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THE SCOPE OF EVOLUTIONARY EXPLANATIONS 

 

Andrew Werth  
Department of Biology, Hampden-Sydney College 

 

 

Abstract: This paper explores the limits of evolutionary explanations (EEs) in explaining human behavior. It 

begins by discussing the philosophical debate between Daniel Dennett and Stephen Jay Gould on the scope of 

EEs. Dennett argues that EEs are universal and can explain all aspects of the natural world, while Gould argues 

that there are limits to EEs, particularly in the realm of human behavior. The paper then considers three case 

studies that illustrate potential constraints on EEs: the evolution of morality, the evolution of religion, and the 

evolution of art. The paper concludes that there are indeed limits to EEs, but that these limits are not always clear-

cut and may vary depending on the specific question being asked. 

Keywords: Evolutionary explanations, Human behavior, Limits of EEs, Daniel Dennett, Stephen Jay Gould, 

Morality, Religion, Art. 

 

 

Introduction   

Are evolution’s explanatory powers limitless or limited?  

According to philosopher Daniel Dennett (1995, 63), evolution is not only true but universal: the central 

organizing principle explaining all aspects of the living world. Dennett likens Darwinian theory to an 

uncontainable ‗universal acid.‘ Evolutionary explanations, he declares, corrode every philosophical worldview 

they touch. People scramble (yet fail, in Dennett‘s estimation) to keep Darwin‘s dangerous idea at bay by 

constantly erecting new barriers while old ones are burnt through, as ―new waves of Darwinian thinking‖ 

relentlessly erode temporary ―forces of containment.‖ As Dennett states (1995, 63), ―Darwin‘s idea had been 

born as an answer to questions in biology, but it threatened to leak out, offering answers—welcome or not—to 

questions in cosmology and psychology… If mindless evolution could account for the breathtakingly clever 

artifacts of the biosphere, how could the products of our own ‗real‘ minds be exempt from an evolutionary 

explanation?‖ Yet as Dennett trumpets the extraordinary power of evolutionary explanations, he reminds us of 

Stephen Jay Gould‘s ‗Nonoverlapping magisteria‘ or NOMA essay (1997, 21), which argues that evolutionary 

explanations must be strictly contained. Contra Dennett, Gould claims that although evolution may be accepted 

as factual, firm boundaries must be respected. 

Modern science offers evolution as the bedrock foundation underlying all features of living systems. Evolutionary 

explanations (hereafter abbreviated EEs) are presented as logical, mechanistic accounts that help us to understand 

why the natural world is the way it is. But are EEs limited in explanatory scope and power? Even those who 

otherwise willingly accept modern science sometimes balk at the sheer audacity of evolutionists to explain every 

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facet of nature, particularly human nature, in evolutionary terms. Social scientists occasionally mock EEs by 

affirming that, like any explanation that purportedly explains everything, they are effectively useless (Dupré 

2001, 74). There is nothing, they tease—no aspect of human behavior, even—that cannot be subsumed within 

and ultimately explained by evolution.   

Surely there must be something evolution cannot explain. Can Darwinian theory explain every aspect of nature,  

or are there distinct, a priori limits to its epistemic utility? If so, are the limitations philosophical or scientific in 

nature? Are they practical or theoretical, real or perceived? Do limits arise from inadequacies of evolutionary 

theory itself, or merely from those who misunderstand or misappropriate it? What sorts of naturalistic questions 

might evolution not be able to answer? Are humans exempt from EEs? 

These questions carry profound significance for scientists, social scientists, and philosophers alike. Following a 

historical introduction via two case studies, potential constraints on EEs are considered. A third case study 

reinforces the conclusion that the stratagem to apply limits to EEs 1) normally occurs in human context and 2) 

ultimately hinges upon one‘s acceptance or rejection of ontological materialism.  

Case Study 1: Thomas Henry Huxley, Darwin’s sometime supporter  

The accomplished nineteenth century anatomist and paleontologist Thomas Henry Huxley (1824-1895) is best 

known today as Charles Darwin‘s colleague. Darwin‘s keen mind and wit made him a fierce debater, but he 

shunned the spotlight and sought to downplay controversy; he privately fumed at critics but hesitated to take them 

on in public (Browne 2002, 295). Huxley, in contrast, cherished confrontation as ‗Darwin‘s bulldog,‘ an 

outspoken champion of evolution. An eager and effective proponent, Huxley defended Darwin from detractors 

on several occasions, notably in the debate at Oxford on June 30, 1860, against Archbishop Samuel ‗Soapy Sam 

‘Wilberforce (Desmond and Moore 1992, 492; Hesketh 2009).   

Yet Huxley challenged Darwin on key points. Huxley admonished Darwin for arguing that evolution must 

necessarily be slow and gradual, contending instead that lineages might evolve rapidly: ―You have loaded 

yourself with an unnecessary difficulty in adopting Natura non facit saltum [Nature does not make leaps] so 

unreservedly‖ (Lyons 1999, 49). Huxley would feel vindicated by today‘s acceptance of variable evolutionary 

rates in punctuated equilibrium (Eldredge and Gould 1972). Still, Huxley acknowledged that Darwin, more than 

Wallace, deserved credit for formulating the decidedly non-teleological, non-intuitive, yet remarkably simple 

idea of natural selection. Upon first grasping this idea, Huxley is said to have remarked, ―How extremely stupid 

not to have thought of that!‖ (Desmond 1997, 41).   

One would suppose that as an ardent convert and supporter of this straightforward scheme, Huxley would fully 

embrace Darwinian theory, but in at least one notable way Huxley broke with it. In his best known work, 

Evolution and Ethics (1894, 36), Huxley tried to reconcile his dim view of a brutal, nasty nature ‗red in tooth and 

claw‘ with his idealistic view of humanity. How could something so good arise from something so bad? Well 

trained, like Darwin, in uniformitarian thinking, Huxley recognized the universal, unalterable permanence of 

physicochemical laws according to which the world operates; he presumed these axiomatic ‗rules‘ of nature hold 

in all times and places. But in Huxley‘s mind these rules must somehow have been subverted for ethics to develop 

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in our species. His selfperceived masterstroke was the metaphor of a garden which must ever be tended to stave 

off disrepair. According to Irvine (1955, 414), Huxley, an avid gardener, was inspired by Voltaire‘s character 

Candide, who avowed that ―Il faut cultiver notre jardin‖ [We must all cultivate our own garden]. Huxley readily 

embraced this directive. He recognized that only by the gardener‘s never-ending toil and constant energy input 

could inevitable decay—the entropy called for by thermodynamics—be postponed and ‗progress‘ made.   

