61 American Scientific Research Journal for Engineering, Technology, and Sciences (ASRJETS) ISSN (Print) 2313-4410, ISSN (Online) 2313-4402 © Global Society of Scientific Research and Researchers http://asrjetsjournal.org/ Enhance Safety Performance through Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis of Accidents in Egyptian National Railway Hany S. Riada*, Haytham N. Zohnyb, Wael M. Ibrahimc, Mona E. Elsayedd a,b,cAssociate professor of railway engineering, Public Works Department, Faculty of Engineering, Ain Shams University, Abdobasha, Cairo, 11517, Egypt dPublic Works Department, Faculty of Engineering, Ain Shams University, Qatamya, Cairo, 11936. Egypt aEmail: hsobhy@yahoo.com bEmail: hnzohny@eng.asu.edu.eg cEmail: wael.mim@eng.asu.edu.eg dEmail: monaessam89@hotmail.com Abstract Rail transport plays an important role in creating a sustainable future for transport. Safety can be defined as qualitatively or quantitatively to prevent unacceptable risks. Improving safety is the main goal of each railway company as safe operation helps in increasing the level of service offered to the users. This paper deals with quantitative and qualitative analysis of accidents in Egyptian National Railway for annual accidents during the period of 2011 till 2017 for the six zones classified according to causes as absolute values and relative values to determine the worst zones and the most popular causes to improve the safety level and put the corrective plan to minimize the effective of accidents on both economic and safety of the society, to realize this goal a data collections were obtained and traffic fluction were calculated by the use of the official time table in train.km/year for the six zones. The study proposes effective solution for the decision maker to enface this very dangerous problem and improve the economic efficiency of the system, and preserve the environment surrounding the system. Keywords: Egyptian National Railway(ENR); Safety; Risk; Quantitative; Qualitative; Accident; Derailment; Collision; Level crossing and Fire. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ * Corresponding author. http://asrjetsjournal.org/ American Scientific Research Journal for Engineering, Technology, and Sciences (ASRJETS) (2018) Volume 43, No 1, pp 61-75 62 1. Introduction Rail transport plays an important role in creating a sustainable future for transport. Safety can be defined as preventing unacceptable risks. Improving safety is the main goal of each railway company as safe operation helps in increasing the level of service offered to the users, improving the economic efficiency of the system, and preserving the environment surrounding the system. A significant rail accident is any undesired or unexpected incidents involving at least one rail vehicle in motion, resulting in at least one killed or seriously injured person or in significant damage for the railway system (railway infrastructure, rolling stock, and railway operation) and the environment [1]. According to Egyptian National Railway, the total number of railway accidents in Egypt from 2011 until 2017 was 6,843 that is high number of accidents, and the latest four years from 2014 to 2017 there have been more than 1,000 accidents yearly, specially in 2017 which have the largest number of accidents, figure (1) illustrate the rate of accidents during the seven years & % of it. Figure 1: Number of annual total accidents in Egypt during the years 2011 till 2017and %of it. The approach taken in this research is to conduct detailed analysis of the train accident data supplied by the railways authority; Analysis of the causes of train accidents helps to put the correction plans to reduce accident occurrence in the most cost-effective manner possible. 2. Definition Safety of a railway system can be defined qualitatively or quantitatively [2]: 2.1. A qualitative assessment approach of safety is risk level 2.1.1. The correlation between the frequency and the severity of an event defines four risk levels [2] 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 T ot al n o. o f a cc id en ts 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total no. of accidents 327 447 774 1044 1235 1223 1793 % of total no. of accidents 5% 7% 11% 15% 18% 18% 26% Annualy total no. of accidents & %of it in Egypt from 2011 to 2017 American Scientific Research Journal for Engineering, Technology, and Sciences (ASRJETS) (2018) Volume 43, No 1, pp 61-75 63 2.1.1.1. Non-permissible Accidents of this category must be eliminated. It represents the most significant category and necessitates urgent safety measures by the services responsible, regardless of the financial and operational cost. 2.1.1.2. Non-desirable Accidents of this category can be accepted only in case of inability to contain their consequences and always upon the relevant approval of the authority in charge. 