The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences Vol. 7, No. 2, 1990 235 Review Article Beyond the Post-Modern Mind* Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi‘ What can an accomplished Western theologian and philosopher offer to modern Islamic thought‘! Is there a need for the contemporary Muslim intelligentsia to learn from outside sources? And, if % umscious and intellectual defence must be made of the Islamic tradition,’” does it mean that Muslims have to live in a state of mental inertia vis-i-vis the impressive Western tradition Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi’ is a Rockefeller Fellow at the Middle Eastern Center, University of Texas at Austin. *Huston Smith, Beyond rhe Post-Mudem Mind. Updated and Revised Edition. New York: Crossroads, 1989. ‘S. H. Nasr, Z s h and rhe Plight of Modem Man (London, 1975), p. 148. Nasr’s full statement on the matter reads as follows: “To conclude, it must be asserted categorically once again that to preserve Islam and Islamic civwtion, a conscious and intellectual defence must be made of the Islamic tradition. Moreclvar, a thorough intellectual criticism must be made of the modem wrld and its shortcomings. Muslims cannot hope to follow the same path as the West without reaching the same impasse or an even worse one, because of the rapidity of the tempo of change today. The Muslim idtelligentsia must face all the changes mentioned here, and many others, with confidence in themselves. They must cease to live in the state of a psychological and cultural sense of inferiority.” Ibid. These broad statements of Nasr on the necessity of presenting Islam as a viable intellectual system form the basis ofthe Islamizadion of Knowledge Project that was initiated by the late Isma‘il al F k - . Ziauddin Sardar s w m u i z e s the main drive behind this Project as follows: “The task before Muslim intelligentsia, then, is to develop, using the epistemology of Islam, alternative paradigms of knowledge for both natural and social sciences and to conceive and mold disciplines most relevant to the needs of contempow Muslim societies. Only when distinctive Islamic paradigms and associated bodies of knowledge have evolved can Muslim scholars contemplate achieving synthesis on an appropriate footing with knowledge created by %stem civilization.” Ziauddin sardar. IslandcRatums: 7he Shape afZ&as to Come (LonQn: Mansell, 1985). p. 104. Sadar, following in the footsteps of Nasr and al Finiqi, contends that a genuine Islamic theory of knowledge rests on mu premises: 1) Concepts, epistemes, and paradigms should receive their “ideational” thrust faom the main sources of Islam-namely the Qur‘an and the Sunnah. 2) A contemporary Islamic theory of kmwledge is Unimaginable outside of the context of “cultural colonialism.” This is best expressed by S d a r who maintains that: The epistemology of Wstern civilization has now become a dominant mode of thought and inquiry to the exclusion of other, alternative ways of knowing. Hence, the totality of Muslim societies, indeed the planet as a whole, is being shaped in the image of Western man. This epistemological imperialism has deep mts going back Over 300 years. Its origins lie in the beginnings of the European colonial adventure and the emergence of scientific ity as the only legitimate method for understanding and controlling nature.” bid., p. 86 236 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences Vol. 7, No. 2, 1990 in philosophy, theology, and other humanistic and social sciences? Finally, what are the intellectual dangers of botrowing from a Western heritage which is diffuse in nature, and which is not free from ideology most of the time? Would we be accused of eclecticism and a lack of historicism?2 Undoubtedly, a major North African philosopher like Abdallah h u i 3 would dismiss the whole theological project of Islam and Christianity, or even the whole theoretical enterprise of comparative religion, as irrelevant, ahistorical, anti-intellectual, nxluctionist, and obstructionist. The same attitude is shared by not a small number of Arab and Muslim social scientists who consider metaphysics a fading religious pastime that should have been driven away from the human mental endeavor long before Kant appeared on the scene. This orientation is sociologically developed by Bassam Tibi in his recent bobk entitled 7he Crisis of Modem Islam: A Reindustrial Culture in the Scientific--Technological Age, where he argues that the only viable approach to Islam in the modern wr ld is the sociological method. Therefore, his aim is not to study the spiritual, philosophical, and social manifestations of Islam in today‘s world, but to understand it, “as it is incorporated into reality as a fait social-that is, a social fact.”4 Metaphysics and the Search for a Method in Religious Studies Prokssor Huston Smith, who sees the validity of the argument that religion is a social fact, argues that the religious question is primarily metaphysical. Thus he offers a “synthetic construct” of religion: metaphysical and social. Put differently, Smith maintains that, transcendentally speaking, religion is a priori and universal; whereas socially spealung, religion is subject to diversity and particularism. It is when we understand his “synthetic argument” that we begin to unravel his conceptual concerns: Smith is troubled by the modern philosophical assertion that truth is made and not found.5 ZIn his controversial philosophical analysis of the predicament of the Arab intelligentsia, Abdallah Laroui argues that, “Arab intellectuals think according to tvm rationales. Most of them profess the traditionalist rationale (salafi); the rest profess an eclecticism. Together, these tendencies succeed in abolishing the historical dimension. But if the intellectual erases history from his thought, can he erase it from reality? Of course not; history as past and present structure informs the present condition of the Arabs quite as much as it does that of their adversaries.” A. Laroui, The Crisis of the Amb Intelligentsia: Tmdtionulism or Historicism? (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), pp. 153-54. 3A. Laroui, L‘ideologie arabe contempomine (Paris, 1967). 4B. Tibi, lhe Crisis of Modem Islam: A preindustrial Culture in the Scientific-Technological 5This notion is examined below. Age (Salt Lake City: University of Utah press, 1988), p. xii. Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi‘ Beyond the Fbst-MocIem Mind Vol. 7, No. 2, 1990 237 What is, therehre, the real intention of the author behind writing such a book?6 And what direction does he follow in justifying his goal? To start with, Smith’s main goal is to show that though the Renaissance dealt a major blow to the religious quest, “religion” is still a philosophical issue. In that sense, the author‘s interpretation and criticism rest on the philosophical and theological tradition in which he places his arguments, so to elucidate the author‘s concepts, one must understand his intellectual framework. Smith is aware of the thmmtical and philosophical underpinnings of the Enlightenment Project and its main architects, be they dead or alive. Smith considers contemporary analytical philosophy in Europe, as well as in the United States, heir to the Enhghtenment Project. In addition to his awareness of the substantial “ideational” threat to theology from analytical philosophy, he is also concerned about the relevance of the religious factor to our social life. His discussion of religious malaise in society is premised on the rupture between religion and society in the secular world. Smith discusses a significant motif in the modem Christian intellectual tradition: the compatibility of the scientific view of human nature with the Christian (religious) one. In that, he follows in the footsteps of Reinhold Niebuhr, who was ambivalent about the progress motif in Western societies. Niebuhr wrote that, ”a further consequence of modem optimism is a philosophy of history expressed in the idea of progress. Either by a force immanent in is a hermeneutical question which is developed by Hans-Georg Gadamer for the Christian tradition, and by