

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man argued in her The Sexual Contract (1988) and ever since, the very notion
of consent becomes meaningless if neither the structural factors (e.g., politics
and economy) nor the contractual limitations that individuals place upon them-
selves are considered. 

In the liberal account, consent is an expression of the human self – that
mysterious entity which in the modern secular world cannot be judged but
which judges all things. Yet the self also has a history. The pre-modern religious
self (nafs, in the Islamic tradition) was thought to be both the source of all
desire and also an object that one had to discipline and cultivate. Human desires
were either good or bad; they could be judged by their singular creator, master,
and sustainer. Good desires were natural, part of one’s fiṭrah, and bad ones
came from the Devil and had to be resisted. But in nineteenth-century Europe,
a number of modernity’s “prophets” (from Darwin and Nietzsche to Freud and
Weber) killed God to their satisfaction and discovered a new one: the human
self, which is supreme and sovereign.

For Kant, the self is autonomous because not only does it choose to act in
accord with what is right, but it also defines or discovers for itself what is right.
Nietzsche saw through this charade, for once there was no God or God became
irrelevant to the discovery of morality (as Kant would have it), the self was
both free and inscrutable. Nietzsche thus reasonably declared that all declara-
tions of good and evil and all judgments related to desire were baseless. He
taught that all ethics were a tale cooked up by the slaves and the weak to keep
the few true men, the “supermen,” chained. It is often acknowledged that there
can be no morality without God. But what is less understood is that with God
there was no inscrutable self, that the self is governed territory. And precisely
because the self is governable, there was no need for the sovereign modern
state and its projects of refashioning the self. The self was governable under a
regime of beliefs and norms that addressed and directed it. According to the
Qur’an there was nothing worse than the unrestrained self (hawā), for it is the
playground of the Devil.

Freud, arguably the greatest prophet of modern unbelief, freed the self
from God by theorizing it in terms of a repressed, inscrutable desire, just as
God’s prophets had explained the human nafs and its origin: the divine breath
(rūḥ). Freud taught that the self was a world unto itself, only a tiny fraction of
which comprised discursive reason. He used the analogy of a vast city under
the sway of barbarians, only a small castle of which has been conquered by
modern science and examined by objective discourse. Only the tip of the ice-
berg was known to us. Our desires came out of an inscrutable world, the id,
that could neither be judged nor disciplined because no knowledge or agency
could be superior to the human self.

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This is the first element of “consent” – an expression of the sovereign self
or psyche that could only have been posited and sustained in a Godless world.
Within this world, human desires (ahwā’) cannot be judged. Elsewhere,
whether in Aristotelianism, Thomism, or Islam, the self is there to be judged,
disciplined, and trained, whether according to rational or revelational principles.
This is why “homosexuality” could not have existed as a self’s identity in the
pre-modern world: In its place, only an assemblage of desires and acts could
be found, already judged by scripture and religious traditions as an abomina-
tion. Even in the Greek world, Plato considered male-male sex unnatural de-
spite its immense popularity; whether it was good or bad was determined by
whether it was natural and good, not simply because it was an irrepressible ex-
pression of the self. This is also why Christians and Muslims could relatively
easily integrate Greek ethical philosophy, because despite having a radically
different theology it did not contradict the Abrahamic notion of the human self
as teachable, as a site of the battle between good and evil.