2.1.1.3. Permissible It corresponds to a generally acceptable safety level, without excluding further improvements, if it is feasible. 2.1.1.4. Unimportant The incidents of this category are acceptable, provided that there is approval of the competent authority. Table 1: Shows risk levels as the combination of frequency and severity frequency and severity of accidents Risk levels Accident severity Catastrophic Severe Minor importance Negligible A cc id en t f re qu en cy Frequent Non-permissible Non-permissible Non-permissible Non-desirable Possible Non-permissible Non-permissible Non-desirable Permissible Occasional Non-permissible Non-desirable Non-desirable Permissible Unusual Non-desirable Non-desirable Permissible Unimportant Rare Permissible Permissible Unimportant Unimportant Unlikely Unimportant Unimportant Unimportant Unimportant Source: Adapted from European Standard EN50126-1 2000, Railway Applications: Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety (RAMS), Part 1, CENELEC European Standards (European Committee for Electromechanical Standardization). 2.1.2. Regarding the classification of accidents according to the severity of their consequences, the following definitions are suggested American Scientific Research Journal for Engineering, Technology, and Sciences (ASRJETS) (2018) Volume 43, No 1, pp 61-75 64 2.1.2.1. Catastrophic Fatalities and/or multiple severe injuries and/or severe environmental impact and/or extensive property damage. 2.1.2.2. Severe One fatality and/or serious injury, and/or significant environmental impact, and/or limited severe property damage. 2.1.2.3. Low severity Minor injury, and/or significant threat (or low impact) on the environment, and/or limited damage. 2.1.2.4. Negligible Possible minor injury and/or minor property damage. 2.2. A quantitative assessment of safety is accident indicators. Countries use specific indicators related to accidents (per year) to evaluate their railway networks’ safety [2&6] 1. Total number of serious accidents (number). 2. Relative number of serious accidents (number/train-kilometer). 3. Distribution of accidents per accident category. 4. Fatality risk indicator: death toll as a result of train accidents per million train-kilometers. 2.3. The railway accidents can be classified into five main categories 2.3.1. Collisions It includes head-on collision, rear collision and side collision. It also includes accidents at Level Crossings. 2.3.2. Derailments This refers to the offloading of wheel or wheels from the track causing detention or damage to rolling stock / permanent way. It includes Derailment on the main track and Derailment on sidings. 2.3.3. Fire in Trains Accident related to fumes, fires of vehicles, tractors or cables in trains. 2.3.4. Opponents on lines American Scientific Research Journal for Engineering, Technology, and Sciences (ASRJETS) (2018) Volume 43, No 1, pp 61-75 65 The incidents of opposition to the lines are accidents caused by external factors that affect the rail, such as the fluctuation of the atmosphere resulting in the occurrence of a tree or cable electricity on the track or leave things on the track. 2.3.5. Other Train Accidents 2.3.5.1. Signal abuse It is an accident that exceeds the semaphores and the disks when the signal is red, even though it is red. 2.3.5.2. Traffic abuse It is an accident that violates the work of railway passengers, which mean entering the train in a busy railway that is supposed to be empty. 2.3.5.3. Platform abuse Is the occurrence of accidents exceeding the trains to the platforms of the stations, that is, the driver exceeds the Green Semaphore and away by the door of the vehicle from the platform of the station so that passengers can get off at the station . 2.3.5.4. Turnouts abuse When crossing the turnouts; it is closed or open in another direction or needs maintenance. 