Civil-Military Relations: Western and Islamic Perspectives Syed Serajul Islam Abstract Some Western scholars have asserted that the high frequency of mili- tary coup d‘etats in Muslim countries is rooted in Islam. They claim that citizens of the Muslim world easily accept military rule because it does not run counter to the spirit of Islam. Is this true? Does Islam really allow military intervention into politics or coup d’etat? This article argues that in some contemporary Muslim countries the coup d’etat or military takeover has nothing to do with the basic spirit of Islam. Rather, in those countries, Western colonial rule laid the foundation for the subsequent takeover of civilian power by the army. Islam does not allow succession to power through force or coup d‘etat. This article clarifies the position of Islam on the question of civil-military relations. A systematic study on this issue has yet to be done, therefore, there is room for controversy. In order to explain the civil-military relations in an Islamic polity, this paper first examines Western perspectives on civil-military relations then highlights Islamic perspectives. Finally, it offers a brief explanation of military intervention into the politics of some contemporary Muslim countries. Since the end of World War 11, frequent military intervention has occurred in many Third World countries, particularly in the Muslim World. One scholar pointed out that in the 1980s half of the Muslim world was directly under military rule and the other half was under military domi- nance.’ According to some scholars, the frequency of military coup d’etat in the Muslim world is rooted in the spirit of Islam. Saleem Qureshi writes, “In the world of Islam no civil military separation exists, and therefore, the justification of the civil-military rule under the leadership of the army does not run counter to the spirit of Islam,” and hence, the citizens of the Muslim syed SirajUl Idam is aprofessor of political science at Lakehead University, Ontario, Canuda. 98 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 17.2 world easily accept military rule? It has been further claimed that, while in the West there has been a development of secularism and with it a separa- tion of civil and military authorities, the former being the controller and the latter being the subordinate professionals, in Islam, there has never been such a distinct separation of civil and military authorities. Consequently, “since in Islam there is no background of secularism and no distinction between the civilian and military components, an overwhelming majority of Muslim states are military ruled or military d~minated.”~ Hence the questions arise: Is this true? Does Islam really allow military intervention into politics or coup d’etat? In Islam, what is the exact rela- tionship between civil and military authorities? Can the military rebel or conspire against a legitimate civilian authority for power? Since there has been no systematic study on this issue, there is room for controversy. This article explores Islam’s bearings on the question of civil-military relations. To explain the civil-military relations in an Islamic polity, this article first examines the Western perspectives on civil-military relations and then highlights the Islamic perspectives on civil-military relations from Qur’anic verses and historical practices in the State of Madinah. Finally, it offers a brief explanation of military intervention into the politics of some contem- porary Muslim countries. Western Perspectives Simply, from the Western perspective, the military is considered to be apolitical and civil-military relations are characterized by civilian control and supremacy. Accordingly, the military not only has a subservient posi- tion but is also constrained from developing any ambition of capturing political power. Western political systems maintain a high level of “civic culture.” These systems are primarily dominated by politicians who come to power through an elaborate competitive struggle along party lines for a certain period of time. The members of the armed forces are neither expect- ed nor oriented to intervene in electoral politics. Even national defense pol- icy rests: by and large, in the hands of elected civilian leaders. Western scholars believe that the factors contributing to the distinct separation of power between civilian and military authorities and the consequent exclu- sion of the army from civilian politics originates from religious traditions that advocate the separation of civil and military powers, and the Western historical preference for a democratic political system. Sirajul Islam: Civil-Military Relations 99 Religious Traditions A large majority of the countries in the West are rooted in Christianity which does not give primacy to military institutions. The norms of secular- ism, which arose out of Christian tradition, developed the concept of church and State separation. Jesus himself declared, “Render, therefore, unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s and unto God the things that are god'^."^ Based on their interpretation of the teachings of Christ, the early Church fathers denied any inherent right of resistance against legitimately elected civilian authority. Subsequently, Protestantism added that “resist- ance to rulers is, in all circumstances, wicked’’6 and taught the lesson of tol- erance. Both Luther and Calvin, the foremost Protestant reformers, men- tioned that the ruler is the vicar of God, and resistance to him is resistance to God. Therefore, rebellion or coup d’etat against constitutionally elected authority, even a bad ruler, is forbidden in Christian tradition. However, Qureshi says that “in the world of Islam, in contrast to Christianity, reli- gious, political and military institutions took shape simultaneously, with a single personage exercising supreme power in all three spheres and thus laying the foundation for a distinct set of values and emphases. These val- ues and emphases have continued to shape and influence subsequent devel- ~pment .”