The Quest for an Islamic Methodology: The Islamization of Knowledge Project in Its Second Decade Louay Safi The Islamization of knowledge is one of the dominant themes that continue to preoccupy contemporary Muslim intellectuals. Since IsmZ'il a1 Fiifiqi presented this thesis little over a decade ago, numerous papers, monographs, and books have been written on the subject. This paper at- tempts to examine the progress of the project of Islamization in the last decade by outlining the general framework of Islamization and examining the work of its proponents and critics. Modifications aimed at overcoming the difficulties inherent in the original plan are then proposed. I argue that the project of Islamization is still in its premethodo- logical stage. This is due partially to the limitations of the original work plan, which does not take into account some important logistical and psy- chological factors. I therefore propose a slightly modified strategy in which the emphasis is placed on a critical examination of methock and techniques developed in both the classical Muslim and the modem West- em scientific traditions. Islamization Framework Any study concerned with analyzing writings on methodology in the context of the Islamization of knowledge has to start from the two essays written by a1 Fgriiqi (IIIT 1987). In this monograph, he Singled out two factors as being responsible for the present condition of the ummah-conditions he termed the "malaise of the ummah"-namely, the cutrent secular-religious duality of education systems in Muslim societies Louay Safi is an assistant professor of political science at the International Islamic University, Selangor, Malaysia. 24 The America Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 101 and the lack of a clear vision with which to guide and direct Muslim ac- tion. The rejuvenation of the ummah, he argued, is contingent on the inte- gration of the Islamic and the secular sciences-in a word, on ending duality in education: The task confronting the ummah in the fifteenth century Hijtah is that of solving the problem of education. There can be no hope of a genuine revival of the ummah unless the educational system is revamped and its faults comted. Indeed, what is needed is for the system to be formed anew. The present dualism in Muslim education, its b i b t i o n into an Islamic and secular system must be removed and abolished once and for all. The two systems must be united and integrated (IIIT 1987,9). According to a1 Fiiriiqi, this desired integration of education is the task of academicians well-versed in the modem disciplines and the Is- lamic legacy (ibid., 14). This integration of knowledge, the concrete manifestation of which is the production of university-level textbooks containing "Islamized knowledge, is the essence of what he called the Islamization of knowledge. "Islamizing Knowledge," he wrote, "[is] in concrete terms, to Islamize the disciplines, or better, to produce univefsity level textbooks recasting some twenty disciplines in accordance with the Islamic vision" (ibid.). The task of integration is not an eclectic mixing of classical Islamic and modem Western knowledge. It is rather a systematic mrientation and restructuring of the entire field of human knowledge in accordance with a new set of criteria and categories derived from and based on the Islamic worldview (ibid., 15) A1 Firiiqi, turning to the specific question of methodology, pointed to the inadequacy of the traditional methods of ijtihad. This inadequacy reveals itself in two diametrically opposed ten- dencies. The first tendency is to restrict the field of ijtihad to legalistic reasoning, thus subsuming modem problems under legal categories and thereby reducing a mujtuhid to a fuqzl (iurist), and reducing science to legal science. The other tendency is to eliminate all rational criteria and standards by adopting "a purely intuitive and esoteric methodology" (ibid., 19) A sought-after methodology should avoid the excesses of these two approaches. In other words, it should avoid mtricting reasoning to the extent that modem problems confronting Muslim scholarship are placed outside the realm of scientific research and should not, at the same time, allow the admission of fiction and superstition into the realm of true knowledge (ibid.). Safk Ihe Quest for an Islamic Methodology 25 Being concerned mainly with outlining the Islamization of knowledge project in general terms, al Firiiqi did not venture into the a m of metho- dology proper, but confined himself to identifying some epistemological principles. Under the label of ”first principles of Islamic methodology,” he introduced five general principles which, he argued, constitute the basic framework for guiding the process of Islamization. As he put it: While avoiding the pitfalls and shortcomings of traditional methodology, Islamization of Knowledge ought to observe a number of principles which constitute the essence of Islam. To mast the disciplines under the framework of Islam means sub- jection of their theory and method, their principles and goals to the following [principles]. (ibid., 22) A1 Firiiqi identified five principles of Islamic methodology and ex- pressed them in terms of five unities: the unity of Allah, of cmtion, of truth, of life, and of humanity. These principles of unity belong to the theory of being (ontology) and hence form the ontological presuppositions of an Islamic theory of knowledge (epistemology). Since this paper deals primarily with methodological questions, we will not discuss these prin- ciples’ content. Rather, we will briefly review their epistemological and moral implications as undelstood by a1 Firiiqi. Following are eight epis- temological principles arising from the five principles of unity: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Everything in the universe is created by Allah according to a precise m e a m . Nothing is futile or devoid of meaning. The universe is governed by one cosmic order consisting of laws dis- coverable by human m n . Hence the Muslim is not free to ascribe anytlung to accident or blind fate. The cosmic order brings unity into creation by linking the objects of the universe through two types of relations: cause-effect relationships and means-to-ends relationships. The Islamic beliefs that constitute the apodictic presuppositions of reason can never be contrary to reason. Hence facts disclosed by revelation should always accord with those discovered by reason and experience. The univetse has been made subservient to humanity so that the whole range of nature is capable of receiving humanity’s efficacy, of 26 6. 7. 