The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences Vol. 8, No. 1, 1991 45 Sociological Realism: An Islamic Paradigm By Ilyas Ba-Yunus Ever since its revelation more than fourteen hundred years ago, the Qur’an has been the object of recitation and memorization, as well as scholarly analysis by millions in every generation. During this long span of time, not only religious scholars and jurists, but also other professionals like physicists, medical doctors, historians, and orientalists have tried to scrutinize and analyze the Qur’an. It is about time that sociologists paid attention to this primary source of Islam. Sociological interest in the Qur’an, as belated as it is, is in fact natural, for, after a brief foray in the direction of what one may call Origin IheoZogy, the basic thrust of the Qur’an remains ideological- humanity and its society in this world. Not that this is such a revealing idea. Whether one looks at it from a juristic point of view or from a historical perspective, it hardly escapes notice that the Qur’anic verses speak out loudly about the nature of plural living as fabricated by the crisscrossing episodes generated by very active, assertive, and expressive individuals over the course of history. Most of what has been going on in Islamic studies, under the rubric of law and history in particular, provides us with sufficient encouragement to cast a fresh look at the same source of knowledge. Questions Sociological Theory Should Answer As we have already seen, sociologists have at different times asked different and disparate, although quite relevant, questions. They have also been insufficient questions. For example, symbolic interactionists remained interested primarily in the indeterminstic nature of the human act. This microscopic preoccupation prevented them from asking questions about social processes of a larger magnitude. Even Blumer’s emphasis on collective behavior, which showed an early promise for the analysis of revolutionary social change, has had only scant appeal for his fellow symbolic interactionists. On the other hand, structural-functionalists as well as conflict theorists remained interested in the deterministic nature of the macro social order. Ilyas Ba-Yunus is a professor of sociology at the State University of New York at Codand, New York. 46 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences Vol. 8, No. 1, 1991 By pursuing this interest, they generated a heated debate with respect to the extent of consensus and conflict in society. Thus, although we have three major sociological theories in vogue today, there are only two major Controversies: determinism vs. indeterminism, and conflict vs. consensus as determinants of social structure. What is needed is a dialogue on the relationship between individual social action and the society which provides it with its relevant context. In short, we need a more synthetic view of social interaction encompassng these controversies. This leads us to ask the following questions: 1. 2. 3. What is the nature of a given social act? What is the nature of a given social order? What is the relationship between the two? In brief, these questions cut across the whole spectrum of contemporary theoretical sociology. By providing answers to these questions, one may find, hopefully, a resolution of the controversies which have beset sociological theory ever since its inception. These questions q u i r e a systematic and holistic paradigm which is both realistic and universal in scope. It must be realistic in the sense that it must appeal to the experiences of all those who read it, and it must be universal in the sense that it is applicable to all societies as they vary in time and space. Basic Assumptions Human society, also known as the society of homo supiens or the progeny of Adam and Hawwa' (Eve), is one of the many societies that are found in this world. In fact, a great many if not all of the living organisms in nature live in their respective communities with their own particular structures, so much so that some of these (i.e., microscopic bacteria and viruses) are identifiable mainly in terms of their respective colonies. A comparison of animal and insect collectivities with that of human beings shows three major patterns. First, whereas animal and insect communities are species-specific universally, human society varies drastically from place to place. Second, whereas animal and insect societies do not seem to change or evolve over time, human society universally experiences evolutionary and/or revolutionary changes. Third, none of the animal or insect societies is as complex as even the most simple human society. These observations raise some important questions: Why are animal and insect societies species-specific and stable in time and space? Why does human society vary in time as well as from place to place? Naturally, the answer to these questions could be sought in the nature of the organism as it may Ilyas Ba-Yunus Sociological Realism 41 relate to its social organization. The question about animals and bacteria might as well be left to zoologists and microbiologists. More pertinently, we may ask: What is there in the makeup of a human being that gives hisher society such a unique and dynamic character? In general, sociologists have evaded this question. Classical European sociology, as represented by the contributions of such stalwarts as Weber, Durkheim, Simmel, and Spencer, does not even address this issue. In fact, early American sociologists have been more attentive to this problem. For example, Cooley devoted a whole book to relating human nature with human social order. Likewise Thomas, in formulating his “four wishes,” remained interested in this very theme. However, both believed that human nature remains inseparable from the society in which a person is born and raised. Mead remained preoccupied with the concept of inborn human potential. But during his long tenure at Chicago, where he taught his social psychology, he