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American Journal of  
Society and Law

A Critical Examination of  Hate Speech in Nigeria
Idachaba Martins Ajogwu1*

Volume 1 Issue 1, Year 2022
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Article Information ABSTRACT

Received: September 18, 2022
Accepted: November 10, 2022
Published: November 21, 2022

Hate speech touches on contested issues of  dignity, free expression, liberty and democracy. 
It can thus be argued that there is a conflict between the right to freely advocate however 
distasteful the idea may be and the right to be free from prejudice and discrimination. In 
some circumstances, speech is restrained and the right to non-discrimination is preferred 
over free speech. Hate speech has been used invariably to mean expression which is abusive, 
insulting, intimidating, harassing or which incites violence, hatred, discrimination against 
group identified by characteristics such as race, religion, place of  birth, residence, region, 
language, caste, community, sexual orientation or personal convictions. The methodology 
adopted in this paper was doctrinal. Both primary and secondary sources were employed in 
carrying out this paper. The finding of  the paper is that asides from Nigeria, various coun-
tries of  the world have adopted some measures to deal with hate speech and other related 
issues. While some countries have clearly defined laws, some others find it quite unnecessary 
to create laws that seek to regulate hate speech as it is perceived as an infringement to the 
fundamental human rights of  freedom of  expression. This paper recommended that the 
existing Cyber Crimes Act and the Anti-Terrorism Act, among other pre-existing regulations 
cover many of  the offences the new bill seek to address rather than waste valuable resources 
on the enactment of  fresh laws to enable effective implementation and avoid a situation of  
plurality of  laws. Perhaps one of  the most effective ways of  combating hate speech would 
be to marginalize purveyors of  such speeches. In the U.K., while far-right, fascist parties 
like the British National Party and the racist ideas they support are not banned, mainstream 
British politician avoid associating openly with members of  such parties. In Nigeria, on the 
other hand, offensive and hate speech mongers are often seen as regional and ethnic heroes.

Keywords
Democratic Society, Fundamental 
Human Rights, Hate Speech, 
Cyber Crime

1 Faculty of  Law,  Kogi State University, Anyigba, Nigeria
* Corresponding author’s e-mail: Idachabamartins1@gmail.com

INTRODUCTION
In any given democratic society, one unavoidable and 
permanent concept is the concept of  fundamental 
human rights. The enjoyment of  these rights are generally 
non derogable; they cannot be interfered with. These 
rights cut across civil, political, economic, sociocultural 
areas and are often protected and guaranteed by the 
grundnorm of  any given democratic society. What is a 
democratic society without fundamental human rights? 
One of  such rights is the freedom of  speech.
Freedom of  speech is a principle that supports the 
freedom of  an individual or a community to articulate 
their opinions and ideas without fear of  retaliation, 
censorship, or legal sanction. The term ‘freedom of  
expression’ is sometimes used synonymously but includes 
any act of  seeking, receiving, and imparting information 
or ideas, regardless of  the medium used.
Freedom of  speech or freedom of  expression is 
guaranteed as a fundamental human right under regional, 
domestic and international laws and is provided for in 
many conventions, constitutions and charters across the 
world. Freedom of  expression is recognized as a human 
right under Article 19 of  the Universal Declaration of  
Human Rights (UDHR) and recognized in international 
human rights law in the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 19 of  the UDHR 
states that ‘everyone shall have the right to hold opinions 
without interference’ and ‘everyone shall have the right to 
freedom of  expression; this right shall include freedom 

to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of  all 
kinds, regardless of  frontiers, either orally, in writing or in 
print, in the form of  art, or through any other media of  
his choice’ . 
In Nigeria, the Constitution provides for freedom of  
speech under Chapter 4, section 39 and is titled; ‘Right to 
freedom of  expression and the press’ 
The version of  Article 19 in the ICCPR later amends 
this by stating that the exercise of  these rights carries 
special duties and responsibilities’ and may ‘therefore 
be subject to certain restrictions’ when necessary ‘for 
respect of  the rights or reputation of  others’ or ‘for the 
protection of  national security or of  public order (order 
public), or of  public health or morals’. Section 45 of  the 
1999 Constitution of  the Federal Republic of  Nigeria 
equally provides for restrictions and derogation from 
fundamental human rights in the instance where the 
exercise of  such right is prejudicial to defence, public 
safety, public order, public morality or public health. 
Freedom of  speech and expression, therefore, may not be 
recognized as being absolute, and common limitations or 
boundaries to freedom of  speech relate to libel, slander, 
obscenity, pornography, sedition, incitement, fighting 
words, classified information, copyright violation, trade 
secrets, food labeling, non-disclosure agreements, the 
right to privacy, dignity, the right to be forgotten, public 
security, and perjury, and hate speech.  Justifications for 
such include the harm principle, proposed by John Stuart 
Mill in On Liberty, which suggests that: ‘the only purpose 

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for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of  a civilized community, against his will, is to 
prevent harm to others. The idea of  the ‘offense principle’ 
is also used in the justification of  speech limitations, 
describing the restriction on forms of  expression deemed 
offensive to society, considering factors such as extent, 
duration, motives of  the speaker, and ease with which it 
could be avoided. 
The former UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion 
and Protection of  Freedom of  Opinion and Expression, 
Frank La Rue , outlined this in a 2012 report;
“The right to freedom of  expression implies that it should be 
possible to scrutinize, openly debate and criticize, even harshly 
and unreasonably, ideas, opinions, belief  systems and institutions 
including religious ones, as long as this does not advocate hatred that 
incites hostilities, discrimination or violence against an individual or 
a group of  individuals.”
Taking into cognizance the fact that freedom of  speech 
and expression is not absolute,  the provisions for laws 
that regulate this right, in order to avoid infringement of  
ones right due to the exercise of  another’s. Enter all the 
instances where freedom of  expression will be restricted. 
The main focus of  this research work however, is hate 
speech.

Analysis of  the Constitutive Elements of  Hate 
Speech 
The philosopher Jeremy Waldron argues that, while purely 
offensive speech may not justify restrictions, there is a 
class of  injury, amounting to more than hurt sentiments 
but to less than harm, in the sense of  physical injury, that 
demands restriction in democratic frameworks , hate 
speech falls within such class of  injury. It lies in a complex 
nexus with freedom of  expression, individual, group and 
minority rights, as well as concepts of  dignity, liberty and 
equality. Its definition is often contested . There is no 
general definition as to the elements that constitute hate 
speech, for the apprehension that laying down a definite 
standard might lead to the curtailment of  free speech. 
There have however been attempts to define and describe 
what will amount to hate speech. 
Hate speech employs discriminatory epithets to insult 
and stigmatize others on the basis of  their race, sexual 
orientation or other forms of  group membership. It is any 
speech, gesture, conduct, writing or display which could 
incite people to violence or prejudicial action . As aptly 
posited hate speech is also seen as any communication 
that denigrates a particular person or a group on the 
basis of  race, color, ethnicity, gender, disability, sexual 
orientation, nationality, religion, or other characteristic. It 
can be in the form of  any speech, gesture or conduct, 
writing, or display and usually marks incitement, violence 
or prejudice against an individual or a group. 
To grasp a better understanding of  the elements that 
constitutes hate speech in Nigeria it is expedient that 
hate speech as it is understood in other national and 
international legal frameworks are considered, thus;
The Law Commission of  India describes hate speech as: 

