Sirat al-Mustaqim and Hikma: 

A Qur'anic View of Socioeconomic 

Behavior, Economic Discourse and 

Method 

Sa/ah El-Sheikh 

This paper seeks to understand the context in which the debates con­
cerning Islamic economics are taking place. The author contends that in 

the absence of a democratic and free environment the discourses on 

Islamic economics are suffering from free and open discussions about 

the true essence of Islam and its implications in the socioeconomic 

arena. After discussing some of the limits of the discourses on Islamic 

economics, suc.h as a lack of common terminology and appropriate use 

of Qur'anic terms, the author advances his understanding of the 

Qur'anic approach to iman. The author argues that 'aql and hikrrui are 

the cornerstones of Islam and the two faculties that the Qur'an repeat­

edly invokes in order that humanity may understand Islamic laws and 

principles and fulfill its mandate of Allah's vicegerency. The paper con­

cludes that the straight path is essentially a rational approach and invites 

the discourses on Islamic economics to rely more on 'aql and hikrrui in 

their contemplation. 

Introduction 

It is no secret that Islamic countries have entered a new era in which seri­

ous questions regarding the nature of their economic institutions have taken 

on renewed urgency. During the past few years, lively debates have taken 

place, both nationally and internationally, among economists, Islamic 

scholars, and intellectuals of various Islamic political movements. 

Salah El-Sheikh is Professor of Economics at Sr. Francis Xavier University in Antigonish, 
Canada. 



56 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 16:2 

Inherently complex, the discourse, which appears in academic and semi- 
academic publications as well as in the popular press, is made more com- 
plex as it takes place in an extremely volatile environment, amidst severe 
economic crises, political turmoil, social unrest, and international conflict. 

Islamic economists and their advocates claim that contemporary eco- 
nomic institutions, be they capitalistic or socialistic, are morally corrupt 
because they run counter to socioeconomic teachings of Islam.’ Therefore, 
they advance a piecemeal, albeit radical, program of Islamization, which 
enshrines their conception of the Islamic teachings provided in the Qur’an 
and the Sunnah? Although increasingly influential, Islamic economists and 
their advocates are by no means dominant among Muslim economists or 
the Muslim intelligentsia in general. It is fair to say, however, that both 
Muslim economists and the intelligentsia are critical of the economic and 
political institutions of their countries and are skeptical about the capabili- 
ty of these postcolonial institutions to effect the socioeconomic programs 
necessary to overcome current economic crises and the concomitant social 
and political problems3 They advocate diverse sets of socioeconomic and 
political reforms of various institutions within their respective states to 
enhance their effectiveness in carrying out development and achieving the 
economic welfare of the Ummah in a manner that is compatible with its 
Islamic character! 

The ongoing debate inspired by the intellectual challenge posed by 
Islamic economists and their advocates is enriching the collective mind and 
conscience of the Ummah. Furthermore, this debate can be invaluable, in 
shaping the political and economic institutions that are capable of realizing 
Muslim aspirations in social and economic progress. Nevertheless, the dis- 
course often lacks a grounding in fundamental principles, and the debate 
often suffers from some basic misunderstandings which, at times, are so 
grave that the discussion becomes like a “dialogue of the deaf.” These 
shortcomings reveal at least three basic causes: The first is the language and 
terminology of the discourse; the second is its rules and procedures; and the 
last and most important is its methodology and, in particular, the role of rea- 
son in dealing with religious issues. 

It goes without saying that the ultimate purpose of economic institutions, 
Islamic or non-Islamic, is to provide efficient and flexible rules, arrange- 
ments, and mechanisms which facilitate the conduct of economic choice at 
both the micm- and macro-level~.~ In this respect, the “postulate of ration- 
ality” is crucial to any serious debate regarding those institutions because it 



El-Sheikh Sirat al-Mustaqim and Hikma 57 

underlies the theory and calculus of economic choice. As such, the postu- 
late of rationality stipulates that individuals possess sufficient knowledge or 
information about the various alternatives; are capable of evaluating these 
alternatives; and make choices that achieve their best interest in the light of 
their preferences and beliefs. Typically, the postulate is expressed in mod- 
em economic theory in terms of a set of axioms which underscore the cen- 
trality of knowledge and reason, thus ruling out contradiction and inconsis- 
tency? 

It is notable that the postulate of rationality, as formulated above, is often 
misunderstood, and in the interest of rigor and claritv, it merits two remarks 
which are important to the objective of this study. First, this postulate is 
essential to the various branches of the science of economics, be they pos- 
itive/empirical- or normative/policy-oriented; some variant of it is adopted 
by each of the main schools of contemporary economics, neoclassical or 
otherwise. A case in point is the notion of “bounded rationality” adopted 
by advocates of “institutionalism” who object to the “modes of analysis of 
neoclassical economics” as Samuels puts it7 This notion was developed by 
Simon to “designate rational choice that takes into account the cognitive 
limitations of the decision-maker - limitations of both knowledge and 
computational capacity.”* Second, the postulate of rationality formulated 
above does not preclude ethical considerations, nor does it exclude ethical 
choices?JO Indeed, the economist’s concept of rationality is aptly charac- 
terized by Rawls, a Kantian moral philosopher, as being merely a set of 
“counting principles.”’ 

Admittedly, the postulate of rationality is a normative notion if one fol- 
lows the logic of speech-act philosophers (of linguistic analysis) and 
defines rational preference (or choice) as being a preference (or choice) that 
human agents ought to perform.’* But economists go beyond definition to 
make the positive (synthetic) claim that human agents are rational accord- 
ing to this definition. This claim about human nature, I will argue, is epis- 
temologically rooted in the Qur‘anic revelation that mankind is endowed by 
the correlative gifts of ‘uql (reason) and ‘ilm (knowledge). 

This study does not attempt to directly contribute to the literature on 
Islamic economics or to the current debate about specific economic institu- 
tions or particular issues (such as the question of riba); rather it deals with 
the nature of the debate at the methodological level by addressing the crit- 
ical question of the role of knowledge (ylm) and reason (‘ql), the basis of 



58 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 16:2 

rationality, in socioeconomic life based on Qur’anic reve1ati0n.l~ In partic- 
ular, I will develop a Qur’anic view about the role of knowledge and rea- 
son in approaching iman (belief or conviction), economic discourse and 
socioeconomic life in general on the basis of Qur’anic h i h  (wisdom) 
according to the sirut ul-mustuqim (the straight path).14 This Qur’anic view 
lends strong support to the employment of ‘uql and ‘ilm in the pursuit of 
truth (haqq), and particularly for the application of the scientific method in 
approaching socioeconomic questions at both the micro- and macro-lev- 
els.15 As such, it may provide a normative and epistemelogical justification 
for Islamic social science in general and the science of economics in par- 
ticular. 
The study consists of five sections, and an appendix. The following sec- 

tion contains some general remarks which a germane to the ongoing 
debate and the objective of the study. In the third section, ‘ilm is introduced 
as being the basis of the relationship between God (the Creator) and Adam 
(mankind) after the Fall from heaven. The fourth section deals with the pre- 
scribed role of ‘uql and h i h  in the Qur’anic approach to socioeconomic 
and intellectual discourse. Finally, the findings are put in perspective and 
the study is concluded. The appendix gives a brief summary of the prob- 
lems of sources and Qur’anic translations and how they were dealt with in 
this study. 

Democracy, Freedom and 
Development of Islamic Thought 

In order to illustrate the immense intricacies and serious shortcomings of 
the above-mentioned debate, it is appropriate to refer to one exchange pub- 
lished (in Arabic) in Al-Ahrum ul-Zqtisadi on the market institution of inter- 
est rates.16 In an article titled “On the Facts of Contemporary Economies 
and the Question of Riba,” El-Biblawi starts by stating: 

I do not claim special knowledge of the rulings of the Islamic Shari’ah 
on the question of ribu, but I believe that something can be con- 
tributed in this respect by shedding light on facts of the contemporary 
economy especially as it pertains to our knowledge of the phenome- 
non of money and the nature of interest rates vu’idah), and this usual- 
ly is the subject of debate when discussing the question of Ribu. 

He then concludes: 



El-Sheikh: Sirat al-Mustaqim and Hikma 59 

The facts of contemporary economic life differ radically from, and 
many of the nomenclature and terms have become deficient in 
expressing the old (economic) phenomena. ... and Affuhu ‘dim (God 
knows better).17 

In a subsequent piece, Mr. Sultan, a specialist in the Shari’ah (Islamic 
jurisprudence), mockingly suggests that El-Biblawi ought to change the 
title of his article to “On the Facts of Contemporary Economies and the 
Inevitability of Ribu,” and states that el-Biblawi should have said 

that the interest rate [institution] is a destructive tool for any economy 
instead of his belief that it is an indispensable instrument to any mod- 
em economy because God the All-Mighty says: “Allah has blighted 
riba and made almsgiving fruitful ...” and believing in this is a duty 
even though we do not know the reasons and causes.1s 

Instead of stopping at this point as his training would recommend accord- 
ing to the celebrated Shari’ah rule: He who says “I do not know” con- 
tributes afutwu (reasoned opinion), Mr. Sultan carries on to make a num- 
ber of unfounded claims about economic theory and actual economic expe- 
rience. l9 

Without delving any further into the specific details and the various prob- 
lems of the above-mentioned discourse, the preceding exchange about ribu, 
among many others, merits the following remarks which underscore the 
objective of this study. First, it is vital that technical terms, both economic 
and Islamic, be clearly defined. The clarity of technical terms (such as ribu 
andfu’idah), which is critical to any scholarly discourse, must be clearly 
highlighted in Islamic debate, in view of the Muslim belief that the Qur’an 
represents the eternal words of God.U’ According to the Qur’an, its verses 
are 

revealed by the Compassionate, the Merciful: a Book of revelations 
well expounded, an Arabic text for people possessed of knowledge. 
(41:2-3y1 

Second, it is vital that the parties to the debate agree in principle on some 
basic parameters of a common approach in order to facilitate the exchange 
between those who specialize in studying the “laws of motion” of society 
and its actual economic formations, and those who specialize in the study 
of Islamic jurisprudence, law, and theology. In this respect, it is worthwhile 
to draw on the tradition established by Muslim scholars in the “golden age” 
of Islamic thought in approaching various disciplines.” Further, it is essen- 



60 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 16:2 

tial to the effectiveness of the discourse in resolving various disputes that 
the participants break through the narrow shells of their disciplines to tap 
others so that a critical minimum of common knowledge and language can 
be secured, not only in economic and Islamic subjects, but also in history, 
especially economic history. 

Third, the lack of a common approach and language conceals a danger- 
ously delicate issue: the dialectical relationship between reason and i m ~ n . 2 ~  
The heightened tension between reason and iman in recent years betrays a 
growing perception of an inevitable contradiction between them, especial- 
ly among the advocates and political supporters of Islamic economists. 
Such a perception, if left unaddressed, can undermine the texture of Muslim 
socioeconomic life, circumscribe the potential for constructive ijtihad in 
general, and threaten the role of reason in economic discourse in particu- 
lar.” 