~ In contrast to Islam, because of its different beginnings, he says, “Christianity developed a different ideology and State structure. Christian political institutions developed three centuries after the founding of the reli- gion. Consequently, religious institutions, operating for at least two pre- ceding centuries, had already acquired a powerful hold on the beliefs and behavior of Christians. As a result, according to Christian values, the for- mal institutions of civil and military power, though accepted as inevitable, were neither eulogized nor given primacy. The norms of secularism and the concept of the separation of civil from military roles, hence, grew out of Christian tradition and have given a seeming “universality” to Western political norms and concepts. Non-Western societies, however, whose background is completely dissimilar to the West, are not likely to be influ- enced by this so-called “universality.” Political Tradi t ions Not only have their religious roots enabled Western countries to remain free from military domination, but also subsequent political developments which have contributed to the growth of liberal democracy. Democratic political traditions have further prevented any kind of military resistance to 100 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 17.2 or takeover of civilian power. Historically, there have been three develop- ments in the West: strong civilian institutions; relatively weaker military institutions; and integral, permeable, or fragmented military boundaries. Strong Civilian Institutions Western political systems have developed strong civilian institutions. Scholars like Huntington and Finer argue that “the military is more likely to intervene in politics if political institutions are weak and lacking in legit- imacy.’* Irrespective of variations in the forms of government, parliamen- tary or presidential, Western political systems have the power to innovate and implement policy decisions for their societies. These are essentially “civic polities.” The strength of civilian political institutions in the West can be measured by two key elements: first, the public support that politi- cal structures are able to aggregate; and second, the degree of mobiliza- tion.l0 In the West, there are publicly agreed procedures for the transfer of power due to the effectiveness of political institutions. They are effective because they are considered legitimate and thus acquire widespread and stable allegiance to their symbols and procedures. Strong and stable struc- tures are necessary for institutional legitimacy because through these struc- tures people can participate and express their views. This legitimacy is quite durable due to its link to a solid institutiofial base at the center that legitimizes the internal patterns of action of these institutions and authori- tatively resolves their social interests. Thus, Kurt Lang observes, “In the relatively small area of Northern, Western and Central Europe, where par- liamentary institutions evolved out of an indigenous tradition and rested on a highly developed industrial base, attempts by the military to overthrow civil governments have been rare and, when they occurred, not difficult to quash. Thus, the most recent challenge to civil power in Great Britain was in 1914, when British officers staged an ‘insurrection’ against their govern- ment’s policy toward Ireland. There was no clash of arms; the issue was quickly resolved by a mass resignation of officers.”’ Each nation in Europe, according to Huntington, made its unique contri- bution to the culture of Western society. Most nations established proce- dures for civilian control of the army. Factors contributing to this estab- lishment were technological advancement, competitive nationalism, reso- lution of conflicts between democrats and aristocrats, and the presence of a stable, recognized, legitimate authority.l2 The first factor arose out of eigh- teenth and nineteenth century development of techno1og)l which led to the growth of industrialism enabling increased functional specialization. It Sirajul Islam: Civil-Military Relations 101 became impossible for the army to be expert in managing external defense while at the same time skilled in civil politics and statecraft for maintaining internal order. The functions of the military officers became distinct from those of the politician and the policeman. The second factor leading to civilian control of the army came from the growth of the nation-state, where competition among the states caused each to create a corps of permanent experts devoted solely to the interests of military security rather than pay- ing attention to both internal and external orders. The third factor developed from the historical fact that in most of European countries the clash between democrats and aristocrats was resolved through periodic revolu- tions in which the democrats had the final victory. Democratic ideals and parties eventually gained a solid grip on the political system. The final fac- tor, the existence of a single recognized source of legitimate authority over military forces increased the strength of civilian institution^.'^ Originally, in every Western country, the king was the only leader recognized by the constitution and, hence, maintained supremacy in all areas of the political system. Gradually, however, power shifted to the parliament whose supremacy, then, became f m l y established. Hence, there has always been a stable legitimate civilian authority that left no room for the army. Weak Military Institutions Western scholars also claim that military institutions in the West are rel- atively weak compared to those in the developing world. Broadly speaking, an army’s institutional strength may be measured by three kinds of resources: coercive, organizational, and p01itical.~~ In the internal dynam- ics of Western politics, the coercive capacity of the military is very limited. Historically, there are few instances of massive deployment of the army in civilian disturbances. Second, the army’s integration into civilian power structures is very limited. Soldiers in the West rarely participate in civilian decision-making bodies, such as cabinets and committees, and also have very few social links with political power groups. While the balance of power between civil and military authority in developing countries is one of mutual weakness, in the Western world it is one of mutual strength and greater institutional autonomy from each. Thus, Luckham comments, The strengthening of civil institutions places much greater restraint on the military’s ability to use this coercive capability to overawe them. Violence is quite easily transformed into power when it is just a mat- ter of taking over one or two key institutions in a coup d’etat. But it cannot elicit the automatic compliance of well-established and diver- 102 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 17.2 sified institutions and the support of a more articulate public. Coercion tends to be blunt and unsophisticated