Tas'iii (Price Control) in Islamic Law Mohamad Hashim Kamali The market (scq or W ) has a distinctive place in the history of Islamic civilization. Makkah and MadInah were major trade centers at the time of the advent of Islam, and the prophet was himself an active market participant and reformer. There were famous markets-'Ukk&, Majan- nah, and Dhii a1 Ma@-in pre-Islamic Arabia that commonly held fairs during the pilgrimage season. This practice was conhued after the ap- pearance of Islam, for when the new Muslims felt that it might be sinful for them to trade in such places (al Zubayli 1984), the following verse was revealed: "There is no sin if you seek the bounty of your Lotd (during the pilgrimage)" (Qur'an 2:198). The main theme here is religious: allaying the fear of indulging in sin. However, i t is Significant that this potentially sinful activity was re- f e d to in such dignified term as "seeking the bounty of your Lotd." Elsewhere in the Qur'an, we find passages dealing withthe market's cul- tural Elspects, such as the verse that asks whether it is proper for the Pro- phet to mingle with the common people in the market place. The answer &ved was that prophets, just like everybody else, ate free to interact and engage in commercial tnmsactions in the mark& "And they say: What sort of a messenger is this, who eats food and walk- through the streets? Why has not an angel been sent down to him to be a Warner with him?" (Qur'an 257) and "And the Messengers whom We sent before you were all (men) who ate food and walked b g h the stnxts" (wan 2520). The second citation refers to market activity in a mainly econofnic and historical ccmtext, one that highlights the market's role in providing foodstuffs and the fact that all prophets mixed with their people on the basis of equality. In other words, they we= otdinary men whose spiritual value was not compromised by engaging in market activities. Mohamad Hashim Kamali is a p f m of law at the Iateanational Islamic University, Kuala Lumpw, Malaysia. This paper was pqared for a collcquim entitled "The Bazaar in the Culture and CivilizatiOa of the World of Idam," which was to have been held in Tabriz, Iran. 26 The Amencan J o d of Islamic Social Sciences 11:l These verses characterize Islam’s worldview in gened and its view of the market’s diverse nature in particular. Islam reaffirms its holistic a p p m h to life and informs us that the market is an arena for the combined interplay of culture, religion, economics, and history. This was partly due, perhaps, to the Prophet’s own commercial experience and acumen, which he put to good use as his future wife’s (Khadijah) trusted agent and that led eventually to the reform of Arabian commercial practices. These re- forms sought to purify the market of practices that differed from Islamic ideals of fair play, honesty, and justice. In many ways, a market is like an open theater, for it displays the unfolding of a portion of a civiliza- tion’s best achievements as well as its worst weaknesses and pitfalls. One frequent issue is the need to recognize the free market principle: the goveming of trade solely by the natural interplay of the economic forces of supply and demand. Only in such a market, it is argued, is one urged to strive and compete with his/her peers in p d t of better products or services. No market can exist without a profit motive, and the right to make a profit must never be eliminated. Thus a market regulator must be concerned with asceltaining that legitimate profit does not exceed the limits of fair gain and that an individual’s greed and desire for profit are controlled. The intention is to ensure that skilled market operators do not take advantage of an unsuspecting customer’s ignorance and naivety. Broadly speaking, one may say that this was the main goal of the new Islamic rules introduced into the Arabian market’s economic life. No law dealing with the quantitative limits of profit was promulgated, for profit is the d t of supply and demand and so is not a concern of the law. The law’s role is limited to ensuring the market’s morality, as well as the propriety and fairness of its participants and their activities (i.e., prohibiting fraud and misrepresentation), and implementing precautionary measuTes to prevent or rectify unfair trading practices. I shall examine several provisions, mainly as regards price control (tm‘fr), and highlight some conflicting interests of freedom vs. authority as reflected in relevant Shari‘ah provisions. The underlying issue is the extent to