Fourth, one should be reminded that the lack of a common approach and 
language nowadays is rooted in the onset of Islam’s cultural and economic 
decline. As such, this state of affairs reflects the cultural dualities and social 
cleavages stemming from the vacillating attempts of Muslim states and 
their intellectual communities to deal with their underdevelopment during 
the past two centuries as they woke up to the shock of foreign occupation 
and became aware of the far-reaching cultural threats of European domina- 
tion. This background has to be examined, understood, and appreciated in 
any discourse whose aim is to buttress or build economic institutions. In 
this respect, Muslim economists would do well to be inspired by the in- 
genuity of early Muslims who absorbed and adapted the institutions of 
ancient civilizations as they set out to build their own.= 

Finally, the viability and continuity of this discourse is predicated on the 
existence of a conducive climate and overall environment which guarantees 
freedom of expression, and promotes commitment to truth and respect for 
differences of opinion. For only in such an environment can creative ener- 
gies be released and harnessed. The democratic spirit and environment is 
critically important for this endeavor, both as a principle and strategy for 
the conduct of intellectual discourse and social transactions in general. In 
this respect, it is recalled that the democratic principle is enshrined in Islam 
and is not a bidu (heresy) or a cultural import. For, in essence, modem 
democratic institutions are merely the modem equivalent of the twin 
Islamic institutions of buy‘u and shuru, which fit the large populations of 
contemporary states and benefit from the mutation in the technology of 



El-Sheikh: Sirat al-Mustaqim and Hikma 61 

communications and production brought about by the industrial revolu- 
tion.26 In addition, it is noteworthy that buy‘u and shuru are organically con- 
nected with the Shari’ah rule, which was established in early Islam by 
Muslim scholars and jurists, and which states that “difference (in opinion) 
is an act of Divine mercy.’Q7 

Without freedom of expression and toleration of difference it is virtually 
impossible to promote the requisite commonality in language and 
approach, and it would be virtually impossible to foster the collective mind 
of the Ummah. In the language of economists, it is not feasible in the long 
run for the intellectual wealth of the Ummah to grow without the special- 
ization and division of labor in the production and accumulation of knowl- 
edge and the development of understanding. For this to materialize and for 
the desired economies of scale to be optimized, the “market” of intellectu- 
al transactions must be widened so that the individual contributions of the 
Ummah members can be accommodated. Evidently, this noble enterprise 
can only be realized by sustained investments in the social infrastructure of 
reason and opinion and by a sustained promotion of the institutions of this 
most impomt  of all markets: the democratic institutions of knowledge and 
opinion, including political opinion. The sections that follow will attempt 
to demonstrate that this enterprise is peculiarly Islamic and, as such, its 
investiture is virtually a religious duty of all Muslims. 

God, Mankind and Knowledge 
The natural point of departure for the relationship between God and His 

creation is the beginning of history. The Qur’an, like the Bible, maintains 
that the Allah created humanity in the person of Adam from earthly, base 
material -clay. Yet, despite man’s earthly origin, Allah exalted Adam and 
elevated him above the angels - thus is His love for mankind. In particu- 
lar, the Creator elected Adam from among all that He created to be His 
khulijiu (viceroy) on earth: 

And when thy Lord said unto the angels: Lo! I am about to place a 
RhaZijiu in the earth, they said Wilt Thou place theEin one who will 
do harm therein and will shed blood, while we, we hymn Thy praise 
and sanctify Thee? He said: Surely I know that which ye know not. 
(2:30)28 

Furthermore, Allah elevated mankind above the angels when He “taught 
Adam all the names” (231) - the key to kn~wledge?~ bestowed on him 



62 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 16:2 

and his consort, Eve, a home in the eternal richness and security of heaven, 
and honored mankind further (because of this knowledge) when He com- 
manded the angels: 

Prostrate yourselves before Adam. They fell prostrate, all save Iblis. 
He demurred through pride, and so became a disbeliever. (2:34) 

Nevertheless, the inherent weakness of mankind, which is rooted in 
Adam’s earthly origin, has exposed him and made him an easy prey to the 
resentment and machinations of Iblis who tempted Adam and Eve to dis- 
obedience and caused their tragic Fall from their blissful life in Eden to the 
lower life (dunya) on earth, where they and their posterity have since 
endured the drudgery and banality of its finitude and the scarcity of its 
resources. The disorientating effect of the Fall and the machinations of Iblis 
have since made the already exacting journey of the dunya all the more 
treacherous, for all conspired to make Bani Adam (the Children of Adam: 
mankind) prone to the ignorance of Iblis and to lose the “Names” (the keys 
to knowledge). 

Nonetheless, God, being al-Rahman al-Rahim (the Compassionate, the 
Merciful) did not leave Bani Adam without means, for He endowed them 
with the riches of the earth and, above all, bestowed on them the unique gift 
of ‘aql (reason), which distinguishes them from the nonhuman nations 
(urnam) of animals and birds and qualified mankind to be God‘s khalifa to 
rule over the earth, its resources, and communities. Moreover, He promised 
Adam and Eve (upon their repentance) guidance through His messengers 
and prophets to remind Bani Adam of the keys to knowledge and save them 
from the machinations of Iblis (237-38). If they follow His guidance, the 
Children of Adam can fulfil their ultimate goal both in the dunya and the 
akhira (i.e, in this world and the next). In fact, they can model their dunya 
on the exquisite images of Eden and, in the process, pursue their individual 
life journeys on the sirat al-mustaqim through the rugged and treacherous 
terrain of the dunya toward their original home in heaven, in the akhira30 

To attain their goal, the Children of Adam are asked to commit them- 
selves to the “great striving” (jihad akbur) in order to overcome their earth- 
ly weakness and resist the temptations of Iblis by adopting the sirat al-mus- 
taqim. All they have to do is to make use of their unique gift of ‘aql and 
open their mind to recognize the beneficence Va@) of their Creator, the 
Compassionate, to seek His ‘ilm and enlightenment (nur), to recognize and 
endeavor to comprehend His glorious creation as they observe and con- 



El-Sheikh. Sirat al-Mustaqim and H i h  63 

template the marvels of life, not the least of which is their being an integral 
part of His universal system and its intricate harmony. In so doing, Bani 
Adam can enjoy the fruits of their labor as they fulfil the responsibility of 
khilafa, a task that entails the employment of God’s knowledge to preserve 
the life of all “nations” (umam), both human and nonhuman, and conserve 
the earth, that is, to pursue the “straight path,” al-sirat al-mustaqim. 

Hence, the message came to the Prophet Muhammad as al-‘Alim (the All- 
Knowing) urged him: “0 immantled one, rise and warn. Thy Lord magni- 
fy” (74 1-3),31 and revealed to him in guidance: 

We shall let you recite Our revelations, so that you shall not forget any 
of them except what God pleases. He has knowledge of all that is 
manifest and all that is hidden. We shall guide you to the smoothest 
path. Therefore remind, for of use is the reminder. (87:6-9)3* 

The essence of the message was explained to Muhammad, the “unlet- 
tered” messenger, by the Hakim (the All-Wise): 

He it is who hath sent among the unlettered ones a messenger of their 
own, to recite unto them His revelations and to make them grow, and 
to teach them the Book and Wisdom, though heretofore they were 
indeed in error manifest. (62:2)33 

Like the prophets who preceded him, Muhammad received the Qur‘an to 
teach the Children of Adam about the powers of God, the ‘Alim, and remind 
them of the blessings He bestowed on them. For He created their living sys- 
tem marvelously, as an integral part of His complex terrestrial and celestial 
universe according to rigorous and immutable patterns and laws ( S ~ n a n ) : ~ ~  

It is the laws of Allah which hath taken course aforetime. Thou wilt 
not find for the laws of Allah aught of power to change. (48:23) 

The powers of the Creator and His creation are not random or haphazard; 
they manifest themselves in recurring patterns and persistent regularities, 
which are controlled by immutable laws whose validity derives from the 
eternal presence of God. Hence, the Hakim challenges the latent powers of 
human reason by repeatedly posing rhetorical questions to mankind, such 

Have you not seen how God has made serviceable to you what is in 
the heavens and the earth, and He has lavished on you His blessings, 
visible and invisible, yet among the people there are those who argue 
about God without ‘ilm, or guidance, or an illuminating Book. (31:20) 

as: 



64 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 16:2 

The preceding verses, which reiterate the critical importance of ‘ilm 
(knowledge or science) to imun, recur in different forms and contexts 
throughout the Qur’an. In fact, the word ‘ilm and its conjugates are among 
the words most recurring in Quranic revelation; about as often as imun and 
its  conjugate^.^^ Thus, Allah constantly reminds readers of the Qur‘an that 
He is the ‘Alim, possessor of all knowledge: 

Unto Allah belong the East and the West, and whithersoever ye turn, 
there is Allah’s countenance. Lo! Allah is All-Embracing, All- 
Knowing. (2: 1 15) 

Therefore, it is not surprising that al-‘Alim is one of the glorious names 
of God in the Qur’an. The word jahl (ignorance), the opposite of ‘ilm, and 
its conjugates also pervade the Qur’an. In fact, jahl is one of the attributes 
of Iblis and the disbelievers in the Qur’anic revelation?6 Moreover, the 
Qur‘an cites seeking ‘ilm as the avenue to Truth (Haqq). This word too per- 
vades the Qur’an and al-Haqq (the Truth) is another glorious name of 

Being the All-Knowing, Allah enunciates a critical (metaphysical/episte- 
mological) distinction between two worlds of His creation and knowledge: 
‘alum al-shahaahh (the Sensible or Visible World) and ‘alum al-ghayb (the 
Nonsensible or Hidden World):38 

~0d.37 

Say: 0 Allah! Creator of the heavens and the earth! Knower of the 
Hidden and the Sensible (ul-ghayb wa al-shahadah)! It is Thou that 
shalt judge between Thy servants in those [matters about which] they 
have differed. (39:46) 

And of His infinite knowledge, only that of the sensible, “phenomenal” 
world is directly accessible to His human creation, as He makes it unequiv- 
ocally clear to His messenger:39 

Say (0 Muhammad): None in the heavens or on earth, save Allah, 
knows the Hidden (ul-ghayb): Nor shall they [ever] perceive when 
they will be raised up [for Judgement]. (27:65) 

Thus, “Allah Alone holds the keys of the Hidden” (659). And because 
the Hidden, the “Nownenal” world, is not directly knowable to mankind, 
Allah, the Haqq, sent His messengers: 

He [alone] knows the Hidden (ul-ghayb), and He revealeth His mys- 
teries (ghayhhu) unto none, save unto such a messenger as His pleas- 
ure was to elect; then He dispatches before him and behind him 



El-Sheikh: Sirat al-Mustaqim and Hikma 65 

guardians so that He may know they have indeed delivered the mes- 
sages of their Lord, and He encompasses [and controls] all [the 
knowledge] in their holdings, and takes stock of everything in num- 
bers. (7226-28) 

Therefore, in His last message (al-Qur’an), Allah, the All-Merciful and 
All-Just, endows Bani Adam with the necessary guidance, the keys, and the 
“light” to dwell in this world and seek His truth for the journey toward 
heaven. 

Thus, the Qur’an presents the enlightenment (nur) of knowledge (‘ilm) as 
being the guide for Bani Adam in their search for truth (hqq).40 The Qur’an 
also speaks of the enlightenment of knowledge as the means to meet the 
responsibilities of having khilafa on earth.“l Therefore, God, the All- 
Knowing sent his revelations through Muhammad to direct mankind on the 
road to knowledge and truth, and to encourage people to seek His knowl- 
edge earnestly for the knowledge of the ‘ A h  is boundless:42 

And if all the trees in the earth were pens, and the sea [were ink] - 
with an additional seven seas to replenish it, the words of Allah could 
not be exhausted, for surely Allah is All-Mighty, All-Wise. (31:27) 

In contrast, the human mind is limited and, therefore, human knowledge 
is inhemntly “little,” as the All-Knowing says: “And of knowledge you 
have been given but little” (17:85). Hence, the search for knowledge is lim- 
itless, and God exhorts mankind to persist in seeking more of it, promising 
His rewards in this life and in the life after; and to His rhetorical question 
“are those who possess knowledge equal with those who do not?” (39:9), 
the answer is ind~bitable:~~ 

Allah will exalt those who believe among you, and those who have 
knowledge, to high ranks. He is cognizant of what you do. (58:ll) 

The exhortation to seek knowledge was also advanced and voiced by the 
Prophet Muhammad in several of his W i f h  (traditional narratives):44 

An hour of contemplation and study of God‘s creation is better than a 
year of adoration; 

He who spreads knowledge distributes alms; 

He who travels seeking knowledge is on the path of Allah until he 
returns; 

Seek knowledge, even unto China; 



66 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 16:2 

The ink of the scholar is more holy than the blood of the martyr; 

Of the greatest jihad (iihad ul-ukbar) is the effort of the student to 
become learned and the effort of the learned to spread knowledge. 

