Globalization: A Contemporary Islamic Response? lbrahirn M. Abu-Rabi ' Neoliberalism, as a global system, is a new war in the conquest of territory. The end of the Third World War, or Cold War, certainly does not mean that the world has overcome bipolarity and rediscovered stability under the domination of the victor. Whereas there was a defeated side (the socialist camp), it is difficult to identify the win- ning side. The United States? The European Union? Japan? Or all three? ... Thanks to computers, the finan- cial markets, fiom the trading floor and according to their whims, impose their laws and precepts on the planet. Globalization is nothing more than the totalitarian exten- sion of their logic to every aspect of life. The United States, formerly the ruler of the economy, is now gov- erned - tele-governed - by the very dynamic of financial power: commercial free trade. And this logic has made use of the porosity produced by the development of telecommunications to take over every aspect of activity in the social spectrum. The result is an all-out war.' In the 1950s and the 1960s, a phase in the history [of the Third World] that the supporters of globalization wish to marginalize and assassinate, culture was in fact made up of two kinds: imperialisthegemonic culture and libera- tionisthationalist culture. Those influenced by the ideol- ogy of globalization desire to create a new genre of cul- ture: the culture of opening and renewal and that of with- drawal and stagnation. - Muhammad 'Abid al Jiibiri.* Ibrahim M. Abu-&bit is Profissor OfIslamic Studies and Christian-Muslim Relations, HarVord &minary HarVod Connecticut. 16 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 15:3 We are told that the world is shrinking, that vast distance has been conquered by computer and fax, and the Earth is now a “global village” in which all of us are connected as never before. It feels, however, quite the opposite. It feels as if distancing and disconnection are shaping modern Iife. If anything is shrinking, it is the fullness of being that is experienced by the modern self ... Psychologists report [high] levels of depression and anxiety ... For most peo- ple today, the web of friends, nearby family members, and community relationships is a shrunken fragment of what previous generations experienced. - Charlene S~retnak.~ Knowledge that was free, open and for the benefit of society is now proprietary, confidential and for the bene- fit of business. Educators who once jealously guarded their autonomy now negotiate curriculum planning with corporate sponsors. Professors who once taught are now on company payrolls churning out marketable research in the campus lab, while universities pay the cut-rate fee for replacement of teaching assistants. University presi- dents, once the intellectual leaders of the institutions, are now accomplished bagmen. - John Harris.‘ Introductory Critical Remarks It is almost impossible to give a simple definition of the term glob- ahation, for it carries a number of implications in the economic, social, political, ideological, and intellectual realms. My concerns in this essay are to raise several critical questions about these implications, especial- ly in relation to the contemporary Muslim world; offer some critical remarks on the state of contemporary Islamic thought; and suggest ways to grapple with the subtle and deep epistemological, ethical, and scien- tific shifts that globalization has engendered recently. Also, at the out- set I would like to say that the Islamic perspective on economy and community has not been taken seriously by the proponents of global- ization, mainly because there has not been a systematic Islamic appre- ciation and critique of this phenomenon. It is true that there has been a political backlash against Western modernism in some Muslim coun- tries, most notably in Iran, Sudan, and Egypt; however, a Muslim intel- lectual response to the problematics engendered by globalization is past due. Regardless of the complex epistemological undercurrents of contem- porary Islamic thought, it has not yet fulfilled its intellectual potential, for Abu-Rabi’: Globalization: A Contemporary IsIamic Response 17 it has failed to grapple with some of the most critical issues of our time. Where is the Islamic critique and appreciation of modem nationalism, democracy, the nation-state, modernity, and even the oftdiscussed colo- nialism and neocolonialism? Except €or a few individual studies and re€lec- tions, contemporary Islamic thought has not presented a amprehemi- let alone convincing-peispwtive or perspectives on the many issues and questions besetting the contemporary Muslim world. The lacuna is most apparent on the question of both modernity and globalization. To shed some light on the nature of modem Islamic thought, one must differentiate among, for example, Islamic thought and Arab or Pakistani thought. One could take modern Arab thought to mean the last one hun- dred years of the intellectual production of both religious and secular Arab thinkers. In other words, one must not equate Arab thought with Islamic thought, since the former includes all those religious and secular tendencies, trends, and patterns of thought that reflect the bewildering number of questions and issues that have preoccupied modern Arab thought.5 Islamic thought, on the other hand, has a theological center and an intellectual fiamework of reference defined by the central place of the Qur’an in Muslim life and thought. The above remarks beg the question of the nature of the Muslim pres- ence in the West generally. It would be fallacious to argue that the Muslim world is out there, separate from the West, and that the Muslim presence in the West is unimportant to the Muslim world because it lacks authen- ticity. With the onslaught of modernity and the migration of Muslim &el- lectuals, engineers, doctors, and professionals to the West since the turn of the twentieth century, it is important to raise questions about the nature and direction of Muslim intellectual contributions in the West. On the whole, apart from a few academics who follow the Muslim perspective, the Muslim community in the West has not produced its own intellectuals, those thinkers who can aid the Muslim community in its daily encounter with modernism and globalization. The failure of this Musiim community to grasp the central problems surrounding its pres- ence in a non-Islamic, though religiously tolerant environment, reflects the deep social and psychological anguish suffered by Muslims in a Western milieu. The Muslim community is in an ideal position to reflect from within, so to speak, OR the nature of globalization and guide the Muslim world in understanding the hazards created by neoliberalism and the new forces of the market. It is quite impossible to escape the conclu- sion that the Muslim community in the West is hard-pressed to apply its ethos to the new realities of the world-realities that do not seem to sub- scribe to any monotheistic worldview, but rather to those of consumerism and competitiveness. 18 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 15:3 As a result of the above factors, there is an almost complete obsession with the issue of tradition and how to conserve it in a fast-changing and sometimes merciless world. This is not to say that the issue of tradition is irrelevant or unimportant. However, it seems to me that it is now time to transcend the conceptual formulations of such nineteenth-century Muslim thinkers as Mdpmmad ‘Abduh, Jamiil al Din al Afghhi, and Sayyid mad Khan by inventing a novel Islamic manner of thinking that responds creatively to the rigorous rules of critical philosophical and ethi- cal thinking. No thinking can probe the problematic of globalization unless it is totally abreast of recent trends in critical theory, economic and social thought, their implications for religious thought in the Muslim world and the West, and the ethical response that contemporary Islamic thought must present to assert its vitality and relevance. Islamic thought must seek the aid of critical tools, besides those of revelation, to provide sufficient answers to the problems of the contemporary Muslim world. Three Premises, Numerous Arguments To reclaim vitality, modem Islamic thought must reinterpret the main theological and normative precepts of Islam in a manner that opposes the totalitarian nature of the contemporary Muslim world’s ruling political and educational systems, as well as the great boost they have received with the onslaught of globalization on the world market and the universal human psyche. If one accepts the claim that the crux of the Islamic worldview is egalitarianism, then one must conclude that to follow Islamic ideals, one must oppose the forms of political, economic, social, or intellectual oppres- sion that currently seem to dominate the Muslim world. In other words, we must promote an Islamic worldview that is liberationist in nature and mean- ingful to the average person. This is thefirst premise. The second major premise is somewhat historical and related mainly to the colossal social and economic changes taking place in the modem capi- talist West and their political and intellectual impact on the modem Muslim world and thought in general. It is naive to assume that modem Islamic thought follows specific internal dynamics that have nothing to do with the complex mutations in modem Western thought, or that modem Islamic thought refises to ~ K O W from external sources. To grasp the nature of eco- nomic, political, and philosophical transformations in the modern Western world is to wrestle seriously with the whole history of Western thought, from Marxist and neo-Marxist to capitalist and globalization, its latest man- ifestation. One may argue that Western-especially American and Europem-history has witnessed major transformations in its worldview, the latest being globalization. Islamic thought is still bogged down by some of the problematics engendered by modernity. Ah-Rabi’: Globalization: A Contemporary Islamic Response 19 To most thinkers in the Muslim world, fiom the radical to the most conservative, globalization seems to be an inevitable phenomenon. In one sense, it is true that because of the fundamental historical, political, and economic mutations in the modem West, the fate of the Muslim world is highly intertwined with triumphant Western capitalism. However, sever- al questions remain to be answered: What does globalization mean in the context of a postmodern, post-Soviet, post-Cold War world, and in the context of aggressivehegemonic Western capitalism? What is the fate of nation-states, constructed during the Cold War era, under globalization? How has civil society in the Muslim world changed in the past decade? Is the recent collapse of the Indonesian economy and society a direct result of globalization’s encroachment?6 What is the role of Muslim intellectu- als in this age of severe transition? How can one preserve the essential features of Muslim identity in the above context, especially if those features have been construed in a pre- globalization stage? If one translates preservation as a defense mecha- nism, what conceptual tools must one create to revitalize modem Islamic thinking about globalization? Lastly, since manufacturing consent in con- temporary society is based on the power of ideas, and the leading (capi- talist) ideas are taught in private schools and universities across the Muslim world, where does the common interest of the people lie? thirdpremise derives fiom the last question. The Muslim world is going through a dramatic process of change in its educational systems. The best education is privatized and is the preserve of the children of the elite-the same elite that has waged a silent and highly subtle intellectu- al revolution against the masses in recent decades. The mushrooming of private educational institutions and distance-learning centers in Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia driv home that education is a highly priced commodity sold to der.’ There is no need to bother about “the revolt of the era1 synthesis of education. As the progressive privatization, elitization, We Americanization of education has been significant in many Muslim coun- tries, common people have been robbed of their traditional pride, and a new consciousness based on class-education distinction and social-eco- nomic segregation has been promulgated. The following observation about a tribal people in northeastern India is applicable to the Muslim world. No one can deny the value of real education-the widen- ing and enrichment of knowledge. But today in the Third World, education has become something quite different. 20 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 153 It isolates children from their culture and from nature, training them instead to become narrow specialists in a Westernized urban environment. This process has been particularly striking in La&, where modern schooling acts as a blindfold, preventing children from seeing the very context in which they live. They leave school unable to use their own resources, unable to function in their own world.' In the Third World, indigenous creativity is sacrificed for the sake of academic and scientific specialization that promises financial gainv The Post-Cold War Muslim World or the New World Order To be sure, globalization is not a new phenomenon; it emerged with the triumph of Zaissez faire capitalism in the post-Industrial Revolution era and the expansion of European imperialism. In other words, triumphant European imperialism created deep structural, economic, political, cultur- al, and religious transformations in the so-called Third World, all of which led to a permanent interaction between North and South.'O Imperialist domination was double-edged: it led to the modernization of some leading institutions and segments of the colonized world, such as the army, the police force, and the educational system, but also created social and eco- nomic disequilibrium, major urban-rural gaps leading to rural migration to the city, and a bilingual and anxious indigenous intelligentsia." The nation-state, a response to the penetration of bourgeois capital- ism that emphasized an autonomous national economic and cultural inde- pendence, sought to create new structures and foundations for the new state in order to bypass the traditional dependence created by a defunct imperialism. The existence of the Soviet Union and the ensuing Cold War gave new nation-states some room in which to maneuver. However, two major events shifted the balance in the 1970s and the 1980s in favor of the capitalist West: the conquest of the huge Chinese market by American capitalism," and the collapse of the Soviet system and the ensuing end of the Cold War that signaled the triumph of the capitalist West over the socialist East." These two major events, without historical parallel, left nation-states easy prey to the challenges and dangers of the New World Order's new geopolitical and economic realities." The above change proves once again the importance of economic decisions in the direction of world politics and the fbture. Pro&-driven and highly cornpetifive capitalism begins a new drive: the conquest of space after the conquest of terrain.lS Enter the multinational companies Abu-Rabi’: Globalization: A Contemporary Islamic Response 21 that see the future of capitalism in conquering new space and new imma- terial territory. To succeed, they seek to create a global climate that allows competitiveness without the controlling hand of the nation-state. This ten- dency of “aggressive capitalism” run amok, so to speak, is all the more dangerous because of the absence of a multi-international economic and political system. In the mono-system of neoliberalism, one author notes that, In this era of widespread liberalization, private f m s are commissioned, in collaboration with the States and the international bodies responsible for helping them, to pro- mote abundance and well-being. These are enterprises producing goods and, increasingly, services, the most effective of which ignore frontiers. Their sole motor, their sole reason for being, is profit; it is a fact that a huge gulf separates the goal that is set from the capacity to reach it. And, without pushing into the background those which have failed in the North, it must be stressed that the South is out of the running.’6 Creating a globalized climate amenable to a new type of international profit has had a negative impact on indigenous economies. In a sense, it creates new sets of rationales and values that are not in tune with the cul- tures, traditions, and histories of indigenous peoples and nation-states. The logic of capitalism is not to maintain or develop healthy social and eco- nomic systems, but to make profit as quickly as possible.” The last thought begs the question of the newly gained relationship between the multinationals and the nation-state; the role of the state in society; the deep changes in power relations, not just between North and South, but also with the countries of the South; the nature of civil society; and the implications for democracy in the Third World.” Globalization challenges the nation-state to open up its space and borders for a novel type of competitiveness free of any The nation-state’s political elite is expected to cooperate fully with the eco- nomic enterprises, and the accumulation of national capital is very often impossible because many Third World nation-states are burdened with large debts owed to international fmancial institutions. The rules of the game change here: national development and growth in the Third World are hampered by the accumulation of capital on an international scale. According to Samir Amin, in the 1950s and 1960s globalization was somewhat controlled by three international factors: the intervention of the capitalist state in the process of capital accumulation; the Soviet project 22 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 15:3 of socialist economy; and the Bandung project of the non-aligned world formed under the auspices of Sukamo, Nehru, and Nasser.20 With privatization mushrooming in the countries of these now- deceased leaders, the nationalisthocialist project of self-sufficiency and the empowerment of the poor has come to a deadly halt. In the Arab world, for example, the Gulf region was forcibly cut off from the rest of the Arab world by the Center that intensified its hegemony, both economic and mil- itary, in the wake of the military defeat of Iraq in the second Gulf war. What this means, according to Amin, is that the Gulf states are now “pro- tectorates that are devoid of any freedom to maneuver both economically and politically.’*’ In the words of Immanuel Wallerstein, the Third World won the political battle in the 1950s and 1960s, whereby decolonization “had been achieved almost everywhere. It was time for the second step, national development .... The second step was never to be achieved in most places.”“ In the age of liberalization and integration, globalization does not permit local economies to breathe on their own.u The failure of nationalist economies in such countries as Indonesia, India, Egypt, and Algeria is proof of the triumph of rational technology in the advanced West. However, as some economists have pointed out, the spread of “financial liberalization” or “technological globalization” cannot be determined by technological factors alone; politics has a lot to do with the spread of rational technology and globalization. It is the polit- ical desire of the Center to subjugate all nation-states, with the possible exception of Israel, to the exigencies of the capitalist market.24 Advocates of globalization envision a kind of “global village econ- omy” that facilitates the spread of modernization and technological rationalization throughout the world. They propose that globalization has led to the integration of hitherto marginalized and impoverished societies into the world market. In their view, globalization did not just result in the creation of millions of new jobs and the improvement of social and economic conditions for the poor, but also led to an opening in the cultural and mental space of the poor nations.25 Even if one accepts such views, which has become an inevitable process in many Third World countries, one must turn a blind eye to other no-less-significant accompanying processes: “globalitarian regimes” are more entrenched than the “totalitarian regimes” of yesteryear.26 The global oppression of the nation-state has created new ways to oppress civil society by the already “oppressed” nation-state, broken down social cohesion in the Third World, and whittled down the democratic space in society. Civil society is suffocated as a result of the new shifts in power boundaries in society, and freedom of expression becomes a rare cornm~dity.