which rules on price control may or may not impinge on one’s basic f&om to trade and to sell items at the regular market price as o p posed to one fixed and imposed by the ruling authorities. The answers provided will show that the intention to preserve the freedom of trade is the overriding factor of the Shari‘ah’s price control rulings. The market offers a venue for both the virtuous and the villain. One who sits and mingles aimlessly is known, in common Persian parlance, as a k d r i o r a bdzdrgurd (i.e., a person of low personal integrity and esteem). Notwithstanding the great value attached to free marketing and trade, market forces alone cannot always vindicate exemplary values in commerce or culture. The market and its participants are only too willing to follow c m t economic trends. For example, if people spend more on Kamali: Tas‘ii (Price Control) in Islamic Law 27 jewelry and ornaments than on dairy products, this is interpreted as a greater need for the former. As a result, the market reorders its resources and runs the likely risk of sacrificing the majority’s genuine benefit (masluhuh) for the specious interest of the rich, who can pay for expen- sive and unnecessary jewelry and ornaments. Sometimes the prevailing market price does not reflect the public’s true interests. For example, the market price of certain goods may not be proportionate to the material and labor costs of their production or may not reflect their social benefit and value (i.e., compare the prices of books with pieces of furniture). Thus the market cannot be left entirely to its own devices. The law has a role to play, even if it means impinging on the ideals of personal liberty and free trade. Evidence in the Qur’an and the Sunnah Literally, tus‘ir means setting the sale price of an item. Jurists have used it to refer exclusively to official decisions on a specific item’s mone- tary price. Sellers and purchasers must obey the ruling, as it has been deemed fair. Any increase or decrease is seen as prejudicial to the buyer, the seller, or the natural flow of supply and demand, upon which normal trade depends (Wiziirat a1 Awqiif 1407/1987; Ibn Qayyim a1 Jawziyah n.d.; a1 Shawkiini n.d.; Zaydiin 1402/1982). While there is no Qur’anic ruling on tas‘ir, it is seen as incompatible with the Qur’an’s approval of the free nature of consent in commercial dealings. The basic authority is the sanctity of private property and the need to trade on the basis of mutual consent: “0 ye who believe. Eat not up your property among yourselves in vanities, but let there be among you traffic and trade by mutual good will” (Qur’an 4:29). Some jurists allow tus‘fr on the grounds of necessity (darzirah). The oft-quoted rele- vant rule is a1 durirah tuqaddaru bi qadrihu (the legally necessary is determined by the degree of necessity) (QLTsim 1406/1986). The basic evidence in the Sunnah is the hadith of Anas ibn Mdik: At the time of the Messenger of God, the market price rose in Madinah. The people said, ”0 Messenger of God, fix the price.” He replied, ”God is the taker and the disposer, the provider, and the controller of prices. I hope that when I meet Him none of you will have a claim against me for an injury concerning life and property. ‘’ ‘See Ibn Taymiyah, Public Duties,, 35. This hadith is reported in the six main hadith collections, except for of al NasH’i’s. A1 Tirmidhi says it is a hudz7h hmun ~uhz3. See al Shawhni Nuyl al ANcZr, 232. A b i Diiwiid records that Abii Hurayrah related that a man asked the Prophet: “0 Messssenger of Allah. Fix the prices for us.” He replied: ”You 28 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 1l:l commentatots have drawn different conclusions fmm this hadith. One interpretation advanced by Ibn Taym-yah, his disciple Ibn Qayyim a1 Jawziyah, and others, is that it does not forbid faair. Ibn TaymTyah (1w1982) says that it addresses a concrete set of circumstances, which is perhaps why it does not convey a binding de-it is only temporary. He adds that the conditions in Madinah at that time made a compulsory ruling unnecessary: the food for sale was mostly imported. Local pmduce was sometimes sold, but the only local cmp was barley. Buyers and sellers were not, so to speak, specific categories of people. In addition, all Muslims were a single class and community that sacrificed their pe- sons and property for Islam. The consequent general atmosphere of fra- ternity did not call for price controls or prohibiting fm'ir. Ibn Tarn-yah's analysis thus comes close to saying that, in