So far, so good: Darwin would object to nothing here. Gardens evidently require constant care. But Huxley‘s 

argument culminated by comparing humanity to the symbolic gardener. Only by exercising similar toil, 

individually and collectively (as society and species), argued Huxley, could humans improve their lot and avoid 

their bestial nature. Only by removing wicked ‗weeds‘can we become moral creatures. Huxley argued (1888) 

that we overcome a Hobbesian nature solely via cultural practice. In short, Huxley saw ethics as an unnatural 

innovation (without biological underpinning) triumphing over evolution. As primatologist Frans de Waal notes 

(2001, 344), this was a case of the bulldog biting his master. Huxley‘s argument deliberately limited evolution‘s 

explanatory power. In de Waal‘s words (344), ―Since many people consider morality the essence of our species, 

Huxley in effect said that what makes us human is too big for the evolutionary framework.‖ Darwin‘s fiercest 

advocate would not bring himself to subscribe to a universally evolutionary position—Huxley did not imagine a 

morality explicable in biological terms.   

As the figurative gardener‘s never-ending struggle attests, Huxley felt EEs could go only so far, despite Darwin‘s 

unequivocal position (stated in The Descent of Man, 1871, 173) of continuity between evolution and human 

nature, including morality. By contrast, Darwin‘s bulldog plainly recognized curbs to EEs.  

Although evolution is the foundation of modern biology—in Dobzhansky‘s famous phrase, ―Nothing makes 

sense in biology except in light of evolution‖ (1973, 125)—Huxley‘s tenuous position (accepting EEs for all of 

biology with the exception of human nature) is far from unique. In the century and a half since Darwin‘s idea 

ascended, many scholars have jumped onto this middle-ground bandwagon. Even Pope John Paul II, in 

articulating the Vatican‘s official position (1996, 1) by admitting the overwhelming empirical evidence for 

biological evolution, nonetheless attached strict limits to its relevance in understanding ‗the truth about man,‘ 

specifically the ‗ensoulment‘ of individual human beings.  

Case Study 2: John Harlow, Darwin’s unwitting (and unheard) supporter  

A similar story lies at the heart of a case the opposite of Huxley‘s. It involves Phineas Gage (1823-1860), the 

railroad worker whose extraordinary tale is now widely known, in part because it is as gruesome as it is incredible, 

and because it has gained notoriety in studies of neuroanatomy and cognition (Fleischman 2002; Macmillan 2002; 

Kean 2014). It is remarkable that Gage was not killed by the iron tamping rod that blew a hole through his brain, 

and that he soon returned to work. Neurologist Antonio Damasio (1994, 8) extensively described Gage‘s ensuing 

personality change—from a pleasant, shrewd, ambitious, exemplary employee to a rash, foul-mouthed, 

unrestrained and unreliable man—and the role of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex in regulating behavior, 

largely by inhibiting impulsive behavior. Less widely known is the role of Dr. John Martyn Harlow of Cavendish, 

Vermont, who treated Gage‘s wound the day of the injury (September 13, 1848) and followed his recovery the 

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rest of Gage‘s life (McMillan 2002, 106). Harlow was riveted by Gage‘s ability to survive his grievous injury and 

by its profound effect on Gage‘s personality, although Kean (2014, 353) casts doubts on the extent of this shift. 

Harlow grew to appreciate the influence, if not explicit causal link, of brain on behavior. Had he discovered the 

mythical ‗moral compass,‘ with the damaged frontal lobe relating directly to sociality (Damasio 1994, 22)?   

Harlow‘s work came in the decade following Darwin‘s publication of Origin, at a time when mental abilities 

were first ascribed to specific brain regions. Paul Broca and Carl Wernicke notably described language deficits 

in speech production and comprehension that could be traced to distinct brain loci (the inferior frontal and superior 

temporal gyri, respectively). Together, Broca and Wernicke demonstrated an unambiguous link between brain 

and behavior. Unlike these European academic anatomists, Harlow was a country doctor. Nonetheless, he 

believed he too had conclusive evidence of a connection between a precise brain region and its corresponding 

higher order function. Damasio (1994, 85) cites Harlow‘s story as ―the historical beginning of the study of the 

biological basis of behavior‖ (presuming one does not invoke once-popular but now-debunked ideas about 

physical traits in 18th century phrenology).  

However, the mind-brain link Harlow explored (Macmillan 2002, 114) involved not language but ethics: he 

speculated on the realm Huxley argued was inexplicable in natural terms. In contrast to Huxley, Harlow suggested 

that morality—which Darwin himself recognized in Descent (1871, 102) as humanity‘s defining feature—was a 

material phenomenon amenable to scientific investigation. Where Huxley defined clear limits to EE, Harlow saw 

none. Yet whereas Broca and Wernicke achieved scientific success and popular acclaim, Harlow‘s idea gained 

no support—at least, none until biologists at the close of the 20th century took up the battle flag and resumed 

Harlow‘s fight. Where the mighty Huxley had circumscribed limits on evolution‘s explanatory power, Harlow 

had tried, and failed, to break through. 

Defining terms, past and present  

 What constitutes an evolutionary explanation (EE)? As used here, the term explicitly refers to a scientific 

hypothesis offering an account of the form or function of any attribute—physical, biochemical, behavioral, etc.—

of an organism or taxon (a group of related organisms at any level such as species or kingdom). In a sense an EE 

is a ‗just-so story‘purporting to explain how something in the natural world came to be. It provides a historical 

explanation—a logical inference based on empirical evidence—spelling out how a feature appeared and later 

predominated in a given environment.   

As such EEs rely upon the classic algorithmic routine, outlined by Darwin and Wallace, of novel variants 

(mutations) appearing and being selected for or against, with new iterations occurring in succeeding generations.   

Although our understanding of underlying genetic mechanisms has made huge strides, in essence EEs are couched 

in the same terms Darwin and Wallace used 150 years ago. Commonly known as natural selection, this process 

involves three step-wise stages: variation, selection, and inheritance. Darwin and Wallace were far from the first 

to propose organic evolution (non-constancy of species), but they formulated the causal, mechanistic explanation 

for how such change occurs. Although ‗natural selection‘ can be taken as roughly synonymous for what is meant 

here by EE, other elements of selection, including sexual, directional, disruptive, purifying, stabilizing, and 

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artificial selection (human-induced selective breeding) also pertain. Random change due to genetic drift can also 

occur, as will be discussed.   

