Islamic Discourse and Modern Political Methods: An Analysis of a1 Nabhiini's Reading of the Canonical Textual Sources of Islam Suha Taji-Farouki On 17 November 1952, Tiiqi al Din al NabhM submitted an appli- cation to the Jordanian Interior Ministry for permission to establish a new political party: Bzb a1 T W . ' 'Ihis was in accordance with the new constitution, which permitted party organization provided that every party submitted to an official investigation. Soon after its promulga€iCm, several ideologically-based opposition parties sought official permission to organize openly. A1 Nabhhi's application was rejected on the gmunds that the party's platform was incompatible with the constitution. This launched the new party on a collision cotuse, which continues even until this day, with the Jordanian authorities. The new party has, as its final goal, the reestablishment of the Islamic caliphate in one of the Arab countries. In its ideological formulations, program, and stmctmc, it conformed to the pattems of similarity dis- cernible among Jordan's new parties? Like the other parties, it reflected Suha Taji-Farouki is a lecturer at the Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, Durham University, Durham, United Kingdom. 'Rachel Sim and Ella Landau, "hWIaet Hashihnn," in Amnm M e n , Miflosr Politiot kgada H a n d d a v i t tahat Hashilton Hahashemi (laudem. * The Truman Mi- tute, The Hebrew Universi of J d e m , 1972), 409 (unpublishd). See also Mudb al Niidi and Sulaymiiu Mi& %*rikh al Urdunfial Qarn al 'lshrih (Ammm al M4ba'at al WaWQd, 1959), 598; A. H. H. Abidi, Jordan: A Political Stucty 1948-1957 (Lon- Qn: Asia Publishing House, 1965), 201. *see Anmon Ckheq "political PaIties m the West Bank rmder tbe HdKanik R m in Moshe Ma'oz (d), Palcrtinimr Arab Politics (Jerusalan: JerusaEem Aca- demk Ress, L975), 3637, 39, a, Avi Pkcov, llte Polcstinion Rclirgas in Joordan 1948-1957 (New Havedr Yale University &ss, 1978), 131,140,142; Shad hfkhd, Ik? 366 The American Joumd of Islamic Social Sciences 11:3 characteristics of the btoader trend of modern tevolutionary-cum- ideological parties that developed throughout the Arab Middle East from the 1930s onwards. Broadly speaking, these parties were vehicles through which the new secular ideologies of nationalism and socialism, radiating from Europe and Sweeping the region, were atticulated. These ideologies were of growing appeal to an emerging interwar generation that was disillusioned with the old order of liberal democratic regimes. By participating in the new political fields that had developed under these regimes in relation to the newly established nation-states, this new generation sought to gain control of the state through a revolutionary program that had the creation of a utopian social and political order as its ultimate goal. Unlike the traditional political groupings of the older generation, these parties displayed many of the characteristic features of what Duverger t e r n the "modem mass political party," distinguished in the context of the development of political parties in the West from the older cadre parties? Hizb al T d - r belonged to this first generation of modem mass political parties in the Arab world. Al Nabhh- was evidently convind of the need to adopt modem political methods and strategies and to participate assertively in the new political fields that had emerged in the region. This was the only effective way to achieve genuine inde- pendence, to d e e m Palestine, and to confront the continuing dangers of colonialism and neocolonialism. His rejection of the overwhelmingly secular nationalist orientation of the new trend of political parties prompted an attempt to articulate an ideological alternative to this, one that was based on Islam. Al NabhM postulated a fhdamental difference between his own endeavor, as embodied in Bzb al TaMr, and that embodied in the Mus- lim Brotherhood Association, its senior ideological counterpart and rival. He sought to fashion Islam into a clearly defined worldview, a coherent and consistently elaborated thought-system, and a mandate for action expressed in a carefully delineated political program (with the sole objec- tive of establishing an Islamic state) and a well-organized political move ment. The end product was a political party as thoroughly modem and political as its secular counterpa*, but with an Islamic ideology. He would rely on the pull of this ideology to mobilize Muslims fitst to join the party and then to engage them, throu& it, in the new political field. Palestinians in Jordan 194P1967 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), 40, %. 3Mulaurice Dwerger, Political Parties: lheir Organisntion and Activity in the Modern State, 2d ed. (Loadon: Methum & Co., 1959), 427. Taji-Farouki: d N a b W s Reading of the Cancmical Textual Sources 367 Thus, in contrast with the Muslim Brotherh~od,~ the establishment of Hizb a1 T&ir represented a clear attempt to amalgamate the approach and methods of the new trend of modem parties with an Islamic ideology. A testament to its thoroughly modem political character can be found in the denunciations of it put out by other Islamist groups, whose suspicions have been aroused by this aspect of its nature. The following comment, for example, is by a critic with a Muslim Brotherhood background: If you read Hizb a1 TaMr’s books, you will have the impression that it is a political party that works to assume power, and not an association that confronts the battlefield of life with the goal of actualizing God’s vicegerency on earth . , . . This has lost it con- siderable weight in the ~truggle .~ Main Thesis and Approach This paper has as its starting point Bizb a1 Tabir’s nature as a modem Islamic political party. It will analyze the case advanced by its founder for constructing such a party. A1 N a b h ~ - claimed to develop this case within the parameters of authentic Islamic discourse exclusively. As a corollary of this claim, he was impelled to infuse the whole of Islam with a political ethos. In elaborating his case, a1 Nabhihi endeavored to recast methods, organizational models, and conceptual patterns characteristic of the new trend of political parties in terms of ideological constructs drawn from traditional Islamic discourse. This required the manipulation of parts of the canonical textual sources of Islam. This paper will demonstrate that he subjected passages from these sources to a subtle reconstruction in the light of his conscious political objectives and general contextual realities. This will be achieved by analyzing his reading of selected passages from the Qur’an and slrah on the basis of a careful contextualization of this reading. This informs our main thesis: that he employed constructs of traditional Islamic discourse to legitimize the adoption of modem modes of political organization. 4Clearly, a1 Banns was the first Islamic reformist to stress the need to create a modern political party and to formulate a comprehensive program of action. At its inception, how- ever, the Muslim Brotherhood could not be described as a fully-fledged modem political P*Y. ’GhSzi al TawbL, d Fikr al Islrimf al Mu ‘&sir: DirBuh wu Taqwim (Beirut: n.p., 1969), 311. 368 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 11:3 The main text of the paper is divided into three sections. In order to contextualize a1 NabhiM's reading of the Islamic textual sources, it is necessary to reconstruct his specific context. This is achieved through a review, in the first section, of his intellectual formation and political career up to and including the establishment of Hizb a1 TaMr. The second section examines his argument that the creation of Hizb a1 Tabrir is a furd (religious duty), based on the contention that Muslims are required by Islam to establish a political party that will assume power and construct an Islamic state. Three themes are developed: a) his argument for establishing a political party formulated without reference to Islamic discourse; b) the establishment of an Islamic political party as a furd; and c) involvement in politics as a furd. The third section considers his claim that in its overall approach, broad divisions, and subsidiary strategies the program he elaborated for Hizb a1 T b - r is a faithful emulation of the prophetic paradigm encapsulated in the sffruh. This comprises two main themes: a) relevant theoretical and interpretative issues, including an introduction to a1 Nabha-'s treatment of the siruh in a selected text; and b) a textual analysis of passages from this. Intellectual Formation and Political Career A1 Nabhihi was born in Ijzim in 1909 into a family distinguished by its tradition of scholarship in the Islamic sciences. He graduated from a1 Azhar in 1932. Returning to Palestine, he began work as a high school teacher of religion. In 1938, he transferred to the Islamic courts of law.6 After a series of minor posts, he was finally appointed qddt (judge) in Ramleh in 1945. After the Arab defeat of 1948, he fled to Syria. The Ba'th Phase On his return from Syria, a1 NabhZni worked as a qadi in Jerusalem and later transferred to the Court of Appeals, where he remained until his resignation in early 1950. During these two years in Jerusalem, he asso- ciated himself with a group of Palestinian intellectuals who were emerg- ing as leaders of their community's aspirations within the Jordanian context following the annexation. This chapter in a1 NabhSini's political career reveals influences that were to shape his vision of Hizb a1 Tab-r. % sketch draws on Ihsiiu ' A M a1 Mun'im Samiirirah, Mufhiim u. 