Thus, if ‘ilm is the avenue to nur (enlightenment) and huqq (God‘s truth), 
it follows that seeking knowledge is virtually synonymous with seeking 
imun (belief in God‘s truth). In the following section, I will demonstrate a 
Qur’anic view of the critical role of reason in this pursuit. 

Qur’anic Approach to /man 
The Qur’an is unique in its approach toward iman. Unlike earlier mes- 

sengers, the Prophet of Islam did not rely on outperforming magicians and 
sorcerers, nor resort to the performance of extraordinary acts or miracles. 
Indeed, the Qur’an is emphatic in asserting the “humanness” of the Seal of 
the Prophets, stating that he is nothing but a man. The Creator Himself 
commands Muhammad to declare this fact to the human family:45 

Say [0 Muhammad]: I am but a human like yourselves; (but) it is 
revealed to me that your God is One God: So whoever hopes for [a 
rewarding] encounter with his Lord, let him undertake righteous work, 
and, in the worship of his Lord, admit none beside Him. (18:llO) 

Again, like other humans, the Messenger of Allah is not possessed of any 
superhuman qualities and, in particular, he is not endowed with any idio- 
syncratic, direct access to noumenal realities (ghayb), for these are known 
only to the All-Knowing; and he was commanded to declare that fact to 
all:% 

Say [O Muhammad]: I say not unto you [that] I possess the treasures 
of God, nor do I possess knowledge of the Hidden (ul-ghayb). And I 
say not unto you: Lo! I am an angel; I only follow what is revealed to 
me. Say [0 Muhammad]: Can the blind be held equal to the seeing? 
Will ye not then reflect? (650) 

Rather than being in command of any material possessions or superhu- 
man nature, it was - on the contrary - his moral qualities as a human that 
distinguished him. In fact, his exceptional moral qualities were mentioned 
in the prophecy of Jesus, wherein he was accordingly named Ahmad, “the 
one most worthy of praise or ~ommendation.”~~ The Qur‘an points out: 



El-Sheikh. Sirat al-Mustaqim and Hikma 67 

And when Jesus son of Mary said: Children of Israel: Lo! I am the 
messenger of Allah unto you ... and [am] bringing good tidings of a 
messenger who shall come after me, whose name shall be Ahmad. 
(615) 

Hence, Muhammad was elected the Seal of the Prophets and entrusted 
with the Qur’an, Allah’s last message. And as a human, he depended on that 
most precious (and distinctively human) of God’s gifts, his intellect, and 
relied on reason and rhetoric to propagate his message, with the Qur’an 
being his one standing miracle, both in its literary achievement and sub- 
stance.48 Therefore, to understand the Qur’anic approach, it is necessary to 
begin with the beginning of the tevelation, namely, the first five verses of 
Surut ul-‘Aluq (Chapter of the Coagulated Blood) addressed to Muhammad, 
the “unlettered” prophet:49 

Read in the name of thy Lord who created. 
Who created mankind of blood coagulated. 
Read! Thy Lord is the most beneficent. 
Who taught (His knowledge) by the pen. 
Taught that which they knew not unto men. (96:l-5) 

Being the first verses of the Qur’an to be revealed, they are critical to 
understanding the essence of the Qur’anic message. In fact, the rest of the 
Qur’an can be viewed as being an elaboration of these verses, insofar as the 
Book goes into great lengths to remind and exhort mankind to seek God‘s 
knowledge, to expound the marvels of His creation (especially as it pertains 
to the place of human livelihood in His universal system), and to narrate the 
human experience over the ages (especially the calamities which befell 
Bani Adam when they failed to adhere to the sirut al-mustuqim). The 
Qur‘an describes the “topography” bf sirat ul-mustuqim to guide the 
Children of Adam in their journey through the dunyu toward heaven, their 
heavenly home in the hereafter. 

The preceding verses, further affii the thesis advanced in the previous 
section about the extent to which the Qur‘an exhorts mankind to seek 
knowledge. Moreover, like these verses, and indeed like much of the 
Qur’an, the following rhetorical question from Allah suggests the connec- 
tion between i m n ,  knowledge, and reason: 

Is he who payeth adoration in the watches of the night, prostrate or 
standing, taking heed of the Hereafter and hoping for the mercy of his 
Lord [to be accounted equal with a disbeliever]? Say [unto them, 0 



68 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 162 

Muhammad]: Are those who are possessed of knowledge equal with 
those who know not? Only those possessed of intellects (uli-l-ulbab) 
will remember. (39:9) 

It is appropriate at this point to define “reason” and the sense in which 
this term is used here, a term which is often confused with “rational.”5o 
According to the Encychpediu Brifannicu. “reason” is generally defined 
(in philosophy) as being “the faculty or process of drawing logical infer- 
e n c e ~ , ” ~ ~  a definition that is akin to the term ‘uql in classical Islamic 
thought? In formal logic, “drawing inferences” (ratiocination, from ruti- 
ocinari in Latin) is “to use the reasoning faculty” and “is classified from 
Aristotle on as deductive (from generals to particulars) and inductive (from 
particulars to generals).” 

Inspired by verses of the Qur’an and its general spirit, classical Islamic 
scholars developed their own doctrine of logic (mantiq), a process that cul- 
minated in the work of Al-Farabi (c. 875-950), “the Imam of 
From the start, the development of mantiq was driven by its purpose 
(gharud) and its utility (manjia‘u). And treatises on manfiq made it clear that 
it was developed 

for the purpose (ghurud) of the discernment of truth and falsehood 
(tumyiz ul sidq wu ul-kidhb) in speech, of true and false (a1 huqq wu 
ul-btil) in beliefs (/? ul-itiqadat), of good and bad in actions (ul-khayr 
wu ul-shurrfi ul-‘aml). Its utility (mn$du) is thus to give access to the 
theoretical sciences (uZ-‘ulurn ul-nazuriyyu) and to the practical sci- 
ences (ul-‘umaliyyu).” 

Like its title, mantiq, the Islamic organon (wusilu) of reasoning (both 
theoretical and practical), borrowed its fundamental technical terms from 
Qur’anic usage, notably the terms burhan (apodictic proof), hujjuh (author- 
itative argument), andjudul (dialectical argument). And these logical terms 
were often the instruments of choice (wusilu) for the Prophet in his dia- 
logues with the Makkan pagans and the Madinans, as he embarked on 
delivering the tuwhidi message, according to Qur’anic reports.55 

Thus, from the beginning of his message, Allah advised Muhammad in 
the Qur’an to rely on the method of reason and wisdom (hikma) in his call 
to 1siam:56 

Call onto the path of thy Lord with h i h  and fair exhortation and 
engage them in argument (judilhwn) with what is better. Lo! Thy Lord 



El-Sheikh: Sirat al-Mustaqim and H i h  69 

best knows him who strayeth from his path, and He is the best to know 
of those who are [rightly] guided. (16:25) 

Furthermore, the Qur’an explains that from the very beginning of His cre- 
ation, the Hukim repeatedly sent the messengers to give the Children of 
Adam the Book and the Wisdom (ul-Kitub wu ul-Hikma) to enlighten and 
guide them to the “straight path.” Thus the Qur’an reports how the House 
of Abraham was particularly favored when the Hukim says: 

We bestowed on the people of Abraham the Kifub and the Hikmu, and 
we conferred upon them a great kingdom. (454) 

In particular, the Qur’an explains how Allah reminded Jesus of the mar- 
velous blessings He bestowed on him: 

When I confirmed thee with the Holy Spirit, to speak to men in the 
cradle, and of age; and when I taught thee the Kifub and the Hikmu, 
the Torah, and the Gospel. (5: 1 

God then tells us that He listened to the prayers of Abraham and his son 
Ishmael (for the offspring of Ishmael): 

Our Lord! And raise up in their midst a messenger from among them 
who shall recite unto them Thy revelations, and shall instruct them in 
the Kifub and the H i h ,  and shall make them grow. Thou, only Thou, 
art the All-Mighty, the All-Wise. (2129) 

We are also told that Allah answered their prayers and sent the “Seal of 
the Prophets,” Muhammad: 

He it is who hath sent among the unlettered ones a messenger of their 
own, to recite unto them His revelations and to make them grow, and 
to teach them ul-Kitub wu ul-Hikmu, though heretofore they were 
indeed in error manifest. (62:2) 

Consequently, teaching the believers the Kifub and the Hikma was the 
mainstay of Muhammad and his followers in overcoming the ignorance, 
prejudice, and aggression of the pagans: 

But for the grace of Allah upon thee, and His mercy, a party uf them 
had resolved to mislead thee, but they will mislead only themselves 
and they will hurt thee not at all. Allah revealeth unto thee the Kitub 
and the Hikmu, and teacheth thee that which thou knewest not. The 
grace of Allah toward thee hath been infinite. (41 13) 



70 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 162 

The association of the words Kitab (the Qur’an) and Hikma in the pre- 
ceding verses (and the Qur’an in general) is noteworthy; the Kitab provides 
mankind with God’s ‘ilm (as explained in the preceding section) and hikma. 
The latter concept is complex: hikma is the wise sayings and dictums which 
make up folk wisdom; hikma is also the body of knowledge and proposi- 
tions characterized by extreme rigor and logical tightness; and hikma is phi- 
losophy (falsufa in Arabic): the body of knowledge which deals rigorously 
with the ultimate reality and the nature of things and beings. Finally, hikma 
is the body of knowledge which enables people to comprehend universal 
principles and laws to improve their lives and discharge their God-mandat- 
ed responsibility as His khalifa on earth.58 

Hence, the Huksm did not merely send the prophets and messengers to 
teach hikma to mankind; He also bestowed hikma on people: 

He gives the Hikma to whomsoever He will, and who so is given the 
Hikma, has been given great richness indeed; yet none remembers 
except those possessed of intellects. (2269) 

The intellect, according to the Qur’an, is, after all, the unique gift that dis- 
tinguishes mankind from other creatures; for from the viewpoint of the 
Creator, the intellect aside, 

No creature is there crawling on the earth, no bird flying with its 
wings, but they are nations (ummm) like unto yourselves. We have 
neglected nothing in the Book; then to their Lord they shall be gath- 
ered. (6:38) 

Therefore, it is no wonder that Allah keeps on exhorting Bani Adam to 
put into good use their intellectual powers: the gifts of understanding, 
thinking, reasoning, and reflecting, among others. In particular, they are 
urged to employ their mental gifts to discover the existence of the one God 
and to enjoy the blessings of the knowledge and riches He bestowed on 
them. The Qur’an is replete with these exhortations but reaches a literary 
peak in Surut al-Rahmun (Chapter of the All-Mer~iful).~~ 

In order to understand the Zeitgeist (Spirit) of Islam (ruh al-Zslam) and 
fully appreciate the role of reason in the Qur’anic approach, it is essential to 
recall the central Muslim belief that what Muhammad, the “unlettered” 
prophet, depended on in his call to Islam was the miracle (‘ijaz) of the 
Glorious Qur’an: the literary style and the content of the Book. A case in 
point is Surat ul-Ruhmun mentioned above. In this suruh, the Supreme 
Author gives a breathtaking array of verses which describe the marvelous 



El-Sheikh: Sirat al-Mustaqim and Hikma 71 

order of His universal system and the thought-provoking laws and balances 
built into it to benefit &ni Adam and enhance their lives. The verses are 
magnificently punctuated by the rhetorical refrain: “0 which of your Lord‘s 
bounties will you deny?” 

