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American Journal of  
Society and Law ( AJSL)

Rustling and Human Security in Nigeria: An Analysis of  Ecowas Response
Akah Augustine Ugar1*, Ekpo Tony Johnson2, Okocha Collins Chukwuka2

Volume 2 Issue 2, Year 2023
ISSN: 2835-3277 (Online)

DOI: https://doi.org/10.54536/ajsl.v2i2.2014
https://journals.e-palli.com/home/index.php/ajsl

Article Information ABSTRACT

Received: September 30, 2023
Accepted: October 26, 2023
Published: October 30, 2023

This study analyses ECOWAS response to rustling and human security in Nigeria. The 
central theme of  the argument in the study is that rustling poses a significant threat to 
human security in Nigeria. This implies that diaries and beef  consumption are altered by 
the activities of  rustlers, insurgents, terrorists, kidnappers, and bandits. This, in turn, also 
poses a significant risk to animal life, human security, and food security in Nigeria. Thus, 
in line with mainstream submissions in the extant literature, the study’s findings indicate 
that rustling threatens human and food security in Nigeria. To address these security issues, 
the study recommends that the government should come out with a new dimension to 
national security, secure the national borders by documenting and using forensic technology 
to record the details of  people and commercial trade activities at the wall, and also seek sub-
regional cooperation with ECOWAS member states.

Keywords
Rustling, Human Security, 
Insurgency, Farmer, Herder, 
Conflict, ECOWAS Response

1 Institute of  International Political Sociology, Kiel University, Germany
2 Department of  History & International Studies, University of  Uyo, Uyo, Nigeria
* Corresponding author’s e-mail: firstclassakahaugustine@gmail.com

INTRODUCTION
Violent conflicts involving pastoralists have escalated in 
West Africa in recent years, claiming thousands of  lives 
and properties across the region. These conflicts were 
primarily driven by competition for land, water, and 
forage, but political and socio-economic factors were 
also involved. This crisis negatively affects farmers and 
agricultural production. Also, banditry and cattle rustling 
are severe problems associated with these conflicts, 
especially in areas where the state was weak or where 
state officials were linked to armed groups. The scale and 
frequency of  farmer-herder battles varied greatly among 
and within West African states, and the increased use of  
sophisticated weapons intensified these conflicts.
To address most of  the pastoral-related issues, such 
as banditry, terrorism, cross-border crimes, and cattle 
rustling, in the West African sub-region, the ECOWAS 
policies were adopted and implemented. By adopting 
the ECOWAS Protocol on Transhumance (1998) and 
supporting Regulation (2003), ECOWAS Member States 
recognized cross-border pastoralist transhumance as a 
valuable economic activity. It defined a regional regulatory 
framework for cross-border transhumance based on 
the ECOWAS principle of  free movement of  persons, 
services and goods. Also, the ECOWAS Agricultural 
Policy (ECOWAP) of  2009 - to be implemented by the 
Ministers of  Livestock, Trade and Security - was adopted 
as a guiding principle for developing the livestock 
industry in the ECOWAS region. Unfortunately, with 
these policies and implementation efforts, some countries 
in the region still experience myriad security challenges at 
an increasing level. (ECOWAS-UNOWAS, 2017).  
Nigeria had more fatalities in farmer-herder conflicts 
than the rest of  the ECOWAS member states combined 
and had faced significant challenges implementing its 