against weapons of political action such as strikes and civil disobedience. Hence the dif- ficulty of the military in achieving anything more dramatic than a putsch changing one civilian regime for another in a country like France or Germany. The militaries in the countries of Europe and North America may often be larger and more sophisticated relative to other bureaucratic structures than are the new nations’ armed forces, but nonetheless able to use domestic vi01ence.l~ Character of Military Boundaries There are three military boundaries: integral, permeable, and fragment- ed. The integral boundary defines a distinct and stable boundary; the per- meable boundary delineates a clear line between the internal system and external environment; and the fragmented boundary indicates differentia- tion in some respects and permeation in others. Typically, according to Huntington and Luckham, Third World countries are in the third catego- ry.”16 Based on his findings, Luckham put forward a model of civil-mili- tary relations as summarized in the table be10w.l~ TLpes system D f Level of Institutidzation of Civilian Political Rocedures: Legi-cy, party Cohesion, and Stability Westem Classical/ Liberal Developed communist Authoritarian + t H H i i g g h h + + H H i i g g h h Praetoriau Developing Domestic Socioeconomic and Environment Showing Level of Social and Economic IUtel’MtiOMl Level of Military Instihhdizatim Mobility + + + + + H H 1 i H H H i i i g g g g g h h h h h + + + + + H H H H H i i i i i g g g g g h h h h h Nature of Boundaries Integrated BOUUdaries Displaying Civilian control permeated Boundaries Displaying Civilian h b O l Ragmented Boundaries Displaying Tenuous Civilian control Sirajul Islam: Civil-Military Relations 103 The above table indicates that the West has integral boundaries where the military and civil powers are balanced at a fairly high level. In these coun- tries, political constraint and professional self-interest keep the armed forces out of the struggle for political power. The army seldom generates the political resources to stage anything more than a secret sudden over- throw, at best changing one civilian group for another. On the contrary, the Third World countries, in general, have fragmented boundaries in which the military adopts a guardian posture. In these models, the military helps civilian groups because they often share common goals and interests. On the one hand, the military is a differentiated body, with distinct group inter- ests and interests held in common with civilian groups. On the other hand, it acts like any other political elite in pursuit of its own interests. It is pre- pared to cooperate with civilian groups to their mutual advantage and to trade off its own goals in return for the support of other bodies.'* Critique of the Western Perspective The above analysis indicates that civil and military institutions in Western political systems are distinct and, as such, the military plays an apolitical role and does not interfere in civilian politics. This analysis though is faulty. Neither the inherent weakness of military institutions nor the clear-cut boundaries between civil and military author- ity, however, are true of Western political systems. The following analysis clarifies this issue. First, Christianity never required the separation of civilian from military power. Historically, in Europe, both civil and military power remained in the same hands. Until the eleventh century, all powers were vested in the king or the prince and were absolute since nobody had the right to chal- lenge his authority. Between the eleventh and fourteenth centuries, the head of the Church, the Pope, claimed supreme universal power, both temporal and spiritual. The reforms that Gregory the Great introduced made the Papal case for supremacy irresistible. It was claimed that the two swords, representing spiritual and secular authority, were given by God to Peter from whom they have descended to the Pope who is the vicegerent of God on earth. In other words, both civilian and spiritual powers were integrated in the hands of the Pope. Eventually, the Reformation rested temporal authority from papal control. It is true that Protestantism subsequently insti- tuted the separation of religious from civilian authority, but to say that it also separated civilian from military authority has no historical basis. The 104 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 17.2 monarch was the head of the army which could not move or engage in fighting without the order of the king. In fact, Christianity did not even raise the issue of the separation of civilian and military powers. The idea that Western military professionalism does not grant military institutions any political role, separating them from society and politics (an implicit assumption in recent years), is not only historically unsound, but also unrealistic in modem times. In Western political systems, civil-mili- tary relations are based on a variety of informal and formal links between military professionals and the civilian elite, and involve a great deal of political interaction. It is a mere assumption that the military in the West is apolitical and that civil military relations are characterized by civilian con- trol and supremacy. In an ideal sense, this may seem to be true, but in a more realistic and practical sense, this must be considerably tempered by historical reality.19 The fact is that in the recent past the military system in the West has passed through important phases of development and change. The primary purpose of the military, which is to win wars, has remained the same, but the means to obtain its purpose has changed. The military has sigmfkantly penetrated the sociopolitical areas of Western political systems and it has increasingly been influenced by values, attitudes, skills, and expectations of civilian lifeJ0 Also, the complex technological requirements of defense and warfare in the modem age, providing global security, and guarding against potential coercion have increased the bargaining power of the military elite, even granting them “veto” power.2l Western governments have to allocate large sums for defense, even tak- ing money from nondefense sectors. Thus, “the continual competition for money between the military and nonmilitary sectors of society has brought military budgets and military strategy and technology into the mainstream of policy making. Deciding budget allocations now requires even the most ‘nonmilitary’ parliamentarians to develop some expertise in military mat- ters. Similarly, this has required military professionals to develop knowl- edge of governmental politics in order to understand their own system and to have some impact on the military’s access to money source^."