2.3.5.5. Train separation These are incidents of separation of the train cars from each other or the separation of the tractor from the vehicles 2.3.5.6. Door opening Is the opening of the doors of the train, such as the opening of the doors of freight trains during the transfer of army vehicles and the transfer of guns over vehicles. 3. Methodology Railway safety is a result of concerted dynamic and daily effort of all relevant actors who interact in the railway system. The figure 2 summaries proposed methodology for the safety analyses for railway. 3.1. First step American Scientific Research Journal for Engineering, Technology, and Sciences (ASRJETS) (2018) Volume 43, No 1, pp 61-75 66 Define current situation (rate, location, types of accidents, and causes of accidents). 3.1.1 ENR network divided into six zones (Central zone, Middle delta zone, West delta zone, East delta zone, Middle zone, Southern zone). 3.1.2. Types of railway accidents ENR accidents divided into five types: 1- Collisions (at level crossing - at illegal level crossing - gate collision - train collision – by fraction). 2- Derailments (on main lines - on branch lines - on refuge and yards). 3- Fire in Trains. 4- Opponents on lines. 5- Other Train Accidents (Signal abuse - Traffic abuse - Platform abuse - Turnout’s abuse - Train separation - Door opening). Figure 2: Represents flow chart of proposed methodolgy. Case study: By applying this previous methodolgy on ENR. 3.1.3. Causes of railway accidents Causes of railway accidents may be identified as follows: 3.1. First step: Define current situation (rate, location, and type of accidents). 3.2. Second step: Analyze the collected data. 3.3. Third step: Develop correction plans. 3.4. Fourth step: implement the plans. 3.5. Fifth step: Evaluate the effectiveness of the plans on safety. American Scientific Research Journal for Engineering, Technology, and Sciences (ASRJETS) (2018) Volume 43, No 1, pp 61-75 67 • Defects in level crossings, (broken barriers, defect in the train announcement system, insufficient/lack of road signs, insufficient lighting). • False switching, and don’t fix the turnout in its correct location. • Violation of instruction (Violation of/incorrect application of the regulations by the staff). • Collision with buses, cars, trucks, motorcycle. • Defects in the equipment of train control. • Defective signals on semaphores or disks, or false information to the train driver. • Inadequate maintenance of the track, which may lead to derailment. • Mechanical failures of wheels and rails like that (rail erosion, rail cracks, rail defects, track geometry defects, sleeper cracks, error in the track alignment geometry (insufficient cant, insufficient length of transition curves, etc.). • External factors like that (Earthquake while the train is moving, explosion on railway, Occupation of the track (by strikes, sand, rubbish, Pedestrian/animal drifts on track, waters/flooding of the facilities), vandalism, sabotage, terrorist actions, falling rocks, etc.). • Collapsed bridge by structural failure. • Improper loading or unloading of cargo. • Technical failures in the railway infrastructure and/or in the rolling stock. • Human errors like that (braking during moving the train, Speed not organized by train driver). • Train staff which is either untrained or under the influence of drugs or alcohol. [1&3]. 3.2. Second step: Analyze the collected data Figurs 3,4,5,6 and tables 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11 showes the distribution of the no.of accidents on the six zones . Table 2: Represents the Total no. of accidentes &%of Total no. of accidentes from 2011 to 2017 for all types of accidentes . Types of accidents Total no. of acc. from 2011 to 2017 %of Total no. of acc. from 2011 to 2017 Absolute Relative absolute Relative Derailment 483 12.94 7 8 Total collision 5152 127.24 76 75 Fire in trains 161 4.2 2 3 Opponents on lines 536 14.21 8 8 Other train accidents 432 10.64 7 8 American Scientific Research Journal for Engineering, Technology, and Sciences (ASRJETS) (2018) Volume 43, No 1, pp 61-75 68 Figure 3&4: Absolute number of annual accidents on ENR networks during the years 2011 till 2017 for the sex railway zones in absolute accidents and in relative accidents per 1000 train.km. Figure 5&6: Persantage share of total accidentes on ENR networkes during the years 2011 till 2017` for each zones the sex Railway