could not find anything other than self-centeredness and symbolic ability which could be classified as aspects of inborn human nature. Fortunately for Muslims, in some of its earlier verses and long before its ideological discourse, the Qur’an provides some fundamental observations on the original makeup of humanity. As will be seen below, more comprehensive assumptions about human nature may be derived from these observations. Observation I: The foremost and perhaps the most profound observation about humanity’s makeup to be found in the Qur’an is that each member of the human race is composed of inherently unlike and mutually opposing elements. To begin with, Allah made each human being from lowly earthly material i.e., sounding clay (.yu&iiZ ka ulfakhkhiir), black odorous mud (bm’ msniin), clay (@) and simple earth (turiib). Having made humanity from this lowly substance, He then breathed into it what is perhaps the most sublime of all things-His own spirit; and man came to life (Qur’an 32:9). Muslim ’ulama’, both Sunni (i.e., Moududi, 1967) as well as Shi’i (Algar, 1979) are in general agreement that the Qur’an is alluding to the dual nature of humanity in these verses. More specifically, it has come to mean that while human beings have self-centered, acquisitive, and destructive tendencies on the one hand, they also have a tendency to be constructive, self-sacrificing, and altruistic on the other hand. Observution 2: Secondly, “He created man and taught him speech” (Quian 55:4). Evidently, the word “speech” in this verse refers to the human ability to acquire and use language. Because human language is based on symbolism, it is assumed that this verse is pointing out humanity’s symbolic ability. This ability includes not merely acquiring, but also changing and even producing new languages. This is perhaps the most distinguishing mark of human beings when compared to other living forms in creation. As is well known, animals do possess and use vocal gestures for communication, yet they cannot change these gestures or acquire new forms of expression. Even if a parrot can imitate a person, it cannot speak his/her language. This is so because parrots do not possess symbolic ability. Due to this lack of symbolic ability, parrots cannot modify or build upon what they haw heard-something which human beings start exhibiting as early as their pre-adolescent years. Due to this lack of symbolic ability, even the smaxtest pan13 cannot philosophize or mathemath problems, despite its s e e d y very interesting ability to mimic human sounds. In short, the above Qur‘anic verse is pointing out that language ability is characteristically an inborn human trait. Obsemtion 3: At the simplest level, symbolic ability, which is at the root of human language ability, means giving non-inherently possessed meanings to things. Thus, certain meanings may be given to a piece of cloth when it is used as a flag. Indians fighting against the European settlers in America used smoke signals in order to convey coded messages. Likewise, a red light is used as a symbol of danger or as a visual command to stop. Even small children make use of symbols, such as making faces to convey a certain message. In a more general sense, symbolism also means to experience things by giving them meanings, understanding them, and thus gaining knowledge about them. It goes without saying that in the absence of language or with impaired language ability, human learning wuld be seriously hampered. The following Qur’anic verse also has something to say regarding human knowledge ability: Recall when your Lord said to the angels, “I am going to appoint a vicegerent on Earth.” They said, “Are You going to make one who will cause destruction there and shed blood; and we are always engaged in praising You and earnestly?” He (the Lord) said, “I have in view what you do not know.” And He taught Adam the names of all things. Then He set these before the angels and asked, “Tell Me the names of all these if you are right (in thinking that this new creature would cause destruction) .” They replied, “Praise be to You, we do not have any knowledge except the knowledge that You gave us. You are the most knowledgeable and most wise.” Then He said, “&am, tell them the names of all these,” and he (&am) told them the names of all things. Then He said, “Did I not tell you that I know the secrets of the Earth and the Heavens which are hidden from you? I know what you say and what you do not” (2:30-33). Muslim ’ulama’ are in general agreement that the word “names” in the verses referred to above means the essence and knowledge of all things in Ilyas Ba-Yunus Sociological Realism 49 creation. However, there are some other implications of these verses which should be mentioned. First, as Moududi (1967,59) pointed out, the knowledge bestowed upon human beings is superior to that given to the angels, who have only a rather limited and more specialized knowledge. On the other hand, the knowledge potential given to human beings is more general and more comprehensive. Second, it means that the knowledge potential of human beings goes far beyond the acquired knowledge itself. After all, to name means not only to identify but also to explain, characterize, classify, relate, and differentiate. Human knowledge potential therefore differs from knowledge given to other forms in creation; not only is it wider in scope, but it is fundamentally analytical and, consequently, progressive. Third, this analytical potential of humanity is its foremost qualification for being the vicegerent of Allah-an office for which even the angels could not qualify. Fourth, humanity’s ability to acquire knowledge is what can save it from spreading blood and destruction throughout the world. After all, the skeptical angels could be satisfied only by klam’s demonstration of his knowledge potential. This implies that knowledge is the vehicle of peace and that ignorance is what causes destruction. To summarize the above discussion, let us start with the assumption that human nature, as gleaned from the Qur’an, is such that by virtue of humanity’s original makeup, human beings are: 1. 