Nonetheless, when people refer to ‗Darwin‘s theory of evolution,‘ natural selection is virtually always what they 

have in mind. Though natural selection remains the centerpiece of modern evolutionary theory it is only one of 

Darwin‘s many contributions that remain central today. Indeed, Darwin‘s theory is not a single idea but a suite 

of interconnected explanatory principles (hence Darwin‘s ‗theories‘ would be a more appropriate name), 

including common ancestry, gradualness of change, adaptation (link between organism and environment), 

macroevolution (extension of adaptation to speciation and higher-level evolution), extinction, and convergent 

(analogous) evolution. Note that Darwin did not initially like the term ‗evolution,‘ partly because previous 

theorists, who described a progressive unfolding, offered no causal explanation for how it might occur (Bowler 

1975; Desmond and Moore 1992, 293). Instead Darwin described this process as ‗descent with modification.‘ 

Only later and reluctantly did Darwin use Herbert Spencer‘s phrase ‗survival of the fittest‘; he might have 

preferred ‗amplification of the aptest‘ (Allchin 2007, 176), given that less fit organisms still survive, even if they 

have lower fitness and less genetic representation in succeeding generations. It must be emphasized that evolution 

and development are disparate phenomena (Werth 2014, 9): the former links a chain of organisms by common 

descent, whereas development refers to programmatic changes during the life history of a single organism. 

Individual organisms do not evolve. It is also important to distinguish true phyletic adaptation (heritable change 

in a lineage due to genotypic change) from acute or chronic change in an organism, such as acclimatization to 

altitude. Such physiological accommodation, although often referred to as adaptation (and likewise fully 

explicable in causal, mechanistic terms), is not a scenario encompassed by EE.  

Among Darwin‘s advances were his emphasis on population-level thinking (Herbert 1977; Ridley 2003) and his 

characterization of variation not as a flaw to be brushed aside or explained away, but as a key element of EEs in 

that they furnish the material sculpted by selection. The development of population genetics that led to the 

‗modern synthesis‘of the 1940s paved the way for today‘s gene-centric focus on fitness, which expanded to 

include behavioral traits in all animals, including humans (i.e., sociobiology and evolutionary psychology, 

hereafter EP). Although modern studies give greater emphasis to genetic fitness, the essential concept of survival 

and reproduction of parent and offspring remains unchanged since Darwin and Wallace. There is, however, debate 

over the level or levels at which selection acts, ranging from gene to individual organism to population (i.e., group 

selection; Wilson 2012; Pinker 2012).  

  

EEs lie at the heart of biology. They are the central organizing principle making biology a bona fide science. 

Evolution is universally accepted as factual by scientists and other scholars. Despite tremendous popular 

opposition, no viable alternative explanatory framework has been proposed, nor has legitimate contrary empirical 

evidence been advanced. Nevertheless, the question remains whether this explanatory framework is universal and 

all-powerful. Can evolution explain all features of the living world?  

Do evolutionary explanations fit basic tenets of science?  

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As scientific explanations, evolutionary scenarios are obliged to follow modern science‘s naturalism. EEs depend 

on empirical data. They must be based on reliable, repeatable, objective evidence rather than mere claims or ideas. 

EEs must be open to rejection or modification in the face of new evidence. They must be potentially falsifiable, 

and testability must be intersubjective: independent investigators must be able to challenge and support or 

disprove claims.   

EEs are bound by rules of logic. Crucially, EEs must offer more than mere descriptions, for at heart science offers 

reasoned accounts for why things are as they are. Further, such explanations must operate according to a causal, 

non-teleological mechanism; they involve proximate (initial mechanistic) rather than ultimate causes (in the sense 

of purpose). All explanation must involve wholly and solely natural, material, physical causes, as opposed to 

supernatural, immaterial, metaphysical phenomena. Though evolution leads to ordered design via selection acting 

on variation generated by random mutation, there is never appeal to a telos or agency beyond nature. Design 

occurs from the ‗bottom up‘rather than ‗top down‘ (Dennett 1995, 75; Shermer 2006, 65).  

Evolution is a ‗theory‘in the strict scientific rather than common vernacular sense (i.e., a hunch or guess; Kugler 

2002, 341). Further, ‗Darwin‘s theory‘is an explanatory framework, not an ideology to be pinned to one man, as 

in the oft-pejorative phrase ‗Darwinism.‘ Even if Darwin never developed this idea, which transformed biology 

from an assemblage of facts into a unified field of study, someone else would have, as Wallace indeed did 

simultaneously. Science, as a cumulative, collective, objective methodology focused on explanations of the 

physical world, is, ideally and in toto, ultimately independent of individual views (admittedly casting aside vast 

issues of philosophical realism and sociology of science). Our understanding of evolution increases as a wealth 

of experimental and observational evidence accumulates.  

It might be argued that these basic stipulations (i.e., observability) constitute essential restrictions on EEs. 

However, EEs that do not fulfill these initial preconditions are scientifically invalid, so this claim is dubious at 

best. To the extent that EEs represent bona fide science, they necessarily abide by such limits a priori. EEs 

published in reputable, refereed publications (as admittedly not all EEs are) are presumed to represent proper 

science; regrettably, this cannot be accepted as a given. One might argue that error bars, confidence intervals, and 

statistical findings also place limits on scientific explanations. However, these simply reinforce the provisional 

nature of EEs, which are not infallible but instead change with evidence.   

Do evolutionary explanations fit the real world, or merely a make-believe one?  

The best explanations are those with the fewest ontological posits, following the rule of parsimony (‗Occam‘s 

razor‘). But does science actually tell us about nature, or does it only explain how data fit a hypothesis to be 

tested? Does it just make simplified models that enable us to understand our perceptions of experiential 

phenomena in the natural world (Godfrey-Smith 2003, 187)? Following Dupré (2001, 10), Holcomb (2002) 

argues science is limited because it merely models the actual universe, representing certain aspects of our world 

but not truly or totally characterizing it. Is science merely a metaphor, and terms like ‗gravity‘ and ‗gene‘ 

linguistic placeholders signifying things we scarcely understand? 