principle, it is permitted. In support of this interpretation, he refers to another hadith and draws an analogy between tar'z7 and the freeing of slaves: If someone frees his share in a slave and has enough to cover the whole cost of the slave, then an equitable value will be assessed on him, neither too low nor yet excessive, and he will give his ceowners their quotas-thereby compelling the slave's freedom. (ibid.; Ibn Qayyim al Jam-yah nd.) The co-owners of a partially fnxd slave at.e entitled to a fair price for their shat.es and must accept this in order to seem the slave's complete freedom. It is argued, by way of analogy, that if co-owners can be made to sell for a fair price in order to secute a slave's freedom, merchants may be forced to sell for a fair price in order to secure the community's benefit (rnushzbuh) and to prevent any harm. In other words, when a poor pemon needs food, drink, and clothing but cannot obtain them due to high prices, the owners of these items may be forced to sell them to him for a fair price. This, in essence, is fus'ir (fin Qayyim al Jawziyah ad.). An Overview of Opinions Jurists disagtee over the permissibility of fus'ir. me majority says it is forbidden, an opinion that is based on Anas ibn Mdik's%adith that the Prophet equated it with transgression (m~lirnah). The Hanafis say that, in principle, it is impermissible but can be invoked if merchants aTe demanding excessive prices and the qddicannot protect the public from the resulting harm. More imposing price controls, however, the ruler should pray to God for that." Andher man came and made the same said "Only God lowers and Wises them" (Ibn Qayyim al JawzIyahT'. &. The Prophet K d : r&T (Rice Control) ia Islamic Law 29 must consult those who are knowledgeable of market conditions. Imiim Miilik is reported to have approved of tas'ir only if there are excessive price hikes in necessities or if such a rise is seen as imminent. The ShGfi'k and the Hanbalis consider this practice as forbidden in principle and have Tecotded different opinions. But even I m b al SW'i , the most vocal opponent, agrees that it is allowed, even obligatory, in the case of exorbitant price hikes or when the poor are in urgent need of food (Wizirat al Awqiif 1407/1987; Ibn Qayyim al Jawziyah nd.; Ibn Tay- m-yah 1402/1982; Zay& 1402/1982; 'Afr 1405/1985). In general, his- torical precedent and the practice of Islamic governments has complied with the majority position. We are thus informed that the market control- let (mubtasib) of the 'AbbEsid era did not, as a matter of principle, order anyone to sell at a specific price. In fact, he/whe saw it as a duty to pre- vent price controls by ensuring that merchants and traders avoided arbi- trary price changes in essential commodities (al Ma@ 1402/1982). Muslim jurists agree that the Shati'ah's trade and transaction norm is that what is not specifically prohibited is permissible (ibdbh). People are free to exchange goods and services, and the law can only intervene if a transgresSion (zulm) is committed against one party. Normally, no one can be made to sell a possession ot sell it for a specific price, as such practices violate the rights of ownelship. In addition, the state cannot interfere with one's exercise of his/het basic rights, except in certain extraordinary situations as outlined in the Shari'ah defaulting on an out- standing obligation (i.e., as obligatory maintenance [nafaqah]) despite an ability to pay, refixing to pay off a debt when able and quested to do so, owning excess food when others are starving, and owning a tree that has spread over the property of another. In these last two instances, the individual may be forced to sell for a fair price (thaman al mithl) (al ShawkM n.d.; Abi Y&yii 1409/1989; Qkim 1406/1986). Ibn Qu&mah's (1401/1981) analysis is representative of the majority position: the Prophet's response was clearly negative, and he viewed price controls as an unjust policy (mazlimah) that violated the seller's free consent by forcing h i m e t to sell at a given price. The othet point is that market prices ate not determined by human authority, for the Prophet stated that it is God who determines them. Therefore, the Prophet upheld the concept of a free market and the freedom of individuals with respect to trade and transactions (Qasim 1406/1986; Ibn Taymiyah 1982/1402 [see the article by M. A. Khan in the appendix of this source]). The Shari'ah calls for fair and free trading as a matter of principle and may be said to validate tus'ir only as a means to vindicate this free- dom and fight corruption. Perhaps this is why jurists always viewed it as confined to cases in which official intervention is justified. For example: 30 1. 