!32 greater competition among ideological, cultural, ethnic, and religious strains; and, for Muslims, the intellectual shift from the Middle Eastern heartland of Islamto other places, such as the United States and Southeast Asia, is bound to accelerate with English, not Arabic, assuming the role as the lingua franca of the Muslim world. What do all of the above trends mean to Muslims? Of the many chal- lenges they can expect to face in the coming century, perhaps three can be highlighted here: a) economic: how to upgrade their knowledge and skills, that, while making them relevant to the new age while keeping them in line with the Islamic conception of knowledge; b) socio-cultural: how to deal with westernization and its attendant values of secularism, national- ism, and capitalism, and still maintain their Islamic identity; and c) politi- cal: domestically, what type of leadership should Muslims have and the quest for an Islamic state and, internationally, how the Islamic leadership can exercise leverage on the world community. The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 13:l The Economic Challenge: This is closely related to the quest for knowledge and the need to upgrade technological competencies and skills. This factor of knowledge (‘ilm) is not new. From time immemor- ial, there has been one valuable constant in human civilization: the bet- ter equipped and the more knowledgeable will prosper over others-as was true of the earlier Chinese, Hindu, Greek, Persian, and Egyptian civ- ilizations. That was also the situation with pre-Islamic Arab civilization, for the region was so backward and pitiful that the superpowers of the time, Byzantium and Persia, simply ignored it as unworthy and unde- serving of their attention. Contrast that with the superiority that Arabs, once Islamized and knowledgeable, attained over others and became the envy of many peoples. Thus Muslims have been ordered to seek knowledge and to upgrade their skills so that they are relevant to the requirements of their age. It is no exaggeration to say that we need more scientists, engineers, busi- ness entrepreneurs” (particularly with a global outlook), networking among Muslim scholars and experts, consultants, and other expertise. The pursuit of knowledge and the upgrading of competence has no boundaries and must not be confined to Muslim lands, for the Prophet advised Muslims to go even to China, then a major center of learning and civilization. They are also well aware that there are many Qur’anic statements about the difference between those with knowledge and those without it (Qur’an 39:9) and how the knowledgeable are higher than others in the eyes of God (Qur’an 58:11).13 The Prophet also said that knowledge is like a lost treasure that Muslims must find and regain, and that the ulama (men of knowledge) are like a bright constellation of stars on a dark night. This principle aside, there is another critical aspect of knowledge worthy of Muslim thought: Knowledge is related to belief (ImCm). If knowledge is the only criteria for ranking people, then Iblis and Shay@n Mutalib: Islamic Resurgence and the Twenty-First Century 93 are higher then humans, for they are more knowledgeable. The key dis- tinction here is that humans have, or (as Muslims) are expected to have, belief. With ‘ilm, imin , and ihstZn, we go to Paradise and leave Hell for Shaygin. There is a Qur’anic supplication commonly recited by Muslim after prayers: “0 Allah, I seek from Thee knowledge and intellect and gather me in the company of the pious” (26:83). Nothing is said about being gathered in the company of the clever/knowledgeable only. Knowledgeable Muslims also have read how earlier jurists, philoso- phers, scientists, and others were people of learning, experts and spe- cialists of repute, and full of piety and faith. There is no need to stretch our memory far to find such examples as ‘Afi ibn Abu Talib, who was not only described by the Prophet as the gate of knowledge but who used his knowledge in the cause of Islam. As Muslims brace to face the economic challenge of the twenty-first century, this knowledge-belief twining in the Islamic conception of knowledge deserves some atten- tion, particularly among Muslims professionals, youths, and educated people. Otherwise, they may waste effort and resources to produce many educated and knowledgeable Muslims who may bring Muslims no closer to success and salvation. In fact, the experience of many Muslim peoples and states have shown that knowledgeable and educat- ed Muslims could actually tear asunder their societies and even sacri- fice their religion. The Sociocultural Challenge: Although this challenge contains many issues and concerns, we will limit it to two related matters: westernization and its impact on the preservation of Islamic identity.14 At this juncture, it is imperative to distinguish between westernization and modernization, for they are not synonymous. While the latter tends to be positive and desir- able, the former can be prejudicial to Muslims if they copy everything that comes from the West as good. Consider how nationalism, capitalism, and especially secularism can be quite inimical to our progress. Nationalism, the product of modem European history and closely linked with the origins of popular sover- eignty, means attaching one’s supreme loyalty to the nation-state. It asserts that this entity is the ideal and only form of political organiza- tion.