Reflections Mirrors and Windows: Redefining the Boundaries of the Mind Isma il Se rage ldin On Boundaries Fmntiets are an invention of the mind. We set boundaries for our- selves and others by what we choose to see as reality and by what we choose to value. But men and women are social creatures, and individual behavior is subjected to the control of widely shared social values. These boundaries that define the limits of acceptable behavior also tend to reflect and reinforce limits on acceptable thinking. How are such social values developed? How do they change over time? The intelligentsiaartists and intellectuals-create mirrors through which we see outselves and windows through which we perceive reality. It is these mims and windows that define the boundaries of the mind. The intelligentsia's roleboth as makets of a cultual outlook and product of the milieu-is central to my view of what is happening in the world generally and in the Muslim societies of the Middle East particularly. These important questions will appear throughout this essay like a leit- motif. The intelligentsia needs a space offreedom in which it can perform its dual tole and shape the boundaries by which we define ourselves. Are such boundaries important? They cettainly are. Shared values re- flected in predictable behavior not only are the basis of all social organi- zation but are at the core of "cultural identity"a hackneyed expression that nevertheless remains essential to anyone who lives in a group.' Yet individuals within a group are not clones, interchangeable units within a collectivity. Each petson interacts with others in an expanding series of circles sta&g with high intensity vis-his the immediate family circle and with decreasing intensity to the limit of the group(s) with which the individual identifies. The author is Vice President, Environmentally Sustainable Development, at the World Bank. This paper was presented on 25 April 1992 and revised on 14 January 1993. The views expressed herein am those of the author and should not be attributed to the World Bank or to any of its affiliated orgaaizations. 'The issue of culture and society remains complex. Fur a survey of recent debates, see Jeffrey C. Alexander and Steven Seidman, eds., Culture and Society: Contemporary Debrrtes (Cambridge: Cambridge Universi Press, 1990). Culture is also central to the pmcess of developent. See h a i l Seragel& "Culture, Empowerment, and the Develop- ment Parad@," Development: Journal of the Society for International Development (Issue on "Refledions on Global Solidarity: Oae Wald or Several"), 1991, no. 1: 88-90. 80 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 1 1: 1 Social values clearly do not have the same impact on all members of a society or cultural group. Obvious cleavages am sex, age, wealth, race, creed, and natiotlal origin. Opinions-mostly conceming social values and whether and how they should or should not change-further subdivide the shifting mass of humanity. What prevents an explosion along one or more of these cleavages is a sense of s h a d cultural identity and the human need to organize social groupings around the family-still essential for reproducing the species and still the basic element of social organization. Boundaries are multiple. Each individual identifies to varying degrees with different sets of individuals: immediate family, extended family, and gmups based on ethnicity, nationality, region, religion, profession, and so on. At no time is one boundary the sole definer of an identity. Yet at dif- ferent timetrand for different i s s u d e r e is a most relevant boundary that becomes prominent and defines the us/them divide. It tends to reject the "other" and frequently reinforces itself by defining the "us," not by its members' specific positive attributes but by the elements in opposition to the "other." This mode stresses the negative, expands elements of sepam- tion, and makes it harder to stress the bmader groupings that always exist, albeit in weaker form. Ultimately, we all belong to one group: humanity. Despite this common humanity, other boundaries tend to prevail. When the "Yugoslav identity" weakened, it could not keep Serbs and Croats voluntarily in the same Yugoslav group. Thus the relevant boun- daries were redefined inward to a smaller group. On the other hand, the strength of the "Swiss identity" is sufficient to hold together a population With several languages (German, French, Italian, and Romanche), several religious affiliations, and multiple local identities.' Further along, we see the emergence of a European identity, by which Germans, French, Italians, British, and otheB are gradually expanding the most important boundary outward-from the nation-state to the pan-European one. The West and the Muslims Against this backdrop of shifting allegiances and identities is a re- affirmation of an old divide: "the West" v e m "the world of Islam." It is an add confrontation. "The West," as a ptecise concept, is less mean- in@ today than ever? Is Japan part of the West? Is the West synony- *See J. M. Gabriel, How Switzerland Is Governed (Zurich: Schweizer Spiegel Verlag, 1983); and Carol L. Schmid, ConfIict Md Consensus in Switzerland (Berkeley: University of Califomia Press, 1981). '"he West bas long been used by "western" scholars as well as politiciaus, preceding the East-West Cold War confrontation. See Oswald Spengler's influential The Decline of the West (New York The Modem Libmy, 1962). For a rebuttal, see J. G. de Beus, The Future of the West (tonQn: Eyre and Spttkwoode, 1953). Of most relevance to the Serageldin: Mirrors and Windows: Redefining the Boundaries of the Mind 81 mous with the OECD? The Gmup of 7? Where does "Eastern Europe" fit? How about the members of the former USSR? How about Turkey?* Hazy as it may be, "the West," in very broad cultural terms, has some validity. Conceptually, it means rich industrial societies with market-based economies and multiparty democratic political systems. Individualism, secularism, and consumerism are hallmarks of values and behavior. The differences among nation-state societies within the group, large as they are, are still smaller than among the gmup and others. It is not just wealth that defines the divide: "the West" does not include oil-rich Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, and Brunei. Leaving aside the question of Japan's inclusion, "the West" clearly includes the most dominant sociopolitical group on the planet today. Aspects of its "culture" tend to invade the cub tural space of other societie~.~ Sometimes such cultural transfecs are en- riching; sometimes they harm a people's heritage and identity. It is just as had to talk of the "world of Islam," or the "Muslim world." There are major differences among communities as diverse as Niger, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia. Numbering almost a billion people, mostly in Africa and Asia, MusIims are increasingly discernible as communities in the industrialized West. In France, the fact that they form over 5 percent of the population is as deeply felt-and resentedas the fact that 11 percent of Fmch citizens are foreign-born. lhis Muslim "diaspora" creates issues unique to its own special position while sharing some of the general ones confronting the majority of Muslims. The Muslim Predicament What are these general issues? Some are historical, while othes arc more m n t . Historically, the fitst issue is the distinction between "Arab and "Muslim" identities. Not all Arabs are Musiims, nor are all Muslims Arabs. When Islam as a faith, a social movement, and a system of govemance exploded out of Arabia onto the world scene, it implanted it- self by varying degrees of voluntarism and coercion in many lands. All became thomughly "Islamized,* remaining Muslim for centuries, even through colonial conquest and rule by non-Muslims. With the exception of the Iberian peninsula, where Islam was forcibly eradicated by 1492, once they became Muslim, most societies tended to stay Muslim. cultural aspect, see J. Bronowski and Bruce Mazlish, The Western InteUecfual Tradition (New Yak Dorset Press, Harper & Row, 1986). 'These types of def~tional issues were recently grapjkd with in "Game of the Name," The Emmmisl, 410 April 1992.50. 'See the concerns expressed by one contemporary Muslim thiaker in Mdjammad Ammjitah, A1 Ghazw ul FikrC Wuhm MI fluq~Tp~hP (Cairo: D& al Shurtiq, 1989). 82 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 1 1 : 1 However, some lands (i.e., Egypt) were "Arabized" and "Islamized" while othem (i.e., Iran) were only "Islamized." The accompanying pro- cesses of cultural development m, regretfully, beyond the scope of this essay. Suffice it to say that there is a profound problem between the over- lapping, but incomplete, concordance of Amb and Muslim identities that makes non-Muslim Arabs and non-Arab Muslims uncomfortable. This temaitls one dimension of the present Muslim cultural predicament6 that is ~ ~ ~ g n i z e d by thoughtful Arab Muslims concerned about the definition of their own identities.' Another problem is the historic "rupture" that characterized the cul- tural evolution of most Muslim societies? It overlaps with, but is not synonymous with, the colonial experience, for much of what Muslims did to themselves in terms of intellectual sclerosis preceded colonization. It is arguable that intellectual sclerosis facilitated colonization and laid bare the Muslim intelligentsia's inability to meet the intellectual challenge posed by the western invaders as well as the d i n g elites' inability to meet the military challenge. The latter is partially a result of the former. This intellectual failure, exacerbated by colonialism, hampers the efforts of would-be Muslim reformers by confronting them with two options, both of which are riddled with problems, albeit quite different problems. The first option holds that our intellectual legacy is so "out of sync" with the contemporary world that it is better to ignore it and start from the present, defined largely by western institutions, standards, and con- cepts. Internalizing this new reality as quickly as possible would enable local Muslim cultures to be "reborn" in a new and more effective form. Extreme adherents assert that we are all part of a global village, that there is only one (technologically driven?) world cultme, and that those who seek to keep alive anachronistic manifestations of the "heritage" are hope- less romantics. The world, it is asserted, is converging rapidly towards a single mode of thinking. Fukuyama's "End of History" is upon us, so why fight it? %ee, for example, M~&ammad 'AmmSrah, A1 I s h wa al 'Urebah wa al 'Ahrfn- @ah (Beirut: D& al W&dah, 1984). 