2. 3. The American Journal of Islatuic Social Sciences 1 1: 1 Exorbitant price hikes by owners of essential commodities. According to the Hanafis and many prominent jurists of the other legal schools, the government may impose price controls to protect the public in- t e e However, government officials must first consult market parti- cipants, guild leaders, and representatives. If, after such meetings, they conclude that price controls are justified in order to p r o k t the public intenst, the necessary controls can be imposed. "Exorbitant," a1 Zayla'i (1313/1896) writes, means charging something like double the normal market price. One can also derive from this that interven- tion is not wamted in cases of marginal price fluctuations (WizGrat a1 AwqS 1407/1987; Ibn 'Abidin 1399/1979). People's need for particular commodities. When there is an urgent need, for example, for weapons during a time of war, those who own them may be compelled to sell them for a fair price. They cannot, so to speak, wait until the enemy prevails and gains control of the arms in question (Wigrat a1 Awqiif 1407/1987; Ibn Tarn-yah 1402/1982). Hoarding and profiteering (ZhtiMr). There is general agreement on the prohibition of hoarding foodstuffs and, with some differences of opinion, of other commodities. The hoarder may be forced to sell and may also be punished. There is a minority opinion to the effect that the government may specify a "reasonable" price in this case, which would be tantamount to resorting to tus'ir. The general view, how- ever, is that tas'ir does not apply to the hoarder (ibid.). The above list is inomplete. For example, Ibn Taym-yah (1402/1982) and Ibn Qayyim al Jawziyah (n.d.) add other instances (i.e., collusion by merchants to sell their goods only to certain individuals or groups, or a similar agreement among customers). Such actions q u i r e official inter- vention, for they represent moves away from cooperation and towards hostility, which is a violation of the Qur'anic admonition to "cooperate in good works and tuqwa, and cooperate not in hostility and rancor" (Qur'an 52). If the public interest cannot be realized without a policy of tas'ir, the authorities may resort to it, but only if they implement it justly and fairly and discontinue it when there is no further need for it. A cornpanson of the views of these two jurists with those of many other jurists shows cleatly that both of them have adopted the least re- strictive view. Ibn Taym-yah even states that, in certain cases, tas'ir may amount to transgression (i.e., forcing people to sell what they own with- out a valid reason, especially during times of price fluctuations beyond their control) or the means by which transgression is fought (i.e., prevent- ing large price increases during times of need by forcing merchants to sell for a fair price). Indeed, applying price controls in the latter case is more K d : Tm'P (Price Control) in Islamic Law 31 than permissible: it is an obligation, for injustice must be fought (Ibn Qayyim al Jawziyah ad; Ibn Taym-yah 1398/1978). Some contemporary writers, including a1 DarM (1408/1988) and al N a b h (1404/1984), support the obligatory implementation of price con- tmls in certain cases. Arbitrary price hikes, according to al Darini, amount to "merchants taking the law into their own hands" ( t a m u m a1 &jar), which violates justice and the public ink- As the establishment of justice is an obligation, tas'ir, when used in purrnit of that goal, also becomes obligatory. He bases this opinion on the legal maxim of md hi yatimmu a1 wdjib i f i bihi fa huwa wdjib (what is necessary for the ful- fillment of an obligation [wdjib] also becomes an obligation [wdjib]). In his discussion of al Darini's opinion, a1 Nabhiin adds: Vhen merchants become exploiters and price hikers (jashi'in, mustaghillin) and the in- terest (maslahah) of the community necessitates implementing a policy of tas'ir, then this becomes an obligation (wdjib)." Ma- (1406/1986), another contemporary author, opines that tas'ir falls under the general heading of "obstructing the means to evil" (sadd al dharui'i'), in the sem that it imposes a ban on something that is "hateful" (mubdh) and likely to lead to evil. While selling is permissible and prices are deter- mined through the agreement of the parties involved, price distortions and hikes can harm