Hence, Allah challenges the pagans and disbelievers to match the Book‘s 
miraculous literary achievement and phenomenal substance:6o 

Say: If mankind and jinn should band together to produce the l i e  of 
this Qur’an, they could never produce its like, even though they should 
back one another. (17238) 

Therefore, it is not surprising that the Divine Author challenges the liter- 
ary mind by the uyut (verses) of the Qur’an and challenges the human intel- 
lect and his sense of wonder by the uyut of His creation (i.e., the phenom- 
enal expressions of His creation are signs, tokens, or marks of His exis- 
tence).6l 

In the Qur’an, “verses” are called uyut not only because they are exqui- 
site illustrations of literary expression, but also because, as such, they are 
phenomenal “signs” of the Creator. In particular, the uyur (verses/signs) are 
revealed to instruct mankind about the marvels of His creation and the infi- 
nite knowledge of the terrestrial and celestial phenomena of His universal 
system as it envelops and supports human life and livelihood. As indicated 
earlier, expressions of these phenomenal “signs” pervade the Qur’an to 
expound and reaffii God’s universal system and its immutable laws as a 
reminder to “those who are possessed of intellects” (li uli al-ulbub), and are 
capable of invoking reason.62 Moreover, the Qur’an repeatedly explains that 
God‘s message to mankind, which was conveyed by the messengers and 
prophets since creation, and of which the miraculous Qur’an is the last, is 
in itself a “clear evidence” or “visible proof” (bayyinat) of the existence of 
Allah and His gl0ry.6~ 

The terms uyut (signs) and buyyinat (clear evidence or visible proofs), 
which pervade the Qur’an, are crucial elements in understanding the 
Qur‘anic approach, given the fmitude of the human mind and mankind’s 
earthly origin. The uyut and buyyinat constitute the starting point to the 
sense-perception of the sensory gifts invested by the Creator in the human 
mind 

It is He who gave you being, and appointed for you hearing and sights 
and hearts. (67:23) 



12 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 16:2 

Therefore in the Qur’an, Allah repeatedly encourages, urges, or exhorts 
Bani Adam to spare no effort in applying their sensory faculties to take note 
of the facts: to “hear and carefully listen,” to “look and insightfully see” the 
uyut and buyyinat of God’s creation around them.@ 

Upon striving to take note of the “facts,” Bani Adam are enjoined to sub- 
ject their observations to the creative gifts and complex processes of the 
human intellect (‘uql) in order to understand and appreciate the mysteries 
of the universe:65 

Know that Allah restores the earth to life after its death. We have 
indeed made clear for you the uyut, that haply ye may understand. 
(57:17) 

The extent to which the Qur‘an invokes reason (in this regard) can be 
seen from its consistent and frequent use of verb roots referring to the use 
of the intellect (and their clusters), such as the following: f uham (under- 
stand, realize), fuquha (understand, comprehend), fukkaru (think, reflect), 
tadabburu (ponder, deliberate), and ‘uqulu (search for causes, find reasons 
and connect ideas in order to comprehend). A case in point, the intellectu- 
ally complex verb ‘uqulu is repeated in the Qur’an about fifty times, and the 
rhetorical refrain “ufu la tu‘qilun” (Can’t you reason?) is repeated at least 
thirteen times in various contexts of reasoning.& 

Hence, the pagans and disbelievers are described in the Qur’an as being 
di‘uful-‘uqul (possessed of weak intellects or minds), la yu‘qilun (incapable 
of sound reasoning), or even la ‘uqlu luhum (possessed of no intellect at all) 
because of their failure to sustain the intellectual debates regarding the uyut 
and b ~ y y i n a t . ~ ~  Such individuals are castigated in the Qur’an as being mind- 
less, like cattle (‘un‘um) in their reasoning, and, like beasts, they screech 
(yan‘uq) and can understand nothing “except a shout or a cry.’*8 

Therefore, to extricate themselves from this beastly state of affairs, Bani 
Adam are enjoined to make use of the heavenly gift that exalts them above 
other creatures, employs their sensory faculties to observe and analyze the 
uyut and buyyinut, and subjects their thoughts to the microscopes of their 
intellectual faculties in the pursuit of truth (haqq). The Qur’an describes 
those who fail to do so, and thereby waste their heavenly gift 

Surely the worst of beasts in God’s sight, are those that are deaf and 
dumb and are not possessed of reason. (8:22) 

In so doing, human beings are enjoined to liberate their minds from the 
enslavement of outdated or false ideas by open-mindedness and the con- 



El-Sheikh: Sirat al-Mustaqim and Hikma 73 

stant recourse to reason. They are advised to avoid complacency and intel- 
lectual lethargy, to be unlike the pagans about whom He says: 

And when it is said to them: Come unto what God and the Messenger 
have revealed, they say: Enough for us is what wherein we found our 
fathers. What if their fathers are possessed of no knowledge and no 
guidance (5104) 

and 

what if their fathers are possessed of no reason and no guidance. 
(2:170) 

Moreover, by rejecting reason and knowledge, the pagans are indeed 
short-sighted; they defeat their own interests because they lack hikma, the 
wisdom that derives from knowledge of the human experience over the 
ages: 

The likeness of those who have taken to them patrons other than God 
is as the likeness of the spider that takes to itself a house; and surely 
the frailest of houses is the house of the spider; Have they any knowl- 
edge? God knows whatever thing they invoke instead of Him. He is 
the All-Mighty, the All-Wise. And these similitudes, we expound for 
mankind, but none will grasp their meaning save the wise. (294143) 

Therefore, Allah invokes the marvels of His creation to exemplify the 
g a t  and bqyinut of His existence, and presents the immutable laws 
(Sunun) and intricate balances of the universal system to signify His eter- 
nal and pervasive presence; and being compassionate and merciful, Allah 
also reveals His Qur’an to enlighten Bani Adam and to guide them in their 
journey through life by way of the sirat al-mmtuqim. To achieve this goal, 
they are enjoined to employ their sensory faculties in order to identify and 
record the “signs” and “evidences,” then apply their intellectual powers in 
order to understand and comprehend the immutable laws and everlasting 
truth of God. This is the message that Allah, the Just, revealed to 
Muhammad to convey to mankind 

Lo! We have sent down upon thee the Book for mankind with the 
truth. Whosoever is guided, is only guided to his own gain, and 
whosoever goes astray, it is only to his own loss; thou art not a 
guardian over them. (39:41)69 

Consequently, since it is up to individual members of the human family 
to choose either the path of ‘ilm, ‘uql, hikma (sirat al-mustaqim), or to deny 



74 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 16:2 

themselves the fruits of their intellectual gifts to become, like beastly crea- 
tures, mere slaves of their base instincts (sirat Zblis), they are in fact faced 
with a complex set of life choices: an interrelated web of material, social, 
and ethical options that make up the continuum of choices leading to either 
of these antithetical paths. Evidently, the Qur’anic viewpoint is that sirat al- 
rnustuqim is, in effect, the optimal trajectory of one’s life, such that these 
complex choices are resolved with the utmost of care, rigor, knowledge, 
reason, and wisdom. 

The principles, rules, and criteria of these optimal choices are detailed in 
countless Qur’anic verses which led an Orientalist, Torrey (1892), to con- 
clude his meticulous study of this aspect of the Qur’an by stating: “A more 
simply mathematical ‘body of divinity’ than this is difficult to imagine.” 
Torrey was not far from the truth when he typified the Qur’anic calculus of 
the subset of socioeconomic choices and actions that hinge on their rela- 
tionship with God in the following economic language: 

The mutual relations between God and man are of a strictly commer- 
cial nature. Allah is the ideal merchant. He includes all the universe in 
his reckoning. All is counted, everything measured. The book and the 
balances are his institution, and he has made himself the pattern of 
honest dealing. Life is a business, for gain or loss. He who does a good 
or an evil work (earns good or evil), receives his pay for it, even in this 
life. Some debts are forgiven, for Allah is not a hard creditor. The 
Muslim makes a loan to Allah; pays in advance for paradise; sells his 
own soul to Him, a bargain that prospers. The unbeliever has sold the 
divine truth for a paltry price, and is bankrupt. Every soul is held as 
security for the debt it has contracted. At the resurrection, Allah holds 
a final reckoning with all men. Their actions are read from the 
account-book, weighted in the balances; each is paid his exact due, no 
one is defrauded. Believer and unbeliever receive their wages. The 
Muslim (who has been given manifold payment for each of his good 
deeds) receives moreover his special reward?O 

Su mrnary 
The aim of this study has been to examine the prescribed role of ‘ilm 

(knowledge) and ‘aql (reason) in Islamic socioeconomic life and economic 
discourse on the basis of Qur’anic revelation. It is clear from the Qur’anic 
textual evidence advanced above that ‘dm, ‘aql, and the complex notion of 
hikmu (wisdom, philosophy) are crucial to Muslims in identifying and pur- 



El-Sheikh: Sirat al-Mustaqim and Hikma 75 

suing the sirut ul-mustuqim (straight path) for their life journey, the optimal 
trajectory of their economic, social, and ethical choices. 

It is notable that in this textual evidence, the words ‘ilm and ‘uql (or their 
conjugates) are often wedded together in the same verse, as it is the case 
with the words kitub and hih. Upon contemplation of these verses (and 
indeed the Qur‘an at large), it is not difficult to recognize that the Qur’an 
establishes between ‘ilm and ‘uql, as it does between the kitub and the 
h i h ,  a symbiotic relationship such that, to mankind, there is no ‘ilm with- 
out ‘uql and there is no justification or use for the ‘aql without ‘ilm. We 
either accept them together or reject them together. 

I have argued that the sirut ul-mustuqim is presented in the Qur‘an as 
being the choice (ikhtiyur) to be appreciated by those who are possessed of 
‘ilm, ‘uql, and h i h .  A case in point that must be remembered (in the cur- 
rent debate) concerns the celebrated Shari‘ah discourses, especially those 
addressing economic issues. These discourses were intended by the 
Muslim jurists and theologians of the second Islamic century primarily as 
“discussions” of the Qur’anic rules to guide Muslim life, and, as such, they 
represent the learned views of their time. As social scientists, economists 
must recognize that these discourses are considered, ‘‘from the point of 
view of logical perfection ... [they are] the most brilliant essays of human 
rea~oning.”~~ 

The evidence provided above also indicates that the calculus of this 
Qur‘anic optimum requires the postulate of rationality as a necessary con- 
dition. The sirut ul-mustuqim as an optimum, however, goes beyond eco- 
nomic optimality alone as it entails the acceptance of certain social choic- 
es and ethical norms, which hinge on the fundamental choice between good 
(God) and evil (Iblis), choices which are to be made, nonetheless, primari- 
ly on the basis of ‘ilm, ‘uql, and hikma. The fundamental choice for people 
is whether to follow iman or to take the sirut Zblis. 