'See Ismail Serageldin, "Ta'qib", 605-10, and "Comments," 100-101, 348, 475-76, in Center for Arab Unity Studies (CAUS), A1 Qawm@ah a1 'Arab@ah wa af Is&, (Beirut: CAUS, 1981) (proceedings of a conference held in Beirut, December, 1980). 'See Mohammed Ark- in the pIoceedings of "Architectural Education in the Islamic World," Seminar Ten in Architectural Tramjbrrnotions in the Islamic Workf (Seminar series held in Granada, Spain, 21-25 April 1986) (Singapore: Concept Media for The Aga Khan Award for Architectwe, 1986), 15-21, and subsequent discussion, 22-25. %rancis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Lust Man (New York The Free Press, 1992). Serageldim Minws and Windows Redefining the Boundaries of the Mind 83 This "bold" approach is d l y the path of least redstance, for, upon closer scrutiny, it allows the West to shape world affairs and the mecha- nism of identity formation in Muslim societies. It eschews the arduous task of struggling with a complex and fiusttating teality and reinforces the very dependence that is so troubling to Muslims today. It is thus a pathetic atteinpt to deny the reality of the heritage and the actual circum- stances that define collectively the frame of reference for each individual. The second option is also fraught with danger. It asserts that a new reality cannot make a tabula rusu of the past but must build upon it. A viable identity can only be created by a patient reconstruction of an intel- lectual edifice built upon the solid foundation of "pm, true Islam."1o This is one of the many problem one encounters. What is "pm" unadul- terated and unumtarninated Islam? Who decides what to keep and what to h w out? How and by what criteria can one select which mental constructs to keep and which to throw out? Even if one could e m t such an edifice, what relationship would it have to the "faulty" western or hybrid concepts embedded in the minds of hundmis of millions of Mus- lims today? How could one replace these faulty concepts-the product of generations of slow evolutian or nonevolution-all at once with the new construct? The history of cultural revolutions leaves much to be desired." For a Critical Process The d e r will doubtless feel that this is the standard game of setting up and then criticizing two extremes in order to defend the middle ground as the only sensible position. That is close but not quite true, for there is no real middle ground here. There is, however, a third, different option. Of COUTS~ there are others, but I will limit myself to presenting and de- fending this third appmch- that of adopting the critical process. The approach is critical insofar as it starts fmm a healthy skepticism and subjects all suggested positions and/or approaches to the discriminat- ing scrutiny of critical analysis. This is not a purely "western" doctrine; it is found among the best of Muslim scholarship from a1 F+ii6bi12 to Ibn Khaldiid3 to Mubarnmad 'Abduh," all of whom applied a discriminating ''An outstanding exemplar of this school is the distinguished scholar Fazlur Rahman. "See Dareyush Shayegan, Qu'est-ce gu'une m'wlurion religieuse? (Paris: Albin Michel, 1991). '2See, mong others, Muhsin Mahdi, Al-Farabi's Philosophy of Pkrto and Aristotle I 3 S e e Ibn Kbaldiin, A1 M u j W a1 Awwal: A1 Muqoddimuh (Beirut: DrTr al Kit& al (New York The Free Press, 1%2). Lllbllw, 1962). 84 The Aanerican J o d of I s M c Social Sciences 11:l critical analysis to the topics they addmsed, fmm the social to the theo- logical. Cantempomy critical analysis, however, must use the tools of cantemporary criticism. That point will be expanded on later. It is a process insofar as there is no final conclusion or product the perfect edifice is never built or completed. We cannot get fmm here to the% because there is no final "there." Is this a cop-out? Not at all. The French identity has been described as the d t of a long labor of self on self: "La France est devenue la France par un lent (long?) travail de soi sur mi." Yet even it has to reinvent itself constantly.'s ?he thnx million North African Arab Muslims living there a cultutal and sociological chal- lenge, whether one chooses assimilation, acculturation, or another way, including forming a Swiss-like two-tier identity. Thus a process it must be. The plrsllit of a conclusive solution is the p d t of a mirage. Conceptual and Practical Problems How can such a process of critical inquiry be launched? Here we run into two sets of problems: conceptual and practical. On the conceptual side are hegemonic western constructs, methods, instruments, and dis- course. Our concepts of geography reflect this. The West (its North At- lantic and mainly European pole) has named the world's regions: Near East, Middle East, Far East. "Near" and "Far" in relation to what? For Australia, the Far East could be the Near North. Our concepts of history are determined from an ethnocentric European view. The medieval "Dark Ages" w e e dark only in Europe; they were an age of splendor in the Muslim world.I6 Our concepts of nationality are largely the result of western deeds or misdeeds. Almost all African and Arab national boun- daries ~IV lines drawn by European colonizers. These lines are a trouble- some legacy for ethnic groups that fall across several states, such as the Kurds of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Central Asia. The creation of a national identity within these frontiers is another burden with which people have to cope, whether they consider themselves Muslims, Arabs, or Kurds. The critical methods are largely those developed by western scholars in western institutions. Despite this frustrating asymmetry, made all the "See Mohammed 'Ammiirah, ed., A1 A'md a1 Kdmiluh li al Imcim Muhammad 'Ahduh, 6 vols. (Beirut, 1972). "The French identity has been much discussed. Perhap the most noted cornmentator is Fernaud Braudel, L'Identid de la France (Paris: Les Bditions Arthaud, 1986). It sub- sumes, however, twenty-six regional identities. An excellent recent survey is "La France dans ses rLgions: Vingt-six enquetes sur le pays d'aujourd'hui," Le Mot&, April 1992. '%ee, among others, W. Montgomery Watt, The Majesty That Was Islam (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1974), and D. M. Dunlop, Arab Civilization to A.D. 1500 (New York Praeger, 1971). Serageldk M h and Windows: Redefining the Boundaries of the Mind 85 more so by the West's largely hostile and distorted view of Muslims and Islam,17 these critical methods are excellent analytical tools within a given frame of reference. Muslim scholars who use them have to convince their colleagues that this does not imply the adoption of an "unacceptable" implicit frame of reference. They must also build a bridge to the orthodox Muslim framework'* in order to be undelstwd. This quim double work and often results in rejection by both camps. Western scholats may scorn such efforts as inappmpriate and unconvincing, while orthodox Muslim scholars may dismiss them as disguised ~rientalism.'~ Thus it seems that the schism between "the Muslim world and "the West" shows itself in the systematic way in which those who would follow a different path 8te forced to "choose a camp." Boundaries of the mind, again. On the practical side, there is an evolving social reality in Muslim societies that no scholar can ignore and expect his/her work to be rele- vant. Its essence is that communications, technology, mobility, and the demographic transition that many societies are undergoing all contribute to changing the way societies function and also accelerate the rate of change. Individuals facing change adapt by "unbundling" their attributes, pmtecting some and discarding othets without regard for coherence or consistency. This phenomenon is seen in rapidly changing societies and is also at the core of explanations of changing social values: social values do not exist in a vacuum and would not be social values if they did not govern individual behavior for the vast majority of the population. In clarifying the link between the scholars' work and the evolving social reality of which they are a part, we come to the heart of the inter- active two-way relationship between the pmcess of defining mental boun- daries and the existence and operation of these boundaries in real life. A Model of Social Behavior I have ptesented my views of a three-tiered model of social behavior elsewhere,2o but as it is central to my arguments that serious change is required in Muslim-Arab societies and in Muslim thinking today and how such change, radical or modest, operates, I have summarized it here. "See Edward W. Said, Covering I s h : How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest ofthe World (New York Pantheon Books, 1981). "See 'AM al W W b K U f , 'lh UsUl al Fiqh (Kuwait: DSr al Qalam, 1970). "See Edwad W. Said, Orientalism (New York Vintage Books, 1979). ?or a discussion of how this process and its dynamics affect Muslim self-image see Isnail Serageldin, "Individual Identity, Grou Dynamics and Islamic Resurgence," in Is- kunic Resurgence in the Arab Worq ed. Ali g,ssouki (New York F'raeger, 1982), 54-66. 