society. In such cases, the basic freedom of buyers and sellers may be restricted by price controls imposed by the government. Fair Price The term "fair price" (i.e., being fair to all parties of a transaction) has various renderings in Arabic: si'r a1 mithl, thaman a1 mithl, qimah a1 mithl, and al thaman a1 'ddil. The idea of equivalence (mithloah or tam-thut) in these phrases refers to a s u h n t i v e parity of value between the object for sale and its price as well as the willingness of othets to pay a similar price for it. A "fair" price is m e that is neither too low or too high and maintains an adequate pmfit margin after paying for the costs of production and other essential expenditures (i.e., transportation) (ibid.). The Sunnah seeks to ensm that fair prices prevail and to preempt unjust price manipulation by middlemen and price hikers. As most food sellers in Madinah were importers who sold their goods upon arrival in the market, the Pmphet forbade the townspeople to sell for the mmads or to act as their agents (bay' h d i r li bid). The rationale was that the townspeople knew the market conditions and, if they acted as agents, they might raise the price and thus harm their customers. The Prophet pro- scribed such agency, although agency in general is permissible, due to the potential danger of price inflation. He also forbade the interception of imports before they reached the market (talaqqfal rukbcfn). In such cases, the seller was allowed an option upon amval in the market, since 32 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 11: 1 he/she might not know the regular price and therefore p e w d e d to sell for a lower (and unfair) price (Ibn Taym-yah 1402/1982). Furthermore, merchants cannot sell items for one price to those who bargain and for a higher price to those who do not (al mustard) or who do not know the regular price. Thus we lwLd in the hadith that "cheating the mustarsil constitutes usury (rihi." This practice resembles intercept- ing goods before the newcomer is a w m of the regular price. The Sunnah also forbids pushing the price in a prospective sale (i.e., najmh) through false bidding (ibid.).2 According to the hadith, the seller must inform the purchaser of any product defect. This is based on the Prophet's decla- ration that "one who cheats is not one of us" (al Nishiipa- 1407/1987). There are many other directives in the Sunnah that cover variant opinions (i.e., khiydrdt) designed mainly to safeguard the integrity of market trans- actions against unfair manipulation in the exchange of values. It is vital that a price control policy produce a fair price and consider all relevant market conditions. For the Miliki jurist a1 BGji (1331/191 l), price controls that leave no profit margin will lead to price irregularities @ui.d al m'dr), supply shortages, and financial losses to the people (Wi- &t a1 Awqsif 1407/1987). Ibn Qayyim al Jawziyah (nd.) writes that no religious scholar has supported price dictatorship (i.e., ordering retailers and suppliers to sell at a certain price regardless of profit/loss and without considering the prices and expenditures incurred while bringing their goods to market). Lastly, a fair price is one reched through consultation with decision makers (iZi al amr) and market participants and representa- tives. This is the best way, according to a1 Biiji (1311/1911) and the Wi-t a1 Awqiif (1407/1987), to prevent injustice and price distortion. As the fixed price must be just, consensual, and acceptable to the public and market participants, it should follow general consensus and custom. Otherwise, its goal of market normalcy cannot be realized. There is disagreement over the permissibility of undercutting the fixed or pre- vailing market price. The correct view, recorded by Ibn Qayyim a1 Jaw- ziyah (1402/1982) and Wiziirat a1 Awqiif (1407/1987), is that such acts are forbidden, as they can harm price stability and cause hostility. The Subject Matter of Tas'ir To What Items Can It Be Applied? Some Banafi scholars maintain that it should be confiied to foodstuffs and animal feed. The Shifi'i view, which is more prevalent, as well as that of some Banafis (i.e., Ab6 Y%uf % some Muslim areas like Qayraw- rural suppliers were iven accommodation and rest shelters near the market so they could ~ssess the market be& entering. Jranian cara- vamerais met this need by attachin such shelters to the market so that the doors would open directly to it. See Encycfopaeda Brinmica, II, 686, and Khan, "Al-Hisbah," 142-43. Kamali: TasW (Price Control) in