The Moral Context of the Prohibition of Rihii in Islam Revisited Abdullah Saeed The prohibition of rihd (interest) in Islam has been a hotly discussed issue among contemporary Muslims since the 1960s. Since rihd is per- ceived by a considerable number of Muslims to be bank interest, and almost all banking systems in the world, including those of the Muslim world, are based on interest, many Muslims are concerned whether it is lawful. For those who regard bank interest as rihd, any increase in a loan transaction over and above the principal is rihd because it involves an increase over and above the principal. They contend that thefiqhl inter- pretation of rihd is the interpretation and must be followed. For other Muslims, the prohibition of rihd is related closely to the “exploitation” of the needy and poor by the relatively well-off, an element that, for them, may or may not exist in modem bank interest. These Muslims have argued that thefiqhi interpretation given to riha is inadequate and does not take into consideration the moral emphasis associated with the prohibition. This paper looks at a) the overall context of the Qur’anic prohibition of rihd; b) how the term is used in the Qur’an, the Sunnah, and in thefiqhl literature; and c) the lack of moral emphasis in the current debate. Ribii and the Qur’an: The Context of Prohibition The Qur’an’s condemnation and ultimate prohibition of rihd was pre- ceded by its condemnation of several other morally unacceptable forms of behavior toward the socially and economically weaker strata of the Makkan community. From the very beginning of the Prophet’s mission, Abdullah Saeed is head of Arabic and Islamic Studies, University of Melbourne, Mel- bourne, Australia. Saeed: The Moral Context of the Prohibition of Rihh 491 Qur’anic verses encouraged Makkans to help, inter alia, the poor, the needy, and the orphans and said that those who do not perform their prayers or feed the destitute will enter Hell (74:43-44). In other earlier verses, the Qur’an stated that the beggar and the destitute have a “known and definite right” to a share of the wealth of the rich (70:24-25) and crit- icized the unbelievers who “do not encourage giving food to the destitute” (69:34). Rich Makkans were condemned severely in other early verses, such as 89: 17-20: Nay, but [0 people, consider all that you do and fail to do:] you are not generous towards the orphan, and you do not urge one another to feed the needy, and you devour the inheritance [of others’] with devouring greed and you love wealth with endless love. The Qur’an also used stories and parables to demonstrate the negative con- sequences of preventing the poor from having a share of the wealth of the rich. It is in this context that the Qur’an repeatedly encourages and urges Muslims to spend out of their wealth. Terms denoting “spending,” whose root in Arabic is n-f-q, are mentioned in the Qur’an about seventy-five times.’ Others, like pzdaqah, were used twelve times: while zakah, in the meaning of sadaqah or spending, is used thirty-one times.3 In all but four instances, zakah is mentioned along with the command to perform the prayer ( ~ a l d h ) , emphasizing the importance of spending. In Qur’anic ter- minology, it appears that p~daqah and zakah are synonymous, even though Islamic law later differentiated between them by restricting the for- mer to voluntary spending and the latter to compulsory spending: This early emphasis on spending indicates that, apart from the insistence on God‘s unity (taw&& His favors to His creatures, the prophethood of Muhammad, the Qur’an, and life after death, the fundamental issue of con- cern was the well-being of the weaker strata of the community and the duty of the rich to look after the economically disadvantaged members of the community.’ In many verses, the rich are commanded to care for the disadvantaged and to spend for the sake of God, on one’s relatives (8:41), orphans (2:177,220; 8:41; 76:s-9), debtors (9:60), wayfarers (2:177; 8:41; 9:60), migrants (24:22), prisoners of war (763-9), the divorced (2:236), beggars, the deprived (51:19; 70:19-25), the destitute (8:41; 76:s-9), the poor (2:271; 9:60), and to free slaves (2:177; 9:60; 58:3). The rich are reminded that their wealth is given by God as a trust, and that amassing it without regard for the needy in the community will not lead to success either in this world or in the hereafter. The Qur’an says that wealth alone does not bring one closer to God (34:37). It condemns severely any pride that one may take in it (“God does not like the haughty;” 57:24) and reminds the rich that God has destroyed many rich people, like Q- (28:81), for their haughtiness and lack of concern for the poor and the needy (17:16; 2354; 28:58). One of the reasons that 498 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 12:4 wealth is given to people is to test them (2:155; 3:186; 8:28). Miserliness is also condemned severely (57:24), and those who overcome their miser- liness attain salvation (595; 64:15-16). Spending is made obligatory via zakat, while other forms of voluntary spending are highly encouraged. Those who hoard gold and silver, the two most important forms of money at the time of the Prophet, and do not spend in the way of God are promised a severe punishment: But as for all who lay up treasures of gold and silver and do not spend them for the sake of God, give them tidings of grievous suf- fering [in the life to come]: on the Day when that [hoarded wealth] shall be heated in the fire of hell and their foreheads and their sides and their backs branded therewith. (9:35) The Qur’an, in 35:29, argues that spending is a trade without loss: They who [truly] follow God’s revelation and are constant in prayer and spend on others, secretly and openly, out of what We provide for them as sustenance, it is they who may look forward to a bargain that can never fail. According to the Qur’an, spending is a form of jihad (8:72; 49:15). Among the most important qualities of a Muslim is spending out of one’s God-given wealth (42:38). It is a way to salvation (63:lO). To attain God’s pleasure, one should spend from that which he/she loves (3:92). It should be for the sake of God, no verbal harm should be inflicted upon the receiver (2:262-63), given with no intent to show off (2:264; 4:38) and in a moderate manner (6: 141; 7:3 1). According to the Qur’an, “spend- thrifts are brothers of Satan” (17:26-27). Those who spend will receive an enormous reward after death: “Whatever you spend will be awaiting” in the hereafter (34:39) and will be rewarded by God (2:261,265; 57:7). If it is difficult to give a grant, one is encouraged to make a loan (qurd @san; 2:245). Such loans are for the sake of God, not to enrich the wealthy by allowing them to take rib& The context of all the Qur’anic verses where this term appears indicates that its recipients are the needy and the poor:6 And why should you not spend freely in the cause of God, seeing that God‘s [alone] is the heritage of the heavens and the earth? . . . Who is it that will offer up unto God a qurd @sun, which He will amply repay? (57:lO-11) If the debtor is experiencing difficulties when the time for repayment arrives, he/she should be given more time without the imposition of addi- tional financial burdens: “It is better if you give (even the principal) as charity” (2:280). Saeed. The Moral Context of the Prohibition of RiM 499 All of the above indicate the Qur’an’s overall concern with the e c e nomically disadvantaged and with the need to provide the required assis- tance to them without undue hardship, either by giving them a grant or, if that is difficult, a qard hasan. It does not indicate, however, that this latter form of assistance is made for purposes of trade or commerce (e.g., non- humanitarian purposes). Ribii as Used in the Qur’an The root r-h-w, from which ribd is derived, is used in the Qur’an twenty times,’ and