“Hate speech is an expression which is likely to cause distress or 
offend other individuals on the basis of  their association with a 
particular group or incite hostility towards them. There is no general 
legal definition of  hate speech, perhaps for the apprehension that 
setting a standard for determining unwarranted speech may lead to 
suppression of  this liberty.” 
The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of  
Racial Discrimination  “CERD” noted that hate speech 
includes: 

a. All dissemination of  ideas based on racial or ethnic 
superiority or hatred, by whatever means;

b. Incitement to hatred, contempt or discrimination 
against members of  a group on grounds of  their race, 
color, descent, or national or ethnic origin;

c. Threats or incitement to violence against persons or 
groups on the grounds in (b) above; 

d. Expression of  insults, ridicule or slander of  
persons or groups or justification of  hatred, contempt 
or discrimination on the grounds in (b) above, when it 
clearly amounts to incitement to hatred or discrimination;

e. Participation in organizations and activities which 
promote and incite racial discrimination. 
The Council of  Europe(Council of  Europe report 1997) 
defines hate speech as; 
Covering all forms of  expression which spread, incite, 
promote or justify forms of  hatred based on intolerance, 
including: intolerance expressed by aggressive nationalism 
and ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility against 
minorities, migrants and people of  immigrant origin. 
According to Neisser, hate speech includes all 
communications (whether verbal, written, symbolic) that 
insults a racial, ethnic and political group, whether by 
suggesting that they are inferior in some respect or by 
indicating that they are despised or not welcome for any 
other reasons. 
It has been stated that the question regarding hate 
speech in the case of  Nigeria is the undergrowth which 
structures the representation of  the falling of  the tree 
in the forest, the tree in this case being Nigerians and 
the Nigerian State.  In the Nigerian context, no formal 
definition of  hate speech exists. However, its meaning 
can be derived from the context of  legal instrument that 
have an impact of  hate speech such as the Constitution 
of  the Federal Republic of  Nigeria, the Criminal and 
Penal Code, the electoral act and so on. Hate speech 
in Nigeria is associated with politics, electioneering, 
religious organizations and ethnicity movements and 
groups. The situation is worsened by the advent of  social 
media. Politically motivated hate speech is historically a 
precursor to election related harassment and violence in 
Nigeria.  A recent report by the Centre for Information 
Technology (CITAD)  shows 618 items conveying 
religious insensitivity, followed by 507 items on ethnicity, 
192 items relating to Biafran agitation. Another report 
showed that 70% of  the people disseminating hate speech 
in Nigerian social media space use their identity and can 
be reached for follow up action. This shows that, on and 
off  the internet, many Nigerians have no inhibitions in 

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using words with intention to insult, offend or convey 
maximum contempt for some other Nigerians, either 
along ethnic, religious or spatial lines.
In determining what constitute hate speech there are 
several considerations to be examined before abusive 
language or innuendo can be considered hate speech. Any 
list of  such considerations should include the following. 
First, hate speech can be identified by the severity of  
what is said, the severity of  the harm advocated and the 
intensity of  the communication.  Another way is to look 
at the intention  of  the author of  the statement. Content 
of  the speech is also relevant and connotes specifics of  
the speech including its tone and if  it requires listeners to 
respond with certain actions or inactions are important. 
The inciters themselves should be considered, specifically 
their standing in the context of  the audience to whom 
the speech is directed.  The level of  their authority or 
influence over the audience is relevant as is the degree 
to which the audience is already primed or conditioned, 
to take their lead from the inciter. Again, for speech to 
qualify as hate speech, it must have occurred in public. 
This also means that communication has to be directed 
at a non-specific audience (general public) or to a number 
of  individuals in a public space. 

The Hate Speech Bill and Its Criticisms
Offensive and hateful speech has been a challenge in 
Nigeria. If  it has to do with the Nigerian Civil War, Igbo 
nationalists take offense with the rest of  the country; if  
it is about Boko Haram and its alleged sponsors, self-
appointed defenders of  the North are up in arms with 
equally self-appointed defenders of  the South; if  it has 
to do with resource control and oil politics, the North 
squares off  against the South. The Igbos and the Yoruba, 
rival major ethnic groups, frequently pick on each other. 
Hate and offensive speech profiling reached a pinnacle in 
the country in June 2017, when a coalition of  Northern 
youth groups issued a Kaduna Declaration which, apart 
from calling the Igbos unprintable names, gave all Igbos 
in the North three months (until October 1, 2017) to 
leave. The reaction stemmed from harsh pro- Biafra 
rhetoric of  NnamdiKanu, leader of  the Indigenous 
People of  Biafra. While it is true that NnamdiKanu had 
engaged in a form of  rhetoric offensive to many people, 
the quit notice given to the Igbos in the North triggered 
competitive quit notices to vacate. 
Though the notices were later withdrawn, they led to 
palpable fears that the situation could degenerate to a 
Rwanda-like genocide unless the tide of  free-flowing 
offensive and hate speech in the country was stemmed. 
In a heterogeneous and polarized country like Nigeria, 
hate speech threatens the nation-building process by 
widening the social distance among Nigerians, cementing 
existing distrust, and undermining national support. 
Hate speech can also negatively affect the economy. For 
instance, in the face of  the quit notice given to the Igbos 
in northern Nigeria, some Igbo businessmen refused 
to entertain any credit request from customers, Igbos 

and non-Igbos alike, until after the October 1 deadline. 
Further, deposit money banks, already risk averse from 
high non-performing loans, became even more unwilling 
to lend during the quit notice period. The competitive 
quit notice, respectively given to the Igbos living in the 
North and the Northerners and Yorubas living in the 
Niger Delta, could curtail the willingness of  Nigerians to 
invest in the regions other than their own because of  the 
risk of  future quit notices. 
It is therefore not surprising that on the 5th of  November, 
2019 the National Commission for the Prohibition of  Hate 
Speech bill was introduced by the Senate of  the Federal 
Republic of  Nigeria sponsored by Senator, Abdullahi 
Sabi to promote national cohesion and integration by 
outlawing unfair discrimination, hate speeches and the 
establishment of  an Independent National Commission 
for the prohibition of  hate speeches and connected 
matters. The Bill specifically prohibits the commission 
of  ethnic discrimination, hate speech, harassment on 
the basis of  ethnicity, ethnic or racial contempt and 
discrimination by way of  victimization by individuals 
or corporate bodies. On the hill of  the introduction of  
the bill, it has come under huge criticism and attacks 
from Nigerians home and abroad. These criticisms are 
considered hereunder.

Poor Definition of  Terms
One of  the criticisms is that the bill poorly defines 
hate speech, especially when differentiating between 
hate speech and offensive speech. Though hurtful, 
offensive speech is believed to be a protected freedom 
of  expression, a critical component of  a functioning 
democracy. Instead, the bill essentially regards even 
insulting or abusive speeches as hate speech, a vague 
and dangerous categorization. Defining hate speech in 
a way that delineates it from offensive speech has been 
a tall task for policymakers and academics around the 
world—including Susan Benesch at Harvard, former 
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, and 
many others. Some believe that the term “hate speech” 
should only be used for extreme cases such as speeches 
that explicitly call for the physical injury or extermination 
of  certain people. 

