id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentence	flesch	summary	cache	txt
ajm-1880	Park, Young	Optimal Incentive Contracts, Common Uncertainty, and Intrinsic Value	2016	18	.pdf	application/pdf	8768	433	48	Optimal Incentive Contracts, Common Uncertainty, and Intrinsic Value Young Park Southern Connecticut State University This paper concerns the optimal use of incentive contracts in a multiple agent situation where moral hazard problems are issues. Researchers have been interested in investigating these special forms of incentive contracts because the above observed phenomena make a puzzle; neither the team-based contract nor the relative performance contract are consistent with the principle of the responsibility accounting, which states that a worker should be evaluated and compensated only on the basis of those factors that he/she is responsible for and controls over.	cache/ajm-1880.pdf	txt/ajm-1880.txt