^ The mil- itary’s impact on society has made it necessary for civilian decision-makers to consider military factors as part and parcel of the decision-making process. Not only the defense budget but also a number of other factors tend to draw military and civilian society together. Today’s military families are Sirajul Islam: Civil-Military Relations 105 concerned about the upbringing of their offspring. Therefore, they want to make certain that the national annual budget includes expenditure for the military. “As a result,” Sarkesian writes, “links between the military and society have strengthened and expanded. Equally important, boundaries between the military and society have become obscure. It is increasingly difficult to identify a purely ‘military’ problem.”23 The political and social impact of military force has become so deep- rooted that military professionals cannot properly perform as “profession- als” without understanding political and social groups. Thus, considering military to be apolitical is false, and describing civil-military relations in the Western world in terms of civilian control and supremacy is too unrealis- tic. A variety of formal and informal channels enable the military to influ- ence mutually advantageous political events in the pursuit of common goals. Military and civilian institutions parallel each other. Although they are not the same, they are interconnected by a variety of relationships, val- ues, and norms. In reality, the military is partly a political institution pos- sessing influence and access to the political process through a variety of informal and formal channels. Thus, in modem Western political systems, “the military profession and the institution cannot adopt an ‘apolitical‘ sta- tus, nor can the concept of civil-military relations remain unrealistically based on civilian control and supremacy.”24 Islamic Perpectives The above analysis indicates that in reality, the theoretical separation of military from civilian institutions is obscured in Western political systems. In contrast, while it may be true that Islam, in theory, does not emphasize the differentiation and separation of civilian and military institutions, this does not mean that they are considered one and the same. Neither in the verses of the Qur’an nor in the political tradition of the rightly-guided first four caliphs is there any evidence to suggest that there was no separation of civilian and military authorities. Also, there is no evidence that the Qur’an condones unlawful seizure of power from legally constituted authority sur- reptitiously by the army. Salem Qureshi wrote, “The Prophet Muhammad himself and his fist four deputies, the righteous caliphs, bore the responsi- bility of being Amir al- Mu’min-in, Commander of the Faithful, a title which asserted the unity in the ruler of the office of the supreme warlord as well as head of the civil administration.”25 Qureshi drew the conclusion that the 106 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 17.2 civilian and military entities were one in Islam. If this is the case then in today’s world, the head of the State, be it president or king, is also the chief commander of the army. The declaration of war lies in the hands of the head of the State. Does this mean that in contemporary political systems there is also a unity of civil and military authorities? The real position of Islam on this issue can be explained both from religious roots and political traditions. Religious Roots In both Qur’an and Hadith literature, and also in the writings of the early Muslim jurists, it is found that only a legally constituted authority may rule the Ummah. The Qur’an clearly states that baghi (rebellion against the legally constituted authority of the imam) is The Ummah must render full obedience to the legally constituted authority of the imam or khalifah. The Qur’anic term for obedience is @‘ah. There are other related terms that frequently occur in the Qur’an, such as, uti‘u and ati‘ana, and ukz‘u, which mean obedience to the legitimate ruler. Whenever reference is made to a general obligation of the Ummah, it specifically applies only to God and His Messenger. Similarly, in the Qur’an wherever the question of obedience is mentioned, invariably, God and His Messenger are mentioned together. For example, in the following verses it is said Obey God, and the Messenger, God does not love the unbelievers.” (3:32) Whoever obeys God and the Messenger4ey are with those whom God has blessed; prophets, the truthful, martyrs, the righteous, good companions.” (4:69) And obey God and obey the Messenger, beware; but if you turn your backs, then know that it is only for Our Messenger to deliver the Message Manifest.” (5:92) And obey God, and His Messenger, and do not quarrel together and loose heart, and your power depart; and be patient; surely God is with the patient.” (8:46) Obey God, and obey the Messenger, then if you turn away, only upon Him rests what is laid on Him, and upon you rests what is laid on you.” (24: 54) Sirajul Islam: Civil-Military Relations 107 0 believers, obey God, and obey the Messenger, and do not make your own works vain.” (47:33) In the light of the above verses it can be stated that the Prophet Muhammad exercised authority that was derived from God. He was both a prophet and a ruler. As the head of State, he was the head of both civilian and military entities. But the Qur’an clearly indicates that any kind of rebel- lion against the authority of the Prophet was considered to be illegal, and prescribes “police action” against those rebellious f0rces.u The Qur’an unequivically forbids coup d’ktat against legally constitued governments.28 Similarly, the hadith literature condemns revolt or coup d’e- tat against a legally constituted ruler and prescribe severe punishment for those who rebel. For example, it is related by Abu Hurairah that the Prophet said, “In the case where an oath of allegiance is exercised on the hands of two caliphs then kill the second one” (M~slim)?