A Concept of Philosophy in 
the Qur'anic Context 

Alparslan ApkgenG 

One of the most debated subjects in philosophy is the nature and 
subject matter of philosophy itself. It is pethaps the only discipline that 
critically discusses its own natum. This is one msan that has led philoso- 
phers, @cularly after the nineteenth century, to distinguish philosophy 
from such other experimental sciences as physics, biology, or astronomy. 
When we add to this the nature of subjects discussed in philosophy, as 
opposed to the issues discussed in those sciences, the sharp distinction 
between the two becomes decisively clear. 

It is our aim to investigate critically the nature of philosophical sub- 
jects, which constitub basically the method of philosophy, in order to 
arrive at a concept of philosophy that is acceptable to the Qur'anic per- 
spective, which can be taken, as we shall see, as a contribution t o w d  
the effort of Islamization. Our discussion requim the development of a 
clear conception of the term "philosophy." If we am to develop an Islam- 
ic concept of philosophy, then we are required in the first instance to 
clarify what we mean by philosophy. We feel compelled to do this, be- 
cause in the history of human thought thew am more than a score of 
conceptions about the nature, purpose, and subject matter of philosophy. 
However, setding this problem alone does not fulfill the task of our pa- 
per. We must, momver, show what the role of philosophy may be in this 
society (in general) so that we can delineate mow effectively its signifi- 
cance in a Muslim community (in particular). F-ly, we must try to 
justify our arguments from the Qur'anic perspective in order to defend 
the ccmception of philosophy that is to be developed hew as an adequate 
one. 

The discussion, then, will be divided into three main sections. The 
first section will be devoted to "what philosophy is." In the second, we 
shall elucidate what we shall tern the "Qur'anic conception of or attitude 

Alparslan A&- is an Bssociete prof-, Deptxmt of Philosophy, Middle East 
Tedmicd University, Ankara, 'hrkey. 



156 The Amencan Journal of Islamic Social Sciences ll:2 

towards philosophy" as reflected in the oft-used Qur'anic notion of 
hikmuh; and finally, in the third section, we shall illustrate the limction 
of philosophy in a Muslim society. Each discusion shall analyze a philo- 
sophical problem in order to reach an explicit judgment concerning an 
issue debated throughout the history of Islamic thought. At the center of 
this debate lies the doctrine of Islamic Aristotelianism that came into con- 
flict with the Qur'anic text. Instead of working out a philosophical system 
based on the Qur'an, certajn Muslim thinkers (i.e., a1 Ash'at? and al 
Ghazilii attacked not only the Mashshii'i doctrines, but also any activity 
that may be characterized as philosophical. When one considers the intel- 
lectual effort behind these debates, however, one finds no other descrip- 
tion than "philosophy" to characterize their activity, which, ironically, was 
developed to rehte philosophy as such. 

Within the context of these thtee discussions, then, our centml con- 
cern is to develop what may be called a Qur'anic perspective of philos- 
ophy. In order to achieve this, we shall analyze the related Qur'anic term 
hikmuh rather than going into the cumbefsome discussion of social and 
intellectual conditions that paved the way in Islam for the disparagement 
of philosophy per se. 

On What Philosophy Is 

In order to pinpoint the Qur'anic attitude toward philosophy, we must 
clarify what we mean by it, for there are several conceptions of philoso- 
phy that, as we shall show, the Qur'an definitely opposes. This fact re- 
veals that the Qur'an is not antagonistic to philosophy as such, but rather 
that it has a particular attitude toward certain conceptions of philosophy. 
This attitude is reflected clearly in seveml verses, which will be discussed 
below, as "disapproval" and "discontent." Therefore, in order to determine 
what kind of a philosophical conception would constitute the Qur'anic 
term & h u h  used in this sense, we shall present a historical survey of the 
issue. 

For the putposes of this paper, areas of leaming can be divided into 
two broad fields: experimental and experiential. Those areas connected 
with human experience (i.e., one's existence par excellence, one's exis- 
tence in the universe, one's social existence) belong to the study of either 
human sciences or social sciences. Although philosophy has a specific 
place among these sciences, it differs from all other sciences in that some 
of its subjects fall under natural sciences and others under social sciences. 

We have characterized the areas of learning pertaining to philosophi- 
cal, human, and social sciences as "experiential." This characterization is 
chosen to reflect our approach in investigating the nature of philosophy, 
for we think that in the experiential field, in addition to sense-experience, 
there is the need for experience of a higher order (which may tentatively 



Aqkgeaq: A Concept of Philosophy in the Qur'dc Context 157 

be called "mystical," as we have no other term at our immediate dispos- 
al), simply on epistemological grounds. We have also pointed out that 
there am several umceptim of philosophy. Our historical survey about 
the nature of philosophy shall further clarify these two points. 

Historically speaking, humanity faced the universe as a whole and 
began by dealing with it in a holistic manner. This ancient approach of 
aquiring knowledge of the universe is clear from the history of science. 
There was no clear separation between "experimental" and "experiential" 
fields, as "scientific" was not yet counterpod to "philosophic." This 
conception aimed mainly at knowledge in general, and, as human leaming 
at large, it did not distinguish between "science" and "philosophy." In 
early history, philosophy meant the "love" or "passion" for learning. 

This ancient conception of philosophy umtinued until medieval times, 
thus putting its impression on the minds of Muslim intellectuals as well. 
A1 FMbi (d. 950 CE), for instance, classified sciences in his famous 
work Zbi' al 'Uhim and included therein a classification of such philo- 
sophical disciplines as logic, metaphysics, and ethics. A1 GhazAi (d. 
11 11 CE), however, opposed this classification and did not admit meta- 
physics as a science ('ilm) as such in the Islamic sense. He nevertheless 
contended that metaphysics was a philosophical discipline. What al 
G W l i  was positing was that the human mind tried to reach the sort of 
certitude in metaphysical subjects that it reached in such formal studies 
as logic and mathematics. However, the nature of metaphysical problems 
are such that they evade mathematical exactitude. This fact is observed 
clearly in the agreement of philosophers upon the solution of a certain 
mathematical problem. But metaphysics has never succeeded in reaching 
a conclusion upon which all philosophers agree (A1 G W l i  1927). 

Thus, two major developments in philosophy or science, according 
to this view, were already on the way to excluding certain fields from the 
main body of learning and incorporating them into independent branches 
of knowledge. The first major and rather practical development was the 
accumulation of knowledge, which resulted in the systematization of and 
specialization in certain fields. The second was the attack on metaphysical 
issues, which never seemed to be settled conclusively in philosophy. One 
crucial attitude that prepad the ground for this attack is known in the 
history of philosophy as "rationalism." This peculiar attitude of the an- 
cient conception of philosophy vis-A-vis the medieval understanding 
claimed that the human mind, by itself, is capable of solving both scien- 
tific and metaphysical problems. It is this attitude that is so vividly articu- 
lated in Ibn Tufayl's (d. 1185 CE) famous work Uayy Zbn Yaqzrin. 

The main repmntative of the second major development, which 
yielded a new concept of philosophy, appeared in the eighteenth century: 
Immanuel Kant (d. 1804), the founder of critical philosophy. Accodhg 
to him, philosophy as metaphysics cannot be a science, "because all our 



158 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 11:2 

knowledge undoubtedy begins with (human) experience" (Kant 1965,41) 
and since nothing is given in our experience as reg& the metaphysical 
objects, speculative knowledge about them is not possible. What brought 
Kant to this conclusion is, no doubt, the empiricist philosophy that 
claimed knowledge, independent of experience, was impossible. Empiri- 
cists did not admit any innate ideas, and Kant considered their attitude 
correct. But they were wrong in denying any a pnori concepts and princi- 
ples to the human mind. That is why such empiricists as David Hume (d. 
1776) became a skeptic, while others, among them John Locke (d. 1704), 
tramcended the limits of human mson and became metaphysical realists. 

This modem development bmght about a new conception of Phil- 
phy that, for the fitst time, sharply distinguished "philosophy as meta- 
physics" from "philosophy as science." Clearly, this modem conception 
does not differ from the ancient-medieval stand, in the sense that all 
fields of human knowledge ate still conceived as a unified whole under 
one discipline: "philosophy." But it differs from the latter in the sense 
that metaphysical subjects of human leaming are excluded from specula- 
tive or theoretical science, i.e., philosophy. On the other hand, these sub- 
jects, which according to Kant are God, freedom, and immortality, led to 
a new branch of leaming: "practical philosophy." It is crucial for our pur- 
pose to note that the modem conception of philosophy did allow the 
possibility of metaphysics as a practical philosophy although it banned 
strictly any speculative or theoretical discussion of metaphysical issues. 