8. The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 101 suffering change at its initiative, or of being transformed into any pat- tern that humanity desim. The meanings of the Islamic revelation are eternally anchored in two solid rocks Arabic lexicography and syntax on the one hand, and reality on the other. Since the pattern of Allah's creation are infinite, no inquiry into the nature of creation is ultimate or conclusive. Hence openness to new evidence and persistence of the quest are necessary characteristics of the Islamic mind. While natural behavior is governed by laws of necessity, human ac- tion is subject to laws of freedom. While the former are immutable, the latter are manifested in history h u g h the human agency (ibid., 22-38). In addition to the foregoing epistemological principles, the first five principles listed by a1 Fiiriqi embody the following ethical principles: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Humanity must live in accord with moral laws (urndnah obligation). Humanity must develop and establish culture and civilization (wli- hifuh obligation). Since the will of Islam to culture and civilization, manifested in the comprehensiveness of the Shari'ah, is all-inclusive, Muslim thinkers have a duty to Islamize every single aspect of human life. Political action (i.e., engaging in activities aimed at ensuring that public affairs are carried out in accordance with the measures of right and justice) is a religious and moral obligation. Each human being has the same basic dignity and human worth. Thus ethnocentrism, of which racism and nationalism are commonplace ex- pressions, is a moral crime. Separating the secular from the religious is contrary to the Islamic concept that obliges each individual to develop hisher life in accor- dance with revealed principles. Clearly, under the title "methodology," a1 Fiitfiqi does not discuss techniques and procedures (scientific methods) but only outlines universal principles that constitute the epistemological foundation of an Islamic methodology. The "fitst principles" summarized above, though open to modification at the level of concrete interpretation and to expansion at the level of general formation, do provide an epistemological foundation on Safi: The Quest for an Islamic Methodology 27 the basis of which an Islamic methodology may be found. Undoubtedly, a1 FGriqi's profound contribution lies, first of all, in his clear statement of the problem and, secondly, in his articulation of the general framework of an Islamic methodology. Let us turn now to the most influential aspect of a1 F5riiqi's proposal. Towards the end of the Islamization of Knowledge monograph, he introduces a general strategy for achieving the objectives of Islamization: his "work plan." The strategy consists of twelve steps summarized in figure 1. The work plan shows in some detail what has to happen if the goal of Islamization is to be achieved. On the level of theoretical q u i r e ments, the plan is lucid and thorough. However, on the level of practical implementation, it appears over- whelming and exceedingly complicated. The plan overlooks two impor- tant practical considerations; one is logistical, the other psychological. If the twelve steps are taken literally as successive steps, this means that one has to be entirely completed before the next one can be attempted With- out a large scientific community who is both interested in and trained to undertake the Islamization of knowledge, the time frame for accomplish- ing the task is immediately stretched into Mnity. It becomes more cum- bersome when we realize that the practical incentives giving impetus to the project are located far down the chain at steps the "Establishing the relevance of Islam to the discipline" and "Producing university text- books." The steps in which the psychological impetus to pursue the pro- ject are located, respectively, in the middle and at the end of the chain. Another scheme for implementing the work plan is to divide it into parallel tracks, as shown in figure 2. The assumption here is that certain steps can proceed simultaneously. The importance of this schema is not that it helps us overcome the difficulties posed by the original schema, but rather that it brings the shortcomings of the original into sharp focus. It becomes immediately apparent through the second schema that steps 2 , 5 , 6 , and 7 are closely interrelated. Those who are to establish the rele- vance of Islam to modem disciplines and provide a critical assessment of the legacy cannot have a knowledge base or a training base separate from those entrusted with surveying and critically assessing modem disciplines. The schema also shows that there are two types of knowledge to be mastered by modem Muslim scholars: substantive knowledge (steps 1,3, and 4) and technical (methodological) knowledge (steps 6, 7, and 10). Insofar as individual scholats are concerned, steps 2,5,8, and 9 represent the impact of hisher moral-spiritual commitment on problems and sour- ces selection. This means that these steps cannot be considered as sepa- rate and independent from the process of thinking itself, but are signifi- cant only as "filter" steps denoting processes of elimination and selection. Taking the foregoing remarks into account, we can obtain a third schema, represented in figure 3. This schema could be quite demanding in t e n y of the intellectual work it requires. It provides a markedly sim- plified procedure consisting of two steps: mastery of substantive knowl- edge and mastery of technical knowledge. Note that mastery is not an 28 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 101 absolute, but only relative, term. Mastery here means knowledge that can be acquired by a scholar, given the constmints of time and the level of development achieved in the discipline. This new diagram brings into sharp focus the crucial role played by methodology in the Islamization of knowledge project. It vividly shows that the production of an Islamized knowledge is contingent on the emergence of Islamic methods. Before examining several works on methodology written by Muslim scholars since al I'iiriiqi inaugurated the Islamization project a little over a decade ago, two points are in order. Fimt, although the production of Islamized knowledge is contingent on the application of methods rooted in the Islamic worldview, this does not mean that the articulation of an Is- lamic methodology must precede a substantive contribution to the Islami- zation of knowledge pmess. Secondly, the final outcome of the schema shown in figure 3 (the production of univetsity textbooks) is knowledge that may be described as Islamized only tentatively. The Islamicity of this knowledge can be confirmed only through the involvement of the Islamic scientific community. We will retum to this point later. A1 FFiliiqi's argument for an Islamic methodology has, thus far, elicited three types of responses. The first two, represented in this paper by Mdpmmad Sa'id a1 Biiti and Fazlur Rahman, deny the need for the development of an Islamic methodology. However, while a1 Biiti claims that an Islamic methodology has already been "discovered by classical Muslim scholars, Rahman advances an argument reminiscent of Ibn Rushd's contention that methods are basically tools independent of any religious orientation. The thid group consists of scholars who have s u p ported the project of Islamization and have made significant attempts to contribute to its advancement. But before we look critically at some of the most important contributions of this group, let us quickly examine the two major dissenting responses to the Islamization thesis. Dissenting Responses In a paper presented at the Fourth International Conference on Islamic Methodology and Behavioral and Education Sciences, held in Khartoum, Sudan, during 1407/1987, a1 Biiti said that the scientific method is a fact (haqfquh) belonging to the "objective world (a1 Biiti, 141 1/1990). Like all "immaterial things" it has a fixed nature and is completely inde- pendent, in structure and existence, of human thought and reasoning (ibid., 57). In addition, the objectivity and permanence of the scientific method (manhaj al rna'rifah) is necessitated by its function. Since the scientific method is an