‘’ Once it is established, its citizens have to defend it fully and sur- render their complete loyalty to it. Carried to the extreme, nationalism stresses the nation’s distinct character, race, and creed. Muslims, living in what is essentially a world of nation-states, are confronted with this stark reality and have to accept it and adjust their aspirations and actions accordingly. While the idea of loving one’s country (watanlyah) does not contradict the Islamic worldview, for the Prophet had said that love of one’s abode (hubb a1 watan) is a sign of piety, an abiding and blind preoccupation with the state and its people-centered sovereignty may pose problems. Here again, while it is permissible to accept Ibn Khaldiin’s concept of ‘asabiyah 94 (a sense of group or national consciousness and solidarity) as Islamically defensible, there are problems if it becomes tu‘iisub, a parochial and blind love of something, manifest in the popular nationalist dictum, “my nation, right or wrong.”I6 Just consider one aspect of the western value system: secularism. In this ideology, religion is separated from politics in the affairs of the state, and material well-being is deemed to be most essential to human happi- ness. In this regard it is related to capitalism, which espouses the ideol- ogy of material prosperity in an open free market system and where ownership of wealth, resources, and venture capital, usually gained via private enterprise, determines an individual’s or a state’s progress. With its emphasis on achieving maximum efficiency, secularism rejects any form of theocracy, viewing religion as incompatible with development and modernity. Hence, secularism is the antithesis of Islam, for it rejects belief in God’s supremacy, revelation, and the hereafter. So too with cap- italism, if it leads to our obsession with material pursuits. Secularism creates further challenges for Islam: It encourages a different set of poli- cies based on science and human-made laws rather than divine criteria, and consciously relegates religion to the realm of private preference and judgment.” In the decades to come, despite evidence of a worldwide trend in revival of all major religions, nationalism and capitalism may lead to the consolidation of secular norms and practices everywhere. Hence, the challenge for Muslims is to see how such an emphasis on rationality and the irrelevance of faith in guiding people can be ventilated by a greater commitment to Islamic principles and ideals, upon which we can pre- serve our Islamic identity. This will not be easy for future generations, given the anticipated global domination of non-Muslim powers, the growing permeation of western values via extensive mass media expo- sure,” and the kind of education and socialization processes through which Muslims pass. This challenge will, in all probability, escalate in the coming century, since the global economic and political system is tilting more and more toward such capitalistic, nationalistic, and secu- laristic ethos and inclinations. If Muslims residing in Muslim-majority states, particularly affluent states, are already confronted with a gamut of secular influences, imagine the plight of Muslim minorities, more so in states that profess secularism as the national ideology. In such situations, they have to strive to retain their Islamic identity in a manner that will not lead to a greater clampdown from the majority populace. The case of French Muslims in France being harassed for wearing the hijab is not an isolated incident, for Muslims in many countries face similar discrimination because of their “Islamness.” The general non-Muslim individual‘s perception of Islam and Muslims presents many challenges to Muslims, who must handle them judiciously. Despite that, however, many Muslims ironically find it easier to practice their faith in secular states than in states claiming to be governed by the The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 13: 1 Mutalib: Islamic Resurgence and the Twenty-First Century 95 Shari‘ah and Islamic modes of behavior. In these so-called Islamic states, Islamic leaders and scholars are often persecuted, women find their rights abused based on misinteqreted Qur’anic texts,19 and many other Muslims suffer for a variety of reasons. The Political Challenge: In this paper, we have limited the political challenge to three areas, namely, the leadership of the Muslim commu- nity, the quest for an Islamic state, and the issue of a global pan-Islamic leadership. The importance of leadership in determining the success or failure of groups, organizations, communities, nations, and religions cannot be over- emphasized. Imagine the fate of Muslims and Islam today if the Prophet and the generation of those who alive when the Qur’an was revealed were lacking in leadership. Rather than delving into the details of current Muslim leadership, we will first analyze some pertinent principles and aspects of the Islamic defi- nition of leadership. According to the unanimous opinion of the ulama, two principles are paramount: meritocracy (qualification and capability) and religiosity (piety and adherence to