86 A NEW IDEAS INTELLECTUAL DOMAIN The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 11:l Figure 1. Conceptual Model of Social Behavior QUR'AN [ T A H I PROPHET GREEK PHILOSOPHY LOCAL INFLUENCES PERCEPTUAL DOMAIN I -- MODERNIZING FORCES ORMAJOR + + + PHYSICAL CHANGES PHYSICAL DOMAIN Serageldin: Mirrors and Windows: Redefiniog the Boundaries of the Mind 87 The three ties define the intellectual, peweptual, and physical do- mains. In the intellectual domain, "theoretical ethics" (what should be: the normative ideal) are debated by scholars, philosophers, and intellectuals. Here, in addition to the Qur'm,2' the Sunnah,= and the body of Muslim scholarship, other elements come into play, including local pre-Islamic traditions, classical Greek philosophy, and contemporary western thoughL The vast majority of the population, however, does not petceive this "ideal order" of theoretical ethics. Their petception of ethics is a distorted "practical ethic^,"^ one which allows a Muslim to show prejudice and to feel free with the blood of othels in the name being a good Muslim-in spite of the verse: There is no coedon in religion" (wan 2:256). Less dramatically, it condones the visitation of "saintly" shrines and the inter- cession by "saints," many of whom were unsavory persons. Such prac- tices are rejected categorically by all Islamic theological schmls." Never- theless, they are widespread and are considered by practitioners as signs of being a good Muslim. Thus does practical ethics become the relevant framework for the overwhelming majority of Muslims. Practical ethics shape social values, for they are the primary guides to individual behavior in the real (physical) world. Many rituals, as well as people's sense of "what will othels think," are dominated by the prevalent social values. Hence individual behavior, by and large, con- forms to the prevalent social values. Individual behavior, when collecti- vized, becomes "social praxis," or what we see society doing every day. Change can enter the schema in several ways. First, and most com- monly, it enters at the level of social praxis due either to strong "mdem- izing forces" or to major physical changes. An example of the former is the impact that the huge increase in Saudi oil revenues during the mid- 1970s had on northern Yemen. Not only did massive migration to the north bring money and new consumption patterns, but it also changed *'I have used the authoritative translation of Yusuf Ali, [The Meaning ofl The Glori- ous @'an (Cairo: DSr al Kitsb al 'Arab% Beirut: D& al Kitsb al hbnfini, ad). The twevolume edition is distributed by Saudi Arabia's Riibm al ',&lam al Ism-. =Of the many biographies, the best, in my opinion, is Mubarnmad &sap aaykal, H a y i t Muhammad, 6th ed. (Cairo: LMr al Nahdab al MisrIyah, 1956). However, the topic and meaning of the Sunnah Continue to be debated actively to this day. See M&ammad al Ghaziili, A1 Suntiah al Nabrrw@ah Lqna Ah1 a1 Fiqh wa Ah1 a1 Hadith (Cairo: Diir al Shuriiq, 1989). %them have made a slightly different usage of these terms. See Marcus G. Singer, ed., MoraLr and Values: Readings in Theoretical and Practical Ethics (New Y a k Charles scribner's Sons, 1979, 1,2, 4, 8, 18. %See '-ah, A1 A'md a1 Khi lah , 2205. 88 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 11 : 1 practically all aspects of Yemeni life, including architectural expression.z More importantly, villages without ablebodied men saw women assume new. Such changes became "acceptable" in terms of practical ethics and social values. A change in the social praxis moved up to practical ethics. When fourteen years of drought destroyed nomadism in Mauritania, new behavior patterns were acquired by the former nomads in a very painful transition to living in quasi-permanent refugee settlements around such cities as Nouakchott and Rosso. Again, changes in social praxis found their way to practical ethics and social values, where they supported and reinforced necessary changes in individual behavior (and social praxis). If changes persist long enough in the domain of social praxis and be- come widely accepted in the domain of practical ethics, religious scholars, philosophers, and the intelligentsia generally start changing (or reaffirm- ing) the thearetical ethics in response to that challenge. Thus, for in- stance, the widespread availability of interest-bearing banking has led to mponses from various Muslim religious authorities.% But change can also come directly into the intellectual domain when new ideas are confronted, analyzed, adapted, and incorporated, as was the case with classical Greek philosophy at the time of al FZriibi and as is the case today with a number of contemporary ideas. It can enter directly into the perceptual domain via the mass media and the education system. Both of these have much to do with shaping the worldview of most people and thus help define their concept of self and society, however imperfectly or i ~ ~ d q u a t e l y . ~ ' To the extent that these changes are entering or being a d d m e d at the perceptual and intellectual domains (especially the latter), there is a chance of maintaining the general framework of a society's cultural iden- tity. It would be an evolving framework, even a rapidly evolving one-but it would be both integrated and integrating. It would be inte- grated, for its internal coherence is maintained and people feel at ease with themselves and their society. It would be integrating, for it can in- corporate new and novel elements, thus growing and adapting constantly =See Ismail Serageldin, "Rural Architecture in the Yemen Arab Republic," in The Changing Rural Habitat (Proceedings of Seminar Six in the series Architectural Trans- formations in the Islamic World, held in Beijing, People's Republic of China, 19-22 October 1981), vol. 1, Case Studies (Singapore: Concept Media for The Aga Khan Award ?t should be noted that western authorities are now looking at "Islamic banki&' nIn French, the concept "Imaginary Social" captures much of relevance to this issue. See Gilbert Durand, Les Structures Anthropologiques de l'lmaginaire, loth ed. (Paris: Dunod, 1984). for Architecture, 1982), 1-10. with less scorn than they did ten years ago. See The Economist, 4-10 April 1992, 49. Serageldin: M h m and WinQws: Redefining the Boundaries of the Mind 89 to new challengk and generating the capacity to =pond to new chal- lenges and create new oppottunities. This integrated and integrating framework is a healthy one in which artists and the intelligentsia can probe natum, society, and the inner self-opening windows and holding up mimm for each of us, to help us expand the boundaries that limit our scope and define the wise constraints that make us free. I submit that in the Muslim world today, most change is coming from the level of social praxis. A signifcant part of it is entering the petceptual domain of practical ethics via the mass media, which have in this age of global communications expanded primarily the influence of the seductive and effective mass culture of "the West" generally and of the United states specificdly.28 There is little, if any, integration being done at the intellectual level-hence the power of the rejectionist argument advanced by Muslim fundamentalist movements. Their framework is c-y inte- grated, but it is not integruting. Due to the weakness of its intellectual foundations, it fears modifying old solutions or designing novel ones in order to hold onto the old framework's coherence and logical integration. The reformist or innovative current's relative weakness within the broad mainstream of Muslim thinking attests to the inadequacy of the volume and scope of the intellectual output produced thus far by the few active intellectuals among the reformem, although some of it is very, very good. It also attests to the despair of many would-be reformem who have opted for the easy (but in my judgment inadequate) option of equating "modernization" with The Task for the Intelligentsia My premise is that serious intellectual work is needed if Mus€ims are to regain the feeling of being at ease with themselves that an integrated and integrating cultural fmnework provides. Furthermore, this work must clarify the overlap but (noncoincidence) of their national and ethnic iden- tities (especially for Arabs) with their Muslim identities. Such work cannot be done without providing a space offredom in which the intelli- gentsia can work to redefine the meaning and content of cultural authen- ticity in a rapidly changing world in which isolationism or "delinking" is no longer a viable option. The intelligentsia, both artists and intellectuals, %dgar Main, L'Esprit ah Temps (Paris: Grasset, 1962). *%is issue touches all developing societies. See, among others, Alvin Y. So, Social Chon e and Development: Modernization, D e p h n c y , and WorrCi-System Theories (N ew Q ury Park, C A Sage, 1990). 