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Natural selection is nevertheless an exceedingly simple mechanistic relationship. Darwin did not need to 

understand generation of variation to understand how selection operates, just as physicists cannot cleanly link 

Newtonian mechanics with Einstein‘s relativity to explain gravity. It may be that punctuated equilibrium, 

involving gaps in the fossil record and non-linear rates of morphological change, is more a post hoc descriptive 

account of why gaps exist than a causal chain explaining, in a predictive sense, why that pattern exists in nature 

(Hume 1748). Still, to what extent must scientific explanations give causal accounts, given Darwin himself did 

not understand inheritance, and at what level of reduction must they attribute cause? Do we explain natural 

selection in terms of populations, genes, or subatomic particles?  

Do evolutionary explanations show causality?  

As Godfrey-Smith (2003, 191-2) argues, to explain something in science ―is to show how to derive it in a logical 

argument… to show that it is to be expected, to show that it is not surprising, given our knowledge of the laws of 

nature.‖ Under the ‗covering law‘ model of modern deductive-nomological science (Hempel 1965), to explain is 

to give an account of something, a reckoning of cause with a relationship of inference. However, an asymmetry 

problem exists in that whereas we derive conclusions from premises, we cannot always go back to premises from 

conclusions. When we predict something we show it is expected, even if it ultimately does not occur, whereas 

when we explain something ―we know that it has happened already, and we show that it could have been 

predicted, using an argument containing a law‖ (Godfrey-Smith 2003, 192). Because of this unidirectionality not 

all explanations can be reversed, and not all good arguments are good explanations.   

This post hoc rationalization, which Shermer (1997, 216) decries as hindsight bias or ‗Monday morning 

quarterbacking,‘ is a frequent critique lodged against EE, where prediction, as in weather forecasting, is 

theoretically possible if extraordinarily complicated given the number of variables involved. But the inability to 

predict preceding physical states, given an initial set of conditions and well-understood laws of nature, is not a 

special problem for EEs; such ‗overdetermination‘ is a broader issue for science generally.   

Another issue is how well EEs link specific events to general patterns, connecting diverse facts under a set of 

basic explanatory principles. In Godfrey-Smith‘s words (2003, 196), ―[Scientists] try to develop general 

explanatory schemata that can be applied as widely as possible.‖ In this regard EE is wildly successful: Darwin 

transformed natural philosophy from scattered anecdotes into modern biology. A basic principle unifies a huge 

range of natural phenomena—potentially, all such phenomena.   

Do evolutionary explanations lack predictive power?  

Because of science‘s predictive power, it is concerned with explaining not only what is but what might be. 

However, critics contend that EEs are limited by historical contingencies. Evolution might not really explain 

anything because it cannot specifically predict the sorts of things (structural, behavioral, etc.) that will evolve. 

Vertebrates evolved with pectoral and pelvic limbs; this is why they have two sets of paired appendages. But why 

two? Why not three? Unlike Newtonian mechanics or other areas of physical science, where one can calculate a 

precise end result given a set of initial conditions, EEs seem to offer ad hoc, a posteriori accounts. Although one 

can concoct EEs to explain how any aspect of any organism came about, you can‘t predict a priori that X or Y 

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will evolve. Could one have expected that eyes or fins or leaves would evolve? Nonetheless, the issue here 

concerns data, not theory. Those who argue that EEs are necessary but insufficient to explain life‘s diversity fail 

to acknowledge that given enough information, a biologist could explain specific diversity, just as a meteorologist 

could, with sufficient data, predict all weather. The argument is not that EEs should be able to predict perfectly; 

rather, processes that appear stochastic may when better understood be seen as more deterministic. 

The central issue is that EEs are at heart based on statistical probabilities—an inherent element of the algorithmic 

mechanism proposed by Darwin and Wallace. You need not predict who will win a tennis tournament to be 

certain someone will emerge as the winner, but knowing something about the competitors, you can offer a 

statistical argument for who is most likely to win. EEs simply propose that some evolutionary paths are more 

likely than others, just as it is more likely that a top seed will defeat a #64 seed in a tennis match. The set of 

organisms that might evolve is infinite, yet one can predict future organisms given today‘s organisms and 

expected future conditions (e.g., climatic trends). This is the central conceit of books like Dixon‘s After Man 

(1981), which present, as its subtitle explains, A Zoology of the Future. Such books are patently speculative, but 

the conjecture is based on science underlying EEs. Oddly enough, as Mayr (2001, 277) noted, Darwin was 

criticized by contemporaries for focusing on specific predictions and deductions rather than grand, abstract ideas. 

For Darwin, EE fit philosophical as well as methodological naturalism. Darwin‘s view allows for natural, 

material, physical explanations, as opposed to the supernatural, immaterial, metaphysical explanations so 

common outside science. EEs do not rule out the possible existence of divine forces, but neither do they require 

one (Kitcher 2007, 129).  

This stripped-down simplicity of EE is, for many critics, a steep hurdle to overcome, especially when compared 

to the stunning complexity of the living world. How could a simple, blind process result in so much complexity? 

How can the living world‘s beauty and harmony depend on a probabilistic process? This critique is typically 

offered not as a limitation on EEs but as a refutation of them in the first place. 

A common criticism relating to predictive ability is that whereas EE may be seen as necessary it is insufficient in 

explanatory power. It can explain that the necks of giraffes and mice have seven cervical vertebrae, but not why 

mammals have 7 instead of 6 or 8. It can explain the prevalence of the pentadactyl hand as a bauplan for tetrapod 

vertebrates, but not why the common ancestor had five digits rather than some other number. However, this turns 

out to be a weak criticism at best; again, the real problem is of limited data, not underlying theory. Given sufficient 

information, we should be able to explain, via abductive inference, when the next mass extinction will occur and 

which species will survive it.  

That EEs are historical in nature does not preclude scientists from testing them critically (Cooper 2002, 427). EEs 

are open to the same falsification, via experiment and observation, as all scientific hypotheses. Darwin predicted, 

given the presumed relationship between humans and apes, that fossils of early human ancestors would be found 

where chimpanzees and gorillas live, in Africa. This has been borne out by copious evidence. Another example 

involves the evolutionary link between birds and dinosaurs. Based upon skeletal similarities in the wrist and hip, 

scientists predicted dinosaur reproduction was like that of modern archosaurs (crocodilians and birds), including 

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laying and brooding eggs in nests. The discovery of fossilized dinosaur eggs in nests confirmed this prediction. 

