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American Journal of  
Society and Law ( AJSL)

Lupin Conference and the Tensions between Ikhwan and Ibn Saud
Mohammed Muqhim Alawni1*

Volume 2 Issue 1, Year 2023
ISSN: 2835-3277 (Online)

DOI: https://doi.org/10.54536/ajsl.v2i1.1093
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Article Information ABSTRACT

Received: December 20, 2022
Accepted: January 09, 2023
Published: January 14, 2023

The Lupin conference was held in 1930 to reach a peace treaty between Iraq and Saudi Ara-
bia. This study aims to highlight the issues and concerns that compelled the Saudi authorities 
to demand the extradition of  Farhan bin Mashhour from Iraq. This study is based on the 
review and consolidation of  secondary data regarding the rebellion of  the leaders that was 
discussed at the Lupin conference in 1930. The sources mentioned in the country library 
were reviewed, particularly those records were focused that mentioned the rebellious atti-
tudes of  foreign politicians to affect the sovereignty and stability of  the Kingdom of  Saudi 
Arabia. The study found that the peace treaty in 1930 at the Lupin conference was a win-win 
situation for Iraq and Saudi Arabia, as it paved the way for future beneficial associations. 
British officials also agreed to the extradition of  Ikhwan leaders from Iraq and handing over 
to Ibn-Saud. 

Keywords
Farhan Bin Mashhour, 
Ibn-Saud, Ikhwan, King 
Faisal, Lupin Conference

1 Modern History, Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud Islamic University, Saudi Arabia
* Corresponding author’s e-mail: mmalawni@imamu.edu.sa

INTRODUCTION
The Lupin conference was held in 1930, and the key agenda 
of  this conference was to reach a peace treaty between 
the two countries (Britain, 1974). The key participants 
in this conference were King Faisal of  Iraq and King 
Ibn-Saud of  the Kingdom of  Saudi Arabia (KSA). The 
conference discussed the concerns and reservations 
regarding Farhan bin Mashhour. He was found to be 
involved in various rebellion acts against Ibn Saud, due 
to which authorities in Saudi Arabia had cast aspersions 
regarding his motives and intentions. The conference 
took place in a friendly and cordial environment, and 
the Iraqi authorities acknowledged the rebellion acts of  
Farhan Bin Mashhour. King Faisal agreed to hand over 
the family of  Ibn Mashhour to the Saudi authorities 
so that the family could be tried under Saudi laws and 
regulations. It was regarded as a goodwill gesture from 
Iraq to the KSA. The kings agreed to a peace agreement 
on Lupin, the British naval ship. The treaty was signed in 
the Persian Gulf, and the landmark month and year were 
February 1930 (UCA, 2021).
This study aims to analyze the phenomenon of  
disposing of  the rebellion leaders, also known as Fitna 
Ibn Mashhour. The findings of  the study are based on 
historical records and the review of  the country library. 
The study finds out how the rebellion leaders were a 
potential threat to the sovereignty of  KSA and how the 
leaders of  Iraq and KSA entered into a mutual agreement 
to end this rebellion act.

METHOD
This study is based on the review and consolidation of  
secondary data, which was obtained from the country 
library. The records and sources extracted produced 87 
sheets that formed the foundation for developing key 
themes in the current study. These themes were derived, 
consolidated, and summarized by using the approach of  

thematic analysis (Castleberry & Nolen, 2018).
The following sections highlight each of  these themes 
under the relevant headings.