legislation on pastoralism. The frequency and spread 
of  cattle rustling nationwide have been a concern. 
This activity did not only result in the stealing of  herds 
of  cattle but also in the high death toll of  herders and 
sometimes local farmers and residents. Several reports of  
bandits with sophisticated automated weapons attacking 
farms and herders’ settlements to cart away cattle and 
stage cattle proliferation also filled the airwaves of  the 
nation’s media. The evolving nature of  this criminal 
activity manifested in nearly every part of  Nigeria with 
daily occurrences (Egwu, 2015).
For instance, Plateau State – a state in the middle belt 
of  Nigeria, recorded cattle-rustling activities in Mangu, 
Bokkos, Barkin Ladi, Shendam, Jos South, Riyom, 
Langtang North, and Langtang South (Leadership 
newspaper, 2014). Several villages in the regions between 
the four northern states of  Kaduna, Katsina, Zamfara, 
Niger and Benue were also found in the middle belt under 
siege from cattle rustlers who unleashed terror on helpless 
herders and cow farmers. Also, the 2016 Nigeria Watch 
Project: Sixth Report on Violence recorded that the main 
drivers for deaths in the country were crime and conflicts 
among herders, a shift believed to have probably arisen 
from the containment of  the Boko Haram insurgency 
(Adams et al., 2016). This is no surprise as cattle rustling 
evolved into organized crime with immense criminality, 
leading to a high death toll, as evidenced in Nigeria. As 
the violence continues, ECOWAS responses have been 
insufficient in tackling the marauding attacks, especially 
in the country’s northeastern part.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Conceptual Analysis of  Rustling in Nigeria
Rustling is an age-old and profoundly entrenched 
feature of  pastoralist livelihood. It fostered competition 



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between groups that found themselves in harsh, delicate 
environments, which also served as a means of  primitive 
accumulation of  a herd of  cattle in the context of  
subsistence and commercial pastoralism (Blench, 2004). 
The practice dates back to ancient history; the first recorded 
cattle raids were conducted over seven thousand years ago, 
though the problem persisted, even in developed countries. 
For instance, the San Francisco Chronicle (IOM, 2019) 
reported that rustling was rising in California, involving an 
estimated 16,000 herds of  cattle, with the calves reportedly 
missing and stolen from California farms and ranches 
valued at more than $9 million.
Between 2008 and 2015, for example, rural banditry 
escalated in the rural areas of  North-Western Nigeria, 
including the States of  Zamfara, Katsina, Kaduna, the 
Niger and FCT Abuja. This phenomenon was often 
misunderstood and equated with the violent farmer-
herder conflicts in Nigeria’s Middle Belt. Pastoralists in 
the North were particularly affected by rustling. This 
involved the stealing of  cattle and other animals from 
herders or the raiding of  cattle from ranches.  Rustling 
was originally a culturally embedded practice that mainly 
served to reconstitute herds after a significant crisis or to 
secure bride price payments. The course was perceived to 
be driven by different needs, including cash, some groups’ 
need for meat, or as a means of  revenge for damaged 
crops. For years, however, cattle rustling was transformed 
into a vicious criminal activity, far beyond a quasi-cultural 
practice and the low-intensity conflict that previously 
defined the relationship between farmers and grazers. 
It became a form of  economic crime orchestrated by well-
organized networks, often with the backing of  some high-
ranking officials. In Northern Nigeria, wealthy individuals 
staged and financed large-scale rustling operations by 
well-armed groups of  unemployed young pastoralists, 
usually involving several thousand animals and complex 
logistic processes. Other forms of  rural banditry include 
street robbery, rape, kidnapping, organized attacks in 
villages and communities, and looting. They all seriously 
affect farmers’ and herders’ asset bases and livelihoods. 
As herders and farmers armed themselves to fend off  
bandits, there was the risk of  further violent escalation of  
conflict since many farmers believed that local pastoralists 
carried out rustling. These, however, were also victims of  
such practices. Pastoralists reacted to rustling by retreating 
into remote areas, including Natural Reserves, and limiting 
their herds’ mobility. Both methods negatively impacted 
their ability to access services and maintain their flocks 
in a productive state. When security forces got involved 
in rustling cases, they often failed to distinguish between 
pastoralists who were victims of  crime and criminals who 
committed crimes (Kuna et al., 2015). 
Rustling became a significant security issue in Northern 
Nigeria. Pastoralists practiced raiding for many years as a 
cultural pattern of  showing male prowess and restocking 
depleted herds. Over the past years, however, it evolved 
into organized crime. The most affected states include 
Benue, Gombe, Kaduna, Katsina, Nasarawa, the Niger, 