Mur Rahman for the Islamic tradition. See Hans-Geoq Gadamer, Tnuh and Method. Second, revised edition (New York Crossroads, 1989), especially part II, and F. Rahman, Islam and Moakrniq: Tmfoormation ofan Intellectual Tdition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982). Gadamer maintains that hermeneutics is necessary because “the literal meaning of Scripture . . . is not univocally intelligible in every place and at every moment.” Ibid., p. 175. But hermeneutics went through a number of structural tran&rmations, especially in the modem period. In this regard, Gadamer notes that, “Hermeneutics had to rid itself one day of all its dogmatic limitations and become free to be itself, so that it could rise to the significance of a universal historical organon.” Ibid., p. 176. Rahman, on the other hand, maintains correctly that the sources of “Islamic intellectualism,” namely the Qur’an and the Sunnah, have to be reinteqmted in light of modern conditions. The hermeneutical method defended by Rahman proposes a process of inteqmtation which “consists of a double movement, from the present situation to Qur’anic times, then back to the present. The Qur’an is the divine response, through the prophets mind, to the moral-sociaI situation of the Prophet’s Arabia, particularly to the problems of commercial Meccan society of his day.” Ibid., p. 5. Therehe, Rahman suggests ahistorial method ofinterpmationthattalresthe complex strucme ofthe Qur‘an, as well as the historical evolution of Islam, into consideration. For a discussion of Gadamer‘s hermeneutics see R. Rorty, Philosophy and the M i m r of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), especially chapter VII [pp. 315-66J where Rorty argues that truth is made aad not found, and that henneneutics is no longer interested in finding truth as much as it is intemted in understanding the human sciences, i.e., philosophy, literary criticism, and religion. 238 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences Vol. 7, No. 2, 1990 nature itself, or by the gradual extension of rationality, or by the elimination of specific sources of evil, such as priesthoods, tyrannical government and class divisions in society, modem man expects to move toward some kind of perfect society. The idea of progress is composed of many elements. It is particularly important to consider one element of which modem culture is itself completely oblivi~us."~ As Smith argues throughout the book, the philosophers of the Renaissance believed f d y in the full possibilities of science. In a sense, they were optimistic about the present and future of mankind. They believed that science will solve man's eternal problems. Progress was the catchword of the 19th century as it was completely associated with industry, democracy. and expansion. In other words, the mentality of the philosophers of science viewed the traditional biblical episteme as a hindrance to the potentialities of the human mind. To their mind, the Christian revelation was interpreted in a stagnant and debilitating manner, and it was time to break away from this 'R. Niebuhr, Zhe Nature and Destiny of Man. Volwne I (New York Scribner's, 1964), p. 24. Niebuhr contends along the same lines of the main 18th and 19th century thinkers that progress is the main feature of the Renaissance. To better understand the historical context in which he places his argument, the following thoughts oftNiebuhr are quoted: "The Renaissance as a spiritual movement is best understood as a tremendous affirmation of the limitless possibilities of human existence, and as a rediscovery of the sense of a meaningful history. This affirmation 'bkes many hrms, not all of which are equally consistent with the fundamental impulse of the movement. But there is enough consistency in the movement as a whole to justify the historian in placing in one historical category such diverse philosophical, religious and social movements as the early Italian Renaissance, Cartesian rationalism and the French enlightenment; as the liberal idea of progress and Marxist catastrophism; as sectarian perfectonism and secular utopianism. In all of these multifarious expressions there is a w i n g principle. It is the impulse towards the fulfillment of life in history. The idea that life can be fulfilled without those memations and qualifications which Biblical and Reformation thought make is derived from two different sources; from the classical confidence in human capacities and from the Biblical-Christian impulse tawards d c a t i o n and the fulfillment of life, more particularly the Biblid-eschatological hope of the fulfillment of history itself." R. Niebuhr, Zhe Nature and Destiny ofha'n, volume II, p. 160. On the notion of progress, see the following important works: J. B. Bury, ZIte Idea of Progress (London, 1924); A. Comte, Course de philosophie positive (Paris, 1835-1852); M. Condonxt, Esquisse d'm tubleau historique de progr& des l'esprit humain (Paris, 1933); H. Spencer, Jllust~'ons of Universal Progress (New York, 1881) E Teggart, Zhe Idea of Progress (Berkeley, 1949); A. J. 'Ibdd, Zheories of Social Progress (New York, 1919). In his Introduction to the classical book on pt.ogress, fiquisse d'm tableau historique des progris de l'esprit hwnain [pp. 2-31, Condorcet says that "Ces observations, sur ce que l'homme a %, sur ce qu'il est aujourd'hui, conduiront ensuite am mcyens d'assUrer et d'ass~rer et d'accelerer les nouveaux p ~ k s que sa nature lui permet d'espker encore. Tel est le but de l'ouvrage que j'ai entrepris, et dont le &sultat sera de montrer, par le raisonnement et par les Edits, que la nature n'a marque aucun terme au perfectionnement des hculks humaines; que la perfectibiliG, d&rmais ind&pendants de toute qui Voudrait les arrester, nont d'autre terme que la d& du globe ou la nature nous a jetes." Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi' Beyond the Post-Modem Mind Vol. 7, No. 2, 1990 239 view to a much more mature one that was capable at emancipating the human mind from the shackles of external and past-oriented revelation. Far from considering revelation a some of spiritual and historical rigidity and stagnation, Smith argues that the Transcendent is the only certain foundation on which man can build his future. In that sense, he agrees with Niebuhr that religion "interprets history from the standpoint of the etemal (i.e., since it sees the source and end of history beyond history), it gives the individual a place to stand within a world of meaning, even when and if the particular historical movement into which he is integrated should Eail completely."8 Smith highlights what he calls "The Revolution in Western Thought" @p. 3-16) in the first chapter of the book. He says that a deep-seated epistemological transformation has taken place in the Western world: "Quietly, irrevocably, something enormous has happened to Western man. His outlook on life and the world has changed so radically that in the perspective of history the tweptieth century is likely to rank-with the fourth century, which witnessed the triumph of Christianity, and the seventeenth, which signaledwe'dawn of godern science-as one of. the very few that have instigated genuinely new, epochs in human thought. In this change, which is still in process, we of the current generation axe playing a crucial but as yet not widely recognized part."9 To put it simply, traditional metaphysics gave way to a new aggressive episbmology which is bas@ on sciedce and the deepening role of the human minli in the affairs of the universe. Smith says that, "no one who works in philosophy today can fail to realize that the sensy'of the cosmos has been shqen by an encyclopedic skepticism. The clearest yidence of this is the coll pse of what historically has been philosophy's k n t d discipline: objective me physics."l0 The scholastic argument about the revelatiodreason polarity, which was an integral part of the intellectual e#viro&ent of the medieval per& and the early Renaissance, is no longer a significant issue today?' H u p ~ n reason has occupied the center of all intellectual endeavor. 3 I *R. Niebuhr, ibid., p. 69. 