instrument, a scale ( m f a n ) for ensuring the cor- rectness and s o u n d n ~ of thinking, its validity must be independent of the thinking process. Hence, a1 Biiti concludes, the scientific method cannot be modified or altered by reason, for this would involve seeking another method for its modification, a search that would lead to infinite regress (ibid.). He argues that since the scientific method is fixed and per- manent, it is not susceptible to development and innovation. Thus, the Safi: The Quest fa an Islamic Methodology 29 role of human intellect-in this case Muslim-is limited to identifying or discovering the “sound method“ (ibid., 59). Furthermore, contemporary Muslims need not bother to discover the “sound method” of knowledge, a1 Biiti contends, for this discovery has already been accomplished by early Muslims during the “golden age of Islam” (ibid.). As to the question of what is the role of contemporary Islamic scholarship in relation to scientific methodology, he ptoposes a twofold program: contemporary Muslim scholars work, firstly, to re- organize the already discovered method so as to make it more responsive to existing needs and, secondly, to recast it in contemporary language so that it could once again guide Muslim discourse (ibid., 59-60). In fact, a1 Biiti’s argument epitomizes the type of argument against which the advocates of the Islamization of knowledge project, most notably ‘AbdulYam-d AbiiSulaymEn, have been especially critical. A1 Biiti’s argument is problematic for at least two reasons. First, it confuses the methods of scientific research with the fundamental principles of rea- son. While one may argue that the principles of reason (i.e., the principle of consistency or noncontmdiction) is intrinsic to human reasoning and hence unalterable, one can hardly say the same about the techniques and procedures used in usPZ aZBqh (i.e., istihkn). But beyond that, a1 Biiti fails to recognize that the methods employed by USPZ aZBqh were not “discovered,” but rather were developed over several centuries. Indeed, his suggestion that the classical methods need to be recast into contem- porary language points to their inadequacy for modem research. If the use of language is a matter of function and not of fashion, why should any- one call for recasting the perpetual scientific method in a new language, unless there is some intrinsic conceptual or procedural differences be- tween the old and the new? Fazlur Rahman, like a1 Biiti, disagreed with the Islamization of knowledge project, but for very different reasons. In an article that ap- peared shortly after his death, Rahman (1988), while agreeing that much of ConLemporary knowledge reflects a Western ethos, contended strongly that one cannot devise a methodology or detail a strategy for achieving Islamic knowledge. The only hope Muslims have for bringing about Is- lamic knowledge, he argued, is to nurture the Muslim mind: So far as the problem under consideration-Islamization of knowledge-is concerned, I, therefore, conclude that we must not get enamored over making maps and charts of how to go about creating Islamic knowledge. Let us invest our time, energy and money in the creation, not of propositions, but of minds. (ibid., 10) While anyone who has thought about the revitalization of Muslim scholarship can hardly disagree with Rahman that a state of Islamized knowledge can never materialize unless it is produced by scholats who are highly competent in their fields and strongly committed to Islam’s 30 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 101 ideals, one has to reject an outright denial of the methods' value. Indeed, Rahman himself could not maintain his claim till the end of his article. In the early part of the article, he proclaimed that one cannot develop a method for guiding human m n , for "human thought has its own mode of operation. We still do not know what the nature of human thought pro- cess is" (ibid., 11). He stated that Aristotle tried to discover the structure of human thinking, and that his efforts culminated in the theory of syl- logism. But Aristotle failed because, he added, "[albsolutely nothing of this sort happens in actual reality. Human thought does not behave syl- logistically" (ibid., 10). Yet one paragraph later, he outlines a surprising twofold strategy in his conclusion: Muslim scholars must examine (first) Muslim tradition and (second) Western tradition. To do this, he added, Muslim scholars must establish "certain criteria" that "must obviously come initially from the Qur'an'' (ibid., 11). Such an task is what an Islamic methodology is all about. Rahman's concluding paragraph seems to contradict his earlier argu- ment against methods, or at least reveals an inconsistency and ambiguity in his attitude towards methodology. If one concedes a need for "certain criteria" to guide the examination of Muslim and Western intellectual tra- ditions, one must concede a need for rules to guide the derivation and ap- plication of these criteria: an Islamic methodology. The Inadequacy of Traditional Methods Apart from these two types of dissenting responses, a significant amount of literature has been produced, in both Arabic and English, to advance the themes of the Islamization of knowledge. Among those who have made regular contributions to the clarification of the Islamization thesis and have championed its cause for the last decade is 'AbdulHam-d AbiiSulaymin. In his writings, he has consistently criticized the classical methods of us61 ulBqh and called for their reform and restructuring. His basic critique and his most specific proposals for their reformation are summarized in an article published in 1985 under the title "Islamization of Knowledge with Special Reference to Political Science" (AbiiSulaym5n 1985). AbfiSulaymin, like a1 FGfiqi, links the rejuvenation of Islamic scholatship to the development of new Islamic methods. These new methods should overcome the limitations of the old, which are now no longer suitable due to their use of exclusively linguistic and legalistic patterns of thinking. The dilemma of contemporary Muslim intellectual- ism is that while the fuqih qua jurist is trained to handle legal-moral problems, he/she continues to be perceived as an all-round (universal) in- tellectual capable of resolving all problems of modem society: The crisis [of Islamic thought] also lies in the nature of our Islamic methods of research, which are confined to textual studies Safi The Quest for an Islamic Methodology 31 of language, traditions and orthodox jurisprudence. These two at- titudes are manifested in our tendency to regard the f q z l (jurist) in the historical sense as one who is capable of tesolving the crisis of thought, cultwe, and knowledge. (ibid., 268-9) Unlike a1 Firiiqi, who has presented an elaborate strategy for dealing with this problem, AbiiSulaymin identifies more focused, and hence more manageable, areas for the immediate attention of Muslim scholars. Ac- cording to him, the resolution of the intellectual crisis of the Muslims has to proceed along three lines. First, the relationship between reason and revelation should be re- defined. He argues that it is no longer sufficient to state in general terms that both reason and revelation are sowes of knowledge. One has to go a step further and specify, in concrete terms, how each relate to the other. Second, the meaning of ijtihad and the role of the fqz-h in the pm- cess of intellectual mform should