analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 editor’s notes welcome to another volume of analytic teaching and philosophical praxis. this volume finds us considering an issue that goes to the heart of both education and philosophy, namely, what has happened to the pursuit of wisdom? the ten articles that make up volume 31 approach this question from a variety of perspectives, some of which consider it through the lens of pedagogy (levanon, barris and ruff, cowley), some through the analysis of specific philosophers and debates (hall, kraemer, harwood, kitanov, windhorst), while others (gardner and gayle) see the question as a challenge to the discipline of philosophy itself. four of the papers presented in this volume were presented at a conference on wisdom hosted by viterbo university (april 15-17, 2010) organized by rick kyte and the d.b. reinhart institute for ethics in leadership. the conference was a considerable success, thanks in large part to the efforts of rick kyte, and it was really the occasion of the conference that gave me the idea to put out a larger call-for-papers on the topic of wisdom and higher education to complement the conference papers. taken together, the articles explore a number of thorny issues surrounding not only how wisdom might be taught, but also whether it can even be defined. it has become something of a commonplace to lament the ascension of knowledge over wisdom that so defines contemporary culture. it is my hope that you will find the articles collected here offer an insightful and engaging response to the question, “what remains of the pursuit of wisdom”? happy reading, jason j. howard editor jason j. howard contributing editors patrick costello glyndŵr university, wales david kennedy montclair state university judy kyle educational consultant montreal, canada richard kyte d.b. reinhart institute for ethics in leadership, viterbo university richard morehouse, emeritus viterbo university felix garcía moriyón center for philosophy for children madrid, spain michael pritchard western michigan university michel sasseville laval university, quebec david smith university of lethbridge, canada susan wilks university of melbourne, australia michael wodzak viterbo university book review editors gilbert burgh university of queensland, australia trevor curnow st. martin’s college layout design assistant adam alexander publisher viterbo university la crosse, wisconsin 54601 copyright 2005 analytic teaching is published twice a year. issn 0890-5118 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 33 editor’s notes warm regards to all of our readers. this volume (vol. 33) brings the journal back to its roots with a host of articles focusing on key themes related to the complexity of the community of inquiry, both methodological and ontological, and the on-going challenge of integrating philosophy for children with k-12 education. before i go on to say a bit about the articles in this issue of vol. 33, i want to send out a heartfelt thanks to susan gardner and wendy turgeon for all the work they did at this summer’s naaci conference in vancouver. the conference was a huge success and left many us feeling both reinvigorated and re-connected. in fact, the first four articles of this volume (gardner, kennedy, davis and cannon) are products of this summer’s 2012 naaci conference. the first, gardner’s “the complexity of respecting together,” provides an admirable overview of the different positions on respect pursued at the conference, while the other three unpack the deeper assumptions that underlie the structure of communal inquiry. the fifth article by patrick costello is a response to wendy turgeon’s essay in our last volume (vol. 32), in which costello compares common challenges to teacher training in the u.k. ann gazzard picks up on elements of this theme as well, with her paper contrasting the different pedagogical approaches of wartenberg and lipman. of the final four papers, both tiedemann and jackson explore larger pedagogical trends related to philosophy and the scholarship of teaching and learning, while the final two articles focus on cultivating the wisdom of pfc, that of gasparatou & kampeza in greece, and that of määttä & uusiautti in the context of child rearing. taken together the articles make a strong case for not only the incredible resourcefulness of the community of inquiry, but also the necessity of integrating philosophy within the larger educational community, both local and global. as always, i hope you find the articles informative and inspiring, as they provide us with a snap-shot of the struggles of philosophy to find a forum for its wisdom. happy readings, dr. jason j. howard chief editor jason j. howard viterbo university copy editor jacqueline herbers viterbo university contributing editors patrick costello glyndŵr university, wales susan gardner capilano university, canada david kennedy montclair state university nadia kennedy stony brook university, suny richard morehouse, emeritus viterbo university felix garcía moriyón center for philosophy for children madrid, spain joe oyler iapc, montclair state university michel sasseville laval university, quebec john simpson university of alberta, canada susan wilks university of melbourne, australia layout design assistants chelsey e. mccoy publisher viterbo university la crosse, wisconsin 54601 copyright 2005 analytic teaching and philosophical praxus is usually published once a year. issn 0890-5118 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 editor’s notes i hope this issue of analytic teaching and philosophical praxis finds all of you well. i apologize for the long delay in getting out volume 29. it turns out that learning all the details of layout design, website maintenance, and everything else that is needed to keep a journal up and running, takes considerable time. now that i finally know the ‘technical side’ of running a journal, i can commit myself more diligently to my favorite side of the business, namely, eliciting quality contributions. the contributions to this volume span a wide variety of concerns, from reconstructing the notion of personhood to reflecting on the fantasy literature of j. r. r. tolkien. the majority of the contributions come from the naaci conference held at viterbo in june of 2008. i am thankful for the patience of those contributors. i hope you will find the selection of articles thoughtprovoking and helpful in deepening your appreciation for not only the community of inquiry but also the challenges of teaching in general. happy reading, jason j. howard editor jason j. howard contributing editors patrick costello glendŵr university, wales david kennedy montclair state university judy kyle educational consultant montreal, canada richard kyte d.b. reinhart institute for ethics in leadership, viterbo university richard morehouse, emeritus viterbo university felix garcía moriyón center for philosophy for children madrid, spain michael pritchard western michigan university michel sasseville laval university, quebec david smith university of lethbridge, canada susan wilks university of melbourne, australia michael wodzak viterbo university book review editors gilbert burgh university of queensland, australia trevor curnow st. martin’s college online graphic production viterbo university publisher viterbo university la crosse, wisconsin 54601 copyright 2005 analytic teaching is published twice a year. issn 0890-5118 back to home page analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34 issue 1 (2013) guest editor’s notes in this special issue centered on the theme of philosophical inquiry in the learning and teaching of mathematics, our contributing authors – philosophers of education and mathematics education researchers – explore the role of philosophical dialogue and inquiry and its potential for transforming the math classroom. to start us off, stefano oliverio traces the deep, historically grounded solidarity between math and philosophy, and calls for re-thinking and (re-) harmonizing this relationship in the mathematics classroom. contrary to the ancient platonic dictum that math is a “doorway” to philosophy, he suggests the opposite: that philosophical discussion in math classes may lead to an enriched engagement with mathematical practice itself. such an engagement is ultimately ethical, as it allows, in his words, individuals to follow their own inquiries and to find “the appropriate place” for math in their own lifeworlds. then john roemischer points out that mathematics is often taught as “nonproblematic,” but that a discipline can never be such. the role of philosophical inquiry, he argues, is “not to discover something of which until now we have been ignorant,” but to see conceptual aspects and assumptions that have not been unearthed, and thus “to come to know it [mathematics] in a different and better way.” taking this idea a step further, nataly chesky argues for the use of philosophical discourse as a reflective meta-language, which can be utilized to unearth the normative assumptions that inform the way we conceptualize mathematics. then daniel fisherman discusses the potential of philosophical dialogue for transforming students’ negative attitudes towards mathematics, through forging personally meaningful connections between math and everyday experience. transitioning onto more concrete terrain, lyn english offers the possibility of philosophical inquiry set within the context of mathematical modeling as used in real-world interdisciplinary situations. here, philosophical inquiry becomes an “inbuilt component” of modeling, and functions concomitantly with the actual mathematical inquiry to challenge and evaluate students’ assumptions, and the thinking underlying a given math model, thus engaging students in a complex cycle of interpreting, questioning, and trying out multiple approaches to finding solutions. and diana meerwaldt, rita borromeo ferri, and patricia nevers explore yet another aspect of philosophizing in the context of mathematical modeling—the use of speculachief editor jason j. howard viterbo university guest editor for volume 34 nadia kennedy stony brook university, suny copy editor jacqueline herbers viterbo university editorial board patrick costello glyndŵr university, wales susan gardner capilano university, canada david kennedy montclair state university nadia kennedy stony brook university, suny richard morehouse, emeritus viterbo university felix garcía moriyón center for philosophy for children madrid, spain joe oyler iapc, montclair state university michel sasseville laval university, quebec john simpson university of alberta, canada layout design assistants tyler r. mancl publisher viterbo university la crosse, wisconsin 54601 copyright 2005 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis is usually published twice a year. issn 0890-5118 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34 issue 1 (2013) tive thinking in support of the development of modeling skills and dispositions. then, by way of clearing the atmosphere for this kind of thinking, marie france-daniel advocates engaging students in philosophical dialogue to enhance autonomous and critical engagement with mathematical problems and a deeper understanding of concepts, as well as critical reflection on the biases and stereotypes that are often associated with mathematics. finally, dimitris chassapis argues that philosophical dialogue should be an essential dimension of math teacher education. it has the potential, in his view, to act as a tool for the epistemological clarification of mathematical knowledge – which he considers essential for the preparation of competent teachers – as well as to provide a medium for ongoing critical practitioner reflection. our hope is that this special issue of at&pp will inaugurate ever more robust conversations about the merits of philosophical dialogue in the mathematics classroom, and that it will act as a “doorway” leading to not just the reconstruction of classroom practice, but the reconstruction of popular beliefs and value judgments about mathematics as a field of knowledge. happy reading, nadia kennedy analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 53 the u.s. constitution as an atlantic document andrew hamilton does history really matter? as a historian, and more importantly as a teacher of history, i have become convinced of the need to raise this question in my introductory classes. too often this fundamental query is left for upper-division “theory” courses, or never broached at all. at a certain point historians, like most of us i imagine, stop asking why we do what we do and just get on with doing it. but with history, the question of why we engage in it or whether it is worthwhile at all is absolutely vital. in his 1926 address to the 41st annual meeting of the american historical association, carl becker offered a persuasive answer to this question.1 becker asserted that historians do not (indeed cannot) simply assemble all the facts surrounding a given event and then “let the facts speak for themselves.” rather, the historian must engage his or her subject, make choices about which facts are significant and which are extraneous, and provide a context in order for those facts to make sense. the facts alone, becker pointed out, are meaningless. for example, the fact that caesar crossed the rubicon river in 49 b.c. is undisputed. yet this event means very little (if anything at all) unless one understands something about the context: that caesar was a successful general with rising political ambitions, that the rubicon marked the border between rome proper and the frontier, that the senate had instructed caesar to return from his campaigns in gaul without his army, and that caesar intended to return to the capitol with his forces intact. in that context, it becomes evident that when caesar stood on the banks of the rubicon in 49 b.c., he wasn’t just thinking about crossing a river; he was contemplating an invasion that would have world historical ramifications, ending the roman republic and ushering in the empire. it is the historian’s task to establish this context so that the otherwise mute “fact” of a man fording a river on a certain day speaks to us and has significance. in short, becker reminds us, the historian is engaged in creating meaning. this essay pursues two points along these lines. the first is that yes, history really does matter for exactly the reasons becker pointed out. the second theme to be developed here is that considering the u.s. constitution as an atlantic document (that is, in its atlantic context) is a good example of precisely why history matters. in viewing the constitution in this manner, i am utilizing the methods of what has come to be called atlantic history.2 for about three decades now, historians in this sub-discipline have been illustrating the value of transcending the boundaries of nation states and continents surrounding the atlantic ocean and considering the atlantic region as a unit. the edges of nations and continents are of course quite permeable, and ideas, people, beliefs, trade goods, diseases all cross borders regularly. this is true almost everywhere on the globe, but the atlantic region has proven to be a particularly fruitful system to study in this light. whether we celebrate or condemn them, the voyages of columbus in the late fifteenth century suddenly transformed the atlantic ocean from a barrier separating the americas from europe and africa, into a highway which has connected them ever since. although the histories of the continents and nations surrounding the atlantic have long been considered separately in academic programs (american history, european history, and so on), atlantic history insists that beginning with the early modern period, these geographic units are most usefully considered as a system. the merits of this approach may be illustrated by setting that quintessentially american document, the u.s. constitution, in its atlantic context. to begin, i draw upon h. robert baker’s 2008 article, “the supreme court confronts history.”3 in his analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 54 article, baker explores the supreme court’s use of history to argue a landmark case. the utilization of historical arguments to justify interpretations of the constitution and thus to decide cases is nothing new, but the 2008 supreme court case, boumediene v. bush, provides an excellent example of how historical analysis was used to justify both a majority court decision and one of the dissents to the ruling as well. the case also illustrates some of the strengths of the atlantic perspective. the central issue in boumediene was whether habeas corpus applies at guantanamo bay. many of the suspected terrorists apprehended in the “war on terror” and jailed at the u.s. detention center at guantanamo bay, cuba, beginning in 2002, had not been formally charged with any crime. government prosecutors suggested they needed to hold these individuals while they built legal cases against them. did these guantanamo bay detainees have the right to make habeas corpus appeals and demand that they either be charged or else released? habeas corpus, baker points out for those of us whose latin is rusty, means “have the body,” as in a command for the jailor to present the defendant before a judge in order to show the defendant is alive and well, and to explain why the person is being detained. in this case, the pivotal question was whether the government could “strip federal courts of jurisdiction to entertain prisoners’ applications for habeas corpus.”4 the issue centers on article i, section 9, paragraph 2 of the constitution: the so-called “suspension clause,” which expressly forbids congress from suspending habeas corpus “unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.” without digressing into the legal details here, the case turned on the question of sidestepping the suspension clause. rather than charge guantanamo bay detainees with a specific crime, could the government deny their habeas corpus rights (and thus hold them for an indefinite period of time without filing criminal charges) by labeling them “enemy combatants” and putting them in military tribunals? the court in this case said no, though only by one vote. the court split five to four against the government. legal niceties aside, this case reveals a great deal about the significance of historical understanding in arriving at these legal decisions. in responding to the ruling, both justice anthony kennedy, writing for the majority, and justice antonin scalia, who wrote a dissent to the ruling, turned to history to justify their respective positions. moreover, in developing his history of habeas corpus, kennedy set the constitution squarely in an atlantic context, one which establishes the u.s. constitution in a tradition that goes back to the english civil wars and even to the english magna carta of 1215. in his majority opinion, kennedy stakes out special ground for habeas corpus. how does he do this? it has long been noted that the suspension clause does not grant an affirmative right to habeas corpus. it is housed in the same article that forbids congress from granting titles of nobility, preferring one state’s ports over another’s, and from tinkering with the slave trade for twenty years. as baker puts it, “this is hardly the architectural design of a palisade for fundamental rights.”5 nevertheless, kennedy suggests that “the writ [of habeas corpus] had a centrality that must inform proper interpretations of the suspension clause.” by way of proving this centrality, kennedy delves into a history of habeas corpus. he traces its textual roots across the atlantic all the way back to the english magna carta of 1215. the more immediate – and to the american colonists, the more historically significant – context was that of the long and often bloody seventeenth-century battles in england between parliament and the absolutist stuart kings. among the tactics most reviled by their critics, the stuarts brazenly attempted to fund unpopular policies by raising revenue without parliamentary consent (an early version of “taxation without representation”). when subjects objected, king charles i had them jailed and held without charges. there were many other complaints against the stuarts, but the 1627 petition of right, the habeas corpus act of 1679, and the english bill of rights in 1689 all spelled out the right to habeas corpus, suggesting that the king’s strategy of jailing enemies without charges was considered a particularly grievous abuse of power. kennedy examines all of these details in his brief, concluding that the american founding fathers were well aware of the history of what had become an important safeguard against tyranny when they included habeas corpus in the constitution. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 55 but kennedy goes further. he points to the ratification struggle of 1787-88 as additional proof of how central the idea of habeas corpus was to the american framers of the constitution. defenders of ratification were put on the defensive in the state ratification conventions. critics charged that the new federal government was an attempt to substitute a novel american tyranny for the old british one! wasn’t the introduction of a new federal government simply an attempt to undermine states’ (and thus individuals’) rights? kennedy turns to alexander hamilton, who answered this objection in federalist no. 84. to demonstrate that a federal government would be no tyranny, hamilton underscored the many protections of individual liberty in the constitution, especially habeas corpus, which he calls one of the greatest “securities to liberty and republicanism” in the document.6 kennedy insists that his historical analysis proves hamilton and others realized the place habeas corpus held in the historical imagination. despite its negative formulation in article i, the right of habeas corpus was not included in the constitution haphazardly. on the contrary, the historical context suggests that the protection was considered by the founding generation to be one of the most reliable checks against tyrannical power. thus, kennedy concludes, the bar for superseding habeas corpus must be set exceedingly high. the government’s argument in this case was that habeas corpus should not apply at guantanamo bay. their lawyers suggested that much of the evidence against the detainees involved sensitive material, or had not been accumulated yet, so formal charges could not be filed against them. if the government were not allowed to hold the guantanamo bay detainees indefinitely without formally charging them, dangerous terrorists might be freed. that ominous possibility was simply too great to allow the detainees access to habeas corpus appeals. justice scalia’s dissenting brief drew on this line of reasoning, and he, like justice kennedy, turned to history for a justification of his views. however, scalia’s focus is on much more recent history. the primary context for scalia in this case was the modern “war on terror.” he writes, “america is at war with radical islamists. the enemy began by killing americans and american allies abroad: 241 at the marine barracks in lebanon, 19 at the khobar towers in dharan, 224 at our embassies in dar el salaam and nairobi, and 17 on the u.s. cole in yemen.” on september 11, 2001, he continues, “the enemy brought the battle to american soil.” scalia goes on to claim that the majority’s opinion in this case “will make the war harder on us. it will almost certainly cause more americans to be killed.”7 the history utilized here is problematic on a number of levels. to begin with, the claim that the decision in favor of boumediene will result in american deaths is an emotional argument, rather than a historical (let alone a legal) one. furthermore, scalia’s list of attacks lumps various sunni and shiite rebel groups together with al qaeda and assorted other entities with varying degrees of attachment, grouping them all into one reductive “enemy,” when they actually have significant differences and severe disagreements amongst themselves. as baker suggests, scalia portrays this as a war of civilizations, america versus “all who hate us,” glossing over any historical subtlety or context. in the end, as baker notes, “technical merits of his opinion aside, scalia’s use of history is an utter failure.”8 the specific questions surrounding the scope of habeas corpus relating to guantanamo bay and the “war on terror” are still being scrutinized. boumediene v. bush, while a landmark case, is only one part of what is already proving to be a substantial, complicated body of detainee jurisprudence relating to the u.s. government’s antiterrorism efforts. what i hope to have suggested here is that this case helps illuminate how our understanding of the constitution’s use of habeas corpus has much to do with the larger atlantic context within which it was developed. also, it is apparent from these supreme court briefs that history really does matter, as evidenced by the repeated appeals to history in establishing the different arguments in the case. it is indeed heartening to a historian to see supreme court justices recognizing the significance of history in crafting their decisions. intriguingly, even this short examination of the u.s. constitution as an atlantic document highlights not only some of the strengths, but also a potential weakness of the atlantic approach. some scholars have suggested that a shortcoming of atlantic history lies in its seemingly indefinable parameters. that is, the question arises: where does the atlantic, and thus atlantic history, end? doesn’t the atlantic, through continental and oceanic analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 56 connections, extend ultimately into world history? after all, even this limited consideration of habeas corpus and its atlantic connections has introduced global politics and terrorist groups centered in the middle east and asia. but in the end, in this global age is this really a weakness of the atlantic model, or one its great strengths? endnotes 1.the address was later published under the title, “what are historical facts?” in the western political quarterly, vol. viii, sept. 1955, no. 3. 2.the idea of atlantic history stems from work begun in the 1980s by bernard bailyn of harvard university and jack p. greene of the johns hopkins university, among others. useful overviews of the field are bernard bailyn, atlantic history: concept and contours (cambridge, ma and london: harvard university press, 2005) and jack p. greene and philip d. morgan, eds., atlantic history: a critical reappraisal (oxford: oxford university press, 2009). 3.h. robert baker, “the supreme court confronts history,” www.common-place.org, vol. 8, no. 4, july 2008. 4.baker, p. 1. 5.baker, p. 3. 6. baker, p. 3, quoting hamilton. 7. baker, p. 5, quoting scalia. 8. baker, p. 5. address correspondence to: andrew hamilton viterbo university la crosse, wi e-mail: ajhamilton@viterbo.edu analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 25 "back to the future" in philosophical dialogue: a plea for changing p4c teacher education. barbara weber and susan t. gardner abstract: while making p4c much more easily disseminated, short-term weekend and weeklong p4c training programs not only dilute the potential laudatory impact of p4c, they can actually be dangerous. as well, lack of worldwide standards precludes the possibility of engaging in sufficiently high quality research of the sort that would allow the collection of empirical data in support the efficacy of worldwide p4c adoption. for all these reasons, the authors suggest that p4c advocates ought to insist that programs of a minimum of five philosophy courses be accepted as the recognized standard for any teacher to legitimately claim that she is teaching philosophy for children. “education” as opposed to “training” there is much merit in attempting to disseminate the ability to run a vibrant community of inquiry as is done in typical short-term exposures to p4c methods. there is much merit also in suggesting to teachers that they make use of p4c materials (or those of similar content), as they will serve as an impetus to address philosophical, usually non-empirical, and often real life questions (such as what precisely is wrong with being a bully or is it ok not to speak up in class)—questions not normally addressed in the regular curriculum. given this short-term “shot-in-the arm” training, it is not far fetched to argue that the ensuing communities of inquiry led by such teachers can serve as fertile ground for students to learn a plethora of critical and creative thinking skills, such as patiently and carefully listening to those with whom they disagree, reflectively considering the strength of reasons that they offer in support of their own positions, getting practice in imagining alternatives, to say nothing of the importance of being awakened to the myriad of perplexing issues that populate daily existence. nonetheless, despite the potential merits of such training, it can also be argued that, with regard to deep understanding and long-term positive change in students, and with regard to the lasting recognition of p4c as a vital contribution to the education of children around the world, this is not enough. what is missing in too many philosophy for children programs, we would argue, is philosophy. and the solution that we would like to propose is a substantial injection of philosophy in the p4c education of teachers, rather than the typical “shotin-the-arm” training. what a non-philosophical p4c coi might look like we would like to begin by inviting you to imagine what a p4c community of inquiry might look like if the facilitator does not know—and the following are just examples—the difference between an empirical and a non-empirical claim, i.e., she doesn’t know that one can’t reason one’s way to answering whether photo radar reduces speeding, or whether keeping pubs open later will reduce binge drinking that appears to be fueled by the pressure of early closures (a recent country-wide experiment in england showed that binge drinking along, with alcohol-related violence, actually went up with extended pub hours).1 or if the facilitator doesn’t know the difference between liberty and autonomy and thus is unable to point out that “simply doing what one wants” is not indicative of being the author of one’s action. or if the facilitator knows nothing of the difference between necessary and sufficient conditions and is thus unable to show that the claims “you will live if you have this operation” and “you will only live if you have this operation” are not equivalent. or if a facilitator is unfamiliar analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 26 with the most common informal fallacies and is thus unable to point out to a student who says that “physicians should never participate in an act of euthanasia because physicians should always do everything in their power to keep patients alive” that s/he is begging the question. or if a facilitator is completely ignorant of the finallytuned kantian argument that autonomy is the ultimate ground for morality, or the lockean distinction between primary and secondary qualities that founds our present understanding of different realities for different species, or of the rawlsian tactic of standing behind a veil of ignorance in order to gain a more unbiased view—and/or if the facilitator has never heard of hardin’s notion of the tragedy of the commons, of wittgenstein’s notion of language games, or of schweitzer’s notion of reverence for life—to say nothing of being ignorant of plato’s argument in support of separating wealth and power, or mill’s argument for the importance of freedom of speech, or even peter singer’s distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness in trying to maneuver around the complex questions of abortion and animal welfare (practical ethics). can this be real philosophy? can such a p4c coi that is so lacking in philosophical content be called philosophy at all? yes, of course, some might argue, because, after all, it is utilizing the socratic method to investigate exactly the same category of questions that socrates himself considered, and most philosophers consider socrates “a real philosopher” even though he makes few, if any, “appeals to authority.” indeed, many might argue that the strength of p4c lies precisely in piercing through the academic clutter in order to firmly anchor itself in what is really important about philosophy and that is to engage in interpersonal inquiry about real life issues, and to be able to efficiently and effectively attempt to move toward truth on what one inquires about. so what precisely is the problem? perhaps an analogy with medicine will help. can this be real medicine? medicine at the beginning of the 20th century was far less effective at keeping patients alive than medicine at the beginning of the 21st century. medicine that was practiced at the beginning of the 20th century, however, was nonetheless “real medicine.” and not only that, there were truths about past medicine that have been lost in medicine’s spectacular drive toward modernization, not the least of which is the perception of the patient as a “real person.” however, to say that much has been lost in medicine’s move forward, is not to argue that we should therefore ignore recent medical advances, nor that we should not insist that medical students access as many good modern medical voices as is possible. medical students, of course, cannot know it all—there is too much. but they can scaffold on the shoulders of many who have gone before. this, we suggest, is what anyone who claims to teach philosophy ought to be able to do. the metaphor what we are suggesting is that, optimally, all p4c facilitators have a minimum exposure to some of the more common and time-tested philosophical theoretical frameworks. with such a background, a facilitator can then act as a conduit to a whole other non-physically-present community of inquirers who have already exerted lifetimes of effort and energy in trying to clarify and to move toward truth on innumerable pressing human issues. access to such past inquiry can jump start stalls in philosophical investigation so that modern-day communities need not reinvent the wheel. surely we would not want our medical students to “try,” and perhaps fail, to reinvent antibiotics. why then do we want to force our budding philosophers to try, and perhaps fail, to see the differences between, say, consciousness and self-consciousness or liberty and autonomy? of course neither of these exercises, i.e., of trying to reinvent medicines or make distinctions of which one is purposefully kept ignorant, would be fruitless. who knows, maybe if we didn’t tell our medical students about antibiotics, they would come up with the same solution, or better? but maybe not. after all, the scientists who came up with antibiotics were themselves building on past voices. and yes, of course, students and teachanalytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 27 ers trying to muddle through why our society thinks it’s ok to kill cows but not humans might spontaneously articulate singer’s consciousness/self-consciousness distinction, or they might not, or they might simply get so confused that they resort to all kinds of “begging the question” tactics in their desperation to preserve the hegemony of humans. surely, we want to argue, the superior tactic is to start our students off within calling distance of the wealth of what our ancestors left to us, and to inspire them to take us further still. how much and what kind? of course p4c facilitators cannot learn all or even most philosophy, and we will never—unhappily—be in a position in which ph. d’s in philosophy are teaching in elementary schools. but learning some of the basics is possible, and by learning the basics what we mean is the sort 5-course certification program offered at iapc. though our penchant is for including critical thinking, ethics, metaphysics and epistemology, political and social philosophy, and philosophy of education in such a program, we do not believe that what precisely is included is critical. working with the metaphor of the facilitator introducing a community of past inquirers to the present coi, it probably doesn’t matter a whole lot which community of experts one invites. one can imagine an enormous variety of exceptional discussions each with a huge assortment of absent participants. on the other hand, given that absent philosophers are going to be asked to engage vicariously in a discussion of topics that are of importance to the present participants, we suggest that the philosophy taught to future p4c facilitators be of a “practically oriented brand” rather than the typical academic approach that is standard in history of philosophy courses. a practically oriented brand of philosophy. we are hardly the first to suggest that philosophy ought to be imparted in a more practically oriented fashion, and so, in honour of the intergenerational professionally-infused dialogue herein suggested, let us briefly speak to other voices who have advocated a similar approach. in his work entitled politics, aristotle makes a clear distinction between theoretical and more practically oriented studies. specifically, he distinguishes between the life of sensuality and desire (later called the vita voluptuosa), the political life (bios politicos or later the vita activa) and the life of the philosopher (bios theoreticos or later vita contemplativa).2 much later, hannah arendt refers to this early distinction of aristotle and defines the vita active, or action, as one of the three basic activities of human life corresponding to the three basic conditions of human existence (the other two being labour and work).3 according to arendt, public action (which includes speech) is grounded in the human condition of plurality, and is the only enterprise by which humans can disclose their identity and uniqueness to one another.4 thus, though arendt believed that we must introduce students to the already existing world, she believed that the introduction should be in the name of genuine renewal5 --that we should teach in a way that cultivates the political and moral imaginations of our students so that they are able to see the world from the other’s point of view.6 gadamer complains, in his famous work truth and method, that a primarily theoretical orientation prompts us to see philosophical theories as self-enclosed entities that are safely dead so that they no longer concern us. he says of us that we have “truly abandoned the expectation of finding, in the legacy of the text, a truth that is valid and comprehensible for oneself.”7 as an antidote, gadamer suggests that we adopt a hermeneutic approach to texts that will require of us that we engage in a genuine dialogue with past thinkers and that, as a result, we will come to see history as wirkungsgeschichte, i.e., as a force that can impact on who we are or who we become. it is critical to keep in mind, here, that such a dialogue, i.e., one that is hermeneutic, is characterized by the fact that, instead of just trying to understand what another is attempting to say, that, as well, we attempt to create a dialogue between that person’s perspective and our own. thus, within the context of accessing the works of past analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 28 thinkers, a hermeneutic analysis would lead to a ‘merging of horizons’ between the past and the present, i.e., the past remains relevant and applicable for the present questions and problems. similar to gadamer, rorty believes that philosophy ought to be a dialogue. building on this idea, he distinguishes between systematic philosophy and edifying philosophy.8 according to rorty, a systematic philosopher tries to construct a consistent eternal system through which to reveal an external and static truth, whereas an edifying philosopher deconstructs this system so that something new can arise. american pragmatist, john dewey, argues that philosophy has an important social responsibility in a democratic society. for him philosophy ought to be "an explicit formulation of the problems of the formation of right mental and moral habits in respect to the difficulties of contemporary social life." for dewey, then, philosophy ought to be a "theory of education in its most general phases" and that therefore the "reconstruction of philosophy, of education, and of social ideals and methods thus go hand in hand."9 dewey goes on to quite specifically say of philosophy that, like science, “it must assume a practical nature; it must become operative and experimental.”10 in so doing, dewey echoes fellow american pragmatist charles saunders pierce who argued before him that philosophy ought to mirror science by anchoring its methodology in genuine inquiry, and that such inquiry can only be genuine if it is undertaken in the face of “real and living doubt.”11 and finally, though certainly not least—though perhaps most relevant—matt lipman, founder of philosophy for children, in responding to this pierce/deweyan call for genuine inquiry in the face of real and living doubt, situated the community of inquiry at its pedagogical center, and, as well, insisted that students, not the text nor teacher, decide what topic they want to discuss thus ensuring that the issue under inquiry was of genuine relevance.12 in so doing, lipman suggests to us, in spades, an obvious format for the philosophical education of p4c teachers. mirroring the message this overview of philosophers who advocate a more practically oriented education thus mirrors the central message of this paper. that is, this overview not only demonstrates that there have already been a number of voices that form a strong chorus in support of the thesis that philosophy taught to p4c teachers ought to be of a “practically oriented brand,” i.e., that students be required to routinely engage in a dialogue about present day issues that are of core relevance for personal or political decisions and action, but as well, because of the richness that even this short overview brings to the topic, in and of itself, it demonstrates how impoverished a dialogue can be if it fails to engage the voices of those who have already invested a considerable amount of time, thought, and energy in trying to parse though the issue at hand. this short overview, also, interestingly, suggests that this very issue, i.e., theoretical versus practical forms of education, would, in and of itself, be a fruitful exploration for anyone interested in bringing philosophy into the classroom, and hence would serve well as the matrix for one of the courses designed for p4c educators. and finally, with regard to this short paper itself, it is at least plausible to suggest that, had the authors been completely deaf to past relevant voices, classifying this paper as “philosophical” might very well be problematic, just as, we suggest, it is problematic to support the claim that philosophy for children is really “philosophy” if both students and teachers remain utterly ignorant of virtually all of the powerful philosophical messages that form the lebenswelt of that academic discipline.13 the downside of the “shot-in-the arm.” in arguing that it is important to give p4c teachers a firm grounding in philosophy, we want to emphasize that we are not simply making the case that this is the optimal route. we are also making the case that it may be very dangerous to stick to the easy-road quick-fix attitude with regard to philosophy-free p4c training, and the danger is not just in the resulting poorer grade of discussion. the danger rather is much more serious. what can happen in p4c coi’s with an unphilosophically educated facilitator is that poor reasoning may very well be reinforced. how could it not be if a teacher doesn’t know how to recognize an ad hominem attack flung frequently by the attention-seeking “smart aleck” of the group? how could it not be if s/he doesn’t understand that it is a fallacy to presume that answers to difficult questions are best found by adopting the “mean” position? analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 29 how could it not be if the teacher is so intent on having her students adopt what she perceives to be the only legitimate point of view that she implicitly sends the message that what reasoning is all about is to first intuit the answer and then marshal reasons in its support, rather than truly following reason wherever it leads? and aside from inadvertently reinforcing poor reasoning, if dangerously out-of-control coi’s are occurring unbeknownst to the well intentions of p4c experts, the possibility of the p4c movement ever being able to empirically demonstrate the enormous benefit of well-run philosophically-backed p4c coi’s will forever slip through our grasp. or worse, in trying to gather empirical evidence, we or others may gather data that “proves” not only that the medicine doesn’t work, but that it actually sickens the patient, though all along the medicine under investigation, unbeknownst to all, was counterfeit. we must, if we are ever to show that p4c not only works but works beautifully, be able to guarantee that everyone in the experimental group receives the same medicine—or at least approximately—and that it is real stuff, and not just a placebo or worse a poison. adopting a higher standard we recognize the downside of adopting a higher standard. having worldwide certificate 5-course p4c philosophy programs—which is what we are recommending—will, by comparison, devalue weekend and weeklong courses, though perhaps not lethally. one can still argue that there is merit in learning a little about being a p4c coi facilitator, as long as in the process, one is trying to seduce those who get “bitten” by the method into acquiring a much greater wealth of philosophical education, and as long as one makes it clear that, without philosophy, this is not philosophy. the big upside is that once a higher standard has been adopted—with an emphasis on both higher and standard, we will put ourselves in a position to do real research and hence to collect the kind of empirically based data by which we can finally convince the powers that be that p4c is a not-to-be-missed invaluable educational opportunity. we are not making the obviously erroneously claim that investigation into the benefits of various kinds of education can be as precise as those in the physical sciences. but as aristotle said, we must bring to the topic what precision the topic admits.14 our suggestion, therefore, is that we ensure that the medicine is sufficiently real and sufficiently strong to make a difference, and that it has sufficient quality controls that we can make the claim that the results are from the same medicine, and, therefore, that we will all be beneficiaries of world-wide inoculation. endnotes 1. http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/03/05/mnq4vdcai.dtl http://www.cbc.ca/ world/story/2008/03/04/britain-alcohol.html?ref=rss 2. aristotle, politics, 1332b2, 1333a30ff and 1332b32; see 1333a30-33 about the life of the philosopher; see also aristotle, nicomachean ethics, book x. 3. arendt, h. the human condition. chicago: university of chicago press, 1958. 4. ibid. 175. 5. gordon, m. “hannah arendt and authority: conservativism in education reconsidered.” hannah arendt and education: renewing our common world. ed. mordechai gordon. boulder, colorado: westview press, 2001. 63. 6. euben, p. “hannah arendt on politicizing the university and other clichés.” hannah arendt and education: renewing our common world. ed. mordechai gordon. boulder, colorado: westview press, 2001. 194. 7. wahrheit hat man den anspruch grundsätzlich aufgegeben, in der überlieferung für einen selber gültige und verständliche wahrheit zu finden.” (gadamer, h.-g. wahrheit und methode, tuebingen: mohr verlag, 1990, 309). 8. rorty, r. philosophy and the mirror of nature, princeton: princeton university press, 1979, 365ff. 9. dewey, j. democracy and education: an introduction to the philosophy of education. new york: free press, analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 30 1966. 328-331. 10. dewey, j. reconstruction in philosophy. boston: beacon, 1948. 121. 11. peirce, c.s. “the fixation of belief.” philosophical writings of peirce. ed. justus buchler. new york: dover publications, 1955. 11. 12. “there is good reason to think that the model of each and every classroom . . . is the community of inquiry. by inquiry, of course, i mean perseverance in self-corrective exploration of issues that are felt to be both important and problematic.” lipman, m. philosophy goes to school. philadelphia: temple university press, 1988. 20. 13. habermas j. the theory of communicative action. vol. 1: reason and the rationalization of society. trans. thomas mccarthy. boston: beacon press, 1992. (german text: 1981.) “this lifeworld (lebeswelt) is bounded by the totality of interpretations presupposed by the members as background knowledge.” 13. “subjects acting communicatively always come to an understanding in the horizon of a lifeworld. their lifeworld is formed from more or less diffuse, always unproblematic, background convictions.” 70. 14. aristotle. nichomachean ethics, i, 3. “our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts.” address correspondence to: barbara weber dr.barbara.weber@web.de or susan gardner sgardner@capilano.ca analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 68 p4c, community of inquiry, and methodological faith dale cannon abstract: in this paper i venture to bring out and disclose an element of faith at the heart of the kind of critical inquiry that we encourage and foster in philosophy with children. it is clearly distinct from doubt, the kind of doubt we customarily associate with what makes critical thinking critical, but, properly understood, it grants to doubt and critical reflection essential roles in the process. what i mean by “faith” in this connection may be understood as trust and confidence in the process of thoughtful inquiry (especially with thoughtful peers). our coming to recognize the centrality of faith in this sense within philosophy with children may entail some changes in our thinking about where philosophy with children fits into the larger cultural movements of our time and as well about how involvement in philosophy with children bears upon the beliefs and traditions of the sub-cultural backgrounds of children who participate. i should make clear that my perspective is informed by the philosophical insights of michael polanyi into what he calls the tacit dimension of all kinds of knowing, even the most rigorous and formal, especially considering knowing as an ongoing process. polanyi focuses a great deal on what he speaks of as “the fiduciary [i.e., faith] coefficient of our knowing” – indeed, of all explicit propositions we may happen to entertain or hold. he takes as his paradigm of knowing (that is, the knowing process) the anticipation of an approaching discovery, whether in the natural sciences or in other areas. i will also relate my discussion to the well-known controversy between w. k. clifford’s “the ethics of belief” and william james’ “the will to believe.” i contend that james’ most important point in that controversy has much more to do with general epistemology than philosophy of religion. introduction my aim in this paper is to bring out and disclose an element of faith at the heart of the kind of reasoned, critical inquiry that we encourage and foster in philosophy with children. i think that there is something of this sort at the heart of all varieties of what we normally think of as “critical thinking.” but in philosophy with children (though this may also apply elsewhere, such as in the college classroom), we often find ourselves in a position of having to initiate and help develop in young people not only a certain practice of critical inquiry (the kinds of intellectual and verbal moves that it involves and the skills that its exercise entails) but also and crucially a trust in it, a confidence that it is a worthwhile thing to pursue and acquire competence in, and a hope that something of value will come of its pursuit. now normally in the everyday practice of critical inquiry we take for granted these things; they go unsaid. but when we seek to get it started in young people, and between them and their peers in a genuine community of inquiry, where we are seeking to get them to invest themselves in it in a way they have never done before, it becomes more a self-conscious matter for we who are its facilitators; it becomes something we can’t take for granted or ignore. methodological faith i believe it is appropriate to call this trust, this confidence, and this hope, taken together, a sort of faith in the process of critical inquiry, a methodological faith. of course i do not mean “faith” in a religious sense. i am 30 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 69 not trying to smuggle religious faith into the back door. i am comfortable with calling it “generic faith” or “faith in a generic sense,” or “methodological faith.” to give oneself over to reasoned inquiry clearly involves a sort of venture that is fraught with uncertainty and risk. one cannot know with any certain assurance what will result, especially for the person whom we are trying to initiate into the process. you can’t justify with any completeness that it will be worth her self-investment in advance, although you may be able to expose her to a limited extent to the successful ventures of others. i want to make clear that the sort of faith i am speaking of involves as an essential component of that faith a respect for the contributions of other participants in the process of inquiry (both those who have already spoken and those who have not yet spoken, a trust, a confidence, and a hope in their contributions) and, crucially, a nurturing care and respect for one’s own contribution to the process (both what has been contributed up to the present and what is yet to come). a crucial role for the facilitator therefore is to evoke and build that faith and that respect in each member of the community, where there may be very little of it in evidence when a community of inquiry is first finding its feet with all that it involves. that is to say, a given would-be member of the community may have, even when asked, no faith at all in the process and no faith that she/he might have anything valuable to say, least of all valuable to the others. in such a case, the facilitator/teacher must supply the missing, not yet evident, not yet emergent, faith and respect in the person and her/his contribution that she/he does not yet have. what i want to call attention to here is that what i am here calling faith is the exact opposite of a certain kind of doubt – specifically, doubt that anything good at all will come from investing myself in the communal process of inquiry, doubt that i will have anything of value to contribute to the process, indeed, doubt that anything of value to me will result from the inquiry. and if there is much of a spirit of skepticism about the process of inquiry shared by members of the group (as there often can be as adolescence is approached), especially a skepticism or cynicism that might occasionally be directed toward the potential contributions of shy and reticent students who doubt the value of their own contributions, you can be sure that the shy and reticent students in question will never move beyond ground zero – unless there is some kind of intervention on the part of the facilitator to counter that skepticism and doubt and bring to birth from within the group hope and confidence in the process and in those persons’ contributions. now all of this i suspect may be fairly obvious to reflective, seasoned facilitators of young people’s communities of philosophical inquiry. i don’t think i am saying anything radically new. however, i want to call attention to how there is a certain tension between the cultivation of this sense of faith in the process of reasoned inquiry and our dedication to cultivating critical thinking in accordance with the paradigm of critical inquiry that has characterized modern intellectual culture—a paradigm whose motto is “doubt unless and until one has sufficient reason to believe.” “doubt,” versus “believe” or “doubt” versus “have faith.” make the advocate of belief first offer proof, or at least sufficient reason to believe before taking him at his word. take nothing simply on faith. now were methodological doubt to be our first advice to young people we seek to initiate into a community of philosophical inquiry, and were this advice meant and understood literally, i think we would all agree that we would get nowhere fast and be working against ourselves. to doubt the process of reasoned inquiry before it has even gotten off the ground, to cultivate a critical suspicion that takes in (or takes on) this process as well as everything else, to insist that reasoned inquiry first prove itself before one gives oneself to it (even tentatively), is a ticket to failure. indeed, i believe that were we to come to think about this deeply, we would realize that our own trust, confidence, and hope in the process of reasoned inquiry is similarly grounded in faith in this generic sense and not in doubt. i do not mean faith in some absolutist unquestioning sense. doubt continues to have its place and function, to be sure—please don’t get me wrong—but prior to doubt and even enabling reasoned doubt is a root faith and confidence in reasoned inquiry—not uncritical but an acritical or precritical faith that is prior to critical examination and grounding it.1 31 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 70 michael polanyi and the shift from critical to post-critical were we to come to recognize the centrality of faith in this generic, acritical sense within philosophy with children may entail some changes in our thinking about where philosophy with children fits into the larger cultural movements of our time. what i have in mind has to do with the so-called shift from a modern to a post-modern intellectual sensibility. what goes under the name of “post-modern” intellectual movements is a very mixed bag of things, not all of which are compatible—some good, some not so good. i don’t think it is all simply confusing and confused. it is quite a chore to sift the wheat from the chaff. i do think that much of what has gone under the name, especially of “deconstructive post-modern” currents is to a large extent modernist critical doubt turned upon modernism’s own presuppositions and paradigms —i.e., it amounts to the modern critical project deconstructively turned upon itself. much of this is good as far as it goes, but rarely if ever does it point forward to any constructive alternative. there are a few exceptions, sometimes going under the name of “constructive post-modernism.” one of these exceptions, though he made no use of this phrase, is the work of philosopher-scientist michael polanyi, who subtitled his magnum opus personal knowledge, “toward a postcritical philosophy.” i see philosophy for children, as i am conceiving it in this paper, as exemplifying the shift from a critical to a post-critical sensibility in the sense that polanyi understood it.2 i should make clear that my perspective is informed by the philosophical insights of polanyi into what he calls the tacit dimension of all kinds of knowing,3 even in the most rigorous and formal of the sciences, especially considering knowledge as an ongoing process (shifting from the noun “knowledge” to the verb “knowing”). we have been accustomed through positivist philosophy, the epitome of the modernist critical project, to think of knowing in its explicit dimensions only, especially in the sciences. this has led to all sorts of distortion, principally because of its neglect of what is going on in the tacit, non-explicit, unspoken dimensions of scientific practice only recently come to light (in large part due to polanyi’s contributions and influence) come to light. polanyi focuses a great deal on what he speaks of as “the fiduciary [= faith] coefficient of our knowing”4 – indeed, of all explicit propositions we may happen to entertain or hold. this tacit coefficient of our knowing is largely acritical, not uncritical. the very attempt in science or anywhere else to make it critical (i.e., to subject it to explicit critical examination) easily misrepresents it and disables the tacit practice that it relies upon. he takes as his paradigm of knowing (that is, his paradigm of the knowing process) the anticipation of an approaching discovery, whether in the natural sciences or in other areas.5 for me this paradigm serves well for what it is that is pursued in a community of philosophical inquiry. w. k. clifford and william james it may help to clarify what i am getting at by relating it to the well-known controversy between w. k. clifford’s “the ethics of belief” and william james’ “the will to believe” in the last years of the 19th century. all of us have been long accustomed to think of critical thinking as specifically involving a disposition to doubt until sufficient evidence proves otherwise and therefore as essentially opposed to a disposition of faith as a matter of believing without sufficient evidence. very likely for many of us clifford’s paradigmatic essay, “the ethics of belief,”6 has had some influence upon us on this topic. in that essay he famously advances the claim, “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.” the argument he offers in support of it, when examined closely in light of the concept of methodological faith as i am articulating it, is a lot less convincing that it may otherwise seem. there he sets out two vivid cases where inquiry was cut short and a conclusion prematurely reached and then acted upon with tragic consequences: one where a ship owner concluded that his emigrant ship was seaworthy without having thoroughly investigated the evidence, and the other where certain agitators concluded that some teachers of religion were illegally and immorally indoctrinating their children, again without having thoroughly investigated the evidence. 32 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 71 i agree with clifford that the ship owner and the agitators are wrong in these cases, but i submit that they were wrong not because they believed when they should have doubted, as clifford maintains, but that they allowed their impatient hankering for a certain outcome of the investigation in question to override an appropriate faith in the process of reasoned inquiry and in the result that that sometimes agonizingly slow process would have produced. they allowed their prejudice to sway their conclusion rather than actual evidence. one might say that each case was a situation of distrust, lack of confidence, and lack of hope in the process of reasoned investigation. of course it is possible to say, as does clifford, that the ship owner and the agitators should have doubted their premature conclusions; but that doesn’t get at the crucial problem. the real problem is that they failed to have faith in the process of inquiry (the disposition to attend to that process and to follow it to the end). note here that methodological faith in these cases does not in advance of a result have sufficient evidence that the reasoned inquiry in question will come up with a satisfying result. there are unavoidable uncertainties and risks involved in trusting in it ahead of time. simply following clifford’s general advice to doubt rather than to believe literally would undermine this faith and bring the investigation to a halt. no doubt there will be objections that clifford did not mean that we should doubt the process of reasoned inquiry! but if we take him literally here, such a doubt would be entailed. my point is that faith in reasoned inquiry and in wherever it uncertainly leads on to, takes precedence over doubt and skepticism and should always take precedence. now what about william james’ response in his equally famous essay, “the will to believe”7? there are some unfortunate circumstances that have led many readers of james’ essay to miss what i think is its main and most important point—which has less to do with an issue in philosophy of religion (specifically, with believing “the religious hypothesis”) than with an issue in epistemology. james is in large measure responsible for these unfortunate circumstances. but i would like for us to reconsider his basic argument independently from its relevance to “the religious hypothesis.” james’ principal claim is that where there is insufficient evidence we should withhold belief (note that here james is in agreement with clifford) except where there is what he calls a genuine option.8 a genuine option he defines as a situation where (1) we are presented with two candidates for belief, (2) there is no possibility of not choosing between them (i.e., when not to choose the one is to choose the other) — i.e., believe or not believe; (3) both options are real possibilities; and (4) one of the options holds a unique opportunity for realizing a significant benefit. he then presents five cases besides the religious hypothesis,9 several of which are relevant to methodological faith in reasoned philosophical inquiry. (a) in order to reach a just verdict in a court of law, one must first believe (have faith, have the methodological faith) that there is a just verdict to be reached. (b) in order to make progress in pursuit of a scientific discovery, one must believe a discovery is there to be reached by following up certain clues. (c) to make progress in discovering the morally best thing to do in a given set of circumstances, one must believe that there is a good to be discovered. (e & f) certain realities (such as personal relationships like friendship and love, and social organisms of any sort like nations and fraternities [and communities of inquiry]) do not come into being, nor do they remain in existence, apart from belief in them. my point in rehearsing these cases cited by james is to call attention to how methodological faith in reasoned inquiry is a prime case, perhaps it is the paradigmatic case, of a genuine option for belief, where belief in the sense of methodological faith can come—indeed, must come—prior to sufficient evidence, for it is the very means that will turn up and bring to light the evidence we seek. now in the process of reasoned inquiry, doubt—even what i would call methodological doubt—may have an important role to play. it’s just that its role is not dominant but is subordinate to faith in reasoned inquiry and serves it. there is no good point to be realized in doubting for doubting’s sake; we need good reasons to doubt (even when they may not be fully clear). as james himself put it, we seek first and foremost not to avoid error by doubt but to seek truth by believing in the process —“faithing,”10 as it were. 33 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 30 summary conclusion to summarize: i have sought in this paper to call your attention to the central and essential role of methodological faith in reasoned inquiry in philosophy for/with children, and how it is somewhat in tension with our fidelity to the dominant paradigm of critical thinking in our culture. i have suggested that a recognition of the centrality and priority of methodological faith in this connection coincides with much of what michael polanyi has written of as a shift from a critical to a post-critical cultural philosophical outlook and what he has to say about the tacit dimension of knowing. and i have shown how it relates in turn to the controversy between w. k. clifford and william james, which many, unfortunately, have misinterpreted as exemplifying a conflict between critical inquiry and faith in any sense, whereas james actually was arguing for recognition of a foundational role of faith to reasoned inquiry and by no means did he mean to set faith over against reasoned inquiry as its opposite. endnotes 1. “acritical” is distinct both from “critical” and “uncritical.” whereas uncritical refers to what could be and perhaps should be subject to critical reflection, “acritical” in important respects cannot be made subject to critical reflection. it is something on which we are inarticulately relying, particularly in our very act of critical reflection; it is prior to it and grounds it, giving it, as it were, a place on which to stand. my use of this distinction is drawn from michael polanyi, personal knowledge: toward a post-critical philosophy (chicago: u of chicago press, 1958), 264 et passim (see the index). 2. for a fuller discussion of what is meant by critical and post-critical sensibilities and the shift between them – and how they relate to pre-modern, modern, and post-modern sensibilities, see my essay, “beyond post-modernism via polanyi’s postcritical philosophy,” the political science reviewer, volume 37, 68-95, especially the chart on p. 72f. 3. see michael polanyi, the tacit dimension (chicago: university of chicago press 2009, reprint of the doubleday 1966 edition). see also polanyi, personal knowledge, especially indexed reference to the “tacit coefficient” or “tacit component” of knowledge;and michael polanyi, knowing and being: essays by michael polanyi, edited by marjorie grene (chicago: university of chicago press, 1969), especially part three: “tacit knowing.” 4. see polanyi, personal knowledge, pp. 264ff: “the fiduciary programme,” and indexed references to “tacit component” and “fiduciary.” 5. polanyi, the tacit dimension, p. 25. 6. for ready access to clifford’s essay, go to this website: <http://www.infidels.org/library/historical/w_k_clifford/ethics_of_ belief.html>. the two imagined cases clifford proposes for consideration, including variations, are given in the first few paragraphs of the essay. 7. for ready access to james’ essay, go to this website: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/26659/26659-h/26659-h.htm, pp. 1-31. 8. james sets out his definition of “genuine option” in ibid., section i, pp. 2-4. he expresses his agreement with clifford with respect to non-genuine options in the next couple of sections. 9. ibid., sections viii and ix, pp 18-25. 10. ibid., section vii, pp. 17-19. references for more information on michael polanyi, see: the polanyi society website: <http://www.missouriwestern.edu/orgs/polanyi/>. polanyi, michael, 1969. knowing and being: essays by michael polanyi, edited by marjorie grene, chicago: u of chicago press. polanyi, michael, 1958. personal knowledge: toward a post-critical philosophy, chicago: u of chicago press. polanyi, michael, 1946. science, faith and society, chicago: u of chicago press, 1964. polanyi, michael, 1966. the tacit dimension, chicago: u of chicago press, 2009. mary jo nye, 2011. michael polanyi and his generation: origins of the social construction of science, new york: oxford u press. gelwick, richard, 1977. the way of discovery: an introduction to the thought of michael polanyi, eugene, or: wipf and stock, 2004. cannon, dale, 2008. “beyond post-modernism via polanyi’s post-critical philosophy,” the political science re34 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 30 viewer, volume 37, 68-95. for the original essays by clifford and james, see: clifford, w.k., 1879. “the ethics of belief” in lectures and essays, vol. ii. london: macmillan. available online at <http://www.infidels.org/library/historical/w_k_clifford/ethics_of_belief.html>. james, william, 1896. “the will to believe,” the will to believe and other essays in popular philosophy, new york: dover publications, 1956. available online at <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/26659/26659-h/26659-h. htm>. for further insight and teaching suggestions on methodological believing in relation to methodological doubting, see: elbow, peter, 1987. embracing contraries: explorations in teaching and learning, new york: oxford university press. address correspondences to: dale cannon professor emeritus of philosophy and religious studies dept. of philosophy and religious studies, western oregon university 345 monmouth ave., monmouth, or 97361 cannodw@wou.edu 35 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 64 the dialogical path to wisdom education maya levanon abstract: in the following pages, i make an argument on behalf of “wisdom education,” i.e., an approach to education that emphasizes the development of better thinking skills as well as socialization and the development of students’ sense-of-self. wisdom education can best be facilitated through dialogical interactions that encourage critical reflection and modification of one’s presuppositions. this account presupposes that wisdom is given to dialectical forces. while the paper is primarily theoretical, it touches upon my work as a teachers’ educator, which almost always utilizes dialogical pedagogies in the belief that these pedagogies are potent platforms for better learning and thinking and thus are more meaningful and transformative. the idea that dialogical interaction can be a most potent facilitating apparatus for authentic learning and transformative education can be traced back to plato’s dialogues, which illustrate how dialogue, understood as a pragmatic manifestation of the dialectical method (gonzales, 1988), actually works. we see how socrates creates spaces where the interlocutor has to pause, reflect, doubt, and then, ideally, reconstruct his or her ideas. by so doing, socrates doesn’t brutally defeat his interlocutors for the petty purpose of “winning” an argument. instead, he gradually disrupt their assumptions by using logical cross-examination until they find their beginner mind—a position from which they are able to receive new ideas—or rather re-find their innate, a priori knowledge that precedes but also enables our interactions with other minds, what i am referring to as “wisdom.” a close reading of plato reveals that dialogue is a way to epitomize dialectic as a method in which the interlocutor represents the thesis, that is, existing beliefs and assumptions, and upon hearing these from another person’s perspective, recognizes potential antitheses. after all, “[it] is easier […] if you do not have to invent the arguments against your prejudices yourself, but have them presented to you by a person who believes in them” (russell, 1968, p. 23). finally, a synthesis is formed. if we recall that dialogue means dia-logos or “through words,” we can see that practicing genuine dialogue means putting our thoughts into words so we can articulate our own innate wisdom, then assisting our counterparts in doing the same, and finally working together to assign meanings and actual applications to these findings. this is where the idea of wisdom comes full circle: it is innate but can only count as wisdom once it is being applied and used in the actual world, where human interactions and the overall process of construing meanings take place. translating our thoughts to others i have always loved words; i have trusted them to deliver my thoughts, ideas and feelings to others. as i have grown older, however, i have learned that words should be taken with a grain of salt: their fuzziness, mirroring the fuzziness of life, can cause great problems. words, after all, once vocalized, are no longer private but rather move into the public sphere, where actual events and human interactions co-exist, and it is in this very sphere that words can often be misunderstood. indeed, as some of the world’s great wisdom-systems have suggested, words are capable of both creating and destroying, healing or bringing evil (dein, 2002; gaster, 1971). in genesis, for example, we read that the world was created by the means of speech: “and god said,1 let there be light.… and god called the light day…” (1:3-10). for the greeks too, logos, i.e., “words,” was the animating force of the universe (beck, 2004). and later, in the gospel of john (1:1), we read that “[i]n the beginning was the word, and analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 65 the word was with god, and the word was god.”2 within these traditions, divine forces are capable of creating and manipulating the world with words, and humans can do so as well. in jewish mythology, for example, we find the famous story of the golem from prague, a clay-made creature who came to life when the maharal3 put a word on his forehead. then, by taking one letter away (and subsequently creating a different hebrew word), he took the golem’s life. words are the very building blocks of understanding. from our early stages of development we learn to articulate our experiences with gradually increasing levels of complexity until we are able to construct a highly developed cultural matrix in which we integrate different ideas and experiences into a shared narrative. the process of integration inevitably happens through ongoing dialogue. being part of this collective process, we need to learn how to make our thoughts sufficiently available to others, and for that to happen, we must understand the nature of our own thoughts and accept ownership of them. in that sense, through the collective process of exchanging ideas, we not only participate in the dynamics of creating meanings, but also improve our own thinking. articulating our thoughts forces us to slow down and reflect, and to trace our patterns of thought and thereby see them more clearly. the dialogical act is essential, then, for our development as individuals and of the community. which is formed when individuals truly come together. from individuality to interdependence as a collaborative engagement, dialogue is based on a few suppositions. first, the meanings we give to our ideas are communal and accumulative, in the sense that meanings expand and shift as more individuals contribute. second, these individuals contribute to the much richer process of construing meanings by sharing their diverse ideas, experiences, and thinking styles (dewey, 1938, 1997). for these reasons, differences in a dialogue are valued when they are understood as a means to advance the inquiry. despite the differences among individual perspectives, some values appear and reappear enough to be ubiquitous. realizing this enables participants to see beyond moments of difference, which in turn creates the safe-space that is necessary for a collective inquiry to thrive. je est un autre written by the nineteen-century visionary french poet arthur rimbaud, these words remind us that “otherness” is relative and transient: just as “you” (or “s/he”) is an-other to me, i am an-other to everyone else but me. failure to apprehend otherness within, in the form of contested meanings within the self, often results in the establishment of a partial sense of self. we are so accustomed to the paradigm of dualistic thinking, according to which something, e.g., darkness, can be known only in relation to its opposite, e.g., light. this paradigm has taken over the very way we think of ourselves: we constantly compare ourselves and subsequently feel good or bad about who we are in relation to how good or bad others are. but since we cannot really control others, we develop an existential anxiety, thanks to which we irrationally and on an unconscious level fear for our own existence in the midst of so many competing perspectives. using this comparative, dualistic paradigm, hoping it will help us establish a valid sense-of-self, in fact takes us further away from who we are. as mentioned earlier, we begin to overcome this existential anxiety only when we feel confident enough to embrace differences and contradictions, especially within ourselves. having a more complex, “imperfect” sense-of-self is a reflection of the dialectical nature that is at the heart of our very existence: yes, we aspire to create and live with a balance, but we know every balance is temporary, till the next thought/feeling/perception/event occurs and creates a new, but also temporary, state of disequilibria. in other words, fully accepting ourselves depends on whether or not we learn to operate dialectically instead of dualistically. what we see, then, is that for a genuine dialogue to take place, participants need to first bring themselves fully to the public place of inquiry, and then to identify otherness and allow it to exist—by refraining from trying to change others, and also by practicing turning our own self into an-other. the beauty is that without realizing analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 66 it, these acts open up for us the possibility of accepting ourselves. by learning to feel safe with others and with otherness in general, we slowly learn to feel safe with our inner dichotomies and paradoxes. indeed, as ever-changing beings, once we become familiar with the dialectical model, we derive comfort from it rather than anxiety, because it reflects a productive way of being-in-the-world. investigating the world with a method of inquiry that reflects what we are, i.e., dialectical creatures, can provide us with ontological security –the sense that we are part of and able to embrace the world as it is, which is a necessary condition to entering relationships fearlessly, authentically and compassionately. this happens when we understand that though we do affect each other, it is not through structures of opposition that put us in relationships of comparison and contrast, but rather through a process that binds us to, and calls upon us to take responsibility for, one another (levinas, 2000). in order to meet the challenges of wisdom education, even in an inconsistent, ever-changing world, we need to overcome the dualism mentioned earlier, which also finds expression within the self through its persona, that is, the “face” we choose to present to the public, as opposed to one’s authentic self. in order to create a healthy dialogical environment, founded on genuine responsibility, sensitivity, and care, we need to cultivate an integrated self. in order to maximize the chances of this happening, we need to bring dialogical practices into the classroom, at as early an age as possible. in the classroom, the facilitator should also model authenticity and integrity while working within a supportive, safe environment. facilitation in his dialogues, plato illustrated how, although wisdom is within us, we need someone to facilitate our “recollection” of it. because the dialogical journey can be challenging, it requires a chameleon-like facilitator, who can alternate roles and responsibilities and mirror the different phases of inquiry. ideally, though, the facilitator eventually becomes invisible, and the learning community can facilitate itself. this signifies an authentic internalization of the dialogical process and the capacity of learners to apply it in different contexts. by being exposed to different narratives and discourses, learners are given an opportunity to broaden their spectrum of possible orientations. this is the beginning of learners’ personal transformation. further transformation can occur after the dialogue, where participants can congregate to discuss and share both lived experiences and their interactions with the curriculum. in this multi-layered, ongoing activity, meanings are allocated and the act of learning becomes meaningful. dialogue and wisdom education like many other dialogical practitioners, i also owe a great deal to the platonic noesis, according to which dialogue enables us to access our inner self, where wisdom resides. in the current educational system, however, this model of what we today refer to as “socratic dialogue” is not always feasible. for dialogue to assist us in the delicate process of recollection, we need to remind ourselves and our students that in wisdom-education, it is not about winning a position but about coming together to help each other access our innate wisdom and then creating meanings together. the result is what bohm (1998) describes as a “win-win” situation. we want students to leave behind the model of competition and choosing sides that is currently so dominant, and instead to adopt dialogue as a way of thinking and learning that is both ancient and new, both internally and externally directed. understanding life in terms of ongoing change and cooperation, those committed to dialogue construe meanings collectively, while letting go of the comparative paradigm. participants in the dialogue can do that because they come to realize that they can question and unpack almost any concept or set of beliefs; this, after analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 67 all, is what the philosophical tradition stands for. at the same time, after practicing dialogical learning for some time, participants come to see that even when it seems that discussions are caught in a tangle of repetition and inconclusiveness, if they listen for the gentle sound of dialogue, they can detect progress even in an inquiry that seems deadlocked,4 and also develop personally by listening to new views and new ways of thinking to supplement and complicate their own. when learners truly listen, they go through both cognitive and social development (dewey, 1997). according to vygotsky (2002), we develop both social and cognitive skills through social practices. what first may appear as a cognitive crisis—when we recognize the limitations on our own perspective and the presence of other selves and different views—is in fact where the individual builds new, stronger thinking skills. internalizing new cognitive “voices” requires a context that allows, even celebrates, new ways of thinking, communicating, and learning. dialogical settings do just that, because dialogue is intrinsically social. as in other social activities, participants tend first to play roles based on a particular understanding of their own beliefs and inclinations. nevertheless, in an authentic dialogue, participants are encouraged to switch roles and expand their epistemological repertoires so they can employ new styles of thinking and knowing. in his discussion of learning-communities, grinberg (2005) speaks about respect and trust, which are the premises but also the results of learning through informal camaraderie. palmer (2003) suggests that mutual respect and trust among teachers, students, parents and principals is necessary for an approach to education that encourages exchange of ideas and expression of feelings. for this to occur, we must learn the practice of “listening for” (lipman, 2003). like a meditative practice, “listening for” is about attending quietly while suspending judgments and presuppositions. it requires participants to slow down and carefully analyze their own ideas and beliefs as they apprehend and probe the ideas and beliefs of others. we see how dialogue facilitates individual and communal development, and as such it is distanced from a regular conversation among friends, where the flow of ideas is often spontaneous and therefore tends to be loose. although in such conversations changes within or among participants may occur, and perhaps even some progress in the inquiry, these occurrences are often random. dialogical engagement, on the other hand, focuses on inquiry as its objective. the inquiry some thinkers suggest that dialogue, when it is facilitated spontaneously using techniques such as free association, cannot assume a pre-determined objective (bohm, 1998; burbules, 1993; kennedy, 1999). according to this approach, true dialogue aims at understanding participants’ ongoing inner processes and nuances and, therefore, cannot have a predefined purpose other than seeking a mutual understanding through exploration of the participants’ thoughts and feelings while in the dialogue. in my view, however, based on professional-educational experience, a well-structured dialogue needs to have a direction and goal. otherwise, it risks becoming a chat, where there is a danger that no process of inquiring together will take place, or worse, that more dominant participants will exert undue influence on the discussion. furthermore, as a form of inquiry and a tool for construing meanings, a genuine dialogue will aim at having a better understanding of the question/concept at hand, as conceived in terms of participants’ interests. in practice, it is usually helpful to begin a dialogical gathering by asking participants questions such as “why are you here?” or “what do you hope to learn, achieve, or improve through this process?” because the answers to these questions usually change throughout the dialogical process, participants take notice when they digress to a sideconversation that may or may not be found relevant to the inquiry-at-hand. although the philosophical method of inquiry is indeed systematic, it is nonetheless flexible. dialogical inquiry, as noted earlier, is the manifestation of dialectics, and as such is at the core of the philosophical method. when invested in a dialogical inquiry, we can take different directions and approaches, sometimes digressing in analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 68 order to reach a better understanding of a particular concept. yet, we keep in mind our preliminary question or goal, and keep our awareness of the shifts as these occur. although digressions often occur during the dialogical process, participants and their facilitator are obliged to look for a direction, for relations among statements and arguments to take shape. in that sense, inquiry is like a person: when one goes through changes, one often feels as if one’s sense-of-self has been lost. with the realization that the self can be fluid and transient, however, one can re-gain confidence. likewise, a dialogical inquiry can appear to fall victim to a digression from the inquiryat-hand, but through an effective facilitation and reflective participation, it is brought back into focus. conclusion there is indeed more than one path to wisdom, and one of these is dialogue, the path of brotherhood (zohar & marshall, 2000). it is especially useful if we want to transform the educational experience of our students into one based on the values of wisdom, authenticity and interconnectedness, rather than competition and the achievement of statistical benchmarks representing “achievement.” dialogue is an ancient way to approach the deepest questions of life, in which, through hearing others, the wise mind learns to understand its own limitations and flexibility. in this paper, i have attempted to illustrate how dialogue has the potential to advance philosophical thinking, social and ethical virtues, and authenticity, which together constitute wisdom. i examined the ongoing nature of reflective questioning in a group as a practice with the potential to advance a deeper understanding of the world. by appreciating the learning process as an ongoing journey in which questions are as important as answers, educators and parents can interpret children’s critical-reflective questions as indications of the kind of cognitive development that enables independent thinking. at a time of increased calls to “spiritualize” our educational system –that is to make it a more effective vehicle for promoting values beyond mere knowledge—it is helpful to recall that what characterize the dialogical approach are virtues such as empathy, tolerance, gratitude, and humility. with that in mind, we might want to practice more of this pedagogy with our students at all levels of life and education, and hopefully create future generations who are better thinkers and also better persons: compassionate, tolerant and humble. these qualities suggest some of the many facets of wisdom. endnotes 1 italics are mine. 2 all biblical quotes are taken from the king james bible. 3 judah loew ben bezalel (1525-1609) was an important talmudic scholar who served as a leading rabbi in prague. 4 in the hebrew script of laws (gemara), when the sages try to resolve an issue, they often end a discussion declaring “teko” (deadlocked). this doesn’t imply they gave trying to resolve the issue. instead, they leave it open for future generations of sages to add layers of interpretations. references beck, j. (2004). bearing insight: anxious wisdom. in a. a. anderson, s. v. hicks, & l. witkowski (eds.), mythos and logos: how to regain the love of wisdom (pp. 75-96). amsterdam-new york: rodopi. bohm, d. (1998). on dialogue. london: routledge. burbules, n. c. (1993). dialogue in teaching. new york: teachers college press. dein, s. (2002). the power of words: healing narratives among lubavitcher hasidim, medical anthropology quarterly, 16 (1), 41-63. dewey, j. (1938). logic: the theory of inquiry. new york: holt. dewey, j. (1997). how we think. new york: dover. gaster, m. (1971). studies and text in folklore magic medieval romance hebrew apocrypha and samar. jersey city, analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 69 nj: ktav. gonzales, f. j. (1998). dialectic and dialogue: plato’s practice of philosophical dialogue. evanston, il: northwestern university press. grinberg, j. g. a. (2005). “teaching like that”: the beginning of teacher education at bank street. new york: peter lang. kennedy, d. (1999). philosophy for children and the reconstruction of philosophy. metaphilosophy, 30(4), 338359. levinas, e. (1982). etika ve’ha’einsofi [ethics and the infinite]. jerusalem: hebrew university magnes press. levinas, e. (2000). totality and infinity: an essay on exteriority. (a. lingis, trans.). pittsburgh, pa: duquesne university press. (original work published 1969). lipman, m. (2003). thinking in education (2nd ed.). new york: cambridge university. nussbaum, m. c. (1990). love’s knowledge: essays on philosophy and literature. new york: oxford university press. palmer, p. j. (2003). teaching with heart and soul: reflections on spirituality in teacher education. journal of teacher education, 54(5), 376-385. russell, b. (1968). the art of philosophizing and other essays. new york: philosophical library. vygotsky, l. (2002). thought and language (a. kozulin ed.). cambridge, ma: the mit press. zohar, d., & marshall, i. (2000). sq: connecting with our spiritual intelligence. new york: bloomsbury. address correspondences to: maya levanon interdisciplinary studies in curriculum and instruction dept. of integrated studies in teaching, technology & inquiry national-louis university, milwaukee campus maya.levanon@nl.edu analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 22 thoughts on geographic imaginaries for the 21st century diana sorensen my thoughts are informed by my five years as dean for arts and humanities at harvard university, where i have been able to observe the intellectual configurations that have emerged and taken shape in response to the ways in which the world is being reimagined and represented in the first decade of this century. by tracing how the categories of space, materiality and movement are being thought about, i want to understand the institutional and intellectual transformations that are taking place in the humanities and the interpretive social sciences. one of my goals is to reduce the distance that tends to separate the institutional, administrative world from the strictly intellectual one, and to further their coexistence under the larger academic umbrella which shelters both. the present time’s geographic imaginaries are taking on different shapes, both large and small. the conceptual models we employ to map our global topographies expand, contract, and are organized along shifting, often incommensurate, logics. as deleuze and guattari observed, we are “at the crossroads of all kinds of formations,”2 in which the ordering patterns produce shifting, fractal terrains. the paradigm of studying specific regional areas established during the cold war no longer provides the central organizational structure that reflects our institutional cultural mappings, which can be, in saskia sassen’s words, “contradictory spaces.” a crisis of understanding has resulted from the inability of old categories of space to account for our diverse cartographies, as if our geographies had become jumbled up. in literary and cultural studies, the world is mapped along differing principles of organization: a very capacious world literature initiative is becoming the prominent paradigm in a number of comparative literature departments (including harvard’s); it goes hand in hand with the rising interest in translation studies and bilingual studies. this kind of model has produced significant tensions around the role of vernacular languages, the potentially flattening gaze of translation, and the totalizing force of anglo-globalism. other—quite different—ways of thinking about contemporary space tend to privilege regional cominglings that may be expansive or contractive in their gravitational force. there are initiatives to further areas of study such as mediterranean studies and the global south—itself seen more as a condition than a place, and, in several ways, an heir to the now outmoded “third world” as a designation for non-hegemonic areas. orientations such as “global south” are parceling up the larger field of postcolonial studies, representing a reordering of the geographic in order to focus on the parts of the world marked by the highest degree of political, social and economic upheaval. in a different alignment of forces, north and south are brought together in the hemispheric studies of the americas, which is modifying the configuration of some history and literature departments. the globe is reshaped in yet other regimes of representation in transatlantic studies, whose gravitational pull is west–east, and which are thriving in departments of history, history of science, english, comparative literature, and in spanish or lusophone studies, often ruled by the logic of colonial affiliations. a case in point is hispanic transatlantic studies, generously supported by the spanish government as it seeks to renew old ties severed by independence movements in the nineteenth century, and by the shift of power alignments that took place in the twentieth century. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 23 forces of contraction are also at work. regional studies such as catalan, galician, czech, mapuche–huilliche or aymara studies are taking root across the academic landscape. this is not new in itself, but it is significant as a response to the perceived risk of overgeneralization, homogenization, and the flattening of specificities. the power of local languages is emphasized in these groupings, and they are seen as the backbone of the scholar’s understanding of the cultural world in question. the nation–state is eschewed in favor of the region, the city, or the village—reminding us, with k. anthony appiah, that “humans live best on a smaller scale.” in a loosely connected way, i’ve been struck by the rising interest among young linguists in dying languages, which implies studying groups of five or six speakers and their disappearing cultural universe in remote, tightly circumscribed areas. what is local and vernacular is in constant transformation as our epistemologies respond to the unstable territorial politics of our time. borders are confounded by diasporic peoples who actually inhabit or make present their vernacular cultures in the midst of a foreign state, so that, for example, within california we may have parts of mexico or india. migration is transforming the relationships between the state and its citizens in sending as well as in receiving countries. the modern relationship between the state and its citizens was based upon the assumption that state, territory and population would coincide: as rights are extended to nationals abroad, citizenship ceases to be divorced from territory. cultural flows in these contexts are both homogenizing and heterogenizing: some groups may share in a global culture regardless of where they might be; they may be alienated from their own hinterlands, or else they may choose to turn back to what may have once been seen as residual, very local cultures which deliberately separate themselves from global culture. as homi bhabha has pointed out, we need to turn to paradox in order to name the ever rearticulating formulations of our geographic imaginaries: we have coined such oxymoronic phrases as global village, globloc, vernacular cosmopolitanisms, or transcultural localisms. the different movements of expansion and contraction operate with logics of their own, so that the overall effect is similar to the movement of tectonic plates. while this is known to be characteristic of the era of globalization, there may be several interlocking and even contradictory logics at work in these liminal moments, made all the more unstable by the current global financial crisis. i plan to chart the often contradictory and even agonistic constellations of discourses and institutional practices which have been addressing the expansion and contraction of our geographic imaginaries. in these potentially paradoxical configurations, i would claim that rather than the oft-cited process of deterritorialization what we are witnessing is intense territorialization (hyperterritorialization), obtaining in spatial figurations and models which are often incommensurate. the divergent processes i have sketched unify or fragment the object of study and its explanatory force. it would be interesting to trace the logics of understanding produced by some of the current geographic models, studying the kinds of knowledge they are likely to enable. for example, transatlantic studies are predicated on the logic of the colonial and its effects —whether english or spanish, north or south. their maritime inflection privileges crossings and exchanges, movement and distances to be traversed, multi-local networks and migration. their vast geopolitical reach embraces imperial histories, the slave trade, scientific and biomedical exchanges, biogeography and cultural geography, all in multiple directions of movement in space and historical periodicity. we read about the red atlantic of revolutions, the black atlantic of the slave trade, the green atlantic of irish migrants; cis-atlantic and circum-atlantic studies are introduced into the broader transatlantic realm; we see efforts to reinterpret empires like the portuguese one according to the extent to which the atlantic might or might not do justice to its holdings beyond africa and brazil. in a different, north-south axis, hemispheric studies take stock of indigenous commonalities and differences, cross-border exchanges, and the comparative structures that united and separated the americas with the arrival of the europeans. the “hemispheric turn” in american studies might be a step towards furthering inter-american relations, and so far it has operated by tackling such projects as comparing different appropriations of european culture, or by tracing the presence of spanish-speaking groups in the nineteenth century along borders that separate the us and mexico today. the hemispheric turn is receptive to notions of creolization and mestizaje, which is especially productive in the study analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 24 of the heteroglossic caribbean. in hemispheric studies, considerable tensions exist around the direction of the gaze in a historically fraught north-south relationship. the power alignment it favors is in a relationship of potential rivalry with transatlantic studies, where spain is given greater salience than the u.s. the oscillation between expansion and contraction that i have been discussing is subject to varying senses of distance and movement as constitutive of cultural production and understanding. the awareness of distance presents the need for cultural and linguistic specificity: what is understood as being far is different --linguistically and culturally. whether it is china as understood in the west, or the andean nations in latin america, we oscillate between distant readings, as in franco moretti’s graphs, maps, trees,3 and the close reading paradigm in which difference and specificity are the guiding principles. in its fullest expression, the focus on difference can provide specificity and contextual richness; it can also produce a certain exhaustion of difference whereby, as arif dirlik has pointed out, our recognition of previously ignored aspects of cultural difference, while countervailing the pitfalls of essentialization, may have the undesirable effect of producing a conglomeration of differences which resist naming and the postulation of collective identity. in arif dirlik’s terms, “the dispersal of culture into many localized encounters renders it elusive both as a phenomenon and as a principle of mapping and historical explanation.”4 even when the transnational impulse is arrested, and one nation is studied as a discreet unit, the spatial logic of explanation and the function assigned to distance will produce different accounts of the object of study—that is to say, different geographic imaginaries. to help flesh out these concepts, a couple of illustrations may be helpful. one is offered by arif dirlik in a study of chinese culture that rethinks the intersection between space and historical explanation. for dirlik, distance is not so much a measure between two or more bounded cultural worlds, but a “potentiality, a space of indeterminacy inherent to all processes of mediation, and therefore inherent to the social process per se.” when distance is brought into play, new ways of conceiving social and cultural space follow. in the chinese example, it would call into question the traditional account of the formation of chinese civilization as radiating from a han monarchic center towards peripheries in which “barbarism” ruled under the aegis of fifty-six recognized ethnic nationalities. dirlik sees in the current condition of migration and displacement (“living in a state of flux”) an opportunity for relinquishing static, traditional notions of cultural formation, replacing them with paradigms that stress motion and process, distance and mobility over “stable containers.” (14) such alternative spatialities would instantiate a more productive understanding of the role of boundaries in the formation of chinese culture, which would cease to be unified, and become, instead, the product of “multiple contact zones of a people in constant motion.” in this reversal, the chinese would be global in reach “because they have been formed from the outside… the inside and the outside become inextricably entangled in one another...” (11) what i find interesting is the emplacement of explanation and its bearing on the geographic imaginary it produces: what emanates from a centrally located origin (the han) is refigured and radically transformed in its explanatory logic when the border becomes the intellectual perch, the place from which the scholar looks. in fact, the border is not only the focus of current border studies; it is also the nodal point which represents the convergence of geography and mobility. it is emblematic of new identity formations, and, at the same time, of the current politics of national security, surveillance and containment. the border is not exclusively situated in the national periphery: boundaries are dispersed in cosmopolitan cities, marking exchanges of technology, objects and persons. their plurality contains the dilemma of contemporary citizenship and belonging. the subject position that stems from the boundary is the immigrant, who tends to represent the reality of internal exclusion. shifting from the center to the border produces an alternative geographic epistemology; so does an explanatory logic displaced from a territorial center to the sea. consider the role of the “heartland” in an agrarian american tradition invented in the nineteenth century, when the notion of manifest destiny evoked a drive west and the move of the european settlers towards the interior, with its rolling, grain-producing plains and its imposing mountains. there is an emerging countervailing model which does not emanate from the heartland: it displaces its stable centrality and opts, instead, for maritime studies as fluid spaces of movement and multiple analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 25 engagements that eschew closure and operate with different causal systems. as gary okhiro explains it, “the sea, before europeans, had no exclusionary laws, fences, or border patrols or imaginary cartographic lines, but rather ‘points of entry that were constantly negotiated and even contested. the sea was open to anyone who could navigate a way through.” within the fluid parameters of the maritime imaginary we would have to make distinctions between the atlantic and the pacific, the north and the south. if the border or contact zone—be it china or the us-mexico border—de-essentializes the logic of explanation by taking stock of transborder forces and assailing notions of cultural homogeneity, the fluid notion of the seas eschews confinement and tracks multiple directions of contacts and crossings. my point is that there are important distinctions emanating from each epistemological location—whether it settles on the sea or the interior, the north or the south, the east or the west, the center or the border. different explanations stem from the geographic imaginaries produced in the very locational impulse, in the direction of the gaze. in the contemporary intellectual scene there are multiple and shifting geographic logics at work; the institutional mappings they are producing override national borders and replace them with potentially contradictory, frequently interstitial, always dynamic configurations. there is no outside to the global system, but it can be mapped from different locations, and it is being drawn and redrawn in structures of various kinds both within the academy and in the geopolitical order.5 it is no longer enough to echo marx’s communist manifesto and quote the deterritorializing effects of capitalism, as has been done since postmodern theory reread this passage. as i observed above, whether global or local, our intellectual projects are hyperterritorial in a manner that shapes our understandings of history and culture, and that are in constant transformation. connected with the shifting regional, global, interstitial and liminal mappings, there is great interest now in theorizing materiality in literature, history, anthropology, and art-history departments. thingness appears in a variety of contexts, as if anchoring so much geopolitical fluidity and counterbalancing the digital world. objects in fiction, in anthropology, or in the visual arts might help make contact with the real, seeming to provide compensatory materiality in the face of discourse and the digital world. they are studied in their ability to organize our relationships with matter, desire, and the phenomenal world. things occupy space; they inscribe memory as well as temporality: as heidegger notes, “the question ‘what is a thing?’ includes in itself the question: ‘what is zeitraum (time-span)?’, the puzzling unity of space and time within which, as it seems, the basic character of things, to be only this one, is determined.”6 and, indeed, heidegger insists on the determinative power of quality, extension, relation, place and time in our study of the thing. we need to think about the intersection between mobility and materiality in the geographic context described above. my claim is that the deeper the anchor materiality seems to provide, the denser are the pathways of movement and transmission it inscribes. take timothy brook’s latest book, the charming vermeer’s hat. the seventeenth century and the dawn of the global world,7 in which the hat in question inscribes the history of its manufacture, and it traces a series of routes which take us to champlain’s adventures in north america and the search for beaver pelts. from there we move to cultural and economic history, as brook narrates the effect on fashion and status of the arrival of pelts from canada into european markets in the late sixteenth century. his narrative logic derives from the conjuring of distance, mobility and materiality to suggest a new understanding of the invisible ties that link places as distant as delft and what would later become canada. brooks draws on the discourse of globalization to show what others before him had anticipated: that globalization has always already been with us, but that it now provides a structure of understanding and a kind of interpretive teleology which thrives on movement across vast spaces, following things and their transformations (say from beaver pelt to hat to the suitor in vermeer’s painting). the hat as thing condenses disparate orders of knowledge: the history of early north american settlers, the qualities of beaver pelts and the effects of glue on the mental health of hat makers, the travel narratives of marco polo and the search for china in the early explorations of america, the development of the arquebus, the inventory of vermeer’s possessions drawn up by his bankrupt wife after his death. as heidegger explained it, “the determinations name the respects in which things exhibit themselves to us in the assertion and talk about them, the perspectives from which we view things, in which they show analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 26 themselves.”8 in the study of things we deploy multiple regimes of signification, endowing materiality with the power to contain the same epistemological diversity i discussed above in relation to geographic imaginaries. in art history, the study of objects is standard practice, but inserting a consideration of their mobility within a geographic context implies a significant departure from the autonomy and anchored materiality of the object at rest. motion and distance are constitutive: they intervene proleptically in the production of a work of art, whose materiality can be partly determined by the anticipation of movement and transportation. i think we should be exploring how interpretation is transformed by the geographic imaginary in which it is located. how would insertion into a transatlantic corpus transform our understanding of a given author or group of works? what interpretive insights would be derived from such a conceptual model, and how would they be transformed by a hemispheric one, or a world-literary one? what questions of translatability (broadly construed) would have to be considered? would such critical geographies allow for interdisciplinary transformations that transcended our conventional departmental arrangements? what would be the intellectual and institutional effects of grouping together areas of study along new geographic principles of organization? for example, gathering the study of the ancient world around the mediterranean would lead to assembling the classics, egyptology, and the middle (or near) east, and this would have profound effects in terms of cultural affiliations and understanding, on notions of influence and origin. some institutions are considering grouping german and slavic: is that more productive than a possible french-slavic alignment? what relationships of belonging and family resemblances are presupposed and generated by each assemblage? has the time come to rearrange the area studies paradigm inherited from the cold war era? could we turn to material objects to ground our spatial displacements, while, at the same time, allowing for the tracing of their pathways and the avatars of their historical transmission? colonial art, for example, needs to be understood in the light of distant destinations anticipated in the very crafting of an object: a gift for philip ii of spain would bear the traces of its future transit even before it was sent across the atlantic to spain. such traces would include size and scale, and the tensions inherent in the question of cultural translatability from precolumbian to colonial frames of understanding. such studies would encapsulate the role played by geography, distance, materiality and mutability in cultural construction and reception. in dialogue with new models for thinking about time, we may be ushering in profound and productive transformations in the ways in which we imagine time and space in this liminal moment which we inhabit. endnotes 1. this lecture was presented at the first latin american and latino studies teaching workshop held at viterbo university, la crosse, wisconsin, on april 26 – 27, 2010. 2. g. deleuze and f. guattari, on the line, trans. john johnston (new york: semiotext(e), 1983). 3. franco moretti, graphs, maps, trees. abstract models for a literary history (london: verso, 2005). 4. arif derlik, “timespace, social space, and the question of chinese culture.” boundary2 35:1 (2008), 5 5. an interesting geopolitical illustration would be the different configurations of groups which gather to discuss the world financial crisis that began in 2008. aside from the group of 8, we have a new group of 20 which reflects divergent notions of emerging power, as well as an array of local trade organizations such as asean and mercosur. a revealing new group of very recent formation is bric, constituted by brazil, russia, india and china. its agenda included an attempt to go beyond the dollar as the international currency. 6. martin heidegger, what is a thing? (chicago: henry regnery co, 1967), 17. 7. timothy brook, vermeer’s hat. the seventeenth century and the dawn of the global world (new york, berlin, london: bloomsbury press, 2008). 8. heidegger, 63. address correspondences to: diana sorensen harvard university e-mail: sorensen@fas.harvard.edu analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 11 using blogs in latin american studies seminars bert kreitlow abstract: although there is extensive research on applying blogs to higher education, there is little available to assess its application to teaching the latin american studies seminar in particular. this article makes a preliminary assessment of the value of a blog in helping to meet two challenges posed by the latin american studies seminar. these challenges are exposing students to different cultures and accommodating the broad range of student interests and subject matter. evidence for this assessment is centered on a classroom (i.e. not online) course led by the author in which a blog was used as a shared site for students to upload assignments and to discuss guest speakers and other assigned experiences. this evidence includes focus groups, interviews, and personal experience, as well as secondary literature. this article concludes that the blog in this case is well suited to answer the particular challenges of a latin american studies seminar because it enhances the interactivity and active learning implied by the term “seminar”. introduction some educators can recall from decades ago the chaos they beheld each time they opened the door to their department’s av supply room. dusty machines for projecting and magnifying dominated the disorder, amid cords, slides, film rolls, and rolled-up maps leaning like jousters’ swords into the corner. today we are more likely to go for our teaching tools to our computer hard drive or through an internet connection rather than to a closet down the hall. although computer-based educational technology seems more tidy and compact, our source for tools over the last 20 years can still seem chaotic given the vast and rapidly changing choices available. thus, in these times part of being a successful teacher involves evaluating these computer-based tools to decide which improve the quality of learning of our classes and which tools are merely new. this article assesses one such tool for rapidly updating a course web page—the blog—in terms of how it may improve the teaching of the latin american studies seminar. most everyone is by now familiar with the idea of blogs, given that the term itself was designated six years ago by the dictionary publishers merriam-webster as the word of the year. there are now beyond 40 million users of these easy and accessible web-publishing platforms worldwide, and a new blog is launched every second. (barnes, 2005) among these millions of users are students and professors. blogs have been adapted in higher education because of their easy access, rapid editing, and their ability to append comments to the published content. a growing pedagogical literature has more rigorously confirmed the utility of the blog, both in higher education in general and in the case of specific subject matters. however, within this growing pedagogical literature on blogs there is a relative dearth of information on applying blogs to the job of teaching latin american studies, and in particular to the introductory seminar course. the introductory seminar within the field of latin american studies poses two daunting challenges to educators. first, these classes teach about other cultures that are heretofore unfamiliar to students who are typically freshmen or sophomores. second, the seminar is a first passage into an interdisciplinary field that connects students with a wide range of backgrounds and interests. in fact, one objective of this course is to develop an interest in each student and lead them to specialize in later coursework in one of the many possible scholarly and analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 12 artistic approaches to understanding latin america. thus, this second challenge for the introductory seminar is presenting material from many disciplines and in many formats and encouraging a diverse class of students to engage and interact. this paper explores the value of using a blog in a latin american studies seminar course for the purpose of gathering, sharing, and discussing both subject matter assigned to students and student written work. the course addressed here is an introductory class and is conducted in a traditional classroom setting as opposed to online. to explore the value of blogs in latin american studies seminars i rely on secondary research as background, but focus primarily on my experience in leading a course. i also weigh the feedback from surveys and focus groups from other faculty and students involved in this course in assessing the apparent benefits and drawbacks of this technology. to focus the assessment, i compare the outcomes using the blog versus using institutional course software (d2l, blackboard) for the same purpose. therefore, the central question in this paper is whether a blog is a more successful means than is institutional course software of addressing the challenges of the latin american studies seminar. i conclude that a blog is an effective way to further the interdisciplinary ideal of latin american studies courses and is particularly effective in introducing undergraduates to the features of cultures that are different from their own. assigning students to make their written work a post to a blog, or assigning them to comment on other students’ posts, also lends itself to achieving other typical course objectives such as interactivity among students and the study of the visual and performing arts produced by the cultures of latin america. my intent is to induce further experimentation in the classroom with this promising teaching tool and to suggest that more rigorous empirical study of this tool is worthwhile. literature review on teaching latin america and blogs in education recommended designs for teaching the latin american studies seminar will typically call for an interdisciplinary and collaborative approach to the course design and content. one reason for this is the help that an interdisciplinary approach offers to students confronting a number of new and distant cultures for the first time. according to one researcher, “an interdisciplinary approach helps to overcome the challenge of conveying the diversity of the region without simplification or overwhelming students with information.” (novoa, 2007) lozano-alonzo et al. (2006) also argue that the greater value in an interdisciplinary latin american course is not merely in increasing the quantity of subject matter that is mastered, but rather resides in higher levels of knowledge acquisition through “an intellectual dialogue” between the frameworks of disciplines. in other words, the diverse nature of knowledge bound by latin america is a means to an epistemological end, which is a more sophisticated sort of wisdom. finally, the department of education deems an interdisciplinary approach as a “critical” element in the area studies programs, which include latin america, that the federal government has promoted since 1965. (schneider, 2000). in short, most educators contend or assume that latin american studies seminars should be interdisciplinary in their approach and content, and some pedagogical research buttresses that belief. the argument developed below is that blogs are an effective on-line platform for courses that strive for this interdisciplinary approach. the introduction to latin american studies course is typically labeled as a seminar and— true to the meaning of the term—aims at interactivity among its students as one of its objectives. the specific objective is for collaboration on assigned projects and dialogue in reacting to class content to take place between students, ideally with little to no mediation by the professor. as a means of furthering this objective, the blog is a promising new tool according to some research. andergassen et al. (2009) finds a growing consensus that “social software” such as blogs are effective in achieving what is termed student-centered learning, an example of which is dialogue among students about an assignment through the written comments that are left by each student and posted below the original article or post. in this body of research, blogs are seen as effective platforms or spaces for interactivity among students, and this interactivity is a means to desirable categories of knowledge (e.g. discursive). according to analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 13 williams and jacobs (2004), there are also other benefits. “blogs are more successful in promoting interactivity that is conversational; a mode of interaction more conducive to improved student and teacher relationships, active learning, higher order thinking, and greater flexibility in teaching and learning more generally.” i would also contend that the interactivity that occurs among the students in a latin american studies seminar is another aid to addressing the challenge of teaching the diversity of cultures in latin america and the range of disciplines that address the region. given the wide range of interests among students, it helps engagement to offer students choices of topics and learning materials, such as assigned texts. these allow students to pursue their area of expertise and indulge new interests within the field of latin america. however, more important to the goal of addressing diversity, the students post the results of their assignment, such as a paper with relevant images, on the blog. this makes the students’ work accessible to all other students, who are then assigned to react to other students’ posts. this exposes all students to a wide range of subject matter and the variety of ways to interpret it. also, since the material is presented by other students to whom they make comments, the material can often be more engaging. in other words, students learn well when they learn from each other. in sum, existing literature points to the value of an interdisciplinary approach to learning and interactivity among students both for higher education in general and in teaching about latin america in particular. at the same time research on the efficacy of blogs in education suggests that its accessibility and ease of use make it an effective tool in achieving the objectives of cultural understanding and interdisciplinary learning. therefore, the use of a blog in the latin american studies seminar shows promise based on existing research. what remains is to evaluate the actual use of the blog in such a course. test case: a latin american seminar using a blog the specific question to be weighed in evaluating a test case is whether incorporating a blog into the course design of a latin american studies seminar can further the common objectives of such a course. as an experiment that contributes a first step toward research into that question, i designed and taught a class in the fall of 2009 within the international relations program at my university that was called introduction to latin american studies. this class is being developed as the only required course among a variety of combinations of other courses that make up the list of requirements in a proposed latin american studies minor at the university. the program itself includes the goal to be interdisciplinary and to serve as “a broad introduction to history, society, and culture” (cited in “proposed revisions to the latin american studies minor”, unpublished report, sept. 2009). given this, the design of the class was to serve students from a wide variety of backgrounds and majors and rely on assignments that allowed students to choose and pursue a variety of topics. the course also was conceived to involve personal visits to the class by a variety of experts on latin america. these visiting experts included both faculty from a variety of disciplines and community members. in other words, this class gathered students, several faculty, and community members from off campus, all of whom shared little more in common than an interest in some aspect of latin america. this feature of the class posed the question of how to make a workspace that accommodated diversity. for this class, which met twice a week, i used both the centralized campus course software brand-named desire2learn or d2l (education research will term this technology computer-mediated communication, or cmc) and a single blog using wordpress software that is offered through and supported by the campus learning technology staff members. all of the students were given the same access to post, comment, and edit the site to which i also had access. the site was not restricted to only class members or the campus; it was available to anyone with access to the internet (the url is www.blogs.uww.edu/introtolatinamerica). interdisciplinary learning thus, one goal in using the blog in a latin american studies seminar is to provide a space for interdisciplinary analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 14 learning, which is a term understood in practice as providing students experience in researching and writing from a variety of academic disciplines. another means to the interdisciplinary goal were the visits by other faculty and guests from outside the campus. there were seven out of the 30 class sessions in which these guests made a presentation to our class, four of whom were faculty from women’s studies, sociology, modern languages, and social work departments. for these sessions with a visitor, i posted an introduction to the speaker and their topic to the blog. students were assigned after the class session to post a reaction to the visitor’s presentation roughly equivalent to a page in length that summarized the main points, and also included two other components. the reaction was to include, first, a question that the presentation provoked, and, second, a description of how this topic connected with, or was related to, other assigned material in the class. often this material would be background reading or class discussions on the broad history or themes of latin america, such as the legacy of colonial control or racial mixing. the blog format, which is as easy to gain access to as any other website, was chosen in part because it was easily shared among the faculty participating as guests to the class sessions. the intent was to use a platform to which all participating faculty members and guests could obtain access. collaboration and interactivity with the interdisciplinary goals of such a course in mind, several assignments provided students the opportunity to pursue topics of their choosing—either locations or themes—within the broad field of contemporary latin america. however, these projects submitted by students were used to further another goal, that of interactivity. this goal was pursued through requiring students to react to the work of other students and not merely from the instructor. thus, there were two occasions when students were assigned to post the results of their independent research to our shared blog. one research project required students to choose among five salient topics in the current events of latin america—narcotics trafficking or environmental movements were two popular topics— and then summarize some aspect of that topic in a post. the other requirement was to attend a cultural event related to latin america in the area and then describe the event in a post that also included images. those students choosing the same current events topic or cultural event worked together in researching or attending the events. however, each composed their own post. once the post was published online, each student was assigned to comment on at least two posts by other students. this requirement was meant to encourage interaction among students. a combination of the ease of access and of the appealing visual quality of the blog was meant to encourage more frequent and longer use of the blog beyond the required minimum posts and comments. culture and visual arts the objectives of this course, as is typical of most introductions to latin america, included an exploration of the rich and accomplished cultures (in the sense of art and expression) of the region, including an exploration of the many cultures of latin america and a study of their artistic production. the class blog was used as an aid to understanding these cultures and was an effective way to sample the visual and performing arts that are a necessary part of any class introducing the latin american region. students were granted flexibility in their choice of assignments to pursue a particular culture and location. in presenting their research, students were to include digital image files. i also posted image, sound, and video samples in the posts that provided background to art and popular cultural topics i taught in class, or in the posts i made on items that captured my interest and related to the class content. in addition to easy access and easy browsing, the blog platform provides an easy way for students and instructors to upload and share media files for music and video. music samples of latin american genres from samba and tango to reggaeton and duranguense were playable using software embedded in the blog post. one guest to class sessions was a group that teaches and performs capoeira, which is an afrobrazilian form of performance that combines martial arts with dance. their visit was videotaped by the campus analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 15 technical support staff, and the link to the video file posted to the blog. thus the experience in class was also archived for students to re-visit if desired as they wrote and submitted their reactions. assessing the blog the use of a blog as a shared space for assignments and interaction in a latin american studies seminar was intended to encourage interdisciplinary work, interactivity among students, and to aid their understanding of the various cultures of the region. the assumption was that this platform would be more effective in encouraging those goals than centralized course software or a classroom-only space. each of these aims will be assessed in turn. interdisciplinary learning the blog format provided at least two advantages over a class approach that relied solely on class-time interaction and paper assignments, or solely on the course software. these advantages stem from the open access and the comment feature. the open access allowed other participating faculty to visit the site, find the post regarding their visit, view student comments on their visit, and even post their own comments. granted, it would also be possible to post an introduction to the visitor to a forum (or discussion) feature of course software such as d2l or blackboard to which students could comment. however, access by faculty would require the course instructor to enroll other guest faculty as visitors to the site, while non-campus visitors would only have access, if at all, after more lengthy and cumbersome steps. despite these clear advantages, faculty and other guests apparently went to the site very little. based on a survey of the participating guest faculty in this particular course under discussion, only one of the guests visited the site and only one time. more promotion of the site by the course instructor among the guests, including perhaps a request that they comment on student comments, would probably increase this usage. the posting of assignments and the requirement that students comment on the work of each other was intended to fulfill the objective of interdisciplinary learning. the results of these assignments were promising, based on student interviews after the class. the three out of 14 students interviewed after the class reported that they read more posts than assigned, that they consulted the blog at times out of interest beyond the need to fulfill class requirements, and mentioned that they were exposed to topics they had not known of before. they mentioned the brevity of articles and the ease of scrolling through past posts at one location as reasons why they were willing and happy to browse the blog. even after a semester had elapsed since the latin american studies seminar ended, interviewed students were still able to recall some knowledge of certain topics outside their speciality, and these were topics they learned about through reading other student posts on the blog. examples of such topics included blog posts on the tango or narcocorridos, a type of popular music that celebrates drug cartels. “it is a good way to see lots of little bits of everything,” summarized one student (j. riemer, personal communication, april 21, 2010). collaboration and interactivity the goal of interactivity in this course was pursued mainly through the work of students reading and writing reactions as comments to the posts of other students on the blog. in total there were 209 comments on the blog, which averages 14 comments per student. students in post-class interviews reported that they routinely read many more posts than the ones they eventually wrote reactions to, and also read the reactions of other students. meanwhile, other students did fail to fulfill the minimum requirements for comments, but the rate of this failure was no higher than presumably would also occur if central course software were used instead of a blog. one student also provided extra-curricular posts out of a spirit of sharing her experiences with other students and the public. this student transmitted a letter from a great aunt who lives near lake maracaibo in venezuela analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 16 and another post was a narrative of walking through a milwaukee neighborhood into which she weaved her own family’s history and also changes in immigrant enclaves. kim (2008) asserts that writing assignments on a blog with open access may inhibit participation due to anxiety. however, the case of this course tentatively suggests that willingness and rewards of interactivity among students was improved by using a blog as the gathering space for student work as compared to the use of a less accessible course software such as d2l. visual and performing arts students did use the blog to hear examples of music through embedded players. they also reported that the ability to easily post and view digital images of sculpture and painting was an advantage of the blog over the traditional course software. such media can also be made accessible through centralized course software, but mainly through links and new windows that students reported are less inviting and slower. other effects of blog on learning outcomes rather than reporting greater anxiety by virtue of having the posts visible to other students and, in theory, anyone with internet access, students reported after the class that the public nature of their work encouraged them to take more care and more pleasure in the work they submitted. they expressed pleasure in the cases when non-students browsing the blog made comments, including a reader from brazil. however, the writing was far from error-free in the case of several students. students also appreciated the experience with posting to a blog because they expect those skills learned such as linking to other websites and including other media to be applicable to their professional work in the future. disadvantages and cautions the blog posts were short, up to 400 words, and therefore do not allow a fuller development of ideas nor encourage the ability to communicate more sophisticated and substantive arguments. it is also more difficult to provide feedback to students compared to written work on paper or the digital word processing files that allow inserted comments. this shortcoming could be overcome by the effort of requiring a digital word processing file as well, or by the professor making a copy of the post that could then be commented upon. i used a feature in the online grade book that permits only brief, overall comments for each graded assignment. the fact that the blog is not password protected also exposes the participants and the institution to more risk of copyright violations if they quote from works or upload images and other visual media. copyright law makes a distinction between material on the internet that is or is not password protected. conclusion instructors in higher education are rightfully astounded and perhaps intimidated by the variety of rapidly changing digital teaching tools at their disposal. among the elements of the so-called social media, the blog would seem to offer more effective means to overcome the challenges presented by teaching the latin american studies seminar. in other words, the blog is a valuable aid in the challenge of introducing the variety of distinct cultures of the region to u.s. students, and also effective in presenting the variety of disciplinary approaches to understanding latin america to a wide range of students. a one-course experiment in the use of a blog as a means to the goals of interdisciplinary learning, interactivity among students, and exploring the region’s culture produced, overall, encouraging results. like much of the research on blogs in higher education, this case should be followed by additional research before hard conclusions can be drawn. rest assured that when such results are produced, someone will post them on their blog. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 17 references andergassen, m., behringer, r., finlay, f., gorra a., & moore, d. (2009) “weblogs in higher education – why do students (not) blog?” electronic journal of e-learning 7, 203-215. available at www.ejel.org. barnes, n.g. “behind the scenes in the blogosphere: advice from established bloggers.” center for marketing research at the university of massachusetts dartmouth (2006) available at www.umassd.edu/cmr. divitini, m., haugaløkken, o., & morken, e.m. (2005). blog to support learning in the field: lessons learned from a fiasco. proceedings of the fifth ieee international conference on advanced learning technologies (icalt’o5). kim, h.n. (2008). the phenomenon of blogs and theoretical model of blog use in educational contexts. computers & education 51, 1342-1352. lozano-alonso, a. & buckley, c. (2006). pedagogy and latin american cultural studies. hispania (american association of teachers of spanish and portuguese) 89,165-6. novoa, a. (2007). teaching modern latin america in the social science curriculum: an interdisciplinary approach. social education 71, 187-90. schneider, a. (2000). title vi funding for undergraduate international studies programs: long-term impact on language offerings? adfl bulletin 32, 42-47. williams, j.b. & jacobs, j. (2004). “exploring the use of blogs as learning spaces in the higher education sector.” australasian journal of educational technology 20, 232-247. address correspondences to: bert kreitlow university of wisconsin at whitewater whitewater, wi e-mail: kreitlob@uww.edu analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 10 running widdershins round middle earth: why teaching tolkien matters dr. victoria holtz-wodzak tolkien, in his 1936 address to the british academy entitled “beowulf: the monster and the critics,” offered the following allegory: a man inherited a field in which was an accumulation of old stone, part of an older hall. of the old stone some had already been used in building the house in which he actually lived, not far from the old house of his fathers. of the rest he took some and built a tower. but his friends coming perceived at once (without troubling to climb the steps) that these stones had formerly belonged to a more ancient building. so they pushed the tower over, with no little labour, in order to look for hidden carvings and inscriptions, or to discover whence the man’s distant forefathers had obtained their building material. some suspecting a deposit of coal under the soil began to dig for it, and forgot even the stones. they all said: this tower is most interesting.” but they also said (after pushing it over): what a muddle it is in! and even the man’s own descendants, who might have been expected to consider what he had been about, were heard to murmur: he is such an odd fellow! imagine his using these old stones to build a nonsensical tower! why did not he restore the old house? he had no sense of proportion: but from the top of that tower the man had been able to look out upon the sea (beowulf, pp. 6-7). tolkien’s reference to sea is one key to understanding the significance of his mythmaking. in the two towers, gandalf explains to pippin that the first of the numenorean men to return to middle earth brought with him the seven palantiri, seeing stones that allowed him to communicate with and observe distant places; he placed one of them so that it commanded a constant view of the sea (beowulf, p. 203). earlier in the same book, gandalf brings word from galadriel to legolas, the elf member of the fellowship: legolas greenleaf long under tree in joy thou hast lived. beware of the sea! if thou hearest the cry of gull on the shore, thy heart shall then rest in the forest no more. (beowulf, p. 106) in his mythology, tolkien tells us that the elves crossed the sea in rebellion, and even those who linger yet in middle earth do not forget and yearn for a return to their land of origin. for elves, the sea is a mixed blessing. in rebellion, many of them crossed it to their sorrow, and those who still linger in middle earth live with the divided allegiance of their love of forest and the call of the sea, urging them to return to the land of their creation. tolkien lives with a similarly divided symbolic imagination. trees and the sea are keys to his imagination and through both he offers us an opportunity to envision a world different from the one we live in and responds to the demands of the material (or practical) with a vision that is instead, mythic. returning to tolkien’s allegory, it is clear that he suggests that his fellow medievalists have taken a work of great imaginative and artistic power, and instead of using it to “see the sea”, they have mined it for words and phrases, and pulled it apart, looking for bits and pieces from other ancient works, and even reworked it after their own notions of how it “ought” to be built. in his essay, tolkien recognizes the tension between two apanalytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 11 proaches to the old poem. the “practical” approach, that treats it as a source book for other sorts of studies, is important and fundamental to any attempt to make sense of the text and is something that tolkien himself had mastered young. at the same time, tolkien argues that, as essential as that sort of intellectual activity is, it offers only a limited understanding of the potential of the poem. the tension tolkien has identified in his own discipline reflects an ongoing tension common to many disciplines between pursuits that yield practical and material results and pursuits that, often drawing on those material results, go beyond them to recognize larger and more abstract qualities. tolkien concludes: it is just because the main foes in beowulf are inhuman that the story is larger and more significant than this imaginary poem of a great king’s fall. it glimpses the cosmic and moves with the thought of all men concerning the fate of human life and efforts; it stands amid but above the petty wars of princes, and surpasses the dates and limits of historical periods, however important….we look down as if from a visionary height upon the house of man in the valley of the world ... a light starts…and there is a sound of music; but the outer darkness and its hostile offspring lie ever in wait for the torches to fail and the voices to cease (beowulf, p. 35). the description tolkien provides of the overall importance and effect of beowulf could be, with equal accuracy, applied to his own mythology. there, tolkien provides a modern-day instance of an epic tale that gives us glimpses of the lives of human beings and their fate. like beowulf, his epic gives us, to return to his opening allegory, a tower from which we may see the sea. familiarity with tolkien’s epic generally begins with lord of the rings, and that what is commonly understand of his mythology comes as partly understood echoes in the poems and stories his characters share. for tolkien, epic, myth, language, culture, and verisimilitude were inextricably linked, and they provide the opportunity to climb his “non-sensical tower” rather than mining for coal at its base and treating myth and epic as simple archaeology, or perhaps tomb raiding. tolkien’s visual art demonstrates the linkage tolkien establishes among myth, epic and verisimilitude. in their book on his visual art, hammond and scull1 point out that his paintings “the halls of manwe”, (#52 in their book), the “misty mountains from the hobbit “(#110) and an untitled mountain landscape (#53), perhaps from his trip to switzerland as a young man, are all depictions of the same mountain from varying perspectives. likewise, tolkien depicts nargothrond, the underground home of the elves in the first age of middle earth (#57) and the third age elven king’s gate from the hobbit (#117 and #120) as physically very similar places. hammond and scull explain the overlaps by suggesting that tolkien was a “frugal artist” who “often reused elements of his pictures that he thought came out well.” (j. r. r tolkien, p. 54) frugality seems an unlikely explanation for tolkien’s reuse of images. he may well have been frugal with his use of paper, frequently making use of scraps and back sides of copy books, especially during the war years when most materials were in short supply, but his sense of frugality never extended to his mythmaking. a more convincing argument suggests that, in his imagination, these places were somehow the same, that the later mountains and forests in his mythology resembled or reflected the “original” mountains of his earlier matter. to further understand tolkien’s mythic imagination, turning to lothlorien, a place in his narrative where the matter of the first age and the matter of the third age come together is instructive. tolkien describes the fellowship’s arrival outside caras galadon, the chief city of the elves in lothlorien: “welcome to caras galadon,” [haldir] said. “here is the city of the galadrim where dwell the lord celeborn and galadriel, lady of lorien. but we cannot enter here, for the gates do not look northward. we must go round to the southern side, and the way is not short, for the city is great.” there was a road paved with white stone running on the outer brink of the fosse. along this they went westward, with the city ever climbing up like a green cloud uipon their left; and as the night deepened more lights sprang forth, until all the hill seemed afire with stars (fellowship, p. 368). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 12 in this short, seemingly unimportant passage, tolkien gives us an important clue to the principles of his mythmaking. to enter caras galadon, the party must travel widdershins—that is counterclockwise—and so enter it as one would traditionally enter faery. to travel, or to imagine, widdershins, is to risk entering the world of myth, a world where time and narrative do not follow linear patterns, and a world from which one may not emerge, “unchanged,” or, to borrow boromir’s suspicious description, “unscathed” (fellowship, p. 352). tolkien has described frodo’s first impression of lothlorien: frodo stood awhile still lost in wonder. it seemed to him that he had stepped through a high window that looked on a vanished world. a light was upon it for which his language had no name. all that he saw was shapely, but the shapes seemed at once clear cut, as if they had been first conceived and drawn at the uncovering of his eyes, and ancient as if they had endured forever. he saw no colour but those he knew, gold and white and blue and green, but they were fresh and poignant, as if he had at that moment first perceived them and made for them names new and wonderful (fellowship, p. 365). sam’s reaction is equally telling: “i thought that elves were all for moon and stars: but this is more elvish than anything i ever heard tell of. i feel as if i was inside a song, if you take my meaning” (fellowship, p. 365). frodo and sam both recognize the unusual, dream-like intensity of lothlorien. it is timeless, or rather time flows around it. haldir remarks that it is unfortunate that they have only seen lothlorien’s mallorn trees in winter, alive, asleep, and “arrayed in pale gold.” even aragorn stands still and silent as a tree…he was wrapped in some fair memory; and as frodo looked at him he knew that he beheld things as they once had been in this same place. for the grim years were removed from the face of aragorn, and he seemed clothed in white a young lord tall and fair (fellowship, p. 366). they are inside song; it feels as if they look on a “vanished world” (fellowship, p. 366). it is hushed, quiet, waiting, winter-time in lothlorien. the only apparent sign of time moving is in the trees. the silver trees have lost their leaves for the winter, but the mallorn trees are still leaved in pale gold, colors reminiscent of the original two trees. frodo listens to the wind “sigh” among the branches and hears “far off great seas upon beaches that had long ago been washed away, and sea-birds crying whose race had perished from the earth” (fellowship, p. 366). here, tolkien hints what that vanished world looked like, and through the trees themselves, offers us clues that help us to understand myth, and understanding myth, revision, retelling, and recycling of mythic tales. trees are key to understanding tolkien. we know they were important to tolkien. treebeard alone, or bilbo’s party tree, should be sufficient evidence, but there is other evidence. in a letter to his son michael in 1967 or 1968, he discusses his discomfort with the changes of vatican ii using a tree as his metaphor. he complains of the “protestant” attempts to search backwards through church history to reclaim a simpler, presumably more accurate worship from the early church. such attempts must fail, he says, …because “my church” was not intended …to be static or remain in perpetual childhood; but to be a living organism (likened to a plant) which develops and changes in externals by the interaction of its …circumstances. there is no resemblance between the “mustard-seed” and the full-grown tree. for those living in the days of its branching growth the tree is the thing, for the history of a living thing is part of its life and the history of a divine thing is sacred. the wise may know that it began with a seed, but it is vain to try and dig it up, for it no longer exists, and virtue and powers that it had now reside in the tree. very good: but in husbandry ...the keepers of the tree …will certainly do harm, if they are obsessed with the desire of going back to the seed or even to the first youth of the plant when it was (as they imagine) pretty and unafflicted by evils” (the letters of j. r. r tolkien, p. 394). how do these passages reveal tolkien’s myth-making? trees are a good place to start, both because they were so fundamentally important to him and because they are central to both the dream of lothlorien—notice that caras galadon is literally built in the trees—and the metaphor for the church in his letter to michael. his vision analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 13 is rooted in both his mythic and his non-mythic worlds, and trees unite both. trees grow slowly and live for a long time. they bear within them the history of their existence—patterns of rain or drought for example—but their history can only be inferred from the outside of a living tree. the only way to examine a tree’s rings is to damage the tree itself, and as gandalf observes, “he that breaks a thing to find out what it is has left the path of wisdom” (fellowship, p. 272). the life pattern of a deciduous tree, in its growth and loss of leaves, implies both stasis and change. the leaves that it loses will be replaced the following spring, but the replacement will be a new leaf, not a reincarnation of the old leaf. tolkien’s cycle of myth is both stasis and change. the pattern is a cycle, or more accurately, a spiral, into what tolkien characterizes as “the long defeat” and he lives and writes with one foot in mythic time and one in “secular” time. in his written work, the cyclical pattern is easy to trace. arwen is the evenstar of her people as luthien was the morning star, and both are lost to the elves. frodo and gollum and their long struggle over the ring parallels the confrontation between isildur and sauron, and frodo’s ultimate fate is gentler than isildur’s only due to the mercy of the elves. the rohirrim arrive with the sunrise to help their allies in minas tirith, just as their ancestors had arrived at sunrise at the beginning of their alliance with the men of gondor. the pattern in his visual art works in much the same way, but it is rarely linked to his mythological structure. i have already noted the marked similarities in “the halls of manwe” and the “misty mountains of the hobbit”. hammond and scull note other places he reuses images. for example, tolkien variously titled his picture of the haunted forest of taur-na-fuin (#54) as “mirkwood,” “fangorn,” and “entwood”, and he published the picture for all three to illustrate all three of those places (j. r. r. tolkien, p. 58). seen mythically, these pictures are representations of the same types of places, just as arwen is a type of luthien, or for that matter, as sauron and saruman, are “types” of morgoth. tolkien used his art to support the verisimilitude of his narrative. tolkien explained many times that one of the early inspirations for a critical part of his myth, the story of earendil the mariner, was a line from the old english poem crist, “eala earendil, engla beorhtost!”2 (the letters of j. r. r. tolkien, p. 385). the linkage between tolkien’s mythic character earendil the mariner and the manuscript phrase establishes a connection between the world of his myth and the ancient manuscripts of our world. he repeats the pattern in lord of the rings, this time echoing a topos common to medieval documents. his story, he tells us, derives from a document called “the red book of westmarch” which he translated from the original elvish (return, p. 411). the book records, he says, the history of middle earth, as it is known among hobbits and recorded by bilbo and frodo baggins, sam gamgee, and later elanor gamgee (return, p. 411). in the same way, tolkien’s visual art functions at times to establish a credibility claim outside his myth. for example, a comparison of the eagle tolkien painted to represent the one that had rescued bilbo from the goblins (#113) shows that it was modeled accurately after one by thorburn (#112) in a book from his children’s bookshelf. more intriguingly, tolkien used his skill as a calligrapher to produce manuscript “evidence” of correspondence between aragorn and sam gamgee. in “dangweth pengolth” (#198) and “king’s letter”(#199), manuscripts he developed for inclusion in a rejected epilogue to lord of the rings3, tolkien mimics medieval european manuscripts such as the fifteenth century ellesmere chaucer, or the circa 9th century beowulf, with great skill. by doing this, tolkien offers an invitation to imagine a link beyond the objective, material world, here represented by manuscripts he knew, loved, and translated. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 14 beowulf manuscript ellesmere chaucer the end result for tolkien’s mythology is similar to the interlace patterns found in celtic and medieval visual art. john leyerle, in 1967, argued that an interlace pattern explained the narrative structure of beowulf. in beowulf, leyerle argues, the narrative is constructed of three interlaced strands, each of them of equal social and cultural importance to the poet who wrote down the story. tolkien’s mythology exhibits a similar set of interlaced strands. one strand is the primary narrative, the second is his mythology, and the third strand is the world into which tolkien, as sub-creator, introduces his story. the pattern is apparent in his narrative art, and it is equally apparent in his visual art. why is this important? in my view, teaching students to climb the tower and see the sea is a critical part of their education. tolkien, while he would likely never have considered teaching either his mythology or his epic to his oxford linguistics and old english students, nevertheless understood the role of myth and story to be crucial. in a 1951 letter to publisher milton waldman, he wrote . . . an equally basic passion of mine . . . was for myth . . ..and for fairy-story, and above all for heroic legend on the brink of fairy-tale and history, of which there is far too little in the world . . i was from early days grieved by the poverty of my own beloved country: it had not stories of its own (bound up with its tongue and soil), not of the quality that i sought, and found. . . in legends of other lands (letters of j. r. r tolkien, p. 144). in this letter, tolkien explains that his “stuff” is mainly concerned with “fall, mortality, and the machine” (letters, p. 145). he saw the mythic and epic analysis of “fall” and “mortality” as a sobering and critical antidote to the effect of the machine as he had seen it used on the battlefields of world war i, and as he was daily learning of its deadly use in world war ii. in his fiction, and in his painting, the machine is controlled by those who, like saruman, have, as gandalf says, “left the path of wisdom” and “would break a thing to find out what it is” ( fellowship, p. 272). to tolkien, “the machine” signifies the abuse of power over nature and over one’s fellow human beings. tolkien rarely articulated his concerns about these issues directly, but his close friend during these years, c. s. lewis, was much more explicit. in lewis’ terminology, the problem has to do with what he called “the materialist menace,” and he and tolkien saw, in very stark terms, what they thought to be its consequences. materialism, in their view, was at the root of atrocities such as the excesses of stalinism, the fanatical racism of nazi germany, and the growth of an intrusive authoritarianism on the part of their own government. writing in 1952, in the voyage of the dawn treader, c. s. lewis introduces eustace clarence scrubb, cousin to the pevensie analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 15 children and a product (or in lewis’ view, perhaps a victim) of a materialist education. eustace likes “animals, especially beetles, if they were dead and pinned on a card. he liked books if they were books of information and had pictures of grain elevators or of fat foreign children doing exercises in model schools” (voyage, p. 9). eustace, while he had read a lot of “books about exports and imports and governments and drains” did not know enough to recognize a dragon when he saw one or to anticipate any risk of falling asleep on a dragon’s hoard while thinking “dragonish” thoughts. he awoke to discover he had turned into a dragon while he slept (voyage, p. 83). eustace is eventually restored to his human shape by aslan, but several adventures later, he still betrays the limitations of his materialist education. he meets ramandu, a retired star. in discussing the geography of the last sea, eustace concludes that ramandu must have been flying above it. the only kind of flying that eustace has learned to imagine is in an airplane. in fact, the star tells him, he was a long way above the air. “in our world,” eustace observes, “a star is a huge ball of flaming gas.” ramandu replies “even in your world, my son, that is not what a star is but only what it is made of” (voyage, p. 189). eustace’s understanding is accurate, but it is insufficient to comprehend the nature of the star or of the world around him. lewis’ allegory suggests that an education that focuses solely on what things are made of, that is a materialist education, one that focuses on the archaeology of a poem, to return to tolkien’s allegory, provides an accurate understanding of what the old land-holder’s property is made of, but not what it is. tolkien, unlike lewis, despised allegory and rarely used it. he saw it as a form of tyranny of the writer over the reader. instead, he explained that his myths offered what he called “applicability.” they might, he hoped, offer some view of the possibilities of life that extended beyond the daily, tangible observation. tolkien’s myth matters, like other myth, because it offers an alternative to the dragonish thoughts of a purely materialistic education, and it offers an opportunity to explore what can be seen from the tower. one hopes for a distant glimpse of the sea. our last glimpse of frodo shows him on shore, taking ship with gandalf, bilbo, and most of the elves remaining in middle earth: . ..and the sails were drawn up, and wind blew, and slowly the ship slipped away down the long grey firth; and light of the glass of galadriel that frodo bore glimmered and was lost. and the ship went out into the high sea and passed on into the west, until at last on a night of rain frodo smelled a sweet fragrance on the air and heard the sound of singing that came over the water. and then it seemed to him. . . the grey rain-curtain turned all to silver glass and was rolled back, and he beheld white shores and beyond them a far green country under a swift sunrise (return, p. 310). endnotes 1. because the tolkien estate has not given permission to publish tolkien’s pictures with this article, all references to tolkien’s artwork are accompanied by reference numbers to their location in wayne hammond and christina scull, j.r.r. tolkien, artist and illustrator, boston: houghton mifflin, 1985. the author of this article apologizes for the obvious inconvenience to readers. 2. translation: hail earendil, brightest of angels 3. the epilogue was finally published in sauron defeated: the history of the lord of the rings, part four (the history of middleearth, vol. 9). christopher tolkien, ed. houghton-mifflin, 1992. works cited carpenter, humphrey, ed. “the letters of j. r. r. tolkien.” in the letters of j.r.r. tolkien, by ed. humphrey carpenter, 144. boston: houghton mifflin, 1983. hammond, wayne and christina scull. j.r.r. tolkien, artist and illustrator. boston: houghton mifflin, 1995. lewis, c.s. voyage of the dawn treader. london: geoffrey bles, 1964. leyerle, john. “the interlace structure of beowulf.” university of toronto quarterly: a canadian journal of the humanities , 1967: 37:1-17. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 16 tolkien, j. r. r. “beowulf: the monsters and the critics.” proceedings of the british academy. london: oxford univer sity press, 1936. 1-53. —. the fellowship of the ring. london: george allen and unwin, 1965. —. the two towers. london: george allen and unwin, 1965. —. the return of the king. london: george allen and unwin, 1965. address correspondence to: vicki holtz-wodzak 900 viterbo dr. viterbo university la crosse, wi 54601 vlholtzwodzak@viterbo.edu analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 2 57 the support of the community of inquiry in the understanding of death among children: a german – japanese comparison with gender analysis eva marsal & takara dobashi this presentation of our research compares concepts of japanese and german primary school children relating to the topic of death in the context of values education and the ethics of care. this is a project of the german-japanese research initiative on philosophizing with children (djfpk), which aims to facilitate individual autonomy by enhancing philosophical-ethical judgment. it encourages the application and appropriate transfer of values based on philosophical-ethical knowledge acquired through independent reflection on the situations of daily life. our presentation draws attention to the supportive function of the community of inquiry, not so much in terms of the intellectual potential it undoubtedly possesses, as has often been demonstrated, but rather in terms of its emotional potential. for in addition to intellectual support through shared ex-amination of arguments, the community of inquiry also has an emotionally stabilizing function that should not be underestimated. this function makes it possible for children to deal with anxiety-inducing phenomena such as death and human mortality. in the community of inquiry children can examine together all aspects of such touchy topics and reflect upon them. in addition, the emotional strength children gain through the community of inquiry allows them to consciously break away from others who are important to them, attractive role models or those they love, in order to pursue ideas their societies do not accept but which are nonetheless important to them, such as, for example, the notion that grandparents are reborn in the children’s pets. here the group can provide emotional support and protection, especially when the children discover that others have similar ideas, and they can pursue and test their intuitions together. most educators, whether parents or teachers, wish to protect children and so are reluctant to approach the difficult topic of death themselves, or permit others to do so. for this reason it was not easy to find school directors willing to allow their students to philosophize about death. especially in japan there were strong reservations not only about the topic but also the method of “philosophizing with children.” as a result we have very limited data here. another problem was the fact that free expression of opinion, encouraged in german classrooms, is not a normal practice in japanese classrooms. the discussion circle was also a novel and enjoyable experience for the japanese children. the value of the community of inquiry as an emotional resource expanding the space for thought was less evident in the verbal arguments of the japanese children, but more so in the pictures they drew to represent their constructs. the unaccustomed physical proximity to others (japanese children, unlike german children, normally sit isolated at their individual tables) visibly encouraged them. children encounter death as a primary experience in their personal environment and as a secondary experience in the media. starting from the hypothesis that globalization promotes the exchange of information between differing cultures, our research project, a cultural comparison that also considered gender, investigated how and to what extent the concepts of japanese and german children differ with regard to 1. a metaphysical life after death; 2. a genetic life after death; and 3. a social life after death.1 here we limit our presentation to the first point: a metaphysical life after death. as an impulse for philosophizing, german children’s author marion parsch developed a story for us in which children sitting at their grandmother’s grave ask her whether analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 2 58 she can hear them. the story encourages thinking about the question: is death the end of everything? along with reflective verbalizations, the children made a sensory-aesthetic record of their ideas in drawings, which they then explained to others. to ensure that the children’s concepts covered the entire philosophical spectrum, the recorded lessons were constructed as a philosophical dialogue. we followed the socratic “five-finger method” of german philosopher and educator ekkehard martens2 in which classroom materials (photographs and stories) provide the necessary prompts to encourage phenomenological, hermeneutical, analytical, dialectical and speculative thinking in both critical and creative ways. these critical and creative modes are accompanied throughout by “caring thinking.” with this technique of providing prompts we take up the chain questions of the philosophical riddle game, in which one fundamental life question leads to another. in the analysis of dutch historian johan huizinga, this type of archetypal play is the foundation of culture. we understand philosophizing with children as archetypal play and archetypal knowledge,4 since in this process the children first reconstruct images of themselves and their world within a given culture and then construct them anew.5 the lessons were recorded and transcribed so that we could carry out a content analysis of the children’s views and their arguments.6 between 2006 and 2009 we philosophized in germany with various primary school classes in karlsruhe (peter hebel school) and graben-neudorf (kussmaul school) as well as with individual groups of fourthgraders. in hiroshima, japan, in september 2009, we were only able to visit the fourth-grade children of the noboricho primary school and the children in classes 4a and 4b of hankawa elementary school, where we philosophized with them using culturally adapted versions of the same stories with japanese names, foods, etc. since we were not allowed to show imagery from the cemeteries and grave monuments of various nations to demonstrate the cultural variety of death conceptions, we instead used the german children’s drawings of their ideas about life after death. due to the limited quantity of data we did not attempt a statistical evaluation of the japanese children’s statements. eva marsal philosophized with the children in germany and takara dobashi philosophized with the japanese children. we abbreviate german girls by gg, german boys by gb, japanese girls by jg and japanese boys by jb. 1. a background sketch of traditional ideas about death in german and japanese culture in germany two thirds of the population belong to catholic or protestant churches. the remaining third includes muslim and jewish communities (ca. 5%) and a large group not affiliated with any church. the topic of death is generally avoided in schools, but christian views of death can be considered part of general cultural knowledge conveyed by public rites and symbols and in the media. at the same time minority religious communities educate their members in their own traditions. for christians, death began with adam and eve’s fall from god’s grace, but christ’s sacrifice on the cross made it possible for the faithful to enter paradise and be with god after death. in traditional belief the dead arise with new bodies on the day of final judgment and are judged on the basis of faith, spending eternity either in heaven or hell, or for catholics passing through the transitional realm of purgatory. in islam the soul is also immortal. after death the archangel azrail separates the soul from the body to await the last judgment in a transitional world (berzah), where reward or punishment depend on the deceased’s deeds in life. obedience to allah’s laws laid down in the koran is the most important requirement for entry into paradise, a realm of unimaginable joy. on judgment day allah decides who will spend eternity in heaven or hell.7 among jews the immortality of the soul is less enshrined in dogma and a wide range of beliefs (or disbeliefs) co-exist. in japan, ideas about death are influenced by an amalgamation of shintoism, a nature religion, with confucianism, taoism, and buddhism. buddhism presumes that humans are reborn into new, finite lives in accordance with their karma, until they reach nirvana. shintoists, by contrast, believe that the soul migrates into its world of origin or another world,8 or else alternatively it remains in a dark border region of this world. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 2 59 2. metaphysical life after death: the german children most of the children in the two fourth grade classes of the peter hebel school were convinced that individual life goes on in some form even after death; only 5% believed that death represented an ultimate end, as for example in the case of michelle (gg2_10): “when you’re dead, you’re dead. then nothing else happens,” or tim (gb1_334): “well, maybe death is like an empty room in the dark. without anything, no sound, not a soul there any more, just everything dark.” the statement of sophia (gg 8), in contrast, is a good example of the prevailing opinion: “a person... i mean life… it goes on and on and never stops. when you die, you still live on.” like the japanese primary school children, the german children assume that there is a dual system. they suppose that humans are a union of body and soul that is prone to come apart after death, a thought expressed by elvira (gg 33): “with people, here’s how it is: after they are buried they turn to dust and their spirit goes upward.” on the basis of this duality the children develop different forms of life after death, both immaterial and material gestalt types. in addition, they also distinguish between the individual fate of a given soul (which might live on as a soul, with god or elsewhere, or be reborn or resurrected) and the continued social life of the complete body-soul union in the memory of the living, as well as the inter-individual transmission of genes to descendants. the individual’s metaphysical afterlife: is the soul immortal? first we present the outlook of the german children with regard to a continued life of the soul. at the study’s outset, 3% of participating children stated that they could not comment on this because it was epistemically impossible to do so. for example, norbert (gb1_290) states: “jonas said that if you read the bible you’ll know it, but the people who wrote the bible weren’t even dead yet.” or larissa (gg1_27) wishes: “i would really like to know what happens when you are dead, whether you go to heaven or are born again or are just dead and nothing else happens… i’d like to know that, because the stupid thing is, when you’re dead and you know it, you can’t tell anyone about it any more.” but this epistemic impossibility of determining the truth does not prevent the children from developing and testing their own subjective theories within the classroom community of inquiry. (german girl, 10 years old) (3) gg2_10 michelle “just 3 gravestones, because when you’re dead, you’re dead. then nothing else happens.” (german boy matthias, 9 years old) “the dead person is lying in the ground; all around him are stones, and the roots penetrate down to the body. up on the surface a bush is growing.” analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 2 60 most striking is the number in the 2nd category, reincarnation. one-third of the children presume that the soul will be reborn. this unusually high number for germany results from the fact that 25% of the girls think there may be a transmigration of souls. although one-third of the japanese children also share this value, the responses of the german children reflect not so much a familiarity with buddhist religion as wishful thinking. lea (gg 277), for example, tells this story: “back when i was younger, i kept on thinking that maybe my great grandfather was an animal or something, so then i always said ‘hello’ to animals.” or sophia (gg 280) says: “i got cats, and (...) then i used to always think that it was my great grandfather, my cat, and then i always said his name.” at that point it becomes clear that johannes (gb 284), who had previously only operated with the christian theory of soul, also has his own quite private notion: “sometimes i also think that my fish… is my gra…, i mean my great grandmother, my grandpa, um, my great grandmother and great grandfather, and then i always say goodbye to them when i leave.” since parents reject such ideas, normally the children did not speak about them. the experience of expressing these views openly in the community of inquiry and finding other children with similar ideas was a great relief to them. viktoria (gg2_46): offers another form of the reincarnation idea: “i think that then the soul rises up and then it is born again right away.” according to norbert (gb1_344), rebirth can also take place in heaven and be repeated there indefinitely. gg2_16 rashita: the soul can.., that’s true, but there are many things. some people say the soul goes to heaven that a person is born again, or some say it goes to hell and isn’t born again. gg2_18 larissa: what viktoria said, that’s also a possibility, because if a person is dead and then reborn, that could be. and i drew here that when a person is dead there is a kind of light where the person can then rest in peace. gg2_20 nina: “well, i think about it some, when a person dies, that (...) my soul goes on to the next child. i mean, ... at the exact moment when i die, that maybe somewhere, like in a hospital or in someone’s home, a new child is born and it gets my soul.” analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 2 61 another boy, ralf (gb 9 years old) says: “but maybe when you die you are born again in heaven, and when you die there, you go to heaven’s next level, and so on forever.” slightly more than half of the german children have the opinion, like anna, that people live on in heaven. anna (gg2_130) says: “but i think… i guess that the people who are dead, they go to heaven, because heaven is really huge; it has no end.” the dialogue then brings up the question of whether there is enough room for everyone in heaven: gb1_296 balduin: but if all dead people go to heaven, there wouldn’t be enough room, would there? gb1_298 jonas: heaven is actually infinite, isn’t it? gg1_302 viktoria: but if there’s enough room for all the people on earth, why shouldn’t there be enough room in heaven? gg1_304 iva: but on earth people die, and then they go away again, and then there is room for everyone. if people didn’t die, then there wouldn’t be enough room. gg1_308 rashida: when i was at a cemetery, someone told me that only the most important part goes upward, because you might not necessarily need your legs and so on, only the most important things go with. teacher 1_309 mh, mh. what is the most important? gg1_310 rashida: … for example, the soul, the heart, things like that. as a tentative solution, rashida suggests that the soul is not physical and thus does not take up space. but apparently the concept of a being without a physical body is quite difficult for the children to grasp, since the same space problem arises in their discussion of the proposition that souls remain on earth or else return to it as ghosts or guardian angels: another question that greatly preoccupies the german children is what the souls do for such a long time in heaven. a condition that never changes for all eternity does not seem to them worth having, and so they talk about various metamorphoses, such as the transformation into a star or an angel. gg2_30 rashida: i was thinking that when you’ve been in heaven for a long time, you turn into a star. gb2_48 norbert: maybe the souls get trained there and then they come down again as angel assistants. gb2_50 moritz: um, who gives them the training? gb2_52 patrick: god. gg2_56 michelle: probably an angel who’s in heaven. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 2 62 after the community of inquiry has thus cleared up the fate of the soul in what the members found to be a satisfactory process of argumentation, it moves on to the second component of its dual theory. there is soon agreement about the material development of the body. the children agree on a biological nature concept. as an example we cite here sophia (gg 28): “when they die they live in the earth, that is, then they turn into earth...” and also johannes (gb 30): “and then they live on as earth.” 3. metaphysical life after death: the japanese children most of the japanese children were convinced that individual life goes on in some form even after death. however they did not verbally develop their concepts of death as the german children did through argumentative exploration in the community of inquiry, but rather individually in their drawings within the community, after having reflected together about the story and the drawings of the german children. although they were hardly able to account for these death concepts verbally, their drawings are very differentiated, rich in meaning, complex, and expressive. to begin we present here short dialogue excerpts: teacher td: what do you think? can sachiko and juichi see their grandmother who died, or at least feel her presence? what do sachiko and juichi believe, do you think? minako jg:_n: i’m surprised that the two talk about a topic like this. yuri jb_n: i think the two children can be seen by their grandmother who died. naoto jb_n: i think if that would happen to me i would ask the same question as the two children did. that’s why it doesn’t surprise me. td: do you think the same way as juichi or not? what experience have you had? many: yes, yes. kento jb_n: i’ve had experiences like what was said a minute ago. at times i think like juichi, about whether my dead grandmother can see me. yuki jg:_ha: when my father’s brother died i thought about it. setsuko jg_ha: when my great grandmother died i thought about it. mona (german girl, 9 years old) (2) 001 jpg ...that then of course we live on in heaven, and that then we are angels or something. ... gisela (german girl, 9 years old) (1) 001 jpg i was thinking that when you’ve been in heaven for a long time, you turn into a star. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 2 63 td: the boy juichi thinks his great grandmother is still alive. what do you think? children: silence saijaka jg_ha: i think the grandmother is looking down from heaven and watching the figures of her grandchildren. mariko jg_ha: because it’s necessary, our grandmother watches us from heaven with protecting eyes, i think. td: our topic is the question, what form does the grandmother’s inochi (finiteness of life) take? we’ve already heard one opinion, that the grandmother protects us from heaven. have you ever heard the word tamashi (soul)? do you think there is a soul? kazuo jb_ha: yes, tamashi (soul) remains as itself. td: or do you have a different opinion, that there is no more tamashi (soul) after death? children_ha: no answer. td: do you think it can be proved that there is a tamashi (soul) after death? children: impossible. nr.39 psh,4 a: m (japanese girl) grandmother is protecting us nr.50 ps h,4b:k (japanese boy) grandfather is protecting us nr .8 ps n 4:k8 (japanese boy) nr.1 psn kouki (japanese boy) analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 2 64 megumi jg_hb: it’s hard to prove it, but in juicho’s heart his grandmother lives as tamashi (soul). that’s how it seems to me. many voices_hb: yes, we think so too. td: which idea is the best one for you? your thoughts, please. sakura jg _n: my idea about dying is that you go to heaven. koichi jb_n: that we are reborn as babies is the right idea for me. shin jb_n: i don’t want to only ask about dying. i’d rather think that i will fly to heaven and be born again as a baby. ryo jb_n: i wish that some person like a god, like for example an angel can lead me to heaven when i die. taro jb_n: i still don’t have a clear idea about this topic. exactly like most of the german children, most japanese children have a dualistic worldview: the body decays and the soul lives on. nr. 10 psn, 4: k(japanese boy) nr. 20 psn, 4:m (japanese girl) nob 44 (japanese girl) nob 41 (japanese girl) analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 2 65 unlike the german children, japanese children like ikuhei (jb_n), for example, believe that the dead remain among the living in invisible form: ikuhei: (japanese boy) “the way i see it, the person is dressed in a white suit after he dies. the insignia is the proof that the person who comes out from the gravestone is someone who has died. this apparition can only be seen by the dead, but not by the living.” through the community of inquiry it is also possible for the children to discuss traumatic experiences, such as an earthquake that cost the lives of the grandfather and an infant, both of whom are now with buddha in the granddaughter’s imagination, or death in a traffic accident. but many children also project the things they wish for onto heaven, such as “eternally playing” or reconciling again with a friend. nr. 51 psh, 4 b: k (japanese boy) (japanese boy) nr.16 ps n, 4: m 16 (japanese girl) nob 22 ps n, 4: m 22 (japanese girl) analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 2 66 4.evaluation of the approach through the children’s self-assessments at the conclusion of our research process, we wanted to know how the children assessed reflecting about death through group conversation in the classroom. after all, talking about death is taboo in both japan and germany. this makes it especially burdensome for children to come to terms with this difficult existential topic. while in germany nina (gg) reports positive feelings about remembering her grandfather again during the discussion of the death theme (“it was also nice...because talking about this made me remember my grandpa again”), somäa (gg) and the immigrant african girl rashida exemplify ambivalent attitudes. on the one hand, they find thinking about the topic “death” quite difficult and become anxious. somäa (gg3_174) emphasizes: “it could also happen that some children talking about a topic like this might be afraid that now maybe they will die too.” on the other hand, they find the treatment of the topic liberating, as rashida (gg3_172) points out: “it’s like this: it’s true that this is hard for children to learn about, but when they know it, in the end, then they feel freer, for sure.” the japanese children saw it as positive that they could discuss the topic of death since they “talked about a subject” as kiichi (jb) from noboricho says, “that we don’t learn about in school. that’s why it was very good for me.” the others also found it “a good experience” like taro (jb). teruka (jg) from hankawa added: “if you think by yourself about inochi (finiteness of life) , it stays unclear, but when i thought about it together with other children it became quite understandable.” seiko (jg) went still further: “today i experienced good learning. i am very grateful.” only yasunai (jb) found it “difficult to think about the topic of inochi, because we have no experience with it.” this feeling can be attributed first of all to the fact that for most of the children death was affirmed to be “not final” and was associated with hopes for various forms of living on after death. second, the children felt liberated by their long conversation about the process of dying itself, and they were consoled to learn that not every death involves pain or represents a release from pain. it was also liberating for them to exchange their fantasies and anxiously guarded speculations, which had been rejected by adults: for example, their belief that grandparents lived on in family pets and were thus still present for them. because their assertions were neither ridiculed nor treated with scorn in the classroom community of inquiry, but were instead received with interest and developed further in a respectful discussion, they experienced the conversation about this tabooed topic as a relief. the intercultural perspective of this lesson enabled the children to develop comprehensive concepts related nr. 33 psh, 4a (japanese boy) nr. 27psh, 4a: k3(japanese boy) analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 2 67 to the themes death, the finite nature of life, and the various forms of living on after death. in our study we were able to show that the community of inquiry promotes not only the transfer of culture but also the development of autonomous, reflective, and age-appropriate pictures of the world; for in addition to intellectual support, the community of inquiry also has an emotionally stabilizing function that should not be underestimated. endnotes 1 takara dobashi, “school as caring community. toshiaki ôse philosophizes with japanese children,” in children philosophize worldwide. international theoretical and practical concepts, eds. eva marsal, takara dobashi, barbara weber (frankfurt: peter-lang-verlag, 2009), pp. 427-436. 2 eva marsal, “a german framework for philosophizing with children: the five-finger model of ekkehard martens”, in children philosophize worldwide. international theoretical and practical concepts, pp. 503-512; and ekkehard martens, methodik des ethikund philosophieunterrichts. philosophieren als elementare kulturtechnik (hannover: siebert, 2003). 3 eva marsal & takara dobashi, das spiel als kulturtechnik des ethischen lernens (münster: lit, 2005). 4 takara dobashi, “the first children‘s philosopher of japan: takeji hayashi,” in thinking, iapc vol. 18-3 (montclaire, new jersey), pp. 3542. 5 eva marsal, “das philosophische rätselspiel als ‚selbstläufiges’ gespräch: philosophieren mit kindern im öffentlichen lernraum,” in philosophical foundations of innovative learning philosophische grundlagen innovativen lernens, proceedings of the international conference on philosophy for children -kongressband des internationalen. kongresses für kinderphilosophie, ed. daniela g. camhy (münchen. 2007), pp. 43 – 54. 6 eva marsal & takara dobashi, “empirical evaluation of philosophy instruction (p4c): models, methods, examples,” in children philosophize worldwide. international theoretical and practical concepts, pp. 473-478. 7 helmut werner, (ed.) das islamische totenbuch. jenseitsvorstellungen des islam (cologne: anaconda, 2009). 8 masahide satô, “nippon ni okeru shi no kannen (the view of death in japan),” in, sei to shi (life and death) (tokio: tokyodaigakusyuppankai, 1992), p. 48. address correspondences to: eva marsal university of education karlsruhe, germay e-mail: marsal@ph-karlsruhe.de and takara dobashi hiroshima university, japan e-mail: dobashi@hiroshima-u.ac.jp analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 68 approaches to learning and teaching: some observations. michael jackson “teachers don’t teach, but students learn.” jacob neuhauser introduction college professors often say that their goal as teachers is to assist students to think for themselves. one way to do that is by taking note of the growing body of research into teaching and learning in higher education. after all, approaching teaching in a scholarly way, mindful of recent research, making decisions based on evidence, seeking feedback systematically, and the like, parallels the approach we take as researchers. thanks to ernest boyer’s scholarship reconsidered: priorities of the professoriate (1990), this approach is widely known as the scholarship of teaching and learning. these pages offer a survey of theoretical and empirical findings in the scholarship of teaching and learning, outside the united states. the focus is on elements that have immediate practical implications for the classroom in humanities and social science. some findings confirm common practice while other findings spotlight alternatives. what do students and teachers say about teaching and learning? both usually describe a good class in pretty much the same terms. more often than not, students and teachers say they want active experiences on a high level. neither wants passive and boring sessions where the inert hands of the clock droop like a salvador dali painting. teachers say they want students to be responsive, and students say they want classes to be lively (jackson and prosser 1985; jackson and prosser 1989; jackson 1990; booth 1997; and jackson 2006a). despite this common ambition, students and teachers do not always find that classes work that way. students in political theory, as in many other fields, require conceptual change and growth. in practice, with a teaching load to manage and other commitments, it can be tempting to approach teaching as information presentation and transmission, an administrative conception of teaching (svensson and högfors 1988). sometimes this kind of administrative teaching just does not result in student learning. student learning goes well beyond completed assignments and grades to conceptual growth and change in the way students think. student learning happens when the concepts students use to analyze arguments and phenomena enlarge and change. at the start of a course on utopia, my students make maps of the concepts they associate with utopia (novak 1998). their responses are largely predictable at the beginning, and they are relatively sparse, but by the end of the semester they have developed a much larger, more complicated, set of 65 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 69 conceptual relations. of course, there is variation among them on the degree of change and the success with which they master this change. there is also individuality along with much common ground that is now better understood. why spend precious time reflecting on teaching or seeking evidence at all? why not just get on with the job? commendable as that focus is, first, we do have evidence that there is teaching-without-learning, that not all students grasp the fundamentals we teach even in the most well organized lectures. teachers often speak of their frustrations with students (as students do of teachers). even academically successful students, who can spot a faulty argument in a classroom, do not think as critically outside a classroom. for example, many economics graduates believe that production costs determine price, while economists refer to the higher law of supply and demand (saunders 1980; dahlgren 1984). howard becker (1968) says sociology students likewise retain naïve misconceptions. in another example, the short film a private universe (schneps 1988) shows harvard university science graduates explaining the change of the season by the earth’s proximity to the sun rather than to the tilt of its axis in stellar orbit. i know that my own students understand thomas hobbes’s compelling arguments against the destructive power of opinion, but when they discuss contemporary politics, it is all a matter of opinion. the administrative approach to teaching the administrative approach to teaching emphasizes order, validity, and coverage of the material presented to students. if students take accurate notes and study the powerpoint slides posted on the web site, the information has been transmitted (handal, lauvå et al. 1990). the material moves students from like to like in small steps. this is the way jean piaget described psycho-motor learning (piaget 1956). however, conceptual frameworks are not increments of each other on the same plane. some are antithetical to others; they assume what others contest. a post-modernist says all is opinion while an empiricist cites hard reality. these two frameworks are antithetical rather than continuous. learning to appreciate what contesting conceptual frameworks have to offer takes more than small steps. it may take a leap of faith to put aside one’s own point of view to try another, and another. information presentation cannot fill this bill, no matter how well done. perhaps an analogy from sports helps. learning to play different positions on a team is best done by playing those positions in practice, not seeing information presented about the needs of different positions no matter how well done. there is no bright line between the quality of information presented and conceptual growth and change in students (marton and ramsden 1988). listening to even more lectures on logic may not make the listener more logical. rather than place all our efforts on improving teaching, we could take some time to consider how students approach learning and try to manage that. surface and deep approaches to learning what is the distinction between surface and deep approaches to learning? a student taking a surface approach to learning is one who strives to reproduce what the teacher does without trying to understand why the teacher does it that way (ramsden 1988a). if i put a passage from jean-jacques rousseau’s vibrant prose on the screen this student will copy it down. while copying it this student may not hear the interpretation of that passage. this student assumes that if a passage is selected and screened then it must be important in itself (ramsden 1992). yes, sometimes that may be true, but not always. sometimes a lecturer singles out a passage to bring the class back to the text, or to make a transition to another point, or a comparison with a different perspective, or to illustrate a common error, and so on. the passage can be a means to, not an end of, understanding the nature and limits of rousseau’s arguments and not simply to transfer received knowledge to the students’ notes. 