Islamic Law 33 and Ibn 'Abidin) and &dmlis (i.e., Ibn Taymiyah and Ibn Qayyb al Jam-yah) is that a price contmls can be applied to any commodity or service that is susceptible to the idea of a fair price (qimuh a1 mithl). This suggests that fungibie goods and those sold by weight and measurement are the main candidates (Ibn Taymiyah 140g1982; Wiziitat a1 Awqiif 1407/1987). Miliki jurists have recorded two views. The fitst one states that tus'ir can be applied to all fungible goods. Nonfungible goods are exempt, for they have no substantive equivalence (tamtifhul) and are therefore not amenable to fixed prices. Ibn Hijib al M a k i as- serts that tus'ir cannot be applied if them is no exact equivalence. Al Eji (1331/1911) states that m ' i r can only be applied to fungible goods that have an equal or near-equal quality, for superior quality goods may not be subjected to the same prices as those paid for lower quality goods. The second view is that tas'ir can be applied only to foodstuffs (Wiziimt a1 Awqiif 1407/1987; al Bfiji 1331/1911; Ibn Qayyim a1 Jawziyah nd.). To What Groups of People Can It Be Applied? As a market phenomenon, tar 'ir is generally related to market participants, especially merchants and retailers who sell directly to the public. Thm are exceptions, however: 1. Importets (JalhbEn). According to the majority opinion of the legal schools and the Shi'ah Imiiniiyah, an importer is only liable to price contml in cases of necessity based on fear of general famine and ca- lamity. In such a case, he/she must sell at a fair price. Such Compan- ions as 'Abd All& ibn 'Umar, al Q S m ibn Muhammad, and Siilim ibn 'Abd All& are said to have held that tas'ii does not apply to them. (Wiziirat al Awqfif 1407/1987; Ibn Qayyim a1 Jawziyah nd.). Another opinion, recorded by the Miilikis Ibn =jib and al Eji, says that dealers in goods other than wheat and barley may be sub- jected to tus'ir. As wheat and barley importers are exempt, they may sell to retailers without restriction. Ibn Hijib writes that they may sell as they wish among themselves as long as they observe market conditions and do not exceed or undercut prevailing prices. Al Biji adds several more exemptions: importets of edible oils, meat, f d t , lentils, and other foodstuffs who supply these to retailers. If im- porters do not cooperate with the price contmls, they can stay in the market and observe the prevailing prices or leave. They may not, however, be forced to sell at a fixed price (al B5ji 1331/1911; Ibn Tay-yah 1402/1982; WiSrat a1 AwqX 1407/1987).3 3The difference between importer and retailer may not always be clear. As Ibn Qay- yim al Jaw-yah (al al Turuq a1 &hn@ah, n.d) says: When the shopkeeper sells whole- sale at impott price, he is like the importer. The difference thus depetaaS on the profit ele- ment that the reatiler adds to the imps price." 34 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 1 1 : 1 2. Hoarders (MubtukinZn). Such people are exempt, for they are already violating the law. They can be forced to sell their goods to the public. The hoarder may retain what he/she needs for his/her own consump- tion and that of his/her family for a period of one year and can then sell the rest at any price. As a hoarder is not a retailer, farmer, or supplier, he/she cannot be subjected to price control. The Hanafi jurist a1 ShaybGrS stated that although the hoarder can be forced to sell, the price of his/her goods cannot be fixed. Rather, he/she should be told to "sell as other people sell," which implies that he/she should follow the prevailing market prices (WizZirat a1 Awqiif 1407/1987; a1 E j i 1331/1911; a1 Zayla'i 1313/1896; a1 Musili 1369/1950). 3. Those who sell their goods outside the market area, such as farmers, fruit merchants, craftsmen, transport workers, and even brokers and agents, are not liable to tas'ir (at least not directly). Officials are urged to meet with these people and their representatives to ensure conformity to prevailing trade practices and general customs. Stan- dard practices related to quality and service that are generally ob- served can be applied to them (Wizlrat a1 Awqlf 1407/1987). What Constitutes u Violation of Tus'ir? The preferred Wliki, Shiifi'i, and Hanbali view is that one who disobeys a legal price control policy has engaged in a reprehensible, though essentially valid, sale. The mtion- ale is that the Owner is not under interdiction and thus can dispose of his/her propetty as he/she wants. The buyer may not compel the seller to sell at the fixed price, for