90 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 11:l have a major responsibility, for they are the ones who fashion the mirrors in which we see ourselves and the windows through which we see the world. Through their work, the boundaries defining our identities are being reshaped. Unfottunately, however, it is my opinion that the Muslim intelligentsia of today is poorly equipped to handle such a task For the Muslim intelligentsia to move to a new level of critical analysis of the issues it confronts, it is essential that: First: Intellectuals develop a more systematic methodological basis for the appreciation of such key concepts as comunity, culture, Islam, society, identity, myth, imagination, and creativity. This is not just an intellectual’s q u e s t for esoteric discourse and hair-splitting def~t ions : it is rather an essential task that must be accomplished to construct a more sophisticated edifice for the theory and practice of intellectual criticism and art criticism in the Muslim world of today. Without clearly undetstood and agreed concepts, terminology, and methodology, the interdisciplinary discourse on these vital topics is bound to remain loose, unstructured, and, possibly, unconstructive. Second: Muslim intellectuals must explore more thoroughly the prob- lem of cultural continuity in contemporary Muslim societies. What is needed is not an endless array of descriptive monographs, useful as these may be, but a thorough analytical probing of an evolving cul- ture’s complex phenomena and the way it is manifested, as well as to situate the role of the intelligentsia both as agents of change and products of the milieu. While the first of these tasks is arduous, it is a prerequisite to implement- ing the second. Given the paucity of knowledge about the contemporary cultural scene throughout the diveme Muslim communities and the s p e d of phy- sical development and socioeconomic change, Muslim intellectuals have a monumental task ahead if they want their ideas to be relevant. They must restate the basic questions that all societies ask so that their under- standing of self will not be degraded into the mere modes of consumption of both materials and time. At present, Muslim intellectuals cannot afford to be alienated from their societies. Muslim intellectuals and artists must learn to decipher comt ly the past and the present. Today’s high technology and their societies’ socio- economic reality must be integral parts of their present consciousness, and a proper understanding of their cultural past must be an integral part of their sense of self and society. They must dare to think the unthinkable Serageldin: M h ~ s and Windows: Redefining the Boundaries of the Mind 91 and to go "whete othes fear to tread" so that they will not fall prey to the ptevalent mode of degraded thinking that has manipulated Muslim cultural symbols into debased ideologically charged signals that supplant critical appreciation with populist slogans. This is a tall order, but it provides the springboad for the tasks ahead. Two contemporary ideas pose a profound challenge to contemporary Muslim thinkem democracy and the tole of women, both of which derive their toots from the fundamental concept of human rights. Both of these issues are indivisible parts of the broader issue of human rights. Wore proceeding, however, it is essential to reaffirm that although the following discussion will be limited largely to the intellectual domain of theotetical ethics, it must be tooted in the social context in which societies perceive the practical ethics and in which social values (which govern individual behavior) ate Limitations of space make it impossible to pursue this essential analysis of social context, which, incidentally, includes the historical legacy of the particular societies concerned. History matte~s.~' On Method k t me outline my personal I believe that this synthesis of critical method and in-depth historical, cultural, and socioeconomic knowledge of a society is necessary to make ptogress in dealing with the challenges of contemporary Muslim societies. My line of argument is two-fold. The fitst is based on the application of strictly Islamic wdi princi~les?~ arguing within the framework of the rules established and recognized by Muslim scholarship, telying on the the Sunnah3' 3oSee George Gaskell, "Collective Behavior in a Societal Context," in Societal Psy- chology, ed. Hilde T. Himmelweit and George Gaskell (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990), 252-72. %ee, among others, Robe~t A. Nisbet, Social Change und History: Aspects of the Western Zheory of Development (New York Oxford University Press, 1969). "See Ismail Serageldin, "The Justly Balanced Society: One Muslim's View" in David Beclrmann et al., Friday Morning Reflections at the World Bank: Essays in Values and Development (Washington, DC: Seven Locks F'ress, 1991), 55-73. "See Muhammad Abii ZahrT, U s d al Fiqh (Cairo: Diir al Fikr al 'Ambi, 1958). %There are several levels at which the Qur'anic text can be read. This issue has con- cerned theologians, phil hers, and mystics for centuries, including most recently the work of such eminent ~Tks as Mohammed Arkom, who seeks to subject the text to a semiotic analysis. This search for understanding is enjoined by God: " m y ] Do they not seek to Ponder [understanding the meaning of] the Qur'an?'' (Qur'an 47:24 and 482). 92 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 11:l (especially the hadith?, ijrnti‘ (unanimity of leamed opinion), and qiycfs (analogy). The second is a conventional analysis in the western academic mode. Not SUrpriSingly, both arguments can reach compatible conclusions. This belief is grounded in the following assumptions. Fitsf, if the goals of the Islamic UsfiZiargument and of western analytical Teasoning are equity and justice in social interaction, there is no a priori Teason to ex- pect diffenmt conclusions in addresing the same objective conditions and problems. Second, if we accept that a recommended course of action must be compatible with the aim of being adapted to and adoptable by a given society (i.e., the action must take the society% realities into account), there is no a priori tetlson to expect different recommendations to emerge. Although them is enough space for only the sketchiest of pmsenta- tions, it should be enough to mark out the terrain of inquiry that needs to be filled in so that specific recommendations can be formulated. Such recommendations 8 ~ e beyond the scope of this essay, even though the analysis of the social context is absolutely essential if meaning is to be given to these otherwise abstract arguments. My claim that there are no a priori reasons to expect contradictions is based upon a specific reading of Islamic doctrine. The oft-quoted credo of Muslim activists that “Islam is for all times and all places“ applies to Islam’s beliefs (‘qd’id)” and core values and does not freeze specific rulings on social organization (mu ‘timafit) into eternal truths. Thus: 1. The Prophet, before sending Mu‘zidh ibn Jabal to Yemen:* asked hjm to use his judgment when ruling on issues for which he could not find direct instmction in either the Qur’an or the Sunnah. %e Sunnah r e f a kchuically to the way the Prophet showed for all Muslims to fol- low to live as Muslims. More generally, it means the Prophet’s words and deeds. See Ahmad HSshim, A1 Sunnah al Nahw@ah wa ‘UliZmihd ( C a h Gharii Library, 1989). 36The Mith are an essential source of Qur’anic exegesis and religious and legal doc- trine. Their collection and classiiication has been controvezsid, for they were not recorded during or immediately after the Prophet’s lifetime. The primacy collection-is al BukhWs M*. Other important ones are Muslim’s $&z$, a l Tirmi&-’s Jiimi‘, Abii DSwud’s S u m , and NWCs A1 Mujtobah. See Mansik NasIf, A1 Tq a1 Jiimi‘ li al UsilfiA&-- a h a1 Ranul (Cairo: D& al Fikr, 1975). For an introduction to the subject, see Subu al $a& ‘Uhim a1 I j d h wa Mwtaf&itiha (Beirut: D& al ‘Ilm li al Malayin, 1978). nSee M W i i d Shaltiit, A1 I s h : ‘Aqr7h.h wa Sharfah (Cairo: Diir al Shwfiq, 1980), 7-69. Uaylral, Hay& Muhammad, 485. The incident is paxticularly relevant, for it occurred s h d y befm the Prophet’s death and when the revelation was complete. Details are given in W i d M. W i d , Rijd hawf a1 k - l , Z d ed. (Beirut: Diir al Kit& al ‘Arabi, 1973). 172-73 (with the biography of the emissary Mu‘iidh ibn Jabal given at 172-81). 33 Serageldin: M h m and Windows: Redefining the Boundaries of the Mind 93 2. 3. ‘Umar ibn a1 Khattzib changed rulings made by the Prophet and Abii Bakr concerning those [recently] reconciled to He denied them sadaqah (alms) from the treasury, even though they were en- titled to it by the Qur’an (9:60) and the practice of the Prophet and Abii Balm His rationale was that this practice was meant for non- Muslims who had not been allies of the Quraysh or Muslim sympa- thizers who were being persecuted. Treasury h d s were used to keep them from joining the Quraysh or to compensate them for their or- deals. ‘Umar ruled that this made sense when Muslims were embattled and persecuted. Now that they were the rulers, he said: “Let those who fear persecution come live under our protection, and let those who would wage war do ~0.‘‘~’ He saw that things had changed-and only six years after the death of the Prophet. Imiim a1 Shiifi‘i, the founder of the science of usi2 a2 fzqh (the principles of jurisprudence), changed his rulings between his stay in Iraq and his stay in Egypt, citing social differences as j~stification.~’ Surely there is far more difference between the variegated societies in which Muslims find themselves today, over a thousand years later! This permissiveness finds its juridical expression in the legal principle of ”that which is not expressly forbidden is allowed” (a2 aylfi- a2 umir a2 ibdhah).42 This contrasts with the fundamentalist view that tends to see in everything new that which would lead Muslims astray (bid‘ah). To de- termine what is appropriate, we can refer to the well-established rule that the public interest is dominant when enacting laws and regulations. Who can argue that contact with a rapidly changing and evolving world is not in our interest? Surely the experience of societies that have tried to “de- link” from the world community (such as Albania) are an important testi- monial to the folly of this approach, which leads only to ever-incteasing 39These were. defined by Yusuf Ali as: ”men who have been weaned from hostility to Truth, who would probably be persecuted by their former associates, and r uire assis- tance until they establish new comections in their new environment.” Y u s Ali, [The Meaning ojj The Glorious Qur’an, 458, n. 1320. 4 0 M ~ a d Haykal, A1 Fdraq ‘Umar, vol. 2,4th ed. (Cairo: Maktabat a l Nahdah a1 Mbriyah, 1965), 273-303, especially 282-83. 4’Mu4ammad Abii Z M , A1 Sh#i‘i(Cairo: D&r a1 Fikr al ‘Arabi, 1978), 158-61. 42”He hath explaiied to you in detail what is forbidden to you” (Qur’an 6119). See ‘Abd al Wahhib Khalls, ‘Ifm Usd a1 Fiqh, especially 115-16, and Yiisuf al Qaradiiwi, A1 Ifah1 wa a1 IfarCmfial I s h (Cairo: Wahbah, 1980), especially 18-21. 