The conceptions of philosophy discussed so far can be classified 
conveniently under two heads: the ancient-medieval view, which we shall 
call the "rationalist conception," and the modem view, which can be 
called the "critical conception." But we shall distinguish yet another view: 
the "positivist conception." This third conception of philosophy began to 
emerge in the nineteenth century but only received its definite form in the 
twentieth century. As a tesult, it is more reflected of contemporary trends. 

The positivist conception is based on the critical conception in addi- 
tion to its understanding of the positivist attitude of science. This attitude 
claimed that 

philosophy was once construed so broadly as to cover any field 
of theoretical inquiry . . . . However, once a field of study 
reached the point where some main theory dominated and with 
it developed standard methods of criticism and confinnation, then 
the field was cut off from the mother country of philosophy and 
became independent. (Comman et al. 1974,2) 

Therefore philosophy expotted problems to other sciences. Whatever 
is left to be studied in philosophy a "questions and problems that resist 
such exportation by virtue of their general and fundamental character" 



Aqkgeq: A Concept of Philomphy in the- Qur'anic Context 159 

(ibid.). As for metaphysical problems, the positivist view regarded them 
as pseudo-problems. Although the critical conception shows the imposSi- 
bility of metaphysics, it does this on different grounds. For example, Ayer 
(1952), a prominent positivist, claims that the positivist conception shows 
the nonsensical character of metaphysics as a matkr of logic. But since 
the critical conception shows this as a matter of fact, it still allows meta- 
physics in its practical aspect. 

The underlying idea of the positivist conception is what can be called 
"pure empiricism," according to which any claim that pmfesses to in- 
crease our knowledge of reality does not achieve its purpose unless its 
truth can be tested, in one way or another, by empirical means. Since 
each experimental science can use such empirical methods, they are tmly 
considered knowledge. But since metaphysics cannot prove its claims in 
this way, it should not be Considemi a bmch of leaming. There remains 
only philosophy (cut off from metaphysics) and, as such, it analyzes and 
examines the statements of particular sciences. Therefore, the function of 
philosophy is reduced to a certain kind of linguistic analysis carried out 
by a logical method (ibid; Cornman 1974). 

Our historical m e y  shows that there rn essentially three views 
about the na tm of philosophy, and that many other views concerning the 
problem in question can be classified conveniently as belonging to the 
rationalist, critical, or positivist conception. The conclusion to be drawn 
from our exposition on these thtee conceptions is that the subject matter 
of philosophy is either scientific, with or without the exclusion of meta- 
physics, or that of linguistic analysis. Certain extreme forms of positiv- 
ism, in fact, annihilate philosophy altogether as a bcanch of learning and 
thus reduce it to the status of a method. others claim that 

there are indeed many q u d o n s  which cannot be answered by 
direct appeal to experiment or firmly established theory. For 
example, in all fields of inquiry, people seek knowledge. But it 
is in philosophy that one asks what knowledge is. . . . In some 
fields people study the causal consequences of certain actions and 
policies. But in philosophy one asks what general fea- make 
actions and policies right or wrong, etc. (Cornman et al. 1974,3) 

In any case, positivism does not offer much for philosophy to be con- 
sidered as a branch of learning, because neither experimental nor experi- 
ential (i.e., metaphysical) areas of learning fall under its subject matter. 
Thus, it has no subject matter left other than "gossiping" critically(!), so 
to speak, over the statements of scientists. 

So far, we have presented from our (Islamic) point of view the thnx 
most significant conceptions of philosophy within their historical perspec- 
tives, all of which have come down to us in one form or another. There- 



160 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 11:2 

fore, we may say that although the history of philosophy reveals innumer- 
able views of the natme of philosophy, there has remained, nevertheless, 
at least one characteristic of this discipline that has never changed, giving 
it a unity to its nature: reflecting and teasoning as such. Of muse, phi- 
losophers disagree about the mode and method of this "reflmhg and m- 
soning." But at least we can grant this much-that philosophers almost 
universally would admit the definition of philosophy as a discipline that 
embodies some sort of reflective reasoning or thhking. We shall, at the 
same time, grant that this is the common point between the thtee concep- 
tions of philosophy that have been expounded so far. 

The Qur'anic Perspective: Ifikmah 

Our aim is to elucidate the term hihuh in order to see, rather indi- 
rectly, what kind of a conception of philosophy the Qur'an would ap- 
prove. We contend here that the conclusions ate based on the worldview 
derived from the Qur'an as a whole, but that their proofs are provided on 
the basis of individual vefses.' Since this exposition is the d t  of our 
experiences and undelstanding, reached via personal study, of the Qur'an, 
it cannot r e p m t  the Qur'anic perspective par excellence, which shall 
always remain the archetype of all secondary Qur'anic perspectives drawn 
therefmm by individual Muslims. Thus, we may distinguish two perspec- 
tives: the "archetypal," which is embedded within the Qur'anic text alone 
and is independent of interpreters, and the "derivative" or "secondary," 
which consists of the understanding based on or derived from the "arche 
typal" perspective. All perspectives declared to be "Islamic" must belong 
to the second kind, for the archetypal perspective must remain as an ideal 
to which every interpreter endeavors to ascend. Our claim in this essay 
must, therefore, be conceived as an attempt of this second perspective. 

Our exposition of the three concepts of philosophy shows implicitly 
that any unde&mding of philosophy as a bmch of learning is inherently 
based on a theory of knowledge. Therefore, the Qur'anic attitude to be 
drawn from the Qur'an shall also embody an implicit theory of knowl- 
edge. We call this a "theory" not in the sense that the Qur'an develops 
such a theory, for the Qur'an reveals the Truth (haqq) and not a theory. 
But since it is an undelstanding derived from the Qur'an, in the sense of 
the second perspective as outlined above, it always has the mark of a 
human character-it can be either true or false, no matter how much 

'The method employed here largely has been drawn from Fazlur Rahman's two major 
work Mujor Themes of the Qur'an (Chicago and Minu k Bibliotheca Islamica, 
1980) and Islam and Modernity: TrMsfomation o an lnxctud Tradition (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1984) more specifi cad y the Introduction to the latter work. 



Aqkgeag: A Concept of Philosophy m the Qur'auic Context 161 

comes from the Qur'anic text. Therefore it can always be characterized 
as a "theory." Hence, the derived or secondary Qur'anic perspective is 
primarily an interpretation that may have the character of a theory. Within 
this framework, we shall now elucidate a conception of philosophy that 
can be termed a secondary conception of philosophy within the Qur'anic 
perspective. Leaving aside this philosophical jargon, we shall now devel- 
op a concept of philosophy within the Qur'anic context. 

The Qur'an manifests two worlds ('dlam) that are subject to human 
knowledge: the unseen world ( ' d h  al ghayb) and the visible world 
('durn al shahihh). That this distinction is made by the Qur'an is evi- 
dent fmm the oft-repeated verse ' d im al ghuyb wa al s h a h a h  (Knower 
of the Unseen and the Visible: 39:46; 23:92; 6:63; 59:22; and 9:105). 
Moreover, not only is it clear that the Qur'an makes this distinction, but 
it is self-evident that the distinction is maintained because of the possibili- 
ty of human knowledge concerning these two different worlds. Consider 
the following v e d :  "Say (0 Muhammad): 'I do not tell you that I 
possess the tteasures of God, nor do I know the ghuyb . . . I only follow 
what is revealed"' (650); "Or that the ghuyb is in their hands, so that 
they can write it down?" (68:47); "To God belongs the ghayb of the 
heavens and the earth" (16:77); and "God alone has the keys of the 
ghayb; none but He knows them" (659). 

It is clear in these v e m  that man cannot know the unseen world 
(ghuyb). It must be pointed out that as a world, the unseen world in this 
context does not mean pmphesizing about the future, for the Qur'an 
makes it clear that human beings cannot foretell the future. Here, we are 
concerned with the unseen world that is posed as an ontological world 
and whether it can be made known to us. 

Although it is clearly stated that the unseen world cannot be known 
by human beings, it is never implied in the Qur'an that we cannot know 
the visible world. On the contrary, humanity is encouraged to inquire and 
reflect upon the visible universe: 

In the creation of the heavens and the ad, and the alternation 
of night and day there are i n d d  signs for men of understanding. 
(3:190) 

There is no lack of pmpo&m in the creation of God. So turn 
your eyes (and look amund). Do you see any defect? Again, t u n  
your sight (and examine) a second time. But your eyes will come 
back to you dull and frustrated in a state worn out. (67:3-4) 

'All of the Qur'anic citations in this attick am based on A. Yusuf Ali, The Holy 
Qur'an: T a  Translation and Commentary (Bremvood, MD: Amam, 1983) and A. J. 
Arbeny, The Koran Interpreted (New Yak Macmillan, 1976). 



