162 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 33:3

ISIS and Islam: How a Terrorist’s
Ideology Twists Religion

On May 3, 2016, at the International Institute of Islamic Thought’s headquar-
ters in Herndon, VA, Asaad Al-Saleh (Indiana University; scholar-in-resi-
dence, IIIT) spoke on “ISIS and Islam: How a Terrorist's Ideology Twists
Religion.” He began by asking a question – Is ISIS Islamic or not? – and then
proceeded to give a “simple point of view.” He first drew a distinction between
“Islam” and “Muslim,” which he said is a very problematic thing to do.
“Islam” is the text (i.e., the Qur’an and the Hadith literature). He contended
that the battle with ISIS is mainly textual, for the Qur’an is a “textual con-
tainer.” Thus, anything beyond the Qur’an and Hadith texts cannot be con-
sidered purely Islamic, but only a human interpretation of the text. For
example, if we take history, then “Islamic history” is a highly misrepresented
label, for it is only “Muslims” who are participating in “history.” This histor-
ical error dates from the third Islamic century, with the rise of the “Islamic
sciences.” 

As ISIS is not textually Islamic, not a revealed entity from the heaven
of Islam, it cannot be labeled “Islamic” without violating the boundaries of
the Qur’an and Hadith. On the second level, if ISIS claims to be a Muslim
body interpreting Islam, then its members are not following the agreed-upon
rules of interpretation. For example, their selective interoperations not only
work against the majority of Muslims, including the scholars of Islam, but
they are also being labeled as “deviant” even by other terrorist groups, such
as al-Qaeda. 

Another branch of these  sciences to which Al-Saleh referred was Islamic
theology, which gradually developed a creed (‘aqīdah) to defeat the Khawarij
and other non-Sunni groups. The Khawarij, which at one point in Muslim (not
Islamic) history was a predecessor of ISIS, assassinated Ali, the reigning caliph
and cousin of Prophet Muhammad, in 657 because he had agreed to arbitration
after the Battle of Siffin. They contended that judgment belongs to God only,
that arbitration violated God’s rights, and were very quick to brand their oppo-
nents as unbelievers, thus practicing excommunication (takfīr). Taking advan-
tage of the ongoing debate over who was supposed to rule the Muslim
community, they ignored the relevant background. Instead, they put forth their
own understanding of what the Qur’an says based upon certain verses taken
out of context, personalized them by asserting that the verse referred to “what



Conference, Symposium, and Panel Reports 163

is in their minds,” and then proceeded to build a worldview from it. According
to Al-Saleh, this was the beginning of sectarianism and systematic violence in
the name of Islam. ISIS is a modern-day representative of the Khawarij, for it
holds the same views. Both movements had been against Muslims who find
their ideology non-Islamic. 

In terms of the modern nation-state, Islam had very little role in its for-
mation beyond the belief that it should provide a or the legal framework. Many
people wanted a caliphate and the Shari‘ah, or at least a Qur’anic mandated
rule. In this regard, ISIS and other Islamist groups translate the Qur’anic term
yaḥkum to mean “to rule” or “to govern” (in reference to Q. 5:44), whereas in
textual scholarship it means “to judge.” Some scholars said that this interpre-
tation first appeared after the Prophet’s death; others say that it developed
under the Umayyads.

In the 1960s, the Tanzīm al-Jihād group tried to establish an Islamic state
in Egypt. They saw Nasser, then president of Egypt, as a tyrant (ṭāghūt). The
speaker explained that this term does not necessarily mean “ruler” in tafsīr
books, but that they nevertheless saw it that way and used it to justify their
decision to get rid of him. This view was proposed by Muhammad Abd al-
Salaam Faraj in his The Missing Duty, namely, jihad. A member of this group,
Khalid Islambouli, killed Sadat during a celebratory parade in 1981; Faraj was
executed the following year. Many who had adopted Faraj’s ideology were
arrested; others went to fight alongside the Mujahideen in Afghanistan. When
they began returning to their countries, they were not welcomed.

This strand of thought eventually joined Wahhabism, the official Saudi
ideology that also practices takfīr to the extreme. Adherents of such groups
see any resistance to them as resistance to Islam itself, which was not an en-
tirely new development. In short, this exemplifies the attitude that “We are
starting over with the true Islam.” Ibn Ghannam’s History of Nejd describes
this viewpoint. Although this view was once legitimized by Saudi government
during the surge of Wahhabism, Saudi Arabia is not responsible for ISIS, be-
cause the movement has drawn upon so many sources to build their ideology,
including de-contextualized verses from the Qur’an. Interestingly, according
to Al-Saleh, ISIS members consider Saudi Arabia to be a kāfir (non-Muslim)
country. 

Al-Saleh concluded his presentation with three remarks: (1) the members
of ISIS believe that, like the Wahhabis and the Khawarij before them, they
represent true Islam. Obviously, this is very problematic for all other Muslims;
(2) ISIS has relocated Islam to the first three Islamic centuries, not modernity.
Other groups share the same ideology, but want to accomplish it without em-



164 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 33:3

ploying violence; and (3) ISIS is reinventing Islam on the grounds that the
Islam that we see today is not the true Islam. 

During the ensuing Question and Answer session, Al-Saleh made the fol-
lowing points:

• ISIS, as well as al-Qaeda and other jihadi groups, justify their existence
by identifying “enemies” who are “killing” Muslims. They see their own
terrorist attacks as acts of revenge, for they view their actions as justified
on the grounds that Islam is not about peace, but about violence.

• The ideology of ISIS cannot be fought by another ideology; it can only
be contained through force. The group’s present strategy is to engage in
so much killing and cause so much chaos that the people will finally
agree to accept any ruler as long as he can stop the fighting. He stated
that this was how the Khmer Rouge had gradually assumed power in
Cambodia and then began to massacre the people in the name of a secular
ideology that killed around 1.4 million people.

• Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (d. 2006), the godfather of ISIS, had started his
own group in Iraq. Although he was not really member of al-Qaeda, he
was their representative in Iraq. By the time he was killed, he had already
set up the “Islamic State of Iraq.” 

• It says that al-Qaeda is only attacking the West in order to hurt it, whereas
ISIS wants to set up a state. Al-Qaeda was never an “Islamic” project,
for it existed only to take revenge. ISIS, however, is an “Islamic” state
with publically announced officials. But at the same time, it is clearly an
anti-Islamic undertaking because it is trying to kill off the Sunni intelli-
gentsia. The group had its own government by 2004 and proposed to
many people: “You help us now, and when we become strong we will
save Palestine.”

• Another inspiration behind this movement and its takfīrī ideology was
the writings of Sayyed Imam Al-Sharif (b. 1950), also known as “Dr.
Fadl.” A friend of al-Qaeda’s leadership when he was in Afghanistan,
upon his return to Egypt he was jailed. As soon as he was released in
2013, he made a public announcement that he regrets all that he has writ-
ten and done.

Jay Willoughby
AJISS

Herndon, VA