be redefined. This redefinition, he con- tends, is necessitated by the fact that ijtihad has been limited to linguistic reasoning. Consequently, the faqdz is trained exclusively to deal with legal issues. If ijtihad is to be entrusted with the task of reformation, it has to be def ined so as to incorporate empirical m d e s of thinking in- trinsic to economic, social, and political disciplines. As he put it: In view of this multifacedness of knowledge, and the multifarious- ness of the fields of specialization, it is clear that Ijtihad, insights, solutions, alternatives, etc., in the domain of social and scientific knowledge cannot be provided by the specialists in legal studies alone. Both the task and the expectation are impossible. (ibid., 272-3) Third, the religious-secular dualism should be ended. Created by Western science, it is completely alien to Muslim thought. If the secular and religious spheres are to be integrated, thereby ending the existing dualism, the various fields of modem knowledge have to be restructured. AbiiSulaymh’s treatment of the question of Islamic methodology has been confined mainly to general principles. Even when he analyzes tech- nical and procedml issues, he tends to focus on some salient aspects ra- ther than on engaging the full range of opinions expressed by classical scholars, as he did in his The Islamic Theory of International Relations when addressing qiycis and ijmZ (AbiiSulaymZin 1984,65-6,75-6). Fur- thermore, in his critique of the classical wil, he endeavors to show the methodological inadequacy of the traditional approaches by demonstrating the substantive inadequacy of their resultant political science theories and doctrines. In other words, he tries to show that these doctrines are not adequate for explaining modern societal phenomena or for dealing with modem societal problems (ibid., 76-81; AbiiSulaymZn 1985, 277-80). This approach has one difficulty: while the argument may have a resounding impact on those who recognize the inadequacy of traditional 32 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 101 methods for social mearch through their own experience, it fails to strike a chord with those who strongly believe that "sound methods" are "dis- c o v e d " once and for all, but that they can never develop. Difficult Transition: From Principles to Techniques The logistical difficulties of al Fiiriiqi's work plan are reflected in the works of the scholars who have sought to further the Islamization project by attempting to devise methodological procedm. Before we examine four important contributions, it should be noted that so far, all studies in search of an Islamic methodology engage the "Western disciplinary" track (steps 1,2, and 6 of the work plan; see figure 2) of the Islamization work plan, while almost completely overlooking the "Islamic legacy" track (steps 3, 4,5, and 7; see figure 2). One who has tried to identify possible avenues for the development of an Islamic methodology within the Islamization of knowledge frame- work is Muhammad Arif (Arif 1987). In "The Islamization of Knowledge and Some Methodological Issues in Paradigm Building," he outlines and applies procedures for building an Islamic paradigm or worldview (he uses the terms interchangeably). Drawing on Imre Lakatos' Scientific Re- search Program (SRP) notion, he urges Muslim scholars to adopt the SRP elaborated by a1 Flfiqi. This, he argues, will allow them to reduce the task of building Islamic paradigms in their respective disciplines to the realization of the Islamization program's goals (ibid., 51-2). A1 Firiiqi's SRP, he opines, promotes the incorporation of revelation into scientific research and thus frees Muslim scholars from the constraints of Western epistemology (ibid., 53). Arif, seeing that a1 Firiiqi's epistemological principles are too broad, has tried to derive a more specific set of principles to guide economic re- search. But, in his attempt to move from the general to the specifically economic, he runs into rough terrain. In a surprising move, he abandons the Islamization approach and embraces two approaches found in the field of theoretical physics. Both can help develop an Islamic paradigm (worldview), he states, for "[Tlhe role of the social scientist engaged in the Islamization of knowledge resembles that of a theoretical physicist" (ibid., 56). To make things more complicated, Arif introduces the concept of philosophical foundation, which, he argues, constitutes the ground upon which an Islamic worldview is erected. The selection of a philosophical foundation, the ultimate normative ground, is, however, a matter of value judgment by the scientist. With this formulation of the problem, the ques- tion becomes: "How does a social scientist arrive at a particular world- view given the philosophical foundations of hisher thought?" (ibid., 57). In response, he proposes two diffetent approaches: the stratification a p proach, taken from Einstein's Stratification of Scientific System process, and the idealization approach, adapted from the Academic American En- cyclopedia. Safi The Quest for an Islamic Methodology 33 Einstein's stratification procedure calls for the conceptual systemiza- tion of physics via a series of conceptual abstraction, whereby concepts derived from "immediate experiences" are subsumed under more general concepts in an upward movement ending with the most abstract concepts. The movement from the primary and concrete to the secondary and abstract system allows the scientist to deal with a SCienMic model having fewer, and hence more manageable, sets of concepts. The idealization ap- proach, however, in complete opposition to the stratification approach, allows the movement from the most general and abstract to the most par- ticular and concrete. This is due to the fact that here, the system's para- metem are specified in advance of its substantive elaboration. If the purpose of these two procedures is to explain how a social sci- entist arrives at a particular worldview, the above exercise is, at best, problematic. Stratification is in direct opposition to Islamization, for it de- rives the ideal and universal from the actual and particular. The idealiza- tion procedure, while not contradicting the Islamization framework, brings us back to the initial question, for it presupposes the availability of the worldview that it is presumed to elaborate. The most troublesome aspect, however, is found in the application. Arif says he devised, by applying stratification, five criteria for evaluating the performance of an Islamic economic system: 1) socioeconomic justice for efficiency and gro&, 2) freedom for individuals to maximize their well-being (fiufih); 3) purity; 4) elimination of class dominance; and 5 ) equal opportunity for all (ibid., 64). Substantive soundness aside, the scientific value of the above-cited criteria is questionable. When an empirically based method such as strati- fication is used in social science, it serves only to idealize the actual: it can produce only a system in which the "ought" accords with the "is." How could Arif arrive at a set of principles aspiring to change, rather than to perpetuate, the status quo via an intrinsically naturalistic strategy? But there is a more important reason: the methods through which the so- called "criteria for the evaluation of Islamic economic system" are to be identified do not emanate from the Islamization framework, but are pre- dicated upon a logical-positivistic