~ Arfajah heard the Prophet saying, “In the near future there will appear schism; thus, if anyone causes dissension in the community and destroys the unity of the community, chop off his head whosoever he may be” (Muslim)?O Ibn Umar relates that the Prophet said, “Anyone who owes allegiance to an imam and takes an oath of loyalty by placing his palm on the palm of the imam, and of his own voli- tion agrees on giving fealty to him, then he should obey him to the best of his ability. If there arises another claiming to be the imam, then behead I believe the above citations from hadith literature clearly indicate that any army takeover of civilian power is unlawful. In my opinion this further indicates that Islam does not allow the overthrow of a ruler by unlawful means. If any ruler loses the trust of the people, the people have the right to change the ruler but, in this interpretation, only through election, not by force. During the medieval period of Islam, on the basis of practices in the State of Madinah, many Muslim jurists and thinkers further elaborated the qual- ification of a legitimate ruler and the nature and mode of elections. They clearly enunciated that there is no scope for the army to capture civilian power. The most famous of these jurists were al-Mawardi, al- Ghazali, Ibn Khaldun, and Ibn Taymiyyah. Al-Mawardi held the view that the khalifah must be elected by the Ummah through an electoral college known as ah1 al-hall wa al-‘aqd. He enumerated three qualifications that entitled individ- uals to be members of the electoral college: knowledge, intellect, and jus- tice. Thus, he posited that the seizure of political power by force cannot be b . 7 9 3 1 108 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 17.2 entertained. Al-Ghazali enumerated similar qualifications of a ruler. Ibn Khaldun laid down the same type of conditions for a ruler, such as, knowl- edge, justice, physical and mental fitness. Ibn Khaldun went beyond his predecessors who believed that the Shaii'ah was the only basis of political authority, and as such they had not accepted kingship as a legitimate form of government. Similarly, according to Ibn Taymiyyah, the leadership of the Muslim State should be set up on the basis of a contract (mubaya'ah) between the ruler and the community. For Ibn Taymiyyah, caliphal author- ity is based on cooperation (ta'awun). These Muslim jurists and political thinkers clearly stated that the government must be based on the Shari'ah, which does not permit the military to capture political power. Political maditions Not only in the Qur'an, Hadith, and the writings of the early Muslim jurists is coup d'etat prohibited, but also in the model Muslim State of Madinah there is evidence that the ruler could only claim legitimacy of power with the consensus of the community. In the early Muslim state, two separate authorities did not exist, that is, religious and political (church and state), as was the case with Christianity in the West; therefore, the theory of obedience in Islam developed in a very different social and political set- ting. The Islamic community (Ummah) grew up in a milieu of tribal anar- chy, and, therefore, nothing similar to the Christian church could emerge as a separate institution. The Christian community had come into existence within the Roman Empire. But before the rise of Islam, no Arab empire existed, and, therefore rendering obedience to the ruler did not arise at all. Consequently, this basic difference between Islam and Christianity, the process of community building under the impact of Islam simultaneously involved ideological social and political integration of the Arabian tribes. Historically, however, during the later Abbasi caliphate and subsequently in Egypt after the installation of the Abbasi caliph by Sultan Baibars, the khilafah was reduced to the status of a purely religious institution, and the defacto political power came to be exercised by the secular rulers.32 In this manner, during the period of political decline, the offices of sultan and caliph were separated.33 With the rise of Islam, the Prophet Muhammad exercised both temporal and spiritual powers and, therefore, he was both prophet and ruler. Mainly, he performed the following functions: received 'divine revelations; preached about Islam; embodied the divine injunctions by his own conduct; Sirajul Islam: Civil-Military Relations 109 organized individual and collective life of the Ummah in accordance with divine injunctions; established the institution of hudi (punishment) and organized the collection of zakah (poor tax); conducted the affairs of the community in consultation with his companions; and adjudicated dis- p u t e ~ . ~ ~ The Prophet used to conduct civilian and community affairs in consulta- tion with his companions. He was only one among others, and his own civilian judgments (in contra-distinction with his prophetic judgments) could be overruled by others and, in fact, this happened many times.35 For example, one year the Prophet asked some people to fecundate trees, but, unfortunately, the yield was low that year. Consequently, people came to the Prophet and complained about the low yield. The Prophet is reported to have said, “I am but a man. What I tell you in religious matters you should accept. When I tell you something about worldly affairs, remember that I am but a man.”36 In this way, the Prophet’s role was limited in secular mat- ters. In this situation, since the emerging Ummah had no central political authority, the Prophet continued to be the main focus. To regard the Prophet as a sovereign of the newly emerging Ummah in Madinah is not quite accurate. In determining the nature of authority exercised by the Prophet, scholars have failed to distinguish between the terms: community, State, and government. In fact, the Prophet was engaged in the task of com- munity building that was free from politics, but not necessarily apolitical. This was because the Prophet was not concerned about his political role, and, therefore, his role in secular matters was incidental to his prophetic mission.37 After the arrival of the Prophet in Madinah, the city-state began to emerge as the model of an Islamic polity. The Prophet Muhammad, as the vicegerent of Allah on earth, was both political and religious authority. In order to build the State, he delegated both his civil and military powers. The civil administration included central, provincial, divisional, and local administrators. The central administration included the deputies (nuwab) of the Prophet, advisors (rnushi’irin), secretaries (kutab), envoys (rusul), com- missioners or officers on special duty, poets (shci’ir), and orators (khutuba’). The main provincial functionary was the governor (wulu). The local gov- ernment included local administrators (ru’usu), local representatives (nuqu- bii’), judges (q&h), and market officers (sahib ul-suq or ‘alu ~l -suq) .