Of course, the secular self does not automatically lead to homonormativity
in twenty-first-century America. Certain political and economic conditions of
modernity that can be best captured as late-capitalism have led to a world in
which desire reigns supreme and the conditions of excessive affluence in “win-
ner” societies – never mind the enormous corresponding deprivation in the
“losing” societies – provide the context in which inscrutable desires could be
properly worshipped; not merely satisfied, but idolized, legalized, and infinitely
extended and explored. And why not, for what else is there in a world that has
lost its God and its raison d’être? After having demolished the community and
the extended family, the biological and nuclear family is merely the latest fron-
tier in the march of capitalism. Whatever else may be said about capitalism, it
is inconceivable without secularism, but (like nationalism) it has often been
fueled by foolish religious fervor, passion, or discipline.13

The non-liberal alternative to the modern, capitalist self was the Marxist
self – a place that, while awash with passion for equality and revenge, was fun-
damentally empty. Capitalism can tolerate a religion that restricts itself to man-
aging the poor, fueling its ideals, justifying its winners and losers, and/or
quenching its guilt. But Marxism, bent on ideological consistency and purity,
refused to traffic in even this nominal religion. Marxism, ultimately more mod-
ern and rational than capitalism, would fall with the rise of postmodernity, a
condition best seen as a continuation or logical extension of, rather than a re-
jection of, modernity. 

Unlike capitalism, which promotes greed or expanding desire as a principle
and thus leaves the self to freely (“liberally”) choose its own myriad means of
satisfaction and extension (limited only by the infinitely disputable principle

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of no-harm), the Marxist self sought to limit itself by its dogma of materialism
and the desires of which it approved. Having vanquished its nemesis, late cap-
italism has now overcome politics and democracy as well. The task of “man-
ufacturing consent,” to use Noam Chomsky’s well-known phrase, may have
been pioneered by the nation-state in times of war, but global capitalism, in its
current neoliberal phase, has dwarfed states and taken over the task of manag-
ing mass desires while deepening the illusion of individual choice and freedom.
A world set against divine interdictions and sanctions has proven unsustainable
not only in the spiritual but also in the material sense, leading us ever faster to-
ward an economic and ecological apocalypse. 

The Limits of Historicism and Social Construction
It is widely acknowledged that whereas same-sex sexual activity has been
recorded in nearly all past societies, homosexuality, the idea that certain per-
sons are to be identified by their sexual preference, on the grounds that this is
a fundamental part of their identity, is socially constructed and historically
novel. Furthermore, whereas the biological and cultural bases of such desire
are debated, science has returned empty-handed from its quest for a “gay
gene.” According to the new ta’wīl, however, the results are carefully couched
in a postmodern framework to draw our attention to the constructedness of
all categories. 

That homosexuality is a cultural construct as opposed to a biological con-
struct does not mean that it is based on something other than a real, strongly
felt, desire. But as Imam al-Ghazali said, “intention,” the basis and determinant
of all actions, is semi-voluntary at any given instance. In other words, one
cannot instantly purify and simply will to be as pious as one wishes. Our pas-
sional constitution is comparable to our physical one; just as one builds muscle
over a long period of time via a process that depends on training, discipline,
diet, as well as other environmental and genetic factors, so is our emotional
make-up multi-dimensional and only semi-voluntary. From an individual and
instantaneous perspective, however, the source of one’s desire may appear
moot. The misery of a pious homoerotic individual may indeed be great and
is definitely worthy of compassion and support, but one must also be aware
of the deployment of such tropes in accounts that are, in fact, key to construct-
ing homonormativity.

Aside from homoerotic desire, which has been documented in almost every
society, the homosexual identity that fortifies it as a right is a modern construc-
tion. In The History of Sexuality, Foucault famously shows that Western soci-
ety’s views on sex have undergone a major shift over the past few centuries.

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Same-sex relationships and desires certainly existed before – but homosexuality
was never considered a biological type or social identity. Besides Foucault,
various historians have argued that the idea of a homosexual role and stereo-
typical behavior emerged in late-seventeenth-century England.14

Psychologists, at that time still working under the remnants of Christian
morality but without Christian belief, sought to replace religion and super-
stition and to categorize all untidy phenomena systematically. In this quest,
they recast “sodomy” as a disorder (seen as harmful to the family, which was
then regarded as an indispensable engine of national progress). When such
vestigial Christian moralism came under fire, homosexuality became a new
normal, an identity to which some people were simply biologically wired.
Later on, Foucault established the relative novelty (and thus historical con-
tingency) of both “the idea that our desires reveal a fundamental truth about
who we are and the conviction that we have an obligation to seek out that
truth and express it.”15