Plateau, Taraba and Zamfara, with neighboring states 
also involved. Within these states, rustlers operated out 
of  inaccessible forest areas such as the Dajin Rugu forest 
stretching from Kaduna through Katsina to Zamfara, 
where they had their bases and accumulated the stolen 
animals before trucking them to the urban markets. 
Rustlers attacked farmers and pastoralists, who preferred 
transhumant pastoralists from neighboring countries, 
who drove larger herds and were less able to connect 
to the local security forces. For this reason, pastoralist 
movement from Niger into Nigeria has declined by 
80 per cent since 2012 (IOM, 2019).  Rustlers attacked 
villages and pastoralist settlements, maimed or killed their 
inhabitants, raped women, kidnapped girls and drove 
away the cattle. Available figures on cattle rustling were 
anecdotal but highlighted the size of  the phenomenon. 
In 2013, cattle rustlers killed 322 herders and stole over 
30,000 cattle in five northern states (Okoli & Okpaleke, 
2014).  Overall, it is estimated that several hundred people 
were killed and several tens of  thousands of  cattle stolen 
yearly by rustlers.
Where there were no more cattle to steal, rustlers turned 
to kidnapping, demanding high sums from impoverished 
pastoralists. Rustling became a sophisticated business 
operation usually run by influential and sometimes 
well-known urban businessmen who hired and armed 
disadvantaged pastoralist youth to carry out the raids. They 
also operated cattle bases in remote areas and organized 
the transport and marketing of  the stolen cattle towards 
Nigeria’s large urban markets. The rustling networks 
were known for their violence and feared by the police. 
Meanwhile, rustling further exacerbated farmer-herder 
tensions since farmers often blamed local pastoralists for 
the violence. Farmers and pastoralists established local 
vigilante groups in many areas who engaged in retaliatory 
violence after rustling incidents. Many Nigerians also 
blamed “foreign herders” for the scourge of  cattle rustling 
in the northern regions and demanded the total closure of  
Nigeria’s borders for pastoralists from other countries.
Some observers maintained that some of  the rustling 
in Northern Nigeria was carried out on behalf  of  Boko 
Haram, which was alleged to pay its arms and fighters 
from its proceeds (Olaniyan & Yahaya, 2016). Before 

Table 1: Showing Distribution of  the Number of  Cattle 
from 2009 to 2015
Year Number of  cattle 
2009 16,434,978
2010 16,577,962
2011 19,041,270
2012 19,206,929
2013 19,374,029
2014 19,753,249
2015 20,184,763
Total 130,573,180

Source: Federal Department of  Livestock (FMA&RD), 2021



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coming under military pressure from the government, 
Boko Haram fighters also undertook raids similar to 
rustling in the north-eastern States of  Borno, Gombe and 
Adamawa to ensure the sustenance of  their group.