approach. Unaware of the profound in- congruence between logical positivism and the Islamic ethos, Arif sees the role of Muslim scholars as reconciling Islamic values with logical- positivistic methods: The above discussion [the reference is to a1 Firiiqi's call for re- conciling wuhy and 'aqo enables us to understand the comple- mentarity of Revelation in Islam and what we might call logical positivism-which as suggested by Dr. Fiiniqi, are the two ele- ments whose interaction produces the Islamic epistemology. (ibid., 54) Needless to say, "the complementarity of Revelation . . . and . . . logical positivism" is Arif s misreading of a1 Firiiqi's call for reconciling 34 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 1 0 1 revelation (wuhy) and reason ('aql). Unlike a logical positivist, a1 Fiiniqi maintained that while the natural order is subject to laws of necessity, the human (moral) order is subject mainly to laws of freedom (HIT 1987, 30). Another work deserving critical examination is A. Rashid Moten's "Islamization of Knowledge: Methodology of Research in Political Sci- ence" (Moten 1990). A political Scientist, Moten tried to further the ob- jectives of the Islamization project in his field. Like Arif, he begins from the Islamization of knowledge framework to develop an alternative to the currently predominant Western paradigm. However, he rejects logical- positivism, in particular, and the naturalistic methods that are the bedrock of contemporary Western social science. The new paradigm, he says, should study "individual behavior within the context of an entire social system" (ibid., 163), abandon the individualistic (hence ethnocentric and anthtopomorphic) approach of Western political science, and then replace it with one viewing "human life as an organic whole and integrates moral values and social ideals" (ibid.). Yet Moten rejects the naturalistic model of science without com- pletely abandoning empirical research. The scientific value of empirical findings has to be determined in connection with a three-layer schema of human knowledge which includes-in addition to empirical-rational and absolute knowledge. As he explains: To be sure, the place of the two sciences [political and natural] in the scheme of human knowledge is one and the same, i.e., to unfold and comprehend the Divine pattern. In the Qur'anic scheme, this knowledge ('ih) is to be obtained through revela- tion or divinely ordained absolute knowledge (haqq al yaqin), rationalism or inference based upon judgment and appraisal of evidence ('ilm al yaqin), and t h u g h empiricism and perception, that is, by observation, experiment, historical reports, description of life experience and the like ('ayn al yaqin). Thus, the Islamic way of knowing accords full freedom to experience and experi- ment and to rational and intellectual inquiry within the circum- ference of revealed knowledge (ibjd, 165). Although this model uses Qur'anic terminology, it has not been sys- tematically derived from the w a n , rational arguments, or empirical ex- perience. However, its heuristic value cannot be overlooked, as it pro- vides a hierarchical categorization corresponding to intuitive, rational, and empirical knowledge. But it still needs further development and a more rigorous grounding, for it cannot guide scientific research without sub- sumption rules that may relate the empirical to the rational as well as the rules of derivation by which the absolute can validate the rational.' 'The three levels represent, in descending order, revelation, reason, and experience. Safi: The Quest for an Islamic Methodology 35 Yet as soon as Moten identifies substantive elements of the Islamic paradigm, he almost completely drops his initial methodological concems and embraces unexamined notions and concepts. Following a1 FiWiqi, he proposes an organic model of the ummah for advancing substantive Is- lamic research in political science. An organic model is justified on the basis of a prophetic statement and four pragmatic and metaphysical consi- derations. But without well-defined rules of derivation allowing for rigor- ous predication of political theories on prophetic statements or metaphysi- cal arguments, the mobilization of authoritative or metaphysical state- ments in support of the scholar's contention is worrisome. In other words, the use of a prophetic statement, whose immediate reference is to the be- lieves' solidarity, to justify an organic political organization with far- reaching consequences is inadequate for its scientific grounding. Such an exercise falls more in the realm of speculative reasoning than rigorous scientific derivation. A comprehensive analysis of the organic model of the Islamic polity becomes more urgent when one realizes that the model contradicts the contractual model embraced by classical Muslim scholars. Moten, like all contemporary Muslim scholars, is aware of the current tension between mson and revelation and devotes a section of his paper to dealing with it. His brief treatment of it presupposes, however, that the tension will fade away as soon as Muslim scholars reject Western scien- tific approaches and embrace approaches rooted in the Islamic legacy. However, the general and passing reference to the historically har- monious relationship between revelation and teason in the Islamic legacy overlooks one factor: the unease that grew gradually within the dominant intellectual school, the Ash'ariyah, and climaxed in an anti-intellectualist stance that manifested itself in a hostile manner vis-A-vis the nonlegalistic sciences.' It is true, as Moten states, that this school, beginning with Abii a1 Basan a1 Ash'ari, "strongly defended the use of reason" (ibid., 163). But it is also true that the Ash'ariyah used reason only as a defensive mechanism and restricted its use to defending the worldview of the rnutu- kallirnzin (philosophers), even to the one embraced by Ash'ari scholars. Moten's general assertion that "the truth of revelation was always ap- preciated in light of reason" (ibid.) is borne out by the history of Islamic scholarship. However, a detailed examination of the relationship between the revealed and the reasoned uncovers areas of tension and conflict re- quiring the immediate attention of contemporary Muslim scholars if the Islamization of knowledge project is to be erected on a solid foundation. The Specter of Madhhaboah One of the difficult issues facing modem Islamic science, which is still in its embryonic stage, is the direct result of the absence of a precise *See, for example, al Shiiibi's Muwafqqiit, vol. 1, 46-52; also a1 GhazziXli's Mus- rmfi, vol. 1, 3. 