66 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 70 if a student adopts a surface approach, that student will focus on the signs (the passage) as discrete elements, memorize the information for examinations, and associate concepts and facts without the significance of context. unaware of the topography of a field of study, such a student treats everything as though it exists on the same flat surface, and does not discriminate between different kinds of meaning (assumptions, concepts, theories, evidence, and argument) but treats each as equally arbitrary. students who approach learning as an endless series of isolated lumps of material to be remembered will also be the most likely to perceive a large workload in their study. they lack principles, concepts, or theories in which to locate these lumps. assignments and grades do not alone compel deep approaches to learning. smart students using the surface approach to learning may well absorb enough information and command enough material to pass an examination. some will boast of it. many teachers see some of the longer-term evidence of this surface approach to learning in graduates who a few short years later can barely remember what they did in university. please note that a surface approach to learning is not rote learning, which has a place in learning multiplication tables, verb conjugations, the latin names of bones, and the like. nor is the surface approach an irremediable psychological attribute. it is a tactical choice, and as such may be influenced by teachers. in deep approaches to learning a student concentrates on what is signified (arguments and conclusion) not on the signs, and tries to apply the concepts being studied to experience, to distinguish argument from evidence, to relate and integrate knowledge from a variety of sources, and to organize material into structures with several dimensions. of course, a student taking this deep approach may err, but this approach is the one that promises conceptual growth. if errors are never surfaced, they cannot be amended in teaching. it is easy to blame the lack of deep approaches to learning on externalities. the usual suspects today are timepoverty identified by students and attention span deficit identified by teachers. conversely, the argument here is that a student committed to a surface approach to learning will not go deep, no matter how much time there is, no matter how much concentration there is during that time. that is, the intention with which the student approaches a task is itself decisive, not time nor attention-span. there is ample empirical evidence to support this argument (marton 1992; prosser 1993). students matched on indicators of achievement like admissions scores performed differently on interpretative tasks and those differences traced back to the stated intentions that the students applied to the tasks. in one study, students read and re-read a franz kafka story. they were given as much time as they needed, and they were each asked to re-read the story at least once. students who read the story in a surface approach, trying to capture and retain detail, read the story time after time to point being able to recite it word-for-word without yet grasping its meaning. whereas other students instructed to look for the meaning, did so (svensson and högfors 1988). they tried to relate the events in the story to their own experience and to see the meaning of the story beyond the detail. instead of memorizing detail, they asked themselves why the author had written the story. it can be that simple; instruct students to test what they study against their own experience, other concepts, or general knowledge. the tragedy occurs when bright students alive with the excitement of learning and teachers possessed by a love of knowledge meet in mutual incomprehension with one side floundering in a surface approach to learning, trying to capture and reproduce everything, and the other bunkered in an administrative approach to teaching that covers every detail. the result is a mutual incomprehension as profound as that c. p. snow saw in the two cultures of science and the arts. students’ perceptions of learning are shaped by previous experience, contemporary events, peers, family, the school, the degree, the discipline studied, the physical character of the classroom, the timetable, and the idiosyncrasies of teachers. causation here is, as always, multiple. there is a great deal on that list, but its focus is the classroom, and it is there that lecturers can influence students’ perceptions. again there is encouraging evidence. students, many of whom with no idea of academic governance, can perceive a learning environment 67 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 71 in a department where instructors are broadly consistent in their approach to teaching (bain and thomas 1984; lizzio, wilson et al. 2002; david 2004). and education practice and research continues to identify a myriad of techniques to use in gaining and directing students approaches to learning, like problem-based learning, internships, case studies, discovery learning and the like (cryer and elton 1992). there is no shortage of techniques, but the suggestion in these pages is that the application of these techniques will have greater effect if it is informed by recognition of students’ approaches to learning, and if these approaches are made explicit and legitimated, so that a bright students seek meaning rather than retaining every detail. an anecdote may assist. a colleague lecturing to a group of two hundred students carefully broke up the fifty-minute sessions into two or three parts each time. at the end of each part of the exposition, the colleague invited students to discuss the material just presented among themselves. this practice arose from a humane consideration of the length of attention space being about twenty minutes. yet never did this colleague find out by any means what it was that students discussed among themselves in those pauses. from where the students sat, in tiers, the peer discussion was simply filler, not a part of the learning experience. why might one seek feedback from students in such pauses? it would be one way immediately to confirm conceptions and to identify and address misconceptions. how can one get feedback from 250 students in a tiered lecture theatre? a simple show of hands in response to propositions on slides is one of many classroom techniques available. the point of this aside is that in this case the technique is sound, but it is at least partly wasted because the intention was merely to provide a pause not to capture and work with students’ responses. the one thing we have most control over is our own intentions as teachers. if our strategy is to promote conceptual change in students, then we are well advised to select teaching techniques that encourage and support approaches to learning that are associated with conceptual change. among the critical factors that shape students’ perceptions, four stand out. they are the (1) course objectives, (2) assignments, (3) teaching methods, and the (4) workload. there is research literature on these four, which i will briefly sketch. course objectives are critical. if an instructor spends half an academic hour saying why this course is important, that will give students a guide for the remainder of the semester, the more so if those objectives are occasionally reiterated. these objectives may be described within the context of the course alone. why should a student take history of political theory 201 very seriously if that student is not a major or a minor in political science? why indeed? some very good answers can be given to that question, and given they should be. the objectives can be intellectual, social, or moral; they can be the intrinsic satisfaction of understanding or the extrinsic use of clear thinking. with a set of objectives students can fix priorities, making it easier for them to navigate deep approaches. that grades motivate students is a truism, but what may be less obvious is that one empirical study found that “the majority of students reported greater use of transformational [deep] activities for the open-ended assessment [assignments] than for the closed examinations; and conversely less use of reproductive [surface] activities with the open-ended assignments than with the short answer and closed examinations” (bain and thomas 1984). grades can encourage students to take deep approaches only if the assignments are conducive to deep approaches to learning. a true-false test is not conducive, but a term paper can be. if there are pressures to teach more students and to cut costs by using more examinations, then we need a rational argument with empirical evidence that open-ended assignments lead to better results for students, not simply assert that the term paper is preferable, because it is the tradition. teaching methods are the heart of the matter. autonomy and responsibility fuel those students ready to take deep approaches, and give others the incentive to try. if there is no free discussion, if there is no freedom 68 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 72 for students to make choices, say about what to write the term paper about or what kind of argument to make, students are less likely to adopt deep approaches to learning. some argue that when course objectives, assignments, and teaching methods align, they have the greatest influence (kember, ng et al. 1996). this is not always the case. in one department where i taught, the rhetoric emphasized critical thinking and the like, but the reality was a curriculum with set essay topics and prescribed reading lists for each topic in every course. students wrote essays by piecing together passages from the restricted list of reading. entwistle and tait (1990) interviewed undergraduate students from more than sixty departments, and found that departments with assignments that placed a premium on factual information and gave students less freedom (and thus less responsibility) led students to the surface approach to these assignments; as did another modest study (jackson 2006b). this study compared faculty reports of approaches to teaching with data from students’ perceptions of fields of study. when faculty respondents stressed the administrative approach to teaching, students described work in that field in terms of the surface approach to learning. in addition, feedback on assignments is another crucial element associated with the approach to learning taken by students in these departments. if the feedback focused on compliance to rules about spacing and the like and details of the subject, the surface approach remained, as it did if there was no feedback apart from the grade. one implication of the discussion to this point is that it might be more effective to manage students’ perceptions of the learning environment than to concentrate on special study skills sessions, essay writing workshops, yet more powerpoint slides, more self-paced web material, and the like. there are few technical solutions to human problems. students’ “perceptions of teaching and assessment methods [assignments] in academic departments are significantly associated with … students approaches to studying” (entwistle and ramsden 1983; this finding was also corroborated recently by diseth and martinsen 2003). workload includes not only assignments, though they are crucial, but also the number of contact hours, duration of the classes, length of assigned reading, and the syllabus itself. if students perceive a heavy workload, and i stress ‘perceive,’ they are more likely to take a surface approach to learning to manage the volume of work. we all do the same when there is just too much to do. we know this and yet there are professors who set fifteen written assignments in a ten-week quarter. such an instructor grows exhausted reading and grading these assignments, the more so because most of them are superficial. equally, the nature of the assignments influences students’ approaches to learning. students will study for technical examinations by concentrating on the form of the material rather than its meaning (ramsden 1988b). they can reproduce platonic arguments in political theory but they cannot explain or evaluate them. students’ perceptions of the volume of work are stimulated in the first instance by the syllabus itself. if it is long and detailed, it is easy for students to conclude that the workload is heavy. before the end of the first class, these students start the course on the assumption of a high workload and govern themselves accordingly by looking for short cuts. teachers, who dedicate themselves to thinking of everything and setting it all out in the syllabus or on a web site, may be discouraging deep approaches in students. the different ways – surface and deep – students approach learning emerges readily in conversation, in research interviews, questionnaire studies of student descriptions of learning activities, and in one’s own observations in and out of class (gow and kember 1993; prosser, trigwell et al. 2003). fortunately, research has identified deep and surface approaches that classroom teachers can use to good effect. finding ways to manage that difference constructively is an opportunity to enhance learning. 69 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 73 conclusion deep approaches to learning can be cultivated with reflective assignments so that students can think back about their own work (by revising an essay), or by comparing their work with that of peers by posting work on a web site. deep approaches to learning can be legitimated by encouraging students to relate what they are learning in one course with work in previous or contemporary courses, rather than narrowing the focus to this course alone. deep approaches to learning grow from encouraging students to apply what they are learning to their own lives and to consider messy reality rather than sterile thought-experiments. in sum, many classroom techniques are available and they need to be used purposefully to stimulate, encourage, reward, and enhance students taking deep approaches to learning. success is never guaranteed. students who take deep approaches will make mistakes. students who read for meaning may miss details. students who try to interpret and evaluate material will err. but their mistakes, oversights, and errors give the teacher openings to influence the thinking of these students. students who are content to memorize detail and repeat it, will never quite see the point of the assignments they have done, and will, more likely, quickly forget them. * * * jacob neuhauser (1992, p. 1030) put it best: “teachers don’t teach, but students learn. students should ask their teachers: (1) let me discover. don’t tell me things. (2) give advice in my terms. (3) when my work is poor, tell me how to improve it.” references bain, j. and p. thomas (1984). contextual dependence of learning approaches. human learning 3(4): 230-242. becker, h., b. greer, et al. (1968). making the grade. new york, wiley. booth, a. (1997). listening to students: experiences and expectations in the transition to a history degree. studies in higher education 22(2): 205-220. boyer, e. (1990). scholarship reconsidered: priorities of the professoriate. princeton, n.j., carnegie foundation for the advancement of teaching. cryer, p. and elton, l. (1992). effective learning in higher education (sheffield: cvcp staff development and training unit). dahlgren, l. o. (1984). outcomes of learning. the experience of learning. f. marton. edinburgh, scottish academic press. david, k. (2004). interpreting student workload and the factors which shape students’ perceptions of their workload. studies in higher education 29(2): 165-184. diseth, a. and o. martinsen (2003). approaches to learning, cognitive style, and motives as predictors of academic achievement. educational psychology 23(2): 195-208. entwistle, n. and p. ramsden (1983). understanding student learning. london, croom helm. entwistle, n. and h. tait (1990). approaches to learning, evaluations of teaching, and preferences for contrasting academic environments. higher education 19: 169-199. gow, l. and d. kember (1993). conceptions of teaching and their relationship to student learning. british journal of educational psychology 63: 20-33. handal, g., p. lauvå, et al. (1990). the concept of rationality in academic science teaching. european journal of education 25: 319-332. jackson, m. (2006a) ‘great classroom teaching’ and more: awards for outstanding teaching evaluated. international journal of educational management, 20(4), 261-278. jackson, m. (2006b) approaches to teaching and perceptions of learning: a research note, mountainrise, 3,2, 20 pp. retrieved from http://www.wcu.edu/facctr/mountainrise/archive/vol3no2/html/jackson.pdf 70 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 74 jackson, m. (1990). knowledge for what? australian quarterly 48(1): 4-14. jackson, m. and m. prosser (1985). de-lecturing. higher education 14: 651-663. jackson, m. and m. prosser (1989). less lecturing, more learning. studies in higher education 14(1): 55-68. kember, d., s. ng, et al. (1996). an examination of the interrelationships between workload, study time, learning approaches and academic outcomes. studies in higher education 21(3): 347-358. lizzio, a., k. wilson, et al. (2002). university students’ perceptions of the learning environment and academic outcomes: implications for theory and practice. studies in higher education 27(1): 27-52. marton, f. (1992). differences in understanding and the use of reflective variation in reading. british journal of educational psychology 62(1): 1-16. marton, f. and p. ramsden (1988). what does it take to improve learning? in p. ramsden (ed.), improving learning: new perspectives. london, kogan page. marton, f. and r. säljö (1984). approaches to learning. the experience of learning. f. marton. edinburgh, scottish academic press. neuhauser, j. (1992). the social contract between teachers and students. in w. safire (ed.), lend me your ears: great speeches in history (pp. 1027-1030). new york, norton. novak, joseph (1998) learning, creating, and using knowledge : concept maps as facilitative tools in schools and corporations. mahwah, nj, l. erlbaum associates. piaget, jean (1954) the child’s construction of reality (margaret cook, trans.). london: routledge & kegan paul. prosser, m. (1993). phenomenography and the principles and practices of learning. higher education research and development 12(1): 21-31. prosser, m., k. trigwell, et al. (2003). dissonance in experience of teaching and its relation to the quality of student learning. studies in higher education 28(1): 37-49. ramsden, p. (1988a). studying learning: improving teaching. in p. ramsden (ed.), improving learning: new perspectives (pp. 15-25). london, kogan. ramsden, p. (1988b). context and strategy. in r. r. scmeck (ed.), learning strategies and learning styles (pp. 155168). new york, plenum. ramsden, p. (1992). learning to teach in higher education. london, routledge. saunders, p. (1980). the lasting effects of introductory economics courses. journal of economic education 12(1): 1-14. schneps, m. h. (1988). a private universe. [video tape.] cambridge, harvard university. svensson, l. and c. högfors (1988). conceptions as the content of teaching. in p. ramsden (ed.), improving learning (pp. 162-177). london, kogan page. address correspondences to: michael jackson, ph. d. professor institute for teaching and learning university of sydney sydney, nsw 2006 australia fax: 61 2 93513624 telephone: 61 2 93512055 michael.jackson@sydney.edu.au 71 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 2 82 recognition, tolerance, respect and empathy maría del rosario del collado after working for the last nine years with children at a private primary school in mexico city in order to build communities of inquiry, an essential methodology of the ‘philosophy for children’ (p4c) program of dr. matthew lipman and dr. ann margaret sharp, i have perceived the difficulty that pupils have in respecting ideas from their own schoolmates and friends. since respect is an integral component of successful communities of inquiry, lack of respect in the classroom is a serious problem. to incorporate the methodology of the philosophy for children program is not an easy task. it requires that students are conscious of themselves and others as worthy of respect, unique and irreplaceable as individuals. i believe that implementing an educational proposal like the one expressed by lipman makes sense and is deeply significant; however, this approach must be supplemented by work from complementary disciplines, especially psychology and its tradition of humanistic psychology, with thinkers like abraham maslow, carl rogers, and rollo may. according to client-centered therapy, as developed, for example, by carl rogers (1961), we have summarized the following six characteristics: 1. people are worthy, unique and irreplaceable beings, holding a special capacity to be self-conscious and to take decisions toward self-development. 2. people are considered as biological-psychological-social-spiritual beings, recognizing their structure as a unit composed of body and spirit. people are beings who, on the one hand, are subject to physical and biological laws of nature, but on the other hand, are in need of other beings so they can transform themselves. this is to say that human beings are connected to each other and have a natural tendency to seek their self-fulfillment in material, intellectual, emotional, social and spiritual needs. 3. people are self-conscious beings capable of self-directed behavior. they recognize in themselves the capacity to perceive their own existence through their perception of the environment, know their capacity for introspection and self-consciousness, and have the possibility to modify the idea they have of themselves and their attitudes, and to direct their own actions toward what they find pleasing, which entails the possibility of controlling their emotions. people respond to reality depending on the way they perceive it. and when they are conscious of this reality, people need not automatically react to it, but instead handle it in relation to their own judgments. 4. each person recognizes him or herself as someone who has the possibility of positive behavior and who can act toward self-development. 5. people are beings who develop better in a favorable environment. 6. finally, the human being is a social being. this is to say that the human being could not recognize and be conscious of herself without the presence of other human beings, so it can be said that she is a being in connection with others, and that is why interpersonal relationships are so important for her. this goes along with the proposal to build communities of dialogue, as the human being gets to discover herself and develops herself through other human beings. as we have observed in the implementation of the p4c program at the primary educational level of my school, analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 2 83 especially in regard to the building of communities of inquiry, there are a number of previous conditions that need to be in play in order to generate this style of educational community. children who have no experience recognizing the importance of thinking about, and feeling for, themselves as persons, or perceiving others as persons similar to themselves, will be unable to build a community within the classroom that can create critical, creative and caring thinking. from our work in different groups, we realized that it is very important that young students perceive others as persons. however, in order to recognize the dignity and importance of other persons, students must first recognize their own dignity, which brings us to the concept of ‘recognition.’ only when someone has an experience in which she recognizes her own dignity, can she then move to the next level of recognizing the importance of others. consequently, when attempts are made to form communities of inquiry, it is important that teachers do not assume that students have discovered their own sense of dignity; if this previous work of self-discovery has not been undertaken, students can hardly be expected to perceive the other’s importance. i suggest as an initial step toward building communities of inquiry, that teachers perform exercises that enable students to discover, and so recognize, their own significance as unique persons of value. once i discover myself as someone important, i can come to see the need to silence my own expectations and assumption in order to listen better to others who are equally as important. as a second step toward building communities of dialogue, we have to understand the concept of ‘tolerance.’ the values dictionary of hector rogel defines tolerance as follows: “the attitude of someone, who is willing not to repress the conviction of others, especially those of a religious or moral kind, even though they seem to him false or deserving to be rejected, neither prevents their expression.” however, taking an attitude of tolerance does not mean that one needs to either approve of such convictions or be indifferent toward what is right or wrong. the demand for tolerance is based on the person’s liberty to, under his own judgment, decide what is true or false, what is good or bad; it is also based on the indisputable fact that people can be mistaken. therefore, tolerance is demanded by the principle of justice, which implies the recognition of someone’s right to their own beliefs. in being tolerant we respect the person’s capacity to formulate judgments. however, tolerance has its limits, specifically when tolerance itself becomes an issue, or in other words, the extent to which a person has a right to act according to his thoughts. a person’s rights are not unlimited, since they are limited by other person’s rights; neither individuals nor communities are obliged to accept actions carried out in the name of freedom of conscience that clearly impact the rights of others. additionally, we believe an important corollary of this view is the principle that no one can be legally forced to do something against his own conscience, taking liberty of conscience as a fundamental human right. looked at from a more positive point of view, tolerance deals with “the frank acceptance of other human beings as equally respectable, allowing this other person to be as he is.” virgilio ruiz declares that “recognition and respect for others as persons belong to tolerance, not only because their human dignity but it is assumed that they put all their effort to pursue truth and welfare.” (ruiz, 2005 p.41) ruiz provides an expanded concept of tolerance that makes clear its importance in the building of communities of dialogue, since a spirit of tolerance is needed within such communities that allow people to express themselves while building and consolidating their own thoughts. additionally, ruiz mentions that the idea and practice of tolerance is directly related not only to the personal analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 2 84 development of the individual, but also to two of the most important principles of modern democratic states: the principle of equality and principle of liberty. these principles are deeply integrated into the philosophy for children program and how it is structured. for most authors, tolerance is a positive concept that refers to that attitude through which ideas, beliefs and behaviors different from one’s own, are allowed. thus, it is understood that toleration also implies respecting other persons and their ideas. the theorist todorov explains this point as follows: evidently, i can only be tolerant toward other humans if i postulate from the beginning, that all of us share the same human essence and therefore i suggest that others deserve the same respect. we must recognize that men are equal in order to admit that at the same time they are different. tolerance based on equality should not face any limit and in a reciprocal way, any unequal discrimination is condemnable. ruiz, 2005, p. 42) ruiz explains that he who is tolerant does not expect self-confirmation, either through a violent conversion or bettering of others; rather, his main concern would be a coexistence based on equality and mutual understanding. in order to achieve this, we require: “the capacity to listen…and to seriously take others into account, besides acquiring the attitude to learn through new situations and new information.” (ruiz, 2005, p.172) as mentioned in international documents like unesco’s letter of tolerance, (unesco, 1995) the struggle against intolerance requires education and it is precisely the process of building communities of dialogue that we will enable us to build such privileged spaces and transform individuals. another complex concept that is related to notion of tolerance is that of ‘respect.’ although this is a very familiar term, it seems that its full meaning has been lost on many people. we consider it important to unpack the full meaning of respect as we build our communities of dialogue. everybody uses the word respect, yet if we compare the scholarship dedicated to this moral value as opposed to others like love or justice, it does not appear sufficiently studied. josep m. esquirol mentions that respect comes from how we look at the world. respect is an ethical attitude that directly links us to things, and the world itself, in which we find a close relationship between the world and ourselves; it is an attitude of the subject toward someone or something deserving of respect. in thinking about what the word “respect” means, we also need to consider what kind of entities deserve respect, and the many things in the world worthy of respect. we have perceived in the communities of dialogue that respect is an essential attitude that enables one to participate and get in touch with other members of the group. i think that respect is a very common term, one that may even be part of many people’s daily vocabulary. everybody uses it, knows its meaning, and understands that respect for other people and for certain things, is a good example of moral behavior (esquirol, 2006, p. 11). it is also helpful to see respect as a virtue; instead of the ‘courageous’ or ‘wise’ person, we could consider the person as ‘respectful.’ it is often the case that moral terms are not as clear as they could be. quoting josep m. esquirol, he tells us about the well-known sentence of marx: “the worker is more in the need of respect rather than bread,” where we find that the meaning of the word “respect” is close to “recognition.” the worker wants to be recognized as a subject, but as esquirol emphasizes respect is something more than just recognition. even though respect presupposes recognition, recognition does not necessarily presuppose respect. consequently, marx’s sentence may have been better expressed as “the worker is more in…need of recognition rather than bread” (esquirol, 2006, p.12). without recognition we can hardly expect to be respected. this relates to the point we made previously that analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 2 85 the person should first recognize himself if respect is to be possible. to treat someone or something with respect means primarily to treat them with attention. if we look in many dictionaries we find that the word “respect” is equivalent or is a close synonym to terms like “consideration,” “deference,” “attention,” and “regard.” the castilian word “regard” (“miramiento”) can perfectly function as a synonym of respect: to treat someone with regard means having respect or attention for them. in german, the word “achtung” means respect as well as attention. for esquirol, this equivalence shows the medullar meaning of the term, namely, attention: the essence of respect is the attentive look as a condition for the possibility of respect. esquirol explains that respect comes from the attentive look: “not everything that we look [at] attentively ends up deserving our respect, but it can be said that some things that we look [at] attentively…can also end up being respected by us.” (esquirol, 2006, p. 13) one place where looking attentively is very important is in the building and maintaining of communities of dialogue. without the attentiveness of participants it is impossible to establish the minimal conditions needed to initiate dialogue. therefore, as esquirol makes evident, the concept of respect is an essential attitude to develop in students who participate in the community of inquiry, which is an attitude grounded in how we look and pay attention. as facilitators of communities of dialogue, we will have to discover exercises and practices that can help achieve a way of looking at others that shows our attentiveness, our desire to generate dialogue. we can think of respect as a type of movement, but not in the sense of a mechanical or local movement. the type of movement expressed by respect is perhaps best understood with reference to aristotle and his conception of movement as “dynamis.” this notion includes what could be called “life movement” or “eros;” for example, the encounter between two lovers is a kind of movement that surpasses both. similarly, respect is akin to a movement but one whose approach also keeps some distance, generating an approximate proximity while keeping distance between subjects. how we approach someone or something is a condition for appreciation; if the distance is considerable and the object we seek to appreciate cannot be perceived clearly, so neither can it be rightfully appreciated. esquirol says: “i realize the existence of persons, situations and things by first approaching them; it is only through approximation [that] i can perceive their singularity, their value.” (esquirol, 2006, p.58) given our consideration of respect outlined above, it seems that one can work towards creating respect in the community of dialogue by stressing its importance in the building of a respectful dialogue community, where everyone could participate in this dialogue without fear of exclusion. at the level of dialogue, respect exists in terms of whether we give due consideration to others as valuable, which is something we can convey in the very way we look at others. it is in classroom work where this look of consideration can be practiced and exercised. the differences between members of the classroom, is something teachers are confronted with every day. however, these differences can be understood in different ways. we can learn to recognize these differences and tolerate them, which enables participants to look attentively at their relationships with one another, making respect come much more easily. such an atmosphere of mutual respect allows dialogue to come to life. and so the true meaning of respect comes to the fore as we recognize not only the differences between other members of the community, but also our own. through engaging in dialogue respectfully, we learn to live well, to pay attention to the world and others around us, to respect ourselves and see how this self-respect is inseparable from respect for others. thus, in the end, engaging in respectful dialogue allows us to see that it is other human beings who, through their distance and differences, help widen our own perceptions of ourselves and the world. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 2 86 finally, i would like to explore one more concept, that of ‘empathy.’ i believe this notion not only helps facilitate acceptance and respect, for ourselves and others, but can also help deepen our discovery of ourselves and others as persons. although the concept of empathy has received some attention from the perspective of philosophy, i approach the term largely from the perspective of therapy and the creation of therapeutic environments. according to the psychology dictionary of carlos gisbert, “empathy” is defined as: “the emotional approach or instinctive knowledge of another person caused by his behavior or state, provoking a comprehension and acceptance attitude up to the point of sharing or even experiencing his/her feelings. this is where different individuals tend to regularly show reactions of empathy in various degrees.” (gisbert, 1999). going deeper into this concept and analyzing it through the lens of humanistic psychology, such as the work of american psychotherapist carl rogers, we can easily see the value of empathy. the state of empathy or emphatic comprehension, is the right perception of the internal reference frame of another person with the meanings and emotional components in it, as if one were the other person, but never excluding the condition of ‘as if.’ empathy implies, for example, to feel the pain or pleasure of another person as he/she feels it, and to perceive the causes for them as he/she perceives them, but always being conscious that either the pain or pleasure are his/hers. if this condition of ‘as if’ is absent, we face ourselves before a case of identification. (rogers, 1998, p. 45) this capacity to think and feel the internal life of another person as if it were our own, and yet do so without losing our own identity, appears to be a capacity that is indispensable for getting close to someone else. it is really only when we recognize the feelings, thoughts and experiences of others, that we can feel a personal identification with them. learning how to live in another’s shoes without forgetting ourselves is an essential aspect of empathy. empathy is needed when engaging in philosophy for children and facilitating communities of inquiry, and it is needed not only by those who facilitate communities of dialogue, but also by those students who participate in them. it is empathy that allows us to get into the other’s world and understand it, silencing our own thoughts to listen and perceive the views of others. the community of inquiry is that place in which we can perceive other persons while still being ourselves; it is precisely through our perceptions of what the other is and thinks that we can enrich our own perception. in the words of marie-france daniel (1998), “once we recognize in [the] other person, similar needs like ours, we may wish to approach him/her to even see our own humanity.” empathy, then, is the capacity to feel and think as if we were some other person, but without forgetting our own identity in the process. having an empathetic attitude allows us to understand another’s point of view and situation, rather than just judging them from our own perspective. when we really understand someone, it does not matter if that person thinks like us or not. the important thing is that we can begin to comprehend his/her needs and reasons, which gives us the possibility of widening our horizons and our own perspective. in order to have empathy it is necessary that we learn how to be flexible. being intolerant and strict will never allow us to listen and understand the other’s reasons. and that is why empathy without tolerance, a concept we discussed earlier, would be difficult to acquire or apply. in méxico there is a series of programs related to the acquisition and spreading of values, such as, the “the force of values” program (la fuerza de los valores). the slogan of the program seems to follow the values we have been exploring: “to see things under others’ perspectives, changes ours, and tolerance as well as acceptance analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 2 87 of differences grow.” (albarrán noriega, p. 13) even though i believe that philosophy for children is probably the program best suited to cultivate these values, as it encourages the child to not only model these values in their actions, but also to reflect on them and give them a meaning that makes sense within their own experience, it is an encouraging sign to see programs that celebrate values like tolerance. our reflections on the meaning and role of the concepts of recognition, tolerance, respect and empathy, should make clear why these concepts are so integral to building a community of inquiry. moreover, we understand the rich complexity of these concepts and the way they underscore the moral dimension of being human. we also realize the difficulty of trying to consolidate such attitudes in the moral education of students. moreover, we also need to recognize, as mary france daniel explains (1992, p. 247-268), that just as our understanding of human beings needs to be filled out by other disciplines like psychology and educational pedagogy that can understand our motivational and affective nature, so logic and the development of reasoning abilities are also indispensable from the first years of formal education, otherwise no serious work can be achieved in the moral education of our students. moral education requires the inclusion of the discipline [of] logic in this formation. logic will complement imagination just as [well as] the affective and psychological dimension of the person… but just as…logical reasoning can prove useful in some occasions, [technical] knowledge, sensitivity toward others, the opening of spirit and the imagination, may sometimes become more relevant. (daniel, 1998, p. 61) i recommend we look at the cultivation of values like recognition, tolerance, respect and empathy in a similar interdisciplinary sprit, as necessary conditions for the moral education of the individual and the building of future communities of dialogue. as mary france daniel explains in the quote above, moral education should not limit itself to instructing children in what society expects of them; rather we also need to cultivate sensitivity toward others, critical reasoning and logic, and the constructive use of imagination. moreover, any moral education without practice will be incomplete, while the impact of any true moral education should be verifiable at the level of individual moral behavior and reflected at the level of sound moral judgments. the solution pursued by philosophy for children is to incorporate the distinctions discussed above, but do so primarily through the creation of communities of dialogue. it is precisely by seeing these distinctions as conditions that need to be implemented in order to build effective communities of inquiry that we are best able to solve the continuing problems that beset moral education. for example, michael schleifer discusses the importance of communities of inquiry in cultivating empathy. empathy, as schleifer mentions, “is the faculty to imagine the experience lived by [another] person… we must help children to develop their capacity to comprehend, feel and share [the] joy as well as sadness of [their] neighbor. when we show empathy before a person’s joy, we also avoid jealousy.” (schleifer, 2008, p.221) although there are some philosophers, educators and psychologists who think we should avoid putting too much emphasis on empathy, i strongly feel that empathy is something essential in the building of a community of dialogue. consequently, i fully agree with schleifer when he writes: “a person really being someone with empathy, either an adult, a child, a psychologist, a professor or a friend, will always consider his/her neighbor’s needs…[as] inclusively [as] his/her own…” and i also agree that empathy is not simply a competence or technique related to verbal and non-verbal expression, but is also related to cognitive and affective factors, and so perhaps is best seen as an attitude and as a moral concept. seen along these lines, empathy represents the capacity to “put ourselves in the place of others”, to comprehend analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 2 88 others, to consider the perspectives of others, which, in turn, helps us to interpret and decode their thoughts and feelings. and so, as schleifer reiterates, empathy does not primarily refer to how we react to other people, like when we start crying because we see someone else cry. neither is it is a simple projection or emotional contagion; instead, it is an attitude that has to do with being able to perfectly comprehend the point of view of the other, his/her thoughts, feelings and opinions, without losing our self-consciousness, our identity, or our own point of view. this is a point that was also mentioned in our earlier discussion of carl rogers. consequently, we have to help children to understand the multiple facets of empathy and encourage them to consider points of view different from their own if we hope to build viable communities of dialogue. we need to help children to understand empathy as an ability that has been recognized as essential in developing moral judgment and in the acquisition of a moral behavior. as schleifer emphasizes: children can apply the variations of the golden rule more efficiently, if they have acquired the necessary cognitive empathy. they will be more inclined to share and cooperate if they are able to show affective empathy, to read and comprehend other’s emotions, which of course means that they have learned to distinguish among their own emotions, to name them and comprehend them. children will develop a true concern for their neighbor.” (schleifer, 2008, p. 223) undoubtedly, it is a real challenge for those who facilitate communities of dialogue to not only consider the development of a child’s rational and cognitive abilities, but also participate in the construction of therapeutic experiences. the latter demand seems to require the facilitator have some experience working in the application of therapeutic techniques and exercises, recognizing and defining emotions so as to be able to better detect their own feelings and those of others. such emotions can be discovered through tales, personal stories, plays, and so, which also enable the educator to make use of his or her own personal experiences, something that schleifer thinks is important. through these types of exercises, we can consider another person’s feelings in a way that naturally promotes better self-assessment and a greater sensitivity toward others in the community of dialogue. finally, i want to conclude my analysis of recognition, tolerance, respect and empathy, with some questions and practical considerations for further thought. for example, how can we include some reflection on these concepts as a regular part of the class? which texts, exercises, and discussion plans can facilitate the analysis and comprehension of these concepts and attitudes among primary school students? what challenges will we have to face when trying to develop recognition, tolerance, respect and empathy in the classroom? what other philosophical perspectives could aid us in implementing these concepts? what kind of material is best suited for facilitating these concepts and attitudes in the classroom? how can we improve our educational background to better incorporate these concepts philosophically? at least one key insight that could guide us in our struggle to incorporate recognition, tolerance, respect and empathy into the building blocks of communities of inquiry, is to remember the promise of such communities of inquiry. that continually searching for the conditions to healthy communities of dialogue is part of the very nature of this community, keeping open a space that empowers us to reflect on our own existence and the world around us, and where the ancient search for truth, goodness and beauty, is constantly renewed as sources for the future. references albarran noriega, m.p. (2003). la fuerza de los valores. méxico d.f.: artax. bornstein, j.c. (2006). redescribiendo la comunidad de investigación pensamiento complejo y exclusión social. madrid: de la torre. brugger, w. (1983) diccionario de filosofía, barcelona, 15ª edición: herder. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 2 89 daniel, marie-france. (1992a). la philosophie et les enfants. le programme de lipman et le influence de dewey. montreal: logiques. daniel, marie-france. (1998a). la educación moral en la escuela primaria: tres modelos que hay que experimentar. crecimiento moral y filosofía para niños. españa: desclée de brouwer. esquirol j. m. (2006). el respeto o la mirada atenta, una ética para la era de la ciencia y la tecnología. barcelona: gedisa. farre martí, j. m, lasheras, perez m.g. (1999). diccionario de psicología. dirección c. gispert. barcelona: océano. gonzález garza a.m. (2008). el enfoque centrado en la persona aplicaciones a la educación. méxico: trillas. garcía moriyón f. (ed.). (1998). crecimiento moral y filosofía para niños. bilbao: desclée brouwer lipman, m. (1988). pensamiento complejo y educación. madrid: de la torre. mainou y abad, v. (2004): el enfoque centrado en la persona. méxico d.f.: cía. editorial impresora y distribuidora, s.a. rogel h. (2003). diccionario de valores. méxico d.f.: seminario conciliar de méxico. rogers, c. (1991). libertad y creatividad en la educación. méxico d.f: paidós rogers, c. (1990). psicoterapia centrada en el cliente. méxico d.f. paidós. rogers, c. (1961). on becoming a person. copyrigth renewed 1989 by carl rogers. introduction copyright 1995 by peter d. krammer, m.d.: boston new york: houghton mifflin company. rogers, c. (2006). el proceso de convertirse en persona. 1ª ed. 1964. méxico d.f. paidós. rogers, c. (1998). terapia, personalidad y relaciones interpersonales. ediciones nueva visión. buenos aires. ruiz, v. (2005). la tolerancia. méxico. d.f.: editorial porrúa. sharp, a. (1990). ¿qué es una comunidad de investigación? traducción de juan carlos lago bornstein. aprender a pensar, revista internacional de filosofía para niños y criancas. 2° semestre. madrid: de la torre. schleifer, m., con la colaboración de martiny, c. (2008). valores y sentimientos de los 2 a los 5 años como hablar de las emociones con nuestros hijos. barcelona: claret sau http://www.unesco.org/cpp/spdeclaraciones/tolerancia.htm(18/01/05) address correspondences to: maría del rosario del collado member of the mexican federation of philosophy for children. mexico city. e-mail: rdelcoll@yahoo.com.mx analytic teaching and philosophical praxis analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 37 matthew lipman’s model theory of the community of inquiry darryl m. de marzio introduction n an earlier publication, titled, “what happens in philosophical texts,”1 i present what i refer to as matthew lipman’s model theory of the philosophical text. i argue there that the distinctive form of lipman’s own philosophical novels—the curricular flagship of the philosophy for children program—lies in how they perform a modeling function, in the sense of being both a model of and a model for philosophical thinking. in addition, i attempt to locate through this theoretical rendering the place that lipman’s novels occupy in the history of written philosophical discourse, and argue that the novels are simultaneously retrospective and futuristic: harkening back to a time when philosophical texts served as a technology with which we form our philosophical thinking, rather than as an exposition to which, as readers, we are merely exposed; and, at the same time, i suggest that lipman’s novels point toward a hoped-for future in which narrative discourse might once again establish a position of priority over exposition in the development of philosophical curriculum. throughout this inquiry into the theoretical foundations of lipman’s philosophical novels i became more and more struck by the extent to which lipman relies upon the notion of a model and of modeling to account for the pedagogical importance of these otherwise peculiar texts. lipman’s philosophical novels teach philosophical thinking and participation in a community of inquiry by presenting, in narrative and contextualized form, models of philosophical thinking and community of inquiry. they are not intended merely to dramatize philosophy, or to make philosophy more developmentally appropriate, nor to provide a classroom community with a set of problematic situations about which to inquire. rather, lipman’s philosophical novels contain within them an educational trajectory—they aim to be formative, not simply informative. in this paper i seek to extend the aforementioned work by exploring lipman’s use of the notion of a model to account for his rendering of the community of inquiry. in likewise fashion, i wish to present a model theory of the community of inquiry (ci) as lipman both understood ci, as well as the way in which he developed ci as a teaching and learning practice. while my ambition in this paper is somewhat modest—i seek mainly to recapitulate lipman’s theory of ci and to highlight the significance of ci’s modeling function, and in so doing will rehearse points which many students of lipman and ci are already well aware—i believe that the upshot of the discussion will be a recalibration of the received view of lipman’s theory of community of inquiry, a view which tends to see ci primarily as a needed environmental condition for the development of reflective educational i analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 38 practice. rather, what i believe lipman’s model theory will show us is that community of inquiry is a model of reflective educational practice for the development of a more salutary community. as lipman puts it in a seldom cited, but i believe crucial essay which i will turn to shortly, “it is inquiry that makes for community and not community that makes for inquiry.”2 while lipman’s reference to the modeling function of the philosophical novel is substantially developed in several of his writings, most notably in the chapter, “teachers and texts: the springs of inquiry,” in the first edition of thinking in education,3 the notion that the community of inquiry itself serves as a model is developed much less coherently, with just few references sprinkled throughout lipman’s work. in fact, if we were to turn to lipman’s framing of ci in its barest most essential outline-form, as he transcribes in both editions of thinking in education, and also in natasha: vygotskian dialogues, we see that the initial step in the process of forming a community of inquiry is “the presentation of the text,” where the text functions as “a model, in story form, of a community of inquiry”.4 it would seem, then, that it is the text itself that serves as the model of and for the community of inquiry, a model that the community utilizes toward achieving its own formation, but that the community of inquiry itself does not follow or reflect any modeling function of its own. i was mainly convinced of this perspective—that according to lipman, it is the text, and in a somewhat weaker sense the teacher too, that serve as models of and for the community of inquiry, but that the community of inquiry itself is not a model—until i came across a passage in the seldom cited piece that i alluded to earlier, titled, “pixie and the relationship between cognitive modeling and cognitive practice,” a chapter lipman wrote for an edited collection of essays on the philosophical novel, pixie. there he writes the following: but if the model is a novel, what happens to the live teaching in the actual classroom—isn’t he or she supposed to be the model of thinking for the live pupils, and of thinking about thinking and all those other good things as well? my own opinion is that classroom teachers have seldom been in a position to provide their pupils with a model of inquiry into inquiry or learning to learn, nor is it essential that they think they need to be in such a position. the responsibility for such modeling can be appropriately delegated to the novel and the classroom community of inquiry.5 now, in addition to the clear declaration that lipman makes about delegating the responsibility for the modeling of thinking and ‘all those other good things’ to both the text and the community of inquiry—a statement that i will unpack in greater detail in what is to follow—is the seemingly striking opinion that it is inessential for the teacher to serve as such a model. my sense, however, is that this is a much more modest and familiar appraisal of the role of the teacher in the light of lipman’s understanding of the modeling function of the community of inquiry. indeed, the teacher is seldom expected to serve as a model of inquiry precisely because, as is analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 39 the case in more traditional educational landscapes, reflective inquiry is seldom expected to be practiced. but in a community of inquiry it is not the sole responsibility of the teacher qua teacher to model for the community its inquiry procedures. rather, that modeling function can be taken up by the text—if it is so designed—as well as the community itself. to reiterate, this is not to say that the teacher can never model inquiry in ci, but that insofar as the teacher does serve such a function it is because the teacher is a full-fledged member of the inquiring community, and not because the teacher has a special and distinctive status as a model of inquiry. as lipman says, “we should be wary of ascribing all the modeling for higher-order thinking to the teacher…true, the teacher does serve as a model, but not as a model for reasoning procedures. i think rather that the teacher provides the model of someone who transcends rather than rejects right-wrong answers in the sense of caring more for the process of inquiry itself that for the answer that might be right or wrong at a given time.”6 the point to the above discussion concerning the limited extent to which the teacher serves as a model is to underscore the more important point which i want to make, and that is that the community of inquiry, along with the philosophical text, are the primary models of inquiry and philosophical thinking. in what follows, i shall attempt to make clear what lipman’s understanding of a model and the function of modeling is and how the notion, when applied to the community of inquiry, carries with it profound educational and social significance. for lipman, modeling is itself a significant activity that any healthy community of inquiry actively engages, so that community of inquiry itself functions as a model of the very inquiry procedures and social relationships which it engenders. in addition, i seek to show how for lipman it is mainly the practice of inquiry modeled by the ci which becomes a model for the formation of a more salutary community life, rather than that the practice of community which the ci models functions as the model for the formation of inquiry. lipman’s notion of a model as one might have detected thus far, i have been using the term ‘model’ more or less interchangeably in two main ways—one being what might be called a noun-sense, in which the term ‘model’ refers to a thing, in the sense of a replica, or a smaller-scaled version of an original, and perhaps, ‘more-real’ object; the other sense of model being a verb-sense, in which an object is fashioned or formed in some intentional manner. the difference here is between a model of something or other, and a model for some state of affairs. this manner of usage, i argue, is consistent with the understanding lipman employs throughout his writings, and reflects a distinctive understanding of the notion so as to contrast it with other possible uses of the term. as i hope to make clear, this is no mere argument in semantics but rather a crucial point to be clear on as it helps clarify the educational and social significance of lipman’s theory and practice of community of inquiry. initially, it will be helpful to turn, albeit briefly, to lipman’s view of the philosophical novel in order to better tease out these two senses of the notion ‘model’. first of all, then, what are the philosophical novels a model of? they are a model of their own schematic mode of organization. the novels are narratives, but like most works of fiction they are composed schematically rather than analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 40 conceptually in that they arrange and organize states of affairs in a more organic and dynamic way so that, as lipman puts it, “every detail counts and adds to the quality of the whole”.7 conceptual organization, in contrast to the schematic mode, tends to arrange facts and states of affairs in a static way, as when, for example, a biographer assembles the details of a person’s life according to the concept of chronological time in which decade increments, the 1950s, the 1960s, and so on, serve as chapters. lipman’s novels are arranged schematically according to cognitive tools and inquiry procedures, such as relationships, in the case of pixie, or the rules of formal and informal logic, as in the case of harry stottlemeier’s discovery. in this way, the novels are models of the schemata of thinking, the stuff that there is to learn from reading the novels. secondly, the novels are also models of the history of philosophy. similar to the manner in which the texts serve as models of cognitive tools and inquiry procedures, arranged schematically rather than conceptually, the history of philosophy is also arranged according to its themes and modes of thinking, rather than say historical epochs, systems of thought, or the major figures of the tradition. when in elfie, for example, the title-character wonders whether or not she is actually thinking at a given moment, she replies, “dummy! if you can wonder, you must be thinking! and if you’re thinking, then…you’re for real.”8 here we have in the text a clear appropriation, not of the concept of the cartesian cogito, but of the manner of thinking peculiar to descartes and the philosophical tradition. following the first manner of being a model of the cognitive tools and inquiry procedures of philosophical thinking, lipman’s novels are also a model of the history of philosophy in this sense. as models, the texts therefore are the reflections and embodiments of the rational and creative thinking that lipman envisioned as operative in the full-fledged philosophical community of inquiry. but what are the texts models for in the verb-sense that i describe above? i believe lipman answers this at least provisionally when he writes that the philosophical text ought to be: [a] work of art that has a specific job to do—to be consummatory in providing the experience upon which reflection will take place, and to be instrumental in providing trails leading toward that reasonableness and judiciousness that are characteristic of the educated person.9 here we can see that what is at stake in the engagement with such a philosophical text is the experience and the formation of the reading subject, not the truth value of the propositions contained therein, or the exposition of the author’s thinking. the philosophical text is therefore a model for, as lipman puts it, the practice and development of reasonableness and judiciousness. it does not inform us of philosophical thinking, but works to form us in philosophical thinking. before explaining how this double sense of ‘model’ is applied to the community of inquiry, i want to be sure that the notion, at least in lipman’s rendering, is precise and does not imply other senses in which the term might be employed. by determining the contours of the notion of a model we should be able to get clearer on lipman’s understanding of ci so that we can begin to critique the view that ci is primarily an environmental condition or structural situation in which philosophical analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 41 inquiry can be free to take place. i am suggesting, then, that when we talk about the community of inquiry model in a lipmanian manner we must remain within the contours of the double sense of a model of and a model for, and that the notion of a model as a kind of deep educational structure in which we may have, for example, a “traditional model”, a “reflective model”, and so on, will weaken and thin the significance of the model and the modeling function in our understanding of ci. the notion of an educational model in the structural sense suggests a foundation or configuration that would allow for certain educational practices to take place. in this way, when we think of a community of inquiry, and in particular, a classroom community of inquiry, we can assume that there is a larger system or structure inside of which that specific community would operate, for example the school system itself, or perhaps even the larger social structure. now we may refer to this structure as a model, as in when one argues that classroom communities of inquiry require a reflective model of education to flourish.10 but i question whether we can refer to the community of inquiry itself as such a deep structural model, or if instead ci is a collective discourse phenomenon that occurs in concert with, or in spite of, the structural model that may surround it. when lipman refers to the community of inquiry as a model he does not employ the notion in the structural sense, though he does acknowledge the existence of such structural models. instead, he employs the notion strictly in the noun and verb senses that i describe above and in accordance with the idea of being a model of a state of affairs and a model for a state of affairs. the question to turn to now is what, precisely, does the ci model? the community of inquiry as a model lipman gives us our initial indication when he writes the following: in any community of inquiry, children will use other children’s behavior as models for their own. each child’s conduct is seen as exemplary. if one child is silent, the others may be likewise. if one child asks a question, the others may again do likewise. these behaviors gradually become normal practice within the community.11 based on this passage, it would appear that the community of inquiry, by virtue of its constituent members, models behaviors. however, we must probe more closely to determine which specific behaviors are to serve as models of ci. after all, we know from the social theory of cognition, whether from early theorists such as mead and vygotsky, who heavily influenced lipman, or more recent work by the likes of bandura, that any social matrix will engender those social relationships in which the behaviors exemplified by the prominent members of the group are modeled and then, in turn, get appropriated by the newest members.12 we can therefore ask, focusing on the details of this passage from lipman, whether the silent behavior of the child actually functions as a model in the community of inquiry if, in fact, such behavior becomes ‘normal practice within the community’? while such modeling may be a sign that social learning is indeed taking place, my sense is that such modeling analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 42 would not indicate especially that social learning within a community of inquiry is taking place. similarly, if question-asking functions as a model, is it the sort of question-asking behavior that would indicate whether the community of inquiry is modeling the behavior, or would we be looking at some other social matrix? we must conclude that if we are to consider the community of inquiry as a model of certain behaviors, we need to be precise as to what those behaviors are. in this respect, much scholarly work has been dedicated to both detailing and actualizing those specific behaviors that would prevail in the community of inquiry. an excellent example of such scholarship was presented at the 1998 naaci conference, in a paper by maughn gregory titled, “a behavioral pedagogy for the community of inquiry”.13 in this paper, gregory makes an important distinction between virtues of inquiry and behaviors of inquiry. by way of a hermeneutical blending of both the virtue ethics of aristotle and the semiotic pragmatism of peirce, gregory arrives at a definition of inquiry virtues as those “habits of cognitive behavior that are useful for rational deliberation.”14 examples of such virtues would include habits such as impartiality, consistency, and reasonableness. but as gregory is keen to point out, such virtues are not yet behavioral terms, but rather terms that describe dispositions to behave in certain ways which aim at furthering inquiry. so, in gregory’s analysis, a cognitive virtue such as ‘reasonableness’ stands for the disposition to engage in more specific behaviors, such as ‘giving and asking for reasons,’ and ‘using criteria’. with such an analysis in mind, an important question to raise at this point would be whether it is the virtue or the behavior that serves as a model? at first glance it would appear that there is not much of a distinction to make for it would seem a reasonable assertion to claim there exists models of virtues such as reasonableness, for example, and models of behavior, such as using criteria. however, a closer look at the manner in which models actually function, according to lipman, should reveal that it is the behaviors and processes specific to the community of inquiry that serve as models, for the function of modeling entails that what gradually becomes normal practice or habit—that is to say, the behaviors themselves, and the virtue that stands for the disposition to engage in those behaviors—is what is ultimately being modeled. this modeling function—of gradually becoming habit—is what lipman calls, following vygotsky, the process of internalization.15 in this process, any sign or sign-system emerging externally, from the culture or social group, is transformed into an internal form within the individual’s cognitive structure, thus securing the further self-regulation of action and behavior of that individual.16 for lipman, a vast series of characteristic behaviors of the community of inquiry thus serves as models which get internalized so as to become individualized self-regulating behaviors—for example, when members of the ci request of each other reasons for their beliefs, individuals will internalize such behavior and begin to reflect on their own reasons for belief and action. lipman writes, “and so with countless other cognitive acts and processes: they begin in each of us as adaptations of group behaviors. and since thinking is individual emulation of social norms and social conduct, the more rational the social or institutional conduct, the more rational will be the internalized reflection. a analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 43 community that has institutionalized patterns of criticism among its members prepares the way for those members to become more self-critical, self-controlled, and autonomous.”17 therefore, what the community of inquiry is a model of are those behaviors that, as maughn gregory puts it, are “useful for rational deliberation”. strictly speaking, the ci is not a model of inquiry virtues, such as reasonableness or judiciousness, or even of affective virtues such as empathy and care, at least not until those models have been internalized so as to become habit and normal practice with the community. but does this suggest that the modeling function would therefore cease once a clearly defined set of inquiry-specific behaviors is internalized by each individual and so institutionalized within the community? i think that such a suggestion would imply both that there is indeed such a limited set of inquiry-specific behaviors, as if altogether new behaviors, whether cognitive, affective, somatic, and so on, would no longer appear in the long run; and that each possible behavior could be so internalized by every individual that the community of inquiry would no longer in effect model those behaviors whenever they happened to manifest. while in principle it is the case that the modeling function could therefore cease, my sense is that if such a situation did emerge, the community of inquiry would lose its formative potency insofar as there would be no new behaviors to learn, no new way in which to be transformed behaviorally by the community itself. in this sense, we might even consider—though i suspect that some behaviorists may object—that modeling itself is a behavior which is modeled within the community of inquiry. i am thinking here especially of those very intentional communities of inquiry that develop procedures for practicing inquiry–specific behaviors, such as assigning to specific members the making of specific inquiry moves—asking for reasons, offering counter-examples, etc.—so as to model those behaviors for others and to evaluate the degree to which the ci progressed or matured. if we agree that such procedures aim at generating models, then even the most advanced communities of inquiry may come to establish them and “come to think in moves that resemble [these] procedures”.18 such communities of inquiry resemble lipman’s philosophical novels in both the way they are intentional regarding their modeling function, as well as the way in which they model their own mode of organization—that is, as the novels are crafted schematically so as to model the schematic dimensions of philosophical thinking, so too would communities of inquiry with intentional modeling procedures be organized in accordance with the very behaviors they seek to model. to summarize, then, the community of inquiry is a model of inquiry-specific behaviors, even of modeling itself insofar as such a procedure would aim at facilitating the internalization of those inquiry-specific behaviors. but we are still far from grasping the meaning and import of lipman’s claim that it is “inquiry that makes for community and not community that makes for inquiry.” it is my understanding that when we look at the community of inquiry as a model in the second sense that i describe above, in the verb-sense, as a model for, in which an object or state of affairs is actively formed and fashioned in some way, then i believe that we shall see how it is that the modeling function of inquiry-specific behaviors in the community aims at the transformation, not only of that particular community of inquiry, but of communal life generally. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 44 in a passage from philosophy goes to school, lipman writes the following: if we begin with the practice in the classroom, the practice of converting it into a reflective community that thinks in the disciplines about the world and about its thinking in the world, we soon come to recognize that communities can be nested within larger communities and these within larger communities still, if all hold the same allegiance to the same procedures of inquiry. there is the familiar ripple effect outward like the stone thrown in the pond: wider and wider, more and more encompassing communities are formed, each community consisting of individuals committed to self-corrective exploration and creativity.19 here lipman draws an image of the classroom community of inquiry as a model, not so much as a model of larger communities still, but as a model for them. while it is indeed true that communities of inquiry provide opportunities for the appropriation of the larger culture, lipman gives us the sense that it is the community of inquiry itself which can be utilized by other participatory communities. while participation in a community of inquiry ensures that models of inquiry-specific behavior are internalized by each member, this internalization is then intended to be projected outward and brought forth into subsequent participation in additional communities, serving as models again for their transformation. this is why lipman, in addition to referencing the community of inquiry as a model for community life, often uses metaphors for ci such as seedbed, a nucleus, and a stone thrown in the pond. the idea is that more than just being a model of salutary communal life and democratic social practice, it is a model for the transformation of other participatory collectives into inquiring communities. this dimension of the community of inquiry as model for communal and social transformation underscores the need to be wary of the view that the community is solely the desirable environmental situation for the promotion of inquiry in lipman’s rendering of ci. this is not to suggest that the environmental situation is insignificant, but that it is the inquiry, along with the behaviors which are modeled, that pave the way for the formation of communities of inquiry. the model theory of the community of inquiry therefore takes into account models of inquiry-specific behaviors as being models for the formation and transformation of community life in general. i would like to conclude by offering a brief framework of lipman’s model theory, incorporating both the modeling function of the philosophical text and of the community of inquiry. in this framework, it is the philosophical text that serves as a model in narrative form of philosophical thinking and community of inquiry, which in turn, functions as a model for the formation of philosophical thinking and communities of inquiry. the community of inquiry, in turn, serves as a model of inquiry behaviors which are internalized and function as models for the transformation of communal life in general. here we have a framework that maps the modeling dimensions of lipman’s analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 45 philosophy for children program—from the text as model, to the community of inquiry as model, to the formation of reasonable and judicious communal life. endnotes 1 darryl matthew de marzio, “what happens in philosophical texts: matthew lipman’s theory and practice of the philosophical text as model,” childhood & philosophy 7, no. 13 (2011): 29-47. 2 matthew lipman, “pixie and the relationship between cognitive modelling and cognitive practice,” in studies in philosophy for children: pixie, ed. ronald f. reed and ann m. sharp (madrid: ediciones de la torre, 1996), 35. 3 matthew lipman, thinking in education (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1991), 212-25. 4 ibid, 241; also, matthew lipman, thinking in education, 2nd edition (cambridge university press, 2003), 101; and, matthew lipman, natasha: vygotskian dialogues (new york: teachers college press, 1996), 11. 5 lipman, “pixie and the relationship between cognitive modelling and cognitive practice,” 29-30. 6 lipman, thinking in education, 219. 7 ibid, 220. 8 matthew lipman, elfie (upper montclair, nj: institute for the advancement of philosophy for children, 1988), 2-3. [emphasis in original] 9 lipman, thinking in education, 221-22. 10 see, for example, david kennedy, “the community of inquiry and educational structure,” thinking: the journal of philosophy for children 9, no. 4 (1991): 20-23. 11 lipman, thinking in education, 219. 12 see, especially, g.h. mead, mind, self, and society (chicago: university of chicago press, 1934); lev vygotsky, mind in society: the development of higher psychological processes, trans. m. cole (cambridge: harvard university press, 1978); and, albert bandura, social foundations of thought and action: a social cognitive theory (englewood cliffs, nj: prenticehall, inc.: 1986) 13 maughn gregory, “a behavioral pedagogy for the community of inquiry,” analytic teaching 19, no. 1 (1999): 29-37. 14 ibid, 30. 15 vygotsky, mind in society, 52-57. 16 see, especially, the ‘afterword’ by arkady a. margolis, titled, “a comparison between the philosophy for children approach and the cultural-historical and activity approaches: psychological and educational foundations,” in lipman, natasha: vygotskian dialogues, 117-29. 17 lipman, thinking in education, 52. 18 ibid, 16. 19 matthew lipman, philosophy goes to school (philadelphia: temple university press, 1988), 20. references bandura, albert, social foundations of thought and action: a social cognitive theory (englewood cliffs, nj: prentice-hall, inc.: 1986) de marzio, darryl m., “what happens in philosophical texts: matthew lipman’s theory and analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 46 practice of the philosophical text as model,” childhood & philosophy 7, no. 13 (2011): 2947. gregory, maughn, “a behavioral pedagogy for the community of inquiry,” analytic teaching 19, no. 1 (1999): 29-37. kennedy, david, “the community of inquiry and educational structure,” thinking: the journal of philosophy for children 9, no. 4 (1991): 20-23. lipman, matthew, philosophy goes to school (philadelphia: temple university press, 1988) _______ elfie (upper montclair, nj: institute for the advancement of philosophy for children, 1988) _______ thinking in education (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1991) _______ “pixie and the relationship between cognitive modelling and cognitive practice,” in studies in philosophy for children: pixie, ed. ronald f. reed and ann m. sharp (madrid: ediciones de la torre, 1996), 28-36. _______ natasha: vygotskian dialogues (new york: teachers college press, 1996) _______ thinking in education, 2nd edition (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2003) margolis, arkady, a., “a comparison between the philosophy for children approach and the cultural-historical and activity approaches: psychological and educational foundations,” in lipman, natasha: vygotskian dialogues (new york: teachers college press, 1996), 117129. mead, g.h., mind, self, and society (chicago: university of chicago press, 1934) vygotsky, lev, mind in society: the development of higher psychological processes, trans. m. cole (cambridge, ma: harvard university press, 1978) address correspondences to: darryl m. de marzio panuska college of professional studies university of scranton darryl.demarzio@scranton.edu mailto:darryl.demarzio@scranton.edu analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 68 introducing p4c in kindergarten in greece renia gasparatou & maria kampeza with support from maria anna karelou, emmanuela lambridou, liana poulou and martha stamatopoulou introduction the movement of philosophy for children starts with m. lipman in the early ‘70s. university professor matthew lipman noticed that his students lacked critical thinking skills. he suggested that, when students reach university age, it is rather late and difficult to teach them how to think.1 it would be wiser to undertake such a task at a much earlier age. thus, he proposed the introduction of philosophy in elementary schools. since then, philosophy for/with children (hereafter p4c) has been practiced all around the world. p4c takes up socrates’ methodology of provoking philosophical conversation (referred to as “communities of inquiry”) by asking the right questions or telling compelling stories. p4c practitioners employ different versions of such a method.2 the triggers tend to vary: some facilitators use lipman’s original philosophical novels; others use whatever story they find intriguing; others walk into the classroom with a direct philosophical question. the dialogue is also performed slightly differently: most practitioners prefer peer-to-peer dialogue, while others use a more structured practice, having students perform different tasks.3 nevertheless the basic idea is to rely on a trigger (a story or novel, a poem or song, a question or a thought experiment) in order to initiate discourse on philosophical topics. and the main purpose of this activity is to teach children to think and discuss. experience and studies have shown that p4c programs contribute to the development of critical thinking, the emotional flourishing of the child, the deepening of the relation between children with their peers and those between children and the adults (teachers and parents). moreover, communities of enquiry also tend to cultivate democratic values.4 children learn to defend their opinions using arguments; they are tolerant to new ideas; they change their mind when they are convinced; they ask and give reasons for their views. despite all the data that support the introduction of such a practice early in ones’ education, in greece, a country that might be considered the fountainhead of democracy, p4c is rarely implemented. in fact, any coordinated attempts to include the teaching of philosophy to children have been limited to research programs. in this paper, we will describe such a research p4c-pilot-program, which we performed in two kindergartens, in patras, greece. p4c even in kindergarten? m. lipman’s first attempts to include philosophical dialogue in schools took place in elementary schools. however, the practice was soon expanded throughout the school curriculum, including kindergarten. today, many books are written specifically for such a use in pre-school education,5 while more and more practitioners 72 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 69 practice philosophy with four or five year old children.6 current research has reported significant progress in children’s development of critical thinking and dialogue skills of children engaging in such programs, even in the age of four or five.7 this is also evident in g. mathews research.8 mathews records real dialogues with kids and vividly shows that children are natural philosophers from a very young age. they question things around them pretty much like philosophers do, and they struggle for adults’ attention in their philosophical quests. while having different pedagogical backgrounds that affect teaching modes (content or process driven, instructional objectives or learning outcomes), kindergarten curricula cater for overall, balanced development of young children’s personality and thought. this implies that teachers have to move from teaching isolated facts to organizing learning in ways that foster higher-level thinking.9 questions & aims when starting this research, we wanted to explore three main questions: (a) first, we wanted to investigate whether a p4c program can be applied in kindergarten. research suggests that children at the age of four or five are capable of discussing some general questions or assessing other people’s behavior. still, they are not often asked to do so. more specifically, we wanted to see if p4c could be implemented in a greek kindergarten. our teachers do not have the relevant expertise nor do they have much experience in similar projects. in the greek kindergarten daily schedule, group discussion normally takes place at the “discussion corner;” children share experiences or work on their literacy activities; usually the teacher reads a fairytale and asks children some comprehensive questions. thus, a typical discussion is restricted to questions that help children understand the story. we, however, wanted to see if children at the age of four or five can also make general evaluations, give reasons for the heroes’ actions, put themselves in the heroes’ shoes and argue what they would do and why. also, we wanted to see if a typical kindergarten teacher, with our minor guidance alone, could perform such a program. (b) second, we wanted to explore if the available material is sufficient for practicing p4c sessions; and whether the teachers could handle it properly. in greece only very few philosophical novels have been translated.10 we thus decided to rely on stories that one can easily find in a greek bookstore. it is fairly easy to find stories, which, even though they are not written specifically for p4c sessions, raise questions that provoke philosophical discussion. our hypothesis, then, was that we could use standard commercial material and, with a proper support, help teachers engage in some form of philosophical dialogue with young children. (c) the last, but not least, hypothesis we wanted to explore was whether we would find evidence that p4c helps develop children’s critical thinking skills. the problem here was to find some method of evaluating these discussions, so that we could measure if any progress was made concerning the child’s ability to think critically. daniel et. al have done similar research in kindergartens, and they provide us with some tools that can help evaluate progress in dialogue and thinking. we have been inspired by their methods of valuing linguistic cues,11 types of dialogue12 and types of thinking.13 in this paper, however, we would like to introduce a tool of our own. methodological framework sample in our research the sample consisted of 30 children from 5 to 6 years of age (preschool) attending two allday kindergartens (15 children in each class) in patras (a city in greece). children had not participated in any p4c sessions before. in each classroom there were two teachers changing shifts every week, so the same teacher implemented the morning session every second week. one class was the experimental group and the other the 73 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 70 control group. the students of the 75th kindergarten of patras were the experimental group. the 75th kindergarten is a state school, placed in a low-to-middle class suburb of patras. the control group was the experimental kindergarten of the university of patras. even though the experimental kindergarten is a state school, most of the students are middletoupper class. the choice of which students get admitted has, to this point, been made at random (by drawing names out of a box). however, the school is situated outside patras, within the university campus, and it is where most educational research programs take place. hence, this school is clearly different from the national average. it provides an authentic learning environment to innovate, conduct research and teaching practice; the teachers employed there are more qualified. for this reason, we decided to use it as a control group and let teachers read and discuss the stories without any intrusion from us. children attending this kindergarten are better equipped to construct a community of enquiry (teacher and children share in the reading of a story and discuss about their own questions). we would consider it a success, if our intervention in the experimental group could match the results we would get from the control group. process as was mentioned before, our research is exploratory and follows a qualitative approach. since one of the aims of the research was to explore the possibility of the integration of a p4c program in the daily schedule of a kindergarten class, we chose to use eight illustrated stories that teachers could easily have access to and could be used in order to form a community of enquiry. we paid specific attention to the fact that the stories could challenge children’s thinking, encourage them to raise questions and provoke interactions among them on the topics of friendship and diversity.14 for example, one story was something else15 where the hero tries to be like everyone else but all his attempts fail to help him fit in. when another extraordinary hero shows up, his experience made him accept the other’s differences. in another story, elmer16 the elephant who was colored patchwork all over (and that differentiated him from all the other elephants that were gray) realized the joy of just being himself. in the story the lamb who came for dinner17, the hungry wolf started to like the little lamb and found he couldn’t resist caring for his new friend. the teachers of each class implemented the sessions. we contemplated whether some of us should facilitate the sessions ourselves, since we were more trained in p4c, but we decided against it. we wanted to see if teachers could include it in their daily routine, and what kind of difficulties they might have. moreover, we thought that if their regular teachers facilitated the sessions, the children would feel comfortable and free to express their ideas and thinking. in addition, the teachers would be more aware of the individual characteristics of the children as well as the dynamic of each group in order to facilitate communication and exchange of ideas. teachers of both the control and the experimental group had no previous experience with p4c. we provided no training in p4c for the teachers of the control group. we just told them that we would like to see if the children could discuss the stories we would give them. we asked them to read the story as they normally would and discuss it with the children. we were present while they read and discussed the story so that we could record the discussion. yet, we did not provide any instruction or feedback to the teachers before or after the reading of the story, nor did we interfere with the discussion whatsoever. the teachers of the experimental group were handled differently. we met with them twice before we launched the program, and we talked to them at length about the p4c movement: its history; its aims, its methods, and its expected outcomes. we thus provided a short training program of p4c before the teachers started practicing it. on top of that, we discussed with them twice every week during the program, before and after each session. specifically, we met with the teachers of the experimental group a couple days before each session. we discussed the story they would read and contemplated how they would handle it. moreover, we always provided a handout, which reminded them of our basic instructions. our instructions included (a) some general guidelines and 74 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 71 (b) some suggested questions. (a) in the guidelines we reminded them of our purpose. for example, we would say that teachers should provide enough time for children to think before they speak; children should be encouraged to express their opinions, explain and justify those opinions; peer-to-peer dialogue should be initiated; kids should be offered a chance to put themselves in the shoes of the story’s heroes and defend their points of view; children should be able to focus on different aspects of the story. then, (b) we addressed the several philosophical topics of each story. using something else, for instance, we suggested that the group might focus on different concepts: friendship, diversity and similarity or fear (among others). and last, we offered some suggested questions per topic. for example: if the group focuses on friendship, you may ask the children: • how do they choose their friends? • what makes a good friend? • should one be similar to us in order to call him / her a friend? • in what aspects do we expect our friends to be similar to us? • have you ever felt that other children don’t want to play with you? what did you do to make them change their mind? • if the group focuses on diversity / similarity, you may ask the children: • ask a couple to stand up and describe their similarities / differences: are you all the same? • show the twins (there were two identical twins in the classroom) and ask the rest if they are the same person or/and what things differentiate them. • are all people alike? do you think being different from each other is a good thing? why? • if you changed clothes, would you become someone else? • would you like it if all people liked exactly the same things (eating only the crumb of the bread or the leg of the chicken)? would it cause any problems? • if the group focuses on fear, you may ask the children: • when was the last time you were frightened? • what makes you afraid? • what is similar to all the stories you just told us; 75 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 72 • is it always a real threat; apart from the training and the instructions for each session, we were also present during the session. we recorded it and provided feedback afterwards. we believe that, with our help, those teachers managed to facilitate p4c sessions quite competently. the p4c sessions took place each week between february and may at the same hour in the morning schedule. the experimental group facilitated 10 sessions (1 for deciding the rules, 8 in which they discussed the stories, and 1 for the concluding activity), while the control group facilitated 9 sessions (8 for discussing the stories and one for the concluding activity). in the very first session, the experimental group discussed how they should all behave in order to facilitate group discussions and provide better conditions for thinking. encouraged by their teachers, the children proposed a number of rules. these rules are an essential part of the philosophical enquiry since they keep the discussion organized and focused. the rules expressed by the children in the experimental group were: • do not make fun of other children. • listen closely to other children. • do not harm other children. • raise hands when someone wants to talk (so one person is to talk at a time). • be polite and use the words “thank you,” “please,” and “sorry.” • respect other children’s opinions and not say they are correct or incorrect. • do not interrupt other children when they speak. • do not misbehave. • do not lie. after children decided the rules, they drew some of them, with the encouragement of the teacher. the drawings were tagged to a table so that the children could “read” the rules and refer to them when they thought that one is not respected. establishing these rules help children learn to reason in a disciplined way, understand that different views should be respected, and to try reaching consensus and enjoying working collectively. only the experimental group had established rules. the teacher would present the table with the rule-drawings every time right before the session; hanging the rules from the table was the signal that p4c was about to begin. the children knew that they were now going to listen to a story and then discuss it, following those rules. the duration of the sessions varied according to children’s concentration and interest or the ability of the teacher to invite children to ask questions, make comments, compare or justify. each session was tape-recorded (in experimental group the sessions were also video-taped) and transcribed in full. the names of the children and of the teachers were coded in the transcripts to ensure confidentiality. 76 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 73 taking into consideration that the evaluation instruments that were used by other researchers concerned older children18 or classes that implemented p4c for a long time19, we decided to use a data collection instrument inspired by previous research but more appropriate for our group of children. because our intervention was rather brief, we decided to use some marker-words (hereafter markers) as evidence that p4c helps develop children’s critical thinking skills. analysis of the transcripts brought to light the use of these words: why, because, in order to, since, namely, hence. we used these words as a list of criteria for analyzing classroom practice that indicate posing questions, reasoning, justification or explanation. results the study shows that children aged 5-6 are capable of developing critical thinking skills as they used the markers many times in their responses. we present the results that emerged from the analysis conducted within the framework of this research. it is worth noting that children in both classes participated with enthusiasm and vivid interest. illustrations of exchange conducted by the children are presented in the following examples: 1st example child 3:…in the deep sea. teacher: why? child 3: because he didn’t like being in the fishbowl. teacher: why didn’t he like the fishbowl? child 3: because he lived there all alone. one of the things we wanted to see is whether children could justify their views. here, we see that the child tries to justify her views (about the hero’s action) when encouraged by the teacher. this provides her peers the opportunity to think about whether they agree or disagree. 2nd example teacher: look how nice that little lamb is. child 2: the wolf wants to eat it…since i see that he is licking his tongue. teacher: is there a chance he is having a toothache (teacher showing her teeth) and… all children: no! teacher: no, uh? he wanted to eat her child 2: he wanted to cook her. teacher: can the wolf and the lamb be friends? the wolf wants to eat the little lamb. how can they become friends? 77 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 74 child 13: because his heart was beating and he wanted to be friends with her (the lamb). and because he had no other friend. teacher: how can they be friends, the lamb is afraid of the wolf? tell us child 5 (child 5 raising his hand). child 5: the lamb, if she was afraid… i would try to do something in order to help her (the lamb) stop feeling this way. in the above transcript, we can see the child’s effort to provide an explanation for his point of view and the teacher’s “trick” to help the other children get interested in his perspective. in addition, stimulated by the story, the children discuss the possibility of the two-seemingly unpaired-heroes becoming friends and they provide reasons for their opinion. in the last sentence, we see the child adopting the point of view of the wolf (the child says that if she were the wolf, she would try to help the lamb stop feeling scared) in his effort to find a solution to the problem under consideration. 3rd example child 1: if i throw a punch in …(name of child) we won’t be friends any more, hence i will be sad. teacher: you will be sad but then, whose fault is it? child 1: me. we note that the child is offering a hypothesis connecting her action with a result and also this result with the way she is feeling. in the following table we present an analysis that accounts for the number of words generated by the children in both classes during the 8 sessions concerning the stories used to initiate discourse. table 1 number of markers generated by the children participating in the experimental and control group. 78 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 75 more exchanges indicating critical thinking in the experimental group have been noticed (a difference of 13,24%). even though this is an informal test and the data were not sufficient for a thorough statistical analysis, one must not forget that in our control group, at least some of the students were above average. specifically, we observed a total of 154 dialogue exchanges in the experimental group. the majority of the markers concentrated on the words ‘because’ and ‘why’ that indicate attempts for justification and posing questions. it is also worth noting that children in both groups used the words ‘in order to,’ which reveals their effort to make their responses more understandable and clear. having in mind that the interaction between teachers and children is important, and the fact that the way the children respond is often affected by the way the teachers pose their questions, we sought the degree that teachers used the markers as shown in the following table. table 2 number of markers generated by the teachers participating in the experimental and control group. teachers in both groups used the markers often. we have to note here that all these words are common everyday words, frequently used in greek language as causal connectives, and preschool children are able to understand and use them in their conversations. however, the control group’s teachers used the markers to a far lesser extent than the experimental group’s teachers. teachers in both groups mostly used the word ‘why;’ yet, the teachers in the experimental group used all the other markers more and especially the words ‘hence’ and ‘namely.’ we believe the experimental group teachers used those markers more, due to their p4c training. specifically, teachers, in accordance with our guidelines, asked children to give reasons for their opinions, justify and explain their thinking. our instruction and guidelines enhanced the use of these markers by the teachers who integrated them in their interaction with the children. considering the above tables, one could claim that it is possible that the children in the experimental group were just mimicking the teachers when using those words. at this point of our research, we don’t have enough evidence to support or contradict this view. however, even if this is the case, one should keep in mind that mimicry is a way that young children learn, so using these words affect the way they are thinking and talking. providing children with good thinking skills (explaining, justifying etc), increases the possibility they would practice the same ways of thinking successfully themselves. discussion according to fisher20 the aim of p4c is “to develop the ability to go beyond the information given and to exchange with texts at an analytical and conceptual level.” results of our study show more exchanges in the 79 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 76 experimental group, despite the fact that the children participating in the control group were more qualified to perform the task. in the dialogues above, we see the children of our experimental group starting to philosophize. their engagement in philosophical dialogue underlines the positive effect of p4c in the development of critical thinking. specifically, our first hypothesis is verified. the experimental group teachers were responsive to our instruction and guidelines and managed to perform the sessions quite competently. they encouraged children to discuss amongst themselves, explain and justify their opinions. the fact that the teachers of the experimental group used the markers more often than the teachers of the control group is an indication that the discussions that took place in the 75th kindergarten were of a different type than the typical reading of a story. p4c sessions were successfully integrated in the daily schedule of the greek kindergarten. in the experimental group, the discussion was more disciplined since children had established specific “rules” concerning the behavior they should exhibit during the sessions (e.g. “we don’t interrupt each other, we listen closely to other children and respect their opinion”). moreover, the teachers encouraged the children to take some time to think about what another child said; thus they facilitated the expression of agreement or disagreement and even the drawing of distinctions, explanations or inferences. thus, the children could take part in the discussion at their own levels and develop their abilities to reason with others. children in both experimental and control groups were able to take part in a dialogue, think about the heroes’ actions, argue what the heroes should do and why. in addition, the teachers in the experimental group faced no particular problems or difficulties incorporating such an approach in their practices. at first, they felt a little anxious that this kind of interaction with children was more demanding on their part. also they were worried that it would be more time consuming than an ordinary reading of the story, since there are many points and issues to be discussed. as time passed, however, they thought the discussion added an interesting dimension to their usual mode of teaching. our second hypothesis was also verified. the selected stories provided a stimulus for thinking; they succeeded in having the children’s attention focused on the particular topics (friendship and diversity). also, they gave the children the opportunity to express their viewpoints and engage in discussion – with the help of their teachers. it is evident in the results of our study that even in the control group there were many exchanges using the markers, and this is probably because children found those issues interesting. the results also verified our third hypothesis concerning the promotion of critical thinking skills in early childhood education. from the examples presented above, it is evident that children started to think critically: they gave reasons for their opinions; they made judgments and evaluated their ideas; they even drew inferences. the guidelines and the questions given to the teachers in the experimental group enabled them to provide conditions of argumentation in their classrooms and stimulate critical thinking. so, even though the children in the control group were more experienced in discussing various topics, they used lesser marker words than the children in the experimental group. we should also keep in mind that for kindergarten children the communication process is still under development; therefore, they can’t become automatically active participants in a community of enquiry. encouraging justification and explanation triggers the utterance of the markers, both by the teachers and the children of the experimental group; p4c inspires the group to discuss, provide explanations, reasons and conclusions. the use of those markers show that children started to internalize the rudiments of arguments. this could partly be due to the imitation of their teachers; or because of the way the teacher posed a question. yet, this does not suggest that they couldn’t have done otherwise. in any case, the fact that, when encouraged by their teachers, they did start to argue, reinforces our claim that p4c promotes critical thinking. 80 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 77 the study was a pilot; therefore, there were significant limitations. first, the program was very short. the longer a p4c programs lasts, the greater the benefits for the community of enquiry. secondly, we did not have the time to train the teachers fully in p4c methodology; as a result, sometimes they would not ask for justification when they should. notwithstanding certain peculiarities of greek education, however, we believe the results of this program can be used as evidence to show that more kindergartens should include such programs and that more teachers should become involved in p4c. we should note that the greek school curriculum includes philosophy as an optional course, but only in secondary school21, for one hour per week. students are taught theories of philosophy through its history; trained philosophy teachers are rarely employed and so a literature teacher usually teaches the class. so, even though p4c programs are flourishing all over the world, in greece there are no official attempts to practice p4c; only a few research programs, such as ours, have tried to practice it and only for a few weeks at a time. the kindergarten setting is arguably the most effective way to start including p4c programs for two reasons: (1) the kindergarten curriculum describes aims and goals that are in line with p4c practice (2) kindergarten teachers are freer to implement new projects than teachers in other levels of education, who are constrained by strict curricula. despite the many limitations of our research program, we believe there is some initial evidence which suggests that students can benefit from the inclusion of p4c programs in kindergarten. it would be ideal if attempts like that discussed here were to become mainstream in the future. endnotes 1. lipman, m. 1982. 2. for a quick overview see unesco 2011a&b. 3. tozzi, m. 2012; goucha, m. 2007, p. 28. 4. see lipman, 1982; unesco 2011a; fisher, r. 2008; haynes, j. 2008; daniel, m.f. & delsol, a. 2005; daniel, m.f. & gagnon, m. 2011; daniel, m.f.et al.; topping, k.j. & trickey, s. 2007; vansieleghem, n. & kennedy, d. (eds) 2011 among many others. also see sapere: http://sapere.org.uk/ (last accessed on 24/7/2012). 5. philosophical novels, such as sharp, a.m. & splitter, l. j. 1999, the doll hospital and making sense of my world but also books proposing other kinds of philosophical trigger such as games, for example stanley, s. & bowkett, s.2004. 6. for an overview, see unesco 2011b. 7. see for example: fisher, 2008; daniel & delsol, 2005; daniel & gagnon, 2011; daniel et al. 2011. 8. mathews, g. 1980. 9. yelland, n. et al. 2008. 10. among them the only one suitable for pre school age is sharp & splitter’ s the doll hospital and making sense of my world (published in one volume together with the instructions’ for teachers’ manual). 11. daniel & gagnon, 2011; daniel et al. 2011. 12. daniel & delsol, 2005; daniel et al. 2011. 13. daniel & gagnon, 2011. 14. haynes, 2008. 15. cave, k.1998. 16. mckee, d. 1989. 17. smallman, s. 2007. 18. fisher 2008. 19. daniel & gagnon, 2011. 20. fisher, 2001, p.67 21. the greek school system includes 9 years of basic education (1 year in kindergarten, 6 years in elementary school and 3 years in high school – or gymnasium as we call it) and 3 of compulsory education (3 years either in technical school or secondary school – or technical lyceum and general lyceum, as we call it). references cave, k. (1998) something else. greenvale -n y.: mondo publishing. daniel m.f. & gagnon m. (2011). developmental process of dialogical critical thinking in groups of pupils aged 4 to 12 years. creative education, 2(5), 418-428. 81 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 82 daniel m.f., pettier j.c. & auriac-slusarczyk e. (2011). the incidence of philosophy on discursive and language competence in four-year-old pupils. creative education, 2(3), 296-304. daniel, m.f. & delsol a. (2005). learning to dialogue in kindergarten: a case study. analytic teaching, 25(3), 23-52. fisher, r. (2001). philosophy in primary schools: fostering thinking skills and literacy. reading, 35, 67-73. fisher, r. (2008). teaching thinking: philosophical enquiry in the classroom. londonn.y.: continuum intl pub group. goucha, m. (2007). philosophy. a school of freedom. paris: united nations educational, scientific and cultural organization. haynes j. (2008). children as philosophers. londonn.y.: routledge. lipman, m. (1982). philosophy for children. thinking, (3), 37. mathews, g. (1980). philosophy and the young child. harvard university press. mckee, d. (1989). elmer. new york: harper collins publishers. sapere. retrieved july 24, 2012 from http://sapere.org.uk/. sharp a.m. & spitter l. (1999). the doll hospital. camberwell: australian council educational research. smallman, s. (2007). the lamb who came for dinner. londonn.y.: little tiger press. stanley, s. & bowkett, s. (2004). but why? teachers manual: developing philosophical thinking in the classroom. londonn.y.: continuum intl pub group. topping k.j. & triskey s. (2007). impact of philosophical enquiry on school student’s interactive behaviour. thinking skills and creativity, (2), 73-84. tozzi, m. (2012). l’ apprentissage du philosopher. retrieved july 24, 2012 from http://www.philotozzi.com/. unesco (2011a). teaching philosophy in europe and north america. high-level regional meeting on the teaching of philosophy in europe and north america, 14, 15 and 16 february 2011, milan (italy) – working document. retrieved january 10, 2012 from http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/multimedia/hq/shs/pdf/ working_document_teaching_philosophy_milan2011_en.pdf unesco (2011b). teaching philosophy in preschool and primary levels. in teaching philosophy in europe and north america. high-level regional meeting on the teaching of philosophy in europe and north america,14, 15 and 16 february 2011, milan (italy) – working document. retrieved july 14, 2012 from http:// www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/multimedia/hq/shs/pdf/working_document_teaching_philosophy_milan2011_en.pdf vansieleghem n. & kennedy d. (eds.). (2011). philosophy for children in transition. journal of philosophy of education, special issue 45(2), 171-397. yelland, n. lee, l. o’rourke, m. & harrisson, c. (2008). rethinking learning in early childhood education, berkshire: open university press. address correspondences to: renia gasparatou, lecturer, department of educational sciences and early childhood education school of humanities and social sciences, university of patras rion 26500 patras greece +30 2610 997552 gasparat@upatras.gr http://www.ecedu.upatras.gr/services/site/prosopiko.php?sm=22&teacher_id=105 maria kampeza, lecturer, department of educational sciences and early childhood education school of humanities and social sciences university of patras rion 26500 patras greece +30 2610 969305 kampeza@upatras.gr http://www.ecedu.upatras.gr/services/site/prosopiko.php?sm=22&teacher_id=111 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 68 how to raise children to be good people? kaarina määttä and satu uusiautti abstract: more and more expressions of violence and malaise take place in schools and youth camps which gives a reason to discuss topical issues related to child rearing. in this article, the purpose is to view love as the core means of raising children. the article is based on the authors’ various studies of love and from the specific point of view of how to raise children to appreciate and practice goodness. the theme is discussed from parents’ and teachers’ points of view. there is not just one answer for how love for a child might represent the road to goodness. introduction childhood may be the optimal time to promote healthy attitudes, behavior, adjustment, and prevention of problems by, for example, recognizing the children’s strengths and building on those strengths (brown kirschman, johnson, bender, & roberts, 2009). it has been shown that children’s development is greatly affected by the phenomena that take place in their growing surroundings: juvenile culture, media, as well as societal values and ideals. therefore, it is important what kind of surroundings—day care or school or other institutions—provide for children’s development and growth (e.g. hagegull & bohlin, 1995; boshcee & jacobs, 1997) in addition to home (kyrönlampi-kylmänen & määttä, 2011a, 2011b). baumeister et al. (2001, p. 323) have pointed out that: at the individual level, temptation and destructive instincts battle against strivings for virtue, altruism, and fulfillment. ‘good’ and ‘bad’ are among the first words and concepts learned by children --, and most people can readily characterize almost any experience, emotion, or outcome as good or bad. (baumeister et al. 2001, p. 323) furthermore, baumaister et al. (2001) claim that bad emotions, parents, and feedback have more impact than good ones as bad information is processed more thoroughly than good. given this starting point, it is disconcerting that violence and malaise are increasingly expressed in schools and youth camps (see also horsthemke, 2009)—even taking on such extreme forms as that of violent massacres, as happened, for example, in norway (july 2011) and finland (november 2007); something which is, indeed, quite rare in these so-called lands of milk and honey. likewise, suicidal behavior among the youth can be considered one contemporary manifestation of negative occurrences today (kilpimaa, 2008). following the radical societal change which took place, for example, in finland after the second world war as the country started to industrialize rapidly (statistics finland, 2007), the traditional social network started to change too, from the family, relatives, and neighbors forming a supporting network into families and individuals 83 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 69 coping by themselves (anttonen, 1998). the survival of human beings on this planet is grounded on mutual concern, care, and goodness. anger and fear have their place as these feelings are also needed but without love, goodness, and care, humankind would not be the dominate species in the world (berscheid, 2006; de vaal, 2010). given the imporatce of this kind of social support we can ask whether more can be done to cultivate it. foe example, would it be possible to start a new kind of inculcation of enlightened attitudes through education that would enhance interaction skills among children and youngsters? (see kilpimaa, 2008). uusitalo (2008, p. 116) has illustrated well the role of significant adults in the lives of children. significant adults are mirrors that children use to reflect themselves as they construct their own concept of selfhood. if the mirrors are dusty or cracked—in other words, the child does not become seen, heard, or accepted as his or her own personality—the child’s self-concept becomes distorted and he or she will have frail self-esteem (uusitalo, 2008). however, there are children who have success in life and are happy, content, and well-balanced, as well. everyone can be seen as potentially good. why is it, then, that some people succeed while others do not even when they have similar backgrounds? in this article, our purpose is to consider love as the core means of raising children to be good people. the article is based on our various examinations of love, which we want to then use in order to approach the issue of how to raise children into good people or toward goodness. we will discuss the theme from parents’ and teachers’ points-of-view and highlight some ethical issues as well. the core concepts goodness as the goal good is a word that is so common that people do not stop to think about its definition very often. a good way of checking its rather mundane definition is to look at a dictionary. according to an online dictionary at dictionary.com, the term ‘good’ as a noun means profit or advantage, worth, or benefit; excellence or merit; kindness; and moral righteousness and virtue. the last two sets of definitions are relevant here; namely, they refer to such actions that aim at doing or being good or having he power for good. but what this is remains unknown—or at least undefined. as educators, we are interested in psychological-philosophical definitions of (moral) goodness. often, human goodness is compared to humanity or altruism (e.g. haidt, 2010; batson, ahmad, & lishner, 2009). seligman et al. (2005, p. 412) have created a classification of universal virtues and strengths. their definitions for the virtue of humanity and its character strengths (kindness, love, and social intelligence) might be considered as one side of goodness. according to the authors, “humanity” refers to “interpersonal strengths that involve ‘tending and befriending’ others” (seligman et al., 2005, p. 412). altruistic people act to benefit another whereas gratitude as a part of goodness enables people to receive, and that motivates people to return the goodness they have been given (see emmons, 2010). the existence of a good human being can be considered problematic or even impossible, especially when ‘good’ is so easily confused with ‘perfect.’ being a good human being does not mean that one should be totally irreproachable, moral, and faultless; such a goal is actually non-human and likely impossible (see ojanen, 1998) given that the circumstances and chances of being good vary so much (nagel, 1979). according to ojanen (1998), people can be good although they are not perfectly good, do other things than are not routinely good, and have flaws. the fundamental goal is, however, to pursue goodness by accepting the imperfect nature of human beings. 84 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 70 love as the means next, we discuss love as the fundamental factor in raising children to be good human beings. goodness and humanity are connected with love and, on the other hand, the ability to love is often linked to human virtues (goldstein & lake, 2000; swanton, 2010; määttä & uusiautti, 2011a). this viewpoint is in line with seligman and peterson’s categorization of human virtues, six of which they take to be universal. these virtues were wisdom and knowledge, courage, justice, temperance, spirituality and transcendence, and love and humanity (see seligman, 2002; seligman, steen, park, & peterson, 2005). based on wärnå, lindholm, and eriksson’s (2007) research, love is a central virtue, and it enriches health by increasing physical well-beng and enhancing love of life. according to our studies (määttä, 2011a, 2011b; uusiautti & määttä, 2011), love consists of three interconnected areas: emotions, knowledge and skills, and acts. through these three components of love, we conclude that the ability to love necessitates virtues. from this point of view, love can be learned and practiced. our viewpoint is that emotions that are connected to love are positive and produce “goodness” as such, for example, feelings of joy and pleasure and the sense of togetherness. moreover, love can be seen as a decision that is manifested by acts. this idea is similar to that discussed by fromm (1977) and solomon (2002) as well. solomon regards constancy as a virtue in love and fromm (1977) has pointed out that love is not just about an affect or a passive inner emotion but active aspiration to help the beloved to grow and be happy. with this kind of love enacted in child rearing, children can both feel loved and worth loving and thus learn to love others as well. storh (2009) has combined love with the idea of “minding others’ business.” she explains that we might be morally required to intervene in someone’s life in order to promote that person’s own happiness. storh (2009, p. 136) concludes, “my flourishing depends on the flourishing of others. that makes it all the more important to permit wise intervention in others’ affairs, for in minding others’ business, we are also often minding our own.” transmitting this kind of an attitude to our children could well serve as the main ideal when it comes to upbringing. this is what love fundamentally is and children will learn to use it if we—as educators, parents, and other significant people in children’s lives—set an example by directing our mindful and loving action toward children and other people as well. some viewpoints to fostering the child’s self-esteem and relationships according to the post-modern idea of childhood, childhood is a social construction and a child is the constructor of his or her own life, knowledge, identity, and culture (kronqvist & kumpulainen, 2011). therefore, development does not happen distinctively in phases nor is it universal as there are cultural variations (see e.g. rothbaum et al., 2008). at its best, raising children both at home and at day care offers a positive environment that enhances the development of children’s strengths, most of which are important to survival in the modern world: healthy self-confidence and self-esteem, balanced emotional life, judgment and responsibility, the ability to control one’s own behavior, empathy as well as the ability to respect and appreciate other people (see määttä, 2007). of course, rearing principles vary by culture as there are great differences between, for example, western and eastern child rearing in emphasizing such concerns as expectations of children’s individuality, compliance, and proximity, stability, and the trust of close relationships (rothbaum et al., 2008). there are various theories focued on the meaning of positive encouragement that help us understand the significance of creating a loving atmosphere in early childhood. for example, according to broaden-and-build theory (fredrickson, 2004), positive emotions, such as joy, interest, contentment, and love, broaden an individual’s thought-action repertoire; joy sparks the urge to play, interest sparks the urge to explore, contentment sparks the urge to savor and integrate, and love sparks a recurring cycle of each of these urges within safe, close relationships. consequently, the importance of loving and safe relationships should not be underestimated. for 85 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 71 example, berscheid (2006) claims that understanding human behavior has suffered because we have forgetten the fact that people live in a net of human relationships for their entire lives, and that most of human behavior takes place in the context of human relationships. alice miller (1984) says, “do not hope that a child would turn into something specific, just that he/she would develop. enjoy the child and his/her developmental phases as he/she is. enjoy your life together instead of being constantly worried about what your children will become or not in the future.” this is how a healthy self-image is created as well as the self-confidence to confront difficulties and problems in life. successful rearing does not aim at removing hardships and obstacles but helping children to learn to confront, tolerate, and conquer the inevitable difficulties of life (mcree & halpern, 2010). according to lawrence (2001), the earliest sense of a “true self” is for the infant a self “worthy of love”—an idea that is in accordance with the notion of authentic selfhood (see joensuu, 2011). consequently, raising children provides people with the readiness to nourish relationships and, similarly, the experiences gained from these relationships function as sources for self-development (määttä, 2010). feeney and van vleet (2010) point out how secure base concepts provide an important theoretical basis for understanding how people can grow as a result of being attached to someone. with well-developed self-appreciation, one can respect others’ dissimilarity and individuality and does not expect oneself or others to be perfect. self-appreciation is enhanced by learning to enjoy one’s own success, fields of expertise, and competencies and achievements, instead of clinging to others. through the above-mentioned practices, a child finds the world interesting and enjoyable, and feels that he or she has a positive place in it and thus, the purpose of becoming a good person can be more readily achieved. love at the core of upbringing and education parental love children have to find out that they are loved and valuable even when their actions are harmful or cause disappointments and shame for their parents. children’s inappropriate behavior cannot be accepted and the right direction has to be shown (e.g. hoffman & saltzen, 1967). however, since children are still maturing human beings, they have to be able to trust that parents will not abandon them. children are allowed to express their bad feelings and still parents’ love holds on; children need love especially when they do not seem to deserve it (e.g. katz & tello, 2003). even the disappointments are an important part of developing self-esteem and mental health (e.g. desjardins, zelenti, & coplan, 2008). at home, children can learn in a safe environment those means which help to handle disappointments and failures. when necessary, parents can protect their children from the feelings of anxiety and guilt. family boundaries mean that the family provides consistent supervision for the child and maintains reasonable guidelines for behavior that the child can understand and achieve. beneficial development is secured by establishing boundaries that are preserved with love instead of discipline, ignorance, underestimation, mocking, or malignancy. what the rules are is entirely up to parents and other adults in the household; furthermore, parents also have to make rules relating to how they themselves will behave—consistency is needed in the maintenance of boundaries (greenberg, 2003). in addition, parents give an example for children how to nurture human relationships and the ability to love. a devoted relationship between the parents and a child (bolwby, 1988) is the basic component of human behavioral repertoire and creates the ability to love (feenye & van vleet, 2010). by the parents’ caring, children 86 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 72 learn not only to seek to conform and trust but also to explore the world—to work, play, discover, create (feeney & trush, 2010). ultimately, the only right the parent has to the child is the right to love; the only task is to secure the provisions for free humanity, and the only glory is the children’s love (see e.g. aunola & nurmi, 2005). teachers’ pedagogical love and tact love appears in teaching as guidance toward disciplined work, but also as patience, trust, and forgiveness. the purpose is not to make learning fun, easy, or pleasing but to create a setting for learning where pupils can use and develop their own resources eventually proceeding at the maximum of their own abilities (määttä & uusiautti, 2011a, 2011b). furthermore, it has been argued that it is not appropriate for the teacher to express his or her negative emotions at school. however, even the teacher’s negative emotions have their own meaning because the teacher who shows his or her humanity can trust that the pupil will not be broken if the teacher sometimes gets angry. the pupil is also allowed to show his or her malaise without fear of losing the teacher’s caring (uusitalo, 2008.). in addition, a loving teacher takes care that the learner does not lose his or her trust in his or her own learning when facing trouble. therefore, love appears as goal-oriented action; a teacher plans and implements learning situations that enhance learning. furthermore, a loving teacher takes a pupil’s personal situation into consideration (e.g., van manen, 1991; hatt, 2005). from this point of view, pedagogical love is not irrational sentimentalizing or weak-willed coddling; rather, it is a working method that involves persistent interest and perseverance to support pupils’ development for the sake of themselves and the whole society. in addition, teachers should find a balance between pedagogical love and pedagogical authority and combine them both in a student-specific manner; pedagogical tact comes out strongest in this ability. confronting various students requires flexibility and sensitivity in the teacher’s pedagogical approach; some students need more intimacy, while some others consider expertise especially important. moreover, the teaching content and learning objectives may necessitate different kinds of procedures from the teacher—in other words, a certain kind of tact (määttä & uusiautti, 2011a, 2011b). haavio defines pedagogical tact as follows: “pedagogical tact is the ability to find quickly and confidently an appropriate course in every education and teaching situation” and to achieve it, the teacher needs “an open eye” in order to be able to understand human life (haavio, 1948, p. 54). while haavio writes about understanding, siljander defines pedagogical tact as an educator’s ability and desire to become aware of the pupil’s situation; this includes the educator’s thoughtfulness but it is also the skill to mold the tension between the maturing individual and the demands of the society (siljander, 2002, p. 87). taking this viewpoint further, van manen pointed out that pedagogical tact is “the language of surprising and unpredicted pedagogical action” that emerges from the genuine attachment toward the pupil (van manen, 1991, pp. 122-156). at the core, it is the children’s vulnerability and defenselessness that make the educator protect them. tactful behavior is present at every moment in a pedagogical situation and at the same time, this encompasses the ability to listen to and put oneself into the children’s position. tact is intuitive intervention into situations where one has to be able to make quick decisions. according to hare (1993), pedagogical love, caring in the classroom, humility, commitment, and hope are traits that constitute a “good” teacher although they are not always easy to adhere to in modern schools. therefore, pedagogical tact is the key, and this is the case because it, along with pedagogical goodness, illustrates the pedagogical relationship and the fundamental idea that the adult is primarily working for the benefit of the child in this context (saevi & eilifsen, 2008). in our opinion, this kind of action can be one of the best ways to raise children to be good people. 87 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 73 conclusion: good people are raised with love—but also with authority an essential element in goodness is respect. children will learn to respect people who show respect to them. respect for children’s dignity is defined in the united nations charter of children’s rights (melton, 1991) but when it comes to goodness, respect includes the idea of caring and showing interest. the people who are most likely to be respected by children, use a unique combination of being loving but still setting limits in firm but caring ways. children need constructive feedback but it must come within a relationship of love, support, and sensitivity if it is to motivate good behavior. grusec and goodnow (1994) studied the internalization of values and concluded that the optimal impact on internalization may arise from some particular sequence of a particular form of reasoning and a particular form of power assertion. children also need limits, but these can be established with kindness and respect. flexible authority means being capable of bending according to children’s needs and qualifications. (see määttä & uusiautti, 2011a.) this demands a degree of empathy of sorts, the ability to look at things from children’s point-of-view (hättich, hättich, & hoffman, 1970; van manen, 1991). creating a warm and supportive environment at school and at home is crucial. mutual respect supports empathy; students respect the teacher and children respect parents or other caregivers and regard them as a sort of safe haven that they can rely on. safe and respectable adults trust and believe in children’s abilities, respect their individuality, and help them to enhance their balanced development and find their own strengths. authority is then understood as positive, related to expertise and love-based pegagogy, and is not associated with authoritative domination. the relationship between the adult and the child is two-way and target-oriented, as the purpose is to help children learn, grow, and develop their knowledge and skills. discussion together with parents, educators work with one of society’s most vulnerable groups—young children. the quality of the interactions between young children and the adults who care for them has a significant and enduring impact on children’s lives. the intimacy of the relationship and the potential to do harm call for a commitment on the part of child care practitioners to the highest standards of ethical practice (holmgren, 2006; see also horsthemke, 2009). outstanding facilities or even the most advanced technology does not guarantee positive development, nor can one raise a child like one might a company --according to the indexes or expectations of market economy. every child develops with the support and encouragement that he or she receives in everyday life from the people he or she lives with. nothing can replace human interaction. lawrence (2001, p. 61) notes that love is a social experience and organizes the social experience. humanity is manifested in child rearing by respecting each and every child. children should be appreciated so that they will be understood and approved of even when weak, maladjusted, or difficult, even when they do not meet those idealistic hopes and expectations that parents, daycare, and school systems have set up to help them. this is a fundamental issue because so much of modern society’s “i’ll manage alone” ideology ends up admiring those people who do not need others and who can cope by themselves. as a consequence of such narcissistic ideologies, the helthy developmen of both larger society and specific individuals are put at great risk. for much of contemporary culture, we do not seem to tolerate or handle failures and difficulties; admitting weaknesses and vulnerability are considered as giving up (gauvain & huard, 1999). therefore, children have to perceive that they are loved, cared, and accepted as they are—not just when they meet our expectations. successful child rearing does not aim at clearing the hardships and obstacles but helping children to learn to confront, tolerate, and conquer the inevitable difficulties that life will throw at them (mcree & halpern, 2010). parents, caregivers, and teachers should encourage and support the child to behave appropri88 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 74 ately, undertake challenging tasks, and perform activities to the best of her or his abilities. caregivers and educators have to have faith in children’s talents, but just belief and trust will not be enough. successful child rearing also has to be focused on action: being present, giving time, and making the effort to create positive togetherness. significant adults care, ask, discuss, listen, tell, explain, argue, fuss and busy themselves with children. adults are role models for children even in the most difficult life situations; we have to recognize and maintain this belief and activley pursue the challenge of building a better environment and more human world for children. child rearing exists to help children experience what life can offer. children have to be allowed to see how the world could be ‘better’ and to be assured that this ‘better’ world is also achievable. the world is changing at an unprecedented pace, with internationalization and multiculturalism all of one piece, which demands a new kind of approach to human relationships; the emphasis is on societal responsibilities and the roles of active future makers (von wright, 2009; seidl & friend, 2002). interpersonal and interactive relationship skills are becoming increasingly more important; this is especially true given the growing dissimilarity among people we now encounter just within our daily environment. likewise, teachers also need to be flexible with students, especially when it comes to those who have learning difficulties and suffer from social exclusion, and so being better prepared to get along with different kinds of learners is something good teachers would be wise not to neglect. in this article, we wanted to discuss the idea of love as the pathway toward goodness. we also wanted to highlight various forms and dimensions of love. still, it is reasonable to ask whether love is enough to transform our children into good people. and if love is not enough, what is? it is likely that any definite answer to this question either cannot be given or at least not in a direct or unambiguous manner. nevertheless, given the increasing stakes that are involved, as well as what we now know about childhood behavior, it seems these kind of issues are in more need of deliberation and discussion than ever before. references anttonen, a. 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(2003). setting limits with love. scholastic parent & child, 10(6), 33-35. grusec, j. e., & goodnow, j. j. (1994). impact of parental discipline methods on the child’s internalization of values: a reconceptualization of current points of view. developmental psychology, 30(1), 4-19. doi: 10.1037/00121649.30.1.4 haavio, m. (1948). opettajapersoonallisuus [teacher personality]. jyväskylä: gummerus. hagegull, b., & bohlin, g. (1995). day care quality, family and child characteristics and socioemotional development. early childhood research quarterly, 10, 505-526. haidt, j. (2010). wired to be inspired. in d. keltner, j. march, & j. a. smith (eds.), the science of human goodness. the compassionate instinct (pp. 86-93). new york, ny: w. w. norton & co. hare, w. (1993). what makes a good teacher: reflections on some characteristics central to the educational enterprise. london & ontario: the althouse press. hatt, b. e. (2005). pedagogical love in the transactional curriculum. journal of curriculum studies, 37(6), 671-688. doi:10.1080/00220270500109247 hoffman, m. l., & saltzstein, h. d. (1967). parent discipline and the child’s moral development. journal of personality and social psychology, 5(1), 45-57. holmgren, a. (2006). klassrummets relationsetik. det pedagogiska mötet som etiskt fenomen [the relationship ethics of the classroom. the pedagogical encounter as an ethical phenomenon]. (doctoral dissertation.) umeå: university of umeå. retrieved from: http://www.sprak.umu.se/digitalassets/6/6109_avh_holmgren.pdf horsthemke, k. (2009). rethinking humane education. ethics and education, 4(2), 201–214. joensuu, k. (2011, in press). how do we take care of child’s selfhood? a view on child care through the lens of heidegger’s analysis of dasein. early child development and care. katz, l., & tello, j. (2003). “i love me!” how to nurture self-esteem. scholastic parent & child, 10 (6). kilpimaa, m. (2008). miten luoda toivoa ja turvallisuutta itsetuhoisille lapsille ja nuorille? [how to provide hope and security for suicidal children and youngsters?] in k. määttä, & t. uusitalo (eds.) kasvatuspsykologian näkökulmia ihmisen voimavarojen tueksi [perpectives in the educational psychology to support human strengths], (pp. 75-91). rovaniemi: university on lapland. kyrönlampi-kylmänen, t., & määttä k. (2011a). what do the children really think about a day-care centre – the 5 to 7-years-old finnish children speak out. early child development and care, ifirst. doi:10.1080/03004430. 2011.557861 kyrönlampi-kylmänen, t., & määttä k. (2011b). what is it like to be at home – the experiences of 5 to 7-year old finnish children. early child development and care, ifirst. doi:10.1080/03004430.2010.540013 lawrence, m. m. (2001). the roots of love and commitment in childhood. journal of religion and health, 40(1), 61-70. mcree, a.-l., & halpern, c. (2010). parenting style and foregone health care as adolescents transition to early adulthood. journal of adolescent health, 46, 10-11. doi:10.1016/j.adohealth.2009.11.025 melton, g. b. (1991). respect for the dignity of children. american psychologist, 46(1), 66-71. miller, a. (1984). lahjakkaan lapsen tragedia ja todellisen itseyden etsintä [das drama des begabten kindes und die suche nach dem wahren selbst]. lahti, porvoo: wsoy. määttä, k. (2007). vanhempainrakkaus – suurin kaikista [parental love –the greatest love]. in k. määttä (ed.), helposti särkyvää. nuoren kasvun turvaaminen [fragile – securing youngsters’ growth ]. helsinki: kirjapaja. määttä, k. (2010). how to learn to guide the young to love. educational sciences and psychology, 2(17), 47-53. 90 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 91 määttä, k. (2011a). the fascination of love never fades – how do the elderly describe their experiences of falling in love? international review of social sciences and humanities, 2 (1). määttä, k. (2011b). the sweet poison of love in adolescence and early adulthood. elixir pscyhology, 37, 38363843. määttä, k. & uusiautti, s. (2011a, in press). pedagogical authority and pedagogical love –connected or incompatible? international journal of whole schooling. määttä, k. & uusiautti, s. (2011b). pedagogical love and good teacherhood. in education, 17(2). retrieved from: http://ineducation.ca/article/pedagogical-love-and-good-teacherhood nagel, t. (1979). moral luck. in t. nagel (ed.), mortal questions. cambridge university press. retrieved from: http://brommage.freeshell.org/denison/fys/nagel.pdf ojanen, e. (1998). hyvyyden filosofia [the philosophy of goodness]. helsinki: kirjapaja. saevi, t., & eilifsen, m. (2008). ‘heartful’ or ‘heartless’ teachers? or should we look for the good somewhere else? considerations of students’ experience of the pedagogical good. indo-pacific journal of phenomenology, 8, 1-14. seidl, b., & friend, g. (2002). leaving authority at the door: equal-status community-based experiences and the preparation of teachers for diverse classrooms. teaching and teacher education, 18, 421-433. seligman, m. e. p. (2002). authentic happiness. using the new positive psychology to realize your potential for lasting fulfillment. new york, ny: free press. seligman, m. e. p., steen, t. a., park, n., & peterson, c. (2005). positive psychology progress. empirical validation of interventions. american psychologist, 60, 410–421. siljander, p. (2002). systemaatinen johdatus kasvatustieteeseen [systematic introduction to the science of education]. keuruu: otava. statistics finland. (2007). finland 1917-2007. helsinki: statistics finland. retrieved from: http://www.stat.fi/ tup/suomi90/index_en.html swanton, c. (2010). a challenge to intellectual virtue from moral virtue: the case of universal love. metaphilosophy, 41(1-2), 152-171. uusiautti, s., & määttä, k. (2011). the ability to love – a virtue-based approach. british journal of educational research, 2(1), 1-19. uusitalo, t. (2008). opettaja oppilaan voimaannuttajana ihanneopettajan myyttiä uhmaten [the teacher empowering the pupil by flying in the face of the myth of an ideal teacher]. in k. määttä & t. uusitalo (eds.) kasvatuspsykologian näkökulmia ihmisen voimavarojen tueksi [perpectives in the educational psychology to support human strengths], (pp.115-130). rovaniemi: university on lapland. van manen, m. (1991). the tact of teaching: the meaning of pedagogical thoughtfulness. london: althouse press. von wright, m. (2009). the shunned essentials of pedagogy: authority, love and mystery. nordic philosophy of education network nera annual meeting, trondheim, march 5-7, 2009. retrieved from: http://oru.divaportal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2:212954 address correspondences to: kaarina määttä, ph. d., professor of educational psychology faculty of education, university of lapland, rovaniemi, finland p.o.box 122, university of lapland, 96101 rovaniemi, finland +358 400 696 480 kaarina.maatta@ulapland.fi satu uusiautti, ed.d., post doc researcher faculty of education, university of lapland, finland lepolantie 29, 01830 lepsämä, finland (may-sep) 2403 se 8th avenue, cape coral, 33990, fl, usa (oct-apr) +358 50 355 1280 +1 239 789 5562 satu@uusiautti.fi power, pedagogy, and the "women problem": ameliorating philosophy analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 17 power, pedagogy, and the “women problem”: ameliorating philosophy hilkje charlotte haenel abstract: being a member of a minority group makes it harder to succeed in academic philosophy. research suggests that students from underrepresented groups have a hard time in academic philosophy and often drop out instead of pursuing a career in philosophy, despite having the potential to become excellent philosophers. in this paper, i will argue that there is a specific way of thinking about traditional conceptual analysis within analytic philosophy that marginalizes underrepresented groups. this has to do with what kinds of analyses we philosophers think are worthy of conducting and with who we think are worthy of pursuing such analyses. i will then show why this is particularly worrisome for the profession of philosophy as an institution geared towards the love of knowledge and argue that it should be in our interest as philosophers to find ways to prevent this marginalization of underrepresented groups. finally, i will provide an example of how to do philosophy differently that does not exclude members of underrepresented groups and suggest ways in which the teaching of analytic philosophy can directly counter the discriminatory practices of academic philosophy. n philosophy, especially analytic philosophy, there are certain minority groups who are neither represented by the subject matter nor presented with the same possibilities for advancing in the field. “women” are one of those minority groups.1 being a member of such a minority group makes it harder to succeed in academic philosophy. furthermore, research suggests that students of underrepresented groups have a hard time in academic philosophy and often—despite having the potential to become excellent philosophers—drop out instead of pursuing a career in academic philosophy. this is worrisome for at least two reasons: (1) it prevents particular students from flourishing in philosophy and from gaining knowledge, and (2) it contributes to the narrow scope of philosophical research and slows down the process of making epistemically sound philosophy. first, by marginalizing those students that are members of minority groups, analytic philosophy harms those students. it structurally prevents some students from gaining more knowledge and flourishing. second, by contributing to the high dropout rate of students that are members of minority groups, the scope of philosophy excludes underrepresented topics (those topics of interest to minority groups). furthermore, it should be in the interest of all philosophers to strive for good philosophy. however, by excluding some students—those that have the potential to become excellent philosophers—academic philosophy slows done the process of delivering good philosophy. thus, as analytic philosophers, we should address the marginalization of minority groups in philosophy and find a way of teaching and doing philosophy that prevents this marginalization. in the first section, i will argue that there is a specific way of thinking about traditional conceptual analysis within analytic philosophy which is discriminatory against underrepresented groups when combined with the set-up of academic philosophy.2 this has to do with which analyses, i analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 18 we (as philosophers) think, are worth conducting and who, we think, are worthy of pursuing these analyses. (section 1) i will then show why this is particularly worrisome for the profession of philosophy as an institution that teaches the love of knowledge. (section 2) further, i will show that there are ways to do philosophy differently that do not exclude members of underrepresented groups. for example, sally haslanger’s contributions to the topic—if understood correctly—suggest a way of doing analytic philosophy which is not discriminatory and which can even help fight discriminatory practices. (section 3) finally, in the last section, i will suggest a couple of ways in which the teaching of analytic philosophy can directly counter the discriminatory practices of academic philosophy. (section 4) 1 there is a specific way of thinking about traditional conceptual analysis within analytic philosophy which marginalizes underrepresented groups when it is combined with the specific set-up of academic philosophy: the predominantly white, male, and middle class teachers, the aggressive debating styles, etc. this has to do with which analyses, we (as philosophers) think, are worth conducting and who, we think, are worthy of pursuing these analyses. one central focus of so-called analytic philosophy is and always has been a certain way of doing conceptual analysis.3 unfortunately, this traditional conceptual analysis is nearly perfect for dismissing any views that do not hold on to beliefs of objective truth and a priori thinking. let me explain. traditionally conceptual analysis was taken to be what williamson famously describes as “armchair-thinking”. in his words, the traditional methods of philosophy are armchair ones: they consist of thinking, without any special interaction with the world beyond the chair, such as measurement, observation or experiment would typically involve. (2007: 1) the idea is roughly that we can simply sit back and arrive at an analysis of the concept in question by a priori thinking. this hypothesis is constituted by two claims: (1) the semantic internalism claim: the (objective) truth or right analysis of a concept in question can be known through introspection; (2) the intensional definition claim: there is an intensional definition for the concept in question. the idea that we can arrive at an analysis of a concept while sitting in our armchair implies that, first, there is such a concept (in my head), and, second, that we neither have to do empirical research nor have to engage with the things denoted by the term in question to know it. i think the first claim is rather obvious. it would not make sense for me to sit in my armchair doing philosophical analyses, if i did not believe that i could arrive at some truth doing so. furthermore, i do not merely believe that i can arrive at some truth doing so, but that i arrive at the truth doing so. thus, not believing in some form of semantic internalism would render my philosophical analysis ad absurdum. semantic internalism broadly is the theory that an individual can have access to knowledge claims by reflection. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 19 in other words, semantic internalism assumes that concepts are in the head and that through reflection i can gain access to the concept in question. therefore, according to semantic internalism, my specific social position as an individual has no implications for my analysis, the world around me does not influence the meaning of the concepts. what about the second claim, namely that there is an intensional definition for the concept in question? in comparison to an extensional definition—the meaning of a concept is given by specifying its extension, that is, by specifying all objects that fall under the concept—, an intensional definition describes a definition that gives the meaning of a concept by specifying its necessary and sufficient conditions. while giving an extensional definition works best by actually “looking” at the extensions of the concept and therewith often involves some form of descriptive analysis, intensional definitions can be given by mere introspection. if i sit in my armchair for an a priori analysis of some concept in question, i use my intuitions and experiences to come up with the best possible intensional definition of the concept in question. so far, so good. however, again, the claim needs to be stronger: i need to be convinced that my result is not just any definition. for example, a definition should not only have meaning for myself, while someone else’s analysis yields some other definition of the concept. this implies that i have to believe that i, as the analyst, do not bring my personal history or social positioning into the analysis. why do i need to be convinced of this stronger claim? because again, thinking that whatever my analysis yields is totally arbitrary—taking a relativist stance—renders my analysis ad absurdum. there would not be any impact of my thinking except for wasting my time. thus, taking both claims into account—the semantic internalist claim and the intensional definition claim—implies that i take a stance of aperspectivity. thus, the argument goes, if i am not conditioned by my social position, then i should accept intensional definitions; and if i do not have any impact on the observations i make, then i should believe in semantic internalism. (cf. haslanger 2012: 70) there are many arguments for why this practice is particularly marginalizing for minority groups in philosophy when combined with the current set-up of academic philosophy.4 let me raise only two here. first, the view that the best analysis can only be provided introspectively (i.e., while sitting in an armchair) indicates the method of “reflective thinking.” imagine the following “armchair-thinking”scenario, in which philosophy professor a wants to know what x is: a, being convinced by the armchair-method, sits down in his comfortable rocking chair and starts thinking about some intuitions he has about x and about different cases and principles related to x. luckily, after a while he reaches a reflective equilibrium and can give a definition for x. what about these intuitions he so accurately considers? obviously he does not conduct any empirical research or talk to anyone—he is all on his own in his rocking chair (except for his clumber spaniel but the dog is not of much help). the intuitions he considers and on which he bases his answer are therefore his own. unfortunately, not everybody has the same intuitions. (cf. antony 2012, buckwalter and stich 2010, nisbett et al. 2001, weinberg et al. 2001) and by ill luck, the philosopher is a male, white, heterosexual, ablebodied, and middle class person with academic upbringing and background. contra the semantic internalism claim, his intuitions reflect his person and his social situation. epistemic knowers—in this case, the philosopher—are situated knowers. (cf. anderson 1995a and 1995b, code 1991, jaggar 1983, scheman 1995) philosophers come to have the intuitions they have because of their socio-historical analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 20 position. most philosophers are similar to our armchair-philosopher in their social position and therefore many answers philosophy has given reflect male, white, heterosexual, abled, and middle class ideas.5 this makes it very hard for anybody not fitting in this frame of the philosopher to succeed or even to be heard at all. second, embedded in this idea of the philosopher separate from his standpoint and epistemically neutral is the assumption that some people just “have it” while others do not. in other words, some have a talent for rational and reflective thinking and philosophy and others do not. i have met several senior professors who claimed to detect after a few minutes of conversation or after an hour of seminar who has a talent for philosophy and who does not. unfortunately, there is still a bias towards attributing rational and reflective thinking to (white) men. (haslanger 2008: 213 and 2012: 47) for example, haslanger writes: [...] these ideals of rationality and rational selves have typically been defined in contrast to what are assumed to be characteristic features and capacities of women: women are guided by emotion or feeling rather than reason; women are not capable of impartiality or abstract thought; women are more intuitive and closer to nature than men, and so on. (2012: 47) professors are quicker in judging a person to be good in philosophy if they think that person is a (white) man. when i was an undergraduate student i took a class on philosophy of mathematics. there was one other woman among the twenty or so participants. in one of the first sessions the professor went to the blackboard and drew a square and a heart. pointing at the square he said “this is how men do math,” pointing at the heart “and this is how women do math, which is why we stick to men’s skills.” that was in 2008. haslanger describes the same experience: in graduate school, one of my teachers told me that he had “never seen a first rate woman philosophy and never expected to because women were incapable of having seminal ideas.” (2008: 211) we all employ stereotypes and schemas. in fact, we need schemas to organize and respond to the world quickly and go about our everyday business, but some of these stereotypes lead to discriminations and other lead to preferential treatment. in the case at hand, “we” attribute the desirable characteristic of being good in philosophy to (white) male students, while at the same the undesirable stereotype of not being fit for philosophy is attributed to female students.6 note, that such attribution of stereotypes and/or biased judgement is not a conscious process, rather it is implicit; in other words, social behaviour is not always under conscious control. (greenwald and banaji 1995) also, and quite obviously, it is only possible to judge someone as “being good in philosophy” if that person is not too shy and is forthcoming about their ideas. both are attributes that men are (mostly) better at. that this is the case has to do with the fact that men already feel entitled to do philosophy; while as one of the few women in the seminars who are being openly told that we “don’t have what it takes to do philosophy,” we mostly feel like the odd ones out.7 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 21 2 i have argued that the claims of semantic internalism and intensional definitions can be particularly marginalizing for philosophy students who are members of underrepresented groups when combined with the culture of male entitlement in academic philosophy. for example, in 2010, philosophy had a lower rate of female phd-students than most of the physical sciences8—despite the fact that no fewer women than men take philosophy classes in college. thompson et al. (2016: 1) write: in 2012 in the united states, for every 100 men graduating with a college degree, 141 women graduated. for decades now, more women have been enrolled in american universities than men. yet, during these same decades, the proportion of women who major in philosophy has remained stagnant, hovering below one-third. so, while almost 60% of college graduates are now women, only 30% of philosophy majors are women […] with women getting just 30% of philosophy bachelor’s degrees, it’s no surprise that the ratio of women to men is so low among philosophy graduate students (30%) and professors (20.7%).9 these numbers are particularly worrisome for the profession of philosophy as an institution that teaches the love of knowledge. i contend that the fact that analytic philosophy marginalizes members of underrepresented groups is worrisome for at least two reasons: (1) it prevents particular students from flourishing in philosophy and from gaining a particular kind of knowledge, and (2) it contributes to the narrow scope of philosophical research and slows down the process of epistemically good philosophy. first, by marginalizing those students that are members of minority groups, analytic philosophy harms those students as subjects that come to the profession to learn. it structurally prevents some students from gaining more knowledge and flourishing, while it provides this knowledge to others. it is wrong to epistemically disadvantage a student due to her membership in a particular social group (say, the social group of women) that is underrepresented in philosophy. furthermore, the marginalizing of said student not only prevents her from gaining knowledge, it also restricts her flourishing in general. by being marginalized in this way, she is restricted in developing her love of the subject, her own identity, and following the life path she has set out for herself. this can, furthermore, involve an economic disadvantage: dropping out of philosophy can lengthen her studies and thereby force her to pay more student tuition and get her to the job market later. it should be in the interest of any subject to not (unfairly) burden some of its students more than others and it should be in the particular interest of philosophy as an institution that teaches the love of knowledge to not (unfairly) restrict some of its students from flourishing in the pursuit of knowledge. second, by contributing to the high drop-out rate of students that are members of minority groups, the scope of philosophy excludes underrepresented topics (those topics of interest to minority groups). dotson (2012) argues that academic philosophy is not a productive environment for diverse philosophers. rather, engaging in topics, methods, or philosophers that diverge from the canon is made hard at best in philosophy, if not impossible. furthermore, members of underrepresented analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 22 groups in particular often have an interest in topics and methods that diverge from the canon of philosophy. also, it should be in the interest of all philosophers to strive for bringing about the best possible philosophy. however, by excluding some students—students that have the potential to become excellent philosophers—the norms of academic philosophy slows down the process of delivering good philosophy. it excludes some voices that could play a significant role in bringing about the best possible philosophy. discouraging some students (say, women) from advancing in academic philosophy will lead to talented philosophers not graduating, not getting a job, not getting their work read, etc. but, as saul argues, to “get the best possible philosophy being done, we need the best philosophers to receive proper encouragement and good jobs, and to be working in environments where they can produce their best work.” (2013: 50) some of these best philosophers might dropout of philosophy before they even have a chance to contribute to it. in other words, there are two reasons why we should work towards making philosophy more inclusive: for reasons of fairness and for the sake of philosophy. 3 i have argued that the claims of semantic internalism and intensional definitions can be particularly marginalizing for philosophy students that are members of underrepresented groups when combined with the culture of male entitlement in academic philosophy. and i have identified two reasons why this is particularly worrisome for academic philosophy: for reasons of fairness and for the sake of philosophy. luckily, there is no reason to give up yet. by explicating haslanger’s philosophical projects of conceptual analysis i will show that there are ways to do philosophy differently that do not exclude members of underrepresented groups.10 haslanger’s contributions to the topic of conceptual analysis—if understood correctly—suggest a way of doing analytic philosophy which is not marginalizing and which can even help to fight unfair practices. in several papers haslanger provides an insightful account of conceptual analysis within analytic philosophy. broadly, she claims that we are mistaken in assuming that there is only one way of doing analysis and that, further, we do not need to accept traditional armchair philosophy. in other words, it is not the case that the (objective) truth or right analysis of the concept in question can be known internally or that there is an intensional definition for the concept in question. instead, she argues that there are three different kinds of concepts: [manifest concept]: the concept we take ourselves to be applying; [operative concept]: the concept we are in fact applying; [target concept]: the concept we should be applying. respectively, there are three ways of conducting conceptual analysis: [the internalist approach]: the question “what is x?” is answered by a priori methods and by reaching a reflective equilibrium that takes into account intuitions about the concept and its cases and principles. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 23 [the descriptive approach]: the question “what is x?” is answered by considering what objective types our epistemic vocabulary tracks, i.e. it identifies paradigm cases for fixing the referent of the term and draws on (quasi) empirical methods to explicate the relevant kind or type to which the paradigm belongs. [the ameliorative approach]: the question “what is x?” is substituted by the question “what is the point of having x?”, i.e. which concept could actually do the best work for us?11 only the internalist approach, resulting in the manifest concept, uses the methods popularly and strongly associated with analytic philosophy, namely a priori methods. the descriptive approach, yielding the operative concept, takes up some ideas of externalism and empirical research methods. this approach is therefore in less danger of being marginalizing than the first. but it is the ameliorative approach, yielding the target concept, that i want to focus on as an example of doing analytic philosophy, which is not marginalizing and which can even help to fight unfair educational practices. haslanger’s ameliorative inquiry diverts from the aforementioned armchair philosophy in two ways: (1) it is a distinctly normative conceptual analysis. it starts with a particular set of goals that a group should hold and asks what the concept of f-ness should be given those goals. the resulting concept of f-ness is the target concept of f. such an inquiry is normative because it asks what the concept in question should be and because it aims at particular goals. and (2) ameliorative inquiry need not be in line with our intuitive understanding or our use of the concept in question; it can be revisionary. in other words, ameliorative projects have a particular epistemic subject that normatively engages in conceptual analysis; it not only affirms the situated position of the philosopher, but takes her to be invested in particular projects and analyses. in response to haslanger’s ameliorative project, the armchair philosopher could argue12 that firstly, amelioration is contextualized and secondly, contextualized amelioration is not a new project, but rather what many philosophers in the past have done. the question “what is the practical task of concept x?” is trivially and truly answered by saying that it enables us to talk about x. but the ‘us’ is not unique and neither is this a normative question. the concept x should not enable us to talk about x, it simply provides the opportunity to do so. therefore, we need to talk about contextualized amelioration: in particular contexts we adjust concepts to our practical purposes of the speaker and her audience. however, this is not a new idea. normative considerations shaped the tradition of analytic philosophy all along. the armchair philosopher could then think, for example, that frege, wittgenstein, and carnap were all ameliorators. this would led the armchair philosopher to propose that amelioration is indeed universal amelioration in so far as haslanger’s considerations of amelioration are involved in all philosophical analysis. the idea that there can be three different ways of engaging in conceptual analysis is mistaken, rather, armchair philosophy as an introspective endeavor always has an ameliorative aspect—however, this ameliorative aspect is far from being normative. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 24 now there is some truth to these ideas, but they misunderstand haslanger’s underlying point. in my understanding, haslanger explicitly develops a way to engage in conceptual analysis that takes seriously our social positions and our normative investment in certain topics as philosophers. she argues for a particularly normative way of doing philosophy. but she does not say that ameliorative projects are motivated in the sense that, for example, wittgenstein motivated his linguistic turn. without question he adjusted concepts to our practical purposes. however, haslanger implies more than this. ameliorative projects in her sense have a political motivation, which can be seen by the examples she uses. one of those examples is the concept of woman. in analysing that concept haslanger aims at showing that women are a genuine type (instead of a gerrymandered or random collection of individuals). the thought is that providing such a concept can be useful in showing what is wrong with patriarchal oppression of women. this is clearly a normative motivation for the analysis and it is a motivation that derives from her own social position—it is a topic she is deeply invested in. (haslanger 2012, haslanger 2006) to please the armchair philosopher, we could say that there are two distinct ameliorative projects. we can adjust concepts to our practical purposes, or we can adjust concepts to our normative purposes. the two projects are similar in so far as they are based on specific considerations. but they differ in that the first is mainly unreflective: we are driven by the aim of arriving at some target concept in question and our socialisation, biases, and so on push us towards a certain adjustment of the manifest and/or operative concept that has the benefit of being practically more useful. the second is deliberate: we are driven by the aim of arriving at some target concept that fulfils some specific normative purpose and in line with our normative aim we adjust the manifest and/or operative concept. it is this deliberate way of doing ameliorative analysis that can help strengthen minority groups in philosophy. the ameliorative project—when understood properly—involves being practically engaged and normatively aware, and as such it is the ideal replacement for the “armchair model” of conceptual inquiry that can lead to the marginalization of underrepresented groups. i should make one last comment here. in response to my argument, some people might respond with the critique that such ameliorative analysis is still highly theoretical and academic and in no way a good practice to politically change the environment of philosophy. maybe that is right. but i do not claim that doing ameliorative analysis should be the only thing we do. in fact, neither does haslanger. she states that: ideology critique of the sort i’ve described can help create conceptual space for such change, but thought can never replace action. (2012: 475) ameliorative analysis can provide a space where we acknowledge our normative aims and where we can develop those concepts that are deeply important to us. in this sense, ameliorative projects help to tackle the unfair aspects of armchair philosophy as outlined above and it can diversify philosophy by making room for subjects and methods that lie outside of the traditional canon of philosophy. the concepts we employ and the terms we use create the world we live in as much as that world creates us and our language. so to end discrimination (in philosophy and elsewhere) we need to tackle our concepts and terms as well as the world we live in. to provide a flourishing context for all philosophy analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 25 students, we desperately need to change the set-up of academic philosophy as well as the way in which we engage in philosophical thinking. 4 i have argued that armchair philosophy—specifically the claims of semantic internalism and intensional definitions—can be particularly marginalizing for philosophy students that are members of underrepresented groups when combined with the culture of male entitlement in academic philosophy. and i have identified two reasons why this is particularly worrisome for academic philosophy: for reasons of fairness and for the sake of philosophy. on a good note, i have shown that not all projects of conceptual analysis contribute to marginalizing members of underrepresented groups, and i have provided the example of haslanger’s ameliorative projects. as philosophers we should aim at diversifying the profession and a first step to do so is to change the way we engage in philosophical thinking inside and outside the classroom. i will conclude this paper by suggesting two strategies that we can adopt in the classroom to counter the marginalizing effects on those students that are members of underrepresented groups: diversifying the methods we teach and diversifying the discussion in the classroom. first, besides teaching the traditional armchair method, we can broaden our methods and include other ways to do conceptual analysis. these can include haslanger’s descriptive and ameliorative inquiries, but also methods from experimental or critical philosophy; e.g., pragmatic analysis, critical analysis, standpoint analysis, and so on. if we want to teach our students a broad range of methods of conceptual analysis—and i have argued that we should—we can do so by: (a) choosing philosophical texts where different methods of conceptual analysis are employed; (b) showing the limits of, for example, the armchair method and asking students to come up with other ways to conduct philosophically fruitful analyses; (c) providing different examples that show that depending on the question we fare better with one analysis rather than another (e.g., intensional definitions are useful when we want to provide generalized accounts, extensional definitions are useful when we have a small and diverse sample of objects, etc.); and (d) showing students that what they assume to be a neutral perspective of investigation is usually a situated position. these and other tools can broaden the spectrum of possible conceptual analysis for students and show how their diverse perspectives can be beneficial for our philosophical engagement. in this sense we can diversify the methods we teach. second, even when we present diverse reading material and diverse methods of conceptual analysis, students that are members of underrepresented groups participate in classroom discussions less than others. besides diversifying the methods of philosophical thinking, we should also aim at diversifying the discussion we have with our students. let me suggest the following tool by which we can encourage diverse participation without putting certain students in the spotlight: we can ask our students to send us one (or more) questions that engage with the assigned reading material before class. we can then read all questions before class and pick a couple of questions that are particularly interesting or engaging, always keeping in mind that the set of questions we pick should be by students from diverse social groups. when we start the discussion in the classroom, we can read the analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 26 questions we have picked beforehand to the class—highlighting the interesting and good ways they engage with the material. we can then ask the students who wrote the presented questions to elaborate on their thoughts before starting a discussion with everyone. this way, we encourage students from diverse social groups to participate in class, but we make sure that they are well prepared (they wrote a good question) and we give them a feeling of being good philosophers by stressing the good quality of the question before we make them talk—therefore providing them selfconfidence to speak up in class. these two ways of diversifying the philosophical methods and the discussions in the classroom can help create a philosophical set-up that is inclusive for everyone in the classroom. it can therefore help counter the marginalizing effects of armchair philosophy. to sum up, i have argued that the narrow conception of armchair philosophy can be marginalizing for philosophy students that are members of underrepresented groups when combined with the culture of male entitlement in academic philosophy. i have, further, identified two reasons why this is particularly worrisome for academic philosophy: for reasons of fairness and for the sake of philosophy. however, i have also shown that not all projects of conceptual analysis contribute to marginalizing members of underrepresented groups and i have provided the example of haslanger’s ameliorative projects. finally, i have concluded this paper by suggesting two strategies that we can adopt in the classroom to counter the marginalizing effects on those students that are members of underrepresented groups: diversifying the methods we teach and diversifying the discussion in the classroom. now we just need the will to do it. endnotes 1 for numbers concerning “women” in philosophy in the uk see beebee, helen and jenny saul 2011. important essays about the discriminatory ideology of philosophy are haslanger 2008 and dotson 2012. 2 by the “set-up of academic philosophy” i mean the fact that most lecturers in philosophy are white, male, and middle class, the aggressive debating style common to philosophical discussions, and so further. 3 even though other and more descriptive, normative, and experimental methods have gained importance in analytic philosophy, a priori philosophy still is the most common method with which analytic philosophers work. 4 i am not going to consider outright hostility against minority groups (e.g., sexual abuse of female students in philosophy departments) or any reasons, which are not connected to the methodological claims given above. i can also not consider every argument for why academic philosophy in particular is marginalizing for underrepresented groups. for a good argument of why and how knowledge attribution in general is discriminatory, see haslanger 2012: 344. 5 see the following article for numbers of the overwhelming majority of white male philosophers in academic philosophy: https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/women-in-philosophy-do-the-math/?_r=0; accessed: april 30, 2017. https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/women-in-philosophy-do-the-math/?_r=0 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 27 6 i use the terms ‘male’ and ‘female’ broadly in the sense that we physically judge some persons to be male while we judge others to be female; this is not meant as an endorsement of the binary gender system. for an overview of stereotypes and stereotyping see blum 2004. for an explanation of schemas see valian 1998. 7 this issue is also connected to stereotype threat. female students who believe in the “just having it”-myth are more prone to stereotype threat. carol dweck conducted a study on stereotype threat with math students. she concludes: “it looks, then, as though the view of math as a gift can not only make women vulnerable to declining performance, it can also make them susceptible to stereotypes, so that when they enter an environment that denigrates their gift, they may lose the desire to carry on in that field.” (2006: 6) this is not only true for math but also for (analytic) philosophy in general. 8 see this chard: https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=zgvmyxvsdgrvbwfpbnxhcgfjb21taxr0zwvvbnr ozxn0yxr1c29md29tzw58z3g6nthlnmfintzjmtc5zde0mw; accessed: april 30, 2017. 9 see also beebee 2013, norlock 2012, and paxton et al. 2012. 10 this is, of course, only one side of the coin: to stop underrepresented groups from being marginalized in philosophy, we cannot merely tackle its methodological problems, but we have to take seriously the discouraging “set-up” of academic philosophy. for different arguments that take this into account, see hutchison and jenkins 2013. 11 these three ways of conceptual analysis are taken from haslanger 2006, see also haslanger 2012: 223f., 342, 367, 371, 386 and 395. 12 similar arguments were, for example, brought forward in a talk (“the philosophical significance of ameliorative projects”) by herman cappelen at an arché workshop on haslanger’s ameliorative projects in st. andrews at the 15th october 2013. references anderson, e. 1995a. “feminist epistemology: an interpretation and a defense,” hypatia, 10(3): 50 84. ——. 1995b. “knowledge, human interest, and objectivity in feminist epistemology,” philosophical topics, 23(2): 27-58. antony, l. 2012. “different voices or perfect storm: why are there so few women in philosophy?” journal of social philosophy, 43(3): 227-55. beebee, h. 2013. “women and deviance in philosophy,” in: women in philosophy: what needs to change? k. hutchinson and f. jenkins (eds.), oxford: oxford university press. beebee, h. and j. saul 2011. “women in philosophy in the uk: a report by the british philosophical association and the society for women in philosophy uk,” http://www.swipuk.org/notices/2011-09-08/; accessed: april 30, 2017. blum, l. 2004. “stereotypes and stereotyping: a moral analysis,” philosophical papers, 33(3): 251-89. buckwalter, w. and s. stich. 2010. “gender and philosophical intuition,” social science electronic publishing: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1683066; accessed april 30, 2017. https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=zgvmyxvsdgrvbwfpbnxhcgfjb21taxr0zwvvbnrozxn0yxr1c29md29tzw58z3g6nthlnmfintzjmtc5zde0mw https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=zgvmyxvsdgrvbwfpbnxhcgfjb21taxr0zwvvbnrozxn0yxr1c29md29tzw58z3g6nthlnmfintzjmtc5zde0mw http://www.swipuk.org/notices/2011-09-08/ http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1683066 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 28 code, l. 1991. what can she know? feminist theory and construction of knowledge. ithaca: cornell university press. dotson, k. 2012. “how is this paper philosophy?” comparative philosophy, 3(1): 3-29. dweck, c. 2006. “is math a gift? beliefs that put females at risk,” in: why aren’t there more women in science? s. ceci and w. williams (eds.), washington, dc: american psychological association. greenwald, a. and m. banaji. 1995. “implicit social cognition: attitudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes,” psychological review, 102(1): 4-27. haslanger, s. 2006. “what good are our intuitions?” proceedings of the aristotelian society, supplementary volumes, 80: 89-118. ——. 2008. “changing the ideology and culture of philosophy: not by reason (alone),” hypatia, 23(2): 210-23. ——. 2012. resisting reality: social construction and social critique. oxford: oxford university press. hutchison, j., and f. jenkins. 2013. women in philosophy: what needs to change? oxford: oxford university press. jaggar, a. 1983. feminist politics and human nature. totowa, nj: rowman and allanheld. nisbett, r., i. choi, k. peng, and a. norenzayan. 2001. “culture and systems of thought: holistic versus analytic cognition,” psychological review, 108(2): 291-310. norlock, k. 2012. “gender perception as a habit of moral perception: implications for philosophical methodology and introductory curriculum,” journal of social philosophy, 43(3): 347-62. paxton, m., c. figdor, and v. tiberius. 2012. “quantifying the gender gap: an empirical study of the underrepresentation of women in philosophy,” hypatia, 27(4): 949-57. saul, j. 2013. “implicit bias, stereotype threat, and women in philosophy,” in: women in philosophy: what needs to change? k. hutchinson and f. jenkins (eds.), oxford: oxford university press. scheman, n. 1995. “feminist epistemology,” metaphilosophy, 26(3): 177-99. thompson, m., t. adleberg, s. sims, and e. nahmias. 2016. “why do women leave philosophy? surveying students at the introductory level,” philosophers’ imprint, 16(6): 1-36. valian, v. 1998. why so slow? the advancement of women. cambridge, ma: mit press. weinberg, j., n. shaun, and s. stich. 2001. “normativity and epistemic intuitions,” philosophical topics, 29(1,2): 429-60. williamson, t. 2007. the philosophy of philosophy. malden, ma: blackwell publishing. address correspondences to: hilkje charlotte haenel phd student at humboldt-university of berlin, germany email: hilkje.charlotte.haenel@gmail.com mailto:hilkje.charlotte.haenel@gmail.com analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 19 being participation: the ontology of the socratic method jessica davis abstract: the dialogue format in plato’s works is often described as a method conducive to eliciting interlocutors’ inherent knowledge, or as a tool by which elenchus, valued for its own sake, can be achieved. but to understand plato in either of these ways is to miss the significance of the dialogue format predominant in his corpus, as well as the metaphysical underpinnings of the dialectic relation. in this essay i interpret the limitations of knowledge in plato’s corpus as a correlate of one’s claims to independent possession of knowledge. explicitly, i argue for a platonic analysis of the individual that bolsters the impetus to use dialogue, rather than instruction, as a primary tool for philosophical inquiry and for education in general. plato’s criterion for doing philosophy well involves not only a subjective willingness to question one’s beliefs and to live by one’s vision, but also an objective demand to coordinate one’s beliefs with those of others –and ultimately– to acknowledge the interdependence of one’s own reality with that of others. part 1 introduction when advocates of the socratic method (sm) argue that dialogue is an alternative to (or a supplement for) the ‘instructional approach’ to education, they seem to focus on the benefits that dialogue has for students and teachers.1 these same advocates seem to conceive of plato and the sm, understandably, as entailing a certain metaphysical position.2 in particular, this position holds that one’s knowledge is limited insofar as one is part of a changing, material world, and that one’s knowledge is confirmed to the extent that one connects with the unchanging forms inhering in the soul; we are limited to the status of becoming.3 i agree that the sm is beneficial, and i agree that the metaphysics mentioned above are easily derivable from the platonic corpus. however, i argue that it is just as plausible, and more powerful, to view plato, and the method he portrays, as pointing to a fact of our being, rather than as a fact of our becoming. to frame this essay, which interprets the sm in an educational context, i begin by offering a contrast between what i call the ‘instructional approach’ to education, which is common in our nation’s educational institutions, and the sm, which we find in the platonic corpus.4 next, i describe how some interpretations can be seen as faulty, because they view the sm merely as instrumentally valuable to our becoming something else. i will end with an explanation of my interpretation of the sm, which is based on an ontological reading of the sm itself as intrinsically valuable.5 let us begin with some context: the problematic, instructional approach to knowledge, or what socrates referred to as sophistry.6 the problematic instructional approach it is typical in popular education approaches for students to be seen as passive recipients of knowledge, and for teachers to be seen as bearers of knowledge which they then impart to students.7 there is a sharp distinction between teacher and student, and students are taught certain pre-determined curricula which essentially contains other people’s beliefs. however, the students are not instructed on how to develop and evaluate their own beliefs.8 students memorize isolated and fragmented bits of information without ever learning the connections 19 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 20 between facts, and without being able to give an account of how things are related.9 “teaching to the test,” which is now widely admonished by educational reformers, is a symptom of this problem.10 our schools teach content that is required of them in order to get funding, rather than being concerned with the form which education takes, or with the overarching principles which guide our schools. funding for secondary schools is largely contingent on test results and on end results in general. it may be results that we want from schools –certainly we want all students to graduate, for example– but this approach leaves no mechanism for checking whether or not our collective goals are good goals. when teaching to the test we are vulnerable to the possibility that the mob, as socrates might say, is wrong.11 it is most likely because of these problems –of structuring schools around the demands of our funders, of being subject to assessments which discount qualities like integrity or morality in our students, and of being dependent on quantifiable results in general– that educational reformers today advocate for use of the sm.12 in the next section i will explicate just how the sm in general serves as an alternative to the instructional approach, before delving into my interpretation of the ways in which the sm is viewed as instrumentally valuable by its proponents today. the socratic method the sm is generally viewed as an alternative to the instructional approach toward education because it prioritizes the investigation of the beliefs that students have, and their processing of those beliefs, rather than on beliefs or information which teachers have and give to students.13 the qualities derivable from a survey of the myriad of examples of the sm in plato’s corpus have been nicely summarized by angelo corlett as consisting of epistemic humility, a collective pursuit of truth, curiosity, honesty, humor, and hope, among other things.14 the sm has also been described by other philosophers as consisting of (at least) two key steps: the ‘gadfly’ step, wherein students are brought to doubt their claims to knowledge, and the ‘midwifery’ step, in which students are led to critically evaluate their beliefs and elicit ‘improved’ or ‘correct’ beliefs.15 essentially, the instructional approach as described in the above section is concerned with ‘the destination,’ or particular conclusions and results of education, while the sm in general is concerned with ‘the journey,’ or the form which education takes. the instructional approach assumes that education itself is be of instrumental value, because the process of instilling information in a student is analogous to using information as a tool by which to ‘do something to’ a student. the end result, in this framework, is a knowledgeable student who has been ‘filled.’ in the following section i aver that despite its alleged dissimilarity with the instructional method, the sm has also been interpreted (and/or implemented) primarily as instrumentally valuable. part 2 becoming: instrumental interpretations of the socratic method many of plato’s dialogues have been classified as either embodying a “radical openness,” or as typifying the instructional or consensus-aimed methods of education.16 decker avers that because elenchtic dialogues can only refute invalid beliefs, and cannot themselves give birth to viable new philosophical theses, we ought to either abandon elenchtic dialogues all together, or decide that the dialogical format is itself the wisdom for which we should strive.17 the sm must either be instrumentally valuable or intrinsically valuable. let us examine two interpretive schemas which take the sm to be instrumentally valuable, before taking a closer look at a schema which is closer to viewing the sm as intrinsically valuable. the instrumental recollection and instrumental emergence approaches analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 70 regarding the relevance of the dialogue format within education studies, the emphasis seems to be either on the benefits of using the method due to the uncovering of knowledge otherwise buried within the student, or due to the possibilities which are made available when education is led by inquiry rather than predetermined curricula.18 within the former framework –which has been derived from various platonic dialogues– it is assumed that students have knowledge within themselves and that the sm brings out and gives birth to this knowledge.19 the object of value in this case is the knowledge that each student possesses. the latter view holds that the sm creates value by maintaining a kind of grounds for possibility. the object of value in this case is ‘the possibility itself,’20 or the properties which consequently emerge, such as the equality which obtains when neither teacher nor student is said to possess knowledge,21 or the self-improvement which results from the student’s process of disregarding false beliefs.22 critical theory of education, though its affinity with the sm may be limited to its questioning of beliefs, may also be seen to fit into this category, insofar as it utilizes analytical methods in order to reach certain valued ends in education.23 with respect to the view which holds that beneficial possibilities emerge from use of the sm, one problem is that if we have a fixed notion of potential in mind, we may actually thwart potential because of our own ignorance of capacities and possibilities.24 similarly, if we take this fixed notion of potential for our students –be it a quality conducive to egalitarianism, or a quality of achievement– to be our end, we may come to find that there are other ways of achieving this end without having the sm as a core element in our classrooms. the students may just go ahead and become their own midwives. and yet, this concern is precisely what is wrong with assuming a priori knowledge: it reduces knowledge to the status of an object which can be possessed. this objectified notion of knowledge takes wisdom as constitutive of the fragmented, isolated bits of information upon which the instructional method of education thrives. furthermore, in each of the ‘instrumental’ and ‘emergent’ value approaches, the role of the interlocutor, and thus, the sm itself, can become problematic and even superfluous if a priori knowledge or emergent qualities can arise otherwise. in both interpretations, as explicable as they may be within the context of plato’s works, the operative notions of wisdom are problematically consequentialist. let us move on now to a third interpretation of the sm. instrumental aporia approach having gone through the conceptions which take the sm as instrumentally valuable –because it elicits a priori knowledge or because it opens us up to some other extrinsically valuable quality such as possibility– we can now assess the accounts which take the aporia resulting from the sm as ‘intrinsically valuable.’25 my argument here is that this approach also interprets plato incorrectly, attributing too much to the ideas expressed by plato’s interlocutors by concluding that our ontology entails a gap between our existence and truth. the ‘instrumental aporia approach,’ i argue, takes the sm as a means to realizing our epistemic ineptitude and to realizing, essentially, the chasm between ourselves and certainty. this view thus remains an instrumental account of the value of the sm. it may be the case that dialogue is doubly instrumentally valuable, insofar as it both brings forth a priori knowledge and opens us up to possibility. there is certainly evidence of this within the text. we also see, however, many occurrences in which something else is alleged to occur as a result of the sm. in sophist: visitor: and you’ll assign this dialectical activity only to someone who has a pure and just love of wisdom. theaetetus: you certainly wouldn’t assign it to anyone else. visitor: we’ll find that the philosopher will always be in a location like this if we look for him. 21 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 71 he’s hard to see clearly too, but not in the same way as the sophist. theaetetus: why not? visitor: the sophist runs off into the darkness of that which is not, which he’s had practice dealing with, and he’s hard to see because the place is so dark. isn’t that right? theaetetus: it seems to be. visitor: but the philosopher always uses reasoning to stay near the form, being. he isn’t at all easy to see because that area is so bright and the eyes of most people’s souls can’t bear to look at what’s divine.26 even the philosopher, who is engaging in the sm and is closest to truth, is only near it. the ‘instrumental aporia approach’ recognizes this element in plato and deems it a valuable end. plato’s corpus includes many passages which indicate that socrates (or plato) believed elenchus itself to be truth because our bodies act as a barrier to knowledge; we can only know our limitations.27 and there is much scholarly discussion regarding the disparity of metaphysical ‘beliefs’ which obtain in the elenchtic dialogues and the more ‘robust’ and theoretical later dialogues.28 some interpreters hold that while the earlier dialogues are aporetic, the later ones, insofar as they articulate more elaborate metaphysical and civic accounts, such as those found in laws or timaeus, represent plato’s abandonment of the ‘the value of aporia’ in favor of certainty.29 i believe that these concerns only arise when one seeks justification for use of the sm –and of philosophy itself– by appealing to its instrumental capacities, rather than on its intrinsic value. it need not be a surprise that interpreters attempt to justify use of the sm in terms of the results it affords; we live in an age, as padraig hogan and richard smith write, in which “nothing seems to have value unless it has demonstrable, quantifiable outcomes.” however, as they go on to say, “to the mentality that fetishizes the performance-indicator, the socratic dialogue is likely to remain a lasting puzzle.”30 whether you take plato’s older dialogues to be indicative of fixed metaphysical positions or not, what can be said is that the dialogue format obtains throughout the corpus. in my view, it is the dialogue form itself which we ought to view as the most conclusive metaphysical and normative assertion within the corpus: engaging as such is what it means to be. plato’s ‘problem of participation,’ it turns out, is his solution: we are participation.31 let us examine just how this plays out. part 3 being: the intrinsic value approach based on ontological interpretation it is certain that throughout the dialogues, platonic characters point us towards philosophical inquiry as being valuable. it is also certain that philosophers themselves find philosophy to be valuable. but among philosophers who either advocate for use of the sm or who consider it useless (or at best, instrumentally valuable and thus disposable), there seems to be a disagreement about the role of the sm within philosophical inquiry. assuming that philosophers either find philosophy valuable for themselves, for other philosophers, or for every human being, the divergence must lie within their beliefs both about the world and about philosophy. what i argue in the remainder of this paper is that if we understand reality to be concordant with practical identity, or as comprised of natural laws which all living organisms must respond to (or are affected by), then philosophical inquiry – insofar as it is intended as a means of engaging with reality in an ‘appropriate’ way– ought to include some form of dialogue akin to the sm. i argue that it is the sm which takes into account the 22 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 72 unavoidable interconnectedness of other people in our quest for knowledge.32 and while it is typically agreed that plato’s later dialogues contain a theory of literal other-worldliness regarding truth, my interpretation takes the sm throughout the entire corpus as representative of the nature of being: we do not exist in isolation. whether we look at ‘ourselves’ as individual human beings or as the human race, we cannot rightly lay claim to certain knowledge, because we can only occupy our place in relation to otherness.33 this universal necessity of relatedness, and the multitudinous, particular manifestations of beliefs, situations and embodiments which arise from this relatedness, is the universality to which philosophy draws our attention. with that, let us turn our attention to a key feature of the sm which gives force to my position. the role of the interlocutor the republic and other works emphasis a distinction between wisdom of the self and the knowledge claims of sophists, the mob, and interlocutors –even when the interlocutor is socrates himself. socrates presents the ideal of knowledge as that which one uncovers within one’s soul, regardless of the material world and other people, yet we are faced with the brute fact that it is dialogue, not diatribes, which are predominant in the corpus. if the role of the interlocutor or teacher is nothing more than the “leading out” of a priori knowledge within the student, then the interlocutor may not be necessary if the student has some other way of accessing their knowledge. while many of plato’s passages indicate that it is up to the individual to order themselves properly, and to not succumb to group dynamics or pressure from majority rule, other dialogues clearly dismantle the kind of knowledge a pythagorean might express, wherein “every man (is) self-sufficient in wisdom.”34 what exactly is plato’s stance on the role of other people as interlocutors, as teachers? i take this issue to be the prime reason to interpret the sm ontologically. take socrates’ commitment to the ideal state of justice in republic: but perhaps […] there is a model of it in heaven, for anyone who wants to look at it and to make himself its citizen on the strength of what he sees. it makes no difference whether it is or ever will be somewhere...35 being the idealist that i am, this statement stands out to me. i know what it is like to have ideas about living sustainably on the planet, or about dismantling gender roles, for example, and to have those ideas shunned by your society. a person with ideals like this can either bury their ideals and conform to society, or live by their ideals despite their peers’ reactions. as socrates surmised in republic, just because our ideal does not presently exist, does not mean that we should not act as though it does; our ideals ought to effect what we do.36 but why does plato bother having his characters bring this up throughout the corpus, if at the same time, his dialogues exemplify the value of bouncing your ideas off of others? plato confirms time and again that reason can help us edit our ideals, but that ultimately, the ideals come from outside of ourselves. the role of the self plato’s dialogue format, wherein people can check their conceptions of the world with each other, and confirm their most reasonable mode of behavior, should be seen as an exemplification of practical identity.37 as christine m. korsgaard writes, in the kantian spirit, in order for us to be efficacious agents, we must act on beliefs, or reasons, which consistently cohere with our reality. in order to do this, she continues, we must presup23 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 73 pose the existence of other agents who share in the same reality and hence, the same universal reasons on which we act.38 thusly, one’s practical identity –in my argument and in korsgaard’s– amounts to one’s ability to act efficaciously, or carry out one’s will, with integrity and full knowledge of cause and effect (in both a physical and a moral sense).39 you cannot climb a tree without some knowledge about gravity and the use of your muscles; you cannot tell a lie without expecting to be lied to in the future. the reasons that we have for acting the way we do –if we are doing it properly– are universal reasons that we all share.40 this is the mysterious harmony of life that socrates tried so hard to reveal among his friends. to the extent that we take the ‘instructional approach’ to education, we devalue the means by which students must come to check their own belief systems. but to the extent that we treat the sm as a means by which to solicit inherent knowledge, as does the ‘instrumental recollection approach’, or as a fertilizer for potential, like the ‘instrumental emergence approach,’ or as a grounds for humility as does the ‘instrumental aporia approach,’ we miss out on the true value of the sm. the method is valuable because it best facilitates the means by which each person develops their practical identity and engages in being. this is a metaphysical, ontological position. it is not a purely humanistic, constructivist, or anti-realist view in which our knowledge is determined by what we can all agree on. it is not a dualist view in which we have no access to objective truth despite its existence. it is a view which holds that in terms of educating ourselves and others, we ought to approach education in a way which is most conducive to our nature –not as humans but as relational entities. the recollection, emergence, and aporetic approaches for interpreting the sm all rely on a reading of plato which precludes certain knowledge and more importantly, which precludes a solid justification for use of the sm. the sm may well be a tool. however, i believe that if we interpret the sm as a metaphysical assertion about our interconnectedness –even if it was never an intention of plato’s to do this– this interpretation affords us not only a better understanding of ourselves, but a better justification for the role of the sm in education. if we place a stronger emphasis on a “socratic interpretation” of the platonic corpus, wherein we assess the dialogue form itself as representing an ontological position, it becomes a method conducive to self knowledge and wisdom; we can’t know anything –even ourselves– without recognizing our interdependent ontology.41 as kant puts it: enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-imposed immaturity. immaturity is the inability to use one’s understanding without guidance from another. this immaturity is self-imposed when its cause lies not in lack of understanding, but in lack of resolve and courage to use it without guidance from another […] for enlightenment of this kind, all that is needed is freedom. and the freedom in question is the most innocuous form of all –freedom to make public use of one’s reason in all matters.42 kant praises the process of deriving knowledge not from other people, but through our relations with other people. he admonishes the instructional or banking approach to wisdom. we too should realize that ‘thinking for ourselves’ and behaving philosophically is a way of life which requires our inclusion of other people’s experiences and wisdom into our framework of reason(s).43 conclusion: participation 24 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 74 love is at the same time the foundation of dialogue and dialogue itself.44 –paulo freire i have proposed an interpretation of the sm in which the method is valuable as an end in itself because it is the source of all value; it is us. this interpretation of the sm dissects the dynamic of inquirer and interlocutor as suggestive not of a protocol or embodied ideal which we ought to pursue, but as a metaphysical truth; we are intimately connected –one’s wisdom cannot emerge without a profound humility, respect for one’s interdependence, and a desire to be. it has been said that “socratic pedagogy is erotic because it produces itself through a relation.”45 it seems to me, however, that eroticism –and even, platonic love– could not exist without the relation that is socratic pedagogy. the sm is a profound characteristic of being itself from whence everything, including love, comes. is this a fairly obvious and simple assertion –that we are connected, that we are social animals, and that no person lives alone? it appears that within plato studies in education, interpreters have been locked within the mouthpiece interpretation, wherein they are forced into siding with one of the conclusions presented by interlocutors in the dialogues: either the dialectic process is good because it uncovers our ignorance, or it is good because it points us to truth.46 my claim is that if we want to elicit in our students the kind of wisdom loved by the philosopher, we must focus our education not so much on the outcome of what our students are becoming, but rather, on what it means simply to be. if understood in this way, i believe that the justification for the use of the sm in our schools today can be founded on the intrinsic value of a philosophical way of life, rather than on philosophy as a specialization or as a means to some other end.47 as such, with an interpretation of the sm as an educational approach which models itself off of what it means to be, we avoid the pitfalls of taking the sm as a tool to becoming something else. we can view limitations in our knowledge as determined not by a metaphysical gap between the ‘world of becoming’ and ‘the world of forms,’ but rather, as determined by any instances in which we believe ourselves to be privy to epistemic –or metaphysical – isolation or superiority. indeed, plato’s character eros, who is intended to embody the favorable characteristic of love itself, is endowed with a genetic make-up which keeps her ever ‘in limbo’: and his nature is neither immortal nor mortal; but sometimes on the same day he flourishes and lives, whenever he has resources; and sometimes he dies, but gets to live again through the nature of his father. and as that which is supplied to him is always gradually flowing out, eros is never either without resources nor wealthy, but is in between wisdom and lack of understanding.48 perhaps, participating in this kind of limbo is not so bad. socratic humility, in my view, is based not on our separation from the form of the good, but on our ontological status of participating. by interpreting sm as an educational approach modeled on what it means to be, as the relational beings that we are, we avoid the pitfalls of taking the sm as a tool to becoming something else, and we ground the value of sm as a method irreplaceable in any school that takes flourishing for all students to be the goal. endnotes 25 1. pablo cevallos estarellas, “teaching philosophy vs teaching to philosophise,” philosophy now 63 (2007):1215., mehul shah, “the socratic teaching method: a therapeutic approach to learning,” teaching philosophy 31, no. 3 (2008): 268. 2. there are even advocates of the socratic method’s potential to “turn the soul” of students, who attribute this metaphysical framework to plato but decide to simply circumvent his metaphysics altogether while still using the sm. see sophie haroutunian-gordon, turning the soul: teaching through conversation in high school (chicago: the university of chicago press, 1991) 5-6. 3. plato, phaedo, 66c-d, parmenides, 133b, and timaeus 50d-e.in, the complete works of plato. 4. valerie o. pang, multicultural education: a caring-centered, reflective approach (boston: mcgraw-hill, 2005) 28-31. zeus leonardo, “critical social theory and transformative knowledge: the functions of criticism in quality education.” educational researcher, 33, no. 6 (2004): 12-15. 5. interestingly, paul woodruff argues that in the early platonic dialogues, in which there is some scholarly agreement that the historical socrates is more accurately portrayed that in later dialogues, socrates himself is not committed to an ontological framework. specifically, because “early dialogue socrates” does not adhere to the platonic forms, woodruff claims that socrates was ontologically neutral. this view gives credence to the aspect of my argument which holds that the socratic method does not limit us to a dualism. however, because woodruff bases his conclusion on the content of the platonic corpus, rather than on the sm itself, woodruff remains in the ontologically-neutral position regarding socrates. see “socrates and ontology: the evidence of the “hippias major,” phronesis 23, no. 2 (1978): 113-114. 6. see plato’s republic book 6, 493a-d, and republic book 9, 576b-c, in the complete works of plato for some discussion of this sophistry. 7. plato, republic book 7, 518b-c., and paulo freire, pedagogy of the oppressed (new york: continuum, 2000), 72. 8. pang, multicultural education, 14. 9. ibid., 21 and 29. 10. ibid, 422-423. 11. see republic book 6, 493a-d and book 9, 576b-c. 12. it should also be noted that in this framework students are assumed to be individuals who, although needing to be “filled with knowledge,” are culpably if unsuccessful. this blame is based on the assumption that students ought to meet universal standards. and to the extent that teachers are then to blame in terms of these high-stake tests, it is still based on the assumption that teachers ought to be able to mold students into these universal standards. 13. henry g. wolz, plato and heidegger: in search of selfhood (lewisburg, pa: bucknell university press, 1981) 1415, and john p. portelli, “the philosopher as teacher: the socratic method and philosophy for children.” metaphilosophy 21, no. 1 and 2 (1990) 143-144. 14. angelo j. corlett, interpreting plato’s dialogues (las vegas: parmenides publishing, 2005) 48-49. 15. gareth matthews, “whatever became of the socratic elenchus? philosophical analysis in plato” philosophy compass 4, no. 3 (2009): 441, and wolz, plato and heidegger, 14-15. 16. kevin decker, “the limits of radical openness: gadamer on socratic dialectic and plato’s idea of the good” symposium: canadian journal of continental philosophy 4, no. 1 (2000): 6 and 22, and matthews, “whatever became of the socratic elenchus?” 441. 17. see decker, “the limits of radical openness,” 22, and matthews, “whatever became of the socratic elenchus?” 2. 18. frank margonis, “in pursuit of respectful teaching and intellectually-dynamic social fields,” studies in philosophy & education, 30 no. 5 (2011): 433-439. 19. see meno for discussion of recollection. in euthydemus 719c-d, and 303b -306a, socrates agrees that wisdom can be taught, but that this type of wisdom is likely sophistic. 20. freire, pedagogy of the oppressed, and matthew lipman, frederick s. oscanyan, and ann margaret sharp, philosophy in the classroom, (philadelphia: temple university press, 1980) 157 and 207. 21. freire, pedagogy of the oppressed, 89, and lipman, oscanyan and sharp, xv. 22. see james c. overholser, “collaborative empiricism, guided discovery, and the socratic method: core 26 processes for effective cognitive therapy,” clinical psychology: science and practice, 18 (2011): 5, and nancy vansieleghem and david kennedy, “what is philosohy for children, what is philosophy with children – after matthew lipman?” journal of philosophy of education, 45, no. 2 (2011): 173. 23. zeus leonardo, “critical social theory and transformative knowledge: the function of criticism in quality education,” educational researcher, 33 no. 6 (2004): 12-15. 24. see margonis, “in pursuit of respectful teaching and intellectually-dynamic social fields,” 436, and claire colebrook, “leading out, leading on: the soul of education,” in nomadic education: variations on a theme by deleuze and guattari, ed. by inna semetsky (rotterdam: sense publishers, 2008), 40. 25. see matthews, “whatever became of the socratic elenchus?” 441. an intermediary view is expressed in passing in lipman, oscanyan and sharp, 207. 26. bold emphasis by author, plato, sophist 253e-254b. 27. catherine c. mccall, “three methods of philosophical dialogue: differences and similarities between nelson’s socratic method , lipman’s p4c method, mccall’s copi method,” the subject centre for philosophical and religious studies, accessed october 17, 2011, http://prs.heacademy.ac.uk/projects/elearning/ abstracts.html. 28. hugh h. benson, “the dissolution of the problem of the elenchos,” in socratic wisdom: the model of knowledge in plato’s early dialogues (oxford: oxford university press, 2000) 57-95. 29. padraig hogan and richard smith, “the activity of philosophy and the practice of education,” in the blackwell guide to the philosophy of education, eds. nigel blake, paul smeyers, richard smith, and paul standish (oxford: blackwell publishing, 2003), 167-168. 30. ibid., 175. 31. for one of many discussions of “the problem of participation” see aristotle, metaphysics, 1045b20, in vol. ii of complete works of aristotle, ed. jonathon barnes, trans. w.d. ross (princeton: princeton university press, 1984). 32. this might be favorably seen as reinforcing megan laverty’s statement regarding the grounds for knowledge, wherein she writes about “the inescapable grounds of knowledge in our relationality, sociability and corporeality,” in “philosophy for children and/as philosophical practice,” international journal of applied philosophy 18, no. 2 (2004): 141-151. 33. a further, very interesting claim is that socrates took the elenchus as tool by which incongruity could be identified not with respect merely to varying beliefs that a person has, but with respect to their beliefs and the way they live their lives. this too, is an interpretation of the socratic method which views its value in terms of its good-making consequences. see charles h. kahn, plato and the socratic dialogue: the philosophical use of a literary form (new york: cambridge university press syndicate, 1996) 302. 34. plato, thaetetus 169d. 35. plato, republic book 9, 592b. 36. william james echoes this when he asserts that: “it is quite obvious that something more than the mere possession of ideals is required to make a life significant in any sense that claims the spectators admiration. inner joy, to be sure, it may have, with its ideals: but that is its own private sentimental manner. to extort from us, outsiders that we are, with our own ideals to look after, the tribute of our grudging recognition, it must back its ideal with what the laborers have, the sterner stuff of manly virtue: it must multiply their sentimental surface by the dimension of the active will, if we are to have depth, if we are to have anything cubical and solid in the way of character. william james, “what makes a life meaningful,” in talk to teachers on psychology and to students on some of life’s ideals (cambridge. ma: harvard university press, 1983), 161. 37. i am making use of christine m. korsgaard’s notion of practical identity, which she attributes to kant. interestingly, korsgaard uses plato’s idea of the just soul as an explanation of how we must properly order ourselves in order to have a function, practical identity. see self-constitution: agency, identity, and integrity (oxford: oxford university press, 2009), 134-137. 38. ibid., 205-206. 39. ibid, 12-14, 37-44. 40. ibid, 206. 41. for an explanation of the socratic interpretation, see corlett, 39-66. on the topic of self-knowledge my view can be seen as akin to dunson’s in that it takes the aporia resulting from the socratic method as a means 27 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 77 toward self-knowledge, yet dunson does not take self-knowledge to entail others. james a. dunson iii, “hegel’s revival of socratic ignorance,” idealistic studies 40, no. 3 (2010): 205. 42. immanuel kant, “an answer to the question: what is enlightenment?” in groundwork for the metaphysics of morals, ed. lara devis (peterborough, ont: broadview press, 2005): 119. 43. or in the words of socrates, “only the temperate man will know himself and will be able to examine what he knows and does not know, and in the same way will be able to inspect other people to see when a man does in fact know what he thinks he knows.” charmides, 167a. 44. freire, pedagogy of the oppressed, 89. 45. colebrook, “leading out, leading on: the soul of education,”40. 46. for a description of the ‘mouthpiece interpretation’ see corlett, interpreting plato’s dialogues, 19-38. 47. hogan and smith, “philosophy and the practice of education,” 170-172. 48. plato, symposium, in the dialogues of plato, trans. seth benardete, (new york: bantam books, 1986), 265-266. references benson, hugh h. socratic wisdom: the model of knowledge in plato’s early dialogue. oxford: oxford university press, 2000. colebrook, claire. “leading out, leading on: the soul of education.” in nomadic education: variations on a theme by deleuze and guattari, edited by inna semetsky, rotterdam: sense publishers, 2008. 35-42. corlett, angelo j. interpreting plato’s dialogues. las vegas: parmenides publishers, 2005. decker, kevin. “the limits of radical openness: gadamer on socratic dialectic and plato’s idea of the good.” symposium: canadian journal of continental philosophy 4, no. 1 (2000): 5-32. dunson iii, james a. “hegel’s revival of socratic ignorance.” idealistic studies 40, no 3 (2010) 201-214. estarellas, pablo cevallos. “teaching philosophy vs teaching to philosophise,” philosophy now 63 (2007):12-15. freire, paulo. pedagogy of the oppressed. new york: continuum, 2000. haroutunian-gordon, sophie. turning the soul: teaching through conversation in high school. chicago: the university of chicago press, 1991. hogan, padraig and richard smith, “the activity of philosophy and the practice of education.” in the blackwell guide to the philosophy of education, edited by nigel blake, paul sweyers, richard smith, and paul standish, 165-180. oxford: blackwell publishing, 2003. kahn, charles h. plato and the socratic dialogue: the philosophical use of a literary form. new york: cambridge university press syndicate, 1996. kant, immanuel. “an answer to the question: what is enlightenment?” in groundwork for the metaphysics of morals, edited by lara denis, 119-126. peterborough: broadview press, 2005. laverty, megan. “philosophy for children and/as philosophical practice.” international journal of applied philosophy 18, no. 2 (2004): 141-151. leonardo, zeus. “critical social theory and transformative knowledge: the functions of criticism in quality education.” educational researcher, 33, no. 6 (2004): 11-18. lipman, matthew, frederick s. oscanyan, and ann margaret sharp, philosophy in the classroom. philadelphia: temple university press, 1980. margonis, frank.” in pursuit of respectful teaching and intellectually-dynamic social fields,” studies in philosophy & education 30, no. 5 (2011): 433-439. matthews, gareth. “whatever became of the socratic elenchus? philosophical analysis in plato.” philosophy compass 4, no 3. (2009), 439-450. mccall, catherine c. “three methods of philosophical dialogue: differences and similarities 28 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 78 between nelson’s socratic method, lipman’s p4c method, mccall’s copi method,” the subject centre for philosophical and religious studies, accessed october 17, 2011, http://prs.heacademy.ac.uk/projects/elearning/abstracts.html. overholser, james c. “collaborative empiricism, guided discovery, and the socratic method: core processes for effective cognitive therapy.” clinical psychology: science and practice 18 (2011): 62-66. pang, valerie o. multicultural education: a caring-centered, reflective approach. boston: mcgraw-hill, 2005. plato. the complete works of plato. edited by john. m. cooper, translated by g.m.a. grube. indianapolis: hackett publishing company, 1997. plato. the dialogues of plato. translated by seth benardete. new york: bantam books, 1986. . portelli, john p. “the philosopher as teacher: the socratic method and philosophy for children.” metaphilosophy 21, no. 1 and 2 (1990): 141-161. shah, mehul. “the socratic teaching method: a therapeutic approach to learning.” teaching philosophy 31, no. 3 (2008): 267-275. vansieleghem, nancy and david kennedy. “what is philosophy for children, what is philosophy with children – after matthew lipman?” journal of philosophy of education 45, no. 2 (2011):171-182. wolz, henry g. plato and heidegger: in search of selfhood. lewisburg pa: bucknell university press, 1981. woodruff, paul “socrates and ontology: the evidence of the hippias major.” phronesis 23, no. 2 (1978): 101-117. address correspondences to: jessica davis phd candidate, columbia university teachers college new york city davis77@rohan.sdsu.edu 29 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.2 21 developing communities of inquiry in the usa: retrospect and prospective richard morehouse this paper takes a board perspective on community of inquiry (ci), following the orientation of earlier papers looking at progressive pedagogies (morehouse, 1993a; 1993b). in those papers, i argued that philosophy for children should look for kindred spirits in order to both better understand its own position within pedagogic tradition and to “make friends” in order to positively influences the lives and learning of children. the whole language approaches to reading instruction was the major focus of those papers. here i take a bolder perspective arguing that in order to understand and appreciate what a community of inquiry is, how it operates, and its influence in the schools, one ought to look at applications of ci that are not within the philosophy for children literature. some of these programs specifically discuss ci, others do not. in taking such an approach towards the literature of pedagogy, i have discovered and included programs that do use the words ‘community of inquiry’ as a part of the pedagogic lexicon. this position appears to be supported by matthew lipman himself (1988). if we begin with the practice in the classroom, the practice of converting it into a reflective community that thinks in the disciplines about the world and about its thinking about the world, we soon come to recognize that communities can be nested within larger communities and these within larger communities still, if all hold the same allegiance to the same procedures of inquiry (1988, p 20). my point is that seeing the community of inquiry as related primarily to philosophy for children is to diminish our understanding of it, even within the practitioners of philosophy for children. this broader position does not seem to be at odds with lipman’s placement of ci within a larger, nested framework. a look at the origins of ci will, i think, add support to such a broader view. though not mentioned in lipman’s parathion of contributors to the community of inquiry as an educational framework, other writers including lipman (cf. splitter & sharp, 1995) refer back to charles sanders pierce and his articulation of the idea of ci as a method of science (1878). following pierce, john dewey extends the idea of a community of inquiry specifically to teaching and learning in “my pedagogic creed” (1897) and his book on democracy and education (1916). lipman, in philosophy goes to school (1988), makes further connections regarding his intellectual path to writing philosophical novels for children and to the community of inquiry. one has only to reread montaigne, locke, richard and maria edgeworth, coleridge, and i.a. richards, or dewey and bruner to discern that a crude but powerful notion was here struggling to be born. john dewey’s contribution, it must be acknowledged, dwarfs those of all others, much as does his standing in the philosophy of education (1988, p.4). in this statement you can read the connections between philosophy for children and community of inquiry: cultural heritage, languages to be learned, conversation with mankind, and dialogue. lipman’s wide and deep reading uncovers the interconnections between teaching, learning, dialogue, thinking, and narrative. these elements inform his view of ci. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.2 22 however, in addition to being influenced by a deep understanding of the philosophical tradition, matthew lipman was also influenced by the educational reform movement as well as the social/cultural/political turmoil of the 1960s. it is within the context of his sensitive awareness of educational change, the social turmoil happening within the university and beyond, as well as his study of the contributions of philosophers to knowledge and knowing, that lipman develops the idea of a community of inquiry as a major pedagogical undertaking (lipman, sharp, & oscanyan, 1980). his turn to ci and its development in the united states is the starting point for this paper. this examination of lipman’s development of ci looks at work within philosophy for children and to like-minded innovators and educational programs that preceded him as well as those that follow him. community of inquiry as articulated within philosophy for children starting in the middle with matthew lipman as hinted at earlier, lipman’s early work happened at a critical time in american educational reform the post-sputnik period of the early 1960’s. these changes not only occurred within the context of the cold war, but also at a time of social/cultural/political unrest. it was during this time that several major curriculum projects were undertaken in mathematics and science and later in the social sciences (see fenton, 1967 for a short summary and its relationship to innovations in teaching social studies). among the more innovative of the curriculum reform projects, and one that may have influenced lipman’s work, was jerome bruner’s ‘man: a course of study.’ two other educational reformers whose work was a part of the zeitgeist of change were sidney simon on value clarification and lawrence kohlberg on moral reasoning (1973; 1984;devries & kohlberg, 1987; power, higgins & kohlberg, 1989) whose work may have had an indirect influence on lipman’s thinking (see morehouse, 1982 for a comparison of these programs). given this complex history, it seems appropriate to start in the middle with lipman’s philosophy in the classroom (lipman et al, 1980). i will first look at how lipman’s ideas are extended within the philosophy for children family and then look back to the origins of lipman’s ideas on ci. a wider view of the educational innovations that have extended some of the important elements of ci will then be presented. matthew lipman’s great insight was to marry community of inquiry as pedagogy with philosophy as doing within a curriculum for elementary and secondary students. this marriage is the essence of the philosophy for children program. with the publication of philosophy in the classroom (lipman, sharp & oscanyan, 1980), lipman launched an educational movement that continued and extended the work of john dewey and the educational reform movement of the 1960s. lipman’s ideas about education are embedded within the history of philosophy. he writes about some of his intellectual debt to past philosophers and educators. it is clear that john dewey made some substantial contribution to his thinking on ci. from dewey, it is only a short step to jerome bruner’s contention that the cultural heritage of mankind can be taught with undiminished integrity at every grade level, to michael oakeshott’s insistence that all disciplines, the sciences as well as the humanities, are languages to be learned, languages whose interanimation constitutes “the conversation of mankind,” to wittgenstein and ryle on thinking and to buber on dialogue. another short step and we see the text replaced by the philosophical novel and the instructional manual (how it would have delighted wittgenstein!) composed almost completely of philosophical questions (1988, pp. 4-5). lipman builds on dewey’s foundation, but how does lipman combine the pedagogy of ci with doing philosophy? first, lipman and his colleagues (lipman et al, 1980) thought anew about how to teach philosophy not as a history of ideas or an uncovering of the ideas of others, but as a thinking activity; philosophy for children is doing philosophy. perhaps this idea of doing philosophy is in part what oakeshott had in mind when he wrote: analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.2 23 as civilized human beings, we are the inheritors, neither of an inquiry about ourselves and the world, not of an accumulating body of information, but of a conversation, begun in the primeval forest and extended and made articulate in the course of centuries (oakeshott, 1959). doing philosophy as conversation, dialogue, and discussion is at the core of ci as practiced within philosophy for children. secondly, he introduced narrative as a method for raising questions, exploring issues, and as a model for intellectual behavior, that is, the stories read by the students are a model for a community of inquiry. students read about and participate in a community of inquiry. lipman’s use of narrative as driving force of a curriculum was a unique contribution to pedagogy, though narrative was not unknown within the educational system. for example, the junior great books program used classic works of children’s and adult literature, science and philosophy as a part of an educational program; however, the narrative did not provide an explicit pedagogy, as did lipman’s philosophical novels. instead, the junior great books project uses three types of questions (fact question, meaning questions, and interpretive questions) to explore a set of stories and essays. narrative was not central to this project nor was there any modeling of a community of inquiry as was found in lipman’s work. the third key point to lipman’s development of community of inquiry as a pedagogy is the understanding that thinking aloud is a means for self-correction; it is a means for improvement of thinking skills. most importantly thinking is presented as an ability that can be improved when children think together aloud. building on the work of george herbert mead and lev vygotsky on thinking as internalized dialogue, lipman see thinking aloud as a way to improve thinking by making the internal external (lipman et al, 1980, p. 23). the community of inquiry allows for both the internalization of dialogue and the externalization of thinking. lipman takes full advantage of children thinking aloud in a classroom setting to exploit the power of discussion that moves toward a solution. elaborating on a point raised earlier, lipman saw ci as connected to a larger vision of education. in writing about the connections to the thinking of others regarding community of inquiry, he references john dewey (wrestling with problems), jerome burner (the teachability of our cultural heritage), michael oakeshott (the conversation of mankind), martin buber (dialogue), gilbert ryle, and ludwig wittgenstein (thinking) as influences on his thinking (1988, pp. 4-5). of these figures, only dewey and bruner are discussed in this essay as they are the most well connected with educational innovation in the united states. lipman develops the value of struggling with problems, thinking skills as learnable, dialogue as self-correcting community within a series of books and philosophical novels (lipman & sharp, 1975;lipman, sharp, & oscanyan, 1980; lipman, 1988; lipman, lipman, 1991; lipman, 1993: lipman, 1996) as well as in the instruction of philosophers as trainers in philosophy for children at mendham (an educational retreat center) and in workshops conducted by himself and colleagues at montclair state university . early adopters and innovators sharp & splitter and reed while ann sharp wrote philosophy in the classroom (1980) with matthew lipman and fredrick oscanyan, she greatly expands her contribution to ci with her work with lawrence splitter (1995). teaching for better thinking: the classroom community of inquiry (splitter & sharp, 1995) provides an extended argument and set of examples for ci as an important educational tool; a tool that has the advantage of engendering thinking skills and a reasoning disposition. splitter and sharp make clear in the introduction that they are writing about ci within the context of philosophy for children even while they draw ideas and inspirations from well beyond the horizons of philosophy for children. instead of trying to define a ci, which they argue is a concept that emerges within practice and that takes on new dimensions as students and teacher work to become a community of inquiry, they ask a more interesting question: if we were to visit a classroom where ci is in use, what would we see? (p.18). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.2 24 they see: in a classroom wherein a community of inquiry was occurring, children at a round table or with desk formed in a circle, participants building on, shaping and modifying one another’s ideas, bound by their interests in the subject matter to keep a unified focus and following the inquiry wherever it might lead (p.18). they also argue that we would also see an open-ended inquiry shaped by student and teacher questions, hypotheses, pondering and explanations. we would see, according to splitter and sharp, efforts to “get to the bottom of things” while realizing that may be a long way off. if conclusions are reached the students in a community of inquiry would regard those conclusions tentative and incomplete ideas, arrived at by a thoughtful and reasonable process (pp. 18 19). as the above comments imply, ci is often thought of as being both a process and a goal, that is, we work toward creating a ci by participating in a ci (morehouse, 2003). splitter and sharp’s major contributions to ci revolve around the ways that classroom teachers might apply these concepts in their own classes as well as providing an overall justification for community of inquiry and philosophy for children as an important, perhaps in their eyes, even essential tool for educational reform. ronald reed in his work as the founder and first editor of analytic teaching, as well as with his published books (reed, 1983) and several anthologies (reed, 1993; sharp & reed, 1992; reed & sharp, 1996; portelli & reed, 1995), extends our understanding of community of inquiry. one element of reed’s work was to look at ci in terms of conversation (cf. reed, 1993). reed’s point is that what happens in the classroom is more than a discussion; it is, in fact, a conversation that, while not having any predictable direction, is not without purpose. consistent with oakeshott, the purpose of a conversation is mutual engagement that may lead to a solution of a problem but whose value is as much in the doing as it is in ci. reed (1993) took the idea of conversation seriously. in talking with children he wrote: the very physical act of one person talking with another person can create a bond, can strengthen an already existing bond, or destroy it. we utter the platitude that talk is cheap and then realize that talk often significantly affects what people know, do, and feel. it becomes difficult, at this point, to think of anything more valuable than talk (1983, p. 2). ron reed was also instrumental in founding the north american association for community of inquiry (naaci), an organization that i was fortunate enough to lead from 1994 to 2008. there are many other contributors to the development of theory and practice of ci. i will just mention three here: marie-france daniel on philosophy with children in relation to science and mathematics (daniel, lafortune, pallascio & sykes, 1996), david kennedy on childhood (2006) and susan gardner on practical reasoning (2009). a historical look at community of inquiry charles sanders pierce the godfather of community of inquiry pierce’s ideas about community of inquiry can’t be characterized in a sentence or two or in a nice neat phrase. rather they are embedded in his ideas regarding semiotics and the nature of logic. pierce sees a community of inquiry as closely related to a community of scientists. in their various forms, communities seek to find certainty through the three-pronged approach of abduction, deduction and induction. abduction is another name for generating a hypothesis. hypothesis generation (abduction) is closely connected to induction and deduction, as a hypothesis must be a guess that is amenable to verification or disproven by induction or deduction. much of science, in pierce’s view, was conducted and, perhaps more importantly, corrected within a community of science scholars. the science community as a group of open-ended inquirers testing their ideas in a public forum analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.2 25 (thus allowing for joint struggle for truth) was his model of a community of inquiry. john dewey real problems and community of inquiry john dewey’s thinking about education arises out of the context of america’s transition from an agrarian society to an urban industrial one and from a “settled” population to a population characterized by internal migration and external immigration. his ideas on pedagogy and curriculum grew out of the social and cultural issues of the day. he saw these issues as having a potential solution through the democratization of political and social institutions of the culture. schools were among the institutions that needed, he thought, more democracy. his thinking on schools and education spawned much innovation not only during his most productive years (1890 1940) but also much later (after his death) during the educational reform movement during the 1960s and early 1970s. these reforms were simulated by sputnik and the cold war competition for prominence in science much as dewey’s reforms were precipitated by the changes in the early part of the 19th century. dewey asks and answers a question in democracy and education (1916) that is relevant to lipman’s work on ci as well as the school reform movement that provides a context for this paper. dewey’s simple question is “why are children so full of questions outside of school and so conspicuously absence of display of curiously about the subject matter of school lessons?” (p. 153). his answer is equally relevant to this discussion. dewey’s answers is, in part, there must be more actual material, more stuff, more appliances, and more opportunity for doing things, before the gap can be overcome. and where children engage in doing things, and in discussion what arises in the course of their doing, is found, even with comparatively indifferent modes of instruction, that children’s inquiries are spontaneous and numerous, and proposals of solutions advanced, varied, and ingenious [italics in the original] (1916, p. 156). dewey goes on in the section of democracy and education (1916) entitled “thinking in education” to write about how ideas cannot be simply transferred from one head to another head. he writes that when a child is told something, it is the teller that has the idea not the listener. for the idea to become the listener’s idea, he or she must engage with the idea, must struggle with the problem, and must see it through to application if it is going to be her idea, if it is going to be understood. the communication may stimulate the other person to realize the question for himself and to think out a like idea, or it may smother his [or her] intellectual interest and suppress his [or her] dawning effort at thought. but what he directly gets cannot be an idea. only by wrestling with the conditions of the problem at first hand, seeking and finding his own way out, does he think. a parent or teacher can provide the conditions to stimulate thinking. teachers or parents can inter into a common experience with the child if they have a sympathetic attitude toward the activities of learning, but that is all that second parties can do, it up to the pupil to do the reflective thinking that makes learning possible (dewey, 1916, p. 159-160). the twin ideas of having stuff to think about and a method for making ideas one’s own are manifested in lipman’s “invention” of the philosophical novel and its unpacking in the community of inquiry. dewey’s summary of ‘thinking in education’ also provides the context for my connecting matthew lipman, and those who have come before him (especially jerome bruner) with those who have followed after, all of whose work continues in the same rich vein of intellectual discourse initiated in democracy and education. here is dewey’s summary paragraph from the chapter called ‘thinking and education.’ processes of instruction are unified in the degree in which they center in the production of good habits of thinking. while we may speak, without error, of the method of thought, the important thing is that thinking is the method of an educative experience. the essentials of method are therefore identical analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.2 26 with the essentials of reflection. they are first that the pupil have genuine situations of experience that there be continuous activity in which he is interested for its own sake; secondly, that a genuine problem develop within this situation as a stimulus for thought; third, that he possess the information and make observations needed to deal with it; fourth, that suggested solutions occur to him which he shall be responsible for developing in an orderly way; fifth that he have opportunity and occasion to test his idea by application, to make their meaning clear and discover for himself their validity (p. 163). having a genuine sense of the situation, developing problems, gathering information, and testing of possible solutions, are all a part of ci in the various manifestation discussed here. jerome bruner a possible transition from dewey to lipman jerome bruner, one of the preeminent psychologists and educators of our time, has contributed to the conceptualization and initial implementation of head start, the development of a curriculum called ‘man: a course of study’ and about a half dozen books on education and learning (bruner, goodnow, & austin, 1956; bruner, 1960; bruner, 1966; bruner, oliver, & greenfield, 1966; bruner, 1971; bruner, 1983; bruner, 1996). toward a theory of instruction (bruner, 1966), wherein he documents the development of his curriculum project man: a course of instruction (1970), provides scholars interested in new ways of teaching and curriculum development with a set of conceptual tools, new ideas, and research that could be put to use in their work. as a starter, bruner offer six benchmarks for intellectual growth. several have direct connection, i argue, to elements of lipman’s contributions to ci. bruner’s number three is “intellectual growth involves an increasing capacity to say to oneself and others, by means of words or symbols, what one has done or what one will do” (1966, p. 5). his fifth benchmark is “teaching is vastly facilitated by the medium of language, which ends by being not only the medium of exchange but the instrument that the learner can then use himself in bringing order into the environment” (1966, p. 6). two other overarching ideas from bruner are presented before turning to ‘man: a course of study’ as potential models of philosophy for children and ci. first is bruner’s conception of the spiral manner in which learning unfolds. three representations of the world are proposed to explain this unfolding: representation through action (called enactive), sensory representation (called iconic), and linguistic representation (called symbolic). these three ways of representing the world are a counterbalance to piaget’s stages of development that focus on epistemology. bruner’s representational sequences are oriented toward understanding the psychology of the way one processes or represents the world. bruner’s model is sequential only in the sense that each way of representing the world is mastered in order, but after mastery the order that is most effective to the material at hand, and the ways of representing it, can be used effectively in any order. my point is that lipman implicitly works on the iconic and symbolic level of representation, while conscious of piagetian levels of epistemological stages of comprehension. however, lipman does not necessarily see students as limited in their understanding of the world in the same way as piaget’s epistemological levels predict. lipman hinted at his orientation toward bruner’s conception of learning in a citation presented earier in this paper. lipman, paraphrasing bruner, states that any idea can be taught to anyone at any age if it is taught in an intellectually honest manner. specifically, lipman states that the cultural heritage of mankind can be taught with undiminished integrity at every grade level. bruner in the early 1950s (see bruner, 1983 for his own perspective on this move) makes a serious move away from behaviorism toward what he calls cognition, what others have called the first cognitive revolution (gardner, 1985). this move from behaviorism to cognitivism may be characterized as a move away from subjects toward agentsa move from behavior toward action, and a move away from information toward meaning (bruner, 1990). it seems clear to me that lipman’s approach to philosophy and inquiry are in the same direction as bruner’s moves toward agents, action, and meaning. the following quote from bruner, i argue, makes a clear intellectual connection between bruner, dewey and lipman. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.2 27 we say, “i see what i am doing now,” or “so that’s what the thing is.” the new models are formed in increasingly powerful representational systems. it is this that leads me to think that the heart of the educational process consists of providing aids and dialogues for translating experience into a powerful system of notation and ordering. and it is for this reason that i think a theory of development must be linked both to a theory of knowledge and a theory of instruction or be doomed to triviality (1966, p. 21, the emphasis is mine). extensions of ci: some new application of basic ideas four educational theorist and practitioners are presented in this section, david perkins, deanna kuhn, ann brown, and robert selman. all four differ somewhat in their understanding and use of ci, however, all share the underlining premise of ci as presented here; specifically, they all accept the classroom as a community of scholars committed to seeking answers while engaged in self-correcting dialogue. david n. perkins the thinking classroom david perkins, a co-director of project zero with howard gardner, is a kindred spirit of those working on enhancing community of inquiry. like some of the others mentioned in this section, perkins (nickerson, perkins, & smith, 1985) includes philosophy for children and community of inquiry within his discussion of programs that further critical and creative thinking. perkins has done original work on creativity (1981), critical thinking (1995), and the transfer of skills and knowledge (1992) both within and across domains. these studies have found direct application on his work in schools. it is specifically his work in schools that ties him to the like-minded innovators discussed here. i will focus on just one of his recent books, the thinking classroom: learning and teaching in a culture of thinking (tishman, perkins, & jay, 1995), as it clearly presents his orientation toward community of inquiry, though at least four of his other books also report favorably on lipman’s work (nickerson, perkins, & smith, 1985; perkins, 1981; 1992; 1995). his ideas about schools and community of inquiry are represented as follows: schools are places of culture. not only in the sense that they introduce students to great intellectual achievements, but also in the sense of community, their spirit of common enterprise. … in particular, it is about how to transform the culture of the classroom into a culture of thinking (tishman, perkins, & jay, 1995, p.1). the goal of these authors is to create a culture of thinking. that culture of thinking is very similar to a community of inquiry. one becomes acculturated by the exposure to models and explanations, by interacting with others within that culture and by getting feedback on one’s behavior or activities, much as one learns to discuss ideas in a community of inquiry by participating in a community of inquiry. self-correcting reflection is also a key element in the thinking culture of a school (tishman, perkins, & jay, 1995). deanna kuhn the skill of inquiry deanna kuhn and matthew lipman share a commitment to inquiry and argument. kuhn writes about philosophy for children and its relationship to the development of personal epistemology (1999). her work on inquiry and argument skills (2005) and lipman’s community of inquiry is based on dialogic argument and open-ended discussion. kuhn’s education for thinking (2005) is built on the dual processes of inquiry (distinguishing theory from evidence) and argument (coordinating claims and evidence). in the skill of argument (1991), kuhn states that dialogic and rhetorical arguments are based on very similar structures. “evidence must be related to each assertion, and, ideally, if the argument is to move forward, this evidence needs to be weighed in an integrated evaluation of the relative merits of the opposing assertions” (kuhn, 1991, p.12). in a later work analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.2 28 (2005) she agrees with lipman that thinking is a social act (kuhn, 2005, p. 13; lipman et al. 1980, p. ). thinking is something people do, most often collaboratively, while they are engaged in pursuing the activities and goals of their daily lives. thinking rarely remains a solitary activity conducted inside people’s heads. thinking is most often and most importantly social activity embodied in the discourse people engage in to advance their individual and shared goals (kuhn, 2005, p. 13 14). she further stares that in order to think well with others, that is, to engage in a dialogical argument, one needs to coordinate three perspectives: one’s own perspective, the perspective of another person, and external information. the coordination of these three perspectives is facilitated within a community of learners engaged in thinking together under the guidance of an able teacher committed to inquiry and argument (kuhn, 2005). ann brown – communities of thinking and learning ann brown was an important contributor to understanding the relationship between teaching and learning from a vygotskian perspective. a major project, embarked on just before her untimely death, was called ‘fostering communities of learners.’ this project was a part of her work at harvard university. brown’s work begins by developing an approach to teaching the skill of reading called reciprocal teaching that involves first modeling, then involving students in acting aloud to each other in small groups a series of metacognitive questions, such as what might happen next? (prediction), what’s happened so far? (summary) and what is the relationship between two characters in a story? (clarifying). the students eventually internalize these questions. reflective teaching uses vygotskian scaffolding in small groups as a teaching tool in what brown calls a culture of learning. brown summarizes the community of learners as follows: the three key activities -(a) research, (b) in order to share information, (c) in order to perform a consequential task -are overseen and coordinated by all members of the community, … the community relies on the fact that participants are trying to understand deep disciplinary content. they are learning about something meaningful (1997, p. 404). brown’s work clearly owes a debt to bruner, lipman and dewey and is within the confines of ci developed in this paper. robert selman: voices of love and freedom the work of robert selman may seem like a stretch to be included as a community of inquiry program. it is included to the extent it uses the classroom community as a way to develop literacy and social awareness. i argue that social awareness is one of the underdeveloped ideas in community of inquiry. most of the theorists other’s perspective external information self’s perspective coordination of three perspective required in argument evaluation (kuhn, 2005,p.137) analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.2 29 and practitioners discussed here assume that social awareness will develop as a community of inquiry unfolds. to a certain extent, i agree with that assumption. however, selman’s work helps us understand and respond in situations were social awareness does not occur naturally and may in fact undermine our effort to create a community of inquiry. robert selman’s work in education began with lawrence kohlberg’s work on moral reasoning. selman enrolled in a course kohlberg was teaching at harvard while on leave form the university of chicago. this soon led to his implementation of moral dilemmas in the classroom and eventually to his research on perspective taking and social behavior. selman argues that a lack of ability to take the perspective of another person was related to the level at which students responded to moral issues. his work with individual students eventually lead to a classroom project called voices of love and freedom (vlf). vlf is a pedagogy directed to promoting social perspective coordination skills by having “disparate groups talk to each other, in their own voices, about their experiences – to share their perspectives on life in the community” (selman, 2003, p.65) with a use of a multiracial story as a conversation starter. by helping students develop a stronger sense of autonomy and connectedness, this program brings ci to the challenging world of school environments. this is consistent with lipman’s field-testing of philosophy for children in an inner-city school. summary one way to think about a community of inquiry is to conceptualize it as a way of addressing the following questions: how should we teach students the skills of inquiry? and what does it mean for students to inquire? the advantage of looking at ci from the perspective of these questions is that it ties together what otherwise appear to be a series of unconnected efforts at educational reform and also places ci outside the bubble of philosophy for children. however, one additional set of questions, first asked by john dewey in 1916, is required to complete those connections, namely, how is it that a child is so interested in the world and asks so many questions, but stops asking questions once she is in the classroom? dewey’s answer is that there is not enough stuff for the child to think about and that when we think about stuff it needs to be within the context of figuring things out for oneself. this paper has tried to view community of inquiry within a historical context of philosophers, educators and psychologists who have attempted to address these three questions within the context of joint problem solving and thinking aloud. jerome bruner, in evaluating ann brown’s fostering communities of learners (fcl) provides a way of thinking about the elements of ci. he argues that four critical elements underlie fcl, and i would argue that these elements also underlie ci. the first of these is the idea of agency: taking more control of your own mental activities. the second is reflection: not simply “learning in the raw” but making what you learn make sense, understanding it. the third is collaboration: sharing the results of the mix of human beings involved in teaching and learning. mind is in the head, but also it is with others. and the fourth is culture, the way of life and thought that we construct, negotiate, institutionalize, and finally (after it’s all settled) end up calling ‘reality’ to comfort ourselves (1996, p. 87). i have argued that an educational program that advances agency, reflection, collaboration, and culture has the necessary elements for a community of inquiry to occur. although community of inquiry will develop largely within the context of philosophy for children, it is not and should not be the exclusive property of philosophy for children – ci is too important an educational tool not to be widely use and further developed. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.2 30 references brown, a.l. (1997). transforming schools into communities of thinking and learning about serious matters. american psychologist, 52, 399 413. bruner, j.s. (1996). the culture of education. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. dewey, j. (1987). my pedagogic creed. in j. j. mcdermott (ed). the philosophy of john dewey, (pp. 442 – 454). chicago: university of chicago press. dewey, j. (1916; 1944). democracy and education: an introduction to the philosophy of education. new york: the free press. devries, r. & kohlberg. l, (1987). programs of early education: a constructivist view. new york: longman fenton, e. (1967). the new social studies. new york: holt, rinehart, and winston, inc. gardner, h. (1985). the minds new science: a history of the cognitive revolution. new york: basic books. kohlberg, l. (1973) stages of moral development as a basis for moral education. in c. beck, b. crittendon & e. sullivan (eds.). moral education: interdisciplinary approaches. toronto: university of toronto press. kuhn, d. (1991). the skill of argument. cambridge: cambridge university press. kuhn, d. (2005). education for thinking. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. lipman, m. & sharp, a.m. (1978). growing up with philosophy. philadelphia: temple university press. lipman, m. (1974). harry stottlemeier’s discovery. new jersey: iapc. lipman, m. & sharp, a. m. (1975). philosophical inquiry instructional manual to accompany harry stottlemeier’s discovery. new jersey: iapc. lipman, m., sharp, a. m., & oscanyan, f. s. (1980). philosophy in the classroom. philadelphia: temple university press. lipman, m. (1988). philosophy goes to school. philadelphia: temple university press. lipman, m. (ed). (1993) thinking children and education. dubuque, ia: kendall/hunt publishing. lipman, m. (1996). natasha: vygotskian dialogues. new york: teachers college press. lipman, m. (1991). thinking in education. new york: cambridge university press. morehouse, r. (1982). a model for the evaluation of moral education. analytic teaching. 3, 2. (reprinted in thinking: the journal of philosophy for children. 4(1) 2-9). morehouse, r. e. (1993a). philosophy for children: curriculum and practice. thinking: the journal in philosophy for children. 10 (3) 7-12. __________. (1993b). philosophy for children and other progressive pedagogies. analytic teaching. 13. (1) 4552. morehouse, r. (2003). tutkiva yhteisö: demokraattisena kasvatusymparistöna (community of inquiry: a democratic educational environment). in p. elo, k. heinlahti & m. kabata (eds.) hyvan elaman kotsomustieto (pp. 78 – 91). helsinki: painatuskeskus. oakeshott, m. (1962). rationalism in politics and other essays. london: methuen. perkins, d. n. (1981). the mind’s best work. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. perkins, d. n. (1992) smart schools: from training memories to educating minds. new york: free press. perkins, d.n. (1995). outsmarting iq: the emerging science of learnable intelligence. new york: free press. pierce, c. s. (1878) how to make things clear. popular science monthly in pragmatism: the classic writings. h. s. thayer (ed), 1982. portelli, j. p. & reed, r. f. (eds.). (1995). children, philosophy, and democracy. calgary, alberta: detselig enterprises, ltd. power, f. c. ,higgins, a. & kohlberg, l. (1989). lawrence kohlberg’s approach to moral education. new york: columbia university press. reed, r. & sharp, a. m. (1996) studies in philosophy for children: pixie. madrid: ediciones de la torre. sharp, a. m. & reed, r.f. (eds.). (1992). studies in philosophy for children: harry stottlemeier’s discovery. philadelphia: temple university press. splitter, l. j. & sharp, a. m. (1995). teaching for better thinking: the classroom community of inquiry. melbourne, victoria: acer. tishman,s., perkins,d. n. & jay,e. (1995). the thinking classroom: learning and teaching in a culture of thinking. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.2 31 address coresspondence to: richard e. morehouse, phd professor emeritus viterbo university remorehouse@viterbo.edu or praxis consulting*training*educating*evaluating 115 5th avenue south suite 409 la crosse, wi 54601 phone: 608.782.4041 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 21 moral philosophy and the ‘real world’ christopher cowley notoriously, most philosophers write for other philosophers. most philosophy books are designed for stu-dents of philosophy, students who can be assumed to have signed up and remained in the subject voluntarily, and therefore to have a certain interest in the subject and a certain understanding of the point of it all. in this paper i want to consider the philosopher’s engagement with those who, living in the ‘real world’, have had neither interest in nor exposure to philosophy beyond the stereotypes of popular culture.1 by ‘engagement’ i have in mind formal pedagogical encounters such as compulsory teaching sessions in professional schools (medical ethics, business ethics, philosophy of mind for psychologists), public discussions and television talk-shows where the speaker is introduced as a ‘philosopher’, but above all the informal conversations that a philosopher inevitably has with his family, neighbours, doctor, accountant, his child’s teachers, his priest etc., where he is not so much teaching philosophy as explaining what the subject is. i’m hoping this is not of merely anthropological concern, but that this exploration can reveal something important about teaching the subject to philosophy students as well, even if for reasons of space it will have to be a bit polemical. i’m taking the notion of ‘real world’ with as little metaphysical baggage as possible – suffice to contrast it with the artificial world of the academy and its textbooks and seminar rooms. i’m talking about the sort of world where the vast majority of adults in the modern west spend their time: in desk jobs and factories, in shops and museums and pubs, in the worlds of hobbies and sports and music, and the world of their personal relationships with friends and families. every philosopher knows the situation. “what is it you do, then, boyo?” “i’m a lecturer at the university.” “really? what subject?” “philosophy.” “oh. [pause] what’s that all about, then?” for the full effect, the last line has to be delivered with a hint of pinteresque menace. the philosopher then has to decide whether the question is sincere, and if so, how much the questioner can understand of what it’s all about. (there is the underlying worry that the philosopher might not quite be able to justify the salary that he is receiving from the non-philosopher’s taxes, of course.)2 i have always been embarrassed by these encounters, precisely because i felt unable to answer the questions – not only within the constraints of polite conversation, but even in principle. at the same time i was unable to ignore them either. other academic subjects do not seem so vulnerable to the same embarrassment. after all, we all know enough of what physics and economics is about, and the physicist and economist can tell us roughly what the point of it all is. and when we enquire further into what exactly this physicist or economist are personally engaged in, we will probably come to a point where we are simply unable to understand. and that seems fine, to both parties. it’s in the very nature of a legitimately technical specialisation that the layperson can acknowledge the authority of the expert, and the expert can move on from the encounter with a clean conscience. but as a philosopher, and especially as a moral philosopher, i have never been comfortable with the idea of turning away lay enquiries by murmuring “you wouldn’t understand,” precisely because i consider moral philosophy to be answerable to the ordinary ethical problems that all of us are familiar with in our ordinary lives. by analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 22 ‘answerable’, i mean more than merely consistent with or explanatory of – after all, any theory or generalisation in the social sciences has to be relatively consistent with the behaviour of individuals. but moral philosophy is rooted in the individual’s pre-theoretical experience of a moral dilemma, of a moral conflict with another person, or of being the object of moral criticism by another person. moreover, moral philosophy is rooted in the ordinary concepts and language deployed by non-philosophers in their spontaneous efforts to make sense of their moral problems. my technical language and idiom is a useful shorthand, but it has to be cashable into ordinary language if it is to do the job of capturing the ordinary situation. sometimes a philosophy student will come to me and say “i’ve never done ethics;” and i remind them that all of us have ‘done’ ethics, in the sense that all of us have experienced and discussed moral dilemmas, moral conflict and moral criticism – that is the raw material that the moral philosopher has to work with, and to which his conclusions must be answerable.3 however, this conception of moral philosophy is controversial among anglo-american moral philosophers.4 for example, so-called non-cognitivists will claim that the objects of moral experience are not actually there. as john mackie puts it in the infamous first words of his book ethics: inventing right and wrong (1977), “there are no objective moral values.” this is a philosopher who is rejecting what i am calling answerability. he is prepared to tell the non-philosophical individual, in the middle of his moral dilemma, that it is all an illusion, and that he, john mackie, knows better what is actually going on. for me, mackie is just being frivolous: the opening words undermine his entire philosophical project precisely because they would be rejected by any non-philosopher as patent nonsense – and such a rejection would be entirely legitimate because of the answerability to the real world. this brings me to a second reason for my embarrassment by encounters with laypeople: i cannot claim to speak on behalf of the majority of academic moral philosophers. i have already mentioned john mackie, who was widely esteemed by philosophers. but even those who oppose mackie philosophically – so-called realists – go so far in metaphysical directions, e.g. about the nature of moral properties, that they have left the ordinary layperson far behind. nothing is more typical of these ‘technicians’ than their obsession with some idealised conception of rational agency more appropriate to narrow legal reasoning than the full and diverse range of moral experience in the real world. 1. losing touch with the real world despite his opening remark, at least mackie claims in the rest of his book to take moral experience seriously insofar as he feels obliged to explain how we could be so thoroughly mistaken. no such efforts are apparent in david benatar’s 2006 book better never to have been: the harm of coming into existence. if we read this title without philosophical prejudice, it can only appear the work of a crack-pot. and yet it was published by oxford university press. the author is a professor at the university of cape town, which seems to be a small but serious department. according to the philosopher’s index, benatar has been publishing articles since 1997, so he is no novice, and must have had plenty of feedback on what he has written so far. here is the book’s central argument:5 the central idea of this book is that coming into existence is always a serious harm. that idea will be defended at length, but the basic idea is quite simple: although the good things in one’s life make it go better than it otherwise would have gone, one could not have been deprived by their absence if one had not existed. those who never exist cannot be deprived. however, by coming into existence one does suffer quite serious harms that could not have befallen one if one had not come into existence. [...] most people, under the influence of powerful biological dispositions towards optimism, find this conclusion intolerable. they are still indignant at the further implication that we should not create new people (p. 1) what are we to make of this? i’m not asking what we are to make of the philosophy; the philosophy may be impeccable. i’m asking for all one’s philosophical training to be set aside, just for a moment, to look at what he is analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 23 arguing in the clear light of day, precisely as the non-philosopher would do. the book has been reviewed by at least three philosophers, and i suggest it reveals something of the sad state of the discipline to examine their reviews. jean kazez (2007) opens promisingly by saying that “it’s hard not to react defensively to the nihilism” of the book, and closes with “i couldn’t help but wonder what kind of a life [benatar] lives. what’s it like thinking that existence, your own and everyone else’s, is regrettable?” but between these statements, kazez reviews the book, and evidently considers it worth reviewing politely and professionally, and considers the central philosophical argument worth engaging with (though ultimately rejecting). her tone suggests that her defensiveness is understandable, but she has successfully overcome it in order to fulfil her obligations to the guild. her final question is meant to be rhetorical – she seems to consider the question irrelevant to her philosophical evaluation of the book. i believe, on the other hand, that her final question would have constituted enough of a review on its own. christopher belshaw (2007) starts by making fun of benatar’s title as one of the oddest of the year, but then goes on, under a “charitable reading” to object in some detail to the main philosophical arguments. once again, there seems to be no doubt in belshaw’s mind that the book deserves to be reviewed seriously. even if he too ultimately rejects the central argument, it is important that he rejects it on its own terms. len doyal (2007)6 calls benatar an “intriguing philosopher of pessimism,” and goes the furthest of these three reviewers to argue against him, and thereby to legitimate him as worth arguing against. doyal also concludes on the most upbeat note: one thing is clear. whether you agree with his conclusions or not – and he accepts that few probably will – his arguments force one to examine deep seated presumptions about the value of life and the moral significance of human existence. i highly recommend it, noting that the beneficial soul searching that it can cause feels quite harmful at times. i am glad that i did not miss the experience! although the three reviewers are not persuaded by the arguments, none of them evidently consider benatar to be a crack-pot: he is a legitimate member of the moral philosophical community, vetted by oup, and as such deserves at least a “charitable reading”. even if he is wrong, this logic continues, his arguments force the “beneficial soul searching,” (echoes here of mill’s defence of freedom of expression in on liberty).7 the strongest permissible reaction for a philosopher is simply not to read the book, or not to write about it, saying: “i’m interested in other questions.” what would a non-philosopher make of this book? after all, benatar is not just writing about philosophy for philosophers; for he claims that no one should have children, for example. for most other academic disciplines, indeed most other areas of analytic philosophy, lay opinion may be irrelevant, but i believe it is the key question for any genuine work on moral philosophy. and while benatar obviously cannot be faulted for using technical language, how would benatar cash out that language in ordinary language and persuade a sceptical bookstore visitor to buy the book? i can’t see how it could be done. if a layperson were to disagree strenuously with benatar’s injunction not to have children, is there really something that the layperson has failed to understand? if one were then to mention benatar’s credentials (university professorship, prestigious publishing house), this would not push the non-philosophical reader to revise his judgement, but would instead bring both universities and academic publishers into (further) disrepute. imagine if the three reviewers were at the stall alongside benatar, how would they defend the book to the sceptical non-philosopher? would they say something like: “yes, i accept it’s a bit eccentric, but there are a lot of interesting points inside”? doyal would have presumably reminded the non-philosopher of the importance of examining “deep-seated presumptions about the value of life.” but what sort of presumptions could those be, and is it really so important and/or harmless to ‘examine’ them? analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 24 benatar and (to a lesser extent) doyal seem to be assuming, first, that the philosophers have understood something that is essentially inaccessible and inexplicable to non-philosophers, and second, that the philosopher’s job is to boldly go where non-philosophers fear to tread. both assumptions can and should be challenged. benatar can only reach the conclusions that he does by stretching the meanings of common words such as ‘harm’ to absurd degrees, and by ignoring the contextual contributions to any correct understanding of the concept of harm. a particular individual can only understand a particular action as harmful within the context of an on-going human life, with all the background meanings that characterise that human life. if my wallet is stolen, that action is meaningfully harmful precisely because of our normal attitudes to personal possessions and to their non-consensual removal, and because the action is relatively harmful compared to the rest of my life at that moment. an example of a harmful act, i contend, would be benatar’s book. the undergraduate philosophy students at the university of cape town, still trying to find themselves in their late teenage years, will be offered this sort of thinking as an example of mainstream intellectual respectability. i am not claiming that students will be inclined to take the book’s conclusions literally seriously, and i am certainly not advocating banning it as incitement – instead, i am calling the author irresponsible for undermining some of the basic moral intuitions that allow these students to make sense of the world and of the moral choices they have to make in that world. would i be equally opposed to the placement of descartes’s scepticism on the philosophy syllabus? indeed, would i censor the matrix? of course not, for the simple reason that scepticism about the external world is not possible to take seriously without going mad. it really is a harmless philosophical game. besides, the whole point of cartesian scepticism is the epistemological challenge – the scepticism is at best a temporary, pedagogical position. on the other hand, moral intuitions are in a state of flux in one’s late teenage years, and there is so much facile relativism and moral frivolity in the media already, that this sort of book will have unpredictable and corrosive effects on teenagers (effects that would obviously be difficult to corroborate empirically – like arguments about the causal influence of violence on tv). and benatar shows no sign of temporarily holding his sceptical views; he does not begin with the question “what is it about life that makes it so valuable?” for this reason i have considerable sympathy for aristotle’s belief that ethics should not be taught to anyone before the age of 30. however, it is precisely because of the existence of books like benatar’s that responsible moral philosophers have to try to teach serious ethics to teenagers. the key is the word ‘serious’. moral philosophy is different from all other areas of analytic philosophy, and all other disciplines in the academy, in being very personal. in order to teach the subject properly, it cannot be a game. to use raimond gaita’s expression (2004),8 the teacher has to be able to stand behind his words, to be present in his words. in contrast, the philosopher of mathematics and the physicist need only intellectually endorse the propositions they utter in the classroom. of course the question of honesty and integrity arise for all academic disciplines, and there will be some who espouse fashionable theories merely to get a leg up. but moral philosophy is not only about what one believes but about what one does and how one lives. it will not do, with jean kazez, to wonder what sort of person benatar is as an amusing aside. benatar is, quite simply, the sort of person who would write a book like this. the contents of the book discredit him as a serious moral philosopher, even without reading beyond the first page. but if i am to be judged by the company i keep, then his book also directly embarrasses me. inevitably my tone will strike many, perhaps most philosophers as at best hysterically ad hominem and at worst deeply reactionary. it comes too close, they will say, to condemning people for opinions of which i morally disapprove. this is partly true and partly false. it is false to think that i cannot accept disagreement on substantive moral questions, such as abortion and euthanasia – for clearly in both those divisive issues there are morally serious advocates on both sides. but i will condemn people – morally condemn them – for holding substantive moral positions which they do not and cannot personally stand behind. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 25 benatar may be an extreme example, but the same can be said about the absurd thought experiments that characterise contemporary utilitarian philosophy. this was the target of elisabeth anscombe’s celebrated remark: but if someone really thinks, in advance, that it is open to question whether such an action as procuring the judicial execution of the innocent should be quite excluded from consideration – i do not want to argue with him: he shows a corrupt mind. (anscombe 1958 p. 19) despite anscombe’s warnings, the modern utilitarian descendants of her opponents, like peter singer (1979) and john harris (1985), have become hugely successful among non-philosophical readers. although their approaches have been strongly criticised,9 the point i want to focus on is this public involvement. benatar is not and cannot be serious about the ideas behind his book. singer and harris, however, seem to be genuinely serious, and also unlike benatar, make concrete policy proposals. rather than retreat into technical pastimes and ignore lay complaints about the uselessness of their work, they wade into the throng with their sleeves rolled up. in so doing they rely partly on their authority as academic philosophers. indeed, in 1982 stephen toulmin published a famous article entitled ‘how medicine saved the life of ethics’. his main thesis was that the young field of medical ethics rescued the allegedly moribund subject of ethics in philosophy departments, and provided new jobs for moral philosophers. twenty-six years on, this is more true than ever. moral philosophers are not only teaching undergraduate medical students, but business, engineering and science students as well. they now advise companies about how to make ethical investments. they serve as advisors in hospitals, and wear bleepers. they are all over the media. and they model themselves etymologically on physicists and economists by calling themselves not philosophers (for they might not have any philosophical training at all), but by the pompous neologism ‘ethicists’. this is the third reason to be a embarrassed about being a moral philosopher. a dentist can be taken as possessing true expertise in a technical discipline. when i, a non-dentist, visit him to complain about the pain in my jaw, then i am bound to accept his advice insofar as i want the pain to go away. if he suggests that the molar has to come out, i can decide that the pain is not that bad, but i cannot disagree with him about whether removing the molar will ease the pain. he can successfully explain the reasons in rudimentary, metaphorical terms, but beyond a certain point he can only say “look, i’m an expert on this, i’ve got the certificate on the wall; until you yourself become a dentist then you will just have to trust me that i know what i’m doing.” none of this is possible with ethics. the prestigious moral philosopher, with several weighty tomes to his name, cannot turn aside criticism of his adultery or his embezzlement by saying “look, i’m an expert in this, i’ve got the certificate on the wall; until you yourself become a moral philosopher you will just have to trust me that i know what i’m doing.” it’s true that he may ignore my moral criticism. it’s true that he may respond to it by saying that i don’t know the full picture, and present me with relevant facts in an attempt to justify or excuse the adultery or the embezzlement. but ignoring or justifying or excusing is an avenue open to any competent adult under moral criticism: there is no distinction between expert and lay here. hence, moral philosophers have no special expertise to solve other people’s moral problems, although of course they have just as much authority to morally criticise other people’s actions and attitudes as anybody does (although perhaps as articulate intellectuals they have a certain civic obligation). this illegitimate moral expertise is to be distinguished from the legitimate technical expertise that such philosophers may possess on a particular historical figure or on matters of moral metaphysics, or on matters of public policy.10 unaware of the spuriousness of their authority, the ethicists too often come across as busybody preachers, and it should come as no surprise that such efforts can prompt ridicule and resentment, and occasionally offence. peter singer, for example, in the second edition of his practical ethics, has a long afterward entitled ‘on being silenced in germany’. here he describes how a number of invitations to speak at german universities were overturned by the university authorities either at their own initiative or in response to protests. the controversy analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 26 stemmed from his arguments for the routine killing of neonates with severe enough disabilities. now, my point in raising this is not to suggest that singer is a crack-pot of the likes of benatar, nor would i necessarily support any prohibition against him speaking. what is remarkable, however, is singer’s refusal to see that the german university authorities might possibly be justified in taking offence at his argument as it is phrased, precisely because of the context: the dark history of germany’s treatment of the handicapped during the nazi regime. refusing to even discuss the possibility of routine euthanasia becomes eminently understandable in this light, and not, as singer suggests indignantly, a demonstration of cowardice and superstition. indeed, even outside the specific german context, it is remarkable that singer has not met someone who, just by the sheer force of their seriousness, intellect, education and compassion, has not persuaded him that such a refusal might be at the very least philosophically legitimate.11 2. being philosophically open to the other let me summarise this rather dispiriting first half of the paper, then. i claimed to be embarrassed by my encounters with non-philosophers for three reasons. first, because i was unable to explain what my discipline was all about, and yet i felt i owed the non-philosophers such an explanation since i was answerable to them. second, i was embarrassed by being associated with the excesses of the ‘technicians’, epitomised by a recent book by david benatar. third, i was embarrassed by the excesses of the crusading ‘ethicists’ like harris and singer. (the fourth reason i will leave until the final section.) but with all the embarrassment, what is left over? what are moral philosophers supposed to do, exactly, if they are to remain answerable to non-philosophers and are meant to avoid excessive technicality and ethicism? it’s really hard to say, and to be entirely honest i haven’t come up with an answer yet. perhaps the very search for an answer to this question is part of what constitutes the discipline as i understand it. in the remainder of the paper i’m going to adumbrate a tentative and unoriginal suggestion, but then close by describing a glaring limitation to it. the tentative unoriginal suggestion is that the moral philosopher is seeking wisdom. and wisdom may be minimally defined, in the light of the foregoing discussion, as striving to understand one’s own life, others’ lives, and the relationships between us, in full moral seriousness, and in full humility. the first condition is to remain open to non-philosophers. this is not just a matter of social politeness or instrumental schmoozing or happy-clappy universal love. nor is it a matter of detachedly observing these exotic human creatures in action, in order to gather empirical material for a psychological study or for a novel. rather, it is about remaining philosophically open to non-philosophers, and to their lives, to the reality of the value of their lives, to the possibility of being surprised by them however well one thinks one knows them. philosophical openness also means being conscious of and striving to avoid, as far as possible, the misleading implications of the language of ‘us’ and ‘them’, by accepting that the philosopher is himself one of them, himself equally susceptible to moral dilemma and conflict and criticism, himself equally in need of moral advice and understanding. philosophical openness involves the rejection of science fictional and absurdly schematic examples (such as the famous trolley problem12) from moral philosophy, in favour of plausible, richly detailed examples about real people in the real world; it involves a rejection of the complacent optimism that guides too many philosophical searches for an arbitrarily reductionist resolution to tragic conflict. philosophical openness involves a direct challenge to the cartesian ego as the best logical place to begin an (analytic) philosophical enquiry, and a challenge to the autonomous rational mind which the western liberal tradition has always tried to protect and support. in saying this i am not only alluding to the philosophical arguments of the so-called communitarians (alasdair macintyre, charles taylor), but above all to the ordinary familiar experience of being struck or moved or angered or enthralled by another human being: that has to be the starting point. finally, philosophical openness involves critical engagement and moral seriousness and risks on both sides; it should not be confused with a blanket nonjudgementalism or with fawning hero-worship. philosophical openness is therefore consistent with the philosopher’s impatience at lazy thinking and at insincere allegiance to pop-philosophical theories such as relativism. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 27 but if the philosophically open philosopher and the non-philosopher are on the same plane, if neither is an expert, then again it may be asked, what does the moral philosopher then have to offer the rest of society? if he is not engaged in a technical subject with the goal of advancing technical knowledge, if he is not preaching advice to the unlearned, then what is his distinct philosophical training for? certainly he is striving to understand himself and others, but does this lead to anything that he can then offer or dispense – if not expertise, then at least wisdom? the question then becomes: is wisdom enough of a thing, that can be acquired and then distributed to the unwise? i suggest not. instead, it is something that is invoked and revealed during an encounter with another person to whom one is being philosophically open. most of wisdom consists in what i have described above: standing behind one’s words, being morally serious in one’s enquiries, being humble about the limits of one’s understanding and of what can be understood (humility is to be contrasted to the putative expert’s desire to ‘master’ a discipline). moral philosophy, if done properly, involves the cultivation of this sort of attitude. there is of course no guarantee that the moral philosopher will find it to any degree. and moral philosophy, of whatever stripe, is certainly not the only path to wisdom. rather it is suitable for a certain temperament, one which likes things as explicit as possible, even when the explicitness can only apply to the limits of explicitness. one paradoxical thing about wisdom is that one cannot really recognise when one has it: with the possible exception of friedrich nietzsche, the wise person will not be able to say sincerely and seriously “i am wise” in the way that he may authoritatively declare “i am knowledgeable about x” or “i have expertise in y.” this is because of the humility that is essentially a part of wisdom, and as such it was not entirely disingenuous of socrates to claim that he knew nothing (in the apology, among other places), while confidently and critically engaging his opponents. this conception of wisdom, and of moral philosophy as having essentially to do with wisdom, has two important corollaries, described eloquently by raimond gaita (2004 p. 265 ff.). first, it is essential to wisdom that it requires time to achieve, and moreover time within the context of an individual human life. it is not an accident that there are no child geniuses in moral philosophy. this time requirement is not contingent on the cognitive powers of human minds, in the way that knowledge and expertise is. while a mastery of kung fu can be ‘poured’ into the mental receptacle of keanu reaves in less than a minute (in the film the matrix), this would not be possible for wisdom, since it has to be ‘earned’ through experience, it has to be ground and burned into the skin. second, a wise person can sometimes be described as having “something to say.” but this ‘something’ is often not going to be very original or bold or brilliant. indeed, one sign of a wise person is not that he says wise things, but that in his presence and under his compassionate attention one is oneself more inclined to say wise things. usually, the ‘something’ consists in revealing what a particular person has made of a fact that is generally known, as well as what a person made of himself through that fact – for the two processes are interdependent. this gives the wise person a special kind of personal authority that no amount of specialised knowledge or expertise can provide. 3. the limits of moral philosophy joyce carol oates wrote a short story called ‘the undesirable table’ (1996). it concerns a group of middleclass friends who gather at a favourite restaurant one evening. unfortunately the restaurant is quite full and the only table available is the ‘undesirable’ one. finding another restaurant would be time-consuming and risky, but more importantly, none of the guests wants to accept the undesirability as a reason for them to look elsewhere. for although we are never told or shown explicitly, the undesirability (and oates repeats the word with increasingly ironic effect) has to do, we can guess, with the presence of a beggar outside and directly in front of a large bay window next to the table. the dinner party is ruined, despite the best efforts of all involved to ignore the white elephant and stick to their middle-class topics of conversation. the story is strikingly uncomfortable on two levels. first of all, because of the familiar awkwardness of being forced into close proximity with a beggar and not knowing what to do or say; second, because of the familiar analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 28 awkwardness of being seen by one’s friends wondering what to do or say after being forced into close proximity with a beggar. exactly this sort of awkwardness reveals mettle. it would be too easy to blame the diners for their privilege and indifference, but oates is careful to make them attractively ordinary middle-class figures, and certainly she could expect the bulk of her readership to identify with them sufficiently to share the embarrassment without condemning any of them. i believe the story well illustrates the stark limits of philosophy, and indeed of wisdom – and it is by gesturing toward these limits that i want to conclude this paper, lest the previous section give the incorrect impression that the wise philosopher can conquer all. it‘s very well avoiding the excesses of technicality and ethicism by focusing on wisdom in the philosopher’s encounters with non-philosophers. but what of those non-philosophers who are somehow unfortunate: the homeless, the ill, the desperate, the damaged, the senile, the self-loathing – those people who are in one way or another beyond the language of philosophical enquiry and its implicit optimism. for this is my fourth reason to be embarrassed to be a moral philosopher: i do not know how to deal with encounters with these sorts of people, and i am certainly no better equipped than the diners in oates’s story. notice that i do not say that i am embarrassed by the encounters per se; only at my impotence within these encounters, precisely because i believe that my moral philosophy, if it is to be worth anything at all, should also be answerable to these – especially to these – non-philosophers as well. note that the encounter with the beggar need not be especially embarrassing for those moral philosophers whom i have been calling technicians. however they deal with the situation, their philosophy is already immune to the real world anyway. but for the moral philosopher who seeks wisdom, who is embarked on a deeply personal attempt to make sense of the world and of others and of his place among them, the encounter is embarrassing and it is revealing to examine why. here before him sits a man, shabby and dirty, his hand outstretched. it is obvious what he wants; it is obvious what he needs. it is obvious that i can part with a tenner without much of a dent in my comfortable life. it is obvious that “there but for the grace of god go i.” in sum, there is no good reason not to give him the money. or rather, lest i be accused over an excessive rationalism, there is no reason that i can give him for not giving him the money if he asked me for a reason: i am answerable to him far more than to some idealised ‘fellow human being’ or ‘rational mind’. there are of course plenty of post hoc rationalisations for not giving him the money: maybe i worry that he would only spend it on booze; maybe i’d prefer to donate it to the shelter for the homeless, in the belief that it will be spent more effectively than dubiously motivated piecemeal donations; maybe i would rather spend it on a more worthy project, such as my children and their glorious future; maybe i feel that the homeless person is responsible for his fate and does not deserve rescue. but none of these rationalisations seem to suffice, for otherwise the dominant emotion would not be embarrassment but regret. ultimately, i think my refusal to give the tenner amounts to a worry that i have no good reason to refuse a tenner to the next homeless person i meet, and the next, and the next, until i had turned myself into an impoverished saint; any threshold short of that can only be arbitrary. my refusal to pay money thereby becomes a refusal to pay attention, and i walk on by the other side like the priest and the levite before me. it is important to note that this paper is not arguing for a change in social policy, in order for the state to look after the homeless better. after all, i do not care enough about the beggar to resign from academic philosophy and work for a charity, nor am i arguing that other philosophers do so. and i certainly believe in the elitist project of supporting universities with public money that could otherwise have been spent on shelters for the homeless. instead, i worry that my inchoate philosophical understanding of the world does not allow at all for the brute existence of the unfortunate and of their legitimate claims on me. perhaps david benatar would take the beggar’s existence as support for his thesis. perhaps john mackie would take my inaction as support for his. philosophy and wisdom, or at least such philosophy and wisdom as i have managed to acquire to date, are paralysed before the cruelty of fate; for what use is my philosophy and wisdom to the beggar? what use is my philosophical openness? any moral philosopher who does not acknowledge this crucial fourth reason to be analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 29 embarrassed will be lost to the real world.13 bibliography: anscombe e. (1958) ‘modern moral philosophy’ in her: collected philosophical papers, vol. iii, blackwell belshaw c. (2007) ‘review of better never to have been: the harm of coming into existence’ in: notre dame philosophical reviews, 2007.06.09. http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=9983 dawkins r. (2007) the god delusion, black swan doyal l. (2007) ‘is human existence worth its consequent harm?’ journal of medical ethics vol. 33. foot p. (1977), ‘abortion and the doctrine of double effect’ in her virtues and vices; and other essays in moral philosophy, clarendon gaita r. (2004) good and evil; an absolute conception, 2nd ed., routledge harris j. (1985) the value of life, routledge kazez, j. (2007) ‘review of better never to have been: the harm of coming into existence’, http://faculty.smu.edu/ jkazez/articles/benatar.htm mackie j. (1977) ethics: inventing right and wrong, penguin maclean a. (1993), the elimination of morality: reflections on utilitarianism and bioethics, routledge mill. j.s. (1859) on liberty. text accessed from http://www.serendipity.li/jsmill/on_lib.html oates j.c. (1996) ‘the undesirable table’ in: will you always love me? and other stories, dutton. singer p. (1979) practical ethics, oup toulmin s. (1982) ‘how medicine saved the life of ethics’ in: perspectives of biological medicine, vol. 25. endnotes 1 clearly i am talking about those countries such as the uk that do not teach philosophy as a compulsory subject at secondary school. 2 philosophers at private universities do not have this particular problem, since they are paid by students freely choosing the subject. but there is a lingering risk of the subject being seen as a scam. 3 perhaps literature is another discipline vulnerable to a similar kind of embarrassment as the one i am describing, not only because the literature professor does not seem to offer much that is inaccessible to a reasonably educated amateur reading group, but also because literature is answerable to the real world in the way i am describing. 4 i should say that i am directing most of my remarks at anglo-american philosophers, only because that is the tradition i am most familiar with. i suspect that many so-called continental philosophers, moral or otherwise, would have more sympathy with my criticisms. 5 taken from the ‘search inside’ function on the amazon website. i won’t be paying money for this book. 6 benatar himself responded to the review in ‘grim news from the original position: a reply to professor doyal’, in the same volume. 7 “if the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.” (book ii, mill 1859) 8 most of this piece has been inspired by gaita’s discussion of what it means to take moral philosophy seriously. 9 see gaita, op. cit. for an articulate attack on the utilitarian bioethics, see anne maclean (1993). 10 this point about public policy is worth expanding. a moral philosopher can achieve legitimate expertise, i argue, in the policy discussions surrounding, say, euthanasia. he is someone who knows about different policies in different countries, including the evaluations of those policies; he is someone familiar with the relevant law; most importantly he is someone familiar with the relevant arguments (in academic journals and elsewhere) advanced in favour of this or that policy. however, i argue that no matter how well-informed such a policy expert is, he cannot claim any expertise in ruling on the matter of whether this patient ought – morally ought – to be allowed to kill himself. 11 the same question could be asked of richard dawkins. has the author of the god delusion (2007) never met analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 30 a religious believer, someone he admired enough intellectually and liked emotionally, someone who might persuade him, just for a moment, to refrain from dismissing that person’s entire religiously underpinned worldview as massively deluded? and if he has met such a person, can he really look him in the eye and call him massively deluded? could he ever cultivate a friendship with such a person? 12 a runaway train trolley approaches a set of points; down one line it will kill a famous violinist, down the other it will kill five children. which way should i switch the points? see philippa foot (1977). 13 my thanks to andrea kenkmann and brendan larvor for some very valuable criticism of earlier drafts. address correspondences to: christopher cowley school of philosophy, university college, dublin, ireland christopher.cowley@ucd.ie liberation philosophy and the development of communities of inquiry: a critical evaluation patrick j.m. costello and richard e. morehouse introduction the aim of this paper is to offer a critical evaluation of the role of liberation philosophy in developing commu-nities of inquiry. the article is divided into three sections. in the first, we examine the relationship between liberation philosophy and liberation pedagogy. the second section focuses on a discussion of relationships between liberation pedagogy, communities of inquiry and the teaching of philosophical thinking. finally, we discuss what we regard as some of the challenges of liberation pedagogy and outline future directions for research and practice. while a number of scholars have offered radical critiques of education and schooling (latta, 1989), this article considers the work of paulo freire as expressed in what is perhaps his best-known book, pedagogy of the oppressed (freire, 1996). liberation philosophy and the development of liberation pedagogy according to dussel (1985, p.9), while the concept of “liberation philosophy” has been articulated only comparatively recently, “its antecedents are older than modern european philosophy.” with this in mind, it is interesting that the call for papers for this special issue of analytic teaching and philosophical praxis was made in the context of a conference on bartolomé de las casas, which was held at viterbo university in october, 2012. bartolomé de las casas, who lived from 1484 to 1566, was a spanish social reformer and dominican friar. perhaps the best known of his writings, a short account of the destruction of the indies, discusses the colonization of the west indies, to which he was opposed. dussel (p.9) refers to his work as follows: bartolomé de las casas ... wrote that ‘they have used two ways to extirpate these pitiable nations from the face of the earth,’ referring to the two ways europeans used to dominate the periphery. ‘one is by unjust, cruel, bloody, and tyrannical wars’ that is, the europeans assassinated the inhabitants of the periphery. ‘the other way is that after they have assassinated all those, such as adult males, who can yearn for freedom usually they do not leave any survivors of war except children and women they then oppress survivors with the most violent, horrible, and hateful slavery.’ they assassinated the amerindians; if they left any alive, they debased them, oppressing them with servitude. they spared women, to live in concubinage (sexual domination) and children, to be educated in european culture (pedagogical domination). and thus in the name 1 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 2 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 of the ‘new god’ (gold, silver, money, pounds sterling, or the dollar) there have been immolated to the god of nascent mercantilism, the god of economic imperialism, and the contemporary imperialism of the multinational corporations, millions more human beings of the periphery than those the aztecs immolated to their god huitzilopochtli to the horror of civilized, religious-minded europeans! the notion of “pedagogical domination,” to which bartolomé de las casas refers, is a familiar one in the context of liberation philosophy and, more particularly, “liberation pedagogy” (also referred to as “critical pedagogy” see giroux, 1988, 2011; mclaren, 1999; mclaren, macrine and hill (2010); and nocella, best and mclaren (2010)). one of the foremost scholars of liberation pedagogy is paulo freire, who has written extensively in this area (freire, 1996, 2004, 2005, 2008; see also irwin (2012), schugurensky (2011), and glass (2001)). in what follows, we will focus on his pedagogy of the oppressed (freire, 1996: hereinafter referred to as ‘po’) to make explicit connections between his liberation pedagogy, communities of inquiry and the development of philosophical thinking. liberation pedagogy, communities of inquiry and the development of philosophical thinking the concept of a “community of inquiry” is well-known within the field of philosophy for children/philosophy with children. indeed, a number of papers have been published in this journal on the nature and development of such communities (see, for example, costello, 2007a, 2010a; morehouse, 2010). for the purposes of this article, a brief summary of the concept and its application would be useful (see costello, 2007b for an expanded account). matthew lipman, founder of the philosophy for children programme, and his colleagues, have argued as follows: when children are encouraged to think philosophically, the classroom is converted into a community of inquiry. such a community is committed to procedures of inquiry, to responsible search techniques that presuppose openness to evidence and to reason. it is assumed that these procedures of the community, when internalized, become the reflective habits of the individual (lipman et al., 1980, p.45). the authors also tell us that in order to create a community of inquiry, certain prerequisites are necessary. there should be a “readiness to reason, mutual respect (of children towards one other, and of children and teachers towards one another) and an absence of indoctrination” (1980, p.45). following the work of lipman and other scholars at the institute for the advancement of philosophy for children (iapc), the term “community of inquiry” is now widely used by educators, whose aim is to enable their students to develop and demonstrate an ability to think, reason and argue effectively, both orally and in writing. as is well known, the philosophy for children programme utilises novels and teachers’ manuals to engage learners in philosophical thinking. in philosophy in the classroom, the following rationale for the novels, which have been written specifically to develop reasoning skills, is given: the books are works of fiction in which the characters eke out for themselves the laws of reasoning and the discovery of alternative philosophical views that have been presented through the centuries. the method of discovery for each of the children in the novels is dialogue coupled with reflection. this dialogue with peers, with teachers, with parents, grandparents and relatives, alternating with reflections upon what has been said, is the basic vehicle by which the characters in the stories come to learn. and it is how real students likewise come to learn by talking and thinking things out (lipman et al., 1980, p.82). the modus operandi advocated by the iapc for undertaking philosophical discussion in the classroom will also be familiar, both to teachers utilizing the programme, as well as to those undertaking research in this field. a typical session would take place as follows. first of all, children are asked to read aloud an episode or chapter from one of the novels. a key pedagogical component of the program is that poor readers or those who do not wish to read are permitted to “pass” (fisher, 2003). in preparing teachers to teach philosophy, lipman argues it is necessary that they should be introduced to the novels by reading them aloud in the same way that children are asked to do. as he suggests: this gives them experience in hearing the language of the text as well as in listening to one another. taking turns is an exercise in moral reciprocity, and the collective effect of the ensuing discussion is a sharing of the meanings of the text through their appropriation by the group as a whole. thus, even in the very first stage of exploring the curriculum, the members of the seminar begin to experience themselves as members of a community of shared experience and shared meanings, the first step toward becoming members of a community of inquiry (lipman, 1988, p.156). when the designated episode or chapter has been read, children are asked for their comments on it and they have an opportunity to determine which issues are then discussed (costello, 2007b). hannan and echeverria (2009, p.7) suggest that what they refer to as a “community of philosophical inquiry” has the following characteristics: • safe environment. • expressing disagreement. • cooperative endeavour. • practice and development of thinking skills. • topics for discussion are based on student interest. • topics discussed are philosophical. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 3 • knowledge is understood as evolving constantly. • knowledge is co-constructed. • teachers and students are co-enquirers in the search for meaning. • a space for the development of a personal and social project. with this summary in mind, we would argue that the theory and practice of developing communities of inquiry have a close affinity with freire’s conception of “liberation pedagogy” and, in particular with his discussion of several key terms and themes, including “narrative,” “banking education,” “indoctrination,” “problemposing education,” “dialogue,” “critical thinking,” “reflection” and “action.” we will discuss these in the context of extracts from po. the teacher as “narrator” in po, freire sets out a distinctive view of the teacher-student relationship. central to this perspective is his view of the teacher as “narrator”: a careful analysis of the teacher-student relationship at any level, inside or outside the school, reveals its fundamentally narrative character. the relationship involves a narrating subject (the teacher) and patient, listening objects (the students)... the teacher talks about reality as if it were motionless, static, compartmentalized and predictable. or else he expounds on a topic completely alien to the existential experience of the students. his task is to ‘fill’ the students with the contents of his narration contents which are detached from reality, disconnected from the totality that engendered them and could give them significance. words are emptied of their concreteness and become a hollow, alienated, and alienating verbosity. (po p.52) narration (with the teacher as narrator) leads the students to memorize mechanically the narrated content. worse yet, it turns them into ‘containers’ into ‘receptacles’ to be ‘filled’ by the teacher. the more completely she fills the receptacles, the better a teacher she is. the more meekly the receptacles permit themselves to be filled, the better students they are. (po, pp.5253). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 4 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 5 according to roberts (1996, pp.52-53), in freire’s view “...the relationship between teacher and students tends to be overwhelmingly monological: the teacher narrates the subject matter to students who are expected to receive passively, memorize and (if requested) repeat the content of the narration.” freire’s view is made explicit in the following schema: • the teacher teaches and the students are taught; • the teacher knows everything and the students know nothing; • the teacher thinks and the students are thought about; • the teacher talks and the students listen meekly; • the teachers discipline and the students are disciplined; • the teacher chooses and enforces his choice, and the students comply; • the teacher acts and the students have the illusion of acting through the action of the teacher; • the teacher chooses the programme content, and students (who were not consulted) adapt to it; • the teacher confuses the authority of knowledge with his or her own professional authority, which she and he sets in opposition to the freedom of the students; • the teacher is the subject of the learning process, while the students are mere objects. (po, p.54) the ‘banking’ concept of education freire’s conception of the teacher as “narrator” leads him to discuss the notion of “banking education,” in which students are regarded as mere “containers” or “receptacles,” whose role involves being “filled” with the knowledge, skills, attitudes etc. that teachers possess. according to freire (po, p.53): in the banking concept of education, knowledge is a gift bestowed by those who consider themselves knowledgeable upon those whom they consider to know nothing... the teacher presents himself to his students as their necessary opposite; by considering their ignorance absolute, he justifies his own existence... the raison d’être of libertarian education, on the other hand, lies in its drive towards reconciliation. education must begin with the solution of the teacher-student contradiction, by reconciling the poles of the contradiction so that both are simultaneously teachers and students. education thus becomes an act of depositing, in which the students are the depositories and the teacher is the depositor. instead of communicating, the teacher issues communiqués and makes deposits which the students patiently receive, memorize and repeat. this is the ‘banking’ analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 6 concept of education, in which the scope of action allowed to the students extends only as far as receiving, filing, and storing the deposits. problem-posing education at the heart of freire’s liberation pedagogy lies the idea of “problem-posing education.” according to freire (po, pp.60-61): accordingly, the practice of problem-posing education entails at the outset that the teacherstudent contradiction be resolved... through dialogue, the teacher-of-the-students and the students-of-the-teacher cease to exist and a new term emerges: teacher-student with studentsteachers. the teacher is no longer merely the-one-who-teaches but one who is himself taught in dialogue with the students, who in turn while being taught also teach. they become jointly responsible for a process in which all grow. (pp.60-61) ... the problem-posing educator constantly re-forms his reflections in the reflection of the students. the students – no longer docile listeners – are now critical co-investigators in dialogue with the teacher’. (po, pp.61-62) whereas banking education anaesthetizes and inhibits creative power, problem-posing education involves a constant unveiling of reality. the former attempts to maintain the submersion of consciousness; the latter strives for the emergence of consciousness and critical intervention in reality. (p.62) dialogue and critical thinking dialogue and critical thinking are essential both to freire’s liberation pedagogy. consider the following: banking education resists dialogue; problem-posing education regards dialogue as indispensable to the act of cognition which unveils reality. banking education treats students as objects of assistance; problem-posing education makes them critical thinkers. (po, p.64) dialogue is thus an existential necessity... this dialogue cannot be reduced to the act of one person’s ‘depositing’ ideas in another, nor can it become a simple exchange of ideas to be analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 7 ‘consumed’ by the discussants. (pp.69-70) only dialogue, which requires critical thinking, is also capable of generating critical thinking. without dialogue there is no communication, and without communication there can be no true education. (po, pp.73-74) the above extracts from po offer a concise summary of the key aspects of freire’s liberation pedagogy. we will discuss these with particular reference to communities of inquiry and the development of philosophical thinking. let us begin with freire’s view of the teacher-student relationship. in evaluating this, we would argue first of all that it offers a very fixed and rigid representation of the educational process. writing in 2012, we are bound to ask to what extent this conception represents the very rich and varied ways in which teaching and learning currently take place in schools, both in a national and international context. nevertheless, it is always very instructive to discuss the above extracts with students who are undertaking teacher education programmes, either at undergraduate or postgraduate level, as this enables them to share their own previous (and current) experiences as learners within the educational system and then to reflect critically on their own pedagogical practice. we would wish to express similar reservations about freire’s conceptions of “banking education” and “problem-posing education,” at least to the extent to which, as in his view of the teacher-student relationship, these terms represent a fixed, unambiguous, “all or nothing,” view of the educational process. again, writing from the vantage point of twenty-first century schooling, we need to ask whether and to what extent freire’s dichotomous account of education as either “liberation” or “oppression” represents the current state of thinking and practice in schools today. of course, it is possible to argue that one of the reasons why so many schools have moved away from the forms of pedagogy epitomised by “banking education” is because of the widespread influence of liberation pedagogy and the writings of scholars such as freire, and we would agree with this view. indeed the praxis involved in teaching philosophy in schools has strongly underpinned a liberation education perspective. the shift from the kind of traditional education epitomised by mr gradgrind in dicken’s novel hard times (2003) to the more progressive forms of schooling evident today is to be welcomed and freire’s notion of “banking education” offers us a stark warning about how the teaching-learning relationship should not be enacted in the classroom. the relationship between “banking education” and indoctrination is a strong one and freire refers to the latter in po (p.59): “education as the exercise of domination stimulates the credulity of students with the ideological intent (often not perceived by educators) of indoctrinating them to adapt to the world of oppression.” as we saw above, lipman et al. (1980) argue that a prerequisite of developing communities of inquiry is that there should be an absence of indoctrination. indeed the iapc is well aware of the problems posed by indoctrination: there is no study that can more effectively prepare the child to combat indoctrination than philosophy (lipman et al., 1980, p.85). [a philosophical] education is the antithesis of indoctrination as it aims to give children the intellectual tools that they need to think autonomously about moral issues, to explore the metaphysical, logical and aesthetic dimensions of these issues and eventually move toward the formation of their own answers (sharp, 1984, p.3). we would argue that the notion of “problem-posing education,” with its emphasis on dialogue and critical thinking, has a close affinity both with communities of inquiry and the development of philosophical thinking in schools. for example, in the context of such education, freire suggests that students are no longer “docile listeners” but rather “critical co-investigators in dialogue with the teacher.” this approach is essential to any viable conception of a community of inquiry and, indeed, to the teaching of philosophy itself. freire’s view of “banking education” as involving the “submersion” of consciousness also reminds us of indoctrination and, in particular, of the indoctrinated state of mind. the emphasis of “problem-posing education” is on the “emergence” of consciousness, and again, this is key to the development of successful communities of inquiry. curriculum content in discussing curriculum content, freire (po, p.103) offers an example that is reminiscent of the philosophy for children program, with its emphasis on novels that have been written for use in schools: “another didactic resource as long as it is carried out within a problem-posing rather than a banking approach to education is the reading and discussion of magazine articles, newspapers, and book chapters (beginning with passages).” of course, a broad range of alternative approaches to the teaching of philosophy in schools (which may be grouped under the heading ‘philosophy with children’) is now available. for example, morris (2009) outlines a number of classroom activities to encourage the development of philosophical thinking, and hannan and echeverria (2009) discuss how the community of inquiry can be developed within individual subject areas. we referred above to what we consider to be freire’s very fixed view of the teacher-student relationship and the educational process. in our view, this has led him to propose an unrealistic account both of the nature and implementation of school curricula. why do we argue this? consider the following statement (po, p.90): “in contrast with the antidialogical and non-communicative ‘deposits’ of the banking method of education, the program content of the problem-posing method dialogical par excellence is constituted and organised by the students’ view of the world, where their own generative themes are found.” it is clear that the view espoused by freire does not pertain in most schools; the curriculum is neither constituted nor organised primarily by reference to how students see the world. this is not to say that what freire refers to as “problem -posing education” does not (or should not) take place in schools; indeed, it should and it does. rather, we are arguing that the concept of “education” is rather broader than freire conceives of it, involving as it does introducing learners to a broad range of knowledge, skills, world views, academic disciplines etc. about which currently they may know very little. as richard peters (1981, p.52) has argued, in the context of moral development and moral education, children “can and must enter the palace of reason through the courtyard of habit and tradition.” similarly with the other disciplines that make up the school curriculum. for example, on the ask a mathematician, ask a physicist website (2012) and in response to the question, “how can we prove that 2 + 2 always equals 4?” a number of answers is given, including this one: in science, theories are often not proven, but disproven. perhaps the same concept would have to be applied here. if the numbers 0 through 4 are set quantities (so that i can’t just turn around and say, oh let’s make 2=3 (artificially, as in a linguistic change, not a mathematical one)), then by definition a physical total of two 2s would yield four. it may be impossible to prove that 2+2 8 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 9 always yields four, but perhaps it is impossible to disprove 2+2 equalling four ever. because the physical evidence is overwhelmingly in 2+2=4’s favour, perhaps it is a postulate or observing type of thing, like right angles are always equal, not a proof type of thing. it is important to note that, although participants in such discussions are clearly engaging in high-level inquiry and debate, they do so having initially being taught (and having successfully learned), in the elementary school classroom or elsewhere, that two plus two does equal four. unfortunately, freire’s perspective has been embraced much too readily by some advocates of the teaching of philosophy in schools. in a review of hand and winstanley’s (2009) book, philosophy in schools, costello (2010b) considers three quotations from one of the chapters: ...adults’ psychological need to be in control has contributed to a curriculum that is focused on subject and knowledge content and to the questionable but popular conception of knowledge as infallible, as an ever-expanding body of facts that can be readily transmitted... (p.115). the emphasis on closed questioning in schools gives a false picture of what knowledge is. whatever the discipline, ‘facts’ should always be tentative... meanings cannot be given or handed out: they need to be acquired (p.116). political correctness in britain can be a barrier to authentic enquiries in class. there is an assumption that children should not question their faith... talk about taboo subjects, or be exposed to literature that gives the ‘wrong message’... it is crucial that the integrity of philosophical enquiries is not compromised by subtle manipulation (steering enquiries into ‘safer’ territory)... by avoidance (of what may upset children or parents) or by projection (of a need for answers and certainty). teachers’ urge to protect must not be allowed to stifle independence of thought and autonomy (p.117). the notion of “control” in education has been much discussed. however, it is evident that teachers are (and should be) “in control” in classrooms and schools. this does not mean that, ipso facto, such control will stunt pupils’ intellectual growth and ability to reflect critically on ideas and subject content. an argument could just as easily have been presented to suggest that effective control by teachers is essential to developing a classroom environment that is conducive to philosophical thinking taking place (ensuring that children listen to others, have an opportunity to speak etc.). the acquisition of facts is a necessary (and unavoidable) part of the educational system. again, this does not (nor should it) preclude the development of a reflective disposition in children. as regards the third quotation, we need to remember that schools are social institutions into which, as it were, philosophy enters as a welcome guest at a party, rather than the host. when teachers enable and encourage children to discuss philosophical ideas, to express points of view, to offer reasons to support their arguments and so on, all of which are entirely desirable, this does not (nor should it be taken to) imply equality in the domain of teaching and learning. this is not to say that teachers have nothing to learn from the arguments which their students advance. in the spirit of freire’s conception of the “teacher-student with students-teachers,” we agree that they certainly do. rather, it is simply to acknowledge that society has given teachers a role which, if denied or ignored, will lead to students’ educational impoverishment. teaching philosophical reasoning constitutes an important addition to the school curriculum. to increase the likelihood of its successful introduction, we need to ensure that we do not claim more for it than it is able to deliver (costello, 2010b). the challenges of liberation pedagogy: future directions for research and practice the above examination of some of freire’s key themes and arguments leads us to conclude that liberation pedagogy offers a number of challenges to teachers. in this final section, we outline what we consider to be some of these challenges, beginning within the field of teaching philosophy and then moving on to the broader educational context in schools. we would argue that there is a need to expand programs of education that focus on the teaching and learning of philosophy in schools. we are all indebted to matthew lipman and his colleagues at montclair state university for developing and implementing the philosophy for children program so successfully. their work has acted as a catalyst for reflective thinking and practice, and has led to the emergence of a broad range of alternative approaches. one way to convince teachers that such programs should be introduced into schools is to focus on the contribution they make to developing communities of inquiry and to improving thinking and learning more broadly in the classroom. allied to this, proponents of teaching philosophy in schools need to convince practitioners that, in implementing programs in the classroom, they will be fully involved as participants who are able and willing to develop their pedagogical practice and to reflect carefully on it. in short, in order to be successful, teaching philosophy in schools is an initiative that must be undertaken by and with teachers; it should never be imposed on them. this notion of active teacher participation in programs for teaching philosophy can be expanded in two ways. first, it is important for teachers to engage in research on their own professional practice, with a view to improving it. the authors would argue that action research is ideally placed as a vehicle to assist in this task (costello, 2011). furthermore, action research is concerned principally with the relationship between “reflection” and “action” and this resonates strongly with freire’s own view: “but human activity consists of action and reflection: it is praxis; it is transformation of the world. and as praxis, it requires theory to illuminate it. human activity is theory and practice; it is reflection and action” (po, p.106). within the uk, for example, teachers have undertaken funded, small-scale action research projects that focus on the teaching and learning of thinking skills (including philosophy). we suggest that this work should increasingly incorporate projects undertaken for academic qualifications such as taught master’s degrees in education, both in the uk and elsewhere. second, active teacher participation should be encouraged in publications about the teaching of philosophy in schools. for example, while the increase in books being published on what might be generally termed “critical analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 10 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 11 thinking” is to be welcomed, it is of vital importance that these should reflect teachers’ “voices.” not all texts are successful in achieving this (costello, 2010b). moving on to the broader context of education, we would argue that it is in the spirit of freire’s liberation pedagogy that all classrooms should become communities of inquiry. this is an idea that has become increasingly popular in the literature on school improvement. indeed, although the term is rarely used in this context, the essential characteristics of a community of inquiry are evident. for example, lucas and claxton (2010, p. 116) refer to lave and wenger’s (1991) concept of “communities of practice,” which is used to describe social learning, and argue that “members of a community pursue a common interest and help each other as they do so. and as they work and solve problems together, so their learning habits and attitudes rub off on each other.” gerver (2010, p.123) supports this view and refers to the practice of “learn share,” which he introduced into his school: this was developed from the need to help our children communicate and empathize with others. in most schools children tend to work and play with the children of their own age, in their own class. we wanted to ensure that our children began to see themselves as a wholeschool community and to be able to develop skills that allowed them to empathize and interact with other children outside the usual grouping. learn share evolved out of a weekly session where children throughout the school were paired with a child from another class and year group and would work with them to share reading. the system proved so successful that we expanded it to allow children to share all aspects of their learning and, indeed, their interests. krovetz (2008, p.111) argues that the following are characteristics of a “resilient learning community”: • students are working in the library, computer lab, laboratories, and hallways, individually and collaboratively with peers. • students are engaged in required helpfulness. • older students are seen working with younger students. • students are engaged with peers as peer helpers, conflict resolvers, and tutors. • students spend time each week in service learning projects on and off campus. • class meetings and school-wide forums are held regularly to gather student input regarding meaningful school issues. these meetings are often facilitated by students. • an effort is being made to include all student groups in the daily life of the school; students are not seen on the fringes of the school campus, alienated and voicing displeasure with the school, staff, and peers. • a large percentage of the students participate in and lead a wide range of school activities. • signs on campus encourage students to join activities and do not indicate hurdles to complete; the words ‘students must’ do not appear on school postings. • time is provided at least weekly for teachers to work together on curriculum, instruction, and assessanalytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 12 ment. • most students, faculty, and staff are known and welcomed by name, and many parents and community members are known and welcomed by name. • drug, alcohol, smoking and fighting infractions are statistically small and show an annual decrease. similarly, peters (2008, p.72) outlines “goals for creating a #1 classroom” and suggests that students: • become partners in learning. • learn in a respectful, productive, positive atmosphere. • are encouraged to share their thoughts, difficulties, successes and dreams. • recognize and respect their own culture and those of others. • have opportunities to explain, clarify, expand on, or question. • receive honest, timely, and respectful feedback about their work. • recognize their own areas of strength in thinking and learning. • identify their dreams, aspirations, and natural gifts. • receive direction and vehicles for future success. • receive instruction from amazing teachers. in conclusion, we would agree with gilbert (2011, p.45) who suggests that “the ‘guess my thought and i’ll throw you a fish’ approach to teaching and learning has got to change if we want confident creative thinkers capable of both convergent and divergent thinking according to what each individual situation merits. and part of that thinking skill set needs to be the ability to confidently and without malice throw out an old idea and come up with a new one.” the call for papers for this special issue of analytic teaching and philosophical praxis is entitled “the promise of liberation philosophy.” we would argue that such philosophy, when translated into a viable liberation pedagogy, has much to offer education systems internationally. again it is in the spirit of freire’s philosophy of education that, while his readers may not always agree with everything he says, yet through studying his arguments carefully they may gain valuable insights that will enable them to clarify and enrich their own thinking and practice. references ask a mathematician, ask a physicist (2012). how can we prove that 2+2 always equals 4? retrieved from http:// www.askamathematician.com/2009/10/q-how-can-we-prove-that-22-always-equals-4/ costello, p.j.m. (2007a). promoting communities of inquiry through teacher education in the uk. analytic teaching, 27(1),16-23. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 costello, p.j.m. (2007b). developing communities of inquiry: the role of narrative. prospero: a journal of new thinking in philosophy for education, 13(1), 10-16. costello, p.j.m. (2010a). developing communities of inquiry in the uk: retrospect and prospect. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis, 30(1),1-20. costello, p.j.m. (2010b). review of philosophy in schools by m. hand and c. winstanley (eds.). journal of beliefs and values, 31(3), 365-367. costello, p.j.m. (2011). effective action research: developing reflective thinking and practice (2nd ed.). london: continuum. dickens, c. (2003). hard times. london: penguin books. dussel, e. (1985). philosophy of liberation. new york: orbis books. fisher, r. (2003). teaching thinking: philosophical enquiry in the classroom (2nd ed.). london: cassell. freire, p. (1996). pedagogy of the oppressed. london: penguin books. freire, p. (2004). pedagogy of hope. london: continuum. freire, p. (2005). education for critical consciousness. london: continuum. freire, p. (2008). pedagogy of the heart. london: continuum. gardner, s.t. (2012). teaching children to think ethically. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis, 32(2), 75-81. gerver, r (2010). creating tomorrow’s schools today: education our children – their futures. london: continuum. gilbert, i. (2011). why do i need a teacher when i’ve got google? abingdon: routledge. giroux, h.a. (1988). teachers as intellectuals: toward a critical pedagogy of learning. new york: bergin and harvey. giroux, h.a. (2011). on critical pedagogy. london: continuum. glass, r.d. (2001). on paulo freire’s philosophy of praxis and the foundations of liberation education. educational researcher, 30(2), 15-25. hand, m. and winstanley, c. (eds.). (2009). philosophy in schools. london: continuum. 13 hannam, p. and echeverria, e. (2009). philosophy with teenagers. london: continuum. irwin, j. (2012). paulo freire’s philosophy of education: origins, developments, impacts and legacies. london: continuum. krovetz, m.l. (2008). fostering resilience: expecting all students to use their minds and hearts well (2nd ed.). thousand oaks, california: corwin press. latta, r. (1989). the critics of schooling. canadian journal of education, 14(4), 482-496. lave, j. and wenger, e. (1991). situated learning: legitimate peripheral participation. cambridge: cambridge university press. lipman, m. (1988). philosophy goes to school. philadelphia: temple university press. lipman, m. sharp, a.m. and oscanyan, f.s. (1980). philosophy in the classroom (2nd ed.). philadelphia: temple university press. lucas, b. and claxton, g. (2010). new kinds of smart: how the science of learnable intelligence is changing education. maidenhead: open university press. mclaren. p. (1999). critical pedagogy and predatory culture. london: routledge. mclaren, p., macrine, s., and hill, d, (eds). (2010). revolutionizing pedagogy: educating for social justice within and beyond global neo-liberalism. london: palgrave macmillan. morehouse, r.e. (2010). developing communities of inquiry in the usa: retrospect and prospect. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis, 30(1), 21-31. morris, i. (2009). teaching happiness and well-being in schools. london: continuum. nocella, a., best, s. and mclaren, p. (eds.) (2010). academic repression: reflections from the academic industrial complex. san francisco: ak press. peters, r.s. (1981). moral development and moral education. london: george alien and unwin. peters, s.g. (2008). teaching to capture and inspire all learners: bringing your best stuff every day! thousand oaks, california: corwin press. roberts, p. (1996). structure, direction and rigour in liberating education. oxford review of education, 22(3), 295-316. schugurensky, d. (2011). paulo freire. london: continuum. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 14 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 sharp, a.m. (1984). philosophical teaching as moral education. journal of moral education, 13(1), 3-8. address correspondence to: patrick j.m. costello glyndwr university, wales wrexham,wales p.costello@glyndr.ac.uk richard morehouse professor emeritus viterbo university, la crosse wi remorehouse@viterbo.edu 15 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 39 assessment standards: recentering and decentering higher education michael wodzak at this point in time, the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, one would be hard pressed to find a mathematics professor in the united states not painfully aware that too many students arrive at college holding high school diplomas, but with math skills that are so poor that they need remediation. remedial math courses, as one would expect, rarely carry credit towards college graduation. this situation has obvious cost-benefit ramifications: a student in remediation, for which he gets no credit, is obviously going to consume proportionally more state money, in the form of financial aid, than he would have if he had not needed this non-credit-bearing help. i am a member of a task force charged by the state of wisconsin to identify the core competencies needed in mathematics in order that diploma-bearing students need no college-level remediation. i have attended conferences and workshops, sponsored either by my state or by the mathematical association of america (maa) where the focus has been to improve the teaching of science, technology, engineering and mathematics (stem) subjects. at such conferences, and as part of the task force, i am invariably told by someone who proclaims to all who will listen that “i don’t teach mathematics; i teach students.” on its face, such a proclamation is the very essence of student-centeredness, but, i confess, i often find it difficult not to retort “and do your students learn mathematics, or do they learn you?” philosophical questions, especially in this (almost post-) post-modern world, tend to turn on what we mean by the words we use. the bumper sticker logic of who/what gets taught/learned hides and so leads us, in searching for the hidden, to ponder just what is meant by “teach”. in the declarations “i teach mathematics”, and “i teach students”, the transitive nature of “teach” is apparent. the identical english grammatical structure leads us to suppose that the objects of the declarations are equivalent, hence alternative, and hence in opposition. should i be mathematics-centered or should i be student-centered? on the other hand, if we ask ourselves what prepositions might be appropriately inserted into our uninflected english, something significant happens. i teach to my students. i teach about mathematics. the two objects are not, in this sense, grammatically equivalent, revealing that they are not in fact equivalent. if they are not equivalent, how can we presume that they are alternatives? why do we place being student-centered and being discipline-centered in opposition to each other? if i do not teach mathematics, but rather i teach my students, exactly what am i teaching those students? the a priori declaration is that it is not mathematics, whatever else it may be. is it not, however, valid to declare “i teach about mathematics to my students.”? the derridean notions of “center” and “centeredness” are, i hope to demonstrate, intrinsic to philosophical questions about the “culture of assessment” (derrida, 1972). indeed, the assertion that a construct may have more than one center is one that every mathematics teacher should be completely at ease with. any euclidean triangle has a circumcenter, an incenter and an orthocenter, and, if the triangle is scalene, these are distinctly different points from each other. in precisely this way, i have no trouble considering my teaching to be both student-centered and subject-centered, because the centeredness means something different in either case. if, at any moment in time, i am considering the incenter of a triangle, this does not, for an instant, deny the existence of the orthocenter, which is also inherent to the nature – the very existence – of the triangle. consideration of analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 40 the orthocenter does not annihilate the circumcenter. none of these centers of the triangle is any more or less fundamental to its existence. it is impossible for me to teach my subject without teaching it to students. perhaps, then, a better notion than a focus on a particular center is the more dynamic notion of juggling; i can let neither my students nor my discipline fall to the ground. i have suggested that my teaching can have two centers, my students and my subject. how many centers can it reasonably have? how many balls can i juggle? can i, as teacher, also be centered on assessment? a very premature answer to this question is: “yes, quite apparently i can. i have been so all of my professional life, as have most of my colleagues and predecessors”. but this is a premature response precisely because it does not consider what is meant by “assessment”. to assess is, perhaps, even more transitive than to teach, because the objects of this new action are even more diverse. am i assessing my subject, my program, my students, my teaching? for whom am i doing the assessment? if having two objects of the verb to teach leads to counterproductive equivocation, how much more fraught with peril is the situation where the objects are multiplied? mathematics is intrinsically a discipline where the performance of all the actors can be, and has been, objectively assessed. whereas many teachers, in the humanities for example, need complicated rubrics to objectively, consistently and fairly grade their students, a mathematics teacher simply evaluates whether each step in a student’s work is right or wrong. this is, of course, something of a paradigmitical oversimplification, but it is not, in reality, too far from the truth. similar claims about the assessment of mathematics programs and teachers can also be made, and i will consider these claims below. what i want to consider, for the moment, is the use of the term “rubric” to describe assessment instructions. the history of this term goes back to the middle ages. “rubric” is cognate with “ruby” and indicates something written in red. specifically, our modern use of the word evolved out of instructions, written in prayer books, telling when to stand, sit, kneel, etc. the word, i would submit, has not evolved so far from its medieval meaning, and still carries some religious intent. at the most benign level, we are reminded that we are taking part in a service. slightly more troubling, perhaps, is the notion that, in order to make the assessment more objective, more consistent, the clear instructions allow for less personal judgment and wisdom. the instructions can become almost ritualistic. but personal judgment and wisdom, surely, are inherent to the humanities, perhaps their ultimate raison d’être, and so removing them from assessment seems rather counterintuitive. i, however, am not a teacher of the humanities, and so it is inappropriate for me to do too much analysis of the assessment of those disciplines. i want to raise the notion that something quasi-religious is taking place, although i will defer naming the deity for the time being. there is a rather ironic history to the assessment of student work in mathematics. how well a student has done in an exercise has always been clearly, objectively and quantifiably measured. in order to achieve the same level of clarity, objectivity and quantifiability in the assessment of student work, other disciplines have needed to construct ingenious rubrics. in as much as these rubrics have been created and continue to be created, other disciplines are following the model of mathematics. now, however, with the culture of assessment that we are all required to subscribe to, mathematics teachers are beginning to be asked to supply rubrics for their assessment of students. it is a rare image that is not something of a distortion. mathematics teachers are now being asked to emulate, to a degree, an image of themselves. i would submit that, not only is an image of an image somewhat unlikely to be faithful to the original, it is less than wise for the original to attempt to mimic its mimics. nevertheless, the mathematics teacher is asked to supply rubrics, and i shall consider the motivations behind this request as we progress. assessment is not only of students. we must also assess ourselves as teachers, our pedagogical methods and our programs. one definite benefit of the culture of assessment has been that it requires teachers of mathematics to reflect on their own effectiveness and on that of their teaching methods. the fact, however, is that this kind of assessment, has also always been readily available to the teacher of mathematics. if a student does not learn a particular piece of material, if a whole class does not learn what is expected, it is only too obvious that there has been a failure somewhere. the teacher who is committed to his students’ learning, who is studentcentered has, i would submit, always recognised that the failure may, in part or in whole, have been his, or that analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 41 of his pedagogy, and he has striven to remedy the situation. unfortunately, it has, in the past, been rather too easy for the same teacher to recognise the all too obvious failure, and direct the blame away from himself. eventually, the school system has tended to catch up with some ineffective teachers, and do what it can to remediate the situation, but, equally evidently, sometimes it has not. the point is then, when it came to the effectiveness of his teaching, not that the mathematics teacher did not have adequate assessment tools at his fingertips, but that he may not always have used them. at the moment, with the culture of assessment, there is certainly more of an expectation of self reflection than in epochs past. it remains to be seen whether this extra scrutiny will be cost effective in the long run. just as mathematics has always been inherently rich in objective, quantifiable assessment of students, it has also been as rich in the assessment of its programs. this has been achieved through a well considered construction of course prerequisites. if a student has not mastered certain material, he will find it very difficult to grasp what comes next... this has always provided a very accurate extra and external assessment of how well a teacher has taught in a previous course. if he consistently fails to teach material in an earlier course in such a way that his students really learn that material, then that deficit becomes painfully apparent in the next course in the sequence, or even when that understanding is crucial to learning material presented later in the same course. further, it becomes apparent that students may find certain material difficult to master precisely because something has not been included earlier, and this assessment causes the program to be reconfigured. in other words, the traditional mathematics program, carefully constructed so that, at any time, the student should have the necessary skills to master new mathematics, has been carefully constructed to be self assessing. no system is perfect, and, at the college level, this system, perhaps, has the drawback that that it has not been adequately “sold” to colleagues from other disciplines. advisors recommend that their advisees take mathematics courses for which they quite apparently do not have the prerequisite background knowledge. the programmatical assessment that we are led to is to be found somewhere along the continuum between the two explanations that either mathematics faculty have not adequately educated their colleagues about the fineness of the tuning of the mathematics program, or that colleagues do not care to be so educated. the courses are seen as checkboxes to be filled, not as rich with material needed to enable later learning. ironically, an education system that is heavily dependent on testing, on assessment, has trained our students to have something of a similar attitude. because there is such a focus on doing well on the assessment, some students learn material in a “load and dump” fashion, committing material to short term memory rather than long term understanding. on one level, assessment trains the students to disregard that the material in today’s class is part of a program of learning leading to even deeper knowledge and understanding later on. of course, we have assessment tools to diagnose this situation. what then should our prescription be? to frequently test to make sure that students retain earlier skills, knowledge and understanding? to some degree we could do this and do, but this tactic makes mathematics even more onerous than many students already find it. more troubling, it reinforces the false notion that mathematics consists of a collection of facts and formulae to be remembered rather than understood. a more constructive tactic, incorporating assessment into the learning itself, is to make sure that students frequently use earlier material, actively building on that foundation to acquire more skill and understanding. we invite the student, herself, to assess the contention that earlier material is needed now, and to infer that current material will be useful later in the sequence. this we try to do, but it leads to a pedagogical paradox. in mathematics, perhaps more than in any other educational endeavor, a student gets the notion, is actively, deliberately given the notion, that each new piece of learning is part of a greater whole. it depends on earlier learning and it will be foundational to later learning. mathematics is going somewhere. where? the answer is that, for the vast majority of students, the mathematics program they are in is leading to calculus. this is a carefully constructed, assessment-driven model of an educational program constructed long before the term “assessment” was being used in its current meaning and intensity. mathematics leads to calculus. but the majority of students never take calculus. mathematics is used in other subjects. but the majority of the mathematics a student learns she will never use. a student is trained to perceive that mathematics is applicable to something and is moving somewhere. is it really surprising, then, if she never gets to the destination analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 42 and rarely gets to use the material, that she thinks of the subject as pointless and useless? notice that in other subjects, the claims of destination and applicability are made far less frequently, either explicitly or implicitly, and so the student has less need to assess the subject by those standards. a student in a western civilization class, for example, rarely wonders when she will need to use the fact that the great plague was spread by fleas on rats, and if she does, it is because her whole perception of education is a utilitarian one. i do not mean to belittle any subject outside of my own; i merely mean to point out that history, for example, in the perception of many students, can be taken on its own merits. of course, history is applicable outside of the classroom, but it need not be in order to be seen as worthwhile. mathematics is sold as useful, and so it is seen as useless. mathematics is sold as having a direction, and so it is seen as pointless. i should point out that this is not a paradox unique to mathematics; in exactly the same way, certain aspects of the english curriculum in american colleges are included for purely utilitarian reasons. i am thinking, in particular, about courses that train a student to write in various contexts and in various styles appropriate to those contexts. perhaps, precisely because the average student is taught to see english as useful, she wonders what the use is of studying a play or a poem or a short story. there has always been a tension in mathematics between the pulls of “pure mathematics” and “applied mathematics”, just has there has been tension in the english curriculum between the pulls of “language” (by which i mean “composition” rather than “linguistics”) and “literature”. there is just such a tension in the academy between utilitarian training and an education that, while it may well go deeper and broader than simple training, has an immediate usefulness that may be harder to assess, and so the education is proportionately harder to justify. the paradox is that, in mathematics at least, and i suspect the same to be true of english, it is so often the case that that which is ultimately found to be the most useful, the most important, having the most impact, comes from purely non-utilitarian study, that which, on its face, has no immediate usefulness whatsoever. i have said that mathematics has always been assessment rich in some regards, although, admittedly and lamentably, not every teacher of the subject has availed himself of the assessment tools that have been to hand. however, and this cannot be stressed enough, “assessment” is prone to dangerous equivocation. that one justifies and applauds assessment in one context should not be construed as justification and approbation in another. the ultimate problem of a “culture of assessment” is one of not being critical about what assessment is good, what is meaningless, what is a waste of time and what is downright destructive. a “culture of assessment”, moreover, a priori, admits of little that cannot be assessed. this is of fundamental concern to a teacher of mathematics; i do not care so much, for example, that my student can solve a quadratic equation using the quadratic formula, which is measurable and hence assessable; i care more that she understands what she is doing, which is, at least immediately, only vaguely measurable and so the assessment (at least vis a vis the culture) is undeniably suspect. if she does understand, of course, she will be able to perform, which, again, is assessable. further, contrapositively, i can assess whether she does not understand by her inability to perform. but it is an obvious mistake to assume the converse, that i can assess her understanding by her performance. nevertheless, it is her understanding, the higher echelons of bloom’s taxonomy, that i am ultimately concerned with. many teachers will assert that they “just know” whether a student understands or not, to which an acolyte of assessment may justifiably ask “how do you know that you know?” such existential questions easily leave us mise en abyme; how do we know that any assessment of her understanding or of our knowledge of her understanding is valid? how do we assess the assessment? where do we place our axiomatic foundation? is it any more justified to assume that an assessment of the recognition of understanding is valid than the simple claim that one recognises understanding when one sees it? i would make the claim, in this instance, that while i never truly know whether my student understands, my experience tells me when i can be fairly certain. moreover, the very inbuilt assessment structure of mathematics allows me even more certainty when, later in the course of her study, she is able to apply what she has learned earlier to novel situations. it is not assessment, then, as such, that this mathematics teacher objects to, but rather particular assessment constraints, embodied in the culture of assessment. in particular, if we are to be concerned with the assessment analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 43 of outcomes, we should, too, be concerned with the outcomes of assessment, the negative as well as the positive. how many programs around the country are, at this very moment, either already restructured or in the process of being restructured, not in order that they better serve the students or the discipline, but largely or even solely that they may be better assessed? or, to be more accurate, that they be better seen to be assessed. when this happens, we are being neither student nor subject-centered. it is not hyperbolic to assert that this is an outcome of assessment that we need to be excruciatingly aware of. earlier, using the metaphor of the triangle, i made the claim that i was comfortable with a structure having multiple centers. a program restructured so that it may be better assessed becomes assessment-centered. at this point i find it hard to extend the metaphor inasmuch as the incenter and circumcenter of a triangle are both independent of the orthocenter. all three are dependent on the structure of the triangle rather than each other. making a program assessment-centered, on the other hand, manifestly restructures that program and a fortiori changes both its student-centeredness and its disciplinecenteredness. it is not apparent to me that this change must be for the good or for the ill, but it is a change that is inherent and hence needs must be negotiated. meta-assessment, assessing the culture of assessment, needs to start with an analysis of the assessment model currently in force in higher education. very loosely speaking, an institution houses schools, which house departments and programs. the college has a carefully composed mission statement as do the schools, although their mission statements need to be aligned with that of the college. the departments and programs have mission statements that need to align with that of the school in which they are housed, and finally, the departments have student learning outcomes, aims and objectives, that need to align with the mission statement of the department or program in as much as alignment is even relevant. it is the responsibility of the institution to assess to what degree it lives up to each of these mission statements and achieves the aims, objectives and desired outcomes. there is then the process of closing the loop, whereby practices are modified or maintained depending on the assessment data or else the assessment questions are changed in order that success can be claimed. from the point of view of the mathematics teacher, here is another instance of center shifting. in the past, i was concerned with, for example, whether a student was able to use implicit differentiation to find the rate at which two objects were coming towards each other; now i need to address whether that problem aligns with my school’s mission statement. in so much as i do need to justify my syllabus within the mission statement framework, this last statement is not completely hyperbolic. the evolution of the mission statement is relatively simple. there was a time when colleges had no such thing, although they often had a college motto, often in latin, something along the lines of “from learning to the light” or “quantus est canis in fenestra”. at some point a simple declaration of what the college believed itself to be and what it held dear was made. this statement was invariably, to greater or lesser degree, concerned with what might be termed “marketing”. i do not, by this, mean to suggest that anything so crass as madison avenue style marketing was taking place, at least not at this point in history, simply that schools recognised something of a need to declare – to advertise – to prospective students what it was that they were offering. was it a liberal arts education? was it career training? but, inevitably, with the rise of an administrative class in higher education, each institution realised that it was in competition with other similar institutions, and that this was commercial competition, not just competition on the sports field. at this point, saint webster’s college needed to have a unique mission statement in order to distinguish it from mount mckinley academy. a college found it needed to have a brand, and, one could not, as happened in the 1920’s, declare “guinness is good for you”, unless there was evidence to back the claim. there needs to be truth in advertising. we need to assess the claims we make. notice that we begin to see something from the modern business world creeping into the academy; packaging and advertising begin to take on an importance that rivals that of the actual product. another profound shift in center has thus taken place. education was a vocation, a profession. we used rubrics. we declared mission statements. we saw what we did as a service. all of these statements have deeply religious connotations. increasingly, we are abandoning our old service model of education and replacing it with a business model. we are less and less colleagues and more and more human resources. considering the history of the academy, it is no surprise that we traditionally used religious language. what is more worthy of comment is analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 44 that in the new paradigm we continue our religiosity. we continue our talk of service and mission. we follow rubrics. there is good reason to suspect that this is more than mere habit. as an example of the new religiosity, there is a spectrum of attitudes to be seen among faculty members about the culture of assessment. some, it must be admitted, have serious qualms about the enterprise, although they whisper them only in private; others are convinced of its benefits; still others adopt patience or resignation. all, in public, except for the most entrenched, tenured curmudgeon, recite the new credo, extolling the new culture of assessment. the emperor may or may not be naked; he is still the emperor. institutions of higher learning have been told, in no uncertain terms, that their accreditation depends on their embracing the culture of assessment. in my native england, in the sixteenth century, similar declarations of loyalty to the new church of england were demanded. that this mandate comes, quite apparently, from outside the academy, gives a further instance of recentering. but why should accrediting agencies be so concerned to impose on colleges models of quality control that seem to be taken from business? accrediting agencies answer to federal government, which was, at the time that demands of assessment began to be made, during the nineteen eighties and then the first years of the third millennium, of a business mindset, of a mindset that genuinely believed that there was no problem that could not be solved by free market forces. of course there is danger of equivocation here. a business model, particularly a bureaucratic business model, is not necessarily a free-market model any more than democracy is necessarily capitalism. nevertheless, at about the same time as the public school system was given the assessment constraints of no child left behind, private institutions of higher education were expected to adopt a culture of assessment. looking at higher education through such a business lens, we should ask what the problem was that needed the curative of the free market. what was defective in the product that demanded systematic quality control, which is no more or less than what assessment is in this context? a cynical response might be that business leaders expected the education system to do all the training needed to produce an effective and efficient workforce, and saw no justification in (their) tax dollars being spent on an education where they saw little return on the investment. if they were going to make the investment, they wanted some say in the product. this is consistent with a model of education as a corporation that has major shareholders. even more cynically, one might suppose that those same leaders saw, in higher education, a way for them to be relieved of any costs of training their workforce. there are certainly those who see assessment as part of a systematic attack on the academy, an attack that also includes the kind of politics wherein a candidate is seen as unsuitable because she is “too intellectual”. perhaps, though, these cynical views are as uncharitable as they are paranoid. i think that the governmental demands on the accrediting agencies come from a genuine belief in the power of the free market, in the ultimate good flowing from business, and in the nature of the free market, in, to put it in religious terms, a reverence, if not outright worship, of mammon. admitting that, on its face, this seems an outrageous supposition, what are its implications? would we not expect to witness numerous doctrinal disputes and the imposition of religious edicts by those in power? this is exactly what we do see. consider the objection that what is learned in a traditional liberal arts education has nothing to do with the “real world”, and, indeed, that the average academic knows nothing about the “real world”, living, as she does, in her “ivory tower”. the mathematics teacher, for example, needs to justify everything in the mathematics curriculum as real, meaning immediately useful. however, the “ivory tower” is an absolute myth, and hence borders on the religious; the average academic goes to work every day, just like the average business woman or factory worker. she earns her pay and pays her taxes. she pays down her mortgage and feeds her family. she does what she can to save for her retirement. precisely what aspect of her life is any less real than anyone else’s? the only possible answer is that it is the goods she produces. in this sense, the teacher of poetry also stands accused of trading in the unreal. questions about what is and what is not real are ultimately questions of philosophy and religion. one could suggest that buying and selling shares in “futures”, a normal part of the new business model, is trading in the imagined, the imaginary, rather than in the real, and, indeed, it is just such trading in the imaginary that invariably ends in some financial bubble being burst, most analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 45 recently in the burst of the housing bubble, which very nearly brought about the collapse of the whole western economy. i raise this point because it illustrates that, sometimes, there are facets of the current economic model that were designed in and for that model, that are perilous to the model itself. would we not be wise, then, to scrutinize any aspect of that model we adopt for use in a structure – the education system – for which it was not designed? education , viewed through a business lens, requires business rules, which is what we see with the culture of assessment. a business model applied to what has long been regarded as a service or a vocation, a profession with its own norms and established, functioning traditions, implies a profound recentering. in the past, we assessed what was going on because we cared deeply about our disciplines and our students. on the other hand, if we are a business, concerned with products and profits, then we need to be seen to have quality control so that no one gets cheated. we still view what we do as vocation, as service, as profession. it is the religious belief that everything is part of the market that does not allow for any other vision than its own. religions are concerned with what outsiders may not believe exists, and another aspect of the business model that is a clear example of trading in the non-existent is to be found in the current outcrop of indictments against perpetrators of pyramid schemes. modern investors in such schemes have the historical example of such charlatans as charles ponzi to act as warning. consequently, they are less likely to be gulled by a simple promise of a return on an unexamined investment. they require evidence that they are investing in something. the modern ponzi has to create dummy stocks and shares, signifying investment in that which does not really exist. he does not need to offer real investments, but he does have to be seen to be offering real investments, whether they exist or not. there is a frightening parallel in higher education. what is becoming paramount is not that an educator assesses, but that she be seen to assess. as in the situation we considered earlier of mission statements, we find that the packaging and advertising begins to rival the product. indeed, from the very outset, the investors here demanded packaging and advertising over product. as i suggested earlier, programs in mathematics have always been rich in assessment events. the assessor was, moreover, afforded exquisitely detailed assessment. when, however, accrediting agencies started to demand that we assessed -which we had always done -they needed to be shown that we were assessing. these agents were not mathematicians, and so had no understanding of our myriad real aims and objectives; nor had they any way to gauge whether we lived up to our promises. we were told to whittle down our student learning outcomes to between five and ten to “minimize the work we had to do”. in reality, all that was minimized was the amount of checking the accreditor had to do. we continue to assess what we have always assessed, because it is imperative to our students and our discipline that we do so. we assess whether or not a calculus student has mastered integration by parts, for example, but we have also composed a handful of student learning outcomes that are so broad and vague as to be worthless to us. these are dummy stocks, graven images, that serve as evidence that we are assessing. indeed, we assess them by means of rubrics, which, although they give us little in the way of usable data, are discernable from outside the discipline. they are evidence that the accrediting agent, as investor, can use to see that the investment of accreditation has some chance of a return. we are seen to assess. this is in direct opposition to what we are told are “best practices” in assessment. educators are told that they need to “own” the assessment, to develop assessments that are meaningful to them and their programs, not to the accrediting agencies. this is what mathematics educators have always done. the instruction to assess in a meaningful way and to use the assessment, and yet to do things differently from what we have done in the past is oxymoronic. this leaves a program vulnerable to cheapening. what does it matter whether a student is able to prove the heine-borel theorem if she already knows how to prove the cayley-hamilton theorem? they both address the learning outcome of being able to reason deductively. the fact that they address completely different mathematical situations is completely irrelevant to the assessment scheme. accrediting agencies are, then, vulnerable to academic ponzi schemes, investment in programs that, while they have little disciplinary merit, have impressive assessment credentials. no educator who is either disciplineanalytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 46 centered or student-centered would willingly perpetrate such a scheme, but we would be naïve indeed, to expect that pressure to act in this way, would not be brought to bear on the educator by market forces in today’s business model of education, a model that holds that a college is at least as much a business as it is a service, a business where the share holders demand a concrete return on their investment. is it not a tenet of modern business that income should be maximized at the same time as outlay is minimized? if it is true that the culture of assessment represents a business model of quality control imposed on the academy and, indeed, that the academy is moving further from its traditional service model to a modern business one, we might expect certain symptoms to be apparent. imagine two businesses, founded in the later eighteen or early nineteen hundreds, to manufacture bicycles. both were founded by entrepreneurs to provide a service that the community needed. if the product was not of good quality and affordable, then the company went out of business. over the years, the companies saw new business opportunities and diversified their products. this happened, of course in higher education also; institutions that were founded as normal colleges or seminaries are now “liberal arts” institutions. now, at the beginning of the twenty first century, the bicycle makers who founded the companies are long dead. one company is still family owned and still tries to produce the kind of quality product that great grandfather wilbur would be proud to put his name to. their bikes have continued to evolve and exploit new materials, new designs, but are undeniably exceptional quality machines. wilbur’s spirit lives on in the product. the other company has been acquired by shareholders who are interested in the company not because it makes bicycles but because it makes a profit. great grandfather orville lives on only in company commercials, as a young, brilliantined mechanic with striped, collarless shirt and canvas apron. the only skills that are respected in orville’s company are business and marketing skills. for devotees of mammon, these are the only real skills. the actual manufacture is by unskilled labor and automatic machinery. indeed, the more automated the process becomes, the more interchangeable the workers are, and the less respect is warranted for any skills they may have learned throughout their careers. in years past, a welder had a very different skill set from that of a die caster and each assessed his or her work differently because it was different. these days quality control is less heterogeneous, mirroring the nature of the work. this is mirrored in the homogeneity of assessment expectations in the new culture, as it is mirrored at institutions where, more and more frequently, the administration expects faculty members to teach classes in which they have no expertise, training or experience. most children today ride an orville bike. they are cheap, readily available at big box stores, of consistent quality and, ultimately, throw-away items. each of these product attributes is to be found in modern higher education, but it is the consistency of quality that most interests us at the moment. consistency of quality tends to mean consistency of acceptable quality rather than exceptional quality. at wilbur’s company, on the other hand, the quality control is inherent in the work at every step of the way. there is no need to formally assess the work, because the workers are proud of the product, and their skills are respected by the company. they are colleagues, not human resources. it is this form of quality control, the continual, self-regulating and largely habitual kind, that leads to an excellent end product. surely, this is what accrediting agencies have in mind when they speak of a culture of assessment. but any external imposition of quality control makes the habitual forced and the self-regulation oxymoronic. quality control, imposed externally, may well produce acceptable standards, but it militates against the exceptional. on the other hand, self-regulation in business, where the business is driven by profit motives alone, often leads to exploitation of the system, even if the self-regulation is of governmentally imposed standards. might we not expect higher education, if run on a business model, to begin to exhibit more and more exploitation of self regulation? in as much as the american education system has not been producing an exceptional quality product, perhaps some form of quality control is necessary. mathematics teaching stands accused here. american mathematical skills, in the general population, seem to be lagging seriously behind those of much of the rest of the world. there are, of course, different ways to understand the data that lead us to this conclusion, and one can easily find people who will argue that math skills are no worse in america than they are anywhere else. let us, however, for the sake of argument, assume that the state of the nation’s math skills is as bad as we are led to beanalytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 47 lieve. the pertinent question is whether or not the culture of assessment in higher education will do anything to mitigate the situation. as i have said, teachers of mathematics have always assessed. we just did not use the term. indeed, i cannot remember a time when we did not try to use our assessments to improve our teaching. to use another neologism, we have always attempted to “close the loop”. if we have gone through the process and yet we still stand accused of not doing our jobs well enough, perhaps this exposes the argument for curative assessment as an enthymeme that warrants rather deeper analysis than is, at present allowed. mitigation is certainly called for. i believe that we can teach better. but the culture of assessment, by its nature, by moving the focus away from students and discipline and by leaving space only for that which is assessable, it impedes that mitigation. in as much as high school graduates are arriving at college in need of remediation, this particular bicycle manufacturer is not able to work with the raw materials he once had at his disposal. i am not so arrogant as to blame high school education or the students themselves for this situation. the reasons need to be considered elsewhere. my contention, however, is that a government official who knows little about bicycles is the last person to recognise when the quality of my work is slipping, certainly the last person i need to inform me of what i already know, that i am not working with the materials i once had, and that imposition of standards from the outside only benefits orville’s company. references derrida, j (1972). structure sign and play in the discourse of the human sciences. in richard macksev and eugenio donato (eds.), the structuralist controversy (pp. 247-265). baltimore, md: johns hopkins. address coresspondence to: michael wodzak viterbo university 900 viterbo dr.la crosse, wi 54601 mawodzak@viterbo.edu analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 editor’s notes welcome to volume 32 of analytic teaching and philosophical praxis. two of the goals of the journal continue to be the exploration of underlying philosophical themes in higher education, as well as the analysis of central issues in philosophy for children. both of these themes are explored in the current volume, with issue one dedicated to some of the conceptual difficulties involved with teaching international topics in higher education, while issue two looks at some longstanding challenges in the implementation of philosophy for children. the articles published in issue one discuss a variety of different themes largely related to the challenge of teaching a culturally homogenous student body about international topics, of which these students (and perhaps even faculty) will have little firsthand knowledge or experience. the articles by sheryl ross, bert kreitlow and maribel bird take on this problem directly, while others (diana sorensen, michael paton, maría navarro, jesús jambrina, and andrew hamilton) explore in different ways the larger implications of globalization, political change, and in some cases even technological innovation, on western views of education and history. issue two opens up with a joint article by eva marsal and takara dobashi that contrasts different conceptions of death in japanese and german children, giving a nice illustration of an article in philosophy for children that is ‘international’ in both authorship and theme. the remaining articles (those of wendy c. turgeon, susan gardner and maría del rosario del collado) explore topics directly germane to philosophy for children and the difficulty of effectively implementing philosophy at the elementary and high school level. given the international theme of this year’s volume, it is fitting that so many of our contributors come from across the globe: mexico, spain, australia, canada, germany, and japan. taken together, this double issue explores a number of crucial problems at the intersection of education and globalization that are not only compelling in their practical implications, but also mobilze deep philosophical assumptions about the nature of education. happy reading. chief editor jason j. howard contributing editors patrick costello glyndŵr university, wales david kennedy montclair state university judy kyle educational consultant montreal, canada richard kyte d.b. reinhart institute for ethics in leadership, viterbo university richard morehouse, emeritus viterbo university felix garcía moriyón center for philosophy for children madrid, spain joe oyler iapc, montclair state university michel sasseville laval university, quebec david smith university of lethbridge, canada susan wilks university of melbourne, australia michael wodzak viterbo university layout design assistants genevieve donohue and kabau vue publisher viterbo university la crosse, wisconsin 54601 copyright 2005 analytic teaching and philosophical praxus is usually published once a year. issn 0890-5118 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 1 learning assessment: hyperbolic doubts versus deflated critiques andrew n. carpenter & craig bach abstract: arguments against outcomes assessment often provide powerful portrayals of assessment as anathema to quality teaching and learning in higher education. however, we two philosophers, with extensive experience designing, implementing, and managing outcomes assessment, find these arguments to be less than convincing. in this paper, we present a philosophical analysis of some of these arguments with the goal of unpacking their exact strengths and weaknesses. in doing so, we are more interested in discussing these arguments in the context of assessment (or conceptions of assessment) well done and well managed rather than reading these arguments as attacks on poorly implemented versions of assessment. in short, we aim to get at the realistic possibilities of using assessment as a tool for improving instruction, curricula, and student learning. we also advocate scholarship of teaching and learning that aims to improve theories of learning assessment and to develop new models and methods of assessment. introduction arguments against learning outcomes assessment are too frequently framed in hyperbolic and overly emo-tional terms: “outcomes-assessment practices in higher education are grotesque, unintentional parodies of both social science and ‘accountability’” (fendrich, 2007); assessment is the death of the humanities at the hands of the social sciences; assessment is a direct, offensive attack on the authority of the faculty and academic freedom1. these and similar published, sometimes whispered, arguments against learning outcomes assessment portray the practice as an external, overly bureaucratic and compliance-focused process that has little or no regard for the academic disciplines, the faculty who practice within them, and their students’ true learning needs. the authors of this article—two philosophers with extensive experience designing, implementing, and managing learning outcomes assessment—find these arguments to be less than convincing as attacks on the enterprise of learning assessment. indeed, the authors have found that most of these arguments contain important insights that inform new and more nuanced approaches to learning assessment. the sustained resistance to learning outcomes assessment seems to have three main sources. first, and most importantly, is the focus on assessment as a compliance and accountability issue with little or no recognition of its possible benefits. for example, while the current american philosophical association’s statement on learning assessment is an improvement over the defensive posturing contained in the previous version, it still focuses on accountability and basic definitions, omitting discussion of the transformative possibilities of doing assessment (apa, 2008). second, implementing learning assessment drives a shift in cultures. understanding whether, and how well, our students are learning both in courses and across their programs of study often requires changes in how we teach our courses and how we collaborate with our colleagues. both involve longand strongly-held, often implicit, beliefs about the role and responsibilities of the faculty. third, almost all of the regional accreditors develop the conversation on assessment in terms of building a culture of assessment, as if doing assessment were an end in itself. of course, it is not. building a culture of effective learning (if one wants to speak in terms of culture building) is most likely a more accurate statement of the end goal of learning assessment. the focus on mechanism and method, instead of the goal of learning, places assessment outside the broader context of all the efforts we already undertake to support improvements in teaching, learning and curricula. the analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 2 conceptual isolation of assessment is inappropriate and damaging, and not dissimilar from asking the field of astronomy to set as its main goal the development of a culture of telescopes (mceachron & bach, 2010). the shift of focus, perhaps small, has a distinct influence on how learning assessment is presented and leads to many of the current problems found in its implementation2. reinforcing the impact of these sources of resistance is the fact that persons identified to lead institutional assessment efforts are often hired in the midst of a looming accreditation visit and respond by managing the assessment effort as a compliance exercise. it is not surprising that learning assessment has not been broadly and energetically embraced. at the heart of the push to better articulate and evaluate student learning is a seemingly simple value proposition: institutions should be able to demonstrate the value of the investments made in them. here there is nothing specifically about learning assessment – value can be expanded in terms of better job prospects, contribution to the economy, or improving social cohesion. learning assessment enters the conversation when the claim is further articulated by the addition that institutions should be able to demonstrate their value in terms of their core purpose. in the case of colleges and universities that core purpose is learning. on the face of it, neither of these propositions are unexpected or untoward. the former pushes us to communicate the value of an education and the latter to do so in more discrete terms related to the breadth and depth of learning within a curriculum. the problems arise in the specific manner in which the propositions are interpreted and the ways institutions decide to address them. the shift in culture coincident with learning assessment does not impact all departments or institutions evenly. departmental and institutional differences regarding disciplinary autonomy and authority, academic freedom, and faculty autonomy and satisfaction, as well as differences in mission, play key roles in the perceived threat and encumbrances of implementing learning assessment. some of these threats are real, but they are not threats from learning assessment, rather they are threats from learning assessment implemented without appropriate respect for disciplinary and methodological differences across areas of study. in fact, even in the most silo-structured departments (should any exist) where faculty would not think to discuss their teaching with other faculty members, where sections of the same course are incommensurable, and where all courses are independent of, and not intentionally connected to, a programmatic vision, a robust learning assessment model that meets accountability goals and informs departmental members in meaningful ways about student learning could still be implemented. additionally, the authors have found that the discussions that are part of implementing learning assessment are often a catalyst for re-evaluating and better articulating a range of assumptions about how departments work, the responsibility of faculty to their students, the level of expected collaboration among faculty, and the roles and responsibilities of students. in this paper, we identify six key arguments that either directly attack outcomes assessment or attempt to marginalize its role in higher education. for each argument, the authors present its full exaggerated and impassioned form and then pull out its core elements to reconstruct the argument into a moderated form. we then analyze the reconstructed argument with the goal of unpacking their strengths and weaknesses. we argue that these emotionally-deflated critiques, while offering significant and meaningful responses, pose no decisive objections to the enterprise of assessment but rather provide useful insights and criticisms that can inspire and inform the development of effective, faculty-driven assessment. in moving the conversation forward, we are more interested in discussing these arguments in the context of assessment (or conceptions of assessment) well done and well managed rather than reading these arguments as attacks on poorly implemented versions of assessment. the authors are not interested in being boosters for learning assessment in a war of rhetoric. we aim to get at the realistic possibilities of rational, thoughtful work on learning assessment to improve instruction, curricula, and student learning —and most especially in our home discipline of philosophy and in other disciplines that may not be well-served by existing assessment practices. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 3 six fundamental critiques of academic assessment below we address six arguments that present significant and fundamental critiques of academic assessment. our analysis of these arguments rests on two assumptions: 1) assessing the strengths and weaknesses of these critiques provides conceptual resources that can improve the theory and practice of academic assessment and 2) exaggerated, hyperbolic presentations of the critiques block constructive dialogue and so retard the development of effective assessment of student learning. it is our aim, therefore, to inspire our readers to reject hyperbolic forms of these critiques in favor of more moderate variants about which both opponents and proponents of current assessment practices can engage in constructive dialogue. we are confident that such dialogue would lead to significant improvements in the theory and practice of learning assessment. the nature of higher education argument the first argument we consider maintains that learning assessment is a misguided venture that misunderstands the nature of student learning. according to this objection, there exist vital aspects of higher education that either are not captured by assessment efforts or, worse, are disrupted or otherwise harmed by those efforts. for example, perhaps assessment is incompatible with the holistic nature of a college education: student learning is not reducible to discrete bits of knowledge of the sort that assessment methods seek to measure. or, it may be the case that assessment practices undermine the mentor/protégé relationship that is important in some higher education classrooms. finally, and perhaps most powerfully, the project of academic assessment flies in the face of the vital facts that, first, higher education is an ongoing process that extends from one classroom to another throughout students’ academic careers and, second, that much of the benefit and value of higher education is revealed years after graduation and so in principle is immeasurable while students are enrolled. in its strongest form, this objection seeks to demonstrate not only that assessment practices do not measure what is important about student learning, but that they systematically devalue important pedagogical techniques and learning activities and thus may serve to delegitimize and undermine the use of some of the most important aspects of teaching and learning. if this line of thought is correct, then there exists a good reason for educators actively to resist assessment. a weaker variant of this argument maintains that attempts to assess learning will inevitably fail to capture the most important aspects of students’ college education. both versions assume—rightly, we think—that much of what matters the most about education does not occur until years after graduation, that the most important forms of learning cannot be reduced to discrete knowledge bits, that the most significant learning often involves close, personal, and unique relationships between students and faculty, and that the deepest and most important way to view learning within higher education is as an ongoing process of education rather than a series of specific destinations corresponding to each class, term, or academic year. we submit that these points present significant challenges to meaningful learning assessment and we acknowledge that there exist some types of learning that are difficult, perhaps in some cases impractical or even impossible, to assess. yet we need not make a strong impossibility claim about some types of learning to move this argument forward. we can merely recognize that any system of assessment leaves things out whether by necessity, intention, or accident —one cannot capture all learning that occurs in a class or program. this conclusion, however, does not justify abandoning attempts to assess learning that can be measured well. in fact, the conclusion points to the importance of clearly distinguishing the kinds of learning that can be meaningfully and efficiently measured from other, perhaps more important areas, that are not readily amenable to assessment. this effort has two benefits: 1) it creates a space for faculty to work together to define what learning is important, what learning can be assessed with available methods, and what learning cannot be assessed (e.g., too resource intensive, difficult, impractical), and 2) it helps faculty to develop a learning narrative that ensures that efforts to assess the learning that can be measured will neither delegitimize learning that cannot be measured nor undermine educators’ attempts to help their students to secure that learning. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 4 with respect to understanding exactly which learning is assessable, we see two reasons for optimism about the prospect of educators developing sophisticated methods to measure learning in some of what now appear to be “hard cases.” first, we note that assessment need not always be in the aggregate: measures of student learning can attempt to capture unique uses (student-faculty interaction) and learning across courses and years (programlevel assessment). second, we also note that it is possible to measure some “down the road” learning: these assessments are not impossible to conduct, merely difficult because it is hard to secure good access to students 5, 10, or 20 years after they have completed their studies in order to understand what learning remains important over those intervals. there is another way to approach the nature of higher education argument. through the very acts of conducting discussions about which student learning is easily measured and which important learning is impractical or perhaps impossible to measure; by articulating clearly the various types of learning that is expected of their students in specific classes, across programs, and past graduation; by discussing what learning is most meaningful to their students, faculty engage in an important aspect of learning assessment that takes seriously the lessons to be learned by the moderated nature of higher education criticism. if these educators further determine what information would count as evidence of student achievement of any learning priorities that currently seem difficult or impossible to assess, and discuss possible ways of gathering that information and determining how well students have achieved those priorities, then they are engaged in work that advances assessment practices in ways that respect the pluralistic conception of the types of significant learning that we believe constitutes an important lesson to be drawn from the moderated critique. finally, if faculty members articulate those areas of student learning that cannot be assessed, then it follows that conversations can occur about what learning of these areas might look like and how the assessable areas of student learning relate to them. these discussions can then support a coherent learning narrative that integrates assessed activities and collected evidence with other areas of importance to the faculty – creation of this collaboratively-developed learning narrative is an example of very good and very sophisticated learning assessment. if the optimism we express above is correct—that some significant learning that cannot be measured by current assessment practices will become measurable as higher education faculty develop new assessment methods—it follows that the educators designing assessment processes, first, need to ascertain exactly which types of learning can adequately be measured using existing methods and, second, need to explore creatively and thoughtfully new methods of assessing the important areas of student learning that cannot be measured using currently available methods. perhaps most importantly, those responsible for planning and conducting assessment need to become proactively engaged in creating productive scholarly conversations about these issues and need to publicize their investigations in ways that prevent external agencies from mandating reporting that devalues learning that is not easily measured or that cannot be measured at all. social scientism the next objection we consider focuses on the limitations of a methodology that some critics assume assessment typically or even necessarily adopts. according to this objection, the practice of academic assessment is mired in assumptions and methods of social science that are inadequate for measuring student learning. the most direct and emotionally laden presentation of this argument is the remark noted at the beginning of this essay, “assessment is the death of the humanities at the hands of social science.” this sentiment is further, but no less emotionally, articulated by fendlich (2007): “what’s currently practiced as outcomes assessment may have a place in the fields of mathematics and the hard sciences (emphasis on the word may), it’s a destructive blunderbuss when applied to the arts and humanities.” in its strongest form, this objection first maintains that the impact and value of one’s own work as an educator can only be properly understood by methods of inquiry located within that discipline and then rejects the idea of trans-disciplinary methods of assessment. typically, this critique takes the form of an argument against a form of social scientism that is unable to comprehend the most important and distinctive elements of discianalytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 5 plinary teaching; those elements, these critics urge, cannot be understood by generic social science assessment methodologies. a weaker version of this argument maintains that those assessment methodologies can measure some important aspects of learning, but cannot address the disciplinary core of what those outside of the social sciences do as educators. if either of these objections is true, then measurement of learning based on social science methodologies is so limited that it would be harmful to make important decisions about education and learning on the basis of those assessments. this argument, for example, underlies andrew davis’s (1988) skepticism about “making judgments about rich cognitive achievement on the basis of limited samples of behavior” (p. 61) —the substantive heart of the critique is that, for many disciplines at least, the data gathered and analyzed through the methodologies of social science is unable to support meaningful conclusions about the forms of student learning about which faculty in many disciplines care the very most. we agree that the objects of knowledge of the social sciences are very different from the things that members of other disciplines would want to understand about the learning that occurs in their classes; this is the case, for example, in our own academic discipline of philosophy. from this, it follows that using methods of inquiry designed around the objects of knowledge studied in the social sciences are unlikely to tell us everything we want to know about learning in our philosophy courses and programs. however, we also maintain 1) that there are some important aspects of learning in our discipline that are well-captured by the methods of social science, and 2) that assessment of learning need not be based solely on social science methods and educators are free to use or reject the research methodologies of social science as they develop discipline-appropriate assessment methods. the arguments to support the first point are overwhelming and frequent and we won’t spend time on them.3 however, the second point gets very little, if any, sustained attention in the literature. during our work on assessment across disciplines, we have developed a working hypothesis related to the social scientism argument that provides a framework for our second response to the argument. the hypothesis goes something like the following: while there are aspects of student learning that are amenable to assessment using common methodologies (including social science methods), for each discipline methods of learning assessment can be developed that are aligned to how these disciplines investigate and engage the world. for example, good models of assessment have been developed in engineering departments that bring key engineering concepts (e.g., process improvement, controls, systems analysis) to bear on developing meaningful learning assessment. moreover, these discipline-based approaches can find meaningful use in other contexts, including the development of new, cross-disciplinary assessment models and methods. consider the case of the authors’ home discipline, philosophy. philosophers too need to develop and integrate assessment methods that meet their needs as educators and that are appropriate for the learning for which they hope their students to secure. but this effort is not just about defining appropriate methods for our own discipline: the methods of philosophy can contribute to many aspects of learning assessment, including the refinement of assessment theories and the development of new assessment practices. the following two examples will illustrate the point: learning outcomes a foundational activity of learning assessment is the development of learning outcomes. the outcomes are usually developed within a larger hierarchy of outcomes and may use a range of theoretical frameworks (e.g., general-specific, course-to-program-to-institution, bloom’s taxonomy, maslow’s needs hierarchy, kolb’s learning cycle) or categorical structures (e.g., gardner’s multiple intelligences, perry’s categories of knowing) to organize them. these are common practices; however, there are many areas of imprecision that regularly occur in these structures that impact their validity. as bach and carpenter point out (2006), “there are inconsistencies within many implementations concerning how program/course/lesson outcomes are defined: what are the appropriate levels of generality in which to express them? how do we identify when one outcome falls under another outcome of greater generality? to address both these concerns, we would expect to see a set of criteria, definitions, and necessary and sufficient conditions to refine and delineate the concepts and relationships at issue.” the fact analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 6 is one rarely sees this level of rigor. an appropriate philosophical (e.g., conceptual) analysis in addressing these questions would add a great deal to the literature and current practice. learning goal development one method of developing a set of learning goals for a program is through a process of a faculty-led, conceptual analysis of current and historical syllabi, assignments and student work as primary texts. the process focuses on what faculty and students are actually doing in their classrooms and can make use of the methodology of philosophical conceptual analysis. this conceptual analysis would be intended to identify the range of learning occurring in a program, ways of supporting student success (e.g., assignment, instructional support), methods of evaluating student work and prioritizing the learning that is evidenced in the documents in ways that extend the rigorous analysis of concepts related to learning outcomes discussed in the preceding paragraph. this extended conceptual analysis would thus use a philosophical methodology to facilitate conversations among faculty in any discipline and could serve to create the kind of scholarly community that we above identify as a hallmark of sophisticated assessment. simply put, the social scientism critique overlooks the possibilities of constructing diverse assessment methods that are appropriate to the learning that occurs in different subjects and disciplines. revisiting fendlich’s comments from the start of this section, we note that instead of proposing that she work with her colleagues to develop new assessment methods suited for their own discipline fendlich gloomily concludes that “we in higher education —especially those of us who teach fine arts, drama, dance, literature, history, religion, and philosophy —have, of course, brought this plague of pedagogical bean counters upon ourselves” (2007). we maintain that creative disciplinary and cross-disciplinary approaches to developing assessment theory and practice can go a long way towards keeping those bean counters at bay. reductionism in its strongest form, the reductionism argument maintains that assessment of student learning is an illegitimate enterprise because the external authorities who demand that assessment take place erroneously assume that assessment is to be solely equated with objective testing and that assumption embodies a problematically narrow conception of education and learning. according to this objection, the assessment enterprise seeks to reduce and redefine learning in a way that does not capture the sophisticated and rich activities that matter the most to educators and their students. a more moderate version of this objection acknowledges that there exist other methods of assessing student learning, but notes that they at best play a marginal role due to the conflict with the strong orthodoxy that maintains objective tests are the “gold standards” to which all assessment should aspire. since this argument centers on a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of learning in higher education, one can view it as an example of the first criticism we discuss above, the nature of higher education argument —and, indeed, the points we lay out above apply to the specific line of thought upon which we focus here. even so, we would like to make additional points about the anxieties common in higher education about the misuse of objective tests in learning assessment. we see three reasons to be anxious about the use of objective tests to assess student learning. first, we agree that objective testing cannot capture much of what educators do (this is certainly true of our work with our philosophy students). second, we agree that there is growing pressure from accreditors and the federal government to use standardized tests (e.g., ets proficiency profile, cla4) to measure student learning. third—and even though we believe that testing can adequately measure some aspects of student learning in any discipline—we maintain that objective testing is not a sufficient tool for capturing all learning that is important to any discipline. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 7 however, we reject the charge that the assessment enterprise is hopelessly reduced to objective testing. there exist many other methods of assessing and reporting student learning that can meet accreditation/accountability goals and provide meaningful information to educators and students. there is no reason why educators cannot develop those methods in ways that satisfy the demands of external parties. we further suggest that there is great benefit in educators doing this as a means of ensuring that policy work by the federal department of education and regional accreditors is informed by more complex and meaningful concepts of learning, theories of assessment, and assessment practices. indeed, we submit that a significant reason why we are assailed by inappropriate and reduced conceptions of assessment is that higher education has not responded creatively and with scholarly sophistication to calls for accountability consistently or sufficiently. further, this lack of innovation in response to calls for accountability is not solely about how assessment is regularly conducted (e.g., testing, portfolios, rubric-based performance assessment) – there exist significant opportunities for theorists and practitioners to build upon existing academic literature that discusses ways to respond innovatively and creatively to calls for accountability and transparency (astin, 1990; hernon & dugan, 2006; mentkowski & associates, 2000). it is also about a lack of innovation in our conceptions of institutions of higher education, academic freedom, curricular governance, faculty autonomy, the role of the learner and many other core beliefs about the enterprise of postsecondary teaching and learning. the perfectionist fallacy in its starkest form, this objection maintains that, because it is difficult or impossible to assess all learning, assessment of student learning is absurd. in its more moderate forms, this criticism maintains that the most important aspects of learning are not measurable in ways that will meet accreditation or accountability demands and so assessment is fundamentally a bankrupt enterprise. we have already expressed our agreement with the claim that many of the goals of education are difficult to measure, and we have already identified many reasons why this is so: the time frame in which this learning is demonstrated (in many cases, perhaps, extending years beyond graduation), the lack of consensus among academics about what this learning entails, the individual nature of much of this learning, the abstractness and complexity of some learning, and the growing pressure to meet accountability demands through objective tests. as we have also already discussed, each of these difficulties strikes us as tractable. first, there exist many other methods of assessment than objective testing that can meet accreditation and accountability goals. second, these methods already provide meaningful information to educators and students about significant types of student learning. third, we are optimistic that thoughtful work by educators can create new assessment models and methods that may be able to measure additional significant forms of learning. to those points we additionally submit that the two claims, 1) that no single method of assessment is perfect, and 2) that not all important learning is easy or even possible to measure, do not imply that we should give up on the enterprise of assessment; instead, they are more meaningfully interpreted as a call for practitioners and scholars to creatively identify opportunities to gain whatever meaningful information they can about student learning using methods they deem appropriate. this pragmatic approach strikes us as a useful counter-model to objections that are based on what strike us as an objectionable perfectionism. similarly objectionable is the perfectionist demand that assessment be undertaken only after all practical and theoretical problems have been solved and then only by “experts” — the development of faculty-driven assessment methods and models strikes us as a much more constructive response to the difficulty of assessing the various forms of learning that are significant to us as educators and to our students. we also note with relief that almost all of the regional accrediting bodies embrace a pragmatic rejection of perfectionism insofar as they identify the importance of efficiency, usefulness, moderation, and reasonable accurateness in their criteria of good assessment and insofar as they promote incremental implementation and measured continuous improvement of assessment practices at the institutions they accredit. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 8 the argument from authority the fifth criticism we consider maintains that academic assessment constitutes a breach of trust that disrespects academics’ professionalism. at its most extreme, this line of thought becomes an angry assertion along the lines of ‘the world should trust that i teach well, that my students learn what i say they learn, and that what i teach is good to be taught’ and then concludes—with resentment and rancor—that assessment is a pointless attack on the authority of the faculty. a less extreme version of this critique focuses on professional credentials. a more moderate—but still angry—critic might maintain ‘i have earned my authority in my area of study by my standing in the field and by my ph.d., so my expert grading of student work should be a sufficient measure of their learning and is sufficient for purposes of accountability —anything more than this constitutes a waste of my time.’ we agree that most college and university faculty are expert educators who have a strong intuitive understanding of their students’ learning. we also agree that these faculty members are uniquely positioned to understand student learning. however, we maintain that these facts demonstrate that learning assessment should place faculty at the core of the development of assessment models and methods and of the analysis and use of resulting data; far from constituting a challenge to doing systematic learning assessment, educators’ professional authority highlights the importance of faculty-centered and faculty-driven assessment efforts of the sophisticated sort that we advocate in this paper, including collaborative efforts to advance our theoretical understanding of learning assessment and to develop new assessment models and methods. with that said, and taking nothing away from the importance of faculty being at the center of assessment process, solely focusing on instructional inputs (e.g., degrees held, publications, funded research dollars) neither guarantees good outputs (e.g., student learning) nor does it provide much information about the best methods to teach specific topics, the best materials to use, or the kinds of support students need to succeed in a particular area. in order to become collectively smarter about educating students —all kinds of students of different ages, backgrounds, life experiences, motivations, or abilities —we need to first have a better grasp of what students actually learn and how well they learn it. without this information, most of our efforts to improve teaching and learning will be hit or miss exercises. to add to what we have already said about the development of learning assessment by productive scholarly communities, we maintain that faculty should lead efforts to determine the most meaningful consensus levels (e.g., fields of study, departments, cross-institutional, national) and the most meaningful kinds of learning to measure and report, and should work to develop efficient methods that are meaningful to faculty and students and meet administrative, regulatory, and social needs (noting that the latter usually fallout of the former). the pigeon hole argument the final criticism we address maintains, in its strongest form, that assessment is only about accountability and compliance and therefore is not about improved learning and teaching. fendrich (2007) offers an example of the pigeon hole argument that is striking for its rhetorical ferocity: outcomes-assessment practices in higher education are grotesque, unintentional parodies of both social science and “accountability.” no matter how much they purport to be about “standards” or student “needs,” they are in fact scams run by bloodless bureaucrats who, steeped in jargon like “mapping learning goals” and “closing the loop,” do not understand the holistic nature of a good college education... whatever their purpose, outcomes-assessment practices force-march professors to a maoist countryside where they are made to dig onions until they are exhausted, and then compelled to spend the rest of their waking hours confessing how much they’ve learned by digging onions. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 9 a more moderate variation of this criticism laments that assessment is being driven by administrators concerned about accreditation and accountability requirements and concludes from this that educators have few or no opportunities to connect learning assessment to their concerns about student learning and teaching. according to both lines of thought, assessment is a bankrupt, time-wasting, and energy-draining enterprise that claims in bad faith to exist to improve learning and teaching. it is true that most assessment efforts across higher education have been prompted by accreditation requirements, legislated reporting requirements, or ranking competitions/peer comparisons (e.g., u.s. news and world report, nasalgc’s college portrait, president’s forum transparency by design), and we also agree that this sometimes means that persons leading assessment are more connected with those concerns rather than with student learning and good teaching. so, to this extent these criticisms have merit. however, and as our prior comments about scholarly communities of faculty advancing the theory and practice of learning assessment suggest, we believe that what is correct about this line of criticism does not show that assessment is a bankrupt enterprise. to the contrary, it is clear to us that assessment can provide meaningful information about student learning and teaching that can help improve both. that external compliance issues constitute a key motivation for assessing student learning in the first place does not detract from the benefits of assessment for higher education faculty and students. in fact, looking at the argument from the other direction, most of the success the authors have had in implementing learning assessment programs at several institutions is due to a focus on what is meaningful and useful to individual faculty and the departments in which they teach. by responding to what is most important to the faculty and departments, and by developing assessment around their priorities, the odds are much higher assessment data will inform curricular, instructional and budgetary decisions. and, by “closing the loop,” responses to compliance and accountability concerns fall out as a byproduct. fendrich’s argument also points to the downside of the backwards approach promulgated by most accrediting agencies and discussed in the introduction of this paper. to revisit, the focus on building a culture of assessment (rather than focusing on effective learning) has helped create several of the most pressing problems with which the accreditors are now dealing. these include, the lack of documented use of assessment data (i.e., closing the loop) compared to the amount of effort spent on creating data collection systems, the lack of sustainability of most assessment systems away from a looming accreditation visit, and the simple observation that not many institutions are doing assessment well. in short, the overriding purpose of assessment is to support and improve teaching and learning, and we submit that focusing on that priority meets learning and teaching goals, organizational development goals, and accountability goals. however, assessment efforts that focus on the compliance aspects of assessment usually fail to meet learning and teaching goals and, therefore, are unsustainable and ultimately cannot meet the very compliance goals upon which they focus. treating assessment primarily as a compliance matter is perhaps the least effective model of assessment practice (astin, 1990; maki, 2004), and for critics to pigeon-hole assessment as being only about accountability and compliance is to make a correspondingly large intellectual mistake. conclusions and recommendations the main goal of this discussion has been to respond thoughtfully to several common and powerful arguments against learning assessment. these arguments, though often hyperbolic and blustery, contain insights important for development of learning assessment methodologies and (although this is the topic for a different paper) new approaches to evidence-based teaching and learning. we wish to highlight four conclusions emerging from our responses to these arguments. first, we conclude that the field of learning assessment can be informed by incorporating rational responses to legitimate critiques considered in their deflated, non-hyperbolic forms—avoiding the over-emotionalism and destructive rhetoric of the hyperbolic forms is crucial for this to be possible. second, we conclude that assessment can be done well and meaningfully with good effects, and need not address all learning in order to be a fruitful exercise. third, we conanalytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 10 clude that disciplinary approaches are an important part of learning assessment as are (following our example of the use of philosophical analysis and critique to improve thinking about learning outcomes) cross-disciplinary efforts to support and influence the development of learning assessment. fourth, we conclude that the success of learning assessment is dependent upon its focus on improving teaching and learning. we end by expressing our hope that readers will be inspired to join communities of scholarship that will advance the theoretical and practical development of learning assessment. as we have argued above, thoughtful and creative scholarship of teaching and learning is perhaps the most important means of addressing the challenges of assessing the many types of learning that are important to us and to our students, of ensuring that assessment is done well and in ways that benefit us, our students, and our institutions, and to repel the specters of the reductionist bean counters and bureaucrats that too frequently inflame the overheated rhetorical passions of published and whispered criticisms of learning assessment. endnotes the second statement was communicated to one of the authors during a departmental assessment con-1. versation – original attribution yet undetermined. the last comment is a synthesis of statements both authors have heard repeated over the past six years. the claim being made here is an existence claim about a specific kind of behavior that is prevalent across 2. institutions, accrediting agencies, and most pointedly, in the field of philosophy. in making the claim, the authors are informed by the rich literature connecting assessment to learning (astin, 1993; maki, 2004; dwyer, 2006). to note just a few examples: 1) a range of surveys provide meaningful information about important areas 3. of student learning across disciplines (e.g., idea center’s student survey tools and methodologies, the national survey of student engagement), 2) targeted use of standardized testing (e.g., collegiate learning assessment, ets major field tests, and 3) longitudinal, mixed-method studies and content analysis of learning documentation can provide meaningful insights into areas of student learning. the measure of academic proficiency and progress (mapp) assessment has been renamed to the ets® 4. proficiency profile. the cla is the collegiate learning assessment initially develop through rand’s value added assessment initiative. references american philosophical association. 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(2008, august). a philosophical assessment of the strongest arguments against academic assessment. paper presented at the american association of philosophy teachers seventeenth international workshop-conference on teaching philosophy, guleph, ontario. davis, a. (1998). the limits of educational assessment. journal of the philosophy of education, 32(1), 1-192. dwyer, p. (2006). “the learning organization: assessment as a change agent,” in revisiting outcomes assessment in higher education, edited by peter hernon, robert dugan, and candy schwartz (pp. 165-180). westport, ct: libraries unlimited. erhmann, s. c. (2009). frequently made objections to assessment and how to respond. the tlt group flashlight evaluation handbook. retrieved from http://www.tltgroup.org/flashlight/handbook/fmo.html. ewell, p. (2009). assessment, accountability, and improvement: revisiting the tension. national institute of learning outcomes assessment occasional paper, 1, 1-24. urbana, il. retrieved from http://www.learningoutcomeassessment.org/documents/peterewell.pdf. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 11 fendrich, l. (2007). a pedagogical straitjacket. the chronicle review of higher education. washington, dc. retrieved from http://chronicle.com/article/a-pedagogical-straitjacket/20446. finkelstein, m. (2003). the morphing of the american academic profession. liberal education, 89(4), 6-15. gosling, d. (2000). using habermas to evaluate two approaches to negotiated assessment. assessment and evaluation in higher education, 25(3), 293-304. hernon, p. & dugan, r. (2006). “future directions in outcomes assessment,” in revisiting outcomes assessment in higher education, edited by peter hernon, robert dugan, and candy schwartz (pp. 367-396). westport, ct: libraries unlimited. mackenzie, j. (2008). conceptual learning in higher education: some philosophical points. oxford review of education, 34(1), 75-87. maki, p.l. (2004). assessing for learning: building sustainable commitment across the institution. sterling, va: stylus. mceachron, d & bach, c. (2010). drexel edapps: freeing faculty for innovative teaching, forthcoming in the proceedings of the the 8th international conference on education and information systems, technologies and applications, orlando, fl. mentkowski, m., & associates. (2000). learning that lasts: integrating learning, development, and performance in college and beyond. san francisco, ca: jossey-bass. romer, t. (2003). learning and assessment in postmodern education. educational theory, 53(3), 313-327. shumar, w. (1997). college for sale: a critique of the commodification of higher education. bristol, pa: palmer press, taylor & francis, inc. slaughter, s., & rhoades, g. (2004). academic capitalism and the new economy: markets, state, and higher education. baltimore: the johns hopkins university press. address coresspondence to: andrew n. carpenter professor of philosophy director, center for teaching and learning ellis university acarpenter@ellis.edu and craig bach teaching professor, goodwin college associate vice provost office of curriculum and assessment drexel university bachcn@drexel.edu analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 27 asian students, critical thinking and english as an academic lingua franca michael paton abstract: a number of scholars such as kutlieh and egege (2003), atkinson (1997) and fox (1994) have argued that critical thinking is incompatible with asian cultural attitudes. others have disagreed, arguing from different perspectives that critical thinking is not the preserve of western culture and that the comparative lack of ‘critical’ quality in the academic work of asian international students in universities where english is the medium of instruction is due to the difficulties of study in the context of edge of knowledge discourse in a second, third or fourth language (kumaravadivelu, 2003; paton, 2005; and lun, 2009). in this context interviews were undertaken with both postgraduate and undergraduate students in three major universities in china and one in india to find their perceptions of critical thinking and english as an academic lingua franca. their responses are discussed from the perspective of history and philosophy of science. introduction my two decades experience of teaching english for academic purposes and my research into the history and philosophy of science in china has given me some insight into asian cultural attitudes to knowledge. thus, when i heard at the seventh pacific rim first year in higher education conference kutlieh and egege (2003) assert that critical thinking is specifically a western approach to knowledge claims and that the challenge for transition programs for international asian students in australia is the incorporation of critical thinking into first year programs without taking either an assimilationist or a deficit approach, i appreciated the researchers sentiments but disagreed with the premise of their argument. my experience and research had shown me that critical thinking is not the preserve of western culture and that the comparative lack of ‘critical’ quality in the academic work of asian international students in universities where english is the medium of instruction is mainly due to the difficulties of study in the context of edge of knowledge discourse in a second, third or fourth language. the research of other scholars, such as that of kumaravadivelu (2003) and lun et al. (2010) has reinforced this idea of the medium of instruction being the issue with critical thinking rather than it being the preserve of one cultural attitude. however, little research has been undertaken as to the opinion of asian students themselves on this issue in their own countries. thus, interviews were undertaken with both postgraduate and undergraduate students in three major universities in china and a research institute in india to discover their perceptions of critical thinking and english as an academic lingua franca. the following paper considers the results of these interviews from the perspective of history and philosophy of science. definitions critical thinking the definition of critical thinking is important if we are to decide whether it is incompatible with asian cultural attitudes. more general definitions include those of ennis (1989: 10): “reasonable reflective thinking that is focused on deciding what to believe or do”; halpern (1997): “the use of those cognitive skills or strategies that increase the probability of a desirable outcome”; and paul and elder (2000): “self-directed, self-disciplined, self-monitored and self-corrective thinking.” analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 28 more nuanced definitions of critical thinking include the concept of analysis. the delphi report (1990) states that critical thinking is “purposeful, self-regulatory judgment which results in interpretation, analysis, evaluation, and inference, as well as explanation of the evidential, conceptual, methodological, criteriological, and contextual considerations upon which that judgment is based. . .” (facione, 1990, p. 3). the national council for excellence in critical thinking instruction says that critical thinking is “the intellectually disciplined process of actively and skilfully conceptualising, applying, analysing, synthesising or evaluating information gathered from or generated by, observation, experience, reflection, reasoning, or communication as a guide to belief or action” (scriven and paul, 2003). sievers (2001), moreover, states that it is “the process of analysing, evaluating and synthesising information in order to increase our understanding and knowledge of reality.” in fact, sternberg (2003:5) equates critical thinking with analytical thinking but in doing so separates critical thinking from creative and practical thinking. paul (2009), in addition, traces critical thinking and its integral relationship back to socrates, but argues that until recently this concept has been ‘buried’ without an explicit expression to capture it. similarly, egege and kutlieh (2004:6), citing lloyd (1996), argue that critical thinking comes from western philosophy stemming from socrates, plato and aristotle and the traditional greek method of argumentation. universality of critical thinking the problem with such an approach is that it equates critical thinking with only one intellectual tradition. the thinking of all cultures would certainly be deemed to be critical using the initial definitions above which do not include analysis. an example from the history of science can be seen in relation to swimming. the first book in a european language on swimming was written by an italian by the name of wynman. in this, he called breaststroke the modern scientific method of swimming. nevertheless, in the1880s a solomon islander came to sydney, australia, and taught the locals how to swim through surf, a stroke which then became known as the australian crawl and is now known as freestyle. thus, we can see that the critical thinking of what many then would have deemed to be a ‘backward’ culture, especially in the european intellectual climate of the late nineteenth century, has added very much to the knowledge of the world. (colwin, 2002; osmond & phillips, 2004) a further example of this addition to present day science by traditional knowledge systems is the development of processed rubber by mesoamerica indians as early as 1600 bce (hosler et al. 1999). moreover, in terms of more civilized cultural traditions outside of the western paradigm, he argument of lloyd (1996) that traditional chinese thought is merely analogous and circular is somewhat over-simplified. for example, the traditional philosopher, mozi, and the mohist school that developed from his ideas were very similar to the classical greeks in seeing reason as the answer to the problems of humanity. in fact, mohism had a strong sense of the a priori. the mohists divided knowledge into four categories: discourse or the knowledge of how to connect names and objects; ethics or the knowledge of how to act; science or the knowledge of objects; and argumentation or the disputation of the converse (graham, 1989). the concept of disputation of the converse gives an idea of the amount of critical thought inherent in mohist philosophy. graham (1989), in fact, likens some of mohist thought as very much a precursor to modern social science as the later mohist canons used every day examples such as money and prices and their effect on demand and supply. in addition, the conception that analysis is purely based on the classical greek tradition is somewhat flawed if one considers some of the components of classical chinese cosmology. binary theory, the basis of much of present day information technology, can be traced through leibnitz, as he himself argued, to the chinese concepts of yin and yang (ryan, 1996). moreover, the analytical framework of the chinese five phases (wu xing) more readily capture the modern understanding of the relationship between entities than do the traditional greek elements in that the five phases describe the continuum of the relationship between entities over time and space. in fact, the research of nisbett et al. (2001) into the information processing of present day asian students reinforces the traditional conceptions of the five phases and yin/yang and the holistic nature of traditional chinese science in that the study found that such information processing was based on the ideas that reality is dynamic and changeable, opposing propositions may exist in the same object or event and everything in life and nature is interconnected. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 29 furthermore, besides classical greek and chinese thought, other cultural intelligences have informed the present idea of critical analysis. one wonders for example where our present day analytical framework would be without the concept of zero, which comes from the indian intellectual tradition, as the greeks were too enmeshed in philosophical arguments on how zero could exist (bourbaki, 1998). thus, i argue that what we now consider to be the basis of our knowledge systems, critical analysis, is an amalgam of various intellectual traditions. in fact, critical thinking not only “discerns an indivisible solidarity between the world and man” (freire, 1972, p.53) but also discerns an indivisible solidarity between the various strands of humanity. critical thinking equals scientific thinking? critical theory in both its literary and sociological strands is basically a theory of communication, and habermas’ understanding of rationality particularly captures the sense of critical thinking of the definitions outlined above because he sees rationality as being “epistemic, practical and intersubjective” (bohman & rehg, 2009). these three strands can be seen in paul’s (1992) division of critical thinking into a weak and strong sense. paul argues that weak sense critical thinking is argument analysis, synthesis and evaluation, that is, the epistemic and practical. intersubjectivity is found in paul’s strong sense critical thinking, which he argues is the ethical sense of fair-mindedness to negate any ego-centrism. however, in this context it could be argued that critical thinking is neither more nor less than scientific thinking. crombie (1994) showed that scientific thinking involved postulational, experimental, modeling, taxonomic, historical derivation, and probabilistic thought, and these as a whole could be equated to paul’s weak sense critical thinking. moreover, the subjectivity of observation, as pointed out by the sociologists of science, could be understood in relation to paul’s strong sense critical thinking. if this relationship between scientific and critical thinking is accepted, then it is interesting to note in terms of the present discussion that traditional chinese science displayed all of the various forms of scientific thinking as outlined by crombie except probabilistic thought, and even probabilistic thinking was implied if not overtly discussed. (elvin, 2004) english as an academic lingua franca the chinese government is sending its scholars and bureaucrats to major academic institutions around the world as part of the people’s republic of china ‘211’initiative. for example, the faculties of education and science at the university of sydney were jointly contracted for a number of years to train eminent visiting chinese academic scientists of various disciplines from top level universities in a series of one semester courses of study in the teaching of science in english because their institutions in china had decided to teach science with english as a major medium (king, 2003). this project at the university of sydney was a part of a much broader systematic attempt by the chinese government commencing in 1999 to transform higher education in china as a reflection of its commitment to higher economic growth (li et al., 2008). this is merely one example of english becoming an international academic lingua franca. there are many conceptions of a lingua franca. crystal (1995:454) defines it as “a medium of communication for people who speak different first languages.” modiano (2001a:170) argues further that a lingua franca is “a mode of communication which allows people to interact with others without aligning themselves to ideological positioning indicative of specific mother-tongue speech community.” however, these two definitions do not sufficiently encompass the native speakers of the lingua franca. although elder and davies (2006:282-3) do extend the concept to include four different areas in which to understand a lingua franca, one of which is “the use of english in an interaction where at least some of the participants are non-native speakers of english,” the other three possibilities they put forward do not include native english speakers. thus, mcarthur’s (2002) definition of “a language common to, or shared by, many cultures and communities at any or all social and educational levels, and used as an international tool” would seem to be closest to its usage in the sense that english has become an academic lingua franca although the tertiary academic level is the focus. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 30 method to shed some light on the critical thinking debate and its relationship to english as an academic lingua franca, student interviews were undertaken at three top tier project 211 universities in china and one research institute in india. the interviews in india were used to help gauge the comparative generality of the students’ responses in china. a total of fifty seven students were interviewed, fifty in china and seven in india. the students comprised both undergraduate and postgraduate with majors in science, engineering, finance, economics and english. the students were interviewed in english with some prompting in mandarin chinese when necessary in groups ranging in size from three to seven members. this focus group technique was used because it was considered that the groups could capture a greater understanding of critical thinking and english as an academic lingua franca than could the sum of each student individually. an example of this will be given at the end of this section as evidence for this decision. the interviews were recorded in note form, and these notes were written up immediately on completion of the interviews to ensure that the nuances of the responses were captured. the research approach adopted was based on grounded theory where the approach ‘is a general methodology for developing theory that is grounded in the data systematically gathered and analysed. theory evolves during actual research, and it does this through continuous interplay between analysis and data collection’ (strauss and corbin 1994 p. 273). thus the analytical framework of the discussion is based on the students’ responses and was not developed prior to the interviews. besides demographic data, such as the number of years english had been studied, the number of academic courses studied in english and major, the interviews comprised two open-ended questions: “is critical thinking important in university study” and “what do you think of english as the international academic lingua franca, i.e. the language of international academic communication”? when necessary, which was not always the case as the students seemed to have a fairly clear understanding of the concept, critical thinking was defined for the students in simple terms as objectively coming to a conclusion after considering all sides of a problem. the fact that most of the students interviewed already had a clear conception of critical thinking causes one to reflect on the emphasis that egege and kutlieh (2004) place on the paucity of clear guidelines to students in australia as to what critical thinking might entail. moreover, the concept of an academic lingua franca was explained in terms of the 11th international conference on the history of science in china in harbin, which i had attended as a plenary speaker. the interviewees were told that even though the topic of the conference was china and its location was in china, the official language of the conference was english, i.e. english was, ironically in this case, the academic lingua franca. as a final note on the method, as mentioned previously, an example of the power of the group interaction in capturing the students’ conception of critical thinking can be seen below in the interaction between the members of one group in answer to the question: is critical thinking important in university study? there are three groups of students: those who have critical thinking and language skills, those who have critical thinking but no language skills and those who have neither. critical thinking is character building. it’s especially beneficial for women because they can be moody and sentimental, and it can be disastrous if their feelings take over. it’s also good for career development. critical thinking and the dialectic method gives further development and successful research, which leads to a positive career and the right attitude to life. i have a similar opinion. but critical thinking can’t be taught, it can only be cultivated. in work, study and career it’s useful. in life it’s useful to look at the other side. bad ideas and habits can be changed to good through critical thinking. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 31 i don’t agree. critical thinking is easier in the academic field. it’s more difficult in everyday life. people follow others too easily. in postgraduate work it’s important. in research we have to look through theories and think about the materials from all aspects. by finding the demerits we find our own opinion. critical thinking has its roots in traditional daoism. it is not only useful in university; it is a view that keeps us rational. and it is the source of our creativity. i have the same idea as the rest. to sum up, many linguists like chomsky and halliday use critical thinking to find new approaches. to become famous you need critical thinking. results and discussion critical thinking there was a general acceptance by the students that critical thinking was extremely important to university study. the comment below captures this general mood: not knowledge but critical thinking is the most important, the teaching style is important, there is no progress unless we change our thinking style, it is important for science to determine the one truth, decisions can only be made after critical thinking, it is important for progress. there was some tendency, however, particularly by the postgraduate students to see critical thinking as being more important to postgraduate studies as it was thought that undergraduate studies should involve a solid base of learning what is already known. it’s more important in postgraduate studies. you need to challenge the ideas in theories and research. in empirical study, critical thinking is more efficient. in undergraduate education it’s not as important. no need at the beginning. to practice deeper skills it is necessary but only after you learn foundation knowledge. the stereotype of asian students being group conformist and dependent on rote learning was somewhat negated by the students’ attitudes to critical thinking. a certain level of individualism was certainly evident and there was, moreover, a comparative rejection of the model of rote learning from the textbook that is the typical conception about asian academic learning and teaching in english speaking countries such as australia (vandermensbrugghe, 2004, p. 417). it is important that critical thinking is based on your own judgment to give you a better understanding of knowledge. better study leads to greater creativity and this gives a better society. similarly if you just follow the textbook and the teacher, it kills creativity, which is bad for both you and the society. it is noteworthy to compare this statement to that of a chinese international student, written in a learning journal upon completion of an australian undergraduate academic course on academic discourse and critical thinking. the similarities are striking: the other two important things i have learned from this course are how to critically evaluate the world around me and bring out my own argument to convince others. i have learnt that university is a place to start building up my own value of the world, that things that happen in the world are not simply good or bad. it is important to understand the story and the background of it, so that i can understand why it is happening and the other sides of the story. challenging professional people is not a wrong thing to do since it is challenge and doubt that help us bring up knowledge. having my own stance is important analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 32 because it represents a part of me (paton, 2008, p. 209). this emphasis on critical thinking beyond the university and on its effect on the individual as well as society was found to be a continuum amongst the students in both china and india. an indian student, for instance, stated that “a sense of responsibility is tied to critical thinking.” in this context of societal and individual effect, the next quote is particularly interesting not only because the student was female but also she pointed to the dialectic method being directly to critical thinking. critical thinking is character building. it’s especially beneficial for women because they can be moody and sentimental, and it can be disastrous if their feelings take over. it’s also good for career development. critical thinking and the dialectic method give further development and successful research, which leads to a positive career and the right attitude to life. this mention of dialectical thinking fits well with lun et al.’s (2010) psychological research into cultural differences in critical thinking of three hundred and sixty six students in a new zealand university, which shows that dialectical thinking styles in particular enhance asian students’ critical thinking as compared to students of a european background. nevertheless, lun et al. (2010, p.21) demonstrate that “english language ability, but not dialectical thinking, explained the difference” between european and asian background students, and that “asian students and western students are not different from each other in terms of general intellectual functioning.” differences in asian thought patterns were not only spoken of by the students in terms of dialectical methods but also in relation to traditional asian philosophies. one chinese student pointed to daoism as the basis of critical thinking: critical thinking has its roots in traditional daoism. it is not only useful in university; it is a view that keeps us rational. and it is the source of our creativity. this harkening back to daoism aligns very much with the ideas of many historians and philosophers of science in china, who point to daoism as one of the major bases of the strength of traditional chinese science (see needham, 1956 & 1959; graham, 1989). nevertheless there are strong criticisms by students of both the historical lack of critical thinking and the education systems in both china and india. one chinese student thought that critical thinking was rooted in the historical traditions of the west: it’s different in the west where it starts from the root and flows to the branches. in china we only learn critical thinking. another said: critical thinking doesn’t give a good impression. you need to listen to the teacher and receive guidance. you are not used to thinking by yourself. this is the chinese weak point. we are not accustomed to it. but when you need to take action critical thinking is not that easy. however, the major blame for the lack of critical thinking in both china and india was laid on the education and particularly examination systems in these countries. an indian student stated categorically that to create one’s own approach you must have a critical approach both in university and in life. it should be encouraged but it’s missing in the university system here. another indian student was no more sanguine about the indian education system: analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 33 the education system in india is a problem. the matriculation examination system doesn’t reflect critical thinking. there’s too much emphasis on textbook learning. echoing these thoughts, a chinese student stated: in chinese exams everything is in patterns, for example ielts (international english language testing system). there’s not enough critical thinking. when asked to explain this statement about the international english language testing system (ielts) further, the student stated that he thought that many students in china just learnt patterns of essays for the ielts examination to pass the examinations rather than learning english deeply. it is interesting to note that such criticisms are also common in relation to matriculation examinations in australia such as the higher school certificate in new south wales. however, in the interviews the one student who was the greatest outlier in relation to all of the groups’ conceptions of critical thinking was a first year chinese female undergraduate student, who did not have much faith in the power of critical thinking for the general undergraduate student population. she stated flatly that: critical thinking is overstressed. university students should be taught to be followers. when pressed to expound on this ambivalence to critical thinking the student explained that she was a strong believer in legalism ( fajia), the philosophy that was the basis for the establishment of the chinese state by the qin dynasty of emperor qin shihuang in 226 bce. this philosophy, in opposition to confucianism, held humanity to be ‘bad’ at its core and argued that people could only be ruled by the strict observance of draconian laws and the burning of books, much akin to modern day fascism. even though such a philosophical stance is anathema to the basis of the present general conception of the university as an institution of unfettered debate towards a garnering of truth, the fact that it has solid historical and philosophical foundations indicates that the student in being critical of critical thinking is actually displaying critical thought. the final important thread to be found in the students’ discussions on critical thinking was the idea that ability in critical thinking and language ability were not necessarily linked. one student summarised this general opinion particularly well when he stated: there are three groups of students: those who have critical thinking and language skills, those who have critical thinking but no language skills and those who have neither. english as an academic lingua franca the responses to the question as to what the students thought of english as the international academic lingua franca, i.e. the language of international academic communication, can be analysed into four major streams: internationalisation, language as a tool, the economics of a lingua franca, and cultural chauvinism. many of the students interviewed recognised the need for an academic lingua franca in relation to the people of the world needing to communicate knowledge with each other, and saw english in a positive light with comments such as: we need one world language, english is the universal language and we need one, english as the lingua franca is more positive than negative. communication is the most important thing. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 34 80% of information is transmitted in english, so it’s good to speak english internationally. however, some students were more ambivalent to english being the academic lingua franca, seeing it as a merely a useful tool in some circumstances, which nevertheless could outlast its usefulness: knowledge is more important than language; english is just a tool. it’s not strange that english is the lingua franca. it’s the least effort principle. there’s a need for a common language. english is now the international language. if that becomes inconvenient another language will become the lingua franca. it depends on the field. english is ok for science but english can’t capture the literature of other languages. there’s a problem with the translation of great novels. other students were even less positive, stressing the unfairness of english as an academic lingua franca: language affects understanding and it is unfair to chinese as compared to native english speakers. moreover, one student highlighted one of the major reasons that students go to countries such as australia to study: it takes too long to study in china as compared to if it was studied in a native english speaking country. such comments as those above give an insight into the role english plays as an academic lingua franca from the perspective of the chinese students’ understanding of internationalisation, but the indian students were much more positive about the role that english plays. they all saw english as the “best alternative for higher studies,” and “a linking language,” and they were “more comfortable with it because of colonization.” however, unexpectedly, they saw this colonial past as a “positive thing” because it provided “a kind of infrastructure” that was “not a colonial hangover.” these indian students particularly pointed to the problems of having many different languages in india, and the positive aspects of having english as an external academic language that did not give power to any specific language group. one student pointed to the substandard nature of most economics textbooks in bengali and said that “our equations are in english, so i have no problems sharing ideas in english.” economic imperative english has become the major language of science and of business. one example, as mentioned previously, is the chinese government’s 211 project to enable higher economic growth (li et al., 2008). thus it can be see that english as an academic lingua franca certainly has an economic aspect. however, not only economic but also historical and structural aspects were reflected in the student interviews in china and india. as one student stated: english as a lingua franca has both economic and historical reasons. we need to pick a language and english places more emphasis on logic. there english is more convenient as the lingua franca. or perhaps in the world we could have many languages as the lingua franca because of the problem of translation of some words in english. therefore people should learn other languages. nothing is forever. the lingua franca was latin before. it depends on what’s convenient. other students saw english as a “necessary tool”, “a bridge” or “the official language.” the positive economic outcomes of learning english were very much part of the thinking of the students who considered that “it can analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 35 be used for my future,” “if i learn it i can get a good job” and “if i practice it gives me greater work skills.” some students, however, had a more altruistic view of the economic power of english. one student stated that english helps in that “developing countries can learn from developed countries” and another said that english “enables relationship.” moreover, the importance of the role of english in international business was perceived by a number of students. one stated that: with globalization the world is becoming smaller and smaller. we need one language, so english plays a more and more important role. even in daily life there is no doubt that it’s essential, especially in finance. another went so far as to argue the merits of english as an academic lingua franca in a business context because of its structure. she pointed out that: it is good because of the structure of english. you express ideas at the beginning, not at the end, so it is really useful for business. as put succinctly by one of the indian students: english is quicker to write than hindi. this understanding of the usefulness of english as a lingua franca in business may point to a major reason for the popularity of university business courses for international students in australia. as an example of this australia wide, of the 141,131 international students commencing higher education study in australia in 2008, 71,382 (just over 50%) were undertaking studies in management and commerce (deewr, 2009). such an influx of chinese, however, is not only a recent phenomenon in the relationship between china and australia. in the nineteenth century from 1849 to 1900 more than 100,000 chinese came to live in australia, which became known as the “new gold mountain” as compared to california, which was called the “gold mountain” (choi, 1975; fitzgerald, 2007). cultural chauvinism there is a tendency for powerful cultures to usurp the knowledge systems of less powerful cultures and claim them as their own. this is akin to both an actual and metaphorical war of more powerful cultures against others. those who advocate the concept of greater power being equal to intellectual superiority could be considered to be cultural chauvinists (see paton, 2004). an early example of this in scientific thought can be seen in the musings of francis bacon, the 16th17th century scientist and philosopher, when he stated that the basis of modern civilisation was paper money, gun powder and the compass, not realising that each of these had been invented in china and used there for over five hundred years (hobson, 2004). similarly, even today the standard western approach to the history of science is that it originated with the ancients greeks and was then rediscovered and developed further in post-renaissance europe. this view is contested strongly by authors such as lal (2009), who argues that such an approach is fabricated in three phases: the crusades where world-wide science was captured from the arabs and given a theologically correct greek origin, the inquisition when world science was claimed to have been rediscovered by europeans, and the european colonial period where it was argued that the theologically correct version of science could only be found in europe. although such arguments could be seen to be merely a radical response to western hegemony, it should be noted that what we see as science today is rooted in many cultures. algebra analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 36 is an arabic word after all. moreover, as mentioned previously, the concept of zero as a decimal place value system comes from the jain culture in india (clarke, 1930), and the binary system comes from chinese science via leibnitz’s reading of the yi jing, although the indian writer pingala (circa 200 bce) seemingly developed the first known binary numerical system (sanchez & canton, 2007, p. 37). also, as previously mentioned, even comparatively uncivilized cultures such as those from the pacific islands have added to the world of science with the development of freestyle swimming, although the english speaking world knew it originally as the australian crawl and in doing so laid claim to its origins. i gave a lecture which included the topic of cultural chauvinism in relation to science using the examples above at two of the universities in china where i interviewed the students prior to the interview process, and some of the answers to what the students thought of english as an academic lingua franca reflect this lecture. one student stated: i think english, as a lingua franca is cultural chauvinism. europe and the english speaking countries have economic, political and social power and so the language has spread. it’s a reflection of financial power. i think chinese could become the lingua franca. another said: i blame english for being language chauvinists. in a similar vein, another student opined: ancient languages are disappearing as english takes over. therefore we should keep our own languages. us chinese should speak chinese. however, a female student was the most aggressively negative towards english as an academic lingua franca. she stated bluntly: english is the lingua franca because the us and uk are superpowers. we should start a war with them and kill them all and all the people of their colonies and then chinese can be the lingua franca. this was the same student who criticized the focus on critical thinking because she was a believer in the traditional philosophy of fa or legalism. this student is an example of what are known in china as the fenqing ( ) or “angry youth,” which is a shortened form of the chinese phrase fennu de qingnian ( ). these are a substantial minority of students in the elite universities in china who are dissatisfied with china’s place in the world and hold beliefs much like the fascist youth movements in europe. wang (2006) points to the fomenting of a national nihilism in china, which has developed into a magnified empty patriotism amongst such disaffected youth. with this in mind, perhaps the chauvinism in the concept cultural chauvinism is not as metaphorical as first considered. conclusion to conclude, it can be seen from the interviews of asian students in this study that there is a significant level of understanding of critical thinking and its relationship to english as an academic lingua franca. in fact, the depth and variety of thought shown in the students’ responses indicate a remarkable level of critical thinking, which would seem to belie the strident claims by those such as atkinson (1997) that critical thinking is the preserve of western culture. even the great outlier of the students, the chinese undergraduate student who saw critical thinking as being overrated and advocated waging war on the english speakers because of their cultural hegemony, displayed a level of critical thinking. although her ideas are not those to which most of us prescribe, her opinions had a solid philosophical and historical basis insofar as such a viewpoint was the basis of the develanalytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 37 opment of the chinese nation. these results reinforce the argument that critical thinking is part of the framework of humanity. the use of english establishes a certain methodology of expression of critical thinking, but this is only a methodology, not the critical thought per se. on the positive side, it is very useful to have an academic lingua franca because it gives a medium for the exchange of ideas world-wide. however, we need to be aware of the power relations implicit within the choice of such a lingua franca, otherwise we can fall into the trap of cultural chauvinism, which can lead to chauvinism itself. as elvin (2004) discusses, such a war mongering attitude is the epitome of the “logic of short term advantage,” which had a devastating effect on the environment of china. thus, native english speakers in the academy should be very careful of 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(2004). the unbearable vagueness of critical thinking. in the context of the anglosaxonisation of education. international education journal, 5 (3), 417-422. wang yan (2006). value changes in an era of social transformation: chinese college-educated youth. educational studies, 32 (2), 233-240. address correspondences to: michael paton faculty of economics and business university of sydney, australia e-mail:michael.paton@sydney.edu.au analytic teaching and philosophical praxis analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 47 engaging science, artistically vadim keyser abstract: in this discussion i show that philosophy of science concepts, especially where examples and thought experiments are limiting, can be enriched with artistic examples. i argue that artistic examples show abstract components and relations that can then be used to engage with philosophical concepts. first, i discuss a useful representational model for thinking about the process of science as analogous to the process of art. i set up philosophy of science as not only open, but also closely connected to art by using giere’s (2006) and van fraassen’s (2008) discussions of the connection between scientific and artistic perspectives. second, i show how artistic examples can be engaging and informative for teaching philosophy of science concepts. i apply two artistic examples to the concept of quantum measurement ‘indeterminacy’: jackson pollock’s artistic process and mark dior’s fallen hemlock. finally, i use anecdotal experience of creating art with a philosophy of science class in order to apply indeterminacy to social properties. introduction ragmatic choices about how to teach a philosophical subject are guided by the concepts and corresponding examples. when teaching kant’s concept of the ‘sublime’ in philosophy of art, visual displays can push the boundaries of the concept. one can use examples such as horace vernet’s “stormy coast scene after a shipwreck”, to explore the role of fear in the ‘sublime’.1 likewise, one could use albert bierstadt’s “in the mountains” to explore the same concept without any analysis of the role of fear. in philosophy of art, such examples engage by providing instantaneous and rich content. but in philosophy of science the role of engaging examples is of a different sort. the concepts in philosophy of science are rooted in the axiomatic tradition where logical structure sets the boundaries between theory and data. the tradition has transformed, leaving the hypotheticodeductive method for more pluralistic explorations in model-building and experiment. the way those abstract concepts are taught can be enriched by visualization techniques for clarifying technical arguments. for example, chang (2007) has used three visual models2 of argumentation in order to understand how students structure arguments. teaching philosophy of science concepts through empirical examples can also provide lively applications. in philosophy of physics one can explore error analysis applied to the case study of so-called “faster-than-light neutrinos” (amelino-camelia, 2011). in philosophy of biology, one can explore how populations change epigenetically due to the presence of chemicals—e.g., mice change their mating dances in response to vinclozolin (blocker et al. 2013). these kinds of examples are complex, interesting, and push the boundaries of philosophy of science concepts. however, sometimes such examples are not straightforward, overcomplicate the picture, or carry their own biases. one such example is schrödinger’s cat: one can even set up quite ridiculous cases. a cat is penned up in a steel chamber, along with the following device (which must be secured against direct interference by the cat): in p http://arxiv.org/find/physics/1/au:+amelino_camelia_g/0/1/0/all/0/1 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 48 a geiger counter there is a tiny bit of radioactive substance, so small, that perhaps in the course of the hour one of the atoms decays, but also, with equal probability, perhaps none; if it happens, the counter tube discharges and through a relay releases a hammer which shatters a small flask of hydrocyanic acid. if one has left this entire system to itself for an hour, one would say that the cat still lives if meanwhile no atom has decayed. the psifunction of the entire system would express this by having in it the living and dead cat (pardon the expression) mixed or smeared out in equal parts. (schrödinger 1935, §5) originally, variations of this example by schrödinger as well as einstein were composed as a critique of the copenhagen interpretation. in popular culture it has become a catching demonstration of quantum measurement.3 when teaching quantum measurement and quantum interpretations in undergraduate upper division philosophy of science, students will often use the parameters set by pop cultural interpretation of the example as a framework for new interpretations. in the pop cultural example, the cat is in a superposition of states, both dead and alive, and it only collapses on to one of those states when…the box is opened. this prompts a faulty assumption that quantum measurement is necessarily mediated by conscious activity.4 but this interpretation is not representative of more common interpretations of quantum measurement, and furthermore, it limits student exploration of new philosophical views on quantum measurement. the issue is that when attempting to explain the process of quantum measurement in a different way, one is limited either to modifying the cat example or to simply drawing diagrams of photon guns and interference patterns. the cat example is simplistic and becomes tedious to students, and the measurement set-up diagrams are informative but not engaging. in fact, the question is often, “what else does this apply to?” i take there to be two questions here: 1) what other physical systems does this apply to? 2) what are the important components in this system that i can abstract out and apply to other things? i take (2) to be the more difficult question; and i think that the generation of interesting examples can help teach (2) as well as (1). in this discussion, i suggest that philosophy of science concepts, especially where examples and thought experiments are limiting, can be enriched with artistic examples. specifically, i argue that artistic examples show abstract components and relations that can then be used to engage with philosophical concepts. i apply two artistic examples to the concept of ‘indeterminacy’: pollock’s artistic process and dior’s fallen hemlock. my discussion is outlined as follows. in section 2, i discuss a useful representational model for thinking about the process of science as analogous to the process of art. this section is supposed to set up philosophy of science as not only open, but also closely connected to art. recent work by giere (2006) and van fraassen (2008) make use of art as an analogy for science because of the perspectival and representational similarities. just like works of art, scientific models and measurements represent reality to respects and degrees. i suggest that understanding the relation opens philosophy of science concepts to parallel artistic examples. in this section i use artistic examples to draw analogies between science and art. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 49 in sections 3, i show how artistic examples can be engaging and informative for teaching philosophy of science concepts. interestingly, the examples that i use are from non-representational art. here, i not only use famous art examples but i also use anecdotal experience where i have created art with a philosophy of science class in order to engage the material. in section 3.2, i discuss a specific interpretation of quantum indeterminacy in relation to pollock’s process of making art. in section 3.3, i use dior’s project on a fallen hemlock as a technical example for measurement interaction. in section 3.4, i discuss pedagogical extrapolation where an artistic example that was made with the help of student collaboration prompted further exploration of indeterminacy and social properties. perspective and representation: art and science van fraassen (2008) and giere (2006) converge on at least three features of perspective, which transfer from visual/artistic perspective to scientific perspective. 1) the distinction between what things look like vs. what they are like 2) the intersubjective objectivity of a perspective 3) the selective input involved in a perspective. i discuss these features to show the close relation between science and art. understanding the relation opens philosophy of science concepts to parallel artistic examples. in short, both scientific and artistic practices share (1)-(3), and so examples can be exchanged between the two disciplines. features of a perspective: what things look like vs. what things are like according to van fraassen, art and scientific measurement tell us what things look like from a vantage point. van fraassen says, “the painter’s eye is located with respect to the content of the painting in a way that he himself can express with “this is how it looks to me from here””(2008, 59). in order to demonstrate the perspectival nature of measurement van fraassen uses an example of two moving cars and a painter as the measurer. suppose that two cars are moving in parallel, with the same velocity. van fraassen asks us to imagine a spatial frame of reference that has the left border of the road as the y-axis and an orthogonal x-axis. there is a series of horizontal lines, parallel with the x-axis. the painter sets up his easel at the beginning of the road on the y-axis. the cars begin to move. they reach each horizontal line simultaneously. but from the painter’s point of view the right-hand car is moving along the hypotenuse of a perceived triangle and covers a larger perceived distance (in the same time interval) than the left-hand car (2008, 69). van fraassen says, within the painter’s perspective, the right hand car is moving faster than the car on the left. if he were making a motion picture, or simply taking notes of where in his visual field the cars are at t = 1, t = 2, etc. he would be making a measurement of the velocities, but the content of analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 50 his measurement would be what the motions look like and not what they are like. (2008, 68, my emphasis) on this view, what measurement and perspectival art have in common is they both provide a vantage point on a phenomenon. information gathered during measurement will tell us what something looks like from a vantage point, rather than what something is like. giere (2006) uses visual perspective in vision (rather than art). in using this example, giere draws the distinction between what we perceive as colors (our trichromatic visual perspective) and the physical properties that interact to produce that perception (e.g. the incident light and the molecular makeup of the surface). giere distinguishes our experience (perspective) of color and the physical properties that produce the perspective. in this sense, color properties are perspectival properties that depend on the evolutionary story of our visual system as well as physical properties of wavelengths of light. this perspectival feature shows why differences in perspective can be real in art as well as science. a dichromatic vs. trichromatic person looking at a painting has a difference in perspective similar to two measurement instruments sensitive to different wavelengths of gamma radiation.5 features of a perspective: intersubjective objectivity giere brings up an important point about visual perspective—namely, the “intersubjective objectivity” of a given perspective. in common parlance, perspective indicates a different point of view. giere says this may, misleadingly, suggest that each perspective “is as good as any other” (2006, 13), thereby suggesting some sort of relativism. according to giere, a perspective should not indicate something that is merely subjective. that is, there is “roughly a way something looks from a particular location for most normal viewers”—e.g. the washington monument from far away vs. from the base (2006, 13). in discussing how things “appear” during measurement, van fraassen also cites intersubjective objectivity of a measurement perspective: “how an observable object or process (phenomenon) appears in the outcomes of the measurement is itself an objective fact, a public, intersubjectively accessible fact” (2008, 284). according to van fraassen, sometimes appearances are deceiving. he uses the example of rainbows to indicate “public hallucinations”—appearances that are intersubjective but do not correspond to real physical objects.6 the point about intersubjectivity is important. often, examples from art are taken to have a subjective component or totality. but since art is a matter of perspective, and that perspective can be recreated, it indicates that the interaction between the viewer and the work of art is relational rather than subjective. van fraassen’s and giere’s views emphasize support for this relational view by emphasizing that perspective can be recreated given the position of perspective. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 51 features of a perspective: selectivity to input visual perspective and scientific perspective both involve selective sensitivity to input. according to giere, with the use of a visual vantage point we can emphasize certain details of our target while ignoring others (e.g. emphasizing the height of the washington monument by making a painting, photo, or video looking up7). likewise, with the use of a scientific perspective we can select and emphasize certain aspects of the phenomena. giere’s perspectival view can be contrasted to a strong realist view, which i call ‘reflective realism’. the difference can be usefully taught, using an art analogy because it draws on the concept of ‘reflection’, which i discuss by referencing the work of ron mueck. for the reflective realist (reflectivist), scientific practice reveals or reflects properties that objects, events, and processes really have. for example, a value v in a given measurement reflects property p of the actual object of measurement. terminology such as “discover”, “reveal”, and “reflect” are used in strong “realist” characterizations of measurement.8 if we set up a parallel to visual or artistic perspective, we see that no visual reflection is perfect—e.g. think about a “reflection” from the lake and the skewed image it produces. but realists use the term to indicate perfect reflection. we can compare the reflective realist view of measurement with hyperrealism in art. hyperrealist works of art, like those of ron mueck, have an eerie quality of accuracy to them. mueck focuses on details like wrinkles, skin pigmentation, uneven fat distribution, arm and leg hairs, sweat particles, etc. the goal of these works of art is to get the relation between the subject of the art and the art as close as possible. the properties in the work of art are intended to closely correspond to properties of the subject, even though in reality this is impossible. it is up to the artist to make sure that the process of reflection goes smoothly. in the contrasting perspectival view of scientific practice, the product of a given measurement or theory of some phenomenon is a representation of that phenomenon to respects and degrees. van fraassen uses the analogy of art to contrast representation with resemblance. he says, “successful representation may require deliberate departures from resemblance” (2009, 13). sometimes, distortion in the form of representation is used in order to successfully represent: misrepresentation is a species of representation after all: a caricature of mrs. thatcher may represent her as draconian, but it certainly does represent her, and not her sister or her pet dragon… yet even if we take the caricature to represent her because of some carefully introduced resemblance there, we can declare it a misrepresentation by insisting that it represents her as something she is not. (2009, 14) in art, visual accuracy is not required for a successful representation. certain features of the target are selectively represented. in this sense, because there is incompleteness, there is a departure from accuracy. this is applicable to scientific measurement activities that selectively focus on specific properties, while excluding others. the artist can also sacrifice visual accuracy for a distortion of the analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 52 target in order to represent some aspect of that target, which i will shortly describe using the work of bellows. one of the most important aspects of looking at science and art as representational is that a representation does not represent on its own. for both van fraassen and giere, a representation is used by someone to represent some thing for some purposes. for example, the distortion of mrs. thatcher as a draconian only “makes sense” if we understand the artist’s representational purpose. similarly, the success of a distortion in representing a target depends on the purposes of the scientist. because the scientist selects the respects in which a representation represents a target, a two-place relation between the representation and the target (y is represented as f) is substituted by a four-place relation between user, representation, and target: x represents y as f, for purposes p. to illustrate selective representation in art, take the example of george wesley bellows’s painting depicting the legendary boxing match between dempsey and firpo. bellows’ painting selectively represents visual and circumstantial elements of the actual boxing match (the target of representation). the circumstantial ones are more interesting to focus on. first, in the historical event, as dempsey went through the ropes his head clashed with a writing machine, leaving a cut on his head. second, the boxing event was controversial because of the notoriously slow count of the referee. (in fact, many argue that if it was not for the slow count, and individuals physically helping dempsey get back in the ring, the fight would have been ruled in favor of firpo.) but if you look at the painting, the referee is already counting before dempsey makes full contact with the ringside surface. dempsey’s head does not clash with the writing machine. for the purpose of the artist’s representation, these physical inaccuracies (or distortions) do not matter. according to wood (2010), bellows painting represented a more complex phenomenon—the juxtaposition between the american hero and the alien fighter; and ‘the fragility of power’ (2010, 5). even though dempsey won the fight, bellows chose to highlight the temporary, heroic moment of the hated foreign fighter, firpo. the success of bellows’ representation of firpo only makes sense if the viewer understands the political context of the boxing match and bellows’ interest in the concept of the foreign fighter. bellows had demonstrated interest in the concept of the alien fighter in 1921 with his painting “introducing georges carpentier” (wood 2010, 4). he continued this theme with firpo. wood remarks: the exoticism of this argentinean challenger is reflected in the tanned contours of his body and the richness of his purple trunks; dempsey's coldness, in contrast, is encapsulated in his white trunks and pale body. firpo's handsome face betrays no emotion as he watches a faceless dempsey fall through the ropes; a facelessness that finds its echo in that of the owner of the arm supporting his fall. (5) without knowing the purpose of the distortion in the bellows’ work it would be very difficult to figure out what aspects of the dempsey/firpo fight the painting represents.9 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 53 art and science: the analogy falls apart what we have gathered so far is that representation in art and science is related in the following ways: 1) the representation selectively represents the target in terms of selectivity to respects/aspects and to degrees. 2) a representation does not represent on its own. both the artist and the scientist select the respects and degrees to which a representation represents a target. a two-place relation between the representation and the target (y is represented as f) is substituted by a four-place relation between user, representation, and target: x represents y as f, for purposes p. however, the analogy between representation in art and in science falls apart. paintings only represent/depict things as they appear to us in perception. but, according to van fraassen, scientific theories (and maybe scientific measurements) represent/depict things as they are.10 van frassen writes: if science offers a representation of nature, what precisely does it represent? paintings and photos depict things as they appear to us in perception. in contrast a scientific theory may be said to depict things as they are. the differences between how things appear to us and how they are depicted by a scientific theory can certainly be striking. (2009, 269) i think that the representational discrepancy between science and art is exactly where art becomes even more useful for scientific practice. if one is, for example, teaching representationalism vs. realism in philosophy of science, works like those of mueck or bellows are demonstratively clear. but if one is teaching specific scientific concepts like quantum measurement, which describe processes that we do not encounter in our daily perceptual experience, how can artistic examples even apply? this is where nonrepresentationalist art provides the proper analogy. in the next section i show that artistic examples are useful even for discussing complex concepts like ‘indeterminacy’; and the use of artistic examples is to show unique components and relations that can be abstracted and made to engage with the scientific concept. indeterminacy, numbered paintings, and a fallen hemlock in this section i focus on specifying an interpretation of ‘indeterminacy’ using two artistic examples. i spell out barad’s (2007) concept in section 3.1. in section 3.2, i use pollock’s artistic process to illustrate non-representational emergence of new things, which is parallel to the emergence of new properties through quantum measurement interactions. in section 3.3, i use dior’s example of the manipulation of conditions to illustrate that how conditions are manipulated within an interaction (or “intra-action”) matters in scientific practice. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 54 ‘indeterminacy’ to discuss a specific characterization of ‘indeterminacy’ i use barad’s (2007) interpretation of quantum measurement. barad refers to traditional scientific views where: 1) the world is composed of separate objects with definite and determinate properties; and 2) our scientific practices reveal these properties (and quantity values) without disturbing the world. barad says, “classical epistemological and ontological assumptions, such as the ones found to underlie newtonian physics, include the existence of individual objects with determinate properties that are independent of our experimental investigations of them” (ibid, 106). but quantum measurement seems to “smear” this simple realist picture of scientific practice of revealing determinate properties. i give a brief description of non-controversial aspects of quantum measurement in order to set up barad’s use of ‘indeterminacy’ (dewitt 2004). it is important to note that barad’s interpretation is one of many, but i have chosen it because it is difficult to structure using examples. first, it is necessary to characterize particle and wave phenomena and their relation to scientific measurement. particles are: discrete, that is, they are separate objects with particular properties; determinate, i.e., they have well-defined and precise location in space-time; and interactive: they interact with other particles. waves are: spread out over a large region of space-time; and interact as waves (changing magnitude, cancelling magnitude, and no-effect interaction). according to dewitt (2004), the fact that particle patterns and wave patterns appear in measurement settings is not debated. firing a photon gun through two slits results in wavelike interference patterns. but when particle detectors are added to the measurement set-up, particle-like interference patterns result. the metaphysical interpretations of these results are debated. depending on the view we take we can ask if presence of particle detectors alters certain intrinsic properties of the photon? there are various interpretations that focus on measurement-dependence; and there are other controversial interpretations that posit consciousness-dependence (see dewitt 2004).11 recently, barad (2007) proposed an interpretation of ‘indeterminacy’ that focuses on measurement interaction (‘intra-action’). this interpretation is difficult to understand because it posits an unusual framework for pre-measurement and post-measurement properties. for barad, there is a puzzle if the nature of light is both particle and wave: “the dual nature of light and matter presented a quandary of the first order: an object is either localized or extended; it analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 55 can’t be both” (2007, 100). to avoid a contradictory nature to a single object, one can posit that premeasurement properties differ from post-measurement properties. barad’s view radically changes the picture of pre-measurement and post-measurement properties. according to her picture, a given property cannot be separated from an experimental arrangement, which is composed of a set of conditions that constitute measurement apparatuses. in other words, the role of the apparatuses cannot be abstracted to find out what pre-measurement properties really are. barad posits that properties only emerge from arrangements. one cannot split the arrangements into interacting parts that are self-contained and determinate. rather, arrangements are “intra-actions”, which cannot be separated: “since individually determinate entities do not exist, measurements do not entail an interaction between separate entities; rather, determinate entities emerge from their intra-action” (ibid, 128). this means that different objects and properties become determinate through different intra-actions. this also implies that objects are indeterminate independent of intra-action. barad says: so the question of what constitutes the object of measurement is not fixed: as bohr says, there is no inherently determinate cartesian cut. the boundary between the “object of observation” and the “agencies of observation” is indeterminate in the absence of a specific physical arrangement of the apparatus. what constitutes the object of observation and what constitutes the agencies of observation are determinable only on the condition that the measurement apparatus is specified. the apparatus enacts a cut delineating the object from the agencies of observation. clearly, then, as we have noted, observations do not refer to properties of observation-independent objects (since they don’t preexist as such). (ibid, 114) for barad, ‘indeterminacy’ is rooted in a metaphysical account rather than epistemological one. objects are not determinate unless there is an intra-action (i.e. an arrangement of conditions). this implies that determinacy can only occur within a given arrangement of conditions. that is, once there is a given arrangement then determinacy emerges. so the next question is, how does one teach barad’s ‘indeterminacy’? one can focus on the fact that things are not determinate prior to measurement, but this is puzzling. the usual question is, “what are things prior to measurement?” “don’t they still exist as objects?” schrödinger’s cat does not help much as a teaching tool. how does one characterize interaction vs. “intra-action” in the case of the cat? it seems like the example would generate the same pre-measurement picture. in order to provide useful examples, it is important to selectively focus on certain features of the concept that an example should represent. it turns out that an adequate way to represent barad’s example is through non-representational works of art. i use two examples. one focuses on the nonrepresentational emergence of new things from their interactions. the other example focuses on the fact that interactions matter—that is, for any kind of measurement it can’t be just any interaction. in quantum measurement as well as other physical sciences, conditions must be carefully manipulated to produce new things. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 56 pollock and non-representational art the representational art analogy from section 2 emphasizes measurement as a passive process: just as the subject is represented on the canvas, the phenomenon is represented as a measurement result or theoretical variable. this is why representational art examples do not capture ‘indeterminacy’. rather, we have to find some example that focuses on the interacting elements of the measurement set-up that are relevant to the emergence of new things. i will use the example of jackson pollock’s art in order to illustrate the emergence of new things from interaction. the focus here is on pollock’s total process of making art. pollock numbered his paintings so that people would look at them without searching for representational elements in the names of his paintings (karmel and varnedoe 1999). for pollock, the work of art is not a representation of a phenomenon (ibid, 68-69). rather, it is the phenomenon, which is produced by the interactions that take place in the painting set-up (ibid, 99).12 pollock’s local painting set-up13 and the interaction (intra-action) that occurred within this set-up can be summarized as follows: first, paint was carefully selected to have the proper viscosity. pollock used gloss enamel paint rather than oil-based paint. the paint was sometimes diluted to have little textural effect, and at other times thickened. he used sticks, worn out brushes, and basting devices that looked like giant fountain pens. pollock also used raw, unstretched canvas in order to be able to perform full-body painting (ibid, 72). the painting resulted from the interaction that took place within the painting setup. moreover, it is fair to say that it is difficult to appreciate the work of art without looking at this process of interaction. as part of the painting set-up, pollock is interacting with other elements of the set-up to produce the phenomenon. this means that pollock is not separate from the measurement interaction, he is working as part of it. this is why the term “intra-action” applies nicely—one cannot separate the elements of the artistic set-up without losing the thing that is being produced. in interviews pollock describes being “in” his painting when making it (ibid, 17). the quality of interacting from within importantly shows students the transition from ‘interaction’ to ‘intra-action’. i teach that both terms signify the importance of elements causally intersecting to produce the new phenomenon. however, there is a major difference in metaphysical views between ‘interaction’ and ‘intra-action’. ‘interaction’ signifies that we can step outside of our measurement practices to view measurement-independent properties. ‘intra-action’ signifies the opposite—that we cannot separate the elements without losing the phenomenon that emerges. students follow this conceptual progression by thinking about traditional representationalist art, where the painter is outside of the work and also the object being represented. in pollock’s case, everything is entangled, and the thing produced is not a representation, but rather a product of the intra-actions. hemlock and careful conditions the pollock analogy effectively captures how new things emerge as a product of intra-actions; but it misses the fact that measurement intra-action must be carefully maintained. that is, how conditions are manipulated in the scientific context matters, and there is regularity to the manipulation/stabilization of conditions. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 57 on february 8th, 1996 in seattle, a hemlock tree fell over. the tree fell in a protected watershed area and because of other fallen trees it did not touch the ground. this prevented the tree from rotting quickly. mark dior took an interest in this tree for a work of art. but the work was not a painting, a sculpture, or a photograph—it was not a representation of the tree—rather, the work of art was the tree. dior’s goal was to take the tree out of its natural setting and place it in a gallery context. according to dior: we’re taking a tree that is an ecosystem—a dead tree, but a living system—and we are recontextualizing it and taking it to another site. we’re putting it in a sort of sleeping beauty coffin, a greenhouse we’re building around it. and we’re pumping it up with a life support system—an incredibly complex system of air, humidity, water, and soil enhancement—to keep it going. (art:21 interview14) the importance of this project is preserving the ecosystem as the art system. in other words, dior’s aim was to preserve the macro and micro interactions that have been occurring in this hemlock tree ecosystem. in order to preserve bacterial, fungal, plant, insect, and soil profiles; and in order to replicate the forest ecosystem’s pattern of decay and renewal, dior carefully planned “a life-support system” for the tree. first, the tree was transplanted to seattle, carrying all of its biosystems (including, a hummingbird nest). teams were in charge of preserving specific systems of the tree (e.g. fungi, insects, etc.). second, once transplanted to olympic sculpture park, a greenhouse was built around the tree in order to replicate conditions similar to those found in the watershed area forty-five miles outside seattle. biologists, soil scientists, and architects were involved. the greenhouse comes equipped with water systems, irrigation systems, cooling systems, panels to control the light levels, the glass to replicate the color spectrum of the canopy in the original forest. these greenhouse systems are carefully timed for execution. i teach dior’s project as a project that is dedicated to carefully manipulating conditions. this means that within an intra-action, conditions cannot be manipulated any which way. they have to be manipulated in order to get a repeatable, re-producible, and reliable phenomenon. i call this ‘stabilization of conditions’. according to dior, this reconstruction (or, the stabilization) is ultimately doomed. he says, we’re putting it in a sort of sleeping beauty coffin, a greenhouse we’re building around it. and we’re pumping it up with a life support system—an incredibly complex system of air, humidity, water, and soil enhancement—to keep it going. all those things are substituting what nature does—emphasizing how, once that’s gone, it’s incredibly difficult, expensive, and technological to approximate that system—to take this tree and to build the next generation of forests on it. so this piece is in some way perverse. it shows that, despite all of our technology and money, when we destroy a natural system it’s virtually impossible to get it back. in a sense we’re building a failure. dior clarifies why it is a failure: analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 58 i want to show how difficult it is for us to grasp—not just conceptually, but also practically. how difficult it is for us to figure in all of the variables that you would need to replicate a forest. we’re trying but we can never do it perfectly. in dior’s 5-year project, he carefully set up forest conditions in a sculpture park to stabilize a phenomenon. researchers are doing something similar: they are setting measurement conditions in order to get repeatable, re-producible, reliable phenomena. this teaches the students how to understand condition manipulation. but condition manipulation/stabilization is not merely reserved for quantum measurement. in fact, i show that once we abstract out the importance of condition manipulation/stabilization, we can easily apply it to many types of physical measurement. for example, when measuring the boiling point of water it is not accurate to say that we just put a thermometer in a sample and get a reading of the true temperature. rather, the boiling point of water is a process of stabilization of conditions. chang (2004) offers an account of the history of thermometry where he describes that to get a sample of water to have the same temperature value, conditions like atmospheric pressure and dissolved gas must be manipulated. chang presents an anecdote about how de luc walked, slept, ate, etc. for 4 weeks straight all while shaking a tube of water to purge it of the dissolved air. de luc’s dedication to manipulating the conditions of measurement serves as a good illustration of the care with which the conditions of measurement have to be carefully stabilized. once students understand the importance of, 1) measurement intra-action and the emergences of new things from pollock, 2) the careful manipulation/stabilization of measurement conditions through dior, and 3) the application of (1) and (2) to other sciences, this is where student creativity and collaboration can take exciting form. i describe an activity that spontaneously emerged in a unit on quantum measurement to briefly discuss the extrapolation of concepts. the measurement problem of internet mechanics one day a student conversation emerged about digital communication. i thought about a scenario, which happens frequently: two people are digitally chatting, when one cuts out. after some time, the person comes back and says, “sorry i disappeared, the wi-fi went out.” an interesting symbolic question emerges: if the wi-fi goes out, do we “disappear”? not physically, of course; but rather in a social sense. students agreed that digital spaces are integral to certain complex social properties, like identity, social connections, and social communication. that is, digital spaces provide intra-actions that can determine our identities and connections; and for some, if the digital intra-action disappears, so does a large part of the person’s social properties. this conversation sparked an unusual application of the concept of ‘intra-action’. the students liked the example so much that they prompted the development of a small animation. we storyboarded it together and then i animated the piece, using stop motion animation. the piece depicts two agents communicating when the wi-fi goes out. both agents disappear—one into particles and the other into waves. they reach out for one final connection, before becoming indeterminate: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s5icemtc6kg https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s5icemtc6kg analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 59 simple examples can open new areas of exploration. in this philosophy of science course, a simple animation began a conversation about to what extent social properties become determinate with measurement context. but because of this exercise, i created an essay question as part of the final exam that asked students to apply various quantum interpretations to social phenomena. this then became a structured presentation in the philosophy of science class for the next term. in both terms students have focused on things like the determining function of the media. does the media merely expose limited information (epistemic limitation) or does it actually change how new things emerge? students and i discussed that it can be the former as well as the latter because information exposure can function as a causal property that influence other properties. that is, the kind of information that we are exposed to prompts what we do about actual events. this is commonly referred to as a type of ‘endogeneity’: where there is a loop between two variables. in this case the loop would be between information sources and social states of affairs.15 while this falls outside of barad’s interpretation, it is still worth noting as an important example of the measurement-dependence of social properties, which has both epistemic and metaphysical components. the progression of examples from pollock to dior to an oddball animation has prompted an application of quantum measurement to social properties. this shows that sometimes the examples that we use in teaching can have unpredicted pedagogical consequences. not only do examples push conceptual boundaries but they also push new applications. extrapolating concepts is a continuous endeavor. it may be that the application of ‘indeterminacy’ falls apart in interesting ways when applied to specific social properties—after all, some social properties may remain invariant over different measurement contexts. but it may also be that such application produces interesting relations between physical and social measurement. either way, it prompts for active application on the part of the total class, where key features of concepts are abstracted and applied. concluding remarks in this discussion, i have suggested that philosophy of science concepts, especially where examples and thought experiments are limiting, can be enriched with artistic examples. specifically, i have argued that artistic examples show abstract components and relations that can then be used to engage with philosophical concepts. i discussed a useful representational model for thinking about the process of science as analogous to the process of art. i set up philosophy of science as not only open, but also closely connected to art by using giere’s (2006) and van fraassen’s (2008) discussions of the connection between scientific and artistic perspectives. then, i showed how artistic examples could be engaging and informative for teaching philosophy of science concepts. i applied two artistic examples to the concept of ‘indeterminacy’: pollock’s artistic process and dior’s fallen hemlock. i also described anecdotal experience where i have created art with a philosophy of science class in order to engage the material. this act of student engagement prompted a new application of ‘indeterminacy’ to social properties. this shows that examples aren’t merely illustrations—they push concept and application boundaries. the use of artistic examples offers more than just a visual display of some concept. it provides avenues to new applications. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 60 endnotes 1 kant seems to suggest that we are both powerless and yet have the feeling of separation from nature, which gives us a sense of power (see hacket 1987 §28, 261–262). 2 toulmin’s model (toulmin 1958), means and voss’s model (means & voss 1996) and lakatos’s scientific research programmes model (chang 2007). 3 in popular terms, we can think of schrödinger and einstein as “trolling” on the copenhagen interpretation. so, the example is about as robust of a demonstration of a view as a caricature is of some person. 4 schrödinger’s use of “direct observation” may be blamed for the limiting interpretation of measurement: “it is typical of these cases that an indeterminacy originally restricted to the atomic domain becomes transformed into macroscopic indeterminacy, which can then be resolved by direct observation” (schrödinger 1935, §). 5 see giere’s discussion on comptel and osse, where two instruments produce images of different sorts based on their sensitivity ranges (2006, 47). 6 he says, “if the rainbow were a real thing then all of the various observations and photos would locate it at the same place at a given time (2008, 102)”. 7 the triggering of vertigo-like symptoms would serve as good emphasis. 8 swoyer (1988) provides a good example for such terminology: “even a fairly small group of objects can be ordered in a good many ways, and it is difficult to see why vastly different operations would so frequently yield quite similar orderings if they weren’t reflecting the same facts about the world. according to the realist, there are objective facts about length that transcend the particular methods of measuring it, and the reason why different measurement procedures so often yield similar results is that they are sensitive to the same facts” (239). 9 an interesting point about the bellows episode is that he distorts in order to tell a particular story. while scientists distort to emphasize certain details, they do not distort to produce a desired outcome. 10 an objection can be made that both visual representation and scientific theory are based on observation. 11 still others are more controversial and posit many worlds. there are some interpretations that stick to the point that measurement does not change intrinsic properties and there are merely hidden variables. 12 pollock was resistant to representation in art. he was also resistant to the view that artists should paint things “out in nature”: “when asked whether he painted from nature, pollock replied: “i am nature”” (ibid, 253). 13 what i mean by ‘local painting set-up’ is the conditions for making art. this is analogous terminology to the ‘measurement set-up’ and the conditions for measurement interaction (“intraaction”). 14see http://www.pbs.org/show/art-21/ 15 see weijers and keyser (2016) for a discussion of a complex endogeneity problem in ethical and technological contexts, where information used to make predictions determines the predicted http://www.pbs.org/show/art-21/ analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 61 likelihood of a given event, which, in turn, can affect the morality of using the information to make the bet. references amelino-camelia, g. (2011). opera data, phenomenology of philosophy of science. arxiv: 1206.3554v1[physics.hist-ph] blocker, t. d., & ophir, a. g. (2013). cryptic confounding compounds: a brief consideration of the influences of anthropogenic contaminants on courtship and mating behavior. acta ethologica, 16(2), 10.1007/s10211–012–0137–x. http://doi.org/10.1007/s10211-012-0137-x chang, h. (2004). inventing temperature. oxford: oxford university press. chang, s. n. (2007, june). teaching argumentation through the visual models in a resource-based learning environment. in asia-pacific forum on science learning and teaching (vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 1-15). hong kong institute of education. 10 lo ping road, tai po, new territories, hong kong. erwin schrödinger (1935) the present situation in quantum mechanics (translation of 3 part schrödinger, erwin (november 1935). "die gegenwärtige situation in der quantenmechanik (the present situation in quantum mechanics)". naturwissenschaften. 23 (48): 823807–828812. giere, r. n. (2006). scientific perspectivism. chicago: the university of chicago press. karmel, p. (1999). jackson pollock: interviews, articles, and reviews. the museum of modern art. kant, immanual. critique of judgment, trans. werner pluhar, indianapolis: hackett, 1987. means, m. l., & voss, j. f. (1996). who reasons well? two studies of informal reasoning among children of different grade, ability, and knowledge levels. cognition and instruction, 14(2), 139-178. swoyer, c. (1987) the metaphysics of measurement, in forge (ed.), measurement, realism and objectivity, pp. 235-290. toulmin, s. (1958). the uses of argumentcambridge university press. cambridge, uk. van fraassen, b. c. (2008). scientific representation: paradoxes of perspective. oxford: oxford university press. weijers, d., & keyser, v. (2016). the varieties and dynamics of moral repugnance: prediction markets and betting on matters of life and death. humanities, 35, 91-129. wood, j. (2010). madness at the whitney: resistance to genre in dempsey and firpo. dandelion, 1(1). address correspondences to: vadim keyser, assistant professor, california state university, fresno email: vkeyser@mail.fresnostate.edu mailto:vkeyser@mail.fresnostate.edu analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 1 agitating for munificence1 or going out of business: philosophy’s dilemma susan t. gardner philosophy has a dirty little secret and it is this: a whole lot of philosophers have swallowed the mechanistic billiard ball deterministic view of human action—presumably because philosophy assumes that science demands it, and/or because modern attempts to articulate in what free will consists seem incoherent (e.g., that free will might somehow be found in the indeterminacy of subatomic particles2). this below-the-surface-purely-academic commitment to mechanistic determinism is a dirty little secret because an honest public commitment would render virtually all that is taught in philosophy departments incomprehensible. can “lovers of wisdom” really continue to tolerate such a heavy burden of hypocrisy? for it is maximally hypocritical, is it not, to teach ethics, or existentialism, or political philosophy, or critical thinking, or indeed to teach anything at all if one views the bodies of humans as entities determined by forces that are describable entirely under the auspices of physical/ chemical laws. the only option, it would seem, to avoid such hypocrisy is to go out of business. after all, either base metal can be turned into gold, or it cannot. we found out long ago that it cannot, and so alchemy was rightly banished into the dustbin of history. likewise, either philosophy can enhance the wisdom quotient of its disciples as its name implies, and thus override billiard ball mechanics, or it cannot. and if it cannot, it deserves to follow alchemy to an ignominious end. before we go quietly into the night, however, let us reflect upon whether putting on a more finely grained pair of theoretical glasses might yet let us see the possibility of gold in “them there determined hills.” the theoretical focus that i have in mind is one that seeks first to examine an intermediate mode of movement, namely the behavior of our animal friends. it is my contention that, once we understand how the development of consciousness transforms the mere movement of inanimate objects into animate behavior, we will be in a much better position to understand how the development of self-consciousness and language transforms animate behavior into the possibility of cooperative human action. and from there, we will be in a still better position to see how reasoning—in particular impartial reasoning—can transform the conforming action of self-conscious humans into the possibility of self-legislating autonomous individuals. in a nutshell, then, what i am going to argue is that kant got it right when he argued that autonomy requires that humans rise above their sensuous nature, but that his portrayal was incomplete in that he failed to take into account the nature of both consciousness and self-consciousness, and therefore failed to see that there were more steps to freedom than just one. more precisely, what i am going to argue is that there are 3 steps to 3 different kinds of freedom, each logically and metaphysically dependent on the step before (as each is freedom from the previous way of being). autonomy is the pinnacle. so let us look at animate behavior pavlov, and after him the entire behaviorist movement, long ago showed that the configuration of selfpropelled animate behavior can best be explained by reference to the geometric sum of environmental appetitive stimuli that elicit approach responses, and environmental aversive stimuli that elicit avoidance responses. this is a seminal claim (seemingly ignored by philosophers) since what behaviorists are saying is that the behavior of animals, rather than being explained by reference to a push-from-behind mechanistic dynamic requires, instead, analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 2 a reference to the quasi-magnetic pull of perceived stimuli that emerge with the development of consciousness. and what is important here is that, though the resulting behavior is still utterly determined, it is determined in an entirely different way than the way non-animate objects are determined, as a dog scampering up hill (thus defying the laws of gravity) to fetch a ball that is (gravitationally) rolling down to it so amply demonstrates. and it is this recognition—that there are different kinds of determinism—that, i will argue, ultimately opens up the way to seeing how freedom in the self-legislative sense is possible. so let us begin. layers of determinism step one in the evolutionary change in the “dynamic of movement” of entities that populate our world is, as has already been outlined, the development of consciousness whereby animate beings are freed from the determining forces of physical/chemical laws by being ensnared by the determining perceptual forces of environmental stimuli. understanding this step is critically important because once we understand step one, step two—or the behavioral impact of the evolution of self-consciousness—becomes readily explainable. that is, if we adopt the model suggested some time ago by george herbert mead3 and charles horton cooley4, and later empirically supported by gordon g. gallop5, we can describe self-consciousness as the capacity to perceive one’s self from the point of view of another that emerges as a result of a systematic correlation—either in reality or, more importantly and pervasively, in the imaginative space created by symbolic, i.e., linguistic, interaction—between one’s own behavior and the reaction of others. thus, if young johnny is systematically exposed to his mother’s enthusiastic approval of toy-sharing (either through direct experience or through story-telling), in future potential toy-sharing situations, johnny will generate an image of an approving mother, which, if sufficiently strong, will take control of his behavior. johnny, in other words, becomes self-conscious when he becomes conscious of the value of his behavior from another’s viewpoint, and the behavioral offshoot of the emergence of this selfconsciousness is what psychologists refer to as the development of self-control. there are three things of note with regard to this dynamic. the first is that the underlying behavioral influence of self-consciousness is similar to the influence of mere consciousness in that what controls action here is a perceived stimulus, though in the case of self-consciousness, the stimulus is self-generated, and a product of the social rather than the physical environment. the second thing of note is that the associational learning, which for animals transpires in reality, can, for linguistically interacting entities, transpire in the imagination, thus rendering inter-human behavior-modification far more precise and pervasive, yet more invisible. and the third point of note is that, though psychologists refer to this as the development of self-control, in reality what we have here is the emergence of social control. that is, what we have here—if indeed the image of approving mom elicits a sharing response—is mommy controlling her child from afar. so the question is ”what now”? if fundamental changes in movement through phylogenetic and ontogenetic development occur as a result of entities escaping lower-level determining forces by being ensnared in higher levels of determinism, where do we go from here? if autonomy is the goal, what is the next step that humans need to take in order to free themselves from the determinism of social forces?” the answer is that, since social determinism results largely because social others plug into one’s practical reasoning by pairing, through linguistic interaction, an imagined action with an imagined reinforcement (e.g., all good children share their toys), the most effective way to take control of one’s own behavior is to take control over one’s own practical reasoning. and the only way to do that is to neutralize outside influence, or bias by submitting all of one’s beliefs, opinions, judgments, and—most importantly—the vision of who it is that one wants to become6, to the objective court of reason and to let the best option, i.e., the one backed by the strongest reasons, win. autonomy, in other words, requires that humans allow themselves to be determined by the rules of reason. elsewhere7 i have argued that, contrary to kant’s internal univeralization test, the best way to ensure impartiality is to reflect upon and “objectively” test one’s own viewpoints against those of actual others. and though this analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 3 is a critically important issue the details of which will ultimately determine how best to guide others to “think their way to freedom,” what is important here is to demonstrate how impartiality fits into the bigger metaphysical picture, which can be summarized as follows. freedom and determinism are not the antagonistic, mutually exclusive positions that they are often portrayed to be. indeed the possibility of any kind of freedom depends, both literally and conceptually, upon the actuality of many layers of determinism. the fact that physical objects move according to physical/chemical laws is the foundational position of determinism, both concretely and conceptually. however, animate beings, precisely because they are also determined by the stimulus environment in which they move, are—to a greater or lesser extent—freed from the universal determining power of physical/chemical laws (e.g., they can move up hill). on still another level, symbolically interacting self-conscious entities, precisely because they are also determined by the values that they introject from symbolically interacting others, are—to a greater or lesser extent—freed from the determining power of behavioral laws (e.g., i can share my chocolate cake). and finally, linguistically interacting self-conscious agents, who strive for impartiality by submitting to the determining rules of practical reasoning, free themselves from the determining power of social influence (e.g., i can override introjected values that seem contrary to the individual i hope to become) and, in so doing, make autonomy, and its existential counterpart, individuality, possible.8 “but is this really real freedom?” one might finally ask. “is flying from conformity into the freedom of impartiality good enough?” the answer i suggest is: “how much better freedom do you want than the freedom to genuinely listen to the merits of opposing viewpoints in an effort to reach an impartial judgment?” from a societal point of view, if a sufficient number embrace this process, kant’s kingdom of ends will be within our visionary ideal. and from an individual point of view, we can expect that agents will no longer suffer the anxiety of simply being blown whichever way the winds blow. since they will recognize that their decisions, judgments, opinions, and overall vision of who it is that they want to become are a product of their own reasoning rather than a result of societal influence, individuals who consistently strive to view and judge impartially will flourish with a sense of dignity that is well deserved. besides, and as somewhat of an aside, through the platform from which this discussion was launched, this is precisely the kind of freedom that is good enough to keep philosophy unhypocritically afloat. this picture of freedom, after all, demonstrates in detail how vision matters, and since philosophers speak to vision, since philosophers can prod, poke, nudge and provoke their students to challenge their biases so that they are catapulted into the stratosphere of objectivity, autonomy, and individuality, it turns out that we philosophers can, with integrity, go back to our roots. we can become gadflies for the good. we can—and we ought because we can—fall inline with the socratic echo, and agitate for munificence. an addendum it is of interest to note that, in a recent experiment9, social scientists showed that when subjects are exposed to the deterministic message “that free will contradicts the known fact that the universe is governed by the lawful principles of science,” those subjects were far more likely to cheat both in a quiz situation and one in which money was involved than those who are not so exposed. what is particularly interesting about this experiment is that it not only makes an even stronger case for the danger of a wholesale commitment to a mechanistic physicalistic view of human action, but as well, in and of itself, it undermines such a viewpoint, and points instead to the fact that we are all in the business of what daniel dennett10 refers to as memetic engineering, i.e., that the pictures that we paint with our words can override physicalistic deterministic influences. the argument that is being presented here goes still further by making the claim that, though in many instances such memetic engineering can lead to social determinism, it can, as well, inspire others to think through beliefs and opinions impartially, and, in so doing, open up the way for individuals to capture their own freedom. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 4 endnotes 1. defined as “splendidly gracious; having a generous nature; hospitable to differing viewpoints.” 2. in his book minds, brains and science, (cambridge, mass: harvard university press, 1984) john serle writes for instance that: “indeterminism at the level of particles in physics is really no support at all to any doctrine of the freedom of the will; because first, the statistical indeterminacy at the level of particles does not show any indeterminacy at the level of the objects that matter to us—human bodies, for example. and secondly, even if there is an element of indeterminacy in the behaviour of physical particles—even if they are only statistically predictable—still, that by itself gives no scope for human freedom of the will; because it doesn’t follow from the fact that particles are only statistically determined that the human mind can force the statisticallydetermined particles to swerve from their paths. . . . so it really does look as if everything we know about physics forces us to some form of denial of human freedom. (87) 3. mead. g. h. on social psychology. a. strauss (ed.) chicago: university of chicago press, 1934. 4. cooley, c. h. human nature and the social order. new york: schocken books, 1964. 5. gallup, g. g. “self-recognition in primates: a comparative approach to the bidirectional properties of consciousness.” american psychologist, vol. 32, may 1977, 329-338. 6. it is of note that creating a “magnetic vision” of who it is that one wants to become requires self-consciousness, a robust sense of time, and (as existentialists have pointed out) a deep understanding of one’s own mortality so that one has a sense of oneself as a finite process to which evaluative defining predicates can be applied. 7. gardner, susan t. thinking your way to freedom: a guide to owning your own practical reasoning. philadelphia: temple university press, 2009. 8. this “evolution of movement” finds parallel empirical support in the work of developmental psychologists such as: kohlberg, l. “stages and sequences: the cognitive-developmental approach to socialization,” in d. gaslin (ed.), in handbook of socialization theory and research. new york: rand-mcnally, 1969, and loevenger, j. ego development. san francisco: jossey-bass, inc., 1976. 9. vohs, kathleen d. and jonathan w. schooler. “the value of believing in free will: encouraging a belief in determinism increases cheating.” psychological science, vol. 19, number 1, january 2008. 49-54 (6). 10. dennett, daniel c. freedom evolves. new york: viking, 2003. according to dennett, “a meme is an information-packet with attitude—a recipe or instruction manual for doing something cultural”(176). dennett argues that such “shared knowledge is the key to our greater freedom from ‘genetic determinism’”(166), and that “the issue is not about determinism, either genetic or environmental or both together; the issue is about what we can change whether or not our world is deterministic” (160). with regard to the more traditional libertarian notion of free will, dennett argues that that kind of freedom (whatever that is) is not worth wanting (136), in contrast to the “incremental character-building that may (and may not) grow out of a lifetime of hard choices taken seriously (that) really does add a ‘variety of free will worth wanting’” (126). address correspondence to: susan t. gardner capilano university north vancouver, canada sgardner@capilanou.ca analytic teaching and philosophical praxis analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 38, issue 1 (2017) editor’s notes the six articles that make up the current issue of volume 38 survey a range of issues germane to the practice of successfully teaching philosophy both at the college and k-12 level. thematically, the six articles fall into three broad categories. the first two focus on links between philosophy and oppression. tarrant and d’olimpio explore how the community of inquiry can improve students’ ability to identify oppression while haenel looks to how academic philosophy, particularly analytic philosophy, discriminates against female and minority students. the second two articles engage the tradition of pfc directly —miller by examining the positive impact of aporetic thinking on student grit and de marzio by offering an instructive analysis of lipman’s notion of modeling. the last two take up themes we looked at in volume 37 on the relation between art and philosophy. keyser provides an informative account of how art can be used in courses like the philosophy of science to help explain complicated scientific notions, while ioannou, georgiou and ventista explain why art museums serve as the ideal environment for philosophical inquiry with children. together, the six articles provide a wide range of innovative analyses and examples that seek to deepen not only how we teach but also what we teach. i also wanted to inform you of an important change taking place at the journal. we have decided to strengthen our ties with the department of education here at viterbo and look forward to doing more collaborative projects with them in the future. philosophy for children and community of inquiry, as well as philosophy of education, will continue to be the mainstay of the journal, but we also hope that reinforcing our ties with the school of education will open up new and exciting opportunities in the future. i hope the current volume finds you all doing well and engaged in a project you love. pax et bonum jason j. howard chief editor jason j. howard viterbo university web page master jason skoog viterbo university copy editor jan wellik viterbo university editorial board sara cook viterbo university susan gardner capilano university susan hughes viterbo university david kennedy montclair state university nadia s. kennedy stony brook university, suny richard morehouse, emeritus viterbo university félix garcía moriyón center for philosophy for children, madrid, spain joe oyler institute for the advancement of philosophy for children montclair state university barbara weber university of british columbia publisher viterbo university, la crosse, wisconsin 45601 established in 1981 as analytic teaching at texas wesleyan college and transferred to viterbo in 1993. online copyright 2005. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis is a peer-reviewed, online, open access journal published annually and sometimes biannually. issn 2374-8257 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 89 the problem of the relationship between philosophical and theological wisdom in the scholasticism of the 13th and early 14th centuries severin v. kitanov the ominous wisdom of aristotle, the philosopher in the first ordinary question of the secular oxford theologian henry of harclay (ca. 1270–1317), a question dealing with the possibility of accurately predicting the second coming of christ, we read the following account of a story told by alexander neckham (1157–1217), a christian theologian and abbot of cirencester (ca. 1212): we should also look at the remarkable story alexander neckham tells in his second book of on the nature of things, in the chapter called ‘on the jealous’. it concerns the evidence for antichrist’s coming. he writes that aristotle, the philosopher, when about to go the way of the flesh, gave instructions that all of his subtlest writings were to be placed with him in his tomb, so that they could be of no use to those who came after him. when he was alive, he fortified a place for his tomb with his own hands so that to this day no one has been able to enter it. this place, neckham writes, will be given over to antichrist when he comes. antichrist, then, will work wonders by means of the cunning inventions (per ingenia subtilia) to be found in aristotle’s writings, so much so that the foolish will take him for god. at that time, if anyone were to know where aristotle’s tomb was and were to see it lying open, that person could (if the story is true) argue that antichrist had come. [transl. by edwards & henninger]1 the story henry of harclay narrates is an excellent illustration of the ambiguity characteristic of the attitude of thirteenth-century university professors toward aristotle’s recently discovered legacy. on the one hand, one recognizes the immense respect and admiration for aristotle’s intellectual acumen. on the other hand, one senses the enormous tension between aristotle’s intellectual universe and the christian worldview. alexander neckham’s2 association of aristotle’s most sophisticated writings with the deviousness of the antichrist creates the double impression of aristotle as an individual of profound but ominous insight. once aristotle’s philosophical writings became an established part of university education,3 christian scholars faced the difficult challenge of reconciling aristotle’s intellectual world with the claims of christian doctrine. aristotle had distinguished between philosophical (sophia) and practical wisdom or prudence (phronesis). broadly speaking, prudence involves the know-how requisite for performing adequate actions in different realms of human endeavor. in the narrow sense, prudence is moral wisdom, i.e. the knowledge of the principles conducive to a good and fulfilling human life and the expertise in applying those principles to the varying circumstances of human existence.4 in the nicomachean ethics, aristotle calls philosophical wisdom an intellectual virtue and defines it as the product of both science (epistêmê) and intuitive grasp or understanding (nous). in the metaphysics, aristotle links philosophical wisdom with the study of the first principles and highest causes. christian scholars had to show that philosophical wisdom is insufficient on its own and that a higher form of wisdom is required in addition to philosophical wisdom.5 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 90 thomas aquinas is the prime example of the attitude according to which theological wisdom complements and completes philosophical wisdom. for him, natural human reason is powerful but limited. the wisdom acquired through the study of sacred scripture can assist the human intellect in the pursuit of absolute truth. in fact, some of the truths of faith fall within the domain of human reason and can be examined independently of scripture. revelation provides the additional supernatural dimension to truth as known by human reason. this dimension transcends the natural light of reason and it is yet indispensable for a complete account of reality.6 as witnessed by some of the theses of the famous 1277 parisian condemnation, aquinas’s generous interpretation of the relationship between philosophical and theological wisdom posed some insurmountable conceptual problems, e.g. regarding the compatibility between the biblical doctrine of creation in time and aristotle’s hypothesis of the eternity of the universe.7 moreover, some scholastics questioned the very existence of wisdom other than that associated with the practice of philosophy. thesis 182 of the condemned propositions, for instance, asserts that “one does not know anything more by the fact that he knows theology.”8 it is difficult to imagine a more radical assault on the value of theology as an independent theoretical discipline than the claim that the knowledge of the theologian, and not just any self-professed theologian but the welltrained university theologian, amounts to nothing more than what one might come to know by natural means alone. at the heart of the mistrust of theology’s independent status was the conviction that theology, as a purely theoretical discipline, does not and cannot satisfy aristotle’s requirements for it to be called wisdom. we can, therefore, ask: what aristotelian requirements did theology fail to meet for it to be justifiably called wisdom, and if theology can be called wisdom in some sense, how did christian theologians conceive of the relationship between theological and philosophical wisdom? certitude with respect to first principles as the starting point of philosophical wisdom and the possibility of a scientific theology9 in both his nicomachean ethics and metaphysics, aristotle characterizes wisdom (sapientia) as the highest and most certain of all the sciences. in book vi of the ethics, aristotle describes wisdom as the knowledge of divine things and as the most certain, crown-science.10 in book i of the metaphysics, aristotle defines wisdom as the science of the first and highest causes.11 the wise man, according to aristotle, governs and is not governed.12 the wise man knows all things universally; he knows the most difficult things, has certitude, is capable of providing an account of the origin of his own knowledge, and masters the supreme and most autonomous science.13 later on in metaphysics, book vi, aristotle associates philosophical wisdom with the science of first philosophy (or metaphysics), which deals with the causes and principles of beings as beings.14 aristotle also calls metaphysics the most enjoyable and divine of the theoretical sciences.15 for a brief moment in aristotle’s metaphysics, the speculative study of being as being becomes a theology, i.e. a study of god. this occurs in metaphysics, book xii, where aristotle introduces the concept of the unmoved mover and discusses the life of god.16 aristotle’s various characterizations of metaphysics gave rise to differing scholastic conceptions of the genuine object of metaphysics as a science: the first and highest causes, being as such, god and the separate intelligences.17 because of aristotle’s association of philosophical wisdom with the practice of metaphysics and because of aristotle’s categorization of metaphysics as the supreme and most autonomous science, christian theologians attempted to incorporate metaphysics into the study of theology and met, as a result, with the difficulty of transforming theology into a scientific discipline in the aristotelian sense of the term. the most formidable objection to the enterprise of justifying the scientific status of theology was based on aristotle’s requirement of certitude with respect to the first principles and causes. aristotle’s requirement meant that one can never be mistaken with respect to the starting points and first causes of one’s scientific investigation.18 but can theology meet aristotle’s certitude requirement in order to be called science and wisdom in the aristotelian sense? thomas aquinas argued that since theology is based on divine revelation and not natural huanalytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 91 man reason alone, theology is rightfully called the highest wisdom.19 he attempted to handle aristotle’s certitude requirement by postulating the existence of a higher science, that of god and the blessed, to which theology in this life is subordinate and from which it derives the certitude of its own principles. the truths of christian doctrine, according to aquinas, are not evident in the light of natural reason, but they are nevertheless certain because they are evident to god and those who see god face-to-face in heaven.20 the obvious philosophical problem with aquinas’s account of theology as a scientific discipline and a form of wisdom is that, regardless of its indebtedness and proximity to aristotle’s model of the subalternation of the sciences in terms of the derivation of their first principles, aquinas’s account rests upon the assumption that there is indeed a science of god and the blessed which guarantees the credibility of theological doctrines and the reliability of the theological method.21 one may ask how one assumption can give any more credibility to another assumption if it is possible that the initial assumption is false. in other words, how can one have certitude with respect to one’s starting points in theology in this life if it is uncertain whether there indeed is any higher science – the theology of god and the blessed – capable of providing the lacking certitude. philosophical wisdom in the service of deductive and declarative theology the thirteenth-century debate over the relationship between theological and philosophical wisdom gave rise to two competing conceptions regarding the place of philosophical wisdom in the actual practice of theology in the context of university education. these conceptions are known under the titles of “deductive” and “declarative” theology and can be understood, at least indirectly, as emerging from an inherent ambivalence in the medieval scholastic view of philosophy as a servant (ancilla) with respect to theology – ancilla in the sense of famulatus (“submissive service”) and ancilla in the sense of subalternatio (“lower in priority”).22 according to “deductive” theology, philosophical wisdom allows one to derive conclusions from the articles of faith in harmony with strict scientific procedures. the approach can be traced to the writings of william of auxerre (ca. 1150–1231) and aquinas, but the dominican theologian godfrey of fontaines (ca. 1250–ca. 1306) was among its most prominent representatives. according to “declarative” theology, philosophical wisdom amounts to no more than aiding one’s comprehension of the mysteries of faith and deepening one’s belief. the model of “declarative” theology, also called “defensive” or “persuasive” theology, was inspired by aurelius augustine. the franciscan theologian peter auriol (ca. 1280–1322) was among the most well-known exponents of this type of theology.23 both approaches depart from aquinas with respect to what it means for theology to have certitude. godfrey of fontaines distinguished between certitude of evidence (objective certitude) and certitude of conviction (psychological certitude) and argued that aquinas was mistaken in calling theology a science in the strict sense of the term because that implied that theology has both kinds of certitude. for godfrey, theology is a science in an improper sense only, viz. in the sense that it studies the loftiest subject matter and in the sense that it is more evident to the theologian than to the simple believer.24 but whereas deductive theologians conceived of the theological method in the narrow sense of making proper inferences from the principles of faith, declarative theologians understood the theological method as also involving the clarification of theological concepts and terms, on the one hand, and the explication and defense of essential christian doctrines, on the other.25 philosophical and theological wisdom as autonomous and mutually exclusive realms especially problematic from the point of view of christian theology was the theory that theology and philosophy constitute two independent and mutually exclusive realms of inquiry. this theory was associated with the muslim philosopher ibn rushd or averroës (ca. 1126–1198), whose many commentaries on aristotle served as a powerful tool for the study and incorporation of aristotle’s philosophy in the latin west. but averroës was not only a commentator. he also wrote several philosophical treatises aimed at expounding and defending aristotle’s philosophy against the criticism of muslim theologians and the syncretism of avicenna’s philosophical system. the key to understanding averroës’ view of the place and role of philosophy in relationship to the practice of islam is the decisive treatise (fasl al-maql), which explored the relationship of “parentage” (ittisal) between analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 92 the way of life advocated by the qur’nic law (shari‘a) and the wisdom (hikma) pursued in philosophy.26 according to averroës, the law recommends the use of rational analysis and encourages philosophical reflection.27 there cannot be a genuine opposition between religious (or revealed) and philosophical truth.28 if a specific qur’nic text contradicts established philosophical doctrines, the scholar ought to apply the means of figurative commentary to get to the true meaning of that text.29 if the scholar, presumably the qualified judge of difficult questions, makes an interpretive mistake, he is excused according to the words of the prophet insofar as he has at least made a personal effort (ijtihad) to solve the conceptual problem posed by the qur’anic text.30 most importantly, however, because of its character of a universal revelation, the qur’an makes possible different levels of comprehension of one and the same truth in agreement with different levels or degrees of education. the most educated men, those trained in aristotelian syllogistic logic, are capable of penetrating the symbolic veil of the qur’anic text and grasping its unifying meaning.31 thirteenth-century latin followers of averroës (also known as latin averroists) were not familiar with the complex analysis of the relationship between muslim law and philosophy in averroës’ decisive treatise and believed that he had advocated the theory of double truth. according to this theory, there is no genuine unity between theological and philosophical wisdom. one could speak as if from two different perspectives or points of view: that of the theologian and that of the philosopher. these two perspectives are incompatible, and so what the theologian considers true is regarded as false by the philosopher and vice versa.32 the figures associated with the theory of double truth were siger of brabant (ca. 1240–ca. 1284) and boethius of dacia (fl. ca. 2nd half of the thirteenth century). the teachings of these two parisian thinkers and some unknown members of the arts faculty were the primary target of the 1277-condemnation.33 the separation of faith and reason is especially evident in the writings of boethius of dacia. boethius did not actually deny the truth of christian revelation. he only attempted to impose clear boundaries on what humans can know by natural means alone.34 one of the most important aspects of boethius’s thought, however, is the view that the philosophical lifestyle, which involves the rational investigation and pursuit of truth, is the most fulfilling and enjoyable way of life. this is not to say that a human being has no higher supernatural end beyond the reach of the present life. it does mean, however, that, in this life, there is no more fulfilling and happy life than that of the philosopher.35 philosophical wisdom as a fool’s wisdom in the aftermath of the 1270 and 1277 parisian condemnations, christian scholars were much more apprehensive about the project of establishing a christian philosophy through a straightforward synthesis of the claims of christian revelation with the demands of aristotelian metaphysics and syllogistic logic. christian thinkers attempted to show the limitations of aristotle’s philosophy by pointing out areas where the aristotelian conceptual apparatus was ill-equipped to deal with fundamental insights peculiar to the christian worldview. a good example is the franciscan theologian and philosopher, john duns scotus’s attempt to re-cast aristotle’s account of the process of moral deliberation in terms of the relationship between the human intellect as a merely natural power incapable of self-determination and the human will as a fully rational, self-determining power.36 one of the most remarkable developments pertaining to the problem of the relationship between theological and philosophical wisdom concerns the application of aristotelian syllogistic logic to principal christian doctrines such as the belief in the trinity and the incarnation. protecting the integrity of theological discourse required either excluding these doctrines from the domain of aristotelian syllogistic logic altogether or modifying the art of syllogistic demonstration by means of special rules applicable solely in the context of belief. i focus mainly on the view according to which christians are bound by special rules of faith. according to this view, the authority of scriptural and ecclesiastical tradition and not natural reason as such is the final arbiter in matters of faith.37 christians ought to respond to arguments against faith by using the rules of the logic of faith (logica fidei). in essence, this view implied that – ordinary logic aside – the theologian obligates himself to principles governing an imaginary logical game in which one ought to accept whatever follows from given premises taken as true and reject all consequences incompatible with these premises.38 the english dominican theologian robert analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 93 holcot (b. ca. 1290–d. 1349), whom i shall discuss in more detail, was among the main advocates of the logic of faith. but the roots of this view can be traced to the writings of the most well-known medieval logician, the franciscan theologian and philosopher william of ockham (b. ca. 1285–d. 1347/49), who maintained that theology begins with premises and involves consequences which are not open for debate, but whenever a theological problem arises that is not immediately related to the official doctrinal formulations of the church, the problem is to be examined according to the rules of ordinary reasoning.39 robert holcot was both a dominican friar and a follower of william of ockham. h.g. gelber notes that “holcot’s education took place in the wake of william of ockham’s career at oxford and of the beatification of thomas aquinas.”40 holcot’s thought presents therefore an excellent study case for exploring early fourteenthcentury scholastic attitudes to the relationship between theological and philosophical wisdom. furthermore, holcot wrote a substantial and widely circulated commentary on the book of wisdom.41 there has been a considerable debate about how to interpret holcot’s views regarding the relationship between faith and reason. earlier twentieth-century scholars had taken holcot to be a skeptic. the growing consensus is that he was not a skeptic.42 it is easy enough to show why holcot gained the reputation of being a skeptic. holcot was deeply interested in circumscribing and differentiating from each other the realms of theological and philosophical wisdom. in one of the questions belonging to holcot’s first quodlibet, we find an enlightening treatment of whether catholics ought to concede contradictory propositions. the treatment is contained in the first article of a question titled: “whether this [proposition] ought to be granted – ‘god is father and son and holy spirit.’” holcot lists ten instructions regarding what a catholic ought to accept and/or reject. he says, for instance, that a catholic ought to concede statements contrary to reason, and, more precisely, statements with unknown truth value.43 furthermore, only the vicar of christ on earth, that is the pope, has the authority to determine what ought to be granted or not.44 a catholic should not endeavor to demonstrate the truth of the articles of faith through natural reason but only by means of authority, revelations, or miracles.45 a catholic should not attempt to respond scientifically to the arguments of heretics and philosophers unless those arguments are formally incorrect. a catholic cannot in principle demonstrate the falsity of the premises of heretical or philosophical arguments because doing so requires demonstrating the truth of the articles of faith, which is beyond the ability of the wayfarer (viator) in this life.46 most importantly, holcot states that a catholic ought to respond to arguments contrary to faith on the basis of spiritual rules. he gives the example with anselm of canterbury’s rule which stipulates that one ought to grant the unity of the trinity in syllogistic discourse unless the identity of the persons is undermined as a result of a given syllogistic argument. in the latter case, holcot says, one ought to accept the premises of the argument and deny the conclusion.47 ultimately, a catholic ought not to use any logic in conceding or rejecting propositions and consequences pertaining to faith unless the church has so determined. natural logic, holcot states, cannot handle satisfactorily the subject matter of faith (credibilia). a case in point, according to holcot, is the following expository syllogism (i.e. a syllogism involving singular premises)48: (p1) this thing is the father. (p2) this thing is the son. (c) therefore, the father is the son. one should not accept the conclusion of the syllogism although the argument is formally impeccable.49 in response to the objection that it is pointless for a theologian to learn logic,50 holcot states that the study of logic in theology is useful mainly for the purpose of defeating sophistical arguments.51 what can we tell about holcot’s understanding of the relationship between theological and philosophical wisdom on the basis of the aforementioned directives pertaining to the use of logic in theology? we might be tempted to infer that holcot was indeed highly skeptical with respect to what natural reason can achieve in the realm of theology. in the prologue to his wisdom commentary, holcot indeed states that “the strength of the analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 94 secular sciences does not exceed the power of human reason whereas the strength of the most sacred theology, which ensues from the authority of the first truth, exceeds the power of any given [human] intelligence.”52 moreover, there is no room for a philosophical practice apart from the practice of christianity. the church has absorbed the ancient wisdom of plato, pythagoras and aristotle. compared to christ, the wisdom of the philosophers is foolishness.53 does all this mean that one ought to embrace christianity blindly? oberman explains that holcot’s aim is not to eliminate or negate reason altogether but, rather, to humble reason’s pretensions to absolute certitude in matters of faith. reason can only supply probable and insufficient grounds for belief in god. reason, however, is an indispensable tool for any genuine effort (facere quod in se est) to come to terms with the divine. revelation presupposes the use of reason even though the complete grasp of the divine is beyond the reach of reason.54 a probabilistic natural theology – concluding unscientific postscript one may ask in the end whether, and if so, to what extent did scholastics achieve the sought for synthesis between theological and philosophical wisdom? before i attempt to answer this question, i should like to make two important points. my first point is that the conflict between christian theology and the philosophy of aristotle involved more than a mere opposition between dogmatic adherence to the authority of scripture, on the one hand, and the rigor of aristotle’s scientific criteria. christian theologians were also deeply influenced by the augustinian view of the mind as deficient and in need of direction through divine illumination. in essence, then, the confrontation between christian theology and aristotelian philosophy was a confrontation between two very different systems of thought – the augustinian and the aristotelian – with their incompatible standards of truth and rationality.55 my second point is that prior to the arrival of aristotle in the west twelfth-century thought shows strong continuity with the ancient platonic ideal of philosophical wisdom as the speculative pursuit of eternal and immutable reality, on the one hand, and self-knowledge as the best form of therapy in this life, on the other.56 from the perspective of the platonic ideal, wisdom encompasses both an objective dimension – the knowledge of what is unchangeable – and a subjective dimension – the knowledge of oneself.57 under the influence of aristotle, thirteenth and fourteenth-century scholastics conceived of wisdom as primarily an objective or epistemic mode.58 at the dawn of the renaissance, however, we find in the writings of theologians such as meister eckhart (1260–1328) and nicolas of cusa (1401–1464) a serious effort to revitalize the platonic ideal of wisdom as the unifying horizon of the objective understanding of first truths and self-knowledge.59 given my two provisos regarding the complexity of the actual historical context, i suggest that medieval scholastics failed to fully synthesize theological and philosophical wisdom. this failure, however, was in some sense inevitable given the nature of such an ambitious enterprise. scholastic theologians in general believed that theology is in a unique position insofar as it provides a corrective with respect to philosophy’s claim to be the master discipline in virtue of philosophy’s genuine concern with wisdom. medieval scholastics had to claim this corrective function for theology as a theoretical discipline insofar as they maintained that theology begins with revealed knowledge, which, by definition, cannot be erroneous. from the point of view of philosophy as the master discipline, however, theology is inescapably problematic insofar as it demands adherence to propositions that may be ultimately false. it would be entirely anachronistic, nevertheless, to suppose that the medieval scholastics operated with a conception of philosophy as a fully autonomous discipline, a discipline independent of any other, and especially independent of theology. this kind of conception, in essence based on assumption, is more characteristic of the modern “secular” understanding of philosophy,60 some elements of which are of course latent in medieval scholasticism as witnessed by the 1277 parisian condemnation of latin averroism. most importantly, if, as james f. anderson points out, “christianity is true, philosophy is not absolutely autonomous; there is a higher science possible to man: a science based not on naturally known principles, but on principles revealed by god. if such a science – theology – exists, philosophy is necessarily inferior to it in the analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 95 very order of science.”61 suppose a philosopher granted the possibility of there being a science higher than philosophy and abandoned the dogmatic insistence on philosophy’s wholly independent status (and, according to anderson, “[i]t is impossible to maintain the absolute autonomy of philosophy without denying that theology is a science […]”62), how can the scholastic theologian attempt to make a case for the truth of christian convictions? perhaps the very best a theologian can do is showcase the plausibility of revealed truths by means of a probabilistic natural theology. this kind of theology insists that natural reason can indeed provide good although not definitive grounds for belief in the existence of god. a contemporary proponent of this view is richard swinburne. according to swinburne, natural and revealed theology can only differ in the degree of the probability of their proofs. any evidence in support of the claim that god exists makes it more probable that god has indeed revealed himself, and, similarly, any evidence in support of the truth of specific revealed doctrines (the trinity or the incarnation) makes it more probable that god exists.63 finally, one might also think of the possibility of a natural theology in terms of testing the belief in god’s existence through the method of counterexample and holding on to this belief in the absence of evidence to the contrary. one may thus be certain that god exists but not in the sense that it is impossible for one to be wrong. moreover, one may claim certainty with respect to revealed truths at least insofar as one can show that these truths are not logically impossible.64 given then that the pursuit of wisdom as an all-comprehensive and complete account of reality as such (i.e. knowledge of reality as if sub specie aeternitatis65) is not an entirely contradictory, and, so, meaningless project, and given that the theologian and philosopher are interested in the same kind of wisdom and that both keep an open mind, it should in principle be possible to show whether or not theological and philosophical wisdom do indeed converge. all one can say in the end is that if theologians and philosophers are equally motivated by the desire for truth and wish to unravel the ultimate mystery of reality, they are bound to work together toward an ever more increasing understanding of the absolute foundations of reality.66 endnotes 1 henry of harclay, ordinary questions, ed. by mark g. henninger, sj, english translation by raymond edwards & mark g. henninger, sj, auctores britannici medii aevi xvii (oxford: oxford university press, 2008), q. 1, n. 83, p. 63. 2 unlike at paris, where the public and private teaching of aristotle’s libri naturales and metaphysics was forbidden up until about 1240, oxford scholars began commenting on aristotle’s writings early during the thirteenth century. alexander neckham was the first english scholar who applied natural philosophy in theology. see fernand van steenberghen, aristotle in the west: the origins of latin aristotelianism, transl. by leonard johnston (louvain: nauwelaerts publishing house, 1970), 108. see also monica asztalos, “the faculty of theology,” in a history of the university in europe, vol. 1, ed. hilde de ridder-symoens (cambridge, uk: cambridge university press, 1992), 409–441, at 426. 3 the translation process of aristotle’s works of natural philosophy (libri naturales) and those of his arabic commentators had begun in the second quarter of the twelfth century. in 1210, ecclesiastical authorities at paris imposed a ban on the public and private teaching of aristotle’s natural philosophy. the ban was eventually lifted (ca. 1240) and aristotle’s libri naturales entered the curriculum of the parisian faculty of arts. aristotle’s metaphysics followed suit. see asztalos, “the faculty of theology,” 420–422. see also van steenberghen, aristotle in the west, 66–77, 108–109. 4 see john kekes, moral wisdom and good lives (ithaca/london: cornell university press, 1995), 16–17. 5 the main issue here concerned the epistemic status of theology with respect to aristotle’s understanding of science. see asztalos, “the faculty of theology,” 423–424. 6 thomas aquinas on faith and reason, ed., with introductions by stephen f. brown (indianapolis/cambridge: hackett publishing company, 1999), 114–115. see also asztalos, “the faculty of theology,” 423–424. 7 for a concise discussion and essential bibliography regarding the parisian condemnations of 1270 and 1277, see john f. wippel, “the parisian condemnations of 1270 and 1277,” in a companion to philosophy in the analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 96 middle ages, ed. by jorge j.e. gracia and timothy b. noone, blackwell companions to philosophy 24 (malden, ma/oxford, uk/carlton, victoria, aus: blackwell publishing, 2006 (hardback 2003)), 65–73. for the errors associated with aquinas, see stephen f. brown and juan carlos flores, historical dictionary of medieval philosophy and theology, historical dictionaries of religions, philosophies, and movements 76 (lanham, md/toronto/plymouth, uk: the scarecrow press, inc. 2007), 316. 8 see brown and flores, historical dictionary, 314. 9 my discussion focuses primarily on the problem of reconciling theology and philosophy as theoretical or speculative disciplines on the basis of aristotle’s criteria for science. i do not talk about the problem of reconciling the purely theological concept of wisdom as a gift of the holy spirit and the aristotelian concept of wisdom as an acquired intellectual habit. i also do not talk about the medieval scholastic discussion of the problem of defining wisdom as both understanding and science (which is basically the problem of the identity of wisdom as a virtue). for a discussion of these particular problems, see risto saarinen, “wisdom as intellectual virtue: aquinas, odonis and buridan,” in mind and modality: studies in the history of philosophy in honour of simo knuuttila, ed. by vesa hirvonen, toivo j. holopainen and miira tuominen, brill’s studies in intellectual history 141 (leiden/boston: e.j. brill, 2006), 189–198, esp. 191–192. 10 jacqueline hamesse, les auctoritates aristotelis: un florilège médiéval, étude historique et edition critique, philosophes médiévaux xvii (louvain/paris, 1974), p. 240, n. 113: “sapientia est cognitio rerum divinarum habens caput inter omnes alias scientias.”; n. 114: “sapientia est certissima omnium aliarum scientiarum.” 11 hamesse, les auctoritates aristotelis, p. 115, n. 11: “sapientia est scientia primarum et altissimarum causarum.” 12 hamesse, les auctoritates aristotelis, p. 116, n. 13: “sapientis non est ordinari, sed ordinare oportet, id est sapientis est regere et non regi.” 13 hamesse, les auctoritates aristotelis, pp. 115–116, n. 12: “sapientem oportet scire omnia in universali et scire difficillima et habere scientiam certiorem et scire reddere causas ipsorum quae scit et habere scientiam quae subordinet alias scientias subservientes et habere scientiam quae sui ipsius sit causa et non alterius.” 14 hamesse, les auctoritates aristotelis, p. 126, n. 143: “metaphysica considerat causas et principia entium in quantum entia.” 15 hamesse, les auctoritates aristotelis, p. 127, n. 147: “tres sunt partes philosophiae speculativae, scilicet naturalis, mathematica et divina, id est metaphysica.”; n. 150: “theoricae scientiae, id est speculativae, aliis scientiis sunt delectabiliores et metaphysica theoricis.” 16 aristotle’s unmoved mover or god has little to do with the gods of greek polytheism and with the idea of a supreme, benevolent, creative, omnipotent, and omniscient deity at the heart of christian monotheism. aristotle’s prime mover is a theoretical construct meant to provide a solution to the problem of the beginning of movement in the physical universe. see adam drozdek, greek philosophers as theologians: the divine arche (aldershot, u.k./burlington, vt: ashgate, 2007), 182–183. see also mary louise gill, “first philosophy in aristotle,” in a companion to ancient philosophy, ed. by mary louise gill and pierre pellegrin, blackwell companions to philosophy 31 (ma/oxford, uk/carlton, victoria, aus: blackwell publishing, 2009 (hardback 2006)), 347–373, at 368–369. 17 see joël biard, “god as first principle and metaphysics as a science,” in the medieval heritage in early modern metaphysics and modal theory, 1400–1700, ed. by r.l. friedman and l.o. nielsen, the new synthese historical library 53 (dordrecht/boston/london: kluwer academic publishers, 2003), 75–97, at 76–80; severin v. kitanov, “1200-luvun aristotelismi,” keskiajan filosofia, toim. vesa hirvonen & risto saarinen (helsinki: gaudeamus, helsinki university press, 2008), 47–64, at 52–53. 18 andreas speer, “certitude and wisdom in bonaventure and henry of ghent,” in henry of ghent and the transformation of scholastic thought: studies in memory of jos decorte, ed. by guy guldentops and carlos steel (leuven: leuven university press, 2003), 75–100, at 83. 19 thomas aquinas, summa theologiae, i, q. 1, a. 6, resp. 20 thomas aquinas, summa theologiae, i, q. 1, a. 2, resp. 21 i have in mind the deductive approach, according to which the theologian derives conclusions from the articles of faith. 22 according to s.f. brown, the term “subalternatio” could be taken to affirm the superiority of revealed truth analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 97 in relation to philosophical truth but it could also be interpreted as allowing for the development of an independent scientific discipline. see stephen f. brown, “theology and philosophy,” in medieval latin: an introduction and bibliographical guide, ed. by f.a.c. mantello and a.g. rigg (washington, dc: the catholic university of america press, 1996), 267–287, at 273–274. 23 brown and flores, historical dictionary, lx–lxiii; stephen f. brown, “declarative theology after durandus: its re-presentation and defense by peter aureoli,” in philosophical debates at paris in the early fourteenth century, ed. by stephen f. brown, thomas dewender, and theo kobusch, studien und texte zur geistesgeschichte des mittelalters 102 (leiden/boston: e.j. brill, 2009), 401–421, at 406–407 and 417–421; stephen f. brown, “declarative and deductive theology in the early fourteenth century,” in was ist philosophie im mittelalter? qu’est-ce que la philosophie au moyen âge? what is philosophy in the middle ages? akten des x. internationalen kongresses für mittelalterliche philosophie der société internationale pour l’étude de la philosophie médiévale 25. bis 30. august 1997 in erfurt, hrsg. von jan a. aertsen und andreas speer (berlin/new york: walter de gruyter, 1998), 648–655, at 648–649. 24 brown and flores, historical dictionary, lvii–lix; brown, “declarative and deductive theology,” 650. 25 brown and flores, historical dictionary, lxi–lxii; brown, “declarative theology after durandus,” 415–416; brown, “declarative and deductive theology,” 650–651. 26 see roger arnaldez, averroes: a rationalist in islam, transl. by david streight (notre dame, ind: university of notre dame press, 2000), 79. 27 arnaldez, averroes, 80–81. 28 arnaldez, averroes, 82. 29 arnaldez, averroes, 82–83. 30 arnaldez, averroes, 87–88. 31 arnaldez, averroes, 88–89. 32 i should note in this connection that parisian arts masters were required until the 15th century to swear obedience to a statute stating that any questions pertaining to faith ought to be determined according to faith, not according to reason, and that one is not allowed to discuss arguments contrary to faith. see asztalos, “the faculty of theology,” 424. 33 brown and flores, historical dictionary, 43–46. 34 brown and flores, historical dictionary, 59–60. 35 pierre hadot, what is ancient philosophy?, transl. by michael chase (cambridge, ma/london, u.k.: the belknap press of harvard university press, 2002), 262. see also andreas speer, “the vocabulary of wisdom and the understanding of philosophy,” in l’éboration du vocabulaire philosophique au moyen âge, actes du colloque international de louvain-la-neuve et leuven 12-14 septembre 1998 organisé par la société internationale pour l’étude de la philosophie médiévale, édités par jacqueline hamesse et carlos steel (louvain: brepols, 2000), 257–280, at 275–276. 36 see s.v. kitanov, beatific enjoyment in scholastic theology and philosophy: 1240–1335 (ph.d. diss. university of helsinki, 2006), 245–247. 37 whether the final arbiter in matters of faith ought to be the pope himself or a general council was by no means a settled question in the scholastic middle ages. the doctrine of papal infallibility was not formulated definitively until 18 july 1870 at vatican council i. the roots of the doctrine, however, can be traced back to fourteenth-century scholastic authors. for the origin and history of the doctrine of papal infallibility in medieval scholasticism, see brian tierney, origins of papal infallibility 1150–1350: a study on the concepts of infallibility, sovereignty and tradition in the middle ages (leiden: e.j. brill, 1972). 38 hester goodenough gelber, it could have been otherwise: contingency and necessity in dominican theology at oxford, 1300–1350 (leiden/boston: e.j. brill, 2004), 183–185. see also michael h. shank, “unless you believe, you shall not understand”: logic, university, and society in late medieval vienna (princeton, nj: princeton university press, 1988), 74–79. 39 s.v. kitanov, “peter of candia on beatific enjoyment: can one enjoy the divine persons separately from the divine essence?”, mediaevalia philosophica polonorum 35:1 (2006): 144–166, at 159–161. 40 robertus holcot, exploring the boundaries of reason: three questions on the nature of god, ed. by h.g. gelber, studies and texts 62 (toronto: pontifical institute of mediaeval studies, 1983), abstract page. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 98 41 kimberly georgedes, “robert holcot,” in a companion to philosophy in the middle ages, 609–610, at 609. 42 see holcot, exploring the boundaries of reason, 2. for a discussion of holcot’s supposed skepticism, see heiko augustinus oberman, the harvest of medieval theology: gabriel biel and late medieval nominalism (grand rapids, michigan: william b. eerdmans publishing company, 1967), 238–243. 43 holcot, exploring the boundaries of reason, p. 31, lin. 10–12: “circa primum articulum, dico primo quod catholicus debet concedere illa quae sunt contra rationem, hoc est, aliquas propositiones de quibus non potest sibi constare utrum sint verae vel falsae.” 44 holcot, exploring the boundaries of reason, p. 32, lin. 32–p. 33, lin. 44. 45 holcot, exploring the boundaries of reason, p. 33, lin. 45–48: “quarto, dico quod catholicus non debet niti ad probandum vel ostendendum quod sic est sicut articulus dicit per rationem innitentem lumini naturali, sed tantummodo per auctoritates et revelationes vel miracula.” 46 holcot, exploring the boundaries of reason, p. 33, lin. 51–57: “quinto, dico quod nec catholicus debet niti ad respondendum scientifice ad argumenta haereticorum et philosophorum nisi sint argumenta peccantia in forma, quia hoc non est sibi possible, quia respondere scientifice ad argumentum peccans in materia est ostendere aliquam praemissam esse falsam, sed impossibile est catholico ostendere quod oppositum articuli est falsum quia hoc esset ostendere ipsum articulum esse verum, quod est impossibile viatori de lege communi.” 47 holcot, exploring the boundaries of reason, p. 33, lin. 58–62: “sexto, dico quod argumentis factis contra fidem responderi debet per regulas catholicas quae sunt spirituales in spiritualibus materiis secundum determinationem sanctorum, sicut in materia de trinitate dantur regulae quod omnia sunt unum in divinis ubi non obviat relationis oppositio, et concedere tunc debet praemissas et negare conclusionem […]” 48 for an account of this problematic expository trinitarian syllogism, see simo knuuttila, “validity and logic in late medieval thought,” in the medieval heritage in early modern metaphysics and modal theory, 1400– 1700, 121–142, at 126–127. 49 holcot, exploring the boundaries of reason, p. 35, lin. 102–p. 36, lin. 116. 50 holcot, exploring the boundaries of reason, p. 36, lin. 117–118: “contra ista: si ista sunt vera, sequitur quod non sit utile theologo addiscere logicam.” 51 holcot, exploring the boundaries of reason, p. 36, lin. 119–123: “dico quod sic, magis tamen ad respondendum et solvendum rationes sophisticas quam ad adducendum. dicunt enim multi contra fidem et frivolas inducunt rationes, et ad tales sufficit ingenium per logicam informatam, unde aristoteles, de pomo, et tamen eodem modo logica est necessaria, ut beatus a loco non legatur.” 52 robertus holcot, super libros sapientiae (hagenau, 1494), prol., f, tertium principale: “robur namque scientiarum secularium non excedit potestatem rationis humane; sed certe robur sacratissime theologie est prime veritatis auctoritas que cuiuslibet ingenii vim excedit.” 53 holcot, super libros sapientiae (hagenau, 1494), prol., e: “petra autem erat christus, cui nullus hereticus nec philosophus comparatur, sicut in ps. 140: ‘absorpti sunt iuncti petre iudices eorum,’ [140(141):6] glossa. iudices eorum sunt potentes et doctors qui de moribus iudicabunt. plato, pithagoras et aristoteles absorpti sunt petre iuncti, idest, comparati christo, per se videntur aliquid dicere, sed iunge et compara eos christo, et nihil sunt, mortui iacent, et stulta est sapientia eorum, hec glossa.” see also oberman, the harvest of medieval theology, 242. 54 see oberman, the harvest of medieval theology, 243–244. 55 see alasdair macintyre, three rival versions of moral enquiry: encyclopaedia, genealogy, and tradition, being gifford lectures delivered in the university of edinburgh in 1988 (notre dame, ind: university of notre dame press, 1990), 109–111. 56 andreas speer, “the vocabulary of wisdom and the understanding of philosophy,” in l’élaboration du vocabulaire philosophique au moyen âge, édités par jacqueline hamesse et carlos steel, rencontres de philosophie médiévale 8 (louvain: brepols, 2000), 257–280, at 259–263. 57 speer, “the vocabulary of wisdom,” 262. 58 speer, “the vocabulary of wisdom,” 279. 59 speer, “the vocabulary of wisdom,” 280. 60 see james f. anderson, “is scholastic philosophy philosophical?”, philosophy and phenomenological research analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 99 10:2 (1949): 251–259, at 257. 61 anderson, “is scholastic philosophy philosophical?”, 257–258. 62 anderson, “is scholastic philosophy philosophical?”, 259. 63 richard swinburne, “the revival of natural theology,” archivio di filosofia 75:1–2 (2007): 303–322, at 321. 64 i thank ronald j. glass for this suggestion. 65 the possibility of knowing reality as such characterizes philosophy in its pre-critical phase, prior to correlationsim – the view that we can never grasp an object “in itself,” independently of or in isolation from its relation to the subject. see quentin meillassoux, after finitude: an essay on the necessity of contingency, transl. by ray brassier (london/new york: continuum, 2008), 5. 66 i find especially supportive of my view pope john paul ii’s admonition to philosophers and philosophy teachers to “have the courage to recover, in the flow of an enduringly valid philosophical tradition, the range of authentic wisdom and truth – metaphysical truth included – which is proper to philosophical inquiry.” see john paul ii, fides et ratio: on the relationship between faith and reason, encyclical letter to the bishops of the catholic church (boston, ma: pauline books & media, 1998), 128. address correspondences to: dr. severin v. kitanov assistant professor of philosophy 352 lafayette street salem state college salem, ma 01970 skitanov@salemstate.edu analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 20 the effects of assessment: a reflection from within the economic worldview in education olivier michaud in a seminar held in my university last fall on education policy research, i was, like many of my colleagues, as-tonished at the dominance of the economic worldview in the shaping of american education.1 the question of what good education is was surprisingly absent from the book used in the seminar: handbook of education policy research (sykes, barbara, & plank, 2009). the majority of the authors of this book were more interested in how we could make the educational system more efficient. more to the point, they were interested in how efficiency can be measured. this is why the main methodology used by the researchers was quantitative. indeed, the assumption is that only quantitative methods allow for a more accurate judgment of reality at large, in this case the educational system, and show possible links between causes and effects. the circle is complete: the economic worldview dominates the discussion on all aspects of policy research. the economic worldview in education gives us, as its main advice, to treat the educational system with the medicine of the market. we have to make the educational system efficient through the use of the business model. the prerequisite of this model is a simple outcome, because only a simple outcome can be measured or assessed clearly. finally, we evaluate the model through the logic of the model, i.e., the predominance of quantitative methods. everything is now understood through the lens of quantity and numbers. i don’t know for what reason my colleagues and i were surprised by the dominance of the economic worldview in education policy research. aren’t we already aware that this discourse is shaping most of the public sphere and, by extension, invading even the private sphere? bourdieu states it in a simple way: “everywhere we hear it said, all day long—and this is what gives the dominant discourse its strength—that there is nothing to put forward in opposition to the neo-liberal view, that it has succeeded in presenting itself as self-evident, that there is no alternative” (cited in hursh, 2001, p. 3). there is no reason why the same logic that is taking over the public domain will stop in face of the sacred role of education in our democracies. according to milton friedman, father of all the theories that aim at reshaping education through economy (belfield & levin, 2009, p. 516; carnoy, 2009, p. 31; witte, 2009), education is not a different good than other goods, there is no essential difference between food and education: “the role of the government, in market-education, says friedman, would be limited to insuring that schools met certain minimum standards, such as inclusion of minimum common content in their programs, much as it now inspects restaurants to insure that they maintain minimum sanitary standards” (quote of 1962 cited in witte, 2009, p. 491). therefore, the invasion of higher education by issues of assessment and measurement has to be put in a larger perspective. first, we have to recognize that higher education is poised to succomb to the same economic logic that has taken over virtually every other dimension of education. second, much of what determines education policy is largely a response to the market ideology that shapes the public domain. the goal of this article is to offer a rationale against this dominant economic model by analyzing one aspect of it: high stakes testing. according to jenlink and austin (2004), “the standards movement now dominates discussions about all aspects of education – teaching and learning, curriculum, and assessment – as well as all aspects of educator preparation” (p. 3). consequently, the choice to look more closely into high stakes testing, rather than some other feature, is not a trivial one, but speaks to the core elements of the economic ideology in education. rather than see this analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 21 situation as hopeless, i aim to show, through several qualitative studies on k-12 education, that we can use this type of economic logic against itself. but before we do that, let’s review a short history of the economic worldview in education. a short history and presentation of the economic worldview in education the educational situation in which we encounter ourselves today did not pop up accidentally in recent years; on the contrary, it has a long history. as said earlier, the theoretical roots of this movement at least go back to milton friedman in the sixties. however, it is with the publication of a nation at risk in 1983 that economic educational theory took a new direction that became predominant in the shaping of american education. according to cuban (1998), all the changes in educational policy in the united states since the publication of a nation at risk have been superficial, since all the politicians of the different parties and policymakers have adhered to the main principles of this work (p. 463). if there has been a change in the actors and the names of educational reforms, there has been no change in the basic principles. this trend continues up to the present: no child left behind (nclb) is the continuation and the intensification of the changes proposed in a nation at risk (olsen & sexton, 2009, p. 9; shoen & fusarelli, 2008, p. 190). the development of the economic view in education is based on the idea that the american schooling system is failing children and american society. first, the educational system does not prepare the american workforce for the global economy. second, it is failing because scores on various tests have not improved in the last decades even if the investment per student has increased significantly. the educational economists took a diagnostic of why the american schooling system has been failing. on one hand, it is failing because the laws of the market are inexistent in education. as a consequence, an important part of the solution to reform the failing system is to apply the laws of the market to education, which means improving competitiveness. this is the basis of what is called “public choice” in education (west, 2009). charter schools and voucher programs (belfield & levin, 2009; vergari, 2009; witte, 2009) are some of the direct effects of a policy that aims to create competition and choice in the american educational system. the creation of competition inside american schooling is twofold: first, it facilitates the creation of private schools and, second, it creates competition inside the public system (hess, 2009). on the other hand, the economic view in education also affirms that the american educational system can be managed as a business. the central concept of this theory lies in the idea of “accountability.” people working for the government have to be accountable to it. this is why the second concept that follows from the business model is that of “standards.” people can only be accountable if they know what they are accountable for: this is the role of standards. educational standards represent what the student is expected to learn at any given stage of education as well as how the student should progress through the education system. “the market-oriented education” is the belief that fair competition inside the american schooling system will result in a better education for all and, ultimately, a better society. indeed, this improvement of the educational system is necessary to establish fair competition among individuals. the democratic ideal that sustains this vision is the one that we usually refer to as the “american dream” (beach, 2007): there is natural inequality between people, but this can only be fully appreciated and assessed from the standpoint of fair competition. all individuals need some common standpoint or measure from the beginning of the competition, which ensures it is a fair competition. the idea is that a good education is something all require in a democratic meritocracy. furthermore, the public good will be naturally enhanced from the competition of all: everyone can share the burden of any democratic inequalities. i want to focus my attention on a particular aspect of the economic worldview in education, an aspect that is logically and naturally related to “accountability” and “standards,” namely, “high-stake testing.” testing is the tool that policy makers and politicians use to verify if educational actors (administrators of all levels, teachers and students) have attained the standards that were assigned to them. “test scores were favoured partly because analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 22 they were the most readily available measure of school outcomes” (carnoy, 2009, p. 31). without testing there is no accountability, because this is the most effective way to verify that standards are reached. moreover, to make accountability real there must be consequences attached to the people that do or do not achieve the goals given to them. depending on whether the standards are attained or not, there can be rewards or sanctions. a reward, for example, could be that certain teachers receive monetary bonuses, or that students receive a diploma, or that administrators receive public praise in seeing their school labelled as “successful.” the sanctions are more diverse: students jeopardize their chances to graduate, schools are publicly labelled as “failing” and, in some extreme cases, even closed and restructured. high-stakes testing performs various functions for those who advocate its use. first, as representing common standards, they give a reference point to all educational actors of what has to be achieved. second, they can give a description and evaluation of the education situation for not only policy makers and politicians, but also for teachers and administrators of a school and district. they can also provide data that can be used to inform people about a given educational situation, which allows for future actions to be taken and the potential success of these actions assessed. third, because the testing is related to positive and negative consequences, it is supposed to motivate actors to attain the goals assigned to them (herman & baker, 2009, p. 179). my next goal is to show the negative consequences of the widespread policy of high-stakes testing in education, referring to some recent qualitative studies that directly tackle this issue. my assumption is that most of the problems and criticisms with high-stakes testing at k-12 education also hold for higher education in general insofar as both buy into the same market ideology. perverse effects of high stakes testing teaching to the test one of the collateral effects often attributed to high-stakes testing is that curriculum is narrowed, which allows for teachers to teach to what the test assesses, therefore, narrowing significantly the education of children. this phenomenon is usually referred to as “teaching to the test” (herman & baker, 2009, p. 182). mcneil, coppola, radigan and heilig (2008) report in their research that teaching has been significantly affected by testing. teachers limit the curriculum to what will be assessed in the test. there is also an effect on the pedagogy used inside the classroom, increasing the use of drills to make the students learn the knowledge and skills they need to pass the test. narrowing the curriculum affects at risk students more than those in little danger of failing the test (mcspadden mcneil, coppola, radigan, & vasquez heilig, 2008, p. 28). the former lose their elective classes in order to focus on math and english (sipple, killeen, & monk, 2004, p. 154). for the same reason, other schools may ask their at risk students to stay after school (seachore louis, febey, & schroeder, 2005, p. 193). “teaching to the test” also narrows what it means to be educated. students will have to memorize a large amount of knowledge without seeing the usefulness of what they learn. learning then becomes disconnected from student lives (rigsby & demulder, 2003, pp. 19-20). lipman (2003) argues that, thanks to this process, at risk students learn obedience and powerlessness; the students are not recognized as agents of their learning but as passive actors that need to be filled with information and skills. this vision of how learning is degraded through “teaching to the test” is largely voiced by teachers. they feel that education becomes not only meaningless for the students, but also for themselves as teachers (rigsby & demulder, 2003, p. 17). for most teachers, teaching involves much more than “teaching to the test,” but is a passion that has to be shared with the students. students do not learn to read just for the sake of reading, they must learn to read texts that are meaningful (gerstl-pepin, 2006, p. 153). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 23 a variety of different studies report that teachers feel high-stakes testing is attacking their professionalism, limiting their autonomy as a teacher (e.g. seachore louis, febey, & schroeder, 2005, p. 184). what is more, the problem is far more serious for those teachers who have students at risk of failing tests (lipman, 2003, p. 337). teachers find it difficult to teach something that they believe is important and educational but yet is not explicitly required for test preparation (mabry & margolis, 2006, p. 12). the consequence is that teachers are losing their sense of agency in the educational process. some teachers conclude that they are no longer educators or teachers but, rather, technicians (rigsby & demulder, 2003, p. 17). they do not have to think, but rather apply mechanically what others have thought. this is well expressed in the following quote from a teacher: “it makes me feel, like, then, you don’t really need trained teachers; you just need trained monkeys” (cited in olsen & sexton, 2009, p. 23). as is evident, such testing policies clearly impact the morale of teachers, in which they feel unrecognized as professionals while being forced to do things they do not believe in. it undermines other essential dimensions of teaching as well, such as reflectivity and compassion (gerstl-pepin, 2006; rigsby & demulder, 2003). for example, some teachers report that they are thinking about quitting the profession because of the climate created by high-stakes testing. quite often high-stakes testing only compounds the anxiety and pressure felt by participants. students fail the tests because they are under stress. teachers and administrators at schools that are “high risk” usually feel more pressure. moreover, the pressure is higher when teachers and administrates believe there is no way to reach the objectives proposed to them, especially with the limited resources often available (mabry & margolis, 2006, p. 155; sipple, killeen, & monk, 2004). pressure comes not only from all levels of administration, but also from the public, since schools labelled as “failing” are publicly shamed. even schools that perform well are under constant pressure, as they want to keep their status of successful schools (seachore louis, febey, & schroeder, 2005, pp. 183, 186). equity one of the goals of high-stakes testing is efficiency. this is seen as a tool to make sure that the goals settled by policymakers and politicians are attained. however, there is another goal behind this policy as important as that of efficiency, namely, social justice or equity. the very name ‘no child left behind’ points out that goal. “the catch-phrase, ‘no child left behind,’ refers to federal efforts to remedy persistent gaps in student achievement results in comparison among majority student performance and groups of minority, low-income, english language learners, and students with disabilities” (lindle, 2009, p. 319). nclb aims to remedy the various achievement gaps in education among students of different groups by offering an education of quality to all. seen as such, it is the continuation of the democratic ideal where the success of an individual in school – and therefore in society – is not determined by his or her cultural and economic background. a lot of studies put in doubt the notion that the policy of high-stakes testing narrows achievement gaps. diamond (2007) concludes that such testing is ineffective as a means to narrow achievement gaps. this is also a finding of seashore louis, febey and schroeder (2005) in which they note that in one of the three schools they studied: “almost all teachers mentioned that poor, immigrant students’ needs were given inadequate consideration by state-level policymakers representing suburban and rural interests” (p. 192). the results of many studies corroborate the conclusion that high-stakes testing is not helping the communities that most need it. other researchers are far more radical in their estimation and affirm that high-stakes testing is increasing the very achievement gaps they were supposed to remediate (lipman, 2003; mcspadden mcneil, coppola, radigan, & vasquez heilig, 2008). lipman (2003) concludes that the latino and black communities in low income neighbourhoods are more at risk of being victims of the “teaching for the test” style of pedagogy. a school in a white middle class community can avoid this, since they are not in danger of failing the test (p. 338). for lipman, that situation prevents latino and black youths from low income communities from receiving an education that aims to teach them the higher critical thinking skills that could help them to resolve real life problems. lipman analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 24 claims that not only is high-stakes testing not resolving the achievement gaps, but that it is actually increasing them, preventing youth from learning those very skills needed to transform their situation. mcspadden mcneil, coppola, radigan and vasquez heilig (2008) arrive at the same conclusion, bringing to light another hidden side-effect of high-stakes testing. they studied a high school in a high-poverty urban district of texas and brought to light how this school improved their test score results by keeping at risk students from graduating into tenth grade. by keeping those students in ninth grade, they prevented them from taking the national test, which is given in tenth grade. the school could do this by using a waiver administered by the state education agency that permits schools to apply for special rules for graduation to some students. “it was a waiver from the traditional method of basing grade promotion on the number of accrued credits; a school under this waiver could base grade promotion on different criteria, such as having to pass four courses rather than gaining credits” (p. 21). the final consequence of this strategy was that a lot of students were just dropping out of school instead of repeating a year. the authors of the study argue that the decision to drop out of school is not the result of one cause, but the convergence of many, such as: students were repeating a year, students were identified as those who will underachieve in the state test, students report the experience of school as meaningless, useless and boring, and that the curriculum/pedagogy of their courses were completely shaped by the test. this strategy of the administrators and teachers of edgeview, the school studied by mcspadden mcneil, coppola, radigan and vasquez heilig (2008), is directly linked to the texan policy of high-stakes testing. the previous principal of the school had been fired for lack of results, even though he had improved the test scores from 15 to 20 % (p. 20). the teachers of edgeview had, for their part, to live with the public shame of being a failing school and facing the danger of being closed. the stakes were clear for the administrators and for the teachers of edgeview school. administrators and teachers saw, in the waiver, the most efficient way to improve their test scores. moreover, they knew that other schools in the district were improving their scores through the waiver. the administrators and the teachers were morally divided. on the one hand, they knew it was bad for the students. on the other hand, they had to avoid the negative consequences, such as, losing their jobs and being labelled a failing school. “ethically, i think it [the waiver] is wrong. but if i’m going to lose my job if my scores don’t go up, do i roll over and forget it?” (the principal of edgeview high school, cited p. 21). by using the waiver strategy the school was able to earn the title “recognized with exemplary progress” (p. 22). “this jump [in the test scores] earned the school its exemplary progress rating on the district’s accountability matrix and another star on the marquee in the front of the school for becoming a recognized school.” this example clearly shows that positive consequences and recognition can be won at a considerable expense, namely, the loss of many students from the schooling system. this loss did not appear in the official number of edgeview dropouts in 2002, which was reported at zero. it is because of problems like the one outlined above that some authors affirm that the social justice discourse in education is false and misleading. indeed, the rhetoric of nclb is so closely focused on teachers and administrators in accounting for achievement gaps that deeper social inequalities are easy to miss. thus, the inequality that pervades many a school is never put in the larger context of the structural inequality of our society. there is an economic gap at the root of the educational achievement gap that is shadowed by the rhetoric on educational accountability. (anderson, 2001, p. 324; gerstl-pepin, 2006, p. 143; lipman, 2003, p. 344). the validity problem various authors put in question the validity of the tests. “validity is thus a matter of accumulating and integrating evidence that demonstrates the extent to which inferences drawn from an assessment’s results are justified for particular uses or purposes” (herman & baker, 2009, p. 180). the general claim against high-stakes testing is that they are not valid because they are not giving an accurate representation of student learning. therefore, the studies reviewed do not put in question the reliability and the consistency of tests, but they put in doubt analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 25 that those tests achieve what they are made for: an accurate representation of the knowledge and the learning of a child at a precise moment. “reliability and accuracy are necessary but not sufficient prerequisites for valid assessment” (herman & baker, 2009, p. 180). at the root of the critiques against the validity of high-stakes testing is the issue and tension between uniformity and particularity. the tests are constructed on the frame of a “one-size-fits all standard” (lipman p. 343). however, students are not all at the same place at the same moment. the nature of our education system is such that we are attempting to artificially civilize the whole spectrum of the population, including those who enter school with major disparities, to a common level. it is a race to the top of the hill that was chosen by the ruling powers to be the goal of all children. the problem is that there are unforeseen handicaps in the race. some children have to carry heavy baggage. some children have been coached in racing tactics. some children were unable to read the racing instructions. yet all children are assumed to be equally able to race (teacher quoted in rigsby & demulder, 2003, p. 17) testing is based on an ideal situation where all students would be at the same place at the moment of the test. as stated earlier, one of the goals of a democratic education is to create a situation where all the individuals could engage in a fair competition, fair because they all start at the same point. however, as this teacher tells us, high-stakes testing is not fostering such a situation; rather, it is fostering the same kind of inequalities. what was supposed to be part of the solution is in fact now part of the problem. moreover, testing does not take into consideration the fact that all children are fundamentally different. testing makes sense from the view of the policymakers: all students are data, they have no particularities and individualities, they all share common formal characteristics, they are all abstractly similar and interchangeable. the teacher has a completely different view. for him, students are not abstract entities, but concrete individuals with whom he is living every day. he knows the specificities of all his students and will adapt to them. in other words, his teaching and evaluation are informed by his knowledge of the differences between the students of his class. “we are teaching a child. you take out that human piece at the times when you just look at the data” (quote of a principal in mabry & margolis, 2006, p. 19). “they [the staff of the school] also shared their school’s ongoing struggles to improve amid the reductionism of their school districts, which tended to treat all schools, teachers, and students as the same” (craig, 2009, p. 125). the second aspect of the critique of testing validity arises from the issue of time. tests are temporally situated at a precise moment. they are a snap shot of the learning of the child at a particular time. testing has therefore not the temporal vision of the teacher, a vision of the progress of the child through time. a teacher evaluates the child by taking in consideration the progress he made during the class. in mabry and margolis (2006), a principal affirms that he relies more on the teachers to know the state and progress of student learning than test scores (p. 25). as cuban (1998) points out, policy makers and researchers have different criteria to judge the validity of an educational policy, and, more fundamentally, of what it means to educate someone and how we can measure such education. finally, there is the belief across several studies that tests are not valid because they are not constructed to evaluate the learning of the child. as said in a previous section, testing can lead in some places to a narrowing of the curriculum and of teacher pedagogy – what we usually refer as “teaching to the test.” when that happens education comes to have a very limited meaning: a teacher educates when he makes the students learn the skills and the knowledge necessary for the test; a student is educated when he has the skills and the knowledge to pass the test or when he has passed the test. here is how a teacher describes her experience of “teaching to the test”: “i presented the information to my students in a way in which i was not comfortable: read, recite, review, memorize. i knew the majority of my students would retain little, if any, of it. however, i got caught up in the testing mania” (quoted in rigsby & demulder, 2003, p. 19, majuscules originals). in such cases, testing becomes its own goal: being educated means being able to pass the test. education no longer means equipping the child with analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 26 skills and knowledge that are relevant for his life and that will help him to transform his reality. the teacher says in the last quote that even memorization may be of little use, because she expects that the students will forget all that they learned through drills. moreover, this approach prevents the learning of other thinking aptitudes, such as critical thinking, that are obviously more important in today’s world. if we understand education as a more complex phenomenon than only memorization, we have to conclude that much standardized testing in its current forms is not very valuable, as it does not represent and evaluate the learning of the child. mabry and margolis (2006) conclude their study by saying that official test scores, even where they are positive, may not give an appropriate image of the real situation of the schools. “test data indicating that the two participating schools were meeting state and federal achievement targets suggested successful policy implementation. however, the fuller picture of implementation provided by classroom observations and interviews of personnel was much less clear about whether local implementation of nclb had been successful” (p. 26). the role of the scholar in this debate how to reflect in the era of economic logic i think it is inevitable that the assessment logic that has so dramatically affected the k-12 american educational system will proceed along similar lines in the field of higher education. there may have been a time, a golden age, where the university was seen as an institution that had to be separate from other social institutions, as a place that dedicated itself to the search for truth, a place of higher learning free from the mercantile passions that dominate society (bloom, 1987). if such a time really existed, it is now far beyond us. we should therefore not see our role as university scholars as disconnected from the other levels of the educational system. the question is what should be our role in this debate? i believe that the battle with the economic logic in education is ultimately ideological: between what we think are the goals of education, of what is the role of teachers, on how we can assess learning, on how and if we should help children in difficulty, in what kind of society we wish to live in, and, ultimately, what kind of democracy we want. however, providing alternatives alone does not end our intellectual work. to be successful we need to use the logic of the economic worldview against itself. first, we must continue to do the kind of research that was presented in the previous sections. this means going into the field and showing the real consequences of such economic policies in education, as well as looking at examples of people who have successfully struggled against them. as shown earlier, the policy of high-stakes testing is one of the most important dimensions of the economic worldview that permeates education, and so showing the failure of this approach is one of the best ways of showing the limitations with the economic approach to education. it is now clearly documented that the policy of high-stakes testing is ineffective at aiding those students that the policy was originally designed to help. indeed, high stakes testing is not narrowing the achievement gap but increasing it. it is the students of low income communities or from specific minority groups that are the biggest targets of “teaching for the test,” and who end up with not only lower test scores, but also impoverished curriculums that do not prepare them for any real life problems. we have to advance the notion that high stakes testing is not, in its current use, improving the quality of education. such an approach to testing is not valid, because it does not give a valid measure of children’s learning. the meaning of “being educated” ends up terribly impoverished under these assessment methods. the ultimate goal of high-stakes testing was to improve schooling. we can show in various ways that it is working against this goal: learning cannot mean memorizing facts, and teaching cannot be defined only by the use of drills to prepare pupils for tests. policy makers and politicians should be sensitive to such arguments, as it makes good use of the vernacular they are most comfortable with, that of numerical data. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 27 how to improve high stakes testing my position is not to reject high stakes testing outright. we probably all share, to some degree, aspects of its ideology. however, the way that such testing is used at the present is doing more harm than good. consequently, i now want to focus on how i think we can best improve the problem, and do so from within the framework of the economic worldview. the ultimate principle of the reigning economic logic is one of efficiency. as shown in the previous sections, high-stakes testing is not efficient: it is not achieving the goals for which it was established and in many cases even undermining these goals. this is an argument that people who promote current assessment policies should be sensitive to. we then have to propose a new form of testing, which demands staying inside the economic logic of education while avoiding its pifalls and limitations. i have focused most of my efforts so far on the negative effects of high-stakes testing. however, there are also successful stories of such testing (e.g. gerstl-pepin, 2006; rigsby & demulder, 2003; seachore louis, febey, & schroeder, 2005). what most of these success stories have in common is that the policy was implemented in a democratic way. there is a clear correlation between the positive perception of the educational actors and the level of democracy they experience. there is also a clear correlation between the positive effects of testing and the democratic experience of the different actors. the problems that are reported by many people who have been involved with high-stakes testing appear to be the result of a top down policy that is rigidly applied. to be sure, we have to be careful in our judgement of whether top down policies are democratic or not. top down designs are undemocratic according to a particular vision of democracy, yet they also retain important elements of democracy. for example, educational policies are applied by policymakers who themselves have received orders from politicians democratically elected. it is legitimate for the politician to ask for reforms since he receives his legitimacy from the community through a democratic process. it is through the politician that the community can act. i agree that this dimension of democracy is important, but it remains too limited as a model of effective policy implementation. i want to advance another vision of what it means to democratically implement an educational policy and standard, one that is informed by those studies that report a successful implementation of high-stakes testing. this model should not be seen in direct opposition to the hierarchical model mentioned above. i think both approaches can be seen as mutually complementary and informative of what democratic processes entail. i therefore do not promote an either/or approach to this topic. from a minimalist standpoint, democracy occurs when individuals are given some power to discuss the issues in which they are concerned. this appears at the level of high-stakes testing when a certain degree of autonomy is granted teachers, schools and districts when it comes to the implementation of educational policy. however, a fuller picture of democracy occurs when the different actors are involved communally not only in the process of implementation but also in the decisions about standards and high-stakes testing in general. this means, for example, that the administration and teachers are collectively engaged in how they will adapt testing reform to meet their particular situation. when top down designs are implemented rigidly participatory democracy disappears, which leads to ineffective and dangerous results. in those cases that interest us, this happens when teachers see themselves as technicians who are pressured to teach to the test. the results of this approach are ineffective, since it pits teachers against the very reform they need to implement. in cuban’s (1998) analysis, there cannot be effective reform without adaptability. a top down design of high-stakes testing is dangerous because it leads to the creation of an education schedule of drills and memorization, wherein education is rendered largely useless for the students. we have also seen that this kind of situation is more likely to happen for those students already in difficulty or from low income communities. rigidity in top down design leads to a loss of democracy inside the schools. it leads to what olsen and sexton (2009) call “threat rigidity”: “threat rigidity is the theory that an organization, when perceiving itself under siege (i.e. threatened or in crisis), responds in identifiable ways: structures tighten; centralized control increases; conanalytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 28 formity is stressed; accountability and efficiency measures are emphasized; and alternative or innovative thinking is discouraged” (p. 15). as said earlier, i do not want to fall into an either/or position by saying that top down designs are necessarily bad and anti-democratic. however, it does seem clear that when top down designs are used rigidly they become undemocratic. top down designs are democratic when they allow autonomy and local decisions; in others words, where decisions can still be experienced by participants as flowing from the bottom up and not just from the top. it is precisely when high-stakes testing is implemented with an eye to moderating both sides that it will be the most efficient and, unsurprisingly, the most democratic. in that sense, i think we should not separate democracy from efficiency, for both clearly go together on this matter. again, the language and measures of efficiency are essential, because it gives us a common language from which to engage, and persuade, those within the economic paradigm of education. i think the best way to confront the prevailing ideology of high-stakes testing is to accept the criterion of efficiency in order to clearly show why current policies are failing to reach their goals. that said, i hope it remains clear that in taking this approach one is still moving the debate to another level. indeed, what we mean by democracy is fundamentally an ideological issue, as is our vision of the teacher’s role in cultivating a democratic education, and how political policy should be implemented. in using economic ideology against itself we are at the same time opening up the space for another kind of conceptualization. however, my hypothesis is that, in order for this political strategy to work, we need to be seen as ‘playing the game’ rather than confronting the issue directly as a battle of different ideologies of education. the issue of whether these two types of democracies, top down and grass roots, can be united is one of the most important and complex issues of policy and politics in the contemporary world. it is easy to say that top down design must encounter bottom up movement. however, it is impossible to clearly predict how that can happen concretely. indeed, how far can a policy design be flexible to local situations? which points of a policy must be strictly adhered to, and which changed? there is no ultimate answer to these questions. this is an issue that flows out of, and follows, the politics and policy-making of a democracy. fundamental to the nature of our democracies, is the union of local democracy with national democracy. if nothing else, it is our role as educators to demonstrate the complexity of democracy in action and challenge the simplistic view of participatory democracy that inevtiably arises once quantitative methodology, and the positivism that underwrites it, are seen as the order of the day. moreover, although the complexity of real democracy in action seems impossible to capture, the studies i referred to earlier show how different actors have been able to integrate, in a positive way, the policies of high-stakes testing. the underlying issue in saying we should not confront the economic ideology directly, however, does not mean we should abandon the ideological discussion altogether. to be sure, we need to engage in the political discussion in order to show what is at stake in the different ideologies of education. i think this is nicely illustrated in the debate between those who acknowledge the complexity of reality, and those who continually affirm its simplicity. according to cochran-smith (2005), the complexity/simplicity dichotomy is at the root of two worldviews in education. the economic view in education is based on the conception that reality is simple. “stone suggested that from a market model of policy making, the definition of policy problems is mistakenly regarded as a simple and straightforward matter of ‘observation and arithmetic’ ” (cited p. 133). reality is unproblematic in this view, it is easy to judge situations and act to change them. the following statement confirms this worldview: “in simplest terms, if the objective is to improve student performance, student performance should be the focal point of policy… i use a simple definition of teacher quality: good teachers are ones who get large gains in student achievement for their classes; bad teachers are just the opposite” (hanushek cited in cochran-smith, 2005, pp. 183-184). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 29 the present use of high-stakes testing is a good example of the simplicity of the economic worldview at work. it is based on the belief that student learning and knowledge is easily measurable, which ends up dissolving the complexity of school situations, as well as student lives, in order to emphasize their uniformity and unity. “one of the most basic assumptions embedded in technical standards is a naïve realism that assumes the world is a simple system made up of entities capable of precise empirical descriptions” (jenlink & austin, 2004, p. 4). in general, testing risks giving a simple vision of student reality by assuming it is easy to separate the loosers from the winners (cuban, 1998, p. 456-7). the alternate worldview, as discussed by cochran-smith (2005), is one that embraces the complexity of reality. education is something hard to define, there are diverse conceptions of what a good education is, and we cannot subsume these views in one idea. the reality of students and schools is diverse and complex, and policy must be flexible enough to respect this. therefore, testing alone, in virtue of its simplicity, is unable to give an accurate vision of educational reality, and so also remains unable to effectivley transform it. in the current situation, where the economic view dominates the landscape of policy research, it is our duty as scholars to present the weaknesses of this paradigm as well as present viable alternatives. in doing so, we have to be aware of how the dominant discourse of the day shapes our understanding of reality (stovall, 2009; torres & van heertum, 2009). it is only by entering in a debate with the dominant worldview that we can offer a more complex and authentic view of reality. that can only happen if we engage in thinking critically about our practice at all levels: our epistemology of education, our understanding of what democracy means, our role as scholars, our teaching practices, and finally our research methodology. engaging in such a multilevel process helps ensure two things: first, we do not separate ourselves from the other struggles taking place at different levels of education, second, we do the best we can do in our specific role as scholars in higher education. endnotes i want to thank marta pires, tyson lewis and the two reviewers of 1. analytic teaching for their careful reading and precious comments on the first version of this manuscript. references anderson, g. l. 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(2009). public choice and the political economy of american education. in g. sykes, b. schneider & d. n. plank (eds.), handbook of education policy research (pp. 362-371 ). new york: routledge. witte, j. f. (2009). vouchers. in g. sykes, b. schneider & d. n. plank (eds.), handbook of education policy research (pp. 491-501). new york: routledge. address coresspondence to: olivier michaud michaudo1@mail.montclair.edu “the signs of the times”: the changing faces of liberation theology bill katra jesus seguia en casa cortando la madera . . . observando a las gentes sufriendo miseria . . . sentia a veces ganas, estaba a la espera . . . de salir por el mundo, por ciudades y aldeas, y llevar a los hombres la esperanza mas nueva (erdozain & arbeloa: 146). jesus continued in his house cutting wood, . . . observing the people suffering in misery. . . . he had the urge, he waited for the moment . . . to go out to the world, into cities and towns, and take to all mankind the message of a new promised land. liberation theology, briefly considered, was a tendency that grew to the proportions of a movement in the 1960s and 1970s, that primarily involving the catholic church and primarily played itself out in latin america, to modify liturgy, spiritual practice, and ecumenical activity toward greater social relevance and on behalf of society’s more marginalized groups. today, an impartial observer of events over the past half-century would not be faulted for wondering, “how was it that the deliberations of the conservative, spiritual minds at the head of the catholic church led to the emergence of those politically potent and socially disruptive doctrines?” subsequent church leaders must have asked themselves the same painful question, because the record is clear that, in spite of a near absence of public pronouncements, since about the middle of the 1970s, they have systematically silenced or removed from their ranks the most salient of liberation voices. the inner history of those developments —that is, the thoughts, reactions, and deliberations taking place at the highest of church levels— might never be told given the vatican’s prohibitions against public disclosure. yet, the external evidence is plentiful. the following paragraphs focus on events over the past 50 years in tracing the emergence, and then retrenchment, of liberation theology within the catholic church of latin america. at the beginning of the 1960s, the special council of catholic church leaders, known popularly as vatican ii, set into motion the reforms and reorientations that would give birth to liberation theology. the most important document emerging from those deliberations, gaudium et spes (wikipedia, 2013), in english translation, joy and hope, provided an overview of the church’s teachings about society, especially in reference to economics, poverty, social justice, and ecumenism.* it urged church leaders to better respond to “the signs of the times,” that is, the social and political contexts in which the religious faithful lived. this message was particularly significant for the different countries of latin america. in essence, priests and bishops were being invited to leave behind their traditional alliance with social and economic privilege and to reach out to the catholic majorities who were powerless to escape the marginal conditions of everyday life. a first step was to restructure aspects of liturgy and 33 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 34 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 religious practice in order to invite active participation from previously passive followers. a second step was to invite pastoral agents to become more involved in the social and communitarian aspects of their parishioners’ lives. undoubtedly, pope john xxiii and the council of bishops, in issuing gaudium et spes, were responding at least in part to the general sense of optimism across the world. latin american countries, in particular, were experiencing record rates in productivity, and people everywhere were enjoying a rising standard of living (arellano). yet, while these indicators generated ambitious hopes, unchanged was the backdrop of endemic poverty. also, the region continued to suffer from very high demographic increases and the unsettling migration of rural peoples to urban areas. social transformations were inevitable, but to whose benefit? the widespread impetus for change was fueled by the divergent promises of the marxist-inspired cuban revolution, under the charismatic comandante fidel castro, and the capitalist-inspired alliance for progress, under the equally charismatic u.s. president, john f. kennedy. in rome, the pronouncements of pope john xxiii and the council of bishops echoed not only kennedy’s call for peaceful change, but also his alarm over communist advances in the hemisphere. at the conclusion of the vatican council, the latin american bishops felt a new sense of empowerment. over the past decade, there had been an ever increasing number of priests under the bishops’ charge who advocated a more activist role for the church in the poorest of the hemisphere’s parishes. now, the bishops had the theoretical and doctrinal blueprint to move ahead. in their 1968 celam conference in medellin, colombia, they took inspiration from the ideas of vatican ii and the concerns of priests, nuns, and laity across the continent who supported the struggles of the poor. they denounced as “structural sins” those social and political institutions that perpetuated injustice. furthermore, they defined channels whereby the church, at the grass-roots level, could help empower the faithful in their daily strivings. as a result of this meeting, the church was urged to adopt a “preferential option for the poor” (allen, 2007, p.1). ** other problems faced the regional bishops. in many countries there were whole dioceses with insufficient pastoral agencies. they witnessed the “loss of popular allegiance” when the personal and spiritual needs of a growing number of parishioners could only be treated in an impersonal manner by the limited number of priests available (newhouser, 1989, p.237). enthusiastically, they found one solution in vatican ii’s call for a new and expanded role of the laity. a second remedy was to enlist the missionary services of european and north american priests, nuns, and lay activists. to this same end, the bishops attempted to personalize church relations by subdividing overly large dioceses and creating new urban parishes. more important, church leaders promoted the active participation of their parishioners by making available thousands of bibles in spanish and portuguese; by promoting the formation of small groups so that the faithful could hone literacy skills by reading and critically reflecting upon biblical passages; and by empowering the laity to accept new responsibilities in administrative, pastoral, and ceremonial functions. all this was in response to the general perception that the church had to accept its faithful not as mere obedient followers, but rather as active participants in their own faith journey. modern day believers, they came to realize, increasingly desired a church that resembled a shared community, and more and more rejected a hierarchical, patriarchic, elitist structure. another significant motivation–generally downplayed by church officials—for the vatican ii reforms and the subsequent spread of progressive practices and beliefs across latin america, was the very high rate of catholics converting to protestantism (newhouser, 1989, p.237). diverse factors account for this: the protestant bible in the vernacular, a more accessible leadership, the positive image of an upwardly mobile people, its known successes in helping individuals resolve problems such as broken families and alcoholism, and its participatory, musical, and aesthetic forms of worship. indeed, many of the vatican ii reforms bear a high resemblance to practices integral to protestant devotion. by the middle of the 1970s, the “new” latin american church in many areas was experiencing humble successes in its attempts to intercede on behalf of previously excluded groups. the spread of progressive doctrines associated with liberation theology accompanied the rapid spread of base christian communities—here i will call them cebs for their spanish name, comunidades eclesiales de base (later known also as grupos de refleccion). clerical and lay leaders realized that the ceb was the ideal instrument for the church to realize the gaudium et spes promise of empowering the poor to alleviate their marginal economic situations and confront repression. the cebs offered to the faithful the opportunity to develop literacy skills and to know the bible in the vernacular. from this, it was a logical step for the participants to study their own social reality; this, in turn, led them to act as a group in seeking improvements. in many instances, this involved petitioning local agencies for needed services; in other moments, this led to angry protests against injustices perpetuated by those in power. in 1978 archbishop oscar romero, in el salvador, affirmed the importance of cebs in a pastoral letter, “the church and the popular organizations” (romero, 1985, p.178). while affirming people’s right to organize, he cautioned church-sanctioned groups from participating in revolutionary activities. although the existence of cebs predated vatican ii, the next two decades saw the rapid spread of cebs all across latin america. while cebs varied widely, they generally shared the following characteristics: first, they were almost always created by pastoral agents—bishops, priests, nuns, and lay workers trained by the church (cleary, 1985, p.114)— and, as such, enjoyed enduring ties to the larger institution. there were exceptions (bruneau & hewitt, 1989, p.41). in general, theologians and social scientists commissioned by the church produced their written materials, and pastoral agents regularly visited the different groups in the capacity of promoters. the strong liberation orientation in the national churches of el salvador, nicaragua, peru, and brazil accounted for the spread of cebs; conversely, where the church did not provide pastoral agents, then cebs did not prosper. second, the “base” qualifier identifies the predominant population grouping: these were community groups uniting urban workers, but mainly rural, populations, most of whom were of humble means. they were relatively small groups of 15-25 members, generally women, who met regularly in homes, a local parish, or in a neighborhood meeting hall. third, their group discussions had the general goal of concientizacion. that is to say, participants might read an old testament passage about israeli suffering or oppression, critically analyze it, and then compare the biblical setting with aspects of their own lived experiences. and fourth, when it came to actions taken, these groups had predominantly religious objectives; they were less politically motivated than what many critics claimed. however, it is also true that many times the individuals meeting for religious refection later took upon themselves other goals, such as the promotion of work cooperatives, self-help projects, or political action to obtain needed municipal services. these activities were accompanied by important doctrinal changes. the new generation of theologians steered the church to an understanding of “faith” that involved more than just a spiritual relationship between god and the believer; now, it involved a commitment to social justice and human rights. before, faith practice was largely passive and theoretical; now, it required participants to expend their energies to change or improve society. that is to say, social and political involvement was held to be a legitimate, indeed, necessary, expression of religious faith (katra, 1987, p.587). god, the liberation theologians preached, worked not only in the human heart, but also realized his purposes through history. salvation for humankind was now seen in both its individual and collective dimensions. by the middle of the 1970s, the promoters of liberation theology were facing a dramatically changed situation analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 35 across latin america. gone was the widespread optimism that had previously prevailed. the fledging democracies that had emerged a decade earlier were in crisis. leaders in church and society were losing faith in the ability of democratic regimes to resolve crucial social and economic problems. in academic circles, a new realism—or cynicism—now prevailed in the form of “dependency” theories that linked latin america’s longstanding oppression to powerful international forces at the center of a world capitalist system. before, benign, and perhaps naïve, latin american church and civil leaders had encouraged poor people to organize as a peaceful means of obtaining improvements in workplace and living conditions. few significant gains had been realized. now, entrenched power elites began to react. the latter saw popular mobilizations at best as disruptive and, at worst, as destabilizing for the existing social order. repressive acts followed, and the “new” church became a target, along with the poor’s labor and community organizations. repressive elites viewed cebs as yet one more source of unrest. in brazil, the military denounced the clergy for “provoking a wave of unrest in the whole region through their erroneous interpretations of the encyclicals. . . . the priests of the northwest are not practicing religion, but politics” (time magazine, 1976, p.72). by about 1975, repressive military dictatorships had replaced democratic regimes in brazil, chile, argentina, uruguay, bolivia, paraguay, haiti, and several central american countries. in addition, there were selective acts of repression in mexico, venezuela, colombia, costa rica, peru, and ecuador. in chile, cardinal silva and church leaders issued a statement expressing alarm about “the fearful and all-powerful police state” that threatened to impose itself “without opposition in our latin america” (time magazine, 1976, p.79). in this new context of political oppression it is understandable that “liberation” theories and practices evolved. in the national churches of countries experiencing the most obscene forms of authoritarianism—brazil, nicaragua, el salvador, and peru—church militants reacted to the imprisonment, torture and even murder of priests, and in some cases, nuns. there were several instances of brave church officials taking a public stand against state repression. a few bishops and many priests believed that their pact with god required them to become the voice for the voiceless. at times, they made this decision at terrible risk. one team of researchers affirms that, in this dark chapter of latin america’s history, when the region’s bishops embraced a “preferential option for the poor” they, in essence, were offering the church to the exploited masses as a substitute for the now prohibited political and social organizations (bruneau & hewitt, 1989, p.40). it is interesting to note that in several countries where political authoritarianism was not so severe the national churches remained relatively conservative: mexico, colombia, costa rica, and venezuela. a semblance of democracy during the preceding period meant the continued existence of channels whereby radicalized, dissatisfied elements became integrated into the relatively stable political order. that being said, it must also be noted that dictatorship or political authoritarianism was not a necessary causal agent for the emergence of the progressive church. argentina is the most dramatic example of this, but the same can be said for guatemala, paraguay, and uruguay, where the church generally supported authoritarian and repressive regimes. these last observations should lead an informed observer to an important thesis: it is difficult, if not impossible, to generalize about the “latin american church.” one may talk of shared hemispheric tendencies, but only after acknowledging the vast differences existing between the progressive church of brazil, at one extreme, and the conservative church of colombia, on the other. it therefore follows that it is also difficult to generalize about “liberation” beliefs and practices, being that the church’s activities during this period varied considerably from country to country. indeed, within several countries—mexico and nicaragua are a good examples—it even became common to differentiate between the “liberation” advocacies of a few bishops and the “traditional” or “conservative” advocacies of others. with the advent of the 1980s, latin america saw the retrenchment of liberation practices and beliefs. papal authorities in rome became alarmed about how the “idealistic” vatican ii invitation for the church to “reach analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 36 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 37 out” to the world had evolved into practices of social and political activism. they disapproved of the blurring of religious and secular pursuits in the advocacies and activities of those priests most fervently embracing “liberation” ideals. most of all, they were taken aback by the severity of repression launched against the church in some countries—they had the very real fear that in those regions the church could disappear as a social and religious institution. most alarming were the unfolding events in central america. the church in el salvador, which became deeply divided between the liberal wing, that favored the leftist insurgency, and the conservatives, that had been aligned traditionally with the social elite. monseignor romero’s short tenure as archbishop, although tragic in its demise, spread liberation beliefs and practices to even the highest levels of the church hierarchy. but the oligarchy, realizing the significance of the invigorated threat offered by the liberation church, increased its repressive measures and sought the means for annihilating this popular program through the murder of dozens of church officials (caceres, p.125). even more serious was the obscene repression against the progressive church in guatemala, with the martyrdom of priests, nuns, and lay workers; the forced exile of the maryknoll and jesuit orders; the official support for rival protestant groups; and the de facto disappearance of pastoral agents from some regions. the implantation of progressive tendencies in other regions caused different, but less severe, problems. one observer reported that in tepotzlan, mexico, parishioners walked out of a mass, because they were dissatisfied with the largely political orientation of the priest’s homily. similar events occurred in a parish of pullman, washington, where the liberation-inspired priest became demoralized when a vocal segment of his congregation questioned the utility or relevance of the political orientation that he was attempting to imbue through his homilies (katra, 1994, p.220). a similarly negative reaction occurred in tlayacapan, mexico. the priest, having been appointed by the progressive bishop, attempted to do away with the cults of the saints by eliminating side altars, limiting the role of incense and ritualistic objects such as crowns of cypress, and restricting the role of drinking and dancing in the religious festivals. unfortunately, these initiatives alienated the community, which later succeeded in having the priest recalled (ingham, 1989, p.51). the above paragraphs are evidence that many of the changes brought about by liberation practitioners evoked negative reactions not only from without, but also from within, the church itself. that is to say, there are many cases in which doctrinal modifications, having been pursued with excessive zeal, failed to inspire the imagination and loyalty of catholic intellectuals, professionals, and leaders in business and trade. many of these did not take to heart the ideas emanating from the bishops’ conclaves in medellin or puebla, and opposed the actions by their churches and governments that were aimed at benefiting the underprivileged masses (ugalde, p.131). this crisis within the church paralleled dramatic changes over the past decade in latin american society. a serious economic crisis brought to an end the rising expectations for peaceful change. previously, ideas of “social-democratic keynesianism” had predominated in governmental circles, which preached the state’s role in triggering a type of prosperity that would benefit the masses. with the economic downturn, government after government found itself struggling under the burden of astronomical foreign debt (taylor, p.1169). forced to follow sometimes draconian measures dictated by north hemisphere governments and the international monetary fund, latin american governments privatized industries and utilities, laid off workers, reduced retirement benefits and medical services, and eliminated sometimes important regulatory agencies. in short, few, if any, countries found themselves in the position of providing state services to improve the plight of the poor. given this reality, it became counterproductive for liberation theorists to continue advocating governmental intervention. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 38 this crisis of the state was shortly followed by the crisis in marxism. one has to understand that, from its beginnings in the 1960s, important liberation theology proponents had flirted in some degree with the different marxisms. in brazil, archbishop helder camara, was known to his opponents as a “bandido marxista” for statements such as this: “when i fed the poor they called me a saint; when i asked why the poor existed they called me a communist” (camara, 2008). also important in the early years was the colombian priest camilo torres, whose moral and spiritual convictions led to his death in 1966 fighting with leftist guerrillas against his government. in the 1970s, catholic priests miguel d’escoto and ernesto cardenal served as cabinet members for the marxist government of nicaragua. then, in 1985, brazilian priest frei betto published a book in which cuba’s fidel castro emphasized the convergences between liberation and communist thought. that was not all. in theoretical writings peruvian gustavo gutierrez and american robert mccaffee brown posited direct associations between marxism and liberation theology. everywhere mainstream priests and nuns accepted aspects of marxist thought as central to liberation doctrine. first, marxism’s underlying conception of class conflict came to be seen as a useful conceptual tool for comprehending the status of the poor within society. many church theorists therefore posited that conflict was an integral part of social life. as such, the medellin conference’s condemnation of “institutionalized violence” was language similar to the marxist condemnation of the class exploitation at the heart of capitalism. second, church leaders joined marxists in denouncing latin america’s right-wing dictators, in addition to their north american supporters and the capitalist system uniting them (kline, 1990, p.1169). third, there was a shared ethos of commitment in marx’s advocacy of workers’ rights and liberation theology’s preferential option for the poor. fourth, both camps emphasized praxis that went beyond contemplation: marx had written, “the philosophers have only interpreted the world . . . the point, however, is to change it” (marx, 1972, p.109). similarly, for the new generation of liberation practitioners, praxis on behalf of justice was held as the highest of ethical values. fifth, in both camps there was an emphasis on the benefits of living and acting in community—the etymological root of communism. sixth, the supporters of both embraced a semblance of “just war” against their enemies. liberationists found in luke 4:18 a strong biblical definition for their struggle: “the spirit of the lord is upon me, because he has anointed me to preach good news to the poor. he has sent me to proclaim release to the captives and recovering of sight to the blind, to set at liberty those who are oppressed.” marx could not have said it better. seventh, practitioners of both came together with their moral, ascetic stance: both criticized usury and the materialistic consequences of capitalism. and eighth—most important of all—both marx and the bible projected a utopian vision that because the world’s evil was man-made it could be overcome. both projected a vision of “a new heaven and a new earth” in which the poor would be exalted. both marx and paul of tarsus offered to their followers the hope of a better world in the here and the now. in the dichotomous world of the cold war, to assume an anti-capitalist, anti-u.s.a. politics almost necessarily implied favor for marxism, socialism, or communism, and for their maximum defenders, the soviet union—and its usually subservient new world ally, cuba. for the charismatic new pope, john paul ii (1978 to 2005), who had spent his youth combating soviet tyranny in occupied poland, the marxist leanings of many liberation activists was anathema: he understood clearly that in the church under his charge marxism or communism simply had no place. that being said, no informed person ever doubted his commitment to maintain the post-vatican ii church’s commitment to the poor. understandably, many observers viewed ambiguities in the polish pope’s advocacies. in his september 1984 visit to canada, he attacked the “imperialistic monopoly” as one of the causes of poverty in some regions. in his important meeting with peruvian bishops a month later, he condemned interpretations of society based on the “class struggle,” and he attacked the association of church doctrine with marxism. at the same time, however, he reaffirmed the duty of christians everywhere to defend the interests of the impoverished (burrsma, 1985, p.1a). under the leadership of pope john paul ii and his right-hand assistant, cardinal ratzinger (later pope benedict xxvi), the church in rome began to react against those priests and sisters who, in sharing the sufferings of analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 39 latin america’s poor, emphasized the affinities between marxist and liberation doctrines. during the puebla bishops’ conference of 1979, the pope urged the latin american clergy to be “priests, not social workers or political leaders or functionaries of temporal power” (john paul ii, 1979, p.329). in 1982, he instructed the members of the jesuit order to stop their marxist flirtation and placed his personal representative at the head of the order. he mandated that priests renounce political positions—especially those serving in the nicaraguan sandinista government—and ordered them to end the “concientizacion” work a la paulo freire with the poor (the christian century, 1989, p.403). he censored bishops pedro casaldaliga (brazil) and raymond hunthausen (western usa), and imposed limits on the deliberations of national bishops’ conferences. he imposed sanctions against radical theologians leonardo boff (brazil), charles curran (usa), and gustavo gutierrez (peru). he supported conservative movements such as opus dei. in general, the national churches demonstrating the most progressive tendencies during the previous two decades—chile, brazil, nicaragua, and peru—were brought back into line with vatican orthodoxy (mainwaring, 1990, p.144). during the 1980s, these actions by the pope antagonized liberation activists throughout the hemisphere. but in retrospect, even his most stalwart opponents have to grant him credit: the pope’s stubborn opposition to the church’s social and political activism placed it in a strong position to weather the next decade’s earth-shaking events in the european theatre. nobody better than the pope anticipated what was to transpire: the 1987 beginnings of perestroika for a soviet economy in crisis; the 1989 fall of the berlin wall; the 1990 election of mijail gorbachov; and the 1991 implosion that signaled the definitive breakup of the soviet union and the dissolution of communist regimes across eastern europe. in short, all this signaled the end of the cold war; the nearuniversal recognition of communism’s bankruptcy as an economic and social system; and—consequently—the discrediting of many facets of marxist thought. one situation that the pope could not reverse, however, was the accelerated abandonment of church members to protestant groups. since the days of vatican ii, the numbers of protestants in latin america had jumped from 15 to 40 million participants. guatemala was the first country in the region with a majority of protestant evangelicals, and several other countries were on route to achieve the same by the year 2000—mexico and brazil heading the list. evangelical growth was startling in almost all of latin america: evangelical churches experienced an even faster rate of growth than what protestantism had experienced during the reformation of the 16th century in western europe (stoll, 1990, p.48). if the loss of catholic practitioners to protestant sects can be viewed as a compelling cause for the church hierarchy to choose progressive alternatives in the 1960s and 1970s, one has to admit that the implementation of those practices had hardly affected the flight of disgruntled believers to protestant folds. indeed, worthy of special note is the fact that the greatest protestant gains were precisely in those regions or countries where, in the previous two decades, the progressive catholic church had thrived: central america, brazil, and peru (nunez & taylor, 1991, p.179). the church’s political involvement necessarily changed given these profound transformations in the political and ideological landscapes. the late 1980s saw the overthrow of repressive regimes across—especially—southern south america—and a tenuous transition to democracy. this means that new channels appeared or reappeared for the inclusion of marginalized groups. political parties, labor unions, and human rights organizations now assumed many of the functions previously served by the church in darker hours. no longer did the downtrodden seek in its religious leaders a “voice of the powerless.” moderates in the church reckoned that, given this new reality, it was time for the church to return to its previously spiritual function and leave aside political involvement and social activism. this was the message from frei betto, one of brazil’s most radicalized spokesmen: “the church cannot attempt to substitute for political parties, unions, neighborhood associations, which are mechanisms specific to the political struggle. . . . asking the base communities to also become the union movement, a grass-roots party organization, or a social center is a mistake” (mainwaring, 1990, p.154). by the beginning of the 1990s, the radicalized wing of the church had been significantly altered: almost all of the overtly leftist theologians, bishops, and archbishops across north, central, and south america had either retired or had been silenced. much of this had been done without a significant amount of fanfare or adverse publicity. but it was unmistakable that, in country after country, new church leaders were eschewing social and political involvement in favor of pastoral services. this being said, in public utterances the church’s representatives on all levels of the hierarchy continued to voice their—now more vague—concern for the poor. information is sketchy with regard to the status of the grass-roots church in the different countries at the beginning of the 1990s. in brazil, the same number of cebs—some 60-80,000—were still functioning, but with fewer participants and a much higher turnover rate. indeed, there are many indications that dissatisfaction was widespread: a brazilian ecumenical center found that catholic base community members were joining pentecostal churches in large numbers(cook, 1990, p.1176). it is undisputable that in previous decades, the cebs had played a central role in the participants’ search for new values of participation, initiative, and mutual respect (hewett, 1990, pp.141, 146). now, their activism primarily had the goal of neighborhood improvement (examples: the paving of streets, provision of better health facilities, and improved public transportation). more important were their activities in forming values and spurring motivation. they excelled in developing in many of their participants a spirit of “enlightened self-interest” and a higher awareness of political rights and duties (hewett, 1990, p.140). this is hardly the image of leftist agitation against the status quo, that had predominated in the previous twenty years of militant liberation theology (the image of being “troublesome, indeed dangerous to stability and order”) (krischke, 1991, p.189). on the contrary, survey research indicated the relatively conservative political beliefs held by a majority of brazil’s ceb members. in comparison to non-practicing counterparts, they were more likely to support traditional church teachings on family matters and were less likely to support labor strikes. the surprising conclusions to one study suggest that post-vatican ii innovations appear to have had minimal impact on the beliefs and actions of those closest to the church; that the church had been unable to cultivate a mass following of committed progressives, even among its closest adherents; that it had had a limited impact on society as a whole with regard to its preferential option for the poor (bruneau & hewitt, 1989, pp.59, 60). a somewhat more upbeat portrait circulated for the church in chile. there, catholic leaders had assumed a position of firm opposition to the pinochet government in the early 1980s, had developed “passionate” ties with the poor, and was widely celebrated for its role in bringing about the restoration of democracy in 1988. the bishops of the country seemingly went along with the pope in their public disapproval of three emphases of previous liberation practices: marxist analysis, class warfare, and the idea of a “popular” church. that being said, there was widespread admiration for a few radical priests on account of their selfless apostolic commitment to the poor during the allende years. another indication of a thriving liberation church was the proliferation of cebs. one observer called attention to the vitality of these smaller neighborhood groups, where participants shared in prayer and reflection of the gospels; with pastoral assistance they avoided the “liturgical sluggishness” of more established parishes (torrens, 1989, p.269). in the same time span—at the beginning of the 1990s—mexico also demonstrated a mixed view, with grassroots organizations served by 10,000 priests in 53 dioceses. in the first two decades after vatican ii, the country had its experience with left-leaning priests working in urban slums or impoverished peasant communities. but this type of social and political activism was disappearing. progressive bishops such as sergio mendez arceo (cuernavaca) and samuel ruiz (chiapas) had retired. theirs had been minority voices within the country’s catholic hierarchy, nevertheless influential in the bishops’ 1983-85 pastoral program, which took note of the failure of mexico’s economic model, the general mood of discontent, and the “unmeasured” concentration of power in the state (riding, 1985, p.90). many of these views were repeated in the pastoral letter of 1992 that denounced as immoral the neo-liberal economic reforms promoted by the president, carlos salinas de gortari. 40 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 41 contrasting with this progressive image was the other, conservative, identity. a propos, the arch-conservative catholic group, opus dei, continued to exercise considerable influence in business circles and with mexico’s leading oppositional party—the national action party (pan)—which would soon win the presidency. in addition, lay organizations in different regions of the country continued their strident opposition to abortion and the government’s family planning programs. in this light, many citizens continued to view the church as a committed right-wing force—that is to say, as a part of the frozen system that maintained the status quo. visitors to nicaragua reported a less rosy picture: given the military conflict between defenders of the sandinista government and the u.s.-sponsored contras, the country as a whole remained highly conflicted, as did the church. cardinal obando y bravo supported a return to a largely spiritual function, whereas a much smaller number of liberation priests, many of them foreigners, continued mixing ecumenical concerns with lessons about the evils of american capitalism (wright, 1989, p.159). at that time, different observers suggested reasons for liberation theology’s crisis, in spite of its initial successes in the 1960s and 1970s. heading the list were the internal church divisions in country after country that had resulted between its leaders, with their traditional links to the region’s power elite, and the “new” church of the poor. second, the avocation of radical social and political change by liberation priests and cebs had provoked a fierce and violent reaction that undermined social stability and the church’s predominant role. but there also existed other, more subtle problems. given the generally closed nature of latin american society, activism there by marginal groups rarely yielded positive results. for the lowest strata of society, rarely does either education or hard work help one get ahead. in other words, liberal myths were much less functional than in the united states or in other more open societies. unfortunately, in only select instances had ceb militancy yielded possibilities for upward mobility (cook, 1990, p.1178). on the contrary, militancy, in many instances, had proven physically dangerous for its participants; it had triggered violent retaliation by an oppressive opposition. therefore, the cebs’ return to a more spiritual function was welcomed by many participants. not only that, but also there is much evidence that the liberation agenda of grass-roots politicization contradicted the ways many poor people made sense of their lives and have endured under stress. perhaps, wrote one observer, by revealing the mechanisms of exploitation and encouraging the poor to insist on their rights, the militant church was, in essence, eschewing the protective shield that had previously surrounded religious activity (stoll, 1990, p.45). unfortunately, in most regions of the world, existing elites are so deeply entrenched that no amount of activism on the part of the poor can yield significant change. given this reality, perhaps the end result of liberation’s call to militancy was yet one more experience in failure and defeat. perhaps the passive social role of the traditional church had taken this into account. perhaps there was a value to its traditional role of offering to the poor a psychological escape and a more peaceful spiritual domain. perhaps the perverse irony of liberation theology was that its advocates had only brought about the denial of that psychological balm to those who most needed it. approaching the dawn of the new century, liberation theology has survived, but in a much more modest form than before. given marxism’s recent defeats, the new generation of liberation theorists now disavowed “marxist reductionism” in favor of “communitarian participatory radicalism” (sigmund, 1990, p.122). supporting the swell of democratic regimes across the continent, many ceb participants have now accepted the principles of democratic liberalism and have critically sought their place within the reigning market system. although not totally comfortable with the reigning economic and political forces associated with globalization and neo-liberalism, they admired how thousands upon thousands of previously marginal people were now enjoying a significantly higher standard of living. leftist political leaders espousing some form of marxism were now less visible—a fact reflected in the thought of a new generation of liberation theorists. in politics and religion those militants advocating an improvement in living conditions for the poor now defended the advantages of a “dialogue with liberalism;” activism to “nurture democracy;” and a fusion of their preferential option for the poor with capitalist market efficiency. many have realized the need for a new theological orientation based on the “spirituality of socially concerned democracy, whether capitalist or socialist in its economic form” (taylor, pp.1169-70). another lesson learned, was that liberation praxis is necessarily “situational.” that is to say, a ceb of mainstream practitioners in tepoztlan would not thrive over time by continually comparing old testament suffering to the exploitation experienced by the poorest of indigenous populations in far-off chiapas. another example: how long would the interest of a small group of big-hearted, sincere ceb participants in la crosse, wisconsin, be maintained if they were to select human rights abuses in guatemala as their main concern? not long. the lesson learned is that the cebs that prospered over time were those whose members lived in crisis, who reflected and acted according to their own specific situation. other voices were urging the new generation of liberation activists to eschew the utopian views, which formerly had been embraced by the left, in favor of specific issues. mcgovern simply stated, ceb activism had to yield positive, concrete results. urging the poor to embrace a vague, general goal of “liberation” had been counterproductive (as cited in kline, 1990, p.1169). instead, needed now were survival strategies and explicit ethical norms for guiding the activism of a new generation of church militants. postscript avanzamos, peregrinos, con jesus, nuestra esperanza. el nos salva, el nos guia, con la luz de su palabra. . . . jesucristo, nuestro hermano, nos dara su eternidad (martins: 300). pilgrims, we go forward, with jesus, our hope. he will save us, he guides us, with the light of his word. . . . jesus, our brother, he will give us his eternity. it was the afternoon of march 12, 2013. in the vatican assembly hall were 115 cardinals from all parts of the globe. not present, however, was the de facto protagonist of that conclave: pope emeritus benedict who, over the past 32 years—first, as cardinal ratzinger, the head advisor to pope john paul ii, then as pope—had played a major role in the selection of each and every one of the bishops who would now choose his successor as holy see. throughout those years, he had the reputation as one of the most stalwart opponents of liberation theology. he had personally orchestrated the removal or silencing of key liberation voices across the americas, those who had invited jesus “to go out into the world, into cities and towns, / and carry hope to all mankind of the new promised land.” now, one can imagine the pope emeritus silently celebrating his achievement: the presence of jesus —again—had been reduced to “his word” of “hope;” and his promise to “save” the faithful in “his eternity” would no longer cause internal church divisions and undesirable turbulence in the social sphere. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 42 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 43 *pope john xxiii, in his last months of his life, provided the inspiration for gaudium et spes. it was drafted from the floor of the council, approved overwhelmingly, and then promulgated by the new pope paul vi on 7 december 1965. as is customary with catholic documents, the title is taken from its incipit in latin, here rendered in english translation: “the joys and hopes, the grief and anguish of the people of our time, especially of those who are poor or afflicted, are the joys and hopes, the grief and anguish of the followers of christ as well.” **in the “medellin documents” of the celam (conferencia general del episcopal latinoamericano) mention is made cebs, of the need for church-sponsored “concientizacion,” and of the urgency of pastoral activity on behalf of the poor (medellin documents). it was fr. gustavo gutierrez, in his 1971 book, la teologia de la liberacion, who popularized the term “preferential option for the poor”. references allen, j.l. 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(1979, 28 jan.). opening address at the puebla conference. reprinted in john eagleson & philip scharper (eds.). puebla and beyond (pp. 324-32). maryknoll, n.y.: orbis books, 1979. riding, a. (1985). distant neighbors: a portrait of the mexicans. new york: alfred a. knopf. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 romero, o. (1985). voice of the voiceless: the four pastoral letters and other statements. maryknoll, n.y: orbis books. sigmund, p. (1990). liberation theology at the crossroads: democracy or revolution? oxford: oxford university press. stoll, d. (1990, 17 jan.). a protestant reformation in latin america? the christian century, 44-8. the christian century. (1989, 19 april). 106, 403-04. time magazine. (1976, 15, nov.). caesar or god? 72. torrens, j.s. (1989, 28 oct.). chile: a watershed in church/state relations. america, 161, 268-70. ugalde, l. the present crises of society and the church: an eye to the future.” in cleary (ed.). born of the poor (pp. 115-33). wikipedia. (2013). gaudium et spes. retrieved from es.wikipedia.org/wiki/gaudium_et_spes wright, t.c. (1989, 23 sept.). vagarities of religious experience in nicaragua. america, 167, 158-61. address correspondences to: bill katra independent scholar la crosse, wi (608) 785-2031 billkatra@hotmail.com 45 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 39 wolf, goat, and cabbage: an analysis of students’ roles and cognitive and metacognitive behaviors in small group collaborative problem-solving nadia stoyanova kennedy abstract: the research reported on in this paper examines students’ cognitive and metacognitive behaviors as they are manifested in non-routine problem-solving in small groups in a mathematics classroom. students’ cognitive and metacognitive moves are analyzed as well as the connection between the interaction of both cognitive and metacognitive processes and the effectiveness of the problem-solving process. some links between modes of discourse, modes of thought in social interactions in small groups, group communicative patterns, and the interplay among students’ roles within the groups are investigated, in order to identify factors which influence the process of collaborative problem-solving, and which contribute to optimal and successful cooperative work in group settings. the results of the study indicate that a setting with a balance between the incidence of cognitive and metacognitive behaviors of the participants and relatively equal participation of all the members of the group, without pronounced patterns of domination and with a high degree of tolerance of other’s opinions, are factors which contribute to successful work in group settings. problem solving is one of the most important aspects of doing mathematics, and is considered to be a cru-cial domain of mathematical learning and knowing (nctm, 1989). research findings (schoenfeld, 1985; forman & mcphail, 1993; cobb, wood & yackel, 1993; cole & nicolopoulou, 1993; cai, mamona-downs, weber, 2005) indicate that current interpretations of problem solving and of the factors that contribute to its success might be too narrow. several studies investigating mathematical problem-solving (garofalo & lester, 1985; schoenfeld, 1985; lambdin,1993, artzt & armour-thomas, 1992; muir, beswick, williamson, 2008) suggest that success in the latter may depend on the active monitoring and regulation of the cognitive processes engaged in the larger process itself. however, if we accept the assumption that students’ knowledge is individually constructed, and that success in problem-solving is an independent achievement, there is the risk of ignoring the role of the other in the process. drawing on lev vygotsky’s theory, which exerted a strong influence on western scholars, current researchers and educators operate with a multi-layered model of the relationship between cognitive, psychological and sociocultural factors in the learning process. such a model also suggests that the kinds of activities in which students engage in their everyday classroom life have a profound impact on the development of their cognitive, metacognitive and communicative functions. if this is the case, it follows that systematic analysis of collaborative classroom problem-solving activities can help teachers identify, not just levels of development in students’ patterns of communication, goal-setting, social interaction, and ability to solve particular problems, but how and under what influences they change. moreover, it is important to know how all those factors may communicate in ways that either promote or impede successful problem solving. once this becomes clearer, it might be easier for teachers to identify the cognitive and communicative opportunities that are available in the microculture of the classroom. purposes of the research given the multiple dimensions sketched above, the goal of the mini-research project described here was manifold. first, i intended to analyze students’ cognitive and metacognitive behaviors (moves) in the solution of analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 40 non-routine problems that require more than one step--to investigate how their choice and management of strategies can be responsible for successful problem-solving. students’ behaviors exhibited during problem solving such as reading the problem or listening are characterized here as cognitive. when behaviors are accompanied by self-regulation and self-monitoring---for example, such behaviors may be exhibited in implementation of a plan for solving a math problem or verification of a solution----they can be characterized as metacognitive. given the sociocultural dimension, i also examined the phenomenon of cognitive processing as it evolves while students are engaged in problem-solving in small groups, with special attention to the observable links between modes of discourse and modes of cognitive and metacognitive behaviors during social interactions in small groups. literature review solving non-routine problems requires thoughtful analysis: defining the problem, planning a strategy for its solution, implementing the strategy, and checking the results (polya, 1973). a thoughtful analysis entails understanding, problem solving skills, and motivation. effective problem solving also requires cognitive flexibility (baroody, 1987). according to schoenfeld (1985) mathematical problem-solving requires, not just a basis in mathematical knowledge, but that adequate resources are made available to the individual in the given context. heuristic efficiency in problem-solving, he claims, might depend heavily on managing the resources available and the execution of control within the environment of the given problem. the key component in schoenfeld’s model of problem-solving proficiency is the capacity to monitor the state of the solution as it evolves, and to rethink each new move in light of one’s emergent understanding of the problem and its constraints. he argues that “resources and control are two qualitatively different, though deeply intertwined, aspects of mathematical behavior” (p.135). recent research tends to support schoenfeld’s view, and indicates that performance on a task is positively correlated with one’s mathematical knowledge, on the degree of one’s metaknowledge, and on the interaction between the two (lambdin, 1993; artzt & armourthomas, 1992; carpenter & fennema, 1992; carpenter & fennema, 1996; muir et al, 2008). furthermore, vygotsky’s theory offers an approach to the study of cognition in social contexts, and explains the development of mental functions as a result of the child’s interaction with adults and peers. vygotsky claims that “every function in the child’s cultural development appear twice, on two levels: first on the social and later on the psychological level— first between people as an interpsychological category and then within the learner as an intrapsychological category (vygotsky, 1978, p.128). many authors (bruner, 1986; minick, 1989; wertsch, 1985) suggest further that the vygotskyan perspective on teaching and learning processes goes far beyond the mere transfer of knowledge from teacher to learner. collaborative problem-solving activities understood from a vygotskyan perspective have drawn increasing attention from researchers. in fact recent studies indicate that they provide a context in which additional supports for, as well as challenges to, students’ thinking occur (cobb, 1995; yackel, 1995; lampert, 1990). school activities that involve collaborative problem-solving provide a rich environment for students to learn how to work together with complex tasks. many studies discuss the social, affective and cognitive benefits of cooperative learning and cooperative problem-solving, but little attention has been paid to how students working collaboratively negotiate goals and define tasks, and how they carry them out using shared means of communication. schoenfeld’s method of protocol analysis focuses on decision-making at the executive or control level of the problem-solving procedure, and suggests a way to examine individual behavior throughout the evolution of the solution. in his model, protocols are partitioned into sections called “episodes.” each episode represents a period of time during which an individual or a group of problem solvers is engaged in one large task and are consistently displaying one form of behavior. the junctures between episodes are the points at which the direction of the problem-solving process changes significantly. schoenfeld identifies six characteristic behaviors which he claims to find in sequence in the problem-solving process: “reading” the problem, analysis, exploration, planning, implementation and verification. his protocol analysis offers a picture of executive decision-making, control level, analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 41 and management of the problem-solving process. schoenfeld has not specified a way to determine the cognitive level of each episode, but other research studies (schoenfeld, 1985; lambdin, 1993; artzt & armour-thomas, 1992) indicate that the reliability of the parsing protocols analysis is substantial. nor has schoenfeld fully addressed the collaborative aspects of problem-solving, but lambdin (1993) uses parsing protocols to analyze cooperative mathematical problem-solving in small groups. she adds to her analysis of the procedure itself a further analysis of the monitoring moves and the roles characteristically played by individuals working together, which gives a more detailed picture of the dynamics of the process and the cognitive levels of the moves. in addition, artzt and armour-thomas (1992) use parsing protocols to delineate the types and levels of the cognitive processes individuals use as they work together in a small group setting, and to understand how these processes affect the entire process of solving a given problem. their study suggests that a certain balance between cognitive and metacognitive processes within a group is required to ensure the success of problem solving efforts. design of the study in order to analyze the data i collected, i utilized transcripts of students’ discussions in five small groups during mathematical problem-solving events. for more in-depth analysis, i also used my observations of these same students over a one-month period, and information given by their teacher. during observations of classes prior to the recorded discussions, i noted patterns of math-resistant behavior – especially toward some geometry and algebraic problems. students appeared to see no connection between these problems and “real life,” and understood them as impractical and useless. thus, i suggested to the teacher that we try a problem that seemed to me to be more connected to their informal knowledge, hoping that it would draw their attention, and lead them more easily into collaborative work. the problem given was: a wolf, a goat, and a cabbage are on one side of a river. a boatman is given the task of transporting them to the other side, but there are two conditions: first, he can only take one at a time; and second, the wolf must not be left alone with the goat and the goat must not be left alone with the cabbage. find a way for the boatman to carry all three across the river. the site of the study was a magnet high school in new jersey, founded one year previously and operated under the administration of a college of education of a university nearby. when i recorded the discussions for analysis, i had already been visiting two tenth grade geometry sections for a month, and meeting regularly with the teacher of both sections to discuss students’ learning problems, the psychological environment, specific instructional strategies, and aspects of classroom dynamics. the majority of students were of african-american and latino ethnic origin – a total of 30 tenth-grade students, 13 boys and 17 girls, who comprised two classes taught by one teacher. on the teacher’s account, they had little experience in working in small groups. typically, the whole class worked together, and the last minutes of the class period were spent working in pairs. since they rarely changed their seats, the working pairs – chosen by student preference – were virtually permanent. thus, students had no experience working with different students, either individually or in groups. for the purpose of this study the teacher formed new groups of two, three or four students of differing abilities in mathematics. i was given permission by the principle and the teacher to make a 45 minute tape of student discussions as they engaged in the process of solving non-routine problems. on the day on which i recorded, the teacher formed four groups during the second period and five groups during the third, and asked each to solve the problem i had chosen, stating that they would be working collaboratively. i audiotaped two groups who worked during the second period and three groups during the third, all of them randomly selected. the resulting tape was transcribed and used as data for analysis. i analyzed each discussion using schoenfeld’s six-step protocol, and made a description and analysis of each student’s role in the problem solving process. using a framework developed by artzt & armour-thomas (1993) i coded students’ behaviors as cognitive and/or metacognitive, and examined the way the two interact and affect the outcome of mathematical problem-solving in small groups. finally, i examined the structures and dynamics of students’ cognitive and metacognitive processes. i tried to articulate the complexity of the problem-solving process accurately, taking into account the influence of social, psychological and cognitive factors. in addition to using schoenfeld’s parsing protocol as an analytic tool, i included an analysis of subjects’ regulatory and monianalytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 42 toring roles. in order to analyze the cognitive and metacognitive behaviors of the subjects while they worked together in small groups, i adopted artzt & thomas’s framework, which is derived from schoenfeld’s model, and expands the latter’s episodic categories for coding students behaviors with two new categories – understanding the problem and watching/listening – given that, quite often, students made comments about the conditions of the problem, or tried to clarify their understanding, and by definition collaborative work implies that at certain moments students watch and listen to others. following artzt and thomas, i classified each of the eight episodes as cognitive or metacognitive. in keeping with the working definition developed by garofalo & lester (1985, p.164), i identified behaviors as predominantly cognitive when actions were made toward further processing – not including monitoring or regulation – and as metacognitive when actions indicated procedural assessment, state assessment (i.e. assessment of the current status of the problem-solving process), self-regulation, and partner reflections (lambdin, 1993). the “reading” episode is assigned cognitive characteristics. analyzing and planning and understanding are assigned predominately metacognitive characteristics, because they require reflective thinking and regulatory functioning to keep the process within the frame of the problem as defined. exploring and verifying episodes can be assigned either cognitive or metacognitive characteristics, depending on whether the behavior is guided by monitoring. schoenfeld (1987, p.194) drew the conclusion, based on the bulk of his research studies, that in many cases exploration often results in “wild goose chases.” when exploration, implementation and verification are accompanied by self-regulation and self-monitoring, such behaviors can be categorized as metacognitive – otherwise they should be assigned cognitive characteristics. watching/listening is not categorized as either cognitive or metacognitive, because it offers no evidence that makes it possible to infer a level of cognition. transcripts were analyzed by one-minute intervals, after which i coded the heuristic episode and the cognitive level that best represented the students’ behaviors exhibited during the interval under examination. the behaviors were listed in sequence, then were categorized in two ways – by episode and by cognitive level. charting each student’s behavior in this way created an individual profile for each student. by counting the number of cognitive and metacognitive behaviors and dividing them by the total number of behaviors coded in the group, a profile was obtained for each group member’s cognitive and metacognitive participation and contribution within the group. space limitations do not allow for the inclusion of the protocol analysis and the behavior analysis of all five groups in this paper, and i have therefore chosen to present analyses only for groups 1, 2, and 4. what follows are three representative examples of three of the protocol analyses of the groups involved, and a discussion which draws implications from all five. analysis protocol analysis group 1 the first discussion took place among four students, a, b, c, d. the students read the problem silently. there were no comments or attempts to define a goal. they moved immediately into trial-and-error exploration, which began in the pursuit of two ideas, within the context of their professed intention to explore the possibility of solving a part of the problem – i.e., bringing one of the items to the other side of the river. the first idea led them to the conclusion that they couldn’t proceed further without violating the conditions of the problem. their second idea was immediately assessed as unworkable, considering the problem constraints. during the second minute student b – who, based on the comparative number and length of her interventions, of which a comparatively large number were interruptions of others, i will characterize as “dominating” – led the group into the exploration of an idea which was completely outside of the frame of the problem. a: i guess you take the goat first. then you leave a wolf and a cabbage… b: but if you take the goat first you never know, because like…say if you take the goat you come back, come back to the shore, the goat, the wolf…what is it called?… a: no. b: because you got the thing, you got the goat in your hand… a: no. the goat is on the other side of the shore. you bring the goat and drop it off and come back and get analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 43 the wolf. b: but then the wolf is gonna jump out before you jump out and eat the…um, and eat the… c: look. you take the goat, first, what you gonna take next? either way if you take the wolf and the goat is on the other side of the river, the wolf will eat it by the time you come back and get the cabbage. b: so you take the wolf first, drop the wolf off…hm . . . c: but if you take the wolf first, the goat will eat the cabbage. b: but, listen. o.k. you can’t do it. you can’t. a: wait. b: this is what i will do. i will take the cabbage and let them eat each other… d: so, there is no solution. towards the end of this excerpt we see that student c introduced a new out-of-frame idea, which was not recognized as such, but was rejected as irrelevant. student b then returned the group to an idea which had already been examined, and was again assessed as unacceptable. this was followed by various local assessments of the proposed ideas, in a series of interventions characterized by a lack of overall orientation and direction, and several imaginative leaps. the exploration period went on for about four minutes. there were instances of local assessment of suggested ideas, but the episode lacked moments of global assessment of how these ideas were connected to all of the problem’s conditions – apart from the negative one that the problem was insoluble. by the end of the episode, many ideas had been explored and analyzed, even some wild ones. a: you can’t do it because either way something has to be eaten. c: might as well let the goat eat the cabbage. oh! let the goat eat the cabbage,…cause you can grow another one ………………………………………………………………………………………… c: how about this. you can bring the goat in the boat then throw the cabbage in the water,…cause the cabbage is going to float. a: but it would float down the river. you are going across not down the river. b: but, how about if you take the wolf across the river and drop it off. wolf don’t stand still waiting for you, wolfs run away into the wilderness, so the wolf run away and you safe with bringing others. d: but you try to bring everybody over there. a: why not eat the cabbage on the way there, then you don’t have to worry about the cabbage. you go pick up the goat. b: but if you drop the cabbage off first, then the wolf will eat the goat. a: either way something is going to be eaten. d: there is no solution. it could be inferred that it was the sense of exhaustion of possibilities which led the group to look more closely at the conditions, and which triggered them to reconsider the problem and the way they perceived it. they all seemed to carry the practical assumption that the three items could be carried across the river only once, and in one direction. in addition, a great deal of energy was spent by students a and d in disciplining and monitoring students b and c – i.e. in keeping them within the framework set by the conditions of the problem. eventually, it was realized that the possibility of carrying things in both directions across the river had been omitted from previous assessments. at this point, student a offered an outline of a strategy. after a short negotiated analysis of the plan’s compliance with the problem conditions, student a lead the group in implementing and verifying the solution. a: look, you can bring one over and you can bring it back if you need. bring one over and the other back and then bring the other one over and another one back. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 44 c: then you could take more than three trips. d: he has to make only three trips? a: no, more than three trips. d: oh, all right. a: let say she brings the goat, because you can have those two over, then go back and bring the wolf and bring the goat back over, then bring the cabbage over and then go back and bring the goat. oh, there you go. bring the goat over first, then come back and get the wolf and then bring the wolf over then turn around and bring the goat back with you and then the cabbage and bring it with you. d: no. it’s the other way around. you bring the wolf back with you and then go get the cabbage. a: no…cause you leave the goat with the cabbage. but listen, listen, listen. bring the goat over, she is over here, he is over there, and then come back and get the wolf, then back over and takes the goat with her and picks up the cabbage. d: but then you are going to have the cabbage with the goat. a: no. you hold the cabbage in your arms. the goat ain’t gonna take it from you. you leave the goat back on the other side and come back over. c: o.k. i got you. during the last one-minute chunk of the discussion, it was determined that every member of the group had the same understanding of the solution. overall, the group discussion was characterized by lively, highly-motivated dynamics, although its overall tendency was to meander through the exploration of a variety of different ideas, some of which were dramatically outside of the framework conditions. there were numerous instances of control behavior on the part of the students, which was important for reaching closure of the exploration stage, and successfully terminating the problem-solving process. in short, the group went through a short episode of reading the problem, then through a long and chaotic episode of exploration, which exhibited more of a trial and error approach that any strategic exploration, and finally through a quick implementation and verification episode of the suddenly thought-out solution. role analysis in group 1: classifying students’ behaviors student a assumed the role of regulator. she appeared to be the most focused on the problem and its conditions. in the transcript, she is seen to have started exploring an idea immediately, but she was quickly forced into a regulator role by student b’s interventions, whose ideas she recognized as out-of-frame. she continued in this mode throughout the first three quarters of the discussion, when, having more or less succeeded in “disciplining” student b, she temporarily overlooked the conditions herself for a time. but she is the student in this discussion who most consistently analyzes why suggested ideas will not work, who most often backs up her claims with arguments, and draws conclusions. she is the one who is outlining a plan (metacognitive) which is implemented at the end (metacognitive). she also kept track of each argument, and carefully monitored the final verification. student a’s behaviors were coded as reading, understanding, exploring, planning, implementing, verifying, and watching/listening (cognitive and metacognitive). student b took the role of instigator. she could be characterized as the element in the group that organized the system through creating resistance. the overriding frequency of her interventions and her continual prevention of the development of ideas by others are overshadowed only by her, to use schoenfeld’s term, “wild goose chase” ideas, which were dramatically out-of-frame and lacking argumentation. she appeared to lack any capacity for self-regulation. she showed no recognition of, or ability to build on, others’ ideas, although she did accept, at least partially, their arguments against hers. she did show a vivid, even creative understanding of transitive logical connections, but didn’t seem to be able to bring an awareness of the framework conditions to the problemsolving process in any consistent way. her behaviors were coded as reading and exploring (cognitive). student c’s role in the group could be characterized as reflector. she originally entered the discussion with a local assessment “look. you take the goat, first, what you gonna take next? either way if you take the wolf and analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 45 the goat is on the other side of the river, the wolf will eat it by the time you come back and get the cabbage,” and tried at first, like student a, to correct student b’s thinking – pointing out, how her idea contradicted the problem conditions. from that point on, her approach to the problem and her awareness of the framework conditions was more or less identical with student b’s “c: how about this. you can bring the goat in the boat then throw the cabbage in the water,…cause the cabbage is going to float.” it might be speculated that her behavior was influenced by student b’s thinking and behavior. otherwise she engaged in watching/listening behaviors, without verbal indications, which is difficult to interpret. her behaviors were coded reading, exploring, watching/listening (predominantly cognitive). student d assumed the role of observer, in that he spent most of the time watching/listening. at the end of the second one-minute chunk, he tried to summarize the ideas explored so far, for example: “d: so, there is no solution.” or “d: but you try to bring everybody over there.” at times he appears confused, and unable to understand student a’s strategy. or had difficulty articulating his thought – it is unclear whether he was suggesting a new variant of the solution or trying to restate student a’s solution. overall his behaviors were coded as reading, understanding, exploring, and watching/listening (cognitive and metacognitive). protocol analysis group 2 the protocol for group 2 represents a discussion among three students, e, f, and g. the group read the problem without any explicit comments or statement about the conditions. they made no verbal assessment of directions that might be taken. after the short reading episode, they moved to a trial-and-error exploration. student e began by suggesting a direction which considered one of the conditions, but overlooked the others. student f refuted her idea by noting explicitly the overlooked condition, exhibiting a local control move. student e suggested another out-of-frame idea, which didn’t satisfy the problem conditions, but in fact became an element of discussion until the end of the conversation. e: we can only take one at a time. so, that means we take the wolf first. f: but the goat is gonna be left with the cabbage, so forget that one. e: if you take the cabbage and the goat...but you can only take one at a time... g: but if you leave one, they are gonna eat the other one. e: yo, you take ...,you take...you only get one at a time, you take the goat,...no, you take the wolf and you take the cabbage because the cabbage don’t weigh nothing so you can put it in your pocket... f: and then you bring the goat and then you go back and i’ll take the cabbage back there. you leave the goat over there. g: you take the wolf and the cabbage, and you put the cabbage in your pocket and you take the wolf... e: no, you take the wolf over there and then you go back and get the goat, ...cause the goat will not eat the wolf. f: then take the...goat e: the goat? they already gonna have the goat and the wolf in there... f: ..and the cabbage e: no, the cabbage you already have in your pocket. f: but wait, you are still missing one thing. e: the tiger? [laughter] f: that’s .... [ inaudible ] e: no. there’s only three animals. f: we got it. e: we got it. g: we bring the wolf... e: take the cabbage – the cabbage you put in your pocket then you come back and you bring the goatf: ...then you go back and pull the cabbage. oh, that was good. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 46 this lengthy exploration without much direction appears to have been possible because no control moves – either local or global – were exercised, and no elements of the exploration were judged as irrelevant or inappropriate. student f did try to consider the problem constraints, but after the first communicative exchange her reactions lost an apparent focus. this exploration was basically “wild” – without any goal orientation or traces of analysis, and lacking any evidence of management of the problem-solving process. the group made no attempt to verify what they arrived at as an answer, or even to make basic explanatory sense of it. they all seemed implicitly to agree upon its correctness. this group did not appear to exhibit any reflective thinking. there were several incorrect references. in short, the group moved from the short reading episode to the exploration episode and became “stuck.” role analysis in group 2: classifying students’ behaviors student e’s role was virtually identical to student b’s (instigator) in the previous protocol, except that group resistance to her dominating behaviors did not lead to the development of a strategy, but rather ended in acquiescence. she initiated with an idea which did show awareness of the problem conditions, was returned to the problem frame by student f, and that was the first and last attempt at local control assessment. her second outof-frame idea was discussed briefly by the group, then accepted without any attempt to evaluate it. the behaviors of student e were coded as reading and exploring (cognitive). student f’s role was virtually identical with that of student c above (reflector). like the latter, she made an initial control move, but from that point on predominantly watched and listened. she did make some attempt to clarify ideas, but without substantive effect. her behaviors were coded as reading, exploring (cognitive and metacognitive), and watching/listening. student g also assumed the role of a reflector. most of her time was spent watching/listening. she didn’t appear to understand the problem very well – or at least the conditions were not clear to her. her participation consisted mostly in repeating statements made by student e. her behaviors were coded as reading, exploring (cognitive), and watching/listening. protocol analysis: group 4 the protocol for group 4 represents a discussion among two students, k and l. the reading episode was short and silent. students went immediately into exploration, which started with k’s out-of-frame idea. student l refuted the idea by ignoring it, and introduced another possibility, which partially considered the problem framework, but did not coordinate all the conditions. student k continued introducing out-of-frame ideas, with student l attempting with some indicated irritation to return him to the framework by focusing on the conditions, restating the problem, and actively monitoring the exploration process through local and state assessment. he firmly insisted on student k considering his critique. k: i think you first have to put the cabbage in a bag and take it with the wolf to the other side l: wait a minute. wait a minute. i’m thinking that you take the wolf first and when he comes back he take the cabbage, so that when he puts it over there the wolf does not eat the cabbage, so they ‘re left alone. they ‘ll do nothing. then you come back for the goat. k: just throw the cabbage and . . . [inaudible] l: it’s not a part of the problem. no time to joke. k: no. i’m serious. throw the cabbage at a distance and the goat run away...[inaudible] l: you can’t throw the cabbage. you have to put it in the boat and cross it over the river. k: cabbage by itself? l: well. the condition is you’ve got to carry only one thing at a time. there’s three things: a wolf, a cabbage and a goat. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 47 in the next part, student l also tried to explore an idea which didn’t satisfy all conditions, and it took him some time to realize this and abandon it. the exploration episode was focused and without major fluctuations – a result of student l’s active monitoring and local and state assessments of the process. l: o.k. but listen, get the wolf first then you come back and get the cabbage, then you go to the other side of the river, then you throw the cabbage, then the wolf runs away, then you bring the goat to the other side, then you bring the goat and everybody is happy. k: why would he run away? the goal is to bring all three to the other side. you are not gonna make them run away. l: but if you can’t put the wolf and the goat together...how... k: i’m saying...look, you put the wolf...you cross the river with the wolf first, he stays there and then you come back for the cabbage, so the cabbage and the wolf they’re alone since the wolf can’t eat the cabbage. l: the wolf does not eat cabbage,so they’re left alone, so the boatman...he doesn’t have to worry about anything. so then he comes back for the goat and all three of them are over there on the other side of the river. k: but the wolf is gonna see the goat when it comes by, and then..[inaudible] l: is that part of the problem? is that part of the problem? k: but if you bring all three of them to the other side then the wolf is going to see the goat and is going to eat him. but then while the goatl: stick with the problem, man. we don’t want no jokes. k: while the goat is being eaten by the wolf he’s going to eat the cabbage then the whole problem is going to go down the drain. the interesting thing here is that, the two students listen very carefully to each other’s ideas. in the beginning of the episode we see that k is the one who is asking for justification of l’s ideas. very quickly the roles are reversed again. l: i’m thinking. i’m thinking, the first thing we should do is send the goat, so that way, when it’s over on the other side the wolf and the cabbage they’re alone, so there’s nothing wrong there. but then from here on there is a problem right there, because if you send the cabbage, the goat will eat it, and if you send the wolf over there, then-k: o.k. but go down the river then-l: send it across, not to go down the river. k: i’m saying more down so they don’t see each other. l: i’m thinking, there is no solution to this.[pause] k: i’m saying what i think...it would make more sense if the...i mean, come on, a wolf in a boat, it’s gonna kill the guy, it would probably kill me. because i’m trying to tame the wolf and then the goat would probably eat my shoes and the cabbage...you know... l: he will have his own protection from the wolf. don’t worry. k: are we just trying to get all three of them to the other side. that’s it? l: that’s it. that’s the goal. k: so you just bring one, then one, then one. bring the goat first, then the cabbage. l: no, you got to understand what’s the situation—what’s going on. if you send one, the two on the other side, they are gonna, a-a ....i say if you send the wolf in first the goat and the cabbage, they’re left alone. but the goat is gonna eat the cabbage. if you send the cabbage over, then the wolf will eat the goat. k: so, send the goat over... l: yah, that’s what i’m thinking. that’s the first step, it’s, um,... just have no choice. i mean either..., um,... send either one of them and something goes on. k: so send the goat, then take the wolf, throw him in the river, then take the cabbage and then when the goat tries to eat the cabbage, just run away. that could work. the planning episode was overt and well articulated, but it dealt with only some of the problem’s condition. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 48 student l assessed what he considered necessary to do to move forward, identified the source of the conflicts that were preventing a solution, and then moved to a short analysis episode. here student k followed up by moving the process into another exploration episode by introducing new out-of-frame ideas. this particular episode lacked any assessment on the part of the participants regarding the success or the failure of their problem-solving process. student l was trying to help student k understand the conditions, but at the same time he himself was drawn to ignore the conditions imposed by the problem. l: but does it have to be on a boat or i mean, uh... you said that the boat man can only carry one thing at a time. so how about taking one on the boat and the other just dragging in through the river. can we do that? [asking the teacher?] teacher: no. [pause] l: why don’t you just keep a fence on the other side of him, just keep the goat on one side and the wolf on the other? k: the goat will eat the metal and in the fence and the wolf will just jump over it and eat the goat and the goat will eat the cabbage. l: are they like running free or something like...is there something like a cage? [a question to the teacher again.] teacher: no. i don’t think so. l: all right. i’m just curious. i was thinking if you send both of them like the wolf and the goat over there, what’s the point of worrying, because the wolf is in the cage. i mean, he can’t get in. k: send the wolf then send the cabbage, then go down the river, and send the goat. l: [inaudible]...the wolf, but then when you get there you put in the goat in the boat, if you take him back and then drop him off and bring the cabbage in, put them over there so the wolf and the cabbage, they’re alone. go back and get the cabbage. i got it. [sotto voce]. that’s it. k: what? l: all right. this is how it is. [ drawing] here is the river and here is where all three of them are, and here is where they’re supposed to be. [explanations continue] at this point he used the teacher as referent, asking her questions about the relevance of his ideas, thus expressing the need for some external assessment. the teacher may have helped him here to abandon these ideas and to look for a strategy which would satisfy the whole set of conditions. then apparently he “saw” a strategy and came up with a relevant plan, which was quickly followed by implementation. student l was clearly confident with the solution, and the verification episode went as quickly: after brief initial resistance, student k agreed on l’s solution. role analysis in group 4: classifying students’ behaviors within the context of the dyad, student k could be characterized as a focus distractor –although, as with students b, e, and i above, it could be hypothesized that he created the resistance necessary for the process to self-organize (this is more difficult to claim with a dyadic situation). he consistently resisted the many efforts by student l to persuade him to frame his exploration ideas within the given conditions. he appears to generally exhibit unreflective thinking. it wasn’t clear at the end whether he understood the solution. his behaviors were coded as reading, exploring (cognitive) student l played a role of a regulator. he spent a great deal of time explaining the conditions, reformulating the problem, and trying to keep student k within the framework. he worked single-handedly to monitor and evaluate the process – attempting to orchestrate, and exhibiting conscious local, global and state assessment and time management behaviors. he was trying to orchestrate the process, exhibiting assessment and time management. his regulatory functions were verbalized in statements like “stick with the problem,” or “it’s not a part of the problem. no time for jokes.” his behaviors were coded as reading, understanding (metacognitive), exploring (cognitive and metacognitive), planning (metacognitive), analyzing (metacognitive), implementing (metacognianalytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 49 tive), and verifying (metacognitive). below is a table that represents the individual students’ cognitive and metacognitive behaviors in percentages, based on the analysis of the discussions. categories groups students metacognitive cognitive total % group 1 a 25.4 7.2 32.6 b 0 14.5 14.5 c 12.7 5.4 18.1 d 9 3.6 12.6 group 2 e 0 33.3 33.3 f 6.6 6.6 13.2 g 6.6 6.6 13.2 group 3 h 33.3 11.2 44.4 i 0 22.2 22.2 j 18.5 7.4 25.9 group 4 k 0 34.4 34.4 l 50 15.6 65.6 group 5 m 0 33.3 33.3 n 0 33.3 33.3 o 0 22.2 22.2 table 1: table of the % of cognitive and metacognitive total behavior per student results and discussion protocol analyses were carried out using schoenfeld’s framework for macroscopic analysis. they focused mostly on monitoring, control and regulatory functions of the thought processes, and on tracing the consequences according to whether these behaviors were present or absent. each session was parsed into episodes. junctures between episodes delineated points at which major shifts in resource allocation and direction of the problem-solving process were executed. the analyses demonstrate that absence of monitoring and assessment at the control level can generate failure in problem solving. of the five groups examined, groups 1, 3 and 4 were successful with the problem solving and groups 2 and 5 were not. groups 1, 3 and 4 exhibited a fair amount of reasonable control decisions – evaluating and curtailing a number of possible approaches while working on the problem, and spending a relatively limited amount of time on “wild goose chases.” this allowed for the emergence of new possibilities for solving the problem. the overall quality of the students’ monitoring, assessment and executive decision-making in these groups was relatively poor. in many cases they made detours, and pursued out-of-frame ideas. group 1, for example, spent a comparatively long time during the exploration episode to pursue several out-of-frame ideas, but their monitoring, assessment and executive skills made positive contributions to a successful problem-solving performance nevertheless. groups 2 and 5 explored several out-of-frame ideas without pausing to consider the problem constraints, and consequently failed to discard these ideas. the absences of monitoring and control behaviors were perhaps the major contributing factors to these groups’ failures. the episode analyses provide a clear contrast between the two sets of groups. groups 1, 3 and 4 are much more dynamic and rich in episodes and transitions. the analyses of the transcripts of groups 2 and 5 indicate only reading and exploration episodes, with no transitions. there were no evidences of shifts of direction, which precluded the possibility of finding a solution. all this suggests that monitoring and control decisions can be crucially important for the success of problem solving. it suggests that education with an emphasis on metacognition can have a significant effect on students’ behaviors at the control level, and therefore positive effect on analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 50 problem-solving performance. coding of students’ cognitive behaviors was carried out using artzt & thomas’s (1993) framework. it delineates both individual students’ and groups’ profiles. figure 1 represents the percentage of behaviors coded as metacognitive, cognitive and watching/listening. the total percentage of the metacognitive behaviors of the students varies between 0% and 50%. the range of the individual cognitive behaviors as a percentage of the total behaviors coded ranged from 3.3% to 34.4%. the total percentage of metacognitive behaviors exhibited in the groups varies between 0% and 51.8%. the range of the cognitive behaviors in the groups’ profiles is between 30.4% and 58.8%. a close reading of the transcripts and their analyses indicates other factors which played a role in the incidence of executive and control behaviors in the problem-solving process. i would like to note two of them. one of them is a discursive clash between the subjects and the teacher – i.e. a conflict between the academic discourse of classroom mathematics and of the students – which was especially evident in a word problem which did not involve number calculation. there are many examples in these transcripts of cases in which the students were either unable or did not care to restrict their thinking to within the frame defined by the conditions of the problem, which is the major element of mathematical discourse. another factor which appeared to play a significant role in these particular discussions is the degree of tolerance of others’ opinions manifested by the students, and by the distribution of power within the group system. in group 1 for example, student b played a dominant role, which was partially neutralized by the interventions of students a and c, who were monitoring and trying to exercise some control over the process. student d was blocked and not given chance to participate at all. near the middle of the discussion student b was called away by the teacher for another class, and the group began functioning more evenly – communication patterns changed and allowed for the emergence of dialogue between all of the members. the resulting exchange of ideas and the addition of an analytic dimension to the exploration provided a new opportunity for success. group 5 showed a dysfunction of another kind. all three members were completely undirected in terms of goal, and jumped from one idea to another, without any instances of assessment or review. no attempt was made to understand each other’s ideas, or collaborative work on ideas. this could be characterized as a situation of goal displacement. the participants gave the impression of being motivated primarily by a desire both to impose their opinions on others and to reject the opinions of others, which implies a double-bind – at least in the world of mathematical discourse. as a result, the discussion exhibited a dramatic lack of cohesion. in group 3 one student (i) was unfocused and two students (h and j) were making a significant effort to bring her into focus, thus balancing the system such that it remained relatively goal directed, which was important for its success. in group 4 – the only dyadic group – two students were competing for domination. one of them (k) had the disadvantage, not only of lacking focus, but of appearing to be unfamiliar with the constraint structure of mathematical discourse, while the other (l) was perhaps the most aware of all the students in the experiment of the discursive demands of the problem. l used this power to assert control of the process, but it could also be suggested that their standoff contributed to a relative balance in the system, which allowed for the possibility of success. in summary, this sort of analysis of the group dynamics of problem-solving groups yields the possibility of a connection between the degree of tolerance and the distribution of power within the system on the one hand, and metacognitive knowledge, control execution in the system and successful problem-solving on the other. comparison of the groups’ profiles supports these conclusions on a micro level. they suggest that the groups with the lowest total percentage of metacognitive behaviors (groups 2 and 5) were the most unsuccessful in terms of the problem solving task. and it is worth noting that the individuals with the highest percentage of metacognitive behaviors were students l, h and a, who were the most active participants and who exhibited the greatest self-control. they were the plan-makers and the energetic collaborators in the implementation and verification episodes. another distinction between the successful and unsuccessful groups is that the metacognitive and cognitive analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 51 behaviors in the first set of groups were fairly well-balanced – 47.1% vs. 30.4% in group 1; 57.8% vs. 40.7% in group 3; and 50% vs. 50% in group 4 – whereas the imbalance in the second set of groups is obvious (13.2% vs. 46.5% in group 2, and 0% vs. 58.8% in group 5). structural analysis thus indicates that groups that functioned well in terms of equal participation and involvement of all of the members were more successful than groups in which there were larger variations. this would suggest that a well-functioning collaborative problem solving group requires a balance between the cognitive and metacognitive knowledge of the participants. the foregoing analyses support the idea that the relatively equal participation of all members of a collaborative group, without pronounced patterns of domination, and with a high degree of tolerance to others’ opinions, are factors that contribute to an optimal environment for well-functioning and successful cooperative work in group settings. this research also seems to indicate that a balance of cognitive and metacognitive moves creates a greater possibility than otherwise for monitoring and regulation to occur during collaborative problem solving. it also seems to support schoenfeld's (1989) contention that in collaborative problem-solving activities, achieving the solution to a problem becomes secondary to negotiating a shared problem definition and a common means of communication. in this case, groups with weak communicative patterns were less successful in problem solving than the groups which functioned better as a communicative system. negotiation of a shared problem definition in many cases turned out to trigger reformulation of the problem in another frame. at least two questions emerged in the course of this study which could be investigated further: 1) how great a role do the factors mentioned above play in collaborative work? and 2) could there be other factors of equal or even greater importance that influence this process? conclusion the purpose of this study was to examine the role of cognition and metacognition in small group settings. two frameworks were used to delineate the types and levels of thought processes and their interrelationships within existing classroom culture. the analysis suggests that different processes serve specific functions, and that the interplay between and among them accounts for problem solving effectiveness. this study suggests that these frameworks may be useful for action research in the classroom, and they promise to be a feasible tool for studying classroom cognitive dynamics. it goes without saying that a teacher needs some understanding of classroom cognitive dynamics in order to be able to adapt her practice to different classroom contexts. if the teacher knows what students are capable of doing on their own, she can take them to a more difficult level at the appropriate moment, assist them in the active construction of new knowledge, and thus enhance if not accelerate cognitive development. in addition, the regular practice of collaborative problem-solving promises to render students' thinking processes more explicit, thereby exposing those processes to more immediate intervention on the part of teachers and peers, and stimulating both group and individual self-correction. references artzt. a. f., & armour-thomas, e. (1992) development of a cognitive-metacognitive framework for protocol analysis of mathematical problem solving in small groups. cognition and instruction, 9 (2), 137-175. baroody, a. j. (1987) children mathematical thinking. new york: teachers college. bruner, j. (1986) actual minds, possible worlds. cambridge: harvard university press. cai, j., mamona-downs, j., weber, k. (2005). mathematical problem solving: what we know and where we are going. journal of mathematical behavior, 24, 217-220. carpenter, t. p., & fennema, e. (1992) cognitively guided instruction: building on the knowledge of students and teachers. international journal of educational research, 17, 457-470. carpenter, t. p., fennema, e. (1996) a longitudinal study of learning to use children’s thinking in mathematics instruction. journal for research in mathematics education , 27(4), 403-435. chang-wells, g.l. &well, g. (1993) dynamics of discourse: literacy and the construction of knowledge. in e. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 52 forman, n. minnick, s. addison stone (eds.), context for learning.(pp.58-91). new york: oxford university press. cobb, p., wood. t., & yackel, e. (1993) discourse, mathematical thinking, and classroom practice. in e. forman, n. minnick, s. addison stone (eds.), context for learning. (pp.91-120). new york: oxford university press. cole, m. & nicolopoulou, a. (1993) generation and transmission of shared knowledge in the culture of collaborative learning. in e. forman, n. minnick, s. addison stone (eds.) context for learning. (pp.269-283). new york: oxford university press. forman, e., & mcphail, j. (1993). vygotskyan perspective on children's collaborative problem-solving activities. in e.forman, n. minnick, s. addison stone (ed.) context for learning.(pp.213-230). new york: oxford university press. garofalo, j., & lester, f. k. (1985) metacognition, cognitive monitoring, and mathematical performance. journal for research in mathematics education, 16, 163-176. lambdin, d. v. (1993) monitoring moves and roles in cooperative mathematical problem solving. focus on learning problems in mathematics, 15, 48-64. minick,n.(1989). mind and activity in vygotsky's work: an expanded frame of reference. cultural dynamics, 2, 162-87. muir, t., beswick, k., & williamson, j. (2008). “i’m not very good at solving problems”: an exploration of students’ problem solving behaviors. journal of mathematical behavior, 27, 228-241. schoenfeld, a. h. (1985) mathematical problem solving. orlando: academic press. schoenfeld, a.h. (1989) what’s all the fuss about metacognition? in a. h. schoenfeld (ed.). cognitive science and mathematics education (pp.189-215). hillsdale, nj: erlbaum. schoenfeld, a.h. (1989) ideas in the air: speculations in small group learning, environmental and cultural influences on cognition and epistemology. international journal of educational research, 13, 71-88. schoenfeld, a. h. (1999). looking toward the 21st century: challenges of educational theory and practice. educational researcher. vygotsky, l. s. (1987) mind in society: the development of higher psychological processes. (m. cole, v. johnsteiner, s. scribner, e. souberman, eds.). cambridge: harvard university press. vygotsky, l. s. (1993) the collected works of l. s. vygotsky. vol.2. new york: plenum press. wertsch, j..v. (1985) vygotsky and the social formation of mind. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. address correspondence to: nadia stoyanova kennedy state university of new york, stony brook nadiakennedy@verizon.net analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 33 editor’s notes this second issue of volume 33 is dedicated to themes surrounding the relevancy and promise of liberation philosophy and associated movements (such as liberation theology). the interest in such themes arose in response to a conference on bartolomé de las casas held from october 12-13, 2012 at viterbo university. although our cfp did not receive as many submissions as we had originally hoped for, the five articles selected for this issue (two of them in spanish) effectively demonstrate both the conceptual resourcefulness and historical complexity of liberation pedagogy. the first article by costello and morehouse explores the rich cross fertilization between the community of inquiry and liberation philosophy, while offering some promising areas for future research. glina’s article looks at ways that liberation pedagogy can help pave the way for broadening how we consider the practice of exploratory talk in the classroom. katra’s piece serves as a nice complement to the other articles in focusing exclusively on the historical development, and eventual eclipse, of liberation theology in latin america. given that liberation philosophy arose as a reaction to a complicated configuration of problems within latin america, it is only fitting that the final two articles of this issue are written in spanish and speak to the development and on-going legacy of one of the greatest advocates of liberation philosophy, enrique dussel. although the inclusion of these two articles presumes of our readers a level a familiarity with spanish that may be unrealistic, i hope it still might serve as an invitation to encounter that other voice of philosophy that remains so often overlooked in the annals of traditional western philosophy, the voice of spanish. it was once a common practice of this journal to publish book reviews on relevant works related to philosophy and education and i have let that practice slip. this issue finds a return to that practice with two concise yet informative reviews of two important books related to philosophy and children, joanna haynes and karin murris’ picturebooks, pedagogy and philosophy, and jana mohr lone’s the philosophical child. happy reading chief editor jason j. howard viterbo university copy editor jacqueline herbers viterbo university contributing editors patrick costello glyndŵr university, wales susan gardner capilano university, canada david kennedy montclair state university nadia kennedy stony brook university, suny richard morehouse, emeritus viterbo university felix garcía moriyón center for philosophy for children madrid, spain joe oyler iapc, montclair state university michel sasseville laval university, quebec john simpson university of alberta, canada barbara weber university of british columbia, canada layout design assistant chelsey e. mccoy publisher viterbo university la crosse, wisconsin 54601 copyright 2005 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis is a peer-reviewed, on-line, open access journal published annually and sometimes biannually. issn 0890-5118 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 48 radical courage: bartolomé de las casas and his defense of the american indians jesús jambrina radical hope. in his book radical hope. ethics in the face of cultural devastation (2006) jonathan lear elaborates on the importance of studying historical contexts in order to achieve a deeper understanding of ethics (8).1 writing on how native american chief plenty coup (1848-1932) dealt with the devastation of the crow people’s way of life, lear goes beyond the classical definitions of concepts like hope and courage, reinterpreting them in terms of their ‘radical’ character. as we all know, “radical” is a very controversial word today. it is often used to define socalled “antiestablishment activism,” which often includes acts of violence. however, the first meaning of “radical” is not its similarity with “extreme”; on the contrary, radical comes from the latin word radix (root). this meaning was assimilated into the discipline of linguistics and is used to refer to the ‘stem’ of words. the term ‘radical’ is also used by scientists in chemistry, mathematics and physics to identify basic principles that allow for different developments within natural processes. i think lear’s use of the adjective “radical” is meant to convey the older, more ancient sense of the term –its sense as original and fundamental– and not its current political usage and its association with violence. for lear and his argument about the crow people, ‘radical’ means the ability to maintain the core values of the community while moving ahead in difficult times. being radical about hope also implies being radical about courage. in fact, lear’s book can be read as a discussion of how a classical concept like courage, one that is traditionally measured in terms of bravery in war, can be transformed to also include a sense of ‘engagement’ and ‘commitment.’ stated differently, how can one design survival strategies while also taking into consideration leadership initiatives that can move the community forward in a way that is sensitive to one’s particular historical situation. in a moment of cultural chaos and political confusion, the crow leader, plenty coup, was able to use his own dreams, coupled with native american ways of understanding reality, to propose a practical solution for his people’s way of life. this solution took into account the new conditions facing the crow people, but did so in a way that attempted to improve upon the old ways of life at the same time. if hope was necessary for plenty coup to imagine a different world for his people, courage was equally important in order to face his community and explain to them why they should go from a nomadic lifestyle to one that was settled and localized; to move from an era of constant battle with other native american groups, to that of cooperation with them and even with europeans. all this leadership and work made plenty coup into a hero to the crow people, one whose actions continue to serve as a model today, especially for those interested in the inter-relation between history and ethics. this paper draws from jonathan lear’s account of how to perceive the role of virtues, especially courage, as the centerpiece for an ethical vision that can move communities forward in times of difficulty. plenty coup and bartolomé de las casas (1484-1566) fought to transform their fellow citizen’s perspectives on humanity when analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 49 everything seemed to conspire against their ideas for a better future. through thoughtful actions, they both created an alternative narrative that allowed indigenous people to survive cultural devastation, and provided a new way to think about their future. similar to plenty coup, las casas challenged his fellow spaniard’s perception of the new “discovered” people, and worked most of his life to prove that the spanish treatment of the native american populations was unjust. las casas reinterpreted virtues like courage by contrasting the religious goals of the conquest with the actions of the conquistadores, exposing the unbalance and contradictions between these two poles. who was bartolomé de las casas? las casas (seville, 1484 – madrid, 1566) came to the americas in 1502 as a regular spanish conquistador, and in 1514, after a long transformative experience that included becoming a priest, he took the side of the american indians against most of the economic interests of the encomenderos (land owners). he is well known for his book a brief account of the destruction of the indies (1552), which describes the massive killing of native people in central america and the caribbean during the first ten years of the conquest.2 las casas was a firsthand witness to some of those killings, and they played a prominent role in his later decision to defend the indians. he was declared “protector of the indians” in 1515 and bishop of chiapas, southern mexico, in 1544, by the spanish crown. in order to carry his mission of defending the american indians he had to become a sharp politician who was able to balance several factors inside the spanish imperial machine. he was friends with christopher columbus’ family, with many catholic church authorities, and also the many indigenous leaders with whom he had to seal peace and economic treaties. las casas’ work, however, was not completely recognized until the 19th century when the new latin american nations defeated spain in the independence wars, and started to revalidate their national and cultural identities. in the 1960’s and 70’s, las casas was (re) discovered as the father of liberation theology, a perspective that was reaffirmed in 1993 by peruvian theologian gustavo gutierrez in his book las casas: in search of the poor of jesus christ (1993).3 las casas’ life and work still speaks to millions today, and his ideas continue to fuel arguments about a number of crucial issues; for example, the legacy of the spanish empire in the americas, the richness and prestige of the american indians’ cultures, and the role of the catholic church in the social and political structure of latin america. turning points in her introduction to the only way (1992), helen rand parish establishes three major spiritual crises in bartolomé de las casas’ life. the first one occurred during pentecost in 1514 when, as a priest, las casas had to decide if he was going to continue to support the encomiendas system. encominedas were an economical structure that established land ownership and the allocation of natural resources -mainly gold and silverthat directly impacted native populations living in the area. these institutions formed the basic structure for life in colonial spanish america. encomiendas were granted by the monarch to conquistadores who were supposed to provide food, housing, and christian education to the indians in return for their labor. in most cases, none of these three conditions were followed, which meant that the indians became de facto slaves. las casas renounced his own encomienda and freed his indians. this gesture frightened most of the conquistadores who, at the beginning of the conquest, had come to the americas basically to become wealthy and return to spain. the second moment that helen rand parish mentions in las casas’ spiritual crisis happened in 1522, when, after failing to establish a model community in cooperation with the indians, he entered the dominican order. while in the order he dedicated himself to writing about, and rethinking, his mission to defend the indigenous peoples. the third crisis occurred around 1550 when, as bishop of chiapas in southern mexico, he chose to enforce the new laws, despite the fact that they had been partially revoked by the king under pressure analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 50 from land owners who did not want to give back their territory to the indigenous communities.4 using his ecclesiastic authority, las casas declared that the inheritance rights of the new laws had to be recognized (that lands confiscated by the conquistadors needed to be returned to the indigenous peoples), and those encomenderos who did not comply would be excommunicated on their deathbed. in every previous case, las casas’ actions were motivated by a profound sense of responsibility toward his christian and catholic faith. actions like that of enforcing inheritance rights, show how las casas’ courage derived not only from his faith in his religious message, something that was shared by many other priests, intellectuals and nobles, but also in the way he acted for the cause of liberation; this latter sense of courage was something that grew out of his respect for the millions of human beings who lived across the atlantic, and las casas’ commitment to find a way for their culture to move forward. we should not forget that las casas tried to make his case for the indians during a time of war and political intrigue, in which his cause was constantly in danger of being lost in the labyrinth of imperial politics. las casas conducted himself in a way that enabled him to influence spanish laws regarding the treatment of indigenous populations in the americas. by the middle of the 16th century, he had established official standards of moral conduct that needed to be followed in all dealings with the indigenous peoples of the americas. this did not mean that these moral sanctions were given equal consideration by all, seeing they were often ignored not only by the conquistadores, but also by other ecclesiastic authorities within the vast spanish american territories. nevertheless, las casas’ efforts have had a definite impact on political and cultural debates, and have produced a solid corpus of scholarship across disciplines, from theology to anthropology, international law, literature, history, and philosophy, which still serves as a valid reference point for studying colonial spanish america.5 the humanity of the indians all of las casas’s arguments can be summarized into a single idea: the human condition of the indians. this is the central theme that he explores, and in doing so, allows him to speak out against both the mistreatment of the indigenous people, and against slavery and all other forms of oppression.6 las casas accomplished this by reaching out to other social fields, going beyond his own religious framework in order to articulate what could be called a ‘counternarrative. these efforts can be traced back to his “humanity of the indians,” the prologue to the only way, a five-page text where las casas summarizes the reasons for his position. in this document las casas utilizes all of the knowledge and experience he accumulated while living in the americas, to prove that, in some respects, the indians were even more civilized that many europeans. using aristotle’s conceptualization of the virtues, he illustrates how many aspects of pre-columbian civilization achieved a high degree of ‘functionality,’ which enabled the maintenance of a productive political structure: then too there exist extraordinary kingdoms among our indians who live in regions west and south of us. there are large groupings of human beings who live according to a political and a social order. there are large cities, there are kings, judges, laws, all within civilizations where commerce occurs, buying and selling and lending and all the other dealings proper to the law of nations. that is to say, their republics are properly set up, there are institutions. and our indians cultivate friendship and they live in large cities. they manage their affairs in them with goodness and equity, affairs of peace as well as war. they run their governments according to laws that are often superior to our own… las casas goes on to explain how the indians had not only developed artistic skills just as sophisticated as those of europe, but also how they were able to learn and even improve upon practices like music and handwriting that had come from ‘old world’ europe (las casas, 65).7 las casas places himself as a witness to these advances, challenging scholars and politicians in spain who presented indigenous people as uncivilized flocks without any capacity to govern themselves or assimilate new skills: “i have seen all this (advances) with my own eyes, touched it with my own hands, heard it with my own ears, over the long time i passed among those analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 51 people…” (las casas, 65). that las casas himself was a witness to such achievements, helped secure his credibility with both the king and the pope. maintaining this credibility helps explain why las casas made so many trips to the peninsula, for doing so allowed him to reveal before the royal court, theologians and scholars, his firsthand accounts of what was happening in the americas. las casas was well-read in the historical and philosophical debates of his time, and so he made the decision from 1514 onwards to begin documenting what he was seeing in the americas, with the hope that he could ensure for these new human beings an important place in the history of the west. when las casas writes that “the indians come to be endowed, first by force of nature, next by force of personal achievement and experience, and with the three kind of self-rule required: (1) personal, by which one knows how to rule oneself, (2) domestic, by which one knows how to rule a household, and (3) political, knowledge of how to set up and rule a city” (las casas, 65), he is prioritizing indigenous personas over any other consideration, and presents their cultures and civilizations at the same level as that of the greeks and the romans. las casas even affirms that “they are inferior to none …. and in a good many customs they outdo, they surpass the english, the french and some groups in our native spain.” (las casas, 66) if these words sound heretical for some today, imagine how they sounded when read or pronounced in front of the spanish royal court, a bureaucracy that considered itself the alpha and omega of the globe in the 16th century. las casas hammers home his point, arguing that: our comparison show that in the entire world, in the old days of paganism, there were countless peoples who were much less rational in their use of mind than our indians, people who had customs far more horrible, vices far more depraved. that conclusion is enough to confound those who have so rashly, perhaps unforgivably, defamed our indians, to those defamers ashamed in and for themselves, to make them admit their error… and all those who know of them should consider them false witnesses. the more so because, as we have seen through comparison and contrast, the indians are and were ahead of others –many, many others– more ordered in their use of mind, more ordered in their use of will, with less taint of malice and malignancy. (las casas, 66) it is true that in making this case, las casas was not saying something separate from the official political stance of the church. his radical courage consists in not just maintaining his position against constant detractors, but defending it from the political relativism of his time, a relativism that continually gave the benefit of the doubt to conquistadores and encomenderos who profited from the dehumanization of the indians. in 1550, las casas had a debate with juan ginés de sepúlveda (1483-1579), a scholar serving the spanish crown, in which they argued about whether the indians had any ‘humanity.’ although no winner was officially recognized by the panel in the debate, the spanish enterprise of colonization continued for more than 250 years under the assumption defended by sepúlveda, who argued –following aristotle’s theory of natural slavery– that the mistreatment of native populations was justifiable. even as recent as the late 18th century, jesuit friars were expelled from spanish colonies in south america for expanding their missionary duties to incorporate las casas’ recognition of the cultural and political capabilities of indigenous peoples. through 40 years of work and action, las casas proved that neither the ancient perspective of greek philosophy, nor the christian standpoint, could justify treating people from the americas as less than human. the rich history of the indigenous peoples of the americas, despite being victims of mass violence (some of which was witnessed by las casas himself in cuba, la española [current domincan republic], and central america), systematic oppression, and internal warfare, provided a framework through which las casas could extend their own worldview in productive ways, learning from new challenges as they arose. and it is precisely on this point that i think plenty coup and bartolomé de las casas come together, with their drive for social justice connecting them across historical time and geological space. their stories encourage us to reflect on analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 52 different ways of understanding the nature of courage, and help us to recognize the challenges, both historical and contextual, involved with living out the full potential of the radical virtue of courage. endnotes 1 jonathan lear, radical hope: ethics in the face of cultural devastation (cambridge: harvard university press, 2006). 2 bartolomé de las casas, “history of the indies (selections),” in witness. writings of bartolomé de las casas, edt., george sanderlin with foreword by gustavo gutiérrez (new york, orbis books, 1993). 3 gustavo gutiérrez, en busca de los pobres de jesuscristo. el pensamiento de bartolomé de las casas, 2da edición (lima, 2010). 4 the new laws of 1542 were promulgated by charles i in order to eliminate the enslavement of the indians. the laws were the result of an intense effort by las casas with the royal court in which las casas testified on the ill treatment of the indigenous populations by conquistadores. the new laws were partially revoked a year later due to the protest of encomenderos and their families in mexico and peru who saw their heritage rights threatened by these laws. the new laws, however, founded a legal precedent in favor of the indians and their rights to their original lands and cultural identity. 5 las casas’ work has gained even more relevancy today thanks to new technological advancements in archeology. work in this field has confirmed that many of las casas’ claims, described as “exaggerated” by his opponents, are largely reliable descriptions of the rich cultures of the indigenous communities. one important recent example is described by charles c. mann in his book 1491. new revelations of the americas before columbus (new york: vintage books, 2006), in which he summaries global peer reviewed research on this topic and concludes that the western hemisphere was densely populated before the arrival of europeans, with some advanced civilizations reaching the peak of their age. 6 in 1516, las casas, confronted by the killing and rapid extinction of indigenous communities in the caribbean, defended, along with many others, the importation of african slaves into the americas, a decision he repented shortly afterwards due to its harmful consequences. he offered a formal apologize for this previous position in his history of the indies written in the mid 1500s. the reconsideration of las casas’ role in spanish american slavery started in 1822 when emphasis was placed on his total condemnation of the slave trade. see, santa arias: “equal rights and individual freedom: enlightenment intellectuals and the lascasian apology for black african slavery,” romance quarterly (fall 2008, vol. 55 issue 4): 279-291. more recent studies pay attention to the general context in which slavery was perceived in andalucía, spain, where las casas was born and grew up. see lawrence clayton, “bartolomé de las casas and the african slave trade,” history compass (volume 7, issue 6, nov., 2009): 1526–1541. 7 bartolomé de las casas, the only way, edt., helen rand parish, tr., francis patrick sullivan (new york: paulist press, 1992). address correspondences to: jesús e. jambrina viterbo university la crosse, wi e-mail: jejambrina@viterbo.edu analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 editor’s notes welcome to volume 30 of analytic teaching and philosophical praxis. the 2009-10 academic year has been a busy one for the journal, with three cfp (calls for papers) being posted on a variety of different topics. volume 30 explores the first of these calls through its focus on the philosophical and conceptual implications of the culture of assessment in higher education. it seems true to say that institutional assessment has become as inevitable as death and taxes, with much research dedicated to ‘assessing’ the effectiveness of this new institutional charge. the five articles that make up issue 1 of volume 30 explore this paradigm shift from a variety of perspectives, some take an internal and personal perspective, while others look at the trend from a more distanced standpoint. over the years i have heard a variety of dissenting voices, largely from faculty, directed at the ‘colonization’ of higher education, and i wanted to get a ‘snap shot’ of these voices, moving them out of the hallways of our colleges and universities to the ‘public’ domain. in putting out the cfp i also wanted to avoid faculty rants about assessment as well as rubber stamps of its legitimacy (those that feel the issue is resolved through quantitative data alone). to ensure the voices of institutionalized assessment received a fair hearing i enlisted the aid of a guest co-editor, viterbo’s own naomi stennes-spidahl, director of institutionalized assessment, whose expertise was invaluable in sharpening the discourse on assessment and correcting any over-simplifications of the issues. the result, i believe, is an interesting collage of different articles, some of which focus on assessment in action (moore and hassinger), others the difficult balance of teaching under the assessment structure (wodzak), while another on the challenge of chairing departments through the lens of quantitative accountability (turgeon). these internal perspectives are supplemented by two articles that focus on larger trends within assessment culture, one of which sees assessment as a clear extension of market capitalism (michaud), while another traces the complex connection between pedagogy and accountability (bach and carpenter). my hope is that readers will find the selection of articles both intriguing and informative, and as adding an important critical element to the often one-sided discussions of assessment in higher education. issue 2 of volume 30 includes two articles from two scholars well-known for their work in the field of editor jason j. howard guest editor naomi stennes-spidahl viterbo university, director of institutionalised assessment contributing editors patrick costello glyndŵr university, wales david kennedy montclair state university judy kyle educational consultant montreal, canada richard kyte d.b. reinhart institute for ethics in leadership, viterbo university richard morehouse, emeritus viterbo university felix garcía moriyón center for philosophy for children madrid, spain michael pritchard western michigan university michel sasseville laval university, quebec david smith university of lethbridge, canada susan wilks university of melbourne, australia michael wodzak viterbo university book review editors gilbert burgh university of queensland, australia trevor curnow st. martin’s college layout design assistant adam alexander publisher viterbo university la crosse, wisconsin 54601 copyright 2005 analytic teaching is published twice a year. issn 0890-5118 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 philosophy for children, that of patrick costello and richard morehouse. costello’s article offers a timely exploration of the status of communities of inquiry within the uk; this is complemented by morehouse’s piece, which takes up similar concerns but from the perspective of the usa. together these two articles return us to the original mission of analytic teaching, providing an invaluable reminder of what alternative pedagogies can accomplish in the k-12 classroom. happy reading, jason j. howard editor jason j. howard guest editor naomi stennes-spidahl viterbo university, director of institutionalised assessment contributing editors patrick costello glyndŵr university, wales david kennedy montclair state university judy kyle educational consultant montreal, canada richard kyte d.b. reinhart institute for ethics in leadership, viterbo university richard morehouse, emeritus viterbo university felix garcía moriyón center for philosophy for children madrid, spain michael pritchard western michigan university michel sasseville laval university, quebec david smith university of lethbridge, canada susan wilks university of melbourne, australia michael wodzak viterbo university book review editors gilbert burgh university of queensland, australia trevor curnow st. martin’s college layout design assistant adam alexander publisher viterbo university la crosse, wisconsin 54601 copyright 2005 analytic teaching is published twice a year. issn 0890-51188 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 1 communicating toward personhood susan t. gardner abstract: marshalling a mind-numbing array of data, harvard political scientist robert d. putnam, in his book bowling alone, shows that on virtually every conceivable measure, civic participation, or what he refers to as “social capital,” is plummeting to levels not seen for almost 100 years. and we should care, putnam argues, because connectivity is directly related to both individual and social wellbeing on a wide variety of measures. on the other hand, social capital of the “bonding kind” brings with it the ugly side effect of animosity toward outsiders. given the increasing heterogeneity of our world, the goal therefore must be to enhance connectivity of the “bridging sort,” i.e., connecting across differences. this, in turn, requires that we first clarify what bridging communicative styles looks like. examining communication as it might transpire (a) in kant’s kingdom of ends, (b) through the perspective of habermas’ “communicative action,” and (c) within the scientific community, offers a compelling suggestion that there is a way of communicating such that, if adopted, one would come to view others as if they were persons, i.e., that a bridging communicative style facilitates a kind of bonding that sees through differences toward the commonality of personhood. this paper will briefly explore how communicating toward personhood might be promoted. the need to increase social capital. in his dense and provocative book bowling alone—published at the opening of this new century, 1 robert d. putnam, harvard political scientist and the peter and isabel malkin professor of public policy, argues that, with regard to social capital, i.e., those fundamental bonds that keep us connected to one another, we are on the verge of going bankrupt. marshalling a mind-numbing array of data, putnam shows that on virtually every conceivable measure, from political participation, to volunteering, to religious affiliation, to union membership, to participation in organized sport (hence the title), even to sharing dinner with friends, civic participation is plummeting to levels not seen for almost 100 years. and we should care, putnam argues, because connectivity is, on the one hand, inversely related to crime, while, on the other, positively related with economic prosperity, physical health, overall sense of personal well-being and how well education works. those with “can-do” attitudes will immediately respond, “well, tell us the cause, and we’ll fix the problem”— and putnam obliges by presenting a plethora of data that suggests that there are a number of factors that contribute to these dissipating social bonds, amongst them “time famine” caused by increasing commute times and the technological invasion of the home, as well as the fact that the prime mover of social bonding has left her post. but putnam warns against this disease model of getting rid of the germs in order to get the patient back to health—or what he refers to as a “reactionary form of nostalgia.” he notes that just as those experiencing the social chaos of rapid urbanization in the 1890’s ought to have resisted the temptation to say that, “life was much nicer back in the village. everybody back to the farm,” so we ought to resist the temptation to say “life was much nicer back in the fifties. would all women please report to the kitchen, and turn off the tv on the way.”2 well, no kidding. but let us not lose the essential point that is buried in the jest of this facetious comment, and that is that the onus lies with us to create unique ways of reconnecting with one another as we go forward into the twenty-first century. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 2 putnam does not leave us entirely without a compass, however. he notes that while what he refers to as “bonding social capital” has all the merits previously described, it brings with it its own poison, namely that, while reinforcing connection with those on the inside, it likewise tends to reinforce animosity toward those on the outside. as well, bonded groups, as we are all too well aware, can be far more effective in their capacity to execute nefarious ends than individuals in isolation. indeed, it is surely not outside the realm of probability to suggest—though putnam never actually mentions this—that at least one psychological factor contributing to the dramatic drop in social capital might very well be the revulsion of enlightened thinkers toward the inherent, often irrational, conformity and exclusivity that group membership entails. one way to try to avoid the negative side effect of “bonding social capital” would be, instead, to focus on “bridging social capital.” putnam explains the difference between these two kinds of social capital by pointing out that “bonding” social capital is like joining a “favor bank”—“i’ll do this for you now in expectation that you will return the favor.” “bridging” social capital, by contrast, requires the adoption of the norm of “generalized reciprocity”: “i’ll do this for you without expecting anything specific from you, in the confident expectation that someone else will do something for me down the road.” putnam goes on to liken the greater social efficacy of “bridging” over “bonding” by noting that “a society characterized by generalized reciprocity is more efficient than a distrustful society, for the same reason that money is more efficient than barter.” and he says elsewhere that “bonding social capital constitutes a kind of sociological superglue”—apparently meaning that people in relatively small groups get really stuck on one another, whereas “bridging social capital provides a sociological wd-40” –presumably meaning that “bridging individuals” are more able to engage in relatively “squeak-free” interaction with a large variety of individuals.3 from a philosopher’s point of view, since putnam’s research (presumably by necessity) focuses on bonded groups, the big question that he leaves untouched is what a bridging person would look like. what kind of communicative style would fuel such bridging social connectivity? how might we articulate its guiding principle? in order to avoid the treacly sweet, “kumbaya”4 “love they neighbor sort” of admonition that tends to glue people together against those who are not their neighbors, let us begin with the more academic suggestion that bridging will be markedly facilitated if we see (as opposed to love) other humans as persons “like ourselves.” let’s try to unpack what such a suggestion might entail. seeing persons clearly, to see humans as persons requires a lot more than seeing humans as merely humans. when we see humans as humans only, what we see are animals of the species homo sapiens. to treat humans as humans only would be to treat them as animals only and thus, to echo kant, would be to treat them as a means only (which is not in any sense, by the way, to condone the despicable way that we humans treat animals). what kant would have humans do, rather, is to treat humans also always as “ends.” what precisely might this involve? according to kant, to treat others as ends-in-themselves is to treat others as primarily self-conscious rational agents. this admonition is harder to understand than may at first appear since self-conscious rationality is, from an “excluded spectator” point of view, completely invisible. this is so because an agent cannot see self-conscious rationality in another unless s/he is able to understand and potentially linguistically interact with that other. it is this language barrier that may explain why humans have such difficulty recognizing personhood as it functions outside of our species. there is, for instance, enormous evidence to suggest that whales are not only self-conscious, but as well, have a complex language of their own that differs not only across whale species, but even across pods, though we humans—no doubt because we cannot share their environment—have been unable to crack the code. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 3 since we cannot talk to whales we apparently feel relatively unencumbered by our practice of wantonly killing them, a practice that, to this day, is checked only by a concern for potential extinction, rather than for the moral health of humans who may very well be—indeed most probably are—committing mass murder. “feel free to kill those with whom you cannot communicate”: interesting dictum, which suggests that at least a necessary condition of seeing personhood is the propensity to dialogue with that other. dialoguing with a person, however, cannot mean just spitting out words, nor can it mean simply engaging in turn taking in an effort to persuade another. using words as weapons in this way is simply to don a more sophisticated manipulatory mantle that is characteristic of the push and shove techniques that we think of as characterizing the animal kingdom. the question is, then, what sort of communicative style maximizes the possibility of seeing the personhood of one’s communicative partner. seeing persons through communicative interpersonal visiting habermas, in his book, a theory of communicative action, vol. 1, takes viewing others as rational self-conscious agents seriously. he argues that you cannot judge the adequacy of an agent’s reasoned support of her assertions and/or actions—(an adequacy that can nonetheless be objectively measured5 according to how it stand up to such critical evaluation as coherence, prediction, etc.)—unless you first understand the invisible personal larger context—i.e., a person’s life-world (or lebenswelt)6—from which those assertions and/or actions make sense, i.e., seem rational, to that agent. seeing another as a unique rational self-conscious agent thus appears to be a necessary condition for being able to judge the adequacy of what habermas refers to as their criticizable validity claims.7 another way of putting this point would be to say that engaging in communicative rationality of the habermasian sort requires of participants that they render their personal boundaries highly permeable,8 i.e., that they each get comfortable both with welcoming foreigners and traveling to distant lands.9 while this “fusing of horizons”10 –as gadamer would put it—seems precisely what the doctor ordered with regard to enhancing social capital, the question that now begs an answer is how to make such a goal attractive. that is, given the time and energy expenditures required, as well as the natural tendency to self-protect, the question that now seriously surfaces is whether, and if so how, it is possible to inspire ordinary individuals to engage in the strenuous work of attempting to hermeneutically analyze of the claims of others, while welcoming hermeneutic invasion of their own turf? genuine inquiry requires a commitment to both fallibility and truth the answer, it seems to me, is as simple as it is difficult to achieve. if the goal is to inspire individuals to communicatively visit one another’s personal spaces, then clearly a necessary condition for ramping up enthusiasm for such interpersonal travel is to instill in participants an unshakeable and abiding belief in their own fallibility11. if interpersonal bridging is ever to become commonplace, in other words, the start point must begin not just with an acceptance, but with a celebration, of the fact that, regardless of the apparent adequacy of any belief, judgment, or opinion, there is always the possibility of a better answer around the corner, and that that corner may very well be within the rational self-conscious space of others. it is truth, then, with a capital t—or, more specifically, the belief that one is already in possession of the truth—that forms the fault line that tends to preclude the possibility of interpersonal bridging. it is truthpossession that blinds us to the personhood of others. but how can this be, some may wonder. after all, it is the belief in the objectivity of truth that fuels the impetus for interpersonal inquiry to begin with. why else would i go to the trouble of attempting to estimate the adequacy of your criticizable validity claims if i did not believe, from the get-go, that there were legitimate means by which to judge whether those claims were more or less adequate than the my own. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 4 we thus seem to have found ourselves in an interesting paradox. on the one hand, a belief that one has found the truth thereafter tends to close off respectful communication with those who disagree, while on the other, belief in the objectivity of truth is a necessary condition for respectful habermasian communication to begin with. respectful communication needs truth; truth can destroy respectful communication. how do we get out of this devil’s paradox? solving the “truth paradox” interestingly, this “truth paradox” is anything but a problem for those most commonly credited with pursuing truth. that is, rather than skirting it, this “truth paradox” has been actively embraced by scientists who utilize it—much to our combined benefit—through the ingenious infusion of the null hypothesis at the core of the scientific method. the null hypothesis is anchored in the recognition that one cannot verify12, for example, that “this drug always works,” and that hence, the approach must be reversed, i.e., that one must attempt to show, rather, that it is not the case the drug works. if, after a strenuous unbiased investigation, i fail to prove the null hypothesis, i.e., i fail to prove that the drug does not work, then i have grounds for believing that it is true that this drug works, but i only have grounds because, of course, the investigation itself may have been faulty. thus, though it is evident, beyond doubt, that we can make progress toward truth using the scientific method, it is built into the fact that the method employed is one of falsifiability,13 rather then verifiability, that it is incapable of revealing absolute, i.e., uncriticizabe, or unrefineable, truth. given the fact that scientists recognize that “the truth that survives falsification” is the only truth to which they have access but which is nonetheless a truth of which they can never be absolutely sure (i.e., this is truth with a small “t” 14), scientists thus remain eagerly open to public discourse with the view to ensuring continuous vetting by further inquiry. that is, it is this practical ideal of “least faulty”—though metaphysically anchored in the regulative ideal of truth with a capital t—that keeps the lines of genuine cooperative inquiry open and which invites creative contributions of colleagues. this notion of “colleague,” as used in the scientific community, is an interesting one in that it surreptitiously suggests that one of the inevitable side effects of engaging in genuine inquiry is that inquirers come to view those who are likewise engaged as allies, cohorts, associates, or collaborators in the pursuit of truth. none of which is to say, of course, that colleagues always agree, or even that they are always civil. but it is to say that, insofar as individuals are committed to tracking truth while knowing that they will never get there, they recognize that the enterprise is intrinsically intersubjective—that they have need of one another in this enterprise. it is the absolute conviction, on the one hand, that progress towards truth can be made, accompanied, on the other hand, by the absolute conviction that the truth-seeking process can never reach its end, that keeps scientists communicatively interacting with one another as if they were persons and in so doing they instantiate their mutual personhood. enhancing bridging communicative styles the answer with regard to how we might enhance bridging communicative styles so as to increase social capital, as putnam would have us do, is thus already within our midst and, indeed, has already been suggested by american pragmatists charles s. peirce15 and john dewey.16 that is, if all of us undertook to employ the scientific method in the pursuit of answers to everyday practical questions17 (which i refer to elsewhere as “scientific ethicism”18), the happy result ought to be, on the one hand, the production of better solutions to human problems, while on the other, the enhancement of the human capacity to see co-inquirers as persons. it is inquiry in the pursuit of truth that one knows can nonetheless never be fully grasped, in other words, that creates the analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 5 “in-between”—in martin buber’s19 words—where persons can meet in the middle, and in so doing, perceive one another as “thous” rather than merely as “its.” it is inquiry in the pursuit of always illusive, always unattainable, truth with regard to everyday practical and ethical issues, whether they be private or public, or of incidental or of historical significance, in still other words, that persons will come to view others who are likewise engaged as colleagues of importance in pursuit of a worthwhile endeavor. ramping up inquiry in “philosophy for children” since the educational program, philosophy for children (p4c), incorporates as its fundamental pedagogical tool the community of inquiry in which participants cooperatively inquire about any topic that is of interest and importance to them, it is in a unique position to enhance the kind of general inquiring communicative style that can be expected to feed directly into the bridging tendencies of its students. indeed, given the overwhelming manipulative communicative styles employed in traditional education, i.e., communication in order to persuade, one wonders how else our youngsters are going to learn bridging tendencies except though years of experience in communities of genuine inquiry that form the base of p4c. nonetheless, if enhancing the general inquiring communicative tendencies is to become one of the official goals of p4c, there are a number of fault lines in the present program that need to be addressed. thus, in the name of the procedure that gives value to this enterprise, i.e., falsifying towards truth, i will end by focusing on three flaws, or obstacles, that p4c would do well to rework in order that it may offer to the world a more perfect package. obstacles 1: clarity with regards to its goal(s). philip cam, in a recent challenging article entitled philosophy and freedom,20 says courageously—and, i think, correctly—that advocates of p4c cannot claim to know what they are doing if they are unclear about the larger purpose, i.e., if they are unclear about what p4c is most fundamentally trying to achieve. cam goes on to argue that the guiding ideal of the community of inquiry ought to be freedom (in the deweyan sense of flourishing), rather than truth (citing an earlier article of mine 21). in light of the fact that i have recently written a critical thinking text entitled “thinking your way to freedom,”22 it is clear that there are many way in which cam and i converge. however, there seems to remain one point of divergence and that is my belief that one of the most pernicious obstacles in making the case for the value of learning to “generally inquire” is the refusal of many in the p4c camp to embrace the notion of truth23. if there is no truth, how can there possibly be any point to inquiring? thus, it seems to me that, though reticence about truth is understandable since its misrepresentation, as has just been pointed out, can do more harm than good, nonetheless p4c needs to courageously promulgate the nuanced practical ideal24 that the point of inquiry is to ferret out the least worst option that survives a stringent impartial multi-dimensional and on-going falsification process.25 in contrast to the “product” notion of truth that kills inquiry, this “process” notion of truth depends upon it. it is truth with a small “t” that legitimizes the commitment to bridging communication. thus, though cam is no doubt on the right track by making the claim that the ultimate payoff of mutual interpersonal inquiry is personal autonomy and mutual well being, along with flourishing personhood and an increase social capital, we must be absolutely clear that the immediate goal that makes the ultimate payoff possible is a universal commitment to fallibility in the face of the always open possibility of discovering claims that are “truthier” than those to which one presently adheres. obstacle 2: advocating respect for the ideas of others. though it is common among p4c advocates to argue that we ought to always “respect the ideas of others,” 26 only a little reflection will show that, within the context of genuine inquiry, this notion is incomprehensible. if mary makes a point that is not backed by reason or evidence, or if john manipulates the reasons and/or evidence in order to support the conclusion that he wishes to be true, it is not at all clear why we should respect either of their ideas, just as it would not be at all clear what it would mean to respect the ideas of a scientist who had analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 6 cooked the books. on other hand, it is nonetheless true, as mill so eloquently pointed out in “on liberty,”27 that even poor reasoning can sometimes serve as fodder for truth insofar as it requires good reasoners to figure out why they think what they think, and why other alternatives are not equally good. thus, while it is no doubt appropriate that we advocate an attitude of appreciation of all who genuinely attempt to contribute to the inquiry at hand, nonetheless, it seems equally important that players recognize that “bringing down poorly reasoned positions” is the name of the game. how else are we going to help individuals think well and, importantly, to maintain personal permeability within the context of disagreement if they have never had the experience of having their illegitimate ideas publicly, though presumably, kindly shredded? how else can communities of inquiry be saved from sinking into a mere exchange of ideas, if most inquiry time is subverted by the efforts of “inquirers”— in the name of “respect”—to molly coddle one another? thus, though habermas is adamant in his claim that understanding requires that one enter the other’s lifeworld and, hence, to that extent, becomes the other’s “neighbor,”28 he is also at pains to point out that such understanding in no way implies acceptance or agreement29. thus, i may understand why, for instance, you are intent on seeking the demise of all israelis or palestinians, or all hutus or tutsis, or all christians or muslims (or whatever) because you are enraged by some past injustice, nonetheless my job is to issue the summons30 that challenges you to justify your intended actions in light of a much wider horizon. and if you fail to open the door to the possibility that your position may be faulty, my job surely is to keep on knocking. obstacle 3: advocating feelings. not unrelated to the above, there have been a number of recent attempts to incorporate “caring thinking” as the third pinnacle to accompany critical and creative thinking goals of p4c.31 it seems to me that this is even more dangerous to the p4c movement (as i have argued strenuously elsewhere32) than advocating that we must all respect the viewpoints of others. the strength of the p4c movement lies in the fact that, unlike education with a substantive agenda, p4c implicitly recognizes the dignity of potentially autonomous persons by not dictating to participants what they ought to think and feel, but rather focuses instead on the perfection of the procedures used to inquire. and while “caring” may seem like a laudable goal, it may very well produce the kind of bonding that is too sticky for outsiders to penetrate. besides, as has already been discussed, insofar as all who are engaged in dialogue are committed to genuine inquiry, there will, as a result of individuals attempting to understand and judge the merits of various justificatory positions, emerge a sense of collegiality, i.e., a recognition that we all become more of who we are in “the in-between.” the moral of the story is that we cannot aim directly at personhood. we need, rather, to aim toward truth, and to the degree that others aim similarly, and to the degree that we all recognize that our own fallibility dictates the constant need of the perspective-taking capacity of others, personhood will follow. that is, to the degree that participants in a community of inquiry internalize the inquiry process, they can be expected to adopt a generalized “respect for persons” in the sense that they will feel obliged to reasonably defend their positions and to be open to the reasons offered by those who think differently. battersby and bailin, in their article reason appreciation33, echo this point that inquiry itself breeds respect when they say that “reasoning is the least manipulative and most respectful way to motivate change in belief and behaviour. to give reasons rather than threats, to reason with, rather than cajole or manipulate, is . . . to respect the autonomy of the other person.” conclusion we need to take seriously putnam’s warning that we ignore our dramatically decreasing social capital to our detriment. and we ought also to heed his advise that in our multi-cultural global village, the sort of social capital that we try to resurrect should be of the less sticky sort, i.e., “bridging” rather than “bonding.” the collegiality inherently fostered by scientific inquiry that is based on the assumption of fallibility and that requires continuous public input in the cooperative effort to falsify towards truth, suggests that adopting this inquiring communicative style toward those pressing philosophical questions of how we ought to live, will not only give us better answers analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 7 but, in the process, will make our common personhood more visibly valuable. as an educational program that explicitly promotes extensive participation in communities of inquiry about issues of practical importance, philosophy for children can be a landmark educational movement that will promote “bridging attitudes” at the very time that we most need them. and for its value to be legitimate and to be recognized as such, advocates will have to continue their time-honored engagement in self-reflective cooperative inquiry so as to perfect its potential impact. it is in that light that i suggest: (1) that we be more courageous in precisely clarifying the goals— which, in my view, ought to be the entrenchment of inquiring attitudes securely anchored by the certainty that better answers are the inevitably result when fallible inquirers work cooperatively within the stringent demands of tracking-truth. this goal, in turn, suggests (2) that we avoid advocating respect for opinions unless they are worthy of respect, and (3) that we beware of promulgating “caring thinking” as the stickiness of such emotional bonding may impede the bridging force of genuine inquiry. and so, my friends, let us go forward together confident that the educational endeavor to which we have committed so much energy and effort is one of extraordinary value in that, on the one hand, it insists that students actually talk with (rather than at) one another (which seems to be a necessary condition for seeing personhood) while, on the other, if done well, fosters genuine inquiring attitudes (which ought to be sufficient for bridging toward personhood). it is within this context, then, it seems to me, that p4cers can, with some legitimacy, adopt as our mantra a slight twist of the words of robert browning: “inquire along with me. the best is yet to be34.” endnotes 1. putman, r. d. bowling alone. new york: simon & schuster, 2000. 2. ibid. 401. 3. ibid. 23. 4. ibid. 21. 5. habermas, j. the theory of communicative action. vol. 1: reason and the rationalization of society. trans. thomas mccarthy. boston: beacon press, 1992. (german text: 1981.) 22, 25. 6. “meanings . . . can be made accessible only from the inside. symbolically presturctured reality forms a universe that is hermetically sealed to the view of observers incapable of . . . becoming at least potential members of [that other’s lifeworld]. habermas. ibid., 112. 7. ibid., x. 8. in his book a new earth: awakening to your life’s purpose (new york: plume printing, 2006), eckhart tolle echoes a similar theme when we argues that attaching to0 rigidly to beliefs systems jeopardize one’s well being as the “most rigid structures will collapse first.” 19. 9. i am grateful to dr. barbara weber for pointing out to me, in a personal communication, that the word “person” in greek is “per-sonne.” “per” means “through,” while “sonne” refers to “sounds.” a person was a human in a theatre play with a mask through which one could hear a voice. this, interestingly, suggests that to “seeing a person” requires that “we hear what is behind the mask.” 10. gadamer, hg. truth and method, 40-41, quoted by habermas. ibid. p. 134. 11. peirce, c.s. “the scientific attitude and fallibilism.” philosophical writings of peirce. ed. justus buchler. new york: dover publications, 1955. 42-59. 12. there is a long a distinguished philosophical discussion about verifiability, particularly in the logical positivist camp. see, e.g., a.j. ayer, language, truth and logic (1936, revised in 1946), and his comments on the criterion of falsifiability in the central questions of philosophy. london: weidenfeld and nicholson, 1973. 27-29. 13. for a discussion on the importance of falsifiability in science see popper, k. conjectures and refutations: the growth of scientific knowledge. london,1963. see also gardner, s.t. “truth in ethics (and elsewhere).” analytic teaching, vol. 19, no. 2, april, 1998. 55-62. 14. gardner, ibid. 15. “. . . sentiments in their development will be very greatly determined by accidental causes. . . . to satisfy our analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 8 doubts, therefore, it is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs may be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency—by something upon which our thinking has no effect. . . . such is the method of science (18). peirce, c.s. “the fixation of belief.” philosophical writings of peirce. ed. justus buchler. new york: dover publications, 1955. 5-22. 16. “the attainment of a unified method means that the fundamental unity of the structure of inquiry in common sense and science be recognized, their difference being one in the problems which they are directly concerned, not in their respective logics. . . (81). dewey, j. logic: the theory of inquiry. new york: henry holt, 1938. 17. in my critical thinking text, entitled thinking your way to freedom: a guide to owning your own practical reasoning (philadelphia: temple university press, 2008), students are asked to focus their newly acquired falsifiability-based thinking skills on issues that are of real personal relevance, such as whether or not it is ok to get blind drunk every week-end, or whether casual sex is ok, rather then focusing on such academic issues as whether capital punishment should be legal. 18. in a paper entitled, “beyond universalizability” presented in july 2008 at the xxii world congress in philosophy in seoul, i make a plea for leaving behind universalizability as a moral test, since a fanatic can easily pass the test simply by being mindlessly wedded to his own biases, e.g., a nazi imaginatively consenting to be killed if she were a jew. if we adopted instead a more scientific approach to ethical questions, the nazi first of all would have to give reasons for his point of view, e.g., that all jews are vermin, and then that reasoning would be subject to the test of falsifiability. 19. buber, m. i and thou. 2nd ed. new york: charles scribner’s sons, 1958. 20. cam p. “philosophy and freedom.” children philosophize worldwide: theoretical and practical concepts. eds. eva marsal, takara dobashi, barbara weber. frankfurt am main: lang (hodos edition), 2008. 21. “inquiry is no mere conversation: it is hard work.” published in analytic teaching, april 1996, vol. 16, no. 2, 41 – 50, as well as the australian journal for critical and creative thinking, vol. 3, no. 2, october, 1995, 38-49. 22. thinking your way to freedom: a guide to owning your own practical reasoning. philadelphia: temple university press, 2008. 23. with the notable exception of burgh, g., t. field, and m. freakley in their recent book ethics and the community of inquiry: education for deliberative democracy. melbourne, australia: thompson, 2006, who argue strenuously for “the objectivity of genuine inquiry.” see, in particular, chapter 3. 24. “so, the disposition of inquirers to pursue a particular epistemic aim involves a practical commitment to truth, that is, a commitment expressed by certain kinds of actions –those directed at discovery and justification (i.e., deweyan ‘proof’). ibid., 53. 25. i have talked of this notion of truth in several places including my article “truth in ethics (and elsewhere).” analytic teaching, vol. 19, no. 2, april, 1998.55-62. i have also detailed the process of truth seeking in practical reasoning in my critical thinking text entitled thinking your way to freedom: a guide to owning your own practical reasoning. philadelphia: temple university press, 2008. 26. burgh, g., t. field & m. freakley in their ethics and the community of inquiry: education for deliberative democracy (melbourne, australia: thompson, 2006) say, for instance, that “these aspects of caring thinking are captured under the heading of being aware of the context in which discussion takes place, sharing discussion, welcoming and respecting each other’s views, and engaging in self-correction” (112)—emphasis added. 27. mill, j.s. on liberty. (1859) new york: penguin, 1974. 28. habermas, j. op. cit. 112. 29. ibid. 136. 30. weber, b. “with habermas against habermas: a phenomenological critique of communicative rationality.” paper delivered at the university of victoria, february 15, 2008. 31. sharp, a m. “caring thinking and the education of the emotions.” children philosophize worldwide: theoretical and practical concepts.eds. eva marsal, takara dobashi, barbara weber. frankfurt am main: lang (hodos edition), 2008. 32. gardner, s.t. “love they neighbor? maybe not.” children philosophize worldwide: theoretical and practianalytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 9 cal concepts. eds. eva marsal, takara dobashi, barbara weber. frankfurt am main: lang (hodos edition), 2008. 33. battersby, mark and sharon bailin. reason appreciation. reason reclaimed. eds. h.v. hansen and r. pinto. newport, va: vale press, 2007. 34. the actual line is “grow old along with me. the best is yet to be,” from browning’s poem “rabbi ben ezra.” address coresspondence to: susan gardner capilano university 2055 purcell way north vancouver bc canada, v7j 3h5 sgardner@capilanou.ca analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 5 thoughts on wisdom and its relation to critical thinking, multiculturalism, and global awareness jeremy barris and jeffrey c. c. ruff we want to propose a conception of wisdom with a view to exploring what insights it can give us into some basic dimensions of teaching in contemporary higher education. we hope to show that this conception allows us, on the one hand, to see some crucial inadequacies of existing approaches to critical thinking, multiculturalism, and global awareness or internationalism. on the other hand, we believe that it also gives us some insight into the existentially or spiritually meaningful dimensions of learning. in this way, it bridges the most contemporary and practical foci of teaching and its most fundamental and timeless concerns. in the later part of the paper, we shall explore some of the characteristics of this conception further through the teachings of some of the longstanding wisdom traditions, including what they say about teaching itself. our conception of wisdom involves several very sharp, related paradoxes, which will emerge in the various stages of our discussion. we will show in each case that these paradoxes actually make an easily grasped kind of sense, and we ask the reader’s forbearance with each apparently nonsensical initial presentation. the initial paradoxes are, in fact, nonsensical: but, as we hope will become clear, this is not all that they are. a conception of wisdom we propose to think of wisdom as a matter of coming to understand as a whole a perspective on life or on reality in general, whether it is our own perspective or another’s. in a related form, this conception is a central part of the tradition of metaphysics in the west, where the highest or deepest kind of knowledge is commonly understood to be insight into the nature of the whole of being, into its foundations and sense.1 the same is true of many religious traditions, east and west, which typically ask the “big” questions about the origin of things in general, the meaning of life, and our ultimate destiny. our conception emphasizes, as many of these traditions also do. that the whole we aim to grasp includes ourselves, our act of looking at the whole, and the structure of the perspective that we inhabit in attempting to look at it. when we learn new things within a general perspective, standpoint, or framework, we are essentially learning new information, which we can organize within our existing categories and ways of making sense of things. we have “boxes,” as it were, into which we can place the new items: we already know how things make sense, and we are discovering new things that make sense in those familiar ways. it is different when we consider the whole perspective, standpoint, or framework itself. when we turn our attention to the perspective in its own right, we are learning about the categories and ways of making sense themselves. that is, we are no longer placing information into the existing categories in which they fit and make sense, but are standing outside the categories and trying to make sense of them. as a result, we do not yet know how to make sense of what we are learning. we do not yet have the “boxes” in which to fit the information. we propose that this deeper kind of learning, in which we come to make sense of the categories and so the conditions of sense itself, constitutes at least one crucial dimension of what is traditionally described as wisdom. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 6 one traditional, common sense way of describing wisdom is that it involves getting a perspective on ourselves, and this is what we have described. what is important to recognize in this re-description, however, is that getting a genuine perspective on ourselves means partly stepping outside of our capacity for making sense at all. better expressed, it involves stepping outside of what objectively constitutes sense in the relevant context. for it is sense itself that requires an account of itself (a making sense), and so it is sense itself that requires us to step outside it. it is true that in each case we step outside only a particular perspective on sense. but the perspectives we are discussing stepping beyond are perspectives on reality in general, and so on sense in general. consequently what fails is what we in this perspective mean by sense in general, or sense as it can ever possibly be. further, if what really happened was that we simply stepped into another—say a broader—perspective in which we could still make sense, we would not yet have gained a perspective on our own perspective as a whole. we would only have shifted our perspective to another on which we had no perspective, and so we would not yet be accounting for sense in general (or all of sense as it is for our perspective). getting a genuine perspective on ourselves, then, involves an intrinsic failure of what we mean by sense itself, in general. but, as we will see, this is a very productive failure. a natural objection is that it is impossible to get a view of ourselves or of our sense-structure as a whole, exactly because this would have to be described in terms like “stepping outside of ourselves or outside of all sense.” but this objection itself is a comment on what can be true about our sense-structure as a whole. as such, it claims to be a view of our sense structure as a whole, and so denies its own possibility. that is, it refutes itself. (actually, given our thesis, we would say it is no different in this respect from all perspectives on our perspective or sense-framework as a whole: it is a failure of sense, but, as we shall try to show, a failure that is profoundly productive for sense itself.) the idea of a necessary and intrinsic failure of sense is also part of traditional, although not common-sense, understandings of wisdom. traditional accounts might call this awakening, enlightenment, gnosis, wisdom, arcane knowledge, occult knowledge, or esoteric knowledge. historical wisdom traditions typically expect acolytes, adepts, or students radically to alter their understanding of how they make sense of the world in the most fundamental and comprehensive ways, and the transition from one sense of things as a whole to another is not itself seen as a domain of rational sense. this re-understanding of sense itself, then, is traditionally an intrinsic part of gaining wisdom. philosophers like karl jaspers and ludwig wittgenstein also identify this dimension of the deepest kind of knowledge. jaspers notes that for the clarification of . . . the encompassing, we have used words and concepts which had their original meaning for definite things in the world; now however they are used to go beyond the limits and are not to be understood in their original sense . . . [as a result,] through reason i catch sight of something which is only communicable in the form of contradiction and paradox. here a rational a-logic arises, a true reason which reaches its goal through the shattering of the logic of the understanding.2 wittgenstein famously argues in the tractatus that the sense and value of the world can only lie outside of it, where they cannot be said but only shown, and that we can do even this only in propositions that we must in the end recognize and discard as nonsense: “the solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem,” and “my propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them. . . . he must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright.”3 the same idea is present in a different form in his later work: “the results of philosophy are the uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense and of bumps that the understanding has got by running its head up against the limits of language. these bumps analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 7 make us see the value of the discovery.”4 postmodern philosophers and theorists often also defend and pursue the fundamental importance of this kind of failure of sense; we shall give some examples later. in addition, as we will discuss in the final part of the paper, the logical tetrads of taoism and buddhism suggest a similar understanding of the relation between sense and failure of sense. fundamental religious insights, eastern, western, and tribal, are often expressed in the forms of myth, vision, and dream, which are typically articulated partly on the basis of contradictions, category confusions, nonsequiturs, and equivocations. as we hope to make clear in our discussion below, these are not logical flaws in these contexts, but accurate and appropriate expressions of an objective incoherence in sense that occurs at the deepest level of sense itself, the level at which the nature of sense itself is addressed. in accounting for sense itself, for sense as such and in general, we step partly outside it, and this involves the failure of sense itself. this corresponds to another traditional characteristic of wisdom: that answers to the deep questions always seem somehow unsatisfactory as they stand, and are somehow always anti-climactic. yet we propose that this does not mean that giving these kinds of answers is misguided. this failure of sense is a very specific type. it occurs in trying to get a perspective on our standpoint: it is only by trying to make sense of our standpoint as a whole that we reach the position where we are outside it and where it therefore no longer makes sense. what is more, as we have noted, it is sense itself that requires us to account for sense as a whole and so leads us outside it, to this specific kind of loss of sense. and it is this specific standpoint (or sense-making framework) that requires this particular outside, and so this particular failure of sense. we are only “outside” sense, then, and are only justified in being there, because of what occurs “inside” sense itself. the failure of sense “outside” only occurs with reference to, and as a product of, the particular sense “inside.” the outside of sense is required by its inside, and so is, paradoxically, internal to it. we have, as it were, one foot in the framework and one foot out of it, and that is how the failure of sense occurs. now, outside our perspective as a whole, its sense simply fails to occur at all: we are outside sense as a whole, or outside all of sense. as a result, any awareness of our perspective can only occur wholly inside it, to the exclusion of anything outside it. it follows that perspective on it is both wholly and exclusively inside it and—since it is perspective on it as a whole—wholly outside at once. (our “feet” metaphor, then, is more accurately expressed as: both feet are inside, and only inside, and both feet are outside, and only outside, simultaneously.) consequently, the statements we make from this position both essentially make sense (even if they are partly mistaken, the mistakes are intelligible: they occur in a context where the rules of sense-making apply) and are also wholly outside of that sense. the answers we find to deep questions at this level are simultaneously and in the same respects both perfectly sensible and perfectly nonsensical. that is, it is not that they are simply absurd or misguided, but rather that they are simultaneously obviously true and yet do not exclude the opposites that cancel them: they are both clearly true and completely useless as guides. for example, “love all things” means also “love your own hatred,” and “accept what is” means also “accept your own inability to accept things.” consequently, as we hope will become clear, the real value of these answers is not in what they directly say, but in the consequences of the position they place us in with respect to our perspective as a whole. by placing us outside our whole framework of sense in this way that retains its link to the specific inside (where sense occurs), they function as a passage to a renewed grasp of sense in general, as a redirecting of our capacity to make sense as a whole. they function as what plato called a periagoge or conversion of the soul, a turning of ourselves wholly about to face the same world of things in a new direction that allows us to re-understand it.5 for example, a statement like, “everything is caused, determined, necessary, and so just as it should be,” allows us to register certain dimensions even of what we think of as free acts that we would otherwise be unable to conceive. we can, perhaps, see these acts as fitting with their surrounding circumstances and events, so that the burden of responsibility for them is not wholly on us. this statement gives a little grace, a little charity, to the world’s requirements analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 8 of us. to give a somewhat more academic example, richard rorty discusses how our perspectives are each fundamentally governed by what he calls a different “final vocabulary.” he calls it a “vocabulary” to indicate that each person articulates their sense of things based on a particular set of words that is just one among many other possible sets. he calls it “final” to indicate that to the particular person it is basic or foundational in the sense that “if doubt is cast on the worth of these words, their user has no noncircular argumentative recourse. those words are as far as he can go with language.”6 by using this kind of formulation, rorty allows us to compare different perspectives from their own point of view without committing ourselves to the truth of any of them—including the truth of our own perspective. this position partly outside our own commitments produces a prevailing attitude that he describes as “irony.”7 since, however, this formulation applies to all perspectives, including rorty’s own, it follows on its own grounds (as his ironic attitude towards it explicitly acknowledges) that the vocabulary of “final vocabulary” cannot be the only final vocabulary in terms of which to construe perspectives.8 this means that it, itself, establishes the possibility that it may on occasion be the wrong vocabulary, and in fact that it can be wrong by wholly missing the appropriate sense of what we may justifiably want to say. in other words, it establishes the possibility that it can be simply nonsense. rorty’s formulation from outside any particular perspectives allows us to approach conflicting perspectives in ways that enable us to enter into their ways of making sense and that are profoundly morally and politically helpful, but it does so (despite rorty’s own understanding of it) partly by being capable, and because it is capable, of rendering itself literally without sense. it functions, then, by not simply saying what it says, and in so doing redirecting our capacity to make sense as a whole. one very important dimension of this “rendering itself without sense,” this self-cancellation, of the sense of a general “outside” of perspectives is its contrast with what occurs “inside” a perspective. not only does any coherent perspective on things as a whole or in general make sense on the inside, but, as we have noted, that inside wholly excludes what falls outside it from having any sense. what is outside it is simply nonsense, simply meaningless. consequently, what is inside has no meaningful alternatives to contrast to it: in other words, it is absolute sense. this is the kind of context in which wittgenstein, for example, notes that we can speak of absolutes. when the idea of an overall “language game” in contrast with another plays no role in what we are saying on a given occasion, then, wittgenstein writes, “‘put it here’—indicating the place with one’s finger—that is giving an absolute spatial position.”9 similarly, donald davidson, who argues that the idea of an overall “framework” or “conceptual scheme” is incoherent, maintains “a theory of absolute truth,” according to which “we . . . re-establish unmediated touch with the familiar objects whose antics make our sentences and opinions true or false.”10 we began by noting that wisdom is perspective on perspective, from the outside, because that is where the deep questions of ultimate sense and value find their context. now we are saying that ultimate sense and, therefore, value find their context exclusively inside perspectives. this is not a contradiction; or, rather, it is the kind of contradiction that belongs to the paradox in which we are proposing wisdom consists. we have also noted that the deep questions and answers outside particular perspectives show themselves to be nonsense, and so function to redirect us to a renewed grasp and appreciation of the sense that is made within perspectives. the questions of ultimate sense and value, then, take us out of our general perspective, only to fail there in their sense, and so return us to the general sense of things within our perspective, but now with an appreciation of its foundational character and value. by asking fundamental questions and so leaving our perspective, we find out that sense and value occur only within our perspective: that is, when we are no longer asking the fundamental questions about it. this process satisfies a third traditional characteristic of wisdom. recognizing the nonsensical character of a perspective on our perspective as a whole allows us to make sense not only of the emptiness of stated wisdom and of its always elusive and questionable nature, but also of its status as directing us to what is most solid and basic in life. what is more, it allows us to understand how these two contradictory characteristics make sense as part of the same feature of life. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 9 a little earlier, we discussed the simultaneity of being “inside” and being “outside,” having our feet both inside and outside our perspective at the same time. this simultaneity allows us to understand the meaningful relation between wisdom and the unreflective experience of everyday life, or between depth and shallowness. (it allows us to do this in a way that again corresponds to a prominent insight of a variety of wisdom traditions, as we shall illustrate below when we discuss the existential dimensions of teaching.) expressing this simultaneity differently, deep perspective on ourselves, awareness of ourselves as a whole or from the outside, is nothing but awareness of our shallow, familiar selves, as they occur in our “insides.” outside of those familiar perspectives, as we have argued, there is in fact no genuine or stable sense at all and, as we have discussed, absolute value and sense are only found within perspectives—that is, where deep reflection does not take place. the difference, then, between taking our sense-making categories or foundational “boxes” for granted and having a perspective on them—or the difference between shallowness and depth—is not simply that these are separate, distinct standpoints and ways of thinking. instead, having perspective on our taking our categories for granted does not exclude or eliminate that unaware taking for granted, but is an awareness of it, and so includes it as an ongoing part of itself. similarly, depth is the deeper dimensions of our shallowness, and so does not eliminate it, but includes it as an ongoing part of itself. wisdom is the wisdom of un-insightful life. there is a fourth traditional characteristic of wisdom that is also satisfied by the activity of this kind of thinking. thinking in this way requires us to be tempered, and itself tempers us, in certain ways. it requires and shapes certain attitudes and ways of being in us. in particular, it requires and inculcates patience in the recognition that reality is bigger than we can always grasp in any given moment, and that sometimes we have to wait attentively for insight and control to emerge from the way things sort themselves out entirely independently of our immediate ideas, expectations, and needs. we mentioned at the start that we mean by “coming to understand a perspective as whole” coming to understand either our own perspective or another’s. the logic is identical in either case: to understand any perspective as a whole, we have to be both wholly inside it and wholly outside it at once. more importantly, for our purposes, in coming to understand another perspective, we need to step outside ours in the same way we have discussed. as a result, sense fails, since the sense of our own perspective fails, and we do not yet have the sense of the other perspective. and, equally, we are put in a position to gain a fundamental understanding of our own framework, from the outside. what is more, each time we come across a new perspective, it will contrast with ours in unique respects, and so we will come to see new dimensions of our own perspective as a whole. consequently, the process of coming to understand another perspective is essentially the same as the process of gaining a new sense of our own. in the context of relating our perspective to those of others, then, the encounter with failure of sense is a necessary part of the process by which we engage with deeply different standpoints, and not only of the process in which we engage deeply with our own. wisdom and some of the contemporary concerns of teaching this conception of wisdom can help us to understand some crucial inadequacies of existing approaches to critical thinking, multiculturalism, and global awareness or internationalism. the inadequacies that we have in mind of current approaches to these areas share a common basis. in all of these cases, the existing approaches are certainly thought out in terms of getting perspectives on our particular standpoints, whether individual, subcultural, ethnic, or national, but none of them recognizes that getting such a perspective involves stepping not simply outside of what is familiar and comfortable to us, but outside of sense altogether. this is true even when theorists recognize that other standpoints can be so radically different from our own that the two are incommensurable (that is, without any common standards or grounds), so that we need to step outside of our standpoints entirely even to understand the other one. even there, while the literature recognizes the conflict between frames of sense, it does not recognize the failure of sense itself: say, the sense that even the theorists’ own writing analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 10 might make in discussing these situations. for example, if, as these theorists themselves understand what they are doing, we are describing a situation that involves two (or more) incommensurable or, in other words, two wholly mutually exclusive frameworks for sense in general, then, first, we cannot coherently describe the whole situation in terms of either framework on its own. if we did, we would just be assimilating one framework to the incompatible and therefore distorting terms of the other: we would make nonsense of the meanings of one of the frameworks. second, however, we also cannot coherently describe the situation in terms that include both standpoints. they are mutually exclusive and, as frameworks for sense in general, they each cover the whole of sense: describing one is therefore automatically to deny any possible sense to the other. consequently, the only way we can describe the whole situation these theorists discuss is to include in our description either contradictions or some other types of failure of sense itself, as such. (some postmodernist work does recognize this failure of sense itself, such as the work of derrida or irigaray, but this side and level of postmodernist thought does not seem to be taken up in the theorizing of multiculturalism, international awareness, and critical reasoning.)11 to give one representative example, pearce and littlejohn argue that moral conflicts can be characterized by incommensurable differences of outlook, but in developing a solution, they insist that “postmodernism requires a commitment to the rejection of absolutes and the celebration of difference.”12 their description of their approach contradicts itself: their commitment to rejection of absolutes is itself an absolute commitment. one might also wonder how well “the rejection of absolutes” harmonizes with “the celebration of difference.” if pearce and littlejohn did make room for absolutes that are not their own (of rejecting absolutes), the coherence and sense of their particular “perspective on perspectives” would collapse. and that would be their genuine entry into the process or area of thought that we are describing as “wisdom.” unfortunately, they do not make that room, and so do not go as far as the failure of sense. again, in the context of critical reasoning, richard paul, for example, argues for a “strong-sense critical reasoning,” which involves understanding arguments within the broader context of the overall networks of reasoning and concerns, the “worldview,” within which they have their sense. while he and others working with this kind of model explain what kinds of attention and practice we need to enter into the relevant overall context of thought, they do not consider the ways in which such contexts constitute sense itself, as such, and consequently also do not consider the relevance or the problems of failure of sense for this kind of entry into deeply different worldviews.13 in other words, then, the current approaches to multiculturalism and critical reasoning never reach the point of completely failing to make sense, and so of completely leaving what is familiar and foundational for them. as a result, these approaches always continue to subordinate whatever alternative views they are considering to their own categories of sense. the alternative we are proposing is to recognize that in truly critical, multicultural, or international interactions, we need to reach the point where we no longer presuppose our relevant foundations, and this means that we no longer presuppose even our criteria for relevant sense itself. we have to re-learn what does and does not make sense in this context from the ground up. we have to be beginners, unable to assert any of our certainties, because we no longer know precisely what they mean. we have to be so confused that we are entirely lost. here, it is not even clear that being open, critical, or pluralistic are good ideas. this state of being confused, lost, incompetent, and powerless to assert our certainties is what allows us, in its often difficult and always deeply demanding way, to re-establish and evaluate sense without question-begging pre-commitments. this state is, then, a crucial component of gaining clarity, direction, competence, and empowerment either to assert one’s own entitlements or, equally, to recognize those of others. it follows that the failure of sense that this state expresses is a component of genuinely critical reason. it also follows that openness to unanalytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 11 dergoing this state and the ability to deal with undergoing it are among the essential critical reasoning skills. the failure of sense and the skills of dealing with it are part of the necessary means of achieving sense. and, since it is sense itself that requires and leads to its failure, this failure of sense and the skills of dealing with it are really part of the substance of sense and sense-making—of genuinely critical reason and logic—themselves. in teaching critical reasoning, then, and, for the same reasons, in teaching multiculturalism and global awareness, we need to teach the skills of being profoundly skill-less, without resource, and powerless to assert or to endorse. (this recipe is of course the opposite of what is inculcated in a culture of acquiring skills—“by the end of this course, we will be able to …”—of respecting everyone’s opinions, and of becoming empowered.) the tempering into the kind of patience and fortitude that we discussed in the previous section is relevant here. in teaching students to be open to and how to deal with the experience of the failure of sense, we need to help them acknowledge and teach them—or to work with the process that tempers and so teaches them—to come to terms with the highly ego-threatening failure of their basic competences to make and recognize sense, with the more broadly threatening reality that in these situations they cannot rely on any of what they otherwise take to be obviously rational procedures of thought—among other things, that they simply do not know yet how to criticize and endorse—and with the entirely undignified beginner’s process of learning basic ways of making sense of which they are currently simply ignorant. we think that the way in which this degree of uncertainty and unclarity makes sense is actually intuitively clear. one of the problems with postmodern pluralism that is becoming increasingly recognized in this pluralist field itself is that (like liberal open-mindedness) this kind of universal openness is in fact closed to all the many standpoints that do not accept universal openness. judith butler, for example, offers a rigorous discussion of the problem in an essay arguing that “particular” groups may have views of “universality” that are intrinsic to them as the particular groups they are; as a result, in fighting for the recognition of particular differences we may therefore need to negotiate not simply between conflicting particular groups but between “competing notions of universality.” that is, far from our respect for differences allowing us to replace “universal truths” with “particular truths,” it may require us to respect notions of universal truths and even to find ways of negotiating between different versions of universal truths.14 for another representative example, the anthropologist bruce kapferer complains that “in the contemporary redemptive mood of anthropology,” the “potential differences” between self and other have been largely flattened out in a homogenising, globalising sweep. this contradicts the significance of the postmodern notion of multiple modernities . . . involving distinct . . . orientations to reality . . . to reverse and generalise the rational equation (humanity is united in a common irrationality), as is currently being done, sustains the hegemony of metropolitan assumptions rather than decentring them.15 we note kapferer’s paradoxical formulation, which we endorse: postmodernism is properly concerned partly with multiple modernities, and not only with multiple, “open-minded” postmodernities. in short, in its unconfused and definite (or clear and distinct) commitment to respecting difference, postmodern pluralism utterly disrespects those different standpoints that do not share its respect for difference. in multicultural terms, if we want to be genuinely multicultural, we need to make a place for the many cultures and sub-cultures that reject multiculturalism. in this connection, as we have discussed, that an overall perspective that is not committed to any particular perspective is literally nonsense and so without any validity at all (although it is deeply necessary, productive and important invalid nonsense) is only one side of a coin. the other side of the coin is that what is entirely within analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 12 a perspective on things as a whole has its absolute validity. as a result, the alternative we are proposing allows multiculturalism, for example, both to recognize that its sense necessarily arises from its own cultural particularity (to recognize its own non-multicultural status), and also to endorse the truth of cultures that are not its own in a genuine and unqualified sense—and so to be genuinely multicultural after all. for that matter, it allows it to endorse its own validity, as multiculturalism, through respect for its own inside: that is, because it is a particular, non-multicultural perspective! this, at least, has the virtue of honesty, and as a result may allow more fruitful dialogue with standpoints with different commitments than does the intolerant assumption that our own multicultural tolerance is the only insightful option. if it is not already clear from the logic of the position we are presenting, we are not advocating intolerance. we are saying that where different perspectives on things in general are at issue, what is in fact intolerance and what is instead principled insistence are not clear in advance of finding out what makes sense in each of the frameworks. what we (or “they”) mean by “principle” and “intolerance” are not the only possible relevant meanings in such situations, and we need to find out what the relevant meanings are before we can decide which, if any, are the right ones. we believe that to do otherwise is actually to be intolerant, and we are trying to find a way of avoiding this deep and therefore most insidious kind of intolerance. returning to our description of our alternative, then, and expressing it more generally, it gives us not only more complete and radical questioning of our foundational prejudices and assumptions (to the point where the meanings of our questions themselves are in question), but also more solid answers (in fact, completely solid answers, because the meanings of those questions themselves have come into question, so that the answers are at that point entirely dissociated from the context in which further questions about them even have meaning). like the more general idea that sense itself leads to the failure of sense, this kind of openness to the negation of the sense of openness is of course a self-contradiction. we have argued that this contradiction is inherent both in honest and consistently thought-through multiculturalism and internationalism, on the one hand, and in critical reasoning that is willing to be critical about itself in turn (in other words, critical reasoning that is, again, honest and consistent). we believe, however, that this contradiction is not a problem, but stems perfectly intelligibly from a source that, we have been arguing, is the deep dimension of how sense and meaning work, a source with which “wisdom” traditionally engages. wisdom and some of the existential concerns of teaching on the side of the existential or timeless concerns of teaching, this same passage into loss of sense and meaning gives a helpful understanding of certain crucial phases of learning. when students encounter a wholly different standpoint, they, like all of us in genuinely “multicultural” situations, do not have the “boxes” to make sense of the new information. more precisely, they do not have access to the new “boxes” in which the information (possibly even familiar information) is contained. as a result, they necessarily misunderstand what is being said even in connection with familiar information, and will continue to do as long as they apply their old “boxes” or categories of sense. but those old categories are the only ways of making sense they have, so they will continue to try to apply them; and they should, since they are not yet in a position to know that they do not work. as a result of repeated and, eventually, convincingly terminal failure, they come to realize that they are not equipped to understand the material at all. that point, the point of despair, is when they become equipped to start learning the new boxes or categories themselves: they have given up on applying the old ones, knowing now that these old ones are inapplicable, and this puts them in a position, for the first time, to start learning new categories of sense. confusion, being intellectually lost, and impotence to understand, then, do not only allow us to get beyond our presuppositions and biases, but are also what allow us, positively, to learn a perspective as a whole or, equally, analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 13 to get a perspective on our own viewpoint as a whole. as part of the process of getting a perspective on our own sense of things as a whole, these “negative” experiences, because they are grounded in the objective characteristics of the situation, are part of the experience of encountering our own deep truth, whether or not in concert with the deep truth of others. in engaging with the categories by which we make sense in general and at all, we engage with the source, the fundamental character, of the general sense and meaning reality has for us. in other words, we engage with the fundamental sense and structure of our own being and the meaning being has for us in general. this process of engagement is not only cognitive—it is not only a transformation of our capacities for understanding. as an acquiring of new boxes, new categories for sense itself, the process transforms our sense of things as a whole, including the sense of ourselves as a whole. that is, it transforms what we ourselves mean as a whole, and so what we are as a whole: it is a transformation of our being. these experiences of becoming lost and without understanding, then, are a very real equivalent of a spiritual journey. in this case, it is something like a journey into the desert, in which we lose all sense of orientation in respect to certain fundamental issues, and as a result can come to get a sense of what orientation itself is, and renew our orientations in some sense or in some respects from the ground up. the dry, dispiriting labor of battling to understand and working through confusion has existential or spiritual meaning: it is the labor by which our sense of ourselves and of our reality as a whole is placed at stake and renewed. it is a small but real equivalent of a dark night of the soul, or an initiation process, or an alchemical work: of a liminal passage. that this aspect of learning functions in the same ways as traditional spiritual journeys demonstrates again, but in a different way, how the deeply transformative and the ordinary commingle and function together. in other words, a great spiritual journey or dark night of the soul is not simply a special activity or extraordinary goal; rather it is a deep description of learning in general when examined with reference to the nature of sense as a whole. this is part of the mechanism that many students and teachers might recognize when they think or wonder how or why they did not understand something earlier that they have come to understand as so obvious now. we forget our old perspectives, misunderstandings, or positive sensibilities because the whole of things is different, and so our new way of making sense now makes absolute sense to us. the new way of making sense is so thoroughly reasonable that we often feel befuddled at why the transformation was such a struggle. this impulse is natural but largely unfair: unfair to ourselves and to the process of learning. this sequence of confusion, transformation, and forgetfulness is also another reason that wisdom seems a bit anti-climactic. the part of the process in which we are utterly lacking sense is relatively easy to ignore as in any way significant because of its senselessness, and hard to remember later for the same reason. failure to appreciate these dimensions of the process of learning often has the result that students and even teachers actually end up ignoring their own educational experience. when students encounter calculus, organic chemistry, or macroeconomics, just as much as cultural criticism, philosophy, or esoteric religious traditions, they can become very confused and disturbed. here, too, their old categories simply do not make sense and are of no help. those students who persevere, study, stumble, and fumble along, eventually discover how to make sense in new ways. these successful students, however, seldom reflect on this process. it is even more likely that they do not see this process at all: instead they are likely to believe that they succeeded by using their old, familiar tools of assimilating new information to the categories of sense they have always relied on. in addition, they are likely to believe that they succeeded while some others failed because they are, for example, smarter, luckier, or more talented. likewise, they are likely to believe that their struggles in the first place were not due to having to make a new and different kind of sense, but to the quantitatively greater (rather than the altogether different quality of) difficulty of the subject. the result is that both students and teachers often do not appreciate either their own achievements in these contexts or the broader insights their experience has to offer about the nature and resources of human learning. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 14 an additional unfortunate result is that, because they do not recognize that they have learned by changing their “boxes,” they will continue to think of and explain the new area of knowledge to themselves and others partly in the old terms. that is, they will really have only a confused insight into the new area, consisting in an arbitrary mix of categories that apply to it and categories that do not. in particular, when it comes to approaching wisdom traditions themselves, this information-seeking, no-disruption-of-real-sense approach inevitably tends to distort what it is studying, to make a caricature of wisdom that sees its unfamiliar expressions as exotic, quirky, flaky, enigmatic, or even authoritative in their fascinating mysteriousness, because they are dissociated from any of the particular contexts or applications in which they have their grounded sense. to return to the positive side of our theme: let us emphasize that all of this means that the deepest and most meaningful part of our experience, the source of the deepest insight and growth, is in part our failure of insight and of meaning and sense. we have already argued that depth and wisdom are not simply opposed to and distinct from shallowness. they are also not simply opposed to and distinct from sheer lack of insight and going astray. instead, they are a certain way of working with and through them. as we have noted, the deep truth of things is the truth of those everyday things, and wisdom is what we learn from our shallowness. but among those everyday things that have a deep truth and are the materials in which we learn wisdom, are foolishness and getting lost. wisdom needs to be—and we believe genuine wisdom is—respectful not only of superficiality but also of foolishness, not simply because it should be compassionate (which presumably it should), but because it is in its substance, in part, superficiality and foolishness. this, too, is one of the traditionally recognized characteristics of wisdom: it has a perspective on itself, even on its own limitations as specializing in having perspective on itself. sometimes, it says, one just needs to live; and that perhaps this is even the greater part of wisdom. yeats, for example, writes, a most astonishing thing— . . . seventy years have i lived no ragged beggar man, seventy years have i lived, seventy years man and boy, and never have i danced for joy.16 wisdom and the teachings of wisdom traditions in this section, we will explore how this conception of wisdom is embodied in some actual wisdom traditions and in their approach to teaching. we will discuss the zen tradition and plato.17 zen having a perspective on perspective our proposal is that wisdom involves having an outside grasp of a perspective on life in general, whether it is our own perspective or another’s. zen koans, or paradoxical statements, are intended to teach this kind of outside grasp on our perspective, by stopping someone from thinking in his or her familiar patterns. traditional, ambiguous zen buddhist statements include, “what is the sound of one hand clapping?” or “wakuan complained when he saw a picture of the bearded bodhidharma: ‘why doesn’t that man have a beard?’”18 zen buddhist tradition also illustrates the importance of having an outside perspective on ourselves in many of its teaching stories. one story begins, master nansen saw the monks of the eastern and western halls fighting over a cat. he seized the cat and told the monks: “if any of you say a good word, you can save the cat.”19 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 15 the monks are arguing over a cat. nansen sees that the monks do not have a perspective on themselves or the cat—for zen, arguing over such a thing constitutes a lack of understanding of or perspective on everything that is important in life. buddhists are expected to show equanimity, calm, compassion, non-acquisitiveness. by arguing over the cat, the monks may be behaving as quite ordinary human beings, but they are violating the fundamental truths of their own tradition. they have not yet understood their own tradition’s basic teachings. they lack perspective on their own sense of things. buddhist teaching suggests that the smallest inkling of self-perspective (wisdom) would cause the monks to immediately cease their squabbling. first, nansen discursively offers them a “time out” to consider what they are doing. the monks do not have a perspective to articulate: they literally do not notice what they are doing— cannot speak about it—they are caught up in it. it is important to recognize that nansen is pushing them not just to see that they are being petty and un-buddhist, but that they have missed something even more fundamental. it is not just the content of buddhist teaching in particular that they seem to lack, but more importantly, they do not have the more intimate, and so more basic, awareness of what the perspective is that they themselves inhabit. that is, they are not only inadequately aware of buddhist teaching, but also, more fundamentally, they are inadequately aware of themselves. perspective on perspective, requires us to step out of sense gaining this perspective on our own perspective requires us partly to step out of our familiar sense of things, which at least at first results in a failure of sense: nonsense. the story illustrates this as follows: “no one answered. so nansen boldly cut the cat in two pieces.” this move violates several very basic buddhist expectations. it is violent: killing violates fundamental buddhist values. it appears to be radical over-reaction. as such, it does not seem like a recognizable solution of any kind: it is so gratuitous that it is nonsensical. this is purposeful on nansen’s part. getting a perspective on oneself is not often gained by simply stopping and thinking about things: the monks had been given that opportunity continually in receiving the explicit teachings of their tradition, and had failed. nansen responds by pushing this failure even further, violating any possible expectation, and thereby offers the monks a wholly fresh look at the situation. he provides them the chance to break through their state of being caught up without perspective in their attitudes and actions. if nansen simply wanted them to be more attentive to buddhist rules against arguing and possessiveness, he might have just verbally scolded them. but he does not do that—he responds to their lack of perspective and their violation of buddhist rules, by perpetrating an even greater violation. he turns the situation into a complete violation of everything that makes sense to them. nansen disrupts sense itself, because this is the means to get a perspective on perspective. it is at this point in the story, when all of their expectations and values have been violated, when the story has turned nonsensical, that the monks have a genuine opportunity to step outside what they have so far taken for granted without being aware of it, and gain a perspective on their original dispute, their expectations of themselves, and their expectations of nansen. students are very often puzzled by why zen masters sometimes drink wine when it is forbidden, cut cats in two, speak gibberish, or give other anomalous responses. at least one important purpose of these actions is to demonstrate that even the buddhist dharma itself is useless if one lacks a perspective on that perspective. it is partly the perspective on perspective that the zen masters are teaching, not simply traditional buddhist values. zen masters do also show great respect for basic buddhist values; but they consider them to be only genuinely valuable after one has the truly deep perspective on what a perspective actually is. this is illustrated in another story by a monk who has obviously already assimilated basic and advanced buddhist practices.20 a student asks master joshu: “if i haven’t anything in my mind, what shall i do?” this suggests that the student is already accomplished in the meditations on emptiness. joshu answers his question by saying: “throw it out.” the monk analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 16 asks: “but if i haven’t anything, how can i throw it out?” joshu responds, “well, then carry it out.” in this case, the monk is succeeding in practicing basic buddhist meditation: he has emptied his mind. but joshu’s responses demonstrate that although the student has made some obvious progress in the practice, he has still somehow missed the more fundamental point. practicing non-attachment to thoughts (becoming empty) and practicing non-attachment to the emptiness itself (non-attachment to the non-attachment) equally and together demonstrate an awareness of the more fundamental insight: our perspective or view of things is very valuable, but it needs to go together with a perspective on it in turn, an awareness that is not wholly absorbed in it. our general awareness involves our taking its organizing categories or “boxes” unawarely for granted, much as we cannot see our eyeballs while we are using them as the basis for our seeing. as a result, to be properly aware, we need to become aware of our “boxes” as well. but this second awareness does not eliminate these boxes: it is partly an awareness of our taking these things for granted. so proper awareness includes simultaneously and in the same respects (1) awareness, (2) awareness of awareness, (3) a “throwing out” of that awareness, and (4) awareness that we are throwing awareness out—in other words, also lack of awareness and awareness of lack of awareness. this is in fact a version of the famous zen buddhist term “mu,” sometimes expressed in the form of the logical tetrad: “it is this, and that, and both, and neither.” it is nonsense: but it is the kind of nonsense that occurs when we have a perspective on sense itself or, in other words, when we make sense of sense itself, as sense itself requires, so that we are partly outside sense. as a perspective on or awareness of sense, it is nonsense that includes sense: it itself is “both and neither sense and not sense.” as nonsense, it does not even have the unqualified sense of being identifiable simply and exclusively as nonsense! returning to sense/new sense of sense awareness of our perspective, then, not only makes us more properly and deeply aware of ourselves—aware of our “boxes”—but also actively returns us to the sense of things in general we take for granted within our perspective (or within a new perspective). when perspective on perspective is gained, it reveals itself to be nonsense, and, by contrast, the sense that occurs within taken-for-granted perspectives emerges, whether this is our own, old, familiar perspective or a new one that may happen to speak to us. what is more, because what is outside that perspective turns out to be nonsense, what makes sense inside turns out to be what we should take for granted, and so what we can be at peace in taking for granted. there is nothing beyond it, alternative to it, that makes sense. we are returned to the old sense with a renewed appreciation of it. (while at the same time, “multiculturally,” we can also recognize and appreciate the equal validity of alternative and even conflicting senses of things as a whole that are taken for granted inside other perspectives.) “throwing out emptiness” is a way of saying that the monk should return to the familiar, everyday sense of things: that she should recognize that she can let go of the nonsense of deeply questioning her perspective and instead appreciate the sense or meaningfulness of her familiar, everyday life. in keeping with this idea, the modern zen master, shunryu suzuki makes the following analogy between zen meditation practice and eating brown rice: “how do you like zazen [sitting meditation]? i think it may be better to ask, how do you like brown rice? zazen is too big a topic. brown rice is just right. actually, there is not much difference. when you eat brown rice, you have to chew it, and unless you chew it, it is difficult to swallow. when you chew it very well, your mouth becomes part of the kitchen, and actually the brown rice becomes more and more tasty.”21 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 17 repeating the process zen stories sometimes demonstrate the same lesson multiple times in the same story. the “nansen cuts the cat” story concludes: that evening joshu returned and nansen told him about [the cat incident]. joshu removed his sandals and placing them on his head, walked out. nansen said: “if you had been there, you could have saved the cat.” joshu hears the story (regular sense making). he then engages in a nonsensical response (sandals on head, walking out). nansen then expresses the new sense of the regular sense discursively and in a very ordinary way (awareness of perspective would have allowed the issue to be resolved without extreme measures like killing the cat). while nansen expresses this new regular sense on the basis of the nonsensical response, he also does not draw on the content of that response. joshu’s response allows a return to and appreciation of the regular sense by simply falling away as the nonsense of an “outside the regular perspective” that it is. this part acts as a demonstration or summary of the earlier lesson. plato having a perspective on perspective to turn to a western example, the socratic method shown in plato’s dialogues directly takes up the issue of having a perspective on one’s perspective. the meno, for instance, begins with meno asking socrates one of his culture’s well-worn customary questions about virtue: “can virtue be taught?”22 meno offers additional parts to the question (is it the result of practice? of nature? etc.). if socrates were to take up any of the alternative opinions, and try to argue in favor or against them, he would remain within meno’s customary framework for making sense of this topic. instead, however, he begins with the statements, “i do not even have any knowledge of what virtue itself is,” and “also . . . as i believe, i have never yet met anyone else who did know” (71a-c). in other words, he is saying that they need to begin by getting a perspective on the whole idea of virtue, obvious though it may customarily be taken for granted to be, before they can really even ask whether or not it can be taught—or why that might or might not be a sensible or answerable question. meno effectively ignores socrates’ question, by simply remaining within his familiar way of making sense. he offers several conventional ideas about virtue, continuing to fit it into his familiar “boxes”: it is the proper management of one’s public affairs, desire for good things and the power to get them, and others (71e). and when socrates questions each of these in turn, meno adds familiarly related ideas: for example, the power to get good things, but in addition justly, piously, or with moderation (78d-e). socrates, however, is actually asking meno to subtract his ideas and their related concepts and turn his attention away from them to his assumptions about how they make sense. he is asking meno to look at his general perspective, standpoint, or framework itself: in this case, to examine the sense of virtue itself. without that, meno is not deepening his understanding of virtue, but instead going in circles, recycling what he already takes for granted about virtue within his existing understanding of it. as socrates says, “i begged you to tell me about virtue as a whole, [but] you are far from telling me what it is. rather, you say that every action is virtue if it is performed with a part of virtue as if you had said what virtue is as a whole, so i would already know that, even if you fragment it into parts.” (79b-c, our insertion). meno, then, continues to make assertions that come from his original assumptions, and they keep failing to give him a new perspective. socrates responds by repeating his original question in different ways each time that meno offers an answer, and in that way he metaphorically hammers away at these assumptions until they break. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 18 perspective on perspective, requires us to step out of sense after several attempts and failures at getting perspective on virtue as a whole, meno finally begins to lose his sense of things, and to enter the state of confusion and nonsense. he reaches the point where, instead of continuing to respond to the issues about the topic, he says: “socrates, before i even met you i used to hear that you are always in a state of perplexity and that you bring others to the same state [and now] … i am quite perplexed [aporias: in a state of being completely at a loss, of having no way out]” (79e-80a, our insertions). he goes on to compare socrates to an electric eel that stings or shocks people until they are paralyzed, so that “my mind and my tongue are numb, and i have no answer to give you.” he even playfully accuses socrates of sorcery. at this point, all sense has failed for meno. his investigation has simply ended in sheer (if playful) foolishness, and in particular in abandoning the area of sense that belongs to their topic. instead of dismissing what he says, socrates actually plays along with the nonsense and pushes it even further, as nansen did analogously with his students in the zen example: socrates flatters meno’s beauty, and then suggests that he would only be an eel if eels also make themselves numb as they do others. he says, “i am more perplexed than anyone when i cause perplexity in others” (80c). in other words, now neither of them has any idea what is going on. this profound general and resourceless perplexity leads meno to despair that one cannot get to know anything: “how will you look for it, socrates, when you do not know at all what it is? how will you aim to search for something you do not know at all? if you should meet with it, how will you know that this is the thing that you did not know?” (80d). this is the point where meno has given up on his old sense-making framework, something he has been able to do only by pushing his perspective beyond its capacity to make and so provide sense. this state is what socrates typically aims for as the beginning of wisdom, the state in which we are able to learn something beyond what our assumptions about how things make sense have pre-arranged for us. this is consequently also the first point in the dialogue where meno and socrates actually begin to address the original question in depth and without the clutter of meno’s original assumptions. returning to sense/new sense of sense at this turning point, socrates begin to persuade meno that he need not be stuck in the paralysis, by reassuring him that exactly because he has arrived at the point of nonsense he can begin freshly again, and in fact is in an even better position to do so than when he first started. he is no longer blinded by his taken for granted presuppositions about the possible sense of the topic, and so can start entirely over: in other words, he can in fact start genuinely from the beginning for the first time. he can explore the relevant questions within the same world of familiar sense, but now being less prejudiced as to what that sense can involve. socrates offers a theory—based on a myth—that our souls have already learned all knowledge before descending into our bodies, so that all we need to do in order to come to know “new” things is to recollect what we already know (81a-d). he concludes, “i do not insist that my argument is right in all other respects, but . . . we will be better men, braver and less idle, if we believe that one must search for the things one does not know.” (86b). the value of the myth for socrates is not its content, and therefore not the sense that it might make in its own right, but the attitude it inspires in us. it returns us to exploring the familiar, everyday world, and its own sense or lack of sense becomes irrelevant in itself. and so socrates brings us full circle: we are back to exploring within the world that we already know—but now in the context of an awareness that there is such a thing as our knowledge as a whole (in other words, with a sense of it, as it were, from the “outside”), and consequently with a perspective on the familiar sense of our topic and also on this whole process of exploration itself—a perspective whose own relation to sense is, naturally and appropriately, uncertain. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 19 conclusion we would like to end by adding a reflection from the daoist tradition: the wise ones muddle their minds for the sake of everyone under heaven. everyone sets their eyes and ears upon the wise ones. they make everyone laugh like children.23 endnotes 1 plato, for example, has socrates in the phaedrus describe the proper nourishment of the human soul as the sight of true being, the source of the being of all that is. true being dwells in the “place beyond the heavens,” and we come to see it by passing beyond the boundaries of the encompassing heavens and standing “on the back of the world.” plato, phaedrus, trans. r. hackforth, in edith hamilton and huntington cairns, eds., plato: the collected dialogues (princeton: princeton university press, 1961), 247. again, aristotle describes “first philosophy” as the “science which . . . treats universally of being as being,” and which seeks “the first principles and the highest causes.” aristotle, metaphysics, trans. w. d. ross, in the basic works of aristotle, ed. richard mckeon (new york: random house, 1941), iv.1.1003a21-27. this idea of the nature of the highest wisdom is repeated in various ways throughout the history of western metaphysics. 2 karl jaspers, reason and existenz: five lectures, trans. william earle (milwaukee, wi.: marquette university press, 1997), 111, 112, our insertion. 3 ludwig wittgenstein, tractatus logico-philosophicus, trans. d. f. pears and b. f. mcguinness. (london: routledge & kegan paul, 1961), 73, prop. 6.521, 74, prop. 6.54. 4 ludwig wittgenstein, philosophical investigations, 2nd ed., trans. g. e. m. anscombe, (oxford: blackwell, 1958), 48e, no. 119. 5 plato, republic, trans. paul shorey, in edith hamilton and huntington cairns, eds., plato: the collected dialogues (princeton: princeton university press, 1961), 518d. 6 richard rorty, contingency, irony, and solidarity (new york: cambridge university press, 1989), 73. 7 contingency, 73. 8 jeffrey stout notes “rorty’s apparent suggestion that . . . the creation of, and choice between, vocabularies . . . is something we exhibit outside one of those vocabularies,” and argues that, instead, “choice between or among vocabularies itself always takes place within some vocabulary or other, although not always the same one.” ethics after babel: the languages of morals and their discontents (boston: beacon press, 1988), 263-264. 9 ludwig wittgenstein, zettel, ed. g. e. m. anscombe and g. h. von wright, trans. g. e. m. anscombe (berkeley and los angeles: university of california press, 1967), 123e, no. 713. 10 donald davidson, inquiries into truth and interpretation (oxford: clarendon press, 1984), 221, 198. 11 derrida explains, for example, that since “i try to write the question: (what is) meaning to say?” his writing needs to avoid presupposing what meaning includes, and that consequently “it is necessary . . . that writing literally mean nothing.” jacques derrida, positions, trans. alan bass (chicago: university of chicago press, 1981), 14. and irigaray writes, “it is surely not a matter of . . . remaining within the same type of utterance as the one that guarantees discursive coherence. . . . in other words, the issue is not one of elaborating a new theory . . . but of jamming the theoretical machinery itself . . . this ‘style,’ or ‘writing,’ of women tends to put the torch to . . . proper terms, well-constructed forms. . . [it involves] a proper(ty) that is never fixed in the possible identity-to-self of some form or other”; the reality of women does and must “remain elsewhere” to and “threaten the underpinnings of logical operations.” luce irigaray, this sex which is not one, trans. catherine porter with carolyn burke (ithaca, ny: cornell university press, 1985), 78-79, 76-77. 12 w. barnett pearce and stephen w. littlejohn, moral conflict: when social worlds collide (thousand oaks: sage publications, 1997), 147. 13 see, for instance, richard w. paul, “teaching critical reasoning in the strong sense: getting behind worldviews,” in richard a. talaska, ed., critical reasoning in contemporary culture (albany, ny: state university of new york press, 1992), 135-156. 14 judith butler, “competing universalities,” in judith butler, ernesto laclau, and slavoj zizek, eds., continanalytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 20 gency, hegemony, universality: contemporary dialogues on the left (london: verso, 2000), 166-167. 15 bruce kapferer, ed., beyond rationalism: rethinking magic, witchcraft and sorcery (new york: berghahn books, 2003), 18-19. 16 william butler yeats, “imitated from the japanese,” in collected poems (london: macmillan, 1950), 340. 17 many religious and philosophical traditions do not seem to echo the argument or pattern we are exploring here in their self-conscious teaching methods (although we would argue that some of them exhibit this conception without realizing it). the relevant religious traditions might be more properly called mystical or esoteric traditions. as it happens, even though they do not echo our argument in the way that zen, socrates, or jesus might, studying them would (and does) result in the same process we are describing (moving from one sense making framework to another, with all of its confusion, senselessness, and new discovery). in other words, understanding these traditions requires the same process because they do not fit with the modern western students’ common sense-making frameworks. these mystical traditions themselves, however, do not echo our argument, because their emphasis is on teaching a particular sense-making framework without an outside perspective on it. 18 see “a beardless foreigner,” in the gateless gate, in zen flesh, zen bones: a collection of zen and pre-zen writings, compiled by paul reps and nyogen senzaki. (rutland, vermont: tuttle publishing, 1985), 121. bodhidharma is the legendary founder of chan (zen). he was reputed to be an indian monk who traveled to china to teach the meditation tradition. he is generally depicted in art as bearded. 19 the gateless gate, 128. 20 101 zen stories, in zen flesh, zen bones: a collection of zen and pre-zen writings, compiled by paul reps and nyogen senzaki. (rutland, vermont: tuttle publishing, 1985), 57. 21 shunryu suzuki, not always so: practicing the true spirit of zen, ed. edward espe brown. (new york: quill, 2003), 40, our insertion. 22 plato, meno, trans. g. m. a. grube, in plato: complete works, ed. john m. cooper (indianapolis: hackett publishing company, 1997), 70a. 23 dao de jing 49, translated by jeffrey c. c. ruff. address correspondences to: jeremy barris philosophy department marshall university huntington, wv 25755 barris@marshall@.edu and jeffrey c. c. ruff religious studies department marshall university huntington, wv 25755 ruff@marshall.edu analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 13 community of inquiry as a complex communicative system1 nadia stoyanova kennedy complexity theory has been steadily gaining recognition over the last half a century as a new way of under-standing the organization of systems on all levels—whether organisms, social systems, business organizations, or ecosystems. contrary to a mechanistic, analytic approach to the study of phenomena, the complexity perspective takes into account all interactions between the components of a system, which it understands as in dynamic interplay. in this paper, i will attempt to re-describe community of inquiry (ci) as a complex system, and draw some implications that follow from taking into account such description. by community of inquiry, i mean a relatively small (10-20) group of people engaged in a conversation (or, preferably, an ongoing series of conversations) about an agreed-upon concept or problem or question, which is convened and overseen by a “facilitator” who is committed to certain normative ideals, chief among which is the construction of an “ideal speech situation” (habermas, 1990)—that is, a discursive setting in which everyone has equal right and opportunity to speak, in which intimidation of any sort is absent, and in which epistemological authority is distributed rather than centralized in one person. the group enters the dialogue with the shared intention of participating in ongoing critical deliberation together about the issues, with the expectation that new meaning will arise from their interaction and the challenging and testing of each other’s assumptions in the common space of dialogue. in all forms of community of inquiry there is a set of basic discourse rules, implicit or otherwise, that participants abide by, and one or more “facilitators”--who act to clarify and to coordinate the emergent structure of ideas and arguments that the conversation generates (kennedy& kennedy, 2010). i will start by spelling out a distinction made by paul cilliers between two types of systems: complex and complicated (1998). a modern jumbo jet is a complicated system—it has intricate sets of mechanisms and automated devices. because all of those mechanisms have fixed relationships between their elements, the entire jet can be analyzed by “parsing” it into its different segments, and a thorough description and understanding of the jet can be produced by assembling the descriptions of the different parts that comprise it. on the other hand, an ecosystem or the brain are complex systems, in that they are characterized by non-linear relationships and feedback loops. such systems can only yield partial analysis, which can produce partial descriptions. it is not possible to fully understand a complex system, like a cell, an ant colony, human society, or communication among a group of people by taking it apart like a mechanistic device. the traditional analytic method that works well with complicated and simple systems does not fare well with complex systems. the problem is that the traditional analytic approach of taking and studying smaller parts of a system destroys its so-called “emergent properties”, which result from the interaction among its components. as we already mentioned, those properties cannot be reduced to the characteristics of the components themselves. an example of an emergent property is consciousness, something that arises from the interactions of single neurons and even mundane phenomena, such as walking, and which cannot be understood when only parts of the human body are examined. in community of inquiry, some emergent products are collective arguments or a collectively elaborated concept, and even more ephemeral products like justice, respect, care. emergent properties are usually the important features of the system that we want to study, and in order to do this, we have to deal with the system as a whole. as the truism associated with complex system goes, “the system is always more than the sum of its parts.” analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 14 complex systems are typically the ones associated with living organisms or groups of living things like humans, viruses, social systems, language, oceans, or the brain--systems, that shift and change, self-organize and self-produce, of which community of inquiry (ci) is one example. ci as a complex communicative system if we accept the social system theorist niklas luhmann’s (1995) argument that social systems are communicative systems, and his useful and compelling definition of complexity, community of inquiry as a communicative system may be understood as complex, in that it contains more communicative possibilities than can be actualized. for example, on the level of group interaction there are always more themes than can be explored, more questions than can be pursued, and more concepts than the group can take up for inquiry. on the individual level, there are always more possible interventions than one can actually make. community of inquiry shares many important characteristics that cilliers believes are common to all complex systems : rich, interconnected and nonlinear interactions; recursion, redundancy, feedback, adaptability, and autopoiesis. (1998). i provide a brief description of those characteristics below, in the context of the dialogical format of a community of inquiry (ci hereafter). davis and simmt (2003), in describing the emergence and the functioning of a learning community of pre-service teachers as a complex system, emphasized eight characteristics of such a community: internal diversity, redundancy, decentralized control, organized randomness, neighboring interactions, regulatory constraints, emergent diversity, and distributed control. i would diverge from davis & simmt’s description of a learning community in complexity terms, in particular in the interpretation of two characteristics-decentralized control and neighboring interactions. this is due to the difference in the forms of the communities we describe. davis &simmt (2003) portray the forming of a learning community of pre-service teachers who have organized themselves into study groups, thus forming a network of connected study clusters. none of the teachers were in charge of the collective, any more than one individual may be said to be in charge of an ant colony, the growth of a city, an immune system, or the functions of the brain. these are all decentralized systems, without a central authority. the behavior of any element in the system, and thus the system in general, is influenced by the interactions in the systems, and particularly by communication with the most closely located elements, or by the nearest neighbor interactions. thus, if an ant encounters a high rate of nest-maintenance workers entering and leaving the ant colony, there is a higher probability that it will adopt a nest-maintenance job, and if it encounters ant foragers busy lugging food home, the chances are it will switch to foraging (mitchell, 2009). similarly, in human learning communities learners are greatly influenced by communications with other learners from the same small cluster (davis & simmt, 2003). in comparison, in a community of inquiry every participant is potentially connected to every other, and since all communication has the same range, every communicative intervention is potentially equally influential. also ci might be better understood as a complex system governed by certain communicative meta-rules from the start, where the facilitator is the central communication organizer, the one who enforces those rules. thus the term decentralized control, often used to describe complex systems, does not do justice to the control mechanisms in ci. the facilitator in a ci exercises control procedurally—she may act to regulate the distribution of turns or the length of a speaker’s intervention, call for paraphrasing, summarization or location of the argument, or insist on a group response to an intervention that has been over-ridden by the next speaker. although it may appear that it is the facilitator who is navigating the direction of the group, unilateral navigation is in fact only possible, if at all, in a closed, controlled system, in which the teacher dictates events and meanings, and inhibits any dynamic emergence. her operative goal is in fact to enable as much as possible communicative diversity and clarity, in the interest of acquiring new meanings, and better participation. in fact, we could say that procedural control, because it holds everyone responsible for adhering to the communicative rules, enables a ci to work towards its regulative ideals-—distributed thinking, distributed intelligence, and distributed agency. the term ambiguous control (lushyn & kennedy (2002) indicates that it is neither centralized nor decenanalytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 15 tralized control, but a more complex control mechanism that facilitates the organization of a complex system of communication. in a collective such as ci, each intervention is understood as potentially important, and it is never exactly clear how much and to what extent an intervention might affect the course of the inquiry or its group dynamics. the facilitator may have more perceived authority to steer the group, but other members—those less constrained by the internalized hierarchy of the traditional model—may exercise their distributed authority from the start. this should be welcomed by the facilitator, whose long-term goal is the distribution of power within the system, just as she encourages the emergence of distributed thinking and distributed self-expression. in a more mature ci, the facilitator also strives to distribute procedural authority throughout the group—that is, to promote a system-condition in which all participants, including herself, share in such things as regulating the distribution of turns, calling for summarization or restatement, calling for definitions or examples, encouraging alternative hypotheses, identifying unstated assumptions, and similar activities. neither distributed control nor ambiguous control imply that control is equally distributed or that relationships between the members of the group are symmetrical; nor does it mean that those relationships are of domination or exploitation, although this cannot be guaranteed. non-linearity, asymmetry, power and competition are inevitable to the dynamical nature of complexity, and necessary for maintaining it (cilliers, 1998). if relationships were symmetrical and power was equally distributed throughout, the system would quickly lose energy and stagnate. asymmetry insures shifts in the “weight” of contributions, and in levels and distributions of communicative control and power. ideally, interactions in a community of inquiry are “rich” and interconnected in the sense that every interaction influences and is influenced by others. ci deliberations are nonlinear, in that some interventions are amplified, and have a greater effect than others. this is usually described in complexity theory as the “butterfly effect,” in that small causes can have large effects and vise versa. any member of the group can also intervene and change the direction of the inquiry with new substantive or procedural suggestions. the inquiry itself can shift direction through a series of individual moves within the “conversation plane,” and the conversation can shift “vertically” between inquiry, reflection on the inquiry, and feedback. the interactive dynamics are constantly changing—whether in levels of participation or levels of clarity of the “argument.” this presents a picture very different from the traditional monological, unidirectional model of classroom conversation, in which, when there is interaction, it is most typically between teacher and individual student. complexity thrives on the ambiguous, just-barely-in-control interplay between ci group members, in which the pattern of intervention is recursive—new interventions connect with previous ones and may even appear to repeat them, but their measure of difference opens possibilities for future interventions, thus forming patterns of argument that make of the structure of ci an emergent constellation of interactions. in fact recursion is a primary characteristic of this form of collective dialogue, demonstrated through members’ repetition of utterances, or through paraphrase and summary; recursion is thus associated with redundancy, which assures through repetition that what might not have been well-articulated, or which remains ambiguous, can be communicated again. recursion is a sign of redundancy, which means that there are informational overlaps and alternative communicative routes that insure the system’s flexibility. because the system has a memory, and each event informs consecutive events, the system’s history is not reversible. recursion and redundancy are carried by the feedback loops that are endemic characteristics of complex systems. a negative feedback loop has the function of maintaining the system’s stability through inhibition and stabilization. for example, a negative loop is initiated when the facilitator or another member suppresses, on the grounds that it is not relevant to the current inquiry, an intervention initiated by a group member that has the potential to open a new direction, or promises to change the current group focus. positive feedback introduces more diversity—for example, when a member suggests a new perspective on the issue at hand, thus stimulating reconceptualization or consideration of a new perspective. as a whole, the system operates far-from-equilibrium; equilibrium is in fact “enemy” to the system in that it represents stagnation or actual system-death. as such, the system is fed by a flow of new perspectives, new information, and new meanings. any stability that is achieved is of a dynamic nature, in a communicative zone analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 16 that is between chaos (too many disconnected interventions, to the point that meaning-making is impossible) and stagnation (no new information at all) (kennedy & kennedy, 2010). it is said that complex systems involve an interplay between chaos and non-chaos, and that they operate at “the edge” of chaos (kauffman, 1995; baranger, 2000). all biological and social systems exhibit the two basic characteristics of cooperation and competition. an important insight that comes from a new understanding of living systems is the recognition that networks are basic patterns of their organization, and that a network’s complexity involves an interplay between cooperation and competition (capra 1997; kauffman, 1995). social systems are networks of organisms; organisms are networks of cells, organs and cells are networks of molecules, and they survive because of the intricate coupling between cooperation and competition, where often cooperation on one level underlies competition on another, or the other way around. for example, members of a ci are typically competing for the opportunity to shape the character of the discussion with their own ideas, but do so in the interest of collaborative reconstruction of the concepts in play. ci as a communicative system is always reproducing itself, in a process that has been termed “autopoiesis” (from “auto” self and “poiesis” production) by the biologist and philosopher humberto maturana (varela, maturana & uribe, 1974). along with the production of utterances that constitute judgments, arguments, and sequences of argumentation, there is the autopoiesis of ideas—new meanings that co-evolve with each individual’s thoughts, feelings and expectations. however, all events in the communicative process are discrete and temporal. thus the autopiesis of the communicative system as a whole depends on the ongoing disintegration and reproduction of the materials and the catalysts necessary for the continuation of the process. the autopoietic process constantly increases the complexity in the system, which in order to survive struggles to reduce complexity. out of the necessity for the system to maintain an autopoietic balance in ci, just as among any interconnected elements in any living system, there emerges the necessity for regulatory constraints. constraints are limiting, but are also enabling. for example, selection is a constraint born from the impossibility of connecting every intervention or communicative event to every other one in the course of the communicative process. if there is no selection, then the proliferation of communicative moves and events will amount to chaos in the system. selection is both enabling and constraining for the production of new ideas and meanings, and therefore must steer its way through the complexity of communication. any order in a communicative event emerges through a reduction of complexity and through the selective conditioning of this reduction. without such selections in the communicative process, the ci system would quickly reach incomprehensible complexity. the emerging communicative structure’s self-organizing process is not controlled or predetermined in any way, and is a response to the system’s environment, or context. ashley (1962) points out that each dynamic system generates its own form of self-organization in response to its need for survival and for the management of complexity. only by structuring complexity and imposing constraints can a communication system acquire “internal guidance,” and make self-reproduction possible. this is what ensures the quality and connectivity of the communicative events. in that sense, ci develops an organization (structure) of communication that is in unison with the general ci meta-rules that ensure balancing of weight, distribution and good communication “traffic” of all communication moves, but yet is always unique to the particular system. complexity is fed by the diversity in the system, but as page (2011) notes, it’s not so much the fundamental diversity or the diversity of the members of the group that is important for complexity. rather, what is essential is the emergent diversity in the system, which in ci is manifested at higher levels—that is, in the communicative products of ideas, linguistic expressions, restatements, and summarizations, the recombination of which produces complexity. because the elements of the system are interconnected and adaptable, the system as a whole is self-balancing, analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 17 and although there may be crises and breakdowns, the latter represent—potentially anyway—transitions to a new state of dynamic balance. the autopoietic function finds expression in the idiosyncrasies of the group-as-a-whole and the interactions among its members. notwithstanding its systemic contingency, for any outcome could always be otherwise, ci as a communicative system is quite robust, and its emergent structure relatively stable in time and across contexts. acknowledgment and respect for complexity the modern (traditional) way of encountering complexity has resulted, we have discovered, in reductionism and determinism, and in the attempt for a totality of descriptions, truths, and understandings in an attempt to separate, isolate, analyze, predict, and master. such an approach is equivalent to occupying an epistemological position from which the continuous shifting of relationships in a system are ignored and, in fact, complexity is avoided. an acknowledgement of complexity requires that we take into account our new understanding of complex systems and their main characteristics and behaviors. but “taking into account” such knowledge will require more than just “knowing about it.” dealing with complex systems requires, i suggest “respecting the complexity” of ci , not only in the dictionary sense of “regard” and “admiration” for the wondrous properties and behaviors of complex systems, but also in the etymological sense of constantly “turning round” and “looking at” (from the latin (“raspicere”) the system if we want to understand it better (partridge, 1966). what i have tried to provide here is a very general description, which does not pertain to the ci model in a scientific sense. any models or descriptions that we create will be flawed, and in ways that we cannot completely determine in order to correct them. on the one hand, each member of the system is ignorant of the behavior of the whole system—-she cannot “contain” or comprehend the complexity of the entire system (cilliers, 1998). nor can any model or description predict or control the behavior of a complex system. this is not to say that we don’t need theory or description; in fact, complexity theory helps us to better understand the dynamics of ci. it also highlights the importance of uncertainty, contingency, local factors, specific context and timing of events. rather than formulating fixed descriptions or models that portray ci as a fixed and rigid system, we might do better to devote ourselves to a process of describing, in the interest of understanding it, a system that is constantly unfolding and becoming. we can identify no predetermined outcome states, but some states are more possible than others. such states occupy a space that stuart kauffman calls the “adjacent possible”—a space of possible other states that are close to the current state of the system. kauffman describes it this way: “the adjacent possible is like a forever expanding house, where passing via a particular door from a room to another room, opens new doors in the adjacent possible which we explore” (kauffman, 2010, para. 14). we cannot grasp the essence of the system in some determinate way, since each description provides a limited view, and portrays some aspect of the system from a specific position inside or outside it, and at a specific point in time. in this sense, the description of the system is also distributed. however, we are bound to “look back or again at,” “regard,” “consider” (respicere, respect) the system constantly, appreciating its complexity; to take different “snapshots” of the system and attempt to make sense of them, acknowledging the fact that they are temporal, local, limited, and unfinished representations, but confident that they can help us to develop an ever-fuller understanding of the phenomenon called community of inquiry. notes 1. the paper was presented at the 2012 conference of the north american association for community of inquiry in vancouver, canada. references ashby, w. r. (1962). principles of the self-organizing system, in h. von foerster and g. w. zopf, jr. (eds.). principles of self-organization: transactions of the university of illinois symposium, pergamon press: london, uk, pp. 255-278. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 18 baranger, m. (2000). chaos, complexity, and entropy: a physics talk for non-physicists, http://www.necsi.edu/projects/ baranger/cce.pdf. capra, f. (1997). the web of life. anchor books. cilliers, p. (1998). complexity and postmodernism. london: routledge. davis, b., & simmt, e. (2003). understanding learning systems: mathematics education and complexity science. journal for research in mathematics education, 34 (2), 137-167. habermas, j. (1990). moral consciousness and communicative action. cambridge, ma: mit press. kennedy, n. & d. kennedy (2010). between chaos and entropy: community of inquiry from a systems perspective. complicity: an international journal of complexity and education, 7, 2. http://ejournals.library.ualberta. ca/index.php/complicity/index kauffman, s. (1995). at home in the universe-the search for laws of self-organization and complexity. oxford university press. kauffman, s. (2010). re-imagining society: are we trapped by old ideas? retrieved from http://www.npr.org/ blogs/13.7/2010/11/01/130976163/ luhmann, n. (1995). social systems. palo alto, ca: stanford university press. lushyn, p. & kennedy, d. (2002). power, manipulation, and control in a community of inquiry. analytic teaching 23, 2: 103-110. mitchell, m. (2009). complexity: a guided tour. new york: oxford university press. page, s. (2011). diversity and complexity. princeton university press. partridge. e. (1966) a short ethymological dictionary of modern english, 4th edition. ny: macmillan publishing. varela, f., maturana, u., & uribe, r. (1974). autopoiesis: the organization of living systems, its characterization and a model. biosystems, 5, 187-196. address correspondences to: nadia stoyanova kennedy stony brook university, ny nadiakennedy@verizon.net analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 41 loving wisdom with dewey and simone weil h. dirk windhorst abstract: this paper attempts to explicate and compare the ideas of john dewey and simone weil on wisdom. it is a conceptual analysis which proceeds on the assumption that cultivating a love of wisdom in a student is a teacher’s highest calling. the comparison is focussed around two main questions: 1) how is wisdom connected to experience from a psychological perspective? 2) how is wisdom connected to the social dimension of experience? why compare john dewey and simone weil on their views of wisdom? it seems that the two major research teams in the modern psychology of wisdom–the berlin wisdom paradigm (baltes & smith, 1990; smith, staudinger, & baltes, 1994; staudinger, 1999; baltes & staudinger, 2000; pasupathi, staudinger & baltes, 2001; baltes, glück & kuntzmann, 2002; staudinger & pasupathi, 2003) and sternberg’s balance theory of wisdom (sternberg, 1990; sternberg, 1998; sternberg, 2001a; sternberg, 2001b; sternberg & lubart, 2001; sternberg, 2003)–share at the heart of their conceptions a pragmatic orientation. the berlin paradigm identifies the domain of wisdom to be the “fundamental pragmatics of life.” at the base of sternberg’s balance theory is practical thinking which is invoked when the problem-solving components of intelligence consider how to respond to a precarious environment. at the heart of this practical base, there is tacit knowledge which can only be learned through experience. the terms “pragmatic,” “practical,” “problem-solving,” “responding to an environment,” and “learning through experience” bring to mind john dewey. if it is true that the berlin and sternberg groups are implicitly1 assuming a deweyan position when they think about wisdom from a psychological point of view, then it might be illuminating to uncover what dewey’s position on wisdom was. little work has been done in articulating dewey’s views on wisdom. two notable exceptions are dewey and eros: wisdom and desire in the art of teaching (garrison, 1997) and eros and the good: wisdom according to nature (gouinlock, 2004). like dewey, both authors eschew transcendent forms of good in considering how humans discover or construct “goods” within the daily joys and struggles of life. gouinlock (2004) borrows much from dewey’s pragmatism in articulating an idea of moral wisdom grounded in nature. wisdom emerges when the pursuit of desired goods is tempered by a realistic acknowledgement of the ways in which nature can assist or limit this pursuit. nevertheless, guoinlock (2004) acknowledges the existence of human cupidity in a way that dewey would resist. it is very likely that dewey would have strongly disagreed with the following assertion: “even with the best of education, sometimes, not much can be done to develop a talented and virtuous human being. nature has made some persons impervious to such instruction” (p. 103). in garrison’s (1997) view, dewey would certainly counter gouinlock’s assertion–no matter how warranted it may seem: a teacher is called to bestow value on such students by using sympathetic moral perception to imagine the possibilities for them in the midst of what might seem like an impossible situation. recounting a case study of a boy who was on the verge of being placed on a remedial track, garrison (1997) applauds the efforts of one teacher who believed in him and successfully fought a system that was ready to label him as somewhat “impervious” to normal classroom instruction. even though this boy was three or four years behind his peers in the ability to read and write, the teacher had perceived a practical intelligence in him that no one else had. the teacher believed that this intelanalytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 42 ligence and interest in practical things needed to be nurtured in the reading and writing workshops of a regular classroom (pp. 178 202). although wisdom and dewey are addressed by both garrison (1997) and gouinlock (2004), neither attempts to elaborate dewey’s concept of wisdom in a direct or systematic way. gouinlock (1997) uses deweyan pragmatism as a platform from which to develop his own theory of wisdom. garrison (1997) comes much closer to articulating dewey’s views on wisdom. nevertheless, he focuses more on uncovering dewey’s philosophy of eros than on explicating his view of wisdom. granted that a case can be made for unearthing john dewey’s concept of wisdom, why bring in simone weil? john dewey’s position needs to be appraised by someone who holds foundational assumptions that he rejected or found problematic. a comparison of two thinkers who seem so opposed to each other can sometimes pull into bold relief ideas that would otherwise remain hidden. a person often experiences this sort of thing in relationships with different people. with one friend, the humorous side is evoked. with another, being serious seems more “natural.” what will weil evoke from dewey? what will dewey bring to light in weil? in addition, when commonalities surprisingly emerge between thinkers who inhabit radically different ontological and epistemological paradigms, the shared conceptions seem more valid, or at least, more plausible.2 john dewey (1859 1952) and simone weil (1909 1943) were philosophers in the original sense: in their writings can be found a genuine love for wisdom. yet, it would be difficult to find two figures in the history of philosophy who would seem more opposed to each other. raised as a secularized jew, weil became a christian platonist who died in relative obscurity at the youthful age of 34. in contrast, dewey slowly and carefully discarded the christianity in which he grew up in tandem with eschewing the absolute idealism of hegel that captivated him as a young man. he established a name for himself by espousing a down-to-earth-yet-thoughtful pragmatism well before he died at the ripe old age of 92. simone weil critiqued the foundations of modernity as it came to expression in her native france and wrote a treatise which envisioned a radically different social order (weil, 1952). john dewey embraced the modern spirit and challenged his fellow americans to build a more democratic society through technological science and educational reform (westbrook, 1991). she was a religious mystic who believed in a “supernatural physics of the soul.” he advocated a “natural piety” that rigorously excluded serious contemplation of anything beyond the natural realm, notwithstanding kestenbaum’s (2002) thesis that dewey allowed the “transcendent” more room in his thought than is generally believed. in fact, kestenbaum unwittingly employs simone weil3 to support his position that dewey was more interested in transcendent values than is generally believed. is kestenbaum reading into dewey a platonism that garrison (1997) would adamantly maintain isn’t there? although kestenbaum (2002) points to a transcendent dimension that weil and dewey might share, there are other grounds on which they could find a basis for discussion. both thinkers adopted a similar approach in pursuit of wisdom: for both, experience was the foundational platform on which they constructed their ideas, and for both, practical action was the criterion for testing the validity of those same ideas. even though dewey was much more explicit in connecting his notion of experience to his ideas of nature (dewey, 1929a), art (1934/1979), and education (1938/1963), weil’s respect for experience is revealed in a statement that enucleates her thought: “faith is the experience that the intelligence is lighted up by love” (weil, 1956, p. 240). dewey echoes this: “that god is love is a more worthy idealization than that the divine is power. since love at its best brings illumination and wisdom, this meaning is as worthy as that the divine is truth” (dewey, 1929a, p. 167). however, for weil, “idealizations” of god were problematic. she shows this in one striking illustration (cayley, 2002): imagine two people who have not experienced god. one is an atheist. the other believes in god. who is closer to god? the atheist is closer, because he doesn’t have a false conception of god which gets in the way. this raises all kinds of questions about how one can properly interpret an experience, but it does demonstrate how fundamental the notion of experience is in her thought. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 43 this paper will analyze and compare john dewey and simone weil on wisdom. it employs a dialectical or back-and-forth method: dewey’s assertions are examined through the eyes of weil, and vice-versa . the comparison attempts to answer two questions: how is wisdom connected to experience from a psychological perspective? how is wisdom connected to the social dimension of experience? how is wisdom connected to experience from a psychological perspective? dewey considered wisdom to be a moral activity that constructed a moral self (dewey, 1922; dewey & tufts, 1932/1989). it had its roots in the habitual transactions that humans forged with their environments. the moral self was a bundle of habits that were continually re-constructed as the self adapted to changing environments or responded to problematic transactions. wisdom was the cord which held the bundle of habits together. wisdom was a meta-habit: a habit of habits. the habit of deliberation developed at the core of wise activity. it meant thinking before doing by rehearsing various courses of action in the mind before deciding on one. it meant learning from mistakes, learning from experience, and re-constructing habits. a teacher with wisdom derived from experience could visualize a classroom activity well enough to anticipate student responses to instructional directions. she could enter a classroom of new students and know how to read the situation, alert to signs of attention or inattention, careful not to jump to conclusions, but also willing to take appropriate action if the situation required it. to act wisely was to think before, during, and after acting–it was the habit of reflective practice, a habit which expressed her moral self-as-a-teacher and, at the same time, modified this same self as it was embodied through action. transactions with events in environments were central to dewey’s conception of the moral self, and of these transactions, the ones connected to other selves–the social dimension of experience–held the most value for “shared experience is the greatest of human goods” (dewey, 1929a, p. 167). for the development of a moral self, the meta-habit of wisdom continually took others into account so that a shared experience–the democratic way of life–would enrich the lives of each one. for weil, it also would be fair to say that the roots of wisdom lay in transactions with an environment. it was difficult, if not impossible, to conceive a self separate from the transactions which defined it. the surrounding conditions were the backdrop that brought a self into relief, and without the environmental backdrop which sustained it, the self would disappear. the transactions were a composite of a self with its environment–each acting on the other (weil, 1987, p. 69). nevertheless, this composite self was divided, craving to be unified, to be whole, to have integrity: i am always a dual being, on the one hand a passive being who is subject to the world, and on the other an active being who has a grasp on it; .... can i not attain perfect wisdom, wisdom in action, that would reunite the two parts of myself? (weil, 1987, p. 78) like dewey, weil saw wisdom developing through action. one’s actions not only revealed the degree to which one possessed wisdom as a force that unified the self–that tied the habits together–these actions created that very self. weil (1987) was emphatic about it: “...my existence as i know it is not a feeling but my creation” ( p. 59). activity which exhibited a grasp on the world might look passive to someone looking from the outside, just as passivity which exhibited the world’s grasp on the self might appear as activity to the same observer. the colloquial term, “acting out,” denotes such a passive state where anarchic desires are given “free” reign. as dewey (1938/1963) made clear, such a person’s conduct is dictated by immediate whim and caprice; that is, at the mercy of impulses into whose formation intelligent judgment has not entered. a person whose conduct is controlled in this way has at most only the illusion of freedom. actually he is directed by forces over which he has no command. (p. 64 65) analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 44 effective action was tempered by thinking which dewey (1922) would translate as “deliberation” or “dramatic rehearsal” or “activity following intra-organic channels” (p. 191). deliberation is a wonderful word to describe how conflicting impulses lost their freedom to go unchecked: they were not liberated but de-liberated. here, scientific thinking–what weil (1987) called “directing one’s reason well”(p.47) – transformed crude impulse into refined action. the result would be what weil called indirect action or work and what dewey called intelligent action. indirect action (work) was the key to changing one’s self for the better: trying to control one’s impulses directly was a recipe for failure–like a dog chasing its own tail. work consisted of directing one’s attention outward, grappling with the surrounding conditions of existence which more or less resisted one’s efforts at control. out of this struggle, the necessary discipline could be furnished to master oneself. dewey could not agree more: we cannot change habit directly: that notion is magic. but we can change it indirectly by modifying conditions, by an intelligent selecting and weighting of the objects which engage attention and which influence the fulfillment of desires. (dewey, 1922, p. 20) in this way, the wisdom of the socratic dictum became concrete: to know oneself was to reveal and to re-fashion oneself through the indirect action of work. so far in our comparison, we could say that dewey’s and weil’s views on wisdom dovetail very well. both of them undertake a psychological journey in their quest for wisdom and both stay with their starting point– the transaction between a self and the environment. however, a slight tension can be detected in the way they conduct their inquiry. written in the third person, human nature and conduct (dewey, 1922) is a more conventional scholarly approach: the investigator appears as a detached observer taking notes on what is happening in the psyche. “science and perception in descartes” (weil, 1987, pp. 31 88) is divided in two sections: the first part is a third-person commentary on descartes; the second part, weil’s own cartesian journey of doubt, is appropriately–given the nature of her task–written in the first person.4 would not dewey have applauded the following statement which seemed so close to his view of science and his theory of education? and so outside of effective action, when the body, in which past perceptions are inscribed, is relieved from the necessity of exploration, human thought is given over to the passions, to the kind of imagination that conjures up gods, to more or less reasonable-sounding arguments received from others. that is why mankind needs science, provided that instead of imposing its proofs it is taught in the way that descartes called analytic, that is, in such a way that each student, following the same order he would follow if he were methodically making discoveries himself, may be said less to receive instruction than to teach himself. (weil, 1987, pp. 85 86) weil not only believed that she was being faithful to the spirit of descartes by undertaking her own journey of self-instruction, but that descartes had demanded such a journey from any reader who wished to understand him: cartesian thought is not something that one can comment on from the outside; every commentator must become, at least for a time, a cartesian. but how does one become a cartesian? to be a cartesian is to doubt everything, and then to examine everything in order; without believing in anything except one’s own thought insofar as it is clear and distinct, and without trusting the authority of anyone, even descartes, in the least. (weil, 1987, p. 54) where is the tension between dewey and weil? none of the foregoing is meant to imply that weil’s first-person journey is superior to dewey’s third-person approach. what attracts us to weil is her impetuosity–her boldness to plunge in with little regard for what her supervisor might think. we think along with her as we are drawn analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 45 vicariously into the water with the swimmer who feels that mixture of pleasure and pain (weil, 1987, pp. 55 56). the determined reader has to work harder to experience the same with dewey, and perhaps the increased effort demanded of the reader provides a greater reward.5 nevertheless, in weil’s account we see more vividly a person struggling with her thinking in a way that makes dewey appear relatively calm. perhaps this simply reflects the difference in their ages–comparing the impetuosity of a twenty-something with the serenity of a sixty-something. or perhaps dewey, like his pragmatist predecessor, c. s. pierce, would question the wisdom of undertaking the cartesian journey of doubt and might wonder if it is truly possible to doubt everything except “one’s own thought insofar as it is clear and distinct.” outside of testing ideas in practical experience, why should one trust or assume that one’s thinking is clear?6 wisdom and the divided self to return to the question: what bearing has the above excursus on discovering an important tension between dewey and weil? dewey’s third-person stance puts him in the position of observing the psyche from the outside. look again at the way he describes deliberation: deliberation means precisely that activity is disintegrated, and that its various elements hold one another up. while none has force enough to become the center of a re-directed activity, or to dominate a course of action, each has enough power to check others from exercising mastery. activity does not cease in order to give way to reflection; activity is turned from execution into intra-organic channels, resulting in dramatic rehearsal. (dewey, 1922, p. 191) the “self” seems to have disappeared. it has no ontological status apart from the pattern of biologically derived impulses holding themselves in check and eventually reorganizing themselves into a new pattern or re-constructed habit where the previously incompatible desires achieve a new harmony. the beginning of wisdom appears in a new and better ordering of desires: temperance is the root of reasonableness, rationality means that the relations among competing desires have been tempered, each relation defined by a new ratio that when combined with other ratios achieve a new harmony which is expressed in effective action. the “self” comes back into view. although dewey lays out in detail how habits are re-constructed through enduring interests, one cannot help feeling that there is something magical and mysterious about how the self reappears after deliberation as a morally stronger bundle of habits. by contrast, weil examines her own thinking from the inside and cannot allow her “self” to disappear because she is more explicitly both spectator and participant. her “self” is a dual being which seeks unity through self-mastery (dewey’s tempered mingling of desires). from weil’s perspective, this unity is effected through a painful struggle where the active part–the being which can effect a grasp on the world through work–seeks to diminish the weight of the passive part in so far as it is subject to the world. implied (but never stated) is weil’s identification of her “true self” with the active part. there is a sense in which dewey both agrees and disagrees with her. yes, the “self” is created in action, but one must be careful that in conceiving the self this way one does not fall into the trap of hypostatization–reifying a concept into a real existent. reminded of his own youthful struggles with absolute idealism, dewey might look kindly at this intense young woman and gently remonstrate her for falling into the “philosophic fallacy” where functional distinctions are mistakenly awarded ontological status. for dewey, the “self” is shorthand for denoting a more-or-less ordered system of processes and impulses. as a naturalist, dewey sees no separate existence of a “self” or a “soul” apart from the biological and chemical activities which define it, just as a beautiful snowflake does not exist apart from the water molecules which together with certain environmental conditions determine the snowflake’s unique pattern. surprisingly, weil (1950/1977b) agrees with him. the soul or its modern counterpart–the person–has no existence independent of the biological and social mechanisms which make it what it is: an organized yet dynamic series of events. yet, she maintains, there is something “sacred” within each analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 46 human being, and it has nothing to do with personality or personhood: at the bottom of the heart of every human being, from earliest infancy until the tomb, there is something that goes on indomitably expecting, in the teeth of all experience of crimes committed, suffered, and witnessed, that good and not evil will be done to him. it is this above all that is sacred in every human being. (p. 315) dewey made a strong case for avoiding the pitfalls of hypostatization when doing scientific or theoretical work. but what about everyday practical living–something that both dewey and weil prized? do we not need to cultivate what laing (1973) called “ontological security” to live with some measure of sanity? does not one need to develop confidence that one is real and that one can relate to others who are experienced as real through acts that demonstrate a faith in oneself? if this is simply a noble lie or a “useful” reification, it loses its functional power as soon as one regards it as such in the warp and woof of daily life. dewey would acknowledge this, but he would add, we can believe in our real existence naturally defined without necessarily believing in a soul or a self existing apart from the dynamic series and organized patterns of events that we call a living body. can a soul exist apart from a body? can form be separated from matter? here we have another footnote to the longstanding debate between two giants of greek philosophy with weil taking plato’s side and dewey reiterating the aristotelian position. wisdom and thinking clearly weil demonstrates a variation of ontological security throughout her cartesian journey. she doubts everything at the outset except one thing–her own thought “insofar as it is clear and distinct” (weil, 1987, p. 54). one is tempted to say that the one part of her self whose reality she will not doubt is her ability to think clearly. but she does not say that, and here she departs from laing (1973) and modern self-actualization theorists: she only trusts clear thoughts. and this is consistent with the way she lived: she would rather have been challenged on the truth of her thoughts than have been complimented on her intellectual ability to formulate those thoughts. the important issue was not whether the thoughts belonged to her as a form of intellectual property, but whether the thoughts were true. for her, clarity was the initial–though not necessarily the final–criterion of truth. clarity impelled her to examine the truth of an idea in the crucible of experience. to use deweyan language: “truth as a positive, achieved thing simply means that use has tested and has approved what was an intellectual, and so problematic affair, and thereby has given it an assured status in further effort” (dewey, 1911/1985b, p. 46). successful deliberation cleared up a problematic situation, but the clarity, elegance, and coherence of the hypothetical solution was not enough to satisfy a pragmatic conception of truth: the act of thinking was not complete until it was tested in practice (dewey, 1910/1985c, pp. 234 241). in this regard, she was zealously deweyan: is marxism a path of liberation for oppressed workers? she involved herself with trade unions to find out. will educating workers help them achieve steps towards liberation? in her spare time from her day job as a high school teacher, she instructed railway workers to examine this notion. why were the communist unions unable to challenge nazism? she visited germany to see for herself. was the soviet union simply another form of oppression for the working class? she tested her hypothesis in a long argument with one of the russian bolsheviks, leon trotsky.7 convinced that the republican militia were fighting for spain’s “famished peasants against landed proprietors and their clerical supporters” (weil, 1938/1977c, p. 75), she joined up and soon discovered how the justice of one’s cause can quickly be obscured in war by cowardice, cruelty, and wanton disregard for the value of human life: “people get carried away by a sort of intoxication which is irresistible without a fortitude of soul which i am bound to consider exceptional since i have met with it nowhere” (p. 77). is manual labour a path to wisdom? she worked in a factory and in a vineyard to experience this for herself. her whole intellectual journey–from before her 1930 student dissertation through to her death thirteen years later–is based on a trust of clear and distinct thoughts that are tested, purified, modified, or discarded in the fire of one’s own experience. by 1942, despite her unshakeable faith in the reality of a realm transcending analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 47 nature–a confidence born of her mystical experiences which she articulated in a christian idiom–she refused to compromise her intellectual scruples by accepting baptism in the catholic church. in fact, far from being threatened by religious superstition, her early confidence in clear thinking was somehow connected to her developing view of supernatural truth. weil (1950/1959) believed “that one can never wrestle enough with god if one does so out of pure regard for the truth” (p. 36). thinking clearly–the active part of the self–operated through a conduit to the environment, what dewey called the transaction and what weil (1987) called the imagination, “this knot of action and reaction that attaches me to the world” (p. 70). on closer examination, two types of thoughts can be distinguished in the imagination: a) those which impose themselves and are fused with impulse, feeling or emotion–a pang of hunger, a painful injury, a friend’s rebuke; and b) those which do not impose themselves but require work to make themselves apparent and clear–knowing how to swing an axe with grace and power, knowing how to write a line of poetry, understanding a theorem in geometry.8 weil (1987) concluded: if i try to discover how much trust should be put in the thought harbored by the imagination, i find that the clear ideas alone do not represent the encroachment of the world on me, since they are made present to me only by an act of my own attention. (p. 72) developing the ability to pay attention increasingly became her preferred method of discerning clear ideas– whether such thought was provoked by the imposition of a problem or whether the thing attended to was contemplated as an object of beauty. for dewey (1929a), thinking and knowing were, strictly speaking, associated more with problem-solving and productive action than they were with contemplation (pp. 269 270; 289 290). unlike dewey, weil rejected the view that thinking could be explained as a natural product issuing forth from a progressively sophisticated pattern of material forces. following plato’s teaching in conjunction with the scientific conception of entropy, weil (1943/1962b) maintained that “the imperfect cannot give rise to the perfect or the less good to the better” (p. 44).9 regardless, weil (1955/1958) believed that the connection between thought and action would remain an unfathomable mystery despite advances in neuroscience or physiological psychology: “the extreme complexity of vital phenomena can perhaps be progressively unravelled, at any rate to a certain extent; but the immediate relationship linking our thoughts to our movements will always remain wrapped in impenetrable obscurity” (p. 89). it is difficult to understand how she can be so sure. dewey might counter that her bold assertion is based on a false, ontological dichotomy between thinking and acting. if one asserts, as he did, that thinking is acting turned inwards, then the problem disappears. to sum up the comparison so far: dewey and weil substantially agree on what wisdom is from a psychological point of view. they locate its genesis in the transaction between a self and its environment. wisdom begins to take root in mindful work–when activity is diverted from immediate outward expression through inward deliberation towards mediated, indirect action. for both, the test of experience is essential in verifying or modifying ideas and developing wisdom. however, a fissure seems to appear in their respective positions when we examine their views of the moral self. from her first-person perspective, weil experiences a binary tension within the transaction where the self and its environment are linked in a wrestling match: her active self seeks to increase its grasp on the environment while her passive self allows the environment to encroach. impelled by a desire to achieve mastery of herself–the active part overcoming the passive part–weil discovers that clear thoughts (the only thing she trusts at the outset) are secured through the active work of attention. from his third-person perspective, dewey describes a plurality of tensions among competing desires which hold each other up in deliberation as old habits are disrupted. thinking is employed to find a way to unite the desires around enduring interests in order to forge a better transaction with the environment, i.e. a new habit is constructed out of the remnants of the old one. the widening fissure can be postulated as follows: dewey loves experiential wisdom inasmuch as it creates a self that grows progressively stronger and richer from a moral point of view. weil analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 48 loves experiential wisdom inasmuch as it reveals clear thoughts that act as stepping stones on the way to truth. to dewey, weil is dangerously close to committing the philosophic fallacy, a form of self-delusion that seeks to vouchsafe the hard-won insights of experience by inventing a realm called “transcendent.” is she not holding on to “either/or” thinking–that ancient dualism that kept mind and matter ontologically separate? to weil, dewey may be guilty of “lowering the sights” of philosophy by aiming at personal growth and social usefulness at the expense of a commitment to truth. how is wisdom connected to the social dimension of experience? both dewey and weil would agree that humans are unavoidably social beings, and that the wisdom of moral deliberation entails taking into account connections that bind a self to others. dewey finds meaning through making connections, and the more connections that are ascertained in deliberation, the more meaningful a chosen activity becomes, no matter how mundane that activity may seem at first glance. for dewey and tufts (1932/1989), the social dimension understood in a democratic sense is the criterion that distinguishes fleeting pleasure from enduring happiness: “harmony and readiness to expand into union with other values is a mark of happiness. isolation and liability to conflict and interference are marks of those states which are exhausted in being pleasurable” (p. 199). dewey’s (1927/1954) democratic idea was the meta-habit of wisdom socially transposed: it bound individuals and groups together without strangling them. more than being simply the social corollary of the moral self, the unavoidable web of social connections were necessary to the very construction of that moral self: ...a good citizen finds his conduct as a member of a political group enriching and enriched by his participation in family life, industry, scientific and artistic associations. this is a free give-andtake; fullness of integrated personality is therefore possible of achievement, since the pulls and responses of different groups reinforce one another and their values accord. (p. 148) the individual was not only circumscribed by the groups to which she belonged, she was to a great degree defined by them. each group had a share in making the self what it was. both dewey and weil believed that wise deliberation kept the social dimension constantly in view. weil followed marx in emphasizing that society was the fundamental human fact. although she debunked the marxist formula that “social existence determines consciousness,”10 she appreciated his attempt to analyze the relationships of force in reference to human society in the manner of a physicist who analyzed these relationships in reference to inert matter. she took marx’s position and re-framed it in a way that kept the relationships of social forces intact while maintaining that humans understood as individuals were relatively free: men are not the impotent playthings of fate; they are eminently active beings; but their activity is at each moment limited by the structure of the society which they form among themselves, and only modifies that structure in its turn by a ricochet, once it has modified the relations between them and nature. the social structure can never be modified except indirectly. (weil, 1955/1958, p. 149) the structure of society, like the structure of the moral self, could only be transformed indirectly through work, which from a social perspective meant conjoint activity channeled through the means of production. amish mennonites understand this: to conserve their social structure which is constructed around the value of manual labour, they resist technological change. whoever owned the means of production was not the decisive issue. altering the means of production was the key to real social change, even though the issue of ownership was inextricably linked to it. if this is true, then education could only effect dewey’s hoped-for social transformation if it was aimed at equipping students with the ability and the desire to comprehend technology, i.e. clearly analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 49 understanding how humans interact with human and non-human nature through productive work and intelligently changing that interaction based on a knowledge of foreseeable consequences. no wonder that dewey’s laboratory school had occupations at the core of its curriculum. the ever expanding patterns of relationships that working individuals formed around the means of production, patterns that became increasingly complex through specialization and division of labour, crystallized into powerful social mechanisms that could be as blind and as dangerous as any force of nature. ironically, unruly nature, seemingly domesticated through collective human action, reappeared within the social structure with all the oppressive power of an arbitrary deity.11 how could it be mastered? weil (1955/1958) answered: ... to gain mastery over it means to subject it to the human mind, that is to the individual. in the subordination of society to the individual lies the definition of true democracy and that of socialism as well. (p. 20) ... the only hope of socialism resides in those who have already brought about in themselves, as far as is possible in the society of today, that union between manual and intellectual labour which characterizes the society we are aiming at. (p. 23) this union between manual and intellectual labour had to begin at a very young age in a school system where abstract thinking was grounded and tested in concrete experience. weil (1942, 1977b) was beginning to envision the laboratory school which dewey had begun at the university of chicago forty years earlier: [the school] must be conceived in an entirely new way, that it may shape men [sic] capable of understanding the total aspects of the work in which they will be taking part. not that the level of theoretic studies must be lowered; rather, the contrary. more should be done to excite intelligence to wakefulness, but at the same time teaching must itself become more concrete. (weil, 1942/1977a, p. 71) nevertheless, weil was much more wary of the social dimension than dewey. this was part of the reason she never joined the communist party or the catholic church: “as soon as a party finds itself cemented not only by the coordination of activities, but also by unity of doctrine, it becomes impossible for a good militant to think otherwise than in the manner of a slave” (pp. 30 -31). like dewey, she saw how a community of relatively free individuals could be become unthinking cogs in a collective machine. nevertheless, her notion of freedom was not the romantic ideal of rugged individualism so often celebrated in american westerns. all that an individual owned–even her sense of worth, her self-esteem–was derived from the social element. weil’s experience as an anonymous factory worker removed all doubt on that score. yet, there was one thing that an individual could do which a collectivity never could. an individual could think. weil (1950/1977b) described it in stark terms: “a collectivity is much stronger than a single man; but every collectivity depends for its existence upon operations, of which simple addition is the elementary example, which can only be performed by a mind in a state of solitude” (p. 320). by solitude, she did not mean physical isolation from others, although this may be necessary from time to time. she was merely pointing out that when thinking clearly and effectively, a person had to focus on an issue or problem without being intimidated by the presence of others or what others might think. since calculating machines have taken over many of these “simple operations” and computers are able to process information in speed and quantity in ways that literally boggles the best of human minds, one wonders whether a collectivity has the potential to be exponentially more powerful than even weil could imagine. this raises a number of related questions: could a society exist without depending on human minds performing operations in solitude? in theory, is there anything about human reasoning that could not be duplicated by a machine? and if such a dimension of reasoning could be shown to exist, would it be considered essential for maintaining or improving a social order? or, alternatively, would it be considered a threat to that order? if not, would there be any use or purpose for a uniquely human form of thinking? weil’s (1955/1958) criterion for measuring freedom and democracy in a society was the extent to which the patterns of relationships among individuals could be understood by each thinking individual: analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 50 thus, if we wish to form, in a purely theoretical way, the conception of a society in which collective life would be subject to men as individuals instead of subjecting them to itself, we must visualize a form of material existence wherein only efforts exclusively directed by a clear intelligence would take place, which would imply that each worker himself had to control, without referring to any external rule, not only the adaptation of his efforts to the piece of work to be produced, but also their coordination with the efforts of all other members of the collectivity. (pp. 98 99) is this not a clear statement of the democratic ideal which dewey prized? in the need for roots, weil’s (1949/1952) blueprint for a democratic society was built on a startling assumption that challenged the principles of the french revolution: rights were a social phenomenon and existed only when obligations were exercised by humans toward each other. hence, obligations were prior to rights: a right is not effectual by itself, but only in relation to the obligation to which it corresponds, the effective exercise of a right springing not from the individual who possesses it, but from other men who consider themselves as being under a certain obligation toward him. (p. 3) for the christian platonist weil, keeping an obligation was a duty whose roots lay in a supernatural realm beyond the immediate and changing context of a specific situation. however, when an obligation was exercised and made its appearance as a right, it had to take into account particular social conditions. in the following illustration, i draw an analogy from something that weil, following the ancient greeks, considered precious and is hinted at by dewey in his study of deliberation: the mathematical idea of ratio and proportion. rights in different situations and contexts can appear analogous to different ratios that are nevertheless equivalent: 2 to 4, 3 to 6, 4 to 8, etc. when the obligation, 1 to 2, needs to be constructed as a right in a particular situation where the prevailing conditions provide 32 as the first term, then the conditions more amenable to modification must be manipulated in such a way that 64 as the second term may appear. there is a sense in which dewey (1929b) echoed this idea: if certain ideals or values were to be secured in social life, one had to understand how the conditions of existence supported or hindered their existence. by modifying these conditions through the experimental methods of modern science, dewey was very hopeful that the moral traits found in nature could be as firmly established in the social sphere as mechanical, electrical, and atomic forces had been harnessed in the physical sphere. of course, in dewey’s metaphysics, these moral traits had no root in a supernatural realm– they were completely natural. and obligations were conditional; any sense of “owing” or “duty” was predicated on what one judged to be a worthwhile value. by the same token, these judgments were never final: they were hypotheses that guided inquiry into the objective conditions that could or could not support the existence of the chosen value. by being tested in action, hypotheses were open to ongoing modification. if any obligation had unconditional status in dewey’s system, it was the one owed to using and constantly improving the methods of experimental science. weil might respond to dewey by citing nietzsche: if the supernatural is a human construction, how could the idea of equality as a foundation for human rights and democracy survive, since nature produced beings unequal in strength and intelligence? ironically, nietzsche could not help inventing his own version of the supernatural on which to pin his hopes–the ubermensch. even heroic atheism had to have larger-than-life heroes. for weil, the fact that humans could not help constructing ersatz forms of the supernatural (idols), was an indirect proof for its reality. real hunger expresses a need for real food.12 idols, however, could not deliver the justice, equality, and liberty which humans craved. quite the contrary, they enslaved and oppressed them. ersatz forms of the supernatural were social constructions that derived their power from energy derived from collective ties. hitler understood this. organized religion more or less succumbed to it. this is why weil was so wary of the social element, and why she took great pains to construct an ideal society that was based on the needs of individuals rather than vice-versa. nevertheless, the social element was an unavoidable necessity for human analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 51 beings. hence, weil (1949/1952) argued, “we owe our respect to a collectivity, of whatever kind–country, family, or any other–not for itself, but because it is food for a certain number of human souls” (p. 7). to sum up the comparison regarding wisdom and the social dimension of experience: dewey and weil agreed that wisdom involved taking into account how humans could best live together in community. both of them formulated a substantially similar democratic ideal that functioned as an end-in-view for the type of society each wanted to help build. dewey used the criterion of openness to wider connections–the possibility of further growth–in distinguishing a moral community from one which was less moral. for example, a band of robbers was by definition limited in its potential for wider connections with individuals and groups who were not involved in crime. weil, on the other hand, used the criterion of individual needs to distinguish a relatively free society from a relatively oppressive one. both dewey and weil valued intelligent conjoint activity. just as a moral self was created indirectly through work, so a moral social structure developed indirectly via conjoint activity through the means of production. however, weil emphasized that thinking could only be done by individuals not by associations. dewey and weil agreed that the substance of thought was largely a social construction, but weil maintained that only an individual with an unyielding commitment to truth would be able to think about the relationships of force in society with any degree of clarity. nevertheless, both of them wanted to reconnect intellectual with physical labour, and both saw that the best way to achieve this was through a radical reform of education. dewey and weil saw shared experience as an unqualified good. however, weil believed that the only foundation for a democratic and free society were rights effectively exercised through the recognition of obligations that were rooted in a realm beyond nature. dewey, of course, would wonder why weil would need to posit a realm beyond nature to establish a foundation for the type of morality that undergirded democracy. since moral traits appear in experience alongside amoral forces–or as weil put it, human beings crave for justice while being subjected to force–dewey (1929) deduced that moral traits “may also be supposed to reach down into nature, and to testify to something that belongs to nature as truly as does the mechanical structure attributed to it in physical science” (p. 5). in all construction projects–whether material or intellectual–the building blocks are provided by nature, and human beings, who are thoroughly part of nature, endeavour to secure these blocks in full knowledge that there are no guarantees. there are no certainties in the mixture of stability and contingency that humans experience in their transactions with nature. just as a tsunami can devastate the lives of millions, so a tyrannical force can destroy a stable democracy. however, humans committed to democratic ideals will resist this force, just as those humans who care for others in misfortune will come to the aid of tsunami victims. the moral traits found in nature are the only source for fashioning the foundational blocks of a democratic form of life. we have no omnipotent, supernatural ally to help us build the good society–we are on our own. how open would weil be to the possibility that what she calls “supernatural” may simply be what dewey calls the moral traits found in nature? could the argument be resolved by an appeal to semantics? could they possibly be using different words to describe the same phenomenon? this appears to be the case when we examine weil’s (1949/1952) argument against a dualism which asserted that force was sovereign in the natural world but that somehow human beings who are part of nature could have a conception of justice that was not itself subject to force: “either we must perceive at work in the universe, alongside force, a principle of a different kind, or else we must recognize force as being the unique and sovereign ruler over human relations also” (p. 241). could we not translate this into deweyan language? is not this “principle of a different kind” the same conception as dewey’s “moral traits” which are as much a part of nature as the mechanical forces studied by a physicist? it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine these questions in any detail. suffice it to say that for dewey wisdom was connected to nature through the moral striving of the human part of nature. it came into existence as humans modified actual conditions towards ideal ends which themselves were suggested by natural situations previously experienced. the wisdom of human action took into account the generic traits of nature (stability analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 52 and contingency) to which it was always subject even as it sought to manipulate these traits in creating a better life for all. for weil, wisdom was connected to nature in a double relation. nature was subject to a divine wisdom even as human wisdom was subject to nature. human modification of actual conditions was not a one way street: both human actions which changed natural environments and human joys and sufferings given or inflicted by nature were tempered and enlightened by a divine love–a wise persuasion–which was communicated to those who ardently desired it and who were willing to wait patiently and attentively for it. finally, weil not only believed that nature was subject to a divine wisdom, but that a democratic society would only thrive if it was watered by supernatural springs. dewey could not see how one could move outside nature or experience and believed that any attempt to do so would stunt the growth of wisdom. wisdom could only be nourished by natural rivers–even if one named some of them “god” (dewey, 1934/1960, p. 51). notes 1. except for one brief citation by birren and svensson (2005, pp. 12 13), dewey is nowhere to be found in any of the reference lists of those who are researching wisdom as a psychological construct. 2. fishman (2007) found this to be the case in comparing a non-theist (john dewey) with a theist (gabriel mar fishman (2007) found this to be the case in comparing a non-theist (john dewey) with a theist (gabriel marcel) on their views on hope. similarly, when comparing a pragmatist (dewey) with someone who was very critical of pragmatism (george grant), windhorst (1995) was astonished to discover that their philosophical conceptions of technology were virtually identical. 3. actually, kestenbaum (2002, pp. 17 18; pp 32 -33) uses iris murdoch to bolster his argument. i do not know if he is aware of it, but murdoch was deeply influenced by weil and acknowledged her debt, especially to weil’s concept of attention which kestenbaum uses second hand. see murdoch (1985, pp. 34, 40, 50, 104). 4. “science and perception in descartes” was written by weil when she was a student at the école normale supérieure in 1930. writing a short dissertation was one of the requirements for graduation. weil rarely (if ever) consulted her supervisor. he disagreed with her reading of descartes and gave her the lowest possible passing mark (mclellan, 1990, p. 29). lest the reader think that she lacked the ability to do good scholarly work, it should be pointed out that in the entrance examinations for this elite school two women had the highest scores: simone de beauvoir placed second, and simone weil was first. 5. not everyone would agree. for egan (2002), untangling deweyan syntax is not worth the effort. he considers dewey to be a mere plagiarist of herbert spencer. 6. “we cannot begin with complete doubt. we must begin with all the prejudices...we actually have....a person may...find reason to doubt what he began by believing; but in this case he doubts because he has a positive reason for it, and not on account of the cartesian maxim” (pierce cited in dipert, 1999, ¶ 11). since we begin our lives believing the ideas given to us by our parents, care-givers, teachers, and other authorities, there is no practical reason to doubt an idea until it is found to be false or problematic in an actual, specific situation in which the idea is put to a test. weil’s cartesian journey of doubt can be interpreted as a series of thought experiments or tests performed through reflecting on her own accumulated experience, but unlike descartes, she sees no need to base the clarity of her thoughts on the existence of god. 7. see pétrement (1976) for a description of weil’s activities in this regard. 8. except for the example drawn from mathematics, the illustrations presented here for both types of thoughts are mine not weil’s. the three examples of thoughts that require work correspond to categories of learning outcomes drawn from posner and rudnitsky (2001): respectively, they are psychomotor-perceptual skills, cognitive skills, and cognitive understandings. 9. weil might reason analogically as follows: a perfect triangle exists nowhere yet we refer to it in our minds when we attempt to draw one. if we used a less than perfect triangle as our referent, our drawing would be even less perfect. she translates this to the realm of human morality as follows: “it is only the thought of perfection that produces any good–and this good is imperfect. if one aims at imperfect good, ones does evil” analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 53 (weil, 1950/1970, p. 342). but where does this thought of perfection originate? weil distinguished between plural goods embodied in existence and the good beyond being. following plato, she believed that existent goods derived their “goodness” from transcendent good. plural goods existed on the same plane as, and were opposed to, plural evils. the good transcended the good/evil opposition. it had no opposite (weil, 1956, pp. 592 593). it was her contention that if one oriented one’s attention and desire to the good beyond being, then and only then, would existent goods be strengthened and non-existent goods come into being. if one oriented one’s attention and desire wholly to existent goods, then these goods would degrade and evil would increase. to use deweyan language, this hypothesis required a proper test, but what would constitute a proper test outside of employing weil’s method of paying attention? 10. dewey (1929), who asserted that mind was “a function of social interactions” (p. xvii) would probably agree with her refutation of marx: “seeing that what is ‘social’ can have an existence only in human minds, ‘social existence’ is itself already consciousness; it cannot in addition determine a consciousness which would in any case remain to be defined. to posit in this way a ‘social existence’ as a special determining factor divorced from our consciousness, hidden no one knows where, is to make a hypostasis of it; and it constitutes, furthermore, a beautiful example of marx’s tendency towards dualism” (weil, 1955/1958, pp. 133 134). 11. see crozier (1964) for a brilliant analysis of how modern bureaucratic structures imprison and warp human intention and behaviour. however much it may appear as perfectly rational in an organizational flow chart, the phenomenon of bureaucracy often belies the intentions of those who “run” it and is often experienced as a pitiless and indifferent machine by those who inhabit it. 12. strictly speaking, the existence of hunger does not necessarily prove the existence of food, even though 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(original work published 1952 1955) weil, s. (1958). oppression and liberty (a. wills & j. petrie, trans.). london: routledge & kegan paul. (original work published 1955) weil, s. (1959). waiting on god (e. crauford, trans.). london: fontana. (original work published 1950). weil, s. (1962b). the romanesque renaissance (r. rees, trans.). in s. weil, selected essays, 1934 1943 (pp. 44 54). london: oxford university press. (original article published 1943) weil, s. (1970). first and last notebooks (r. rees, trans.). london: oxford university press. (last notebooks first analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 55 published 1950) weil, s. (1977a). factory work (f. giovanelli, trans.). in g. panichas (ed.), the simone weil reader (pp. 53 72). new york: david mckay. (original article published 1942) weil, s. (1977b). human personality (r. rees, trans.). in g. panichas (ed.), the simone weil reader (pp. 313 339). new york: david mckay. (original article published 1950) weil, s. (1977c). letter to georges bernados (r. rees, trans.). in g. panichas (ed.), the simone weil reader (pp. 313 339). new york: david mckay. (original letter written 1938) weil, s. (1987). formative writings, 1929 1941 (d.t. mcfarland & w. van ness, trans.). amherst, ma: university of massachusetts press. westbrook, r. b. (1991). john dewey and american democracy. ithaca, ny: cornell university press. windhorst, h. d. (1995). is technology a threat to education? the contribution of george parkin grant. unpublished master’s thesis, brock university, st. catharines, ontario, canada. address correspondences to: h. dirk windhorst department of education redeemer university college ancaster, ontario, canada dwindhorst@redeemer.ca analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 2 68 the place of ‘philosophy’ in preparing teachers to teach pre-college philosophy—notes for a conversation wendy c. turgeon many teachers who encounter the idea of philosophy for and with children are engaged by the concepts of community, dialogue, questioning, and lived learning. in many cases they discover the idea of “doing philosophy for children” from a book, website, newspaper articles, or attending a workshop. these educators are well skilled in teaching and working with children. they understand the perspectives and needs of their children and young adults; they are versed in cooperative learning and integrative teaching which stress the importance of involving students in reflective inquiry. teachers perceive themselves to be good listeners and facilitators of children’s learning and philosophy seems like a natural extension of this relational model of education. in many of these ideas they are correct. however, what many teachers do lack is sustained training in and appreciation for philosophic inquiry and this often derails their good intentions. firstly we note that philosophy is not a required subject in many us colleges for any major. those in teacher training programs often find their schedules so tightly packed that the luxury of exploring disciplines that do not directly connect to teacher certification is unavailable to them. for those who do take philosophy courses they are usually peripheral to their focused education studies and are often part of a general education core taken early on in their undergraduate career. while many teacher candidates are asked to write their own “philosophy of education” this usually takes the form of a declaration of dedication to children and closely aligns itself with the state education department certification requirements. teachers abroad who have studied philosophy as part of their high school or teacher training program consider it to be a matter of recognizing the great philosophers and mastering their theories. teaching philosophy means instructing students in the history of ideas. in some cases interested teachers can participate in a workshop, such as those sponsored by the iapc, the northwest center for philosophy for children and other centers around the country; these workshops can help them become more familiar with this way of parsing human experience. teachers who have participated in such workshops often return to their schools as “experts” in p4c and are given the task of training other teachers in philosophic inquiry. however, with just a workshop acquaintance, they either present a version of p4c which heavily resembles whole language or literary analysis or they simply equate it with cooperative and discussionbased learning. since many teachers consider themselves already well-versed in such methodologies, they easily dismiss the need to see the program as requiring careful and sustained apprenticeship in philosophical theory and methodology. in the united states, there is a general belief that philosophy simply means the having of opinions and beliefs and everyone has plenty of those. philosophy is an activity that we all can do naturally (more about this notion in a minute). these points help to explain how philosophy can start off strong in a school and then disappear. the teachers become disenchanted as it seems to lead nowhere and even the most enthusiastic lose their steam. administrators and parents start to challenge the value of a subject that “bakes no bread.” what has happened? i would propose that when endeavors like philosophy with/for children fail it is often because of the dissipation of the philosophical component in the hands of ill-prepared but willing teachers. consequently the following questions analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 2 69 arise: what constitutes training in philosophy?• what are some of the common problems encountered by teachers in implementing philosophy with • children? how can we help a teacher come to a deep and sustained understanding of the nature of philosophical • questions? how can we assist these prepared teachers in an on-going way so as to best support them in their contin-• ued growth as facilitators of philosophic dialogue? let us explore each of the above issues. i. the dilemma of teacher education in philosophy while there are many models of philosophical training, i would like to focus on the most sustained and well developed one. there are isolated texts available which introduce the idea of philosophy with children and young people and celebrate its enriching power but without a clear pedagogical path, these can serve as inspiration but can ultimately fail a teacher in the classroom environment.1 if we take the iapc lipman model as a paradigm of one of the more sustained methodologies, we find at the heart of the p4c curriculum the materials and the classroom teacher. the program reaches from preschool through high school and focuses on building a community of inquiry that addresses problematic questions emerging from the students’ reaction to a text. the program is designed for implementation by a teacher within his/her regular classroom. as preparation, a series of workshops is deemed essential. run by well-prepared teacher-educators, these workshops guide the teachers through the content and methodology of the program. however, is this enough? traditionally, professional philosophers have been trained extensively with a careful reading and analysis of the historical philosophical texts—primary documents and commentaries. they tackle the problems in the recognized areas of philosophy such as epistemology, metaphysics, logic, politics, aesthetics, ethics, etc. and often they apprentice within a particular philosophic tradition that uses its favored methodology to view and critique all other approaches and ideas. professional philosophers have often majored in philosophy in their undergraduate studies and gone on to complete extensive graduate work at the masters or doctorate level as well as ongoing self education during and afterwards. with much of the literature that discusses philosophy with youth there is little reference to any version of such a sustained study of philosophic issues. philosophy is deemed a natural human activity to the point of being viewed as instinctive. this unfortunately is often the view proposed by well-meaning proponents of philosophy with children. to properly prepare the classroom teacher to engage her students in philosophic reflection it is a disservice to overemphasize the naturalness of the philosophic perspective. the writings of gareth matthews may be easily mis-interpreted to suggest that children are naturally philosophic to the point that we need do nothing to encourage, promote or develop such inclinations. in such a reading, our job is to get out of the way of innate curiosity and philosophic proficiency. by extension, it might be assumed that the adult need only re-discover one’s “inner child” to find a full-blown philosopher waiting to spring out and function in a thoughtful and critical manner. of course, gareth matthews is not arguing this point and indeed, it is most unhelpful and confusing to both teacher and students to operate under these assumptions. the prevalence of fallacious reasoning in every analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 2 70 corner of the world bears out a genuine need for training in thinking skills. but initial enthusiasm can lead us in this direction and we must be cautious about over assessing the presence of philosophical inquiry in children and ourselves. “my philosophy of –whatever” is a common enough phrase that we tend to see philosophy as nothing but an open and enthusiastic expression of beliefs. “what i like about philosophy is that there are no right or wrong answers,” i often hear. the failure to prepare teachers to some level of basic competence in philosophy as a technical craft thereby runs the risk of losing the philosophic perspective and can ultimately result in the teacher’s loss of interest and focus in using the particular materials designed for this educational experience. when teachers abandon the lipman novels, for example, in favor of using regular literature it is often a reflection of an inability to recognize and sustain philosophic dialogue as much as it might be a dissatisfaction with the literary qualities of these novel/texts. the teacher thus reverts to familiar material, literature or topical issues from the news, and the discussions evolve into lively literary analyses or free wheeling opinion-sharing; captivating and vital though they be, such debates can be impoverished of philosophic astuteness. (please note the qualifiers here: “often”, “can”— there are, of course, exceptions and literature as well as news can function quite well as a catalyst for philosophic discussion.) however, it would be impractical to insist that the teacher return to college to earn an undergraduate major or complete a graduate level program in philosophical history or problems before they are prepared to work in teaching philosophy in the pre-college classroom. such expectations would be quite discouraging to the typical classroom teacher and would clearly lessen the appeal of any philosophy and children program. practically speaking, teachers and administrators are loath to commit to any program that requires an extended preparation since it is assumed that one’s teacher training equips the teacher to work with any and all curricula and students. teachers themselves quickly realize that the teacher certification process touches but the tip of the educational iceberg and are usually strong advocates of on-the-job learning. so both teachers and administrators are reluctant to support the idea of a formal program which might require that they learn an entire new discipline or way of teaching. this presents something of a quandary for the dedicated p4c educator. specifically: with how much philosophy must an educator be familiar to initiate or support an authentic philosophic inquiry in the classroom? how much background knowledge, practice and on-going mentoring is necessary and practical? until philosophy is recognized as a legitimate elementary or secondary level subject area for teaching training, it is unlikely to find many teachers who have extensive undergraduate experience, much less any graduate study. however, the egalitarian nature of lipman’s program and some other recent writers on philosophy for children and young people that de-emphasize a role for sustained and deep learning of the discipline may be self defeating. perhaps we have been too dismissive of the nature of philosophy as a discipline requiring such sustained training and experience? ii. some common problems that teachers encounter in introducing philosophy to their students many teachers express confusion over distinguishing philosophy from garden-variety opinion and areas of human knowledge that are open to uncertainty. teachers are often puzzled about what makes a topic a “philosophic” one instead of, for example, scientific. exposure to and practice with philosophic questions will help them develop their “philosophic ear” but it is also helpful to directly address these distinctions. while it might seem easy to depict science as dealing with observable facts and philosophy as with unobservable concepts, it is not quite so simple. at the cutting age of science, theories struggle with other theories and philosophical thinking and science intertwine. which questions can in principle be settled by scientific method and which ones cannot? this might serve as a beginning foundational lightning rod. ethical discussions often become an exchange of legal fact checks or sociological descriptions of beliefs and practices. learning to distinguish analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 2 71 descriptive from prescriptive claims and the various types of prescription (legal, prudential, ethical) is a needed skill to acquire. when it comes to religion, teachers are even more confused and reluctant to engage their (public school) students in such discussions. this is a difficult area: philosophical considerations of god and religion are not simply historical reviews, not are they theological foundations of beliefs. but such subtleties can be difficult for the neophyte philosopher. until children have acquired some experience in critical thinking and philosophical distinction making, they might be ill-prepared to approach the topics of god and religion. that is not to discourage or forbid such discussion but rather to recognize that it is fraught with potential misunderstanding and misinterpretation. once children have achieved such tools of inquiry (into their secondary educational level) then it would be appropriate to engage them in such reflections. at the same time, it must be remembered that not all religions or sects see a role for rational thought in comprehending the religious experience. that itself can be open for discussion. at the very least our educational system should be doing more to educate our children on the meaning of religion in its doctrinal senses and its impact on our global community but that is apart from a philosophy of religion. then there is the issue of critical thinking skills. we would like to assume that all teachers have already achieved a high degree of proficiency in thinking skills such as constructing sound and strong arguments, recognizing and avoiding fallacious reasoning, using logical patterns of reasoning in ethically astute ways, etc.. however, we recognize that this is not always the case. familiarity with bloom’s taxonomy, de bono’s thinking skills or piagetian stage theory does not constitute a rigorous and sustained ability to think clearly, compassionately and creatively within a philosophical context. of course, such skill acquisition and practice are on-going projects for all of us. but how might we best introduce or nurture our teachers in the conscious awareness of and focused development of these aspects of thinking? perhaps some version of lipman’s harry stottlemeier’s discovery is crucial as a course in informal logical thinking for the teacher as well as for the student. another text that might be worth perusing is anthony weston’s a rulebook for arguments. catherine mccall argues persuasively for the importance of some formal training and practice in logic in her recent text transforming thinking. in this work she offers numerous examples of conversations with children and young adults and carefully analyzes the quality of the dialogue as philosophical or not, indicating ways in which a teacher might assist his students in developing reasoning skills. teachers could read these transcripts and practice analyzing them against mccall’s standards. the construction of a genuinely philosophical dialogue requires some sense of concept development or articulation and ultimately the conversation must move forward, even if only to reveal further complications and complexities. this is far more difficult to achieve than one can imagine. a lively interchange of ideas is not as such philosophy, nor is a rigorous debate. peter worley, also of the uk, argues for logical rigor in any philosophical dialogue and offers models for teachers to practice and implement in their own classrooms. in philosophy in the classroom (lipman, sharp, oscanyan) and in sharp’s and splitter’s teaching for better thinking there is an excellent discussion on guiding teachers into a better appreciation of the differences among types of inquiry. for example, one of the most difficult challenges for a teacher is using anecdotal examples productively. the tendency is to glory in these personal accounts to illustrate a concept and lose the concept in the process. adults are just as guilty as children here—witness the faculty meeting. the teacher must learn to make a concerted and conscious effort to monitor discussions for such digressions so as to use them productively. this is critical since a successful philosophic discussion must move forward to some degree. that is, a better understanding (albeit, even if “better” here means only more complicated) of the topic must be sought. a self-conscious focus on the nature and role of examples facilitates the development of a conversation into a philosophic inquiry. too often philosophy in pre-college classrooms manifests itself in one of two ways: either is it a sharing of opinions, all equally valued and accepted or it becomes a debate with one side pitted against the other, a blood sport if you will. philosophers such as susan gardner in canada, clinton golding in australia, oscar breneanalytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 2 72 fier in france have all argued persuasively for better training in logic and in the construction of meaningful dialogues. this is far from an easy task. collectively they challenge us to examine what we do with children and young people and encourage us to ask, “yes, but is it philosophy?” iii. what ought models of teacher education in philosophy offer? based on some brief observations of typical pitfalls we could conclude that a solid knowledge base and an active and self-aware use of philosophical tools are necessary for the teacher to be successful in her implementing genuine philosophical inquiry into the classroom. let us begin by proposing the following knowledge and skills base for teachers who wish to engage their children in philosophical inquiry: 1. the ability to recognize philosophic issues and problems and distinguish them from other types of inquiry and meaningfully use materials such as stories, news, anecdotes, dilemmas, philosophical writings in the promotion of philosophical inquiry. 2. the dispositions, skills and techniques needed to assist children in acquiring and developing their critical thinking skills, specifically the developing ability to note logical structures in living dialogue and the skill to assist the children in honing their own thinking techniques. examples might include distinguishing forms of arguments/disagreements and comprehending the epistemology of philosophical inquiry: facts, opinions, theories, ideas. in addition, we want to nurture creative thinking which responds in novel ways to the puzzles at hand. the first requires a cache of ideas and problems that can be recognized as philosophical in the comments and questions of the children. this ties into knowledge of the history of ideas and sensitivity to topical categories but it also references the skill of seeing philosophical issues and questions within the concrete comments and examples of the children and any materials that are being used. the second speaks to the need of methodological techniques to facilitate the sharpening of children’s tools of inquiry and creative response. if we assume that some systematic training is needful and profitable for the teachers, what sources might we recommend? one approach would be to develop a series of self-study guides or “curricula” that teachers could use to assist them in their own learning. there are numerous introductions to philosophy written for undergraduate courses and general reading. such introductions should be well-written, not assume a vast store of knowledge of ideas but also rich and meaningful to adults—the teachers.2 while academic texts abound which function as primary source readers or secondary accounts of historical philosophy, one trade source is jostein gaarder’s sophie’s world. gaarder’s account of the history of philosophy may be deemed sketchy and slanted to some degree but it is easily read and thereby less likely to intimidate someone new to philosophical ideas. it could serve as an excellent and quite engaging introductory platform upon which to build a more sustained and nuanced appreciation of some of the ways in which philosophers parse the world. reading the primary sources is always to be desired and finding beginning to intermediate reading lists of philosophical classics is a fairly easy enterprise. one can also use collections of questions both to promote philosophic dialogue with students and to assist the teacher in developing their “philosophic ear.” finally, news stories, literature, curricula materials can also be plumbed for philosophic dilemmas but may need modeling in order to distill the philosophical potential. roger sutcliff and his associates in the uk have developed a rich array of materials for using these commonly found resources.3 another approach is for colleges to offer teachers a formal survey of philosophers and their ideas. for example, a course dedicated to a survey of western philosophy could provide teachers with a sustained and analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 2 73 guided reading within a community of fellow teachers of the classic works. this might be a fruitful enterprise for colleges to consider—offering courses which teachers can take as non-majors or perhaps developing certificate programs in the discipline of philosophy. this could offer an opportunity to expand a philosophy department’s perspectives beyond the general education course offerings and/or the traditional graduate school preparation models. for example, my college, st. joseph’s college, has a proposal up in the nysed to offer a concentration in philosophy for child study majors. this would prepare elementary teachers directly to work within the discipline of philosophy as part of their educative mission. iv. supporting the teacher in on-going philosophic development once the teacher has had an opportunity to encounter philosophic ideas and issues, they then begin to practice philosophical inquiry within their classes. whether they use formal curricula, such as lipman’s, specially written stories such as those by phil cam, karin murris and others, or self-developed curriculum materials as a springboard, they must begin to lead their children in the development of critical and creative thinking, reflecting on the issues of importance as chosen by the children. together the class forges a community of philosophical inquiry. but what happens then? to what extent can a practicing teacher continue to be successful in implementing a philosophy and children curriculum with the preparation of one or two courses, workshops, self reading or even sustained academic training? what kinds of ongoing development should be encouraged? should further “refresher courses” be stipulated as essential or, at least, recommended as helpful? should we work towards a formal shared certification program for the teaching of philosophy that can offer teachers and their students a greater degree of success in their enterprise? to answer these questions it can be instructive to examine further the patterns of success and failure in the implementation of philosophy and children. we can also analogize the development of a p4c practitioner with the development of practitioners in other fields. what sorts of support are needed to continue to develop as a doctor, engineer, psychologist? what resources should be available and encouraged for the new elementary/ secondary school teacher of philosophy? some possible activities/ideas could include: • school or district wide discussion groups of teachers • on-site philosophers or visiting philosophers who can participate in and comment upon the course of classroom discussion in a helpful, constructive and supportive manner • internet discussion groups devoted to teachers interested in philosophical education • a journal or newsletter of philosophic material designed for teachers • organizations such as the newly formed plato sponsored by the american philosophical association which invites pre-college teachers to become involved as a community as well as to participate in the apa meetings around the country. i would suggest that the successful pre-college philosophy program continue to nurture the development of its teachers as well as its children. the educational world is beginning to accustom itself to the idea of renewing certification or updating skills as a necessary part of teacher maturation and development. such programs do not imply a lack in the teacher but rather echo the need for personal and professional growth in every field. perhaps the philosophical community should begin to formally address this aspect of on-going support systems to assure the quality of the philosophical inquiry by both children and teachers.4 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 2 74 endnotes 1. in recent years more and more of these texts are appearing. see, values education in the schools by mark freakley, gilbert burgh and lyne tilt macsporran (australia: acer, 2008); mariette mccarty, little big minds (new york: tarcher/penguin, 2006); catherine mccall, tranforming thinking (london: routledge, 2009); thomas wartenburg, big ideas for little kids (new york: rowman & littlefield, 2009). 2. two short but quite supportive texts are thomas nagle’s what does it all mean? (new york: oxford university press, 1987) and roger scruton’s an intelligent person’s guide to philosophy (new york: penguin books, 1999). 3. see dialogueworks in the uk-http://www.dialogueworks.co.uk/index.php/home. 4. a version of this paper was read at the apa-eastern division meeting in december 2009. address correspondences to: wendy c. turgeon st. joseph’s college new york e-mail: wturgeon@sjcny.edu analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 68 the place of ‘philosophy’ in preparing teachers to teach pre-college philosophy: a uk perspective patrick j.m. costello in a recent issue of this journal, wendy turgeon (2012) offers what she refers to as ‘notes for a conversation’ about the place of ‘philosophy’ in preparing teachers to teach pre-college philosophy. in this article, i offer a response to her paper’s key arguments from a uk perspective. it is clear to me from reading turgeon’s paper that the american educational context which she describes has much in common with that which pertains in the uk. in britain, trainee teachers and their more experienced colleagues tend to find the idea of undertaking philosophy for and with children appealing because they are actively engaged (or wish to engage) in forms of pedagogy that rely heavily on developing learners’ thinking reasoning and argument skills (costello, 2010a). on the whole, they see it as essential to their role as educators that they should engage children and young people in dialogue; that they should ask questions and explore answers in terms of learners’ ability to provide reasons and evidence for the views they hold; and that they should develop what lipman and his colleagues have referred to as a ‘community of inquiry’ (lipman et al., 1980). in addition, not only do these educators ask questions but they are also keen to encourage those whom they teach to do the same. in this context, when teachers are introduced to philosophy for and with children, it seems like a natural extension of what they are already doing in the classroom. here, as turgeon suggests (p.68), we meet an immediate obstacle: “... what many teachers do lack is sustained training in and appreciation for philosophic inquiry and this often derails their good intentions.” in my view, there are two reasons why this is the case. first, some of the current literature which explores the teaching of philosophy in schools is less than helpful in assisting teachers to develop an understanding of the nature of philosophical thinking, which is a pre-requisite for successful teaching. second, it is sometimes implied that philosophy ‘just happens,’ for example as a result of teachers asking questions. i offer the following example to illustrate this point. in his book teaching happiness and well-being in schools, ian morris (2009), devotes a chapter to the topic ‘philosophy and well-being’. in a section entitled ‘getting started with teaching philosophy’, he makes a number of assertions. these will be examined and commented on in turn. starting children off on philosophy is easy. a philosopher does not have to read every last sentence written by plato or understand every nuance of kant, they simply have to start asking questions. the process is so easy that even a 5 year old can do it, and indeed, there is a lot of successful teaching of philosophy happening in uk primary schools, where children learn to debate and help each other to form good arguments. (p.60) 36 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 69 here we might ask: what evidence does the author offer for his view that “starting children off on philosophy is easy”? while it is certainly true that, in order to develop learners’ philosophical thinking, teachers do not have to read “every last sentence” of plato’s works or “understand every nuance of kant” (as if this were a realistic ambition in any case), simply to start asking questions is no substitute for critical engagement with philosophical literature. indeed a good place to begin is to read introductory texts both on the nature of philosophy, of which there is now an abundance (saunders et al., 2012; finn et al., 2012; arp and watson, 2011) and on the history of the discipline, including its foremost thinkers and key ideas (harwood, 2010; law, 2007; dupré, 2007). the first step is to stimulate questioning with the students and to do that you just need to give them something interesting to look at or do. you would be surprised at how simple the stimulus can be: a pine cone, a box, a photo of a boxing match, a watch – anything. the next step is to ask the students to come up with questions based upon the stimulus. they do need to come up with the right kind of questions though: the more open-ended the better. if you put a clown’s shoe on the table and a student asks the question ‘how do you spell shoe?’, any discussion will be short. but if they ask ‘do clowns feel pain?’ you may have a more open-ended debate. (p.60) while i have no objection to utilising a broad range of stimuli to develop learners’ philosophical thinking, indeed this is an important aspect of the pedagogical approaches associated with philosophy with children, nevertheless the author’s view that “anything” may be used to achieve this goal requires justification. again, this is part of an effort to assure would-be teachers of philosophy that the task facing them is a very simple one. however, it is not. as with any successful teaching, philosophy requires careful planning and preparation, as well as considerable pedagogical dexterity in the classroom. the ‘fixed lesson plan’ approach which student teachers are encouraged to adopt and adhere to at the very beginning of their training is likely to have little success in the philosophy classroom. here effective teaching requires that practitioners should be able to ‘go with the flow’ of the discussions, dialogues and debates that take place and to alter the focus of the lesson as appropriate. having observed a student teacher teaching philosophy to seven-to-eight year olds very successfully for an hour, i asked her in the conversation which took place afterwards how she felt the lesson had gone. she replied: “very well, i think, although i covered hardly anything on my lesson plan. i had to change direction because they [the children] kept coming up with new ideas.” in philosophy, this counts as a successful outcome, because it demonstrates that the student is reflective in terms of what she has tried to achieve and has ended up achieving, and because she has been able to adapt her lesson appropriately to ensure a successful outcome. the pedagogical approach adopted by morris is also questionable. he is at the same time both nondirecting (asking learners to devise questions—he does not appear to want to ask any himself) and narrowly focused (wanting learners to ask “the right kind of questions… the more open-ended the better.” again we are not given a rationale as to why open-ended questions are to be preferred: this is just assumed to be the case. to his credit, the second question proposed by morris is a philosophical one; however, like the question that precedes it, “do clowns feel pain”? it may, at least on one level, be regarded as closed, since it admits of a ‘yes or no’ response. finally the objective of this lesson appears to be simply to engender open-ended debate among the learners. however, this begs the question: with what end in mind? if the aim is simply to encourage a debate in the classroom, what makes this philosophy? 37 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 70 once the question is asked, the debate can begin and this is where the philosophy can happen, because the students will begin to construct arguments. as soon as we have arguments on the table, we can start the process of refining arguments and making them more and more successful. (p.60) from this extract it would appear that morris regards both debating and the construction of arguments as essential to philosophy. however, once again no reasoning is provided to support this view. in any case, neither aspect is sufficient to distinguish a philosophy lesson from say, a politics or a history class. for example, history teachers might ask their students to engage in a debate on the question ‘what were the causes of the second world war?’ they could invite the students to work in groups and to develop a set of arguments, which would be presented to the class as a whole. a decision as to which group presented the best arguments could be arrived at by means of a vote. however, these features, by themselves, do not constitute a philosophy lesson. in the context of morris’s book, turgeon’s comments (p. 69) are apposite: there are isolated texts available which introduce the idea of philosophy with children and young people and celebrate its enriching power but without a clear pedagogical path, these can serve as inspiration but can ultimately fail a teacher in the classroom environment. with much of the literature that discusses philosophy with youth there is little reference to... a sustained study of philosophic issues. philosophy is deemed a natural human activity to the point of being viewed as instinctive. this unfortunately is often the view proposed by wellmeaning proponents of philosophy with children... to properly prepare the classroom teacher to engage her students in philosophic reflection it is a disservice to overemphasise the naturalness of the philosophic perspective. in contrast to using isolated texts to introduce philosophical inquiry, turgeon refers to lipman’s philosophy for children (p4c) program as a paradigm of what she refers to as “one of the more sustained methodologies” (p.69), since it incorporates a broad range of teaching materials that may be used from preschool to high school. in addition, would-be teachers of p4c undertake a series of workshops that focus on the program’s content and methodology. yet, even in this case, turgeon (p.69) asks “... is this enough”? she refers to the extensive training undertaken by professional philosophers, both at undergraduate and postgraduate level, involving close study of the key areas of philosophy: epistemology, metaphysics, logic, ethics etc., and argues that “the failure to prepare teachers to some level of basic competence in philosophy as a technical craft... runs the risk of losing the philosophic perspective and can ultimately result in the teacher’s loss of interest and focus in using the particular materials designed for this educational experience.” (p.70) i agree with this view and it pertains also in the uk. so what is to be done and how can we make progress, given that initial teacher education and training (itet) programs are so full of prescribed content that there appears to be little room for anything more than, if students are lucky, a seminar or two on teaching thinking skills (which may or may not include the teaching of philosophy for and with children)? in my view, there are a number of fruitful avenues to explore and i will discuss five of these. 38 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 71 educational resources to support the teaching of philosophy in schools to begin with, when considering curriculum issues with students (this is, after all, a substantial aspect of itet programs) teacher educators need to utilise to best effect opportunities to introduce and discuss the many educational resources that now exist to support the teaching of philosophy in schools. for example, in the uk, the society for the advancement of philosophical enquiry and reflection in education (sapere) (http:// sapere.org.uk), dialogue works (http://www.dialogueworks.co.uk) and the council for education in world citizenship – wales (http://cewc-cymru.org.uk), offer training courses and resources for teachers. the success of these organisations is linked, in part, to the increasing attention now being paid by policy makers to developing children’s thinking skills. in the context of a revision of the school curriculum, the welsh assembly government (wag) has implemented a ‘developing thinking and assessment for learning’ programme, in partnership with schools and local education authorities. in its document why develop thinking and assessment for learning in the classroom?, wag (2007, p.4) suggests that ‘metacognition (thinking about thinking) is at the heart of the learning and teaching process’ (costello, 2010a; wag, 2008a; 2008b; 2008c). sapere is an educational charity that was founded in 1992, with the aim of advancing “education for the public benefit, in particular amongst those young persons up to the age of 16 years, by the promotion of the development of their skills in logical thinking and other philosophical techniques so that their personal and social lives are enriched” (http://sapere.org.uk). sapere provides p4c courses at three levels, as well as in-service training for schools, local education authorities and other organisations. members of sapere receive a regular on-line bulletin, containing details of courses, conferences, resources, calls for papers for academic journals and news items. i would argue that this range of provision goes at least some way to meet the requirement for systematic training and on-going development in philosophy for which turgeon argues. developing critical thinking skills second, let us now turn to the issue of developing critical thinking skills both in itet programmes and continuing professional development courses for teachers. as turgeon (p. 71) suggests: we would like to assume that all teachers have already achieved a high degree of proficiency in thinking skills such as constructing sound and strong arguments, recognizing and avoiding fallacious reasoning, using logical patterns of reasoning in ethically asture ways, etc. however, we recognize that this is not always the case. familiarity with bloom’s taxonomy, de bono’s thinking skills or piagetian stage theory does not constitute a rigorous and sustained ability to think clearly, compassionately and creatively within a philosophical context...but how might we best introduce or nurture our teachers in the conscious awareness of and focused development of these aspects of thinking? turgeon offers two suggestions for appropriate texts to use with teachers (weston, 2009 and mccall, 2009) and these are also recommended by lecturers in university education departments in the uk. i would also wish to commend morrow and weston’s a workbook for arguments: a complete course in critical thinking (2011), bonnett’s how to argue (2011); moseley’s a to z of philosophy (2008) and baggini’s philosophy: key themes (2002) in this context. undergraduate students in the uk, across a range of academic disciplines, 39 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 72 are introduced to study skills at the beginning of their programs of study and stella cottrell’s the study skills handbook (2008) and critical thinking skills (2011) are widely used. in addition to mccall’s book, contributors to the discussion about developing philosophical inquiry in the classroom include bowles (2008), haynes (2008), and hannam and echeverria (2009). these publications have at their core a concern that schools and other educational settings should provide an appropriate environment in which learners’ thinking and valuing processes may be supported and enhanced. hand and winstanley’s philosophy in schools (2009) offers a sustained and convincing theoretical justification for this endeavour. the book is divided into two parts, which are entitled ‘meeting the objections to philosophy in schools’ and ‘making the case for philosophy in schools’. having asked ‘is it time to put philosophy in the school curriculum?’ (p.x), the editors suggest that the contributors to the volume “…are united in the conviction that exposure to philosophical ideas, questions and methods should be part of the basic educational entitlement of all children.” (p.x) although this is an interesting collection of essays, written from a variety of educational and philosophical perspectives, its main deficiency is that it omits teachers’ accounts of their own experience of teaching philosophy. given the book’s title, and that the teaching of thinking skills in schools is now being undertaken in the uk with the active encouragement of policy makers, and within the context of an increasingly substantial literature base, it is both surprising and disappointing that practitioners have not authored (or coauthored) some of the chapters. this is especially the case since the idea of developing teachers’ research into the teaching of thinking skills in the uk (for example, through best practice research scholarships in england and teacher research scholarships in wales) is well known (costello, 2010b). professional learning communities third, and returning to the need for on-going development in philosophy, which turgeon argues for and which i have referred to above, the rise in the uk of professional learning communities (plcs) has the potential to make a significant contribution to this endeavour. for example, the welsh government (2011, p.5), in its guidance document professional learning communities, offers the following definition of a plc: “... a group of practitioners working together using a structured process of enquiry to focus on a specific area of their teaching to improve learner outcomes and so raise school standards.” having outlined a national model for plcs, the government suggests that such communities “have the potential to make a positive difference to learner outcomes as well as enhancing the quality of professional learning.” (p.5) furthermore it is suggested that: “if plcs are to make a real difference to school performance and learner outcomes, the participants need to engage in collaborative and interdependent learning. they need to: • have the responsibility to try new learning and teaching strategies in order to extend their own professional development and learning; • enquire as a group in order to generate new professional knowledge and understanding; • implement the most effective learning and teaching solutions.” (p.5) in the uk, the imaginative minds group (img) (2012) publishes a number of professional journals for teachers, including creative teaching and learning, one of the focuses of which is to develop children’s critical thinking skills (including philosophical thinking). img offers an on-line plc package of magazines, journals and e-newsletters, subscribers to which also have access to an archive of thousands of professional development articles, as well as to a ‘knowledge bank’ of themed collections of papers. the archive contains over 500 articles on developing thinking skills and creativity in the classroom. 40 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 73 education studies programs fourth, i would argue that we need to consider the role of undergraduate programs in education studies in promoting a knowledge of philosophy and of philosophical inquiry. although such programs do not carry with them the award of qualified teacher status (qts), over three years of study they do afford students many more opportunities to explore the theoretical perspectives that underpin pedagogical practice than are available to their peers who are undertaking education degrees with qts. in the uk, students who complete an education studies degree successfully are eligible to undertake a one-year postgraduate certificate in education to obtain qts. earlier this year, i presented a paper on the theme ‘education studies and the foundation disciplines: a critical evaluation of the philosophy of education’ at the british education studies association annual conference. i began by exploring some historical themes from a uk perspective and discussed the following quote from bartlett and burton (2012, p.5): as a result of political and economic pressures in the 1970s and 1980s the theoretical study of education as part of teacher training courses fell into disrepute. teacher education was criticised as being too removed from the classroom. it was perceived as largely ignoring the practical nature of teaching while also promoting progressive ideologies of education. it was from the 1980s onwards that the nature of teacher education changed drastically. with the emphasis becoming firmly placed on training, any traces of academic education(al) studies were removed from initial teacher training programmes. again commenting on developments in educational policy in the uk, oancea and bridges (2011, p.55) refer to “... the movement towards more school-based and practice-oriented training, reinforced by a national curriculum for teacher training, from which philosophical work was effectively excluded.” against this backdrop, i examined the current context concerning the teaching of education studies, having reviewed the content of ten undergraduate programs from universities across the uk. the findings were interesting, since all the education studies programs included some teaching about the philosophy of education. six institutions had infused it into the curriculum as a whole; two offered whole modules on this theme (one in year one and one in year three); one had introduced it as part of a year one module, where it accounted for twenty per cent of the subject matter being taught; and one had included it as part of a module entitled ‘theoretical foundations of education.’ in making a case for the inclusion of the philosophy of education within education studies courses, i argued that, given the following module titles from across the ten programs reviewed, some knowledge of the content and methodology of philosophy was an essential prerequisite for students: year 1 modules • making sense of education • values, attitudes and prejudice in education 41 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 74 • introduction to eco-education • learning in a social and cultural context • critical engagement with equality and identity in education • human development year 2 modules • education and society • social policy and learning • education and equality • creativity in education • theory of multiple intelligences • international and comparative perspectives in education • educational research: theory and practice year 3 modules • education and citizenship • experiments in radical education • education and the inclusive society • globalisation and education • education and social change • informal learning • gender and difference • research project similarly, i suggested that a grounding in philosophy was important in terms of: (i) developing students’ critical thinking, reasoning and argument skills in higher education; (ii) developing students’ reflective practice; (iii) enabling students to evaluate current educational policy. 42 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 75 the role of professional philosophers finally, i suggest that we need to explore the extent to which professional philosophers can be of assistance in helping to promote philosophical inquiry in schools. turgeon (p.73) refers to the role of what she calls “the philosophical community” in assuring “the quality of the philosophical inquiry by both children and teachers” and again i would agree with this. as indicated above, turgeon refers to the extensive training undertaken by professional philosophers. given this, i would argue that universities should encourage much closer collaboration between their philosophy and education departments, in order to promote the effective teaching of philosophy in schools. this work could include: (i) the provision of training workshops by philosophers for their colleagues in education, as well as for students undertaking undergraduate and postgraduate programs in education; (ii) joint teaching projects in schools, where philosophers and education staff teach classes together; (iii) making collaborative research bids. as regards the latter, lecturers in education departments have tended to be much more successful than their counterparts in philosophy in acquiring substantial research funding and so this type of co-operation would be beneficial to both parties, as well as to their universities. endnote i am grateful both to wendy turgeon for raising important issues that are of concern to those who are attempting to promote philosophical inquiry in schools and to analytic teaching and philosophical praxis for the opportunity to contribute to the discussion. references arp, r. and watson, j.c. (2011). philosophy demystified. maidenhead: open university press. baggini, j. (2002). philosophy: key themes. basingstoke: palgrave macmillan. bartlett, s. and burton, d. (2012). introduction to education studies. (3rd ed.). london: sage. bonnett, a. (2011). how to argue. (3rd ed.). harlow: pearson education. bowles, m. (2008). philosophy for children. husbands bosworth: featherstone education. costello, p.j.m. (2010a). developing communities of inquiry in the uk: retrospect and prospect. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis, 30(1),1-20. costello, p.j.m. (2010b). review of philosophy in schools by m. hand and c. winstanley (eds.). journal of beliefs and values, 31(3), 365-367. cottrell, s. (2008). the study skills handbook. (3rd ed.). basingstoke: palgrave macmillan. cottrell, s. (2011). critical thinking skills. (2nd ed.). basingstoke: palgrave macmillan. council for education in world citizenship – wales (undated). retrieved from http://cewc-cymru.org.uk dialogue works (undated). retrieved from http://www.dialogueworks.co.uk dupré, b. (2007). 50 philosophy ideas you really need to know. london: quercus publishing. finn, s.j., zuck, j., underwood, b. and case, c. (2012). the philosophy skills book: exercises in philosophical thinking, reading and writing. london: continuum. hand, m. and winstanley, c. (eds.). (2009). philosophy in schools. london: continuum. hannam, p. and echeverria, e. (2009). philosophy with teenagers: nurturing a moral imagination for the 21st century. london: continuum. harwood, j. (2010). philosophy: a beginner’s guide to the ideas of 100 great thinkers. london: quercus publishing. haynes, j. (2008). children as philosophers: learning through enquiry and dialogue in the primary classroom. (2nd ed.). abingdon: routledgefalmer. imaginative minds group (2012). retrieved from http://www.teachingtimes.com/professionallearningcommunity.htm law, s. (2007). the great philosophers: the lives and ideas of history’s greatest thinkers. london: quercus publishing. 43 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 76 lipman, m. sharp, a.m. and oscanyan, f.s. (1980). philosophy in the classroom (2nd ed.). philadelphia: temple university press. mccall, c. (2009). transforming thinking: philosophical inquiry in the primary and secondary classroom. abingdon: routledge. morris, i. (2009). teaching happiness and well-being in schools. london: continuum. morrow, d.r. and weston, a. (2011). a workbook for arguments: a complete course in critical thinking. indianapolis: hackett publishing. moseley, a. (2008). a to z of philosophy. london: continuum. oancea, a. and bridges, d. (2011). philosophy of education: the historical and contemporary tradition. in j. furlong and m. lawn (eds.), disciplines of education: their role in the future of education research (pp. 50-66). london: routledge. saunders, c., mossley, d., macdonald ross, g. and lamb, d. (2012). doing philosophy. (2nd ed.). london: continuum. society for the advancement of philosophical enquiry and reflection in education (undated). retrieved from http://sapere.org.uk turgeon, w.c. (2012). the place of ‘philosophy’ in preparing teachers to teach pre-college philosophy – notes for a conversation. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis, 32(2), 68-74. welsh assembly government (2007). why develop thinking and assessment for learning in the classroom? retrieved from http://wales.gov.uk/topics/educationandskills/curriculumassessment/thinkingandassessment forlearning/?lang=en . welsh assembly government (2008a). framework for children’s learning for 3 to 7-year olds in wales. cardiff: wag. welsh assembly government (2008b). personal and social education framework for 7 to 19-year-olds in wales. cardiff: wag. welsh assembly government (2008c). skills framework for 3 to 19-year-olds in wales. cardiff: wag. welsh government (2011). professional learning communities. cardiff: wg. weston, a. (2009). a rulebook for arguments. (3rd ed.). indianapolis: hackett publishing. address correspondences to: patrick j.m. costello glyndwr university wrexham wales p.costello@glyndwr.ac.uk 44 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 2 75 teaching children to think ethically susan t. gardner ethics cannot be taught by information transfer. there is much that we teach our children—that, for example, napoleon was defeated at the battle of wa-terloo, pasta is the national dish of italy whose geography closely resembles a boot, 3 x 3 = 9, and salt is made of sodium and chloride. though some of our students do not fare as well as we would like in our educational systems, nonetheless there is much of which we can be proud. the literacy rate in north america is 99% (as it is in most of western europe), which contrasts markedly with, for instance, ethiopia where the literacy rate is approximately 35%, while chad’s is near the bottom at approximately 25%.1 there is a lot, then, that we do well in teaching our children. given that this is the case, why do we fall so short in the ethical domain? why is it that we don’t just teach our children to be kind to one another so that it actually happens? why don’t we instruct our children to refrain from verbal and physical abuse so that we actually get rid of, or at least minimize, violence? why don’t we just send lying and cheating to the dustbin of history by seriously motivating our children to refrain from doing so? the answer is, i will suggest, that we are stuck at the alter of information-transfer worship. this “information religiosity” is lethal because it fails to touch the reasoning that informs the way our children actually behave. in his book how we think, published 100 year ago, john dewey noted, prosaically, that attempting to manufacture moral growth by teaching kids what they ought and ought not to do can have “no more influence on character than information about the mountains of asia.”2 indeed, according to dewey, an attempt at direct value inculcation can do more harm than good because, if successful, it creates a servile attitude (referred to by adorno and his colleagues in the 1950’s as an “authoritarian personality”3) and increases “dependence upon others, and throws upon those in authority the responsibility for conduct.” and, in any case, says dewey, “as a matter of fact, direct instruction in morals has been effective only in social groups where it was a part of the authoritative control of the many by the few. to so attempt in a democracy is to rely upon ‘sentimental magic.’”4 this distinction between information transfer and wisdom, between theory and practice, is a common one, as john dewey is at pains to point out.5 “information is knowledge that is merely acquired and stored up,” notes dewey, while “wisdom is knowledge operating in the direction of powers to the better living of life.” and since we focus in our schools on the former, while virtually abandoning the latter, we ensure, according to dewey, that “pupils are taught to live in two separate worlds, one the world of out-of-school experience, the other the world of books and lessons.” schools focus on products rather than process. should we not find this neglect of our children’s practical reasoning positively outrageous? well, perhaps not. such an educational approach would require that we infect our students with a passion to seek out and to analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 2 76 test the adequacy of the reasoning that supports their own judgments and opinions. since such an educational approach would require that we focus on process rather than product, and since, to be effective, it would require that we stimulate, investigate and, where necessary, seek to alter the reasoning processes employed by our children to answer real questions that actually challenge them “where they live,” both its implementation and its measurement of success would be substantially more difficult than an approach that is tied to information accumulation that focuses on the “correct answer.”6 thus, given “the large number of pupils to be dealt with, and the tendency of parents and school authorities to demand speedy and tangible evidence of progress,”7 and given “the mechanics of school administration and its seeming inevitable bureaucratic need to focus on examinations, marks, gradings, promotions,” and so on,8 we ought, perhaps, to have sympathy for this focus on the product, rather than the mental processes by which the product is attained.9 children learn how to think with or without guidance. while sympathy for the difficulty of implementing such practical reasoning programs may be appropriate, nonetheless, we ought not to be blind to the fact that refraining from such teaching does not mean that learning is not happening. and this is a serious problem because, again in dewey’s words, if these habits of practical reasoning are not habits of careful looking into things, then they are “habits of hasty, heedless, impatient glancing over the surface; if not habits of consecutively following up the suggestions that occur, then habits of haphazard, grasshopper-like guessing; if not habits of suspended judgment till inferences have been tested by the examination of evidence, then habits of credulity alternating with flippant incredulity, belief or unbelief being based, in either case, upon whim, emotion, or accidental circumstance.”10 thus, to the degree that we remain wilfully blind to the cultivation of unhindered, unreflective habits of practical reasoning, we are guilty of delivering our children into the slavery of inconsiderate impulse, unbalanced appetite, caprice, or the circumstances of the moment.11 aren’t adulthood and/or higher education necessary for reflective reasoning? but, one might object, if reflective thought really does require, as dewey argues, “active, persistent and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it, and the further conclusions to which it tends,”12 surely this is the stuff of sophisticated philosophical consideration that can only be acquired either with age and/or higher levels of post-secondary education. surely our high schools, let alone our elementary schools, are not the appropriate place to tackle this sophisticated challenge. oh really, responds dewey, so you think adolescence is a synonym for magic?13 this condemnation laced with such irony is dewey’s way of underscoring the point that waiting until young adulthood to teach ethics is utterly ill-conceived. such criticism seems well deserved, particularly given the fact that so many of entrenched adult problems are already readily accepted as having their source in childhood mis-education. we would find it outrageous, would we not, if anyone suggested that there would be no serious repercussions for allowing kids to consistently eat junk, read porn or spend all day watching violent tv? why then are we not equally outraged by the suggestion that there will be no serous repercussions if kids spend most of their waking hours in a moral vacuum? thinking, after all, begins in babyhood and it is only, according to dewey, if we make the most of this “thought-fact,” already active in experiences of childhood, that there is “any promise or warrant for the emergence of superior reflective power at adolescence, or at any later period.”14 philosophy for children is an “unappreciated” antidote. this then is the clarion call for the educational program called philosophy for children (also known as p4c) because, unlike its postsecondary brethren, philosophy for children has kept its focus firmly anchored on practical, rather than on theoretical, reasoning. one way it does so is through its insistence that the topics scruanalytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 2 77 tinized in communities of inquiry are topics that are relevant to, and picked by, the participants. this is crucial because it is these topics that are ones that give youngsters real pause in real life. paradoxically, however, though this is the strength of p4c, it is also its weakness in terms of its general acceptance, not only to those in charge of school curricula, but even by the discipline that gave it birth. those who associate the hallowed discipline of philosophy with discussions of plato, kant, and mill, look down with derision on a practice that would have its participants scrutinize such topics as whether it is ok to lie to parents, snitch on a classmate, gossip about a friend, engage in physical or verbal bullying, or cheat on an exam. these are clearly unsophisticated topics that could only be of interest to inferior scholastics incapable of engaging in “real” philosophical dialogue with the “big boys.” to scholars who come to a conclusion of this sort, dewy boldly sneers: “[y]our specialized abstract focus has been cut lose from its practical and moral bearings, your extravagant habits of inference and speech, and your ineptness in reaching conclusions in practical matters, and your egotistical engrossment in your own studies, are precisely what should alert us to the tragic effects of completely severing abstract studies from ordinary connections in life.”15 philosophy for children has been less powerful than it could be. adherents of philosophizing with children, however, are themselves not without blame for its lack of general acceptance. since philosophy for children grew out of the seeds planted by the pragmatists, p4c has perhaps been overly confident that the practice explains itself. thinking is an activity after all, and like any other activity, the learning is in the doing. and so it was that the community of inquiry not only became the pedagogical anchor of philosophy for children, but also has been left pretty much on its own to deliver the implicit message of its efficacy and its worth. thus, in trying to propagate the program, the focus has been largely on teaching teachers how to run such communities by engaging them is such communities, with the assumption being that both the teachers and the students would learn in the experience how important it is to have reasons for what they think and feel, to stay open to opposing viewpoints, and ultimately, to experience the exhilaration of following reasons wherever they lead. thus, in his seminal book philosophy goes to school, philosophy for children founder, matthew lipman, says explicitly that “there can be no difference in the method by which teachers are taught and the method by which they would be expected to teach,”16 and since the goal is to eschew “knowledge transmission,” teacher training must likewise refrain from the temptation to engage in lecture-type abstract analyses of the pedagogical forces at work in such communities. the difficulty with this approach of leaving the practice of p4c to implicitly speak for itself is that it may leave the program, and the teachers who embrace it, exposed and unarmed in the face of those who challenge why any one should expect these communities of inquiry to have long-term practical implications; mute with regard to the expected learning outcomes; perplexed as to how these sorts of inquiries differ from ordinary discussions that take place in virtually every classroom around the world; unhelpful to students who ask what principles ought to be adopted in order to maintain momentum in the absence of such communities; and certainly uninspiring with regard to why students should try to transfer this sort of thinking outside the classroom, particularly when such thinking is often contrary to their own short-term best interests. these implicit questions must be answered explicitly by philosophy for children not only if philosophy for children is ever going to be accepted by mainstream educational bureaucracies, but also in order to maximize its own efficacy. what i am suggesting, in other words, is that philosophy for children ramp up its theoretical message both to its participants, and to those who would judge its merits. the need for more precise messaging. elsewhere (in my book entitled thinking your way to freedom17), i have detailed a justificatory theoretical backdrop. however, given the limitation of the present situation, i will only briefly outline four theoretical mesanalytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 2 78 sages that i believe must be delivered with both detail and passion if enhancing wisdom (as opposed to information transfer) is ever to be considered an appropriate enterprise in our schooling systems, and if we are ever to reasonably hope that our youngsters will walk securely along that path. these four theoretical messages are as follows: 1. we should ramp up the message that p4c can enhance practical reasoning; 2. we should explain that the payoff of unbiased practical reasoning is freedom; 3. we should outline a clear vision of what unbiased thinking looks like; and 4. we should come clean on ‘truth,’ i.e., we must tackle the dangerous myth of ‘relativism,’ in order that we may show that practical reasoning really matters. i will briefly deal with these four in turn. 1. the message must focus on practical reasoning. there can be no doubt of p4c’s efficacy in enhancing intelligence and/or critical thinking, as has been demonstrated by, amongst others, the early tests with the new jersey test of reasoning skills.18 however, given the fact that children’s intelligence and critical thinking skills can be enhanced in a myriad of other ways, it seems to me that the noise of the competition, and the accountability pressures to which teachers and administrators are subject, will too easily drown out attempts to make the case for an expensive intelligent-enhancing program like p4c. thus, it seems to me that we ought rather to stress what p4c can uniquely do, i.e., that it can enhance the quality of practical reasoning. focusing thus on wisdom, rather than merely on intelligence, also reinvigorates the moral strength of p4c advocates to challenge the “powers that be” for failing to include practical reasoning as an educational priority. interestingly, this focus will also send an important message to students, i.e., that we care deeply about how they act, and not merely about what grades they get. 2. the payoff is freedom. but why should students care that we care about how they act? why should they respond to such a program? if we are to harness students’ motivational forces so that they will sustain the hard work of reasoning through the pros and cons of various potential actions plans, we must provide them with a theoretical framework that makes the case that there is a payoff. to do this, students need to understand that though all of us feel like choosers, most of us are just placeholders for the strongest messages that waft through our social linguistic environment. they need to understand that, in order to credibly make the claim that their decisions are their own, i.e., that what they do is a product of their own reasoning rather than simply a function of mindless messages introjected from others, they must seriously reflect on the reasons that back all potential options, and importantly, be prepared to adopt the least weak option. students must be reminded, again and again, that it is only by seriously and impartially reflecting on the reasons that guide their actions in the short, medium, and long term, that they can describe themselves as masters of their own fate, as creators of themselves, and only to that degree can they describe themselves as wise individuals and worthy of respect.19 students need to deeply understand, in other words, that the payoff for engaging in genuinely unbiased practical reasoning is ‘freedom’ in the self-legislative sense.20 3. what unbiased thinking looks like. autonomy requires that one think impartially. however, in order to think impartially, one needs a clear image of what impartial thinking looks like. images, after all, are what pull out behaviour. in sports, for instance, it is readily accepted by experts that one needs an image, for example, of what good skiing looks like in order to so guide one’s body—and the more precise the image the better the chance of success. likewise, one needs an analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 2 79 image of what precisely unbiased thinking looks likes. the over-arching assumption that threads through that vision, and upon which the entire enterprise rests, is the unshakable belief that the adequacy of any claim is only ever a function of the adequacy of the reasons that back it. and it is here that the teaching of some logic (as opposed to exclusively engaging in communities of inquiry) is imperative so that students can see that, through logic, the strength of reasons can actually be objectively estimated. amongst other logical moves, they will need to be taught how to find hidden premises, and how to estimate the strength of premises as a function of their vulnerability to counterexample.21 they will need to be gifted the explicit explanation that this attempt to falsify reasoning is a logical move, not an asocial insult. and they will need to be taught that after thus testing for the local sufficiency of any given position (through attempting to falsify premises), the relative adequacy of any premise that survives the test for local sufficiency must then be measured against its strongest possible opposition thus establishing which is the best candidate for global sufficiency, i.e., they must be prepared to fairly balance the pros and cons of all options on the table. learning these terms, i.e., local and global sufficiency, though antithetical to p4c’s typical laissez faire approach, adds enormously to its power by laying out precisely what logical steps need to be undertaken to move toward impartiality.22 and from the above it follows, but must be explicitly stated in order to begin to change attitudes, that one’s opposition is truly one’s very best friend since it is only through testing one’s positions against the strongest possible opposition that one has any clue to their adequacy. hence, since impartially estimating the truth of competing claims is the only route via which one can escape the tyranny of outside pressures, it is only through genuinely reflecting on the merits of one’s opposition that one’s own autonomy is possible. our youngsters must learn, in other words, to abjure the common tendency—even in communities of inquiry—to simply shut up while others are talking primarily so that they can rehearse how better to reinforce their own viewpoints. they must learn, rather, that it is to their own benefit to assist in fleshing out the strength of what is being said because to do otherwise is to deprive themselves of the only method to ‘truth’ that is available to mortal minds—which brings us to the fourth topic. 