Causes of  Rustling in Nigeria
Without a doubt, rustling has developed from an ordinary 
survival crime into an organized crime with connections 
to politics, power and organized violence. Several scholars 
have tried to account for the causes of  rustling and have 
come up with ideas that support their claims. In Nigeria, 
the activities of  rustling witnessed in the northern part of  
the country in recent years have sometimes been traced 
to the activities of  the Boko Haram Islamic sect. Rebel 
and terrorist groups resort to rustling to raise funds 
to support their group agenda (Okoli & Ioryer, 2014). 
However, it becomes pertinent to note that these activities 
are not in total ignorance of  the transnational syndicate 
of  Fulani nomads who have an in-depth knowledge of  
the locations of  the forest. This is because the success 
of  rustling involves good information on herd-ship and 
a vast understanding of  transit routes and movement. 
Hence, Okoli suggests that most of  the culprits of  
rustling are nomads who must have lost their cattle due 
to the constant ‘resource conflict’ with the settled farmers 
or disgruntled Fulani who have lost herds of  cattle (Okoli 
& Atelhe, 2014). 
Regarding rustling and organized crimes in Nigeria, 
Akah & Akah’s (2023) paper interrogates the challenges 
and prospects of  managing protracted social conflicts in 
Nigeria by examining the socio-economic and political 
dynamics of  the Nigerian State within the framework of  
the current security challenges in Nigeria. Their findings 
indicate that the root causes of  conflicts in Nigeria are 
ethno-religious intolerance, struggle for power and 
scarce resources, bad governance, insincerity and a 
haphazard approach towards resolving these conflicts. 
The authors conclude that there is no alternative to good 
governance in Nigeria’s fight against violent clashes. 
Good governance is congenial to the promotion, reign 
and sustenance of  peace. Similarly, Omonyi’s (2023) work 
on ‘Evaluation of  trans-border crimes in Nigeria’ blames 
the causes of  crimes on terrorism, the proliferation 
of  small arms and light weapons (SALWs), human 
trafficking, internet fraud, oil theft, smuggling of  goods 
among others. Hence, Akah & Akah (2023) maintain 
that several administrations in Nigeria have failed to 
change the pattern of  leadership to reflect the people’s 
popular demand; instead, they intensified them and re-
packaged it in a modern way with different brand names. 
Abumbe et al. (2018) aver that Islamic fundamentalism 
has been observed to be a significant cause of  this crisis. 
According to them, Islamic fundamentalism is the belief  
in the existence and supremacy of  the Islamic religion 
above every other religion. BK sect is agitating for an 
Islamic State in Nigeria. Members of  this dreaded group 
believe that an infidel is anyone who practices a religion 
other than Islam and deserves to die. Also, the group is 

firmly against Western education.
On the other hand, another factor aiding the prevalence 
of  cattle rustling in contemporary Nigeria is the harsh 
living conditions of  the herders, which stem from the 
outcome of  climate change and the attendant resource 
conflicts that precipitate criminalities and ammunition 
that facilitate the proliferation of  illegal operations 
among unscrupulous elements in the country (Rufai, 
2017). The criminal impunity of  the people, arising from 
the level of  poverty in the nation due to government and 
private organizations’ inability to provide employment 
and create avenues for wealth creation, is also a factor in 
the rise of  rustling in Nigeria. The unemployed factions 
can only engage in rustling and other criminal activities. 
The level of  economic wealth lost at this point not only 
degrades the potential of  the cattle business but also hurts 
the true nature of  how much cattle business generates for 
the nation.
Moreover, most herders aspire to have control over more 
cattle because of  the cultural respect that comes with it. 
Invariably, the herders use rustling to increase their cattle 
and gain power, consideration and affluence. This is 
juxtaposed with Okoli’s statement that says that herders 
carry out the majority of  rustling incidents.
Small arms and light weapons increase insecurity in 
communities and could account for the prevalence of  
rustling. The Proliferation of  arms and ammunition 
has become a common threat in northern/ middle belt 
regions of  Nigeria. The increasing use of  weapons 
usually instigates the acts of  violence witnessed in rustling 
activities. Most of  the rustlers arm themselves with these 
weapons that aid them to intimidate and threaten the 
herders from whom they steal the livestock. Moreover, 
the study was informed that these weapons have led to 
increased killings in the area and guns are therefore seen 
as an economic investment. Traditionally, the pastoralists 
practiced cattle rustling using spears and bows; now, the 
weapon of  choice is the AK-47 (Eavis, 2002). Pastoral 
communities seem to be arming themselves for defensive 
and offensive reasons with the need to protect themselves 
and their cattle from being plundered by hostile groups 
and using arms to steal stock from other pastoral 
communities forcefully (Abdullahi, 2016). Finally, due to 
the accessibility and volume of  foreign supplies, major 
internal markets have emerged where rebels, criminals, 
and terrorists can access weapons, ammunition, and 
explosives. This has led to a catastrophic rise in violent 
deaths in local communal conflicts over land and water or 
the traditional practice of  rustling (Mkutu, 2007). 
Another trigger of  the rustling is the presence of  large 
swathes of  forest reserves that are generally out of  the 
reach of  the Nigerian security operatives. Most rustling 
activities occur in Northern Nigeria’s state-owned 
resources, such as the Kamuku, Kiyanbana, and Fagore 
forests (Olaniyan & Yahaya, 2016). Most of  the arms 
and ammunition the criminals used to carry out their 
dastardly acts were being ferried into the country by 
using animals crossing the forest (Nan, 2015). This aids 