162 TJw American Jouraal of Islamic Social Sciences 11:2 

And who other than God created the heavens and the earth and 
seat down for you water from the sky, whereby we cause to gmw 
lush orchards For it is not up to you to cause their tmx to grow! 
Is there, then, a god beside God? Yet these are the people who 
ascribe paltrms to Him! And who other than Him made the eatth 
a firm abode (for you), and set rivers travesing through it, and 
put firm mountains the& and sealed off one sea from the other? 
Is there, then, a god beside God? Indeed, most of them do not 
know! And who other than Him tesponds to the disttessed one 
when he calls Him and relieves him of the e, and Who has 
made you His vicegerents on earth? Is there then, a god beside 
God? Little do you reflect! And who ather than Him guides you 
in the darkness of the land and the sea? And who sends forth 
winds announcing His mew (i.e., rain)? Is there, then, a god 
beside God? Far exalted be He above what they 8ssoci8fe with 
Him! And who other than Him brings forth His creation and thdn 
recreates it? And who gives you sustenance from the heaven and 
the eatth? Is there, a god beside God? (2750-4) 

These verses make it clear that the visible world can be known by 
human beings through reflective thinking. It is clear, however, that the 
study of this world falls under the experimental areas of learning and that, 
as such, it is the subject matter of natural sciences. But since the unse!en 
world cannot be known in the same manner, it cannot be the subject 
matter of the natural or experimental sciences. 

Although the unseen world cannot be known, the Qur'an does point 
out that it can be made understandable or intelligible to humanity by 
revelation. In fact, the Qur'an's purpose is to teach human beings about 
the unseen world "God alone knows the unseen world, and He does not 
disclose it to anyone except a messenger whom He has chosen" (72:26-7) 
and "These are the tidings of the unseen world which We have revealed 
unto you. Before this neither you nor your people knew them" (1 1 :49). 

What is this unseen world that cannot be known yet can be made 
intelligible (i.e., complehensible by the mind) only via revelation? To find 
the Qur'an*s answer, we need only the following explanation: "None 
except God knows the unseen world in the heavens and on earth, nor can 
they perceive when they shall be tesuffecfed. Still less can their knowl- 
edge comprehend the He&r'' (27:65-6); "This is the Book, wherein is 
no doubt, a guidance to those who fear God, and believe in the unseen 
world" (2:2-3); and "As to those who know their Lord from the unseen 
world, there awaits them forgiveness and a great reward" (2:97). 

The conclusion one can dtaw fmm these vetses is that the unseen 
world includes such concepts as God, the Hereafter, and revelation. If so, 
then we alteady know that these concepts are subjected to the study of 



Aqkgeq: A Concept of Philosophy m the Qur'dc Context 163 

metaphysics in philosophy. Since the Qur'an states that these cannot be 
known by the human mind, as the mind can only comprehend them after 
they are taught by the Qur'an, we can infer that the rationatist concept of 
philosophy, which claims that metaphysical subjects can be d i s c o v e r e d  
and d v e d  by unaided reasim and, more specifically, unaided by reve- 
lation, is unacceptable to the Qur'anic perspective. 

Why does the Qur'an declare that the unseen world cannot be known 
except h u g h  revelation? We shall try to answer this question within the 
context of a philosophical theory (of knowledge): It cannot be known by 
unaided reason because it has no e f k t  upon our sense organs. But we 
know the visible world directly, thanks to the fact that it affects our sense 
organs, to which the mind adds its capacity of knowing to produce 
knowledge about the visible univetse ('cilam ul shuhdhh). Thedore, we 
may assume that, according to the Qur'an, no human knowledge is possi- 
ble unless there is some sort of experience preceding the mind's cognitive 
opemtion. This is definitely true insofar as knowledge of the visible world 
is concerned. But we think that the Qur'an's statement is general and, 
therefore, the same inference is also true insofar as knowledge of the 
unseen world is concerned. In that case, logic dictates that we ask how 
the experience of the unseen world is produced before the cognitive oper- 
ation of the mind to yield the knowledge of this world. When we exam- 
ine the verses that bear upon this problem, we find that, according to the 
Qur'an, human beings have certain intemal faculties by which they can 
d v e  the effects of the unseen world. In other words, every person can 
experience it provided that he/she pays sincere attention to the guidance 
of the revelation, for the experiencing of the uflseen world may not be 
direct and, hence, not immediate. Therefore, we need revelation to medi- 
ate that experience. The center of this inner experience can be called the 
"inner perceptive faculty," which clearly refers to the heart (qulb) 

It is interesting and even crucial for the Qur'anic doctrine of the 
unseen world that the terms "heart" and "mind" ate juxtaposed as quliibun 
yu'qil- bi hi (harts to think with) (Qur'an 22:46), which signifies that 
the "heart" (qulb) is a faculty of reflective thinking-"intellect" or 
"mind." But we know that the mind is the faculty of conceptual thinking, 
and that the heart cannot perform that function. Why, then, does the 
Qur'an represent the heart as a faculty of reflective thinking? To answer 
this, we need the help of other verses from which we can gather more 
information about the n a b  of the heart. In veme 5037, it is implied that 
the heart is the center of experience, while revelation projects the Truth 
of the unseen world. We can inteqmt the heart here as a faculty of expe- 
rience, because it is compared with the ear, which is a faculty of 
senseexperience. In fact we see that in several more vefses the heart is 
likened to the faculties of experience: 

(Qur'an: 26:88-9; 50~37; 7:179; 13~28; and 22:46). 



164 l’he American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences i1:2 

Have you seen the one who has taken his own vain desire as his 
god? Knowing that, Allah left him astray and sealed his hearing 
and his heart, and put a cover on his sight. Now who will guide 
him after Allah (has withdrawn His guidance)? (4523) 

Is it not a guidance to those who inherit the earth after those who 
inhabited it that if we willed We could punish them because of 
their sins, and seal their hearts so that they could no longer hear? 
(7:lOO-101; 2:7; 24:37; 16108; 17:46; and 1857) 

Verse 7:100, in particular, represents the heart as a ”faculty to hear 
with,” for it is not the physical faculty of hearing that can hear and thus 
experience the Truth of the unseen world. From this, we can conclude 
that for the Qur’an, as the center of inner experience, the heart and all of 
its lower faculties is the only faculty that can receive repmtations from 
the umem world. Therefore it cannot be a faculty of thinking, but rather 
a center that receives from its lower faculties (i.e., desire, guilt, fear) the 
affections of the unseen world In that case, qulzibun yu ‘qiZzZnu bi hi and 
such similar expressions as quhibun yufquhzinu bi hi (7: 179)3 may be ren- 
d e d  as “hearts that furnish representations from the unseen world upon 
which the mind is to reflect” 

Based on this, the Qur’an states that there are two realms of knowl- 
edge into which humanity can inquire: the visible world and the unseen 
world. The former is experienced with the sense organs (external facul- 
ties), and the latter with the heart (intemal faculties). The experience of 
both worlds is then handed down to the faculty of reflective thinking, 
which, in turn, produces knowledge based on these representations. It 
must be pointed out, however, that the visible world’s representation in 
the senseexperience faculties is direct and immediate, while the unseen 
world’s representation in the faculties of inner perception is through the 
mediatian of revelation and, therefore, indirect. Since this mediation is 
possible only through some reflection, there is a reciprocal relationship 
between the heart and the mind. This means that the experience of the 
unseen world reqUit.es some reflection upon revelation. But even here, the 
mind must be guided by revelation, since the subject of learning belongs 
not to the visible universe but to the unseen world! 

3 ~ t h ~ ~  in this verse the statement is negative, we have c o n v e d  it to affirmative 
in order to make a parallel between the two verses (i.e., 246 and 7:169), which does not 
alter my iuteqretation of the Qur’anic tern “herlrt.” 

’There seems to be a sort of cirdatity here; in order to acquire the true knowledge 
of the unseen, one needs the guidance of revelation. But in order for this guidance to 
yield the true h o w  e of the unseen in the mind, one needs to examine revelation by 
reflective &inking. In % case, we are led from the mind to the revelation and from the 
revelatian back to the mind. Although t h t i c a l l y  there is a vicious circle here, in prac- 



Aqkgeq: A Concept of philosophy in the Qur'anic Context 165 

What we understand from this conclusion is that although the Qur'an 
encourages humanity to inquire into and reflect upon the visible world in 
order to aquire its knowledge, in the case of aquiring knowledge about 
the unseen world, it wishes to guide the individual during his/her inquiry. 
Thus, we can say that any philosophy that is not so guided will commit 
great em= when dealing with this metaphysical realm. As the unseen 
world is the realm that transcends our sense-experience, its direct intuition 
or experience is not W b l e .  On the other hand, any philosophy that is 
guided by revelation when dealing with the metaphysical realm is a p  
proved by the Qur'an. The guidance provided by the Qur'an consists of 
the establishment of a finely balanced and reciprocal relationship between 
the heart and the mind. In order to clarify what we mean by this finely 
balanced, or harmonious, relationship, we need to elucidate what is meant 
by the "metaphysical realm." 