'A&iiah ai IjtirnE'Qah fi a1 Fikr a1 Iskimi al Mu'ciyir (Jerusalem: Ma$ba'at a1 Ridah, 1987, 140-46. Compare with David Commins, "Tiqi al Din a1 Nabm- and the Islamic Libera- tion Party," The Muslim World 8 1 (1991): 194. Taji-Farouki: al NabWis Reading of the Canonical Textual Sources 369 This group of intellectuals were "Westem-educated, and modem in their thought on political organization and activity." They resented King Abdullah and were determined to revem the situation in their homeland.' Their sentiments won the support of the Jotdanian Colonel Abddlah al Tall, Commander of the Arab Legion in Jerusalem. A1 Tall strengthened their conviction that the king stood in the way of Palestine's liberation. Under his protection, the group pmued its activities freely, one of which was the publication of the daily newspaper al Ba'th, after which this phase in his life is g e n e d y named.* The group's ideas resembled closely those of the Syrian Ba'th Party. Its central message was a call for revolutionary change in the Arab world and the Unification of all Arab states. A1 Tall encoutaged the group to use al Bu 'th to attack the regime and so to prepare the Palestinians in Jordan to accept the idea of a coup. The success of U r n - al Za'im's coup in Syria prompted the group to consider implementing its own joint coup plan: a promise of assistance was s e c d from Syria and Egypt.g A1 Tall commissioned a1 N a b h - with bringing back a message from al za'im concerning the proposed coup, and so he travelled to Damascus in May 1949 for this putp~se.'~ This reveals his closeness to al Tall. He has also been described as one of the Colonel's closest assoCiates in Jerusalem." While at this point he was evidently committed to the coup plot and its underlying platform, one must ask whether this commitment survived the debacle of al Tall and the coup conspiracy. An answer arises in thtee works he published shortly after this": a review of one of these reveals his intellectual Orientation at this juncture. 'This characterization is based on Clinton Bailey, "The Participation of the Palestinians in the Politics of Jodan," Ph.D. diss., Columbia University (Am Arbor Uni- versity Microfilms, Inc., lW), 125-26, 1303-1; 'Abd Al&h al Tall, KrIrithur Filasffia: Mudh&ir& ' A M AllrSh a1 Tall (Cairo: D& al Qalam, 1959), 587. *See Bailey, "Participation," 127-30, al Tall, KrIrirhat Fihstrk, 569, 587; J. Vati- kbtis, Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab hgion 1921-1957 (Lon- don: Frank Cass & Co., 1967), 102. %or further details about the coup plot, see Vatikiotis, Politics and the Military, 99-10s. "See al Tall, firithat Filas~a, 591. "Bailey, "Participation," 134. 12Ni@n a1 Mujtma'; Risdat a1 'Arab; lnqrsdh Fi&ih. 370 'Lhe American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 11:3 Znqddh Fi@3I3 This monograph reflects a nationalist orientation, based on the notion that the Arabs constitute a single nation (ummah), unique in its posses- sion of an eternal mission, Islam, the fundamental principle of Arab nationalism and its "spirit." Although he insists that Islam must be mdored to Arab nationalism in order to rehabilitate it, the author does not explicitly postulate Islam as a political system. Inqddh FiZastz3 constmes the redemption of Palestine as an Arab problem and proposes a two-pronged appmach to its solution. It is the long-term approach, intended to address problems confronting the Arab nation at the mot, that interests us here. The discussion reflects salient themes of early Ba'thist ideology, including the emphasis on Arab unity, and the notion of a revolutionary vanguard that regenerates the Arab nation by t d o r r n i n g society. The working out of this approach is out- lined below in some detail, as the main notions later recur, mutatis rnutandis, in the program al Nabha- elaborated for his new party some two yeam later. Znqddh FiZustz3 calls for a revolutionary restructuring of Arab society. To achieve this, the author urges Arab intellectuals to form an "elite band" @ 'ah mukhttirah), endowed with outstanding qualities. He refers repeatedly to this as "the first group" (al kutlah a1 E h Q The elite band functions as a launching pad (nuqtat inti@) for their mission, enabling them to unify their ideas and define a course of action. As it forges h u g h Arab society, it fuses with the people, developing first the form of a political party and finally that of a nation or state (kutlah Qizboah munazzamah tunzim a1 ummah aw al dawlah). Once it has matured into a healthy nation, a sound government emerges out of it. At this point, the Arab nation will ascend and Palestine will be redeemed. The Break with the Ba'th: Establishing rjizb a1 Tabrir Despite its closeness to early Ba'thist ideology, there are differences of emphasis in Znqddh F i h h 3 . For example, al Nabm- makes no mention of the Ba'th's pivotal Arab socialism. There are other indications that, by the time Znqddh Filmtin appeared, our author was moving away from his Ba'thist colleagues. For example, he did not associate himself with the Ba'thist group in the fitst two Jordanian elections following the 13Tiiqi al DTn al NabW-, I n q W Filastih (Damascus: MatWat Ibn Zaydtin, 1950), 213pp. See Commins, "TQi al Din a1 N a b W 195-96. Taji-Farouki. al N a b h i s Reading of the Canonical Textual Sources 371 annexation, but stood as an independent instead." Following his failure in both elections, he resumed teaching in Amman and then in Jerusalem. One biographer contends that since his t d e r to the legal profession, he had lobbied prominent figures at home and in Cairo and sounding them out on his ptoposal to establish an Islamic party in order to ratore Islam to its former glory.'' Although this is difficult to reconcile with his dmul- taneous involvement in the Ba'thist group, it is conceivable that the failure of the coup plot convinced him of the ineffectiveness of Arab nationalism in r e d k g the h b s ' ills and redeeming Palestine. Rather than any voltefuce, it would appear that he developed the emphasis on Islam in Inqtidh F ih t in , which had set him apart from his secular nationalist colleagues, to its logical conclusion. In Jerusalem, a1 N a b b - won over M a d and Rajab Bayyiid al T a r n - and 'Abd al Qadii Zalliim, who had broken away from the Muslim Brotherhood Association.L6 Both the initial attempt by Hizb a1 Tab& to obtain a permit to organize (see above) and a subsequent attempt failed." Documentation submitted to the Ministry of the Interior described Bizb al T&-r as a political party with Islam as its ideology and having the g d s of reviving the Islamic ummah,'* purging it of the legacy of colonialism, and restoring an Islamic way of life to it. This would be achieved by uniting it within a single Islamic state (the caliphate), erected on the Mns of existing regimes, that would implement Islam and export it worldwide.'g A1 Nabhid envisaged Hizb a1 TabTr as a vanguard that would transform the public way of thinking at its mot. It would engender an intellectual revolution by supplanting the erroneous beliefs that have "See Avi Plascov, The Palestinian Refugees, 105; Amuon Cohen, Political Parries in the Wed Bank under the Jordanian Regime, 1949-1967 (Itham Cornell University Res, 1982), 216; Samimh, MapIIm a1 'Addah al Ifimci'ijuh, 144-46. 15Sam&&, Mafilsm a1 'Addah al Ijtimd'ijwh, 145-46. "Simon and Landau, "Miflaget Hashih~r," 408. The authurs mahtaiu that al N a b W had also quit the Brotherhood, as does Cohen, Political Pades , 187,209,218. In con- trast, well-placed Jordanian sources deny that he had ever been a member. "Simon and h d a u , "Miflaget Hashihrur," 41q Shaul Midml, West Bank/East Bank, 36. '*The term ummah assumed a usage in Tahrir publications different from that in Inqrsdh FilastrsI. It now sisnified "an d a t i o n of individuals united through the agency of a single doctrine, from which emantes a specific system." See, for example, T&qi al Din al Nabhihi, Sur'ot a1 Bahihah (n.p., 1976), 111, 127. " M a ~ i i n Hizb a1 T&r@, 2d. ed. (Beirut: M e V al lstiqkl, 1953), 73. 372 m e American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 11:3 arisen due to the ummah's state of decline and colonialist "contamina- tions" with its own ideology. This ideology is construed as a correct rep resentation of a "pristine" Islam that is cleansed of all distortions. The revolution in thought would underpin a political revolution, as an exten- sive fifth column is created that supports the idea of the caliphate. This column can be relied on to support the revolutionary state once it has been established by a coup executed with the help of power bases that have pledged their support to the part^.