the actual term ribd is used eight times.8 The root has the following meanings: to grow (22:5), to increase (2:276; 30:39), to rise, to swell (13: 17), to raise (17:24; 26: 18), a hillock (2:265; 23:50), and to be greater and bigger (16:92). These usages appear to have one mean- ing in common: increase, in a qualitative or quantitative sense. Based on internal evidence, the f i t ribd-related verse appears to have been revealed in the very early period of the Prophet’s mission in Makkah, most probably in the fourth or fifth year or somewhat earlier? It reads: And, whatever you may give out in ribd so that it may increase through [other] people’s wealth, does not increase with God; but whatever you give by way of charity seeking God’s pleasure, they will receive manifold increase (30:39). The verses preceding this one refer to the differences in means of livelihood among the people (30:37) and command one to give hisher rel- atives, the destitute, and the wayfarer their due: “It is better for those who seek God’s pleasure” (30:38). This must be on the basis of charity, not of ribd, for only those who give on the basis of charity will have their reward multiplied in this world or in the hereafter (30:39). Early exegetes (mufassirdn) interpreted the meaning of ribd in 30:39 as a gift (hadyah). Based on this, such lexicographers as Azhafi’’ and Ibn Man&’ stated that there are two forms of rib& one prohibited and one lawful. According to Ibn Manm,” the rihd mentioned in 30:39 is lawful and is explained as “giving a person something in the hope of getting something that is better or is more at a later time.” This interpretation, however, does not agree with the other Qur’anic usages of the term, all of which seem to have the same meaning: an increase imposed on the debtor due to hisher inability to repay a debt. Ribd in the sense of gift does not appear to have been used in pre- or post-Islamic times, and neither schol- ar gives any examples. Hence, it is possible to state that the concept of a lawful and an unlawful ribd was a later invention, most possibly due to the difficulty faced when interpreting the rather unusual wording of 30:39 wa mcI ataytum min rihdn li yarbuwa ~5 amwdli a1 ndsi. The Qur’an here appears to be condemning the practice of ribd in the Makkan community. 500 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 12:4 The condemnation of rihd in the very early period of the Prophet’s mission appears to agree with the Qur’anic concern for economically dis- advantaged groups in the community from the very outset. Fazlur Rahman states: It is not at all surprising that rihd is condemned in so early a rev- elation; rather the absence of such early condemnation could have not only been surprising but also contrary to the wisdom of the Qur’an. The Makkan verses of the Qur’an are replete with the denunciation of the economic injustice of contemporary Makkan society, the profiteering and stinginess of the rich, and their uneth- ical commercial practices such as cheating in the weights and measurements, etc. How is it possible, then, that the Qur’an would have failed to condemn an economic evil such as riha?” The second rihd-related verse appears to have been revealed in Madinah immediately after the battle of Uhud (A.H. 3) and almost eleven years after the first condemnation of rihd in Makkah. It reads: “0 Believers! Do not consume rihd, doubling and redoubling, and fear God so that you may prosper” (3: 130). This verse was revealed to remind Muslims what had gone wrong in the battle of Uhud, when a potential Muslim victory was turned into a grave defeat and seventy Muslim men were killed. The result was an immediate growth in the number of orphans, widows, and old parents in need of a~sistance.’~ Such a situation required the granting of assistance on the basis of charity, not of rihd. Thus immediately after the prohibition, the Qur’an commanded Muslims to be God-conscious, fear Hell, obey God and the Prophet, and seek forgiveness from God. Here, God-conscious was defined as “spending in prosperity and adversity” (3:134). The second rihd-related verse prohibited it unequivocally (ld ta’kulu a1 rihd).” Explaining the meaning of rihd prohibited in the verse 3: 130, the well-known exegete a1 Tab- (d. A.H. 310) said: Do not consume rihd after having professed Islam as you have been consuming it before Islam. The way they used to consume riha was that one of them would have a debt repayable by the debtor at a specific date. When the maturity comes the creditor would demand repayment from the debtor. The latter would say: “Defer the repayment of my debt, I will add of your wealth.” This is the vihd which was doubled and redoubled.I6 The way rihd was doubled and redoubled in the pre-Islamic period (jdhihyah) is expressed by Ibn Zayd, on the authority of his father:” Rihd in the pre-Islamic period involved doubling and redoubling [of money or commodity], and in the age [of the cattle]. At matu- Saeed: The Moral Context of the Prohibition of Ribii 501 rity, the creditor would say to the debtor: “Will you pay me, or increase [the debt]?” If the debtor had anything, he would pay. Otherwise, the age of the cattle [to be repaid] would be increased . . . . If the debt was in terms of money or a commodity, the debt would be doubled to be paid in one year, and even then, if the debtor could not pay, it will be doubled again: one hundred in one year would become two hundred. If that is not paid, the debt will increase to four hundred. Each year the debt will be doubled.” Even if the debt was “a small amount, it could consume all wealth of the debtor”” by “repeated increases”z” in the debt due to one’s inability to repay. Commenting on when the creditor would demand an increase over and above the principal in the pre-Islamic period, Ibn Zayd reports from his father that “a person would have a debt payable by another, and upon matu- rity the creditor would come to the debtor . . . .”’I In his interpretation of 3: 130, a1 T a b u said: “Their consuming of rib3 in the jcihitiyah was as fol- lows: a creditor would have a debt payable to him by a debtor. When the maturity comes the creditor demands the repayment of the debt.”” Ibn a1 ‘Arabi (d. A.H. 543) is of the same view: “Rihd was well-known among the Arabs: A person would sell to someone something on a deferred payment basis. Upon maturity the creditor would say: “Will you pay or increase?”” The above reports are almost unanimous that the rib& practiced in pre- Islamic times (rihd a1 jdzitiyah) involved an increase against an extension of the debt’s maturity due to the debtor’s inability to repay on time. None of the reports quoted by a1 Tabafi, the earliest exegetical source available to us, suggest that any increase was added upon repayment. All reports available lead to the view that the increase occurred after the debt contract was concluded and at the maturity, due to the debtor’s inability to repay it. All reports refer to debts, but they do not reveal whether the debts were loans or deferred payment sales. Surprisingly, the Hanafi jurist a1 Jasgs (d. A.H. 370) stated that “the ri& which the Arabs knew and practiced was lending dirhams and dinars to a specified maturity date at an increase over and above the sum borrowed, which is agreed upon between the par tie^.'