94 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 11:l relative backwardnm and lower levels of well-being. This insistence on the intercourse among c u l w , the promotion of trade, and the incorpora- tion of the new does not rule out selectivity and choice. Japan showed that it could modernize without necessarily becoming westernized. Human Rights The Statting point is human rights: the body of "rights"43 that is now accepted by most people and nations and whose fundamental statement re& the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights,44 which has been codified in several international legal agreements.4' Addi- tional declarations and instruments expand on the rights specified in the original declaration or create vehicles for implementation.46 Their rele- vance to international institutions as well as to governments has been the subject of scholarly study?' Despite their universal acceptance, the concept of "rights" continues to be debated in terms of philosophy48 as well as international law!' It is 43See J. Roland Pennock, "Rights, Natural Ri ts, and Human Rights-A General View," in Human Rights: Nomos XXLII, ed. J. Ro & d Pmock and John W. Chapman (New York New York University, 1981), 1-28. General Assembly Resolution 217 (Ill) on 10 December 1948. Especially The Internotional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and accession by General Assembly Reso- lution 2200 A (XI) of December 16,1966,21 UN GAO Supp. (No. 16), at 49, UN Doc. A/6316 (1%7). This covenant entered into force on 3 January 1976; and The Internutional Covenant on Civil andPolitical Rights, adopted and opened for signature, ratifmtion, and accession by General Assembly Resolution 2200 A (XI ) of 16 December 1966, as above, at 52. This Covenant entered into force on 23 March 1976. Cited in Ibrahim Shihata, "The World Bank and Human Rights: An Analysis of the Legal hues and the Record of (cont.) Achievements" (Mimeograph, World Ba& Washington, DC, 1991, with data up- dated to January 1991) (Essay based on a pper presented to the International Third World Legal Studies Association Panel on the World Bank, Development Projects and Human Rights, at M d , Horida, Januuy 8,1988). An edited version was published in Denwr Journal of Internafional Law and Politics 17, no. 1 (1988). "United Nations Secretariat, Division of Human Rights, Human Rights: A Compi- "The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted and proclaimed by the UN 45 lation of lnternafional Instruments (New York, United Nations, 1978). 47These documents' itn~mce and relevance to such institutions as The World Bank were the subject of a study by the Bank's Vice President and Legal Counsel. See Ibrahim Shihata, "The World Bank and Human Rights." "See John Charvet, "A Critique of Human Rights," in Human Rights: Nornos XXIII, 31-51, and Fnthjof Be- "Two Critiques of the Traditional Theory of Human Rights," ibid., 119-47. Serageldin: M h f s and Windows: Redefining the Boundaries of the Mind 95 increasingly suggested that these rights are so clearly repmentative of a universal coflseflsus that they should be an acceptable yardstick by which government behavior can be judged and could be invoked to overrule the sovereignty of nation states, as was done in the case of South Africa.% Is the= a conflict between the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Muslim view of society and the individual? I do not see any.51 The main concern among Muslim intellectuals is whether a Muslim is allowed to acquiesce to the authority of a man-made document. The question, to my mind, is: are there contradictions between this declaration and Islamic doctrine? If not, then surely there can be no problem in adhering to it as a global general compact. Thus we should start from the view that there is no contradiction be- tween Islamic thenretical ethics and the above-mentioned declaration. Rather than investing inordinate efforts in recBsfing it into an "Islamic Declaration" or seeking to derive a separate statement (as some scholars have done):2 we should adopt it as a universally acceptable statement of consensus that does not contradict any fundamental Islamic belief. On Democracy This leads to the question of democracy, which many maintain is the only way of guaranteeing human rights. But there are many Muslims who view it with suspicion as a western import of dubious value and possibly the harbinger of permissiveness and pmmiscuity. Democracy, however defined, is most widely practiced in the rich in- dustrialized societies of the OECD. Yet it would be wrong to consider it exclusively western, for in its link to human rights it speaks to values of 4gSee, among others, Alan GewiTth, "The Basis and Content of Human Rights," ibid., 119-47, and Richard B. Friedman, "The Basis of Human Rights: A Criticism of Gewiah's Theory," ibid., 148-57. "See Ismail Serageldin, "Sovereignty, Governance, and the Role of International Insti- tutions'' (Un ublished manuscript, World Bank, Washington, DC, 21 February 1991). More genera& on the international aspects of human rights, see Louis Henkin, "The Uni- versality of the Concept of Human Rights," in The Annak of rhe American Acodemy of Political and Social Science: Human Rights Around the W 0 r 4 ed. Marvin E. Wolfgang (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1989), 10-16. "See Ismail Serageldin, "The Justly-Balanced Society," 55-73. %On this theme of basic human rights in Islam, see, among others, 'AE 'AM al W&-d W f i , uuqiq a1 Ins& jT al Is& (Cairo: DL al Nahdah, 1979), and Mu- - Fathi 'Uthmw Taqri? Huqiq a1 Ins& bayna a1 Sharr-ah a1 Islcimfyah wa d F i b a1 Qhinia2 Ghurbi(Riyadh: Imam Mohamed Ibn Saud Islamic University, 1978). 96 The American Journal of Islamic Social Science 11:l universal appeal?3 Even though it is the result of a long institutional evo- lution in western societies, it has only recently become associated directly with the concept of human rights. In other words, democracy was under- stood traditionally as a structure of institutions, p m e d w , and laws d e signed to protect citizens of a particular state from arbitrary governmental power and to give them chance to participate in the formulation of deci- sions that affect them. "No taxation without representation!" But participation by whom? The idea of universal suffrage is recent. Indeed, the attributes of citizenship in a democratic society were con- sidered to be largely privileges acquired by membership in that society, as opposed to rights extended to the entire human race. This is demon- strated clearly by the behavior of various western "democracies" over the past two hundred years vis-A-vis other peoples as well as their own women, youths, and those males without property and/or education. Democracy, in the modern sense, is thus a product of two hundred years of western social evolution with special contributions from the French enlightenment and Anglo-Saxon (British) constitutionalism and liberalism. Today, whatever one thinks of the West's history (i.e., slavery, colo- nialism, and lingering racism and sexism), it is clear that western demo- cratic institutions do more than any others to provide guarantees for the respect of individual human rights within those societies. But when we discuss applying democratic concepts to nonwestern societies-in this case Muslim societies generally, of the Middle East specificaIlyit is mistaken to believe that the resulting western democratic institutions can be trans- ferred and implemented anywhere without modification. Nor is it useful to reject them as "western," as some extremists do. We must look at the substance of the democratic process and its institutions, not just the form. Here it becomes useful to go back to the fundamental thesis of human rights. As expressed in the above-mentioned declaration, which has been codified by several legal instruments and de~larations,5~ "human rights" implies a set of universal values. Within the theoretical ethics of Islam, there is much fertile ground upon which contemporary Muslim constructs responding to this universal obligation can be built. This is not the same as saying that the particular institutional forms seen as the "social praxis" of particular western countries (i.e., fairly specific multiparty structures "See Louis Henkin, "The Universality of the Concept of Human Rights," 10-16. However, human rights also have a moral di-mension. See Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Human Rights and the Church: Historical and Theological Reflections (Vati- can City, 1990). "Centre for Human Rights in Geneva, A Compilation of International Instruments (New York United Nations, 1988). Serageldin: M ~ I S and Windows: Redefining the Boundaries of the Mind 97 and rather special electoral politics) ate the only way by which the demo- cratic ideal of respect for human rights can be pvided. They may well be, but this cannot be taken as an a priori assertion. I base this claim on the existence of substantial differences in the ex- periences of the industrialized countries. The American, British, French, Swiss, and German systems are structuraily different in terms of elections, decision making, separation of powers, and other constitutional and legal aspects of applying the democratic idea. Wlt they ate all fundamentally democratic. This shows that there is significant mom for design innova- tion in contemporary structures and institutions while maintaining the real "core" of democratic practice and its respect of human rights. This core has been identified and discussed brilliantly by Robert Dahl." What, then, constitutes democratic government today? What should Muslim societies in the Middle East and elsewhere do to promote "good governance" and "democracy"? Would that be an "Islamic First, we must recognize that "democracy" and "governance" are not the ~ame.5~ "Democracy" connotes a representative form of government with participatory decision making, accountability, and guarantees of human and civil rights without whose exercise its political system could not function. It