Historical Development
The modern state of  KSA came into being in 1932. The 
leader of  the Al-Saud family Abdul-Aziz Al Saud spent a 
significant portion of  his life in exile in Kuwait. In 1902, 
this exile ended, and the leader aimed to face the conflicts 
(Ryan, 2018).
King Abdul Aziz had been successful in making the Al-
Rashid family out of  Najd, and this victory was followed 
by the triumph of  the Ottoman Empire in 1913. KSA 
got hold of  the sizable area of  the Persian Gulf  and also 
got possession of  vast reserves of  oil. This resulted in 
the economic stability and prosperity of  KSA, and the 
country took the lead among the oil-based economies 
(Ryan, 2018).
King Abdul Aziz had not attempted the invasion of  
Hijaz before 1923. It was because he knew that then 
King Hussein bin Ali enjoyed huge support from Britain 
and Britain had a colossal power at that time, influencing 
different countries and geographical boundaries. King 
Hussein ibn Ali requested military assistance from 
the British, but the British government declared its 
impartiality in the dilemma. However, a conference was 
held in Riyadh in July 1924, stating complaints against 
the Hijaz. At the time, Ikhwan units made advancements 
toward Mecca and promoted the notion of  reformed 
practices (Sinani, 2022). Ikhwans were renowned warriors 
and nomadic Bedouins. They were passionate Wahhabi 
Islamic puritans who wanted their interpretation of  Islam 
to conquer the Middle East. Hijaz was conquered by 
them in 1925. 
Britain recognized the rule of  King Abdul Aziz in May 
1927 through the Treaty of  Jeddah. This was a landmark 
achievement by the Saudi authorities, and they wanted 

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to continue with their current geographical boundaries 
because abundant oil reserves and the custodianship of  
sacred places had ensured the economic viability and 
sustainability of  the region. However, Ikhwan leaders 
were interested in advancements and further expansion 
of  the territory by promoting the notion of  Wahhabism. 
King Abdul Aziz did not agree with this idea of  
expansion. The King anticipated that these motives of  
advancements might end up with direct tussles with the 
Britain authorities, which would not be in the interest of  
KSA. It is because Britain had just recognized KSA in 
1927, and it would not be a prudent strategy to invite 
anger from Britain (Safran, 2018). Therefore, the two 
kingdoms of  Hijaz and Najd were together announced 
as KSA in 1932. Two neutral zones were also created, 
one associated with Kuwait and the other with Iraq 
(Demmelhuber, 2021).

Rebellion Acts Of  Ibn Mashhour
The rebellion acts of  Ibn Mashhour were aimed at 
destabilizing KSA and increasing the influence of  
Wahabism in the country. The fitna was promoted by 
projecting false information about the concepts and 
beliefs of  the population. The aim and intent of  Ibn 
Mashhour were to create a distaste regarding the current 
ideological approaches of  KSA. Since the Ikhwan had led 
the triumph of  KSA, the Kingdom was influenced by the 
belief  system of  Ikhwan, which was highly influenced by 
Wahabism. The ideological war against these concepts 
was manifested by Fitna Al Mashhour (UCA, 2021). 
The authorities in KSA had to take this matter seriously. 
Since Farhan bin Mashhour was based in Iraq, KSA 
authorities couldn’t contain his efforts and motives 
directly. The Lupin conference is considered a milestone 
and achievement for KSA. It is because the modern 
KSA was formed in 1932, and the year of  the Lupin 
conference coincided with this event. At that time, there 
was a risk and fear that the Iraqi authorities might not 
cooperate with KSA. However, the leadership of  KSA 
was successful in realizing the harmful potential of  the 
rebellion acts on King Faisal of  Iraq. As a result, when the 
Iraqi authorities agreed to hand over the Ibn Mashhour 
family to KSA (UCA, 2021), the government was in a 
better position to address the ideological movements of  
Farhan bin Mashhour against the concepts and beliefs of  
the Saudi population.

Ikhwan Revolt
The Saudi authorities discussed the concerns and 
reservations regarding Farhan bin Mashhour at the Lupin 
conference because he was involved in various rebellion 
acts against Ibn Saud. The rebellion motives of  Farhan 
bin Mashhour can be analyzed in the larger context of  the 
Ikhwan revolt. This revolt by the Ikhwan group started 
in 1927 (Silverfarb, 1982). Three tribesmen that were 
actively involved in this rebellion were Otaibah, Mutayr, 
and Ajman. They challenged the authority of  Ibn Saud 
because the Saud family was gaining control in Saudi 