Other EE-based predictions such as the stratigraphic and geographic distribution of fossil taxa have likewise been 

corroborated. 

A related issue arises from the reductionism vs. emergence conundrum in that many biological properties (e.g., 

life, consciousness) cannot easily be distilled—they emerge later, with higher levels of organization, as 

epiphenomena. Again, the criticism is that something that explains everything explains nothing, and thus EE is a 

shady, fast-and-loose shell game rather than genuine science. Closer inspection reveals that given a set of initial 

conditions, one could predict the evolution of photoreceptors to sense visual stimuli, or contractile tissues and 

locomotor structures for movement, or plant organs with photoreactive pigments and high surface area for 

photosynthesis. There is nothing shifty or underhanded going on, except that the final solution to these scenarios 

is pragmatically unpredictable: we can‘t easily foretell, with the data we have, which of various possible outcomes 

will come to pass. As physicist Sean Carroll writes (2016, 293), one can explain giraffes‘ long necks via natural 

or sexual selection, or by arguing that ―Given the laws of physics, the initial state of the universe, and our 

location in the cosmos, collections of atoms in the shape of long-necked giraffes came into existence 14 billion 

years after the Big Bang.‖ This statement is true but not useful, Carroll claims, as it lacks the predictive power of 

EEs.  

Are evolutionary explanations tautological?  

Khan (2009) points to the ‗relentless tautologies‘offered by the evolutionary framework. He refers to the 

‗ontological leap‘taken by staunch adherents to EE, particularly social scientists who purport to explain all facets 

of human art, religion, and history via EP. ‗Survival of the fittest‘ is often unfairly painted as a tautology if one 

defines fittest as those that survive. However, because EE involves heritability of characters, natural selection 

does not merely imply that survivors survive. Population genetics demonstrates and predicts when populations 

will or will not be altered by natural selection (Shermer 1997, 143). Genes conferring adult tolerance to lactose 

are likely to be selected for in groups of herders with ready access to milk, but not in populations without 

domesticated cattle, sheep, or goats.  

Can evolution create? Does it involve chance?  

A potential scientific complaint is that evolution cannot generate new forms because it is eliminative only, 

removing less fit individuals of a population. Yet elimination can be creative; sculptors create by chiseling away. 

The ‗adaptationist program‘criticized in Gould and Lewontin‘s landmark ‗spandrels of San Marco‘ paper (1979) 

might be seen as a limit to EE. Chance contingencies are not explained by evolution, though they are often 

subsumed within EE, as Lewontin and Gould noted. Not all organismal features are adaptations demanding a 

just-so story; some are historical accidents. Adaptationism is a seductive siren, yet just because something makes 

sense as an adaptation doesn‘t mean it is an adaptation. Crucially, as genes are linked, many features just ―come 

along for the ride‖ without being truly selected for. Much genetic variation is also the result of stochastic drift; 

‗neutral‘DNA is unexpressed and thus not subject to selection. In this sense, as with external aspects of an 

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organism‘s phenotype, features might be attributed to chance events. This poses a potential limitation on the 

epistemic utility of EE.  

Is evolution limited by material constraints? 

There appear to be constraints from basic physics (which, for example, limit arthropod size), from 

genetics/genomics (with a limited toolkit of conserved genes serving similar functions in a wide range of 

organisms), and from development.   

This is why, even though birds with aluminum wings or mammals with Gore-Tex coats would be highly favored, 

they do not exist (Kardong 2012, 3). As Schloss (2009, 41) notes, EEs offer a scenario in which a bat wing or 

dolphin flipper evolved as variations on the mammalian forelimb, ―but to understand them fully requires 

concepts outside evolution, like aerodynamics and gravity.‖ Schloss (2009, 41) opines that ―evolution is a search 

engine that combs possibility space, but to explain what it comes up with, we need to understand both the engine 

and the space.‖ Why are there no organisms with wheels? Natural selection would greatly favor wheels, or birds 

with aluminum or Teflon wings or horses with six legs. Such extrinsic (physical) constraints allow a crucial 

falsifiability to EEs and predictions. As Long (2013, 15) notes, ―Physical models can‘t violate laws of physics,‖ 

whereas ―every computer model is doomed to succeed.‖ New evolutionary-developmental (‗evo-devo‘) biology 

seeks explanations incorporating intrinsic (genetic) limitations, helping to broaden EEs‘ explanatory power.   

Is evolution limited by irreversibility?  

Another prospective scientific limit to EE lies in the irreversibility of evolutionary change. Although it is 

supposed that random changes in DNA (nucleotide substitutions) can ‗undo‘ earlier changes, ‗Dollo‘s Law‘ 

states that evolution moves in one direction only: organisms cannot return down a road they have traveled (e.g., 

losing and later regaining a trait). A study by Bridgham et al. (2009) offers a potential mechanism for one-way 

evolution, involving mutations (even in ‗neutral‘ or ‗nonfunctional‘ DNA sequences unexpressed in an 

organism‘s phenotype) that destabilize proteins. A simple genetic reversion would not necessarily ‗undo‘ 

destabilizing effects of the original change, which would require, without selection pressure, an exceedingly 

unlikely number of neutral mutations. This ‗one-way‘ path poses a limit, but reflection yields examples of major 

reversals. Marine mammals arose from quadrupeds; in reverting to an aquatic existence, whales gave up the legs 

their ancestors evolved when the first terrestrial tetrapods emerged from the sea. The loss of prismatic enamel in 

cetacean teeth and loss of the complexly folded neocortex in manatee brains (Kelava et al. 2013) are other 

examples of evolutionary reversal.  

Do social norms or sanctions guiding human behavior impose limits?  

From the philosophical realm, another stipulation presents a likely limit on EEs: the injunction against using 

scientific findings as a guide for moral behavior. To borrow a famous phrase attributed to Galileo (1615), scripture 

―teaches us how to go to heaven, not how the heavens go.‖ Science is understood not to be used as a model 

teaching people how to lead their lives. However, this feeling is not universally shared. Much ink has been spilled 

concerning ‗social Darwinism‘ and whether it was justifiable to Darwin and other scientists, but that is not what 

is meant here. Rather, what if EEs shed light on relationships between humans, or between humans and other 

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species, indeed all of nature? If we are morally obligated to yell ―Fire!‖ when we smell smoke in a crowded 

room, then what if scientists possess superior smoke detectors? Are they bound to share results of findings in 

ways that could potentially save lives? This is a key question that demands more space and attention than can be 

given here.  