*^ However, he provided no historical material to support his view and did not attempt to prove its “historicity.” Since it is an assertion with no sup porting evidence and it is not in accord with earlier reports quoted by a1 Tabu, we may reject his view. Hence, our view regarding the fundamen- tal nature of pre-Islamic rihd remains valid. The last rihd-related verses were revealed toward the end of the Prophet’s mission. Reports in a1 Tabu’s a1 Jumi’ suggest a date of A.H. 8 or later. One report claims that these verses were revealed when the Prophet’s governor in Makkah asked the Prophet about the riba claimed by the Banii a1 Mughirah and the T h a q ~ ? Since Makkah was conquered in A.H. 8, this must have occurred sometime earlier. One report, attributed to ‘UmaP (d. A.H. 23) and Ibn ‘AbbasZ7 (d. A.H. 87), says the last verses of the Qur’an to be revealed were those of rihd. For our purpose, it is suffi- 502 cient to know that there is general agreement among exegetes that verses 2275-78 were the last verses revealed in relation to the prohibition of ribii.Vhe verses read: The American Journal of lslamic Social Sciences 12:4 Those who devour ribu shall not rise except as he arises, whom Satan has confounded by his touch. That is because they said, “Buying and selling is like rib&” And yet God has made buying and selling lawful, and rihd unlawful. Hence, whosoever receives this admonition from his Lord, and then gives up [taking rihu], may keep his previous gains, and it will be for God to judge him. Whoever reverts to it, they are the people of the Fire, and there they shall abide. God deprives ribd of all blessing, whereas He blesses charity (pzhqah) with growth. And God loves none who is un- grateful and persists in sin. Truly those who believe and do right- eous deeds and establish prayer and pay zakat will find that their reward is with their Lord, and that they have no reason to entertain fear or grief. Believers! Hold God in fear and give up all outstand- ing ribu if you truly believe. But if you do not do so, then be warned of war from God and His Messenger. If you repent even now, you have the right of the return of your principal; neither will you do wrong nor will you be wronged. But if the debtor is in straitened circumstances, let him have respite until the time of ease. As used here, rihd here does not differ from its earlier Qur’anic uses, according to such early authorities as a1 Tabaii,- a1 Zamakhshafi;” and Ibn Katbir.3’ For instance, al Tabaii interprets the rihu mentioned here in the light of what was practiced in jcjhihyah: “God has forbidden rihd, which is the amount that was increased for the capital owner because of his extension of the debtor’s maturity and the deferment of the debt’s repay- ment.”” Rida, commenting on the meaning of rihd here, says: ‘“at in ribu indicates knowledge and familiarity, which means ‘do not consume rihd which was familiar to you and that you used to practice injdhihyah.’”” The context of these verses affirms the moral emphasis placeded by the Qur’an on the prohibition of rib& Fourteen verses preceding these rihi-related verses (2275-80) exhorted spending (infdq) by using the root (n-f-4) fourteen times. This spending must be in the way of God (2:261- 62, 272) and for the benefit of the needy and the poor. The poor recipient should not be harmed verbally by any reminder of the favor received: Do not deprive your ~aa’aqah by stressing your own benevolence and hurting [the feelings of the needy], as does he who spends his wealth only to be seen and praised by men, and believes not in God and the Last Day. (2:262-64) Verses 2263 and 27 1 focus on the poor and the needy as the recipient of this spending or ~adaqah (charity): “If you reveal the ~adaquh [you Saeed: The Moral Context of the Prohibition of Rihir 503 give] it is good, but if you conceal it and give it to the poor it is better for you” (2:271). A little further on, the Qur’an says: And give unto such of the needy who, being wholly wrapped up in God’s cause, are unable to go about the earth in search of liveli- hood. He who is unaware of their condition might thii that they are wealthy, because they abstain from begging; but you can rec- ognize them by their special mark: they do not beg of men with importunity. And whatever good you may spend on them, verily God knows it all. (2273) After these exhortations to spend on the poor and the needy and a description of the multiple rewards received for so doing, the Qur’an con- demns those who consume rihd and justify its practice by comparing it to trade. The Qur’an rejects this argument and explains the permissibility of trade and the unlawfulness of ribd (2:275). This Qur’anic position has led such scholars as Ma~di ld i ’~ to write that the Qur’an contrasted ribd with profit resulting from sale and, there- fore, contended that the Qur’an prohibits all forms of interest. But there does not appear to be any contrast of ribd with profit-the contrast appears to be between ribd and sadaqah. Two things corroborate this view. First, the Qur’an did not exhort bay‘ (sale) but merely stated its lawfulness. Second, immediately after this, verse 2:276 contrasted ribd and sadaqah, as in verse 30:39, where the term zakat, which appears to be synonymous with sadaqah in Qur’anic terminology, is used. In the words of a1 RBzi: “Know that between ribd and sadaqah there is an opposite relationship (rnundsabatun rnin jihati a1 tadud).” Fazlur Rah- man states: According to the Qur’an, the opposite of rihd is not bay‘ (trade) but saa’aqdh (charity). The prevailing confusion about the problem, we submit, was due to ribd and bay‘ being considered opposed to each other. The result was that juristic hair-splitting was substituted for the moral importance attaching to the problem of ribd.-% Having contrasted ribd with sadaqah, the Qur’an commanded Mus- lims, if they were true believers (2:278), to give up any remaining ribd and receive from the debtors only the principal. Failure to do so would lead to “war from God and the Prophet” (2:279). In conclusion, the Qur’an com- manded Muslims to extend the time for repayment if the debtor is in “straitened circumstance^."^' Early authorities interpreted the term dh6 ‘usratin (a debtor in difficulty) as meaning that the Qur’an was referring to debtors who were poor and unable to pay their debts. Dal~lpk (d. A.H. 105) says: “The expression wa an tasaddaqii khayrun lakum (if you give it as charity it is better for you) refers to the debtor who is in difficulty and unable to pay the debt.”% 504 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 12:4 According to a1 Sudd (d. 127 A.H.), “the principal as juduquh would be given to the While some early scholars suggested that the prin- cipal would be given as juduquh to both the rich and the poor, a1 Tabafi opines that it is the poor who should receive it: “The best of the two inter- pretations is ‘that you give your principal as juduqdh to the poor debtor who is unable to pay the debt, is better for you.’”40 The two most important expressions in the last riha-related verses that could shed some light on the nature of the riha prohibited in the Qur’an are lukum ru’zisu umwdikum and la tazlimfinu wu lfi tuzlumzin (2:279). The first expression, which is explicit and undisputable, states that the creditor is entitled only to the principal. But this is only one side of the coin. The other side is the second expression, which appears to be the rationale (hikmuh) of the prohibition. Separating these two expressions and inter- preting rihd in the light of just one expression may distort the intended meaning. The question, however, is whether the exegetes sought to explain the ribd prohibited in the Qur’an by placing equal emphasis on both expres- sions. Unfortunately, they emphasized the first to the almost total exclu- sion of the second, for they were apparently following the legal views established by the classical schools of law to which they belonged. Since the schools interpreted rihi according to the expression lukum ru’zisu umwdikum and virtually ignored the second expression, the exegetes did likewise. Their attitude toward the second expression could be indicated by a1 Razi’s (d. A.H. 606) view on the rationale for prohibiting rib& The prohibition of rihd is proved by a text [of the Qur’an]. It is not necessary for humanity to know the rationale of duties. Therefore, the prohibition of rihd must be regarded as definitely known, even though we do not know the rationale of its prohibition:’ The point emphasized by a1 