zones in abslute ccidentes and in relative accidente per 1000 train.km . Centr al Zone Midd le Delta Zone West Delta Zone East Delta Zone Midd le Zone Sout hern Zone 2011 72 70 47 37 76 24 2012 116 87 69 41 104 30 2013 147 195 77 99 215 41 2014 188 251 69 140 283 113 2015 290 241 116 179 296 113 2016 296 322 119 132 288 66 2017 221 883 130 121 329 109 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 N o. o f a cc . No. of acc. at Zones in Egypt from 2011 to 2017 Cent ral Zone Midd le Delta Zone West Delta Zone East Delta Zone Midd le Zone Sout hern Zone 2011 1.94 1.34 1.34 1.29 1.52 1.00 2012 3.13 1.66 1.97 1.43 2.08 1.25 2013 3.97 3.73 2.19 3.44 4.29 1.71 2014 5.07 4.80 1.97 4.87 5.65 4.70 2015 7.82 4.61 3.31 6.23 5.91 4.70 2016 7.99 6.16 3.39 4.59 5.75 2.75 2017 5.96 16.89 3.71 4.21 6.57 4.53 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 N o. o f a cc ./1 00 0t ra in .k m No. of acc./1000train.km at Zones in Egypt from 2011to2017 Central Zone, 1330, 20% Middle Delta Zone, 2049, 30% West Delta Zone, 627, 9% East Delta Zone, 749, 11% Middle Zone, 1591, 23% Southern Zone , 496, 7% Total no. of acc. at Zones in Egypt from 2011 to 2017 Central Zone Middle Delta Zone West Delta Zone East Delta Zone Middle Zone Southern Zone Central Zone, 35.89, 21% Middle Delta Zone, 39.19, 23% West Delta Zone, 17.87, 10% East Delta Zone, 26.06, 15% Middle Zone, 31.75, 19% Southern Zone , 20.63, 12% Total no. of acc./1000train.km at Zones in egypt from 2011 to 2017 Central Zone Middle Delta Zone West Delta Zone East Delta Zone Middle Zone Southern Zone American Scientific Research Journal for Engineering, Technology, and Sciences (ASRJETS) (2018) Volume 43, No 1, pp 61-75 69 Figure 5&6: Total no. of acc. due to types of accidents & %of it on ENR networkes during the years 2011 till 2017 in abslute accidentes and in relative accidente per 1000 train.km . Table 3: Persantage of share of accidentes for each zone on ENR networkes during the years 2011 till 2017 Year Zone 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 %Total (2011 till 2017) ab . rel . ab . rel . ab. rel . ab. rel . ab . rel. ab. rel . ab . rel . ab. rel. Central zone 22 23 26 27 19 21 18 19 23 24 24 26 12 14 20 21 Middle Delta zone 22 16 20 15 25 19 24 18 20 14 26 20 20 40 30 23 West Delta zone 15 16 15 17 10 11 7 7 9 10 10 11 7 9 9 10 East Delta zone 11 15 9 12 13 18 13 18 15 19 11 15 7 10 11 15 Middle zone 23 18 23 18 28 22 27 21 24 18 24 19 19 16 23 19 Souther n zone 7 12 7 11 5 9 11 17 9 15 5 9 6 11 7 12 Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 483, 7% 5152, 76% 161, 2% 536, 8% 432, 7% Total no. of acc. due to types of accidents & %of it from 2011 to 2017 absolute Derailment Total collision Fire in trains Opponents on lines Other train accidents 12.94 127.24 4.2 14.21 10.64 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 Total no. of acc.due to types of accidents & %of it from 2011 to 2017 relative American Scientific Research Journal for Engineering, Technology, and Sciences (ASRJETS) (2018) Volume 43, No 1, pp 61-75 70 Table 4: The fluction absolute (no. of acc.) & relative (no .of acc./1000train.km) total annual derailment accidentes and % of it for the six zones on ENR networkes during the years 2011 till 2017. Zone Year Central Zone Middle Delta Zone West Delta Zone East Delta Zone Middle Zone Southern Zone Total & % of it ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. % rel. % 2011 7 0.19 6 0.11 2 0.06 8 0.28 4 0.08 2 0.08 29 6 0.80 6 2012 20 0.54 4 0.08 5 0.14 6 0.21 8 0.16 1 0.04 44 9 1.17 9 2013 32 0.86 7 0.13 9 0.26 10 0.35 11 0.22 0 0.00 69 14 1.82 14 2014 14 0.38 11 0.21 4 0.11 6 0.21 6 0.12 1 0.04 42 9 1.07 8 2015 33 0.89 18 0.34 31 0.88 16 0.56 10 0.20 6 0.25 114 24 3.12 24 2016 37 1.00 21 0.40 25 0.71 9 0.31 15 0.30 4 0.17 111 23 2.89 23 2017 21 0.57 13 0.25 15 0.43 17 0.59 5 0.10 3 0.12 74 15 2.06 16 Table 5: The fluction absolute (no. of acc.) & relative (no .of acc./1000train.km) total annual total collision accidentes and % of it for the six zones on ENR networkes during the years 2011 till 2017. Zone Year Central Zone Middle Delta Zone West Delta Zone East Delta Zone Middle Zone Southern Zone Total & % of it ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. % rel. % 2011 31 0.84 36 0.69 28 0.80 19 0.66 21 0.42 11 0.46 146 3 3.86 3 2012 68 1.83 70 1.34 40 1.14 23 0.80 58 1.16 21 0.87 280 5 7.15 5 2013 85 2.29 