9H. Smith, Beyond the Post-Modem Mind, Ibid., p. 3. "%id., p. 10. llTo better understand this issue from an Islamic p e r s e v e , consult the follawing: 1) Louis Gardet and M. M. Anawati, Zntmduction la tGologie musulmane (Paris, 1948). 2) Ernest Renan, Averroes et IXvermisme (3rd ed., Paris, 1866). 3) Leon Gauthier, La &one d7bn Rochd (Avemes) sur les mpports de la religion et de la philosophie (Paris, 1909). 4) Leon Gauthier, Scolastique musulmane et scolastique chrhtienne,'' Revue dwistoire de la Philosophie, II '(1928). 5) A. J. Arbeny, Revehtion and Reason in Islam (New York, 1957). The same issue has been raised in both Judaism and Hinduism as *ll: A. Heschel, God in Search of Man (New York, 1%5), and K. S. Murty, Revelation and Reason in h i t a vedanra (London, 1%1). 240 The American J o d of Islamic Social sciences Vol. 7, No. 2, 1990 The continuing rupture between revelation and reason since the dawn of the Industrial Revolution has produced a thoroughly secularized world. In this connection, an analytidal distinction should be drawn between the West and Christianity. The modem West is the product of the process of secularization, whereas the chief assumptions of medieval Christianity are based on the following premises: "Reality is focused in a person, . . . the mechanics of the physical world exceed our comprehension, and . . . the way to our salvation lies not in conquering nature but in following the commandments which God has mded to us.y2 Secuhm& * 'onhasperpetuated an environment of alienation between man and God. Smith maintains that a sense of fragmentation pervades the basic attitudes of Westem man toward life and society: "I have argued that the distinctive feature of the contemporary mind as evidenced by frontier thinking in science, philosophy, theology and the arts is its acceptance of reality as unordered in any objective way that man's mind can discem."13 Smith's response to the prevalent sense of epistemological and social fragmentation in the West is to call for the recovery of its historical and epistemological continuity with its past. The salient features of tradition are stability, focus, foundation, intention, and purpose. Therefore, Smith's intention is not to search for new foundations of knowledge as much as to reestablish the merits and relevance of the old ones. Thus his criticism of the post-modem mind involves a reaffirmaton of a traditional language. He etlcouTages us to look in the reservoir of our accumulated knowledge to find a viable solution to the predicament of modem man. As a consequence, he welcomes all human disciplines from epistemology to deconstruction and hermeneutics if they help us in excavating the deep layers of traditional meaning. He replaces the epistemic rupture, often discussed by Foucault, with a harmonious language and intention. In a sense, Smith is after finding a deep structure for our philosophical investigation. Smith's Concept of the Transcendent and Its Relevance to Modern Islamic Thought Modem Islamic thought has preserved its internal integrity by stressing the importance of the transcendent in the secular environment. Two major modem Muslim thinkers come to mind: Jamal al-Din Afghani and Muhammad 'Abduh. Their premises support the historical continuity and the modern "Smith, ibid., p. 5. 131bid., p. 16. Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi' Beyond the Post-Modern Mind Vol. 7, No. 2, 1990 241 relevance of the traditional "transcendental" discourse and method. They stress "the Islamic model," which draws its theoretical orientation from both the Qur'an and the Sunnah, and which is inspired by the historical experience of the Prophet (SAAS) and his companions. In addition, the questions that Afghani and Abduh raised revolve mainly around doctrinal issues. From their side, the traditional Muslim intelligentsia contends that the doctrinal discourse concerns the purification of the fundamentals of religion. As Henri Laoust puts it: No doctrinal reform is possible without return to an original source. Therefore, the return to the just form of religion, and the affirmation of transcendent truth in a modem setting are the main preoccupations of modem Islamic thought. The traditionalist language and method presuppose either a return to or a rejuvenation of past theological, philosophical, and cultural patterns. In that philosophical context, the Salafiyah movement was born. This movement sought to give birth to Islam in the modem world by re-embodying the early experience of Islam in the present. The concept of "history"-a concept that has an immense and subtle philosophical meaning-is in fact peripheral to modem Salafiyah. As a result, the two basic declared positions of the Salafiyah-the return to an original and unadulterated Islam, and the opening of "the gate of reasoning'" are subject to many problems. Many repmentatives of the modem Salafiyah have approached religious problems outside of a new world context-a context in which industrialization, with its accessory problems, have strongly shaped the rise of new ideas and of socio-economic and political relations. Contemporary Muslim intellectuals, therefore, find themselves face to face with a set of social and historical questions that await a theological answer. Muslim intellectuals remain faithful to their vision of past Muslim history- a vision based on the significant role relevation plays in the process of history. Muslim intellectuals, while reflecting on the traditional Islamic model, cannot seek refuge in isolation; they are required by revelation to participate in the making of present history. Consequently, it should be the task of Muslims, especially the educated ones, to be thoroughly acquainted with both their traditional sources of theology, philosophy, and history, and with the challenges of the modern world. In other mrds, Muslims have to transcend their sense of inferiority vis-&s the West, if there is any, by developing a new discourse that demonstrates complete comprehension of its history, culture, philosophy, and impact on the rest of the world. From this angle, Smith's book and method occupy a unique position since they orient us toward the epistemological mechanisms of the West and how they affect the religious phenomenon. 242 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences Smith and the EnIightenment Project , Vol. 7, NO. 2, 1990 One has to discuss the validity of Smith’s argument in view of the philosophical project of the Enlightenment. The main goal of this project was to introduce a critical rational spirit into what were considered to be dull philosophical arguments of the medieval period. S&th is of the view that the premises of the Enlightenment are dead, but their consequences still survive with us t0day.l4 Two issues are relevant here: nihilism and progress. Smith argues that man need no longer be bound by a nihilistic attitude towards life because the death-off-(;od hmula represents the spirit of a defunct era-the 19th century. The idea of progress, which was also the obsession of 19th century thinkers, has been weakened in the wake of the colossal consequences “J. Habermas comments on the rise of modernity in the West in the following manner: Wegel was the first philosopher to develop a clear concept of modernity. We have to go back to him if we want to understand the internal relationship between modernity and rationality, which, until Max Weber, remained self-evident and which today is being called into question. We have to get clear on the Hegeiian concept of modernity to be able to judge whether the claim of those who base their analyses on other premise is legitimate.” J. Habermas, Ihe Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1987), p. 4. There is no doubt that Hegel [1770-1831] was a highly influential ”idealistic philosopher, and @this philosophy provided moral and intellectuaLlegitjmacy to German f8scism, especially in this centmy. Hegel’s systematic treatment of “objective universal xeasof in his ~ m e n o b g y of Mind, and his Lectures on the Philosophy of History reinforced the modem fascist notion that the@rer was simply fulfilling the objectives of 3miversal reason,” andLthat the individual members of society had to succumb to this reality. Hegel’s political philosophy justified the Prussian state at the time as the only viable moral force in society. K. Popper has severely criticized the kc i s t elements in Hegelian philosophy: “Hegel rediscovered the Platonic ideas which lie behind the pew revolt against freedom and xeason. Hegelianism is the renaissance of tribalism. The historical significance of Hegel may be Seen in the fact that he represents the ‘missing link,’ as it were, between Plato and the modem form of totalitarianism. Most of the modem totalitarians are quite unaware that their ideas can be traced back to Plato. But many know of their indebtedness to Hegel, and all of them have been brought up in the close atmosphere of Hegelianism. They have been taught to worship the state, history, and the nation.” Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies: Wume 2 (princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 30-31. One proper connection could be made here between the views of Huston Smith, Jurgen Habermas, and Karl Popper. “hq all share the notion that modernity is still a dominant force in today‘s societies and that its mots are mainly philosophical, and that Hegel has been the single most influential philosopher in the modem period. Therefore, if the goal is to transcend modernity and postmodernity, one has also to transcend the moral and intellectual underpinnings of these two phenomena. For work on the social and political philosophy of Hegel, consult the following: M. B. Foster, Ihe Politicd Philosophies of Plat0 and Hegel (Oxford, 1935); E. Wed, Hegel et litat (Paris, 1950); A. Peperzak, Le Jeune Hegel et la vision m o d du mona‘e (The Hague, 1960). On Hegl’s phenomenology, see the following important book: J. Hyppolite, Geneses et structure de la Phenomenologie de 1Ekprit de Hegel (Paris, 1946). Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi' Beyond the Post-Modern Mind Vol. 7, No. 2, 1990 243 of two world wars. The question is how to examine the premises and orientations of nihilism and progress in a world that is in need of a refbrmuhtion of its thought structure. Metaphysics and Historicism What is historicism? And is it relevant to our philosophical debates? It is possible to argue that historicism is a critical and theoretical formulation, or a historical method which treats concepts, standards, and presuppositions in their historical context. For that purpose, historicism pursues "a complex reconstruction of the various intellectual expressions. Philosophical reflection, for the historicists, is no exception to these historical limitations. Consistently, historicism treats its own interests as bounded by interests, assumptions, and context."15 In this sense, concepts and ideas cannot float in a vacuum; they must be discussed in a historical context. Does Smith object to the above-mentioned formulation of historicism? He recognizes historical and socid influences on religion. But, like Karl Popper, hk would like to transcend the social and historical domain and investigate the metaphysical sources of knowledge. In that sense, his understanding of historicism is similar to the one presented by Popper: "I mean by 'historicism' an approach to the social sciences which assumes that historical prediction is their principal aim, and which assumes that this aim is attainable by discovering the 'rhythms' or the 'patterns,' the 'laws' or the 'trends' that underlie the evolution of history."16 There is no doubt that what Popper is attacking here is the epistemological foundation of Marxist historiography which, to his mind, makes false predictions about the future. My main concern, methodologically speaking, is to show that the sciences of metaphysics and history interwined could perpetuate an ontological theoretical position which might help reintegrate man into both revelation and society at once." A refutation of historicism a$ a social and historical 15R. DAmico, Historicism and Knowledge (New York Routledge. 1989), p. xi. 16K. Popper, Z?E Fbverty of Historicism (New York: Harper, 1953, p. 3. "The following a~ major sources on historicism: D. Collii, Rmaissance Historicism: Selectionsfrom English Litemry Renaissance (Amherst: Univ. of MA Ress, 1987); F. Engel- Janosi, "The Growth of German Histori&sm," Johnr HopRinr university Studjes in History MdpblitimlScience, Series 62 (l944); E. Fackenheim, Mctaplrysics and Hisloricity (Mil&. Marque& University Press, 1%1; Q. Iggers, 7he Genmn Concepzioon ofHistory (Mia-: Wesleyan University Press, 1%8); F. Hayek, *Scientism and the Study of Society: The Historicism $ the Scientistic Approach: in IhC Counter-Rewl#lion of Science (1951); I. , lm; 1. -9 Z?E Methodology o f S c i m ! c Research Pmgnammes; l%ilosophical PbpGTS, W. I. mew Yo&: Cambridge University Press, 1978); D. Lee and R. Beck, "he hkanhg ofwistoriciSm: Johansson, A Critique OfKarl -perk Methoddogy (Oslo: 244 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences Vol. 7, No. 2, 1990 method could simply mean a refutation of realism in religion and society, which I consider not to be the position of Huston Smith. Academia, Westernization, and the Third World Chapter five, entitled “Flakes of Fire, Handfd of Light: The Humanities as Uncontrolled Experiment” @p. 114-32), is perhaps his most challenging section of the book. Smith proposes that the crisis of the humanities as an academic and intellectual phenomenon is pervasive, and the critical predilections of the Western mind have produced widespread dissatisfaction and alienation. Smith defines the humanities as the custodians of the human image, an image which, from a monotheistic point of view, is created in the fashion of God. The humanities carry two burdens: social and conceptual. Their social goal should be to facilitate the social interaction between man and man and man and God. Instead, advanced industrial societies are marked by a spiritual malaise which is the main cause of today’s alienation. Alienation could be simply defined as the loss of vitality in man. Niebuhr, for instance, defines vitality as the ability of man to transcend his limiting physical and cultural environment by achieving a measure of unity with the divine. Alienation as the loss of vitality can be both internal and external. Internally, it manifests itself as a rupture-a split between man’s mind and spirit. Externally, it is part and parcel of the loneliness and estrangement that characterizes the overpopulated modem world. The conceptual aim of the humanities should be to introduce the student to a holistic, humanistic view of life. The academic division of labor, however, has made this task in recent years difficult. What Smith is tackling behind all of this is the impact of modernization on the Western mind. He certainly believes that this impact has been deep and negative. However, what he neglects to discuss meaningfully is the impact of Western modernization on the primordial traditions of the Third World. Any cursory reading of the historical consequences of Europe’s industrialization since the 16th century could meal two facts: first, the triumph American Historical Review, V. 59 (1953-54), 568-77; M. Mandelbaum, 27W Problem of Historical Knowledge (New York: Liveright Publishing, 1938); H. Marcuse, “Karl Popper and the Problem of Historical Laws,” in his Studies in Critical Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Press, 19?2), pp. 191-208; H. Marcuse, Hegel’s ontology and the Iheory of Historicity (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987); K. Popper, Ihe Open Society and Its Enemies. 2 Volumes. (princeton: Princeton University Press, 1%2); K. Popper, 27W h r f y OfHistoricism; P. kd, Ihe G e m Enlighfenment and the Rise of Historicism (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975); D. Roberts, Benedetto Cmce and the Uses of Historicism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); R. D’amico, Historicism and Knowledge (New York: Routledge, 1989). Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi‘ Beyond the hst-Modern Mind Vol. 7, No. 2, 1990 245 of the scientific mentality of the Renaissance, and second, the rupture this triumph produced between tradition and modernity. One could argue that the impact of Western modernization on Third World religions and cultures has been destructive mainly because of the political stagnation of many Third World societies in the period preceding Western penetration. At the conceptual level, there is a pervasive dichotomy between traditional concepts and newly- imported concepts. Furthermore, this dichotomy has given rise to a widespread social rupture. Take, for example, the nature and the function of the intelligentsia in the Muslim world. Some take the Islamic revelation and the Muslim intellectual achievement throughout the ages as their point of rek~nce; others neglect that total tradition and claim that the intellectual achievements of Muslims in the past are incompatible with the demands and conditions of the present. The solution that Smith gives to the “conceptual chaos” of today’s world is ontologicalepistemological. A thinker should be able to erect the conceptual foundations of a discipline epistemologically, and should, at the same time, share in the creative process ontologically. Detached/engaged duality should characterize the modem builders of systems of thought. The following quotation from Tillich could succintly summarize Smith’s methodology: “epistemology, the knowledge of knowing, is a part of ontology, the knowledge of being, for knowing is an event within the totality of events. Every epistemological assertion is implicitly ontological. Therefore, it is more adequate to begin an analysis of existence with the question of being rather than with the problem of knowledge.”18 Smith argues implicitly that the problem of the West is its lap. Tillich, Systematic Iheology, Volume Z (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 71. Paul Tiiich (1883-1965) is an eminent theologian of this century. Though his writing was mainly intended for a Western Christian audience, the educated Muslim cannot afford to miss two significant features about Tiiich’s inquiry into theological and philosophical questions: method and information. Tiiich’s method, which is distinguished by a superb clarity of style and analytical ingenuity, sums up the achievements of one of the greatest minds of our century. Description, interpretation, and systemimtion of knowledge, as well as the addition of historical and philosophical insights weave his methodological approach into a passionate and rich synthesis of arguments and concepts. It is no exaggeration to state that the intellectual vitaIity a reader might derive from reading Tillich’s various works could generate essential ideas about the diffexent disciplines of human knowledge-philosophy, theology, history, anthropology, and soCiology. The following are important sources on Tiiich’s theology and philosophy: J. L. Adams, Paul lillich’s Philosophy of Culture, Science and Religion (New York: Harper and Row, 1956); D. M. Brown, Ultimate Concern: lillich in Dialogue (New York: Harper and Row, 1950). M. Eliade, “Paul Tillich and the History of Religions,” The Fumre of Religions, Paul Tiiich (New York Harper and Row, 1966), pp. 31-36; I. Fagre, “Revelation and the Thought of Paul Tiilich: A Study of Tiiich’s Concept of Revelation in VoIume I of his Systematic Theology,” Theological Journal of Japan Lutheran Theological College, No. 2 (1%7), pp. 44-70; R. E. Fitch, “The Social Philosophy of Paul Tiiich,” Religion in Life, Vol. 27 (Spring 1958), pp. 247-56; J. Gill, “€?id Tillich’s Religious Epistemology,” 246 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences Vbl. 7, No. 2, 1990 divorce of epistemology from ontology, and that the proper reconstruction of the essential connection between being and knowledge entails a holistic approach that begins with the question of transcendence. Smith, however, fails to WoTk out a thmugh reconstruction of theology as an a priori hundation of the human and social sciences. In other words, he keeps ref- to transcendence as the mot of human howledge without paying sufficient attention to revelation, which is the cornerstone of the three monotheistic religions. Philosophy and the Role of the Theologian As an engaged philosopher, H. Smith is disturbed by what he calls the crisis in Western philosophy (chapter 6). He says that the practitioners of philosophy in the West seem to have lost their ultimate point of reference. Philosophical systems appear, and others collapse. What accounts for the mess in Western philosophy? Smith identifies the situation as follows: y~hilosophy . . . seems to be a singular mess, one evidence being the numkr of influential philosophers who see no future for the discipline, or at most a minimal 0ne.”19 Philosophers do not play the same leading role in modern culture as in the past, especially when philosophy and theology were allies. Smith states correctly that “philosophers were the ones who were qualified to monitor the conceptual foundations of culture’s components, validating where appropriate, debunking where not.”2o He calls for the reintegration of philosophical assumptions in a holistic e t e m of knowledge that includes the social sciences, as well as the humanities. Smith is, however, not quite explicit about the future relationship between Religious Studies, Vol. 3 (April, 1%8), pp. 477-98; D. H. Kelsey, Ihe a r i c of Paul lillich’s Zheology (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1%7); W. Leibrecht, ed., Religion and Culture: EFsays in Honor o f k u l Zillich (New York Harper and Row, 1959); B. Martin, “Paul Tillich and Judaism,” Judaism, Vol. 15 (Spring 1966), pp. 180-88; A. J. McKelway, Zhe System.c Zheology ofPaul Zillich (New York: Dell, 1964); H. Meynell, Tdlich’s Theological Method,” Zhe New Zheology and Modem l’heologim (London: H. Meynell, 1%7), pp. 137-56, R. S. Misra, “The Concep of Reason in the Systematic Theology of Paul Tiiich,” Religion and Society (Bangalorehdia), vol. 13, no. 2, (196@, pp. 15-33; R. P. Scharlemann, ‘Scope of Systematics: An Analysis of Tdlich’s ’ILVO Systems,” Journal ofReligion, Vbl. 48 (April 1%8), pp. 136-49; H. Veatch, Tillich’s Distinction Between Metaphysics and Theology: Mew of Metaphysics, wl. 10(3), March 1957, pp. 529-33; and D. Weisser, ed., Paul Zillich in Catholic lhorcghr (New Yo& Doubleday, 1969). 19Smith, ibid., p. 133. 2oIbid., p. 138. Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi' Beyond the Post-Modem Mind Vol. 7, No. 2, 1990 247 philosophy and theology. Tillich, for instance, in discussing the connection between philosophy and theology, inquires about the nature of both. He says that "philosophy and theology ask the question of being. But they ask it from different perspectives. Philosophy deals with the structure of being in itself; theology deals with the meaning of being for us."21 Smith is at his best as a theologian. Not only is he aware of theological and philosophical trends; he is also conscious of the value of social science contributions to religion. In this sense, he shares the concerns of many anthropologists and sociologists of religion such as C. G e e r t ~ , ~ ~ E. Gellner,23 B. W d s ~ n , ~ * P. Berger,25 and their teachers E. DurkheimZ6 and M. we be^^' Two main assumptions about the religious phenomenon characterize the work of these people, including Smith's: First, instead of diminishing in importance as a result of the encroachment of science and technology, religion has become highly differentiated and functional. Second, religion is responsible for the ultimate meaning in human life. For instance, in his celebrated essay on "Religion as a Cultural System," Clifford Geerk defines religion in the hllowing IlP. Tdlich, ibid., p. 22. 