Razi is that searching for the prohibition’s rationale is not important: humanity only has to abide by it. Thus, it may be argued that if there is general agreement on the meaning, nature, and form of what is prohibited, there may not be much point in probing into its rationale. If there is no such general agreement, then, it may be difficult to justify such an attitude toward the rationale. In the case of rihd, which transactions could and could not be so considered has been a matter of dis- pute from the days of the Companions. Thus it is of the utmost importance to refer to the rationale in order to arrive at a balanced view as to what exactly constitutes rib& Since the rationale was not given much importance in the exegetical sources or in juristic discussion, a view that agreed with the prevailing juristic emphasis on forms-the concrete side of the issue “take only the principal”-was given prominence at the expense of the expression “do not commit injustice and you will not be done any injustice.” But, because the latter expression is used immediately after saying “if you repent then you Saeed: The Moral Context of the Prohibition of Ribd 505 have your principal,” it cannot be separated from the prohibition. This is especially true when the prologue shows that the Qur’an was concerned mainly with the plight of the poor and the needy and the injustice occa- sioned by increasing their debt level. Hence, the invariable insistence on spending to alleviate the plight of the poor, the needy, one’s relatives, and other weaker groups in the community for the sake of God and the contrast of rihd with ,raduqclh. There is no indication in the relevant verses that the increase imposed on the debtor was associated with the borrowing and lending found among the relatively well-off members of the community. The Qur’an was apparently relating rihd to the need and misery of the com- munity’s economically disadvantaged groups and to the injustice of increasing their level of debt. As a1 R b i said, the lender mostly would be rich and the borrowers destitute or As Ri@i puts it, “rihd is prohib- ited because it is an injusti~e”~’ and “rihcl, which was an exploitation of the need of their (the Makkans’ and Madmans’) brothers, was prohibited.”” Commenting further, Ibn Qayyim (d. A.H. 751) says: The rihd which they used to practice in the jdhitiyuh was like deferring [repayment ofl a debt and increasing the amount of the debt [against this extension] until one hundred becomes thou- sands. In most of the cases, only a needy destitute would keep doing so, as he would have no choice but to defer the payment of the debt. The creditor agreed to defer his demand for repayment of the debt and waited so that he might gain more profit on the principal. On the other hand, the debtor was forced to pay the increased amount to ward off the pressing demands of the credi- tor and the dangers of hardships of the prison. Thus, time passed and the loss of the debtor went on increasing, while his troubles multiplied and his debt accumulated until all his possessions and belongings were lost to the creditor.4“ As the practice of pre-Islamic rihd indicates, if the debtor could not repay the debt on time, he/she would be plunged into more debt. In such a situation, the debtor may not be able to repay the amount at all, for each year (or at an agreed-upon time) the amount owed would increase. The more the debtor owed, the less hisher ability to repay would be. In some communities, quite often, such debt led to enslavement, as was the case in some parts of India until quite recently. In pre-Islamic Arabic society, there was no government protection for debtors or legislation to prevent them from being enslaved by those who had lent the money. Debtors, who were generally poor and needy, did not have a stable income, for jobs and the stable incomes associated with them were almost unknown at that time in Makkah and Madmah. In other words, uncertainty was the norm. In such a situation, borrowing anything would be a huge risk. What if there were no income to repay this debt? What if it could not be repaid on time? What would happen in the event of 506 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 12:4 death before repayment? It is perhaps in this context that the Prophet dis- couraged Muslims from borrowing. The message simply is that getting into debt with so many uncertainties is the riskiest path one could follow and that it should be avoided if at all possible. Today the debtor is usually a reasonably well-off individual, particu- larly in developed and developing countries. People borrow extensively to purchase consumer products and to produce goods and services. They are debtors, but the difference between them and their pre-Islamic counterparts is that they rely on a reasonably certain future income, either on the basis of a current job, a business, or some other avenue. In addition, there is leg- islation that protects fie debtor: He/she cannot be enslaved, forced into slave labor, can lose only hisher personal assets (irrespective of whether they cover the debt or not), and cannot bequeath the debt to hisher descen- dents. In addition, the debtor can build a new debt-free life by declaring bankruptcy, an institution that also exists in Islamic law. This distinction between modern and pre-Islamic debtors should not be ignored when dis- cussing r-ihd, the nature of debt, and borrowing in the pre-Islamic period. The society to which the Qur’an was referring was characterized by a subsistence economy and uncertainty for most people as regards meeting their basic needs. Uncertainty in relation to what one may be able to earn was very much a part of life. There were no institutions of credit and no legal system to protect people from being exploited by the rich. In short, the debtor was at the complete mercy of the lender due to hisher poverty and need. It is interesting to see how the Prophet associated poverty with debt and used to seek refuge from both. The foregoing discussion indicates that the Qur’anic prohibition of rihcS was related first and foremost to the economically disadvantaged members of the community and then to the concept of pzdQquh (voluntary as well as compulsory spending on the poor and the needy). The nature of r-ihd a1 jdhihyuh, as explained by early authorities, indicate that the Qur’an focuses on those debtors, mostly poor and needy, who were unable to repay their debts and then found their debts increased. The Qur’anic com- mand to demand only the principal was justified in that increasing one’s debt in such circumstances was unethical, immoral, and against the hu- manitarian concerns of the Qur’an. In such cases, justice demands that the creditor receive only the principal, for doing otherwise harms the debtor. It must be noted that none of the rihd-related verses refer to borrowing or lending among the relatively well-off for trade and investment. Ribs and the Sunnah The Qur’anic usage of rihii, as indicated by the reports of the Companions and the Successors, was related to debts and does not specify whether the debt was the result of a loan or a deferred payment sale.46 However, the Sunnah uses rihd mainly in relation to certain forms of sales practiced in the pre-Islamic period. Saeed: The Moral Context of the Prohibition of Riha 507 Very few hadith on ribd aljdhiliyah are attributed to the Prophet. In his Farewell Pilgrimage, he reportedly said: “All ribd ofjdhiliyah is cancelled; the first ribd I am cancelling is that of ‘Abbas b. ‘Abd a1 Muttalib . . .” Usma ibn Zayd (d. A.H. 65) reportedly said: “Ribd is only in nasiah (defer- ment),”47 which appears to refer to ribd a1 jdhiliyah. In the Prophet’s treaty with the Christians of Najrw, the phrase an laysa ‘alayhim r-ubhayyatun wa ld damun is used. Abii ‘Ubayd explained rubbayyatun as riba a1 jdhihyah.& The meaning of this term appears to be that the Prophet canceled ribd on all debts concluded in the jdhi l i~ah.