~’ As one astute author observes, Abu-Rabi’: Glob4zation: A Contemporary Islamic Response 23 As the industrialized nations are gradually figuring out, the new world order imposed by the globalized economy means a race to the bottom for everyone, as jobs are eliminated in the name of global competitiveness or exported and the transnational corporations assume a level of power above any government. Even in a country like India, where 10 percent of the 980,000,000 residents comprise a new middle class that has benefited from the globalized presence of transnationals, the other 90 per- cent are simply not in the plan for the dazzling future. The 10 percent with disposable income constitute a large enough market to cause salivation among the global players: India is called a great success ,toy2* In the new nation-state of the 1980s and 1990s, democratic space has been challenged to the core. One would expect that the advanced Center, carrier of the slogan of “democracy” for so long, would promote real democracy in the South. This is far from true. Under globalization, a new relationship is being forged between the political elite and the economic powers, especially the multinationals.” In the Muslim world, this has meant that the tribal, quasi-constitutional state, controlled by the same family or clan, had gained additional repressive powers. Civil society suf- fers from the additional loss of freedom, and working people and women are disempowered. The multinationals’ gradual penetration of the Third World economies, far from eliminating poverty and alleviating the misery of the urban and rural poor, has led to three intertwined phenomena: an increase in the number of poor and unemployed people, the concentration of wealth in the hands of the political elite, and an increase in state repres- sion.So Indonesia is a prime example. With the onslaught of modem tech- nologies under the guise of globalization, the old Western mission of mis- sion civilisatrice is reaffirmed in the newtold gods of money, technology, investment, and prosperity. In the Third World, the image of the intelligentsia is transformed rad- ically in the age of globalization. In the colonial era, the indigenous intel- ligentsia played a leading role in both political and cultural independence. Although they were, according to Benedict Anderson, a “lonely, bilingual, and highly anxiety-ridden intelligentsia,”” they nevertheless reflected the anguish and suffering of their people, They fought for independence from their colonial masters, whose schools they had attended. The new intelli- gentsia of “Third World globalization” do not share this anxiety. Scientists, technocrats, engineers, and researchers all have something in 24 lltc American Journal of Ishnic Social Sciences 15:3 common: a preoccupation with business and investment, all expressed in a new mode of English, that of the London School of Economics or the Harvard Business School. In the words of Pierre Bourdieu, those new technocrats tend to favor economic profit at the expense of social and mental dislocation in Third World societies. The technocrats support, what he calls, a “structural violence” in these societies, that is, an increase in the number of the unemployed and marginalized in society?2 English, and to be more specific American English, assumes a lead- ing role in the age of gbbalization. One cannot be a successful technocrat without mastering the secrets of American business English. It is true that American English developed from the womb of British English during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. But it is equally true that American English during that period was responding creatively to the new social and economic conditions of the new world. In their fight against British domination, Americans developed a new linguistic author- ity that did not subscribe the old rules of the Queen’s English. Noah Webskry the leading American linguist of the nineteenth century, pro- moted the notion that “it is quite impossible to stop the progress of lan- guage-it is like the course of the Mississippi, the motion of which, at times, is scarcely perceptible.”” During the Cold War (1 945-89), the American political elite failed to deploy English against their enemies, mainly because academic English was the preserve of leftist intellectuals who abdicated “curatorship of the great books, abandoned traditional values, and subverted the social order.’m However, with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, formal business English has taken the offensive. The new technocrats of both North and South have adopted a formal type of English that is more conducive to the business and financial world than to the world of the humanities. To be sure, the increase in misery and economic poverty is not the sole preserve ofthe Third World.” This same phenomenon is unfolding in the Centery such as in France, England, and the United States. Urban decay is apparent in the major cities of the Center, which, in a deep sense, is symp- tomatic of the lack of educational and social well-being among the poor. The use of drugs and the prolifmtion of domestic and societal crime indi- cate that a significant portion of society in the advanced Center has been marginalized. In other words capitalism, in its drive to accumulate capital, acquires more and more profit only at the expense of creating havoc in the weak sector of society, both domestic and overseas. As one author puts it, “capitalism generates, at the same time, both prosperity and poverty.”” As seen above, the New World Order did not emerge from a vacuum. With the collapse of the Soviet system in the early 1990s, after decades Abu-Rabi’: Globalization: A Contemporary Islamic Response 25 of severe struggle, the Third World became easy prey for American hege- mony.” Regardless of whether or not Iraq intended to challenge Western hegemony in general and that of the United States in particular by invad- ing Kuwait in 1990, amassing Western troops under the United Nations’ banner in the Gulf sent shock waves across the Muslim world. The mili- tary defeat of Iraq preserved, if not enhanced, the West’s national inter- ests, which, in clear historical irony, further strengthened the Gulf‘s authoritarian political regimes and obliterated any real chance to achieve democracy for many years to come. In addition to signaling major shifts in world alliances and witnessing the emergence of the United States as the sole superpower, these two events have raised once again, and perhaps in a much more acute fashion, the issue of Western, especially American, cultural hegemony and its impact on Third World cultures. It is far from true that the American impact on the Muslim world in the post-Cold War era is limited to eco- nomic and political matters; rather, it is primarily intellectual and concep tual, for Muslim ruling elites have adopted the capitalist West’s function- ing ideas as their ideal model.’8 Due to the entanglement of the West with the Muslim world since at least the early nineteenth century, modem Islamic thought has been baf- fled by the West as a phenomenon. Since the dawn of colonialism in the early nineteenth century, Muslim intellectuals have asked: “What is the West?” The West has posed a major challenge to the modem Muslim and Arab mind, one that has forced modem Islamic thought to critique the past and attempt to appropriate the modem West’s scientific spirit. However, the West has remained an undefined term in modem Islamic thought (does it exemplify colonialism, liberalism, Christianity, capital- ism, or socialism?). The West, as a scientific and socio-cultural entity, has always been on the offensive. The nuhduh (renaissance) thinkers of the nineteenth-century Arab world and the liberal thinkers in Muslim India39 were intrigued by the dif- ferent possibilities provided by the “Western mind” and Western science. They were aware of the severe stagnation of their societies and that this stagnation violated a major Islamic principle: the common interest (ul mu&zhuh ul ‘ c i m h ) . They sought to ameliorate conditions by reviving this doctrine and linking it to the need for Western science. In other words, in the thought of the nuh&zh intelligentsia, Western science and the Muslim doctrine of common interest did not coalesce; on the contrary, for Muslim doctrine to be well-served, the logic of modernity (i.e., sci- ence) must be adopted.m Thus, R. R. a1 Tahpwi, MNammad ‘Abduh, Sayyid w a d Khm, and their colleagues thought that this tension (stag- nation vs. science) could be resolved only if the intellectual Muslim elite 26 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 15:3 of their times linked its doctrinal philosophy to the logic of Western sci- ence and philosophy-an advocacy of progress, the central concept of nineteenth-century European modernity. However, while trying to resolve this contradiction, a second and perhaps more astounding one was revealed: that of colonialism and science, two givens of the West. The nineteenth-century Muslim thinkers were well aware that the West did not simply mean science, but military and political domination as well. The double tensions of Muslim stagnation and Western science, Western science and Western hegemony, have defined the parameters of the main challenges facing the Muslim mind since the nineteenth centu- ry. This double bipolarity became more complex in the mid-1950s after the end of official colonialism in most Muslim states. The new nation- states sought to modernize without sacrificing the common interest, whether derived from Muslim or nationalist thought, and sought eco- nomic and social independence fiom the West while still relying on it. As globalization began to lay its economic egg in the early 1970s with the economic conquest of China, and came to fiuition with the collapse of the Soviet system in the 1990s, the Muslim world became eternally ensnared in the web of the capitalist West. Further, the power gap between the Muslim world and the West began to widen to such an extent that a coun- try like Syria, which used the Soviet Union during the Cold War to bol- ster its status, appeased the West by sending troops to fight Iraq. Muslim political regimes soon realized that it would be suicidal to challenge American authority. This fundamental power differential is having a deep impact on the internal functioning of Muslim societies and is leading to wider gaps between rich and poor within the Muslim world. The accom- panying international shift in power also is solidifying Muslim military and political elites. Cultural Independence under Globalization The modern Muslim nation-state has inherited a world of contradic- tions. As it sought cultural and political decolonization after indepen- dence, neocolonialism began to manifest itself immediately by forging new economic and political relationships that would give the Center the upper hand when dealing with the international and economic afhirs of its fonner dependencies. In the opinion of many Arab thinkers, globalization is the latest stage of neocolonialism, “it is the culmination of the success of the Capitalist project worldwide.’