12See the following books by C. Geertz: The Religion of Java (New York: Free Press, 1960); Islam Observed: Religious Datelopment in Morocco and Indonesia (Stanford: Yale University Press, 1968); The Interpretation of Cultures (New York Basic Books, 1973); Wbrks and Lives: The Anthropologist as Author (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988). In his Works and Lives, Geertz reflects on the art of writing. Here he tries to develop a style of writing that is reflective of the power of ideas, which are, in turn, derived from all the fields of the human intellectual endeavor: philosophy, sociology, anthropology, history, political science, literature, and even mathematics. Geertz draws a distinction between authors and writers. The former are founders of systems of knowledge, whereas the latter are producers of books. This distinction is particularly important in the case of Muslim writers since many of them are producers of books and not authors of systems of knowledge. "See the following works by Ernest Gellner: Culture, Identity, and Politics (London: Cambridge University Press, 1987), and his edited work titled, Islamic Dilemmas: Reformers, Nationalists and Industrialization: The Southern Shore of the Meditermnean (Berlin, 1985). 14See the following works by the British sociologist Bryan Wilson: Contempomry Tmnsformations of Religion (Oxford University Press, 1976); Magic and the Millennium: A Sociological Study of Religious Movements (New York: Harper, 1973); and "The Return of the Sacred," Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 18(3), September 1979, pp. 268-80. 15See the following works by Peter Berger: The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion (New York: Doubleday, 1969); A Rumor of Angels (New York: Doubleday, 1973); The Homeless Mind: Modernization and Consciousness (New York: Random House, 1973). 16See the following works by E. Durkheim: Les Rigles de la &tWe sociologique (Paris, 1895) (The Rules of Sociological Method Glencoe, 1950); Les Formes klimentaires de la vie religieuse (Paris, 1912) (The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, London, 1915); Sociologie et Philosophie (Paris, 1924). 27See the following works by Max Weber: The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York: Scribner, 1958), and The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1964). 248 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences Vol. 7, No. 2, 1990 terms: %@on is: (1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in man by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of hctuality that (5) the moods of motivations seem uniquely realistic.”z8 To Smith religion cannot be ignored because, “[it] has been revolutionary and conservative, prophetic and priestly, catalyst and incubus. It creates barriers and levels them, raises church budgets and raises the oppressed, makes peace with inequity and redeems, to some extent, the world.”29 Religion has even prospered in the context of secularization: “As societies grew more complex, ‘differentiation’ set in, with religious and secular institutions assuming different functions. Indeed religious and worldly components of the individual psyche came to be differentiated. But this process, which some might call secularization, does not necessarily mean that religion is becoming less significant. In a world of specialists, religious specialists may be as credible as any other. Indeed, the fact that religion is increasingly individualized, and in a pluralistic world a matter of individual choice, serves to make it more important to an individual as such than when it was a more or less automatic part of tribal life. Further, religion’s moral influence on seemingly secular institutions such as business and politics in a nation with a religious heritage may be indirect, but cannot be di~counted.”~~ Therefore, religion is both socially relevant and metaphysically based. In a sense, Smith agrees with William James, one of the main architects of modem pragmatism in American philosophy, that religion is not only transcendent and abstract but pragmatic and socially useful.31 Smith’s main point of reference is the metaphysical and historical experiment of monotheistic religions - Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Consequently, he presents religion as a two-dimensional relationship: The first is the subjective relation between God and man and the second is the social one between man and man. In this connection, Smith says: “Religion began in the individual‘s direct relationship with the transhistorical and ultimate-God by whatsoever name. From this inviolate starting point and continuing center, it has proceeded to shoulder, successively, concern for ~~~ ~ 28C. Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures; ibid., p. 90. 29Smith, ibid., p. 185. 30R. Ellwood, Jr., “Modern Religion as Folk Religion,” in Modernity Md Religion, edited 3 e e William James, Pmgmutim: A New Name for Some Old Hllys of Zhinking (London: by W. Nicholls (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University, 1987), pp. 23-24. Longmans, 19l3), especially Chapter VIII, pp. 273-301. Ibrahim M. AbU-Mi' Beyond the Post-Modem Mind Vol. 7, No. 2, 1990 249 interpersonal relations and society's institutions and structures. To live up to its calling, it must now add to these agendas, concern for other species and life's sustaining en~ironment."~~ Smith argues that the epistemological hundations of the modem West have blocked out truth. He defines the Western mindset as "an epistemology that aims relentlessly at control, and thereby rules out the possibility of transcendence in principle."33 As a result, this mindset is reductionist, mainly because it does not conceive of the world as an a priori creation of the transcendent power. Smith defines reductionism as an attempt to explain all phenomena by means of matter. According to Smith, the modem Westem mindset presents the following assumptions: first, history can be controlled. Second, happiness can be bestowed. Third, truth is instrumental, or as Rorty has put it, truth is made and is not found. Though Smith does not expect the Westem mindset "to collapse in the way an avalanche of snow periodically slides off a he suggests a new way of life to be based on participation, intuitive discernment, transcendence, and fulfillment. In short, Smith searches for social engagement on the basis of transcendence. As a result, it is possible to describe Smith's method of analysis as that of philosophical theology. From the foregoing, we can conclude that Smith's conception of human nature rests on the society/transcendence polarity. In other words, man (1) is the product of culture, and (2) is a spirit that possesses the ability to transcend. As a product of culture, man makes tools-both physical and conceptual -that connect him with reality. In other words, meaning and inner direction (telos) is at the center of man's existence. We can summarize Smith's discussion of the monotheistic view of man in the following epistemological 5 ) God is transcendent and He is the Source. God is not only reason, but vitality and the source of all existence. Everythmg outside of God is contingent upon God-the world, animals, and man. Man is f ~ t e in both body and spirit-a) dualism in unity, and b) man is made in the image of God. Therefore, we have to understand man from the vantage point of God and not reason. Man is distinguished by his rational ability-by his ability to make conceptual tools, and his capacity to transcend himself. 32Smith, bid., p. 193. 331bid., p. 200. Ybid., p. 227. 250 ‘The American Journal of Islamic Soeial Sciences vol. 7, No. 2, 1990 6) 7 Man is distinguished by self-consciousness. God revealed himself in history. It is historical selfdiwl- in the form of Christ. This is where history cenkrs. Human history derives meaning from these revelations. Man is a unity of will-it is altogether the will of God. Man’s essence is free self-determination, but man is a sinner and his sin is the wrong use of his will which leads to destruction. Sin is a priori and universal. 