More broadly, postmodernist critique opposes not only sexual truths about
oneself, but also truth in general. Religious truths or religious differentiation
of gender roles are thus no less constructed than homosexuality. In other words,
the postmodern case for homonormativity argues not that it is an essential part
of one’s being, but that since there is no essential norm or truth or self, and thus
no rational obligation to discipline the self, homonormativity is just as good or
bad as any other option.16

Historians of Muslim societies tell a similar story about the wide attestation
of homosexual behavior, but also the absence of anything like contemporary
homosexual identity. Khaled al-Rouayheb shows that in the traditional Muslim
world, lustful or romantic behavior toward beardless boys was quite common.17
He quotes countless testimonies to the spread of sodomy and pederasty, to
which one may add the following from al-Aqhisari, a zealous seventeenth-cen-
tury Ottoman reformer who wrote that 

In this time, sodomy [Michot translates this as “homosexuality”] has spread
in this Muhammadan community and expanded among its Arabs and its non-
Arabs, its learned ones and its ignorant ones, its elite and its commonality. It
has reached such a point that they are proud of it and blame someone who
has no beardless friend (amrad), speak evil of him, and say that he is not a
human (adami) and has no taste (madhaq).18

Such accounts, even when corrected for some reformist exaggeration,
serve to call into question the widespread pious romanticization of pre-modern
Islamic societies. In particular, the reference to the “learned ones” among the
pederasts is significant. Remarkably, despite all the incentives to do so and the

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power of custom in Islamic law, the ulama never justified this practice. In fact,
denying its prohibition was considered unbelief by consensus, and disagree-
ments revolved only around such issues as whether someone who permitted
sodomy with a male slave was a believer or should be excommunicated – not
for practicing it, but for believing that it was permissible!19

Although pederasty was at times widespread, especially among the elite,
those who engaged in such behavior never claimed to be a distinct type of in-
dividual with distinctive desires. The pious simply deemed them sinners. One
might say that Muslims saw this behavior in the same way as drinking wine;
there was never a question about its impermissibility, even as some or even
many, indulged in it.

But what does this argument about the historicist construction of social
categories entail for the Muslim present? Some use an exaggerated dichotomy
between modern homosexuality and pre-modern sodomy to deny the applica-
bility of the Qur’anic prohibition of homosexuality.

[Al-Rouayheb’s] seminal work and that of Dr. Scott Kugle clearly indicates
that by excluding women and those who do not indulge [in?] the act of anal
intercourse, the category of ma’bun does not define queer individuals. When
will conservative Muslim leaders recognize that paraphrasing legal texts is
not helpful today? Muslim academic Dr. Kecia Ali has indicated that past ex-
egetes and jurists addressed superfluous desire that could be channeled to-
wards women instead of the exclusive innate orientation towards member of
the same sex. 

Past exegetes and jurists operated in the context of age and status asym-
metrical relationships between unequal partners. The 14th century exegete
Ibn Kathir noted that Muslim leaders, jurists and memorizers of the Qur’an
were complicit in liwat – anal intercourse inflicted on males that included
youth, slaves, or those classified as ma’buns.20

Based on the conjecture that the Qur’an and medieval jurists were con-
cerned with condemning the homosexual act primarily, if not exclusively, due
to the absence of consent, in terms of its being an abuse of power between un-
equal partners, and given that contemporary homosexuals feel an “exclusive
innate orientation toward member of the same sex,” this argument suggests
that the divine judgment expressed in scripture from the Torah to the Qur’an
and Hadith is simply outdated. The basis of this unusually harsh scriptural judg-
ment, we are told, was the absence of consent and the subsequent humiliation
attached to the inferior party. Vaid’s essay challenges, at great length, the spec-
ulation that truly felt inclination was precluded from the Islamic or Biblical
classifications of crimes or acts. My concern is with the historical element of

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the claim that the nature of pederasty condemned by pre-modern religious tra-
ditions is entirely different from the modern, consensual, or uniquely involun-
tary urges of a homosexual person. I have already pointed out the difficulty –
if not the actual impossibility – of pinning down consent. We have every reason
to think that consent is also socially constructed, and that a class or race of peo-
ple can be conditioned to accept and even demand a particular kind of treatment
that would be seen as denigrating in other cultures. 