does not connote "good government," efficiency, or lack of corruption, except to the extent that being able to "vote the rascals out" is a rectifier of governmental ineptitude or malice. Democracy stresses Universal suffrage and periodic elections. It can be argued that it deals primarily with the "form," not the "substance," of governing, although ad- vocates ate quick to say that no other "form" delivered the substance suc- cessfully and that, in this case, "function follows form." "Governance," on the other hand, does not presuppose a particular form of government but rather connotes "good government," in the sense %Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven and London: Yale Univer- sity Press, 1989). M"Democracy" and "Islamic government" have been tackled by many Contemporary scholars: 'AE 'AM al Rfiziq, A1 h h wa Uw-1 al Hukm (Beirut: 1966); Muhnmmad Baykal, A1 Hukrzmah a1 I s h Q a h (Cairo: D k al Ma'W, 1977); Mu4ammad al Race, A1 N w @ l i t al Siy&@ah al I s h @ a h (Cairo: D k al Ma'W, 1966-67), Mt&ammad al 'A, Fial N m a1 Siyai-li a1 Dawlah al IshQah (Cairo: Diir al Shuriiq, 1989), E l i d Mu4ammad M i d , A1 Duwlahpal I s h (Cairo: Diir al Tbiibit, 1981), A M al A'E a l Mawdiibi, A1 Hukrsnrah a1 I s h Q a h , trans. Ahmad Idris (Cairo: al Mu- al Mimi, 1980), and Ruhallah al Khomehi, A1 Hukrsmah al ZshQah, paper presented in Arabic by 8asan Banafii Cairo, September 1979. n'Ihe following paragraphs are taken from Isnail Serageldin, "Govemaace, Democ- racy, and the World Bank in Africa" (Unpublished manuscript, World Bank, Washington, DC, 20 September 1990). 98 The American Journal of Islamic Social Scieaces 1 1: 1 of greater efficiency and rationality in motme allocation, an enabling en- vitwunent, and a lack of conuption It emphasizes transpatency, account- ability, participation, the mle of law, and, implicitly, guarantees the civil and human rights neded for effective participation. Many of us consider these to be the "substance" as opposed to the "form" implied in discus- sions of "democracy." Both of these general "journalistic" descriptions fall short due to a lack of clarity on such key amw as the nahm of the relationship between state and society and its constellation of interlinked concepts and issues of agency, instnunentality, legitimacy, power, and authority.s* Given the conceptual complexity noted above, the only viable practical approach is to try to identify and foster those aspects of governance that seem least c o n t r o ~ e ~ a l . ~ ~ Even though there are many different views as to what constitutes good governance, some of which are ethnocentric or culturally determined, we can specify a minimal core of characteristics that, if not universally accepted, are nonetheless widely agreed upon. In large mea- sure these derive from, or are elated to, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which has been signed and thus accepted, at least nomi- nally, by most countries as representing the moral consensus of the inter- national community of nations. This core includes the following: 1. 2. 3. Rulers and government officials are held accountable through clearly formulated and ttanspatent processes. More particularly, governmental legitimacy is established regularly by such well-defined and open pro- cess of public choice as elections and referenda (Article 21). The safety and security of citizens is assured (Articles 3 and 5) and the rule of law prevails, so that contracts among private operators (in- dividuals or enterprises) and between a private operator and the state can be enfo~ed fairly. The law should protect citizens from arbitrary or capricious governmental acts (Articles 7 , 8 , 9 , 10, 11, and 28). Public agencies are responsive to the needs of the public, and social and economic development is promoted equitably for the benefit of all citizens (Articles 22, 23, 24, and 25). "See C. S. Whitaker and G. Bergen, "Doctrines of Development and Precepts of the State: The World Bank and the Fifth Iteration of the African Case." Paper presented at the World Bank Seminar on African Governance, May 1990). %e following paragmphs are taken from Ismail Serageldin and Pierre Well-Mills, "Governance and the External Factor," in Proceedings of i%e World Bank Conference on Development Economics (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1992), 303-20. Serageldin: M h n s and Windows: Redeikhg the Boundaries of the Mind 99 4. Information is mdily available to permit accountability to be prac- ticed, laws to be correctly applied, markets to function, and people to be cmitive and innovative (Article 19). 5. Citizens are guaranteed f d o m of association and expression of opinions (Articles 19 and 20). These principles provide an excellent template against which to assess the proposed actions of governments as well as the institutional ammge- mats being advanced. They provide the real yardstick by which the governmental constructs of contemporary Muslims can be judged if democracy is indeed to flourish in the Muslim world.60 But democracy is more than the form and substance of government, for it involves societal relations at every level. There can be no true democracy or respect for human rights if the rights of women and youth are flouted in the home and in the streets. Authoritarian behavior, like freedom, is indivisible. It is essential that this broader view of democracy and human rights find its manifestations in all aspects of contemporary life, including, most spe- cifically, in the role of women in society. The Role of Women The status of women in Muslim Societies remains controversial.6' Some Muslims argue that women were much worn off in pre-Islamic so- ciety, especially in Arabia, and that Islam improved their condition considerably.62 Although this is probably accurate, it is imlevant to modem problems. Others argue that Islamic jurisprudence is fundamen- tally inimical to women and must be discarded. All this does is give a new version of an old argument used with special force in the time of empire to justify colonialism. %lost critical is how a "Muslim democracy" will deal with non-Muslim citizens. A satisfictoq way has not been found. See Fahmi ljuwaydi, MuwEtinrSn hi Dhimmiyin dah a1 Qawmiyd (Beirut: 1979). For a pithy discussion of this and other relevant topics, see A. K. Abii al Majd, Hi- hi MuwQuhuh (Kuwait: W b al 'Arabs 1985), 109-22. (Cairo: D t al ShWq, 1990), 252-63, and M- 'Ammiirah, A1 I~lcSm wu a1 W&- "See M&ammad al G-, Qadcryah a1 Mar'ah bayna a1 Taq~iICi a1 Rriikidah wa a1 W@%fah (Cairo: D t al Shuriiq, 1990). For an academic overview, see Lois Beck aad Nikki Kedai A, Women in the Muslim World (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Ress, 1978). %ee Ma'riif al Dawfilibiy, Wmj' a1 Mar'ahfTal Islrsm (Be% DL al Kit& al hb- niint, 1981) and M&ammad Abii ZahrZ, Tmiin al Islrsm li a1 Mujtama' (Cairo: DL al Fikr al 'AraM, 1975), 5-14. 100 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 11: 1 Both positions must be set aside in favor of a more balanced reading of doctrine and history and of present social conditions and needs. With respect to doctrine, I adhere to what some recent observers63 call the re- formist or modernist view that would apply fundamental human rights and equality befote God to gender-specific treatment. The most forceful statement of equality before God comes from the Qur'an (33:35): Fm Muslim men and women, for believing men and women, for devout men and women, for true men and women, for men and women who are patient and constant, for men and women who humble themselves, for men and women who give in charity, for men and women who fast (and deny themselves), for men and women who guard their chastity, and for men and women who engage much in God's praise, for them has God prepared forgive- ness and great reward. From this starting point, and using the adoption of fundamental hu- man rights as a foundation, an argument can be made for a contemporary reading of the status of women that tmmcends most current Islamic juris- prudence, certainly in the area of personal status law. This is in line with "modernist jurisprudence."64 There is a body of opinion that would define women's special role from the premise of fundamental human rights and equality inherent in the Islamic belief of humanity's liberation. Using a derivative approach, it would seek amendments to those rights instead of starting from an a priori position on women's status and Such views, though modemist in tone, are not revolutionary in their outcomes.66 At the end of the nineteenth century, Mu4ammad 'Abduh "Donna Lee Brown, "Islamic Law and the Position of Women" (Mimeograph, World Bank, Washington, D.C., March 14, 1992). '%ee Justin kites, "Mcdemist Jllrispludence as a Vehicle for Gender Role Reform in the Islamic World," Columbia Human Righfs Law Review 22, no. 2 (Spihg 1991): 251- 330, especially 323-30 (on Fazlur Rahman and his work). "See Ismail Serageldin, "Comments," in Center for Arab Unity Studies, Islum and Arab Nationalism, Arabic ed. (Beirut: 1981), 605-10. For a writer who takes the same de- rivative appmach from universal human rights to the specificities of women's issues, but &ves at diametrically oppcsed conclusions, see W a y YuqrSq a1 Ins& fi al I s m . %e following section is drawn largely from Afaf Mahfow and Ismail Serageldin, "Women and Space in Muslim Societies," in Expressions of Islam in Buikiings (Pro- ceedings of an International Seminar s F r e d by The Aga Khan Award for &chitecture and The Indonesian Mitute of Archtects, Jakarta and Yogyakarta, Indonesla, October 15-19, 1990) (Genevx The Aga Khan Trust for Culture, 1991), 78-96. Serageldin: Minors and Windows: Redefining the Boundaries of the Mind 101 stated that an Islamic state could limit polygamy.67 What makes this rul- ing important is that it was not given under pressure from a state seeking to move in that direction: it was a volunteered position opposed to prevailing official opinion. It was not an ex post facto rationalization