2. 3. 4. a composite of diametrically opposite tendencies - self- centered, destructive materialism as well as self-sacrificing and spiritual altruism; endowed with symbolic ability, which means that they can speak language@), change language@), and make new language( s) ; endowed with knowledge ability, which means that they can acquire knowledge and produce further knowledge by developing the existing level of knowledge; and endowed with the ability to govern, administer, and otherwise participate in the affairs of creation due to the possession of the above-discussed characteristics. These characteristics, on the one hand, set humanity apart from animals and other created objects. On the other hand, these characteristics provide the backdrop for the nature and the dynamics of social interaction. It is mainly in terms of these traits that individual action may be explained, and that the relationship between the individual and hidher society may also be explained. 50 The American Journal or Islamic 3ociai wiences VUI . 0, I Y U . 1, 1771 Based on these assumptions, it is now time to start trying to answer those questions raised above regarding the nature of human action, the nature of human society, and the relationship between the two. The Nature of the Human Act In emphasizing the dual nature of humanity, the Qur’an is illustrating an inherent dilemma in human nature-human nature is not fixed. It is not merely self-centered as Mead emphasized, nor is it merely altruistic either. This also means that these aspects of human nature, as predisposing as they might be, not, in fact, predetermining. This is so because by being mutually opposing in essence, they tend to cancel each other out by pulling the individual in opposing directions. In its very opening dialogue on human nature, then, the Qur’an preempts any possible determinism and fatalism. Human beings are self-centered and materialistic, but they also have another option available to them. They are basically altruistic, but they can also be quite mean if they choose to be. This duality, then, explains the human ability to choose- to decide-a trait which is only rarely found in other created objects. What may be derived from the Qur’an, then, is the concept that human nature is basically dilemmatic rather than instinctive.’ While instinct guides animal action, it takes an effort on the part of individual human beings to deal with the dilemma posed by the situation in which he/she finds himself/herself. In short, human action is a result of will - the decision-making ability which we have seen above and which stems directly from the fundamental duality in human nature. Mead also emphasizes human will, but does not give any reason for this distinctive human trait. He fundamentally assumes that “I” is self-centered as well as willful. Clearly, Islamic theory goes beyond Mead. Human action (whatever an individual does in a given situation) is a solution to the dilemma posed by the given situation. It is the end product of a process initiated by a desire or an impulse to reach an objective. However, all human decisions to act-when and how or even not to act-primarily depend upon the knowledge acquired from direct or indirect encounters with the environment in specific situations. But, an individual is not merely a passive receptor of knowledge. More significantly, he/she is the willful picker and the analyzer and, thus, the maker of hidher knowledge. All of the knowledge which an individual allows to settle in hidher consciousness is tailor-made by him/her to reflect personal objectives, hopes, aspirations, fears, and biases. It follows that the objectivity of the phenomenon and the subjective knowledge of that phenomenon do not always tally. In the case of there being a high “Verily we have created man in toil and struggle.” (Qur’an 90:4). Ilyas Ba-Yunus Sociological Realism 51 degree of congruity between the objective phenomenon and its subjective knowledge, it speaks not only for the resourcefulness, explicitness, and consistency in the source of knowledge, but also for the receptivity of the receiver. Whether or not there is any significant difference between the objectivity of the phenomenon and its subjective knowledge, the fact remains that the individual cannot but construct this portrait subjectively. In short, each individual is not merely the seeker but also the maker of hisher knowledge on the basis of which he/she makes a decision to act in a given situation. If subjectively defined knowledge is crucial to human decision making, language ability is fundamental to any construction of knowledge. Language or speech is crucial to the ability to obtain knowledge and to make decisions, more so than any bodily or vocal gestures could ever be. First of all, gestures could hardly encompass such complex abstractions or equations as those noted above. Secondly, possessing a language also means that the phenomenon has to be experienced directly in order to learn about it, for it may be learned indirectly through transmission by others. In fact, most of our knowledge about this universe, about the society in which we live, and indeed about the socioeconomic and political processes in which we are interested, is for the most part a second-hard knowledge transmitted through such means as oral or written reports, books, newspapers, magazines, radio, and television. Thirdly, and more importantly, language ability also means not merely that we are able to communicate with others or to receive communication from others, but it also entails the ability to self-indicate and self-communicate. Whenever we encounter a situation, we explain to ourselves those of its dimensions which interest us the most. It is mainly through these self- indications that we are able to define and consider the objective phenomenon subjectively and, in the process, create our own personalized knowledge. Lastly, and quite plausibly, it is mainly through this process of self-indication that we are able to “signal” ourselves to move or not to move along a certain line of action. In this sense, language becomes a purely subjective tool in self-motivation. It must be evident by now that the Islamic theoretical view of human action is basically indeterministic. This brings it much closer to Mead, but not without some notable differences. For instance, as mentioned above, Mead looks at humanity as being self-centered and materialistic. The Islamic view, on the other hand, is that human beings are both self-centered and altruistic at the same time. Whereas Mead does not explain the origin of human will, the Islamic view explains will as being the function of the dilemmatical nature of man. 52 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences Vol. 8, No. 1. 