“’ Neocolonialism has permitted the Center to preserve its markets and cultural influence, and sometimes its troops, at minimal cost While it is possible to measure and quantifL economic factors, it is difficult to measure culture in the same way. The end of official colonial- Abu-Rabi’: Globalization: A Contemporary Islamic Response 21 ism left behind a complex cultural package that cannot be overcome overnight. The intellectual elite of the mcien regime, some of whom fought political but not cultural colonialism, found themselves in com- manding positions and caught between their adopted Western culture and the indigenous culture. Those who opted ‘for Arabization, as in North Africa, support cultural diversity and independence from the dominant culture of the West. Postcolonialism emerged from neocolonialism and is its twin brother, a product of the New World Order.‘* As a historical event of tremendous importance b the lives of Muslims and non-Mudims, colonialism very often entails the military occupation of one country by another (viz., a European country), as well as direct control of natural resources, which makes a difference in the strategic interests of the colonizer. The political elite of the new nation-states have sought to modernize their countries by blindly imitating the West, and have benefited from the political and military protection bestowed upon them by the West. For example, in some of these countries the West has never raised the issue of human rights or the absence of democracy, for its overall con- cern is to preserve its strategic interests. Thus, principles are easily sac- rificed. The basis of neocolonialism is a new form of economic domina- tion that allows other discrete forms of domination, namely, political, cultural, and intellectual. During the Cold War, Third World countries felt somewhat relieved from the West’s cultural and political pressure because the balance of world power permitted them to function somewhat freely. However, the status quo changed with the collapse of the Soviet system and the mili- tary defeat of Iraq. These two events left the Arab world and Arab cul- ture defenseless in face of American hegemony. With the emergence of the United States as the sole superpower, a number of states, such as Cuba, Syria, and Libya, were, and still are, accused by the Center of s u p porting terrorism. The Periphery has been dependent on the Center since the colonial era, and the diffusion of ideas through satellites instituted a new relationship between the Muslim world and the West. The Center practices what one may call a hegemonic “imperialist ~ulture.’“~ Most Muslim thinkers who grew up in the shadow of colonialism draw our attention to the major con- clusions of European, and even some American, thinkers about the rise of United States in recent years and its global cultural impact, even in Europe: “The American empire is the only one in the world. It is abso- lutely supreme, and it is the first time in human history that this curious phenomenon has survived.’w The United States is a unique empire: it is a major producer of all sorts of goods as well as an avid consumer. Its his- 28 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 15:3 tory, from the very beginning, is marked by an extreme tendency toward expansion: “The whole of American history is marked by a perpetual ten- dency toward expanion: thirst for land, thirst for power, thirst for novelty, thirst for glory - as many needs as can be ~atisfied.’“~ According to the famous American literary critic Edmund Wilson, American expansion overseas in the wake of Nazi Germany’s defeat was not by coincidence: We thought we were liberating Europe and fending off the imperialism of feudal Japan, but we turned up after the war [World War I11 occupying or controlling foreign countries all over America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East., and sometimes as unwelcome as the French in Algeria, the British in Cyprus or the Russians in central Europe. After years of being shocked by the imperialism of others, we are developing a new kind of our own, and we find ourselves scowling at the Soviet Union and spending billions for weapons against it-and weapons even the testing of which is dangerous to our own popu- lation- without any real provocation and for the simple sub-rational reason that we are challenging the Soviet Russians for domination of large sections of the world.‘ The recent manifestation of globalization, in the view of many Third World intellectuals, is a triumphant Americanization that has advocated a new kind of cultural and economic model: “Besides being an economic system, globalization is an ideology that serves this system. Americani- zation and globalization are highly intertwined.”“ In its drive toward development., the Muslim world needs Western sci- ence and technology. However, Western science cannot be imported with- out the cultural and ethical values that made it. During its imperialist phase, the West used culture and ideas to colonize the Third World. That is why Orientalism as well as missionary and similar activities flourished. Classical imperialism was sustained by the physical presence of the moth- er countq’s troops overseas; both physical and mental conquest went hand in hand. The situation is somewhat different in the age of neoimperialism with its rapid advances in techno log^. The intellectual and cultural integri- ty of small nations is endangered. The purpose of colonialism was to cre- ate an indigenous cultural elite with Western values and plant Western sys- tems of education and thought in the Third World. The culture of colo- nialism was ideological in nature. Today, the cultural invasion through advanced technology leads to the following conclusion: Besides being ide- Abu-Rabi’: Globalization: A Contemporary Islamic Response 29 ological in nature, Western culture seeks to subdue the means of criticism and rationalism in the Third World. In our case, it is aimed at Arab and Muslim “reason,” attempting to make this “reason” forget its unique and An unfortunate fact of today’s world is that no one can rival American economic and intellectual hegemony. This country has huge economic resources, military prowess, advanced technology, and a will to conquer the whole world intellectually.“ Therefore, I rephrase an earlier question: What is to be done in order to achieve an overall rational cul- tural, political, and social renaissance in the contemporary Muslim world? Islamic thought cannot avoid the full implication of the contem- porary cultural challenge of the West, especially of the United States, in the context of the New World Order. The New World Order, inaugurated in the aftermath of the military defeat of Iraq, has become a political phenomenon of universal proportion. In the Arab world, for example, the nationalist response to the West assumed a grassroots orientation after the end of the Cold War. Most states lost interest in Arab unity. What MNammad ‘libid a1 Jiibiri, a leading Moroccan ideologue of Arab nationalism, says has some relevance, glorious past. Arab existence is well and alive. The recent war that the allies have launched against Iraq has undoubtedly pointed to the vitality of Arabism and its enshrined presence in the souls of the Arab masses that rallied to support Iraq, very often against the wishes of their gov- ernments. Also, what is of significance in this regard is the Arab nationalist position that the Francophone Maghrebi thinkers took, many of whom were deprived of learning Arabic in their childhood. In addition to ral- lying their support behind Iraq, they expressed their dismay at and frustration with the European attitude toward Iraq.49 During the age of imperialism, the main purpose of the Arab nation- alist project was to ensure the independence of the Arab world. The inde pendence of Algeria helped achieve that goal. However, the 1967 war was a major setback in that it did not allow Arab unity and solidarity to take deep organizational and intellectual roots in society. The emergence of the regional state in the Arab world, both as an Arab and international politi- cal fact and as a social, economic, and psychological condition that cannot be overstepped, places more hurdles in the way of the Arab nationalist pro- ject. The Arab world is divided now more than ever. In addition to cultur- 30 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 15:3 a1 challenge and political division, it has to consider the Zionist project and its metamorphosis in the context of the New World Order. Based on the above arguments, one would say that the more urgent task of the Third World is to seek economic and political liberation fiom this new hegemony. A crucial factor is cultural decolonization, since the principal goal of postcolonialism is cultural hegemony and the propaga- tion of Western values in the Third World.5o The North refuses to embark upon a thorough conversation on cultural values with the South on the supposition that its own values are the norm-that is, they are universal values-and that adopting them will solve the social and economic prob- lems of the Third Wor1d.l” Not counting its nuclear and military prowess or economic and political influence, “post-colonialism is a weapon that aims at destroying cultural in today’s world and creating one universal homogeneous culture: Occidentalized culture?3 It is no accident that most international hot spots are located in the Muslim world. The main reason for this is the West’s refusal to come to terms with a system of values other than its own. However, the problem is not caused purely by external factors. The Muslim world, like most of the Third World, suffers from the absence of democracy, a crisis in human rights, and a lack of democratic channels through which its people can express their ideas freely. Such a situation, however, has produced no major outcry from the West. Under the regime of globalization, arms pro- duction in the West is on the increase, and its main consumers are in the South, Africa, the