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as a perfect location for criminals from security forces as 
it is tough to control all border areas between countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. The reluctance of  the Nigerian 
security operatives to enter these forest areas seems to 
be mainly due to inefficiency and corruption (Olaniyan 
& Yahaya, 2016). First, one significant consequence of  
the Nigerian security forces’ lack of  equipment and poor 
motivation is gross inefficiency as they are ill-equipped 
and ill-motivated in contrast to the criminals, who are 
well-armed and motivated. Second, security forces and 
rustlers are often in cahoots, which seems obvious given 
the open manner of  rustling and the reluctance of  the 
security operatives to act, even when provided with 
intelligence by residents. The third issue of  corruption is 
highly explained by Y. Z. Ya’u, executive director of  the 
Centre for Information Technology and Development 
(CITAD), a non-governmental body funded by the 
MacArthur Foundation that is developing workable 
technological innovations against  rustling in Nigeria, 
stated: 
People steal hundreds of  cattle and move them around 
for days, and they do not get apprehended, which means 
there is a problem with our security system. Secondly, 
suppose they can take them to our markets here in 
Nigeria and sell them off. In that case, it means there is 
not only a problem with our intelligence-gathering system 
but also a form of  collaboration with the dealers because 
the primary cattle dealers in the markets ought to know 
if  the cows are stolen. It illustrates that there is a wave 
of  partnerships at various levels of  cattle rustling, and 
there is an apparent inability of  the police and other 
security outfits to deal with the problem because, firstly, 
they are insufficiently equipped to handle the challenge. 
Second, there is a form of  collaboration between criminal 
elements and security agents; third, there is outright 
corruption (National Express, 2017).
The porous nature of  inter-state border-lines in Africa 
makes trans-border rustling conducive and thriving. 
Border security has come to assume heightened 
importance in the world today. It has become easy for 
transnational crimes to be conducted, such as moving 
money, people and goods across the globe, because of  
advancements in telecommunications, transportation 
and technology. These borders promote illicit trade, 
goods and services of  which rustled herds of  cattle 
have become significant commodities being passed and 
crossed along the Nigeria border lines. These borders are 
identified with dried trees, oil drums, and rims of  tyres to 
demarcate the national boundaries; this makes the wall 
disorganized, poorly managed and insecure (Akinyemi, 
2013). This promotes the unrepressed entry of  illegal 
migrants and cross-border activities.  However, some 
indefinable corridors or regions served as a route to these 
illegal migrants, posing a severe threat to the country and 
the national borders. For instance, it has been discovered 
that Nigeria has 1497 irregular and 84 regular routes 
where movements were done illegally.