~* On the other hand, military administration was distributed among the commanders. Like the modern head of State, the Prophet Muhammad was 110 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 17.2 the supreme commander of the army of the Islamic State of Madinah. Commanders, however, were appointed to carry out their respective func- tions. Until the last day of the Prophet's life, commanders continued to be appointed and, in total, forty-nine persons held the position in seventy-four expedition^.^^ In other words, some of the commanders held this position on more than one occasion. The appointments were distributed widely among the various groups of Muslims in Madinah, but most of them went to the Quraysh, muhajirun, and the unsdr. The western and eastern tribes were well represented, while the Muslims belonging to the northern and southern regions of Arabia had few representatives because, in terms of percent of the total population, they were a small minority in Madinah. The only criteria for appointment to a post was merit and suitability; other con- siderations, such as tribe, clan, region of origin, or degree of piety were not as important. In reality, the Prophet was never influenced by these ascrip- tive considerations in making high position appointments." Furthermore, the Prophet Muhammad, as head of State, appointed com- manders for larger forces who were known for their leadership and military capabilities. Interestingly enough, the most striking figure among the Prophet's commanders was undoubtedly Zayd b. Harith, who not only com- manded the maximum number of expeditions but also led the biggest ones."l Other prominent commanders, listed in order of the number of their expeditions, were Usamah b. Zaid, 'Abd. al-Rahman b. 'Awf, Khalid b. Walid, Amar b. al-'As, 'Ali b. Abi Talib, and Alqamah b. Muhazziz. In the execution of their military duties the commanders were free to make deci- sions and act according to their knowledge and discretion. Notwithstanding, they had to abide by the Qur'an and Sunnah (the example and instructions of the Prophet) on all occasions and under all circum- stances." The military organization in the State of Madinah developed systemat- icly. Traditionally, the pagan Arabs used the method of ul-karr wu ul-farr (literally, "attack and retreat"), but in the period just preceding Islam they adopted the formation of tu'biyuh (mobilization) of the ujum (non-Arabs), a more appropriate method for their desperate struggle. The army's forma- tion was called ul-khamis because it was divided into five divisions: the qulb (center), the maymanah (right flank), the maysaruh (left flank), the mzquah'amah (the vanguard), and the suquh (rearg~ard)?~ In the early months of the Islamic State of Madinah, no attention was paid to military strategy, for there was no permanent army. All male adults of the Islamic Sirajul Islam: Civil-Military Relations 111 Ummah constituted the Islamic army. Moreover, since the Muslims had not yet experienced any serious challenge from an organized enemy force, they did not feel an urgency to organize their military system. The Muslims of Madinah, however, soon faced an organized challenge from the Makkan forces at the battle of Badr in 624 C.E. At this time the infant Islamic State of Madinah began to organize it military tactics. By the time the battle of Uhud occurred, the Islamic m y could sufficiently organ- ize to counteract effectively the moves and tactics of its enemies.'''' According to one report, since the Makkans had placed Khalid ibn al-Walid on their left, the Prophet created two flanks in his army, presumably under two respective commanders. Though there is no specific mention of this, it appears that the khamis system was introduced fully at the battle of Uhud. During the Khaybar expedition, the khamis system was fully effective. Thereafter, the five flank formation system in the Muslim army was referred to, either explicitly or implicitly, in the course of all major expedi- tions, such as Umrah al Qaza, Mutah Fathi-i-Mecca, Hunyan, Awtas, Tag, and Tab~k.4~ Clearly, the Islamic State of Madinah, under the leadership of the Prophet Muhammad, had developed the khamis system of military formation. The establishment of a new social structure in Madinah entailed the organiza- tion of a military system which was distinct from civil administration. The military was always engaged in fighting with external forces that threatened the sovereignty of the State of Madinah. It never appeared to be a threat to the civilian leadership of the State during the time of the Prophet Muhammad. With the demise of the Prophet, the Ummah was deprived of direct divine guidance through revelation, the Prophetic ijtihad, and his mature judg- ment. However, the Ummah had the Qur'an, the Sunnah, and the institution of the shuru (informal forum for deliberation on new problems). During the lifetime of the Prophet, the companions of the Prophet were trained in the methods of deducing rulings from the Qur'an and S ~ n n a h , ~ and were quite familiar with the shuru process and its decision-making procedures-ijti- had (effort, research) and ijma' ( c o ~ s ~ ~ s u s ) . ~ ~ After the death of the Prophet, the most urgent question confronting the Islamic community was who would be the Prophet's successor. With the intention of choosing a leader, the community fell back upon the institution of shuru and met at Thaqifah, Bani Saadah. Three nominees stood out but no ijma could be reached. Eventually, the name of Abu Bakr was proposed, 112 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 17.2 since he was the most senior and closest companion to the Prophet, and he had been deputized by the Prophet to lead the prayers. Finally, his nomina- tion was accepted by the people and a consensus was reached. Immediately, a bay‘ah by the elite took place followed by a general bay‘ah the next day.48 There were few like ‘Ali who initially did not take bay‘ah, but eventually they also did. Clearly, the institution of the khilafah, based on ijtihad made by the companions followed by ijma‘, was a natural system of decision making in the political process of the early Islamic com- munity. On his deathbed, Abu Bakr proposed the nomination of ‘Umar as his successor but his nomination had to be confirmed formally by the ijma‘ of the companions followed by a general bay‘ah. Before his death, ‘Umar formed an electoral college consisting of six members who could elect a khaZifah from among themselves. The members of the electoral college were ‘Ali, ‘Uthman, ‘Abd al-Rahman, Talha, Zubair, and Sa’ad bin Abi Waqas. Finally, all but ‘Ali and ‘Uthman excluded themselves from con- sideration. In the competition between ‘Ali and ‘Uthman, the latter got an ijma‘ that led to their bay‘ah to ‘Uthman followed by a general bay‘~zh.