~~ Only the first hadith explains, to some extent, the nature of ribd a1 jdhiliyah. Other versions add the Qur’anic phrase wa in tubtum f a lakum ru’iisu amwdlikum ld taglimfina wa ld tu?lamiina (If you repent you are entitled to receive your principal; do not commit injustice, you will not be done injustice). The near absence of guid- ance in the hadith literature on ribd a1 jdhiliyah appears to have prompted the reported saying of ‘Umar that the Prophet passed away without explain- ing the meaning of ribd in the Qur’an.’O Furthermore, no prophetic hadith dealing with ribd mentions qard (loan) or dayn (debt). This absence led a few jurists to contend that its prohibition was confined to those forms of sales explained in the Sunnah” or, in other words, the Prophet interpreted the Qur’anic prohibition as involving certain forms of sales, not debts or loans. However, this view is not in accord with many reports attributed to such early authorities as ‘A@ (d. A.H. 114), Zayd ibn Aslam, Wand (d. A.H. 179), and m a d ibn Hanbal (d. A.H. 241), which explained the nature of ribd a1 jdhitiyah and the Qur’an’s prohibition of it. The prevalent view of Qur’anic exegetes and hadith scholars is that the ribd prohibited in the Qur’an is related to increasing the amount to be repaid by the debtor against deferment of an already-existing debt, while the Sunnah has prohibited certain forms of sales involving ribd in addition to what was already prohibited in the Qur’an. Rida says: “The prohibition of sale of two forms of money (a1 naq- dayn: gold and silver) and basic foodstuffs except in a hand-to-hand trans- action, for instance, is not an explanation of ribd prohibited in the Qur’an nor a restriction of ribd to sales.’”* Ribd in the Sunnah is Related to Sales. Most of the prophetic hadith deal- ing with ribd are related to certain forms of sales. The root of b-y-‘ is found frequently: ld tabi”c.”(do not sell) and n a k r a s d Alldh ‘an a1 nabi‘aW (the Messenger of God forbade us from selling) are common. One hadith that became quite prominent is the “six commodity hadith,” which mentions six commodities that the Prophet prohibited Muslims from exchanging except on an equal basis and without any deferment. The most well-known version states: The Prophet said: “Gold for gold, silver for silver, wheat for wheat, barley for barely, dates for dates, and salt for salt should be [exchanged] like for like, equal to equal, hand to hand. If types [of 508 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 12:4 the exchanged commodities] are different, then sell them as you wish, if they are [exchanged] on the basis of a hand-to-hand trans- action .” This hadith indicates that the Prophet forbade selling these six com- modities in any way other than those mentioned. The difficulty is in ascer- taining how the commodities should be exchanged. Confusion arises from the terms used in the various versions of the hadith. Most versions use mithlun hi mithlin (like for like), suwu’un hi suwu’in (equal for equal), or ‘uynun hi ‘uynin (same for same), all of which could be taken to mean either equal in quality, quantity, size, or in all of these aspects. There is nothing to suggest specifically that the equality should be in one of these categories. Abu Yusuf s version of AbU Sa‘id a1 Khudfi’s hadith has the phrases wuznun hi wuznin (weight for weight) and kuylun hi kuylin (mea- sure for measure)?6 But these are most likely later additions, for no other version and none of the other six commodity hadiths use these terms. The way it states the details is also not characteristic of other versions, as they are not specific on such minute details. Nevertheless, jurists have focussed generally on one particular aspect of equality, such as weight or measure, to the exclusion of others. As interpreted by the legal schools, the six commodity hadith states that in any sale transactions involving similar commodities (wheat for wheat, for instance), the commodities mentioned must be exchanged like for like on an on-the-spot basis. Jurists, however, generally do not discuss why one person would sell an “equal” measure of wheat for an equal mea- sure of wheat, or why he/she would do so on an on-the-spot basis. It seems that the intended meaning was not very clear even to many jurists. For this reason, some opined that the prohibition of rihu (in what came to be known as rihd a1 fa&) is to be obeyed and followed as in the case of wor- ship and that its intended purpose is not comprehensible (hi unna t&- rimahu tu‘uhhudiy ki yuqulu mu‘ndhu)?’ This confusion appears to have been due to their total neglect of the prohibition’s rationale (hikmh). It seems that at the time of the Prophet, some of the common forms of sales found in Mabmah and the surround- ing regions involved selling one kilo of wheat now for two kilos to be received in the future, or a larger amount of inferior quality wheat for a smaller amount of higher quality wheat to be received now or in the future. Since most people who would resort to such transactions would be poor and needy, there was a potential injustice, for the economically weaker party may be forced to give a higher countervalue, either in terms of quan- tity or quality, either now or in the future. In any case, the weaker party would suffer most from being forced to pay a higher value for the item than what he/she would receive for the item he/she was selling. Secondly, the commodities mentioned were basic and essential for survival: gold and silver were the two forms of available money, and wheat, barley, dates, and salt were the basic foodstuffs. The Prophet would not have tolerated Saeed: The Moral Context of the Prohibition of Ribir 509 any exploitation of the needy in these circumstances. It also appears that, in line with the Prophet’s prohibition of certain forms of sales, he was most probably attempting to block any potential injustice in barter exchanges involving these six commodities by banning completely their exchange on a barter basis and by encouraging people to use “money” to buy goods. The reason appears to be that money may be a better criterion to measure the value of the goods involved, rather than leaving it to the parties involved to determine their “value,” as the following hadith indicates: It is reported that the Companion Bilal (d. 20 A.H.) brought hurni (a form of good quality) dates for the Prophet. The Prophet said: “From where is this?” Bilal said: “We had low quality date, so I sold two su‘ (a measure) of them for one sa‘.” The Prophet said: “This is exactly ribd. This exactly rib& Do not do this. If you wish (to buy good quality dates) sell the dates for something else [in some versions, dirhams] and then buy dates for that.’“’ The argument of potential injustice appears to be the most plausible explanation for prohibiting the deferment of one countervalue in a barter transaction involving any of the specific six-commodities. A person in need may prefer to buy a certain quantity of dates, for example, for more to be paid in future, the increase being in lieu of deferment. The buyer may be unable to repay on time, and the seller may charge more to extend the time of repayment. This is the type of rihd prohibited in the Qur’an, where the debtor plunges into debt and is unable to escape. Ibn Qayyim, who is explicit on this point, said: Had the sale of these commodities (wheat, barley, dates, and salt) been allowed on a deferred payment of basis [in a barter transac- tion of exchange of same type of countervalues], none would have sold that unless at a profit. He would desire to sell it on a spot basis for the greed of profit. This would raise the cost of food for the needy, hurting him severely. Most people do not have dirhams or dinars, particularly those living in isolated areas and deserts. Hence, they exchange food for food . . . . Had it been allowed, it could have led to [the form of rihd a1 jdhitiyah, which is repre- sented in their saying] “either you pay or increase.” One sa‘ could become many qufiz (a measure).”’ The reason for the prohibition of these two forms of rihd -“potential injustice to the economically weaker party in a barter transaction”-is reinforced by the prohibition of certain other forms of sale in vogue in the Madman and Makkan regions at the time of the Prophet: the sale of fresh dates on the trees for dried dates by measure, of dried grapes for fresh grapes, of fruits before they are ripe, of wheat still in the ears for pure wheat, of a sale in which the deal is completed if the buyer touches a thing 510 without seeing or checking it properly, of grain or vegetables before they are ripe, of rigging and collusion (najsh),” of cheating an unsophisticated entrant into the market, of any monopsonistic or monopolistic collusion or exploitation designed to lower or raise prices beyond what is justified by market conditions,6’ and of sales involving uncertainty and speculation.6* The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 12:4 Ribti and Fiqh The Juristic Classijkation of Ribd: Ribd a1 F d l and Ribd a1 Nasiah. The six-commodity hadith, as well as others indicating that gold and silver (dinars and dirhams) can be exchanged only on a like-for-like basis and in a hand-to-hand transaction, became the basis for thefiqhi discussions of rib& Juristic discussion tended, fust, to probe into the ‘illah (effective cause) of the prohibition associated with the six commodities in order to extend it to similar commodities via qiyds (analogy). They did not look into the prohibition’s moral significance, but for a legal purpose, pure and simple. Since these hadith do not provide any reason for prohibiting these particular six commodities, jurists resorted to ijtihad to arrive at the ‘illah. On the basis of certain terms used in some versions of the hadith, they arrived at several ‘illahs. Therefore there are differences between the schools. For example, the Hanafis say that the ‘illah of gold and silver is that they are weighable or measurable, while the MAikis, the SWiis , and the HanbaIis say that the ‘illah is that these items are currency. As for wheat, barley, dates, and salt, the ‘illah is they are weighable or measur- able AND that they belong to the same genus (Hanafis), are storable human nourishment (Mdikis), foodstuffs (Shafi‘is), OR foodstuffs which are measurable or weighable (Hanbah):’ Based on the ‘illah, there could be a host of commodities susceptible to ribd (miil ribawi) and possessing different ‘illahs. Such a situation would produce often irreconcilable results. Eggs, for instance, could be exchanged one for two as they are not weighable or measurable (Hanafis), but this is not allowable as they are foodstuffs (ShHis) or because an egg is not a foodstuff that can be stored for a reasonable length of time like wheat (Mdih) . Attempts to extend the prohibition, however, are not shared by all schools of law. The school rejected such a practice and restricted the prohibition to the six commodities mentioned in the hadihM Other schools, especially the surviving four Sunni schools of law, extended the prohibition to other commodities. Jurists divided rihd into ribd a1 fad1 (involving excess) and rihd a1 nasiah (involving deferment). As the schools of law differ on the exact definition of these two types of ribd, a brief sketch of their generally accepted views is in order: a) rihd a1 fad1 occurs when, in a hand-to-hand transaction, there is an excess in one of the countervalues belonging to the same jins (genus) AND they are both weighable or measurable (Hanafi); either both are currency or both storable nourishment (Mill&); either both Saeed: The Moral Context of the Prohibition of Ribii 51 I are currency or foodstuffs (ShXiis); and either both are currency or both are measurable or weighable (Hanbali)? and b) rihd ul nusiuh occurs when, in a sale transaction involving countervalues susceptible of rihu, delivery of one countervalue is deferred. The countervalues should be either of the same jins (genus) or both weighable or measurable (Hanafi); storable human nourishment or currency (Maliki); both foodstuffs or cur- rency (ShSi‘is), either both measurable or weighable or both currency ( Hanbali).66 The general rules derived by the jurists in relation to rihd in sales can be summarized as follows: If the countervalues are gold, silver, barley, wheat, dates, salt, or any other commodity that is susceptible to rihd by analogy, the transaction should be on a spot basis and the countervalues should be equal. Deferment of one countervalue and/or an increase in any countervalue would be rib& Furthermore, if the countervalues differ in their genus (i.e., selling gold for silver, or wheat for barley), the transac- tion should be on a spot basis. However, the equality of the countervalues is not necessary. When one countervalue is currency (i.e., gold or silver) and the other is a noncurrency commodity, then both the equality of the countervalues and the spot basis of the transaction are not necessary:’ Lack of Emphasis on the Moral Aspect in Juristic Discussion. Jurists ex- tended the Qur’an’s and the Sunnah‘s prohibition of rihG to other transactions by means of qiyds (analogy) on the basis of ‘illuh (effective cause), not on the basis of hikmah (rationale). Here we sketch briefly the usnh argument on whether or not hikmah can perform the function of ‘illuh in qiyus. Several conditions are mentioned in usiih works for the use of ‘illuh to extend a rule in the Shari’ah to a new issue through qiycls. Among them are that the ‘illuh should be clear and explicit and that its existence should be ascertained independently.@ As for extending a rule on the basis of hikmuh, there are three usih views: a) hikmuh can perform the function of ‘illuh whether it is explicit or not and whether its existence can be ascer- tained independently or not (attributed to a1 R a i and a1 Bay@wi); b) hikmuh cannot perform the function of ‘illuh (attributed to the majority of usah scholars)f9 and c) if the hikmah is explicit and if its existence can be ascertained independently, then it can perform the function of ‘illuh (the view of a1 Scholars who opine that hikmuh can perform the function of ‘illah argue that hikmah is the intention of the Lawgiver as shown through His enactment of the law. If it cannot be used to extend the rules, then ‘illuh, which is based on h i h h , cannot be used for the extension of a rule. If ‘illuh can be used, then hikmah should be given priority in extending the rules. This argument is important for any discussion of extending the p r e hibition of riba to other transactions. The Qur’anic prohibition of rib& for instance, appears to have been extended to all loans/debts where an increase accrues to the lender/creditor, mainly on the basis on the expres- sion lukum ru’ksu umwdikum. In other words, the increase in a loaddebt 512 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 12:4 over and above the capital was regarded as ‘illah, whereas the second expression in the same verse, ld tazlimzina wa la tuzlamiin (which is the hikmah) was relegated to a secondary position or, more correctly, ignored altogkther. Extending the rules related to the prohibition of rihd in the Sunnah was also made on the basis of ‘illah, not hikmah. The reason why scholars have regarded hikmah as something minor and unimportant appears to be that ‘illah could be used objectively and easily, whereas a jurist would have to consider many factors in arriving at a decision on the basis of hikmah. Moreover, a decision based on the latter would change according to the circumstances, whereas a decision based on the former could remain unchanged irrespective of the circumstances. An example relating to rihd will clarify the point. Based on a partic- ular ‘illah (an increase in a loaddebt accruing to