Islam). The preferred order is piety and then capability. It is rare for Muslim communities to find leaders with both qualities, an unfortunate situation that can be attributed to the educational systems through which Muslims pass. As a result, many contemporary Muslim societies are led either by members of the traditional ulama class who are well-trained in Islamic disciplines and committed Muslims but who are somewhat unable to resolve contemporary problems, or by secular trained leaders who are also unable to solve such problems and who have no background in religious understanding, practice, or commitment. A major challenge for contemporary and future Muslims is to resolve this dichotomous form of leadership. One way is to ensure that their children and students go to schools, colleges, and universities that can equip them with both secular and religious training and exposure, although such a distinction, doctrinally speaking, does not exist.2D If this challenge continues to be problematic, particularly for Muslim minori- ties living in secular states, the alternative is to provide a supplementary Islamic education in the home or in community programs. At the com- munity or state level, a short-term measure, a system of leadership that can join the talents of religious-trained and secular-trained individuals in one consultative body and then make use of their collective wisdom, must be found. In the meantime, however, secular-trained Muslims in leadership positions must begin to learn the basic Islamic beliefs and understandings and to observe Islamic tenets. If they do not, Muslims will find themselves bogged down in what is allowed ( & I d ) and what is prohibited (hmim), as has happened many times in the past. The end result will be their factionalization and eventual disintegration. Finally, many verses in the Qur’an and the sirah prohibit any type of dictatorial rule, for they command Muslims to conduct their affairs in a % consultative and consensual manner (shz2-d buynuhum). However, such a “democratic” element in Islamic leadership does not necessarily imply that the leader has to follow the wishes of the majority, as is the practice of western democracies. There are instances in Islamic history that prove this assertion. For example, when the Prophet was once faced with having to decide between the opinions of Abti Bakr and that of the majority, he sided with Abn Bakr. The second political challenge is the establishment of an Islamic state. While there is no clear consensus among the ulama as to whether Muslims may establish an Islamic state wherever they are, it is generally agreed that Muslims can only lead an Islamic life, in the fullest meaning of the term, in a state governed by the Shari’ah. However, it is important for thinking Muslims to consider this issue rationally and not to be driven by their em* tions and innate desire to establish such a state. Several factors need to be realized in this context. First, while Muslim-majority states can begin to consider such an option, what about Muslim-minority states or those governed by secular non-Islamc values and policies? Second, the process of establishing an Islamic state is necessarily evolutionary and gradual, for the state’s societal founda- tions and culture must exist before an Islamic state can be established. If this is not the case, the attempt to establish rapidly an Islamic state may lead to chaos and disunity as well as to the ultimate detriment of the Muslims themselves. Third, the very concept of an Islamic state must be truly understood by the leaders and the people in order to pre- vent the state, once established, from being tom asunder by quarrels among the leadership, in the name of Islam, about the state’s form and policies. Fourth, although the model of a fully governable and success- ful Islamic state has existed before, particularly during the Prophet’s generation and that of his four political successors, some thirteen cen- turies have now passed. We come now to the other aspect of the political challenge, which is really an extension of the above discussion. The expected continuation of the Islamic resurgence in the coming decades may lead to the proba- ble tendency, if not desire, to further consolidate the Muslim world under a unified and single leadership structure, a kind of institutionalized pan-Islamism. Although it may be possible to see, in the next century, the establishment of Islamic states pushing for a form of representative global body to safeguard their interests, the stark realities of the emerg- ing twenty-fist century world-system have to be noted: the salience of the idea of the nation-state (and nationalism), even among Muslim coun- tries; the eagerness of other powers (e.g., the United States and China) to defend and promote their ideologies and values worldwide; the rela- tive economic and military weakness of Muslim countries vis-i-vis oth- ers; and the improbability, if not fallacy, of reintroducing a unified pan- Islamic caliphate system located in a certain state, as was courageously attempted by Rashid Rida upon the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 13: 1 Mutalib: lslamic Resurgence and the Twenty-First Century 97 caliphate in Turkey. Any such visionary ideals must first address the above givens and