Arabia. Although Saudi Arabia gained independence in 
1932, the Saud family was gaining control of  different 
territories by that time, and Ikhwan believed they were 
losing their influence over the population. They believed 
they were key participants in the freedom struggle, but 
in the power dynamics, they exercised little control. 
The tactic used in the Ikhwan revolt was to engage in 
cross-border raids that made it difficult for Ibn-e-Saud 
to contain their movements with their efforts. The cross-
border raids were extended to the territories of  Iraq, 
Jordan, and Kuwait. December 1928 was a time when 
tensions increased between Ibn Saud and Ikhwan leaders, 
and the attacks resulted in the loss of  many valuable 
lives. Ibn Saud had acquired a stronghold and power by 
that time in Saudi territories, and the main instigators in 
Ikhwan were defeated successfully by Ibn Saud in March 
1929. This battle is popularly known as the Battle of  
Sabilla (Shayan, 2017). It was a big blow to the Ikhwan 
leadership, and in the aftermath of  this battle, Faisal Al 
Dawish assumed the leadership of  Ikhwan. However, he 
also left for Kuwait in the last months of  1929. Since 
the British authorities were enjoying a colonial power at 
that time, the problems and issues did not end for Faisal 
Al Dawish, and he was eventually detained by the British 
authorities. At the request of  Ibn Saud, Faisal Al Dawish 
was also handed over to the Saud family. The detention 
of  Faisal Al Dawish also paved the way for the surrender 
of  other Ikhwan leaders, including Farhan bin Mashhour.
The Ikhwan revolt highlighted the conditions of  Saudi 
Arabia before independence when the territory faced 
different tribal wars. All tribal leaders had sensed that the 
road to independence was near, and it was high time to 
gain the maximum share of  the power. When Ibn Saud 
was successful in dealing with the revolt of  Ikhwan leaders, 
the unification of  Saudi Arabia turned into reality under the 
leadership of  Ibn Saud. Ikhwan leaders had played a key 
role in different conquests before independence. Ikhwans 
had also established the Wahhabist-Bedouin army and the 
main leaders in this army were Faisal Al Dawish and Sultan 
bin Bajad (Al-Fahad, 2004). However, the conquest of  
Hijaz is seen as the turning point where the approaches of  
Ikhwan leaders differed significantly from the Ibn Saud. 
Ikhwan leaders did not contend in the victories so far, and 
they wanted further expansion in their territories under 
the ideology of  Wahabism. Their expansion plans also 
included Iraq, Kuwait, and Jordan. One of  the reasons King 
Faisal of  Iraq agreed with King Ibn-Saud regarding the 
extradition of  Farhan bin Mashhour was that the Ikhwan 
leaders also threatened the Iraqi territory. King Faisal 
believed that if  necessary cooperation was not extended 
to the Saudi authorities and Farhan bin Mashhour was not 
handed over to them, Ikhwans may also become a threat to 
the sovereignty of  Iraq.

Historical Context
Ibn Saud got control of  Saudi territory in 1902 in Riyadh. 
A significant development was made in 1912 in that 
area when there was the establishment of  the Ikhwan 

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(Brotherhood). The establishment of  Ikhwan was made 
to promote the Wahabist approach to Islam, which is 
close to the Sunni sect of  Islam (BBC, 2019). After its 
establishment, Ikhwan was a source of  great support for 
Ibn Saud. Another significant development in the Islamic 
movements was between 1921 and 1925, when the 
Ottoman Empire ended. This event encouraged Ibn Saud 
to exercise more influence, and the family took control of  
Najd and Hijaz. These two areas have the famous cities 
of  Mecca and Medina, which are considered sacred by 
the whole Muslim community. Beginning in 1928, Ibn 
Saud started promoting a modernization approach in 
Islam (BBC, 2019). It was a time when there were huge 
conflicts and differences between the Ikhwan leaders and 
Ibn Saud. Ikhwan leaders argued that all the conquests 
had the active participation of  Ikhwans, and the 
establishment of  Ikhwan was based on Wahabbi Sunni 
Islam. The modernization policies created acceptance 
and assimilation of  other interpretations of  Islam as well, 
and it was not acceptable for Ikhwans. The successful 
elimination of  Ikhwan leaders through an agreement in 
the Lupin conference made Ibn Saud the single power 
in Saudi Arabia. In September 1932, King Abdulaziz 
assumed power in the Kingdom of  Saudi Arabia.
The power struggles in the initial period of  Saudi Arabia 
are also attributed to economic instability. Saudi Arabia is 
now an oil-rich country and has a highly stable economy. 
However, oil was discovered in the Kingdom in 1938, 
and Aramco was the first company that initiated oil 
production in 1938. Therefore, economic deprivation 
also inclined different tribal leaders to get maximum hold 
of  power. It is because without assuming the powers, they 
could not have higher control over the factors and means 
of  production. The decade of  the 30s is also remembered 
for The Great Depression, which made the economic 
situation more challenging for Saudi Arabia (Crafts & 
Fearon, 2013).