The politics of desire and consent remains complicated. For instance, some
of those who self-identify as homosexual claim to choose to be who they are
even when reprimanded by advocates of homonormativity that such admissions
are politically inconvenient.21 The primacy of the desiring self and individual-
ism that center the idea of consent are certainly modern; however, we have no
way to preclude the possibility that some pre-modern individuals who served
as passive partners enjoyed or felt naturally inclined toward such a relationship.
More importantly, if scripture and tradition had so harshly condemned sodomy
only because it meant degradation for the passive partner, or only because the
latter’s consent was socially or structurally conditioned and hence not fully
fledged, the same should have been said of concubinage or other heterosexual
relationships that scripture did sanction. But clearly rape, which is universally
condemned in all traditional law as an act of illegitimate intercourse, is cate-
gorically distinct from the case of legitimate but unequal relations, for both the
Old Testament and the Qur’an permit sexual relations with one’s concubines.
Whatever behavior or politics one wishes to endorse today, the Biblical and
Qur’anic judgment on sodomy cannot be chalked up to the passive partner’s
degradation or lack of consent.

We now turn to the class of arguments indebted to a hard Foucauldian
(i.e., strong social constructivist) approach to conceptual history, one that pos-
tulates the social construction and hence the deconstructibility of all norms.
When applied to this case, the argument effectively claims that the concept of
male-male sex was identical enough through the 2,500 years that separated
the prophets Lot and Muhammad, peace upon them, that the Qur’an, the
Sunna, and the subsequent tradition clearly sustained the Torah’s judgment
against it. Yet once early modern psychologists in Europe invented the cate-
gory of “homosexuality” as social type several centuries ago, the divine judg-
ment suddenly became ineffective, outdated, irrelevant, and/or inapplicable.
According to this view, notions of sex changed significantly only once in
recorded history: in early modern Europe.

Implausible as this may sound, the argument is of a piece with a larger cat-
egory of claims concerning whether divine norms can survive significant con-
ceptual change in history. The post-structuralist, historicist, or deconstructionist

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trend in conceptual history popularized since Nietzsche and then Foucault is,
in itself, quite useful as a partial tool, a lens through which one can interpret
enormously complex developments in human history and that has successfully
exposed the universalist pretensions of modernity and positivism. In this view,
all concepts have histories or genealogies. But in its strong form this view leads
not only to nihilism, but also undoes itself (i.e., every claim of construction is
itself a construction). Even atheists are more attuned to truth and in agreement
that it is worth searching for than pure constructionists, who, as existentialists,
consider the idea of a true God too superfluous to even refute. 

According to this strong version of social constructivism, all concepts are
in flux and socially constructed: the afterlife, good and evil, and the very notion
of the human being all have histories. But – and crucially – since nothing sur-
vives historical conceptual ruptures, no religion revealed in the past can affect
any meaning or authority outside this historical flux. The notion of one om-
nipotent and omniscient God, in the historicists’ view, is the product of the so-
called axial age. 

A weaker version of social constructivism would hold that certain types
of concepts (say, metaphysical ones) can perhaps survive historical disconti-
nuities, but not social institutions. In other words, specific Qur’anic laws may
be deemed outdated without invalidating its general imperatives. This view
can yield a critique of the Islamic tradition that, in my view, requires careful
and sustained attention by scholars. 