^ The conception of the party as vanguard and its role in transforming society is pivotal. A1 NabhM used the metaphor of fusing in a "cru- cible"" to describe how the party would purge the ummah's intellectual make-up and make it one with the party ideology. The early Leninist notion of the party as the elite, vanguard, educator of the masses and an organization of professional revolutionariesz2 echoes throughout his dis- cussions of the character and role of Hizb a1 Tabnr. This was typical of several of the new political parties in the region. A1 Nabkni's familiarity with the ethos and approach of the Ba'th in particular is evident in the many parallels that arise between his conception of Hizb a1 T h - r and the approach of the early Ba'thists.= The Creation of Bizb a1 Tabrir as a Fard The Case for a Political Party: The Notion of Revival and How It Can Be Achieved In 1953, a1 Nabknl developed his conviction, apparent in a rudimen- tary form in Indqh Filmin, that the establishment of a kutlah is indis- pensable to an ummah's revival (inna a1 ummah Id tanhad illd bi a1 *"This and the following two paragraphs draw on Tiqi al Din a1 NabhW, a1 Takattul af Hi&; 3d. eda (n.p., 1953), 25-28; 303-3; 38-56; 65-66, TQi al Din al NabhM, al Tafi? (n.p., 1973), 102-9; Mofahim Hi$ a1 Tabrp, 53-54; 64-H; 73; Hi$ a1 Tdri? (ap., 1985), 33-36. "See al Nabhiit& a1 Takattul a1 Hi&; 25-28; Hub al T&ir leaflet "JawSb Su'iil,'' (20/6/1%9): 3 and "Qit'ah min KitSb Ursila li ahad al Mas'olin min Shabiib a1 Wizb," (18/1/1%2): 1. pElaborakd in "What is to be Done?," 1902. See Marcel Liebman, Leninism under Lenin (Lmdon: Merlin Press, 1985 reprint), 29-45. =See Kame1 S. Abu Jaber, The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party: History, Iakobgy, and Organization (New York Syracuse University Press, 1966), 101, 107, 11618, 130-32. Taji-Famuki: aI Nabhihiis Reading of the Canonical Textual Sources 373 rakarrut)." This conviction is a corollary of his understanding of revival and of how it can be engendered in an ummah that is in a state of decline. A1 N a b h - defines revival as "'an elevation in thought." For an ummah to achieve this, it must establish political power on the basis of a correct doctrine ('uqfhh), which must be rational and in harmony with human For al Nabh- , only the Islamic doctrine fits this description. Hence "the only way to ptoduce a revival is to m e an Islamic way of life, by establishing an Islamic state."26 He concedes that only individuals are capable of the enlightened thought, clarity of vision, and heightened sensitivity that is required to discover the doctrine that will form the basis of an ummah's revival?' However, only a group can create and disseminate in society a series of concepts, criteria, and con- victions based on this doctrine. Hence only a group can induce the ummah (or most important power-base within it) to accept these concepts, criteria, and convictions and to grasp the necessity for living on their basis. This is fundamental to the attempt to take over authority within the state so that it can be dismantled and a regime erected on the basis of the doctrine." The individual can influence neither the ummah nor the state; only a group can achieve this. To be effective, the basis on which its membem group together must meet specific criteria. For a1 Nabhh-, only a political party (tukattul bizbo, as opposed to groups established on the basis of forming an association (d takattul 'uZd mds ul jurn'ijwh) and groups that resemble genuine political parties only in name (ul rakartul 'uZd as& hizbiisrn~n),~ fit the bill. It is apparently the possession of a cohemt organizational system that distinguishes a tQkattuZ bizbi from these other kinds of group: %Al Nabhihi-, a1 Takattul a1 Hi&; 21. '5Hadith al S i y h (A1 Rihx Matba'at al Ridah , ad.), 16; Hizb d Tabrir leaflet ''TahlilSt Siyiisiyah," (undated); Hizb a1 Tahrii, 12; M@im Siy&>ah Hi$ al Tahni, (ap., 1%9), 14. 26A1 NabbM, N i z h a1 I s h , 5th ed. (n.p., 1953)' 53. nAl NabW, al Takatrul a1 Hizbc 25; a1 Nabhni, a1 Ta&i, 98-99; 105-6. With regard to the Islamic ummah, the Islamic doctrine allegedly exists today as an "empty philomphy''-it must be rediscovered and implemented. mDukhrsl a1 Mujrma' (Jerusalem: 1958), 17. 2gSee al Nabm-, a1 Takatrul a1 Hi&, 4-6, 9-18, 20 for a critique of the failed attempts of earlier movements formed on such bases to engender a revival. 374 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 11:3 It is through its organizational systems (tarqfmfit h i zbz jd ) that (a p u p ) is/becomes a party (hizb), pmceeds to carry out its mis- sion as such, and proceeds on its life as such.30 A1 Nab-- argues that only a takxttul hizbi has a "structured form" (kiyin), which enables it to challenge state and ummah, which also have such forms. A political party's structured form is, moreover, intellectual in nature (kiy&zfikri), which makes it supremely qualified to develop and protect the requisite series of concepts, criteria, and convictions on the basis of the doctrine. This contention derives from his understanding of how an idea is transformed into a concept, criterion, or conviction. This pmess, allegedly, quires the generation of faith in it through persua- sion, repetition, and application, which can only be achieved in collective context. Further, within a group, the doctrine generates a specific intel- lectual climate that influences everyone placed in it. This generates a structured form specific to the party and distinct from those of ummah and state. Thus the party can act upon both of these and is uniquely qualified to reconstruct them on the basis of the adopted doctrine.31 These arguments have been developed without reference to Islamic discourse and derive from al Nabk-'s own notions concerning the inherent n a t m of a revival and how it can be engendered. His conviction that only a modem political party can produce a revival is clear. We will tum now to the main concem of this Section: the arguments he develops for creating a modem political party in terms of the constructs of tradi- tional Islamic discourse. The Establishment of an Islamic Political Party as F a d A1 N a b k - bases this argument on his exegesis of Qur'an 3:104: wa litakun minkum ummah yad'iina iki a1 khayr wa ya'murcna bi a1 ma'riif wa yanhawna 'an a1 munkat wa uki'ika hum a1 mufihiin. We will now examine his reading of this verse and the conclusions he draws from it. The hading of his discussion in this respect states the case he elaborates clearly: "Establishing political parties that work for Islam is a fard, just like that of prayer (~alah)."~' ~ ~~~ %zb al T- leaflet "Yaqiimu Kull Mushrif bi Tafhim Ijalaqaihi al QM al Tiilia'," (2/1Cy1%3): 1. "DuWlrs1 a1 Mujtama', 17-20. "See Hadith af Sipim, 10-13. This is a collection of leaflets. Pages 10-13 were issued originally in Bemt in late 1960. Taji-Farouki: al N a b M s Reading of the Canonical Textual Sources 375 A1 NabhM argues that this vetse designates the specific means by which Muslims must fulfil their duty of conveying the call to good (which he identifies here with Islam) and "bidding to honor and forbid- ding dishonor." This is identified as the establishment of a specific group (kutlah) in which they group together (yatakattalhz b ih i on the basis of fulfilling these duties. Addressing the term "ummah," he thus maintains that it denotes something more specific than an association (in the general sense) (iamii'ah): it is specifically an association made up of individuals who have a bond that unites them, through which they form a coherent grouping (kutlah rnutakattilah) and a single unit, and (thanks to which) they continue thus. This interpretation is substantiated by a quotation from a1 Maruir, Mubarnmad 'Abduh's exegesis, that, in the context of this verse, describes an ummah as "an association made up of individuals who have a bond that unites them and through which they become like the limbs of a person's body." By applying the juristic principle that whatever is indispensable for the achievement of something obligatory is itself obligatory (md h yatimmu a1 wdjib i l h bihi fahuwa ~ d j i b ) ? ~ our author argues that the verse provides textual evidence (qarimh) that it is obligatory to establish this kutlah. To reinforce this point, he states that non-Islamic government by Muslims is one of the gravest examples of dishonor, while creating Islamic rule is one of the greatest acts of bidding to honor. Thus he argues that it is obligatory for Muslims to establish a kutlah "for the pur- pose of fighting the rule of unbelief and creating an Islamic government." A1 NabhM uses the terms kutlah and hizb s i y h i (political patty) interchangeably in the discussion here. For example, he concludes that "Allah has made it a religious obligation for Muslims to be in political parties that propagate the message of Islam and work for the resumption of the Islamic way of life." According to our author, the vetse is thus evidence that a Muslim's pnsence in a political party that calls for Islam and works to destroy the rule of unbelief and create Islamic government is a religious obligation for him, exactly like (the obligatory) prayer: there is no difference between the two." NabW-, a1 S h W Y a h a1 Iskimrjrah, 3 vols., 2d d, (ap.: 1953), vol. 2, 36- 38. "Thefotd 'ayn applies only when no such paay exists. Once it has been established, the fir4 of involvement in it is one of kiyZyah. 