The philosophical issues included in the metaphysical realm are not 
only the problem of God, immortality and revelation, but also such a b  
stract problems as what is knowledge, being, freedom, and truth. Ethical 
problems are also a part of the metaphysical realm. What the attitude of 
a natural scientist ought to be, how he/she should regard science as such, 
and with what intention he/she should study the universe-all of these 
fall within the area of the transcendent realm. Therefore philosophy, in 
the sense of metaphysics, needs the guidance of revelation. Furthermore, 
it is possible only as a science, for its findings can be verified &ugh 
what we shall term "experiential means." We must, nevertheless, empha- 
size the need for reflective thinking, which is guided by revelation, in 
order to extract the transcendent truth-the knowledge of the unseen 
world-from revelation. In other wotds, the mind needs the guidance of 
revelation in order to elicit the Truth of the unseen world. 

Guidance in this wpect consists of the inquirer's attitude, which we 
shall call the "subjective mood" and which underlies the "experiential 
means" referred to above. Since we have interpreted "heart" as the inner 
faculty of experience that receives representations, via the guidance of 
revelation, from the unseen world, we can conveniently entitle all a m s  
of learning that can be placed in this world as "experiential," as opposed 
to directly "experimental," subjects. Experiential inquiries, although per- 
ceived indirectly, belong directly to the inquirer. In other words, our inner 
faculty of representation needs to be awakened by, and to use the media- 
tion of, revelation. Just as our faculty of outer experience sometimes 
needs the mediation of a particular device to see or hear things that are 
not close by, but are nevertheless perceivable directly, our inner faculty 

. 

tice we may ehinate it by assi to the revelation the priority it deserves over reason, 
since the subject of inquiry is p - n  world. Moreover, all ctrcular arguments are not 
necessarily vicious. 



166 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 11:2 

needs a h r  and more subtle mediation-the guidance provided by the 
Qur’an. This type of mediation, known as hidiiyuh, is reflected in the 
mental state-the “subjective mood”-of the inquirer. 

It is important to understand this subjective mood to have an accurate 
pi- of the Qur’anic idea of philosophy. In the subjective mood, as a 
mental state, that which revelation wants to reveal is desced  harmoni- 
ously with the faculty of reflective thinking and the faculty of inner per- 
ception: the heart. To achieve this, the Qur’an d e r s  to subjective states 
that ate connected intimately with the heart. In these states and moods, 
a person’s whole existence is brought into sight, crucial questions are 
asked about life and death, and certain violent and terrifying phenomena 
am described vividly. In these instances, the Qur’an seeks, in the first 
place, to help the subject clear +er own mental states from any preju- 
dice or preconceptions about the subject of study. Secondly, this under- 
taking allows the Qur’an to establish a certain relationship between the 
inquirer and the subject of discoutse. This relationship liberates the in- 
quirer from feelings of indifference towad the subject of study, which is 
a dangerous attitude. Once this is accomplished the inquirer, as a student 
of revelation, becomes sincere and willing to undelstand and receive the 
message projected. Thirdly, by analyzing the inquirer’s subjective states, 
the Qur’an invites the individual to analyze w e r  being and conscious- 
ness. This self-analysis, or self-meditation, prepam the inquirer for the 
message of revelation. In p d t  of this goal, the Qur’an sometimes uses 
moral concepts and ethical consciousness that are engraved deeply in each 
individual’s whole being (fitrah). We shall cite the following verses to 
illushate how the Qur’an executes its operation so carefully and master- 
fully with regard to the subjective mood: 

Woe to the stinkrs who take futl measue when they measure 
against the people; but when they measUte for them or weigh for 
them they skimp. Do those not think that they shall be raised up 
unto a Mighty Day; a day when mankind shall stand before the 
Lord of all Being? (83:l-6) 

Verily We created man from a drop of mingled sperm in order 
to test him So We gave him hearing and seeing. We showed him 
the (right) way; whether he be grateful or ungrateful (rests on his 
will). We have surely prepared for the unbelievers chains, fetters 
and a blazing fire. As to the (morally) virtuous, they shall drink 
of a cup whose mixture is camphor, a fountain where God’s ser- 
vants drink making it to gosh forth abundantly. They fulfill their 
promises and fear a Day whose evil is far-reaching. And they 
feed the poor, the orphan and the captive for only the love of 
God. (76:2-8) 



Aplrgeq: A Concept of Philosophy in the Qur'anic Context 167 

So he gave nothing in charity, nor did he pray! But an the con- 
trary, he rejected the Truth and turned away. Then he retumd to 
his family with arrogance. Woe to you (0 man)! Woe to you! 
Does man think that he will be left unconttolled (without pur- 
p)? Was he not a drop of sperm.emitted (in lowly form)? 
Then he became a leech-like clot. Then God made and fashioned 
him in due proportion. And of him He made two sexes, male and 
female. Does He not then have the power to give life to the 
dead? (753140) 

Read in the name of your Lord, Who cmted mankind from con- 
gealed blood. Read! For your Lord is most generous, Who taught 
by the Pen; He taught mankind what they did not know. Nay! 
Mankind is indeed rebellious, for they think to be self-sufficient. 
Surely unto your Lord is the Retum. (96:l-8) 

As to those who reject Faith (i.e., the Transcendent Truth) it is 
the same to them whether you warn them (i.e., explain to them 
the Truth) or not, they will not believe (i.e., they will not even 
try to understand the Truth you ate communicating). (Therefore) 
God has sealed their hearts and hearing (i.e., their perceptive 
faculties); and on their eyes is a veil . . . . They would (try to) 
deceive God and the believers; but they deceive only themselves 
and yet do not realize (this). In their heads is a disease and God 
has increased their disease. There is a grievous penalty for them 
because they cry lies (even to themselves). When it is said to 
them: "Do not make corruption on the earth," they say: "Why, we 
only want to establish order." They a= t d y  the ones who cause 
corruption, but they do not realize (this) . . . . Their similitude is 
that of a man who kindled a fire, and when it lighted all around 
them, God took away their light and left them in utter darkness, 
unseeing, deaf, dumb and blind; they will not retum (to the 
Truth). Or (another similitude) is that of a rain-laden cloud from 
the sky; in it ate zones of darkness, and thunder and lightning. 
They press their fingers in their ears to keep out the stunning 
thunderclap, trembling from the fear of death. But God is ever 
encompassing the rejecters of Faith (i.e., Truth)! . . . If God 
willed He could take away their faculty of hearing and seeing. 
For God has power over all things. (26-20) 

Man is by nature unstable; when misfortune touches him he pan- 
ics and when good things come his way, he prevents them from 
teaching others. (7019-21) 



168 The American Journal of Islamic Socii Sciences 11:2 

Humanpersonalityhasbeenpermeatedwithgreedorselfishn~ 
(hence be attentive against this natme of your p e d t y ) .  
(4: 128) 

He who makes his personality pute, shall be s u c c d ,  while he 
who compts it shall be in the loss. (91:9-10) 

The successful ate those who can save themelves from their own 
selfish personality. (59:9) 

By stating clearly in 96:4-5 that "He taught mankind that which they 
did not know," the Qur'an declares itself to be humanity's guide in the 
transamdent realm. Although the Qur'an refers to the visible realm and 
gives certain information about it, this is only done in a secondary man- 
ner, for its main goal is to serve as a guide to knowledge of the transcen- 
dent realm. Therefore, both realms cannot be detached from each other, 
for one points to the other, and the latter is the cotlsequence of the for- 
mer. In other words, the visible realm points to its consequence, and all 
the laws of nature are placed into it in such an intelligible manner that 
they also point to the transcendent realm. This "pointing" can be discov- 
ered and conceived only through the guidance of revelation. 

Just as both realms are thus delicately conjoined, their cottesponding 
faculties in human beings also conjoined. Therefote, the heart and the 
mind must also be united in that subtle way. The result of this unity is a 
knowledge of the transcendent and the visible realms, which yields a 
unity that forms a Qur'anic worldview, known in the qur'an as hikmuh. 
When both elements are separated, consequential results-knowledge- 
are yielded about the visible (i.e., scientific) and the tmmcendent (i.e., 
philosophical and metaphysical) realms. When the unity (tawhi4 in both 
realms and in their corresponding faculties of human knowledge is estab- 
lished so harmoniously and delicately, the end result is what the Qur'an 
calls the "straight path" (sirdl mustaqim) in thinking. Therefore, the 
Qur'anic hikmuh leads to the straight path in human thought. 