Unless one believes that modernity is a unique and singular rupture in
human history, an event of such magnitude that God’s scripture could not an-
ticipate it, it is still difficult to justify the wholesale a priori rejection of Islamic
norms and mores for which many modernists and progressivists argue. This is
because the Qur’an offers its own history and philosophy of the secular world,
just as the secular world wishes to historicize the Qur’an. Revealed in the sev-
enth century, the Qur’an upholds many of the Torah’s central laws, including
the prohibition of the homosexual act and usury (ribā), given over 1,500 years
earlier to Moses, while relaxing some peripheral ones. Consider usury, for an
analogy: The Qur’an explicitly chastises the Jews for “their consuming of
usury, when they had been prohibited from it” (Q 4:161). One historian of the
rabbinical prohibition of usury has chronicled how the Jews upheld and ex-
panded the prohibition of Mosaic law for several centuries, but then started to
rationalize it when confronted with the complex Roman commercial expansion
in the name of what we might call “ijtihād.”22

All of this happened before the sixth century, and so the Qur’anic chas-
tisement can be understood as the divine judicial review of this “ijtihād,” so
to speak. The point here is that the logic of historical, social, and conceptual

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change to explain away the prohibition of usury did not serve our Jewish
brethren well. Nor did God spare them, it would seem, on account of the “kullu
mujtahid muṣīb” (i.e., the Islamic legal principle that every qualified legal rea-
soner is correct, so long as he or she does his best) principle. Some interdic-
tions, the Qur’an seems to suggest, are meant to permanent.

The Imperative to Draw Reasoned Boundaries
Concepts as well as norms change over time and in a way that baffles as well
as humbles systematic scholars and utterly eludes others. Many of our modern
concepts, including homosexuality, did not even exist in the recent past. The
Qur’an itself abrogated many of the previously revealed divine laws, and his-
torical change may be offered as one explanation for this. But how adequate
is historical change as a causal explanation and in what cases? Taking the
premise upheld by all Islamic theological schools that God knows the future
as well as the past and hence could not have failed to anticipate a changing
world requires that the line between which norms or concepts can be discarded
and which cannot has to be drawn from within Islamic tradition, based, if you
will, on divine cues.

Not all advocates of an Islamic sexual revolution base themselves on scrip-
ture or tradition; however, those who believe that that guidance must be sought
within divine scripture must grant that its systematic interpretation can only be
carried in conversation with the tradition that has preserved it and made sense
of it for over a millennium. We must recognize that Islam’s marvelous but im-
perfect (because human) tradition of legal and theological reflection has never
seen such a dramatic change in its long and far-flung existence. Socio-economic
conditions have indeed dramatically changed, as has our epistemology itself.
And yet all that our belief in the continued guidance of divine scriptures re-
quires, I believe, is that these changes must be traceable and comprehensible.
This puts the onus on Islamic scholars and thinkers to document and calibrate
both the changes and their implications. Those who deny the significance of
this change or the rupture with the past are often excoriated, and deservedly
so. What I think is less often appreciated and critiqued is the passive acceptance
of certain developments as inevitable, rather than historicizing and hence re-
sisting the necessity of changes that, if accepted, render Islam’s legal and ethical
guidance utterly incoherent and meaningless.

If the terms, norms, and criteria imposed by late capitalism, the modern
state, and their global transformations are accepted, then Islamic fiqh and eth-
ical norms can only become progressively irrelevant. It is this passivity of the
Muslim mainstream that I wish to question also in the case of the rise of homo-