1991 The Nature of Society To put it more simply, society is in essence a plurality of people cooperating, competing, and thus influencing one another within a given territory. Each individual in this plurality has the same basic nature as outlined above. As such, our assumptions about human nature remain fundamental to the analysis of human society, for they are basic to our view of any given individual human act. In fact, human social structure is determined universally by the original makeup of humanity as much as the structure of the bee society is determined by the nature of the bees making up that society. Human action, individual or otherwise, becomes structured when it assumes a form by virtue of being performed in the same manner over and over again. Individual action may become structured as a result of habit, taste, superstition, or some other aspects of individual personality. Plural action becomes structured when many or most individuals in a given society interact similarly in similar circumstances. Social structure thus tends to fabricate an environment of expectations and deeds. Although we become used to its expectations and demands and may not always feel its pressure so profoundly by virtue of living in the same society for a long time, looked at from the point of view of a newcomer it may appear overwhelming. It must be overwhelming by the sheer weight of its plurality, although its impact does not always depend on numbers alone. A moment’s reflection on child socialization brings home the brute fact that despite all the loving care they receive from their parents, children are often inducted into society’s value and expectation systems with varying degrees of coercion. They often have to face and give credence to the moods and the temperamental vicissitudes of their parents and, in the case of an extended family, those of other relatives as well. The fact that the parents’ love for their children more than compensates for their high-handedness must not obviate the fact that childhood is, perhaps, one of the stormiest periods in an individual‘s life. It is during this period that the untamed person learns, sometimes with open defiance but often with noisy protests, that he/she cannot always have hidher way. Similarly, as we grow up and look back laughingly at the treatment we received from our elders, we face new situations of social coercion. Take the case of a young woman who may be in love with a bright young man but must consent to a marriage arranged by her parents, or of a football team which, playing for a home audience, is under constant pressure to live up to the audience’s expectations, or of a political candidate facing an audience intent on hooting him/her down. In short, social pressure impinges upon us from several directions throughout our lives. Teachers, officials, superiors, even subordinates and peers-all possess varying degrees of coercive potential. Ilyas Ba-Yunus Sociological Realism 53 In our perceptions, we may modify the impact of this pressure by either exaggerating or minimizing it. Nevertheless, the fact remains that others, like us, possess a certain degree of self-assertion and the ability to at least try to impose upon us through sanctions-punishing, re-, or withdmmg rewards - or by appealing to our vanity or self-centeredness by admiring us or even beseeching us. However, the basic thrust of the Qur'an is towards introducing and promulgating a body of norms. This brings home the basic fact that a given social environment is, above all, a normative environment; that rules pervade our lives at every stage; that all societies impinge upon individual consciousness through their normative nets composed of laws, mores, folkways, even fashions and fads. From early childhood until death, we are under the constant reminder that we ought to "behave." The imperative mood of the Qur'an seeks to remind us of a universal strategy that all societies have practiced in order to deter and keep their individual citizens under control, i.e., in line with declared expectations. It is mainly through reminding others and reminding ourselves in terms of these expectations that we, along with others, develop a coercive structure around ourselves. One significant impact of the normative environment as perceived by us is that we are able to internalize these norms in varying degrees. Internalization of norms has four basic dimensions. First, we are able to uphold them and defend them vocally or otherwise. Second, in case we exempt ourselves from some of the norms some of the time, we seek rationalizations justifying our conduct to ourselves (we develop a conscience). Third, even if we deviate from some of the norms some of the time, we expect others to uphold them and abide by them. And fourth, we are afraid that if we are caught deviating from the prevailing norm(s), others muld apply sanctions against us. Thus, social norms are not merely external forces operating around us, for in most cases they coerce us from inside ourselves-we let ourselves be coerced by them voluntarily. However, reflecting our human nature (fi