In the fiitst section, we presented the historical concepts of philosophy 
and, in the second section, the qur'anic attitude of these concepts, which 
is based on the Qur'anic worldview. We will now develop a concept of 
philosophy, one which is adequate in the histotical sense and in Qur'anic. 
sense, by using the derived conclusions to formulate a concept of philoso- 
phy in the Qur'anic context. 

Philosophy as a Science in the Qur'anic Context 

We have defined philosophy as reflective thinking in order to avoid 
the complicated problems surtounding the time historical conceptions of 



169 

it. But is it possible to offer a conception that is devoid of these a m -  
plications? Since human knowledge increases and thus perfects itself in 
a trial-and-emr manner, we may use the previous conceptions to formu- 
late a less problematic defrnitian of philosophy. To achieve this, we shall 
begin with the most outstanding feature of reflective thinking or te8son- 
ing, which is, in Kantian tern, architectonic want 1965). In other 
words, the human mind operates within the framework of a certain world- 
view and, as such, it can understand concepts, ideas, and notions only in 
comedon with a system. Otherwise, when ideas or concepts are isolated 
from their own worldview (or system), reflective reasoning canpot com- 
prehend them, or it merely misinterprets them. 

We shall go even further and assert that all human conduct is trace- 
able ultimately to a worldview. This conclusion is sufficient in itself to 
show the significance of a worldview in individual and social life, which 
of course includes philosophical and scienWic activities. Along with this, 
we also emphasize the crucial role a worldview plays in our actions. We 
have no intention of undermining the significance of such other factom 
in human behavior or action as the individual’s psychology and the effect 
of both physical and Social surroundings. But above all, from the epis- 
temological perspective, a worldview is much more significant than any 
other element of human behavior, because it is the only framework within 
which the human mind can operate fully in its quest to attain knowledge. 
We may delineate this not as a full-fledged theory of knowledge, but 
rather as the foundation for such a theory. Since this view gives us two 
separate issues, we shall elucidate the concept of worldview under two 
headings: the nufure of worldviews and their function in society and, 
above all, as a knowledge-acquiring operation in both philosophical and 
scientific activities. 

The Nature of WorMviews. Our exposition of this concept shall utilize the 
knowledge available to us, aside from the Qur’anic somes. For instance, 
using Kantian terminology, we can say that we are already in possesdon 
of certain a priori knowledge, although we prefer to exptess this as fol- 
lows: the human mind is created in such a way that it is capable of ac- 
quiring knowledge of the universe in which it exists. In addition, we must 
Temind ourselves that the world is also created in such a manner that it 
can be comprehended by the human mind. The first step in acquiring 
knowledge is thtough the initiation of reptesentations, which, in turn, is 
initiated via our sense perception of the world to our mind. Using Kantian 
terminology again, we are capable of possessing u posteriori knowledge 
as well. The continual combination of a priori and a posteriori knowl- 
edge gradually forms a framework in the mind-a worldview. From the 
first inception of a posteriori knowledge, the mind begins to work within 
that framework and to enlarge it through various combinations of howl- 



170 The Am&= Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 11:2 

edge that axe acquired later. The worldview thus becomes the environ- 
ment within which the mind opetates and without which it cannot func- 
tion. 

The hatUte of the human mind, therefore, cannot but perceive a cer- 
tain problem within a "scheme of cmstmctive unity," which we shall call 
"system." If we call that mode of philosophizing that is concerned only 
with certain problems in a disctete manner "problematic philosophy," then 
the mode of philosophizing that seeks to capture that scheme in which 
such problems ate articulated can be conveniently tetmed "systematic 
philosophy" or rather "philosophy of systems." But it must be pointed out 
that a system is always assumed, or already pteconceived, when an at- 
tempt has been made to articulate a particular problem. Hence, problemat- 
ic phibsophy inevitably pmpposes a systematic philosophy, for the 
human mind can deal with a problem only within a system that it has 
already built for itself. Recognizing this, Kant says that "human h n  
is by nature architectonic" (ibid., 429) and that "systematic unity. . . is 
indispensable to mason" (ibid, 556). In that c8se, since the concept of 
system is a notion that has far more implications than one might expect, 
we shall try to explicate this concept in somewhat full detail. 

Since the nature of a human being, as a conscious individual, is to 
think and reflect upon one's self and surtoundings, it is plausible to hold 
that, although one natumlly forms a conception of the universe as a 
whole, from the very beginning such questions are dealt with in a discrete 
and isolated manner. "his is proven by the history of philosophy, as well 
as by the fact that as soon as such reflection grew into a discipline, 
named "philosophy" (i.e. love of wisdom) by the ancient Greeks, such 
problems were unified into a coherent body of knowledge: a system. This 
development was natural, for the human faculty of knowledge is such that 
it can operate only within a "categoreal scheme," to use Whitehead's 
term, when it deals with such theoretical problems. Thus, problems led 
inevitably to systems. 

We shall, therefore, defend a concept of philosophy to be formulated 
as a science of systems, by which we mean "systematic philosophy" as 
de$ined above. But my use of the term "system," in the plural, should not 
indicate that there is actually more than one system. There is, indeed, 
only one universal system in the objective sense, but its conceptual expo- 
sition d e s  from philosopher to philosopher. Hence, there may be many 
systems in the conceptual sense. For this reason, philosophy can be repre- 
sented as the science that attempts to capture the conceptual scheme of 
that objective, universal system. 

Our concept of system, in this context, shall refer to the conceptual 
totality as an attempt to grasp the pattern of the universe. "System" is 
thus used in its philosophical signification and, in the most general sense, 
can be taken to be a worldview. But, philosophically speaking, these two 



A q k g ~ :  A Concept of Philosophy in the Qur'anic Context 171 

concepts 8te not synonymous; A system is a systematic organization of 
ideas into an architectonic whole, while a worldview is an architectonic 
whole in which ideas are not so systematically interconnected. As a re- 
sult, some ideas temain vague, unclear, and unorganized. A system, then, 
is a well-knit orgapization of ideas and doctrines, a coherent unity that 
has no gaps or anyinconsistency. As such, it is "a coherent, logical, nee 
essary [unity] of general ideas in terms of which every elemmt of our 
experience can be interpreted" (Whitehead 1979,3). In oder to elucidate 
this point, let us begin to show how a worldview is formed and then how 
a system is built. 

A worldview usually arises in everyday life out of a natural process, 
so to speak, although the ptocess itself is not governed by natural means. 
On the conttary, it is for the most part regulated by education and soci- 
ety. Therefore, the major factom that shape a worldview are mainly cul- 
tural mviT0nment and education. Other dominant factom in the disclosure 
ptocess of a worldview are the individual's psychology, language, natural 
envimnment, and other social conditions. The individual does not make 
any conscious effort to construct a systematically organized worldview, 
but only looks for answem to certain questions that either come to his/her 
mind or are encomtemi accidentally during daily life. Hence, a world- 
view is not cmstmctexi, but rather is formed by the individual in a casual 
manner. It is in this sense that we shall claim its disclosure to be a natu- 
ral ptocess as opposed to a d o u s  effort to build an architectonically 
whole pefspective. As a worldview is, in fact, a perspective ftom which 
an individual views everything, no one can evaluate a question or a prob- 
lem without first assuming a worldview. In fact, the human mind works 
only within the context of such an architectonic whole. It is this point that 
Kant (1965,556) raised specifically: 

Human reason is by nature atchitectonic. That is to say, it regards 
all our knowledge as belonging to a possible system . . . . Sys- 
tematic unity . . . is indispeasable to reason. . . . By an architec- 
tonic we understand the art of constructing systems. As system- 
atic unity is what first raises ordinary knowledge to the rank of 
science [ w k s e ~ c h f i ] ,  that is, makes a system out of a mere 
aggregate of knowledge, amhitectonic is the doctrine of the sci- 
entific in our knowledge . . . . By a system we understand the 
unity of the manifold modes of knowledge under one idea. This 
idea is the concept pmvided by reason.. . . The whole is thus an 
organized unity, and not an aggregate. It may gmw from within, 
but not by extend acklition. It is thus like an animal body, the 
growth of which is not by the addition of a new member, but by 
rendering of each member, without change of pmportion, sttonget 
and more effective for its purposes. 



172 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 11:2 

If this point is accepted simply an epistemological grounds, then it 
must be concluded that science must be based upon an epistemological 
perspective-a worldview. A worldview without a concept of science or 
any other related concepts would be unable to pmduce any scientific 
knowledge. The result would not differ significantly from that of a 
worldview that almdy has all these concepts. But, as they remain buried 
under the debris of history without any clarification, no significant scien- 
tific activity can be expected. We shall try to explain our position by 
Summarizing the main differences between a system and a worldview, 
since it also shows the significance of worldviews: 

1. 