Fitna Ibn Mashhour
Ikhwan and Ibn Saud had worked in collaboration for a long 
time. However, when Ibn Saud attempted to modernize 
the Saudi territory, differences developed between them. 
Ikhwan pointed out that all the efforts to conquer the 
territory were based on a basic and minimum agenda that 
the conquered territory would protect their faith and lives. 
They wanted to continue with the Wahabist approach 
to Islam and were intolerant of  other interpretations of  
Islam. Ibn Saud wanted to build cordial relations with 
other Muslim countries because they had also conquered 
Mecca and Medina and wanted to provide leadership to 
the Muslim world. Their attempts were both in the form 
of  within-state rebellion and cross-border raids. Ikhwans 
wanted to have a small nation-state where they could 
practice their faith with freedom and autonomy. As an 
alternative, they wanted to be associated with other states, 
such as Iraq, Kuwait, or Jordan, so that they could be saved 
from the new and modern ideologies of  Ibn Saud.
These two options of  Ikhwans were contradictory (Hagar, 

1981). For a small nation-state, they had demanded its 
place in the Nejdi land. The British authorities couldn’t 
accept this demand because it would be against the 
obligations of  the British to Ibn Saud. The occupation 
of  Ibn Saud on Nejd had been acknowledged by the 
British authorities. The second option, where the Ikhwan 
demanded to be recognized as Kuwaitis and not Saudis, 
was also impossible for Britain. Kuwait was a small state, 
and there was a real threat that if  Ikhwans were allowed 
to penetrate Kuwait, they could have revolted against the 
Kuwaiti authorities. Ibn Saud was also not in favor of  
providing refuge to Ikhwan in Kuwait. British authorities 
were also suspicious about the new loyalties of  Ikhwans. 
By 1930, both Ibn Saud and British authorities had 
realized that the revolt of  Ikhwan was rooted in religious 
discontent, and they wanted to promote religious 
ideologies under their political agenda. A British official 
Dickson, while analyzing these demands of  Ikhwans, 
urged them to reconcile their differences with Ibn Saud 
(Hagar, 1981).
When the appeal of  Ikhwan to the British officials was 
unsuccessful, Ikhwans again tried to contact Dickson 
on July 24, 1929, through Farhan Ibn Mashhour. Faisal 
Al Dawish was also very active at that time, and during 
this negotiation period, he pushed women, older adults, 
and children from Ikhwans into Kuwait. Since they 
revolted against Ibn Saud, they were facing a food 
shortage in Najd, and they believed that staying in Kuwait 
would reduce their misery. The meeting of  Farhan Ibn 
Mashhour and Faisal Al Dawish with Dickson was held 
on July 30, 1929, in Kuwait (Hagar, 1981) . However, 
Dickson was not satisfied with the demands of  the two 
Ikhwan leaders, and both were asked to leave Kuwait 
after the meeting. In this meeting, Farhan Ibn Mashhour 
represented the whole Ikhwans, and their demands for 
a political agreement were presented to Dickson. In this 
meeting, Ibn Mashhour falsely claimed the victory of  the 
Ikhwans and said, 
“We are victorious today, and as such, we consider it a suitable 
time to reiterate our promises of  friendship with the English and to 
reassure H. M. G. that we, Ikhwan, will not again attack the Iraq 
or Kuwait tribes” (Hagar, 1981).
When the demands of  Ikhwan leaders were not accepted 
by Dickson, Ibn Mashhour threatened that British 
authorities must provide Ikwhans asylum in Iraq or 
Kuwait. If  these demands are not fulfilled, the Ikhwan 
leaders will turn to France to seek help. When all efforts 
of  the Ikhwan leaders could not bring any meaningful 
results, the Ikhwan leaders threatened that they would 
instigate the whole of  Najd against Ibn Saud. Ikhwans 
was involved in many raids against Nejdi tribes that 
mostly occurred in September 1929. Ibn Saud criticized 
the approach of  the British official Dickson because he 
had softly dealt with the two Ikhwan leaders in Kuwait 
(Hagar, 1981). According to Ibn Saud, the two leaders 
should not be allowed to depart by British authorities and 
should be behind bars. Ibn Saud considered it a change in 
the policy of  the British authorities. Ibn Saud also pointed 