8) 9) Opposed to the aforementioned view of man is the modem view which was born in the wake of the Renaissance. The Renaissance premises rested on the unlimited innate ability of man to rationally transcend the human predicament. The Renaissance as a collective ideological and social phenomenon was responsible for the annihilation of preindustrial social structures, and especially the intellectual underpinnings of these structures. The traditional ambiance of harmony between man aqd nature was no longer viable after the eruption of the Renaissance. One implicit assumption that Smith provides throughout his discussion is the necessity of human engagement as an alternative to the crisis of orientation and spiritual malaise in Western societies. A key concept in elucidating “engagement” is ontology, which is simply defined as the science of being. The term ”being” means the whole of human reality: the structure, the meaning, and the aim of existence. In that sense, the ontological elements can be classified in the following terms: 1) Vitality and Form. Vitality is equated with dynamics. Man’s essential substance, which according to Smith is spiritual, is dynamic. In the Christian sense, this dynamism reaches out beyond nature and society because of man’s capacity fbr transcendence. This transcendence is conditioned by man’s will which, ideally spealung, should be derived from W$. Man’s dynamic interaction with reality is a complex process that leads to continuous self- growth and self-consciousness. Man is distinguished from animals by consciousness. In addition to dYna;mics and ‘form, man is distinguished by vitality and intentionality. Intentionality presupposes an inner aim (telos), and telos is the source of social dynamics and growth. Ihtentiodity is defined as a human capacity to relate to meanmgful structures, live in universals, grasp and shape reality. In other words, man is distinguished by his abiIity to create technical as well as conceptual tools that relate him to reality in. its inclusive sense. 2) Freedom and Destiny. This is the second hrprtant polarity in human existence. Thmlogicdy speaking, freedom is as important to man as reason. Freedom presupposes the idea dxespnsibility, and ksponsibility pnmqpms destiny. Freedom is the freedom of the function3or will of man. He is free firahii M. Abu-Rabi’ Beyond the Post-Modern Mind b l . 7, No. 2, 1990 251 to function because he possesses a complete rational self. Freedom is experienced as deliberation, decision, and nqonsibfity. These three elements of M o m constitute man’s destiny. Destiny has two constitutive elements: social and ,transcendental. 3) Individualization and Participation. Man is distinguished by telos, the inner aim, which is the basis of his process of actualization. Christianity has granted man, every man, the possibility of participation in the will of God. Therefore, participation is essential for the individual, and not accidental. This participation guarantees the relational aspect of human life: man is related to God and to other beings.35 Beyond the Postmodern Mind? What is the condition of postmodernity? Smith comments on this by saying that: “Whereas in the past people argued and battled over which view of reality was true, the Postmodern position is that none are true.”36 In short, postmodernity argues that there are multiple realities that are not necessarily related. Postmodernism emerged both as “an academic movement” and as a political movement. Smith discusses theoretical holism as well as practical holism: “Theoretical holism argues for the organic character of thought: concepts cannot be understood in isolation; their meaning derives from the theoretical systems in which they are embedded. Practical holism goes on from theE to argue that, because thmlung invariably proceeds in social contexts and against a backdrop of social practices, meaning derives from-mots down into and draws its life from-those backgrounds and contexts.”37 It is clear that modern and postmodern writers and thinkers3* have 3 5 F ~ r a more comprehensive statement on the meaning of social existence and the sources of vitality in man’s life, consult the second volume of Paul Tillich’s Systemutic Zheology mentioned earlier. 361bid., p. 233. 371bid., pp. 233-34. 38The following is a select bibliography on the meaning and history of modernism in both the West and Islam: 1) Modernity and Western Thought: P. Ackroyd, Notes For u New Culture: An Essay on Modernism (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1976); B. Andrew (ed.), The Problems of Modernity: Morno and Benjamin (New York: Routledge, 1989); C. Baudouin, lk Myth of Modemiry (London: Allen and Unwin, 1950); D. Bell, Z%e Cultuml Conmdia*ons of capiralism (New York: Basic Books, 1976); P. Berger, Facing up to Modernity (New York: Basic Books, 1977); M. Berman, All Z k t Is Solid Melts Into Air: Z?ze Experience of Moakrnity (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982); R. Bernstein, Hubermus on Modernity (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985); J. Collins, Uncommon Cultures: Populur Culture and Post-modemism (New York: Routledge, 1989); H. Foster, (ed.), Zhe Anti-Aesthetic: Ersays on poshodern Culture (Port Townsend Washington: Bay Press, 1983); D. FFisby, Fmgments of Modernity: lkories of 252 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences Vd. 7, No. 2, 1990 confronted and tried to deal with the overwhelming sense of fragmentation and chaotic change that accompanied the Industrial Revolution. This is the reaction of such people as Luther, Mam, Nietzsche, Hegel, Goethe, Eliot, and Dostoevski. All these writers left behind them grand theories about life and society. Hegel, for instance, was a grand theoretician who saw life in a total, comprehensive way. His embracing vision came in response to fragmentation. In a sense, Hegel wanted to find meaning in totality. But many modern writers have noticed or recognized that the only secure thing about modernity is its insecurity; it is in a state of flux all the time. This state of flux is what defmes the main nature of postmodernity. There are even more rapid. changes now than before. In this sense, we could say that postmodernity is the continuation of modernity. The project of modernity is centered around the machine; whereas the project of postmodernity is centered around the computer. The project of modernity created formalism in art and rationalism in philosophy. It tried to create a new language, so to speak. Because of its ability to mass produce, the age of modernity obliterated the distinction between high culture and low culture. Modernity in the Wrks of Simmel, Kmcaver, und Benjamin (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985); S. Gablik, Has Modernism Railed? (New York Thames and Hudson, 1984); C. Grana, Modem*ty und Its Discontents: French Society und the French Man ofL.#ers in the Nineteenth Cenmry (New York: Harper and Row, 1967); R. Gray, Ihe Imperutive of Modernity: An Intellemu1 Biogmphy of Ortegu y Garset (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); A. Huyssen, @r the Great Divide: Modemism, Mass Culture, Post-Modemism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986); F. Jameson, “Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism,” New L.t$ M e w , Number 146, July-August 1984, pp. 53-94; A. Kaplan, Rocking Around the Clock: Music Television, Postmodemism, und Consumer Culntre (New York: Methuen, 1987); D. Kolb, The Critique offire Modernity: Hegel, Heidggerand After (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986); Jean-Francois Lyotard, Zhe Post-Modem condition: A Report on Kiwwledge (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984); S. A. McKnight, sacmlizing the Secular: Zhe Renaissance Origins ofM&mity (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1989); A. Megill, Prophets of Extremity: Niettrche, Heidegger, fiucault, Derriaia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); W. Nicholls (ed.), Modernity und Religion (Waterloo, Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1987); T. kiss , Zhe Discourse of Modernism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982); A Ross (ed.), Universul Abandon? Zhe Politics ofpbst-modernism ( M i i l i s ; University of M m Press, 1988); and G. Vittho, Ihe End of Modernity: Nihilism and Henneneutics in Postmodem Culture (Baltimore: The Johng Hopkins University Press, 1989). 