376 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 11:3 All he has to say with regard to the use of these terms, which represent his interpretation of the signification of the term “ummah“ in this verse, is the following: It is natural to call (this) group (kutlah) a party (hizb): Allah Himself called it this in the Qur’an. He thus called those who make Him their friend35 (yutawuZZzimhu) a party. In the sl;irah ‘The Table,’ He said: Whoso makes Allah his friend and His Messenger and the believers-the party of Allah, they ~IE the vi~tols.3~ And He said in the sziruh ‘The Disputer’: ”These are Allah’s party; why, surely Allah’s party-they are the p m - perers.137 He thus implies that there is a direct correspondence between the signification of the term hizb, as he uses it, and its signification in Qur’anic usage. In the Qur’an and early traditional and historical narra- tives, the term is used most commonly with a rather negative connotation of a variety of ancient factions. In addition to references such as those cited above, where it is used in the Qur’an in an obviously favorable sense, there are also references to hizb uZ shayta (i.e., Qur’an 58:19). Finally, the term is employed, with neither favorable nor negative conno- tations, to refer to a group or faction (i.e., Qur’an 30:32).38 In contrast, the use of hizb to signify a political party specifically, as in the case of our author, is quite recent: it dates only from the early part of this century. As contact and familiarity with European politics developed, there emerged during the last two decades of the nineteenth century and alongside the traditional sense of a general group or assembly, the concept of a political party specifically, in the modem western sense. By the first decade of this century, the tern bizb had come to signify unambiguously a political party. While, as Kedourie remarks, this modem usage was ”in a way a natural and legitimate extension of the traditional and classical it =A. J. Arbem, The Koran Interpreted (Oxford Oxford Univ. Press, 1991, reprint). “Qur’an 58:22. %emard Lewis, % Political Language oftslum (chicago: Chicago University pres~, 1988), 123, n. 25. 3%Xe Kedourie, ”Hub,” The Encyclopedia of Islam, 26 ed. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1979), 514. Taji-Fmuki: al Nabhhiis Reading of the Canonical Textual Sources 377 is nevertheless clear that a1 Nabhsini has discounted the gulf between the signification of the term in Qur’anic usage and of the meaning that he intends. We would argue that his use of the term here underlines his concern to demonstrate, within what are ostensibly exclusively Islamic parameters, that Muslims are obligated religiously to establish a political party as a means towards erecting an Islamic state. To stress further that the term “ummah“ in Qur’an 3:104 signifies a political party rather than any other kind of association, a1 Nabhini argues that the most important expression of the duty to “bid to honor and to forbid dishonor” is seen in calling rulers to account for their actions (mulzdsahit a1 bukkdm; bisbah) and offering them advice. Observing that this is a political act, he infers that the “ummah” mentioned in the verse must possess a specifically and exclusively political character.4o Although not directly relevant to the development of an argument for establishing an Islamic political party as a means to erect an Islamic state, a1 Nabhini’s views on the role of political parties within the hypothetical framework of this state are illuminating in this regard. He thus incorpo- rates a provision for political parties in his proposed constitution for an Islamic state, upholding political parties and a multiparty system as the only means for achieving effective implementation of the obligatory pro- cess of hisbah. In fact, he holds political parties and animating an active opposition to be the ultimate guatantee for the implementation of Islam and an ongoing improvement in this a m . Imposing modem categories on early Islamic history, he construes the Companions and the first genera- tion of Muslims as the “Islamic party“ (a1 bizb a1 ishim&- a1 kutlah al ishimzjuh) left by the Prophet on his death. He attributes the increasing misapplication of Islam to the disappearance of this party and with the end of the generation of the successors to the Companions’ successors.41 This treatment reinforces the impression that political parties have been an intrinsic part of Islamic history, which serves the broader endeavor of construing the modem political party as an authentically Islamic institution and, hence, furthering our author’s own venture in launching Hizb a1 Tahrk. To succeed, this venture also quired the elaboration of arguments treating involvement in such parties, and in politics in general, in terms of Islamic discourse. ‘OHiz,b a1 TahrzT, 7-8. ?he author maintains that it is forbidden for it to have any other character or function (spiritual, educational, or moral). See Mafiim Hizb a1 Tahn?, 66-67. “A1 Nab- N i z h nl I f u h f i u f I s h , 2d. ed. (Beirut: Dk al K M , 1953), 119-23, 36-40. See also al Nab&-, a1 Sha&ijwh a1 Ishim@&, vol. 2, 123. 378 The American Joumal of Islamic Social Sciences 11:3 Involvement in Politics as Fard Al NabhM defines politics as “managing people’s affairs according to the ideas you hold and the systems you adopt.“42 He holds that people are politicians by nature and that they relish politics. Of all people, he argues that Muslims should be highly politicized, as they possess the ulti- mate system for managing the affairs of humanity as a whole.” Subjects’ participation in the domestic politics of the hypothetical Islamic state is construd as afurd a1 kifayah, being essential to repelling any potential hatm issuing from the head of state. On this basis, al NabhM envisages a stak in which the Muslim populace is encouraged by the force of an Islamic legal rule to engage in domestic political life.44 A parallel argu- ment is advanced in relation to international politics: involvement in this anma repels potential harm to the ummah issuing from its enemies, who constantly hatch plots against it. Finally, politics is held to be crucial to the propagation of Islam, according to the precedent of the Prophet and the rightly-guided caliphs.45 Al NabhtM contends that “colonialist unbelievers and heretical hypo- crites” have deliberately repelled Muslims from involvement in political parties, which is “tantamount to tuming them away from the obligation imposed by Allah on Muslims in the Qur’an.lf Their aim is to keep all pious Muslims out of parties so that th- remain the preserve of heretics, the corrupt, and colonialist agents.* Finally, he targets the ‘ulama, accus- ing them of violating the Islamic legal rule by staying away from politics. He rejects their pretext for this-that their imprisonment will deprive the community of access to their learning-as a cover for their c~wardice.~’ “Hodirh a1 Siyiim, 14. “Hi& al T&P, 102, Ma$Thiin Siy&rjah, 1. Channels for such participation on an organized basis are institutionalized in provisions for political parties and a~ elected state council m the proposed state constitution. See article 107 i (b) and (ii), for example, in al Na- Nivim a1 Isliim. %d?h al Siyiim, 6-9, 1422, 119-23. ”bid., 1@3. ‘‘Ijizb al Tat~rir leaflet entitled ”Qur’an 553,” (19/3/1980): 4-5. Taji-Farouki: al Nabhiiniis Reading of the Canonical Textual soutceS 379 Bizb a1 Tabrir's Program as a Reenactment of the Prophetic Paradigm Encapsulated in the Sirah Interpretative Issues and Theoretical Discussion In order to understand a1 Nabhiinh claims concerning the sirah and the relationship he posits between it and S z b al TaMr's program, it is necessary to analyze his relationship as reader to the sfrah as text. This should not be confused with our own reading, either of the sirah itself or of al NabhM's reading of this. In this endeavor, Quentin Skinner's discussion of approaches to inter- pretation and understanding, the analysis of meaning, and the interpreta- tion of historical texts in particular is helpful, as it suggests a framework for understanding the telationship between the reader and his texL4* In particular, aspects of Skinner's critique of the "old" history of ideas, centering on the traditional, closely textual approach to the interpretation of texts and an undervaluation of historical context, can be applied to the contemporary Islamist ideologue's reading of the canonical textual Islamic sou~ces, which function for him/her as a fount of authority and in which he/she consciously roots his/her perceptions and undemtanding of his/her world. Thus, certain of the failings and mythologies Skinner describes in this critique surface in such mdings. The following discussion is centered mund two themes, and a loosely causal relationship is posited between them The first is the general appmch that al NabhM adopts to the sirah, which can be described broadly as p m t i s t . The second is what Skinner terms the "mythology of pmlepsis," a mythological fault inherent in the traditional approach to the history of ideas. While Skinner does not single out presentism per se for explicit criticism in the work cited above, the ahistorical, even anticontextualist natwe of the presentist approach places it clearly within the scope of his general critique. Most importantly for our purposes, we would argue that it is this ahistorical perspective that renders the present-minded appmch to history and texts particularly prone to the incidence of the mythology of prolepsis. Although from our extemal perspective the reader and the canonical text obviously do not share the same context, from a perspective intemal "Quentin Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas," in M. Tully, ed., Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics (Cambridge: Polity ptess, 1988)' 29-67. 