imperatives of a new world order. Conclusion: The Twenty-First Century and the Hijratic Paradigm How can the above challenges be placed in perspective, perhaps even mitigated? There are many ways of looking at the issue. For want of a bet- ter term, we have termed our proposal the hijrutic paradigm, as it is inspired by the Prophet’s hijrah, which signalled the beginning of a new era for Muslims. Its broad guidelines and principles are as follows: a) Muslims must not act or behave in a manner that contradicts or comes into conflict with Islamic tenets and principles; b) the word hijruh is no longer defmed as a “migratory” process or approach, which is a common misun- derstanding of the Prophet’s hijrah from Makkah to Madinah. To be on hijrah is not to run away from problems or to be on the defensive about Islam; c) adopting a hijratic attitude or mindset means to improve and upgrade one’s life continuously. After all, change is the only permanent thing in life; d) all ideas, knowledge, and skills, regardless of geographi- cal or religious source, must be studied to see whether their adoption will be beneficial; e) a greater tolerance and accommodation among Muslims in their practice of Islam” for the sake of Muslim unity and solidarity and so that Muslims can disentangle themselves from the intra-Muslim con- flicts that characterize them today; and e) such elements as dynamism, rationality, prioritization, proactiveness, and a certain balance and judi- ciousness of approach are core features. For instance, many Muslim soci- eties lack a sense of prioritization. A case in point is the neglect of the institution of the family, which has resulted in such long-term social ills as drug addiction, high divorce rates, single parenthood, high crime rates, underachievement in education, and a highly secularized outlook on life. Another example is the undue and wasteful energies spent in the Shi‘ah-Sunni controversy, both of which could be used more productive- ly if they were rechanneled toward developing unity and solidarity among Muslims of different cultural and ethnic backgrounds and experiences. Endnotes 1. For an alphabetical selection of some of the general works published since the 1980s, see: Akbar Ahmad, Discovering Islam: Making Sense of Muslim History and Society (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1988); Syed M. Naquib al-Attas, Islam. Secularism and the Philosophy of the Future (New York Mansell, 1985); Kenneth Cragg and R. Marston Speight, eds., Islamfrom Within: Anthology of a Religion (Belmont, C A Wadsworth, 1980); John H. Donohue and John L. Esposito, eds., Islam in Transirion: Muslim Perspectives (New Y o k Oxford University Press, 1982); John L. &posit0 (ed.), Islam in Asia: Religion, Politics, and Society (New York: Oxford University Press. 1987); Yvonne Y. Haddad, Byron Haines, and Ellison Findly, eds., The Islamic Impact (Syracuse., 98 Ny: Syracuse University Press, 1984); Dilip Hiro, Islamic Fundamentalism (London: Paladin Grafton Books, 1988); Shireen Hunter, The Politics of Islamic Revivalism: Diversity and Unity (Bloomington, I N Indiana University Press, 1988); Hussin Mutalib and Taj ul- Islam Hashmi, Islam, Muslims and the Modern State: Case Studies of Muslims in Thirteen Counhies (New York St. Martins’ Press, 1994); William H. McNeil and Marilyn R. Waldman, eds., The Islamic World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983); Barbara F. Stowasser, ed., The Islamic Impulse (Washington, DC: Georgetown University, CCAS, 1987); John 0. Voll, Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World (Boulder, C O Westview Press, 1982). The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 13: 1 2. BBC World News, 30 September 1994. 3. Such reactions have been documented in many books about Islamic revivalism, even by western writers. For example, see John L. Esposito, Islam and Politics (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1984); Daniel Pipes, In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power (New York Basic Books, 1982); G. H. Jansen, Militant Islam (London: Pan Books, 1979); Voll, Islam; Stowasser, Islamic Impulse; and Donohue and Esposito, Islam in Transition. 4. A symptom of this persecution is the migration of many talented Muslim schol- ars to the western hemisphere where, ironically, their expertise is allowed to flourish in many western universities. 5. In Muslim Southeast Asia, for instance, colonial powers (Portuguese, Dutch, Spanish, British, American) managed to disempower Muslims by the deliberate tactic of shifting and repositioning their traditional political and economic centers from coastal areas to inland and, later, urban areas. Caught unprepared, the Muslims’ centuries-old sea-based technological skills were made redundant, and the role of the once-influential leaders and ulama displaced and uprooted as new, secular Muslims were recruited and sponsored to take over the leadership of the community. 6. In Asia alone, the Asian Development Bank estimated that Asian countries will chart a high 7.2 percent annual economic growth for the next few years, if compared to a dismally low 1.8 percent in other regions of the world, and that by the year 2010, of the six “most competitive” countries, four will be in Asia: China, Japan, Korea, and Singapore. Similarly, by the year 2000, trade and investment flows across the Pacific will be double the transatlantic volume. 