The message of Muhammad has been to exhort mankind to seek ‘ilm as 
the path to imun, the belief in God; a pursuit that requires their “free will” 
(ikhtiyur) in the exercise of jihad ukbar by the intellect in order to recog- 
nize and pursue the sirut ul-mustuqim toward their lost paradise.“ Hence, I 
have argued that the Qur‘anic approach to imun is essentially rational. 
Muslims are enjoined to seek the truth of God by examining the uyut and 
bayyinut of His eternal presence which underlie the immutable laws 
(Sunun) regulating the complex natural, social, and economic phenomena 
of the Universe that He created. It is noteworthy that it was this rational 



76 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 16:2 

approach that guided Muslim scholarship to the eminence of Islamic civi- 
lization as it encouraged scholars to draw on earlier knowledge and wisdom 
of the Near East (including Greece) and beyond. Moreover, guided by this 
approach, Islamic scholars, both Muslims and non-Muslims, were able not 
only to absorb the earlier contributions to knowledge and to enrich this 
knowledge with their own, but also to propagate their knowledge and 
method of inquiry throughout the vast lands of Islam, which spanned the 
world including much of Europe, and in the process provide the initial 
impetus for the Renaissance and modem ~ivilization.~~ 

In fact, the Qur’anic approach described above comprises the scientific 
method employed today in the empirical sciences, both natural and social, 
notably economics, for it enjoins the combined application of a deductive 
“logic of consistency” and an inductive “logic of exploration” in under- 
standing natural and socioeconomic phen0mena.7~ Thus, if God invokes the 
marvels of His creation as being ayut and bayyinat of His existence and 
posits the immutable laws, balances, and patterns (Sunan) of the Universe 
to signify His eternal presence, Muslim scholars are enjoined to employ 
their sensory faculties to identify and record the “signs” and “evidences,” 
then apply their ‘aql and hikma to discover, understand, and comprehend 
His immutable laws and everlasting truth. If their hypotheses fail to explain 
the ayat and bayyinat, they are enjoined to exert their ‘aql and philosophi- 
cal imagination ( h i h )  to revise their hypotheses and theories, then con- 
front these again by the “signs” and “evidences” and strive for rendering 
burhan (apodictic proof). Therefore, it is virtually a religious duty - in 
pursuing their own sirut al-mustaqim - that Muslim scholars keep on 
seeking ‘ilm and reexamining their ideas according to this approach in their 
jihad ukbar for haqq until they return to their Creator, the All-Wise (al- 
Huhm), All-Knowing (al-‘Afim), and the Truth (ul-Huqq). To achieve the 
interest of the Ummah, it is virtually a religious duty that Muslim scholars 
employ this approach in dealing with socioeconomic issues and economic 
institutions. 

In the same spirit, when dealing with fundamental questions such as riba 
it is a Muslim scientist’s duty to apply hisher intellectual faculties (‘aql) 
and deploy hisher philosophical imagination ( h i h )  to understand such 
phenomena and theorize about it. In the case of economic issues, this 
requires, as a necessary first step, the mastery of contemporary economic 
theory in its rightful context as it evolved in the womb of Westem 
(Christian) cultural and historical realities. Only then, after deciphering the 



El-Sheikh. Sirat al-Mustaqim and Hikma 77 

corresponding Islamic literature, both new and old, can technical terms 
such as r i b  (usury) vis-a-visfa’iuizh (interest) be fathomed and made suf- 
ficiently intelligible to answer - without haste - fundamental questions 
such as, Is there an essential difference between r i b  and fa’iuizh, and what 
is the difference, if there is any?75 Such questions have not been adequate- 
ly addressed, let alone answered, by Islamic economists. Timur Kuran is 
essentially correct when he concludes that, as it stands, 

[Islamic economics] fails to provide a well-defined and operational 
method of analysis. Islamic economics is mostly prescriptive, and 
where efforts are made to give it analytical power, it loses much of its 
Islamic 

And yet, this “analytical power” - the hoped for outcome of under- 
standing, philosophizing, then Islamically theorizing - is, after all, the 
essence of the Islamization of knowledge, and the ruison d‘etre of this jour- 

Appendix 
In undertaking a study on Islamic socioeconomic life and discourse, the 

sources and their nahm pose a number of difficult problems. Some of these 
problems have already been pointed out by Pryor?* At a more fundamen- 
tal level, a scholarly study (in English) on the Qur’an is inherently prob- 
lematic insofar as we have to rely on translations of the Holy Islamic 
ScriptlUEs. 

As Arberry points out: 

Since the Koran is to the faithful Muslim the very word of God, from 
earliest times orthodox opinion has rigidly maintained that it is 
untranslatable, a miracle of speech which it would be blasphemous to 
attempt to i r n i ~ e . 7 ~  

Blasphemous or not, from a scholarly standpoint, this “orthodox opinion” 
is well-justified. For, in principle, it is virtually impossible to produce a 
sound “literal” translation of the original Qur’anic text, as various transla- 
tors claim. Any translation, however “literal,” conceals, consciously or 
unconsciously, a specific interpretation of the Arabic text. Therefore, it 
would be both dangerous and misleading in studies of this nature to treat 
any translation as being “literal.” 



78 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 16:2 

Moreover, any translation of the Arabic text deprives researchers of the 
richness of opinion found in various Qur’anic exegeses, much of which is 
conditioned by the history and development of the Arabic script, punctua- 
tion, orthography, philology, lexicography, grammar, and literature. In fact, 
from the outset, the development of the Shari‘ah and Islamic jurisprudence 
has been organically intertwined with the chronological development of 
Arabic. The object of the whole enterprise has been to construct a system 
of rules to regulate Islamic life which is based first on understanding the 
words of the Qur’an, second on the pronouncements of the Prophet, being 
the messenger and the first interpreter of the Divine text, and third on 
human reason and wisdom by means of qiyus (analogical deduction) and 
ijm‘ (the community of learned opinion).8O 

In view of the preceding problems, I relied in this study on the Arabic text 
of the Qur’an, wrote the paper first in Arabic,*’ then translated it into 
English. The translations of Qur’anic verses in this paper represent my own 
understanding of the original text, but mostly coincide with one or the other 
of the generally accepted Qur’anic translations. As such, they should be 
viewed as interpretations of the original text. 

Notes 
1. For the various positions of Islamic economists, see the literature review of Islamic 

economics by F d r i c  L. Pryor, “The Islamic Economic System,” Journal of Comparative 
Economics 9 (1985): 197-223; the survey by F. Eid, “Studies of Islam, Economics, and 
Governance: A Survey of Some New Developments,” The American Journal of Islamic 
Social Sciences 11 (1994): 38-70; and the critiques by T. Kuran, “Islamic Economics and 
the Islamic Subeconomy,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 9 (1995): 155-173, and “On 
the Notion of Economic Justice in Contemporary Islamic Thought,” International Journal 
of Middle East Studies 21 (1989): 171-191. 

2. See A.I. Tayob, “The Paradigm of Knowledge of the Modem Islamic Resurgence,” 
The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 12 (1995): 155-169. Tayob employed 
the concept of “paradigm” used by T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd 
enlarged edition (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1970) and the analysis of knowl- 
edge and power by M. Foucault, PowerlKnowledge: Selected Interviews and Other 
Writings 1972-1977. translated and edited by Colin Gordon (New York Pantheon Books, 
1980), to study the phenomenon of Islamic resurgence. 

3. See, for example, A. Laroui, The Crisis of the Arab Intellectual: Traditionalism or 
Historicism? (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976); B. Tibi, The Crisis of 
Modern Islam: A Preindustrial Culture in the Scientijic-Technological Age (Salt Lake 
City: University of Utah Press, 1988); B. Tibi, Islam and the Cultural Accommodation of 
Social Change (Oxford: Westview Press, 1991); Ozay Mehmet, Islamic Identity and 
Development: Studies of the Islamic Periphery (London: Routledge, 1990), and various 
articles in N.S. Hopkins and S.E. Ibrahim (eds.), Arab Society: Social Science 
Perspectives (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1985); and in E.L. Sullivan and 
J.S. Ismael, The Contemporary Srudy of the Arab World (Edmonton, Canada: University 
of Alberta Press, 1991). In Arabic, see, for example, G. Amin, The Economy, Politics and 
Society in the Era of [Economic] Openness (Cairo: Maktabat Madbouli, 1984); H. el- 
Biblawi, A Trying Test of the Economy and Economists (Cairo: Dar Al-Sharq, 1989); M. 



El-Sheikh: Sirat al-Mustaqim and Hikmu 79 

el-Imam, A Nasserist Perspective of the Economic Question (Cairo: Dar Al-Mustaqbal 
Al-Arabi, 1989?); and M. Wahba (ed.), Religion and the Economy (Cairo: Sinai for 
Publishing, 1990). 

4. Ummah is a technical term which refers to the Islamic community as defined by 
the Sunnah, the traditions of the Prophet. In particular, it is defined in the Sahifoh, the 
Constitution of Madinah, to include the Muslims, Christians, Jews, and pagans who 
a w e d  to its provisions with the Prophet, probably in the two bay’ahs (pledges) of 

“Aqabah. Amended after the Immigration, the Sahifah was preserved by Ibn Ishaq, a biog- 
rapher of the Prophet, and consists of 47 provisions which regulate the rights and duties 
of the various constituencies. S e e  M.W. Watt, Muhammad at Medina (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1956), chapter 7. 

5. On the development of socioeconomic institutions and economic reason, see D.C. 
North, “Institutions,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 5 (1991): 97-1 12. 

6. The postulate consists essentially of three axioms: comparability (completeness), 
transitivity (consistency), and selection; see, for example, D.M. Hausman, The Inexact 
and Separate Science of Economics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
12-27; Peter Newman, The Theory of Exchange (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 
1965), 10-17; W. Nicholson, Microeconomic Theory: Basic Principles and Extensions, 
6th ed. (Chicago: Dryden Press, 1995), 76-77; E. Silberberg, The Structure of Economics: 
A Mathematical Analysis, 2nd ed. (New York McGraw-Hill, 1990). 299-308; and H.R. 
Varian, Microeconomic Analysis, 3rd ed. (New York W.W. Norton, 1992), 94-98. The 
evaluation of alternatives (for selection) is based, in economic theory, on Smith’s notion 
of self-interest (which is not the same as selfishness) according to some criterion that 
reflects the preferences and beliefs of the economic agent. Although the “utility” language 
used by contemporary economists originates from the “utilitarian moral doctrines” of 
Bentham and Mill, “Good economists ... do not or should not mean that utility is an object 
of choice. ... The theory of rational preference or choice specifies no distinctive aim that 
all people must embrace. Utility is just an [ordinal] index of preferences” for ranking 
available alternatives in a simple way, as D.M. Hausman, The Inexact and Separate 
Science of Economics, page 18, puts it. In fact, following P. Samuelson, “A Note on the 
Pure Theory of Consumer’s Behavior,” Economica 5 (1938): 61-71, contemporary econ- 
omists often rely on the theory of revealed preferences which replaces subjective notions 
of preference by an empirical one relying only on a consistency condition, the weak axiom 
of revealed preference (WARP). And as D.M. Hausman points out in The Inexact and 
Separate Science of Economics (p. 19), following Samuelson, they also “succeeded in 
showing that, if choices among commodity bundles satisfy a consistency condition, then 
a complete and transitive preference ranking can be constructed from the choices,” this 
being what economists call “utility function.” On the ideological aspects of the utility cri- 
terion in the context of “utilitarian ethics,” see G. Myrdal, The Political Element in the 
Development of Economic Theory (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1%9), chapter 2. 