2. 

3. 

A system is an orderly unity, w h e m  a worldview is a natural 
(i.e., unintentional) unity of the mind mched through culture and 
education. 

Based on the above difference, we can say that via baby milk, 
family, community, value, and even natural environment, as well 
as by birth, language, manners, behavior, a w h h u n g e n  is 
formed in an accidental manner. A system, however, is built 
within an orderly conceptual manner intentionally, methodologi- 
cally, and scientifically, so that its coflsftucton can be a science. 

The d a c e  of constructing systems is philosophy. However, 
there cannot be a science of "worldview fonnaticm," although it 
can be investigated by a science, for the formation of a world- 
view is dominated unconsciously @.e., unintentionally) by cultural 
and educational elements. For example, a child learns its native 
language "naturally" (Le., unintentidly), but the knowledge of 
that language, its grammar and syntax must be acquired through 
a science (i.e., inteationally). 

When we d d e r  these featum of systems counterpod to the 
above characteristics of worldviews, we can elucidate further the n a t w  
of systems. Although a system is a well-knit unity, it is Possjble to divide 
it into cextain subsystems or "parts" that are not mere4y attached to the 
main system, but rather an all deduced from it. Therefore, in most sys- 
tems architectonic unity is a discursive unity. While there may be systems 
that are not deductive, the most systematic systems ate deductive, and the 
most outstanding of these are the systems of Spinom, Hegel, and al 
FWibi? 

+This is clear exhibited in Spiwza's Ethics, Hegel's Encyclopedia of Philosuphical 
Sciences, d a l  t Wi's al M a d h a t  al F&!i&zhr, which was translated and edited by 
Ridnud Walzes as Al-Faralji on the P e e c t  Stare (oxfard: Clatendon Ras, 1958). 



Aqkge-q: A Concept of Philosophy m the Qur’anic Context 173 

A philosophical system is an orderly unity. The unity’s order is ar- 
ranged according to certain principles and rules developed by the system 
builder. Since they may change from philosapher to philosopher, we will 
not discuss them except in relation to a system. A system’s structure may 
change according to these principles or rules (i.e., methodology). In other 
words, every system is canstruded on a theoretical foundaton, usually a 
general metaphysics, and thus can be called a basic system. This basic 
system, to which we shall refer as “general metaphysics,” consists of 
doctrines, rules, and principles that determine all of the system’s other 
parts and includes, and usually outlines, the methodology of the philoso- 
pher as well. However, we cannot pass on any general conclusion about 
the part of the system that comes right after the general metaphysics, as 
this may change from philosopher to philosopher. Thus, all of the 
system’s other parts that come after the general metaphysics may be 
called subsystems. Each part of the system can be conveniently classified 
into supeqstem and subsystems, according to the position it occupies 
in the system. The part of the system that is prior is a subsystem in -la- 
tion to the ones that come later, which are supersystems in relation to the 
former one(s). It must also be clear that a part of the system can be both 
a subsystem and a supeqstem. 

In addition to a general metaphysics, subsystem and supeqstems, 
a system is constructed by certain theories and doctrines. As a theory is 
a formulation given as a solution to a certain problem, it usually involves 
only one particular problem. A doctrine, however, may involve more than 
one problem and thus is constructed out of a number of theories. In that 
case, a doctrine is a formulation of how we understand a certain state of 
affairs, or a more complex problem, that may involve other problems as 
well. Accordingly, we may distinguish five basic elements of a possible 
system: theories, doctrines, general metaphysics (or the basic system), 

A system is usually constructed out of these five elements. The sim- 
plest element in a given system is a theory and, after that, a doctrine. 
These two elements can be considered as parts of a system, since they do 
not constitute a subsystem within the general scale of the whole system. 
Theories and doctrines are united so harmoniously that they form one part 
of a system. As we have seen, there are three elements to a system: gen- 
eral metaphysics, subsystems, and supeqstem. If we are to illustrate 
this s t ~ c t u m  of a given system with reference to specific systems, then 
we can say that the general metaphysics of systems is usually either an 
epistemology or an ontology that delineates the method of its construc- 
tion In Islamic thought, essentialist systems are based mainly on episte 
mology, as in the c8se of Ibn S-W. If we consider his books (i.e., A1 
IsMr6t wa a1 Tanbihdt and A1 Shifi‘) in which he canstructs his system, 
we will see that he begins with logia, which, in fact, delineates his theory 

subsystem, and supeqstems. 



174 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 11:2 

of knowledge. The existentialist systems, such as those of Ilm 'Arabi and 
Mull5 Sadra, are based on ontology. 

Regardless of the manner and content of the development of this 
general metaphysics, one thing is certaim it is the beginning point of the 
whole system and, as such, its very foundation. The other parts of a given 
system usually follow with an order that varies from philosopher to phi- 
losopher. Fhch subsystem or supersystem that follows the general meta- 
physics constitutes a branch of knowledge (a "discipline"): logic, ethics, 
religion, aesthetics, politics, the philosophy of nature, sociology, or psy- 
chology. These parts can be defined as "individual sciences," each of 
which may be an independent part within the system or a doctrine within 
a part of the system. When taken altogether taxonomically, they constitute 
a classification of sciences. If they ate taken along with the body of 
knowledge contained in the system, then they constitute, in their totality, 
a cosmology, for cosmology, as the science of cosmos (i.e., the system 
posed objectively), is the very project of any system (i.e., the cosmos 
posed subjectively [conceptually]). Hence, although some ptevious sys- 
tems may have cosmology as one of their parts, we view this as untena- 
ble, as the whole system itself projects a cosmology. This is why some 
philosophes use the term "cosmology" as an equivalent for *system."6 

The Functions of Worldviews. Historically speaking, systems seem to 
function as general schemes that embody a systematic unity of cmtem- 
porary knowledge. ~n this rnpeii'i, their function is to systematize the 
accumulation of available knowledge and, therefore, usually open a new 
era in the history of philosophy. This intellectual function of systematic 
philosophy is within the realm of historical thmght and, as such, can be 
called the "historical function." In this sense, a system becomes an inde- 
pendent movement of thought or a philosophical school such as Pla- 
tonism, Neo-Platonism, Peripateticism, MashdSi (Islamic Peripate 
ticism), khriqi, Kantianism, Hegelianism, or Whitehead's Pmcess 
School. 

But systems have another function: Whenever we philosophize or 
construct a theory, even in isolation of an explicit system, the very nature 
of our mind causes us to presuppose, inevitably and n e c d y ,  a system 
of ideas that is not manifested in an orderly manner. This function of 
systems has to do with the nature of our faculty of knowledge, and hence, 
its role can be designated as the epistemological function. In addition to 
the historical and epistemological functions, a system, as the essence of 

Whitehead uses several terms that am used in close signification to the concept of 
system: "categored scheme," "pattem," "camology," "scheme" or eneral scheme," and 
"worldvkw." See his Science Md the Modern World (New Yorlc '& Free Ress, 1967), 
Modes of Thought (New York The Free Ress, 1938), and Process und Reality, ed. by 
David R. Griffin and Donald W. Sherbme (New York The Free Press, 1979). 



Aqkgeq: A Concept of Philosophy h the Qur'dc Context 175 

the idea of philosophy, plays a different role in the society. We shall refer 
to this role, in the following section, as the social function of systems in 
worldview formation. 

A system tends to give a certain dynamism to its society, which 
allows it to flourish. The most important dynamism provided is a system- 
atic worldview. If this process takes place properly, the worldview of the 
individuals in that society develops ScientiJcuUy rather than naturally 
(i.e., unintentionally). In fact, one may claim resonably that it is the 
system developed by a thinker or thinkers (i.e., the ulama) that dominates 
a society's major worldview. Whitehead (1979, vii) expresses this fact 
very clearly when he says that "the mentality of an e p h  springs fnnn 
the view of the world which is, in fact, dominant in the educated sections 
of the communities in question." 

In our opinion, contemporary Muslims seem to be developing a 
worldview in a haphazard, as opposed to scientific (the inculcation of its 
major components [concepts, ideas and doctrines], to individual members 
through clear and transpanat &finitions and a systematically organized 
body of knowledge) manner. 'Ihis is achieved at thtee successive stages: 

1. The "abstract level," which is that of worldview formation. As the 
world is formed by abstract thinking, it is called "system" in the 
philosophical seflse. The ulama are supposed to assume this duty of 
forming (or rather constructing) the system. 

2. The "concretized level," that of intellectuals, men/women of literature, 
artists, architects, teachers, and educatols. As these people can under- 
stand the abstract system developed or constmcted by the ulama, they 
will (or ought to) reflect it in their works. Since the works of the 
intellectuals rn usually of a concrete nature, their activity will con- 
cretize the system and pass it on to the general masses in easier-to- 
understand concrete ideas. At this stage, the system becomes a 
worldview. 