380 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 11:3 to the religious tradition the text is held to be relevant to any context due to its transcendent nattm. Through the present-minded hermeneutics of the intemal perspective, the canonical text is thus rendered perpetually relevant and new. The presentist approach, which is widely evident in the thought of Contemporary Islamist ideologues, abstracts things from their historical context and judges them apart from this by a system of direct references to the present. Through a preSentist reading of the canonical text, timeless elements of universal relevancy are applied out of context and construed in the light of the reader’s perceptions of hisher own reality. Wrenched from its context of historical, political, and social fac- tors and resituated in the reader’s context, the canonical text thus holds within it a meaningful explanation for every reality and a strategy for dealing with every circumstance. Furthermore, through its prophetic aspect, it also discloses the preordained outcome of history. In his present-minded approach to the canonical text, the Islamist ideologue seeks out elements that appear analogous to contemporary developments and which are hence of particular value to his specific and immediate concerns. To paraphrase Chomsky, these elements evidently acquire part of their value as a result of the expectations with which the reader approaches them. Harlan describes Chomsky’s approach to history in Cartesian linguistics as ptesent-minded. He demonstrates Chomsky’s clarity about his presentism with the following quote, which we repeat here in full, as it is a neat expression of the intentions of presentism: I’m looking at history not as an antiquarian, who is interested in finding out and giving a precisely accurate account of what the thinking of the seventeenth century was . . . but rather from the point of view of, let’s say, an art lover, who wants to look at the seventeenth century to find in it things that are of particular value, and that obtain part of their value in part because of the perspective with which he approaches them.49 Over and above the “contextual baggage” that a1 Nabha- brings unconsciously to bear upon his reading of the sfruh, as with Chomsky, there is also a conscious attempt to search out elements that are relevant to his own particular concerns, in what might be described as a deliber- ately anachronistic approach to the past. It is this endeavor that produces in a1 NabhiitlT’s reading of the sfruh what Skinner identifies in the tradi- tional historians of ideas as an unacceptable ”conflation of the necessary 49Noam Chomsky, quoted in David Harlan, ”Intellectual History and the Retum of Litemture,” m e American Historical Review 94, no. 3 (June 1989): 605. Taji-Farouki: al Nabhihiis Reading of the Canonical Textual Sources 381 asymmetry between the significance an observer may justifiably claim to find in a given statement or other action and the meaning of that action This is the characteristic of the mythology of prolepsis, which can be defined simply as the representation of a thing as existing before it actually did. The reading of the sfrah analyzed here arises in a1 NabhM's book a1 Dawlah ul Zslamiyah (Jerusalem: 1953). While treatments of the siruh arise in other Tah& texts, this is the most significant, because it is the earliest and functions as a basis for later treatments, which make explicit what is here implicit. The parallel posited between the prophetic p d i g m and the party's program informs a cruder treatment in later discussions, comprising an exercise in "demonstrating" the alleged identity between the two in all their details." As the seminal treatment developed early on in a1 NabEni's new venture, a1 Dawlah a1 Zslamiyah offers the most suitable material for analysis here. Our examination of this text relies on content, conceptual, and termi- nological analysis. The canonical text, of which a1 NabEni's version rep- resents a particular reading, is kept in mind throughout the analysis. This is Ibn IshGq's Sirat RasCl Allrfh, generally cited by reference to its editor as Ibn Hisham's a1 Siruh a1 Nabaw&uh?2 In overall content and approach, a1 Nabhh-'s treatment of the Makkan chapter of the sirah is faithful to this "original." Having said that, the analysis will focus on aspects of his treatment that distinguish it from the original. A preliminary glance at the treatment in a1 Dawlah a1 Zsllim&uh reveals one of these differences. In place of those in the original, a1 NabhM has substituted his own subtitles as a device for ordering the narrative. These tell us immediately something about his reading of the sirah. They include: "The Starting Point" (Nuqtat a1 Ibtih-7, "The Com- panions Group Together" (Takattul a1 Suhibah), "The Da 'wuh Takes Off" (Zntiliiq a1 Da 'wah), "The Da 'wuh Interacts" (Tufa 'ul a1 Da 'wah), and "Two of the Da'wah's Phases" (Dawran min Adwar a1 Du'wuh). This list summarizes the evidence suggesting that al Nabha- has recon- strued the siruh in terms deriving from a new conceptual frame of refer- ence. This is Hizb a1 TabrTr's program, in which the above terms have a technical signification (see below). ?Skinner in TuUy (ed.), Meaning and Content, 44. "HadzTh a1 Siyclm (early 196Os), 35ff; Hizb a1 T&rR (1985), 31-42. *We refer below to volumes I and IL of the four-volume version of this work, which was edited by M e a al Sayqfi, Ib- a1 Abyh-, and 'AM al Hafiz Shibli (Beirut: D& Ihyfi' al Tur5th a1 'Ambi, n.d.). 382 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 11:3 Diwiid €lam& describes the aim of a1 Dawlah a1 Islcimoah in the book‘s preface as follows: The aim of this book is not to produce a history of the Islamic state:53 its aim is that people should see how the prophet estab- lished the Islamic Assuming that this is an accurate representation of a1 Nabkni’s intentions, we are thus dealing in a1 Dawlah a1 Iskim@zh with a systematic exercise in hermeneutics conceived with the specific aim of pnxenting the sfiah in a particular light. It is valuable, for the sake of clarity, to underline the particular political objectives that a1 Nabhzini has brought to bear on his reading of the sfiah. We have argued that he endeavored to articulate an ideological alternative to the dominant trend that would be relevant to the region’s new political circumstances and could hence be promoted as a viable rival to the secular nationalist parties. Relevancy would be measured largely in terms of modemity. This would also render the new party potentially more attractive than the Muslim Brotherhood, with which it would com- pete for the same constituencies. This constitutes the pivotal feature of a1 Nabhiini’s present-minded approach to the sziiah. Fusing together his political experience and per- sonal convictions, he launched a modem Islamic political party with a program already conceived in prototype within a national milieu and typical in ethos of the new revolutionary parties. Through his ptesentist reading of the sziiah, he sought to legitimate this political program in terms of traditional Islamic discourse. His appmach to the szirah revolves around this conscious political objective. This necessitated manipulation of the sziiah in an effort to present its Makkan chapter as the program of a political party centering on the efforts on a revolutionary vanguatd. Wzb al Tai.uir’s program could then be construed as a faithful reenact- ment of this prophetic paradigm. In its capacity as an account of the Prophet’s precedents, the sfrah is a source of Shari‘ah. A1 NabhW could therefore maintain that the implementation of Hizb al Tab-r’s program is a faid, since emulation of the Prophet would thereby be achieved.” 