Attack on Freedom of  Speech, Expression and the 
Press
Another criticism of  the bill is that it could provide a 
cover for the government to attack free speech, which in 
a democracy, is important both for prevalence of  truth 
and for citizens to effectively participate in the democratic 
process. Hate speech laws have been used to suppress and 
punish left-wing viewpoints in Europe. Similarly, South 
Africa’s hate crimes bill has been criticized for being 
vulnerable to abuses that would undermine free speech. 

Imposition of  Capital Punishment
One of  the major criticisms of  the hate speech bill in 
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person found guilty of  any form of  hate speech that 
results in the death of  another person. This provision is 
seen not only as absurd but one that contradicts various 
international best practices and it is to no surprise that 
the prescription of  death by the proposed bill has come 
under unfathomable criticism and attacks. 

Pre-Existing Regulations and Laws on Hate Speech 
And Related Issues
The major gist of  this research work is to point out 
the necessity or otherwise of  enacting a new law that 
specifically criminalizes hate speech.  In determining 
the superfluosness or otherwise of  enacting a new law, 
recourse must be made to preexisting regulations and 
laws that may make the argument valid.  It is in the light 
of  the foregoing that below are listed, preexisting laws 
regulating hate speech and other related issues. The 
domestic framework, that is, the legal framework in 
Nigeria, which is the focal point of  this research work 
would be discussed below and thereafter the international 
framework. These hate speech regulations contained 
in treaties to which Nigeria is signatory, have a binding 
effect on Nigeria by virtue of  the principle of  pacta 
sunt servanda. Hence, they will also be looked at and 
considered in the foregoing paragraphs.

Domestic Legal Framework
While freedom of  expression is clearly protected by a 
considerable body of  treaty law, it can also be regarded as 
a principle of  customary international law, so frequently 
is the principle enunciated in treaties, as well as other soft 
law instruments. Most human rights treaties, including 
those dedicated to the protection of  the rights of  
specific groups – such as women, children and people 
with disabilities - make explicit mention of  freedom of  
expression. Perhaps, the most significant international 
legal source of  the right to freedom of  expression is 
set out in Article 19 of  the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights.  The ICCPR also provides for 
the limitation of  the right to freedom of  expression.  
Although the ICCPR makes no mention of  hate speech, 
in principle speech that express or incite hatred is not 
only potentially subject to limitation under Article 19(3) 
but it also conflicts directly with an explicit obligation in 
Article 20 of  the ICCPR to prohibit incitement to hatred.  
Nigeria acceded into the treaty on July 29, 1993. Nigeria 
has also ratified the African (Banjul) Charter on Human 
and People’s Right  which it ratified on July 22, 1983. Also 
Nigeria has also ratified the International Convention on 
the Elimination of  all Forms of  Racial Discrimination  
on October 16, 1967. As stated earlier, these instruments 
impose certain obligations on states to fulfill, respect, 
promote and protect these rights.  States are also 
obliged to ensure that their domestic laws are brought in 
consistency with their international obligations.
Hate speech has not been defined in any law in Nigeria. 
However, legal principles and provisions in certain 
legislations prohibit selected forms of  speech as an 

exception to freedom of  speech;

Defamation
Defamation is the oral or written communication of  a false 
statement about another that unjustly harms or injures a 
third party’s reputation. It usually constitutes a tort and a 
crime. The tort of  defamation includes both libel (written 
statements) and slander (spoken statements). Under 
common law, a claim must have been made to someone 
other than the person defamed and must generally be 
false. In some jurisdictions, defamation is treated also as a 
crime. Sections 373-381 of  the Criminal Code in Nigeria 
considers defamation as a crime in Nigeria, especially 
where the acts in issue tend to breach public peace and 
order. Under Nigerian criminal jurisprudence, there is no 
distinction between libel and slander as in tort.

Libel and Slander
Civil defamation: In Nigeria, defamation is both a tort 
and a crime. The tort of  defamation (civil defamation) is 
regulated by the rules of  common law, with few statutory 
interventions aimed at reforming certain aspects of  the law. 
It seeks to protect a person’s reputation from unjustified 
attack either by the written or spoken words of  others. In 
Benue Printing and Publishing Corp. v.Gwagwada , the 
Supreme Court defined defamation as any imputation 
which may tend to lower the plaintiff  in the estimation 
of  right-thinking members of  the society generally, cut 
him off  from society or expose him to hatred, contempt 
or ridicule. On the other hand, freedom of  expression is 
a fundamental right of  every citizen, which is guaranteed 
and protected under the Constitution.
In the light of  the foregoing, the court is saddled with the 
onerous task of  striking an acceptable balance between 
the interest in protecting a person’s reputation and the 
interest in freedom of  expression. The position of  the 
law is firmly established that in an action for defamation 
the plaintiff  will only succeed if  he is able to prove 
the essential ingredients of  the tort, which are (1) that 
the words complained of  are defamatory, (2) that the 
words referred to the plaintiff, (3) that the words were 
published. And in the case of  slander, the plaintiff  must 
also prove special/actual damage, unless he can come 
under the exceptional cases where slander is actionable 
per se.  Though, all these ingredients of  defamation 
must be proved by the plaintiff  in order to succeed, it 
has been held that the essential part of  the cause of  
action in defamation is the publication of  the defamatory 
statements complained of.
Publication is the communication of  the alleged 
defamatory statement or matter to at least one person 
other than the plaintiff  ; which is effectively the exercise of  
right to freedom of  expression. Thus, it is trite law that an 
action for defamation cannot be sustained, without proof  
of  publication. If  the alleged defamatory statements were 
communicated to the plaintiff  only, then no action for 
defamation would be maintained. The success of  the 
plaintiff  in action for defamation also depends on the 

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absence of  an acceptable defense from the defendant. 
When successfully raised, the defenses of  justification, 
absolute privilege, qualified privilege, and fair comment 
would completely exonerate the defendant from liability 
in an action for defamation. The availability of  these 
defenses clearly confirms that the right to freedom of  
expression would not be denied easily and the restriction 
provided by the law of  defamation is by itself  not absolute. 
The entrenchment of  the right to freedom of  expression 
in the Constitution underscores its importance and the 
need for its protection and promotion.
Criminal defamation: Criminal defamation is provided 
for in the Criminal Code  for the Southern Nigeria and 
the Penal Code  for Northern Nigeria. Thus section 375 
of  the Criminal Code criminalizes defamation in the 
following terms:
Subject to the provisions of  this chapter, any person 
who publishes any defamatory matter is guilty of  a 
misdemeanor and is liable to imprisonment for one year 
and any person who publishes any defamatory matter 
knowing it to be false is liable to imprisonment for two 
years.
By section 373 of  the Criminal Code, a defamatory matter 
is one which is likely to injure the reputation of  any 
person by exposing him to hatred, contempt or ridicule 
or likely to damage any person in his profession or trade 
by an injury to his reputation.
The bringing of  the defamatory matter to the notice 
of  the person defamed will be enough evidence of  
publication  and the posting of  a letter to the person 
defamed is publication.  Just as in civil defamation, the 
defenses for criminal defamation include justification, 
absolute privilege  and qualified privilege , amongst 
others. However, unlike in civil defamation, those accused 
of  criminal defamation must establish not only that the 
words were true, but also that they were published for the 
public benefit .
It is difficult to appreciate the continued retention of  
criminal defamation in its present form in our statute 
books. Obviously, an attack on a person’s reputation is a 
civil matter, which is adequately addressed and redressed 
by the tort of  defamation.
Criminal defamation should be restricted to those 
situations where defamatory matters are published with 
intent to extort or commit other crimes. In such cases, 
the basis for the offence is not in the bare publication 
of  defamatory matter but in the criminal intent to extort  
money or other property from the person against whom 
the publication is made.
Akin to criminal defamation is the offence of  sedition. A 
seditious publication has the intention to bring into hatred 
or contempt or to excite disaffection against the person 
of  the President or Governor or Government of  the 
Federation; or to excite the citizens or other inhabitants 
of  Nigeria to attempt to procure the alteration, otherwise 
than by lawful means, of  any other matter in Nigeria as 
by law established; or to raise discontent or disaffection 
amongst the citizens or other inhabitants of  Nigeria; 