36 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 101 definition of the relation between reason and revelation. Where exactly is the demarcation between science and ideology? This problem has been brought to the forefront by Muhammad U d y & in his Mmhaj al Bahth a1 Ijtimii'i baynu a1 Wad'Qah wa al Mi'ydnjmh (Umziyin 1412/1991) Here, he engages in an extensive critique of logical positivism and sug- gests a set of principles, or criteria, for building an Islamic methodology. Of the four parts that constitute the book, the third one is of special interest to the current study. In this part he outlines a number of criteria, the aim of which is to permit the incorporation of revelation as an intrin- sic source of scientific reasoning. He also emphasizes the need to tran- scend the positivistic definition of science in order to arrive at one that reincorporates revelation into the realm of science. This reincorporation, he contends, should be comprehensive, whereby both Qur'anic values and concepts are employed for guiding scientific teseatch. The Qur'an, he argues, could contribute to the development of social theory in three ways: it can a) provide accurate information on the nature of early social life; b) rectify the metaphysics of social knowledge on questions con- ceming the creation and evolution of humanity; and c) help us formulate and discover social laws (ibid., 268-88). However, rather than articulating methods that may allow a rigorous progession from Qur'anic statements to social propositions, he begins to compare what he calls the "social gradation" (ta&ruj ijtimii'i) of Islamic social science With those of the capitalist and Marxist social sciences. As the purpose of this analysis is not a comprehensive critique of Umziyiin's work but rather to emphasize the point that a truly Islamized knowledge presupposes the emergence of a mature and sophisticated methodology, I will discuss only one of the concepts considered by Umziyiin as part of Islamic social science: social inequality. While social inequality, or "the rich versus the poor" (a1 ghani muqlibil al f q i r ) as he prefers to put it, signifies free competition under capitalism and economic exploitation under Marxism, in Islam it simply signifies social integration and complementarity (ibid., 320-1). This mean- ing, Umziyh proclaims, is implied (zhd? in the following verse: Is it they who would portion out the Mercy of thy Lord? It is We who portion out between them their livelihood in the life of this world: And we raise some of them above others in ranks, so that some may command work from others. But the Mercy of your Lord is better than that which they amass. ( w a n 43:32) One must ask here if there are there rules that must be followed by the Muslim social scientist in deriving social principles from revelation, or is this derivation simply a matter of implication and intuition? A modem Islamic social science cannot be left to the loose and unrestricted speculation of individual Muslim scientists, but has to follow a well- articulated and rigorously grounded set of principles and criteria. If it does not, Qur'anic statements can be used arbitrarily to justify any pmpo- Safi: The Quest for an Islamic Methodology 37 sitions serving the ideological commitments of different social groups. In fact, without scientific rules and p rocedw to guide the progression from the revealed text to the sociological principle, both gtoss economic in- equality and political and social inequalities can be justified by this verse. The spectet of subodinating revelation to ideology is raised when UmziyHn deals with the relationship between the Islamic mdhhab@uh and social scientific research. While insisting that Islamic Social science cannot, by its very na tw, proceed unless the scientists adhering to it are committed to the Islamic paradigm (mdhhub@uh Ishm@uh), he stresses "the necessity of emancipation from subjective tendencies and ideological commitment." Evidently, his distinction between ideology and m d h - hub@& is meant initially to differentiate a commitment to the immediate and namw interests on the one hand, and a commitment to the universal and higher interests of human existence on the other. Yet his treatment of the subject (ibid., 327-33) is far from nonproblematic, for he seems to equate ideology only with non-Islamic thought, while excluding the pos- sibility of ideological bias appearing within the fold of Islamic social sciences: There is no ideology which can approach this level of neutrality except the Islamic mudhhab@ah, because it emanates from a di- vine source that transcends all human ink& and desires . . . . (ibid., 328) However, since the Islamic madhhab@ah is used by the author in re- ference to the principles and concepts derived from revelation &ugh the agency of intellectually and morally fallible human beings (ibid., 302-4), one can hardly maintain that the ideas and theories of Muslim scholars enjoy absolute neutrality, especially when a set of rigorous techniques and procedures is absent. And so while one is justified, from an Islamic per- spective of course, in imputing absolute objectivity to the worldview em- bedded in divine revelation, one cannot do the same with regard to any intellectual or moral system formulated by human beings. Do Paradigms Shift? Our critical review of the literature on the Islamization of knowledge project would be conspicuously incomplete without engaging the work of Mona Abul-Fadl, who has provided one of the most profound and thought-provoking contributions to the project. She offers, in several papers written on the subject, a critical assessment of the epistemological foundation of modem Western thought as well as an attempt to explore an Islamic methodology. My critical examination of her contribution will be confined mainly to two works: "Paradigms in Political Science Re- visited: Critical Options and Muslim Perspectives" (Abul-Fadl 1989) and "NabwH Manhajiyat a1 Ta'Hmul ma'a MaGdir a1 Tanzir a1 IslHm- hyna a1 MuqHdimiit wa a1 MuqHwimiit" (Towards a Methodology for Dealing 38 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 101 with the Sources of Islamic Theorizing: Between the Premises and the Es- sentials) (Abul-Fad1 141 1/1990). In "Paradigms in Political Science Revisited" Abul-Fad1 reviews the paradigm debate currently underway in Western scientific literature, ex- ploring the possibility of "paradigmatic shift," in the Kuhnian sense, con- ducive to the historical and intellectual ethos of Muslims. The study's aim "is to draw out some lessons which can tell us why and in what ways the patadigm debate can be important to us in the recovery and reconstruc- tion of our intellectual bearings" (Abul-Fad1 1989, 89-90). Examining recent statements by leading Western scholars, most notably a statement Gabriel Almond delivered before the annual conven- tion of the American Political Science Association, Abul-Fad1 concludes that the field of political science is in a state of flux. The flux, she con- tends, "signifies a crisis of identity in the discipline," which may be linked to more fundamental crises, those of Western cultute and power (ibid., 26-7). The crisis of identity reveals itself on the intellectual plane in the emergence of radical paradigms that are forcing mainstream West- ern social science to abandon its behavioralist stance and embark on a postbehavioralkt project. Yet postbehavioralism, she points out, does not signify a genuine change in the mode of scientific research, but merely a strategic move for silencing critics. According to Abul-Fadl, the paradigm debate and the current state of fluidity in social science "signifies a Kuhnian moment in the evolution of the discipline where the s e n d anomalies between the established ways of thinking and the experiences of the times are intensified" (ibid, 32). The current crisis, she says, has far-teaching implications for scholars with "Islamic sensitivities," for it opens the possibility for a paradigmatic shift (ibid.). Towards the end of her essay, Abul-Fad1 identifies two intellectual trends in Westem scholarship which, she argues, have the potential to guide Muslim scholars in their endeavor to overcome the positivistic ten- dencies of modem social science. The fimt trend is represented by