53The account of the @ah is followed by a lengthy account of the history of the %A1 NabhM, a1 Dawluh a1 Ishzjuh, 6. Islamic state up to 1924. %In relation to c e d aspects of his conduct, emulation is considered a fad . See al Nabhhi, a1 Shakh@ah, vol. 3, 84-85. Taji-Farouki: al N a b W s Reading of the Canonical Textual sourceS 383 A1 Nabm- elaborated his own interptetation of the Makkan chapter of the ayah by maintaining that Muhammad transformed pre-Islamic society by supplanting its concepts, convictions, and criteria with those of Islam. Once the Madinans wete largely united on the basis of Islam, thanks to Mw'ab ibn 'Umayr, and persuaded to live according to it, the Prophet assumed power and established an Islamic regime in Madinah." A1 Nab-- insisted that S z b a1 Ta4rir's program adhed to the pm- phetic paradigm "withuut deviating even a hair's btpadth."" Three phases (adwcTr; sing: uizwr) are specified in this program, each with its own activities and objectives: that of indoctrination (dawr a1 tathqtfl, that of interaction (dawr a1 tafi'ul), and that of government (dawr a1 bkm). Two S u d v e phases meet in an interface (nuqtah)?* The program is launched in the starting point (nuqtat a1 ibtida 3. The fitst interface or transitional stage is the take-off point (nuqtat a1 inti@), the second is the consolidation point (nuqtat a1 imkiz). While the program cannot be described fully here, key concepts and activities within it are r e f e d to in the coutse of the textual analysis, and explanations are pro- vided the= as necessary. The two most important phases are those of indoctrination and interaction. A brief note on these must During the phase of indoctrination, the body of the kutlah (secret at this stage) is built up, the Islamic doctrine (the basis of its ideology) is embodied in individuals though intensive indoctrination, and they group together on the basis of this doctrine. Gradually these individuals amtact others, as the doctrine "cannot bear to remain imprisoned in them." The phase of interaction ushers in the first attempts to a d d m people en mame with the party ideology, triggering an open confrontation with the ideas of unbelief that dominate society. A Textual Analysis of Passages from a1 Dawlah a1 Iskimzjwh: The Starting Point (Nuqtat a1 Ibtidi') A1 Nabhiini's treatment of the first three years of Muhammad's mis- sion6' provides a clear illustration of his manipulation of the original text %H&lh al SiyrSm, 4; Hizb al Tahrii, 16. nMama7n Hizb a1 Tahn?, 63, H d l h a1 SiyrSm, 35-38. s@zb al TaMr leaflet entitled "Jaw& Su'lil," 2qrq1969. sA1 N a b m , al Tak#tul al Hi& 25-28; 31-W; 45-55; Hi& a1 Ti&@, 31-43. Nab- al Dawhh al Isldmijuh, 7-8. 384 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 11:3 through the proleptic use of terms and concepts drawn from contemporary Arab poIitical discourse that, during the 1950s, was dominated by a secular nationalist orientation, and the imposition of terms and concepts deriving from Hizb a1 Tahrir's program and ideology. According to a1 NabhiirG, Muhammad "grouped" people around him- self on the basis of the new faith (kxina . . . yukattiluhum hawlahu), gradually creating a "believing group" (a1 kutlah a1 mu'minah) out of them. Furthermore, he adopted a1 Arqam ibn Abi a1 Arqam's home (ddr a1 Arqarn)61 not only as a place in which to teach the new converts the faith, but also as the kutlah's "headquarters" (markaz). In his account of 'Umar ibn a1 Khattiib's embracing Islam,6' a1 NabhZni construes Khab- b5b ibn a1 Aratt's visit to F5timah63 ('Umar's sister) in her husband Sa'id's house in order to recite the Qur'an to her as a halqah. This term is used to denote the study-circle that is a central feature of Hizb a1 Tabrir's activities, functioning as the vehicle through which the intensive indoctrination of new recruits in the party ideology is achieved under the guidance of senior members.64 Thus: "'Umar embraced Islam at the hands of this &lqah." He concludes this section with the observation that for the first three years of his mission, Muhammad devoted himself to the process of tath- qgexclusively. Thus, "He spent three years indoctrinating these Muslims . . . indoctrinating their minds with the meanings and expressions of the Qur'an and the concepts and ideas of Islam." The term tathqg translated here as indoctrination, also denotes a specific activity within Hizb a1 Tabrir's program: the first phase in it is actually named after it (see above). We will comment further on the use of this term and of the root katala below. The Companions Group Together (Takattul a1 Sahabah) In this secti0n,6~ a1 Nabhihi describes the condition of the Compan- ions after the end of three years, on the eve of Allah's command that Muhammad come out openly with his mission, in terms that derive either 6'For details, see lbn Hishh , a1 Sash a1 NabawQah, vol. 1, 270, n. 1. 621bid., 367-72. A1 NabhiM refers erroneously to her as Zaynab. 63 @For a detailed treatment, see Bizb a1 T&ir leaflet "Al-Balaqiit," undated. See also a1 Qiinin a1 I d i r i l i Hizb a1 Tuhri?, 1953,7. mA1 NabW-, a1 Dawlah a1 IskimQah, 8-10. Taji-Farouki: al N a b M s Reading of the Canonical Textual Sources 385 from Hizb a1 Tabrir's program or from its wider thought-system or con- ceptual framework. The forty-odd Companions who had embraced Islam and joined the Prophet since the start of his mission thus "gmuped together" (takattalu) and conveyed his da'wah. At the end of three yeas, Muhammad was convinced that they had " m a t d in their cultUte" (nabja . . . al Sahubah fl thaqufatihim), that their "mentalities" had been transformed into Islamic mentalities (takawwanat 'aqfiyutuhurn 'aqlgah iskim@ah), that their "psycho-social make-up" had likewise become Islamic (wbalpt nafi@dtuhum nufigah ishm@ah), and that they had clearly "grasped their relation to Allah" (idrukukum silatuhum bi Alhh). A1 NabhiM concludes that Muhammad was encouraged greatly by this and that he was now certain that the "Muslim kutlah" (kutht al muslimfn) was strong enough to confront society as a whole. The terms introduced here require a brief clarification. 'AqE@ah and nafs@ah denote specific concepts in a1 Nabkni's notions of human per- sonality, thought, and conduct.66 The notion of "grasping one's relation to Allah (as His creature)" also denotes a specific concept in his thought- system: that of spirit (rEh). Thus, "the spirit consists in a person grasping his relation to Allah" (al rzih idruk a1 insun silatahu bi ALkTh)!' Finally, the comment that the Companions had "matured in their culture" ICSOM~CX with a specific aspect of a1 NabhM's conceptualization of the new recruit's intellectual formation; "maturity in the party culture" (a1 nudj fi al thaqifah al hizboah) thus qualifies the individual member to proceed to activities of interaction.68 Note that a1 Nabhh- puts these expressions in Muhammad's mouth. This implies that Muhammad thought in terms of such categories and concepts and so, by extension, upheld Hizb al T h - r specific thought- system and ideology, of which these categories and concepts are a part. The Da 'wah Takes The Da 'wah Interacts (Tufa 'ul a1 Da 'wah) (Intilaq a1 Da'wah): The term intiliq here signifies the launch of the public aspect of Muhammad's mission.@' A1 NabhsinT stresses that while the da'wah's @See Mubarnmad Muhammad Mil, a1 Fikr a1 Ishi(Beirut: Maktabat al Wa'i, 1985). 48-51,67-71; al N & W a1 Shdh@& a1 I S h Q a h , VO~. I, 5-12. Mafdiin Hizb a1 Tahrz?, 13-14; al N a b W N i m a1 I s h , 64-67. 61 68A1 NabhiM, a1 Takanu1 a1 Hizba; 44. @A1 NabhM, a1 Dawlah a1 Islrimtyuh, 10-11. 386 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 11:3 existence was widely known before this, what was now disclosed for the fitst time was the existence of the kutluh: Muhammad "publicly disclosed (the fact that the Muslims were) grouping together to all people" (azhara amr a1 takuttul li a1 mis jami'an). As the initial policy of contacting only those individuals who exhibited a readiness to respond was now sup- planted by an endeavor to a d d m all people, al Nabha- describes the new phase as one of confrontation between Islam and unbelief and the friction ( i h t i w ) between correct ideas and compt ones. He concludes that the Prophet's discl- of the kutlah's existence thus signalled the shut of the "second phase": that of "interaction and conflict" (marhalat a1 tcfi'ul wa a1 kifZ). In the section entitled "Tafa'ul a1 Da'wah," our author proceeds to map the progtess of the da'wah's interaction'' in the face of mounting opposition from the Quraysh. Once more, it should be noted that the terms inti&, ihtikiik, and tafi'ul derive from a1 Nabhihi's blueprint for Wzb al Taluir's program: the notion of intiiZq was already developed in the context of Znqah Fihytin, as noted above. nvo of the Da'wah's Phases (Dawran min Adwar a1 Da'wah) This is a particularly important section," as it functions as a summary of and a commentary on the preceding account of the sirah. Through a repeated, more detailed, and thorough imposition of terms and categories drawn from Wzb al Tabtit's progmm, it crystallizes and strengthens the parallel podited implicitly between the latter and the sirah. Al Nabm- asserts repeatedly in this section that Muhammad pro- gressed through two consecutive phases during his career in Makkah. The fitst of these (dawr a1 t a ' h wa a1 tathqz3) aimed to embody Islamic ideas emanating from the Islamic doctrine in individuals once they under- stood them, and then group them together on