11) Modernity and Modern Islamic Thought: C. Adams, Islam andM&mism in E g p t (London: Oxford University Press, 1933); Adonis (‘Ali Ahmad Sa‘id), ul-Zhbit uwl Mutahuwwil, 3 volumes (Beirut: Dar al-Awiah, 19741979); J. Ahmad, Zhe Inteuencal Origins of Egyptian Natimlism (London: Oxford University Press, 1960); M. Arhun, la Pensie ambe (Paris: Vrin, 1975); M. Arkoun, Essai sur la pensie islamique (Paris: Vrin, 19n); Binder, L., Islamic Libemlism: Critique of Development Ideologies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988). See the following critical review of this book by the author: Ibrahim Ibrahii M. Abu-Rabi‘ Beyond the Post-Modem Mind Vol. 7, No. 2, 1990 253 Modernity had to confront the psychological, technical, sociological, and political problems of massive urbanization. It was the art of cities. In modernity, both poor and rich moved into the cities. In postmodernity, the rich were the first to escape from the cities. The urban poor, homekssness, and social poverty are the salient features of the age of postmodernity. As mentioned above, the idea of progress was one of the most distinguishing features of the project of modernity. Nihilism, on the other hand, ushered us into the age of postmodernity. As a philosophical movement, nihilism is simply translated as the loss of a spiritual center. How did modernity deal with disaster? We know that the idea of progress in the West was responsible for the immense devastation that resulted from two world wars. I think that modernity, in an attempt to defend itself, resorted M. Abu-Rabi; “Is Liberalism in the Muslim Middle East Viable? A Critical Essay on Leonard Binder’s Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies,” Iiamdard Islamicus Vol. XII (4), Winter 1989, pp. 15-30; C. Bouamame, la Probl th de la liberti humaine alms la pe&e murulmane (Paris: VM, 1978); H. Djait, La persomliti et le devenir ambo-islamque (Paris: Vrin, 1974); H. Gibb, Modern Trends in Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947); Y. Haddad, Contempomry Islam and the challenge 0fHistory (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982); H. Hanafi, n e Origin of Modern Conservatism and Islamic FirndamenraIism in Egpt (Amsterdam, 1979); H. Hanafi, ‘Des Idblogies Modemistes llslam Revolutionnaire,” Peuples Medite&ens 21, October-December, 1982; A. Hourani, Ambic nought in the Libeml Age, 1798-1939 (London: Oxford University Press, 1970); T. Husayn, n e Future of Culture in Egpt (Cairo, 1936); M. Imarah, %yy&it al-jikr a l - i s h - a l - W t h (Trends of Modem Islamic Thought) (Cairo, 1987); M. Jabin, al-Khi@ al- hmbi al-mu‘@ir (Contemporary Arabic Discourse) (Beirut, 1982); M. Jabiri, IshkiilryrIt al-jkr al- bmbi al- mu‘@ir (The Problematics of Contemporary Arabic Thought) (Beirut: Mar& Dirk& al- W+dah al-‘Arabiyah, 1989); F. Jada’an, U$il al-taq&um ‘ i d mufhkkin al-isliimji‘l ‘dam al- zlmbi a l - W t h (Principles of Progress As Viewed by Muslim Thinkers in the Modem Arab World) (Beirut, 1970); M. Lahbabi, Le personalisme musdman (Paris: Vrin, 1962); M. Lahbabi, Le mnde de dewin: Le Tiers-mnde accuse (Casablanca: Sherbmke, 1980); H. Laoust, “Le Reformisme orthodoxe des “Salafiyya,” et les cara&res generaux de son organisation actuelle,” Revue des Z h l e s Islamiques VI: 175-224 (1932); A. Laroui, Islam et modernit; (Paris: Editions La Decouverte, 1987); S. Mahmassani, “Muslims: Decadence and Renaissance-Adaptation of Islamic Jurisprudence to Modem Social Needs,’’ 27w Muslim ubrld XLIV: 186-201 (1954); Z. Mahmud, %.did al-$kr al- hmbl, (Renewal of Arabic Thought) (Beirut: D k al-Shuniq, 19n); R. Martin (ed.), Appmches to Islam in Religious Studies (’hcson: University of Arizona Press, 1985); R. Mitchell, 27w Society of the Muslim Brothers (London: Oxford University) Press, 1969). F. Rahman, Islam and Modernity: Tmformation of an Intellectual Tdition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); F. Rahman, “Roots of Islamic Neo-Fundamentalism,” in Change and the Muslim ubrld, edited by P. Stoddard (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981); E. Said, Orientalism (New York, 1978); H. Sharabi, A m b Intellectuals and the Wst: Ihe Ibrmative Ears. 18751914 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970); J. Waardenburg, Llslam alms le mimir de l‘Occi&nt (The Hague: Mouton and Co., 1963); and A. &in, ”Beyond Ideology and Theology: The Search for the Anthropology of Islam,” Annuul Raiao Of Anthmpology 6, 1977 224-54. 254 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences Vol. 7, No. 2, 1990 to mythology: the m t against hcism in both Germany and Italy was depicted as a fight to defend Western democracy and civilization. There is no doubt that both Eascism and democracy were the product of modernity. The same occurred in Vietnam: The myth was to defend 'democracy. How can one do that when the devastating effects of modem advanced technology were unleashed against a peasant culture? This is still the major preoccupation of postmodern American movies. In order to better illustrate the main features of modernism, postmodernism, and beyond postmodernism, I have constructed the following schematic table:39 Modernism art objedfinished work centralization class sruggle construction culture famil y-orientation form hermeneutics hierarchy high culture histoire industrial interpretation/reading paranoia patriarchy power presence progress PUP* revolt narrative/grande histoire state power religion theory Postmodernism process, performance decentralization gender and ethnic struggle deconstruction subculture( s) social separatedness antiform nihilism anarchy low culture post-histoire post-industrial against inter. /misreading schizophrenia women's liberation multiplicity of power absence devastation PlaY uprising( s) anti-narrative/petit histoire corporate power paradigm sects 391 am indebted for the idea behind this table and some of its contents to Ihab Hassan, Zhe Postmodern Turn: Essays in Fbstmdern lheory and Culture (Columbus: Ohio University Press, 19871, p. 91. Ibrahim M. AbU-RSbi' Modernism colonization modernization Westernization stagnation of tradition ' traditional culture Beyond the hst-Modem Mind Vol. 7, No. 2, 1990 255 Third world Postmodemism nation-state opendmr policy Americanization tradition vs. modernity liberalism It is to be noted that one of the most significant features of "beyond postmodernism" 'is the resurgence of religion in both industrial and peasant societies. This phenomenon has clearly dominated the Islamic discourse, at least in the past two decades. Consequently, we can assume that Smith's call for transcending the post-modem mind is actually a call for return to the origins, or return to the pre-modern and traditional structure of thought and behavior. Conclusions Huston Smith treatf the reljgiaus quest as a universal spiritual phenomenon that has both objective historical form and a personal/mystical subjective form. Though his analysis does not dwell on Islam as a major religious phen~menon,~~ he understands its sources of vitality-both spiritual and historicaC M o w e r , Muslim intellectuals can learn from his treatment of the meaning, nam, orientation, and the role of relig~on in complex societies. Smith's approach is asociological, though he is not against a sociological interpretation of relqgon. One needs to elabomte such major themes as society, human existence, and human intentions as a means of understanding the connection between the sacred and the secular. Just like the German thinker Paul Tillich, Smith is on the boundary between philosophy and He uses philosophical concepts as a means '"He does, however, have a chapter on Islam in his book Z?te Religions O f M m , to be Wee P. Tdlich, On the Boundary: An Aurobiogmphical sketch (New York: Scribner, l966). Ti& aninaim that%nyme standirtgonthebouadary ~ t f i e o l o g y and philosophy must necessanl ' y develop a clear COIlception of the logical relationship beiween them. . . . I ansunered by classifying dof the methodological disciplines as scicmxs ofthink@, being, that the lindalim ofthe *k systema€sciences is the a n d c u l m ; b y ~ of meaning; by defhing metaphysics as the attempt to expnss the Unconditioned in tern o f r a t i o n a l ~ a n d b y ~ d w l o g y a s t b e o n o m o u s ~ ~ . I n t h i s w a y I a t t e m p t e d to win a place for theology within the totality of human lolawledge." (Ibii, p. 55). In his reissued in 1991 as Zbe Great Religions. . . .