or to promote feelings of  ill-will and hostility between 
different classes of  the population of  Nigeria.  Under 
the Criminal Code, sedition is punishable with a sentence 
of  two years or a fine, and three years for a subsequent 
offence.  Under the Penal Code, the sentences are longer.
The situation in Nigeria regarding the offence of  sedition 
is rather disturbing and unfortunate. In Arthur Nwankwo 
v. The State , the Court of  Appeal struck down on the 
offence of  sedition and held that sections 51 and 52 of  
the Criminal Code dealing with sedition are inconsistent 
with section 36 of  the 1979 Constitution (now section 39 
of  the 1999 Constitution), nevertheless, the law remains in 
the statute book and several Nigerians have been charged 
for sedition. The Supreme Court is yet to pronounce on 
the matter.  However, it has been contended that not 
all the subsections of  section 50(2) relating to seditious 
intention are unconstitutional. Thus, section 50(2)(c) and 
(d) which define seditious intention as an intention (c) 
to raise discontent or disaffection among the citizens or 
other inhabitants of  Nigeria, or (d) to promote feelings 
of  ill will and hostility between different classes of  the 
population, are reasonably justifiable in a democratic 
society. The blanket pronouncement of  the Court of  
Appeal in so far as it affects section 50 in its entirety, is 
with the greatest respect, per incuriam. 

Electoral Act
The Electoral Actspells out detailed provisions 
specifically barring politically inspired hateful speech.  
Political speeches often assume a divisive tone in order 
to exploit social prejudices for political gain. Hate speech 
is a pre cursor to violence and in every electioneering 
especially in a volatile society like Nigeria with different 
levels such as Ethno Religious, Internal Communal and 
Ethnic Stereotypes. 
The Act largely passes the three part test as the provisions 
of  the law are sufficiently precise, the aim being pursued 
is the maintenance of  public order. The restriction is also 
proportionate to the aim sought to be achieved save the 
use of  criminal sanctions, the appropriateness of  which 
will be considered in the next section. On the other hand, 
the Act does not satisfy the six part threshold for hate 
speech as it makes no distinction between the tendency 
and intention. The provisions of  Section 95places focus 
on the tendency that such abusive language is likely to 
promote violent reaction or emotion rather than an actual 
intention to do so. As already discussed, for a proper 
restriction, such statement must have been calculated to 
have incited imminent lawless action , the potentiality 
of  the act to cause harm should rather than its mere 
offensive nature be considered. 
Furthermore, there is a need for a greater level of  
enforcement. The 2015 General Elections were replete 
with various occurrences of  the use of  politically 
motivated hate speech and yet no prosecution arose 
from their use. The framework should be used to hold 
the various political actors responsible for their hateful 
actions. 

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The provisions of  the Act are however largely 
commendable for meeting with international best 
practices. The Act gives room for the regulation of  
political hate speech by non-state actors such as the Media 
and Civil Societies through various code of  conducts and 
regulations. 

Cybercrime (Prohibition, Prevention) Act, 2015
The Cybercrimes Actcriminalizes the online distribution 
of  racist and xenophobic materials.  The Act falls within 
the permissible grounds for limitation under section 45 
of  the constitution as it can be said to be reasonably 
justifiable law. Hitherto the act, internet or online 
activities were sparsely regulated in Nigeria and was used 
to perpetrate numerous crimes such as cyber stalking, 
cyber bullying, credit card frauds and so on. The provision 
of  Section 26 targets the distribution of  materials which 
advocates, promotes or incites hatred, discrimination 
or violence, against any individual group of  individuals, 
based on race, color, descent or national or ethnic origin, 
as well as religion if  used as a pretext for any of  these 
factors.  The Act is thus justified on the basis that it seeks 
to protect the rights of  others as well as public order and 
the collective security and integration of  the country per 
the decision in DPP v Chike Obi . 
There is however a degree of  vagueness in the provisions 
of  the law. Precision of  the law is one of  the grounds 
under the three part test on the restriction of  the right 
to freedom of  expression.  The Act does not establish 
any proximate relationship between the restriction and 
the act, in construing a similar provision of  its own law, 
the Indian Supreme Court held that Section 66A of  its 
Information Technology Act was invalid as it did not 
establish the nexus between such (hateful) message and 
the actions resulting from such message. 
Furthermore, the Act does not conform to some of  the 
criteria for identifying hate speech. There is no ingredient 
in the offence of  inciting anybody to do anything which a 
reasonable man would then say would have the immediate 
threat to public safety or tranquility. This is a fatal flaw in 
the law as the courts in other jurisdictions have always 
distinguished between mere discussion and advocacy 
from incitement. In Shreya Singhal v. Union of  India , the 
court held that discussion and advocacy was the essence 
of  free speech and that such discussion or advocacy 
could only be limited where it amounts to incitement or 
led to imminent violence.  The provision of  Section 26 
can however be defended on the basis that it seeks to 
regulate the distribution of  such hateful materials online. 
It has been argued that incitement to violence cannot be 
the sole test for determining whether a speech is hate 
speech or not where such speech is made online. In the 
age of  technology, the anonymity of  the internet allows a 
miscreant to easily spread false and offensive ideas. These 
ideas need not incite violence but they might perpetuate 
the discriminatory attitudes prevalent in the society. 
The provision of  the Cybercrimes Act gives no 
consideration to the context in which the statements were 