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normativity. In an overpopulated and over-stuffed late-capitalist world, pro-
creation is neither deemed terribly important nor is it exclusively dependent
upon a traditional male-female family. Most Muslims have welcomed the rise
of the nuclear family, which is “allergic” to cousins, uncles and aunts, parents
and in-laws, along with the modern need to be mobile and independent – a
lifestyle that both reflects and requires consumerist capitalism rather than the
thick, organic, mutually supportive, and extended families and communities
that so many Islamic norms, laws, and mores presuppose. Put differently, the
Sharia’s concern, comparable to that of Jewish Halakha and Christian ethics,
to protect family, lineage, and sexual virtue are steadily outdated if the terms
of capitalism and the modern welfare state are fully embraced. The more func-
tions a secular bureaucracy takes away from the family and organic commu-
nity, the less relevant the sexual ethics and laws preached by the Abrahamic
religions become (I use the qualifier organic not in the Durkheimian sense,
but rather to distinguish local, mosque-, and neighborhood-based community
from the global religious community). 

What is at stake in late modernity is not only what Islam is (a private reli-
gion or something else), but whether Islamic norms make any sense. The so-
lution advanced by Muslims to many socioeconomic changes has often been
no more than piecemeal and reactionary ijtihād. Heroic, prophetic struggle
against fundamental wrongs and structural corruption is reserved only for the
radicals and crazies, as if Islam proper is only the religion of docile, middle-
class functionaries. Unless a larger alternative vision of prophetic resistance
and rebuilding makes Islam coherent and gives a proactive, visionary edge to
fiqh, this appears to be our foreseeable future. 

Endnotes

1. Rod Dreher, The Benedict Option: A Strategy for Christians in a Post-Christian
Nation (Sentinel, 2017), 9.

2. Ibid., 10.
3. One watershed event in LGBT history was the Stonewall protest of 1969.
4. Greg Wilford, Independent, 2 July 2017, www.independent.co.uk/news/world/

europe/angela-merkel-chancellor-germany-same-sex-marriage-vote-lgbt-
muslim-mps-berlin-bundestag-cdu-sdp-a7819391.html (accessed 3 July 2017).

5. Brian Leiter, an American philosopher and legal scholar at the University of
Chicago Law School, argues that despite what the people are told, the Supreme
Court judges’ personal moral and political judgment, rather than formal legal rea-
son, are of decisive importance in how they fulfill their role and how they are ap-
pointed. See idem., “Constitutional Law, Moral Judgment, and the Supreme Court
as Super-Legislature,” Chicago Unbound, 2015, http://chicagounbound.uchicago.

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edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1976&context=public_law_and_legal_theory
(accessed 4 July 2017). 

6. According to the Public Religion Research Institute, about 42 percent of Amer-
ican Muslims support same-sex marriage. See Robert P. Jones, “Attitudes on
Same-sex Marriage by Religious Affiliation and Denominational Family,” 22
April 2015, Public Religion Research Institute, https://www.prri.org/spotlight/
attitudes-on-same-sex-marriage-by-religious-affiliation-and-denominational-
family/#.VZ02XcZVikr (accessed 26 Jun. 2017).

7. “Hindus, Muslims and Jews Have Highest Retention Rates,” PEW Research Cen-
ter, 5 May 2017, www.pewforum.org/2015/05/12/chapter-2-religious-switching-
and-intermarriage/pr_15-05-12_rls_chapter2-02/ (accessed 28 Jun. 2017). 

8. See, for instance, Robert P. George, “Muslims, Our Natural Allies,” 2 February
2014, First Things, https://www.firstthings.com/blogs/firstthoughts/2014/02/
muslims-our-natural-allies (3 July 2017).

9. Islamic thought has historically oscillated between two poles: (1) reasoning that
is primarily self-referential or inward-looking, based on the norms derives from
revelation, and (2) reasoning that is primarily dialogical and outward-looking,
accepting “reason” or “common sense” as the common-ground to persuade non-
Muslims of Islam’s truth. In this case, I think it is dialogical reasoning that is
called for: demonstrating not only what Islam says, but why it says so.

10. “Capitalism is the astounding belief that the most wickedest of men will do the
most wickedest of things for the greatest good of everyone,” a statement widely
attributed to the influential British economist John Maynard Keynes. 