151 2.89 41 1.17 73 2.54 160 3.19 37 1.54 547 11 13.62 11 2014 129 3.48 205 3.92 46 1.31 110 3.83 243 4.85 96 3.99 829 16 21.38 17 2015 191 5.15 183 3.50 57 1.62 129 4.49 234 4.67 89 3.70 883 17 23.14 18 2016 212 5.72 266 5.09 64 1.82 108 3.76 224 4.47 47 1.96 921 18 22.82 18 2017 168 4.53 841 16.09 83 2.37 94 3.27 275 5.49 85 3.54 1546 30 35.28 28 Table 6: The fluction absolute (no. of acc.) & relative (no .of acc./1000train.km) total annual fire in trains accidentes and % of it for the six zones on ENR networkes during the years 2011 till 2017. Zone Year Central Zone Middle Delta Zone West Delta Zone East Delta Zone Middle Zone Southern Zone Total & % of it ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. % rel. % 2011 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.03 1 0.02 0 0 2 1 0.055 1 2012 2 0.05 0 0 1 0.03 1 0.03 2 0.04 1 0.042 7 4 0.199 5 2013 1 0.03 1 0.02 3 0.09 1 0.03 1 0.02 0 0 7 4 0.186 5 2014 7 0.19 8 0.15 4 0.11 2 0.07 4 0.08 0 0 25 16 0.605 14 2015 9 0.24 7 0.13 7 0.2 6 0.21 8 0.16 5 0.208 42 26 1.153 27 2016 13 0.35 6 0.11 1 0.03 4 0.14 6 0.12 2 0.083 32 20 0.836 20 2017 10 0.27 3 0.06 7 0.2 1 0.03 20 0.4 5 0.208 46 29 1.169 28 American Scientific Research Journal for Engineering, Technology, and Sciences (ASRJETS) (2018) Volume 43, No 1, pp 61-75 71 Table 7: The fluction absolute (no. of acc.) & relative (no .of acc./1000train.km) total annual opponents on lines accidentes and % of it for the six zones on ENR networkes during the years 2011 till 2017. Zone Year Central Zone Middle Delta Zone West Delta Zone East Delta Zone Middle Zone Southern Zone Total &%of it ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. % rel. % 2011 22 0.59 16 0.31 12 0.34 6 0.21 24 0.48 9 0.374 89 17 2.303 16 2012 13 0.35 3 0.06 11 0.31 7 0.24 13 0.26 4 0.166 51 10 1.391 10 2013 14 0.38 23 0.44 13 0.37 8 0.28 22 0.44 4 0.166 84 16 2.072 15 2014 28 0.76 16 0.31 6 0.17 18 0.63 18 0.36 12 0.499 98 18 2.717 19 2015 29 0.78 14 0.27 9 0.26 20 0.7 21 0.42 6 0.249 99 18 2.671 19 2016 9 0.24 10 0.19 13 0.37 6 0.21 16 0.32 7 0.291 61 11 1.624 11 2017 11 0.3 7 0.13 9 0.26 2 0.07 17 0.34 8 0.332 54 10 1.429 10 Table 8: The fluction absolute (no. of acc.) & relative (no .of acc./1000train.km) total annual other train accidentes and % of it for the six zones on ENR networkes during the years 2011 till 2017. Zone Year Central Zone Middle Delta Zone West Delta Zone East Delta Zone Middle Zone Southern Zone Total & % of it ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. rel. ab. % rel. % 2011 12 0.32 13 0.25 5 0.14 3 0.1 26 0.52 2 0.08 61 14 1.421 14 2012 13 0.35 10 0.19 12 0.34 4 0.14 23 0.46 3 0.12 65 15 1.607 15 2013 15 0.41 13 0.25 11 0.31 7 0.24 21 0.42 0 0 67 16 1.63 15 2014 10 0.27 11 0.21 8 0.23 3 0.1 12 0.24 4 0.17 48 11 1.219 12 2015 22 0.59 15 0.29 9 0.26 2 0.07 15 0.30 3 0.12 66 15 1.631 15 2016 18 0.49 12 0.23 13 0.37 2 0.07 23 0.46 3 0.12 71 16 1.739 16 2017 9 0.24 15 0.29 12 0.34 5 0.17 9 0.18 4 0.17 54 13 1.392 13 Table 9: The largest (zone in (absolute & relative) no. of accidents & the largest year & %of total no.(absolute & relative)) in all types of accidents. Types of accidents Zone Year %of total no. of accidents Absolute Relative Absolute Relative Derailment central zone central zone 2015 24% 24% Total collision middle delta zone central zone 2017 30% 28% Fire in trains central zone central zone 2017 29% 28% Opponents on lines central zone central zone 2014&2015 18% 19% Other train accidents Middle Zone central zone& Middle Zone 2016 16% 16% Note: Analyze the accidents in Egypt on years and the same situation till now without taking safty improvement , this equations above in table 10 shows the relationship between absolute and relative no. of accidents at American Scientific Research Journal for Engineering, Technology, and Sciences (ASRJETS) (2018) Volume 43, No 1, pp 61-75 72 Zones in Egypt within 2011 till 2017 and shows equation for curves and correlation numbers for them related to polynomial curves , we try to solve this problem and reduse no. of accidents on the next years . Table 10: Absolute Total no. of accidents and relative Total no. of acc./1000train.Km on Zones in Egypt within 2011 till 2017 and shows equation for curves and correlation numbers for them related to polynomial curves. Zone Central Zone Middle Delta Zone West Delta Zone East Delta Zone Middle Zone Southern Zone R² 