made. It automatically prescribes offences for insulting 
or threatening persons for the reason that they belong to 
a group distinguished by race, color, descent, national or 
ethnic origin, as well as, religion, if  used as a pretext for any 
of  these factors.  As already stated, the context pf  a speech 
plays an important role in determining its legitimacy. In 
State of  Maharasthra v.SangharajDamodarRupawate , the 
court observed that the effect of  that words used in the 
offending material must be judged from the standards of  
reasonable, strong minded, firm and courageous men and 
not those of  weak and vacillating minds, nor of  those 
who scent danger in every hostile point of  view. 
Section 24(1) of  the Act also criminalizes the intentional 
sending of  messages which are grossly offensive, 
pornographic or of  indecent or menacing character. It 
will be recalled that the right to freedom of  expression 
extends to unpopular ideas and statements which “shock, 
offend or disturb”. 
The question of  whether such laws prohibiting obscenity 
can be said to be at variance with the constitutionally 
guaranteed right to free speech has often been discussed. 
Such restriction must pass the three part test. It is argued 
that the provisions of  Section 24(1) are vague as the law 
does not define sufficiently the terms “grossly offensive”, 
“indecent” or “of  menacing character” leaving them for 
wide scope of  interpretation. In some jurisdictions such 
as the United States and South Africa, such terms have 
been described as being excessively vague where they do 
not contain further definition as was held in ACLU v. 
Reno . Thus, states are required to go further by defining 
such terms. 
In restricting the distribution of  obscene, indecent 
and pornographic materials, it is important to make a 
distinction between materials which are merely offensive 
and materials which cause harm as it is only restrictions 
which have as their objective the prevention of  harm 
that can be said to have met the requirement of  being 
legitimate.  As it is, the provision of  Section 24(1) is 
paternalistic and offends the international standards of  
freedom of  expression. Thus, there is a need to move 
from what is merely offensive. 
Section 24(2) criminalizes the intentional spreading 
of  false news for the purpose of  causing annoyance, 
inconvenience, hatred, anonymity, insult, injury. The 
dissemination of  false news is also prohibited by other 
laws in Nigeria.  In R v. Amalgamated Press , the court 
defended the prohibition on spreading false news and 
held that freedom of  expression cannot be employed to 
spread false news likely to cause fear and alarm to the 
public. This section has formed the basis for the arrest of  
public figures  and bloggers  alike. 
The basic problem with criminalizing false news is 
that they have chilling effect on the right to freedom 
of  expression as it may not be possible to determine 
whether a statement is false or true before publication, 
thus people will be deterred from publishing anything 
they cannot prove to be true.  The Nigerian courts have 
yet to rule on the validity of  this section. However, 

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the Zimbabwe Supreme Court considered a similar 
provision in Chavundunka v. Minister of  Home Affairs 
. The provisions were held as too vague and unduly 
exerting a chilling effect on freedom of  expression. The 
court further held that words used like “fear, calm and 
despondency” were overboard as anything newsworthy 
may cause such subjective emotions in a section of  the 
public or in a single person. 
The permissibility of  the use of  criminal sanctions to 
restrict expression will be discussed under the analysis of  
the provisions of  the criminal code.

International Legal Framework
As earlier stated, the international legal framework for 
the regulation of  hate speech and other related offences 
would be considered given that Nigeria is party to these 
treaties and the laws contained therein has a binding effect 
on the country.  Considered below are the provisions of  
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Right, 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, 
the International Covenant on the Elimination of  all 
forms of  Racial Discrimination and lastly, the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The ICCPR is the most significant international legal 
source for the protection of  the right to freedom of  
expression.  It provides the principal legal standard for a 
vast majority of  cases relating to freedom of  expression. 
Many regional human rights instruments have relied on 
the interpretation of  the ICCPR especially with regards 
the restriction of  the right.  Thus, the ICCPR will largely 
form the basis for the writer’s analysis and criticism of  
the Nigerian legal framework for the restriction of  the 
right to freedom of  expression. 

According to Article 19(3) of  the ICCPR
The freedom of  expression carries with it special duties 
and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain 
restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided 
by law and are necessary: 

(a) For respect of  the rights or reputation of  others;
(b) For the protection of  national security or of  public 

order (ordre public), or of  public health or morals. 
The provision of  Article 19(3) has been interpreted as 
meaning that only restrictions which meet a strict three-
part test are considered to be legitimate.  This three-part 
test is common in most international and much national 
jurisprudence pertaining to freedom of  expression. The 
three part test provides that: 

a. The limitation must be provided by law. 
b. The limitation must serve a legitimate aim pursuant 

to Article 19(3). 
c. The limitation must be necessary to protect the aim 

identified under the second part of  the test. 
The state actor or entity imposing a limitation on free 
expression bears the burden of  satisfying each of  the 
three requirements. The requirements will now be 

considered independently. 

Provided by law
The first part of  the three part test is that the restriction 
must be provided by law. The mere fact that there is a law 
prescribing a limitation does not satisfy this requirement. 
The SiracusaPrinciples provide that such law must be 
a law of  general application in force at the time of  its 
application and must be consistent with the covenant. 
It further states that the law imposing such restriction 
must be clear and accessible to everyone with adequate 
safeguards and effective remedies provided. It is clear 
that the term ‘law’ encompasses different types of  laws, 
including administrative, civil and criminal laws, as well as 
s a constitution. 
It is also required that any law prescribing the limitation 
of  freedom of  expression be sufficiently clear and 
precise. To do so, the law must be formulated so as to 
enable a person to regulate his conduct and reasonably 
foresee the consequences of  a given action.  The courts 
have emphasized that the law must give adequate notice 
to those subject to it of  exactly what is prohibited. 
Otherwise, these laws will exert an unacceptable “chilling 
effect” on freedom of  expression as individuals stay well 
clear of  the potential zone of  application in order to 
avoid censure.  In Gooding v. Wilson , the court stated 
that the right to freedom of  expression needed breathing 
space to survive and as such any regulation must be 
with narrow specificity. However, it is not reasonable to 
expect laws to be perfectly precise as they need sufficient 
flexibility to be applied in different circumstances as well 
as to be relevant overtime. This view was recognized by 
the European Court in Feldek v Slovakia. 

Legitimate Aim 
The second part of  the restriction of  freedom of  
expression is that the restriction must be for the 
protection of  a legitimate and overriding interest. The 
list of  interests  in Article 19(3) is exclusive in the sense 
that are the only interests whose protection might justify 
a restriction of  freedom of  expression as was held in the 
case of  Mukong v Cameroun . In addressing whetherthis 
requirement has been satisfied, the court will usually take 
into consideration both the effect and the purpose of  
such law, so that where the original purpose was to achieve 
an aim other than those listed, the restriction cannot be 
upheld.  Furthermore, the law must be exclusively and 
not tangentially directed towards the legitimate aim.  The 
various interests shall now be considered. 
A limitation to human rights based on the rights, 
freedoms and reputation of  others cannot be used 
to shield the state and its officials from criticism.  The 
expression “public order (ordre public)” as used in the 
Covenant is defined as the sum of  rules which ensure 
the functioning of  society or the set of  fundamental 
principles on which society is founded.  State organs or 
agents responsible for the maintenance of  public order 
(ordre public) should also subject to controls in the 