~~ The murder of ‘Uthman, however, resulted in a serious crisis of succes- sion. At this point, ‘Ali’s name came to the forefront but there was no con- sensus. Those who did not like ‘Ali, however, felt that if no khalifah was immediately elected, a state of anarchy could arise. Consequently, they decided to accept the nomination of ‘Mi. Thus, a consensus emerged and ‘Ali took the oath of office. The election of ‘Ali settled the matter for the time being but gave rise to a new political conflict within the Islamic com- munity that evently led to the Battle of the Camel.M Thus, none of the chief executives assumed the office of khalifuh by means of force or rebellion. Rather, all of them went through a process of consensus. After the death of ‘Ali, however, the consensus process stopped. Mu’awiyyah, governor of Syria during the time of ‘Umar and ‘Uthman, declared himself khalifah without formally being elected by the free choice of an ah1 al-shura (council of leaders). This was a deviation. ‘Ali had tried to dismiss Mu’awiyyah from his post as governor, but he had already built-up support among the tribes in Syria. Naturally, a conflict arose between ‘Ali and Mu’awiyyah which prevented the process of ijma‘ in the matter of political decision making. During the turmoil that followed ‘Ali was assassinated and Mu’awiyyah became the self-declared khalifah. Eventually, Mu’awiyyah appointed his son Yazid as his successor and employed all kinds of political strategies in order to secure allegiance from Sirajul Islam: Civil-Military Relations 113 the shura for Yazid during his life. When Yazid became the khulifah by force of his father, however, the Ummah refused to give their allegiance because he was not chosen by the ijma‘ of the shura, which led to a civil war culminating in the tragedy of Karbala.51 The victory of Yazid’s forces put the last nail in the coffin of the shura (democratic) process of choosing the government in an Islamic polity. In brief, the death of the Prophet resulted in a succession crisis that was resolved by the Ummah (community) according to their tradition and expe- rience which conformed to the spirit of Islam. They followed a two-stage process in electing a successor: nomination and selection by the represen- tatives of the Ummah, culminatingin their bay‘ah; and then confirmation by the public through general acclamation (bay‘ah). The first four khalifuhs were elected through this process. The Qur’anic principle of shura was the basis of the Islamic political order. With the assassination of ‘Ali, however, the Ummayads came to power and the khilafah was transformed into a mulk (kingdom), a change from siyasuh diniyah (politics based upon reli- gion) to siyasah ‘uqliyah (politics based on human reasoning) supported by ‘asabiyah (tribalism) in seizing Gradually, by the middle of the tenth century, due to political fragmentation and weakening of the caliphate, “army commanders began asserting their independence as rulers and subsequently became sultans exercising defacto rule over the emerging political entities.”53 Finally, in the mid-thirteenth century, the Mongols seized Baghdad, the Abbasid capital, which brought about the termination of the Abbasid caliphate and resulted in the emergence of Muslim sul- tanates. By the sixteenth century, three major Muslim sultanates emerged: the Ottomans in the Near East and Eastern Europe, the Safavids in Persia, and the Moguls in India.% The tremendous energy that Islam had generated within the Muslim com- munity through political integration was, thus, consumed in the process of internal struggle for power. The shura, along with the process of ijtihad55 and ijma‘, which had been instrumental in bringing about the political inte- gration of the early Islamic State, gradually degenerated and the system of rule was reduced to “oriental despotism.” Islamic traditions clearly devel- oped a system of civil administration distinct from military administration. The Ummayads felt the need for seeking legitimacy for their rule because they had deviated from the early political traditions of Islam and they never received the absolute legitimacy of the Islamic communiv since they came 114 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 17.2 to power through military means. The general masses had no allegiance to the Ummayad dynasty. From the above discussion some conclusions emerge: First, the Shari'ah enjoins the Ummah to render obedience to an imam who holds the office by virtue of the contract between himself and the community and by the due process of buy'uh between himself and the community at large. Second, the imam must be obeyed if he fulfills his mandate by enforcing the divine laws in the community and rendering justice to the people. Third, a khilufuh, based on usurpation (istila), brute coercion (taghallub), and coup d'etat by military commanders, is not recognized by the Shari'ah as lawful. Fourth, the idea and institution of kingship or a military regime is not consistent with the basic political concepts of Islam. Fifth, the final power of decision-making lies with the community, which should resist tyrants and despots under all circumstances. Finally, Islam allows neither use of force nor interference by the army in civil administration nor an army take-over of power surreptitiously. Civil and military affairs are distinct and separate and there is no instance of interference by the army in the civilian administration of the early Islamic community. Civil and military powers are not integrated in Islam. Thus, it is not correct to assume that Muslims easily accept military rule because it runs counter to the spirit of Islam. Explaining Coup D'etat in Some Contemporary Muslim Countries Despite Islam's objection to army rule, in some contemporary Muslim countries the military has intervened into civilian politics. The army's inter- vention into civilian politics in some Muslim countries has nothing to do with Islam; witness the great number of non-Muslim countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America in which the military has intervened into their civilian politics. Obviously, the reasons for this development lie some- where else rather than in religion. The real causes of military intervention into the civilian politics