It is essential to distinguish ideal science as an independent societal process from science as a flawed, subjective 

institution carried out by biased individuals. Sociologists of science have studied, without arriving at a definitive 

conclusion (Beattie 2007; Dennett 2007), the ‗chicken-and-egg‘ question of whether people are prone to become 

scientists because of their philosophical and religious leanings or in contrast, if working as a scientist leads one 

to develop a secular worldview. Science per se, as a literally atheistic process—where explanations involving 

supernatural causes are not allowed—is separate from scientists, many of whom practice diverse faiths. Science 

has been ―permeated by groupthink, bias, and financial, political, and personal motivations‖ (Bloom 2015), with 

false claims and faulty programs—from the Third Reich to Marxism, with eugenics, phrenology, and stifled 

climate debate—because scientists are human too (Guhin 2016). As Neil DeGrasse Tyson notes, ―In science, 

when human behavior enters the equation, things go nonlinear. That‘s why physics is easy and sociology is hard.  

Nonetheless, this demarcation between ontological naturalism (which argues there are only natural phenomena, 

and that whatever exists or happens is therefore natural) and science‘s purely methodological naturalism poses 

perhaps the greatest potential curb on EEs, especially for adherents of religious or other teleological worldviews. 

To the extent that science is limited in theory or practice by social restraints, these must be seen as limitations to 

evolutionary (and all other scientific) explanations.   

The general issue of whether science itself has limited explanatory power, especially where it abuts belief, has 

attracted scrutiny, most notably by Bronowski (1956), Snow (1959), and Medawar (1984). To be clear, science 

does not presume naturalism; rather, science has provisionally concluded that naturalism offers the best picture 

of the world, based on objective empirical evidence (National Academy of Sciences 1998; Plantinga 2011; Carroll 

2016). Naturalism is therefore a strength of EEs, not an a priori limitation.  

Case Study 3: Alfred Russel Wallace and moral (ontological) limitations  

Consider Wallace as a counterpoint to Huxley and Harlow. A prominent naturalist who supported Darwin and 

equaled him as natural selection‘s co-discoverer, Wallace nevertheless eventually, like Huxley, imposed his own 

limits on EEs‘ utility. Indeed, Wallace is as widely known for his late-life departure from evolutionary theory as 

for his joint contribution to it. Notably, Wallace ultimately concluded, contra Darwin, that evolution is 

teleological and anthropocentric. Wallace was a remarkably productive scientist but a puzzling person. He saw 

himself an ‗utter skeptic‘ (Slotten 2004, 232) and purely scientific thinker, but for half his life was a proponent 

of spiritualism, though he claimed attempts to contact ghosts in séances involved rational, scientific efforts, given 

that spirits would be sensed via material means such as sounds, movements, and temperature changes. Wallace 

publicly claimed he sought to expose fraudulent mystics as sincerely as he sought to communicate with spirits 

from the beyond (Shermer 2002, 179), but his embrace of mysticism cannot be overlooked. There is no disguising 

the fact that Wallace, like Huxley, held a different view of evolution‘s generative powers than Darwin.  

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Whereas Darwin argued that purely physicochemical phenomena could create new, diverse life forms but also, 

presumably, the first life itself—although evolution is strictly about change in organisms, not the initial 

appearance of life forms—Wallace saw stark limits to evolution‘s explanatory capacity, espousing the familiar 

view that material causes are insufficient to explain how life and human cognition arose. He wrote (1889, 478) 

that nonmaterial (supernatural) causes in the ―unseen universe of spirit‖ were alone responsible for life‘s origins, 

for consciousness in ―higher animals,‖ and for man‘s great powers of reason. Indeed, Wallace proudly 

proclaimed these metaphysical goals as the very purpose of the universe.  

Thus Wallace drew the ire of Huxley, who criticized this teleological stance (Raby 2001, 291), and Darwin 

himself, who wrote in a letter to Wallace, ―I differ grievously from you, & I am very sorry for it… I hope you 

have not murdered too completely your own and my child‖ (Darwin 1869, Milner 2014, 2). Wallace‘s writings 

and advocacy of spiritualism, mesmerism, and phrenology have dimmed his luster among modern biologists. 

Despite a selfprofessed insistence on pure scientific thinking, Wallace allowed supernatural causes to enter his 

explanatory framework. Although Wallace‘s myriad contributions to tropical biology and ecology remain 

seminal—as the father of bioegeography, his name persists in the eponymous Wallace‘s Line and Wallace 

Effect—in evolutionary theory he lingers mainly as footnote to Darwin. Students learn of Wallace as the humble 

co-discoverer of natural selection, but the deeper they dig the more they see why Darwin found reasons to shun 

him (Shermer 2002, xviii).  

Two points must be stressed here. First, given that we, as corporeal beings existing in the physical world, can 

perceive supernatural phenomena only when manifested as empirical events capable of being experienced by our 

senses, then they are of necessity rendered open to scientific interpretation and analysis. In short, we have no 

means of perceiving exclusively supernatural (rather than partly or wholly natural) phenomena, or of knowing 

whether supernatural things even exist—we sense phenomena only via natural means. Supernatural things may 

well exist, but they have no place in science (thus science‘s methodological naturalism is better characterized as 

empiricism: knowledge is derived not from thoughts but from experience). Second, teleological explanations are 

similarly ‗wrong‘ only in the sense that they are entirely unscientific. In non-scientific contexts (including 

religious faiths) teleology can be valuable.  

Are humans exempt from evolution? Are we bound by determinism?  

Astute readers will notice a common thread in the stories of Huxley‘s garden, Harlow‘s brain, and Wallace‘s 

ghost. All involve a single species: our own. Aside from possible philosophical and scientific objections to EEs 

noted earlier, all concerns relate to humans alone. We impose limits only upon ourselves. Consider the 

fundamental importance of this observation.  

No one who accepts EEs claims that any aspect of a bird, butterfly, or banana is not amenable (in theory) to 

evolutionary interpretation. Creationists aside, scientists do not argue that a Paramecium, pine tree, or porcupine 

requires a special explanation for its morphology or behavior beyond that outlined by Darwin. Only when a 

spotlight is turned on our species do we search for additional answers; only then do we explain via ultimate 

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causes. We present ourselves as the first and last exhibit in the list of limits on EE. Aside from arguments that we 

have ‗outstripped‘evolution (Gluckman and Hanson 1996, 126), we object for religious or moral reasons.   