Rustling and Human Security in Nigeria: A 
Theoretical Nexus
The growing phenomenon of  rustling is one of  the 
transformations from the hitherto Fulani cultural 
practice of  testing a person’s bravery and prowess in 
bloody warfare involving various groups and actors. 
This transformation has seen the emergence of  well-
coordinated and well-funded banditry in virtually every 
state in the northern area, with the Fulani ethnic group 
often considered at the epicenter of  the scenario because 
of  its deep involvement in pastoralism. However, herding 
livestock is not an exclusive preserve of  Fulani; in Nigeria 
alone, 14 other ethnic groups, including the Shuwa, 
Kanuri, Kanembu, Arabs, and Tuareg, are in some way 
involved in it (Blench, 2013).
In Nigeria, the prevalence and dimensions of  rustling 
have been widespread, particularly in the country’s 
middle belt and northern zones, where cattle raring and 
land cultivation is a dominant agricultural practice and 
defines their livelihood. However, this problem has been 
complicated by the rising incidence of  farmer/herder 
conflicts that stem from farmland encroachment, struggle 
over grazing space, rustling and other forms of  violence, 
including the Boko Haram insurgency. 
In recent developments, the wave of  violence in the 
phenomenon of  herders and farmers conflicts through 
rustling has escalated to a new dimension of  violence that 
poses a serious challenge to human security. This recent 
phenomenon of  criminal activities with sophisticated 
weaponry threatens the lives of  herders, communities, 
states and, by extension, the nation. This has worsened 
the conditions of  the herders, coupled with climate 
change and the frequent resource conflict, which tends 
to coerce criminal tendencies among the herders. The 
consequences of  such a threat are loss of  livelihood, 
population displacement, loss of  lives and property, and 
decline in rural productivity and agricultural output.
In the last decade, the death toll recorded by cattle rustlers 
has increased in Nigeria. In Plateau State alone, between 
2013 and 2015, 28,000 cattle have been rustled, and 
rustlers have killed 264 herders. While it is challenging 
to say the number of  cattle stolen by these unidentified 
rustlers, sources revealed that thousands of  cattle have 
been brazenly stolen by persons who often attack villages 
at night to carry out the nefarious act.

METHODOLOGY
The study deploys content analysis within the qualitative 
research as its research design. It systematically reviews 
literature on cattle rustling, internal insecurity, and armed 
banditry in Nigeria. Hence, it depends on document 
analysis via the utilization of  secondary sources of  data 
such as textbooks, journals, periodicals, online materials, 
government publications, and publications by reputable 
international and national organizations such as Amnesty 
International (AI), National Bureau of  Statistics (NBS), 
Nigerian Intelligence Agency (NIA), Global Conflict 



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Tracker, Global Peace Index (GPI), Global Terrorism 
Index (GTI), World Bank, etc. Results from the analysis 
of  these documents are presented in a thematic format 
to vitiate the subjects of  our inquiry. Hence, the paper 

is descriptive in style since it builds on the strength of  
already existing works.

RESULTS

Table 2: Showing Number of  Rustled Cattle and Causalities between 2013 and 2015
Year in view Number of  Causalities Number of  the Cattle Rustled
2013 322 60,000
2014 281 58,801
2015 2991 64,820
Total 3,594 183,621

Source: Author’s compilation (2022)

Table 3: Showing Dimensions of  Cattle Rustling in Nigeria
Orientation Motivation Origination Destination Culprits 

Petty/Local
Petty/Localized 
rustling

Not Syndicated; 
not armed.

Criminal quest for 
household protein or 
dairy (meat and milk)

Neighborhood 
paddocks or 
grazing fields.

Local 
Household.

Local Farmers 
and Nomads.

Inland rustling Loosely Syndicated 
and moderately 
armed.

Quest for capital 
accumulation.

Grazing fields 
of  herding 
communities.

Local cattle 
markets and 
abattoirs.

Local Farmers 
and Nomads.

Trans-border 
rustling.

Robustly syndicated, 
organized and 
armed.

Quest for capital 
accumulation; 
funding of  political 
cause, e.g. armed 
rebellion and 
terrorism.

Grazing fields, 
commercial 
farms, cattle 
markets, herding 
communes.

Across 
national 
boundaries of  
Niger, Chad, 
Cameroon.

Nomads and a 
cartel of  agents, 
merchants, 
and foreign 
accomplices.

Source: Okoli and Okpaleke (2014), Cattle Rustling and Dialectics of  Security in Northern Nigeria, International Journal of  Liberal 
Arts and Social Science, Vol. 2 No. 3.