of these countries lie in their colonial roots, lead- ing to an overdevelopment of the military, an erosion of the colonial bar- gaining strategy, and an undermining of the monetary interests of the mili- tary in the postcolonial period. Sirajul Islam: Civil-Military Relations 115 Overdevelopment of the Military During colonial rule, the colonial government deliberately ignored the growth of political institutions because it posed a threat to its own exis- tence. The only institution that the colonial government trusted was the army, whose development was vital for its own stability and order. Therefore, in every colony the armed forces were organized with specific quali t ies4 centralized command, hierarchy, discipline, espirit de corps, and a corresponding isolation from the civilian sector.56 With their unbro- ken chain of command and unity of purpose, everything was structured to ensure centralized control and coordinated action. In contrast, the colonial government deliberately denied civilian leaders training in administration. With respect to African countries, Liebenow writes, “In the postindepen- dence era the pool of talent available both to run the State and continue the vital role of the political party in galvanizing society was dangerously shal- low from the outset.”57 The political leaders were never trained or educat- ed to manage a complex modem society, thus, experts in the fields of pub- lic administration, medicine, engineering, diplomacy, and the general areas of economics and finance were scarce. Furthermore, during the anticolonial struggle, the political leaders themselves gave low priority to economics and other fundamental matters. Serious planning regarding the nature of a postcolonial economy was long deferred. In addition, the emerging politi- cal elite overestimated their ability to organize the postcolonial State. The emerging political parties lacked organizational experience. In the post- colonial States, the weak party organizations were easily affected by fac- tional strife, regional cliques, and ideological cleavages, thus severly limit- ing their effectivene~s.~~ Consequently, in the postindependence period, politicians failed to meet the expectations of the people even though they had control of political power. The civilian governments became inept, ineffective, and corrupt. Using Finer’s criteria of civil-military relations and Meheden’s tabulation of military coups, Hopkins has shown how 11 1 countries in Southem Africa, the Caribbean and Latin America, Oceania and Southeast Asia, at different stages of development, became affected by coups and attempted coups between the years 1957 and 1964. According to his calculation, 75 percent of the countries having less than $64 per capita product (in 1957) had mil- itary intervention; while only 6 percent of the countries having more than $836 per capita product had military intervention. Of the 38 successful 116 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 17.2 coups he analyzed, 32 took place in countries with less than $239 per capi- ta product.59 Due to economic deterioration, people become frustrated and inclined to fight the government, thus leading to disorder. Sometimes the level of vio- lence and disorder causes the law-enforcing agencies to fail, thus com- pelling the civilian regime to call in the army to bring about stability.@ Military deployment leads to disastrous consequences: first, civilian regimes become more and more dependent on the army; second, the mili- tary becomes aware of the civilian regime’s weaknesses; third, the army’s success in crisis management makes them increasingly confident; and finally, the military develops an appetite for power. There are many instances in which the military intervened to quell disorder and violence and then seized political power. The Syrian coup of 1949, the coup d’etat of 1965 in Indonesia, Pakistan’s coup d’etats of 1958 and 1977, the Nigerian coup of 1966, and the Turkish coup of 1960.6l Erosion of Colonial Bargaining Strategy Another important factor enabling army intervention into civilian politics in many Muslim countries is the power elite’s inability to secure stability through bargaining with the diverse groups within the country. Officers of the colonial State were strictly neutral arbiters that managed the diversities and conflicts within society. Once power was transferred to the native lead- ers, it was apparent that many of them favored one ethnic group or anoth- er. Even those who had been part of the broad coalition to unseat the colo- nial administration, found themselves challenged by the party and the gov- erning elite at the center.62 Politics took primacy over other legitimate types of activities and the party leaders increasingly turned against their fellow conspirators in the trade unions, the cooperative societies, student organi- zations, and ethnic or regional political associations. The competing organ- izations were effectively subordinated to the dominant party or to the post- colonial State itself, and few new competitors were encouraged to appear on the scene. Consequently, in many of these countries, the weakened con- dition of previous competitors to the political party leadership left only one other strong contestant in the field, the military, which was organized by the colonial ruler in such a way that it had no identity other than as s0ldiers.6~ Oliveira Salazar wrote, “For the soldier ... there exists neither the hamlet, nor the region, nor the province, nor the colony: there is for him nothing but the national territory. He has no family, no relatives, no friends, no neigh- Sirajul Islam: Civil-Military Relations 117 bars."@ Thus, when the governing party lost legitimacy, the military, as neutral arbiter, intervened in civilian politics. Welch and Smith comment, “Military intervention rarely occurs in countries marked by a high degree of legitima~y.”~~ Undermining Interests of the Army In general, in many of the postcolonial States of the Third World, and in some Muslim States in particular, a tendency appeared among the civilian leaders to underestimate the amount of force that is required to maintain the colonial State. For example, the new governing elite in Bangladesh felt that it should direct its energies to and spend more money on economic devel- opment, expansion of educational and health facilities, and the other more positive tasks associated with nation building. Thus, the military was given lower priority than other categories in the national budget. Soldiers, how- ever, were not a