the basis of these ideas (tidun a1 am-r wa tasjiduhdflashkh& wa takattuluhum hawlahri; taktil man yasta- a1 takuttul 'ahi asas a1 'aqidah a1 ishirn@zh). This was achieved by focusing on tathqQin order to prepare the new Muslims spiritually and intellectually. Muhammad would "send someone to indoc- trinak them as a group in study-circles @wsilu man yuthaqqifuhum In spite of the secrecy that surrounded their grouping together at this stage, our author asse& that once the new Muslims had embodied Islam, kutlatan fl halaqcit)." mid. , 17-20. "Ibid., 21-24. Taji-Fmuki: al NabhW's Reading of the Canonical Textual Sources 387 the da'wuh could no longer remain confined to them. As they began to contact anyone in whom they perceived a willingness to embrace Islam, . people came to feel the existence of the du'wuh and the fact that there were individuals conveying it. With this, he observes that the da'wuh passed beyond the statting point (nuqtut al ibtidl'). cotlsequently, attempts to address the people as a whole (mufitabut al ncfs) were introduced. "Thereby," a1 Nabhiini asserts, "the first phase (that of secret grouping together and indoctrination, by means of which the grouping is constructed) came to an end, and it became necessary to transfer to the second phase (that of interaction and conflict). It is noteworthy that it is in their laun~hing'~ of the da'wah on its second phase that our author, for the fiirst time, refers to the Muslims as a (political) party group (kutlah Qizbouh). We will comment on his use of this term later. Here, it should be noted that a1 Nabhit3 argues in al Takattul ul ffizbt that the individuals who, through their grouping together on the basis of its ideology, form the embryonic S z b al Talpir constitute a mere kutlah and not a fully-fledged political party until the beginning of the phase of interaction. It is only then that the kutlah, having been exposed to the vicissitudes of time and travelled through various stages of party development (al hay& a2 hizb~jmh),'~ acquires the attributes and qualifications that make it worthy of assuming power and evolves into a complete political party (gzb mutaka-mit). A1 NabhiWs introduction of the term hizbtto describe the kutlah formed by the first Muslims at this particular junction is therefore precisely consistent with the blueprint he developed to map out the future of the party he created. During the second phase in his career (the phase of interaction), Muhammad's aim was, allegedly, to transform the ideas of Islam into a "driving force" that would propel people to apply them in society. Along- side the ongoing "intensive indoctrination (of individuals) in study- circles" (a1 tuthqg ul murakkaz fr a1 lm?&pit), he thus now initiated a campaign to address people in groups via "collective indoctrination" (ul tathqgal jam-'z]. The latter term again denotes a specific activity in Hizb a1 TabTr's program, as does the term mukh@bat ul Ilcis. Although some eight yeats of confrontation with the ideas of unbelief had carried Muhammad's da'wah to btoader horizons, this success had brought increasing harm to the Muslims in Makkah. Alongside this, al n M d & in Muhammad leading the believers in two orderly rows to perform a cir- cumambulatim of the Ka'bah. "A1 NabW-, a1 ToRonul a1 Hi&; 22-23; Hizb al Tab& leaflet, "Jawiib Su'iil," undated. 388 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 11:3 Nab-- lists a number of concomhnt developments that allegedly con- vinced the Prophet that it was now necessary for him to proceed to the thid phase of his mission: the "phase of applying Islam." Among these, he cites Muhammad's failure to obtain the support and protection of the Thaqif and other tribes, the growing inability of the Muslims to convey the da'wah in the face of mounting pressures in Makkah, the general recalcitrance of Makkan society as a whole, and the fact that Arabs elsewhere in the peninsula failed to approach the Muslims out of fear of the Quraysh. The Da'wah in Madinah: The Second Pledge at a1 ' A q ~ b a h ~ ~ By comparing Mus'ab ibn 'Umayr's experience in Makkah in the course of a single year with Muhammad's c-r in Makkah over some twelve years, al Nab&- finds an appropriate context for "deducing" a principle that is fundamental to his notion of how to engender change in society. He asserts that a Society is ttansformed and a revolution (inqihib) produced if the relations within it are influenced by influencing people's emotions and ideas7' The number of individuals who undertake to achieve this is immaterial: what matters is that they should not be detached from society as a whole, but should operate from within it, as Mus'ab allegedly did in Madinah. A1 Nabhihi's comments in this section also introduce other concepts drawn from the thought-system he elaborated in the context of Bzb a1 T@-r's ideology, as we will indicate below. Having appreciated the enormous difference between Makkah as the "chief center of unbelief" and Madinah, where over a single year Mus'ab had Islamized society's formerly polytheistic emotions and ideas, a1 Nab-- has Muhammad contemplating emigration from Makkah as a means of enabling the Muslims "to transfer the h'wah to its practical phase, i.e., applying Islam and conveying its message with the fotce of a state and government." He stresses that the motive behind the hijrah was not to escape from the sufferings inflicted by the Quraysh, but rather to empower the Muslims so that they could continue to pursue the da 'wah by taking advantage of the strength of Islam in Madinah and the d n e s s of the society there to teceive the Prophet and host the Islamic state. Though the second pledge at al 'Aqabah, our author has the "A1 NabhM, al Dawlah a1 Ishijwh, 26-35. 'SThiS principle appears repeatedly in Tabr?r publication. It derives from al NabhM's notian of society. See N i M a1 I s h , 30, 33.47; Ni@n al H u h , 10; Dukhd a1 Muj- tma', $4. Taji-Famuki: al N a b M s Reading of the Canonical Textual Sources 389 Prophet creating "the comestone and the fitst pillar in the construction of the Islamic state." According to a1 Nabm-, the hijmh " t ranspod Muhammad and his da'wah a leap forward from one phase to anotkr: from the phase of indoctrination and the phase of interaction to the phase of applying Islam's rules to people in their interrelation^."^^ A discussion of the general features of a1 NabhthS's treatment of the sirah reviewed here concludes this analysis. Presentation and Prolepsis: A1 Nabhcini3 Manipulation of the Sirah Before addressing the present-minded and proleptic nature of this treatment, the use of three specific terms in this, touched on above, will be examined. The first of these is the root katala, which appeals in the forms takattala, takaml, takhl, and kutlah. A1 Nabhiit3 clearly employs this mot (and its derivations), which does not arise in the Qur'an or Ibn HislGm, in its modem usage, which has a specifically political significa- t i ~ n . ~ ~ In his use of takattala, he evidently intends the modem political sense, which he has adapted to mean "grouping together to form a political party specifically." In the following quotation, for example, he uses it alongside ijtama'a, with the clear message that it has a significa- tion distinct from the latter: "The Muslims would gather secretly in their houses, in the mountain paths, and in a1 Arqam's home, and group together (fh yajtami'u a1 Muslimcn jT buyzitihim sirran wa jT shi 'a a1 jibdl sirran wa fi dcfr a1 Arqam sirran wa ~atakattalcn)."~' The second term is the Toot thaqafu, which appears in the forms thaq- qafa, tathqlf, and thaqtifah. The Qur'anic usage of this root is confined to the vet$on thaqifah, where it means "to come upon or find."79 In the sfiah, Ibn H i s b uses the verb 'arada 'ah for explaining Islam, and 'allama or fqqaha @a1 din) for teaching or instructing in the faith.8o Al Nabhiini's use of thaqafa and its derivatives in the context of the =?ah d e c t s its usage in modem Arab political discourse, where it has the sense of "to educate, enlighten, or indoctrinate." Derived from a Euro- 76Al Nab--, a1 Dawlah a1 Ishfyah, 36. nTakattui, for example, signifies the formation of blocs in the political sense. "Al Nabhi , al Dawlah a1 Ishfyah, 21. Ibn Iikhiim uses #ama'a to describe the Companions "aming together" to discuss something, for example. See Ibn Hkhiim, al Spat al Nahw@ah, vol. I, 336. %ee, for example, Qur'an 2191; 857. mSee, for exemple, Ibn HishSm, al Sibat al Nabnw@ah, voL II, 23,76. 