To reiterate, important questions about the origin of life do not properly fall under the purview of EE. EEs deal 

with organismal modifications over time; life‘s appearance is a different question. This is not an attempt to hedge 

or dodge the issue. Any scientific account of life‘s origin must unquestionably adhere to the ‗rules‘ of science 

outlined earlier, including an empirical, natural, non-teleological position (opposite Wallace‘s supernatural 

explanation). Again, historical explanations are amenable to the scientific methods of observation and 

experiment, and offer the same predictive power (Cooper 2002, 430). 

In short, Darwin presented humans as animals. His view is often construed as—though it was not intended to 

be—an affront to human dignity and an assault on the doctrine of human exceptionalism and supremacy. If we 

are just animals, then what keeps us from behaving like animals? How can we exhibit morality? We now study 

the biological basis of ethics. Morality has evolutionary roots (Allchin 1999), contradicting Huxley‘s claim that 

ethics must be an exception to evolution. Primatologists like de Waal (2001) argue that moral rudiments exist in 

other primates, particularly chimpanzees and bonobos. Social apes live in tight groups, with a central social life 

focused on status in the dominance hierarchy and with violent, sometimes even murderous, impulses. Perhaps 

not surprisingly, people traditionally viewed apes as aggressive, brutal fighters. But de Waal and colleagues (e.g., 

Pinker, 2002) highlight clear trends in apes toward peacemaking and reconciliation. They challenge the prevailing 

Hobbesian (or Huxleyian) view that we are born ruthless and selfish, and that without culture we remain that way.  

Critics of EE frequently argue humans are no longer bound by the same selective processes that govern evolution 

of other species, whether because so much change in human populations stems from cultural rather than genetic 

evolution (Pagel 2012), or simply because, as O‘Hear (1997, 49) writes, ―our reflectiveness and our rationality‖ 

allow us to ―take on goals and ideals which cannot be justified in terms of survival-promotion or reproductive 

advantage.‖ We are not bound, as EP generally holds, by our Stone Age past; we make conscious decisions that 

differ from subconscious desires. We employ such decision-making every time we use birth control, avoid eating 

desirable calorie-laden foods, submit to painful medical procedures, and aid our enemies (Burnham and Phelan 

2012; Cochran and Harpending 2009). Humans alone are seen as transcending biological predispositions, with 

powers of reason, selfreflection, and cultural transmission that enable us to create new environments, subvert 

nature‘s tyranny, and exempt ourselves from nature‘s inexorable processes (Midgely 1985; O‘Hear 1997; 

Ratcliffe 2005). 

Gluckman and Hanson (2006, ix) argue that EEs do not apply to us because our bodies and behavior are no longer 

subject to natural selection. Following a different tack, others argue that humans are exempt from natural 

selection‘s grasp due to our genetic engineering, particularly the way we can at least potentially alter germline 

DNA and thus transcend selection. The use of viral vectors to introduce DNA could yield ‗accelerated evolution 

that surmounts natural processes.   

Philosophers of science (Dupré 2001, 132; Holcomb 2002; Ruse 2010) use the term metaphysical pluralism in 

criticizing EP as extending beyond the explanatory reach of evolution and science in general. Critics (Midgley 

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1985; Freese 2008) disparage EP as faulty (scientifically, philosophically, ideologically) for its emphasis on 

determinism, mechanism, reductionism, neo-Social Darwinism, and vulgar adaptationism. They accuse EP of 

embodying bad metaphysics for its scientific imperialism and antienvironmentalism, and for uncritically 

accepting explanations offered to fit into an evolutionary framework, sometimes with little empirical evidence or 

with evidence manifestly molded to fit this Procrustean bed. An admitted problem with EP, and a difference with 

other sciences, is that it too often projects wildly speculative conjectures with little hard evidence. Whereas peer-

reviewed science (taken collectively) hesitates to postulate inferences not backed by hard data, EP seems in many 

cases eager to offer far-reaching conclusions (such as about human mating or love of music) without nuanced 

subtlety. 

This is leveled as a practical criticism, not a theoretical one. EP explanations need not be limited. Rather, excited 

writers (often journalists, not sociobiologists) are often guilty of speculating beyond the scope of what limited 

data imply. This revisits the problem of insufficient information, as well as whether branches of science differ 

methodologically or in the physical reality they reveal. Are they genuinely, following Wilson‘s model of 

consilience (1998), points along the spectrum of a larger whole, revealing related aspects of a single truth? 

Holcomb (2002) criticizes such ‗nothing-butism‘ or ‗one-size fits all‘ explanations as metaphysical monism. 

O‘Hear (1997, 214) offers a cogent argument that many aspects of our species, particularly moral reasoning and 

consciousness, are ―unDarwinian‖ or ―not explicable in terms of Darwinian drives.‖ He claims ―We seek truth 

for its own sake‖ (1997, 204) with no benefit to survival and reproduction, though this is debatable. As with all 

organisms, just because traits do not exhibit clearly adaptive ‗purpose‘ does not mean they did not or could not 

have originated evolutionarily.  

Darwin was the first to advance a unified, non-teleological theory of evolution that did not seek refuge in 

Aristotelian final causes. Darwin‘s concept of descent involved no movement toward a goal. Unlike Huxley, 

Darwin viewed nature as ever-changing but not necessarily improving, or progressing. This was a novel, 

unpalatable view. In Mayr‘s words (1964, xvi), ―Darwin postulated a brute, mechanical, soulless universe, 

depending on the whims of accident.‖ Darwin zealously argued that survival is not a matter of mere happenstance: 

it is a statistically predictable property of an organism‘s makeup.  

However, Darwinism seems to rule out choice and free will. As genetic creatures, aren‘t our features, and by 

extension our lives, predetermined? Evolutionists are quick to distinguish the crucial difference between 

determinism (―the future is written‖) and potentiality: many paths lie open, some likelier than others. [Some 

religions involve predestination to a greater extent than geneticists would claim.] In this context one must note 

that ‗evolution‘ literally refers to unrolling or unfolding, as of a scroll already written but not yet open to view; 

thus the word evolution itself carries an indelible stamp of teleology on which so much human thinking is 

predicated. Ever since Darwin biologists have debated the extent to which biological change reflects adaptation 

to an unpredictable, randomly changing environment, or whether evolution reflects goal-directed progress, as of 

the unfolding of a grand scheme. Although Huxley is justifiably famous for his formative views on agnosticism, 

he is also known for espousing a popular view of progress. Then as now, the notion of divinely guided, theistic 

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evolution was a popular middle ground in which people could keep their science and square it with theological 

worldviews.  