7. Samuelson, 1987, 865. 
8. Simon, 1987,266. For a good review of institutionalist views and methodology, see 

C.K. Wilber and R.S. Harrison, “The Methodological Basis of Institutional Economics: 
Pattern Model, Storytelling, and Holism,” Journal of Economic Issues 12 (1978): 61-90. 

9. The quotes in the text are from Hausman, Inexact and Separate Science of 
Economics. The references in the text are from W.J. Samuels, “Institutional economics,” 
in J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, and P. Newman (eds.), The New Palgrave: A Dictionury of 
Economics (London: Macmillan, 1987), II: 864-866; H.A. Simon, Models of Man (New 
York Wiley, 1957); H.A. Simon, Models of Though (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1979). H.A. Simon, Reason in Humun Afairs (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983); H.A. Simon, 
“Bounded Rationality,” in The New Palgrave, vol. 1,266-268. It is noted that this notion 
of rationality and the associated concept of utility index (explained above) constitute the 
core of what economists call “utility theory,” which is also adopted by statisticians, 
philosophers, and various decision theorists. An anonymous referee of this paper 
expressed concern that the present author “incorrectly suggests that neoclassical eco- 



80 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 162 

nomics is spiritually neutral on goal maximization, for neoclassical economics subordi- 
nates this truth to utility” [my emphasis]. Beside the fact that the original manuscript did 
not refer to any particular school of economics (neoclassical or otherwise), the referee’s 
assertion reveals a confusion between the economist’s utility theory (which is explained 
in note [6] above) and utilitarianism, and in the latter a confusion between utilitarianism 
as a moral doctrine and utility as a theory of truth. On the latter point see the acclaimed 
historical survey and assessment in F. Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Volume Vlll: 
Bentham to Russell (New York Doubleday, 1966). 

10. Hausman, 1992, 13. 
11. A theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 416. In this 

acclaimed contribution to ethics, John Rawls employs the economist’s postulate of rational- 
ity, which he accurately states on pp. 142-143, to provide a compelling Kantian alternative 
to utilitarian and other theories. 

12. This type of philosophy was articulated by J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1%2) and his earlier work, and was elaborated by J.R. 
SearIe, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1%9). For a general treatment of the philosophy of language, see also 
W.P. Alston, Philosophy of Language (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964) 

13. An anonymous referee suggested that “intellection,” rather than reason, should be the 
principle. This point is addressed in subsequent sections. 

14. The word iman is often inaccurately translated to mean “faith.” The exact meaning 
of the word is belief or conviction to an extmne and, as such, may mean faith which is 
ikhlas. Thus, restating the principles sanctioned by the classical schools of kalam (specula- 
tive theology) and those of fiqh (jurisprudence), the great theologian Al-Ghazali defined 
iman as r‘tiqad (conviction) plus qawl (verbal expression) plus ‘ m l  (good works). See the 
enties for iman and ikhlas by L. Gardet, Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, vol. 3 
(1971), 1059-1060 and 1170-1 174 respectively. 

15. This study is part of a larger project on Islam and contemporary economic institu- 
tions. See also Salah El-Sheikh, Islam and Economic Philosophy, Economic Book series, 
(Cairo: Al-Ahram Press, 1992) in Arabic. 

16. In the past few years, many articles and exchanges appeared in this journal on the 
question of interest rate and other Islamic economic issues; the journal is published in Cairo. 
In English, see, for example, the exchange in the International Journal of Middle East 
Srudies 22 (1990) between T. Kuran (“On the Notion of Economic Justice in Contemporary 
Islamic Thought,” “A Reply to Muhammad Khan”) and M. Khan (“A Comment on the 
Notion of Economic Justice in Contemporary Islamic Thought”) 375-376 and 376377, on 
the question of economic justice. On the debate about Islamization in general (in the 
Egyptian context), see F.M. Najjar, “The Debate on Islam and Secularism in Egypt,” Arab 
Studies Quarterly 18 (1996): 1-21; and on the thrust of Islamization movements worldwide 
in general, see Tayob, “The Paradigm of Knowledge of the Modem Islamic Resurgence.” 

17. El-Biblawi. “On the Facts of Contemporary Economies and the Question of Riba,” 
Al-Ahram al-lqtisadi 1058 (1989). originally published in the same journal no. 964 (April 
1987): 22-24. Note that Allahu ‘alum is a traditional Islamic refrain to caution against hasty 
or absolute conclusions. 

18. Note that Mr. Sultan does not name the countries which are destroyed (by merely 
having an interest rate system), or explain how it causes destruction. See the appendix on 
translations, especially those of the Qur‘anic verses. S.E. Sultan, “Facts of the Contemporary 
Economy and the Question of Riba: A Comment,” Al-Ahram al-lqtisadi 970 (1987): 38-39, 
83 (in Arabic). 

19. Among these erroneous claims is that “Keynes sees that riba is the cause of the 
World [Great] Depression, and [sees] that any society aiming to fulfil its aspirations in 
development should reach in its economic dealings the degree at which the interest rate 
equals zero.” He also erroneously claims “that the interest rate covers part of the decline in 
value of paper money [due to inflation] ... is incorrect because there does not exist in the 
whole world a system which ties the interest rate to [inflation].” 



El-Sheikh Sirat al-Mustaqim and H i h  81 

20. On this point and on the development of Arabic in relation to Islamic jurisprudence 
and Arabic literature in general, see Bernard G.Weiss, “Language and Law: The Linguistic 
Premises of Islamic Legal Science,” in A.H. Green (ed.), In Quest of an Islamic Humanism 
(Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1984): 15-21; B.G. Weiss. The Search for 
God’s Law: Islamic Jurisprudence in the Writings of Sayfal-Din a l - M i  (Salt Lake City: 
University of Utah Press, 1992); Gibb, “Reflections on Arabic Literature,” in H.A.R. Gibb, 
Studies on the Civilization of Islam (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1%2), 
219-241; H.A.R. Gibb, Arabic Literature, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 
1%3);. N.J. Coulson, A History of Islamic Law (Edinburgh: University Press, 1978); and 
Reynold A. Nicholson, A Literary History of the Arabs (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1%). 

21. The emphasis on the Arabic form of the Qur’an was repeated at least eleven times in 
several contexts: (12:2), (13:37), (16103), (20113), (26:195), (3928), (41:3,44), (427), 
(43:3), (46:12). 
22. They identified three broad intemlated categories: the intellectual or philosophical 

sciences (al-‘ulum ul-‘uqliyya aw al-hikmiyya). the traditional or religious sciences (al-‘ulum 
al-naqliyya aw al-shar‘iyya), and the linguistic sciences (‘ulwnu al-lisan al-’Arabi); see 
Reynold A. Nicholson, A Literary History of the Arabs, 282-283 and M. Mahdi, “Religious 
Belief and Scientific Belief,” The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 11 (1994): 
245-259. Classical Muslim scholars developed the Greek tradition of categorization into a 
separate and uniquely Islamic science, the science of classification, which was at once a his- 
tory of knowledge (both Islamic and non-Islamic) as well as an exposition of the logical 
structure and interrelationships among sciences and encyclopedia. On this science, see A.M. 
al-Najjar, “Classification of Sciences in Islamic Thought: Between Imitation and 
Originality,” The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 13 (19%): 59-87. On the 
development of Islamic thought, see also the general surveys by W.M. Watt, The Formative 
Period of Islamic Thought, (Edinburgh University Press, 1973); and W.M Watt, Islamic 
Philosophy and Theology: An Exteluled Survey (Edinburgh University Press, 1987). 

23. A.J. Arberry, Revelation and Reason in Islam (London: George Allen and Unwin 
Ltd., 1%5), provides an excellent overview of the tension between revelation and reason in 
the history of Islamic thought and the political underpinnings. 

24. This phenomenon is not new in Islamic history. It resembles the socioeconomic and 
political circumstances that led to the emergence and spread of Sufism. See Arberry, 
Revelation and Reason in Islam; A.J. Arbeny, S@sm: An Account of the Mystics of Islam 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1%8); H.A.R. Gibb, Mohammedanism: An Historical 
Survey, 2nd ed. rev. (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), chapter 8; and Nicholson, A 
Literary History of the Arabs, chapter 8 on Sufism and its history. 

25. See a survey of the development of Islamic civilization from a Western perspective 
by Will Durant. The Story of Civilizution, vol. 4 (1950); The Age of Faith (New York: Simon 
and Schuster), Book II, especially chapters 11-14. For a recent discussion of Islamic civi- 
lization, the West, and modernity, see J.O. Voll, ‘The End of Civilization Is Not So Bad,” 
Middle East Studies Association Bulletin 28 (1994): 1-8; and J.O. Voll, “The Mistaken 
Identification of The West’ with ‘Modernity,”’ The American Journal of Islamic Social 
Sciences 13 (19%): 1-12. 

26. For modernist views, see the path-breaking work by Ali Abdel-Raziq, Islam and the 
Fundamentals of Government (Cairo, 1925) (in Arabic), and the books by K.M. W i d ,  The 
State in Islam (Cairo: Dar ”habit, 1981) (in Arabic) and In Defence of Democracy (Cairo: 
Dar ”habit, 1985) (in Arabic), chapter 4. See also the entries in the Encyclopaedia of Islam. 
New Edition for the following terms “bay“,” by E. Tyan, vol. 1 (1960): 11 13-1 114; and 
“shura,” by C.E. Bosworth, M. Marin, A. Ayalon. vol. 9 (1997): 504-506; and “mashwara,” 
by B. Lewis, vol. 6 (1990): 724-725. It is notable that one Qur’anic chapter is titled al-Shura 
(42). 

27. The rule is based on a Prophetic hadith: ikhtilqfL ummati rahmatun (the variance of 
my people is an act of Divine mercy); Nicholson, A Literary History of the Arabs, 465. 
Consequently, since early Islam, a multitude of scholarly doctrines and schools of thought 



82 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 16:2 

developed, of which only the four major schools of the Sunni Orthodoxy have survived: the 
Maliki, H W i ,  ShafVi, and Hanbali. The spirit of intellectual toleration was, from early on, 
so strong that, in the thirteenth century, a new “type of cruciform madrasah (college) was 
built in Cairo for the four schools of Sunni Orthodoxy, which could all be taught at the same 
time”; one such d r u s o h  is still intact today in the magnificent mosque of Sultan Hassan 
in Cairo; see James Aldridge, Cairo: Biography of a City (London: MacMillan, 1%9), 
118-1 19. On this doctrine of ikhtiluJ see J. Schacht, “Ikhtilaf,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, 
New Edition. vol. 3 (1971): 1061-1062. 

28. On the story of the Creation and the Fall, see also (6:2), (15:26), (203115-124). 
(55: 14). and (7: 10-27). 

29. The Sufk (Muslim mystics) interpret “The Names” to be the attributes of Allah, the 
ninety-nine “most beautiful names” (al-asma’ al-hum) of God; others interpret the Names 
to be the names of all creatures: essentially the nomenclature and concepts of knowledge and 
language. See L. Gardet, “Al-Asma’ al-Husm.” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, 
vol. 1 (1960): 714-717 on the theological (tawhidi) and philosophical signification of the 
Names in Islamic tradition. 
30. The term al-sirut al-mustaqim pervades the Qur’an and occurs at least thirty-three 

times according to the verse listing in M.F. Abdel-Baqi, Al-MCjam al-Mufahras li Arfaz Al- 
Q u f m  ul-Kurim (Concordance of Terms of the Glorious Qur‘an) (Cairo: Dar Al-Sha‘b 
Press, 1945), 407: e.g., (2142). (4:175), (6153), (16:76,121), and (4252-53). It appears 
particularly in the Exordium (1:6) which is traditionally considered “the essence of the 
Qur’an.” Muslims recite the Exordium many times in their five daily prayers and recite it 
whenever they do or start anything of significance. On the meaning and signification of the 
term, see G. Monot, “Sirat,” Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, vol. 9 (1997): 670-671. 