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exercise of  their power through the parliament, courts, 
or other competent independent bodies.  A state which 
invokes public morality as a ground for restricting human 
rights, while enjoying a certain margin of  discretion, is 
required to demonstrate that the limitati
on in question is essential to the maintenance of  respect 
for fundamental values of  the community.  Public 
health may be invoked as a ground for limiting certain 
rights in order to allow a state to take measures dealing 
with a serious threat to the health of  the population or 
individual members of  the population. These measures 
must be specifically aimed at preventing disease or injury 
or providing care for the sick and injured. 
National security is perhaps the most notorious interest 
protected by the article, in terms of  potential abuse as a 
restriction of  freedom of  expression.  The problem is 
that on the one hand, national security is a social value of  
highest order, upon which the protection of  all human 
rights, indeed our whole way of  life depends. On the 
other hand, it is very difficult for non-experts including 
judges, to understand and assess what constitutes a 
threat to security undermining over sight mechanism.  
There have however been attempts to construe it. The 
Sirucusa Principles states that national security may be 
invoked to justify measures limiting certain rights only 
when they are taken to protect the existence of  the 
nation or its territorialintegrity or political independence 
against force or threat of  force.  A claim of  national 
security cannot be used as a pretext for invoking vague 
or arbitrary limitation or for local or positively isolated 
threats of  law and order.  Principle 2 of  the Johannesburg 
Principles: National Security, Freedom of  Expression 
and Access to Information drawing inspiration from 
the siracusa principles provides that a restriction is not 
legitimate unless its purpose and effect is to “protect a 
country’s existence or its territorial integrity against the 
use of  force or its capacity to respond to use or threat 
of  force” from either internal or external threat. Lastly, 
even when justified, the law must be accompanied by 
adequate safeguards to ensure against interpretative abuse 
or disproportionate application. 

Necessity 
The third part of  the test is that the restriction of  
freedom of  expression must be necessary to protect 
the interest identified under the second part of  the test. 
The restriction must be necessary and proportionate to 
achieving one of  the grounds outlined as a legitimate 
ground of  restriction. This means that the restriction must 
be no more than absolutely required to achieving that 
aim, and proportionate to that goal. This part presents a 
high standard to be overcome by a state seeking to justify 
its restriction as the state must convincingly establish the 
necessity of  the restriction. 
“Necessary” is a complicated notion  but it has been 
interpreted to include a number of  elements: 
Firstly, there must be a pressing or substantial need for 
the restriction. This is similar to the question of  whether 

the restriction serves a legitimate aim. 
Secondly, the measures taken to protect the right must 
be rationally connected to the objective of  protecting the 
interest, in the sense that they are carefully designed so as 
to be the least intrusive measures which would effectively 
protect it. In R v Oakes , the court held that:
The measures adopted must be carefully designed to 
adhere to the objective in question. They must not be 
arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations. In 
short, they must be rationally connected to the objective. 
Finally, the restriction must meet some form of  
proportionality test, whereby the benefit in terms of  
protecting the interest must be greater than the harm 
caused to freedom of  expression. Otherwise, the 
restriction cannot be justified on the basis of  such public 
interest. 

The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights
Article 9 of  the African Charter protects the right to 
express and disseminate opinions within the law. The 
only other ground of  limitation is contained in Article 
27(2) of  the African Charter which provides that the 
rights and freedoms of  each individual shall be exercised 
with due regard to the rights of  others, collective security, 
and common interest. However, the African Commission  
created a “Declaration of  Principles on Freedom of  
Expression in Africa”  which reaffirms and elaborates 
on the right described in Article 9. Principle II of  the 
Declaration states that: 

a. No one shall be subject to arbitrary interference with 
his or her freedom of  expression.

b. Any restriction on freedom of  expression shall 
be provided by law, serve a legitimate interest and be 
necessary in a democratic society. 
In the case of  Article 19 v Eritrea , the African 
Commission made pronouncement on the so called 
claw back clauses. The court’s jurisprudence interpreted 
such clauses as constituting a reference to international 
law, meaning that only restrictions on rights which are 
consistent with the state parties’ international obligation 
should be enacted by the relevant national authorities.  
The Commission also held that national law cannot be 
used to negate obligations under the charter as it would 
render the charter meaningless and as such to allow 
national law to have precedence over international law of  
the charter would defeat the purpose of  the rights and the 
freedoms enshrined in the charter. International human 
rights standards must always prevail over contradictory 
national law and as such any limitation must be in 
conformity with the provisions of  the charter.  The 
Commission also held in the case of  Media Rights Agenda 
and Anor v.Nigeria that the African Charter does not 
contain a derogation clause andtherefore limitations on 
the rights and freedoms enshrined in the charter cannot 
be justified by emergencies or special circumstances. The 
Commission further stated that the only legitimate reason 
for limitation is contained in Article 27(2) and as such 
any limitation of  rights must be strictly proportionate 

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with and absolutely necessary for the advantages which 
are to be obtained.  Very importantly, any limitation must 
never have the consequence that the right itself  becomes 
illusory. 
The African Commission has also given decisions which 
construe the various grounds of  limitation provided in 
the Nigerian constitution. In Scanlen and Holderness v 
Zimbabwe held that the concept of  “public order” in a 
democratic society demands the highest possible amount 
of  information. It is the widest circulation of  news, ideas 
and opinion as well as the widest access to information as 
a whole that ensures this public order. The commission 
also noted that for a restriction to be “within the law”, 
the domestic legislation must be in conformity with the 
African Charter and other international human rights 
instruments and practices. The commission usually 
adopts a broad interpretation in construing the phrase.  
In Constitutional Rights Project and Anor v. Nigeria, the 
commission stated that it was sympathetic to all genuine 
attempts to maintain public peace, it noted that where 
extreme measures are used to curtail rights, it leads to 
greater unrest and that the judiciary should be empowered 
to check such excesses. 
The onus of  establishing the justification of  any of  the 
fundamental rights guaranteed by the protection of  the law 
must be on the party alleging such justification to derogate 
from constitutional guarantees.  Thus, the state or the 
relevant national authority will usually have to justify any 
limitation placed on the constitutionally guaranteed right 
to freedom of  expression.  The competent authorities 
should not enact provisions which would unduly limit 
the exercise of  this freedom. States should not override 
constitutional provisions or undermine fundamental 
rights guaranteed by the constitution and international 
human rights standards. 

The International Covenant on the Elimination of  
all forms of  Racial Discrimination
The ICERD recognizes the inherent tension between 
freedom of  expression and prohibition of  speech that 
incites to discrimination, hatred and violence. It has 
implications for construing forms of  hate speech as it 
calls upon states to ban a much broader range of  speech 
and action than the ICCPR. 

Article 4(a) provides that State Parties
Shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination 
of  ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement 
to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of  violence or 
incitement violence or incitement to such acts against 
any race or group of  persons of  another color or ethnic 
origin, and also the provision of  any assistance to racist 
activities, including the financing thereof. 
The ICERD however differs from the ICCPR in certain 
respects. Firstly, its conceptualization of  hate speech 
is specifically limited to speeches that refer to race and 
ethnicity.  Secondly, it also imposes an obligation to 
criminalize racist ideas which may not necessarily be 

inciting discrimination, hostility or violence.  The third 
and the most important difference is the issue of  intent. 
The ICCPR requires that intent to incite hatred needs 
to be proved. However, under the ICERD, the mere 
dissemination of  racial superiority or hatred, or even 
incitement to racial discrimination or violence, shall be 
punishable in accordance with the ICERD. 
Furthermore, the Committee on the Elimination of  Racial 
Discrimination has actively addressed hate speech in its 
General Recommendation 29 , in which the Committee 
recommends state parties to: 

a) Take measures against any dissemination of  ideas 
of  caste superiority and inferiority or which attempt to 
justify violence, hatred or discrimination against descent-
based communities;

b) Take strict measures against any incitement to 
discrimination or violence against the communities, 
including through the Internet;

c) Take measures to raise awareness among media 
professionals of  the nature and incidence of  descent-
based discrimination. 