Conclusion: Limits lie in the eyes (and worldview) of the beholder  

According to lore (Zimmer 2001, ix), an upper-class Victorian lady is said to have remarked, upon the  

publication of The Origin of Species, ―Let us hope this is not true; but if it is, let us hope it will not be generally 

known.‖ Alas, for this woman and millions of like-minded critics, evolutionary theory is now as universally 

accepted by scientists as it is widely known by non-scientists, with a deep, enduring, alluring power. As Dennett 

predicted, evolution has spilled beyond the natural sciences to the social sciences, threatening (some would say) 

to account for seemingly every aspect, large and small, of humankind, as it has for all other living creatures. The 

explanatory power of evolutionary accounts might seem limitless.  

Science emerges from curiosity and reflects our innate striving to apply an organizing framework to everything 

we experience. ‗Science‘derives from the Latin verb ‗to know,‘ yet although science is our most powerful tool 

to understand our universe, there is much science cannot answer, including the biggest questions we ask. This 

baffles opponents of evolution who misunderstand that science seeks explanations about the natural world, but 

relies on empirical evidence and addresses naturalistic questions. It cannot speak to supernatural claims. It is not 

suitable for addressing questions about existence, knowledge, or meaning. It cannot tell us how we should behave 

or what our purpose in the world should be. 

At heart, fundamental objections to evolutionary explanations fall into two categories: misunderstanding of the 

nature of science and ideological or ontological protest to evolutionary implications. If EEs follow basic rules of 

science (viz. are based on empirical evidence, are falsifiable and predictive, and do not presume a teleological 

stance), there are no inherent limits qua science. To the extent that one deals with phenomena subject to empirical 

analysis, there may be no inherent boundaries to evolution‘s explanatory powers. It is potentially applicable to 

all facets of the natural world, including human culture.   

In the end, EEs, like any scientific explanations, go only so far as science takes us. For people who feel science 

can answer everything—that all natural phenomena, including aspects of humanity, can be adequately explained 

via physical causes—there are no inherent limits to evolutionary explanations. But for the many who feel 

otherwise, EEs have distinct limits. No one should underestimate the brute force of evolution in providing clear, 

consistent, consilient explanations of the natural world, but none should overestimate the case for science 

likewise. Many who accept evolution‘s factual nature hold differing views as to its explanatory power. This was 

true of key figures in the development and propagation of Darwin‘s theory of evolution, and will likely hold true 

for the foreseeable future.  

The teleological predisposition that lies at the heart of most objections to evolution are so deeply seated in us—

both culturally and biologically (through countless generations of neurological hardwiring)—as to be virtually 

unshakeable. Studies repeatedly show (Kelemen and Rosset 2009) that even when we consciously try to break 

the teleological paradigm, we subconsciously revert to this heuristic. As intentional creatures, it is our nature to 

presume agency, to seek reason and purpose in everything. This is not to say no such meaning exists in the world 

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around us— there may well be. But that remains an open question beyond the scope of science. The point is that 

our default presumption is that there must necessarily be meaning. For most people, religion is the surest path to 

the meaning we crave, and herein lies the greatest potential curb to EE, for if there is a grand ‗meaning to it all‘ 

(beyond that which we impose ourselves), this scheme has the potential to exist outside the observable bounds of 

nature, and thus to be outside the reach of evolutionary explanation. If we wish to believe in a wholly materialistic 

universe, with nothing exempt from ordinary laws of nature, then we can easily imagine an unalloyed, invincible, 

omnipotent evolutionary framework—the ‗universal acid‘ of Dennett‘s metaphor—that truly explains everything 

in nature. But this is a massive ‗if,‘ and for most people an impossibly difficult step. The biggest, surest limit to 

evolutionary explanation is not to be found in the study of nature but rather in the study of ourselves, for it is a 

limit we willingly or unwillingly yet all too easily apply. 

Sheldrake (2012) vigorously critiques modern science‘s unquestioned stance of mechanistic materialism. Haught 

(2009) likewise argues that some scientists uncritically conflate EEs with a materialist or physicalist worldview 

such that ―what emerges is not pure science but a belief system.‖ Haught charges that although evolutionary 

biology is sound, it creeps unwarranted and unprovoked beyond science into ―realms of belief.‖ At issue is 

Darwin‘s legacy, unintended or not, of extending methodological naturalism to ontological naturalism, a 

flashpoint of debate for philosophy. If scientists uncritically accept a wholly material worldview as their starting 

point, their results will be biased, Haught (2009) argues. Recall the essential uniformitarian legacy of Darwin in 

applying scientific investigations and findings to all times and places, not excluding any portions of the material 

universe. But is there more to the universe than matter and energy? In Haught‘s view, EEs are about more than 

science, as they are inherently ―antithetical to religion,‖ excluding the potential for metaphysical explanations. 

Does Darwin make sense only in a materialist setting? Is EE predicated on a materialist worldview? Obviously 

not, as many people prefer theistic evolution or progressive creationism. Others, including astronaut John Glenn, 

see no problem squaring their faith with science (Reid 2016): ―I don‘t see that I‘m any less religious by the fact 

that I can appreciate the fact that science just records that we change with evolution and time. 

The crux of the debate is whether one can be a serious evolutionist without being a materialist. This is a question 

outside science, which we may never answer to everyone‘s satisfaction. Given that faith does not depend on 

empirical evidence, this will not soon if ever be resolved in any formal, final way. Like all scientific explanations, 

evolutionary explanations cannot extend into the realm of belief. This is undoubtedly their strongest, surest 

‗limit.‘ Ultimately it boils down to the worldview one adopts. 

Acknowledgments  

I dedicate this paper in memory of my late colleague Diana Rhoads, who never ceased to provide inspiration and 

tough questions, always in the spirit of graceful cooperation and learning. For a steady stream of feedback I am 

grateful to colleagues in biology (Bill Shear, Mike Dougherty, Michael Collins, Douglas Allchin), chemistry 

(Herb Sipe), philosophy (Marc Hight, Patrick Wilson), religion (Jeff Vogel, Mike Utzinger, Jerry Carney, John 

David Ramsey), and literature (Jim Arieti, Lowell Frye). 

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