of a societal condition, but a thoughtful reading of text and precedent and a realistic understanding of a changing society. Even in civic and political leadership, where Muslim women ar'e con- sidered most marginalized, there is little that is inherently Islamic in the barriers they face.68 Several exceptional have women ruled Muslim states: Sultiinah Radia in Delhi (1236 CE) and Shajarat a1 Durr in Cairo (1250 CE). Four Indonesian women ruled their lands during the second half of the seventeenth century.69 More recently, in Pakistan Benazir Bhutto be- came the first elected woman prime minister of a Muslim country, and the last election in Bangladesh was fought by two women. Muslim wo- men have shared in national struggles, occasionally bearing arms (from documented cases in Iran at the beginning of the century to Libyan wo- men now serving in the Libyan army), but more often participating in organized political activity against colonialism and occupation forces. Many professional women are making major contribution^^^ in Muslim countries today,'' but that is still far short of the role they could play in the Muslim world's development if they could achieve their f i l l potential Why is there such widespread discrimination against women in Mus- lim countries today?72 A partial answer is that interpreters of the Shari'ah "See the full text of this legal opinion in '-ah, A1 A 'mdl a1 K h i l a h , vol. 2,90- 95. W e much has been written on p l y amy in Islam, pre-Islamic Arabia included many other marital practices that were prohifited by Islam. See, among others, A1 Sayyid SSbiq, Fiqh a1 Sunnah, vol. 2, 3d. ed. ( W i t : Diir al Kit& a1 'Arabi, 1977), 8-9. 68For a comprehensive review of the Qur'an and the hadith literature on the role of women, see 'Abd al &dim Abii Shuqqii, T&ra a1 Mar'ah fi '&r a1 Risdah, 6 vols. (Kuwait: Diir al Qalam, 1990), especially vols. 2 and 3. @See Fatima Memissi, Sultanes oubliies: Femmes chefs d'Etat en Islam (Casablanca: Editions Le Fennec, 1990). 'OTheSe women are usually expected to, and usually mauage to, maintain their tradi- tional roles of wife and mother as well as their professional careers. See Earl L. Sullivan, Women in Egyptian Public Life (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1987), 14. "Norma Salem, "Islam and the Legal Status of Women in Tunisia," in Muslim nThis is not unique to Muslims. See Mino Vianello et al., Gender Inequality: A Com- parative Study of Discrimination and Participation (London: Sage, 1990) and Janet S. Chafetz, Gender Equity: An Integrated Theory of Stability and Change (Newbury Park Sage, 1990). For relevant methodological issues, see Hube~t M. Blalock, Jr., Understund- ing Social Inequality: Modeling Allocation Processes (Newbury Park Sage, 1991). Women, ed. Freda Hussain (New York St. Martin's Press, 1984), 141-68. 102 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 11: 1 have, for the last fourteen centuries, largely sought to retain the status quo of early Islam or to return to it as an important plank of a political platform. However, those who advocated the return to the status quo of seventh-century Ambian society as regards women (in fact, often advocating even more mtrictions) also argued that slavery, which existed in seventh-century Arabia, was integral to the Islamic ethic. And this de- spite the many excellent treatises showing Islam’s “evolutionary” legi- slation against slavery and indicating, in many early rulings, where Muslim society should go: limiting its scope, expanding their rights, and cmting more incentives for liberating slaves.” This same reasoning can and should be used to reinterpret the pre-Islam/pt-Islam impmvement in women’s status as the ditection in which society should move, instead of seeing it as a once-and-for-all-time shift in status. More important is the review of c m n t social structures and mechan- isms by which the myths and images of Muslim women m reinforced by artists, intellectuals, and popular discourse. Two authors have made major contributions here: Leila Ahmad, who has provided an excellent social and historical contextual viewy4 and Fedwa Malti-Douglas, who has pro- vided an insightful exploration of the role of women in Arabo-Islamic disc~urse.’~ This is another example of how the intelligentsia-artists and intellectuals-fashion the mirrors in which we see ourselves and the win- dows through which we view the world. This aspect of cultural outputs, insofar as it helps to perpetuates women’s present unsatisfactory status, needs to be subjected to careful critical analysis.76 We will address this later. For the moment, we note that Muslim society’s view of women and Muslim women’s view of themselves are not particularly empowering. Should this view be changed? Of course. Arguing fmm the interest of Muslim society as a whole, there is great benefit to be derived by im- “See ‘Ali W f i , A1 flur@zhfal I s h (Cairo: DSr a1 Ma‘iirif, 1979). “Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate (New Haven and Londo~ Yale University Press, 1992). ”Fedwa Malti-Douglas, Woman’s Body. Woman’s Mind: Gender and Discourse in 7~ entails close study of specific contextual situations. See, among others, S a m El-Me.ss@ “Self-Images of Traditional Urbau Women in Cairo,” in Women in the Muslim World, ed. Lois Beck and Nikki Keddi, 1978,52240, and Soraya Al-Turki, Women in S d Arabia Ideobgy and Behavior m o n g the Elite (New York Columbia University Press, 1986), 152. Arabo-Islumic Writing (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991). Serageldin: Mirrors and Windows: Redefining the Boundaries of the Mind 103 pmving their status. Ample evidence shows that poverty is gender- biased" and that women bear inordinate burdens in periods of economic hardshi~.'~ It is equally demonstrable that significant improvements in so- cial indicators can be achieved by improving female education,n by in- cteasing their assets, and by increasing the returns to their assetsBo That it is doable has been dramatically demonstrated by the brilliant success of the Gtsuneen Bank in Bangladesh.*' From the =ding of doctrine I espoused earlier, it becomes the duty of those serving the public interest to actively promote improving the sta- tus of women, whose marginalization contributes significantly to perpetu- ating the poverty and misery of the whole society.82 Their empowetment should be at the top of the reformist agenda of Muslims. This is not a call to adopt strident western feminism or its mote sedate manifestati~ns,~~ but a call to act in accordance with Muslim precepts of the public good and to promote the spirit of the fundamental equality-or equity-argued in the best of the Islamic tradition. Such actions are the true test of whether democracy and human rights in the fullest sense of those terms takes root in the Muslim world generally and the Middle East specifically. ?See, among others, Paul Collier, Women in Development: Defining the Issues, Work- ing Paper Series No. 129 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1988), and World Bank, World Development Report 1990: Poverty (New York Oxford University Press, 1990). %ee Commonwealth Secretariat, ed., Engendering Adjustment for the 1990s: A Report of a Commonwealth Enpert Group on Women and Structural Adjustment (London: Commonwealth Secretariat Publications, 1989), and Paul Collier, Women and Structural Adjustment (Mimeograph, Oxford University, Oxford, February 1989). '%wrence H. Summers, "Investing in All the People," Policy Research Working Paper WPS 905 (World Bank, Washington, DC, May 1992). %ee Bangladesh: Strategiesfbr Enhancing the Role of Women in Economic Develop- ment, World Bank Country Study (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1990), Women in Paki- stan: An Economic and Social Strategy, World Bank Country Study (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1989), and Leela Dube and Rajni F'alriwala, eds., Structures and Strategies: Women, Work and Fumify (New Delhi: Sage, 1990). "For a detailed review of the Grameen Bank experience, see Mahabub Hosain, Cre- ditfbr Alleviation of Rural Poverty: The Gratneen Bank in Bangladesh, Research Re no. 65 (Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute; Dhaka: Ban x h Institute of Development Studies, 1988), and Economic and Social CommissiOn t%r Asia and the Pacific, Bank Credit for Rural Women: Report on Study Tour of Grameen Bank in Bangladesh (Thailand: United Nations, 1985). See, among others, Price J. Gittinger et al., Household Food Security and Role of Women (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1990), and Paul T. Schultz, Women's Changing Participation in the Lubor Force (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1989). 82 =Janet K. Boles, "American Feminism: New Issues for a Mature Movement," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, no. 515 (May 1991). 