DISCUSSION
The significant findings reveal that rustling has been a 
veritable threat to Nigeria’s national and human security 
and has manifested its effects in diverse dimensions. 
It has led to loss of  lives, human injury, population 
displacement, as well as loss of  cattle in their numbers. 
This situation has diverse repercussions that would affect 
the collective security of  the herding communities and 
the nation. The repercussion goes beyond insecurity; it 
also affects the capacity of  productivity and an eventual 
depletion of  household and national income. This could 
ultimately lead to a drop in the cumulative supply of  
organic protein/ dairy in Nigeria and, by extension, to 
other products that survive on it.  
However, similar findings reveal that the persistent 
attacks by rustlers on herding communities have put such 
communities in a precarious state. This aggravates the 
already conflictive herder/farmer inter-group relation, 
ultimately leading to a ferocious circle of  violence. An 
extension to this dimension is the perceptible collapse 
into various terror brands that commit mass raids where 
massive killings, destructions and raping are perpetuated, 
of  which women and children are victimized and often 
face the worse hit of  these raids. Thus, with its extreme 
dynamics, rustling can be categorized as having traits of  

terrorism in terms of  its destructive import of  instilling 
fear of  destruction of  human life and property. 
Closely related to this is the concern that rustling is 
being resorted to by the insurgents as a fund-raising 
strategy for terror financing (Okoli & Okpalaeke, 2014). 
Some funding sources for terrorist groups in Northern 
Nigeria have been linked to rustling. Some stakeholders 
have alleged that a direct link between rustling and the 
Boko Haram insurgency has been established through 
intelligence reports. The former Governor of  Borno 
state, for instance, stated that:
Our security agencies have reasonably established that most 
of  the cattle being traded at the markets [in Borno State] 
were the direct proceeds of  cattle-rustling perpetrated 
by insurgents [and] were sold at prohibitive costs to 
unsuspecting customers through some unscrupulous 
middlemen who use underhand ploy[s] to disguise the 
transactions as legitimate deliberately. The money realized 
from such transaction[s] would then be channeled to fund 
their deadly activities (Daily Post, 2016).
The implication of  this is that insurgency can raise the 
instrumental value and utility of  rustling to a level where 
its solution would be as problematic as terrorism itself. 
This means, therefore, that if  rustling earnestly becomes 
an instrumentality for terrorist design, it will indeed thrive 



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so long as terrorism prevails.  
In addition, it has also been used as a mechanism for 
Small Arms and Light Weapons proliferation (SALW).  
Arms Trafficking along Nigerians’ porous borders, 
particularly in the heat of  insurgency, has also become 
a trend. Weapons are loaded on these cattle and are used 
as transportation services across the borders. The vast 
ungoverned space stretching between Southern Niger, 
Southern Chad, North East Nigeria and North West 
Cameroon further enhances cattle rustling since these 
cattle’ are not passed through structured road routes 
but through bush paths and other grazing trans-border 
routes. This porous nature of  African inter-state border 
lines generally makes trans-border rustling conducive and 
thriving. That being said, what then is the response of  
ECOWAS in dealing with this violent trend?

ECOWAS Response to Rustling in Nigeria 
One of  the most significant attempts of  ECOWAS to 
deal with the problem of  rustling was the introduction of  
the ECOWAS Protocol on Transhumance in 1998. This 
protocol is also binding in Nigeria. However, Nigeria did 
little to domesticate and implement the Transhumance 
Protocol. Given the general scarcity of  legislation on 
pastoralist transhumance, there was no national law 
domesticating the ECOWAS Transhumance Protocol 
within the period under review, and there was also no 
institutional framework for implementing the law. Hence, 
the issue of  cattle rustling in Nigeria loomed high.
Also, there were very few border posts along the country’s 
northern border, and none was restricted as an official 
border crossing point for pastoralists as required by the 
Protocol. The International Transhumance Certificate 
(ITC) was, at best, only known to some government 
officials in Abuja, while its issuance was the responsibility 
of  the federal states. Most states ignored the certificate 
and did not have institutions to issue it. The provisions 
of  the ECOWAS Transhumance Protocol were unknown 
to the relevant department within the Federal Ministry of  
Agriculture, where it was misunderstood as an agreement 
allowing the unlimited immigration of  foreign pastoralists 
into Nigeria.
This perception was widespread among those officials 
who heard about the Transhumance Protocol but 
did not have a chance to read it. Given the pervasive 
narrative that foreign and heavily armed pastoralists 
were responsible for the rustling crisis in northern 
Nigeria and possibly for much farmer-herder violence 
in other parts of  the country, many official interlocutors 
reject the Transhumance Protocol. This also includes 
representatives of  local pastoralist associations, who fear 
that ECOWAS promoted the unfettered influx of  foreign 
pastoralists, competing with the Nigerians for scarce 
pastoral resources. Many Nigerian pastoralists seemed 
suspicious of  foreign pastoralists arriving in Nigeria on a 
transhumance basis. 
Nigeria’s border guards, including the National Immigration 
Service, considered cross-border transhumance a security 