3. The massive dissemination of this worldview through the educational 
institutions and mass media. This movement of ideas from the first 
to the last stage results in the shaping of the masses' worldview ac- 
cording to the ulama's well-defined and systematically developed 
ccmcepts, ideas, and doctrines. Such a process of worldview formation 
can be classified as scientific. To clarify this further, we shall show 
how a worldview is (or can be) situated within a given society. 

Ideally speaking, there should be only one dominant worldview in the 
society. This worldview, held by at least 80 percent of the people, is 
termed the "dominant worldview." Of course, the remaining 20 percent 



176 The American Joumal of Islamic Social sciences 11:2 

will have other worldviews, but this will not affect social unity. Such a 
situation also allows the dominant worldview to be checked and c o d  
via the debates and mutual discussions that will be generated by the ideas 
and doctrines of these differing worldviews. As such social unity is intel- 
lectual in n a b ,  there is still room left for cultural diversity. 

We must also be clear about our notion of dominant worldview. As 
it is the majority's worldview, it is identical in all the individuals who 
share in it. However, it is impossible for two persons to have an identical 
worldview in every respect. Therefore, by "common" worldview, we 
mean all the worldviews, including the basic notions, assumptions, and 
ideas, that are Similar in at least 80 p e m t  of their contents." Hence, in 
our terminology "same," "common," or "dominant" worldviews refer to 
only those worldviews characterized by having at least 80 percent similar 
contents. We refer to those having 20 percent or less of their contents in 
common as "different" worldviews. Of course, it is not possible to mea- 
sure the percentage of a worldview; we only want to give an idea about 
the amount of similarities and differences between worldviews. In other 
words, just as there are no identical worldviews, there are no worldviews 
that do not share at least some concepts, ideas, and maybe even doctrines. 

As stated earlier, a worldview is a system of 8flswem given by an 
individual to the questions he/she encounters in life. Of course, his/her 
answers are affected by many factom, among them education, religion, 
and even one's natural env imen t .  The study of a worldview is, then, 
the study of answem to the most basic questions: the human being and its 
place in the universe. Thus, a worldview is mainly philosophical, for the 
questions with which it deals fall, in almost every case, within the bound- 
aries of philosophy. As we have pointed out, just as the environment of 
any human activity is the worldview within which that activity is carried 
out, since our scientific activities cannot be without an environment, this 
very environment is also a part of the worldview. We conclude from this 
that all human activities can be t r a d  back ultimately to a worldview, 
just as a philosopher's doctrines and theories can be traced back ultimate- 
ly to a system. 

That human conduct is ultimatdy reducible to a worldview is suffi- 
cient in itself to show the significance of a worldview in individual and 
social life, including, of course, philosophical and scientific activities. We 
have stated this conclusion to emphasize the crucial role of a worldview 
in our actions. We do not wish to undermine the significance of other 
factom in human behavior or the performance of an action, such as the 
psychology of an individual and the effect of both physical and social 
surroundings. Fmm the epistemological perspective, however, a world- 
view is far more significant than any other element of human behavior, 
for it is the only framework within which the human mind can operate in 
otder to attain knowledge. We have tried to prove this point here. 



Aqlkgeq: A Concept of Philosophy in the Qur'anic Context 177 

Worldviews ate, as stated previously, architectonic unities e x p d  
in chaotic categoreal schemes, whereas systems are expressed in unified 
and orderly categoreal schemes. Since concepts, terms, and problems are 
well-defined, they are clearly and distinctly expressed in systems. A 
worldview can be made systematic by philosophical expression and may 
be presented as a system. But as this is reflected in individd minds 
within a society, it will always remain a worldview-it can never become 
a system. When a worldview is thus influend by a system, its cotlcepts, 
views, ideas, and outlook a q u k  a Certain degree of clarity and distinct- 
ness. This characteristic is possible for a worldview in the mind of an 
individual (i.e., an intellectual who is not a system builder). Although it 
can never acquire a system's systematic unity, it can serve to draw indi- 
viduals toward its concepts, terms, ideas, and insights, which may be 
ethical, political, economic, or otherwise in natute. 

ing these abstract ideas is vital for a society's progress, whether in the 
sciences or any other crucial human affair. The d t i n g  progressive de 
velopment of a society's intellectual life is what we call the "social func- 
tion of systems." Civilizations rise as a result of this p m g t v e  advance- 
ment in speculative thought, for, as Rosenthal (1970, 1) acknowledges 
"civilizations tend to revolve around concepts of an abshoct 
hatUte which mote than anything else give them their distinctive chatac- 
ter. Such concepts are to be f d  at the very beginning of a rising civili- 
zation." Thus, we are led to conclude that philosophy has a crucial mle 
to play in a society and, more particularly if developed within the 
Qur'anic context, in Muslim society as well. 

A system's abstract dynamism comes from its originality, which is 
invigorating, fascinating, and enlivening-like the land's mwakeaing 
afkr winter. This dynamism is reflected in the society, which then em- 
barks upon a process of development, pmvided that there are no impedi- 
ments blocking mutual companionship between the speculative system 
and its community. Whitehead (1938,2,3) points to this phemmmm: 

This dynamic interaction of individuals and the proces~ of implement- 

In all systematic thought, there is a tinge of pedantty. There is a 
putting aside of notions, of experiences, and of suggestions, with 
the prime excuse that of coutse we m not thinldng of such 
things. System is important. It is necessary for the hading, for 
the utilization, and for the criticism of the thoughts which thtong 
into our experience . . . . Such a habit of mind is the very es- 
sence of civilization. It is civilization. 

He concludes that "if my view of the function of philosophy is COT- 

mt, it is the most effective of all the intellectual pursuits" (Whitehead 
1967, viii). We believe that this is clear W m  the function of systems, as 



178 Ihe American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 11:2 

outlined above, in a society. Although this is stated emphatically by 
Whitehead, he does not discuss the process of interaction between philos- 
ophy and society. It is usually taken for granted that society, as the cul- 
turalenviranment of philosophy, has a considerable affect upon it. The 
~ v e m e  dimtion of this interaction, however, has not &ved much 
attention "he way systems function as such is very complex, and we 
have tried to elucidate this point in our discussion of the social function 
of systems in relation to the concept of society's worldview. 

As we have seen, every worldview is not systematic and clear. On the 
COntEBty, most individuals of a given society have a vague and unsys- 
tematic worldview. Sometimes almost no one has a specific, clear, and 
systematic worldview. If this is the case, then the society as a whole lacks 
a cleat and systematic worldview. Such a situation marks the beginning 
of that society*s downfall and decline, for it will never be able to estab- 
lish its own identity or to manifest itself. What is more acute and devas- 
tating is the ambiguity, which is caused by intellectual poverty, that be- 
gins to overwhelm ethical concepts and judgments. 

This evil state of &airs can be remedied only by establishing a clear 
and systematic worldview for the society thus afflicted. In other words, 
it must undede the process of forming a scientific worldview,' for only 
this will allow one to q u i t e  a clear outline of the program and ptoce- 
d m  for me*s life. 'Ihe sole way to achieve this is through reflective 
thinkhg: philosophy. Society creates a new scienti~culi'y formed world- 
view h u g h  philosophical thought, while individuals, having clear and 
distinct concepfs and ideas within a systematic unity, become morally and 
intellectually dynamic. This in turn yields a progressive and ktmwledge- 
oriented society, as was the case with early Islamic civilization. 

The ctucial aspect of original reflective thinking is also exhibited in 
the fact that no society is static or stable, as there is always some social 
change that results in the change of individuals. The worldview of a 
society must renew itself in parallel with social change, otherwise it will 
no longer satisfy the individual membem of that society. Again, this task 
belongs to ahilosophy. 

Thus far, we have tried to outline only the most significant role of 
philosophy per se in a society in general. When we consider Muslim 
communities, this significance increases, for it becomes the mast impor- 
tant task of a Muslim to answer such philosophical questions as: What is 
science and knowledge in Islam? What is Islam's attitude towad modern 
science? What do the Qur'anic terms & h h  and 'ih have to offer con- 
temporary humanity? How does Islam provide a solution(s) to the predic- 

I 



A&gen$: A Concept of philosophy in the Qur'anic Context 179 

ament of modem humanity? What is life for a Muslim? What is the indi- 
vidual human being and his/her place in the universe? All of these ques- 
tions, and more, must be answered systematically within a unified Islamic 
worldview, which can be established by a discipline defined as the "sci- 
ence of constructing systems." Since a worldview endows our ideas with 
unity (tuwhiil), the unique Islamic goal of unity can be accomplished in 
the most perfect way as described in the Qur'an. 