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out an agreement that if  Ikhwan leaders entered Kuwait 
territory, they would be attacked at once (Hagar, 1981).
From the perspective of  British authorities, soft dealing 
was essential to portray a neutral stance to the world 
community. British authorities did not want to take sides 
between Ikhwans and Ibn Saud for fear of  strong reactions 
from Muslims in other parts of  the world. However, the 
authorities also wanted to have good relations with Ibn 
Saud because they had emerged as leaders and promoted 
a progressive side of  the religion (Alon, 2010). The 
British authorities ensured that Ikhwan leaders would 
never be successful in overthrowing the rule of  Ibn Saud. 
Nevertheless, Ibn Saud considered the revolt of  Ikhwan 
as a continued threat to his rule, and Lupin conference 
demands can be seen in this historical perspective.

Wahhabism
In the approaches of  Ikhwan leaders, including Farhan 
Ibn Mashhour and Faisal Al Dawish, during 1929-
1930, it was evident that the Ikhwan movement wanted 
to continue with the ideology of  Wahhabism in their 
conquered territories. Therefore, it is imperative to 
analyze how Wahhabism is placed in the Islamic school 
of  thought and how it differs from other communities 
of  interpretation. Sunni and Shia are two major sects in 
Islam, and Wahhabism is attributed to a subset of  Sunni 
doctrine (Ayoob & Kosebalaban, 2009). This school of  
thought emerged after the preaching of  Muhammad 
ibn Abd al-Wahhab, who was an Islamic scholar in the 
eighteenth century (Macris, 2016). It is considered an 
orthodox interpretation of  Islam, in which monotheism 
is considered the best approach to worship. Due to 
their firm beliefs in the oneness of  God, the followers 
of  this school of  thought are also known as Muwahid 
(Macris, 2016). Although the key theologian promoting 
Wahhabism, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab died in 
1792, there were still a large number of  followers of  
Wahhabism in the Arab world. 
The large presence of  the followers in Saudi Arabia can 
be explained by the fact that the reform movement was 
started by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab in Najd, Saudi 
Arabia. He gave the concept of  bid’ah, which referred to 
those practices in Islam that had been added after the death 
of  the Holy Prophet (PBUH) and had no relevance to 
the basic teachings and principles of  Islam (Rosen, 2006). 
For example, the veneration of  saints and pilgrimages 
to the shrines were termed idolatrous impurities that 
were added to Islamic practices. Therefore, the followers 
should focus on the oneness of  God and avoid idolatrous 
acts. There was an agreement between Muhammad ibn 
Abd al-Wahhab and Muhammad bin Saud. As per the 
agreement, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab accepted the 
political authority of  Ibn Saud. Saud family allowed free 
propagation of  the Wahhabi movement and more share 
in land acquisition and power (Rosen, 2006).
After this agreement, an alliance continued with the 
followers of  both parties for an extended time. The House 
of  Saud followed the religious ideologies of  the Wahhabi 