11. Alan Zarembo, “Many researchers taking a different view of pedophilia: Pe-
dophilia once was thought to stem from psychological influences early in life.
Now, many experts view it as a deep-rooted predisposition that does not change,”
LA Times, 14 Jan. 2015, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jan/14/local/la-me-
pedophiles-20130115 (accessed 28 Jun. 2017). 

12. For studies that highlight problems with the current understandings of consent,
see Lila Abu-Lughod, Do Muslim Women Need Saving? (Harvard University
Press, 2013), and for the argument that free consent requires ending the marriage
contract, see Anne Phillips, “Free to Decide for Oneself,” in D. O’Neill et al.
(ed.), Illusion of Consent: Engaging with Carole Pateman (Pennsylvania State
University Press, 2008). For recent coverage of the legal issues, see “Campus
Rape: The Problem With ‘Yes Means Yes,’” Time, 29 Aug. 2014, http://
time.com/3222176/campus-rape-the-problem-with-yes-means-yes/; “‘No doesn’t
really mean no’: North Carolina law means women can’t revoke consent for sex,”
The Guardian, 24 June 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/
jun/24/north-carolina-rape-legal-loophole-consent-state-v-way (accessed 28 Jun.
2017).

13. Consider, for instance, Bethany Moreton, To Serve God and Wal-Mart: The Mak-
ing of Christian Free Enterprise (Harvard University Press, 2010), which shows
how subjugating the self to the global corporation, the single most destructive
force for the planet, the poor, and democracy, draws on a deeper set of ideals

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about the supremacy of family, the morality of self-reliance, and the evangelical
justification of free enterprise.

14. The seminal work of Mary Macintosh (1968), the British feminist sociologist
and founder of the modern lesbian and gay movement in the United Kingdom,
comes to mind. 

15. A homosexual author (Jesi Egan) grapples with the problem that Foucault’s social
constructivism argument, so ardently supported by feminists, cuts against the
LGBT claim that their identity is biologically determined and hence not a choice
that can be influenced. www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2014/03/04/sexuality_as_
social_construct_foucault_is_misunderstood_by_conservatives.html.

16. The questioning of the traditional norms against homosexual behavior need not
come from a postmodernist or genealogical perspective, of course; liberal reli-
gious activists often couch their claims in terms that draw, often unwittingly, on
some kind of moral positivism and human rights discourse that may be theoret-
ically naïve but is often rhetorically powerful. 

17. Khaled El-Rouayheb, Before Homosexuality in the Arab-Islamic World, 1500 –
1800 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005).

18. Ahmad al-Rumi al-Aqhisari, Against Smoking: An Ottoman Manifesto, ed.and
trans. Yahya Michot (Markfield, UK: Kube Publishing, 2011), 21. 

19. Ibid., 124.
20. Junaid Jahangir, “Queer Muslims Deserve More Than Scriptural Zealotry,” Huf-

fungton Post, 12 July 2013, www.huffingtonpost.ca/junaid-jahangir/queer-mus-
lims_b_3581159.html (accessed 26 June 2017).

21. E. J. Graff, “What’s Wrong with Choosing to Be Gay? Many gay activists insist
that they were born this way, hey. But what about those who choose otherwise?”
The Nation, 3 February 2014, www.thenation.com/article/whats-wrong-choos-
ing-be-gay/; Brandon Ambrosino, “I Wasn’t Born This Way. I Choose to Be Gay,”
28 January 2014, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/116378/macklemores-
same-love-sends-wrong-message-about-being-gay.

22. Hillel Gamoran, Jewish Law in Transition (Hebrew Union College Press, 2008).
As a rabbi for Beth Tikvah, I assume that the author belongs to reformed Judaism. 

Ovamir Anjum, Editor, American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences
Imam Khattab Chair of Islamic Studies

Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies
Affiliated Faculty, Department of History

University of Toledo, Toledo, OH

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