European Convention on Human Rights
European Court of  Human Rights  has contributed 
immensely in developing jurisprudence on hate speech. 
Article 10 of  the European Convention of  Human Right 
guarantees right to freedom of  expression, subject to 
certain formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties 
stipulated in clause 2 of  this article which reads: 
The exercise of  these freedoms, since it carries with 
it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such 
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, 
in the interests of  national security, territorial integrity or 
public safety, for the prevention of  disorder or crime, for 
the protection of  health or morals, for the protection 
of  the reputation or rights of  others, for preventing the 
disclosure of  information received in confidence, or for 
maintaining the authority and impartiality of  the judiciary.

Legal Implications and Effect of  the Passing of  the 
‘Hate Speech Bill’ Into Law
Asides from considering the preexisting legal framework, 
the Hate Speech Bill as earlier stated, has received plenty 
criticisms from various stakeholders. It is therefore 
pertinent to examine and discuss the effects that the 
passing of  the Bill into law might have of  some sections 
of  the Nigerian society. 

Proposed Bill and the Nigerian Government
It will be helpful to state that in Nigeria and as obtainable 
in other democracies, there exists a kind of  relationship 
between free speech and hate speech, thus, striking a balance 
between the conflicting interests that exist between them is of  
utmost importance for any government. Free Speech derives 
its legitimacy from the Constitution which vests legitimacy 
on the political authority. Guarantees of  free speech allow 
citizens to readily accept governmental authority. 

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It may be interesting to note that the United States does 
not have hate speech laws, since American courts have 
repeatedly ruled that laws criminalizing hate speech 
violate the guarantee to freedom of  speech contained in 
the First amendment to the United State Constitution. 
By necessary implication, hate speech enjoys substantial 
protection under the first amendment; this is premised 
upon the presumption that freedom of  speech requires 
the government to strictly protect robust debate on 
matters of  public concern notwithstanding that such 
debate degenerates into distasteful, offensive, or hateful 
speech that causes others to feel grief, anger or fear. 
While freedom of  expression is clearly protected by a 
considerable body of  treaty law, it can also be regarded as 
a principle of  customary international law, so frequently 
is the principle enunciated in treaties, as well as other soft 
law instruments. Most human rights treaties, including 
those dedicated to the protection of  the rights of  
specific groups – such as women, children and people 
with disabilities - make explicit mention of  freedom of  
expression. 
Perhaps, the most significant international legal source of  
the right to freedom of  expression is set out in Article 19 
of  the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  
Nigeria acceded into the treaty on July 29, 1993. Nigeria 
has also ratified that African (Banjul) Charter on Human 
and People’s Right  which it ratified on July 22, 1983. Also 
Nigeria has also ratified the International Convention on 
the Elimination of  all Forms of  Racial Discrimination  
on October 16, 1967. These instruments impose certain 
obligations on states to fulfill, respect, promote and 
protect these rights.  States are also obliged to ensure that 
their domestic laws are brought in consistency with their 
international obligations.
In this light, it is opined and submitted that even in the 
consideration of  the hate speech bill by the Nigerian 
government, it should bear in mind its obligations and 
duties under the various international, regional and sub-
regional treaties that it has acceded to. In giving such 
consideration, it will align itself  with best global practices.

Proposed Bill and Fundamental Human Rights
Freedom of  expression has always been a vital feature 
of  any society. In modern times, it has assumed even 
greater importance. Freedom of  expression is an 
important fundamental right because the right to speak 
one’s mind freely on important issues in society, access 
information and hold the powers to account; plays a vital 
role in the healthy development process of  any society. 
Expression in this context includes the right to hold 
views or opinions, speech, publish articles or books or 
leaflets, television or radio broadcasting, producing works 
of  art, communication through the internet, some forms 
of  commercial information and many other activities. 
Simply construed, the right to freedom of  expression 
can be defined as the right to right to communicate or 
express one’s opinions. It is universally acknowledged 
that the right to freedom of  expression is a foundational 

human right of  great importance. At the same time, it is 
also recognized that it is not an absolute right, and every 
democracy has developed some system of  limitations on 
freedom of  expression. At the top of  such restrictions 
are speeches which incite violence, expressions which are 
hateful, offensive and obscene or any expression which is 
legally prohibited. Such restrictions are usually borne out 
of  the need to protect the rights of  others as well as the 
obligation of  the state to preserve public peace, public 
morality and public order. 
The hate speech bill when juxtaposed with the tenets of  
fundamental human rights, the freedom of  expression 
in particular a vicious circle of  affront is seen. The bill 
is a heinous attack on freedoms guaranteed under the 
umbrella of  rights that are fundamental to human beings; 
an attack that should be seen in all its glorified wrongs 
and so vehemently rejected. For an attack on the freedom 
of  expression is an attack to the very essence of  living.

Proposed Bill and the Constitution
The preamble to the 1999 Constitution of  the Federal 
Republic dedicates itself  to “promoting the good 
government and welfare of  all persons in our country, 
on the principles of  freedom, equality and justice, and for 
the purpose of  consolidating the unity of  our people.” 
Chapter IV of  the Nigerian Constitution provides for a 
number of  rights amongst which is the right to Freedom 
of  Expression. 
Section 39(1) provides that: 
Every person shall be entitled to freedom of  expression, 
including freedom to hold opinions and to receive and 
impart ideas and information without interference. 
Also, Section 45(1) provides that: 
Nothing in sections 37, 38, 39, 40 and 41 of  this 
Constitution shall invalidate any law that is reasonably 
justifiable in a democratic society 

(a) In the interest of  defense, public safety, public 
order, public morality or public health; or

(b) For the purpose of  protecting the rights and 
freedom or other persons 
Furthermore, Section 42 which provides for the right 
to freedom from discrimination states that a Nigerian 
shall not as a reason of  his political opinion (one of  the 
grounds listed) be subject to any disability or restrictions 
either expressly, or in the practical application of, any 
law in force in Nigeria or any executive or administrative 
action.
The constitution makes no provision for the prohibition 
of  hate speech and other offensive remarks. And so the 
debate as to the subsequent constitutionality of  the hate 
speech bill if  it ever sees the light of  the day is a viable 
one. It should be noted however, laws have relied on the 
limitation of  rights provided for in Section 45 to do so.