the creditor over and above the capital), any transaction involving such an increase would be prohibited. If, on the other hand, a particular hikmah (the existence of injustice in a particular transaction related to a loan/debt) were given prominence, then only those transactions involving injustice to one of the contracting parties would be prohibited. It must also be noted that the use of ‘illah to determine what is and what is not rihd in loan/debt transac- tions is easier, whereas if hikmah is used a jurist has to look at the cir- cumstances of each transaction in order to identify what is and what is not rib& While ‘illah is easier to utilize in many cases, it may not serve the intended purpose of a particular rule stated in the Quian or the Sunnah. We contend that hikmah can serve this purpose. The futility of using ‘illah is glaringly clear in both previous and pre- sent discussions. In the case of rihd prohibited in the Sunnah, for instance, each school of law amved at an ‘illah that had nothing to do with the trans- action’s circumstances, the parties involved, or the importance of the com- modity to the society’s survival. In other words, there was no emphasis on the moral aspect. This approach, which could be described as superficial and devoid of moral and humanitarian considerations, led to some amaz- ing conclusions. The Shafi‘is, for example, maintain that coins like fals,” do not involve rihd.” Thus, 100 fals could be exchanged for 200 either on the spot or on a deferred delivery basis. If this is allowed, then obviously today’s fiat money could also be put in this category, since it is neither gold nor silver. Commodities that are countable, such as apples or eggs, may not involve rihd and hence could be exchanged less for more, according to some jurists.’3 A piece of cloth could be exchanged for two pieces of the same quality and measure since it is not a currency or a foodstuff and is not measurable or weighable. A commodity without an ‘illah cannot be a mcil rihawj regardless of its importance to the community’s survival. In the context of the Pakistani economy, Rahman remarks: Therefore the question of rihd does not arise with regard to those commodities which are the backbone of Pakistan’s economy, i.e., jute and cotton! However, it is possible that ourfuqahd’ (legists) Saeed: The Moral Context of the Prohibition of Riha 513 may reply that jute is “the golden fibre” and cotton is “the silver crop”! Therefore, they also fall within the category of gold and sil- ver. The same principle will apply to the oil found in Arabia, Persia and elsewhere because oil is called “liquid gold.” But what judgment will our legists pass on hides and skins which are impor- tant source of the wealth of our country?74 The lack of a moral emphasis has also led to other unfortunate devel- opments, as in the case of ribcf-related hiyul.” In the medieval period, and in fact until today, one can advance loans at exorbitant rates of interest using fictitious transactions. Similarly, the six commodities and others susceptible to r-iba can be exchanged. Many jurists do not regard this as reprehensible, since it is perfectly in line with their legalistic thinking. For them, it is the “legal” form of the transaction, not the moral conse- quence(s), which is important. As long as the transaction does not fall into the literal definition of ribcf, as provided by each school of law, the trans- action is not regarded as ribcf. A detailed discussion of hiyul is beyond the scope of this article. While it is no secret in Islamic law that hiyul was practiced by Muslims with the blessings of many jurists, the schools of law are not in agreement about its permissibility, at least in its most extreme forms, which are used to evade the clear prohibitions of the Shari‘ah. The Hanafis and the ShSi‘is are the most favorably inclined to accept its legality. Among the Hanafi authorities who wrote works on hiyul are Abii Yiisuf (A.H. 182), a1 Shay- biirii (A.H. 189), and a1 Khassaf (d. A.H. 261), and among the Shafi‘is are Muhammad ibn ‘Abd Al l a a1 Sayrafi (d. A.H. 330), Abii a1 Hasan M@ammad ibn Y&y% ibn Suraqah a1 ‘Am* (d. A.H. 416), and Abii Hatim Muhammad ibn Husayn a1 Qazw-mi (d. A.H. 44O).”The Hanbah and the traditionists (ah1 a1 bd i th ) are its most vocal opponents. Below are sever- al examples of hiyul, taken from al Khassaf, designed to circumvent the interpretation of r-ibd by means of fictitious transactions: A. Mluh (to lend money at any rate of interest): Person A needs to borrow money from a trader on the basis of hiluh (mu‘cfmuluh). Person B asks a1 Khassaf about the hilu for this even if the trader has nothing to sell. a1 KhassSlf: If the one who needs to borrow on the basis of mu‘cfmuluh (Person A) owns land or a house, he can sell it to the trader for the amount he requires. If the trader takes possession of it and sells it back at a mutu- ally agreeable “profit” to Person A, this is lawful. Person B: And if Person A does not own a land or a house . . . ? al KhassSlf: If Person A owns a slave or any item and the trader buys from him, takes possession of it, and sells it back to him (at a “profit”), there is no harm in it.’’ 514 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 12:4 Utilizing this trick, a person can lend at any rate of interest. This is perfectly legal! B. Zfilah to circumvent the prohibition of riha a1 naslah in money exchange: Person B (asks a1 Khassiif): Person A intends to buy from a money dealer dirhams for 100 dinars. If the money dealer has only 500 dirhams, what is the hilah for this? al Khassaf: Person A should buy the 500 dirhams from the money dealer for the equivalent of dinars and then exchange dirhams for dinars. Then Person B lends the money dealer the 500 dirhams and immediately after that buys the 500 from him. This process could be repeated until the 100 dinars are given to the money dealer and the money dealer owes Person A the equivalent dirhams for the 100 dinars.’’ In the interpretation of rihd, deferment of one countervalue in money exchange (sarafi if rihd. The hilah overcomes this problem. C. Zfilah to lend money at interest and land as security: Person B (asks a1 Khassgf): Person A requires 10,000 dinars from a trader (Person C), and offers land for security. Person B tells Person A that the land should be in Person B’s possession and that he will make a “profit” of 5,000 dinars on the transaction (that is, interest on lending). What is the hilah for that? al Khassz The trader should sell something (a garment or anything else) to Person A for 5,000 dinars (to be paid later) and deliver that item to Person A. Person B then buys the land for 10,000 dinars, gives the dinars to Person A, and writes a document mentioning the 10,000 dinars and the previous 5,000 dinars which Person A owes to Person B. Person B promis- es that when Person A returns the 15,000 dinars, he will return the land.m By using these and other similar hiyal advocated by jurists, lending at any rate of interest can be practiced in the form of a fictitious sale or trans- action. Proponents claim this is not lending at interest but simply buying and selling, and usually call it mu‘dmalah shar‘iyah (a legal transaction)! These and other similar hiyal are an unpleasant reminder that emphasizing the legal form and ignoring the moral consequences of the prohibition of rihd can lead to a Shari’ah injunction devoid of any meaning. Conclusion From the outset, the Qur’an was concerned with a society’s needy, poor, and economically disadvantaged members. It seeks to protect these people by demanding that the economically disadvantaged not be exploit- !heed: The Moral Context of the Prohibition of Riha 515 ed by the rich and resourceful. Thus, ribi is prohibited, for it involves imposing an increase on a debtor who is having difficulty repaying hisher loan. Each increase makes it that much harder to repay the debt, which also increases