0.8398 0.8425 0.8955 0.8394 0.9484 0.6564 Equ. for no. of acc. y = -7.119x2 + 28709x - 3E+07 y = 29.202x2 - 117522x + 1E+08 y = 0.3571x2 - 1424.7x + 1E+06 y = -7.1905x2 + 28982x - 3E+07 y = - 7.619x2 + 30733x - 3E+07 y = - 2.9643x2 + 11954x - 1E+07 Equ. for no. of acc./100 0train.k m y = -0.1921x2 + 774.65x – 780989 y = 0.5585x2 - 2247.8x + 2E+06 y = 0.0102x2 - 40.61x + 40499 y = -0.2501x2 + 1008.2x - 1E+06 y = - 0.1521x2 + 613.4x – 618551 y = - 0.1233x2 + 497.27x – 501341 Table 11: The risk permissible level in all types of accidents to evaluate it from risk level of each type of accidents according to table 1 & this equation In Egypt within 2011 till 2017 . Types of accidents Total no. of accidents from 2011 to 2017 Classification of risks Risk permissible level Accident frequent Accident severity Risk level Derailment 483 4 4 16 Non-permissible Total collision 5152 5 4 20 Non-permissible Fire in trains 161 2 3 6 Permissible Opponents on lines 336 3 3 9 Non-desirable Other train accidents 432 3 3 9 Non-desirable Risk level = Accident frequent* Accident severity (R=F*S) [4] 3.3. Third step: Develop correction plans (as well shown in the conclossion). 3.4. Fourth step: implement the plans (as recommendation). 3.5. Fifth step: Evaluate the effectiveness of the plans on safety (as recommendation). American Scientific Research Journal for Engineering, Technology, and Sciences (ASRJETS) (2018) Volume 43, No 1, pp 61-75 73 4. Results • From figure3&4 we observe that the largest zone in total no. of accidents is middle zone & the largest zone in total no. of accidents/1000train.km is central zone within 2011 till 2017 but middle delta zone in 2017 has large increasing in absolute and relative no. of accidents because of increasing of gate collision in this zone . • From figure5&6 we observe that the largest zone in total no. of accidents is middle delta zone with persentage of 30% & the largest zone in total no. of accidents/1000train.km is middle delta zone with persentage of 23% within 2011 till 2017. • From table 2 & two figures6&7 we observe that the largest total no. of accidentes (absolute&Relative) at total collision with persentage 76% of the total no. of accidentes this represents more than half of total no. of accidentes from 2011 to 2017 because of large no. of accidents at level crossing specially at gate collision with cars . • From table3 we observe that the largest no. of % of share of accidentes(absolute&relative) at 2011 is (23% in middle zone &23% in central zone) , at 2012 is (26%&27) in central zone , at 2013 is (28%&22%) in middle zone , at 2014 is (27%&21%) in middle zone , at 2015 is (24% in middle zone&24% in central zone) , at 2016 is (26% in middle delta zone&26% in central zone) , at 2017 is (20%&40%) in middle delta zone , Total absolute (2011 till 2017) is 30% in middle delta zone and Total relative (2011 till 2017) is 23% in middle delta zone . • From table4 we observe that the largest zone in.(absolute & relative) no. of accidents is central zone at the most of zones & the largest persantage of total no.(absolute & relative) of derailment is 24% in 2015 . • From table5 we observe that the largest zone in absolute no. of accidents is middle delta zone at the most of zones & the largest zone in relative no. of accidents is central zone at the most of zones & the largest persantage of total no.(absolute & relative) of total collision is (30% & 28%) in 2017 . • From table6 we observe that the largest zone in .(absolute & relative) no. of accidents is central zone at the most of zones & the largest persantage of total no.(absolute & relative) of fire in trains is (29% & 28%) in 2017 . • From table7 we observe that the largest zone in .(absolute & relative) no. of accidents is central zone at the most of zones & the largest persantage of total no.(absolute & relative) of Opposials on lines is (18% & 19%) in 2014&2015 . • From table8 we observe that the largest zone in (absolute & relative) no. of accidents is Middle Zone at the most of zones & the largest persantage of total no.