sect. However, when Saudi Arabia gained independence in 
1932, Ibn Saud was ruling the country. At that time, the 
country’s rulers wanted to portray a modern image of  the 
country. Even today, the interpretations of  Islam are mostly 
based on the teachings of  Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab. This has 
been the issue at the government level in the Kingdom. 
The events of  1929-1930 emerged on the political front. 
However, the analysis in the current study indicates that 
the political conflicts were rooted in differences in religious 
ideologies. There has been such a widespread promotion 
of  Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia that any deviations from 
the teachings and principles of  this sect create frustration 
and anger among the local population. 
Fitna Ibn Mashhour also emerged because Ikhwan was 
established based on the Wahhabism approach and the 
leaders were not ready to change their narratives. They 
believed that they had been successful in conquering 
different areas based on Wahhabism interpretations. Now, 
when they have acquired a significant portion of  the land, 
they should be allowed to continue their practices based 
on Wahhabism. The issue with the Wahhabism approach 
is that it is not a majority representation of  Islam (Al-
Ibrahim, 2015). Wahhabism has a strict emphasis on the 
pure teachings of  Islam and Shariah. The interpretation 
believes in the literal interpretations of  the Quran and 
Hadith, and there is no room for multiple interpretations, 
diversity, and pluralism. Wahhabism is also correlated 
with Salafism, and the Ikhwan movement in Egypt 
followed the Salafi approach  (Al-Ibrahim, 2015). This 
rigid interpretation of  Islam causes issues in reconciling 
with other communities. For example, the freedom 
available to women is limited, and different forms of  art 
and aesthetics are not appreciated in this interpretation. 
Therefore, it was the right approach on the part of  Ibn 
Saud to promote the modern interpretations of  Islam. 
Ikhwan leaders, including Farhan Ibn Mashhour and 
Faisal Al Dawish, opposed these initiatives because they 
lost their power and influence in the territory. They had 
gathered a large number of  followers that had been 
attracted to Wahhabism practices. The deviation from 
these practices was considered a loss of  power, and the 
differences were on a constant rise during 1929-30.
Lupin conference can be considered a deciding and 
landmark moment in this era of  tensions between Ikhwan 
and Ibn Saud. Ibn Saud and King Faisal of  Iraq realized 
that it was not prudent to encourage the extremist 
ideologies of  Ikhwan leaders. They are instigating and 
provoking religious sentiments for their benefit. If  they 
were allowed to advance their agenda, they would not 
limit their transgressions to the Saudi territory. They 
will also infiltrate Iraq, Jordan, and Kuwait. The British 
authorities had also realized that their soft dealings with 
the Ikhwan leaders might affect their ties with the Arab 
leaders  (Hagar, 1981).

The Role of  British Authorities
The British authorities had assumed a neutral role in the 
tensions between Ikhwan leaders and Ibn Saud (Hagar, 

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1981). Ibn Saud was not pleased with this strategy 
because it was motivating the Ikhwan leaders, and they 
were increasing their demands on the authorities. Ikhwan 
leaders even claimed that promoting Wahhabism was 
part of  their agreement with Ibn Saud, and they could 
not adopt another approach contrary to the agreement 
(Hagar, 1981). Ibn Saud was well aware of  all these 
developments, but still, they chose to address this issue 
diplomatically. It was a good strategy for Ibn Saud because 
they were already facing opposition from Ikhwan leaders 
and focused their strategies on addressing the immediate 
internal threat. The threat of  Ikhwan leaders was to 
such an extent that the overall rule of  Ibn Saud could 
be overthrown. Therefore, Ibn Saud instead decided to 
seek aid from British authorities and King Faisal of  Iraq, 
and Lupin conference had the representation of  both 
parties. The negotiations and deliberations turned out to 
be in favor of  Ibn Saud, and they were successful in the 
extradition of  Ikhwan leaders from Iraq. 
Ibn Saud was also successful in explaining the benefits 
of  the new approach to Islamic principles. The rulers still 
followed the principles of  the Quran and Sunnah but 
argued that they did not want to jeopardize the unity of  
Islam. They respect other interpretations as well. They 
explained that Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab was not 
the creator of  any new sect in Islam (Kechichian, 1986). 
It was his interpretations and preaching, and because of  
a wider influence, it was termed a Wahhabi movement. 
They highlighted that they wanted to be part of  the 
mainstream of  Islam and wanted to play an active role in 
modern civilization. When the issues of  Ikhwan leaders 
were not addressed adequately by the British authorities, 
they asked Ibn Saud to discontinue their relationships 
with the British authorities. However, Ibn Saud did not 
accept this demand and continued collaborating with the 
British authorities. 
Ibn Saud presented specific demands to the British 
authorities in the context of  Fitna Ibn Mashhour. All 
their demands were consolidated into specific demands 
(Hagar, 1981). The first demand was to provide necessary 
military support to combat the rebellious motives of  
Ikhwan leaders. The next demand was the expulsion 
of  Ikhwan from Kuwait. When Ikhwan leaders held a 
meeting with the British official Dickson, they demanded 
the propagation and implementation of  Wahhabism in 
the Saudi territory and particularly in Najd. The next 
option presented to them was to move to Kuwait, where 
they could practice their ideologies freely. However, the 
demand of  Ibn Saud was the immediate expulsion of  
Ikhwan leaders because they believed that if  Ikhwans 
were allowed to settle in Kuwait, they would increase their 
influence by living there.
Furthermore, it would harm the sovereignty of  all 
neighboring states, including Iraq, Jordan, and Saudi 
Arabia. Therefore, the third demand of  Ibn Saud was the 
creation of  a blockade between Najd and Kuwait. Without 
such a blockade, there could have been movements to 
Kuwait without the consent of  Ibn Saud. These demands 