We have now reached a general concept of philosophy through a 
historical analysis of philosophical activities. This general concept has 
been expressed as "the science of coflsttllcting systems." In the conclu- 
sion, we will apply these results to our analysis of the Qur'anic context 
in order to reach what may be called an Islamic concept of philosophy. 

Conclusion 

At this point in time, Muslims are in need of an Islamic system, in 
the philosophical sense, that has been developed by the ulama. mete is, 
however, a Wereme between such a system and a scientifically formed 
worldview. First of all, a worldview that is not formed within a scientific 
context is a natural worldview. This is not what we had in mind, for 
natural worldviews ~IE not dynamic: they resist any progress, or rather, 
they do not give the individual the kind of dynamism required for pmg- 
ress. Secondly, a scientific worldview is dynamic, for it gives the indi- 
vidual the stamina r equ id  for the rise of scientific activities. But since 
this worldview derives from a system developed by the abstract thoughts 
of thinkem, it still does not, in itself, constitute a system. Hence, the sci- 
entific worldview is called "scientific" only figuratively-in the sense that 
it derives largely from a scientifically constmcted system whose basic no- 
tions, ideas, values, and doctrines can become transparent in one's mind. 
As they are still not organized systematically according to a certain proce 
d m  that can be called a method, they do not constitute a system. 

Our analysis of the Qur'an as a whole reveals, as we have seen, pri- 
marily two modes of knowledge in the Islamic worldview: knowledge of 
the absolute realm and knowledge of the physical realm. The latter mode 
of knowledge is the one investigated by various physical sciences. 
Knowledge of the absolute realm, on the other hand, presents two aspects 
as necessary consequences of the Qur'anic outcome; for if, according to 
the Qur'an, we m responsible for our actions related to the absolute 
realm, then we must be held by it as capable of acquiring knowledge of 
that realm: "Those befote them (also) rejected (revelation), and so the 
punishment came to them from directions they did not perceive" (39:25); 
and "Because of their sins h y  were drowned and put into the Fire. They 
found, in lieu of God, none to help themselves. So Noah said: '0 my 
Lord! Do not leave a single unbeliever on earth."' (71:25-6) 



180 'Ihe American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 11:2 

These and many other verses make it clear that belief (iincm) is an 
obligation on upon humanity, who is also held accountable for its unk- 
lief (kufi). Such obligation and accountability are intelligible only if the 
knowledge of their related mlm is accessible to the mind. In the case of 
the absolute realm, while the mdm itself is not accessible, certain knowl- 
edge of it is given via revelation, which is then comprehended and at- 
tained by the mind thtough an experiential movement the subjective 
mood We call this aspect of the absolute realm, attained experientially 
with the aid of revelation, the "experiential absolute," as distinguished 
from its other, and unattainable, aspeck the "tramcendent absolute." We 
are thus accountable only for the imtsn-the Islamic worldview. Knowl- 
edge of the second mlm, which is also known as the "absolute unseen 
world," on the other hand, is not obligatory for humanity, although its in- 
struction and learning, which has already been given via revelation, is. 

The absolute realm thus presents two sphem of knowledge: the tran- 
scendent absolute (God in Himself, the nature of resurteCtion, freedom, 
and paradise), which can only be studied by revealed theology (kakim), 
and the experiential absolute (i.e., metaphysics in the sense of philowphi- 
cal or raticmal theology [speculative kdiim]). But the method of this sci- 
ence diffem from the methods of those that investigate the physical realm, 
for their experiences am of a different order. 

As regards these two sphem of knowledge in the absolute realm, we 
can distinguish two general sciences: a) reveald theology, which simply 
organizes and presents systematically this realm's subject matter (i.e., the 
nattm of God, resurrection, paradise, and hell), and b) speculative theol- 
ogy, which uses the subjective mood to present the knowledge of the 
experiential realm (i.e., the existence of God, the intelligibility of life 
after death, fmdom, and related theological issues). Since this science 
repnsents the experiential mlm, as opposed to revealed theology, which 
repments the absolute realm, speculative theology is the first human 
science that uses rational procedw in the acquisition of knowledge. 
Thus, it provides a passageway from the mdm of the transcendent to the 
realm of the visible. And because of this, there will be sciences that stand 
between the transcendent and the physical realms. 

In this second group of sciences a t ~  those that study humanity, soci- 
ety, religion, and the nature of science. As they stand between the tran- 
scendent and the physical sciences, they must use their methods-in 
addition to using the subjective mood as a pmedure and the Islamic 
sources as their ground, they must use the experimental-obsetvational 
method and rational pmcdum whenever possible. The classification of 
sciences in the physical realm requites a more rigorous attempt. To give 
an idea about what we mean by these sciences, we cite in this respect 
physics, astronomy, biology and such abstract sciences as mathematics 
and logic. 



A$lkga$: A Concept of Philosophy in the Qur’anic Context 181 

We may now summarize our three topics in a conclusion: The Qur’an 
does not o p  human thinking as such, for it is neither against the ac- 
quisition of scientific knowledge nor the building of a systematic world- 
view based on revelation in philosophy. Moreover, in both of these hu- 
man endeavors, the Qur’an wants to guide and impart knowledge of the 
transcendent realm to the inquirer. As for the visible realm, however, it 
only wants to clarify and purge the scientist’s intention and attitude rather 
than impart knowledge of this realm, because one can aquite this knowl- 
edge directly on his/her own. 

Lastly, since we have shown that philosophy is decisive for both soci- 
ety and the individual within society as well, the Muslim thinker is in a 
position to determine more precisely the borderline between philosophy 
as & h u h  and revelation as the Qur’an. On the other hand, we can say 
now, by way of propaedeutic, that in metaphysical issues we must trust 
the guidance of the Qur’an. By metaphysical issues we mean the unseen 
world. We understand that there ate certain other metaphysical problems 
(i.e., knowledge, causality, freedom, and truth) that can be solved on the 
basis of strict adhemce to what we know of the unseen world through 
revelation. The role of (Islamic!) philosophy within such a scheme is to 
clearly ou the  a worldview-to construct a system- which we have tried 
to define with the Qur’anic term hikmah. This is, we believe, the most 
urgent need of the contemporary Muslim world. 

Bibliography 

Ayer, Alfred J. Language, Truth and Logic. New York: Dover Publica 

Comman, James W. et al. Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An 

A1 Fii6bi. Ihd’  a1 ‘Ulum. Translated by ‘UthmZn &in. Egypt: D5r a1 

A1 GhazGli. Tahufit al Falrssifah. Edited by Maurice Bouyges, S. J. Bei- 

Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Norman Kemp 

Rahman, Fazlur. Major m m e s  of the Qur’an. Chicago and Minneapolis: 

----- . Islam and Modernity: Damformation of an Intellectual Tradition. 

Rosenthal, Franz. Knowledge Diumphant: The Concept of Knowledge in 

tions, 1952. 

Introduction. New York Macmillan, 1974. 

Fikr a1 ‘Arabi, 1949. 

rut: a1 Matba‘iit a1 KathiiEyah, 1927. 

Smith. New York St. Martin’s Press, 1965. 

Bibliotheca Islamica, 1980. 

Chicago: UnivetSity of Chicago Press, 1984. 

Medieval Islam. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1970. 



182 The Americau Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 11:2 

Walzer, Richad, trans. and ed. Al-Farabi on the Per$ect State. Oxford, 

Whitehead, A l f d  N. Modes of Thought. New York The Free Press, 

-----. Science and the Modem World. New York The Free Press, 1967. 
----- . Process and Reality. Edited by David R. Griffin and Donald W. 

UK: Clanadon Press, 1985. 

1938. 

Sherbune. New York The Free Press, 1979. 

* * CALL FOR PAPERS * * 

23rd Annual AMSS Conference 

23-25 Jumdti  al Awwd 1415 
28-30 October 1994 

State University of New York 
Binghampton, New York 

Theme: 
The American Muslim Community and the 
Articulation of Islamic Law with Penal and 

Civil Law in the United States 

Open Theme: 
Topics Related to Muslims and Islam 

The “open theme” portion of this year’s annual conference seeks to prc- 
vide all of our attending scholars with an opportunity to diversify forums, 
and challenges them to relate their research interests to the emerging con- 
ceptual and methodological perspectives inspired by the tuwhdirepkteme 
and promoted by the Islamization of knowledge. 

For more information, contact: 

~ 

Dr. Ilyas Ba-Yunus 
Department of Sociology 

State University of New York-Cortland 
Cortland, New York 13045 

Phone: (607) 753-2475 (Office) 
(607) 753-6411 (Home) 

Note: Abstracts should have been received already. Final papers must be 
received by 8 Rabi‘ a1 Awwal 1415 / 15 August 1994. Late papers wiU 
not be considered.