104 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 11: 1 Criticism of Cultural Output But what of the mimts and windows that the artists and intellectuals are constmcting right now? Will they provide the means and the symbols of this liberating and empowering futm, or will they perpetuate the myths and images of the past? To address these questions we must again advocate the creation of a space offeedom for expression and debate and sharpen our critical analysis of art and intellectual output to focus on cul- tural expressions from the petspective of gender-sensitive criticism.E4 The pweding discussion has shown that addressing women's special issues is central to empowering them to play a full part in the reshaping of Muslim societies in transition. The unique dilemma of the search for cultural identity in Muslim societies-one that risks being stifled and trampled by an overpowering and insensitive western mass-consumption cult--finds an echo in microcosm: the dilemma of a contemporary Muslim woman trying to define her role and contribution in a Muslim so- ciety that frequently tries to suppress her contribution as a means of as- serting its own societal individuality and otherness from the dominant West. This o p p k v e status is is neither inherently Islamic nor neces- sarily the sole or correct reading of Islamic tradition. Much less will it be the c o m t path for the future of truly Muslim societies. Again, this is not a call for Muslim scholars to adopt the ideological constructs or the positions of western feminism generallyE5 nor of western feminist art criticism specifically.E6 Rather, it is an appeal to broaden our own intellectual criticism and art criticism, which has already made its own contribution in recognizing the profound problems of cultural conti- nuity and authenticity as important elements that must be asserted in the wThe rest of thispart is taken from Mahfow and Serageldin, "Women and Space in Muslim Societies," 89-91. %n feminism generally, see Janet K. Boles, "American Feminism: New Issues for a Mature Movement," m e Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, no. 515 (May 1991). %For an excellent survey article of the subject, consult Thalia Gouma-Pete- and Patricia Mathews, "The Feminist Critique of Art History," The Art Bulletin 69, no. 3 (Sep- tember 1987): 326-57, especially 346-57. Showing that there are no monolithic views on the subject, that excellent survey article was poorly reviewed by Cassandra W e r , "Femhst Art History: Critique Critiqued," Women Artist News 12, nos. 5-6 (FalWinter 1987): 38. For a scholarly compendium of essays, see the anthology of American work given in Norma Broude and Mary Garrard, eds., Feminism and Art History: Questioning the Litany (New York Harper & Row, 1982). For a review of significant recent works, see Ellen Handy, "Women, Art, Feminism," Arts Magazine (May 1989): 25-31. For a re- cent anthology, see Arlene Raven, Cassandra Langer, and Joanna Frueh, eds., Feminist Art Criticism: An Anthology, Icon ed. (New York, Harper-Collins, 1991). Serageldin: Mirrors and Windows: Redefining the Boundaries of the Mind 105 face of a "historical rupture" that has tom the cultural fabric of Muslim societies. It is now pertinent to expand our concerns and recognize the needs of women, as well as their unique contributions to building society, in a Muslim world in the thtpes of rapid change. Such gender-sensitive criticism would have certain chamcteristics. The key is to transcend the mere recognition that female intellectuals and artists exist and give them due recognition, which hitherto has been lack- ing. In other words, it should not just be the same old criticism with women added. What is quired is to go to the heart of present critical thinking in art (as well as other forms of cultural expression) and to "question the universal validity of those very myths and values and cul- tural assumptions that, in the past, have automatically excluded fmm the domain of Art the experiences of half of our population.""' Or, as Carol Duncan pointed out, "The value of established art thinking and how it functions as ideology must be critically analysed, not promoted anew."*" In bringing to the fore the need to develop gender-sensitive criticism, we underline the need to analyze the modem tools of critical analysis, to deconstruct the discipline of criticism itself,8' so as to rebuild it anew, in- formed, and enlightened by the process of critical deconstmction itself. To rebuild it with new insight that will not just be beneficial to establish- ing a place for women in Muslim art and society, not just to liberate their expressive and talented contributions as women, but to transcend femi- nism and, through this rethinking of criticism itself, contribute to liberat- ing the evolving cultures of Muslim societies-to liberate them fmm insisting on defining themselves in negative terms of how they differ from the rejected westem Other, to whre they can define themselves in the positive terms of their own achievements and fulfillment. Concluding Remarks Running through the topics discussed above are the primary concerns of Muslim societies today, namely the issues of cultural continuity and 87Norma Broude, "Review of Germaine Greer's Obstacle Race, Mumo's Originals and Loeb's Feminist Collage," Art Journal, no. 41 (1981): 182. "Carol Duncan, "When Greatness Is a Box of Wheaties," Art Forum (October 1975): 64. @For such a consistently radical position on methodology, albeit from a narrow western feminist perspective, refer to Griselda Pollock, "Women, Art, and Ideology: Ques- tions for Feminist Art Historians," Women's Art Journal (Sprin~Summer 1983): 42-44. 106 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 11:l authenticity.w Few issues have affected contemporary Muslim Societies as deeply as the sense of loss of identiq' and the corollary search for cultural authenticity. These are seen by many as a return to the fountain- head of Islam in order to redefine Muslim culture in its essential tern, thereby purging it of the "extraneous elements" that history, wesfem hegemony, and geographrc realities have int tod~ced.~~ This essay rejects that approach as too narrow, overly romantic, and fundamentally nonhistorical. Instead, the proposed approach recognizes the need to u n d e m d thoroughly the past and to decode its language through contemporary eyes that can sift the relevant from the timebound. The arsenal of contemporary analysis must be brought to bear on the reality of Muslim history and of contemporary Muslim societies. We must deal with the historical rupture characterizing the evolution of Muslim cultural developmentw and, by better undewding it, transcend it. This approach, although scientific and systematic, is far from the arid and descriptive scholasticism of much academic research. It explores and revitalizes the myths and images that nourish the creative imagination of modem artists and intellectuals. It develops the iconography and enriches the symbols punctuating their contemporary universe. Most importantly, it does so by grounding these exptessions of culture in all its myriad manifestations, past and ptesent. We hope that the integrity of this approach will separate this search from the doomed attempts to "ape a chaotic and unsettling present by a headlong flight into a romanticized pastM or the equally shortsighted ap- Ismail Serageldin, Spacefir Freedom: The Search for Architectural Excellence in Muslim Societies (Geneva: The Aga Khan Award for Architecture; London: Butter- worth Architecture, 1989), 54-58. 9'This manifests itself in many ways, some modernist and thoughtful. See, for example, Ijusayn A$mad Amin, A1 I s h R %h Mutaghuyyir (Caim Madbiili, 1988), and Mdpmmad '-ah, A1 I s h wa Qmah a1 'Asr (Beirut: Di3~ al W&dah, 1980). On the side of art and architecture, see Ismail Serageldin, "Architecture as Intel- lectual Statemenk Modemism in the Muslim World," in Criticism in Architecture (Geneva: The Aga Khan Award for Architecture; Singapore: Concep Media, 1989), 16- 30; and Ismail Serageldin, A1 Tajdd wa a1 Ta'sz7fi 'Imdrat al Mujtam'lit a1 Ishijvzh: Dirkah li Tajribot J d ' i z ~ ~ f al Agha Khdn li a1 'Imdrah (Geneva: The Aga Khan Award for Architecture, 1989). =See Mdpmmad al Ghazdi, MushkilcitfiTariQ al yay& a1 I s h i j ~ a h (Cairo: DL "For a discussion of these issues, see Mohammed Arkoun, "Current Islam Faces Its al Shwfiq, 1983), especially 10-12. Tradition," h Serageldin, Spacefor Freedom, 241-46. % romantic flight can lead to delinking from society and even violence. See 'Adil &mmiidah, A1 H&ah iki a1 'Unf(Cair0: Sinai, 1987). Contrast this with Abii al Majd, Viwfir P MuwSjahah, especially the two introductory statements at 5-22. Serageldin. Mimm and Windows: Redefining the Boundaries of the Mind 107 ptoach that equates mademity with the wholesale importation of westem technology, aesthetics, and patterns of behavior. The former is tantamount to a slow suicide, for no community can isolate itself from the present no matter how unpleasant its realities are. “he latter apptoach is an agoniz- ing negation of self and identity, foE no society can exclude its past from the constituents of its contemporary reality. The pursuit of cultural continuity by maintaining the fragile links with a society’s past requires special effort if it is to avoid falling into populist kitsch or ideological stereotyping. Critical scholarship is needed to under- stand the past’s legacy, to decode the historical symbols, and to see them through contemporary eyes. This enhances both the undetstanding and the appreciation of the heritage and makes it more accessible to a modem public suffering from a rupture in its natural cultural evolution. This is essential if the ttansition fmm theoretical to practical ethics is not to be too distorting. Along with this deepening of understanding of self and society, the intelligentsia must make a major effort to expand the space of fteedom within which discussion and debate can take place in otder to broaden the awareness of the public, public officials, and decision makes. Sociologists, anthropologists, economists, philosophers, dsts, writes, joumalists, and politicians are all part of the contributing intelli- gentsia in this all-important task of maintaining this space of freedom within which artists and intellectuals can fashion the mirrors in which we see ourselves and the windows through which we perceive the world.” For it is by these contemporary mirrors and windows that we redefine the boundaries of the mind, and the fuhm of the Muslim world is-even at this momen-being invented in the crucible of our minds. gJThe struggle to link identity and worldview is at the heart of the intellectual debate among Muslims of different pemasicms. My personal ~ e w is set out in Serageldin, “The Justly Balanced Society.” Othem have atticdated their views, ranging fKnn the most liberal, such as ZdS Najii M b i i d , Ru’yah t s h @ a h (Cairo: DL d Shurtiq, 1987), to the more conservative, such 8s Sayyid Qutb, ?3tasii’is a1 Tasawwur a1 tslrtmi wu Mu- quwimMu, 11th d (Cairo. D1 d Shuriiq, 1989).