390 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 11:3 pean context and introduced by communist parties, this usage was common during the 1930s and 1940s among secular Arab nationalist parties, to which it was generally confined. The thid term deserving comment was discussed earlier. We refer here to the use of the adjective bizbit0 describe the kutlah formed by the new Muslims. This is another example of the imposition of modem categories on the sfruh. The use of terms drawn from modem Arab political discourse illus- trates the influence of al Nabhini's general context on his reading of the sfiuh. His shift from the dominant ideology of Arab nationalism and pan- Arabism to the radical pan-Islamism of €Jizb al T&-r is clear, and his ZnqLfdh F i U 3 r e p e n t s an early way-station along this journey. How- ever, evidently he remained convinced of the general framework through which the secular nationalist trend articulated an analysis of the problems facing Arab society and advanced solutions to these. He was also con- vinced of the methods and strategies it adopted in pursuing these solu- tions. A1 NabEni thus retains aspects of this trend, now clothed in Islamic garb and worked out within an Islamic framework. Central fea- tures of the discourse and methods of the new parties are not adapted to Islamic discourse. In the process, he has manipulated the latter as dictated by his specific objectives, legitimizing in terms of Islam the construction of a quintessential modem mass political party and the path he delineated for it. As a tesult, the creation of a z b a1 Th-r, participation in it, and the route by which it pursues its goals are all advanced with the force of Islamic legal rules. Let us pursue this point M e r in relation to the siruh specifically. A1 Nabh- 's proleptic use of terms has enabled him to manipulate the sfruh text so that it can be construed as Islamic legitimation for the new party's program. Thanks to his p e n t i s t approach, his reading of the past effectively reconstructs or reinvents it for the sake of the present. As a source of Islamic legal rules, the reconstructed or reinvented siruh is then upheld as the divinely prescribed blueprint that Muslims must adopt. Although elsewhere a1 N a b h - has the following to say about history per se, this clearly does not apply to the siruh, which must be excepted from this general judgment due to its subject matter and prescriptive natm: History mustn't be taken as a basis for revival: a knowledge of the part neither throws light on nor opens the path to the *'A1 Nab&-, a1 Shak.h@ah a1 Iskimijlah, vol. I, 303. Taji-Farouki: al N a b W s Reading of the Canonical Textual Sources 391 On the contraty, through what LaCapra describes as the "urmdmhd fictionalizing and mythologizing" of the past typical of presentism~2 a1 Nab-- "discovem" many a totch and key in the sfruh. His central assumption in this respect can be summarized in the notion that, from eatly on in his mission, Muhammad developed a clearly defined and coherent plan complete with distinct stages and the ultimate goal of estab- lishing a state that would implement and export Islam. All of his actions ate then explained on the basis of this assumption. Naturally, this plan m i m m that of Bzb a1 Talph in its broad outlines and details. While such a teleological approach to the pastss is always an appeal- ing temptation, owing to the necessarily tetmpective orientation of the present-day obsetvet, it is, as Skinnet indicates, absolutely ahistorical: the historical meaning of an action cannot be influenced by events that take place at a later date, whether ot not they ate causally linked to that action. As fot the terms and concepts a1 Nabhfd employs, the following tematk by Skinner in his discussion of the need to recover authorial intention is particularly apt: [I]f a given statement ot othet action has been performed by an agent at will, and has a meaning for him, it follows that any plausible account of what the agent meant must necessarily fall under, and make use of, the range of descriptions which the agent himself could at least in principle have applied to describe and classify what he was doing.84 Indeed, as Skinner puts it: "10 agent can eventually be said to have meant ot done something which he could nevet be bmught to accept as a cotrect description of what he had meant ot done." In the final analysis, we would atgue that through his pmsentist treat- ment of the sfruh and his proleptic intetptetation of Muhammad's =Dominic LaCapra, "Rethinking Intellectual History and Reading Texts," in D. LaCapra and S. Kaplm (eds.), Modern European InteUectual History: Reapprairals and New Perspectives ( I t b Comell University Press, 1982), 80. %e View that developments are due to the Q- or design served by them. A teleological view of the hijrah would suggest that It can be explained by the purpose of establishing the Islamic state in Madinah. "Skinner, in Tully (d), Meaning and Context, 4%. =Bid., loc. cit. 392 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 11:3 intentions and actions, a1 Nabhiit3 has in fact reduced this text to a "pre- text for his own inventions and immediate Conclusion It has been argued that methods of political organization and styles of political rhetoric are "largely defined by the on text."^' In the post- World War I1 Arab Middle East, a new political oder, dominated by the newly-instituted modem nation-states, largely defined the political context. Zubaida posits these states as the framework for a new type of politics that was shaped by the concepts, vocabularies, methods, and strategies of the modem political fields that developed in relation to them.88 The new generation of modem political movements that emerged during the interwar period organized themselves and functioned in a man- ner that took into account the new realities, thereby making themselves effective actors in the context of the new political fields.89 As part of this trend, Hizb a1 Ta4rk has both operated within and been very much part of these modem political fields. This is evident with regard to its methods of political organization, its strategies, activities, political discoutse, concepts, and aspirations. With reference both to a1 NabhiM's adoption of modem methods of political organization and to his couching of these in terms of traditional Islamic constructs, the fol- lowing quotation from Marx provides an illuminating analogy: [A] beginner who has leamt a new language always translates it back into his mother tongue, but he has assimilated the spirit of the new language and can freely express himself in it only when he finds his way in it without tecalling the old, and forgets his native tongue in the use of the new.go A1 NabhihS had clearly "learned the language" of the region's new political fields and was convinced of the need to adopt it as the medium of articulation, by assuming modem political forms and processes LaCapra, in LaCapra and Kaplan (eds.), Modern European Intellectual History, 80. "Roger Owen, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East %ubaida, Islam, the People and the State, 140-50. 89compare with Owen, State, Power and Politics, 19. 86 (London: Routledge, 1992), 20. war1 Manr, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis BoMparte, 6th ed. (Moscow: hgress Publ., 1972), 10. Taji-Farouki: al N a b W s Readiig of the Canonical Textual Sources 393 associated with the modem nation-state and its related political fields. However, he was unable or unwilling to make the kind of transition described above. Consequently, he was compelled to balance two utterly distinct cultures: the modem political and the traditional Islamic. It is in relation to the evident tension between these two cultures, reflecting a broader tension between the pull of modernity and the requirements of Islamic authenticity, that he displays h&innovativeness and creativity in his interpmtation of the textual sources of Islam. Our closing remarks center on Islamist judgments of al NabhZrS’s achievements. As noted earlier, his attempt to create a modem Islamic political party has met with the suspicion of Islamist circles. In spite of the fact that these circles insist on Islam as a holistic ideology addmsing both din wa dunya, they have questioned the Islamicity of s z b a1 Tb-r’s character and approach. For some, only a movement that itself reflects this holistic character, by addnsing itself to all aspects of the community’s life, meets the perceived criteria of Islamic authenticity. More fundamentally, however, the Islamist suspicion of mzb a1 T b - r can be attributed to a reluctance to accept explicitly the basic principles of the secularized nation-state, even though there is no doubt that these states are accepted as an elemental political fact. The fact that I3zb a1 T b - r promotes itself as a vehicle for supplanting the secular nation-state does not rehabilitate it in the Islamist perception. We would argue that, according to the Islamist critique, the perceived deviant char- acter of Hizb a1 T b - r derives fmm its ideologue’s open adoption of the forms, concepts, and vocabularies of the modem political field, and his clear conception of his party’s program and goal in terms of this field exclusively. A1 Nabhh-’s attempt in Hizb a1 T d - r to recontextualize the canonical textual sources of Islam in the context created by the new political field and the configmtion of concepts developed by the new trend of political parties mobilized relatively few Muslims, even during the party’s most successful years in Jordan (between 1953 and 1957). This raises doubts about the effectiveness of his creative hemenuetics in convincing a constituency then deeply suspicious of the secular nation- state and its related political forms and methods.