Middle East, and Afghanistan. Civil wars are on the increase, mainly in the South. The West, including the now defunct Soviet Union, learned a great lesson after World War 11: not to wage any wars in Europe or the North. A major dilemma facing the contemporary Muslim world is safe- guarding universal cultural diversity and pluralism in the face of mount- ing American hegemony. The answer lies in achieving major change in the thinking of both the North and the South. The North must recognize cultural diversity, and the South must affirm its cultural independence. According to one North African Islamist: “Cultural decolonization, namely, that of hearts and minds, is, in effect, an undertaking of several generations.’’u The United States has begun to mount a war against its new univer- sal enemies in the wake of the Soviet system’s collapse. This is expressed clearly in Samuel Huntington’s thesis.55 The West has become preoccu- pied with the “menace” of Islam or Islamic “terrorism” or “fundamental- ism.” The entire Muslim world, with its cultural and ethnic complexity, has been reduced and atomized into these terms. The fact that most Muslims live in countries ruled by authoritarian regimes supported by the Abu-Rabi’: Globalization: A Contemporary Islamic Response 31 West and its democracies is ignored.56 In fact, real cultural decolonization begins when the West and the Third World intellectual elites consider seriously tlre thesis that modernization must not mean occidentalization, and that there are non-Western ways to modernize. A fascinating phenomenon that characterizes modern civilization is the profound mutation that takes place as a civilization transitions from a “culture of production” to a “culture of information and scientific knowl- edge.” This is possible because of radical breakthroughs in science and technology. Due to the scientific superiority of the West, the information gap between North and South has become insurmountable, and yet it con- tinues to widen day by day. For example, in 1990, the United States pos- sessed 56 percent of the world’s total databanks, especially those of research and science. The European community possessed 28 percent, Japan 12 percent, and the Third World 1 percent. The information gap between North and South has been com- pounded in this age of globalization by ‘‘soft power,” defined as the power of cybernetics and the launching of technological warfare fiom a distance. According to Richard Falk of Princeton University, the current thinking of Western and American elites is that the cybernetic potential is unlimited: Certain strategists in the United States dream of taking control of the cybernetic networks and the fairy-tale rich- es that, apparently$ will be produced by the intellectual industries of learning and knowledge. They want to build the new empire of the eletronic era, at the center of which will be a global market entirely enervated by the tech- nology of the future.57 A country as powerful and as young as the United States is still fasci- nated by the early immigrants’ conquest of the American heartland’s prairies. Initially, the amount of land to be conquered seemed unlimited. But by the end of the nineteenth century, this territorial expansion came to a halt and the American mind had to grapple with new frontiers. The new hntier of the New WorM Order is the conquest of space, which means having full access to cybernet resources. With the brain drain fiom the poor countries continuing and the migration of many high-tech experts h m the former Soviet Union, the United States has enormous technolog- ical resources. American globalization has begun in earnest.” One must note, however, that the advanced Center encourages the migration of skilled profasionals from the Third World and that it has begun to enact laws making it much harder for nonprofessionals to immigrate.” 32 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 15:3 This has resulted in Western economic and political superiority; the spread of Western ideas via the acquisition of Western technology; the brain drain from the Third World to the advanced Center; and the gradual infiltration of Western cultural, intellectual, and scientific values into the Third World. All of this results in an absence of serious cultural dialogue between North and South: “On the other hand, it is the absence of com- munication and cultural tolerance that risks endangering peace in the years to come.’)6o However, despite the “information superiority” exhibited by the West, its people still know very little about the people of the Third World and the challenges facing them. The current mass media in the triumphant Center is no better than its counterpart of twenty years ago, for it still wages a war of ignorance about the real problems affecting the South. This double face of globalization (too much information on the Third World but too little knowledge of its problems) becomes more dangerous when new capital forces penetrate every corner of the world and fashion it according to the demands of the new global economy.6’ The advanced West uses its superior research technology to make more profit at the expense of the Third World, especially as the unequal conditions between North and South seem to persist!* Globalization also has accelerated the brain drain from the Third World to the advanced Center. Many Third World intellectuals and pro- fessionals prefer to reside in the United States. This process has been rightly termed intellectual hemorrhage, since it depletes poor countries of much-needed expertise in all scientific fields. Many emigrate not just in search of better economic and social standards, but because the develop- ment process in their native countries lacks the appropriate vision to incorporate them productively. Very often, this is complemented by blind imitation of the modernized North, which leads to a transfer of technolo- gy with no creative contribution from the South. In other words, the South can purchase technology, but it must create its own forms of modernity and modernization. However, these forms cannot be created if native skilled professionals continue to leave. As a consequence of this unfortu- nate state of affairs, the Muslim world and the rest of the Third World suf- fer from the interdependent problems of illiteracy, an absence of rigorous scientific research, and a lack of democratic values. This bleeding of mental resources is an alarming phenomenon. However, it has led to some positive results, especially in the advanced Center, where a dialogue about competing cultural and religious values is taking place between people of different religious and cultural communi- ties.“ In addition, the North needed Third World workers. Europe import- ed skilled and nonskilled labor from many Muslim countries, most Abu-Rabi’: Globalization: A Contemporary Islamic Response 33 notably Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Turkey, and Pakistan. This continuing exodus exposes the continuing underdevelopment of these countries. “Underdeveloment is the inability to create or use skilled human resources intelligently.”” Skilled migrants do not leave for financial rea- sons alone, but because their adopted country offers a better chance to obtain further education in their profession and more opportunities for advancement. Scientific knowledge is a major landmark of development and progress in contemporary society. Due to rapid advances in science and technology, the world of knowledge will double its scientific information in the next decade or so. This is tremendous, in view of the fact that we are learning more in a decade than our ancestors did in a thousand years. But the West and Japan control most of this knowledge, and the best brains of the Third World continue to migrate to the Center. This causes fbndamental “knowledge” gaps between North and South and, coupled with the North’s feeling of cultural superiority, makes it difficult to estab- lish effective North-South cultural communication: “It is a question of ethnocentrism that makes it difficult to establish true cultural communi- cation.”65 The West, now 22 percent of the world’s population and per- haps only 16 percent 30 years from now, consumes 70 percent of total world resources and has three major obsessions: Third World demo- graphic trends, the Judeo-Christian ethic, and Japan.& The world is facing the challenge of cultural pluralism. The future holds two possible scenarios: the reinforcement of a monolithic interna- tional system, as seen today in the New World Order characterized by American supremacy, or the maintenance of cultural diversity, a value that the world must defend. Without defending this right, the Third World will not achieve full cultural liberation and independence. The West is recreating past history by a new form of recolonization: post- colonialism. Globalization is constructing a new world that, a few decades from now, will look very different. Major transformations are already occurring: the collapse of socialism and the spread of privatization to such countries as China, India, and Egypt; the rise of regional powers, such as the European community, in the wake of American supremacy; the widening of social and economic gaps between rich and poor within and between countries; the globalization of exploitation, a natural consequence of pri- vatization and multinational investment; the rise of ultranationalism, eth- nic cleansing, and new refugee problems; the internationalization of crime, especially Mafia-related crime; the destabilization of the nation-state; and the creation of new international 34 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 15:3 Zionism and Globalization Further, in post-colonialism, the Zionist project has taken on a new role that is financed and morally supported by the United States as Ze chef defile du post-colonialisme. The passage fiom colonialism to post-colo- nialism has been aided by the ex-colonizing countries and ratified by the United Nations. And against this context, the Zionist project has sought the recognition of the chief Arab states. The Zionist project, beginning around the same time as the Arab nationalist project in the nineteenth century, reinvented itself under the Likud government by stubbornly clinging to dichotomies: civilization vs. barbarism, compassion vs. terrorism, democracy vs. totalitarianism, and democratic Israelis vs. backward Arabs and Muslims. What might happen to the Zionist project in the future is an important question. For example, it