7. The UN Conference on World Population, held recently in Cairo, estimated that the world population, if left unchecked, will reach 12.5 billion by the year 2050 (the cur- rent population is 7.5 billion). See The Economist (10-16 September 1994). 26 and Asiaweek 24 (August 1994), 22. 8. Consider the existing case of India’s pneumonic plague, which has baffled world experts, since the last recorded instance of plague was the infamous bubonic plague (“Black Death”) that struck Europe in 1666 and killed 70,000 people in London alone. 9. This is the Hegelian vision which was recently articulated by Francis Fukuyama in his much-discussed The End ofHistoiy and the Lust Man (London: Penguin, 1992). 10. Much has been written about their thoughts and panacea to resolve the Muslim plight. See, for example, Leonard Binder, Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); Ernest Gellner, ed., Islamic Dilemmas: Reformers. Nationalists and Industrialization (New York: Mouton, 1985); Donohue and Esposito, Islam in Transition; Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1982); Esposito, Islam a d Politics; Tareq Y. lsmael and Jacqueline S . Ismael, Government and Politics in Islam (New York: St. Martins’ Press, 1985). 11. It is agreed that these different movements, arising from different geographical and contextual settings, cannot all be lumped together as if they were similar in all aspects, such as their leadership, orientation, and emphases. The point which I am arguing here is that, despite their differences, their message, at the principle and broad level, can be said to be similar and remained consistent throughout the centuries. Mutalib Islamic Resurgence and the Twenty-First Century 99 12. Centuries ago, Prophet Muhammad stated that 90 percent of wealth and richness can be obtained through business and trade. 13. Concerning knowledge, the Qur’an also says: “0 Allah, increase me in knowl- edge” (20:114). 14. For a recent treatment of this issue of identity, see Islam, Muslim and the Modern State, which analyzes the attitudes and reactions of Muslims, both as majorities and as minorities, in thirteen countries and two regions. 15. See, for instance, the writings of Hans Kohn, Nationalism: Its Meaning and History (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1965); Erwin I. Rosenthal, Islam in the Modern Nation State (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1965); David L. Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (London: Macmillan and the Free Press, 1968). 16. See some responses of Islamic scholars to nationalism: AbOl A‘IB MawdDdi. ‘The Political Theory of Islam,” in Donohue and Esposito, eds., Islam in Transition; Ozzay Mehmet, Islamic Identity and Development: Studies of the Islamic Periphery (New York: Routledge, 1990); M. Ghayawddin, ed., The Impact ofNationalism and the Muslim World (London: Open Press, 1987); Arsalan Amir, Our Decline and Its Causes (Lahore: Mohd. Ashraf, 1962). 17. For some of the criticism levelled against secularism, see Ozzay Mehmet, Islamic Identity; Mehran Tamadonfar, The Islamic Polity and Political Leadership (Boulder, CO. Westview Press, 1989); AbDl NIB MawdDdi and Sayyid Qujb, in John L. Esposito, ed., Voices of Resurgent Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983); Naguib al-Attas, Islam and Secularism (Kuala Lumpur: ABIM, 1978); Altaf Gauthar, “Islam and Secular- ism,” in The Challenge of Islam (London: Islamic Council of Europe, 1978): and Obaid ul Haq, “Islamic Resurgence: The Challenge of Change,” in Taufik Abdullah and S. Siddique, eds., Islam and Society in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southea5t Asian Studies, 1986). 18. One is reminded of the Prophet’s forecasting that in the centuries after him Muslims would be increasingly faced with ma‘siycit (evil things/actions), so much so that ma‘siycit would be found even within their homes. One way of understanding this perme- ation is the pervasive presence in television programs that expose our children (and us) to a daily diet of sex, violence, and questionable liberalizing values. If uncontrolled, such p r e grams will socialize and sow the seeds of un-Islamic values in Muslim children. 19. For some writings about the position and plight of Muslim women, see Lois Grant Beck and Nikkie Keddie, eds., Women in the Muslim World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973); John L. Esposito, Women in Muslim Family Law (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1982); Reuben Levy, The Social Structure of Islam (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1957); Naila Minai, Women in Islam (New York Sea- view Books, 1981); Muhammad Abdul Rauf, The Islamic View of Women and the Family (New York: Robert Speller, 1977). 20. A better way of grouping these two interrelated aspects or distinctions is perhaps the fard kvciyah and fard ‘ayn. 21. One way of appreciating the importance of culture and traditions in the Islamic practice of Muslims in different places is to study the birth of the different legal schools of thought (jurisprudence or fiqh) in Islamic history, which adopt slightly different rituals in the performance of Islamic duties.