the hermeneutics movement whose relevance, from a Muslim perspective, lies not only in its aspiration to restore value, history, and culture to the study of social phenomena, but also in its capacity to "sensitize" social scien- tists "anew to the affinities between politics and religion" (ibid., 34). The second trend appears in Eric Voegelin's works The New Science of Poli- tics and The Order of Things. Voegelin's importance is not limited to his "distinction between two conceptions of science: natmlistic science and poetic science" (ibid., 37), but extends to the p i b i l i t y of relocating history "in its transcendental perspective" and in recovering "the relevance of a higher realm of order to the mundane order of politics" (ibid., 40). Granted that Muslim scholars must engage, especially at this stage, Western scholarship in a critical examination and debate, and granted that this debate could ultimately lead to a one-sided or even a two-sided (if Western scholars decided to open-mindedly respond to Muslim critique) intellectual exchange, the notion of a paradigmatic shift resulting in the Safi: The Qua for an Islamic Methodology 39 emergence of an Islamic or tawbfdi paradigm out of Western social science is highly problematic. Such a notion ignores the culturally based constraints imposed on social research and assumes that a paradigmatic shift can spill-over across cultures as a result of a paradigm debate. Indeed, this very assumption stands at variance with the main contention of her ''Contrasting Epistemics" (Abul-Fadl, 1990). Here, she establishes the affinity of an Islamic paradigm or tuwhfdfepistemics to a "median culture" in which "the Absolute and the transcendent" occupy a prominent place. The tawhXparadigm, she further argues, is by its very nature an- tagonistic to any "oscillating culture" characterized by "the absence of a core" and, hence, by its tendency towards fragmentation and secularism (ibid., 22-6). Abul-Fadl's intellectual endeavors extend beyond her critical assess- ment of moderh Western scholarship to contributions aimed at building an Islamic methodological alternative. In her "Towards a Methodology for Dealing with the Sources of Islamic Theorizing" (Abul-Fad1 141 1/1990), she recognizes that in order to contribute to the formation of an intrin- sically Islamic social theory, Muslim social scientists should have access to Islamic revealed sources. However, these methods are inadequate when it comes to dealing with social questions, for while the study of social phenomena requires a holistic approach whereby social relations are systemized pursuant to universal rules, classical methods are atomistic, relying primarily on analogical reasoning (Umziyiin 1412/1991,206-7). Abul-Fad1 concludes, therefore, that the uszih-legacy (mirth ul uszil) as it stands today can hardly be used in social research. Before it can be- come operative, the uszilfmethods require a comprehensive restructuring whereby the particular is grouped under the universal. Until that happens, contemporary social scientists have no other avenue but to erect their dis- ciplines on concepts and categories derived directly from the Qur'an (ibid., 207-8). Yet rather than examining classical methods in order to identify the source of their inadequacy and to build on the accomplishments of clas- sical Muslim scientists, she overlooked the entire uszili legacy, which is rich with techniques and procedures for textual analysis, and starts anew. She introduces a three-step procedure designed to help Muslim social sci- entists derive concepts and models from the Qur'an. First, a list of the basic terms of the discipline is compiled and their Qur'anic equivalents identified. Second, the linguistic and historical meaning of the compiled terms is established. This qu i r e s that the terms be examined within both their immediate ( m u h h u r ) and their overall ( i jmdi) context. Finally, the terms have to be reorganized in accordance with a set of criteria (mu'ayir). This set of criteria, Abul-Fad1 argues, must be derived from the Qur'an and social experience. Consequently, it should help Muslim scholars develop social models and identify social patterns (ibid., 216-9). Abul-Fadl's procedure is an important step for ending the practice of loose usage of the Qur'an to support themes and propositions. However, as it lacks the meticulousness of the text-analysis methods furnished by 40 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 1 0 1 classical scholars, the approach leaves mom for loose interpretation of revealed text. In fact, the pmedure outlines in general t e r n the method used in the science of tufsfr, as Abul-Fad1 herself points out. The p m e d m lacks, however, detailed rules of derivation that could end the arbi- trary and loose usage of Qur’anic text in support of theoretical principles. While the proposed pmedure is a step in the right direction, it must be developed further before becoming a useful tool for the articulation of the normative elements of an Islamic social theory. The author is also aware of the applicational inadequacy of her proposed method when it comes to developing a geneml framework for what she refers to as the “Islamic civilizational act“ (a1 fi ‘I a1 hu&iri]. The general framework consists of four generic concepts: tawhfd, istik&Z, ummah, and Shari‘ah. She argues that one can derive, from the generic conceptual framework, two layers of concepts: primary (mufdhfm uwwuh~uh) and secondary (mufdhim fur‘@uh). Out of the four univetsal concepts postulated, she generates nine primary concepts and twelve secondary concepts (ibid., 215-21). Primary concepts are: umr (com- mand), nuhy (prohibition), @‘ah (obedience), ‘isydn (disobedience), h u h (rule), qu& ’ (judgment), wil@uh (sovereignty), isldh (reform), and tadbfr (planning). Secondary concepts are: ‘ad1 (justice), zulm (tyranny), bughy (injustice), bay ‘ah (covenant), shzird (consultation), jihad (struggle), i n f q (expenditure), isZ& (reform), i ‘ t i s h (adherence), and w&h (unity). While these are concepts with important political impli- cations, the method of their selection and stratification is extremely ambiguous. The proposed framework does not tell us why these concepts are deemed relevant, while others that appear to be equally relevant and im- portant for the ummah’s political life, such as ta‘dwun (cooperation) and tusdmuh (tolerance), have been excluded. Nor is it clear under what rules the framework is stratified into primary and secondary concepts. Why, for example, is ‘ad1 secondary, while td ‘ah (obedience) primary? Or, for that matter, why is kldh both a primary and a secondary ~oncept?