this amounts to duress. Many Mdiki jurists agree, in essence, with the majority position, as they say that one who ex- ceeds ot undercuts the fixed price may be ordered to follow it ot leave the market. The less preferred ShS ' i view is that a sale made in viola- tion of m ' i r is invalid (mil). The Banbalis have recorded the view that a defiant sellet cannot be forced to by the purchaser to follow the of- ficial price, for this would invalidate the sale on the grounds of duress. The majority d i n g of the legal schools entitles the imam and the muhtusib to apply a deterrent punishment (tu'zir), as the violator has shown contempt for the imam by his/her action. The punishment may be corporal, financial, or actual expulsion from the market. However, if the tus'ir itself is illegitimate, there is no punishment for violating it, as it is considered ultra vires ub initio (Wiziitat al Awqiif 1407/1987; Ibn 'Abidii 1399/1979; a1 MUsili 1369/1950). Conclusion Although religious scholars are divided on the validity of tus 'ir, the= seems to be general agreement that it should only be used when there is Kamali: Tas% (Price Control) m Islamic Law 35 an urgent need for it.' They have generally seen it as a t r a n s H o n (mtglimuh) and a threat to an individual's civil liberty. %re also seems to be broad agreement that in cases of necessity (i.e., when exorbitant price hikes cause injustice and threaten the community's welfare), the government is within its rights to impose price controls in order to fight injustice (i.e., profiteering, tyrannical monopoly, or hoarding). The basic role and philosophy of government in Islam, as a champion of public welfare and i n t e e , 8te as relevant to modem times as they were during the early years of the Islamic em. Within the Islamic philo- sophical framework, the state has a wide margin of discretion for initia- tive and good judgment, in line with the spirit of a Shari'ah-oriented policy (siydsuh shar6@7h), to identify and secure the community's inter- est. The general Shari'ah guidelines in this regard are equally relevant. The state's policy must, in principle, be one of restraint, as this is the di- rective of the Sunnah and the conclusion w h e d by the religious scholars. The decision to i m p price controls, and then to determine the scope and what items will be affected, must remain largely a matter for the operation of a Shari'ah-oriented policy. Any contempomry discussion of m'fr must consider such c m t economic realities as industrialization, ever-increasing mass pduction and marketing techniques, technical know-how and sophistication, for these contribute to weakening the consumer's position. As the consumer is often unaware of the power and skill possessed by industrial giants, the latter can manipulate the market. When we note; for example, that the mark-up price in the stores is double or triple the production cast, and that the state itself, often for good teasons, adds to the consumer's plight (i.e, adding cusfoms duties and sales taxes), one wonders whether the evil that was once feared has now become common and entrenched in certain quarters. The present free market economy tends, in many ways, to reflect the interests of capitalists and businessmen to a far greater extent than those of the consuming public. A great deal of imaginative work is needed to shift the balance of market forces in favor of the latter. We tealize the limitations of Muslim communities and governments. In general, they are helpless and can do little but comply with the prices laid down for the desired items (i.e., oil, weapons, motor vehicles, and aircraft). The prophetic hadith quoted earlier-that only God has the power to control what we see as well as the underlying factors that are invisible to the naked eye-is perhaps now even more true. Muslim governments must become more aware of their duty as bulwarks and champions of the Muslim public's intensts. However, as there might be limits and vested intemts within the government, the public must develop ?here are repom that jurists of the TaWiin period declared tus'ir as valid due to changed circumstanceS and muy&ah. See al Qar&wi, ShurFat a1 I s h , 1393/1973). 36 The American Journal of JsMc Social Sciences 11 : 1 its rixamxs by organizing consumer associations and exerting pressure on their ombudsmen and repmentatives to emme that their intensts collsideted. There must also be a reasonable ratio between average wages and the prices of necessary goods. 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