31. As W.M. Watt, Muhammad: Prophet and Statesman (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1964), 19-21, points out, these verses were thought to have been the first revealed, 
but later scholars reached the consensus that the verses (%1-5) were the first and that 
(741-7) were the. first revealed after a long interruption. 

32. These. verses, which are considered to be among the eighth earliest revelation, 
address the Prophet’s fear, being unlettered, that some verses might be forgotten; see 
Abdullah Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur‘an: Text, Translation and Conzmentary (Washingon, 
D.C.: American International Printing Company. 1946), 1724. 

33. This theme recurs in the Qur’an as in (2:151). On the history of the message of 
Muhammad, see, in English, the meticulous work of W.M. Watt, M u h a d  at Mecca 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1953) andMuhammadat Medim, which he based on the 
Wan and traditional sources in Arabic. - 
34. The theme of Allah’s eternally immutable Sunan is repeated in the Qur’an, e.g. 

(17:77) and 133:62). 
.35. ‘See for exakple (230,114-120,140-145), (3:61), (576,104). (17:85,107), (31:20), 
and (57:17). On the recurrence and meaning of ‘ilm in the Qur’an and Islamic thought, see 
B. Lewis. et al. “‘Ilm,” The Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, vol. 3 (1971): 1133-1 134; 
and Mahdi. “Religious Belief and Scientific Belief‘; and on the related term ma‘rifa, see R. 
Arnaldes “Ma‘rifa,” Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, vol. 6 (1990): 568-571. Abdel- 
m i .  Al-Mu‘jam al-Mdahras, lists the verses involving ‘ilm (pp. 469480) and iman (pp. 

36. See for example (5:50,104), (7:199), (25:6), (28:55), and (3964). and Abdel-Baqi, 
Al-Mu‘jam ul-Mujkhrus. listings on p. 184. On the meaning and signification of the related 
concept of jahilliya. see B. Lewis et al. “Djahiliyya,” Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, 
vol. 2 (1%5), 383-384. 

37. See the listings in Abdel-Baqi, Al-Mu’jam d-Mdahras, 208-212. See for example 
(4:170-171), (5:77). (39:2,41), and (57:16); and see D.B. MacDonald, “Hakk,” 
Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, vol. 3 (1971), 82-83, on the meaning and significa- 
tion of the term haqq. 

38. This is a recurring epistemological distinction in the Qur’an: e.g. (59:22); for a verse 
listing of these two words, see Abdel-Baqi, Al-Mu‘jam al-Mdahras, pp. 390,475.480,48 1, 

81-93). 



El-Sheikh: Sirat al-Mustaqim and Hikma 83 

507. Of the term ‘alam and the related subject of Islamic cosmology, see T. DeBoer and L. 
Gardet, “‘Alam,” Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, vol. 1 (1960), 349-352. 

39. This is again a recurring theme in the Qur’an; see the sources in the preceding note 
for verse listings. 
40. For example, “He it is Who sendeth down clear revelation unto His servant, that He 

may bring you forth from darkness into nur” (57:9). See Abdel-Baqi, Al-Mu‘jam al- 
Mt&ahras, 725-726, for verse listing; and see T. DeBOer, “Nur,” Encyclopaedia of Islam, 
New Edition, vol. 8 (1995): 121-123, on the meaning. 

41. Thus He says, for example: “[O man], pursue not that whereof thou has no knowl- 
edge of‘ (17:36). 

42. This theme recurs, for example, see (18: 109). 
43. This theme is repeated elsewhere (e.g., 3:18). 
44. While some of these hadiths are translated in Gibb, Mohammedanism: An Historical 

Survey, 126, and in M.M. Nazeer, The Islamic Economic System: A Few Highlights 
(Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 1981), 13, others are my own 
translations. It is notable that these exhortations were echoed by the great Muslim philoso- 
pher Ibn Sina (980-1037) in his Nine Epistles: “The ultimate object of man, wherein lies his 
great happiness in future life, is to gain knowledge of the realities of things so far as his 
M~UR allows”; quoted on p. 167 in A.E. Mifi, “The Rational and Mystical Interpretations 
of Islam,” in K.W. Morgan (ed.), Islam - The Straight Path: Islam Interpreted by Muslims 
(New Y o k  The Roland Press Company, 1958), 144-179. 

45. This assertion of the humanness of the Prophet recurs in the Qur’an: e.g. (41:6); see 
also next note. 
46. The various human, ordinary qualities and attributes of the Prophet pervade the 

Qur‘an and occur in many verses and suras: e.g. (2151). (3:144), (3:159), (3:164), (7:188), 
(9~128). (10:2), (10:49), (15:97), (17:94-99, (21~3). (25~7-8,20), (33:1), (3450), 
(3911-13), (41:6). (46:9), (53:10), and (622); in addition, all of suras 93 and 94 are rele- 
vant. 

47. On the Prophet’s life before his vocation started, see Watt, Muhammad at Mecca, 
chapter 2; and for a recent survey of scholarship on the Prophet, see F. Buhl and A.T. Welch, 
“Muhammad,” Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, vol. 7 (1993), 3 6 3 7 6 .  
48. For instance. as Mahdi points out in “Religious Belief and Scientific Relief‘’ (p. 246): 

“This kind of stress on science or knowledge is not found in the Bible.” This view is shared 
by many Orientalists, notably M. Rodinson, Mohammed (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1971); 
and M. Rodinson, Islam and Capitalism (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978). In Islam 
and Capitalism, chapter 4, she refutes the thesis advanced by Max Weber on Islam being 
inimical to rational behavior and economic progress. Nonetheless, as Rodinson points out, 
this fact did not prevent later Muslims from ascribing the performance of miracles to the 
Prophet, notwithstanding their flimsy Qur’anic basis: such verses as (94: 1-4), cited on p. 5 
in P.K. Hitti, Makers of Arab History (New Y o k  St. Martins Press, 1%8), are open to a 
variety of interpretations as Hitti recognizes @. 19). 

49. As translated by Nicholson, A Literary History of the Arabs, 151. Traditional, schol- 
arly opinion places these verses as the first revealed despite some early disagreement about 
the chronology as indicated in note 29. On the chronology of Qur‘anic revelation, see A.T. 
Welch and J.D. Pearson, “Al-Kuran,” Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, vol. 5 (1986). 
400-432, and the brief discussion in W. Montgomary Watt, Muhammad: Prophet and 
Statesman (London: Oxford University Press, 1964) about the traditionalist vs. Orientalist 
opinion. 

50. The term “rationalism” signifies the doctrine in modem (Western) philosophy affirm- 
ing that reason (and self-evidence or innate ideas) is authoritative, if not the authority, in all 
matte.rs of knowledge, belief, and conduct: on the history of modem rationalism (from 
Descartes to Leibniz), see F. Copleston. A History of Philosophy, vol. 4: Descartes to 
L.eibniz (New Yo& Doubleday, 1%3). especiaUy chapter 1. In Islamic thought, this doc- 
trine was adopted by the Mu‘tazila who called themselves Ahl al-Nazar (People or 
Advocates of Pwe Peason); for a recent s w e y  of their thought, see D. Gimaret, “Mu‘tazi- 



84 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 16:2 

la,” Encyclopaedia of Islam. New Edition, vol. 7 (1993): 783-793, and see also Aff5, ‘‘The 
Rational and Mystical Interpretations of Islam,” and H.A.R. Gibb et. al., “Ah1 al-Nazar,” 
Encyclopaedia of Islam. New Edition, vol. 1 (1960): 266. 
51. Encyclopedia Britannica, vol. 9,975. 
52. This is especially so of ‘Ilm a1 Kalam (both Orthodox and Mu‘tazila), which primari- 

ly a d o p u  the stoics concept of “natural light,” whereas the falasifa adopted a primarily neo- 
Platonist concept of ‘aql. On this point. see F. Rahman, “Akl,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, 

53. This characterization of Al-Farabi is given in I.R. Netton, “Al-Sufistaiyyun,” 
Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, vol. 9 (1997), 765, who attributes the appellation to 
Muhsin Mahdi. 

54. Quoted from the recent survey of scholarship on Man& by R. Amaldez “Mantik,” 
Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, vol. 6 (1991), 443. On Western doctrines of logic and 
philosophy of logic, see W.C. Salmon, Logic (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1%3); 
W.V. Quine, fhifosophy of Logic (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970); and S. 
Haack, Philosophy of Logics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978). 

55. This topic is developed and documented by Salah El-Sheikh, “Al-Mujadalah and al- 
Mujadilah Dialectical Argument and Practical Reason in Al-Qur’an,” unpublished manu- 
script (1998). On these logical terms, see L. Gardet, “Al-Burhan,” Encyclopaedia of Islom, 
New Edition, vol. 1 (1960): 1326-1327, Gardet and M.G.S. Hodgson, “Hudjdja,” 
Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, vol. 3 (1971), 543-545; and Amaldez, “Mantik,” 
442452, who gives also a good review of the development of mantiq. 
56. As indicated in note 11 above, an anonymous referee raised an important issue and 

suggested that I “must emphasize that the intelligence is capable not only of reason, but also 
of intellection which is the principle of reason,” a crucial distinction that is made by Seyyed 
Hossein Nasr and others. Evidently, this is an old and perennial epistemological issue in the 
history of philosophy as it concerns the role of reason in apprehending reality and truth, an 
issue that requires a separate paper. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this essay, the preced- 
ing suggestion merits a few remarks. First, this study does not claim that reason is the sole 
basis of apprehending reality and truth, and as such it does not preclude the proposed notion 
of “intellection” as being the “principle of reason,” if this proves to be viable both 
Qur’anically and philosophically. 

Second, aside from the fact that (according to the Ogord English Dictionary, p. 369) the 
term “intellection” lends itself to a variety of meanings, this suggestion is akin to the peren- 
nial &bate in the history of modem philosophy about the relationship between reason and 
intuition in general, and the rationalist doctrine of “intuitionism” of which the intuitionist 
doctrine of moral sense (in ethics) is but one example. See  Copleston, A History of 
Philosophy Volume Vlll: B e n t h  to Russell. 
Third. the referee’s suggestion is further complicated by the cosmological, epistemologi- 

cal, and practical distinctions, assumptions, and oppositions made by Nasr in his intellectu- 
al enterprise [see J.I. Smith, “Seyyed Hossein Nasr: Defender of the Sacred and Islamic 
Traditionalism,” in Y.Y. Haddad (ed.), The Muslims of America (New Y o k  Oxford 
University Press. 1991), 80-95; and LA. Omar, “Review Article: The Need for a Sacred 
Science: An Intellectual Defence of the Tradition (by Seyyed Hossein Nasr),” The American 
Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 12 (1995): 262-267, for a summary]. For instance, in an 
earlier work, S.H. Nasr. Ideals and Realities of Islam (Cairo: The American University in 
Cairo Press, 1989) First published in 19661 opposes (on p. 22) the gnostic S ~ I  doctrine of 
Ma‘nfkh (gnosis) to reason, stating that “gnosis or direct knowledge ... cannot by any means 
be equated with rationalism which is only an indirect and secondary form of knowledge.” 
In addition to “gnosis” and “direct knowledge,” Nasr also uses the terms “intellectual intu- 
ition” in the same sense as “intellection,” and this doctrine is often repeated throughout his 
work, as Smith, “Seyyed Hossein Nasr: Defender of the Sacred and Islamic Traditionalism,” 
91, pointed out [See for instance essay IJJ in his Suji Essays (Albany: State University of 
New York Press. 1977211. 