~ The Immediate Task We pointed out early in this paper that the Islamization of knowledge framework does not provide detailed methods for guiding scientific research, but only a set of ontological principles having epistemological and ethical implications. Evidently, the ontological principles along with their epistemological and ethical corollaries, though open to further im- provement and modification, constitute a solid foundation for the project 30ne is tempted to consider the repetition of is@ among both primary and sec- ondary concepts as a typesetting emr, especially when i‘tiycim is repeated twice in the list of secondary m c e ts. Yet lacking an understanding of the rules of stratification, one can only express ~wi&erment. SaiT Ihe Quest for an Islamic Methodology 41 of Islamization. Hence, they should be considered an appropriate starting point for any endeavor in this direction. But while the general framework provided by al Fiitiiqi gives us a good starting point, the same cannot be said about the strategy or the work plan he outlined, for it requires an organization of highly qualified scholars working in unison under a unified command. The conditions needed for the implementation of such a sttategy are neither available nor, from what we know about scientists and scientific enterprises, are they likely to materialize. In fact, bumaucratic organizations tend to sup- pmss the very elements that make science possible, viz. creativity and originality. We need, in light of the foregoing remarks, to substitute a1 FGtiiqi's original plan with a more practicable one that will take into account the logistical impediments d i s c d above. One possible alternative strategy, already alluded to in this paper, is to reduce his twelve steps to three. Summarized in figure 3, these steps are: a) mastery of substantive knowl- edge, b) mastery of methodological knowledge, and c) production of university textbooks (or generally intellectual works). The knowledge pro- duced through this procedure cannot readily be described as an Islamized knowledge, for it has first to undergo a close examination by the larger Muslim scientific community. Only by passing the critical scrutiny of other Muslim scholars can the work produced by individual scholars be elevated to the level of Islamized knowledge. To use the terminology of USCZ a l jqh , we can say that only when the individual ijtihad of Muslim scientists is substantiated by the process of i jmZ can it be considered as part of the body of verified knowledge (see figure 5). It is clear, therefore, that the Islamization of knowledge project is still in its premethodological stage. Indeed, due to the lack of articulated methods, the project has been particularly susceptible to criticism from the supporters of both traditional and Western methods. Filling this gap requires the critical engagement of both classical Muslim and modem Western methods. In addition to satisfying the immediate needs of con- temporary Muslim scholarship, this engagement serves as a preparatory stage during which the ground can be prepared for the emergence of an Islamic methodology. This is because an Islamic methodology has to emerge, at least partially, by appropriating elements of both classical Is- lamic and modem Western methods. A wholesale and a priori rejection of either of the two traditions is unscientific. This leads us to the question of inadequacy taised frequently by the advocates of a new Islamic methodology. Although the question of inadequacy is usually &ed in relation to traditional methods, it is by no means exclusive to them. Modem Western methods are also inadequate for the development of a social science that considers divine revelation to be an intrinsic source of knowledge. However, the term "inadequate" should be undetstood at this state to mean "less-than-adequate," not "invalid." The task of contemporary Muslim scholars is, therefore, to examine methods developed in both Westem and Muslim traditions to 42 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 101 determine the source of their inadequacy and the p i b i l i t y of their being developed, supplemented, or invalidated. Thus far, the inadequacy of traditional methods has been attributed to three factors: their a) exclusive legalism, b) overtly linguistic nature, and c) excessive atomism. Although the above characterization reveals a great deal of the truth about traditional methods and is in the main a fair description, it nonetheless overlooks stteams within classical thought that attempted to balance some of mainstream excesses. For example, the theory of rnuqaid a2 shun-ah (purposes of the Shari'ah), advanced by a1 Shiitibi, was intended to systemize the science of fiqh and counter- balance the atomistic tendency that existed in classical legal thought. Thus one may deduce that there can be no hope for escaping the pre- methodological state of contemporary Muslim scholarship without having a serious and profound encounter with the methodological approaches generated in both traditional Muslim and modem Westem scholarship. In their examination of classical and modem methodologies, contemporary Muslim scholars have to answer four interrelated questions: 1. What are the rules for deriving social concepts and categories? 2. What are the rules for deriving concepts and categories from empiri- cal sources? 3. What are the rules for the differentiation (horizontal ordering) and stratification (vertical ordering) of concepts and categories derived from both revealed and empirical somes? 4. What are the rules for linking revealed concepts and categories with empirical ones? Undoubtedly, responding to the challenge posed by the above ques- tions can be quite demanding, but this is inevitable if the goal is to achieve scientific progress, for methodological rigor has always been a precondition of science. Safi: 'Ihe Quest for an Islamic Methodology Figure 1: The Islamization of Knowledge Framework (al Firiiqi). 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. c 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 43 II Critical Assessment of the Modem Discidhe n c 1 I Survey of the Ummah's Major Problems 11 1 I Survey of the Problems of Humanity 1 1 I 1 n Critical Assessment of the Islamic Legacy Creative Analysis and Syntheses J( The University Textbook I 1 . I Dissemination of Islamized Knowledge 44 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 1 0 1 Figure 2: The Islamization of Knowledge Framework Parallel Tracks. 1. 6. Critical Assessment of Safi: The Quest for an Islamic Methodology Figure 3: The Islamization of Knowledge Framework: A Simplified Procedure. 1 University Textbook 1 46 Figure 4: The Production of Islamized Knowledge. The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 1O: l ...... I.... .................... Safi: The Quest for an Islamic Methodology Figure 5: Proposed Revised Islamization of Knowledge Framework. Western Knowledge r' 1. 2. 3. 4. 41 " t . . . . . I I Mastery of Analytic and Synthetic Techniques by Individual Scholars Critical Review by the Muslim Scientific community 5. * . . . . . . u . . . * . . . . l . . . . . . . . , - . . . . . . . . Islamized Knowledge 48 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 101 References Abul-Fadl, Mona. "Paradigms in Political Science Revisited: Critical Op- tions and Muslim Perspectives." American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 6, no. 1 (September 1989): supplement. ----- . 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"Azmat a1 Ma'rifah wa 'Iliijuha fi BayiitirG a1 Isliim-yah a1 MuEsirah." In A1 Manhajoah a1 IsliimQah a1 'Ulcm a1 SulUk@ah wa a1 Tarbawoah, edited by Al-Tayyib a1 Zayn a1 'Abidii, vol. 1. Herndon, VA: IIIT, 1411/1990. IIIT. Islamization of Knowledge: General Principles and Work Plan. Hemdon, VA: IIIT, 1987. Moten, A. Rashid. "Islamization of Knowledge: Methodology of Research in Political Science." American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 7, no. 2 (September 1990): 161-175 Rahman, Fazlur. "Islamization of Knowledge: A Response." American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 5, no. 1 (September 1988): 3-11. Umziygn, M&ammad. Manhaj a1 Babth a1 Ijtimii'i bayna a1 WQcl'oah wa a1 Mi'yiir@ah. Herndon, VA: IIIT, 1412/1991.