is almost impossible to predict with exact accu- racy where Israel will be 50 years fiom now. However, as globalization begins to take deep roots in the world economy and culture, I think that the Middle East in general and Israel in particular wit1 be less important than they currently are to the economic, military, and political strategies of the capitalist Center. Both (Arab) petroleum and Zionism (or any other form of Middle Eastern nationalism) will have to change their character drastically in order to meet the deep political, cultural, and economic changes that will be engendered by globalization. What the above means is that it is impossible to envision the fate of Israel 50 years from now without taking into account the importance of the Middle East as a whole in the same period. The year 1948 saw the triumph and the culmination of the Zionist project: the creation of a strong Israeli nation-state, whose aim was sup posedly to provide a safe haven to its citizens and presumably world Jewry." Some 50 years later, Israel emerges as the most powerhl military state in the Middle East, thanks to the military debacle of Nasserism in the 1967 war and the destruction of the military capabilities of Iraq in the second Gulf war and its aftermath. Although attracting a diverse popula- tion from many corners of the world (i.e., from the Arab world, eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and Ethiopia), the majority of the Jews of the Center (ie., West Europe and North America) have so far shown no real intention of migrating to and living in Israel. In a sense, this leaves the grandiose Zionist project unfblfilled and thus curtailed in spite of the huge financial sacrifice the Jews of the Center have made on Israel's behalf. In a sense, the Jews of the Center who have been in the forefront of globalization detest, in essence, the limited and nationalist essence of Zionism. Although they are its biggest supporters at this stage in history, it is possible that they will oppose it in the future. Abu-Rabi‘: Globalization: A Contemporary Islamic Response 35 Several factors have hindered the mass emigration of Center Jews to Israel: its military nature (since 1948, Israel has gone through several major w m ) and the nature of the Palestinian problem created in the wake of Israel’s establishment. As the Palestinians are perceived as a nation that has been wounded deeply since 1948, there is less and less certainty in the Western world about the central tenets of Zionism, especially in the hands of the Likud. To my mind, the next 50 years in the life of Israel will be somewhat different from the past 50 years. There is a growing dissatisfaction among many Israeli and overseas Jews with the military nature of the state; an increasingly greater appreciation of Palestinian suffering; and a deep understanding, by even the most Zionist of Jews in Israel, that the Israeli economy cannot survive permanently on foreign aid, be it American or European or even Jewish. The fate of the Palestinians and the Israelis will be more intertwined due to demographic and cultural factors. On the demographic side, the cur- rent birth rate of the Jewish and Palestinian populations suggests that the Palestinians in Israel (those who carry Israeli citizenship and who are cur- rently estimated at 850,000) will be around 2.5 million 50 years from now, excluding those in the West Bank and Gaza, who are estimated to become around 5-6 million 50 years from now. It is doubtful that the Jewish popu- lation in Israel will be more than 9 million 50 years from now. Second, on the cultural level, Israeli Jews who immigrated from the Arab world will have more say in the cultural and political affairs of Israeli society and, despite their conservative political leanings, will advocate a cultural Arab- Israeli rapprochement. This is normal in view of the fact that many of them are trying to discover their cultural and religious identity, which was con- structed outside of the existing IsraelUPalestinian boundaries. All of the above will help dilute the Israeli state’s strong military nature and create a more humane and Middle Eastern-bound Israeli soci- ety, a society that sees its survival in reconciliation with its Middle Eastern environment and Arabfislamic culture in general. The Globalization of American Islam I would like to touch on one last major point that relates to the life of the Muslim community in the United States. Many American Muslims believe that only in this country do Muslims have a real opportunity to form a genuine Islamic identity, consciousness, and worldview. This posi- tion is predicated on the following: 1. American cultural and religious space, as it has developed over time, tolerates the formation of new cultural and religious identities; 36 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 15:3 2. Since the cultural makeup of the American Muslim community is very diverse, this country is one of the few areas in the world that could enable Muslims coming from diverse cultural and ethnic backgrounds to mingle freely with each other, and thus pave the way for the formation of a universal Islamic culture, with unique American characteristics, within the boundaries of secularism. In other words, some cling to the view that the Muslims in the heart of the globalized West have a better chance than in any Muslim country to construct a truly universal Muslim community. This thesis is very attractive, and it requires our deep consideration. Internal events in the life of the American Muslim community (both immigrant and indigenous) and recent external changes in the world order, especially the collapse of the Soviet Union and increasing American entanglement in the Muslim world’s economic and political affairs, have transformed the Muslim community from an exotic (and sometimes scary) group of people into a conspicuous and expanding community. Muslims cannot afford to keep their distance from American religious life and the real challenges that secularism poses to the theistic mind. The American Muslim community is still laying its intellectual (viz., religious) and institutional foundations by appealing both to the central Islamic tradition developing in the Islamic core (the Middle East) over many centuries, and by negotiating, although feebly and perhaps with an unclear vision, with American modernity for a place for Islam in this cul- ture. Muslims know that both to survive in this country and to preserve their Islamic identity, a new group of Muslim intelligentsia needs to emerge to reinterpret the vast Islamic tradition in a new situation while analyzing the coexistence of other religious communities with the present social and political order. Muslims must recognize that they live in a multicultural, pluralistic and religiously diverse society, and that some of their classical legal for- mulations (e.g., dir af &rb and &ir af Zsfdm) might not suit their new position in American society. Eventually, Muslims would have to formu- late new legal and theological concepts to express their community’s unique nature, its interaction with other religious communities, and its tolerance of many diverse views and philosophies. In other words, Muslims should answer the following criticism shared by some observers of Islam in the American scene, Muslims who take their religion seriously cannot believe in separation of religion and state, and religious plural- ism is a concept alien to the ideal of a Muslim society. Abu-Rabi’: Globalization: A Contemporary Islamic Response 37 Consequently, Muslims in the United States should be allowed to practice their religion but not to the point where it inhibits or threatens the religious freedom of others, and certainly not to the point of practicing jihcrd (holy war) against non-Mu~lims.~~ This formulation comes from a hostile observer. I think that the most important questions are: How can Muslims interpret the new threats of American globalization to both the Muslim world and the poor masses in the United States? Have American Muslims been used as tools in the hands of globalization in order to impoverish the Third World? It seems that one way to forge a Muslim consensus on these questions is to achieve a measure of true understanding between the two larger communities that comprise American Islam: the indigenous and immi- grant. Both groups face a common challenge: how to articulate an Islamic consciousness that can grasp the central tenets of both modernism and globalization, and that is aware of their impact on the contemporary Muslim world. Further, it is possible to raise the question of how to produce an American Muslim intellectual class that is authentic to its larger Islamic tradition and firmly engaged in the major questions and problems facing the various sectors of the Muslim community, sectors that represent a wide range of cultural, social, and economic backgrounds and aspirations. American Muslims are in a better position than many other Muslims to enlighten the Muslim world on the scope and hazards of globalization and thus resolve some of the central questions facing contemporary Muslim thought. Final Thoughts The Western mind-set, which has shaped the socioeconomic and intel- lectual destinies of the world since the Industrial Revolution, has centered on the notion of progre~s.’~ To some, the potential for progress appeared ~nlimited.~’ The physical and mental terrain of the Third World was there to occupy and colonize. According to one author, in the modem world view, “a salvational sense of progress places economic expansion and technological innovation at the center of irnp~Ttance.”~~ The phenomenon of progress has posed a major challenge to traditional cultures, their socioeconomic bases, and their ethical worldviews. Globalization has not given up on progress, even the most damaging forms of progress, such as those leading to a new form of colonization. According to Hannah Arendt, the classical notion of progress led to a ‘‘process of never-ending accumu- 38 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 15:3 lation of power necessary for the protection of a never-ending accumula- tion of capital [which] determined the ‘progressive’ ideology of the late nineteenth century and foreshadowed the rise of imperiali~rn.”