(absolute & relative) of Opposials on lines is (16%) in 2016 . • From table9 we observe that central zone is the largest no. of accidents in the most of types of accidents. • From table10 we observe that the largest correlation no. is 0.9484 in middle zone and the lowest no. is 0.6564 in southern zone. • From table11 we observe that the largest risk level is 20 in total collision which have non-permissible risk level then derailment is 16 which have non-permissible risk level too. American Scientific Research Journal for Engineering, Technology, and Sciences (ASRJETS) (2018) Volume 43, No 1, pp 61-75 74 5. Conclusions and Recommendations • This analysis applied to all accidents on the six zones in Egypt from 2011 to 2017 to see which of them needs to be developed priority to reduce no. of accidents in it. • We observe that central zone is the largest no. of accidents in the most of types of accidents. • The largest total no. of accidents (absolute & relative) at total collision with percentage 76% of the total no. of accidents this represents more than half of total no. of accidents from 2011 to 2017 because of large no. of accidents at level crossing specially at gate collision with cars. • The largest risk level is 20 in total collision which have non-permissible risk level then derailment is 16 which have non-permissible risk level too. Correctin actions for maintanance: • Closing of illegal level crossing on railway lines. • Making reminder courses for workers in maintenance on lines. • Distributing of workers in maintenance sites according to priority work and size. • Examining the turnouts of stations and ensure the integrity of their tasks and change the damaged ones. • Following-up the maintenance of the daily and periodic railways of welded and non-welded railways as well as diversions and level crossings in accordance with technical regulations to ensure the safety of the train tracks at the limited speeds. • Paying attention to quality system in all works to rationalize the expenses and ensure that the implementation is not repeated again. • Install the appropriate protection systems in level crossings. • Detecting welds and securing defective welds. • Put up warning signs, regulatory and the ground planning for vehicles movement when approaching the legal or illegal level crossing area. • Install monitoring systems which identify any defective material or operation. • For separated railways, ensure the maximum level of cooperation between infrastructure and operation. Correctin actions for human power: • Train drivers must comply with the speed limits for maneuvering and during heating (8 km /h). • The drivers of the trains, locomotives or moving units should not exceed any of the semaphore or disks, which will only show the danger signal in the authorized cases and provided that the driver receives the appropriate movement order as the case may be. • Ensure that employees are aware of the critical functions of safety instructions and the seriousness of their training programs. • Improve the working environment for the train workers. • Improve the education of all railway staff. American Scientific Research Journal for Engineering, Technology, and Sciences (ASRJETS) (2018) Volume 43, No 1, pp 61-75 75 Correctin actions for safety regulations: • Increasing the number of A.T.C control devices for trains with blocks and towers and activating their work. • Determine the technical authorities who responsible for the accidents with the Railway Authority. • Improve operational safety systems, such as the automatic train control system. • Inform the clients and more generally the public on the dangers related to the railway system (though smaller compared to other transport modes). • Implement the correction plane and reevaluate safety. References [1] V.A. Profillidis. Railway Management and Engineering, USA: Ash gate Publishing Limited, 2014, pp. 626-627-628. [2] Sunil .K. Agarawal. “Accident manual 2012” India, 2012. [3] Christos N. Pyrgidgis. Railway Transportation Systems, New York: Taylor & Francis Group, 2016, pp. 377-378- 382-383-384. [4] Egyptian National Railway, Risk management, Egypt: General Administration of Control on the Operating, march 2017. [5] Egyptian National Railway, Schedules of distance of trains - Lower and Upper Egypt, Egypt: General Administration of Control on the Operating, July 2013 &2016. [6] Commission Directive2014/88/EU. “Directives.” Official Journal of the European Union, pp. 3-4, 9 July 2014.  This analysis applied to all accidents on the six zones in Egypt from 2011 to 2017 to see which of them needs to be developed priority to reduce no. of accidents in it.  Improve the working environment for the train workers.