the debtor’s misery and burden. Again and again, the Qur’an insists that people should be helped, not exploited, and demands that those with resources spend and provide for the needy and the disadvantaged. If a debtor cannot repay the debt on time, he/she should be given more time and not be encumbered with more burdens. The economies of Makkah and Madmah at the time of the Prophet were more or less subsistence based, large-scale lending and borrowing for nonhumanitarian purposes did not seem to be practiced widely, and debt appears to have been used by the poor in order to meet a pressing need. This is the moral framework within which the Qur’an deals with debt and increases levied for late repayment. The context of the ribs-related verses indicate that the Qur’an deals with the issue from this moral per- spective. However, when seeking to determine what is and what is not ribij, jurists focussed mainly on whether a particular loan transaction had an element of increase over and above the principal or whether certain qualities existed in a particular commodity susceptible to ribi In both cases, they ignored almost totally the transaction’s nature and circum- stances, the parties involved, the prevailing economic and environment within which it was taking place, and its purpose. Thus the issue of ribd in Islamic law became merely a “legal” issue concerned with the outward “form” and was not concerned with the moral framework within which the Qur’an and the Sunnah appear to have dealt with the issue. The point is that unless the moral importance attached to the prohibition of ribd is emphasized, which is hardly the case in the current debate, there is a dan- ger that the whole discussion may become a meaningless exercise and a quibble over semantics, as seen in the case of hiyul. Endnotes 1. See Qur’an 2:262,4:39, 13:22,25:67, and 3529. 2. See Qur’an 2:196.263, 271,276; 4:114; 958 ,60 , 79, 103-4; and 58:12-13. 3. See Qur’an 2:43, 83, 110, 177, 277; 4:77, 162; and 512. 4. For instance, the verse that states the recipients of zakat used the term pxhquh 5. W. Montgomery Watt, Mohmmud ut Meccu (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 6. See Qur’an 2:245; 5:12; 57:11, 18; and 64:17. 7. See Qur’an 2265, 275-76, 278; 3:310; 4161; 13:17; 1692; 17:24; 225; 23:50; 8. See Qur’an 2:275-76,278; 3: 130; 4 161 ; and 30:39. 9. Fazlur Rahman, “Riba and Interest,” I.slmic Studies (March 1964): 3. for zakat. 1953), 60-72. 26:18; 30:39; 41:39; and 69:10. 10 . Azhafi, TuhLUiih ul Lughh, ed. Ibdhim al IbyWi, 15 vols. (Cairo: D& al ICitab al 11,. Ibn Manziir, Lisdn ul ‘Awh (Beirut: Dar Sadir, 1956), 14:31W. 12. lbid. ‘Arabi, 1%7), 15273. 516 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 12:4 13. Rahman, "Riba and Interest," 3. 14. Ibn HishBm, uI Sir@ ul Nubuwiyuh, ed. Muslat2 al Sagga et al. (Cairo: Muslat5 al 15. Ibn Kathir, Tujiir uI Qur'dn ul 'Azim (Beirut: DBr al Ma'rifah, 1987), 1:412. 16. a1 Tabafi. Jdmi' ul Buydnfi Tujiir 01 Qur'dn (Beirut: DBr al Ma'rifah, 1986), 459. 17. This appears to be Zayd ibn Aslam (d. C.E. 136) Ibn Hajar, Tuhdhih ul Tuhdhih, 18. a1 Tabafi, Jdmi', 459. 19. al Zamakshafi, ul Kushshdj' 'on Huqa'iq uI TunziI (Calcutta: Mafbaat al Laysi, 1956). 234. 20. al BaydBwi, Tujiir uI Qur'dn UI Kurim (Cairo: al Mafba'at al Bahiyah, 1925). 56. 21. In al Tabafi, .Idmi', 459. this appears as yukiinu li ul rujuli judlu duynin f.' yu'fihi idhd hullu' ul ujulu. 22. In al Tabafi, Jdmi', 459, this appears as wu kdnu ukluhum dhdikufi jdhiliyuti- him unnu uI rujulu minhum kdnu yukiinu luhii 'uld ul rujuli mdlun i l l ujulin, j u idhd hullu uI ujulu tuluhuhii. 23. In Ibn al 'Arabi, Ahkdm ul Qur'dn. ed. 'Ah Muh'ammad al Bijawi (Beirut: Dar al Ma'rifah, 1972). 1:241. this appears as wu kdnu UI rihd 'induhum mu'riijun, yuhdyi'u ul rujulu uI rujulu ild ujulin, ju idhd hullu ul ujulu qdlu: utuq4 'um turhi? 24. al JasgBs, Ahkdm ul Qur'dn, 3 vols. (Beirut: DBr al KitZib al 'Arabi. A.H. 1355). 1 :465. 25. al Tabafi. .Idmi', 3:71. 26. Ibid., 3:75; Ibn Kathir. Tujsir, 1:335. 27. al Tabafi, Jdmi', 3:75. 28. Ibn Kathir. TuJsir. 1:335. 29. al Tabafi, .Idmi', 3:67ff. 30. al Zamakhshafi, uI Kuhshsdj; 3:69. 3 1. Ibn Kathir, TuJsir, 1 :334-36. 32. In al Tabafi. .Idmi', 3:69, this appears as wu hurrumu ul rihd, yu'uni ul ziy&htu ulluti yuzdu ruhhu uI mdli hi suhuhi ziyddutihi ghurimuhii fi ul ujuli wu tu'khiri duy- twhu 'uluyhi. BBbi al Halabi, 1955). 2:122-29. 12 vols. (Hyderabad: A.H. 1327). 3:395. 33. Muhammad Rashid Ri&, Tujiir ul Mundr (Cairo: DBr al Man%. n.d.), 3:94. 34. Abii a1 A'IB al Mawdad. ul Rib?& trans. Muhammad 'Agim al HaddBd (Beirut: 35. al RBzi. uI Tujiir ul Kuhir (Cairo: al Mafba'at al Bahiyah, 1938). 7:90. 36. Rahman, "Rib2 and Interest," 3 I . 37. Abii al A'IB al Mawdiich, Towurds Understunding the Qur'un, trans. Zafar 38. al Tabafi, Jdmi'. 375. 39. Ibid. 40. Ibid. 41. al RBzi. Tujiir, 7:94. 42. Ibid. 43. Ri@, M u e r , 3: 103. 44. Ibid., 3: 108. 45. Ibn Qayyim al Jawziyah. A'lum UI Muwuqyi'in 'un Ruhh UI 'Alumin, 4 vols. 46. al Tabafi. Jdmi', 3:67ff. 47. Muslim, ul J h i ' ul Suhih. 5:SO. 48. Ibn Manziir, Lisdn, 14:305. 49. Ibid. 50. Ibn Kathir, TuJsir. 1:335. 51. Muhammad Rashid Rid%, ul RiW wu ul Mu'dmuldtfi ul Isldm (Cairo: Mak- 52. Ibid., 59. Dar al Fikr), 82-85. lshaq al Ansari (Leicester, UK: The Islamic Foundation, 1988). I :221. (Dar al 51, n.d.), 2: 154. tabat al QBhhirah. 1959). 1 1. Saeed: The Moral Context of the Prohibition of Rihh 517 53. a1 Rabi‘ ibn Habib, uI .Idmi’ ul Suhih Musnud uI lmdm uI RUM‘ (Jerusalem, A.H. 1381), 258-59; Malik ibn Anas, Muwuttd’ ul lmdm Mdlik, Riwdyut Mu@mmud ihn ul Husun uI Shuyhdni, ed. ‘Abd al Wahhab ‘Abd al Laof (Cairo: al Majlis al A‘IB li al Shu’iin al Islamiyah, 1979). 289; Muslim, Suhih, 5:42. 54. Ibn Abi Shayba, uI Kitah ul Musunnuffi ul Ahudth wu ul Athur (Bombay: al Dar al Salatiyah, 1980), 2:lOO-101; al Daraqutni, Sunun ul Duruqutni, 2 vols. (Madinah: 1966). part 3, p. 18; al DBrimi, Sunun, 2 vols. (DZir IhyB’ a1 Sunnah a1 Nabawiyah, n.d.), vol. 2, part 2, pp. 258-59; al NasB’i, Sunun ul-Nusdt hi Shurh uI Hdji? Juld uI Din ul Sutyhfi, 8 vols. (Cairo: al Matba‘at al Misriyah bi al Azhar, n.d.), 7:275-76. 55. Muslim, Suhih, 544. 56. Abii YOsuf, uI A t k r , 183. 57. Ri&, ul Rihh, 77. 58. Muslim, Suhih, 3:48. 59. Ibn Qayyim al Jawziyah, A‘hm (11 Muwuqqi’in. 2:157-58. 60. al Bukhari, Suhih, 3:177-241. 61. Implied from the expression buy‘ (11 hddir li ul b& and tubyyi ul rukhn. M. Umer Chapra, Towurd.~ u Just Monetuiy System (Leicester, UK: The Islamic Foundation, 1985), 66. 62. That is to say, ghurdr, mu&quluh, mundhudhuh, and muldmusuh. al Jaziri, Kitdh uI Fiqh ‘ d d a1 Mudhdhih ul Arhu‘uh, 6th ed. (Cairo: al Maktabat al Tijmyah al Kubra, n.d.), 2: 183-81, 273-78. 63. Ibid., 2:249-52. 64. Nabil A. Saleh, Unluwful Guin und Legitimute Profit in Islumic Luw (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 15. 65. al Jaziri, Kitah 01 Fiqh, 2:250ff; Saleh, Unluwful Guin, 19-26. 66. Saleh, Unluwjiul Guin, 19-26. 67. Ibid., 19-26; al Jazifi, Kitdh UI Fiqh, 2:247ff. 68. ‘Umar M. ‘Abd al Hamid. Hujjiyut (11 Qiydsfi Usd (11 Fiqh (11 lsldmi (Benghad, 69. al ‘Amid, 01 lhkdmfi U,sd (11 Ahkdm (n.p.: 1914), 3:290. 70. Ibid. 71. A unit of currency made of a metal that is neither gold nor silver and was used in 72. a1 Jazifi, Kitdh (11 Fiqh, 2:272. 73. Ibid., 2:260. 74. Rahman, “Riba and Interest,” 21. 75. Hiyul is the plural form of hilh, which signifies “a means of attaining to some state concealedly.” Edward William Lane, Aruhic-English Lexicon (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1955), book I , part I , p. 676. 76. Subhi Mahmassani, Fulsufut (11 Tushri‘ fi ul Isldrn, trans. Farhat J. Ziyadah (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1%1), 122. 77. Ahmad ibn ‘Amr Abii Bakr a1 Khassaf, Kitdh ul Khujjdffi ul Hiyul (Cairo: n.p., 78. Ibid., 13-14. 79. Ibid., 11-12. Libya: JBmi‘at BenghBd, n.d.), 112. the course of Islamic history. A.H. 1314), 11.