New Edition, VOI. 1 (1960): 341-342. 



El-Sheikh: Sirat al-Mustaqim and Hikma 85 

Fourth, Nasr (Ideals and Realities of Islam, 34-35) invokes the parallel correlative S@ dis- 
tinction/opposition between Shari’ah (practical Law) and fariqah (spiritual way), which 
Islam integrates, he maintains. But here. intellection depends on the SufdShi’ah method of 
ta‘wil “to penetrate into the inner meaning of the sac& text [Qur’an] ... just as Wsir is the 
explanation of [its] external aspect ...” [Ibid., p. %)I; but the veracity of this direct penetra- 
tion, this “intellectual intuition,” and its certitude is contingent upon the doctrine of ‘ismah 
or “cognitive infallibility” (pp. 162-163). But as F. Rahman, Islam (London: Weidenfeld 
and Nicholson, 1966), 141, puts it, it was this “self-righteous intuitive certainty and infalli- 
bility ... that was not and could not be admitted by the [Sunni] ‘ulema ... because the Sufi 
gnosis was not open to any check and control, being by definition incorrigible.” The 
Qur‘anic evidence presented in the text of the present study, especially that about the noume- 
nal knowledge (of ‘alum al-ghayb) being the exclusive domain of Allah, explains why the 
Sunni theologians and jurists could not accept the Sufi doctrine of “intellection” or “intel- 
lectual intuition.” 

Fifth, this doctrine of “intellection.” which was aptly characterized by the late Muslim 
philosopher/thedogian, Fazlur Rahman, in “The Post-Formative Developments in Islam: I,” 
Islamic Studies, vol. 1:4 (1%2): 21, as being “theosophic intuitionism.” has not proved to 
be cognitively productive, at least according to the great Sufi (theologiadjurist) al-Ghazzali 
(d. 1111); see EM. Denny, “The Legacy of Fazlur Rahman,” in Y.Y. Haddad (ed.), The 
Muslims of America (New York Oxford University Press, 1991): 96-108. on Rahman’s pro- 
found legacy. Again, as Rahman in Islam, 144, puts it, “[al-Ghazzali whose] purpose was to 
live through the verities of the faith and to test those verities through the Sufi experiential- 
ist method ... concluded ... that Sufism has no cognitive content or object but the verities of 
the faith. He, therefore, disallowed the pretentions of theosophic mysticism ... This was a 
remarkable lesson taught by a great mystic spirit ... viz., that mysticism is not a way of find- 
ing extrafacts about Reality but is a meaningful way of looking at it ... as a unity. Further, 
the unity of the mystic consciousness is conditioned by the factual content (however much 
it may try to transcend that content), which it tests and transforms by new meanings.” 

Finally, and notwithstanding the significance of these doctrinal disagreements and distinc- 
tions, this study is primarily concerned with the practical issues of the Shari’ah and science 
(especially social science), with the social (exoteric) life of the Ummah, rather than the spir- 
itual quest of tariqah and the inner (esoteric) life of the Muslim. Hence, the focus in this 
study is on the role of ‘aql/reason (rather than ‘aql/intellection) as a principle rooted in 
Qur’anic revelation. 
57. This theme is repeated in the Qur’an. e.g. (3:4748). 
58. On the meaning of h iha ,  in the Qur‘an and Islamic thought, see A.M. Goichon, 

“Hikma,” The Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, vol. 3 (1971), 377-378, and on 
Philosophy and Hikma, see Arberry, Revelation and Reason in Islom, chapters 1 and 2. 
Besides the verses in the text, the association of Kitab and Hikma is repeated in the Qur’an, 
e.g. in (2231). (375-81), and (33:34). See the verse listing of Hikma in Abdel-Baqi. Al- 
Mu‘jam al-Mdahras, 213-215. 
59. See also Qur’aaic chapters 16,30, and 45 for other examples. 
60. This challenge recurs in the Qur’an. as in (10:38), (28:49), and (5234). For an 

Orientalist view of the literary aspects of Qur‘an, see Nicholson, A Literary History of the 
Arabs, chapter 4. On the meaning and signification of i’jaz, see G.E. Von Grunebaum, 
“Pdjaz,” Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, vol. 3 (1971): 1018-1020. 
61. The appeal to ayat prevades the Qur’an; e.g. (3:190), (65:11), (16:65-80), and 
(30.20-28); also see A. Jeffery, “Aya,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, vol. 1 
(1960): 773-774. Abdel-Baqi, Al-Mu‘jam al-Mqahras, lists the verses involving ayat on pp. 
103-108. 
62. The term ulu al-albab recurs in the Qur’an as in (3:7,190). This term occurs at least 

in sixteen verses according to the listings of Abdel-Baqi, Al-Mu‘jam al-M$ahras. 644. 
63. The verse listings of this term is given in Abdel-Baqi, Al-Mu‘jam al-Mgahras, 
142-143. See, for example, (40:28), (98: la), (655-57); and see R. Brunschvig, “Bayyina,” 
in Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, vol. 1 (1960): 1150- 1151, on the meaning and uses 



86 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 16:2 

of this term. As Rodinson, Islam and Capitalism, 78-79, points out, this line of reasoning is 
pushed even further in the Qur’an by invoking a Pascal-type wager: 

And a believing man of Pharoah’s family, who hid his faith, said Would you kill 
a man because he saith. My Lord is Allah, and hath brought you clear evidences 
from your Lord? If he is lying, then his lie is upon him; and if he is truthful, then 
some of that wherein he tlmateneth you will strike you. Lo! Allah guideth not one 
who is a prodigal liar. (40:28) 

64. Abdel-Baqi, Al-Mu‘jam al-M$ahras, provides the verse listings on nazzara (“look: 
pp. 705-706). ra’a (“see”: pp. 284-285), bassara (“see insightfully”: pp. 121-123). 
samma‘a (“hear”: pp. 358-361). anssuta (“carefully listen”: p. 702). See, for example, 

65. As other examples, see also (47:23-24), (2:219), (3:191), (6:50), and (30:27-28). 
66. These statistics are based on the verse listings in Abdel-Baqi, AI-Mu‘jam al- 

Mdahras, 468-469. On the meaning and signification of ‘aql and related terms see the 
entries in Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, for the following terms: “Akl,” by Rahman, 
vol. 1 (1960). 341-342; “‘Akliyyat,” by L. Gardet, vol. 1 (1960), 342-343; “Fikr,” by L. 
Gardet, vol. 2 (1%5), 891-892; “Fikh,” by J. Schacht, vol. 2 (1%5), 886-891. Abdel-Baqi, 
AI-Mu‘jam al-M$ahras, gives the verse listings for fahama (p. 527), faqaha (p. 525), 
fakkara (p. 525), taddabara (p. 252). 

67. See, for example, (2:73,76), (5:58,103), (10:42), (22:46), and (59:14); and for a 
Qur’anic documentation of these debates, see El-Sheikh, “AI-Mujadalah and Al-Mujadilah: 
Dialectical Argument and h c t i c a l  Reason in al-Qur’an.” 

68. As an example, see (2544) and (2171). 
69. This verse is one among many in the Qur’an that recognize the human free will; see 

L. Gardet, “Ikhtiyar,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, vol. 3 (1971), 1062-1063. It 
should be noted, however, that other verses in the Qur’an support the antithesis of predesti- 
nation. This question was a subject of philosophical debate among Muslim scholars since 
early Islam. The question was resolved by the Ash‘ari doctrine of kasb (acquisition). On this 
subject, see Gibb, Mohammedanism: An Historical Survey, 76-80; Nicholson, A Literary 
History of the Arabs, 222-224 and 367-383; Rodinson, Islam and Capitalism, 91-95; Watt, 
The Formative Period of Islamic Thought, especially chapters IV, VIII, and X ,  and W.M. 
Watt. Free Will and Predestination in Early Islam-@ndon: Luzac, 1948). 

70. Quoted in Rodinson, Islam and Capitalism, 81, from C.C. Torrey, The Commercial- 
Theological Terms in the Koran (Strasbourg Thesis) (Leiden: Brill, 1892). 

71. Quoted from the eminent Orientalist Gibb, Mohammedanism: An Historical Survey, 
62. For treatments of this aspect of the Shari’ah and Islamic jurisprudence, see Gibb, 
Mohammedanism: An Historical Survey, chapters 3, 5 ,  and 6; and N.J. Coulson, Conflicts 
and Tensions is Islamic Jurisprudence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1%9); and 
Coulson, A History of Islamic Law. For an interesting review and critique of “legal orien- 
talism” in the context of the civil society and human rights debate, see J. Strawson, “A 
Western Question to the Middle East: ‘Is There a Human Rights Discourse in Islam?,” Arab 
Studies Quarterly 19 (1997): 31-58. 

72. See note 66 on free will (ikhtiyar). 
73. On this subject, see Durant, The Story of Civilization, Vol. 4 ,  The Age of Faith, 

Chapters 12 and 13; the sources cited by Rodinson, Islam and Capitalism, 274, especially 
George Sarton, Introduction to the History of Science (Baltimore, 1943); and a recent book 
on the introduction to Europe of Arabic philosophy, C.E. Butterworth and B. A. Kessel 
(eds.), The Introduction of Arabic Philosophy into Europe (New Yo& E.J. Brill, 1994). 

74. On contemporary scientific methodology of the natural sciences, the social sciences, 
and economics, see C.G. Hempel, Philosophy of Namral Science (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, 1966); R.S. Rudner, Philosophy of Social Science (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, 1966); and Hausman, The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics. Also 
see Salmon, Logic, on related logical issues. 

(31:20), (86:5), (80:24), (88~17-20), (7:185), (12109), and (40~82). 



El-Sheikh: Sirat al-Mustaqim and Hikma 87 

75. I attempted to answer this question in “Towards an Islamic Interest Rate Policy: 
Some Theoretical Issues,’’ the Annual Meetings of the Learned Societies (Canadian 
Association for the Study of International Development), 1988, University of Windsor. 
Windsor, Ontario, Canada, but this work has not yet been completed. 
76. Kuran, “Islamic Economics and the Islamic Subeconomy,” 170. 
77. On the Islamization of knowledge, see L. Safi, “The Quest for an Islamic 

Methodology: The Islamization of Knowledge Project in Its Second Decade,” The American 
Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 10 (1993): 23-48; Y. Mohamed, “Islamization of 
Knowledge: A Critique,” The American Jownal of Islamic Social Sciences 11 (1994): 
282-294; and I. Ragab, “Islamic Perspectives on Theory Building in the Social Sciences,” 
The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 10 (1993): 1-22. 
78. Fredric L. Pryor, “The Islamic Economic System,” Journal of Comparative 

79. Arberry, Revelation and Reason in Islam, ix. 
80. See Gibb, Mohammedanism: An Historical Survey. chapters 3.5, and 6; Coulson. A 

History of Islamic Law; and Coulson, Confricts and Tensions in Islamic Jurispnuience. 
81. El-Sheikh, “Sirat Mustaqim and Hikma: Towards an Islamic Analytical Framework 

for Dealing with Economic Issues,’’ International Conference on the Epistemological 
Foundations of Social Theory, (University College of Cape. Breton, Sydney, Nova Scotia, 
Canada 1989). 

E C O I I O ~ ~ C S  9 (1985): 217-223.