were also communicated and discussed with Shaikh 
Ahmad of  Kuwait.
One of  the reasons the movement of  Ikhwan followers in 
Kuwait occurred was because Shaikh Ahmad of  Kuwait 
did not cooperate with Ibn Saud. He sympathized with the 
Ikhwan rebels because he had developed differences with 
Ibn Saud. He anticipated that if  Ikhwans were successful 
in toppling Ibn Saud from the throne, Kuwait might have 
good ties with the new rulers  (Zahlan, 2015). However, 
in the public sphere, the ruler of  Kuwait did not openly 
support Ikhwan because he did not want to upset British 
authorities. The proposed blockade between Kuwait and 
Najd was also not liked by the ruler of  Kuwait because it 
would also translate into an economic blockade considering 
the higher trade between Najd and Kuwait. The British 
officials accepted Ibn Saud’s demand to increase controls 
on the Kuwaiti borders. However, a soft stance was taken 
on the other demands. It was a setback for Ibn Saud 
because it allowed the free operations of  Ikhwan leaders. 
Therefore, in the Lupin conference, when the leaders of  
Ikhwan had fled to Iraq, the demand of  Ibn Saud was 
the immediate handover of  Ikhwan leaders to Ibn Saud, 
including Farhan Ibn Mashhour and Faisal Al Dawish.  

CONCLUSION
This study was based on the review and consolidation 
of  secondary data regarding the rebellion of  the Ikhwan 
leaders against Ibn Saud that was discussed at the Lupin 
conference in 1930. The Lupin conference was held in 
1930 to reach a peace treaty between Iraq and Saudi Arabia. 
In the conference, Saudi Arabia expressed reservations 
regarding Ikhwan leader Farhan bin Mashhour who was 
involved in various rebellion acts against Ibn Saud. The 
study highlighted the issues and concerns that compelled 
the Saudi authorities to demand the extradition of  Farhan 
bin Mashhour from Iraq.
During 1929-1930, as Ikhwan had attained a significant 
portion of  the land, they assumed to be allowed to 
continue practicing the religion based on Wahhabism. 
But the ideology contradicted Ibn Saud’s idea of  
modernization within the region, which had a tremendous 
setback on the Ikhwans and resulted in their flight to Iraq. 
Later on, the leaders of  the Ikhwan rebels relocated to 
Al-Jihara in Kuwait after fleeing Iraq. Faysal Al-Dawish 
and other Ikhwan commanders were flown from Kuwait 
to King Abdul-Aziz’s camp at Khabari Wadha on January 
28, when they were handed up to the King. Dickson 
was also in attendance. The leaders were imprisoned 
in Riyadh. Faysal Al-Dawish died in his Riyadh cell in 
October 1931 after suffering from pain for a month due 
to significant growth in the lower region of  his throat. 
Farhan bin Mashhour was not handed over to Ibn Saud, 
but he settled in Syria from 1930 until he died in 1935, 
where he died after fighting with his cousin.

Acknowledgement
The author has contributed to the designing, executing, 
analyzing, and writing this article.

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Am. J. Soc. L. 2(1) 1-6, 2023

Conflicts of  Interest Statement
The author has no conflicts of  interest to declare.

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