~~ Globalization is leading already to a new form of colonization that is more subtle and destructive than the classical one. Furthermore globalization, the latest manifestation of the modem mind-set, has created confusion as to what is important in life. Traditional notions of prosperity, connectedness, community-building, and aiding the poor have been displaced by new aggressive notions of what life means. Before the dawn of the twentieth century, the Muslim world’s reli- gious intelligentsia considered European progress to @e devoid of any ethical foundation. Some, however, argued that the Western mind-set had a centuries-long intent to build on ethical foundations that did not sub- scribe to those of the monotheistic revelations. Under the aegis of globalization, the ethic of the Western mind-set encourages the fast accumulation of wealth and its accompanying power. Extravagant consumerism is the norm. In the view of Richard Falk, At present, it is mainly the consequence of the globaliza- tion of Western cultural influence, including its commit- ment to modernization, that has produced a world order crisis of multiple dimensions: nuclearism, industrialism, materialism, consumerism.” In view of the colossal consequences of globalization, a new pop- ular consciousness has to evolve to understand and resist the negative tendencies of globalization. The Muslim world must work hard to revive the social, financial, and economic ethics of Islam, as a monotheistic phenomenon, to combat these dangerous inclinations. It is important to revive a sense of community that withstands the attacks of individualism, which have become the rule of the day in advanced industrial societies and their Third World satellites. With increasing gaps between North and South, and rural-urban gaps within most coun- tries of the South, and the increasing number of marginalized and impoverished people in the cities, there is no escape from reviving the Islamic communal ethic that “commands the good and prohibits the It is important to remember that for traditional philosophies and worldviews to remain alive in a highly competitive and individualistic world, solutions must be offered on the basis of the traditional worldview. These solutions must take into account the social and psychological rav- Abu-Rabi’: Globalization: A Contemporary Islamic Response 39 ages created by globalization in the Muslim In other words, how can we formulate Islamic answers to the economic and cultural problems and dislocations created by globalization and its allies in the Muslim world? We must not forget the most relevant example of Indonesia, a country that launched a seemingly adventurous modernization program in the late 1960s and whose economy collapsed all of a sudden in early 1998. One wonders what went wrong in the country! It is amazing to realize that the personal wealth of ex-president Suharto and his family almost equals the approved loan of the International Monetary Fund to Indonesia. Therefore, the question is: How do the political and military elites in the Muslim world manage to gather such unbelievable wealth under the aegis of globalization? End notes 1. Sub-Commandant Marcos, “La 4e guerre mondiale a commence,” [The Fourth World War has begun.], Le Monde Diplomatique (The Diplomatic World) (August 1997), 1. 2. 3. 4. Muhammad ‘Abid a1 Jabiri, Qaa2ya fi a1 Fikr al Mu’cisir [Issues in Contemporary Thought] (Beirut: M a r k m a t al W&dah al-‘Arabiyah, 1997), 144. Charlene Spretnak, The Resurgence of the Real: B+, Nature and Place in a Hypermodern World (New York Addison-Wesley, 1997), 11. John Harris, a Canadian journalist for This Magazine. Quoted by Maude Barlow and Heather-Jane Robertson, “Homogenization of Education,” in The Case Against the Global Economy: And for a Turn Toward the Local, edited by Jerry Mander and Edward Goldsmith, (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1996), 62-63. See Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi‘, Intellectual origins of Islamic Reswgence in the Modern Arab World (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), Chapter One. Indonesia has received a lot of coverage in the West lately. Consult the follow- ing articles: V. S. Naipul, “Indonesia: The Man of the Moment,” The New York Review of Books (11 June 1998), 40-45; Noam Chomsky, “L‘hdonesie, atout Maitre du Jeu Amkricain, Le Mom& Diplomatique (June 1998). See Grard De Selys, Tableau noir, appel A la risistance cotatre la privatisation de l’enseignement (Bruxelles: EPO, 1998). Helena Norberg-Hodge, “The Pressure to Modernize and Globalize,” in The Case Against the Global Economy: And for a Turn Toward the Local, edited by Jerry Mander and Edward Goldsmith, (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1996). 36. See Theodore Roszak, The Cult of Information: The Folklore of Computers and the True Art of Thinking (New Yo& Pantheon Books, 1986); Vandana Shiva, Mono-ml- hves of the Mind: Biodiversi& Biotechnology. and the Third World (Penang, Malaysia: Third World Network, 1993). 10. In the case of India, for example, see R Mukhjee, The Rise and Fall of the Eart India Company (Berlin: Veb Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1958). 11. See Edward Shils, The Intellectuals and the Powers and Other Essays (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1972), especially Chapter Three, “Intellectuals in Underdeveloped Countries.” 12. See H. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), and The White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979). 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 40 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 15:3 13. On the domestic effects of the Cold War in the United States, see James T. Pat- terson, Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945-1974 (New York: Oxford University 14. See J. Decomoyn, “Capital PrivC, Nveloppement du Sud et Solidaritt Mondiale: k s multinationales, omniprtsentes et ... impuissantes.” Le Monde Diplomatique (Novembre 1988), 8-9; M. Horsman and A. Marshall, After the Nation State (London: Harper Collins, 1994); K. Ohmae, The Borderless World (London: Harper Collins, 1990); and R. Reich, The Work ofNations (New York: Knopf, 1991). According to Samir Amin, “Although the new globalization [of the 1990~1 has inhibited the ability of the nation-state to manange its domestic economy, it has not cancelled out the presence of the state.” Samir Amin, Fi muwiijutuit azmat ‘qrim- pace to Face with the Crisis of Our Age] (Cairo: Sins’ li al Nashr, 1997), 71. 15. B. Karlin, “Space: New Frontier for US Entrepreneurs.” International Herald Tribune (14 September 1988). 16. Decornoyn, “Capital Privt,” 9. 17. Amin, Fi muwtijh-t, 20-21. 18. See Z. Laidi and et al., L ’or& mondial relache (Paris: Presses de la Fondation 19. See S . Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Dijiiion of Power in the World 20. See Samir Amin, Les dtjis de la mondialisation (Paris: L‘HarmaWorum du 21. Amin, Fimuwiijh-t, 133. 22. Immanuel Wallerstein, After Liberalism (New York The New Press, 1995), 15. 23. See Daniel T. Griswold, “Blessings and Burdens of Globalization,” The World and I (April 1998): 30-35. 24. See P. Bairoch and E. Helleiner, States Against Markets: The Limits of Globalization (London: Routledge, 1996). 25. See Peter Martin, “La mondialisation est-elle intvitable? Une obligation morale.” Le Monde Diplomutque (June 1997), 14. The author claims the following: “Les dtbats sur la mondialisation se polarisent gtneralement sur ses enjeux tconomiques. Je voudrais, pour ma part, mettre en avant les arguments profondkment moraux qui plaident en sa faveur, et que l’on peut dsumer en une phrase: l’inttgration acctltrte de socittts autrefois marginalisees est la meilleure chose qui soit anivte du vivant de la gtntration d’aprk-guerre. La mondialisation constitue une authentique collaboration par-delh les frontikres, des socitt6s et des cultures, contrairement aux collaborations factices des dia- logues Nod-Sud et des tlites bureaucratiques. Non seulement elle a sap6 les fondations de l’empire du ma1 sovittique, mais elle est en train d’en faire autant en Chine. Mdme sans ces effets politiques directs, ses vertus auraient Btt extraordinaires: elle a provoquB une tnorme amtlioration du bonheur humain dans les socibtts ayant su saisir les chances qu’elle offre. Cette transformation produira les effets exactement inverses de ceux invo- quts par les gens qui, A gauche, en font le procks. Sous son impulsion, le pouvoir se dB- placera ktsistiblement des pays dtveloppi5s vers le reste du monde. C’est le d6sir d’emeher A tout prix ce transfert qui sous-tend la vision du monde des critiques de la mondialisation. Leurs arguments, de mon point de vue, reposent sur un dtsir ViscBral de pfiserver le statu quo et de p6renniser I’htgBmonie de leur idtologie profondtment con- sewatrice ... k s critiques les plus raffints admettent que des millions d‘emplois ont 6t6 crss. Mais, disent-ils, il ne s’agit pas de vtritables emplois, mais d’une exploitation thonbk de la main-&oeuvre. Allez dire cela aux travailleurs bien formts de Hongkong, de Singapour, de Malaisie, de Thailande, aux ouvriers de I’tlectronique d’Acer, aux Press, 1996). Nationales des Sciences, 1994). Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). tiers-monde, 1996). Abu-Rabi’: Globalization: A Contemporary Islamic Response 41 ouvriers de l’automobile de Daewoo. Allez dire cela aux travailleurs de la Chine merid- ionale qui ont kchappi5 A la vie miserable et Creintante des campagnes et qui avancent - effectivement dans les pires conditions de travail - vers une authentique pn>spi5rit€ et une authentique autonomie de vie.” Ibid., 14. 26. Ignacio Ramonet, “Rtgimes globalitaires.” Le Monde Diplomatique (January 1997), 1. Accoridng to Ramonet, “On appelait ‘kgimes totalitaires’ ces kgimes & parti unique qui n’admettaient aucune opposition organiste, qui subordonnaient les droits de la personne A la raison d’Etat, et dans lesquels le pouvoir politique dirigeait souveraine- ment la totalit6 des activitts de la socittt dominte. A ces systtmes succtde, en cette fin de sitcle, un autre type de totalitarisme, celui des ‘regimes globalitaires’. Reposant sur les d o p e s de la globalisation et de la penste unique, ils n’admettent aucune autre poli- tique economique, subordonnent les droits sociaw du citoyen A la raison comfititive, et abandonnent aux marches financiers la direction totale des activites de la soci6t6 dominte.” Ibid. 27. See Paul Hirst and Graham Thompson, Globalization in Question: The Inter- national Economy and the Possibilities of Government (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996). 28. Spretnak, Resurgence of the Real, 34. 29. See C. de Brie, “Le couple Etat-nation en instance de divorce.” Le Monde Diplomatique (May 1989). 