Proposed Bill and the Citizens of  Nigeria
Nigeria’s political history reveals that there have been 
consistent and persistent threats to the exercise of  free 
speech by citizens. It is quite appalling that despite these 

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experiences during the military era where suppression of  
free speech and a general violation of  human rights were 
the order of  the day, the Nigerian Senate considers it a 
national priority to prohibit what it terms hate speech. 
This is reflective and symptomatic of  the shallow minded 
leadership that we currently have at the Senate. 
The hate speech bill as stated earlier can inadvertently 
become an anti-free speech bill, this appears to be the 
legitimate fears of  the citizens. 
Nigeria is facing an emergency in terms of  insecurity, 
poor infrastructure and a weak economy, these areas are 
begging for legislative interventions. The Senate should 
be alive to its legislative responsibilities, its oversight 
functions have become more of  sight-seeing lately. 
The Constitution and other relevant statutes as stated 
time over in the course of  this research have placed the 
freedom of  speech within certain legal restraints. The 
ample provisions contained to check abuse of  free speech 
makes this proposed hate speech bill utterly irrelevant and 
unnecessary, the attempt of  the legislature to avert certain 
occurrences from happening may not only amount to a 
wild goose chase but it could bring to reality the worst 
state of  governance that leaves the citizens with no 
choice than to find other unlawful ways through which 
their opinions may be expressed.
Nigerians need respite from the highhandedness and 
insolence of  the ruling class, the national mood suggests 
that there is a deep-seated anger against the political class 
which has a strong penchant for riding roughshod on 
the masses. It can be safely assumed that the proverbial 
last straw that will break the camel’s back may be the 
unfortunate passage of  this proposed bill into law. 
Hate Speech Bill remains one of  the most controversial 
bills currently making rounds in the National Assembly. 
Stakeholders have clamored that the Bill be thrown 
out for various reasons ranging from its imposition of  
capital punitive measures, it’s poor definition of  terms, 
or the fact that it is unnecessary and superfluous, which 
happens to be the basis of  this paper. The view of  this 
paper, and very much that of  civil society organizations 
in Nigeria, is that the Government does not have 
any patriotic or nationalistic reason for amending the 
existing broadcasting laws or laws existing that regulate 
hate speech in Nigeria. The existing Cyber Crimes Act 
and the Anti-Terrorism Act, among other pre-existing 
regulations discussed paper, which already cover many 
of  the offences the new bills seek to address should 
be given more attention and effect to rather than waste 
valuable resources on the enactment of  fresh laws to 
enable effective implementation and avoid a situation of  
plurality of  laws. 
Flowing from this, a starting point is to recognize that the 
line between offensive and hate speech is often blurred. 
While proper hate speech—what I define as presenting 
“clear and imminent danger” of  triggering violence —
should be criminalized (but certainly not with death 
penalty), non-legal instruments would be more effective in 
a polarized society like Nigeria to deal with offensive and 

other hurtful speech forms. In this respect, a taxonomy 
of  what constitutes hate and offensive speeches would 
be good foundation. Media organizations through their 
unions should then be urged to incorporate these as part 
of  good journalistic practice and impose sanctions on 
erring members.
Perhaps one of  the most effective ways of  combating 
hate speech would be to marginalize purveyors of  such 
speeches. In the U.K., while far-right, fascist parties 
like the British National Party and the racist ideas they 
support are not banned, mainstream British politician 
avoid associating openly with members of  such parties. 
In Nigeria, on the other hand, offensive and hate speech 
mongers are often seen as regional and ethnic heroes.
Nigerians should also learn to laugh at themselves. This 
is already happening in some ways with the country’s 
comedians who dish out jokes breaking down the lines of  
ethnic and regional profiling, showing that every ethnic 
group is both a victim and a victimizer.
The National Orientation Agency—responsible for 
communicating government policy and promoting 
patriotism—in concert with civil society groups and 
community leaders, should also embark on a campaign 
against the use of  hate speech. In the same vein, internet 
service providers should be encouraged to bring down 
blogs and websites they host which publish, promote, or 
provide unfettered space for the expression of  hate and 
offensive speeches. Put simply, more than just changing 
the law, it will take efforts from all sections of  society—
government, media, business, community leaders, civil 
society, and more—to curb the influence of  hate speech 
in Nigeria.
Also, international law and standards require States 
to prohibit in law advocacy of  hatred that constitutes 
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence 
(commonly known as “hate speech”). This research work 
recommends that such prohibitions need to be set forth in 
law and formulated precisely. The law and its application 
must also comply with the required guarantees on the 
right to freedom of  expression, and in particular must 
meet the requirements of  necessity and proportionality, 
in compliance with Article 19(3) of  the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
This is not an attempt to support the promotion of  hate 
speeches. Hate Speech in itself  is wrong, it threatens the 
country‘s unity, peace and efforts of  the government in 
nation building, and it similarly widens the social gap 
between Nigerians. However, it is the recommendation 
of  this research work that its regulation should be 
traded with caution, the extremely punitive capital 
punishments proposed in the Bill should be reviewed 
and the wordings of  the Bill should be redrafted to avoid 
falling into a slippery slope with precarious consequences. 
Legislators should engage the services of  experienced 
and knowledgeable draftsmen or lawyers in drafting such 
sensitive laws because at the bottom of  it all, the aim is to 
build a unified and peaceful Nigeria.

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CONCLUSION 
Hate speech exists both in Nigeria and other jurisdictions. 
On the other hand, freedom of  expression is one of  
the basic fundamental human rights in the constitution 
of  most nation states. Freedom of  expression is widely 
accepted as being necessary in a democracy as it facilitates 
the exchange of  diverse opinions. Democracy guarantees 
and protects civil and political rights. Freedom of  
expression is essential for vibrant, robust and rigorous 
debate, disagreement and contention. The right to 
free speech is not unlimited, while few consider this 
freedom to be absolute, most would require compelling 
reason before considering the abridgement of  freedom 
of  expression to be justified. From the foregoing, hate 
speech depicts any utterance whether verbal or virtual 
which can endanger public safety, unity and national 
security. Anything short of  this deserves to be curtailed 
so as not to lead to anarchy and violence. It is pertinent 
to note that for speech to qualify as hate speech, it must 
have occurred in the public. 
With the expansion of  the internet and the social media, 
new regulatory challenges more frequently arise because 
of  the global reach of  hate speech once transmitted. 
From the foregoing it is pertinent that limitations should 
and must be placed on hate speech. However, caution 
must be exercised to ensure that the rights of  citizens to 
express themselves are not suppressed
There is no point overemphasizing that hate speech and 
similar forms of  expressions can contribute substantially 
to the deterioration of  societal stability and drive a country 
to armed confrontation. However, given the plethora 
of  international treaties, laws and legal principles that 
are operative in Nigeria that seeks not only to prohibit 
hateful and offensive speeches but also to punish same 
it will be deemed superfluous to enact yet another under 
the designatum “The Independent National Commission 
for the Prohibition of  Hate Speeches”. 
Such an effort coming at a time when the nation is faced 
with numerous challenges such as a growing rate of  
insecurity, kidnapping, armed robbery, police brutality, 
abject poverty, gross under-development, only to 
mention but a few, it would seem that the government is 
directionless and lack the political will to tackle problems 
that are true to Nigerians.
If  the government’s intention is true as to the prohibition 
of  hateful and offensive speeches so as to curb the 
menace it leaves at its wake, efforts should be geared 
towards giving effect to laws that have already made such 
provisions. Rather than wasting the nation’s time, energy 
and resources in the pursuit of  such pointless venture.
Nigerians need some sort of  succor from the 
highhandedness and insolence of  the ruling class, the 
promulgation of  such a bill at a time like this when there 
is a deep-seated anger against the political class which has 
a strong penchant for riding roughshod on the masses 
will be like the proverbial last straw that will break the 
camel’s back and the aftermath of  such will be left to wild 
imaginations. The #ENDSARS movement will only be 

but a tip of  the iceberg.

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