issue as terrorist or criminal groups could attempt to cross 
the borders in the guise of  pastoralists. They also report 
armed foreign pastoralists who try to evade the official 
Nigerian border points and enter the country through 
illegal roads. While Nigeria counts plant and animal 
quarantine officers at approved border points at its air and 
sea borders, these are missing at its land borders. Hence, 
herds are allowed to pass uncontrolled. 
Generally, there was a feeling among the border guards that 
the ECOWAS Protocol on Transhumance did not reflect 
West Africa’s realities. Pastoralists would abuse ECOWAS 
provisions on free movement for their purposes. While 
this was a valid point of  view, other interview partners 
reported that police and border officers were sometimes 
actively involved in large-scale violent operations such 
as rustling and cross-border transporting of  stolen 
cattle. There were also reports of  abuses of  border and 
police officers against Nigerian and foreign pastoralists, 
exploiting the latter’s vulnerable position to extract 
bribes and ransom. Overall, Nigerian border institutions 
appeared to lack the capacity to implement the ECOWAS 
Protocol on Transhumance fully.
It was reported that the number of  pastoralists moving 
from neighboring countries into Nigeria to benefit 
from dry season pastures and marketing opportunities 
decreased by 80 per cent with the period under review. 
This is mainly due to widespread cattle rustling, farmer-
herder violence, insurgency, and harassment.

CONCLUSION
Rustling is a serious security challenge, given its dire 
impacts and implications in contemporary Nigeria. 
Although it is an essentially local problem, it also has 
growing trans-border crime implications, particularly 
when international criminal organizations become 
involved. It does not only pose a severe threat to humans 
but, by extension, threatens food and national security. 
Its latest manifestations in blood-shedding, rape and raids 
in some parts of  the middle belt and northern zones of  
Nigeria that brings about the destruction of  property 
have become a serious source of  concern that should be 
given immediate attention, particularly with its purported 
association with the Boko Haram insurgency. Therefore, 
it rests on the government to immediately find a way to 
arrest the prevailing violence occasioned by rustling. As 
this study has revealed, rustling activities are the bedrock 
of  human and food insecurity. The marauders have 
repeatedly distorted the peace and stability of  herders 
and crop farmers as they have been identified as bandits, 
gangs of  kidnappers or terrorists.

RECOMMENDATION
Arising from this challenge and the findings discussed 
above, the study recommends that Nigeria introduce a 
ranching system that creates reserves where livestock 
will be nurtured and used for dairy, beef  and other 
commercial purposes. Secondly, it is essential to revisit 
the ECOWAS Transhumance Protocol, and Nigeria 



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Am. J. Soc. L. 2(2) 51-57, 2023

should be willing to implement some of  the protocol’s 
provisions. Also, ECOWAS and all the member states 
should be more committed to its regional security. 
Partnership, particularly military-wise, should be made to 
present a joint military force that will ensure peace and 
stability in the region and combat all the rustlers who take 
advantage of  the vast array of  forests in the northern part 
of  Nigeria to perpetrate violence and criminality.

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