30. See Nancy Birdsall, “Life is Unfair: Inequality in the World,” Foreign Policy (Summer 1998): 95-1 13. 31. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Routledge, 1991)140. 32. Pierre Bourdieu, “L‘essence du ntoliberalisme,” Le Monde Diplomatique (March 1998), 3. 33. H. L. Mencken, The American English: An Inquiry into the Development of English in the United States (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), 25. 34. Richard Ohman, “English and the Cold War,” in The Cold War and the University: Toward an Intellectual History of the Cold War Years, edited by Noam Chomsky et al., (New York The New Press, 1997), 73. 35. See E. J. Perkins, The World Economy in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Schenkman, 1983). 36. M. Beaud, “Jamais Tant de Richesses, Jamais tant de Midre ... Sur les causes de la pauvrett des nations et des hommes dans le monde contemporain.” Le Monde Diplomatique (Novembre 1997), 11. 37. See Chalres William Maynes, “The Perils of an Imperial America,” Foreign Policy (Summer 1998): 36-49. 38. One must note that even some European, most notably French intellectuals, are discussing how to respond to what they see as the American cultural menace directed at Europe, and are seeking ways to protect cultural diversity and reviving their cultural inde- pendence vis-A-vis the United States. See Paul-Marie de la Gorce, Le Dernier Empire (Paris: Grasset, 1996), and Ignacio Ramonet, “L‘empire americain.” Le Mom& Diploma- tique (February 1997), 1. Henry Kissinger reflects the American view on this matter, “A united Europe is likely to insist on a specifically European view of world flairs-which is another way of saying that it will challenge American hegemony in Atlantic policy. This may well be a price worth paying for European unity, but American policy has suffered from an unwillingness to recognize that there is a price to be paid.” Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 82. Another architect of contemporary American policy argues that the strategic task of the United States is to pre- vent the emergence of a dominant and antagonistic Eurasian power and to create a stable 42 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 15:3 continental equilibrium with the United States as the political arbiter. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessbod: American Primacy and I& Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: Basic Books, 1999, especially Chapter Two. 39. A. Ahmad, Islamic M&rnism in India andPakistan (London: oxford University 40. For a detailed discussion, see Abu-Rabi‘, Intellectual Origim, especially Chapter One. 41. ‘Abd a1 Ilah Bilqaziz, “al ‘Awlamah wa a1 hawiyah a1 thaqafiyah” [Globalization and Cultural Identity], a1 Mustaqbal a1 ‘Arabi (March 1998), 92. 42. “Le post-colonialisme est un phgnomene trgs ¢ qui date du &but des ann€es 1990, comme suite ti la chute des ri5gimes communistes, la Guerre du Golfe et I’ef- fritement du peu d’unite que le Tiers Monde etait parvenu a consbuire ....Le post-colo- nialisme est, avant tout, le preduit du ‘nouvel ordre mondial’.” Mahdi Elmandjra, La &colonization culfurelle: Defi majeur du 212me sidcle (Marrakech ~orocco] : Editions Walili, 1996, and Paris: Futuribles, 1996), 208. 43. See for example Mulpunmad ‘Abid al Jsbiri, Introduction a la critique de la rai- son arabe (Casablanca: Editions le Fennec, 1995) and a1 m h r P a1 tuzh&wi a1 ‘arabi [The Project of Arab Renaissance] (Beirut: Markaz m a t al Wibdah al ‘Arabiyah, 1996). 44. Paul-Marie de la Gorce, Le Dernier Empire (Paris: Grasset, 1996), 16. 45. Claude Julien, L’empire am&icaine (Paris: Grasset, 1968), 25. The same ideas are presented by Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber in, Le &fi ambicain (Paris: Denoel, 1967). 46. Edmund Wilson, The American Earthquake: A Chronicle of the Roaring Twenties, the Great Depssion and the Dawn of the New Deal (New York: Da Capo Press, 1996), 569. 47. M~@irnmad ‘Abid al JHbG “al ‘Awlamah, ni@m wa aydiyolojiyah,’’ in a1 Majlis al Qawm- li al Thaqqah al ‘Arabiyah. al ‘Arab wa ta?Kuiiyiit al ‘ a w l a h (Rabiit: al MJXS al Qawmi li al Thaqilfah al ‘Arabiyah, 1997), 15. Several Islamist and Arab nationalist thinkers share the above views. For example, the Egyptian Islamist, Mwmmad IbriWm MabW contends in a very controversial book that the United States encourages pragmatism in the Muslim world as a means of colonizing this world in a new way. See Mulpmmad I b m M a w Ameria wa al Isliim al nafi‘i [America and Pragmatic Islam] (Cairo: MLr al Tawzi‘ wa al Nashr a1 Islhiyah, 1989), especially pp. 19 1-2 1 1. See also ‘Adil uusayn, al IqtigTd al Meri: Min al Istiqlal iki al Taba’iyah [The Egyptian Economy: From Autonomy to Dependency] (Cairo: MLr al Mustaqbal al ‘Arabi, 1986), and Ramzi Zaki, Mushkildt Misr al fqtisadiyah [Egypt’s Economic Problem] (Cairo: MLr al Fati4 al ‘Arabi, 1982). 48. Ignacio Ramonet, “L‘empire americain.” Le M o d Diplomatique (February 1997), 1. See also Paul Salem, “al ‘Arab wa al ‘awlamah,” a1 Musfqabal al ‘Arabi (March, 49. Mulpmmad ‘Abid al Jab%, Mas‘alot al hawiyah: al ‘Unibah, al Isldm wa a1 Gharb m e Issue of Identity: Arabism, Islam, and the Occident] (Beirut: M a r k m a t al W w al ‘Arabiyah, 1595), 16. 50. “Mais la lib6ration du Sud passe d’abord par une decolonisation culturelle car un des principaux objectifs du postcolonialisme est l’hI5gI5monie culturelle et la propaga- tion des valem occidentales. Les conflits a venir seront des mnflits de valem et il y a une tres grande urgence a developper une communication culturelle entre le Nord et le Sud.” M. Elmandjra, La Dicolonisation cultun?lle, 214. 5 1. “Le Nord a di5ployI5 jusqu’a pr6sent tr&s peu &efforts pour comprendre et encore moins pour parler le langage du Sud. Il faut accorder une priorit6 aux sys ths de valeurs Press, 1967). 1998): 78-90. Abu-Rabi’: Globalization: A Contemporary Islamic Response 43 pour se rendre compte que la crise actuelle entre le Nord et le Sud est une crise du systkme total.” Mahdi Elmandjra, Retrospective des futurs (Casablanca: Ouyoun, 1992), 164. 52. Elmandjra, La Dicolonisation culturelle, 215. 53. Mahdi Elmandjra, al Harb al w - r i y a h al olah [The First Civilizational War] 54. Elmandjra, La Dicolonisation cultwzlle, 15. 55. Samuel Huntingdon, The Clash of Civilizations. 56. Brian Goodwin, How the Leopard Changed Its Spots: The Evolution of complexity (New Yo& Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1994); Mitchell M. Waldrop, Complexity: The Emerghg Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos (New York Simon and Schuster, 1992) 57. Richard Falk, “Vers une domination mondiale de nouveau type.” Le Monde Diplomatique (May 1996), 16. Professor Falk goes on to describe in detail the new mean- ing of freedom that is being invented by the supporters of cyberspace technology: AM. John Perry Barlow, tminent futurologue, cofondateur de la Fondation de la frontikre Clec- tronique de Davos (fait significatif, ce village suisse accueille chaque annte les respons- ables du capitalisme mondial), a publit une “Dtclaration d’inde’pendance du Cyberspace”. Elle s’ouvre par ces mots: “Gouvemements du monde industrialid, g h t s fatiguts faits de chair et d’acier, j’arrive du Cyberspace, la nouvelle habitation de I’esprit (...). Vous n’2tes pas les bienvenus parmi nous. Vous n’gtes pas souverains 19 ob nous rassemblons.” Et de dtfier ouvertement tout contr6le territorial: “Vos concepts juridiques de proprittc!, d’expression, d’identitc!, de mouvement et de contexte ne s’appliquent pas 9 nous. 11s sont b&s sw la mati8re. I1 n’y a pas de matikre ici.” M. Barlow s’engage B “cder une civilisation de I’esprit dans le Cyberspace.” Elle sera, selon hi, ‘plus humaine et plus juste que le monde auparavant c d t par vos gouvemements’. Dans cette optique, I’Etat n’est 6 I’Cvidence en rien source de pouvoir, d’identitc!, d’autoritc! Mgale.” 58. See Joseph Nye et William Owens, “America’s Information Edge,” Foreign Alpairs (March-April 1996). 59. S. Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). 60. J. Nye and W. Owens, “America’s Information Edge,” 29-30. 61. See William Greider, One World, Rea4 or Not: The Manic Logic of Global Capitalism (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997); A. Gresh, “Les aleas de I’interna- tionalisme,” Le Monde Diplomatique (May 1998), 12. 62. Richard Barnet and John Cavanagh, Global Dreams: Imperial Corporations and the New World Order (New York Simon and Schuster, 1994); M. L. Bouguerra, Le recherche c o n h le Rers-Mode (Paris: PUF, 1993). 63. For a detailed discussion of this subject, consult Claude Iiauzu, Race et civili- sation: L Xutre hns la culture occidentale (Paris: Syros, 1992). 64. Elmandjra, La Dicolonisation culturelle, 175. 65. Ibid., 188. 66. Ibid. 67. See the interesting article by Le Sous-Commandant Marcos, “La 4e guerre 68. See Zeev Stemhell, The Founding Myths of Israel: Nationalism, Socialism and 69. Dinesh D’Souza, “Solving America’s Multi cultural Dilemma,” The World and 70. See Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi’, “Beyond the Post-Modem Mind.” American (Casablanca: ‘Urn 1994), 21-22. mondiale a comment€," L.e Monde Diplomatque (August 1997). the Making of the Jewish State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). I(January 1996), 35. Jownal of Islamic Social Sciences 7 (September 1990): 235-56. 44 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 153 71. See Jean-Marie Domenach, Enquete dur les idees contemporaine (Paris: Points, 72. Spretnak, Resurgence of the Real, 2. 73. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Cleveland: Meridian Books, 74. Richard Falk, Explorations at the Edge of Time: The Prospects for World Order (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), 48 75. See David R. Griffin and Huston Smith, Primordial Truth and Postmodern Theology (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989). One must note that Christian thinkers and theologians were quicker than their Muslim counterpart in provid- ing ethical answers to the challenges of globalization. Consult, Hans Kung, A Global Ethic for Global Politics and Economics (New York Oxford University Press, 1998), especially Chapter Two. 76. See Akbar S. Ahmed, Postmodernism and Islam: Predicament and Promise (London: Routledge, 1992); Akbar S. Ahmed and Donnan Hastings (eds.), Islam, Globali- zation and Postmodernity (London: Routledge, 1994); Walden Bello, New Third World: Strategies for Survival in the Global Economy (London: Eathscan, 1990). 1987). 1%3), 143.