4. what’s ‘truth’ got to do with it? a 2009 survey of canadian teens, reported in the august 14, 2009 edition of the vancouver sun,23 disclosed that 64% of canadian teens agreed with the statement that “what’s right or wrong is a matter of personal opinion.” to those who do not cringe at this monstrous misguided pseudo-democratic relativist assumption, i challenge you to de-horrify for the rest of us such decisions as the one made in 1997 by david cash, a berkeley university engineering student, who chose to turn the other way as his friend raped and then drowned a 7 year old girl, and who then proudly proclaimed that what his friend did had nothing to do with him and that it was not his place to judge.24 make no mistake about it: relativism is a virus that not only protects evil, it perpetrates it, and its only antidote is truth. our responsibility then is absolute and critical. we must explain explicitly to our youngsters that there is truth in ethics and what counts as true in ethics is the same as what counts as true in science: what counts as true is what survives a rigorous impartial falsification process. there is no space, in other words, between the process and the product.25 like a jet engine, we move forward toward ‘truth’ by putting behind us that which is faulty just as we move toward ‘clean’ by washing out dirt.26 and though, as a result, we must discard the holy grail of ‘truth’ with a capital “t,” i.e., we will never know that a claim will inevitably survive future challenge, nonetheless, the process supplies us with ample ammunition to speedily annihilate relativism on the grounds that we are perfectly capable of judging when one person’s reasoning is more faulty than another’s, just we are capable of judging when someone’s clothes are dirtier than someone else’s.27 we only need the truth-seeking process, in other words, to annihilate relativism; we do not need sanctity or special privileges for claims and/or persons. and it is this process that we must gift to our children: both in practice and in theory. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 2 80 summary in summary, it is my contention that we must keep up the fight of trying to inspire our educational practitioners to focus on educating the practical reasoning of our youth and that we must deliver a clear message that philosophy for children is in a unique position to do just that. and in order to do that, as well as to ensure that p4c can indeed deliver on its promise, it is my contention that we must gird the practice of philosophy for children with the scaffolding of a precise vision of the sort outlined here that will unite p4c practitioners under one clear communicable banner, and one which will enhance its pedagogical power by convincing teachers, administrators and students of the urgency and efficacy of what we offer. with this new armour, we can go forward with renewed enthusiasm, and perhaps succeed where dewey failed a hundred years ago, convincing those mired in educational bureaucracy that the payoff of embracing a process with a clear vision for educating thought that guides behaviour is one that can no longer be responsibly ignored. whether we like it or not, our kids are in charge of their own actions; for god’s sake let us give them the tools to do so wisely. endnotes 1. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/list_of_countries_by_literacy_rate. web. nov. 3, 2009. web. 2. john dewey, how we think, (stilwell, ks: digireads.com pub., 2007), 258. 3. t. adorno, e. frenkel-brunswik, d. j. levinson and r. nevitt sanford, the authoritarian personality, (new york: harper & brothers, 1950). 4. dewey, how we think, 258. 5. ibid., 26. 6. ibid., 29. 7. ibid, 29. 8. ibid, 29. 9. ibid., 29. 10. ibid., 34-5. 11. ibid., 35. 12. ibid., 7. 13. ibid., 34. 14. ibid., 34. 15. ibid., 28. 16. lipman, matthew, philosophy goes to school, (philadelphia: temple university press, 1988), 4. 17. susan gardner, thinking your way to freedom: a guide to owning your own practical reasoning, (philadelphia: temple university press, 2009). 18. m. lipman, a. m. sharp, & f. s. oscanyan, philosophy in the classroom, (philadelphia: temple university press, 1980). 19. gardner, 36. 20. hence the title of my book thinking your way to freedom: a guide to owning your own practical reasoning. 21. arguing, for example, that “ ‘x’ is wrong because it is unnatural,” can be dismissed out of hand because it carries the hidden premise that “all things that are unnatural are wrong”— presumably said by someone who doesn’t think it is wrong to wear clothing, or use a computer, etc., i.e., the counterexamples. 22. for more details, see gardner. 23. reported by douglas todd, “metro vancouver more international than rest of country,” the vancouver sun, august 14, 2009, a1 and a7. 24. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/jeremy_strohmeyer. web. 25. gardner, 36. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 2 81 26. ibid. 27. ibid. address correspondences to: susan t. gardner capilano university, north vancouver e-mail: sgardner@capilanou.ca analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 17 make believe numbers: a multidimensional analysis of phillip pullman’s mythopoeic vision michael wodzak “but think of adam and eve like an imaginary number, like the square root of minus one: you can never see any concrete proof that it exists, but if you include it in your equations, you can calculate all manner of things that can’t be imagined without it” ( pullman, p. 372). the paragraph above, quoted from the end of the golden compass (northern lights in the uk) seems to en-capsulate not only philip pullman’s spiritual worldview, and his evangelization of that view to adolescent readers, but also, as we shall see, his, perhaps, incomplete understanding of the concept of dimension. this is significant, because pullman’s view of the cosmos is undoubtedly multidimensional. there has been a great deal of controversy over pullman’s work, partly, it would appear, generated by himself and his publishers, but, it must be added, the controversy has been enjoined by various christian denominations, notably the roman catholic church. pullman is an atheist, but the his dark materials (pullman) books are not atheistic; they are anti-theistic and anti-religious. in particular they are anti-christian. all the villains are part of church establishment. officially, the catholic church seems to be of the opinion that the books are specifically anti-catholic, although it is difficult to see where this contention comes from. the first book in the trilogy is set in an alternate universe, contemporary with ours, but with a technology that seems, in some ways, to lag about a century behind. centuries in the past there has been a reformation, culminating in the pontificate of john calvin. at the time of the story, there is no longer a pope, only a governing body known as the magisterium. all christendom seems to be part of this one reformed church. the christianity portrayed in this book, however, bears no specific resemblance to roman catholicism except for the word “magisterium”, the catholic term for church authority, and a closer analysis reveals that this term refers not to authority as a concept but to a specific governing board, which is not the catholic understanding of the word at all. the word is the same, its meaning is different. indeed, what little description there is of christianity in pullman’s alternate universe bears more resemblance to what an anglican might term “low church.” be that as it may, there is controversy, which is good for book sales. pullman does have an antipathy to catholicism, which is not to be found explicitly in his trilogy, or the use of the term magisterium, but, in a november 2007 interview with peter chattaway, it is quite clear that he opposes authoritarianism and theocracy. as he says, in talking about jrr tolkien’s catholicism, “tolkien was a catholic, for whom the basic issues of life were not in question, because the church had all the answers. so nowhere in ‘the lord of the rings’ is there a moment’s doubt about those big questions....enormous as it is, tlotr is consequently trivial.” interestingly, although pullman is an atheist, god does exist in these books, as the arch villain – or, perhaps, more accurately, an ex-arch villain who is now a decrepit figurehead for the new heavenly powers – and, at the close of the trilogy, the multiverse is saved when god is killed. why would an atheist want to depict the death of god? how can god be killed if god does not exist? clearly pullman is, to some degree, speaking metaphorically. as a matter of fact, in the interview with peter chattaway, he says “i revel in the ambiguities and shadows analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 18 and suggestions of metaphor.” in other words, perhaps, it is not so much god that pullman seeks to kill as the belief in god. maybe the catholic church is right, after all, to read pullman’s magisterium as a metaphor for its own. if pullman writes metaphorically, we should look for the metaphor in the paragraph quoted at the beginning of this essay. lyra belacqua, the adolescent heroine of the his dark materials trilogy, is told that she could never see any concrete proof that imaginary numbers exist. pullman seems to be saying “imaginary numbers (things spiritual) cannot be proven to exist and, therefore, they do not exist.” this is a materialist position that, apart from being an obvious fallacy, displays something rather self centred and arrogant in the assumption that any existence in the world is predicated on our observance and acceptance of it. in the chattaway interview, pullman even goes so far as to insist that god is a metaphor: perhaps it might be clearer to call him a character in fiction, and a very interesting one too: one of the greatest and most complex villains of all – savage, petty, boastful, jealous, and yet capable of moments of tenderness and extremes of arbitrary affection – for david, for example. but he’s not real, any more than hamlet or mr pickwick are real. they are real in the context of their stories, but you won’t find them in the phone book. in the early twentieth century, gödel demonstrated that there would always exist statements, in any sufficiently sophisticated system (arithmetic being his example), that could not be shown to be true or false. he did not show that the statements were neither true nor false, merely that their truth or falsity could not be proven. statement: imaginary numbers exist. perhaps this is one of gödel’s statements, one that we cannot prove or disprove. this does not mean that such numbers do not exist, or that they do. to be rather less mathematical: for years i kept my telephone number unlisted. i could not be found in the phone book. i am fairly confident that i existed through those years. as with imaginary numbers, so with things spiritual: just because we may never find a “concrete proof” that such exist, this does not mean that they do not exist. we can only know that they do not exist when we are given that proof. proof would, in any case, seem to be a moot point, since we have none in either direction. for either side of the theist/atheist debate to imply that the other is in error because they have no proof is to hoist themselves on their own petard. the above musings, however, turn out to be purely academic since, as will become apparent, we actually do have a proof of the existence of imaginary numbers, one that is physical, if not concrete. what is an imaginary number? the definition that most of pullman’s adolescent readers will have been given is that imaginary numbers are the square roots of negative numbers. almost as soon as a young student has been given this definition in a mathematics class, she will be told that such things do not exist. if any real number (positive or negative) is multiplied by itself, the answer is positive, and, since all squares are positive, only positive numbers can have square roots. our student is, then, perfectly justified in asking what the point is in studying something that her teacher has so ably demonstrated cannot possibly exist in the first place. perhaps she is given no justification at all – i suspect that this is all too often the case – but, even if she is, the justification is likely to be something along the lines of an argument that, by incorporating imaginary numbers into our way of thinking, we are able to make discoveries that would be difficult or impossible to make otherwise. our student is told about imaginary numbers precisely what asriel tells lyra. while it is certainly true that the use of complex numbers (sums and differences of real and imaginary numbers) does lead to demonstrations of such results as the fact that the number of primes less than or equal to a large number is approximately that number divided by its natural logarithm, it is not at all clear that such facts may not always be demonstrated without the use of anything imaginary. moreover, such demonstrations are university level mathematics, and so this justification for accepting imaginary numbers demands an unfairly long analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 19 suspension of disbelief on the part of our student. perhaps the reader is wondering why so much fuss is being made about a comment made to a fictional character in a work of pure fiction. internal self consistency would appear to be the only criterion that needs to be considered in this instance. at this point it would be appropriate to point out that lyra, when she is told about the link between imaginary numbers and adam and eve, has had, according to pullman, a very inadequate education indeed, one that she has done everything in her power to avoid. the chances that she has ever heard about imaginary numbers, or even that she understands the concept of square roots, are not very great. on the other hand, most adolescent readers in the western world have reached this point in the mathematics curriculum. lord asriel’s conversation with lyra is not consistent with the story to this point. nor is it consistent with the rest of the story; asriel does not disbelieve in things spiritual, and he is, in fact, fairly convinced of god’s existence. it is his ambition to kill him. it is apparent that the comment is actually external to the narrative; an argument is actually being presented not to lyra at all, but directly to the real reader in this real world. it must be in this world, then, that we address the linking of eden with the complex. adam and eve (metaphors for things religious) do not exist, pullman seems to be telling his readers. it is just that religion helps us to understand things that would be too hard to understand without it. imaginary numbers help mathematicians and scientists understand things that are too complicated for you to even contemplate, so don’t even bother, just learn how to multiply 2+3i by 7-5i; just learn who begat whom. and there actually is something just so insidiously patronizing going on here; people who believe in adam and eve (or that for which they are metaphor) only do so because there are things that are too hard for them (poor children) to understand without such crutches. the problem with pullman’s metaphor, however, as nice as it appears on its face, is that imaginary numbers, as i hinted above, are not imaginary; the name is a misnomer. that a middle school mathematics teacher should have the understanding that imaginary numbers do not really exist, and pass this understanding on to his students, is not really surprising. it is certainly forgivable. even descartes used the term “imaginary number” dismissively. indeed, this was the understanding of the entire mathematics community for the first two centuries after the concept was introduced by cardano in the early 1500’s in his ars magna, the same work in which he introduced negative numbers. it should be said that negative numbers were also viewed with suspicion, and so it is little wonder that their square roots were not easily accepted until the genius of euler demonstrated their power. before we can get a more modern notion of what imaginary numbers are, we need to understand what is meant by dimension. pullman himself dabbles with one of the stock science fiction motifs, that of parallel universes, what are often, mistakenly, called “other dimensions”. he, quite correctly, does not use the expression “other dimension” to name his parallel universes, but, his multiverse is, of necessity, multi-dimensional. what does that mean? start with a line. imagine that the line is a universe, and that beings live in it. these beings can move in only two directions, forward or backward. we introduce the concept of sign and use + for forward and – for backward. in this sense, beings in our universe can move in only one signed direction, that is, along the line. we call a signed direction the dimension of the universe. our line is a one dimensional universe, since it has only one signed direction in which its inhabitants can move. now imagine a universe that is a plane, like the surface of a table, or like a blackboard. in the middle of the plane there is a point surrounded by the twelve hours of a clock face. it would seem that beings in this universe can move in an infinite number of directions, but, in a sense, they can move in only two. consider the two directions given by moving from the centre of the clock to 4 and from the centre of the clock to 11. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 20 notice, first of all, that the signed (forward/backward) direction from the centre to 4 is exactly the same signed direction as from 5 to 9, 8 to 6, 12 to 2, etc., and that the signed direction from centre to 11 corresponds with the direction from 12 to 4, etc. imagine that the distance from the centre to the clock points is one mile. one can get from the centre to 1 by going two miles in the “11 direction”, followed by about 1.7 miles in the “4 direction”. in other words, going from the centre to 1 is not really a new direction at all. it can be accomplished by using the first two directions. indeed one can get from any point in the plane to any other point in the plane by going a certain distance in the signed “11 direction” followed by a certain distance in the signed “4 direction”. if there was some universal law stating that one could move in only these two directions, beings in this universe could still move between any two points using only those two signed directions. on the other hand, if, instead of the “4 and 11 directions”, our universal rule stated that we could move only in the “2 and 3 directions”, we could still get anywhere in this universe. all that is needed to get anywhere in this universe is any pair of non-parallel signed directions. this is a two dimensional universe. for a universe to be two dimensional we mean that only two predetermined signed directions are ever needed to get from any place to any other place in the universe. in a one dimensional universe, all that is needed to get anywhere is one signed direction. in a two dimensional universe, all that is needed are two signed directions. similarly, all that is needed in a three dimensional universe is a trio of signed directions. now, imagine that the one dimensional universe – the line – is scratched into the two dimensional table top, which is in a three dimensional room. for a being in the line, leaving the line means going in a direction other than the one signed direction of that universe, and, what is more, going in any direction other than the one, will take it out of its universe. going in a different direction and leaving the universe are one and the same thing. for a being from the table top universe, leaving the table top means going in a direction that cannot be achieved by some combination of the “4 and 11 directions” and, as before, going in such a direction will automatically, take the being out of its universe. leaving the universe, no matter what dimension that universe has, means, by definition, that the universe must be embedded in some higher dimensional space, because there must be a direction – a dimension – to move in that is not one of the directions in the home universe. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 21 lyra leaves her universe and travels through a multiverse to other, parallel universes. she does not, as is so often said in popular science fiction, travel to a “different dimension”. one moves in a direction not to a direction. she moves in a dimension (direction) other than the three that define space in her own universe to get to another three dimensional universe. it is as though the line on the table top had, close by, another line running in the same direction and a being from the line universe traveled in a direction that is possible on the table (but not the line) to get to the second line; or a being from the table top rose to a plane hovering just over its home universe. pullman understands this, and uses exactly this table-top analogy, toward the end of his trilogy, to describe the move between worlds. when negative numbers were first introduced to western mathematics, they were met with disbelief. how on earth, could one possess a negative quantity of something? how could a line have a negative length? we are quite familiar with this concept today, and our children are perfectly at home with the idea of a temperature being –10 0 c that is, ten degrees below some standard temperature (in this case the freezing point of water). it should be noted, though, that when cardano wrote his ars magna, such was not the normal currency. indeed, he was using the idea purely arithmetically and symbolically. we write quadratic equations in the form ax2 + bx + c= 0 where a, b and c represent different known numbers, which might be positive or negative. however, if we do not have a concept of negative numbers, we cannot conceive of the equation x2 – 2x – 5= 0 in the generic form above; we have to write x2 = 2x + 5. cardano, by introducing the symbolic negative allows us to write all quadratic equations in the same form and realise that, for the top equation, x= (–b±√(b2 – 4ac))/2a. this kind of symbolic use forces the question of just what negative numbers are. however, not daunted, cardano goes on to use methods equivalent to the quadratic formula above and shows that, for some equations, the unknown x must contain square roots of negative numbers. in other words, immediately after introducing negatives, cardano gives us imaginaries, without ever giving us any real notion of what either mean! quite soon after the ars magna, people did realise that negative numbers could describe indebtedness. as a matter of fact, shakespeare, writing towards the end of the same century used precisely this construction in the merchant of venice. we begin to see an understanding of negative numbers evolving. indeed, the child’s understanding of a temperature ten degrees below zero is significant. below implies a direction – down. while an arithmetical understanding of negative numbers to describe indebtedness might be of interest, and certainly easy enough for middle school students to understand, it is the geometrical understanding, the notion of going backwards, that is of importance here. i have, of course, already been using this sense of the negative in describing dimension: a dimension is a signed direction, a direction in which one may move forward (+) or backward (–). dimension is key to an understanding of pullman’s work. if there are not higher dimensions, then it is impossible to move between universes. indeed, only one universe exists. moreover, when we are considering space, the universe, the multiverse, we are, of necessity, thinking geometrically. we use the concept of negative numbers not to describe being in debt, nor to describe a temperature colder than some standard, but to describe moving backwards. positive and negative numbers describe the two directions our one dimensional line dweller can move, forwards and backwards. suppose that the one dimensional universe is the (extended) line that joins the centre of the clock to the 4. the being in that universe cannot conceive of the “11direction”. to it, that direction is imaginary. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 22 that direction exists; we can perceive it, as we can perceive the whole of the two dimensional table top, precisely because we are not one dimensional beings. yet the direction remains imaginary to the line dweller. this use of the term “imaginary” is not an equivocation, although it is a slight mathematical inaccuracy. for about two centuries now the mathematical community has worked with a geometrical understanding of imaginary and complex numbers, and would call this direction complex. as far as the one dimensional being in the diagram above is concerned, modern mathematicians would call the direction from the centre to 1 (or 7) the imaginary direction. we perceive the 11 direction above as not entirely imaginary since a being moving in that direction is still moving in approximately the nw “real” direction. however, to move from the centre to 1 is to move in a purely imaginary direction. it is to move completely away from the real line. in traditional, newtonian mechanics a moving object will continue moving at precisely the same speed in precisely the same direction unless it is acted on by some force either to speed it up, or to slow it down, or to change its direction. a force that speeds the object up without changing its direction is described as positive; a force that slows the object down without changing its direction is described as negative. we use numbers to describe how large the force is. how do we describe a force that changes the object’s direction? the force clearly has some magnitude, and, just as clearly, must not be in either the positive or the negative direction, or else it would merely change the object’s speed, and not redirect it. the answer is, that we choose some direction other than that in which the object is moving, give it a forward and backward(+/–) sense, and call that the imaginary direction. a force of, whatever size in this direction will redirect the motion of our object. moreover, if we are just talking about movement in our table top universe, forces in these two directions (along the motion of the object and in the imaginary direction) are all that is needed to affect any change whatsoever in the motion of the object. we describe forces that are in a combination of the two directions using complex numbers. of course, in our three dimensional space, we would need to describe our forces in terms of three fundamental directions. this all seems reasonable, but the astute reader will object: but what about all this nonsense of i2= – 1? there is some arithmetic here that still needs explaining. how does this strange piece of arithmetic match up with the geometry of objects moving through space? in the geometrical sense of imaginary and complex numbers, multiplication describes growth and rotation. imagine a stationary being on the table top. multiplying it by any positive number describes its size increasing or decreasing (depending on whether the number was greater than one or else a fraction). as with beings so with other less tangible things like movement, multiplying a force by a positive number may change the magnitude of the force, but it leave alone the direction in which the force acts. multiplying by 1 means leaving an object or a force alone – just as multiplying by one is a neutral action in regular arithmetic. multiplying by a negative number describes the being rotating so that it faces backwards and grows or shrinks depending on the absolute size of the number. multiplying a force by a negative number describes a new force acting in exactly the opposite direction as the original. in particular, multiplying by – 1 describes the object facing backwards, the force pointing in the opposite direction. notice that multiplying by – 1 twice, we reverse directions twice and are back where we started. the square of a negative number is positive, just as in our standard arithmetic. the interesting thing is what happens when we multiply by an imaginary number. multiplying the object or force by i describes leaving its size alone but rotating it through anticlockwise. multiplying the object or force by i analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 23 again rotates through another 90o and the object is facing backwards, the force is pointing in the opposite direction. this is exactly the same as what is described by a single multiplication by – 1. multiplying by i two times describes the same action as multiplying by – 1 once. i2= – 1 do imaginary numbers exist? do negative numbers exist? one might just as well ask if real positive integers exist. to be sure, we all know what two dogs are, or three houses or seven students, but do 2, 3 and 7 exist? aristotle lists quantity as the second most fundamental predicate of being, and, in this aristotelian sense, natural numbers exist in as much as they are descriptors of the universe. since, today, we have a much expanded sense of number, so too we expand our sense of aristotle’s second predicate. 2 exists because it describes two dogs. -10 exists because it describes a temperature 10 degrees colder than the freezing point of water, –153 exists because it describes being $153 dollars in debt, –7 exists because it describes a force of 7 units directly against the motion of some moving object, and –1 exists because it describes a facing backwards. in precisely this way, 5i exists because it describes a force of 5 units out of the line in which an object is moving and i exists because it describes a quarter turn. a complex numbers such as 3+4i exists because it describes a combined force, speeding an object up by a factor of 3 units in the direction in which it was already moving and 4 units in the imaginary direction. such a number also describes a rotation of about 53o combined with a growth of a factor of 5, but, perhaps this is straying a little too far afield. pullman’s analogy, then, does not quite deliver what he wants it to. far from being non-existent or, at the very least, unprovable, imaginary numbers do exist. if we should think about adam and eve like an imaginary number, then we have to think about them as existing and relevant. as so often happens, a nice, seemingly wise comment about spirituality really takes us nowhere at all. it neither undermines the christian tradition nor, to be honest, does its nullification do anything to enhance it. we are left with one question: is pullman’s own understanding of complex numbers the middle school understanding of his former students and teaching staff? is he honestly misapplying an analogy with things he does not really understand, or is there something happening that deserves rather less charity? does pullman actually understand complex numbers but, knowing what a middle school understanding is, use that understanding to make an analogy that suits his purpose? if that is the case, then he is being less than honest with his readers. indeed, deceit is put forward as an admirable quality in the trilogy – lyra, herself proudly bears the title “silvertongue” for her ability to lie convincingly – and even the starting quote displays some dishonesty on asriel’s part since, as we have seen, this character does have some belief in that for which adam and eve are metaphors. we have already seen that pullman has an understanding of the dimensional implications of moving between parallel universes. he also has an admirable description of a multidimensional fractal fortress of heaven in the shining mountain of the amber spyglass. indeed, pullman’s description of a multiverse of discrete universes splitting off from each other depending on whether events do or do not happen, a multiverse created by subatomic coin flips, is remarkably consistent with models of some modern currency. one wonders how an author is able to be so consistent with current mathematical physics, so comfortable with notions of higher dimensions, and yet not be the master of something that is mathematically considerably more basic. for that matter, how can a multiple dimensioned multiverse exist if the two dimensions of the table top described by complex numbers do not? god, like mr pickwick, is “real in context”. this analogy is really only useful if we are certain that the contexts are equivalent. it can be argued that “reality in context” is the only kind of reality that numbers have. even the basic counting numbers from 1 to 10 exist only in context, and all numbers, even the purely “imaginary” ones, share this meta-existence. perhaps, as pullman says, god is like this, like mr pickwick, like the square root of minus 1, but the contexts, the stories, of pickwick and i are fundamentally different from each other; i exists, as we have seen, no less than 1 exists. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 24 it is interesting to note, however, that if we were to paraphrase the opening quote of this essay “but think of god like a real number, like 1”, the christian community, not to mention the jewish, sikh, jain, moslem and numerous others, would respond “we do.” works cited chattaway, peter. “philip pullman – the extended e-mail interview.” filmchat. 28 nov. 2007. 1 may 2008. http://filmchatblog.blogspot.com. pullman, phillip. northern lights. london: scholastic press, 2001. address correspondence to: michael wodzak viterbo university 900 viterbo dr. la crosse, wi 54601 mawodzak@viterbo.edu analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 40 cognitive challenges for the realisation of a collective intelligence: the new educational settings maría g. navarro abstract: understanding information and communication technologies through the networks in which people get connected, communicate and co-operate has been a constant feature in the work of researchers who have not dissociated their view of the meaning of technologies from new social movements. this paper maintains that information and communication technologies are not only networks that people join individually, but they also act as social technologies. their improvement depends both on the diversity of their functions (social, political, cognitive, etc.) and the flexibility with which they adapt to functional diversity (for example, to life cycles, changing and fluctuating mobility or audiovisual perception thresholds). this idea is supported by the new technological challenge represented by portable devices, such as, personal area networks, high-use user interfaces, and systems designed for home care. these important changes will be explored in this paper in connection with their value for education. 1. the virtual setting as an educational problem it seems reasonable to state that the current education system is undergoing transformations very different from those it has undergone in the past. at least some of this change can be attributed to the emergence of information pedagogy – a pedagogical approach that shows how both learners and teachers are a form of mediation between information and human experience, wherein the processing of information becomes one of the goals of both teaching and learning. this conception of teaching is not something new in the history of pedagogy, nor does it contradict the idea that education is a form of social technology whose purpose is to equip the individual and society with a powerful tool to cultivate both the development of cognitive functions and socialisation skills. for decades, when people have considered their education, they have not had to reckon with the reality of a world view that is constantly changing. as a consequence of such changes, different aptitudes and cognitive skills will be needed in order to carry out the project of education, facilitating with all the more precision the diverse ways we know, understand and communicate. all of these changes will allow people to better adapt to their cultural and physical environments. the cause behind these profound shifts in pedagogical perspective has been linked to what some researchers call the third setting or virtual setting (echeverría, 2000). understanding and adapting to changes introduced by new educational technologies is a problem not only at the practical level of use, but also at the level of pedagogy. learning how to think of technology as not simply one more channel of communication for information and knowledge, but also as something that shapes social reality, continues to be a profound challenge. if we think of education as a form of social technology, we might say that in principle the existence of a virtual setting or third setting only increases the potential of education as a social technology. this statement requires two clarifications: on the one hand, we must say what we mean by technology and, on the other hand, what definition of virtual setting can support a conception of education as social technology that would underscore its potential as a new form of pedagogy. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 41 the problem of technology is usually understood in terms of an instrumentalist approach, that is, as something we must know how to use in order to access other things. according to gonzález quirós (2004) this conception of technology sees it as something artificial, as something unnecessary for life. the definition also implies that technology may threaten our ability to lead a more natural life, a life devoid of the artifice of any technology. in many ways this definition points to one of the great challenges of the education system: to take technology as a reality born from the symbolic system of culture as a whole, abandoning the utilitarian conception of technology as a mere instrument. following quirós, we can distinguish between technologies that allow us to manufacture material objects and satisfy our needs (whether complex or basic) and social technologies. the purpose of social technologies is the generation of symbolic tools that prepare and motivate us in relation to the legitimisation of forms of political and social organisation. so it may be said that not all technology falls under the instrumentalist approach, but that some forms also fall under the banner of social organization. that so much of our lives are now part of the ‘virtual setting’ is proof of its power as a social media, since it is precisely from information and communication technology (ict) that the creation of new social spaces arise. the virtual or third setting can be seen as one more instrument within a wide range of instruments that make up the symbolic tools we use every day, and that shape the educational processes that occur within the most general socialisation processes. we can continue to see the virtual setting as a simple instrument –as artificial as it is contrived– and leave it in a subordinate position with respect to the educational system, or we can view it in terms of its vast educational potential, as something that can be developed to become a new educational paradigm. this latter view would recognize the potential contained in the technology and see it as empowering a certain kind of life, as being part of the political construction of a reality that we can engage. one of the key consequences of ict, and the virtual settings it gives rise to, is the realization that the instruments people produce to fulfil specific ends and goals occasionally go beyond their intended usage and the gratification of immediate needs. this point clearly shows that it is not simply instrumentality that defines the raison d’etre of technologies. in fact, we can see this expanded sense of icts in the many educational projects undertaken today that try to develop projects in the virtual setting, and that do this without subordinating their pedagogy and research goals to a conception of icts as mere instruments for learning. instead, icts are seen as creating social spaces and symbolic tools that provide learning experiences similar to those that take place in traditional (physical) spaces, whether this is a library, neighbourhood street, classmate’s house, farm-school, commercial establishment, or some other locale. however, although there are many studies that make explicit reference to the need to use icts in the classroom in order to conduct research more efficiently, or to introduce innovative pedagogical goals (martín-laborda, 2004), it can be said that for the standpoint of the virtual setting to flourish, one must delve deeper into its social and political implications. educational policies should be designed that directly explore this potential, understand its aims and challenges, and that approach the issue from the perspective of both politics and pedagogy, moving beyond the framework of mere digital literacy. in accordance with the viewpoint argued by echeverría (1999, 2000), there is, in our opinion, a way of viewing icts and their sister concept, the virtual setting, that can lead to greater benefits for the educational system as a whole. according to this viewpoint, the virtual setting may be considered not only as a “classroom methodology,” but also as a standpoint that impels us toward the re-conceptualisation and design of a different educational system, of a system specific to the third setting. we need to ask ourselves whether the social settings created through these new media might not have the capacity to generate a wholly different conception of action, one that concerns our common fate but that, until now, has belonged to the second setting, that is, the urban setting. in fact, hasn’t the virtual setting already changed much of our typical activities? for example, the way we invest, work, research, design, pilot, play, form relationships, make art, and even do sport. how can the virtual setting change so much of what we do, and yet not change the concept of human action itself? analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 42 2. virtual settings: the cognitive and epistemic problem of representation the virtual setting is a social space where nearly all the actions we carry out in the urban setting can be enacted, including collaborative actions or those involving intellectual co-operation. this is a specific type of action with a cognitive, political and even economic dimension of extraordinary importance not only for the education system but also for society as a whole. the development of these actions in the third setting constitutes an exploration of the second sense of the concept of technology as set out above. thus, for example, the dutch project, ontdeknet (www.iptop.com/showdirectory. htm?vcat=kids) which focuses on the development of telematic educational networks in which pupils have regular contact with researchers and experts in some subject, is based on a conception of technology as something more than an instrument to be used; rather, it constitutes a setting which favours the generation of new educational scenarios that enhance cognitive capabilities in powerful ways. we should see the new educational possibilities opened up in the virtual setting as going beyond the mere management and administrative functions we find in many programs, computer applications and even networks. one example of this would be an urban scenario in which a subject makes economic decisions and therefore has to add, work out equations and probability calculations, etc., in order to optimise his or her preferences in a virtual technological scenario. although this example illustrates a clear expansion of the concept of social reality to embrace the virtual world, it makes no sense from the stand point of education to exclude that expansion from the further charge of remodelling one’s participation in the socio-political sphere. ultimately, it is the education system that remains our most effective form of social technology, containing within it the power to socialise and legitimate other complex symbolic systems. despite its potential, there are many difficulties involved with implementing icts in the education system. these problems are understandable when we consider the complex changes that new communication technologies force on our cognitive and epistemic processes. the virtual setting is paradigmatic because of the many examples it provides of the difficulties that come with adapting icts to educational programmes. at a conceptual level it is easy to see the reticence that many have concerning the radical changes these new technologies can bring. these changes impact not only how we think about educational space, say at the level of the classroom, but at a more radical level they call into question the very idea of an autonomous and national education system, one whose boundaries have traditionally been seen as distinct from the virtual setting and its international telematic curricular models. this possibility (the possibility that boundaries can be crossed) is no longer an unrealistic or unrealisable hypothesis. if we consider that the pedagogical charge of education is to generate scenarios that expand our students’ concept of reality (and with this the way they experience how the world of reality is changed when concepts are instantiated and presented) we can see that education operates by means of representation, that how we define and experience reality is itself conceptual, and so depends on a medium that is not physical but rather representational. if education is about representation, then we can see how deficient it is to limit our views of technology to fulfilling largely instrumental functions, diminishing its cognitive, sensory and social dimensions. the following example should help bring home the point: organising the furniture of a classroom, establishing work groups and dividing the tables into islands, brings challenges that are both similar to, and yet different from, organising electronic networks and projects in the virtual setting that could enhance teaching and research goals. there can be no doubt that the organisation of physical space for pedagogical purposes does have a cognitive dimension, impacting us at the level of sensation and perception. consequently, we should expect to encounter specific difficulties when organising a virtual educational setting, since the physical environment cannot be relied upon to help guide our perceptions and direct our attention. in the same way, being a tele-tutor (or on-line instructor) poses different challenges than it does for a teacher who knows his or her pupils, and who can interact with them in designing a virtual educational scenario. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 43 overlooking complex differences like those mentioned above often means that the virtual setting ends up being used in a very limited way in the sphere of education. in order to even see the potential opened up by the virtual setting one needs to be aware of how the physical classroom environment both structures and limits students’ cognitive processes. these questions need to be confronted when one aims to change to the virtual setting, since this setting brings with it a new and open-ended sub-system of educational scenarios. therefore, it seems reasonable to claim that if one desires to create a more humanistic conception of technology –as seen in the works of gonzález quirós (2004), l. winner (1987) or f. dyson (1998) –which avoids the narrow utilitarian view of technology as a simple technique for achieving a defined goal, it is necessary to create new kinds of electronic classrooms. 3. “remote classrooms” and the problem of constant cognitive adaptation the development of virtual scenarios for the purpose of education gives rise to the idea of remote classrooms (echeverría, 2000). these remote classrooms go beyond regional, national, linguistic, generational, and even cultural boundaries to such an extent they revolutionize the very concept of mobility, shaping in new ways the spheres of university research and education; and this is especially true when it comes to the areas of secondary education, the baccalaureate, and professional training. it should be remembered that, in education, the term ‘physical mobility’ refers to the way knowledge is exported and becomes international. this process is further reinforced by the notion of ‘virtual mobility,’ which paradoxically implies the negation of physical mobility but in such a way that this negation carries out even further the internationalization of university education and research. as a result of these distinctions, it would be wise for those educating in the virtual setting to avoid insisting on overly rigid distinctions between the methodological dimensions of icts and plans for its specific use. taking a more open-ended approach has the benefit of making it easier for new technology to serve social ends. in order to reinforce this point we should note that having the aspiration to integrate icts as core skills in the teaching of all subjects (martín-laborda, 2004) may not guarantee that pupils will acquire skills and abilities in a way that would enable them to make use of their education in a socio-political setting, whether virtual or not. the same can be said for their use of educational skills within a recreational dimension, say in whether a given interest is turned into a hobby (dyson, 1998). “lifelong learning,” “learning to learn” and “digital literacy,” are essential components that inform contemporary research in pedagogy. however, we should realize that if we truly want cognitive and meta-cognitive strategies to take priority over mastery of content (which has to be acquired throughout a life, and requires the collaboration of others), then we need to establish those cognitive, educational and social contexts that will enable us to constantly re-educate ourselves. in light of this we need to see the principles that inform contemporary pedagogy in terms of the challenges posed by the virtual setting. it is precisely here at the level of underlying pedagogical theory that educational principles are introduced and that later take on a normative dimension (in the sense that these principles seek to regulate our actions in real, as well as possible, scenarios). as a consequence, these principles are descriptive not only of pedagogical policy but also inform a political point of view; to the extent pedagogical principles specify the rules that govern where learning takes place, whether in the virtual setting or some other, pedagogy is also politics. according to the interpretation of a. gonzález andino and f. sáez vaca (2003), the third virtual setting should be defined as a new artificial social space “whose human interactions are sustained by a technological superstructure” (p. 210). unfortunately, typical educational approaches to the virtual setting often miss its deeper implications. teaching models that genuinely engage the virtual setting require an approach that does more than just combine old elements, uniting together hardware, software and teaching staff, but that also generate new paradigms of education. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 44 4. icts and a new conception of action whether virtual spaces are educational depends on the kinds of different relationships that can be established in these spaces. therefore, the key to education in the virtual setting is to recognize the different forms of interaction that can be derived from technological superstructures. it should be added that the complexity of these interactions will vary greatly, and that some may even be similar to those we would traditionally expect in a regular classroom. however, we need to realize that the complexity of interaction alone does not guarantee the existence of educative scenarios; rather, the issue is whether actions can be linked through a technological superstructure that can contribute to a shared symbolic universe. such a link is the first step in granting participants access to a communal and ubiquitous virtual space through remote classrooms suspended in a constant, unitary time. the kind of education required to maintain such remote classrooms is, in theory, inseparable from the variety of possible scenarios that could be designed on the basis of the available technology. for example, a virtual class on sports education would require a technological superstructure to be developed that could create a new kind of class participation, one that expands the levels of sensory engagement beyond just doing individual sport activities. consequently, taking education seriously in the third setting means re-thinking all the traditional goals of instruction, such as, speaking, interpreting, reading, adding, writing, reasoning, not to mention the instruction of specific physical activities, like, swimming, playing, acting, painting, climbing, and so on. under the virtual setting each of these actions would also need to be approached in terms of their modularity, accessibility, communicability through different networks, artificiality, stability, digitization, and so on. it should now be easier to see how the very nature of action itself is challenged in the virtual spaces of education and which, in turn, creates a new field of difficulties for the educational system. moreover, given the incredible complexity of these issues and their unprecedented character, this challenge goes beyond principles of pedagogy, nor is it solvable at the level of software, hardware or any one type of technological superstructure (to help bring this point home consider romeñach and palacios’ discussion of the fate of the functional diversity model [2007]). to understand icts in the light of the networks people use to maintain relationships, communicate and cooperate with each other, has been a constant theme in authors interested in the meaning of technology for new social movements (h. rheingold, 2004). the question of what might define action from a social point of view has been made topical once more by studies such as that of sidney tarrow (1998), neil joseph smelser (1998) and alain touraine (2000). perhaps one of the most interesting features of rheingold’s contribution is his interest in how principles can be established to explain the nature of telematic networks. for example, what is the effectiveness of such networks from a social point of view? what is the capacity of such networks to generate new networks of collaboration? it is important to see that it is possible to set out a conception of icts within the virtual setting in such a way that their functional diversity is also embraced as an incentive for the development of better technology. moreover, these technological innovations can be seen not only as a result of responding to the diversity of functions enabled by new technologies, but also as adapting to situations, building off howard garner’s model of multiple intelligences (h. gardner, 1998). tracing the path of some of these issues, rheingold offers four principles to explain the effectiveness of networks. what is interesting about these principles is that they attempt to move beyond just an economic or technological point of view, but also point to the effectiveness of networks in light of social co-operation and communication. 1. the first principle is sarnoff’s law, which states: for those networks that transmit from a control centre to multiple places of reception, the value of the broadcasting network is proportional to the number of receivers or viewers. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 45 2. the second principle refers to moore’s law, which states: the extent of any technological revolution can be viewed in terms of its capacity for the miniaturization of electronics. 3. the third principle is melcalfe’s law, which states: the utility of any given network is in direct relation to the number of elements that make up that network. 4. the fourth principle, which i take to be one of the most important laws in rheingold’s argument, is reed’s law, which states: there are some networks whose social impact may grow exponentially with the size of the network. in all of these principles, and especially the last one, we can observe the social underpinnings of the laws they reference. in saying this i mean that any description regarding the success or effectiveness of electronic networks presupposes some concept of the socio-political sphere. for example, the effectiveness of an economic network depends on the ease with which the members of that network can set up and carry out economic activities. the same thing happens with respect to the success of university networks and, in general, with any educational and research networks, which makes networks of this type one of the most effective forms of social technology. these types of educational networks constitute, by definition, institutions that are embodied in the actions undertaken by their respective members, in which the limitations of physical space are still operative, but yet not in a way that impedes memebers at the level of symbolic or political participation; indeed, even temporal constraints are overcome to an extent, which presents us with a view of education as true universitas. 5. functional diversity and technological development in education palacios and romañach (2007) discuss the ways in which different models of education have been used in the past to categorise those people who have organs and bodies that function differently from the norm. they contend that the model of ‘functional diversity’ is the only one that conceptualises these differences as a capacity and a value. the model of functional diversity is an important concept, and one that can combat the narrow lens of traditional educational narratives of history, in which the fact of diversity is often met with by social oppression and discrimination. palacios and romañach show that the degree of social acceptance for a determinate form of functional diversity (for example, being short-sighted) depends on whether socially widespread solutions exist that can rein in or alleviate possible threats of discrimination. thus, when tools, techniques and available technologies are unable to accommodate physical diversity, that is when diversity enters the stage of discrimination (palacios and romañach, 2007: 35). this example should help to illustrate our point that the effective integration of any element within a network depends on the capacity of that element to assimilate tools and technologies in order to adapt competently. this adaptation is not about eradicating differences, but rather in finding a technology that can help make people functional. adaptations of this sort should result in not only the gradual cessation of discrimination against people of certain disabilities, but also lead to the development of new technology that can meet the challenges of diversity more directly. seen as a form of social technology, education in the third setting has the potential to promote processes of individual and/or collective socialisation that can tackle discrimination head on. in fact, if we accept the idea of education as social technology the following parallel seems to hold. first, just as the social impact of the educational network and its effects grow exponentially with the size of the network, so too does its capacity for discrimination (exclusion). second, the likely acceptance of a subject’s functional diversity depends on the degree that subject can be integrated into the social network. what this parallel should illustrate is that icts in the virtual setting are not just a network to which individuals are added, but rather act as social technologies that depend for their improvement as much on the diversity of their functions (social, political, cognitive, economic, etc.) as on the flexible adaption to our functional diversity (to our life cycles from infancy to old age, our changeable and fluctuating power of movement, our thresholds of audiovisual perception, etc.). proof of this can be seen in the many technological innovations spurned on by the challenges posed by devices like portable electronics, personal area networks, high-use user interfaces, and care systems in the home. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 46 6. the expression of a collective intelligence the approach put forward here places icts at the service of educational processes, and explores not only the profound potential of such technology, but also the challenges it poses for the domain of education. the revolutionary impact of this technology is clearly shown by the vast body of programmes that continue to be developed, and which range from speech rehabilitation and ergonomic keyboards to the development of guidelines to evaluate the accessibility of web pages, and even the creation of meta-languages to increase the levels of accessibility of computer applications (on this subject see j. cabero, m. córdoba and j. m. fernández batanero [2007]). finally, it must be pointed out that this conception of icts is also supported by p. levy’s research (2002) into the existence of a collective intelligence. levy conceives of cyberspace as the expression of a collective intelligence (or inter-legere) that joins people together by continually reconstituting social ties. one need not accept all of levy’s claims in order to see its value at both the descriptive and prescriptive level. from the descriptive level of cognitive functioning, it seems true that the advent of electronic networks and the development of icts can be seen from an evolutionary perspective, with advances in technology changing the very way we process and engage information. and from the prescriptive standpoint, it also seems true that the combination of icts with education has the power to generate new normative ideals of collective intelligence (and of collective action), some examples of which we explored earlier. the normative dimensions of the virtual setting are already observable in the fact that so many contemporary projects are designed around developing electronic systems of social space. these projects are responses, at least in part, to those who seek to eradicate situations of isolation, either related to age or other circumstances of daily life. this example demonstrates the plausibility of levy’s ideas about cyberspace as an expression of collective intelligence, an intelligence that is at once both descriptive and prescriptive of reality at the same time. we are left with a single social space that can be expanded infinitely into systems of social spaces, wherein the divide between the virtual dimension and the social dimension collapses. and so cyberspace is both a description of social reality as well as a creation of social reality. with possibilities like this, is it any wonder that the virtual setting would fundamentally transform the meaning of education from the inside out. notes * the research that has resulted in this article is consequence of the author’s participation in the research project inredis («interfaces de relación entre el entorno y las personas con discapacidad») for cenit program of the spanish ministry of industry, headed by the company technosite and funded by the cdti. such participation took place in the departamento de ciencia, tecnología y sociedad del instituto de filosofía del centro de ciencias humanas y sociales del consejo superior de investigaciones científicas (csic). references cabero, j.; córdoba, m.; fernández batanero, j. m. (eds.) (2007). las tic para la igualdad. nuevas tecnologías y atención a la diversidad. sevilla: eduforma. dyson, f. (1998). mundos del futuro. barcelona: crítica. echeverría, j. (1999). los señores del aire: telépolis y el tercer entorno. barcelona: destino. ---(2000). educación y tecnologías telemáticas. revista iberoamericana de educación nº 24. (retrieved from http://www.campus-oei.org/revista/rie14a01.htm) (02-05-08) fundación santillana (2008). las tic en la educación: panorama internacional y situación española. elaborated by cnice. (www.fundacionsantillana.org/contenidos/ analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 47 spain/semanamongrafica/xxii/documentobasico.pdf) (02-07-08) fundación vodafone (2003). tecnologías de la información y comunicaciones y discapacidad. (retrieved from http://fundación.vodafone.es/vsharedclient/ fundacionvodafone/pdf/informetic2.pdf) (04-05-08) gonzález andino, a., f. sáez vaca, f. (2008) análisis del tercer entorno y su aplicación a la innovación tecnológica. (retrieved from http// www.oei.es/salactsi/tercer.htm) (12-05-08) gonzález quirós, j. l. (2004). ciencia, tecnología y educación. fundación iberdrola. (retrieved from: http//www. fundacioniberdrola.org/pdf/eysc_cietecedu.pdf) (03-06-08) palacios, a., j. romañach, j. (2007). el modelo de la diversidad funcional. la bioética y los derechos humanos como herramientas para alcanzar la plena dignidad en la diversidad funcional. madrid: ediciones diversitas. rheingold, h. (2004). multitudes inteligentes. la próxima revolución social. barcelona: gedisa editorial. tarrow, s. (1998). the power in momevent. cambridge: cambridge university press. winner, l. (1987). la ballena y el reactor. una búsqueda de los límites en la era de la alta tecnología. barcelona: gedisa. address correspondences to: maría g. navarro instituto de filosofía centro de ciencias humanas y sociales madrid (spain) e-mail: maria.navarro@cchs.csic.es analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 31 democracy as morality: using philosophical dialogue to cultivate safe learning communities monica b. glina in order to begin to cultivate safe learning communities, serious social problems that manifest themselves in school settings and threaten its constituents need to be addressed. one such problem is bullying. bullying is a type of peer aggression (olweus, 1993; rigby, 1996; whitney & smith, 1993) defined as unrelenting, willful and malicious physical or psychological abuse (batsche & knoff, 1994; olweus, 1993) that results in physical or psychological harm (smith & thompson, 1991) to the victim (smith & sharp, 1994; underwood, 2003), the bully (batsche & knoff, 1994) and the bystander (twemlow, fonagy & sacco, 2004). approximately 160,000 students stay home from school each day because they are afraid of being bullied (vail, 1999), and an estimated half a million students nationwide are marked absent every 30 days because of bullying (sampson, 2000). thus, bullying clouds the school setting with fear and anxiety, which adversely affects a student’s ability to learn (greenbaum, turner & stephens, 1989). despite the negative effect that bullying can have on the entire climate of a school which can, in turn, create a mortally unpleasant experience for all students (hoover & hazler, 1991), many schools have failed to create a bully-free environment (shakeshaft et al., 1995; unnever & cornell, 2003). in order to cultivate safe learning communities, schools need to create bully-free environments. to accomplish this, research suggests that it is imperative to cultivate and nurture a safe school environment within which individuals know and interact with each other (gottfredson & gottfredson, 1985; finn, 1998) and within which a culture of trust exists amongst students (stone and isaacs, 2002). in this paper, i will make a theoretical argument for the promise that a pedagogical approach called philosophy for children, which features key tenets of democracy, like philosophical dialogue and deliberation, has as mechanism for cultivating and nurturing safe learning communities. bullying in schools research indicates that most bullying occurs in schools or on school grounds (garrett, 2003; rigby, 2003). hoover, oliver & hazler (1992) found that over 75% of middleand high-school students reported being bullied at least once during the course of their time in school. because of the frequency and severity of the aggression, bullying may be one of the most common and potentially serious forms of violence in schools (batche and knoff, 1994; espelage and swearer, 2003). a major study by vossekuil et al. (2002) of school shootings reported that the common denominator amongst students who had murdered their classmates was that they had been chronically bullied (vossekuil et al., 2002). in its recent analysis of 37 school shooting incidents, the u.s. secret service learned that a majority of the shooters had suffered “bullying and harassment that was long-lasting and severe” (u.s. secret service national threat assessment center, 2000). thus, research shows that bullying can be a significant reason why school children do not feel safe in school. until the problem of bullying in schools is addressed, it will continue to serve as an obstacle to creating a safe community for learning, an implication that extends beyond just the bully and the victim to all the community’s constituents. historically, researchers suggested that bullying involved at least two participants: a victim, who is the target of frequent episodes of physical and psychological abuse, and a perpetrator who is responsible for administering the abuse (perry, kusel & perry, 1988; farrington, 1993). recent studies redefine the bully/victim relationship analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 32 by featuring the bystander in as integral a role as the bully and the victim (twemlow, fonagy & sacco, 2004), suggesting that the bystander is an active participant in the “social architecture” of bullying (twemlow, fonagy & sacco, 2004) who may play a more significant role than previously recognized. furthermore, researchers who have examined the problem of bullying in schools from a variety of perspectives, have found that bullying has serious shortand long-term physical, academic, psychological, social or emotional effects for the bully, the bullied and the bystander (e.g. graham & juvonen, 1998; hawker & boulton, 2000; hazler, hoover & oliver, 1991; olweus, 1991, 1993; rigby, 2003). for example, the bully, the victim and the bystander can all manifest responses that range from depression, low self-esteem and adult psychosis to suicide and violence towards others (such as school shootings) to problems that extend well into adulthood (olweus, 1993; batsche & knoff, 1994; hazler, 1996; ballard, argus & remley, 1999; harris, petrie & willoughby, 2002), where they are manifested as elevated levels of aggression, attentional difficulties, anxiety, depression (clarke and kiselica, 1997; hawker & boulton, 2000) and low self-esteem (hawker & boulton, 2000). thus, the research suggests that all students in the school environment are affected in one way or another by bullying, hence, amplifying the urgency for the recognition of and effective response to this very serious and pervasive problem. empathy and bullying there is a strong correlation between low empathy and bullying (endresen & olweus, 2002; olweus, 1993; smith & thompson, 1991; rigby & slee, 1999; sutton, smith & swettenham, 1999). empathy is defined as sharing the emotions of another person (eisenberg & strayer, 1987). research suggests that bullies lack empathy for their victims, have difficulty feeling compassion (olweus, 1992) and are unable to understand and sympathize with another individual’s feelings (arsenio & lemerise, 2001; eisenberg & fabes, 1998). in addition to the absence of empathy, bullying is characterized by a disequilibrium between an individual who has power over another individual who is incapable of counteracting the aggression (roland & idsoe, 2001; horne et al., 2004). thus, it is critical to attempt to recalibrate the disequilibrium that exists amongst students by cultivating and nurturing a safe school environment within which individuals interact with one another (gottfredson & gottfredson, 1985; finn, 1998) and by creating a school environment within which a culture of trust exists amongst students (stone & isaacs, 2002, olweus, 1996). therefore, any proposed intervention to reduce bullying should (1) promote empathy, respect and caring (miller & eisenberg, 1988; olweus, 1993; rigby & slee, 1999; smith & thompson, 1991) and (2) recognize the power relations that exist between school children (roland & idsoe, 2001). i am proposing that an instructional approach that features democratic tenets such as dialogue and deliberation as core pedagogical values holds promise as a mechanism by which to accomplish these objectives and is an approach that departs from that used by many of the existing bullying interventions. existing interventions there are existing interventions that utilize an instructional model of “knowledge transmission” in which students are told what bullying is, what the characteristics of a bully are and what one should do if one encounters a situation in which bullying occurs (e.g. olweus, 1993; smith, ananiadou & cowie, 2003; smith, schneider, smith & ananiadou, 2004). using paul’s (1986) terminology, these interventions are ‘monological,’ since they do not offer students the opportunity to explore bullying on a deeper intellectual and emotional level, become conversant with and arrive at their own understanding of concepts, such as empathy, power, caring, respect, and justice. philosophy for children (p4c) is a unique pedagogical approach that uses philosophical dialogue to allow children to explore these concepts, to formulate their own understandings of the complex issues involved in bullying and aggression, to engage in structured dialogue with their peers and to reach judgments about how to make their experiences more meaningful. the empirical evaluations of anti-bullying interventions have yielded mixed results. some studies report only modest improvements (e.g. olweus, 1993; smith, ananiadou & cowie, 2003; smith, schneider, smith & ananiadou, 2004), while others fail to show any significant improvement (e.g. rigby, smith & pepler, 2004). thus, empirical research supports the assertion that interventions based largely on transmission may lack the analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 33 qualities necessary to affect change and make an impact on the problem of bullying. because existing interventions have not significantly or successfully impacted the problem of bullying, a new approach may be necessary. i am proposing an instructional method that could offer students the opportunity to move beyond being mere recipients of information presented to them by adults and engage, instead, in a substantive examination of essential issues underlying aggression, such as fairness, respect, caring, justice and empathy using two key features of democracy: dialogue and deliberation. democracy as morality a theoretical argument can be made for the significance of a democratic approach. dewey (1916) explains that democracy is more than the processes and procedures associated with politics and government. he argues that democracy is also comprised of a moral component, or “an ethical way of life,” that informs the way in which individuals should think about issues that affect their communities and the people within them. dewey (1916) further argues that individuals have a moral obligation to others in their community, and the decisions and actions that they make must be understood in terms of the way they influences the lives of others. “a being connected with other beings cannot perform his own activities without taking the activities of other into account, for they are indispensable conditions of the realization of his tendencies. when he moves, he stirs them and reciprocally” (dewey, 1916, 14). thus, democracy for dewey is a political process mediated by the moral consciousness of its participants, who are committed to making unbiased, nonrepressive, nondiscriminatory decisions. dewey recognizes the importance of educating all citizens so that they understand how to participate as moral agents responsible for deliberating over political issues and suggests that it is the role of schools to facilitate this education. democracy has many meanings, but it has a moral meaning. it is found in resolving that the supreme test of all political institutions and industrial arrangements shall be the contributions they make to the all-around growth of every member of society (186). according to dewey, it is the role of social institutions, like schools, to establish conditions such that all their constituents are educated to actively participate in, deliberate about, and contribute to the development of each other as well as the development of their school community. “a society is undemocratic…if it restricts rational deliberations or excludes some educable citizens from an adequate education” (gutmann, 1999, 95). gutmann (1999) argues for the importance of deliberation in a democracy as “a means of reconciling differences” and “an important part of democratic education” (11). thus, dialogue and deliberation informed by a moral consciousness are means by which citizens in a democracy can negotiate issues underlying aggression, such as fairness, respect, caring, justice and empathy so that they support an ethical way of life. philosophy for children philosophy for children (p4c) is an established instructional approach that features philosophical dialogue and opportunities for deliberation. lipman (2003) argues against telling students what is right and wrong. instead, he suggests that children should learn to arrive at their own conclusions by engaging in exploratory dialogue with one another. p4c’s inquiry-based, dialogically-driven group setting offers students precisely the kind of forum that allows students to benefit from social interaction with their fellow participants and engage concepts collectively. as argued by vygotsky, individuals are social and cultural beings who learn through interactions with others (wertsch, 1981). the ideas that are generated during the sociocultural exchange are reflected upon, cognitively accommodated and then internalized (vygotsky, 1978). it is through this process that children learn to think for themselves. understanding the descriptive parameters of dialogue is critical for understanding the transformative power that dialogue can have. lipman makes a clear distinction between conversation and dialogue, arguing that a analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 34 conversation involves stability while dialogues involve instability (lipman, 2003). a conversation involves turntaking, but the turn-taking neither advances nor enriches the conversation. on the other hand, a dialogue manifests instability, which represents a series of arguments and counter-arguments that continually propel the dialogue forward. each turn taken by an individual is a logical, purposeful “move” to both actuate and substantively elevate the dialogue. the descriptive parameters of dialogic inquiry need to be expanded beyond purposeful moves to encompass the central role that dialogic inquiry plays in establishing and nurturing dispositions. dialogic inquiry serves as the vehicle that facilitates the way in which the community sets acceptable parameters for social interaction. participants, learn, for example, to acknowledge the opinions of others, respect the rights of others to be heard in a fair and equitable manner and entertain multiple perspectives. therefore, dialogic inquiry and social interaction together constitute good inquiry. doing good inquiry is not just a way for students to explore concepts in a deeper, more meaningful way; because there are certain ways individuals act when they are doing inquiry, it becomes the way that students learn to behave toward one another. “individuals not only internalize the methods of collaborative performance, they also internalize the characteristic behaviors that come from engaging in a community of inquiry” (burgh et al., 2006). this has significant implications for a successful bullying intervention since doing good inquiry requires a commitment to the dialogue and its participants. engaging in a deeper, more meaningful exploration of issues underlying aggression implies more than just the act of dialogic inquiry but necessarily includes social attributes, such as fairness and respect, which constitute good inquiry. the process of inquiry and dialogue, therefore, are insufficient if a sensitivity toward and understanding of another’s values, interests and beliefs is absent (lipman, sharp & oscanyan, 1980). philosophy for children helps students, “both understand and practice what is involved in violence reduction and peace development. they have to learn to think for themselves about these matters, not just to provide knee-jerk responses when we present the proper stimuli” (lipman, 2003, p. 105). caring thinking is the component of p4c that requires individuals (1) to “care for the other” through love and respect, (2) to “care for his or her own beliefs” by valuing his or her own personal beliefs and values and (3) to “care for the inquiry” by taking judgment seriously. “if thinking does not contain valuing or valuation, it is liable to approach its subject matters apathetically, indifferently, and uncaringly, and this means it would be diffident even about inquiry itself” (lipman, 2003). caring thinking empowers students to establish a value system which leads them toward making sound and compassionate value judgments (lipman, 2003). the dialogic and intersubjective features of p4c necessitate an interaction between students and their classmates. research suggests that learning in small groups supports students’ abilities to work with others in a democratic society (dillon, 1994, gastil, 1993; parker, 2001). cohen (1992) and johnson, johnson and stanne (1989) argue that constructive peer interaction promotes tolerance, diversity and communication in a democratic society. by virtue of the rules of inquiry and an experienced facilitator, students are restricted to well-reasoned exchanges directed toward advancing the dialogue, thus severely limiting or eliminating attempts at or displays of aggression. the social disequilibrium that students feel as victims of bullying can translate itself into a dialogic disequilibrium, which can open the door to discussions of empathy and understanding. thus, students use specific rules of inquiry, such as reasoning and concept clarification, to debate reasonably with one another as they analyze questions of morality and mediate their notions of complex issues, such as caring, empathy, fairness and respect. recent research shows that children are developmentally ready to participate in dialogic discussions and engage in abstract thinking about issues such as fairness, respect, caring, justice and empathy at an early age (reznitskaya et al., in press; crowhurst, 1988; stein & trabasso, 1982), although many educators have previously underestimated this ability in young children. students, though, are not only developmentally ready to handle these concepts but come to appreciate that only by participating in a thinking community where it is incumbent upon them to clarify and defend their ideas with good reasons, where they are helped by others to articulate their ideas and where their ideas are addressed, extended and strengthened by others, can they make judgments that analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 35 are meaningful for them. they recognize that these judgments are the result of multiple and diverse perspectives and begin to realize that even those who disagree with them and with whom they disagree are valuable resources for their own inquiries (gregory, 2004). democracy is not a low-maintenance endeavor. among its requirements is a system of education that prepares people for it—not only to operate it, in the sense of knowing civics, but to constitute it, in the sense of practicing civility (fenstermacher, 1999, 14). in order to begin to cultivate safe learning communities, schools need to address serious social problems, such as bullying. in order to do so, it is incumbent upon schools to provide opportunities for students to critically examine social practices, reflect on what they learn and put that learning into action. philosophy for children is an instructional method that offers students a mechanism by which to accomplish this. conclusion if an educational intervention centered around philosophical discussions, such as philosophy for children does, in fact, have the potential to impact the way students approach each other and the conflicts that arise among them, the implications for reducing instances of bullying in schools and, in turn, cultivating safe learning communities are significant. philosophy for children, or a similar environment centered around a philosophical dialogue, offers a practical, pedagogical vehicle by which participants in a school community can address the attributes essential for a successful bullying intervention by (1) promoting empathy, caring and respect and (2) working toward rectifying the imbalance that exists between bullies and their victims in an effort to begin to redress bullying behavior. while committed to the procedures of inquiry, philosophy for children pedagogy holds discussion participants equally and simultaneously responsible for adhering to conditions such as mutual respect, fairness and an absence of indoctrination. these are the attributes which have implications for school children whose lives are impacted by bullying each and every day (e.g., smith & thompson, 1991; batche & knoff, 1994; nansel et al., 2001; olweus, 2001; rigby, 2001; espelage & swearer, 2003; garrett, 2003; rigby, 2003) as well as for educators who strive to create and nurture safe learning environments. because of the shortand long-term impact that bullying has on the lives of children, there is a clear urgency to identify a successful educational intervention. previous approaches focused on didactic teaching and have yielded disappointing results (e.g. olweus, 1993; smith, ananiadou & cowie, 2003; smith, schneider, smith & ananiadou, 2004). none have used philosophical dialogue as a means by which to affect change in attitudes of violence and aggression amongst schoolchildren. while p4c has been evaluated in relation to other outcomes, such as gains in reasoning skills (e.g. camhy and iberer, 1988; banks, 1989), self esteem relative to family relationships (pálsson et al., 1998) and gains in academic performance (meyer, 1988; jackson, 1993), its impact has not been assessed in relation to issues underlying aggression. the proposal that i have set forth makes a theoretical argument for the potential that philosophical dialogue has for addressing this significant social problem and invites research that will provide concerned educators with practical and empirically-supported suggestions for addressing bullying in their schools as a step toward creating environments that promote safe, democratic and caring communities of learning. references arsenio, w. f. & lemerise, e. a. 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(1993). a survey of the nature and extent of bullying in junior/middle and secondary schools. educational research, 35, 3-25. address correspondence to: monica glina, montclair university, glinam@mail.montclair.edu analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 70 befriending wisdom rhett gayle introduction we live amidst the biggest explosion in knowledge in human history. more and more facts emerge, faster and faster, from the activities of researchers. more and more applications of those facts are then trans� formed into technologies which in turn allow the further emergence of yet more facts. this process is driven by methodological innovation in the production of knowledge that began crystallizing during the renaissance and hit its stride during the enlightenment. set adrift from its traditional focus on wisdom by descartes� accom�set adrift from its traditional focus on wisdom by descartes� accom� modation of the new science and cemented into the new paradigm by kant�s critical move to make philosophy a kind of knowledge, philosophers have been active and full participants in the new approach. there have been suspicions, however, given the ways that certain aspects of modern life seem to have gone astray, that leaving wisdom behind was perhaps, well, unwise. motivated by this thought, some philosophers want to return to our roots as a discipline focused on wisdom. philosophers are by strong inclination interested in educating the young, so it is natural for us to want to include our students in this revival. teaching wisdom in the modern academy, on the other hand, seems a rather difficult task. the notion of the transfer of knowledge, conceived of as collections of facts and their relationships, as the central task of education inclines against teaching wisdom. the methods and attitudes that philosophy has developed while adapting to a world dominated by abundant, scientifically created knowledge, are also impediments. in this paper i will be looking at some of the barriers to teaching wisdom facing a philosopher in modern academia. broadly, the barriers can be divided into two cat� egories: confusions based on the notion that knowledge is wisdom or at least serves the role that wisdom had previously served, and those arising from the belief that wisdom is a kind of knowledge not too different from the propositional knowledge that other disciplines teach. i will then offer an alternative framework for thinking about the teaching task that focuses on the notion that the goal is not a transfer of knowledge but the beginning of a friendship, a friendship between the student and wisdom. pedagogical assumptions of the university context universities are in the business of manufacturing and distributing knowledge. knowledge consists of propo� sitions, grouped by discipline, and the methods by which those facts are justified as being worthy of believing as true. knowledge is only knowledge if it is explicitly representable. the model for knowledge production and jus� tification is science, especially mathematical physics. analysis, the breaking of things and processes into discrete parts, is the foundational method which underlies the specific methods of the various disciplines. knowledge is, of course, independent of the characteristics of the knower, being objective and hence democratically accessible to all. reason is a tool for analysis and calculation, to be used to manipulate the propositions as needed. the job of the teacher is to act as the distributor of knowledge to the students. the teacher knows which propositions are relevant to the discipline being studied and directs the students toward them. the methods of justification of the discipline are also presented. since knowledge is a kind of explicit representation, it is an important feature of good teaching to be as clear as possible. what is being taught should be specifiable in detail analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 71 and the results of teaching should be clearly measurable. the minds of students are best thought of as blank slates or empty boxes, which the teaching process fills up with the relevant propositions and provides with the relevant methods. the slate or the box remains the same, while the contents change via learning. in order to know whether the learning objectives have been met, the contents of the box must be measured. this is accomplished primarily by testing in which the students� memory is sampled. correct answers are evidence of learning and incorrect answers evidence of lack of learning. since knowledge is propositional and its possession measurable, it is obvious that there must be correct and incorrect answers. put in simple terms, teaching is the transmission of a series of propositionally expressible messages and the checking to make sure that the messages have been received. what is being transmitted is knowledge. once the correctness of answers has been assessed students are then assigned differential rewards according to how well they did on the task of providing correct answers. the students have been conditioned to have emo� tional reactions to the rewards and further believe that their collection of rewards can be traded at some later date for more concrete rewards provided by society. there are two assumptions that underlie the reward system. the first is connected to the notion that the university is sorting people out for future roles in society. the sec� ond is that the motivation for learning needs to be provided from some external source. philosophical pedagogy in the context of the university the teaching of philosophy obviously operates in the context of the pedagogical assumptions of the univer� sity. the notion that knowledge consists of explicitly representable propositions, the truth of which is established by methods of appropriate justification is quite consonant with analytic practice. when applied to teaching phi� losophy, the knowledge transmission model produces pedagogy that treats arguments as items to be memorized, and analysis as the method to be applied to these items. professionally we philosophers provide the evaluation of knowledge produced by other disciplines via our methods of critique and produce knowledge of our own in the form of arguments. we pass on to our students, via transmission, our knowledge. we evaluate our students knowing what and knowing how in a manner not too dissimilar to those of our colleagues in other fields. the practice of teaching philosophy fits, perhaps with some moments of bad conscience, into the model of transmit� ting knowledge to the ready minds of students, students who are motivated to learn in hopes of some abstract reward. knowledge is an abstract commodity and we contribute our share to its manufacture and distribution. in this way of looking at the project philosophy has both knowledge of its own and can act as quality control for the other products. the problem of teaching wisdom in the context of university philosophy teaching when we think of the phrase “teaching wisdom”, given the assumptions of the pedagogical model that i have been discussing, we might think that wisdom is some kind of knowledge of the sort that could be characterized as a set of propositions that could be taught to students in just the same way that other things are taught. there would be, of course, methods of manufacturing and justifying those propositions that would count as wisdom. students would be found in libraries and other quiet places, storing wisdom in their capacious memories along side the history of us (1860 to 1940) and other such topics. later we could test them in usual ways to see if they had learned wisdom. the absurdity of this scenario shows that wisdom is not the sort of knowledge, if it is knowledge at all, that the university, as it is currently configured, is set up to teach. further it seems that philosophy, having eaten the pomegranate seeds of the underworld, is similarly hindered from the teaching of wisdom. wisdom, as it is traditionally conceived, is a virtue or a power. it is not a kind of propositional knowledge or a method for producing or justifying propositional knowledge at all. it is a quality that someone has, being analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 72 wise, rather than a commodity that they possess. it is true that wise people have written books full of declarative sentences that are designed to express wisdom. yet the memorization of those sentences, even believing them, does not mean the person remembering and believing them is wise. a working definition of wisdom there are undoubtedly a number of ways that wisdom could be defined. it is not the goal of this essay to address that problem. instead i will offer a working definition which accords well enough to the common use of the term to be helpful to the task of sorting through the potential solutions to the problem of teaching wisdom as a philosopher in the university. for the sake of this discussion then, i will define wisdom as the power to choose well. there are a number of qualities or abilities that someone who is able to choose well would need to have. i would like to focus on four in particular, although there are surely others that are also important. again i am not providing rigorous arguments for my choices. i offer them as being representative of the family of qualities that we commonly assign to the wise. to count as a person who has wisdom, possessing the ability to distinguish appearance and reality would seem to be crucial. choices obviously need to be grounded in reality in order to be effective. since what is real and what is not is often not clear on the face of it, the wise person must have good epistemic discernment. the wise person is also aware of the limits of their knowledge. in other words they acknowledge their own ignorance. human understanding of the world is limited and individual understanding more limited still. without recognizing these limits, choices are made as if knowledge were perfectly certain and this can easily be disastrous. choices are always aimed at some end. in order for choices to be wise they must be aimed at some actually good end. the ability to distinguish appearance and reality is not just about metaphysics or concerned with our ability to tell if someone is lying but is also applicable to the realm of what is worth desiring. it is not enough to merely know what is good though, it has to be wanted as well, so we could think of this aspect of wisdom as the quality of desiring well. perhaps the core concept of what it means to be wise, and hence what founds the ability to choose well, is self knowledge. the wise person knows themselves. this is not merely knowing a set of propositions that are true of oneself, but is some other kind of knowledge, the possession of which has some ongoing transformative impact on the knower. when someone knows themselves, their choices reflect the reality of who they are. some potential solutions having adopted a tentative working definition of wisdom and surveyed some of the qualities or abilities asso� ciated with it, we are now in a position to look at some potential solutions to our problem as teachers of wisdom. all of the solutions that i will examine in this section are being used in one way or another already. i will point to what i think are the problems with each approach in light of the previous discussion. in the next section i will turn to a framework that i think will allow us to make some progress toward success. the technocratic solution is to define wisdom so that it is just knowing what means skilfully obtain which ends. choosing well just means picking the best technical solution to the problem of achieving whatever goal you have selected and then implementing it. wisdom reduces to knowledge, in fact knowledge of exactly the sort the university is set up to manufacture and distribute, so teaching this sort of wisdom is what is already being done. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 73 presumptively philosophy is taught as intellectual quality control, so that the ways in which calculative reason is brought to bear on technical problems are absent the flaws in logic that would undermine the process. really this is just a rejection of the notion that wisdom has a role in education, since none of the qualities or abilities (except perhaps distinguishing appearance and reality in some basic sense) are cultivated or valued. there is no consideration of desirable ends, or self knowledge, only the pursuit of ends that seem good at the time. if this solution worked, conveniently nothing needs to change as there is really no problem anyway. the critical thinking solution is to recognize that wisdom consists of being able to distinguish good beliefs from bad beliefs (a version of the appearance/reality distinction). some of this work is done by good empirical in� vestigation, but philosophy retains the job of making sure the justifications are up to the task. teaching wisdom consists of arming our students with the tools necessary to reject bad arguments where ever they may be found. this approach extends the ability to distinguish appearance and reality that the technocratic solution offers; it might also help with the acknowledgement of ignorance, although in practice the rewards for correct answers and the fear of a lapse into wild relativism militate against this. if we add an ethical problem solving dimension to the approach, it has some of the flavour of meeting the need to choose good ends that i discussed as part of wisdom earlier, and that is missing altogether from the technocratic approach. it does not, however, provide any impetus for change that is aimed at the level of desire and certainly does not work at all in terms of developing self knowledge. the critical thinking approach has the same virtue that the technocratic approach has in that it does not require any change in practice, only a renaming of the product of the practice. perhaps the most damn� ing argument against the critical thinking approach as the right one is that it is the very approach that leads interested parties to wonder about the difficulties of teaching wisdom in the first place. if the problem is business as usual, then casting the net wider might produce some better ideas. choosing well does seem to involve notions of the good, so perhaps the reluctance to teach values directly might be at issue. while the critical thinking approach is, of course, critical, its primary form of critique emphasizes logic and other such concerns, rather than value oriented issues like power and oppression. perhaps the solution to the problem of teaching wisdom is to take a page from the playbook of those disciplines that have turned more toward postmodernity in their approach to education. let us tendentiously call this approach, the ideological ap� proach. there is a clear attempt to influence choices in this pedagogical strategy through the direct presentation of the correct values and attitudes that one should have, if one is to be a good person. in light of these values, assumptions are suspiciously examined to discover how reality (oppression, class interest, racism) is hidden by ap� pearance (false consciousness, denial, self deception of the powerful). the purpose of the relevant choices which are encouraged is to produce a better society (or world, depending on the ambitiousness of the teacher) and so the question of what good is be pursued is answered. there is much to recommend what i am calling the ideological approach, especially its emphasizing the moral character of the choices that we make. it, however, fails as a strategy for teaching wisdom, especially as a strategy that would allow analytically inclined philosophers to teach wisdom. the relativism that underpins it intellectually forces the teacher to, on the one hand, proclaim the relativity of all values and, on the other, to pro� claim that oppression is wrong and that we should value tolerance over other values. this kind of incoherence can perhaps be justified by a rejection of logical coherence as some kind of logocentric fetish but this seems like empty name calling, and further would sit poorly with a discipline in which analysis is the core methodology. if we accept the rejection of logic as a basis for argument, then it seems that thinly disguised bullying and playing on moral sentiments that have been inculcated by other means are all that remain to the postmodern educator. the desire for the good is reduced to an internalized political agenda and self knowledge seems limited to the discovery of the ways in which one has been either a victim or an oppressor or both. at its best the ideological approach will produce justice, not the virtue we are concerned with in this case, and in the worst case it is an approach intellectually unsuitable to the philosophically inclined and unproductive of wisdom. it is possible that wisdom should be taught as a skill, a knowing how rather than a knowing what. this might analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 74 prove to be consonant with the emphasis on method in analytic philosophy. it would have to be skills that are somehow different than the critical thinking skills that were discussed above. instead they would be skills that allowed for the successful navigation of the social world and the challenges of pursuing one�s goals in the context of other humans. let us call this approach the sophistical solution. teaching wisdom would involve teaching the arts of persuasion, both overt and covert, in terms of outer success and methods for achieving the appropriate emotive states such as confidence and cheerfulness in terms of the inner life. this approach has the possibility of aiding a certain kind of good life, good in terms of achieving one�s goals. the sophistical strategy fails as a good strategy for teaching wisdom, in spite of being the strategy most directly focused on the task at hand. it fails for some of the same reasons that the technocratic solution fails. it is con� cerned only with the means but not the ends of choice and action. it is not even as good as the technological so� lution at practicing a discipline of distinguishing reality and appearance, as illusions, both one�s own and those created in others, might be the best means to some goal. it, in the end, entails the same problems of relativism that the ideological solution entails, without even the justification of a moral focus. since as a strategy it could avail itself of some of the tools of analysis, some of its subject matter could be taught by philosophers but in the end it seems more like a discipline for psychologists, personal improvement trainers and gurus. it is a return to the strategies of the teachers of wisdom in ancient greece and as such is a repudiation of the whole project of philosophy. nonetheless it might be the best shot at teaching wisdom, if we think that wisdom is some kind of knowledge that we can explicitly teach. befriending wisdom i think that the vital clue to making progress in creating a useful approach to teaching wisdom, while practic�practic� ing analytic philosophy, lies in the name of the discipline itself. philosophers are not the wise, as the sophists styled themselves, but merely the friends of wisdom. we have been deceived by the success of the natural philoso� phy side of philosophy and the explicit knowledge transmission model of pedagogy into thinking that to teach wisdom we must do so directly, explicitly. this is the key error. if we are going to successfully teach wisdom, then it will be by acquainting our students with wisdom in the way we would encourage a friendship between people. we do not think that encouraging a friendship consists of passing on facts about the people we wish to intro� duce, nor would we merely offer arguments for why they should be friends. of course we offer reasons for why the friendship should exist. “you should meet sophia. you would love her, she�s so funny.” this is not enough, however, a relationship must come about or there is no friendship. we cannot change the larger context in which philosophical teaching occurs. we can, however, change the frame within which we teach. i have proposed a shift to the notion that we are acting to promote a friendship between our students and wisdom. i will discuss some of the implications of this shift below but it seems useful to discuss how shifting the framework in which teaching is practiced might be helpful in general. the meaning of an activity is tied crucially to the end at which it is aimed. this can even effect how easy it is to learn something. for example, it has been found that people have an easier time learning 3 ball juggling if they think the end goal is learning 5 ball juggling than if they think learning 3 ball juggling is the end goal. learning 3 is just a step on the way to the much harder goal of learning 5. similarly, if being able to produce and evalu� ate good arguments is the end goal, the students� and teacher�s attention and what they get out of the process is very different than if they think arguments are part of a process of approaching wisdom in some indirect but effective way. expectations that whatever topic is under discussion will contribute to developing self knowledge or coming to desire well, and so forth, create a very different learning experience than expecting that one will sharpen the argumentative knife to a fine edge. this is true even if the very same topics and methods are the center of attention. the framework in which teaching is conducted also effects the attitude that the teacher has toward the stu� analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 75 dents. if the teacher is transmitter of knowledge, then the students are seen as passive in a certain way and the teacher must work hard. if instead the teacher is striving to bring about a friendship, then they can adopt the role of the socratic midwife, actively helping the student, but also trusting the students to do their part, really the larger part in pursuing the outcome. by shifting the framework, the minds of the students are no longer experienced as empty boxes to be laboriously filled, but instead as being already full and dynamic, ripe to be introduced to wisdom. shifting the framework in which teaching is envisaged can also change what we as teachers invent, in terms of experiences and assignments. assessment and fulfilling the task of sorting students is obviously still needed but the kinds of questions that are asked and the kinds of tasks to be performed can shift as the notion of what is being accomplished shifts. of course, analytic skills and knowledge of specific arguments can still be investi� gated, but the purpose of that knowledge has changed, so its assessment can also change in both meaning and form. i will return to this theme very briefly in the last section of the paper where i will touch on some examples of teaching practice in light of befriending wisdom. the teacher�s internalized framework is communicated to the students, even if it is never explicitly presented. the focus on explicit knowledge transmission obscures this very important fact about teaching. the teacher is acting as a model for the students, and learning by imitation of models is a very powerful and constantly operat� ing feature of human learning. of course the modelling of being a friend of wisdom, rather than one of the wise, frees teachers from the need to somehow act the role of the wise person or think that they must be wise to teach wisdom. it also means that they can model using arguments as tools rather than as the point of the exercise. the power of philos real friendship is based on a kind of love. this love has effects not just on the one who is loved but in the best cases on the one who is doing the loving. since i am proposing that we put friendship with wisdom back at the core of the philosophical enterprise, it seems useful to spend a little time discussing some of the ways that friendships can benefit people seeking wisdom. of course, wisdom itself is the best friend in this context, but let�s begin with just some general thoughts about the benefits of friendship. at the heart of friendship is the mysterious presence of the other. their value to us in friendship lies at least in large part in the fact that they are not us. this distance allows for curiosity, exploration that is motivated not by some hope of external rewards, but with knowledge of the friend. this experience of curiosity in some sense is its own reward. further the mysteriousness of the friend helps us to see the limits of our knowledge, not just in the sense that they know things that we do not but also that they see the world from a viewpoint that is not our own. the desire to be friends leads to the desire to see the world from their viewpoint and so helps us develop intellectual empathy. this actually allows us more access to self knowledge as we can genuinely step outside our view of ourselves and the world and see them through other eyes. friends challenge us to become better people. they can do this directly and also by acting as models of excel� lence. friends disagree and argue, but in deep friendship the goal is not winning the argument. it is a way of exploring, genuinely encountering, not merely tolerating another mind. one of the features of this encounter is that friends incorporate the qualities of their friends into themselves. in some sense this is a model of how the friends of wisdom develop their capacity for wisdom. being friends with wisdom brings with it the usual benefits of friendship, although wisdom is obviously an unusual sort of friend. she cannot speak for herself, so must have surrogates that speak for her. all of the other minds that the student encounters in a philosophy class can perform this role, if the student is primed to expect the voice of wisdom underneath the conversation. both the teacher and any authors that might be read can analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 76 enact wisdom for the student. to emphasize a point i have made several times, this is not necessarily because the text or the teaching is explicitly conveying propositions about wisdom. perhaps the topic is trolley problems or our knowledge of the external world. the opportunity to develop self knowledge and the other qualities of wisdom is still there. friendship is an ongoing process, so there will be no final moment when the student has gotten wisdom, the way they might get calculus or how a reductio argument works. this might seem problematic in the outcome oriented environment of the university but this is only a seeming. the process of creating and nurturing the student�s friendship with wisdom can occur mostly in the background of activities that are perfectly recognizable as legitimate knowledge transmission oriented pedagogy. further they use the skills that analytic philosophers have already developed, so this way of framing teaching philosophy has the advantages of the technocratic and critical thinking solutions, without the failure to really address the issue of wisdom. some introductory examples of praxis in hopes of stimulating the imagination of my readers, i am including here some examples of what i have done in the classroom acting on the ideas discussed so far in the paper. all of the examples are drawn from my introduction to philosophy class. each example presumes that the substance of the argument is being treated in the usual way. some of the experiential examples do help the students connect with and understand the argu� ments themselves, but my focus in the discussion is on the cultivation of the friendship with wisdom. to set up the framework, and to put something in the back of the students� minds for the rest of the semes� ter, i discuss wisdom as the underlying goal of philosophy the first day of class. after looking at the etymology of the word, i ask the students to talk about what qualities they think a wise person has and whether wisdom is something that can be learned. this leads into a discussion of the difference between knowledge and wisdom, and the role of the kinds of questions that philosophy asks in the search for wisdom. this strategy as a way of opening the class not only has the virtue of producing an expectation that befriending wisdom is the goal of the class, but also gets them into the habit of actively thinking about the topic at hand rather waiting for the instruc� tor to tell them what to think. personal identity is an important topic for philosophers. in addition to the arguments, the topic can be used to promote self knowledge, a crucial aspect of wisdom. in the section on personal identity i like to use, among other authors, a section of hume. to set up the discussion i ask them to think about if it would matter if it were false that they had a self which endured across time. this brings out the ways in which the self is important in their thinking about life. i then ask them to just take a moment and introspect, looking for that self that they are convinced that they have and which they believe is obvious. as they are doing this, i point out that sensa� tions and thoughts, even thoughts about the self, are not the experience of the self, so they should search more thoroughly. in the ensuing discussion, the various attempts to put this thought or that in the place of the self can be undermined. this prepares them for the discussion of hume (and kant if one is inclined that way) and it also shakes their confidence in their own self knowledge, which is of course necessary for them to gain any deeper self knowledge. the hume lesson can also lead into a discussion of the difference between observation and what the mind adds, by focusing on the discussion of causality. i perform some actions that are obviously causal (knocking one eraser into another, turning off and on the light) and then ask them to describe what they have observed, focus� ing especially on the question of whether they observed the causing. in the case of the light example it is very easy to get students to see that they are inferring the causation. with some good questions they can also come to see that they are also inferring the causation in the case of the erasers. i return to this when i do epistemology, the section of the course most obviously focused on being developing epistemic discernment, another important ability of the wise. i open that section with russell�s discussion of our perception of a table and how problematic analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 77 that is. he does a very nice job of pointing out the ways in which our previous knowledge plays into the way we interpret our sensory experience without even realizing it. before the discussion i have them observe a book placed squarely before them. i ask then if the cover appears to be a rectangle, reminding them of the definition of a rectangle. with a bit of work it is possible to get them to drop what they “know” and see that the far edge is shorter than the near edge and hence the sides are not parallel. having gotten them to see that direct visual experience and the interpretation of visual experience are not the same, the russellian attack on their naive real� ism is more effective. after the reading, i ask them to journal their experience of spending an afternoon seeing the world as much as possible with the interpretation turned off, focusing on just the raw visual experience. this deepens their direct contact with the ways in which their neurology is between them and the world, advancing both the possibility of connecting to the epistemological arguments of locke and descartes and seeing that the distinction between appearance and reality is one that can be explored outside the classroom. earlier i emphasized the importance of the role of being able to choose well in wisdom. to be able to choose well involves having a good theory to apply in ethically complex situations and some notion of one�s moral intui� tions, both of which can be supplied by experience in the relevant kinds of philosophical argumentation. it also involves some awareness of the kinds of choices that one is inclined to make and what the motivation for those choices might be. a good place to start this discussion could be mill�s distinction between the higher and lower pleasures. of course, there is a great deal of philosophical work to be done around whether the distinction and the argument for it is any good, as well as showing why the distinction is important. i also like to ask them if they would choose to live the life of a well cared for pet. they can be pushed to justify their choice and this brings out the distinction between different kinds of pleasure quite strongly. offering to plug them permanently into the pleasure machine does much the same work, with respect to the importance of meaning and effort in pleasures appropriate to good human life. i also assign a journaling exercise in which they spend an afternoon noticing the pleasures that they choose and categorizing them as higher or lower pleasures. they are invited to reflect on the choices and the process of choosing in light of mill�s remarks. i return to the theme of choice and desire when i do the section on free will. one of the texts i use is d�holbach�s argument against the existence of free will. the students are usually quite confident that they have free will, in fact a will so free that even the traditional god would be envious. it is easy for most of them to dismiss d�holbach arguments, especially because they are often closet dualists (although i have usually done some work to make that less reflexive by this point in the semester), so his physicalist arguments have a hard time getting purchase. one of the approaches that i take is to ask them to journal an afternoon paying attention to the desires that arise (usually this will be the second time i have asked them to focus on desires, acted on or otherwise) and to note the source of the desire. they are often quite surprised to discover that their friends, their parents, the tv and so forth have an enormous amount of impact on what they want and hence on what they end up choosing. of course, this does not get you to d�holbach�s conclusion, but it does open a space to notice how the process of coming to choose is being structured and hence a space for the kinds of questions that lead to a closer friendship with wisdom to be asked. as part of the assessment process at the end of the class i ask them to write an essay, to be turned in at the time of the final, in which they reflect on what they have learned in the class and what questions they will take forward with them. the instructions for this essay, and the length requirement, preclude it being an exercise in flattery. they are required to talk about specifics, what was important and why and how their thinking on the various issues covered in the course has changed or become deeper. this allows the students to take the time to see the class as a whole and to structure it for themselves so that they can more easily remember and reflect on it in the future. given the opening frame of the class it is also a chance to notice the beginnings of their friendship with wisdom. writing about the questions which they found important enough to want to continue to ponder gives the students a chance to project the process they have begun in the class into their future. in the process of writing the essay they are guided to imagine how they will continue deepening the friendship with wisdom that they have come to value, now that the introduction has been made. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 78 concluding remarks in presenting my solution to the problem of teaching wisdom in the context of analytic philosophy, my goal has been neither to try to create a work of scholarship1 nor provide a knockdown argument in favour of my solution to the problem. instead i am offering, in the spirit of friendship, my perspective on the matter, a perspective born of 15 years of wrestling with the problem as a classroom teacher who cares about wisdom. in keeping with the view expressed in the essay, i leave it to the reader to answer the question of the solution�s apt� ness, as well as to use their imagination and experience to discover ways to apply it in practice. endnotes 1. hence why there are no footnotes, and only one joke. acknowledgement i would like to thank my anonymous reviewer for their very helpful comments on an earlier draft. address correspondences to: dr. rhett gayle 20 skinburness drive silloth ca7 4qg uk email: rhett.gayle@colorado.edu analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 68 the principle of a problem-based approach and its consequences for teaching philosophy and ‘ethik’ markus tiedemann introduction the problem-based approach in teaching is a central concept of general didactics and technical didactics. it is a substantial principle and not one of those fashionable terms in didactics that are unjustifiably overrated. the discipline of didactics of philosophy can claim that it developed the problem-based approach first. early in dialogic-pragmatic didactics of philosophy, ekkehard martens already understood philosophy as a “problembased process of communication.”1 in the following, i would like to discuss the problem-based approach in teaching regarding three aspects: • the problem-based approach as a philosophical immanence • the problem-based approach as a historical imperative • the problem-based approach as a didactical consequence the last aspect is further subdivided into three levels, the theoretical-conceptual level, the methodical-practical level and the empirical-critical level.2 the problem-based approach as a philosophical immanence all scientific research is based on “the problem.” the problem’s verbal form is “the question.” the idea of clothing originated from the problem of chilliness. the question was, “what can we do to stop being cold?” soon, the cause for scientific progression went far beyond a purely functional connection. today, we are able to articulate and investigate questions and problems whose solutions do not seem to be of any concrete value for us. we can ask how black holes accrue; we can ask if time is an entity in itself; and we can ask if the universals of language are based on ideal being, on pure imagination or on practiced language-games. the problem behind these questions is that we want to understand things that we have not been able to understand so far. sometimes we just try to understand why we cannot understand, but even then we want to understand. hence, every science is orientated on questions. in the course of time, all sciences have collected a stock of traditions whose maintenance and archiving is left to specialized historians. whoever argues that these historians are scientists who do not work with a problembased approach, is mistaken. the mistake is not that historians of all disciplines are scientists; the mistake is to believe that their work is not problem-based. surely, a historian could impose only descriptive tasks. he could catalogue the date and time 54 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 69 of all medieval royal crowning ceremonies, for example. but the question behind this task will be, if there are any peculiarities or conspicuous features in the list. we call this exploratory research and the scientist’s problem is that he does not know if there will be any peculiarities beforehand. when a philosophical historian asks, if descartes’ “cogito” influenced kant’s “transcendental apperception,” the problem behind the question is that he simply does not know its answer. the pure maintenance of a canon can be understood in terms of teaching, but not as research. science cannot exist without research. this goes especially for philosophy because if philosophy is understood as the teaching of a canon without any research, it loses its identity and turns into the history of ideas. this is exactly what kant means when he claims that not philosophy, only philosophizing can be taught. he also divides philosophy into four categories of questions and answers, rather than dividing it by historical criteria or authors. the nature of philosophy and its teaching is immanently problem-based. this potential has been nourished by a tension between esotericism and exotericism as well as by the discrepancy between enlightenment and science since the dialogues of socrates. ottfried höffe says that philosophy is a science that is “open for the practice in both ways. it learns from the practice and it tries to teach the practice something about itself and thereby tries to improve it.”3 ekkehard martens and herbert schnädelbach say that philosophy as a science is characterized by its object orientation and result orientation. philosophy as enlightenment is characterized by its subject orientation and process orientation. understood as a <pure> type, ‘philosophy as a science’ is philosophy that is close to the object. it tries to understand its structure and its determining laws in a manner of absentminded fascination. […] ‘philosophy as enlightenment’ means that the philosophizing person is concerned with himor herself in an analysing, interpreting and realising manner. the difference between enlightenment and science is that enlightenment involves a self-reference of the subject. therefore, enlightenment is more than mere absorption and accumulation of information. not someone who knows everything is enlightened but a person who is capable of relating the information to himor herself.4 a similar dialectic structure can be found in the relationship between esotericism and exotericism within philosophy. ivory tower and market place, elementary philosophy and world-class science, philosophizing with children and academic dispute are two faces of philosophy. both faces belong to the same head and share one brain in respect to method and contents. what they have in common is their problem-based, critical use of reason. of course research does not take place in a vacuum. kant says that “one cannot become a philosopher without knowledge…but never will knowledge alone determine the quality of a philosopher.” “all systems of philosophy,” says kant, “are only to be seen as histories of the use of reason and should only be used to practice one’s own skills.” kant also explains, “a true philosopher has to make use of his reason in a free and self-determined way, rather than using it in a slavish and imitative way.”5 “sapere aude,” problem-orientated thinking, is therefore immanent to every form of philosophy that creates identity. 55 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 70 the problem-based approach as a historical necessity since the modern age, certainly not later than the post-modern age, life is strongly affected by two kinds of problem-orientation. huge practical problems ask for decisions, but the theoretical foundation of these problems is problematic in itself. hence, during the modern age, theoretic and normative orientation has a practical necessity, but it is theoretically problematic because modern man lives in a scientific-technical risk society.6 today’s expansive technical options affect the whole world and all generations. they urge modern man to make more decisions than in former times. the pressure to make decisions has already increased in the last century. examples are günther anders’7 theses on the age of nuclear power and weizsäcker’s8 declarations on the scientific-technical age. anders’ model of the end of hypothetical questions emphasises the special quality of our age. socrates could have asked the hypothetical question whether humans may be cloned, or whether black-out bombs are legitimate, or whether humanity itself should exist. today these questions are reality and the answers to these questions have real concrete consequences. this problem is amplified by the fact that the global world is increasingly interdependent. not only the quality of what we are technically capable of, but also the mere quantity of our kind and the density of our co-existence force us to find an agreement. modern urbanity and communication combined with small space and time unite people of different cultures and life-styles. furthermore, examples like global warming and the international financial crisis show that people on the other side of the world and even unborn generations are strongly affected by our actions. at the same time, theoretical and normative orientations are extremely problematic in the modern age. from a historical perspective, the modern age, at latest the post-modern age, stands for an era of an explosive quantity of knowledge alongside with a simultaneous lack of qualitative categories. the ever-growing flood of knowledge, mostly freely accessible, is both a blessing and a cause of great disorientation. today, no one is neither in a position to claim comprehensive knowledge for him or herself, nor is it possible to define a necessary or sufficient canon of elementary, middle or higher education. there is a lack of categories such as necessary and sufficient, right and wrong, good and bad. herbert schnädelbach says that modern culture is completely “reflexive, profane and pluralistic.”9 with this conception, the enlightenment has freed mankind from many dogmas. still, full reflexivity turns against the premises of the enlightenment itself. the pure practical, but also the pure theoretical reason, is a regulative idea, not a proven fact. this results in a deficit of legitimacy which is particularly noticeable in normative discourse. resorting to the concepts of karl otto apel,10 jürgen habermas11 and vittorio hösle,12 the stated loss of a final justification can be challenged. postmodern thinkers like lyotard13 and zygmund bauman,14 however, have shown that the post-modern knowledge and postmodern ethics are based on meta-narratives that cannot be finally justified by them. this also applies to the discourse that is legitimized in the form of being effective in practice, but not in the form of a normative requirement. modernity, thus, throws the individual and the collective back to individual discernment and, at the same time, destroys the hope of a final, universal solution. sociologically speacking, authors like ulrich beck and henry w. fischer have worked out that modern humanity has to make necessary decisions, without having sufficient theoretical and normative knowledge. it is therefore a problem-oriented consideration of risks.15 the problem-based approach as a didactical consequence the didactic of philosophy is a theoretical-conceptional, a methodical-practical and an empirical-critical science. the consequences of the problem-based approach can be made clear on three levels. consequences of the problem-based approach on the theoretical-conceptional level first of all, i want to note that on a theoretical-conceptional level, the debate between martens and rehfus 56 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 71 on the advantages and disadvantages of canon-orientation versus problem-orientation had a positive impact on special didactics. already in the nineteen twenties, educational reformers like leonard nelson and gustav heckmann declared the orientation towards concrete problems as the main principle of the socratic method.16 kohlberg’s model of moral development is based on analyzing problem-oriented discussions of dilemmas.17 philosophizing with children emphasizes a problem-based perspective. lipman’s idea of a community of inquiry is nothing else than a collective argument around a problem.18 gereth matthews’ seldomly uses this term. he focuses on the individual’s reflectiveness.19 there are differences in the methodical approach. lipman follows the logical-analyitc tradition, whereas matthews chooses a socratic dialogue-based approach. these approaches never came to conflict over whether children should be led to the problems of philosophy or whether philosophy is merely a tool to solve children’s problems. this is unlike what happened in german-speaking countries during the eighties, with the so called martens-rehfus debate, which took on the status of philosophy head on. in martens’ opinion philosophy is “not practiced for its own sake, but for our own sake.”20 in the shape of teaching, it had to be performed in form of a dialogue with a real-world problem-orientation. he has an understanding of philosophy that is based on competence. philosophical authorities are only heard if they contribute directly to the process of problem-solving. rehfus criticized martens for ‘abandoning’ traditional knowledge and genesis.21 the problem-orientation that can be found with rehfus maintains a historical mentality. the existential crisis and the individual crisis of modern man in general, and especially of children, should be overcome by understanding and relating to the history of ideas. basically, the difference between the problem-based teaching approaches, according to martens or rehfus, can be caricatured as follows: martens enters a classroom and says, “since we had a discussion on the question whether or not one can speak of god in a scientific context last week, i decided to give you an extract from kant’s ’critique of pure reason.’ let’s see what you think about kant’s problem-analysis.” rehfus enters a classroom and says, “i brought you the ‘critique of pure reason.’ now you have a problem!” of course this scenario is not quite fair. also, rehfus argues for a “phase of entering the problem” during which the children’s interest for a topic is awoken and martens has always supported the involvement of traditional knowledge in order to ban the risk of self-adulation. in the practice of teaching, the two concepts of martens and rehfus may have been closer to each other than in theory. both have declared that cultivating autonomous power of judgment is their highest educational aim. on the way to achieving this aim, rehfus focuses on the knowledge of the history of ideas; martens, on the other hand, focuses on the training of free thinking. classical works from the history of ideas are welcome for martens but only as possible dialogue partners; for rehfus they are a necessity. vice versa, rehfus welcomes the dialogue as a teaching method; for martens it is indispensable. rehfus says that the problem-opening phase should be used to awaken the interest for a problem belonging to the history of ideas and to commence with an already prepared teaching unit. on the contrary, martens sees the problem-opening phase as the right time to awaken the children’s awareness for problems, to let them grasp and verbalize problems. only then can the planning of a teaching unit begin because it has to be built on the verbalized interests of perception. already in the eighties, this discrepancy between martens’ and rehfus’ opinions has had a positive effect on the didactics of philosophy. today, the didactics of philosophy are mostly skill-oriented, without having been reduced to a narrow concept of methodological expertise or a competence grid. philosophizing is therefore an intellectual orientation technique.22 this understanding also underlies the immanent problem-orientation. 57 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 72 already in kant’s short work, “what does it mean to orient oneself in thinking,”23 the term orientation is not understood as an acquisition of preset positions or as a platonic show of absolute truths, but as an autonomous act of discernment. the term orientation also makes clear that it is more than just self-activism. orientation is determining one’s location as well as one’s distinct coordinates in order to make a reasoned decision on whereabouts or movement. hence, the knowledge of coordinates, the ability to navigate and the willingness to make use of both, are necessary. the categories of knowledge, skills and attitude24 that were established by martens can be understood as three components of a competency concept coined by weinert. according to weinert,25 competencies are “the individual’s available or learnable cognitive skills to solve specific problems as well as the associated motivational, volitional and social readiness and ability to use these solutions in a variety of situations successfully and responsibly.” the category of knowledge, therefore, stands for those skills that are necessary to capture the complexity of an issue or problem. the category of skill, therefore, stands for the ability to assess a situation or a problem, and analyze, present, and shape it. the category of attitude, therefore, stands for the willingness to make use of the knowledge and for the capability to solve a problem. training how to philosophize as an intellectual orientation technique is matched by the educational concepts of volker steenblock and ekkehard martens. steenblock objects to the adoption of a conservative, humanistic education canon. in addition to a “metaphysical disarmament,” steenblock demands an analytical differentiation of the educational concept and proposes a distinction between educational objects, educational entities and educational processes. philosophy, steenblock says, “should therefore not think itself too good for claiming its share of categories and contents in which people can express and unfold themselves.”26 the didactic self-understanding of the philosophical education process is therefore an exchange structure between study subjects and the curricula. this mediation is successful only when educational content is not seen as an end in itself, which is presented to the learner as a kind of “hot type” or “self-referential”27 specification of the past. on the other hand, the learning subject and the educational process should not be understood as an ahistorical act: “educational contents evolve from certain contexts and therefore each content has to be up to date in respect to new approaches and new self-understanding processes: that is exactly what education needs.”28 the educational process steenblock clearly understands in a socratic tradition as “working on the logos.” steenblock’s understanding of philosophy as a self-understanding process is in line with ekkehard martens’ thesis of philosophy as an elementary cultural technique of the human conduct of life.29 philosophy or philosophizing is a cultural technique, since it is a feature of human culture in general and the greek-european culture in particular.30 cultural technique is philosophy as “craftsmanship or skill” as well as “material science” or “topics of relevant factors and patterns of interpretation.”31 together, martens and steenblock primarily understand philosophy as an act of intellectual orientation. for teaching philosophy, this means the primacy of self-trained and problem-oriented thinking versus propositions about philosophy. consequences of problem-orientation for the methodological and practical level the teacher, however, has to legitimize not only general principles of teaching; he must also explicate methods of their realization. just like the question is the linguistic form of the problem in general, the central question is the didactic form of problem-oriented teaching. the central question is nothing other than the verbal expression of the problem, the conceptual fixation of a substantial problem and the associated cognitive interest. if this step has been successful, it is followed by an educational program that is used by several authors that have given it different names including “problem loop,”32 “method snake,”33 or “candy model.”34 the inherent problem-orientation can therefore be viewed as a didactic consensus. after pinpointing the problem: 58 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 73 …first an intuitive problem-solving phase is following and second, the consultation of experts, which means the consultation of philosophical texts that offer a conceptual-discursive solution to the problem. this solution is developed and the acquired understanding of the text consolidated to be subsequently deepened in a transfer. the outcome is a critical evaluation of the solution, maybe even an own opinion on the problem, which is no longer intuitively, but arguing with reference to the developed solution.35 during the lessons, the central question functions as the thread, the anchor or the archimedean point of problem-oriented education. thus, it is also the condition for the possibility that classes will become a research community, a community of inquiry.36 unfortunately, central questions do not appear from nowhere. nor can they be set by an authority without leading the advantages mentioned above to absurdity. in the following, i will present three ways of starting a lesson that demonstrate how problem-orientation can lead to the formulation of a central question. i will distinguish between open starts, starts with a thematic direction and starts with a material specification. generally, each problem-oriented start follows the so called coffee filter model. the coffee filter model: 59 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 74 hence, before the central question drips like coffee cream out of the filter, one has to go through three phases. in the first phase, a problem space is opened or discovered. the necessary impulse must not necessarily come from the teacher. then, in the second phase, problem interpretations, cognitive interest and preliminary rulings are formulated. finally, in the third phase, the common problem-orientation is defined and put into words in the form of one or more central questions. the open start is the ideal-typical model of problem-orientation. in phase one, the children have an almost unlimited amount of choices. typical tasks in this phase are, “bring newspaper clippings, novels, passages, songs, lyrics, pictures, letters, quotes, etc., from which you believe that they express a philosophical problem.” in phase two, a selection is made, “choose one of the suggestions. put into words the philosophical problem you think it deals with. how do you currently rate the problem or question? try to express your own research interest in a question.” in the third phase, it is especially important to reduce the quantity of issues and to focus the research interest. possible steps could include, “present your questions and your research interest to one another. whoever is interested in someone else’s question, can join his or her proposal. if you have a similar question as someone else, try to find a common expression for both, with which both of you can identify.” typically, this process leads to a significant reduction, but not to a clear decision of the entire class. in this case, it is advisable to perform something like an election campaign: “now, the representatives of the remaining question have ten minutes. during this time you can prepare a stump speech for your election campaign. the performance time for each group is five minutes maximum. the stump speech should pinpoint the proposed problem as clearly as possible and arouse the interest of as many class members as possible.” at the end of the campaign, a simple election is held. the “inferior” topics are not lost, the questions and themes are put into question-memory-storage and can be re-proposed after completion of the teaching unit. the advantage of this method lies in its briefness. in general, all three phases, including the resolution of the central question, can be realized within a double lesson. but much more important, the process itself is inherently philosophical. the children work on concepts and formulations; they articulate first interpretations and judgments; and they practice speaking, answering and arguing. in short, together they philosophize about the quality of their problem-orientation. however desirable and convincing open starts are, they are very rare. the vast majority of german curricula have long omitted a fixed canon of texts. nevertheless, mandatory topic fields are listed, which are to be dealt with in the course of schooling. these requirements seem sensible to avoid a reduction of the spectrum of topics. anyhow, the participation of children and the joint formulation of central questions must not be abandoned. the procedure remains the same, only the width of the offer will be reduced from the start. an according task could be, “bring newspaper clippings, novel passages, song lyrics, pictures, letters, quotes, etc., from those you believe that they express an epistemological (or even ethical, anthropological or metaphysical) problem.” children can be “allured” by using well-directed impulses on relevant fields such as thought experiments, quotes, pictures, etc. it is important that everything is transparent. the teacher should reveal the curricular topic at which the impulses are aimed. within the given field, the central questions can be developed following the coffee filter model. for lessons with material guidelines, it is by far the most difficult to realize problem-orientation. however, these guidelines are not always avoidable. for example, central examination requirements can require the knowledge of specific texts. also, there are still curricula in some states or schools that contain a specific canon of texts, plato’s cave allegory and kant’s treatise ‘what is enlightenment?’ are especially compulsory in many curricula. current regulations can require a particular item, too. there are numerous albert schweitzer schools in germany. it would be interesting to know how many of their teachers are obliged to teach schweitzer’s popular philosophy in class or during project weeks. nevertheless, even under such strict guidelines, a certain degree of problem-orientation can be sustained. an example is plato’s cave allegory, which i mentioned before as a clas60 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 75 sic of curricular requirements. it is possible to work through the text and then continue with plato’s allegory of the sun and the allegory of the lines. the allegory, though, can be used as a stimulus for problem-orientation. the following steps are possible: first, the cave allegory will be staged up to the point where they exit the cave. two or three students are placed as prisoners against the wall, the overhead projector can serve as a light source to simulate fire and the shadows can be generated for example by means of little toy figures. the question “should one free the prisoners?” targets the normative level of the cave allegory and triggers a discussion. the epistemological level can be touched upon by introducing a thought experiment. the class is divided into three groups, each of which takes over the responsibility for a former prisoner. the task is, “try to prove to the liberated prisoner that our world is more real than the world of shadows.” this task is very demanding if you consider that more complex does not automatically mean more real. advanced courses can find this very difficult, while fourth-graders usually find a solution quickly. they suggest touching the figure in the dark or to rotate it in front of the light, so that the three dimensional nature of the figure becomes obvious. it is argued that if the figure can exist without the shadow, but the shadow cannot exist without a figure, then the figure must have a higher degree of realness. from the relationship between these two images, one can derive the whole platonic doctrine of ideas. continuing in this way would most probably mean that one has aroused the students’ interest. a problem-oriented development of key questions, however, has not taken place. but this is still possible. a corresponding task or homework assignment might be: glaucon: “you are describing a strange scene, socrates, and strange prisoners.” socrates: “they are very similar to us.” 1. do you agree with socrates? 2. try to put your ideas and thoughts concerning the cave allegory in words by formulating one or more questions. then the coffee filter method can be used again. consequences of the problem-based approach for the empirical-critical level of course, the impact of the problem-oriented approach on philosophy classes and ‘ethik’ classes can be examined empirically. for example, one could examine the prognosis that problem-oriented teaching statistically enables more students to think critically than a canon-oriented schooling. first studies in this field have been conducted. georg lind was able to prove that if dilemma-discussions were held on a regular basis, a higher score in the ability of moral judgment was achieved.37 marie-france daniel could show that philosophizing with children has a positive effect on their language skills and on their ability to take part in discussions.38 quantitatively, one could count the number of teaching units that are guided by a central question. qualitatively, one could measure the degree to which students are capable of making a connection between the curricular material and the central questions. summary in conclusion, i would like to draw attention to an interesting phenomenon. if you ask children what they have done in school, they usually give a clear answer. but if you ask them why it was taught, they usually do not know. if, however, they give you a good answer to this question, then the chances are high that the children are receiving problem-oriented and thus good philosophy or ‘ethik’ classes. 61 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 76 endnotes 1. martens, ekkehard: dialogisch-pragmatische philosophiedidaktik. hannover 1979. 2. tiedemann, markus: philosophiedidaktik und empirische bildungsforschung. möglichkeiten und grenzen. münster 2011, 12. 3. höffe, ottfried: naturrecht ohne naturalistischen fehlschluss. ein rechtsphilosophisches programm. klagenfurter beiträge zur philosophie. wien: verlag des verbandes der wissenschaftlichen gesellschaften österreichs 1980, 37f. 4. martens, ekkehard; schnädelbach, herbert: zur gegenwärtigen lage der philosophie. in: martens/ schnädelbach (ed.): philosophie. ein grundkurs. vol. 1, reinbek 1991, 32. (translated by maya sippel) 5. kant, immanuel: logik. in: kants werke vol. xi. akademieausgabe. berlin und leipzig 1923, 25-26. (translated by maya sippel) 6. tiedemann, markus: ethische orientierung für jugendliche. der orientierungsbedarf von jugend und gesellschaft und das angebot praktische philosophie in der sek. i. in: zdpe, 4/2004. 7. anders, günther: die atomare drohung. münchen 1981. 8. weizsäcker, carl friedrich von: der mensch im wissenschaftlich-technischen zeitalter. in: ibid.: ausgewählte texte. münchen 1987. 9. schnädelbach, herbert: kant – der philosoph der moderne. in: zdpe, 2/93, 131-139. 10. apel, karl-otto: das a priori der kommunikationsgemeinschaft und die grundlagen der ethik. in: ibid.: transformation der philosophie. vol. 2, frankfurt am main 1973, 358-436. 11. habermas, jürgen: die philosophie als platzhalter und interpret. in: ibid.: moralbewußtsein und kommunikatives handeln. frankfurt am main 1983. 12. hösle, vittorio: die krise der gegenwart und die verantwortung der philosophie. transzendentalpragmatik, letztbegründung, ethik. münchen 1990; ibid.: philosophie der ökologischen krise, münchen 1991, 73. 13. lyotard, jean-francois: das postmoderne wissen. ein bericht. herausgegeben von peter engelmann, 3. edition, wien 1994, 14. 14. bauman, zygmunt: postmoderne ethik. hamburg 1995, 127ff. 15. fischer, henry w.: response to disaster: fact versus fiction & its perpetuation. the sociology of disaster. 2nd edition. lanham, maryland: university press of america 1998; beck, ulrich: risikogesellschaft. überlebensfragen, sozialstruktur und ökologische aufklärung. in: aus politik und zeitgeschichte. beilagen zur wochenzeitung das parlament. heft b 36/89, 01.09.1989, 4-7. 16. raupach-strey, gisela: sokratische didaktik: die didaktische bedeutung der sokratischen methode in der tradition von leonard nelson und gustav heckmann. münster, hamburg, london: lit 2002, 242. 17. kohlberg, lawrence: essays on moral development: vol. 2. the psychology of moral development. san francisco: harper & row 1984. 18. lipman, matthew: harry stottelmeier’s discovery, inst. for the advancement of philosophy for children, upper montclair, n.j. 1980. 19. matthews, gareth: dialogues with children, harvard 1984. 20. martens, ekkehard: dialogisch-pragmatische philosophiedidaktik. hannover 1979, 72. (translated by maya sippel) 21. rehfus, wulff: thesen zur legitimation von philosophie als unterrichtsfach am gymnasium. in: aufgaben und wege des philosophieunterrichts 9. 1976, 5-25. 22. cf. ethische orientierung für jugendliche. eine theoretische und empirische untersuchung zu den möglichkeiten der praktischen philosophie als unterrichtsfach in der sekundarstufe i. münster 2004, 63. 23. kant, immanuel: was heißt: sich im denken orientieren? (ed.) königlichpreußischen akademie der wissenschaften. berlin 1902/1919, 146. 24. martens, ekkehard: philosophieren mit kindern. eine einführung in die philosophie. stuttgart 1999, 12. 25. weinert, franz e.: vergleichende leistungsmessung in schulen – eine umstrittene selbstverständlichkeit. in: ibid. (ed.) leistungsmessungen in schulen. weinheim/ basel 2001, 27f. 26. steenblock, volker: philosophische bildung als ‚arbeit am logos‘. in: johannes rohbeck (ed.): methoden des philosophierens. jahrbuch didaktik der philosophie und ethik. bd.1, 2000, 21. (translated by maya sippel) 27. böhme, gernot: philosophie als arbeit und bildung. in: karl reinhard lohmann / thomas schmidt (ed.): akademische philosophie zwischen anspruch und erwartung. frankfurt am main 1998, 105. 28. ibid. 21. 29. volker steenblock verweist ausdrücklich auf die nähe der beiden theorien. cf.: ibid. 19, 24. 30. cf. martens, ekkehard: methodik des ethikund philosophieunterrichts. philosophieren als elementare kulturtechnik. hannover 2003, 30-31. 31. ibid. 32. cf. martens, ekkehard: didaktik der philosophie. in: ibid./ schnädelbach, herbert (ed.): philosophie. ein grundkurs. bd. 2, reinbek bei hamburg: rowohlt 1991, 772 ff.; cf. also steenblock, volker: philosophische bildung. einführung in die philosophiedidaktik und handbuch: praktische philosophie. berlin 2007, 136 ff. 33. martens, ekkehard: methodik des ethikund philosophieunterrichts. philosophieren als elementare kulturtechnik. hannover 2003, 57. 34. cf. sistermann, rolf : konsumismus oder soziale gerechtigkeit? in: zdpe 1/2005, 16 – 27; here: 26; ibid.: unterrichten nach 62 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 77 dem bonbon-modell. in: zdpe 4/2008, 299-305. 35. henke, roland w.: ende der kunst oder ende der philosophie? ein beitrag zur diskussion um den stellenwert präsentativer materialien im philosophieund ethikunterricht. in: zdpe, 1/2012. 36. lipman, mattew: thinking in education. 2. edition, cambridge: cambridge university press 2004, 22. 37. georg lind: the meaning and measurement of moral judgment competence revisited a dual-aspect model. in: d. fasko & w. willis, ed., contemporary philosophical and psychological perspectives on moral development and education, cresskill. nj: hampton press 2008, 185 – 220. 38. marie-france daniel: learning to philosophize: positive impacts and conditions for implimentation. a synthesis of 10 years of research (1995-2005). in: thinking. the journal of philosophy for children. volume references anders, g. (1981). die atomare drohung. münchen. apel, k. (1973). das a priori der kommunikationsgemeinschaft und die grundlagen der ethik. in: ibid.: transformation der philosophie. (vol. 2). (pp. 358-436). frankfurt am main. bauman, z. (1995). postmoderne ethik. hamburg. beck, u. (1989). risikogesellschaft. überlebensfragen, sozialstruktur und ökologische aufklärung. in aus politik und zeitgeschichte. beilagen zur wochenzeitung. (pp. 4-7). das parlament. heft b 36. böhme, g. (1998) philosophie als arbeit und bildung. in: karl reinhard lohmann / thomas schmidt (ed.): akademische philosophie zwischen anspruch und erwartung. frankfurt am main. brüning, b. (1999). ethikunterricht in europa. traditionen, konzepte und perspektiven. leipzig. daniel, m. (2008). learning to philosopize: positive impacts and conditions for implimentation. a synthesis of 10 years of research (1995-2005). thinking: the journal of philosophy for children. 18 (4), montclair state university. habermas, j. (1983). die philosophie als platzhalter und interpret. in ibid.: moralbewußtsein und kommunikatives handeln. frankfurt am main. henke, r.w. (2012). ende der kunst oder ende der philosophie? ein beitrag zur diskussion um den stellenwert präsentativer materialien im philosophieund ethikunterricht. in zdpe, 1. hentig, h. (1999) ach die werte! ein öffentliches bewusstsein von zwiespältigen aufgaben. uber eine erziehung für das 21. jahrhundert. münchen. höffe, o. (1980). naturrecht ohne naturalistischen fehlschluss. ein rechtsphilosophisches programm. klagenfurter beiträge zur philosophie. wien: verlag des verbandes der wissenschaftlichen gesellschaften österreichs, 37f. hösle, v. (1990). die krise der gegenwart und die verantwortung der philosophie. transzendentalpragmatik, letztbegründung, ethik. münchen. hösle, v. (1991). philosophie der ökologischen krise. münchen. kant, i. (1923). logik. in kants werke (vol. xi). (pp.25-26). akademieausgabe. berlin and leipzig, kant, i. (1902/1919). was heißt: sich im denken orientieren? (ed.) königlichpreußischen akademie der wissenschaften. berlin. kohlberg, l. (1984). essays on moral development. (vol. 2.) the psychology of moral development. san francisco: harper & row. lind, g. (2008). the meaning and measurement of moral judgment competence revisited a dual-aspect model. in: d. fasko & w. willis (ed.), contemporary philosophical and psychological perspectives on moral development and education (pp. 185 – 220). cresskill. nj: hampton press. lipman, m. (2004). thinking in education. (2nd ed.). cambridge: cambridge university press. lipman, m. (1980). harry stottelmeier’s discovery. upper montclair, n.j: inst. for the advancement of philosophy for children. lyotard, j. (1994). das postmoderne wissen: ein bericht. peter engelmann (ed.). (3rd ed.). vienna. matthews, g. (1984). dialogues with children. harvard. martens, e. (1979). dialogisch-pragmatische philosophiedidaktik. hannover. martens, e. & schnädelbach, h. (1991). zur gegenwärtigen lage der philosophie. in: martens/ schnädelbach 63 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 78 (ed.): philosophie. ein grundkurs. (vol. 1) (pp. 32). reinbek. martens, e. (1994). was soll der ethik-unterricht leisten? lehrplanmodelle in der diskussion. in zdpe (pp. 209211). heft 3. martens, e. (1996). warum die ethik auf den hund gekommen ist – oder: welche ethik brauchen wir heute? in: hans a. hartmann / konrad heydenreich (eds.). ethik und moral in der kritik. eine zwischenbilanz. (pp. 12-21). frankfurt am main. martens, e. (1999). philosophieren mit kindern. eine einführung in die philosophie. stuttgart. martens, e. (2003). methodik des ethikund philosophieunterrichts. philosophieren als elementare kulturtechnik. hannover. raupach-strey, g. (2002). sokratische didaktik: die didaktische bedeutung der sokratischen methode in der tradition von leonard nelson und gustav heckmann. münster, hamburg, london: lit. rehfus, w. (1976). thesen zur legitimation von philosophie als unterrichtsfach an gymnasium. in aufgaben und wege des philosophieunterrichts (pp. 9). schnädelbach, h. (1993). kant – der philosoph der moderne. in zdpe 2 (pp.131-139). sistermann, r. (2005). konsumismus oder soziale gerechtigkeit? in zdpe 1 (pp. 6-27). sistermann, r. (2008). unterrichten nach dem bonbon-modell. in zdpe 4 (pp. 29-305). steenblock, v. (2000). philosophische bildung als arbeit am logos. in johannes rohbeck (ed.): methoden des philosophierens. jahrbuch didaktik der philosophie und ethik. (vol.1). (pp. 15-22). steenblock, v. (2007). philosophische bildung. einführung in die philosophiedidaktik und handbuch: praktische philosophie. berlin. tiedemann, m. (2004). ethische orientierung für jugendliche. eine theoretische und empirische untersuchung zu den möglichkeiten der praktischen philosophie als unterrichtsfach in der sekundarstufe i. münster. tiedemann, m. (2004). ethische orientierung für jugendliche. der orientierungsbedarf von jugend und gesellschaft und das angebot praktische philosophie in der sek. i. in zdpe 4. tiedemann, m. (2011). philosophiedidaktik und empirische bildungsforschung. möglichkeiten und grenzen. münster. tugendhat, e. (1993). vorlesungen über ethik. frankfurt am main. weinert, f. e. (2001). vergleichende leistungsmessung in schulen – eine umstrittene selbstverständlichkeit. in ibid. (ed.). leistungsmessungen in schulen. weinheim/ basel, 27f. weizsäcker, c. f. (1987). der mensch im wissenschaftlich-technischen zeitalter. in ibid. ausgewählte texte. münchen. address correspondences to: markus tiedemann, ph. d. professor of ethics and philosophy freie universität berlin habelschwerdter allee 45 raum kl 26/110 14195 berlin +030 838 56227 tiedemann@zedat.fu-berlin.de 64 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 29 socratic aporia in the classroom and the development of resilience stephen kekoa miller ’d like to talk about the value of unlearning, of undoing, of disruption. especially in the early aporetic dialogues of plato (those ending in perplexity), socrates famously takes his interlocutors on a journey that at least initially appears to end in failure: at the dialogue’s conclusion, there seems to be no answer to the questions that inspired the conversation. there has been a lot of recent debate about the so-called socratic method and accusations that it may be deflating, resulting in less, rather than more original thought in students. in particular, the much-discussed work of jacques rancière, the ignorant schoolmaster, suggests that this method in fact masks a move of the teacher to subordinate rather than liberate the student. adding to this the contemporary trends towards emphasis on content over critical reasoning in education and understandings of critical reasoning as consisting of categories to be memorized, and the use of questioning as an educational tool and as an end point can seem problematic indeed. how can one answer the question of what philosophy actually teaches? it is precisely because of its problematic, risky and disruptive nature that socratic aporia works so well both in a particular class and over the course of a whole course. while rancier’s critique only applies to some limited uses of questioning as a method, is it worth the risk? at the end of the day, does a dialectical method that leads us to see fatal flaws with both sides of important topics stand in danger of leading to nihilism, to a belief that we can’t know and that it doesn’t matter? in an interesting recent article in the new york times, justin mcbrayer writes “what would you say if you found out that our public schools were teaching children that it is not true that it’s wrong to kill people for fun or cheat on tests? would you be surprised? i was. as a philosopher, i already knew that many college-aged students don’t believe in moral facts. while there are no national surveys quantifying this phenomenon, philosophy professors with whom i have spoken suggest that the overwhelming majority of college freshmen in their classrooms view moral claims as mere opinions that are not true or are true only relative to a culture.” (ny times) the article discusses how the common core has introduced an understanding of the difference between fact and opinion as claiming facts are true and opinions are things people believe. is this moral relativism caused by poor definitions, or has a socratic method caused this too? first, what is this method, and what’s wrong with it? rancière states that “good masters who follow this socratic model use questions to discreetly guide the student’s intelligence — discreetly enough to make it work, but not to the point of leaving [the student’s intelligence] to itself” (p. 29). i analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 30 on this view, socratic teachers aim not at intellectual liberation, but instead, “interrogate because questions are a more effective means to intellectual subordination, to stultification, than lecturing.” (fullam, p. 55) if the goal is acquiescence and the acquisition of facts, this method sounds effective. at the end of a session, students ought to be subdued, beaten down and ready to bow to defeat, much like thrasymachus at the end of republic book 1. the problem with rancière’s analysis is that it describes a method rarely used in most high schools. according to avi mintz, “there is a distinction that can be made between the texts of socratic teaching and those of the socratic method. the socratic method uses cases which simultaneously teach the law and provide an opportunity to engage in the kind of reasoning about these cases that is necessary for the practice of law (i.e. the case method can make students “think like a lawyer”). in contrast, socratic teaching does not use texts as instruments of knowledge. rather, socratic teaching often uses rich, complex works which serve to enlarge the students’ experiences, as well as to improve their thinking processes.” (p. 490) in short, outside of law school, it’s rare to find teachers using questions to batter students into accepting an answers they had in mind all along, contrary to rancière. if socratic teaching isn’t abusive in this way, doesn’t it still risk leading to nihilism? i strongly remember the first time i taught a college ethics course. at the end of the term during the review session, i realized with horror that my course had inadvertently followed a pattern of exposing the students to an idea such as utilitarianism or kantianism, explaining the idea and then exposing it to such criticism that the students couldn’t have thought it still had value. then the course moved to the next key concept to destroy. at the end of the term, the course had unintentionally suggested to the students a morally relative or nihilistic conclusion. i had to ask myself whether the students had in fact been harmed by the course…had i left them with less understanding of the topic than they started with? this is the more interesting and more disturbing possibility arrived at not only from socratic method per se but from any academic course aiming for critical thinking and analysis rather than rote learning. to get at this, let’s think about the socratic dialogue lysis. in this dialogue, socrates ends up discussing the notion of friendship with two young boys, lysis and menexenus. throughout the dialogue, the three explore how friendship, affinity and goodness relate. throughout also, socrates leads the boys, who, importantly, consider themselves friends, to a point where they think the question has been answered. however, each time, socrates, like peter faulk in a columbo movie says “one more thing,” and introduces a problem. the dialogue ends with the words “and as yet we have not been able to discover what is a friend!” (lysis, 75) while no one seems able to define friendship here, the boys remain friends. everyone simultaneously seems to both know and not know what friendship is. controversially, even the major later dialogues not commonly thought of as aporetic like the republic, end with a real sense that we don’t know if the whole thing is a kind of a joke…does socrates really believe the things he’s said? he couldn’t be serious, and yet, book x ends with a suggestion that the text is to be taken so, “an illustration of socratic education that is systematic and complete, albeit one that is rife with complexity and raises more questions than it answers about the analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 31 usefulness of socratic education for contemporary classrooms since socrates seems to intentionally lead his interlocutors to intellectual disorientation in which they not only realize the inadequacy of their previous answers to questions, but also experience extreme doubt about their ability to find answers that are more adequate.” (mark, p. 41) given that these books have been read and taught for 2400 years, what are high school and college teachers aiming for in presenting these texts, but even more fundamentally and broadly, in designing courses that follow the pattern of the books by arriving at the end of the term without giving definitive answers. a modern academic course carries with it a similar structure. from ethics to philosophy of mind, science or religion, a well-designed course would optimally investigate a few core questions and then query what possible answers would look like. each position would then be critiqued. even in intellectual history courses, it’s hard to imagine a modern professor presenting a narrative of triumphant progress to the present moment where we have come to know which position is right. the best courses i took as a student, and those i have tried to model my practice after as a teacher, never reached the end of the semester with a final answer to the central motivating questions. aristotle’s concept of endoxa, of looking at the range of opinion on a particular topic to generally find that most views contain part of the truth varies from this in one big way – the modern teacher often won’t even say what is true in each position. as a teacher, i have noticed that at the end of a course like my high school existentialism class, the students often describe the course as their favorite, but have a hard time saying what it was about, what they learned and what conclusions they have drawn. this leads to the fundamental, socratic question about teaching…what can a philosophy class teach? at the end of the day, do lysis and menexenus know less than they had before? when students beg to know a teacher’s view on a particular question, are they better served with sly socratic evasion or direct if coercive answers? despite this, plato himself warns us in the republic that the right spirit is needed to do this type of work, “i don’t suppose that it has escaped your notice that, when young people get their first taste of arguments, they misuse it by treating it as a kind of game of contradiction. they imitate those who’ve refuted them by refuting others themselves, and, like puppies, they enjoy dragging and tearing those around them with their arguments. (republic vii 539ab) it’s always useful to allow students a chance to speak for themselves. i asked a former student, jake cardillo, now a florist, about this. here is his exact response: also, i gave a little more thought to your question about philosophy and dialectic being a pursuit which doesn't yield answers, and i wanted to give a more considered answer, which is this: especially today, we are confronted with too many answers, but we simply aren't taught the ability to sort through them and decide which ones make sense and which ones are nonsense. that was what socrates literally spent his days doing: telling people who assumed they had all the answers that maybe those answers don't make any sense at all. if philosophers analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 32 just asked questions that they expected to provide answers to, they'd be scientists; instead, they are questioning the answers themselves, and pointing out that when confronted with several answers to the same question––e.g. in economics, 'what caused the recession?', to which there are competing answers and theories––there is no obvious method for deciding among them, and perhaps the best approach is to critically evaluate each of them and end up rejecting them as thoroughly as possible, exposing the inadequacies of 'experts' in precisely the areas they claim to know everything about. socrates' brilliance is precisely in insisting on impracticality, in other words on the interruption of everyday life for a time to realize that all the answers that everybody throws at you, and which are indispensable for just living life practically, are not particularly well-founded. perhaps all that is obvious, but i just wanted to give a more thorough response. (april 12, 2015) jake’s insistence on philosophy as being a form of impracticality and interruption is apt. the other key piece of the socratic approach involves his famous use of irony. socratic irony is of a special sort; gregory vlastos demonstrates this by showing how different greek irony is from our usage today, as it intentionally uses deception, but deception not meant to be believed (p. 66). jonathan lear describes this as “pretense” (irony, p. 9). no one in the dialogues really believes socrates’ claims to not know anything, and no one reads him as trying to deceive them, however at the same time, socrates does “put [himself] forward in one way or another, we tend to do so in terms of established social understandings and practices.” (irony, p. 16) lear’s book a case for irony makes the intriguing leap of applying this standard to all real teaching – “so, for instance, one way of being a teacher would be to be a professor. in the united states and europe at the beginning of the twentyfirst century there is a fairly well-established range of teaching styles—in seminar, tutorial, and lecture course—and a fairly wellestablished range of evaluative techniques, such as grades. there is even a range of dress you can expect a professor to wear, a way of being in front of a lectern and delivering a paper. and there are socially acceptable ways of demurring from the role: special ways of not wearing the right clothes, not giving a standard talk. that, too, can be part of the social pretense. but in this variety of socially recognized ways, i put myself forward as a professor. in this way a whole range of activity—including dress, mannerisms, a sense of pride and shame—can all count as pretense in that they are all ways of putting oneself forward as a professor… the possibility of irony arises when a gap opens between pretense as it is made available in a social practice and an aspiration or ideal which, on the one hand, is embedded in the pretense” (p. 11) within a class, teachers frequently play the socrates, feigning uncertainty about an answer or leading students into a dead end with a put-on confidence. again, from lear, he shows this discomfort to apply to the teachers as well: “but then things get out of hand. i am struck by teaching in a way that disrupts my normal self-understanding of what it is to teach (which includes normal reflection on teaching). this is not a continuation of my practical reasoning; it is a disruption of it… (p. 21) when irony succeeds, the target has an uncanny experience that the demands of an ideal, value, or identity he takes himself to be already committed can dramatically transcend received social understandings. finally, then, both teacher and student become “an infinite end” (p. 27), open to the world and towards change out of untruth. this form of irony demands of teacher and student alike analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 33 the unsettled feeling of uncertainty. in the meno this is made clear: “the truth is rather that i infect them also with the perplexity i feel myself. so with virtue now. i don’t know what it is . . . nevertheless i am ready to carry out, together with you, a joint investigation and inquiry into what it is.” (meno 80c—d). we don’t know where we’re going or when we’ll get there. in the end, however, it is just this discomfort, disruptive aporia that is the point. this view lines up interestingly with recent work on cognitive and academic development. resilience, grit and hard work in the face of failure have increasingly been shown to correlate with both higher levels of success and subjectively reported levels of happiness. the trait of resilience is trainable and it is now seen as pretty definitive that the secondary school years are some of the most important for this development, as the prefrontal cortex is most actively reorganizing itself during the teenage years. laurence steinberg in independent school magazine writes “it is also the brain region most important for self-control, which is the foundation for critical “non-cognitive skills,” such as perseverance, determination, and the delay of gratification a combination that some experts refer to as “grit.” (new foundations of adolescent learning) the key finding here is that “… the changes that take place in the brain during adolescence are not so much about growth as they are about reorganization.” (steinberg) steinberg goes on to claim that “first, because prefrontal development is stimulated by novelty and challenge, it is essential to expose students to demanding courses that push them intellectually. many american high school students report that school is boring and unchallenging.” in this case, the term “challenging” can best be understood literally. rather than just giving students difficult problems with a pre-arranged answer, philosophy courses really can challenge them. it leads to exactly this kind of reorganization by unsettling everything, forcing a rethinking of not only a particular belief, but the whole web it sits in. just as the first learning as an infant involves pruning back of neural connections, one of the most powerful forms of learning is unlearning. also in independent school magazine, ann klotz points out that “to be resilient means a child has endured something horrific or, to a lesser degree, difficult. but there are opportunities that do not require suffering or loss or exquisite pain, and practicing the habit of resilience helps children learn to weather the storms that are an inevitable part of growing up.” having one’s fundamental, strongly held beliefs cast into doubt serves this purpose well. furthermore, “seligman’s research on ‘learned optimism’ and carol dweck’s research on ‘mindset’… indicate that a significant barrier to happiness and fulfillment is the belief that there are conditions in your life that cannot be changed.” (morris, p. 26). realizing that not only one’s core beliefs but fundamental perception can be taken apart may be scary but it’s also empowering. pavlos michaelides, describes this unlearning powerfully: “for the sage of antiquity divine ignorance and unknowing enables and enhances inspiration, bringing into the pedagogical context aporia, creativity, resourcefulness, and contemplative silence. surely, the negativity arising from the realization of ignorance is at first deflating as it initiates the negative existential state of aporia, impasse, or lack of resource that throws the whole person into uncertainty, confusion, doubt, exasperation, despair, anxiety, resentment, and puzzlement. but most positively it purges the conceit of holding onto contradictory beliefs and false knowledge. aporia induces shame and apotropë toward one's old stance, at best generating change in orientation directed toward the ethical life but analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 34 concurrently, and ultimately, whether one is aware of it or not, it initiates a change in life-posture” (socratic ignorance: lifelong teaching and philosophical education, p. 252). of course, it is precisely this sort of movement that is so hard to measure or to track. let’s go back to justin mcbrayer’s question of “why our children don’t think there are moral facts”. he asks, “so what’s wrong with this distinction and how does it undermine the view that there are objective moral facts? we can do better. our children deserve a consistent intellectual foundation. facts are things that are true. opinions are things we believe. some of our beliefs are true. others are not. some of our beliefs are backed by evidence. others are not. value claims are like any other claims: either true or false, evidenced or not. the hard work lies not in recognizing that at least some moral claims are true but in carefully thinking through our evidence for which of the many competing moral claims is correct. that’s a hard thing to do. but we can’t sidestep the responsibilities that come with being human just because it’s hard. that would be wrong.” (ny times) of course, importantly, this isn’t all that a philosophy course does – it is also part psychology, part history, part logic and part science, but at its heart the socratic, aporetic understanding of teaching of philosophy is countercultural. it violates the spirit of the common core and undermines most of the answers given by universities when faced with the current crisis of the humanities. by measuring the success of a course through a test or, as many universities are now doing, by defensively justifying humanities courses in general by claiming they help students do well at business or law later on, these institutions make a comforting but ultimately dishonest claim about the nature and value of this discipline. in the end, it calls for us not to ask what should i believe, but what life i should live. as pavlos michaelides reminds us, “socrates’ earnestness of ignorance “bestows upon the human renewal and transformation unto its highest humanity” (p. 251). this transformation has come to be called resilience or “growth mindset” lately, but both terms point to improvement through challenge rather than content mastery. philosophy, when understood properly, should make us unlearn much of what we believe, should make us uncomfortable, should make us uncertain and should ultimately, then, make us stronger and better. references flanagan, owen. the really hard problem: meaning in a material world. a bradford book; reprint edition (february 13, 2009). flanagan, owen. self expressions: mind, morals, and the meaning of life. oxford university press, usa; 1st edition (january 25, 1996). flanagan, owen. varieties of moral personality: ethics and psychological realism. harvard university press; reprint edition (january 31, 1993). frankfurt, harry. the importance of what we care about: philosophical essays. cambridge university press (may 27, 1988). frankfurt, harry. on truth. knopf (october 31, 2006). fullam, jordan. “listen then, or rather, answer: contemporary challenges to socratic education”. educational theory. february 1, 2015. goodman, nelson. ways of worldmaking. hackett publishing. 1978. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 35 gutman, amy, ed. multiculturalism. princeton university press. 1994 hanh, thich nath. understanding our mind. parallax press; first trade paper edition edition (february 15, 2006). jonas, mark “education for epiphany: the case of plato's lysis”. educational theory. february 2015, vol. 65 issue 1, p.39-51. lear, jonathan aristotle: the desire to understand. cambridge university press; 19th printing edition (february 26, 1988). lear, jonathan a case for irony (tanner lectures on human values). harvard university press (october 6, 2014). lear, jonathan happiness, death, and the remainder of life (the tanner lectures on human values). harvard university press; reprint edition (february 15, 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development approach. belknap press; reprint edition (june 12, 2013). nussbaum, martha. cultivating humanity. harvard university press; reprint edition (october 1, 1998). plato. lysis. trans benjamin jowett. amazon digital services, inc. rancière, jacques. the ignorant schoolmaster. stanford university press; 1 edition (july 1, 1991) steinberg, lawrence. “new foundations of adolescent learning”. independent school magazine. spring, 2015. taylor, charles. sources of the self: the making of the modern identity. harvard university press; reprint edition (march 1, 1992). vlastos, gregoy, “socratic irony” in essays in the philosophy of socrates, ed. hugh benson. oxford university press, 1992. vlastos, gregory. platonic studies. princeton university press, 1981. williams, bernard. essays and reviews: 1959-2002. princeton university press (january 19, 2014). williams, bernard. ethics and the limits of philosophy. routledge; 1 edition (october 3, 2006). williams, bernard. moral luck. cambridge university press; 1 edition (july 24, 2013). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 36 wolf, susan. meaning in life. princeton university press (2010). address correspondence to: stephen kekoa miller oakwood friends school & marist college 22 spackenkill road poughkeepsie, ny 12603 smiller@oakwoodfriends.org analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 1 philosophy in the (gender and the law) classroom associate professor stella tarrant, the university of western australia dr. laura d’olimpio, the university of notre dame australia abstract: to engage not only with what one thinks but also how one thinks, is to think philosophically. a student’s capacity to think philosophically strengthens their ability to learn and the depth of her or his understanding. this praxis research project was aimed at developing students’ capacities to ‘think philosophically’. the community of inquiry is a pedagogy developed by matthew lipman in the discipline of philosophy that facilitates collaborative and democratic philosophical thinking in the context of teaching philosophy in schools. we introduced a community of inquiry module into teaching at tertiary (post secondary) level in the context of gender and the law studies. this field of study was an appropriate context in which to introduce the community of inquiry because ‘philosophical thinking’ is required to understand gender relations and their impact on laws. here we provide a practitioner reflection on an exploratory approach to teaching in a tertiary setting, with a view to setting an agenda for more systematic research into the incorporation of philosophical method into substantive fields of tertiary study. keywords gender; law; philosophy; community of inquiry; reflexive thinking introduction ender and the law is a third year elective subject at the university of western australia (uwa). it forms part of the undergraduate, law and society major in a bachelor of arts degree and can also be taken by students undertaking other undergraduate degrees, either for interest or to fulfil the uwa requirement to complete a certain number of ‘broadening units’. many of the students enrolled in gender and the law intend to apply to study a postgraduate, professional law degree (the juris doctor) after completing their undergraduate degree. this article reflects on the ‘philosophy and gender’ project, which involved trialling the pedagogical technique known as the ‘community of inquiry’, a method of inquiry developed within the discipline of philosophy, within the gender and the law unit. in an informal sense gender and the law was already based on ‘philosophical inquiry’ due to the philosophical nature of the set readings and the encouragement of discussion within the seminars. this project, undertaken in 2015, formalised the link between the gender and the law unit and the discipline of philosophy. the community of inquiry is a pedagogy that facilitates collaborative and democratic philosophical thinking, developed by matthew lipman (1977) in the context of teaching philosophy in schools. our aim was to see if this pedagogy could advance two key objectives in gender and the law at undergraduate university level. the objectives we focussed on were what we have called ‘reflexive thinking’ and ‘standpoint thinking’. we conclude that the communities of inquiry we undertook influenced the development of students’ ‘reflexive thinking’ significantly and appeared to have had limited influence on the development of ‘standpoint thinking’. here we provide a practitioner reflection on this exploratory new approach to teaching g analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 2 gender and the law in a tertiary (post secondary) setting, with a view to setting an agenda for more systematic research in the future. gender and the law the pedagogical approach in gender and the law (gal) developed incrementally and is based on the expertise of those designing the course; that is, expertise in teaching doctrinal law (criminal law and evidence) and feminist legal theory. gal was taught for the first time in 2014 but developed from its predecessor, a later-year elective subject in the llb law degree at uwa called ‘a feminist analysis of law’, taught 15 years earlier. gal is taught over a 13 week semester, structured in two main parts. the first half covers gender theories presented as an historical survey, with foundational and illustrative readings for each theoretical approach. examples of the readings include: mary wollstonecraft ([1792] 1974) (liberal feminisms); carol gilligan (1982) (cultural feminisms); nancy hartsock (1983) (marxist/socialist feminisms); catharine mackinnon (1993) (radical feminisms); larissa behrendt (1993) and honni von rijswijk (2012) (postmodern feminisms); and sarah zetlein (1995), r.w connell (2005) and nsw register of births, deaths and marriages v norrie [2014] high court of australia 11 (masculinities and lgbti theories). the second half of the course examines particular gender-equality issues within the fields of gender and violence, the ‘economic life of women’, women in leadership and aboriginal women and the law. readings for the later weeks are, in the main, empirical social studies but the design of the course is to examine these issues through a continued reference to the theoretical materials introduced in the first part of the course. there are three hours of classes per week, with an attendance requirement: students must attend the equivalent of 10 of the 13 weeks of classes through the semester. there were two key aims of gal to which we were interested in applying the coi method. they are the development in students of two kinds of thinking: 1. reflexive thinking; and 2. standpoint thinking. the remainder of this section explains these two aims of gal. ‘reflexive thinking’, in the context of gal, refers to the idea that we, as thinkers, play a part in determining the substantive thoughts – and the truths or knowledge – we arrive at. this is the equivalent of the idea of reflexive investigation underpinning other social sciences – an awareness of the impact of the researcher on the object of research (keller 1985, 150; writing cultures, 1986). and insofar as gender is constructed through ideas, ideas themselves are the objects of study. therefore, a reflexive approach includes considering the effect of the thinker on their own ideas. this is foundational to feminist theory; it is inherent in simone de beauvoir’s iconic claim that, ‘one is not born but rather becomes a woman’ (de beauvoir [1949]; and see mackinnon [1993], 443). moreover, to be aware that we are thinking (about gender), and that this will itself have an effect on what we understand gender to mean, is empowering. it can empower a thinker to comprehend their own agency and opens up a choice to be responsible, intellectually. the aspect of the course most directly related to this aim is the assessment option: a ‘diary of a learner’. this requires the student to write diary entries that observe their own processes of learning, studying and experiencing the unit. a series of three ‘response papers’ also permit, and require, a personal engagement with the ideas the student analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 3 selects to explore. instructions to students include: ‘the papers are to be your ideas and thoughts about the required readings .... the tight, sequential structure of a research paper is not required .... [t]he emphasis is on engagement, response and original thinking. ... the papers are designed so that you can develop skills of critical analysis and enjoy the opportunity to explore ideas those in the articles and your own.’ (emphasis in original) the idea of ‘standpoint thinking’ in this context is derived from nancy hartsock’s concept of a feminist standpoint which she, in turn, derives from the marxist notion of a proletarian standpoint. (hartsock 1983, 285-288). the central idea relied on here is hartsock’s concept of a standpoint as something more than an individual’s opinion or perspective; that entire constructs of thinking and experience may be different from our own. what we call ‘standpoint’ thinking amounts to an understanding that: inequalities arise from systemic social relations, rather than intentional individual subjectivities alone; knowledge and truths are associated with context, including one’s own systemic position amongst social and economic relations (286); and, therefore, there is knowledge/experience that each of us does not have access to automatically. that is, there are some things we cannot know unless we actively seek effective mechanisms (of thought and communication) that allow some understanding. as hartsock wrote (288), a standpoint is ‘achieved rather than obvious, a mediated rather than immediate understanding’. it follows that what we have called standpoint thinking urges the recognition of ‘lack’ where it exists – lack of experience/knowledge – and the need for communicative effort (work) if understanding is to be approached. it can open the way to a deeper understanding of difference, and its social and political implications. so, why this ‘philosophical inquiry’ approach?’ why these thinking skills? these aims are motivated by feminist and gender theory, and feminist legal theory, itself. a fundamental tenet of feminist theory is that process, or method, is indispensable to content. in order to know what gender and gender-inequality is, the processes by which they are continuously made and understood also need to be examined. epistemologies – or ways of thinking and arriving at truths – are the foci of much feminist and other gender theory (see e.g., discovering reality [1983]; bartlett [1990]; tarrant [2002]); they are in many instances the ‘content’ of what is taught. catharine mackinnon (1983, 640) for example, writes: ‘feminism comprehends that what counts as truth is produced in the interests of those with power to shape reality.’ to put this in another light, it is specifically feminist to teach in a way that is feminist, as well as to seek to impart a body of knowledge that is ‘feminism’. one of the well-known feminist expressions of this approach is the concept of ‘consciousness raising’. lived experience, as opposed to acquired, abstract ideas, is identified by feminisms as a primary source of knowledge and expertise. (bender 1988, 8; mackinnon 1993, 440.) thus, the ‘philosophical inquiry’ approach in gal was aimed not only at acquiring knowledge but at the experience of studying the unit itself. the community of inquiry the community of inquiry (coi) is a pedagogy that facilitates collaborative and democratic philosophical thinking. it was designed as a student-centred educational methodology by matthew lipman, the founder of the ‘philosophy for children’ (p4c) movement. american pragmatist charles sanders peirce (1839-1914) was first to realise the strength of bringing together two independent analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 4 notions of inquiry and community into the single transformative concept of community of inquiry (lipman 2003, 84). lipman realised the educational implications of the coi and placed it as the central pedagogy by which to teach philosophy in primary schools (lipman 1977). influenced strongly by the work of pragmatist john dewey (1997; 2004), the aim of philosophy for children is to teach students to think for themselves and to empathise with others. p4c commenced in the 1970s in primary and high school classrooms, and has since been introduced at the tertiary (post secondary) level, primarily in the context of courses on philosophy (shapiro 2013). supporters of p4c believe that philosophy needn’t be confined to the domain of the academy. the term was coined by matthew lipman who wanted to encourage reasonableness in citizens, and figured the best way to do that was to teach critical thinking skills from an early age. lipman defines critical thinking as ‘thinking that (1) facilitates judgment because it (2) relies on criteria, (3) is selfcorrecting, and (4) is sensitive to context.’ (lipman 1991, 116). yet critical thinking skills alone aren’t enough, and laurance splitter and ann sharp highlight ‘caring’ and ‘creative’ thinking as equally important skills children should be encouraged to develop (splitter & sharp 1995; lipman 1998, 277). lipman and others have argued that these critical, creative and caring thinking skills will encourage students to be reasonable and democratic, to treat others fairly and to reflect upon their own ideas (lipman 2003; burgh, field & freakley 2006). in this way the critical thinker won’t just know what the right thing to do is, they’ll also know how to go about achieving that action while being sensitive to the context. in a coi, participants are seated in an inward-facing circle and the teacher facilitates a discussion based on the students’ own questions. in order to generate the students’ questions, teachers may firstly read an age-appropriate stimulus text, or bring in pictures or objects that can be used to generate questions. phil cam (2006) discovered that facilitating an activity using a question quadrant (figure i) helped to produce better quality questions, specifically, the open, philosophical questions that are required as a focal point for a coi. the coi is radical in that the role of the teacher shifts from being the ‘one source of all knowledge’ to a facilitator that allows the students’ line of inquiry to dictate the course of the dialogue. in a coi, thinking is individual as well as collective as participants reflect upon their ideas as well as those of others, and build upon or challenge the ideas and questions that are explored. empirical studies published by topping & trickey (2007a & 2007b) have demonstrated that children who study philosophy are more likely to achieve better academic results and they also have additional social benefits such as better self-esteem and the demonstration of empathy for others. there is also said to be less bullying in the schoolyard and less behaviour management issues (golding, gurr, & hinton 2012; millett & tapper 2012). developing the students own questions is a central component of the coi and the aim is to seek knowledge and uncover truth for its own sake as per the socratic tradition in philosophy. as laurance splitter explains: participating in a coi allows students, individually and collaboratively, to develop their own ideas and perspectives based on appropriately rigorous modes of thinking and against the background of a thorough understanding and appreciation of those ideas and analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 5 perspectives that, having stood the test of time, may be represented as society’s best view of things to date (splitter 2011, 497). it is this contextual application of knowledge and the transferable thinking skills that leads sharp to claim that the rituals involved in the practice of p4c in a coi classroom setting can lead to the cultivation of wisdom (sharp 2007, 13). the thinking skills developed in a coi are transferable once internalised (lipman 1998, 277) but this depends on the quality of the conversation. lipman notes that the coi is aiming at dialogue, not simply discussion, as, “what was needed was not merely teaching for thinking, but teaching for critical thinking” (lipman, 2003, p. 31). when it is functioning well, evidence can be seen of ‘distributed thinking’ whereby members of the coi answer each other’s questions, build upon one another’s answers and provide examples to support points made by others participating in the discussion (lipman 1998, 277). it is distributed thinking that lipman believes is evident in higher-quality democracies. education plays an important role in giving students an opportunity to develop and practice the kinds of thinking skills that result in empathetic and critically engaged citizens. winstanley claims, ‘the argument is that philosophy is a powerful subject and that philosophising, or philosophic enquiry, is the optimum pedagogy for fostering the essential skills and dispositions of critical thinking’ (2008, p. 85). this is because, “philosophy is the best possible subject for helping children to become effective critical thinkers. it is the subject that can teach them better than any other how to assess reasons, defend positions, define terms, evaluate sources of information, and judge the value of arguments and evidence.” (winstanley 2008, 95). it is for these reasons that we decided to use the coi as a pedagogy within the gal classroom in order to explore complex concepts such as gender, beauty, feminism, suicide and terrorism. description of the project pedagogy we had five weeks in which to explore how the coi worked in the gal tutorial seminar sessions. we had two groups for 45 minutes sessions and we ran the same activity with each group. in the first week we commenced the tutorial with an icebreaker in which students introduced themselves and explained what they hoped to get out of the unit. we then introduced the theory behind the coi method. dr d’olimpio started with a 15 minute lecture on the p4c approach and the coi methodology that comes out of classical western philosophy (socratic dialogue) via the pragmatism of peirce and dewey. we then used the second half of the lesson to play a concept game based on the concept of ‘gender’. the concept game was structured so that students were divided into groups of fouror five people and one representative of each group was asked to come and choose three images from a selection we had printed out in colour of men and women who may or may not fit the stereotypical ideal of being considered feminine or masculine. the students then discussed amongst themselves whether or not the images fitted into the categories ‘feminine’, ‘masculine’ or ‘?’, and then gave their reasons for their categorisation to the whole group. other students could ask questions or challenge the classification, and the person representing the small group that made the classification had the opportunity to alter the category if they were convinced of another’s reasoning. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 6 in the second week, we decided to use the same set of images in order to explore cam’s (2006) question quadrant (figure i). we wanted to take time to generate interesting questions that would then become the focal questions for the first coi in the third week. cam created the question quadrant in order to improve the quality of the discussion in the coi. by using the question quadrant, students have the chance to formulate their questions prior to delving into the philosophical discussion itself. this was deemed useful as cam observed in a coi setting, ‘the problem is that all too commonly students ask questions that are not very deep and do not readily lead to the kind of discussion that is desired’ (cam 2006, 32). using a question quadrant as a preceding pedagogy to the coi, cam explains that it ‘almost immediately improves the quality of their questions and thereby provides a much more productive basis for discussion’ (cam 2006, 32). the two sections of the quadrant entitled ‘use your imagination’ and ‘questions about real life’ are inherently philosophical. these open questions can form the basis for the coi discussion. as facilitators, we picked the most interesting or common questions from these sections as a basis from which to commence the coi in the third week. in week three, we decided to run a coi including the entire class. the discussion centered on images of women and their depictions in the media, including the photo-shopping of our printed images and the political messages associated with these images of ‘femininity’. topical key events were discussed including the kim kardashian ‘break the internet’ cover shoot for paper magazine, and the recent eurovision winner conchita wurst. realising we had a fairly quiet group in both classes, we decided to split the following two weeks’ cois into two groups within each class, thereby making each coi smaller, in an effort to encourage more discussion and critical dialogue. in week four the stimulus text was on women and terrorism: another topical issue. two of the quieter students were chosen to read aloud a newspaper editorial on three british teenagers who were females who seemingly left the country in order to join the islamic state (isil). each text was read aloud twice, each time by a different reader, to encourage deep listening. the final week, week five, was on male suicide. the same technique as week four was followed with a text on the topic being read by two students. we shortened the week five coi to 25 minutes instead of the usual 40 so as to allow enough time for the students to complete a feedback form. we gave them 15 minutes to fill out the form so that they had time to write down considered responses to the questions asked. the feedback form is included at figure 2. results of the community of inquiry project our inquiry, then, was whether introduction of cois into the gal classroom would advance the course’s aims of promoting ‘reflexive thinking’ and ‘standpoint thinking’. in assessing this we have relied on the students’ written reflections on the cols (35 responses) in their feedback forms and our teacher observations of both the five philosophy and gender tutorial seminars and the written assessment pieces set for the course (response papers and a final paper). did the communities of inquiry advance ‘reflexive thinking?’ analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 7 as explained, our reference to ‘reflexive thinking’ means thinking that encompasses a consciousness of one’s own influence on the generation and modification of ideas. we believe this form of thinking was influenced significantly by the cois. this was reflected in the students’ comments about the ‘personal’ nature of their engagement in the sessions and their engagement after the sessions with ideas that had been generated. it also appeared in their observations on how their thinking had been modified by hearing others. the dominant themes in the student reflections on the cois were that they were beneficial because students felt comfortable and confident in contributing their ideas and that they enjoyed and benefitted from hearing others’ views. to a lesser extent, students commented on their own ideas changing as a result of the sessions. in answer to the question: ‘what (if anything) did you gain personally, from participating in the cois?’ eight of the 35 students identified feeling comfortable and an increased confidence in communicating in a group or in their own ideas. for example, one student wrote: ‘i gained the ability to communicate my opinion’, and another, ‘i think i gained confidence in communicating. i’m a rather quiet person but i do have many ideas and cois encourage you to talk and it provides a comfortable environment where people do not judge me.’ all students were final year undergraduates and would be familiar with the traditional tutorial format, so it would seem these students experienced cois, specifically, as a form that facilitated their confidence. the most prominent theme in students’ reflections about the sessions was their experience of hearing a variety of ‘perspectives’, ‘opinions’ or ‘views’ from fellow students. again, in response to the question asking what, if anything, they had gained from the cols, 23 of the 35 students referred to this idea. for example, students wrote: ‘i was reminded of the extent of views present in each topic’; ‘i loved listening to other people’s opinion’; and ‘i gained insight into others opinions as they brought up ideas i never thought of’. students (10/35 responses) also commented on their own ideas changing or being challenged by hearing others’ perspectives and opinions. students wrote: ‘challenges to my ideas assisted me to develop and reconsider them’; ‘it has encouraged me to look at my own stereotypical views (put on me by society) and challenge them. [i looked] at things through the eyes of other students and [saw] how society is changing and adapting’; and ‘i liked having gained the skills of being more aware about my thoughts and that of others, being able to listen more critically and in a focused manner.’ beyond observations about hearing and responding to others, a number of students commented on the ‘personal’ nature of the sessions in various ways. the ‘informal’ or ‘free flowing’ nature of the sessions compared with other university classes was, they felt, positive for their learning. for example: ‘i think there was a really personal aspect to the sessions because you heard other people’s stories’. there were also comments from five students that suggest the sessions could have been more effective for them with respect to the exchange of ideas, if more students had participated consistently in discussions, instead of ‘the same few’. in most cases, these comments suggest the reluctance to speak was perceived to be a lack of confidence and that the smaller groups worked much better in this regard because they were more ‘intimate’, and less ‘intimidating’. two students made comments that indicated the sessions didn’t engage them. they were critical of the choice of topics, at least within the setting of the cois, because of the political or personal sensitivities associated with them or because they were ‘only very loosely’ about gender and the law (this is discussed further below). the analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 8 students’ reflections that bear on reflexive thinking accord with our observations as facilitators of the cois and teachers of other aspects of the course. in our teaching experience when students ‘come across’ an awareness that thinking is reflexive, it is accompanied by an excitement about their learning and a desire to engage further with the topic and their discussants. in our experience of these cois students, generally, were in one of two groups: the majority of students seemed to look forward to the sessions and although at times appeared uncertain about what was expected, were engaged and contributing thoughtfully. another, much smaller, group, it appeared to us, was not easily engaged, at least in every session. there appeared to be a reticence to contribute to the inquiries and although this was the case with only a few students, we felt at times it affected the mood of the groups as a whole. we were, therefore, somewhat surprised that the written reflections were overwhelmingly positive and the number of students who indicated they were disengaged or uninterested was very low (two or three students). our observation is that students’ reflexive thinking skills developed distinctly through the course and that the cois made a significant contribution to this. as explained, the written, assessed ‘response papers’ are designed to allow students to engage personally with ideas of authors without merely expressing unfounded opinions. students are encouraged to grapple with the author’s arguments, extrapolate their key ideas and then consider how those ideas were evident in their own, lived lives. the quality of the response papers of those students who attended classes regularly, improved distinctly over the semester, and the improvements related to this capacity to explore the application of presented ideas to their own experiences. in the first (of three) response papers students tended to demonstrate their understanding of the article they had chosen and then ‘take a position’ in relation to the ideas – giving reasons why they agreed with or were critical of the author’s theories. in the second and third papers, the students increasingly explored their own ideas, building on those of the author, and often using open questions to initiate a new direction in their response. the papers were clearly more intellectually creative as the semester progressed. the final paper, which students submitted at the end of semester, was in some ways a development from the response papers. students were required to identify an ‘event’, which had occurred within the last three years in the public domain or in their private lives, and analyse that event, utilising selected theories and ideas covered in the course. in this instance a structured piece of academic writing was required. students chose a wide variety of events, for example: caitlyn jenner’s transition; olympic games regulation of the dress code for women beach volleyball players; the rape and murder of jyoti singh pandey; and the personal experiences of: witnessing a husband put his hand on his wife’s back at a party; attending a tutorial in another university course; living near a school and watching mothers come to pick up their children; and, as a (white) shop assistant, being directed by a supervisor to covertly follow two young aboriginal women. the general standard of the papers was high, particularly with regard to their direct engagement with the event they had identified and the ideas they drew on in their analyses. confidence in their own ideas, compared with the start of semester, was evident. a few students made distinct ‘leaps’ in this regard, choosing personal experiences as their events; one student combined poetry and prose in her analysis. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 9 the coi sessions appear to have influenced these developments in students’ work significantly. in the first five weeks of the course the main two-hour class was conducted as seminar discussions but from then on they were lecture-style deliveries by guest lecturers. and the remainder of the tutorials were conducted traditionally with a greater focus on content and were teacher-led. the response papers themselves may have developed students’ skills in reflexive thinking but we observed that it was those students who attended classes regularly who made obvious improvement. of those who did not meet the attendance requirement, some nevertheless demonstrated considerable academic skills insofar as they understood authors’ abstract ideas and could compare different conceptual frameworks. but they did not demonstrate the same engagement with or questioning of their own ideas, or the same depth of analysis by applying authors’ ideas to lived experience. did the communities of inquiry advance ‘standpoint thinking’? as explained, standpoint thinking involves the recognition that knowledge is contextual and therefore that, without some ‘extra’ intellectual work, some knowledge is inaccessible. this involves seeing that others have a profoundly different ‘take’ on the world, not only that they have arrived at different conclusions within shared parameters. there were numerous comments, as discussed, about the benefits of hearing fellow students’ perspectives but the tenor of those comments did not encompass a realisation of the kind of difference relevant to standpoint thinking. they were more reflective of an appreciation of different ways of explaining a topic, from individuals sharing a basically similar frame of reference. there were, however, a few reflections by students that made observations about this more fundamental idea of socio-political ‘difference’. some comments made reference to how the cois had advanced the student’s awareness of gender as a social construct; as having meaning beyond an individual perception. some students used the idea of gaining ‘understanding’ of issues that contrasted with just the giving of different views. for example, a student wrote that they gained a ‘[g]reater appreciation of the discrete and almost subconscious role gender plays in society’, and another wrote that s/he enjoyed the first coi (based on the images of kim kardashian and conchita wurst) most, because ‘i had never thought in depth about these issues previously. i just saw the pictures for their face-value, not what they might represent or mean to society’. and another student thought the purpose of a coi (which they thought had been achieved in these cois) is ‘to: see other perspectives; stimulate ideas; gain extra knowledge; gain greater understanding’ (emphasis in original). the few comments that most reflected standpoint thinking related to the second coi, based on a media text about three young women leaving their homes in the united kingdom apparently to join a proscribed terrorist organisation. a number of students reflected a consciousness of their lack of knowledge, as a significant component of the coi. on the one hand, a few students felt they gained some understanding of a situation profoundly different from their own and so the coi may have facilitated standpoint thinking. four other students expressed concern about the potential dangers of inquiring into topics where there was a lack of knowledge or information. three of these students commented on the ‘women and terrorism’ coi and one more generally. one comment concerned the student’s own lack of knowledge, two were ambiguous and one was a concern about the lack of analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 10 others’ knowledge. it was this alert to the dangers of ignorance that most reflected standpoint thinking but there is no indication that these students felt their thinking was advanced by participation in the cois. again, as with reflexive thinking, the students’ comments relating to standpoint thinking accord with our experience of facilitating the cois. in our experience, when students ‘come across’ the experience of ‘seeing’ another worldview, it is an ‘ah ha’ moment for them. there is a profoundly new way of viewing not just one or more ‘issues’, but how the world is organised, and it is accompanied by a kind of surprise: the new standpoint was not apparent before; one’s usual vision of how society works was partial or untrue. the cois we conducted didn’t appear to advance this kind of thinking. in our observation students seemed somewhat hesitant to raise controversial ideas which may have been a fear of being, or appearing to be, sexist or racist. there was evidence that students’ standpoint thinking advanced through the course, however, we think this development was probably a result of other aspects of the course, rather than the cois. if this is so, why didn’t the cois advance standpoint thinking? three students thought the groups lacked ‘diversity’ or members had ‘similar perspectives’ or ‘just agreed’ with others. they attributed the fact that an inquiry didn’t explore issues in as much depth as they would have liked, to this similarity in backgrounds. however, although all students were privileged at least to the extent they were enrolled at uwa, there were many different ethnic backgrounds represented, first and later generation australians and different gender identities. in our observation it is unlikely to have been lack of diversity itself that inhibited an advance in standpoint thinking. we are inclined to think other factors were at play, and these are discussed below. two further observations there are two further matters that arose during the project that are worthy of discussion: the question, ‘in what way is the coi different from a regular tutorial’; and a resistance to entering into inquiries that we perceived on the part of some students. the coi and university tutorials in many ways the coi and a university tutorial are similar. the coi is derived from the socratic method, as are tutorials, with a teacher promoting learning through inquiry and exchange in a less formal setting that that of a lecture. in previous years gal was run as three hours of seminars with the whole group as one class. in those seminars discussion was often vibrant and inquiring. in many ways these past seminars and the cois were similar. the seminars allowed students to explain their understanding of a text and be challenged by others’ views. students’ perspectives, not just the teacher’s, directed the course of discussion. a central aim of both was to extend students’ capacities to think and discuss and both sought to do this through energetic and intellectually stimulating exchange. however, there was a key difference between the cois on the one hand and the seminars and regular university tutorials on the other: the cois involved ‘handing over’ discussion to students to a greater degree. seminar discussions were closely guided by the teacher, even though in a skillfully led class this may not be obvious. the coi as a pedagogical form involves a more radical relinquishing analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 11 of authority by the teacher. the form and process of the class is determined and the stimulus text was selected (though not the questions) but the authority to determine the direction of the inquiry lies with the group (d’olimpio 2015). the cois we conducted in gal involved this shift in authority and was, in our experience, the key difference from other, conventional forms of university pedagogy. as one student commented, ‘we all talk to each other rather than talk to the tutor’. resistance to entering into inquiries a surprising aspect of the project was what we perceived as a resistance on the part of a few students to entering into the coi fully. this took the form of not staying on task (during the first tutorials before we undertook a coi), being reluctant to move desks and chairs to form the coi circle, and sometimes minimal participation in the coi itself. these students didn’t seem to see the challenge inherent in the coi and appeared to think of the exercise as intellectually facile. this resistance, which arose apparently from scepticism, contrasted with an intense engagement by other students but it influenced the tenor of the cois somewhat. though by no means entirely so, the inquiries were to some extent ‘blocked’ within the concept discussed by sharp (1993) and burgh and yorshansky (2011). burgh and yorshansky write of the importance of the relationships between members of a group in developing a well functioning coi: in a well functioning community of inquiry participants move from considering themselves and their accomplishments as all important. they become conscious of other members’ contributions and allow themselves to transform themselves, eventually becoming part of an interdependent whole. however, in order for this to happen, trust and care of the community must be in place. the absence of care and trust often result in a blocked inquiry in which some members are overpowered by fear and other emotions that keep them from sharing their views and ideas with the community. (2011, 445) the coi can build trust amongst members of a group but also relies on trust to reach its potential (d’olimpio 2015, 8-9). there appeared to us an element of mistrust in the cois; both what appeared to be a lack of trust in the process, producing the scepticism we’ve described, and hesitation amongst some members of the group to trust each other, producing a reticence to explore more contentious ideas. we observed these group dynamics early and made adjustments to facilitate communication. for example, we: divided each group into two and facilitated a smaller group each; talked openly to the students about the impossibility of being ‘wrong’ and encouraged exploration of ideas, rather than an endeavour to arrive at conclusions; and played the role of ‘devil’s advocate’ to model a critical perspective. these adjustments did encourage more engagement but the inquiries nevertheless remained relatively subdued. a group dynamic is complex, determined by multiple factors. however, on reflection, we speculate that the competition built into the course and the compulsory attendance requirement may analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 12 well have been significant factors. a coi aims for valuing the dialogue for its own sake and pursuing truth and seeking wisdom. gal, as a university course, requires students to be assessed and so all learning is framed by judgement of achievement. this is different from a coi conducted in primary schools. although school students are increasingly assessed and their progress monitored, there is limited awareness of each classroom activity contributing directly to that assessment. university students, on the other hand, are keenly aware that their performances will be judged. in this regard no part of gal’s assessment framework involved classroom performance; this was a considered decision, aimed at leaving students free to explore and learn in class in the absence of judgment. nevertheless, we became aware of two significant pressures on students that could have contributed to the reticence we observed. first, as noted, students were required to attend 10 of the 13 weeks of classes, including the philosophy sessions. despite the aim of the simple attendance requirement being to reduce performance pressure, we believe it became for some students a source of frustration. it appeared to be perceived by those students as something that was required without the end of achieving a portion of their grade. this compulsory element, being required to inquire, may well have worked against the aims of free inquiry. the second source of pressure on students that we believe could have underpinned the reserve were the high-stakes on the grade they achieved in this unit. many students wanted to apply for postgraduate studies at the end of the year, in particular the jd (law degree). entrance to these courses depended on students’ grade point average (gpa) over the course of their undergraduate degree and they were keenly aware of the gpa requirements for the courses for which they intended to apply. many students discussed this with us informally during the semester. moreover, graduate course entry is competitive (i.e. gpas are ranked and so even achieving the minimum gpa does not guarantee a place), and there is a profiling, or scaling, requirement applied within the faculty to gal. that is, the students were in competition with each other for what they saw as a vitally important life opportunity in the following year. this embedded competition may not be impossible to overcome but we believe it needs to be addressed in some way for the coi to reach its potential in the university setting. conclusion the philosophy and gender project introduced a series of communities of inquiry into a third year elective at uwa. the community of inquiry is a pedagogy that develops collaborative and democratic philosophical thinking, and the elective was an inquiry into gender and the law. we observed that the communities of inquiry we introduced facilitated students’ ‘reflexive thinking’. they encouraged students’ intellectual creativity and an awareness of themselves as thinkers. they did not appear to have a significant effect on students’ ‘standpoint thinking’. we speculate that the competitive pressures experienced by university students may work against the effectiveness of this pedagogy and conclude that these pressures need to be considered further in order for the community of inquiry to reach its full potential in the tertiary education setting. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 13 references bartlett, katharine. 1990. “feminist legal methods.” harvard law review 103: 829. behrendt, larissa. 1993. “aboriginal women and the white lies of the feminist movement: implications for aboriginal women in rights discourse.” the australian feminist law journal 1: 27-44. bender, leslie. 1988. “a lawyer’s primer on feminist theory and tort.” journal of legal education 38: 3-37. bleazby, jennifer. 2013. social reconstruction learning: dualism, dewey and philosophy in schools. london: routledge. burgh, g and yorshansky, m. 2011. “communities of inquiry: politics, power and group dynamics.” educational philosophy and theory 43(5). doi: 10.1111/j.1469-5812.2007.00389.x cam, p. 2006. 20 thinking tools: collaborative inquiry for the classroom. camberwell, vic: acer press. a modified version of the question quadrant retrieved from: http://www.philosophyineducation.com/resources/question+quadrant.pdf connell, raewyn. 2005. masculinities. sydney: allen & unwin. de beauvoir, simone. 1988 (first published 1949). the second sex. london: pan books. discovering reality: feminist perspectives on epistemology and philosophy of science, edited by sandra harding and merrill hintikka. dordrecht: d. reidel. d’olimpio, l. 2015. “trust, well-being and the community of philosophical inquiry” he kupu 4(2) special issue ‘well-being in early childhood education’ http://www.hekupu.ac.nz/journal%20files/issue2%20october%202015/lauradolimpio.pd f gilligan, carol. 1982. in a different voice: psychological theory and women’s development. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. golding, c., gurr, d., & hinton, l. 2012. leadership for creating a thinking school at buranda state school. leading and managing 18(1): 91-106. hartsock, nancy. 1983. “the feminist standpoint: developing the ground for a specifically feminist historical materialism.” in discovering reality: feminist perspectives on epistemology and philosophy of science, edited by sandra harding and merrill hintikka, 283-310. dordrecht: d. reidel. jacobson, kirsten. 2013. philosophy across the ages: some observations on content and strategy. in sara goering, nicholas j. shudak and thomas e. wartenberg (eds), philosophy in schools: an introduction for philosophers and teachers. london: routledge (pp. 244-256). keller, fox evelyn. 1985. a feeling for the organism: the 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1983. “feminism, marxism. method and the state: towards a feminist jurisprudence.” signs: journal of women in culture and society 8(4): 635-658. millett, stephen and tapper, alan 2012. benefits of collaborative philosophical inquiry in schools. educational philosophy and theory 44(5), 546-567. available from: doi 10.1111/j.14695812.2010.00727.x millett, stephen and tapper, alan. 2013. philosophy and ethics in western australian secondary schools. educational philosophy and theory. retrieved from: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2013.771444 nsw register of births deaths and marriages v norrie [2014] high court of australia 11. sapere. 2010. philosophy for children. from http://www.sapere.org.uk siegel, h. 1988. educating reason: rationality, critical thinking, and education. london: routledge. siegel, h. 1990. must thinking be critical to be critical thinking? reply to finocchiaro. philosophy of the social sciences, 20(453): 453 461. shapiro, david a. 2013. engaging students of any age – in philosophical inquiry: how doing philosophy for children changed the way i teach philosophy to college students. in philosophy in schools: an introduction for philosophers and teachers edited by sara goering, nicholas j. shudak and thomas e. wartenberg, 168-178. london: routledge. sharp, ann. 1993. “the community of inquiry: education for democracy.” in thinking children and education, edited by mathew lipman, 337-345. dubuque, ia: kendall/hunt. splitter, l. 2011. identity, citizenship and moral education. educational philosophy and theory. 43(5), 484-505. splitter, l. & sharp, a. m. 1995. teaching for better thinking: the classroom community of inquiry. melbourne: acer. sharp, ann margaret 2007. ‘the classroom community of inquiry as ritual: how we can cultivate wisdom’. critical and creative thinking 15(1): 3-14. tarrant, stella. 2002. “something is pushing them to the side of their own lives: a feminist critique of law and laws.” in gender and justice, the international library of essays in law and legal theory (second series), edited by ngaire naffine. routledge. topping k. j. & trickey, s. 2007a. collaborative philosophical enquiry for school children: cognitive gains at two-year follow-up, british journal of educational psychology 77(4): 787–796. topping, k. j. & trickey, s. 2007b. impact of philosophical enquiry on school students’ interactive behaviour, thinking skills and creativity 2(2): 73–84. von rijswijk, honni. 2012. “towards a feminist aesthetic of justice: sarah kane’s blasted as theorisation of the representation of sexual violence in international law.” the australian feminist law journal 36: 107-124 winstanley, c. 2008. philosophy and the development of critical thinking. in m. hand & c. winstanley (eds.), philosophy in schools. london: continuum (pp. 85-95). wollstonecraft, mary. 1974 (first published 1792). vindication of the rights of women. ny: garland. writing cultures: the poetics and politics of ethnography. 1986. edited by james clifford and george marcus. university of california press. zetlein, sarah. 1995. “lesbian bodies before the law: chicks in white satin.” the australian feminist law journal 5: 48-63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2013.771444 http://www.sapere.org.uk/ analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 15 figure 1 below is a representation of the question quadrant: (cam, 2006, p.34). ask an expert questions about the text closed open use your imagination questions about real life analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 16 figure 2 gender and the law reflection worksheet we have completed five weeks of gender and philosophy. in the past three weeks created a ‘community of inquiry’ based on three different topics: images of kim kardashian and conchita wurst, women and terrorism and male suicide. this is the first time we have incorporated a community of inquiry method in gender and the law. we would be grateful for your feedback about the sessions in your responses to these seven reflection questions and any other general comments you’d like to make. 1. in your understanding, what is a community of inquiry (coi)? 2. what do you think the purpose of a coi is? 3. do you believe that the coi achieves this purpose? 4. did participating in the coi raise further ideas and/or questions for you? did you continue to consider the topic under discussion further, after the end of the class and after the coi finished? 5. which aspects of the coi would you alter and why? 6. what (if anything) did you gain, personally, from participating in the cois? 7. which coi did you enjoy most and why?  first coi: based on images of kim kardashian and conchita wurst  second coi: based on women and terrorism text  third coi: based on male suicide text. do you have any further comments? address correspondences to: associate professor stella tarrant, faculty of law the university of western australia 35 stirling hwy, crawley, western australia, australia 6009 phone: +61 8 6488 2944 email: stella.tarrant@uwa.edu.au / orcid: 0000-0003-0882-9174 dr laura d’olimpio the school of philosophy and theology the university of notre dame australia po box 1225, fremantle, western australia, australia 6959 phone: +61 8 9433 0143 email: laura.dolimpio@nd.edu.au / orcid id: 0000-0003-0797-6623/ twitter: @lauradol4 mailto:stella.tarrant@uwa.edu.au tel:%2b61%208%209433%200143 mailto:laura.dolimpio@nd.edu.au perceiving “the philosophical child”: a guide for the perplexed a review of jana mohr lone’s the philosophical child. susan t. gardner the philosophical child jana mohr lone rowman & littlefield publishers lanham, maryland and united kingdom 147 pages hardcover $26.22 though jana mohr lone (2012) refers to children’s striving to wonder, to question, to figure out how the world works and where they fit as the “philosophical self,” like its parent discipline, it could be argued that the philosophical self is actually the “parent self,”—the wellspring of all the other aspects of personhood that we traditionally parse out, e.g., the intellectual, moral, social, and emotional selves (p. 5). if that is the case, then to be blind to “the philosophical child,” the latter being the title of jana mohr lone’s book, is, in a sense then, to be blind to the child. thus, though mohr lone says that the subject of her book is to assist parents in supporting the development of children’s philosophical selves (p. 7), that claim may mask the gift that this lovely book can bring to the parent-child relationship if it is interpreted as helping children to become “smarty pants” in the sense of acquiring esoteric skills to excel in the ivory-tower (albeit children-oriented) discipline of academic philosophy. this is not the focus of this book. this is not an invitation to learn about the history of philosophy—about what some wise, usually white, usually men said about the fundamental questions that intrigue all humans. this is not an invitation to memorize and thus to sit in awe of what others think (or thought)—as is too often the case in university classrooms. this book, rather, is a guide to how to actually philosophize—how to use questions to energetically and courageously make progress toward finding answers that one, through reflection, comes to believe are the best, given the reasons and evidence available. and to the degree that we and our children are successful, we give ourselves (as mohr lone notes this is a reciprocal gift) and our children the gift of continuously learning to become ever wiser. the methodological engine mohr lone espouses is that of questioning—both in the adult reader and, hopefully, all the children with whom the adult thereafter has contact. as mohr lone points out, “questioning is an essential skill for evaluating the constant flood of information that bombards children, for gathering what they need to make good decisions, and for conveying the gaps that remain in their understanding of particular topics or situations. the more skilled a child becomes at framing good questions, the more able she will be to think clearly and competently for herself. and the only way to develop this skill is practice” (p. 29). ahh, some adults may immediately think, my children must already be doing philosophy. after all, they are frequently questioned both at home and in school. 73 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 74 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 ahh, though, the philosophical response will be, “are your children being asked ‘real’ questions?” if a “real” question is a “through-and-through” question, i.e., a question to which no one present knows the answer, then, unhappily, one must conclude that most children are rarely exposed to “real” questions. most are, rather, exposed to rhetorical devices used by others, usually adults, to test whether the “victim” can repeat what the “questioner” already knows. and if a child does not know, or worse, if a child has the audacity to actually raise a question that publically broadcasts what s/he does not know, since this has the potential of being both shameful and embarrassing (p. 29), it would follow that the common experience of so-called “questioning” actually weakens the tendency to engage in “real questioning.” but what, then, is a real question? mohr lone answers this question with a wealth of breath-taking, heartbreaking examples. after reading charlotte’s web with your child, for example, you might ask, “would life be the same without death?” or “if you could choose to live forever, would you?”(p. 44). or, after reading the ones who walk away from omelas with your teen, you might ask, “what would you do if you lived in omelas (a city whose entire good fortune depended on the despair of one child locked in the cage)?” or you might ask whether they think their own happiness might depend on the misery of others (p. 91). or after reading the real thief, you might ask, “what is required of friendship?” or, “are friends on face book real friends?” or “what’s the difference between being popular and having friends?”(p. 95). or, after watching the film the matrix, you might ask, “what’s wrong with living in a fake world as long as one is ‘happy’?” or, (echoing robert nozick’s “experience machine”), you might ask, “what else can matter to us, other than how our lives feel from the inside?”(p. 71). or, after reading the ugly duckling, you might ask, “if the duckling believed he was beautiful, would he be more likely to be seen as beautiful? or, “what does it mean to have inner beauty?”(p. 114). or, after reading a picture book, you might ask, “how did the book make you feel? do you think the pictures or the words were more important in making you feel this way?”(p. 106). or, when walking in the forest with your child, you might ask, “if you found out that what you were listening to was really a person imitating the sounds of birds singing, and there were no birds here, would listening to this feel the same way to you?”(p. 111). all of these questions, of course, are such that neither the questioner nor the one questioned knows the answer (an apt definition, perhaps, of a “real” question). as such, they invite us into uncharted territory, and as such, illuminate—rather than paper over—the world of uncertainty in which we live (p. 39). however, precisely because this book invites us to embrace uncertainty, it may initially be off-putting for some adults who find comfort in the more predictable role of guide and mentor—the giver of knowledge. this is hardly surprising. the feeling of uncertainty is “naturally” repulsive. as neuroscientist robert burton (2008) notes in his book, on being certain: on believing that you are right even when you are not, its opposite, the feeling of certainty, is as powerfully reinforcing as crack! we are addicted to being certain! and while the fact that the premonition of being certain may give us an evolutionary advantage that motivates some to slog through tedious investigations, this addiction, like most, when practiced chronically, is very much to our peril. as burton notes, and as i argue at length in my book, thinking your way to freedom, accessing the genuine merits of your opposition and thus actively inviting in uncertainty with regard to your original position, is the primary method we have for moving toward truth on any issue. and given that that is the case, “we must learn (and teach our children),” burton passionately argues, “to tolerate the unpleasantness of uncertainty. . . . we have methods for analyzing and ranking opinion according to their likelihood of correctness. that is enough. we do not need and cannot afford the catastrophes born out of a belief in certainty” (p. 223). however, modeling uncertainty with equanimity (mohr lone, 2012, p. 125) so that children, through the excitement of genuine questioning, can develop competence in “thinking for themselves” (p. 127) and thereby take control of their own futures and develop the confidence to build meaningful lives (p. 122), is not the only payoff for embarking on a philosophical journey. as mohr lone herself attests, the authenticity of such give-andtake dialogue—the ease of this sort of communication—inevitably creates relationship (p. 17), a space of reflective intimacy (p. 125), or, what, in other circles, is called “attachment.” and this is no small gift. as neufeld and mate (2005) argue in their book, hold on to your kids, current “economic and cultural forces . . . have dismantled the social context for the natural functioning of both the parenting instincts of adults and the attachment drives of children” and, as a result, the substitute peer (rather than parent) orientation is such that aggression and delinquency can be fueled by making students less teachable and by formenting unhealthy lifestyle choices (p. 38). we adults, in other words, are losing the power to “hold on to our kids” precisely because that power comes not from technique, but from the quality of the adult-child relationship that is presently under threat due to both parents’ working, divorce, mobility, etc. (p. 50). since this power to bond with our children is subtle, its absence will not be obvious to those who mistake it for force. it is critical to note, therefore, that this power is not simply about, for example, being successful in setting firm boundaries (as important as that may be); this is, rather, “the power to command our children’s attention, to solicit their good intentions, to evoke their deference and secure their cooperation. without these four abilities,” neufled and mate note, “all we have left is coercion and bribery” (p. 49). creating such “attached” relationships, of course, takes time and listening—precisely the ingredients that are necessary for philosophical dialogue. as mohr lone notes, “one of the many pleasures of philosophical inquiry with children is that this activity pushes us to slow down, pay attention, and think deeply,” “to stop the relentless stream of ‘oh, i have to do this now’ thoughts and actions” and allow oneself to be drawn into the slow thoughtful space of philosophical exploration (p. 26), where listening “to our children’s questions and comments, without feeling compelled to jump in and provide answers, is crucial” (p. 8). though time and listening do indeed seem to be crucial for relationship-building, perhaps the even more foundational requisite for attachment is the ability to “see” the other. in her attempt to explain philosophical sensitivity by reference to “naturalist sensitivity,” mohr lone notes that a “naturalist sensitivity involves skill at observing distinctions among living things and seeing details and changes in the natural world that many of us miss; walk in the woods with a naturalist, for example, and he or she will notice small differences among plants, rocks, insects, and flowers that elude those of us not in the habit of looking for them. a naturalist will ‘see’ a web of relationships and connections, a subtle and complex set of interconnected organisms, not visible to people who have not cultivated this capacity” (emphasis added p. 25). though this analogy is meant to lay bare the kind of sensitivity that both the adult and child ought to nurture so that they can see the wonder, complexity, and challenge of the world in which we live, it could just as well describe the goal of being able to see the wonder, complexity and challenge of the children in our midst. if we do not see our children, we cannot relate to them; if we cannot relate to them, we cannot see them. this is a sometimes mystifying dialectic, the only entrance to which is genuine dialogue of the very sort that readily emerges from the soil of real questions. in one of mohr lone’s conversations about childhood with fourth-graders (after reading albert’s toothache about a toothless young turtle who complains of a toothache), young julia comments that she thinks “that children are deeper than adults” (p. 35). upon being pressed to elaborate, she says, “i mean childhood is not just about becoming an adult. it’s a time of its own. what happens to kids affects us our whole lives. that’s mostly not true of adults. i think what we experience we feel more deeply, and it stays with us” (p. 36). in so saying this, julia becomes visible as never before, as do her peers. so, too, will your children. so, too, will your students. so, too, will all those with whom you adventure forth through philosophical inquiry. this extraordinary book, then, is a guide for parents, for teachers, for all of us, so that we may offer the hand of wisdom to others, including our children, and, in so doing, become whole ourselves. thank you, jana mohr lone, for writing this holy book. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 75 references burton, r. (2008). on being certain: on believing that you are right even when you are not. new york: st. martin’s griffin. gardner, s. (2009). thinking your way to freedom. philadelphia: temple. mohr lone, j. (2012). the philosophical child. lanham, maryland: rowman & littlefiel. neufeld, g., & mate, g. (2005). hold on to your kids. toronto: vintage canada. address correspondences to: susan t. gardner professor of philosophy/director of the vancouver institute of philosophy for children capilano university north vancouver, canada sgardner@capilanou.ca analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 76 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 68 do you need to know philosophy to teach philosophy to children? a comparison of two approaches ann gazzard do you need to know philosophy to teach philosophy to children? after reading tom wartenberg’s (2009) book, big ideas for little kids: teaching philosophy through children’s litera-ture, and implementing the lessons as he prescribes, my students assert with confidence, “you don’t need to know philosophy to teach philosophy to children,” and after having been trained in matthew lipman’s approach to teaching philosophy to children, i shudder. the question, then, is whether these two approaches for teaching philosophy to children are compatible. matthew lipman matthew lipman, who could perhaps be best described as the founder of the modern day philosophy for children movement, developed an extensive and rigorous philosophy program for children in grades 1-12 with an accompanying teacher training program. the program for children consists of a series of children’s novels wherein philosophical issues are imbedded in the context of the everyday lives of the characters. the age of the children in these novels approximates to the age of the intended readers with each of the seven novels geared to a particular grade level. each novel comes with a teacher’s manual full of discussion plans and activities to help teachers explore the ideas contained in the novels with their students. lipman began writing harry stottlemeier’s discovery, one of the novels for elementary school, in 1969 and the curriculum was completed in the mid 1980s. the philosophy for children curriculum presents philosophy to children in an interesting fashion. on the one hand, a major branch of philosophy is the focus of each of the different novels. for example, harry stottlemeier’s discovery, written for fourth and fifth grade, focuses on logic and epistemological issues and “lisa” for junior high on ethics. on the other hand, the issues and concerns raised in each novel are presented in contexts and language to which the children can relate. for example in “pixie,” the novel written for third grade, pixie the protagonist is excited about an upcoming class trip and cannot sleep. she goes to her sleeping mother, taps her on the head and says, “mamma, are you in there?” correspondingly, the accompanying teacher’s manual provides guidelines for discussion and inquiry into the continuity of existence and the nature of personal identity, to name a few of the related philosophical themes. lipman insisted that teachers of philosophy for children be trained by professors of philosophy who themselves had undertaken teacher training workshops and accreditation with the institute for the advancement of philosophy for children (iapc). teacher training and the training of teacher-trainers all proceed in the same way as the children themselves move through the curriculum. a small section of one of the philosophy for children novels is read aloud, round-robin, and then the ideas of interest of each of the participants is collected on a board with each person’s question identified by his/her name. most often, a vote is used to decide which question should be discussed first. each question is usually discussed until all participants are satisfied to move on to the next (most popular) question to the point that all questions are dealt with to the satisfaction of all par45 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 69 ticipants. lipman was quite insistent that the teacher-trainers be philosophers themselves (meaning primarily doctorate level philosophy studies). he believed this would secure a greater acceptance and appreciation for the range of philosophical viewpoints that can accrue to any given topic thereby reducing the possibility of inadvertent indoctrination and, in fact, creating an atmosphere of openness and tolerance for multiple points of view (lipman et al. 1980, p.83, 209-214). the teacher-trainers model this approach while at the same time offering insight into philosophical themes that might be brought to the surface by any one of the teachers. lipman was also a firm believer in philosophy, more than any other discipline, being the discipline that teaches good thinking and that philosophers, in their pursuit of wisdom and truth, have a particularly strong interest in the rules that govern correct thinking which separates good reasoning from poor reasoning. it was not enough for lipman that philosophical discussions remain at the level of sharing different points of view. lipman, and hence those trained in philosophy for children, sought rather to further the discussion by using the rules of good reasoning to determine if some points of view on a particular issue were better than others, where “better” might be decided by any number of criteria that establish good reasoning. a list of such criteria might include things like a viewpoint being more comprehensive in its explanation than another, or backed more substantially by empirical evidence than another, or more easily supported by reason than another. this was what lipman saw as one of philosophy’s unique contributions to children’s education, that is to say, the power of philosophical thinking to make good thinkers and independent thinkers of the youth, and it was the pedagogy that lipman called the community of inquiry that enabled this.1 in short, the community of inquiry entailed the process described above plus a commitment on the side of the instructor to remain “pedagogically strong yet philosophically self-effacing.”2 in other words, it was the instructor’s role to keep the discussants on the path of inquiry continuing to pursue the original question where the inquiry may lead, to facilitate the sharing of ideas, and to encourage and direct discussants to reason through competing views. in order to be successful at this highly skilled task, lipman believed that familiarity, at least, with both the content and also the methods of philosophy a necessary prerequisite. ultimately, it is the goal of a well-run philosophy for children class that over time the students need less and less instructor guidance as they become more comfortable with sharing, challenging and defending, explaining and creating, and, evaluating and understanding different viewpoints. contrary to what most educators do, even if they don’t believe in it, lipman insisted also upon philosophy for children teachers being philosophically self-effacing in the classroom. given, that is, that students, especially the younger ones, often have a desire to please the teacher, or think that the teacher is correct, lipman insisted that the philosophy for children teacher should not insert his/her views into the classroom discussion. that is to say, the philosophy for children teacher, on lipman’s account, should be well versed in philosophy and the competing views it provides, not so that they can give “right” answers, but rather to help facilitate dialogue amongst the students.3 for lipman, the philosophy for children teacher uses this breadth and depth of knowledge to understand more fully different student perspectives and to then help them further elucidate their views rather than imposing his/hers. in general, the more a viewpoint is articulated with its underlying foundation and implications made clear, the better able are students to understand whether they agree or disagree with it and why, and the easier it becomes for the discussion and inquiry to move on. to secure as best as possible this type of pedagogy, teacher training in lipman’s program is extensive. with an on-site teacher-trainer, one semester would be used to work through one novel. the teachers and their trainer would meet once a week for two hours and use the community of inquiry methodology to work through the curriculum (i.e. novel and accompanying teacher’s manual). at the same time, the teacher-trainer would visit each teacher’s classroom approximately four to six times over the course of the semester, twice to model the process with the teacher’s students and twice more to observe the teacher him/herself teaching a philosophy for children class to her students. if there were no teacher-trainers within a reasonable vicinity of the school, then teachers would be trained in a week-long intensive workshop. the teacher-trainer would then make two more week-long trips back to the school –once to model the program for each teacher with his/her students and once to then observe each teacher teaching the program to his/her students. 46 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 70 as previously mentioned, the requirement for becoming a teacher-trainer has typically been doctorate level studies in philosophy followed with at least one ten day – three week long training workshop offered by lipman and his associates. in all of these aspects of training, the program was conducted as it would be with the children with the addition of extra sessions in logic, philosophical studies, and pedagogical issues and concerns. up until a few days before he passed away, lipman remained emphatic about the importance of teacher training.4 while all education is in fact teacher sensitive, teaching children philosophical thinking, a skill that relies on open mindedness and inquiry, is perhaps the type of education most vulnerable to corruption. in the new york times’ (2011) recent obituary to matthew lipman, gareth matthews, himself an influential figure in bringing philosophy to children, was quoted as saying that lipman was “‘the most influential figure’ in helping youngsters develop philosophical thinking” and matthews “particularly praised his pedagogical approach” (as cited in education section, 2011, p. a24). tom wartenberg matthew lipman founded the iapc in 1974, and soon after began thinking: the journal of philosophy for children, which continued as a four issue/year journal until 2010. gareth matthews was for most of that time a regular contributor, having his own column in each issue that featured a children’s book with a particular philosophical theme embedded therein. matthews’ column unpacked the philosophical richness of each of these themes. in big ideas for little kids, tom wartenberg follows the lead of gareth matthews and, on the basis of his own work with college students and grade level students, identifies some children’s books that he believes work well to introduce grade level students to some of the major fields in (academic western) philosophy. wartenberg’s book opens with “this book contains everything necessary for teaching an introduction to philosophy class in elementary schools… i emphasize the fact that you do not have to have a background in philosophy to become an elementary-school philosophy teacher” (wartenberg 2009, p. ix). this belief is reinforced frequently throughout the book, especially the first few chapters. the book itself is relatively small, 147 pages in total. in the first three chapters, wartenberg makes some general statements about his interest in philosophy, in children and in bringing philosophy to children, as well as discussing the educational issue of learner-centered education as opposed to teacher-centered education with children’s philosophy classes purportedly a member of the former category, a point to which i shall return later. chapters 4-7 cover his pedagogy, and chapters 8-15, the second half of the book, his curriculum. whereas lipman designed his novels to focus each one on a different major area in philosophy systematically across the grade levels, wartenberg selects eight children’s books that contain themes from each of the major fields he has chosen to highlight, namely ethics, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, environmental philosophy, epistemology, philosophy of language, and aesthetics.5 chapters 8-15 of his book present each of these children’s books with a brief one to two-paged account of the philosophical issues raised within the novel and suggested discussion plans. in some cases, he presents more than one professional philosopher’s perspective on the issue, for example, descartes and quine on epistemology, in others one perspective, for example, aristotle on ethics, and in some cases, a discussion of the theme without reference to a philosopher, for example, “emily’s art” used to ‘teach’ aesthetics. wartenberg’s basic conception of the nature of philosophical discussion is that it is a game of linguistic persuasion, and he outlines six basic rules that “stipulate appropriate responses for any given stage of the discussion” (wartenberg 2009, p. 29). the rules he advocates are as follows: 1. state your position on an issue that is, answer a question that has been asked in a clear 47 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 71 manner after taking time to think. 2. figure out if you agree or disagree with what has been said. 3. present a real example of the abstract issue being discussed. 4. present a counterexample to a claim that has been proposed. 5. put forward a revised version of a claim in light of criticism. 6. support your position with reasons, (wartenberg 2009, p. 33). like lipman’s maxim that teachers of philosophy for children should be pedagogically strong, yet philosophically self-effacing, wartenberg also argues that “while we (philosophy teachers) don’t prescribe what the children say about anything, we do actually require that what they say fits into the rules for having a philosophical discussion…” (wartenberg, 2009, p. 33). little information is provided by wartenberg, however, on how to go about this. rule 6, for example, given half a small page of attention in wartenberg’s book impinges upon each of the other rules, and relies upon students already being able to identify what counts as a reason, and what counts as a good reason. wartenberg offers little, if any, help in this regard however. he states that “a philosophical explanation has to be logical and provide a good explanation of why anyone should accept the claim” but he offers no criteria for discerning among reasons, or distinguishing reasons from other moves in dialogue and argument (wartenberg, 2009, p. 32). rather to illustrate his point, he provides an example of what might constitute a good reason in one very particular situation. furthermore, no instruction is provided in the rudiments of logic beyond an explanation of how to formulate a counterexample. in later chapters when he provides outlines for some of the possible discussions one could have with students over the books in his curriculum, more examples are provided, but general principles are not distilled neither for logic nor good reasoning, and there is no systematic development of logic or reasoning skills throughout the children’s books he recommends. notwithstanding the fact that the repeated practice of being in philosophical inquiry contributes enormously to one’s skill at participating in it, more pedagogical guidance would readily avert some potential serious and likely blunders from occurring. the two approaches this is clearly an area in which lipman and wartenberg differ tremendously. not only do those trained through lipman’s program get a full exposure to logic and good reasoning practices with ample rules, guidelines and criteria as to what counts as what, but the teacher’s manuals are embedded throughout with exercises to reinforce over and over the unending importance of clear thinking. moreover, the logic is developed systematically with skills necessary for more complex moves acquired earlier in the curriculum so that they gradually build upon one another. martha nussbaum compliments lipman’s program on this point when she writes, “his series of books…show again and again how this attention to logical structure pays off in daily life and in countering ill-informed prejudices and stereotypes” (nussbaum, 2010, p. 73-74). so while the two approaches, lipman and wartenberg, advocate the importance of abiding by rules of a philosophical discussion, they differ greatly on the extent to which instruction and guidance is provided for doing this, especially in the areas of logic and good reasoning. an important consequence of this is the difference implied about the purpose or end-product of a philosophical discussion. according to the rules of a philosophical discussion outlined by wartenberg, students are neither expected (nor are they given the tools) to negotiate between competing claims, nor are they expected to determine the superiority of one claim over another even if none are actually false. lipman, on the other hand, while not proposing that there is always, or at any time, a best explanation/reason/theory, advocates strongly for students being able to figure out which ones are better than others, logically speaking, in the hope that such training might mitigate against, amongst other things, the ‘anything goes’ mentality, and provide students with the tools necessary to create more meaning in their lives. the status or purpose of philosophical content is also different in the two approaches. whereas lipman focuses on a different branch of philosophy within each one of the children’s novels and presents a large range 48 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 72 of issues within that realm in that novel (not that they aren’t present in other novels), wartenberg, although he has similarly chosen a different children’s novel for each of the branches of philosophy that he addresses, focuses on only one or two issues in that domain. lipman’s novels introduce many philosophical themes within, for example, epistemology in harry stottlemeier’s discovery that the children may find interesting and provocative and thereby elect to discuss. wartenberg, however, recommends that the teacher choose one or two issues in epistemology presented in morris the moose and lead the children to talking about those, or even just one of them. in other words, wartenberg recommends the teacher set the agenda for discussion whereas lipman puts it in the hands of the children, and on this point, the two approaches are radically different. lipman’s insistence on teacher training by ‘philosophers’ was not only about the teachers being equipped to appreciate the range of viewpoints that could accrue to any one idea, but it was equally about them being sensitive to the philosophical that lay oftentimes below the surface of the ordinary. that is to say, lipman’s approach with its same style of teaching for children as well as adults more directly encourages teachers to be alert to children’s questions and comments with an ear for genuine philosophical puzzlement. after their extensive training in philosophical inquiry and its consequent exposure to the philosophical lurking behind the obviously contestable as well as not so obvious, teachers trained in lipman’s program by force of their own experience are more sensitized to children’s philosophical nuances, even if the children are incapable of recognizing it, at least initially, themselves. the teachers’ awareness of potential teaching moments in philosophical inquiry is also greatly enhanced. an example comes to mind to illustrate the point. the late dr. phil guin, a longtime teacher-trainer for iapc, working with the second grade philosophy for children program, “kio and gus,” asked the second graders what they liked about what they read in the novel. it took a long time for any one of the children to respond. finally one little girl uttered “meow!”, a word which had appeared in the section they were reading. with gracious expertise, dr. guin led the children through a discussion and logical exercise on the difference between “all” and “some” beginning with children discussing whether “all cats like milk” or only “some cats like milk,” and so on.6 lipman’s teachers’ manuals are extensive precisely because they attempt to anticipate the ideas that any of the children might propose to discuss and to provide related exercises and discussion plans to support teachers’ exploration of these ideas with the children. lipman believed that to be learner-centered, the students must not only be able to discuss amongst themselves these ideas, but they must be free to elect the ideas to be discussed in the first place. lipman wanted students to find the philosophical wherever it may be hidden and to learn how to discuss everything in a, if not philosophical way, then a reasonable one. while wartenberg also encourages his readers to be prepared to abandon their lesson plans and follow the discussion where it may lead, he does direct his teacher readers to formulate lesson plans around the themes the teacher identifies as philosophically important to discuss, themes which wartenberg himself identifies as the key philosophical themes presented by each of the books in his curriculum. he writes, “the course that you will find presented in this book was thus conceived as an elementary-school version of a typical college-level introduction to philosophy class.” while he does also say that his book is about “…supporting the philosophical questions that young children find themselves puzzled by,” his methodology is in favor of bringing the philosophical ideas to children that the adults/teachers/parents find interesting instead, especially those of interest to professional philosophers (wartenberg, 2009, p. xi). wartenberg writes, “there are two problems that immediately confront anyone introducing learner-centered teaching in her classroom. the first is how to interest children in the philosophical issue you want to have them discuss…” (wartenberg, 2009, p. 19). wartenberg’s approach, therefore, represents a much more narrow view of what it means to be learner-centered than does lipman’s. my experience with tom wartenberg’s approach via his book big ideas for little kids and the children’s literature he recommends for doing philosophy with children is much more limited than my experience with lipman’s program.7 although i have, over the past 15 years, used various selections of children’s literature to 49 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 73 teach philosophical thinking to children and to teach adults how to teach philosophical thinking to children, i employed lipman’s methodology as well as some of his program’s materials to teach logic and reasoning. in fall 2010, however, i used wartenberg’s book and its recommendations basically in the way he prescribes for one full semester with graduate students in education who are being certified to teach birth through second grade and grades 1-6 literacy. so perhaps i am better placed to discuss lipman’s work. nevertheless, wartenberg’s first sentence in his book, “this book contains everything necessary for teaching an introduction to philosophy class in elementary schools,” is disturbing to me. my students loved wartenberg’s book and our course using it as a text supplemented with numerous other articles from the field. yet it concerns me immensely when students proudly and confidently say, “you don’t need to know any philosophy to teach philosophy to children” and “there are no wrong answers in this class,” even though i coached them repeatedly to the contrary. possibly it is true that teachers need not have any prior knowledge of philosophy for beginning level discussions in teaching philosophy to children where students are getting used to hearing and finding their own voices, and obtaining some comfort level sharing their viewpoints openly. this is what my students experienced and they loved it. it was new found freedom in the classroom for them, an experience that integrated for them playfulness and seriousness. however, i failed to see on any consistent basis either confidence in, or an understanding for, the necessity of evidence and reason based argument in pursuit of truth, knowledge or the superiority within competing views (no matter how much i emphasized their importance). students were content to share views with little forward movement into real inquiry. this is not to say that lively discussions didn’t occur, exposing participants to views that were in competition with their own providing food for thought. it was the lack of commitment to pursue publicly and in community these fine points that perhaps spoke to me the most as a disservice to philosophy. students are still talking about the course, and one student has already elected to do her master’s thesis in the area of teaching philosophy to children. these are all very gratifying results that only speak to the power of engaging students more philosophically with children’s literature. conclusions merely sharing points of view, irrespective of the contribution it can make to the development of a community, is not enough to demonstrate that philosophical thinking is going on or being encouraged. discussion without this move to inquiry whereby students learn to feel comfortable agreeing and disagreeing, providing reasons for their views and expecting the same of others, intellectually challenging others and being challenged and where they develop the habit of validating viewpoints and understanding the strengths and weaknesses of these same views, ultimately strengthens bias, prejudice and narrow thinking. unless the more dominant, verbally confident personalities within a group also happen to be the most sophisticated thinkers of the group who can remain impartial to their own preferred position/viewpoint, then the discussion and concluding remarks will lean in favor of their ideas. intellectual bullying is as much a problem as its physical counterpart. one might even argue that it is more insidious in its power to influence. the intellectual rigor that lipman’s program hopes to establish is one that forecloses these possibilities. children with points of view different from the bully, dominant personalities or popular people are supported equally along with all others on the basis of reason and reasonableness that applies equally to all. strength here is not in physical attractiveness, charisma or any personality attributes other than the qualities that make one a genuine participant of the inquiry. that is to say, strength in the community of inquiry is reflected in the capacity for argumentation based on reason along with tolerance and respect for other people and their views.8 as mentioned earlier, it can be good initially, for the sake of building confidence and a sense of community, for first graders or first timers to philosophy to become more comfortable simply expressing themselves and their views. without the attempt, however, to negotiate with reason between different viewpoints towards an agreed upon or understood goal of truth or greater meaning and understanding, the “free” space that transcends cul50 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 74 tural and familial conditioning to which we are all subjected, cannot be reached. navigating within the waters of culturally conditioned thinking obliges one to stay within the realms of likes and dislikes. without making the commitment to reason, discussion typically leads to forming alliances with those who share similar views, avoiding those with dissimilar views and never experiencing the freedom that comes from being able to step back from what one always thought one knew to consider, and perhaps even embrace, if one thought it more reasonable and valuable, a different perspective. (philosophy) offers those who pursue it to the end a deep understanding of the world and a satisfying explanation of the significance of human experience. it offers them the power to penetrate appearances and to discover the genuinely real from the mere appearance of reality; it offers satisfaction of that desire which everyone, everywhere, holds somewhere in his heart-the desire to be free. (brunton 1984, p. 255) the great ideas of philosophy and the technique of dialogical inquiry particular to it together bring tools to the children capable of transforming them into astute and creative thinkers. but perhaps it educates their sensibilities as well. perhaps it can transform them into more emotionally responsible and mature people, qualities the future so desperately needs. being able to enter the previously mentioned “free” space can also be applied to emotional conflict, struggle, and understanding (gazzard, 2002). being able to step back from one’s emotional state and observe it (its nature and cause, for example) more impartially would be highly educative especially if these observations were able to be shared and discussed with others, and writing, painting and other creative activities were used to further enhance their expression. nussbaum further highlights lipman’s philosophy for children as perhaps the only actual democratic pedagogy that has been developed when she states: our historical digression (pestalozzi, froebel, alcott, tagore and dewey) has shown us a living tradition that uses socratic values to produce a certain type of citizen: active, critical, curious, and capable of resisting authority and peer pressure. these historical examples show us what has been done, but not what we should or can do here and now, in the elementary and middle schools of today. …. teachers who want to teach socratically have a contemporary source of practical guidance … they can find very useful and nondictatorial advice about socratic pedagogy in a series of books produced by philosopher matthew lipman, whose philosophy for children curriculum was developed at… (nussbaum 2010, p. 72-73) yet she goes on to argue that the survival of democracy needs people also educated in: …what we can call the narrative imagination. this means the ability to think what it might be like to be in the shoes of a person different from oneself, to be an intelligent reader of that 51 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 75 person’s story, and to understand the emotions and wishes and desires that someone so placed might have. the cultivation of sympathy has been a key part of the best ideas of democratic education, in both western and non-western nations (nussbaum 2010, p.95-96). she draws upon the use of literature and the arts to do this, but perhaps philosophy can make a large contribution in this capacity as well. that is to say, in as much as our behaviors are readily shaped and conditioned by our environment, so, too, are our thoughts and emotions. unhealthy and destructive patterns of emotion are readily acquired in the early years of life, so teachers of young children can do much to counteract the patterns before they become ingrained and more resistant to alteration. young children often playfully imagine different ways of doing things and can easily be encouraged to transfer this skill to some of the things that they do or think regularly in life, things that perhaps they thought there was no choice about. for example, an authoritarian parent might insist that sugar goes on cereal first before milk, something a child could playfully learn to do differently at school. similarly, a child could come to appreciate the possibility of an apple fairy while not denying the scientific explanation of gravity for the ripe apple falling to the ground. here both matthew lipman and gareth matthews were in full agreement that, on account of this very playfulness and naiveté, children were natural philosophers. recommendations i suggest that if one is to step outside the more formalized approach of teaching philosophy to children that lipman and his associates advocate through the use of a specially created curriculum, then one needs more attention to teacher training. using children’s literature to teach philosophical thinking to children is a very vibrant approach and one that has the advantages that wartenberg mentions, not least of which is the convenience of not having to justify the entry of yet another new program into the schools. of course, for the children, an enormous advantage is the excitement that comes from seeing literature outside its literal transcription. who ever thought “bravery” could be such an interesting idea with numerous ways of understanding it! using children’s literature without more emphasis on teacher training than wartenberg recommends, however, is fraught with challenges that teachers need more help with if the goal, that is, is to move beyond what might otherwise be merely a fun time talking together. as far as i understand, wartenberg teaches his program/method to philosophy students, people already versed in some or many of the ways of philosophy, including we hope, logic, reasoning and inquiry. perhaps then some of lipman’s criteria for a good philosophy for children teacher have already been met. yet wartenberg claims that all you need is his book to teach philosophy to children, and that applies to non-philosophy students also. none of my graduate students, for example, had backgrounds in philosophy save one or two who had taken a single introductory philosophy course to meet their general education requirements. given that we cannot count on teachers or future teachers having any background in philosophy, i believe wartenberg’s book needs to be heavily supplemented with extra written materials and teacher training courses/workshops. moreover, the book itself is in need of conveying more clearly that the views presented therein on different topics, for example aristotle’s view of bravery for ethics, are not the only views one might have. furthermore, given that students, even graduate students who should know better, are still susceptible to believing what the textbook says is right or true, it is no surprise that non-philosophy majors discussed bravery in aristotle’s terms only. i do plan to keep up with this course using wartenberg’s book. i very much want students to feel confident enough to do philosophy or philosophical thinking with their students, but i also want to disabuse them of the belief that you “don’t need to know any philosophy to do philosophy with children” and the belief that “there are no wrong answers.” some answers are simply and plainly wrong, some are better than others, and a background in philosophy is an enormous asset to know the difference and teach philosophical thinking to children. after 52 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 76 all, “the ability to detect fallacy is one of the things that makes democratic life decent” (nussbaum 2010, p.75). endnotes 1. although this theme dominates much of lipman’s writing, a relatively concise statement of his position can be found in lipman (1993). 2. this expression was used frequently by lipman and his collaborators in philosophy for children training workshops and considered one of the tenets of the community of inquiry pedagogy. see also for an example lipman (1988, p.183) and lipman (1993, p. 296). the idea has been further elaborated upon by kennedy (2004, p. 761). 3. each teachers manual, often upwards of 400pp in length, provides an enormous asset for teachers not only with discussion plans and activities but also with commentaries on many of the philosophical issues raised throughout the story to keep teachers abreast of the many different points of view that can accrue to ideas, even ones that they may have thought uncontestable or straightforward. 4. conversation with joanne matkowski, former associate of iapc, february 2011. 5. in lipman’s program, elfie for grade one focuses on metaphysics, kio &gus for grade two on environmental philosophy and scientific thinking, pixie for grades three through four on philosophy of language, harry stottlemeir’s discovery for grade four through five on epistemology and logic, lisa for junior high on ethics, tony for high school on social and political philosophy and suki for high school on aesthetics. wartenberg uses “dragons and giants” from frog and toad together for ethics, lionni’s frederick for social and political philosophy, brown’s the important book for metaphysics, the story of the tin woodman from the wonderful wizard of oz for philosophy of mind, silverstein’s the giving tree for environmental philosophy, wiseman’s morris the moose for epistemology, willem’s knuffle bunny for philosophy of language, and catalanotto’s emily’s art for aesthetics. 6. personal observation, 1980’s. 7. my experience with lipman’s program includes attendance at three international teacher training workshops in philosophy for children varying in length from one-three weeks each. i also studied and worked at the iapc for a number of years as a researcher, teacher trainer, teacher of young children and consultant to the schools, and co-authored the first grade curriculum with matthew lipman. 8. a caveat should be issued here that intolerance for people and views that are, at one and the same time, unreasonable and destructive to the course of humanity is acceptable. that is to say, under such circumstances it would be reasonable to be intolerant. references brunton, p. (1984). the notebooks volume one: perspectives. burdett, ny: larson publications. education section. (2011, january 15). new york times: new york edition, p. a24. gazzard, a. (2002). emotional intelligence, the witness and education. encounter: education for meaning and social justice, 15(4), 20-29. kennedy, d. (2004). the role of the facilitator in a community of philosophical inquiry. metaphilosophy, 35(5), 744-765. lipman, m. (1988). philosophy goes to school. philadelphia, pa: temple university press. lipman, m. (1993). promoting better classroom thinking. educational psychology, 13(3-4), 291-304. lipman, m., sharp, a.s. & oscanyan, f.s. (1980). philosophy in the classroom. philadelphia, pa: temple university press. nussbaum, m. c. (2010). not for profit: why democracy needs the humanities. princeton, nj: princeton university press. wartenberg, t. e. (2009). big ideas for little kids. new york: rowman & littlefield. address correspondences to: ann gazzard, ph.d. associate professor education department wagner college one campus rd staten is., ny, ny, 10301. agazzard@wagner.edu 53 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 1 show and tell: photovoice as international travel pedagogy sheryl tuttle ross introduction the appeal of international travel has long attracted college students to spend time away from their home campuses. from semesters or years spent studying abroad in france, spain or china to spring break weeks spent in jamaica or mexico, wanderlust is part of the college experience. the educational value of each trip varies and depends crucially on the quality of activities engaging the students. teachers who use an appropriate pedagogy may make the difference between students who develop cultural competencies and those who simply enjoy bacchanalian vacations. in this paper, i suggest that photovoice projects enhance short-term, facultyled study tours so that students gain knowledge that is beyond the tourist’s checklist. students embarking on a photovoice project distribute cameras (either disposable or digital) to locals of the area they are traveling, with questions that the photographers should address when they are taking their pictures.1 the students develop or download the images, and then ask the photographers to explain the story behind the photos or how it is that the photos address the question set forth by the students. by engaging with a local population, photovoice creates an experience that moves toward seeing the world through another’s eyes. to illustrate the value of photovoice, i provide a sample of a photovoice project that occurred during a short-term, faculty-led study tour to tanzania, january 2009. what is photovoice? visual anthropology has existed almost as long as the camera itself. during the great depression, among the many public works projects, was the photo-documenting of the conditions that existed within the nation.2 while traditional visual anthropology relies on the social scientists to take the photos, this practice is not without controversy as the power of representation lies with the researcher, and the subject of the photographs risks being objectified. photovoice shares with visual anthropology documenting conditions through the photographic image; however, the term “photovoice” refers to participatory photography--where the typically photographed become the photographers.3 the photovoice concept has two loci of origin, one in the united states where caroline wang developed the technique (first calling it photo novella) as “a process by which people can identify, represent, and enhance their community through a specific photographic technique.”4 the other in the united kingdom, where photovoice (with a capital “v”) is a charitable foundation whose mission “is to build skills within disadvantaged and marginalised communities using innovative participatory photography and digital storytelling methods so that they have the opportunity to represent themselves and create tools for advocacy and communications to achieve positive social change”5 the founders of the charity, tiffany fairey and anna blackman, formed their organization while they were attending edinburgh university. in 1998, “they established projects in vietnam (street vision) and nepal (children’s forum) which were to become the cornerstones of the present-day organization”6 the general research method as developed by wang as well as photovoice charity emphasize the power of photography to influence public policy. in fact, one of the requirements for projects under the rubric photovoice charity is that they are on-going and oriented toward public policy changes. nevertheless the methodology can serve multiple purposes. as the website indicates, “each and every participatory photography project is implemented with its own specific aims and objectives and these can range from artistic, educational, analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 2 therapeutic, research-related community development, policy change or a means of social activism.”7 in order to explore the value of photovoice for short-term, faculty led international travel, i will first consider photovoice as pedagogy more generally which has as its primary goal for students to develop a deeper understanding of how a specific population conceptualizes the world. photovoice as pedagogy images powerfully convey information. they have the ability to transcend linguistic and cultural differences to create a shared experience. students are often far more fluent and familiar with photographic images and narrative films than they are with the written word, as students frequently struggle with the texts of shakespeare, but can ascertain salient features and some symbolic importance of photographic images or movies.8 moreover, the photographic image has become ubiquitous, as cell phones cameras and facebook make sharing visual images the norm for most students. professors can harness the power of the photographic image and student’s intimate familiarity with the medium as part of a critical pedagogy. however, photovoice is not simply looking at pictures, but it also involves hearing the stories behind each shot. it treats the photographer as intentionally engaging in depicting the world; that is, photographers, as cultural ambassadors, have a say in what is represented, how it is represented, and why it is culturally important. both the showing and the telling provide critical information on what it is like to be of another culture. wang and burris list as their theoretical underpinnings the work of paulo freire whose pedagogy of the oppressed has challenged many assumptions about the nature of teaching. no longer is teaching viewed merely as filling an empty vessel with knowledge, but rather teaching requires building upon student’s knowledge acquired through lived experience.9 education toward a critical consciousness means a rejection of merely adopting the so-called knowledge of our forefathers. treating all humans as knowledgeable and as legitimate sources of knowledge is one mark of critical pedagogy. the photographers have something to show and tell about their culture. photovoice turns on its head the notion of student/teacher as well as object/subject-the photographers as teachers transfers the relationship from one who is represented or objectified to one who represents and in so doing expresses agency. this mirrors what friere claims the student/teacher relationship should be. “education must begin with the solution of the teacher-student contradiction, by reconciling the poles of the contradiction so that both are simultaneously students and teachers”10 photovoice requires a certain amount of humility—for it assumes that the student travelers do not know the subjects, but want to learn and are willing to be challenged and changed as a result of the encounter. the student travelers are participating in discovering and creating knowledge in concert with those who photograph and document their answers to open questions. one might think of this process as phenomenological sharing. that is, how one sees and experiences the world is narrated and pictured and shared with others. the photographer’s stories are equally important to the acquisition of knowledge, for frequently the story behind the choice of photograph directs the viewer’s attention to unanticipated answers to the photographic prompts. this process involves examining the traveler’s assumptions and revising them based on what they see and what they hear. friere echoes this process as he writes, “education makes sense because women and men are able to take responsibility for themselves as beings capable of knowing, of knowing that they know and knowing that they don’t”11 how to photovoice photovoice projects can be introduced in a large variety of settings, and need not be limited to international travel experiences. for example, damian hanft developed a project for his “diversities in service industry” course at the university of wisconsin-stout. the main idea was instead of teaching about diversity from some textbook understanding of the term “diversity,” the students would ask those who actually work in the service industry how they experience diversity or what “diversity” means for them. the students selected workers in various service industries (e.g. hotels and restaurants,) gave them cameras, and instructed them to take pictures that represented how they experience diversity in the workplace. the students developed the photographs analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 3 and met with the workers to talk about how the pictures they took address this issue of diversity. this is an important conversation to have as the students were training to become leaders in the service industry. the students returned to the classroom with a deeper understanding of diversity, and were surprised to learn about the various effects of the americans with disabilities laws and how it impacts working conditions in various service industries.12 whether the projects occur internationally or stateside, there are several steps to enacting this pedagogy. step one: define the assignment and organize the project most students are accustomed to being assigned papers or exams —photovoice is likely to be a new experience for them. in order to introduce this pedagogy to students, it is useful to figure out what the final product will look like—a powerpoint presentation to the class or poster session at a local library? there are many ways to make public the results of a photovoice project, such as an exhibition at a local coffee shop or even placing photos in the windows of downtown businesses.13 if photovoice is a part of a credit bearing course, then what portion of the grade will it comprise? how will it be evaluated? how does it relate to the other course material? there are also nuts and bolts sorts of decisions as whether the photographers will use disposable cameras or cheap digital ones? will the images need to be developed or uploaded to a computer? will the interview process involve taped conversations or will the students transcribe notes during the conversations? it may be necessary to break up larger classes into subsections as wang suggests that “to allow for practical ease and in-depth discussion, seven to ten people is the ideal group size.”14 if the photovoice project is part of a faculty-led, short-term study abroad tour, then the scheduling of activities needs to include time for the distribution of the cameras, development of the photos, and the ensuing conversation with the photographers—portions of at least two or three days should be set aside for this endeavor. step two: recruit photovoice photographers students participating in local projects may need no assistance in finding willing photographers depending upon the nature of the assignment. the students themselves cannot be the photographers as the point of this exercise is to get the perspective from someone who has the lived experience of the area. conversations regarding the ethical treatment of all participants and the informed consent of those who are photographed (and the parents in case of photographed children) as well as the photographers are necessary for projects to go forward. the students should anticipate what sorts of photographs might be taken to address the theme selected for the project. this gives the students access to the assumptions that are brought to bear on the theme itself, so that they can become familiar with the difference between their perspective and how that may differ from other’s perspectives. so in the example above, many of the students predicted that there would be many photos featuring faces of different races. recognizing that this is their pre-conception of diversity is an important part of identifying how their conception of diversity has changed as a result of this photovoice exercise. faculty leading international study tours should arrange for the photovoice project while making other tour arrangements. many universities have formal arrangements with universities abroad. these partner universities have faculty who may be able to recruit photographers within the target population, and if the traveling students are not fluent in the language, the international faculty may be willing to translate or find translators of the informed consent documents as well as the narrations of the photos. step three: distribute cameras and themes the students should give the photographers cameras and basic training on how to take pictures. the training includes the basic point, look through viewfinder and shoot, reminding the photographers to keep their figures away from the lens. the training also should include a conversation about the acceptable ways to approach a potential subject of a photo, the audience who might view the photo, the implications of being photographed, and when or why someone might not want to be photographed.15 care should be taken not to describe the analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 4 kinds of pictures that should be taken, but rather to allow the photographers to interpret the theme. the theme or the question should be open ended enough so that the audience could be surprised at the subjects chosen by the photographers. step four: develop, share and discuss photos some of the aspects of this step are contingent on the technology chosen for the project. if disposable cameras are used, then the film needs to be developed with two copies of each picture—one for the photographer, and the other for the student to keep. the images may be shared via blog or flash drives, depending upon the technology that the photographers possess. a conversation about the photos should proceed by having the photographers select their favorite photos, then asking them to describe how the photos address the theme. follow up questions posed in order to extend the conversation should be mindful—the students should not view themselves as “doing the photographers a favor” but instead they should view themselves as fortunate to be able to have this opportunity to experience the culture on a deeper level. many tourists have taken pictures, for example, of the eifel tower, but comparatively fewer students have seen how a french person answers this question: what is uniquely french? the student is not doing the french person a favor but rather the photographer is the generous one. step five: compare assumptions with results in the second step, students were asked to anticipate what sorts of photos would be taken by the photographers in response to the given theme or question. this step invites the students to compare their assumptions about how to answer the question (such as, what does diversity look like?) with the results obtained by the execution of the project—the actual showing of the pictures, and the actual telling why they were taken. for example, none of the uw stout students predicted that there would be photos of sinks that are equipped so that those in wheelchairs can use them. socratic knowledge is often described as knowing what one does not know. students will have a guess at what photos will be taken in response to the specific photovoice prompt, but often those guesses are just an imposition of stereotypes. photovoice projects offer the opportunity to become acquainted with what students thought they knew. the conventional understanding of diversity involves many different faces of different races—that there is more to the concept of diversity was understood by the students through the photovoice project. there is an element of surprise with the photos and the stories that rewards contemplation, and the potential to revise one’s assumptions based on the results of the inquiry—the process of discussing the pictures with the photographers. this step is the most crucial for students as they can come closer to seeing the world through another’s eyes when they can distinguish what their assumptions about what would happen from what is really documented.16 one way to get at this information is to ask the students “what surprised you about the photos or the stories?” step six: summarize and present findings as a result of the images and the stories that are shared, students codify their themes, issues and theories related to the topic.17 the findings are shared in a manner consistent with the teacher’s assignment at the outset, be it a poster, paper or other presentation. there may be many components to this step which allows for both individual and group evaluations. that is, there may be a group presentation for a general audience (such as a rotary club) or an individual reflection paper. students may be invited to think about how this approach compares with other assignments in the classroom so that there are two levels of analysis occurring, one about the themes and the other about the process or a meta-analysis. the next section shows and tells one example of a photovoice project which occurred during a faculty-led, short-term study tour to tanzania. the results consist not only of the pictures and photographer’s stories, but also of the reflections of the faculty and students who organized the project. the purpose here is to demonstrate the process as well as the product. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 5 photovoice: january term tanzania 2009 in january 2009, a faculty led study tour to tanzania was arranged as an investigation into eco-tourism and an opportunity for service-learning by a philosophy professor and a professor of economics. students could earn course work credit, participate in independent research projects or simply engage in a service learning experience. there were seventeen students traveling on the tour with six participating in the photovoice project.18 the project was framed as a group research project. since many of the student researchers were pre-med majors, and since photovoice began as a way to document community health needs, this project was designed to give the premed majors a chance to witness what a community’s health needs are. we had service learning projects arranged at an orphanage which was connected to a hospital and a local school. the photographers were tanzanian students, teachers and health care professionals. we had asked them to take pictures that represent what “health” and “disease” means to them, and what a typical day looks like. we used thirty five disposable cameras, distributing them on one afternoon, collecting them to get developed on another afternoon, and returning to have the follow up conversation on a third afternoon. the instructions and the informed consent forms were translated into swahili, and we had several people who were fluent in both english and swahili to assist with collecting the stories associated with each picture. the photographers identified themselves with their first names, and the first picture of each camera was of the photographer, so that we could identify the developed film with its owner. we distributed the disposable cameras the day we arrived in arusha, picked up the cameras a week later in order to develop the film at a one-hour photo store, then returned with two copies of the pictures for the interviews. we recorded the interviews on hand-held digital sound devices, and eventually transferred the images to a digital format. each researcher saw and heard from five photographers, and we had several follow up meetings to share notes and compare results. in order to share the results of this project more broadly, we composed a powerpoint presentation for the rotary club and arranged for prints to be displayed at a local coffee shop and also at an art-gallery. keeping in line with the charitable aims of some photovoice projects, proceeds from all of the photos sold from the art gallery and coffee shop were given to the tanzanian orphanage and medical center whose participation made the project possible. prior to engaging in this project, we anticipated (faculty and the students) seeing faces of starvation and desperate need. mariah conway recounts “i was expecting to see and hear about poverty, homelessness, sadness and continual struggles.”19 when jack temple first saw the developed pictures he was disappointed. he wondered aloud if “we were not clear enough in our instructions.”20 jack did not believe that this project would serve as a community health needs assessment as there were none of the typical pictures associated with charity drives, such as oxfam or unicef. moreover, none of the pictures documented what seemed like gaping needs we saw firsthand when we toured the hospital the day before. jack reevaluated the project’s success after the photographers told their stories about the pictures. temple explains “practically all of the people took pictures of the chores they perform at home. these include walking a few miles to get water for the family, tending to agriculture, and a variety of other jobs. when i told the participants they work very hard, they respond by saying that this is not hard work; it is simply what they do every day. it is their life. it made me realize that we all have different definitions of work and different thresholds for labor. what i consider to be difficult may be an afterthought to someone in rural tanzania.”21 conway sums up the results of the project by explaining “i feel as though you gain a deeper understanding of the culture by letting the participants become the storytellers…that is, they control the content not the leading questions of the researcher.”22 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 6 what we saw and heard milking the cow kamtate (one of the photovoice participants who received a camera, and chose to be the subject of this photo,) is dressed in her finest clothes milking the cow her family owns.23 she shows us an activity she does each morning which she took to represent “health” and a daily activity. the students were surprised to see this sort of picture but after she told them that this picture represents health for her as the cow is well-nourished and provides food for the family. conway reflects, “i heard about how each individual was proud and how much each individual loved the life they live.”24 collecting the water when this student, geoffrey, wakes up, he walks three kilometers each way to fetch water for the family.25 jack temple recalls “he showed me a picture of him kneeling down in a murky stream with a bucket. he told me that he walks very far and even still the water is not good, but this is all they have.”26 geoffrey wishes that his house had clean running water or at least that the stream itself was cleaner, and this picture represents a need that he and his family have that is not fulfilled. he also recognized that without any water his family would surely perish.27 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 7 rock punishment when geoffrey returns with the water, he walks another six kilometers to school.28 part of photovoice’s potential is that the pictures can relate to another to tell a more complete story. for example, one picture may represent a beginning action, and another the consequences of that action. we saw geoffrey fetching water before, and now we see the next part of his day. in this picture he was 15 minutes late for class. “he was required to hold these two stones over his shoulders for one hour in order learn that tardiness was not tolerated.”29 heather burgos explains “he missed the lesson for the day.”30 that is, instead of hearing what the teacher had to say, he and his friend were required to face the punishment. mariah conway remembers it as it “seems such a harsh punishment for such a minor offense.”31 geoffrey saw this as healthy because it showed that the teachers were strict and therefore good teachers.32 studying by candlelight godlove shows how he studies each night. he said that once the oil in the candle was spent, that he had to stop studying, and he thought that was not fair, because he wanted to study more.33 sheila oberreuter reflects “the results that surprised me the most was the passion the students had for their education. they wanted to learn so they could earn a better life for themselves. they knew the quality of their education was not even with other people of the world.”34 this struck us as different from our experiences in the united states where a parent nagging their children to complete their homework is a common sight. godlove is proud of how studious he is, and has his sights set on studying abroad when he completes his secondary education.35 although this picture analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 8 depicts a rather sparse scene, godlove’s pride in his scholarship is evident, so that there is more revealed by the story behind the picture than what the image can convey. seeing where there is not godlove takes a picture of a field by his school. he explains that this is supposed to be the school’s soccer field, but it is difficult to play because the field is so poorly kept, “there are many rocks and it is difficult to place goals.”36 at first this looked like just a scenery picture, but by speaking with godlove we could see where there is not; we could see in a way that might be thought of as a structured absence. that is, we could see the absence of a soccer field, once godlove told us that it was supposed to be there. richard swatek suggests “it is as if the story behind this picture represents a dream.”37 in addition, we could see how a passion for sports transcended this particular cultural boundary. what is the real-value of short-term study abroad programs? for students who attend smaller midwestern universities, where there is a largely homogeneous student body and faculty, the very act of becoming a foreigner, even if only for a short time is valuable. the phenomenology (or the awareness of the particulars of the experience) opens the students; it makes them aware of what exactly they are taking for granted. moreover, they are no longer treated as just an individual, but as member of a group, and an object of fascination in some cases. one of the problems of introducing our students to international diversity is their mistaking cultural stereotypes and icons for cultural knowledge. students who have been educated with what friere would consider the banking model of education are not used to thinking of themselves as objects of fascination or any other curiosity. in addition, if we were to translate this banking model of education to a mode of traveling, a student traveler might simply tick off “must-see” monuments and mistake that for “real” knowledge of the country. however, a photovoice project can change that educational experience for students. by becoming an object of fascination and by seeing the world through another’s eyes, students can move beyond the stereotypes, and toward a cultural competency necessary for this era of globalization. photovoice projects have the potential to transform the experience of becoming a foreigner into a genuine photo-conversation with another from a very different culture in order to more fully comprehend the similarities and the differences in how the world is conceptualized. i think such conversations are a useful starting place for students to understand this human experience.38 endnotes 1the photographers are not professional photographers, but rather ordinary people. i use the word “photographer” here to simply mean one who takes pictures. 2john collierjr and malcolm collier, visual anthropology: photography as research method (university of new mexico press, analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 9 1986). 3caroline wang, et al, “photovoice as participatory health promotion strategy,” in health promotion international, vol.13 (1), (1998). 4caroline wang and mary ann burris, “photovoice: concept, methodology, and use for participatory needs assessment,” in health education and behavior, vol. 24 (3) (june 1997): 369-387. 5http://www.photovoice.org/about/ accessed 8/17/11 6http://www.photovoice.org/about/ accessed 8/17/11 7http://www.photovoice.org/whatwedo/info/background-to-the-field accessed 8/27/11 8raychel haugrud reiff. “shakespeare: to see or not to see—does watching videos help students better understand shakespeare?,” poster session, university of wisconsin system 2010 president’s summit on excellence in teaching and learning. madison, wi, april 2010. 9paolo freire, pedagogy of the oppressed (new york: seabury press, 1970). 10ibid., 72. 11paolo freire, pedagogy of indignation (boulder: paradigm, 2004), p. 15. 12damien hanft. “lessons learned using photovoice as a participatory-action research classroom technique,” poster session, university of wisconsin system 2010 president’s summit on excellence in teaching and learning. madison, wi april 2010. 13such as occurred in st. paul minnesota with photovoice for ethiopian immigrants in minnesota, spring 2007. 14caroline wang, photovoice: a participatory action research strategy applied to women’s health, p. 187. 15ibid., 16heather castleden, theresa garvin, huu-ay-aht first nation, “modifying photovoice for community-based participatory indigenous research,” social science & medicine 66 (january 2008). 17http://www.comminit.com/global/node/201294 accessed 9/9/2011 18the students were: jack temple, richard swatek, mariah, conway, heather burgos, sheila oberreuter, and anne temple. 19email to author, dated february 10, 2010 20personal conversation, dated january 15, 2009 21email to author, dated february 4, 2010 22email to author, dated february 10, 2010 23recorded personal conversation, dated january 16, 2009 24email to author, dated february 10, 2010 25recorded personal conversation, dated january 16, 2009 26email to author, dated november 28, 2009 27recorded personal conversation, dated january 16,2009 28recorded personal conversation, dated january 16, 2009 29email to author dated december 12, 2009 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 10 30email to author dated december 12, 2009 31email to author dated february 10, 2010 32recorded conversation dated january 16, 2009 33recorded conversation dated january 16, 2009 34email dated december 1, 2009 35recorded conversation dated january 16, 2009 36recorded conversation dated january 16, 2009 37email to author dated december 17, 2009 38acknowledgements redacted for blind review address correspondences to: sheryl tuttle ross university of wisconsin-la crosse la crosse, wi e-mail: sross@uwlax.edu analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 31 improving academic quality through outcomes assessment and active learning strategies – a model for effective institutional change theresa r. moore & mary c. hassinger abstract: whether responding to recommendations by accrediting bodies or to demands for higher academic distinction by various stakeholders, becoming more student-centered often involves large scale, institutional change. viterbo university was recommended by the higher learning commission to improve its “culture of assessment.” as a response to this recommendation, viterbo university launched a project to improve outcomes based assessment and active learning, funded by a $1.8 million title iii federal grant. the focus of this article is to describe the results for this five year project as related to the two overarching objectives of the grant: 1) to improve academic assessment and 2) to improve the use of active learning strategies. data indicates not only a strong participation rate on behalf of faculty in the faculty development activities, but also high satisfaction and long term commitment to active learning and assessment. furthermore, faculty perceptions coupled with objective measures are indicative of improved student learning. the article aims to inform readers of ways that faculty development efforts can improve academic quality and also be sustainable. theoretical framework colleges and universities are increasingly being challenged to become more “learner-centered.” what does this mean for faculty and more importantly, what does this mean for students? many universities are investing large amounts of resources on issues related to improving teaching and learning pedagogies such that there is now much more diversity of teaching than straight lecture only and the “teach as i was taught” model. best practices support a wide variety of teaching pedagogies that are correlated with improved student learning, however, the onus of institutional change remains a daunting one that faculty may find threatening to their academic freedom in the classroom. faculty attitudinal considerations are just one important factor for successful institutional change. institutional change cannot be discussed without unearthing the fact that this theoretical framework assumes that the “covering of content” or dissemination of information is not adequate to what higher education institutions should be teaching students. in fact, the goals of a liberal arts institution are much more existential and hearken back to directives articulated in the american constitution regarding civic virtues such as “respect for the individual and commitment to opportunity; respect for the views of others; the belief that individual right and privileges are to be exercised responsibly (as cited in the wingspread group on higher education, 1992). furthermore, “the liberal [arts] education teaches us to think critically and to question our intellectual, social and political premises” (katz, s. as cited in the wingspread group on higher education, 1992). in essence, in order to become citizens that can fully prescribe to constitution law requires a fundamentally different type of education, one that requires students to learn how to learn and how to think. student –centered learning is based on these concepts, and evidence of student-centered learning is based on various assessment methods widely practiced in higher education. best practices in outcomes-based assessment (banta et. al., 1996, estabrooks et al., 2002, huba and freed, 2000) assert that institutional change occurs most effectively when faculty have direct engagement in the process. travis (1995) corroborates that change directed from top management is not nearly as effective as change analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 32 cultivated among the ranks of those who are expected to adopt the innovations. however an individual institution decides to radically shift the pedagogical culture, faculty still bear the major responsibility for this change to happen. (davis, 1993) further ingredients for successful institutional change continue to highlight considerations of the faculty. the late donald farmer, academic vice president for academic affairs at king’s college in pennsylvania, was able to institutionalize competency growth plans and a coherent curriculum within each field of study to improve student learning based on the following premises for success. his approaches have been modeled by many institutions seeking the same improvements: never to ask faculty to implement a change which faculty believe they are unprepared professionally to • implement; faculty self-confidence is essential to gaining…commitment;• directed and focused faculty is a significant ingredient in preparing faculty to successfully implement • academic change; and permanent and significant changes usually require the acquisition of new resources. (farmer, 1998)• whatever the initial impetus is to become “student -centered,” faculty are being called to take on a major pedagogical shift to stop viewing teaching as only “covering the content” and to start viewing it as emphasizing “helping the students learn” (svinicki, 1990). faculty development efforts are being used in new and exciting ways to enable faculty to consider adaptations to their teaching through an array of initiatives such as instructional grants, workshops and discussion groups, classroom observations, and microteaching opportunities (weimer, 1990). not only is faculty buy-in and commitment to these initiatives important, the commitment of resources on behalf of the institution is integral to the change process. for example, a resource library on best practices in assessment and active learning, hardware technology and support, and consultative personnel are important in augmenting any existing resources that the institution may already have. the cross section of resources is intended to offer faculty significant and “cutting edge” training, and hence support and confidence regarding their teaching (menges, weimer, and associates, 1996). among pedagogical resources available for faculty to become more learner-centered is an array of innovative improvement strategies and classroom methods, such as cooperative learning, case method, test feedback, and videotaping. some of these strategies have a formal structure, an extensive research base, and applicability to almost any discipline. such strategies have been described as “teaching improvement models” (svinicki, 1990). it is integral that the institution provide accessible personnel to assist faculty in sustained training in these areas. to date, most research has focused on faculty development programs’ participation rate of faculty, as opposed to actual measurable relationships between the programs and improved student learning (sargent, 1999, as cited in hickson, et. al, 2008). in contrast, columbus state university undertook a required portion of their accreditation process known as the quality enhancement project (qep). through a faculty needs assessment, the university decided to focus their faculty development efforts on one major initiative: improving student writing. although the goals of the quality enhancement program at viterbo university were different than the goal at columbus state university, their successes were driven by similar premises: 1) the initiatives in the plan were clearly linked to the university’s strategic plan of academic excellence and improved student learning and 2) a structure of accountability, recognition, and rewards reinforced that the university was committed to the activities. (hickson, et. al, 2008). the literature on facilitating institutional change to improve student learning has its underpinnings in several common facets: the importance of faculty buy-in and commitment, the need for financial resources and institutional commitment, and the provision of the necessary administrative support and expertise to facilitate the various faculty development efforts, with long term sustainability always at the forefront of the endeavor. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 33 methodology with best practices of teaching and learning in mind, and the financial resources in hand, the title iii team of administrators at viterbo university, which included a director, an instructional designer, an instructional technology specialist, and several faculty “peer coaches,” undertook five years of rigorous faculty development activities in the areas of assessment and active learning, guided by a clearly articulated timeline for success and facilitated by a team of teaching and learning experts (see appendix a). by the end of the grant cycle (september 2008), the title iii team of administration were able to analyze several forms of data that were gathered over the years, with positive results. data indicates not only a high participation rate in the faculty development activities, but also high faculty satisfaction, commitment to assessment and active learning, and both faculty perceptions and survey data indicative of improved student learning. results assessment over 100% of full time faculty were trained in learning outcomes and assessment and 92% of faculty submitted work reports documenting refined, piloted learning outcomes and assessment strategies in courses. regarding the 49 established academic programs (both undergraduate and graduate) as of november 2008: 100% have established a plan for program-level assessment;• 92% have data on student learning and are in the process of analyzing the data;• 73% have articulated action taken to improve student learning; and• 18% have indicated follow-up measures.• active learning 107% of faculty ( taking into consideration new faculty hires throughout the five year training period) were trained in active learning strategies, and 105% of faculty (#) submitted active learning pilot plans throughout the duration of the grant. preliminary surveys suggest that 82% of faculty (#) have extended the active learning strategies beyond those required for the work reports in the grant. this survey also documents that 79% of faculty (#) reported a high degree of commitment to active learning. as of august 2008, 50% of academic programs submitted documentation reporting a strong commitment at the program level to active learning by their faculty. long term commitment title iii objectives initial survey results indicate that 74% of faculty report a strong commitment to assessment (rank of 4 or 5 on a scale of 15with five being the highest level of commitment). the same survey reports 79% of faculty indicate a strong commitment to active learning (rank of 4 or 5 on a scale of 15 with five being the highest level of commitment). impact on student learning assessment reports archived in trac dat ©, an assessment management repository marketed by nuventive © and adopted by the university via the title iii grant, coupled with faculty self-reports, document increased student learning in programs and courses. fifty percent of undergraduate program assessment coordinators completed a final grant work report which asked them to ascertain and document the impact of the title iii faculty development efforts on student learning. these assessment coordinators, in a variety of ways, articulate an improved assessment culture and increased analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 34 use of active learning. in the same document, assessment coordinators correlated these improvements with overall improvements in student learning. these assertions are corroborated by two other methods of inquiry: 1) objective indicators offered by nsse data and 2) student perception data. the quandary remains as to how measure actual “improvement” of student learning. students may articulate perceptions of increased learning, but the epistemological questions remain: did student learning really improve and how do we know? student data the authors discovered a correlation between student data gleaned from the nsse (national survey of student engagement) and improved student learning during the timeframe of the title iii. while a claim for causation cannot be made, the parallels discovered via item analysis of the nsse provide an interesting counterpart to the title iii data. the nsse annually obtains information from hundreds of four-year colleges and universities nationwide about student participation in programs and activities that these institutions provide for student learning and personal development. survey items on nsse represent empirically confirmed “good practices” in undergraduate education. that is, they reflect behaviors by students and institutions that are associated with a variety of desired outcomes. (http://nsse.iub.edu/index.cfm) there are three domains in the nsse survey in particular related to student learning that are relevant to the endeavors of the title iii project: level of academic challenge (lac), active and collaborative learning (acl), and student-faculty interaction (sfi). the nsse instrument was administered to viterbo university freshmen and seniors during the academic years 2005-2006 and 2006-2007, timing that coincided with title iii faculty development efforts. in fall 2005, viterbo’s incoming freshmen took the beginning college survey of student engagement (bcsse). in spring 2006, these same students participated with seniors in taking the nsse. viterbo’s overall participation rate in the nsse was significantly higher compared to the national average. the freshmen participation rate was 52% compared with 33% from all nsse participants. fifty-six percent of viterbo seniors participated, compared with the 36% rate from all nsse participants. level of academic challenge (lac) is defined as challenging intellectual and creative work central to student learning and collegiate quality. colleges and universities promote high levels of student achievement by emphasizing the importance of academic effort and setting high expectations for student performance. (http://nsse. iub.edu/index.cfm) items in this category asked students questions related to: preparing for class (studying, reading, writing, rehearsing, etc. related to academic program).• number of assigned textbooks, books, or book-length packs of course readings.• number of written papers or reports of 20 pages or more; number of written papers or reports of be-• tween 5 and 19 pages; and number of written papers or reports of fewer than 5 pages. coursework emphasizing analysis of the basic elements of an idea, experience or theory.• coursework emphasizing synthesis and organizing of ideas, information, or experiences into new, more • complex interpretations and relationships. coursework emphasizing the making of judgments about the value of information, arguments, or meth-• ods. coursework emphasizing application of theories or concepts to practical problems or in new situations.• working harder than you thought you could to meet an instructor’s standards or expectations.• campus environment emphasizing time studying and/or academic work.• analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 35 active and collaborative learning (acl) is based on the premise that students learn more when they are intensely involved in their education and asked to think about what they are learning in different settings. collaborating with others in solving problems or mastering difficult material prepares students for the messy, unscripted problems they will encounter daily during and after college. (http://nsse.iub.edu/index.cfm) items in this category asked students if and how often they: asked questions in class or contributed to class discussions. • made a class presentation.• worked with other students on projects during class.• worked with classmates outside of class to prepare class assignments.• tutored or taught other students.• participated in a community-based project as part of a regular course.• discussed ideas from your readings or classes with others outside of class (students, family members, • co-workers, etc.). student-faculty interaction (sfi) is defined as opportunities for students to learn firsthand how experts think about and solve practical problems by interacting with faculty members inside and outside the classroom. as a result, their teachers become role models, mentors, and guides for continuous, life-long learning. (http:// nsse.iub.edu/index.cfm) items in this category asked students if and how often they: discussed grades or assignments with an instructor.• talked about career plans with a faculty member or advisor.• discussed ideas from your readings or classes with faculty members outside of class.• worked with faculty members on activities other than coursework (committees, orientation, student-life • activities, etc.). received prompt written or oral feedback from faculty on your academic performance.• worked with a faculty member on a research project outside of course or program requirements.• results revealed the following regarding viterbo university students who partook in the nsse: level of academic challenge (lac), active and collaborative learning (acl), and student-faculty interac-• tion (sfi) all improved between 2006 and 2007 for viterbo university’s scores relative to the nsse top 50% mean score 2007 lac at the senior level exceeds the 2007 nsse top 50% mean score by 1.4%. • 2007 acl at the senior level exceeds the 2007 nsse top 50% mean score by 8.4%.• item analysis within these three domains indicates that viterbo students reported significantly higher ratings in comparison to other catholic universities and colleges, benchmark schools, and the nsse average. the preceding nsse data is one indicator that viterbo university students are reporting an improvement in certain domains related to classroom experiences and title iii objectives. student focus group data – pilot the breadth of literature on faculty becoming student-centered is being paralleled with literature addressing the student side of the equation – helping students to learn in learner-centered environments. an important consideration for future research, the following results represent a sample of student perspectives on the pedagogical shifts that have taken place since the inception of grant training in 2004. a cross-section of students was selected from various majors and were asked a series of open-ended questions related to student learning outcomes and assessment. the researcher’s goal was to ascertain their general awareness of these topics and how they experience them in their classrooms and, in particular, within their major analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 36 programs of study. eleven upper division students were interviewed (5 male; 6 female) from various disciplines on campus. via content analysis, interview data revealed that students were familiar with outcomes-based assessment verbiage and were aware of objectives in line with title iii faculty training activities. in a focus group format, students were asked a series of ten open ended questions. content analysis of the data revealed that the students in the focus group were able to define and describe a general awareness of student learning outcomes and assessment methods of these outcomes within their majors – especially as they related to courses. a salient level of ambiguity existed when students were asked to define/describe learning outcomes and assessment methods at the program (major) level. not all were able to make the connection between course outcomes and program outcomes and therefore, the concept of competency growth plans within majors eluded them. although all students interviewed were able to give examples of active learning methods used in classrooms, disparity was also found among the rigor and types of activities. the general findings from the pilot interview reveal that students are aware of learning outcomes, assessment, and active learning approaches within classes in their majors. they emphasized the efficacy of active leaning in the classroom and made a significant suggestion as a result of the focus group discussion they advised that general education courses make a better effort at aligning learning outcomes, activities, and assessment methods and making them more transparent to students. discussion the results from the title iii project at viterbo university suggest high satisfaction with the training and long term commitment to active learning and assessment beyond the tenure of the grant. furthermore, faculty and student perceptions coupled with objective measures are indicative of improved student learning. future research calls academicians to take not only the faculty into consideration when making huge pedagogical shifts, but also the learners. (doyle, 2008) students often come to college with certain assumptions about roles and ways of learning that may not only contrast with more learner-centered models, but in fact sabotage them. this leads to the importance of student voice and transparency as to why the classroom dynamics are changing from the traditional lecture-based format. the expectations for both faculty and students’ roles need to be clear in order to assuage confusion and/or resistance. the discussion of actual “improved student learning” versus perceived “improvement” is something that needs careful consideration as student learning continues. triangulation of faculty course data, student perceptions, and perceptions from assessment coordinators, lead the authors to believe that there has inarguably been a cultural shift at viterbo, but the tangible and measurable results of student learning still await full explortion and dissemination. references banta, t. w., lund, j. p., black, k. e. & oblander, f. w (eds). (1996), assessment in practice: putting principles to work on college campuses. san francisco, ca: jossey-bass. davis, b. (1993). tools for teaching. jossey-bass publishers: san francisco, ca. doyle, c. (2008). dancing toward transformation – mapping a pedagogical site. narrating transformative learning in education. palgrave macmillan. estabrooks, c. et al. (2002). ingredients for change: revisiting a conceptual framework. quality and safety in healthcare. january 2002; 11(2). hickson, j. et al. (2008). a quality enhancement model: connecting faculty development with the achievement of student learning outcomes and institutional goals. the journal of faculty development .january 2008; 22(1):5-10 huba, m. and freed, j. (2000). learner-centered assessment on college campuses: shifting the focus from analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 37 teaching to learning. allyn & bacon publishers. menges, r.,weimer, m. and associates. (1996). teaching on solid ground using scholarship to improve practice. jossey-bass publishers: san francisco, ca: svinicki, m., (ed.). (1990). the changing face of college teaching. new directions for teaching and learning. no. 42. jossey-bass publishers: san francisco, ca. travis, j. (1995). models for improving college teaching: a faculty resource. the national teaching & learning forum. publishers: james rhem & associates, llc. wingspread group on higher education.1993.an american imperative: higher expectations for higher education. address coresspondence to: theresa r. moore director of faculty development and internship coordinator viterbo university, 900 viterbo drive la crosse wi, 54601 trmoore@viterbo.edu or address correspondence to: mary c. hassinger academic vice president stephen’s college email: mhassinger@stephens.edu phone: (573) 876-7213 x 4213 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 38 appendix a editor's notes analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 35, issue 1 (2014) editor’s notes this first issue of volume 35 brings us back to the home terrain of analytic teaching and philosophical praxis, with all five articles dealing squarely in concerns central to the meaning and prospects of philosophy for children. that said, the real impetus for the current issue lies on the shoulders of natalie fletcher who took the initiative at the last naaci conference, held in quebec city at the université laval last summer (2014), to encourage participants to submit their papers to the journal. thanks largely to her efforts we managed to get together enough quality submissions to proceed with the current issue, one that i’m sure you’ll enjoy. the five articles published here provide a nice range of approaches to pfc, some of which explore the larger historical context of alternative pedagogies while others document the challenge of implementing pfc in the classroom. kennedy’s article on “dialogic schooling” inaugurates the issue and looks at the complicated yet fascinating genesis of dialogical schools as a longstanding alternative to traditional, state enforced education. natalie fletcher’s contribution “body talk, body taunt” offers a new and intriguing read on the corporeal complexity embodied in the community of inquiry. abdul shakour preece and adila juperi bring us up to date on the many challenges that come with trying to integrate pfc in malaysian schools, “philosophical inquiry in the malaysian educational system.” next up is eva marsal’s piece “socratic philosophizing with the five-finger model,” which provides a rich example of ekkehard marten’s contribution to pfc through the lens of a simple but instructive game called distance and closeness. finally, the impressive research of colom, moriyón, magro and morilla round out issue one in their engaging study, “the long-term impact of philosophy for children: a longitudinal study.” collectively, the five articles assembled here, along with two book reviews on gardner/leask and kohan, give a timely glimpse into the rich and evolving world of pfc. let the revolution continue! chief editor jason j. howard viterbo university copy editor jacqueline herbers viterbo university layout design assistant april wolford viterbo university contributing editors patrick costello glyndŵr university susan gardner capilano university david kennedy montclair state university nadia s. kennedy stony brook university, suny richard morehouse, emeritus viterbo university félix garcía moriyón center for philosophy for children, madrid, spain joe oyler institute for the advancement of philosophy for children montclair state university michel sasseville laval university john simpson university of alberta barbara weber university of british columbia publisher viterbo university, la crosse, wisconsin 45601 established in 1981 as analytic teaching at texas wesleyan college and transferred to viterbo in 1993. online copyright 2005 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis is a peer-reviewed, online, open access journal published annually and sometimes biannually. issn 2374-8257 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 12 confessions of a departmental chair on assessment wendy c. turgeon my college has been swept by the “assessment” wave, as have many, if not all, colleges in the united states. this passionate attention to assessment goes beyond the tools of classroom evaluation (tests, quizzes, papers) and has affected every aspect of academic protocol: courses, majors, programs, degrees. we now speak of a “culture of assessment” to indicate a thorough commitment to reflexive pedagogy and attentive program design. in its best sense, the assessment movement echoes higher education’s response to society’s call for accountability. we acknowledge that just as we continually assess our students within the classroom, we must also assess our programmatic commitment to the larger community. a “culture of assessment” runs deep into the central meaning of education for student, faculty, departments and the college. all aspects of the college experience must be developed so that there is an assessment protocol in place. however, when the “culture of assessment” devolves into its worst sense, faculty are concerned that the call for assessment at the university level may lead to the problems prevalent at the pre-college level with the legislation of “no child left behind.” here we have witnessed the potential for abuses of assessment so as to become a punitive and narrowly conceived tool of defining and measuring success. as reflected at the pre-college level, nclb has been accused of using unilateral models to assess the performances of teachers and schools that ignore the contextual forces of the social milieu in which these schools live and operate and the durational nature of the educative experience. when a teacher or program is summarily evaluated on the basis of poorly designed and implemented assessment standards, we see the devastation that occurs for the students, teachers and schools alike. living life under a microscope of persistent calibration can be enervating in ways that darken the soul of what we do. why assessment is necessary and important now, we must resist the impulse towards this negative vision of assessment as intrusive and based on a flawed factory model of education and there are many reasons to rejoice in a call for clear and persistent monitoring of our attempts and achievements. in fact we have always engaged in the act of assessing, evaluating our selves and others within our disciplines and our classrooms and we must continue to do so if we wish to be self-reflective about our practice of teaching and learning. first, we cannot ignore the interiority of the act of assessment. no one would argue that we should eliminate any sense of prescription and goal setting within our courses, our departments and indeed our lives. an aristotelian telos runs deep in our human desire for directional orientation. we want to achieve more, to do better, to dig deeper, to increase meaning within our lives, to be successful. these are profoundly human goals and may be the matrix in which human happiness and the good life find realization. as students, faculty, administrators, we want to see our teaching and learning flourish as it represents our directional arc towards happiness as human excellence, doing and being the best that we can. assessment also asks us to adopt the perspective of the other. from its nature as exteriority, assessment serves to remind us that we are embedded within a larger community, a community in which we engage in implicit and explicit contracts for mutual benefit and growth. that the larger community, within the college and outside thereof, wishes to see what academics and their students do as “baking bread,”1 is understandable. at the end of the degree program, what can the student do? what have they achieved? i do not doubt that we consult with deep interest such assessment tools as consumer reports or angie’s list when contemplating a purchase or hire analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 13 for service work in our home. to the extent that congress appears to endlessly debate without result, to that extent are we impatient and threaten change. assessment is part of the fabric of social existence and it offers us a road map to avoid the detours and impediments to a successful communal existence within the polis. so why are some so suspicious of the current climate of the university and its “culture of assessment?’ are they resisting the mandate that we be part of the society, even as we question it? are they claiming privileged position due to academic degrees or the esoteric nature of being members of a community of “higher learning?” that is, are we higher than the “hoi polloi” and therefore exempt from it as some sovereign might claim to be above the law? why are some faculty so reluctant to join this “culture of assessment” to the point that the very phrase sets teeth on edge? to tease out an understanding of our conflicted perspective on assessment it might be helpful to begin with an anecdotal but perhaps paradigmatic example. several years ago the dean of my college asked me to chair an ad hoc committee whose charge was to articulate the college’s core values and develop an assessment plan towards our meeting them. our core values, which will sound similar to the core values in many other institutions, are integrity, social responsibility, intellectual and spiritual values, service and global awareness. our fearless committee took up the task with dedication. we worked on skating around the sink holes of defining “intellectual and spiritual values” so as to avoid any particular religious platform or suggestions of elitism. but when it came to detailing the assessment of the stipulated values we ran into a wall. one fellow faculty member quipped that the most effective way to measure the success of our conveying spiritual values would be to measure the length of our graduates’ stay in purgatory as compared to those from other colleges. the humor in this suggestion cut deep and wide and we were faced with a daunting task. how would we control for the attitudes, skills, knowledge and values with which our students enter our institution compared with those they left at graduation? and how would we know the causal factor was the experience within our classes and college community as opposed to their life experiences outside of the institution? and what criteria would we use as a source of measuring the realization of values that develop and grow throughout a lifetime? we want to fulfill our commitments to the nurturing of the stated values but how can we effectively assure ourselves that we are successful? therein lies the dilemma. while this example may seem to stack the deck against assessment due to its reference to abstract values and behavioral traits that can span a lifetime, we might still see it as a placeholder for other assessment concerns. i would like to explore the following themes in an attempt to think deeper into the notion of assessment and its de/value within academia: accountability, assessment as pedagogy within the classroom and within the university, the aesthetics of assessment and finally the temporality of assessment. these must all be considered in light of the players or categories of actions: students, faculty, and academic programs. accountability as mentioned above, a deep attraction to the affirmation of active and ongoing assessment is its role in determining accountability. with accountability come responsibility and the acceptance of consequences for our actions and non-actions. if our program is not preparing students to pass or, better yet, excel on the teacher certification exams, the entrance exams for graduate studies, the cpa exam, then an assessment program ought to reveal this weakness and push us towards improvements. we are accountable for the promises we make our students when we admit them into the institution and into a program. this does not absolve students of their own accountability but it does remind us that our obligations are tied to the promises we make in offering our program in the manner in which we do. but this is where it gets complex and can lead us into dark one-way alleys. in some colleges, assessment looks to performance on standardized tests as one means for program evaluation. faculty may be responsible for teaching the courses in the program but they cannot control the background knowledge and skills with which students come to the subject matter. is the pattern of low scores on a gre subject area due to poor instruction, a weak programmatic structure, unprepared and weak-skilled students, an economy that requires heavy work loads outside of the classroom for survival, a test written to favor a particular analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 14 political perspective or approach within that discipline? the best we can hope for is the monitoring of scores, job placements, graduate school placements over a significant track of time to determine how to parse the responsibility here. but even that may defy easy tracking since demographics, social and economic, are always changing. it is certainly recognized that the educational preparation and economic status of entering college students is directly correlated to their success after college graduation. alexander w. astin argues for a “talent developmental view”2 of the function of assessment which acknowledges the plural factors that influence college performance but in ways which chart paths of creative assessment use. determining the quality of an academic program is a complicated business and any attempt to quickly and comprehensively draw conclusions from such data can be misguided at best or destructive at worst. nevertheless administrators must do so. unfortunately in some schools what often becomes a major tool for program assessment is enrollment numbers. when a program fails to enroll many students, its market value decreases and in the world of shrinking resources, many programs have been eliminated on these financial grounds: classical studies and philosophy3 are two popular programs for chopping but foreign languages often suffer as well. we might wish to ask ourselves whether a university or college has an obligation to its mission that is broader than its fiduciary responsibilities. the financial quantification of merit can be perceived as a narrowing of value to the point at which it becomes the only value. institutions of higher learning must resist taking the market economy as their only and/or dominant model of assessment. assessment’s natural affinity with the quantification methods of the social sciences runs headlong into the desire that we consider the quality issues of education as important. if assessment uses financial models from the corporate world, we are denying the unique and important role of a humanistic education which runs along a track other than bottom line success. this must be faced head-on and should itself become the heart of a college’s discussion on any assessment plan. every college must engage in faculty assessment, both for the benefit and nurturing of their students and for the advancement and development of their faculty. how best can we assess the faculty and their performance? when it comes to faculty assessment, we must struggle with the idea and practice of student evaluations that illustrates many of the problems at the meta-level of program on a localized course/faculty level. yes, the instructor is accountable to his or her students as well as to the institution. an instructor who cancels many classes capriciously, never offers assessment of the students’ understanding, speaks consistently above or below student comprehension levels—that instructor should be held accountable for a serious lack of responsibility and dereliction of duty. but that same person might receive glowing evaluations based on the casual holding of classes, easy grading, or simply nice-guyness. an instructor who insists on rigorous and high standards of performance within the class may be deemed unfair, mean, or burdensome on some student evaluations. but then, students’ views can be dead on and should not be discounted, as students are the reason that we teach in the first place. if one is capable of cross-checking or verifying the source of the student evaluation against a systematic student profile, this might help control for some of these factors but that is usually against the spirit of an “anonymous” and therefore protected instructor assessment tool. if students would provide some referential check-point data (their own attendance record, previous acquaintance with the subject matter, their academic profile, information regarding their time management situation) this might help develop a rubric for estimating the veracity and value of their comments, negative and positive. ironically the very format that is intended to assure honesty and openness might work against its meaningfulness in its absolute anonymity. again, if we see trends of low evaluations, we take that as a warning sign but do we question high assessments likewise? a departmental chair wants honest and meaningful feedback on the classroom performance of instructors. this is important for the meaningfulness of the student learning experience and the promotional track of the professor. but how are we to assure the validity of data? is there a systematic and tested instrument for instructor evaluations out there that can fairly and adequately control for these significant variables? and most importantly, are the results of student assessment of faculty effectiveness being used in helpful ways to guide instructors in their continuing pedagogical development?4 consequently, we certainly want to hold faculty accountable for the quality of their instruction and institutions accountable for their degrees but how do we control for all the extraneous factors and develop modalities analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 15 of assessment that accurately measure the achievements of the goals we have set? when my accountant steals my money or mis-reports my income to the irs, the consequences are quantitative and immediate and we can determine that my accountant is “not doing her job.” but if i supply my accountant with false or partial information, to what extent am i also responsible for that accountant’s failing? however, faculty performance lacks the numerical standard of performance that an accountant has.5 so, how might we work within the parameters available to us so that we can effectively mentor professors within our department and safeguard the learning experiences of our students? often this takes nuanced reading on the part of chairs and the faculty themselves. this disposition towards a wise evaluation defies one-dimensional opscan methodologies and needs to be cultivated over time, consciously and conscientiously. no one would deny that faculty assessment is critical for the nurturing of students and faculty alike and ultimately feeds back into the quality of the program. the challenge is how to do it in a manner that genuinely reflects the strengths and weaknesses of an instructor and, most importantly, can be used for formative as well as summative evaluation. assessment as pedagogy one place where assessment seems inevitable, desirable and fully expected is within the classroom. students need to receive feedback through meaningful assessment tools as to their achievements. since colleges use grades, points or some sort of quantifiable assessment to calculate movement towards a degree, class standing and academic awards, and as clues of performance expectations for prospective graduate schools or employers, these forms of student performance assessment are essential.6 however, assessment can take many forms or tracks: improvement throughout a time period, effort expended, and the mastery of skills and information literacy. each of these serves as a different but important source of evaluation and guidance to the student. these plural and at time conflicting goals require a careful calibration of the nature and structure of the assessment tool so as to serve as a realistic and meaningful yardstick for student achievement. when it comes to skills and content, tests should be challenging; they should push the limits of student’s mastery. if everyone gets an a, what does that indicate? that the teacher is fabulous and totally successful? that the students are geniuses? or that the test was way too easy? none/all of the above? while we do not wish to crush the hopes and dreams of our students, a well-designed test that can offer them the best possible, although still limited, evaluation of their skills and knowledge base is part of an honest teacher/student relationship. of course, controlling across faculty, disciplines, and colleges is an extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, charge. can we really expect all english teachers to read and grade essays completely on the same scale? rubrics7 can certainly help but even with such guidance, there is an unavoidable element of subjectivity in many course evaluations. some professors insist that grading is more of an art than a science and is built upon years of nuanced evaluations. much of classroom assessment is a necessary but deeply flawed event. to paraphrase churchill on democracy, it is the worse form of student feedback, except for all the others. but we might design assessments which assist in helping students reflect on their own progress from the beginning of their course experience to where they are now. we might also acknowledge the role of effort in a certain way so as to encourage active engagement in and responsibility for learning among all the students. but we must ourselves engage in reflection on the function of testing and the importance of honesty and a striving towards accuracy for the student’s own developing sense of content comprehension. to offer no assessment may seem open and freeing (“we are all here just to learn!”) but it fails to provide the student with this important guidance in terms of their own learning goals and potential within the field of study. we should be seeing our courses as learning opportunities and ideally students progress both in content knowledge and skills as they move through a class and a program. we want to encourage them and nurture their development and to do so, we need to honestly and effectively evaluate the degree of that development. putting aside the ferocious debates between the testing advocates and the “performance” advocates, we can recognize that all forms of assessment can play a valuable role, albeit a different one depending upon the nature of the course and the learning goals stipulated therein. instead of viewing tests and projects as after-the-fact measurements (sometimes referred to as “autopsies”), we might do well to use such methods of assessment in directly and actively pedagogical ways. tests could be given, marked and then re-introduced within the classroom community analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 16 as learning tools. essays assigned can be revisited within discussion or incorporated as building blocks towards future learning. there is no magic wand to wave and find the perfect test8 or essay assignment at the end but faculty can become more mindful of how they construct their assessment tools and ways in which they can be more useful to the students. perhaps the most important aspect of student assessment is a clear accounting for the function and meaning of any given assessment activity. is this to help the student calculate their current level of mastery of the subject at hand or is it to serve as a prompt for personal growth in effort and involvement? if faculty can clarify the role of assessment with the students, the chances of those assessment activities being genuinely helpful increase. assessment must function both formatively and summatively and the best instructors help students to use assessment as a learning tool within the process of mastery as well as a vital source for honest self reflection on one’s ability, efforts and achievements. astin devotes an entire chapter of his work to the “feed back principle.” he claims that “ assessment and feedback should be an ongoing, iterative proceeding that is integral to the learning process rather than a one-time activity carried out only at the end of the learning process.”9 if a student’s education is designed to assist them in mastering a subject area or skill, then assessment must keep both goals firmly front and center for it to be meaningful and truly transformative. the aesthetics of assessment one aspect of assessment, at all levels and manners, which is often ignored is the aesthetic nature of the assessment project. this notion suggests pluralistic interpretations. in one way, the very act of assessment is a critical judgment of worthiness. we are valuing something and judging it as meritorious or unworthy. a standard of excellence is determined and that becomes the measuring stick against which we line up the person, program, or course to determine relative relationship to that ideal. have we hit the mark or missed and how far off? how do we determine this standard? what constitutes excellence in mathematics, microbiology, poetry, social work, teaching, or philosophy? in some cases we can appeal to clear quantitative standards but even in science and math there must be room for creative leaps forward that may challenge the very standard that judges it. a doctor’s rate of surgery success can be affected by the riskiness of the cases she undertakes. if we simply measure the doctor’s quality by quantity (as so often reported in surveys on hospital and doctor performance,) we are missing part of the picture. certainly in poetry and philosophy there remains an acknowledged degree of indetermination. we can recognize bad poetry and philosophy when we see it but we might not be able to grasp truly novel leaps forward. we can take the accepted canon as our standard of judgment and this certainly works in many cases but once we move outside that canon we are in unchartered territory10. nothing illustrates this better than judgment in art. was manet an incompetent immoral artist whose presence in the salon would pollute it or is he one of the great masters of a new vision of painting? while assessment is always present as a mode of axiological perception, we must remain mindful of the deep controversies at the heart of any valuation activity and be alive to the role of hegemonic definitions at the hands of the established powers and ruling value systems. the other aspect of the aesthetics of assessment is the actual tool of assessment itself as an aesthetic object. what constitutes an elegant tool? are some exams, surveys, program review documents particularly well done? by that i mean that they achieve their objectives fairly, with just the right degree of meaningful effort on the part of the participants and do so in ways that truly delight (i will suggest that is not too strong a word) the participants? i am sure we have all done some survey from the ubiquitous survey monkey as part of our faculty duties. in some cases the survey is framed in language that is clear, allows for all possible answers, is structured in ways that help the participants understand the purpose of the survey and perhaps even encourages them to reflect on how their own answers reveal further truths about that which is being assessed in novel and helpful ways. we have also dealt with meandering, endless surveys with questions that we wish we could write in “none of the above” as our preferred response. whether we are working on a student evaluation of an instructor and course, a program evaluation for an accrediting agency, an in-house review of a major program or a faculty application for promotion, designing aesthetically pleasing assessments helps render those assessments powerful analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 17 and fulfilling tools for praxis. their relevance and importance become clear and thereby they find validation within the community. one might argue that this is “window dressing” and irrelevant to the quality of the information gathered and the judgments made, but how we approach such assessments and how they present themselves to us is an integral part of the assessment matrix, out of which emerge reflection on self and others along with meaningful data collection. a survey that is cumbersome, repetitive, too sparse, will be treated with contempt and dismissed and that very act of negation by those for whom the assessment is designed will shape the outcome, thereby tainting the import of any data collected. the temporality of assessment finally we must acknowledge the elephant in the middle of the room: assessment treats human events as discrete pieces of data that can be quantified, frozen in some snapshot of evaluation. this flies in the face of durational experience.11 a classic illustration is the attempt to measure integrity or philosophical wisdom. true, if one’s graduates end up in jail as they walk off the commencement platform, we might question how your institution has nurtured personal accountability and integrity. but even then, who is to say that the seeds for criminal behavior and unethical actions were not sowed way before matriculation at your institution? we can measure what student a knows on this day at this time but does that adequately represent their overall understanding and mastery of the material? and if a program produces teachers that have difficulty finding employment immediately after graduation, is that a function of the ineffectiveness of the program, the skill sets of that current group of graduates, a faltering job market, or a recalcitrant system that is unwilling to try new and innovative ideas as instilled in these graduates? some skills and knowledge may take years to fully develop and bear fruit while others may lend themselves to an easy measurement of success according to some industry standard. so assessment must always take the long term durational approach if it hopes to claim access to some truth about the student, program, faculty, college. many of the discussed forms of assessment can only be meaningful over some time period, but when we are dealing with the rich and nuanced fruits of education we might find the factory model of measuring effective production simply fails us. we are called upon by our allegiance to values deeper than or at the very least different from a market economy to advocate for a cautious and thoughtful use of assessment. the very awareness of this can itself enhance the function of assessment within an institution. the philosopher’s view on assessment while all disciplines contribute to the ongoing discussion about the place of assessment in the academy, philosophy might be able to contribute its own perspective as particularly helpful. as a discipline committed since socrates to cogent argumentation, clear and relevant explanation, the crafting of good reasons, philosophy can appreciate the spirit of the call for assessment. it matters how we do what we do so that we can demonstrate its meaning and hopefully its success. or at least obtain necessary feedback information so as to evaluate critically the nature and scope of our goals and our progression towards them. to the extent that the activity of doing philosophy instantiates critical thinking, assessment is embedded within its very nature. philosophers applaud attention to aims and objectives and the careful monitoring of relative success at attaining them. more recent views on philosophy (such as that espoused by the “philosophy for/with children” movement)12 characterize the activity of philosophy as not only critical but also caring and creative. the notion of “caring” is admittedly problematic since it could be construed as non-critical, hesitant to challenge because one wants to be “caring” or polite. but we might also see this notion of caring as more importantly referencing the presence of philosophical thinking within a community, a community that must maintain inter-personal connections and cultivate respect and attention (if not always acceptance) to all ideas. to the extent that we see philosophy as caring in this sense, we acknowledge that what we do is embedded within a larger community and must be shared, analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 18 justified, and challenged by that community. therefore, criticism must be undertaken so as to maintain communication and sharing, but not foreclose dialogue at the same time. the exteriority of assessment reminds us of that embeddedness and can serve as a powerful indicator that we do not exist in a vacuum. our graduates go out into the world and carry with them into the world the skills and knowledge that they acquire and are hopefully continuing to develop. we want them to do so with confidence and humility. therefore, accountably to the larger community is essential for the college community to thrive. however, to the extent that philosophical thinking is creative, we must acknowledge that it might challenge the very rubrics against which it is measured. as mentioned above, many great works of art, philosophical treatises, and scientific theories failed the assessment rubric of the time. copernicus would definitely not have passed astronomy 101 if he had failed to learn “that we live in a geocentric universe.” peter abelard’s challenge of superstitious views was not well received by the assessment standards of bernard of clairvaux. if a culture of assessment means that we must set learning goals and fulfill them without reflectively and continually challenging those very standards, then philosophy (along with many other disciplines) will be perceived as recalcitrant non-players. finally, a number of writers in the humanities have reminded us that the model of a university education, perhaps all education, should be a “cultivation of our humanity,” to borrow the title of martha nussbaum’s book13. she recalls the university to a much larger charge than career preparation: we are committed to “life preparation.” and that is a process that does not end at graduation. we are seeking to introduce students to knowledge and skills that will travel with them throughout their lives. we want them to continue to mature into their humanity but to expect this process to be complete or perhaps even measurable in some quantifiable sense at the completion of a course or degree program falsifies the very goal to which we aspire. noted psychologist howard gardner14 argues for a view of education that introduces students to the large human values of “truth, beauty and goodness.” these values are central to any human life and yet if we were asked to develop learning goals and assessment tools to measure our success, we would face the same challenge that my committee faced on determining measurements of integrity in our students. does that invalidate the importance of these quintessential values? of course not. none of this serves as an anti-assessment argument but it is offered as a caution that a “culture of assessment” within a college must be thoughtfully promoted and owned by the entire college community. if it is misconstrued, it can devolve into a model that fails to see beyond short term goals and objectives that lend themselves to mere quantification which will generate more resistance from the academic community. in its best instantiation, a “culture of assessment” reflects a deep commitment to keeping promises through a continual cycle of self reflection and improvement. we avoid a complacent status quo as we respond to the interests and needs of all stakeholders in higher education and reestablish the importance of education within society in ways that are transparent and accessible. this fruitful model of assessment confirms the need to be mindful of accountability in ways that acknowledge the nature of a life as durational, qualitative and infinitely nuanced. endnotes this metaphor is attributed to novalis. note that he follows that stipulation with the qualification that 1. although philosophy bakes no bread “she can procure for us god, freedom, immortality. which, then, is more practical, philosophy or economy?” alexander w. astin, 2. assessment for excellence, american council on education, 1993. despite the seeming datedness of this study, astin offers some cogent critique of the assessment movement and crafts a model which incorporates assessment into every aspect of the educative nature of education for the benefit and growth of all constituents. in chapter four he discusses the ways in which students entering profiles can be used to promote development and factor into a nuanced assessment study of college performance. a december 2009 article in the new york times, “career u.making college relevant” reported 3. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.1 19 that many colleges were re-aligning their programs and courses to reflect student interest in career applications. see http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/03/education/edlife/03careerism-t. html?pagewanted=1&emc=eta1 astin (op. cit.) devotes chapter seven to general discussion of using assessment tools as feedback mecha-4. nisms for the benefit of faculty, students and institutional goals. for example, one faculty indicated to me that he considered high grades in his class a sign that he had 5. done a good job; low grades indicated the extent that he had failed to teach. is this a fair conclusion? unless you are quite brave. in a recent post on the 6. website inside higher ed, it was reported that cathy davidson of duke university offered her class without any grading: http://www.insidehighered.com/ news/2010/05/03/grading it is worth noting that it appears that everyone will earn an “a.” the association of american colleges and universities has an extensive library of rubric models on its 7. website: http://www.aacu.org/value/rubric_teams.cfm the value of any rubric still rests within the hands of the practitioner and how they apply the rubric to the student work at hand as filtered through their own experienced standards of judgment. e.d. hirsch, jr. offers a thoughtful and enlightening argument for the value of multiple choice exams as 8. tools to assess knowledge acquisition and critical thinking skills in the schools we need and why we do not have them, 1996. on the other hand, he is highly critical of “authentic assessment” in his arguments. astin, op. cit., p. 184.9. a good illustration of this canon shift is the redefinition of many works written by women in previous 10. centuries as “philosophy” whereas they were previously ignored or classified as memoirs or women’s writings by the dominant philosophical canon protectors. see catherine villanueva gardner, women philosophers (2004) for a reconsideration of some women writers such as george eliot, catharine macaulay and chrinstine de pisan (among others) as philosophers. in another article on 11. inside higher education, nancy rosenbach and peter katopes argue for education being recognized as needing time to bear fruit, to unfold. see “the lesson of the delicate arch”, http:// www.insidehighered.com/views/2010/05/04/arch this is a short but lovely argument for a short-sighted model of assessment. matthew lipman and the work of the institute for the advancement of philosophy children gave voice 12. to “p4c” in the united states but this idea has gained ground on every continent and appears in plural forms. nussbaum, martha, 13. cultivating humanity, harvard university press, 1998. while this is an extended defense of a multicultural education, her arguments serve to support a qualitative value to education over a quantification of it. gardner, howard, 14. the disciplined mindwhat all students should understand, simon and schuster, 1999 (revised 2000.) his focus here is pre-college but his vision of education transformed around these three values is inspiring for education at all levels. address coresspondence to: wendy c. turgeon turgeon@optonline.net assistant professor philosophy department st. joseph’s college new york analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue2 enrique dussel y paul ricœur: pensar la creatividad normativa1 alain loute abstract: this essay explores the dialogue between paul ricoeur and enrique dussel on the potential and place of a philosophy of liberation within their respective philosophical commitments. the author suggests that although there is a tension between their different visions of liberation, both thinkers agree on the need to defend the agency of the subject and the subject’s ability to create and recreate institutions in order to live according to the common good by way of respectfully integrating the perspective of the other. en esta presentación quisiéramos reanudar el diálogo entre la filosofía de la liberación de enrique dus-sel y la filosofía de paul ricœur. nuestro objetivo no es confrontar dos autores como si ellos fueran totalmente desconocidos entre sí. de hecho, ambos coincidieron en varias ocasiones: dussel fue estudiante de ricœur en la sorbonne en los años 60; en otras oportunidades sostuvieron un diálogo directo, uno de ellos fue el seminario organizado en nápoles en 1991 sobre “filosofia y liberación, en dialogo con paul ricoeur”, uno de los momentos más importantes de dichos encuentros. nuestra intención de volver al diálogo que tuvo lugar entre estos dos filósofos radica en que consideramos que dicho intercambio se debería profundizar y continuar. para nosotros, lo esencial no ha sido aún dicho. al leer sus intervenciones en el seminario de nápoles, los intercambios entre el hermeneuta y el filósofo de la liberación parece que fue más la ocasión de marcar sus diferencias, que tomar mayor consciencia de la proximidad de sus respectivos proyectos filosóficos. el debate que tuvo lugar entre los filósofos puede ser calificado, al igual que sebastián purcell en artículos recientes (purcell 2010, purcell 2011), como una “missed encounter”. por tanto nos parece y ésta es la tesis que pretendemos defender, que una finalidad común puede ser reconocida en sus filosofías, a saber, la voluntad de pensar la “creatividad normativa”. tanto ricoeur como dussel buscan pensar la manera en que los actores pueden crear y recrear las normas que les permitirán vivir mejor con y para otros en instituciones justas, o para decirlo en las categorías de dussel, aplicando mejor el principio material de la ética. pensamos que este debate entre ricœur y dussel cobraría de nuevo importancia en el plano de esta finalidad común. ésta constituye, a nuestro juicio, un punto de encuentro entre proyectos filosóficos que les permitiera un verdadero aprendizaje mutuo. a fin de demostrar esta tesis, retomaremos, en primer término, el intercambio que tuvo lugar entre los dos filósofos con ocasión del seminario de 1991, con el fin de despejar los principales puntos de divergencia. en segundo término, defenderemos la idea de que ambos desarrollan una filosofía de la creatividad normativa. finalmente, intentaremos mostrar que las divergencias entre dussel y ricœur, percibidas a partir de esta finalidad común que consiste en un pensamiento de la creatividad normativa, no son tantas y podrían llegar a ser la ocasión de un verdadero aprendizaje común. 1. el seminario de nápoles comencemos por dar cuenta del debate entre ricœur y dussel. la impresión que nos deja el dicho debate es la de un encuentro fallido. a fin de justificar este punto de vista, quisiéramos llamar la atención sobre ciertos puntos de este modo de intercambiar sus puntos de vista.2 61 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue2 es interesante anotar que, desde el comienzo de su intervención, ricœur manifiesta cierto escepticismo acerca de la posibilidad de establecer un diálogo con su colega latinoamericano, escepticismo que desentona con su larga práctica de diálogo con otras tradiciones filosóficas y disciplinas diferentes. en primer lugar ricœur subraya el carácter problemático de la expresión “filosofía de la liberación”. para hacer legítima la asignación de la finalidad de la liberación a la filosofía, haría falta reconocer, insiste ricœur, en la polisemia del concepto “liberación” en la historia de la filosofía. resalta además la diversidad de situaciones a partir de las cuales fue formulada la cuestión de la liberación. para ricœur, “existen muchas historias de liberación que no comunican.”3 la situación de la filosofía latinoamericana de la liberación es que está marcada por una “presión económica y política que les confronta directamente con los estados unidos de norteamérica,”4 mientras que la situación de la filosofía en europa es distinta, cuya experiencia principal sería la del totalitarismo. esta heterogeneidad conduce a ricœur a formular la siguiente advertencia: “si insisto sobre esta heterogeneidad de las historias de liberación, es para preparar a nuestros espíritus, admitir que no sólo estas experiencias son diversas, sino quizás incomunicables. es más. la autocom prensión que se atribuye a una, crea obstáctulo a la comprensión plena de la otra, y que, una cierta controversia en este propósito, es quizás insuperable, también para nosotros.”5 además de hacer esta advertencia liminar, ricœur delimita inmediatamente su puerta de entrada en el debate. citamos a ricœur: “el problema que querría someter a discusión es éste: ¿qué aporta el pensamiento occidental de mejor y mayor solidez que pueda contribuir a un debate en el cual ese pensamiento acceda a ser sólo uno de los componentes?”6 ricœur parece más preocupado por lo que él puede aportar al debate, que por lo que puede aprender de su colega. así va a concentrarse en formular una serie de advertencias a la filosofía de la liberación. para él, la filosofía de la liberación pondría un “acento principal sobre la dimensión económica de la opresión, más que sobre su dimensión política.”7 parecería destacarse en dussel una forma de economicismo del que teme que oculte la necesidad de una lucha contra la dominación política. ricœur lanza entonces la siguiente advertencia: “si la crítica de la opresión económica y social no pasa a través de la crítica de la dominación política y si se pretende juzgar a la liberación económica por cualquier camino político, ésta se condena a una terrible venganza de la historia: el leninismo es el ejemplo para la izquierda.”8 valiéndose de la historia de las luchas contra los totalitarismos en europa, ricœur, recuerda ni más ni menos al filósofo de la liberación que la libertad política es condición ineludible para “cada acrecentamiento de la productividad tecnológica y económica, sino también como componente de la liberación económica y social.”9 luego de prevenir a su interlocutor de que esta diferencia insalvable puede imponerse entre ellos, ricœur dirige a dussel otras advertencias, así como lecciones sacadas de la historia europea de la filosofía. dussel, en cambio, rechaza con fuerza la afirmación de ricœur según la cual las historias europeas y latinoamericanas serían heterogéneas e incomunicables. toda la historia de la explotación colonial de la periferia por parte de las metropolis han hecho indisociables esas historias locales. para dussel, hoy la cuestión de la liberación que se ubica en un “great common horizon: the world system, within the space of the global market, geopolitically dominated by certain states (today the united states, western europe, and japan), and under the complete military hegemony of the united status.”10 dussel rechaza igualmente, y tomamos sus palabras: “the critiques of leninism and standard marxism”11 formuladas por ricœur. frente a la pobreza y a la opresión, dussel subraya efectivamente la necesidad de desarrollar una “filosofía económica”. escribe así: “the ‘poor’ (lacking institutional and historical means for the reproduction of life) of the planet demand (theoretical and ethical demand) a philosophical ‘economics’.”12 sin embargo, dussel no entiende por “filosofía económica”, el desarrollo de una ciencia o de una filosofía de la historia de inspiración marxista que reemplazaría la reflexión ética y política, como podría insinuar el texto de ricœur. al contrario, para dussel, “it is essential to develop an economics which integrate ethics as a founding 62 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue2 moment of its development.”13 para dussel, las advertencias hechas por ricœur a la filosofía de la liberación no tienen razón de ser: “i accept ricœur’s suggestions and warnings. in fact, i presupposed them, and i think that an economics without politics is irrational, a totalitarian economicism, unjustifiable for a liberation philosophy. but, at the same time, i am ‘ warned’ of a certain ‘politicism’ in habermas, ricœur, et al.”14 por el contrario, haría falta, en ricœur, una “filosofía económica”. ricœur se habría focalizado en el trabajo de interpretación del texto en detrimento de la cuestión de la producción y de la reproducción de la vida humana, en sus dimensiones productiva y económica. “sin la ‘económica’, la ‘hermenéutica’ (o la ‘pragmática’) se quedan sin contenido ‘carnal’: son meras comunidades de comunicación o interpretación, sin corporalidad, carnalidad, sin subsumir en su reflexión el nivel de la ‘vida’.”15 además, para dussel, la fenomenología hermenéutica de ricœur se caracterizaría por una cierta ceguera frente a las asimetrías existentes entre los sujetos (dominación de una cultura por parte de la otra, de una clase por la otra, de un sexo por el otro, etc.). para ricœur, el sujeto se presenta a sí mismo a través de la construcción de la trama (mise en intrigue) de su vida. el sujeto es lector del relato de su vida. ahora bien, esta operación de interpretación narrativa puede ser la ocasión del ejercicio de una forma de dominación que ricœur, según dussel, no tomaría en consideración. los textos pueden ser impuestos, por parte de una clase dominante, como los únicos textos legítimos. para dussel, ricœur no tendría en cuenta el hecho de que la auto-comprensión frente a un texto puede devenir una experiencia alienante. de la misma manera que el capital puede constituir al productor como una mediación de la valorización del capital, “el texto constituiría al lector como mediación de la ‘cosa del texto’, sería manipulación, propaganda.”16 el lector puede devenir una mediación de la realización social del texto. hemos recordado aquí algunos de los argumentos del debate entre dussel y ricœur, a fin de mostrar que, más que hacer posible un aprendizaje mutuo, el debate condujo a un distanciamiento de los dos filósofos. ricœur, después de haber evocado la dificultad (por no decir la imposibilidad) de una comprensión mutua, se limitó a enseñar algunas de las mejores lecciones de la filosofía del norte, en ocasiones llegando al punto de caricaturizar la posición de dussel bajo los rasgos de un economicismo primario. dussel por el contrario, reconoció, a través del concepto de “sistema mundo”, el horizonte común en el que se arraigan sus filosofías. sin embargo su intervención consistió, principalmente, en una crítica y una toma de distancia con respecto a ricœur, denunciando la ceguera y la incapacidad de su fenomenología hermenéutica frente al problema de la dominación y de la opresión. si hemos calificado este diálogo de “encuentro fallido”, es justamente porque tenemos la convicción de que, a pesar de sus divergencias, una finalidad común puede ser reconocida en ambos proyectos filosóficos. en efecto pensamos que ambos plantean filosofías éticas que tienden a pensar “la creatividad normativa”. intentemos entonces, justificar esta tesis. 2. una finalidad común: pensar la creatividad normativa el lector familiarizado con los dos autores no puede más que sorprenderse con el hecho de que los dos propongan una misma distinción entre el polo absoluto y excesivo de la ética y el polo relativo y limitado de la moral. en sí mismo como otro, obra primordial en que presenta la síntesis de sus reflexiones éticas bajo la forma de lo que denominó su “pequeña ética”, ricœur distingue la ética de la moral. la primera designa la intencionalidad teleológica de una vida buena con y para otro en instituciones justas. en cuanto a la moral, ésta se refiere al momento deontológico dónde la intencionalidad ética está sometida a una prueba de universalización. en la pequeña ética de ricœur, lo teleológico y lo deontológico se complementan el uno al otro. por una parte, la intencionalidad ética refiere a la finalidad que las normas morales tienen para ser llevadas a cabo. la intencionalidad ética motiva a los actores a someterse a la obligación de la norma. de otra parte, la intencionali63 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue2 dad ética debe someterse a la criba de la norma. ésta permite al actor en busca del buen vivir, poner a prueba sus deseos. la norma permite al actor asegurarse de que su sentido de la justicia no lo incita a cometer injusticias; “c’est sous la condition de l’impartialité que l’indignation peut s’affranchir du désir de vengeance qui incite la victime à se faire justice elle-même.”17 en ricœur, el punto de contacto entre la intencionalidad ética y la norma moral es el de una desproporción fundamental. la intencionalidad ética de “una vida buena con y para otro en instituciones justas” está en exceso respecto al resultado que la acción sujeta a las normas morales puede alcanzar. en otros términos, una acción moral que realice totalmente la intencionalidad ética es imposible. toda acción, incluida aquella sujeta a una norma, continúa siendo una acción violenta. incluso bajo “sa forme la plus mesurée, la plus légitime, la justice est déjà une manière de rendre le mal par le mal.”18 esto hace decir a ricœur que “la moral sólo constituiría una efectuación limitada”19 de la intencionalidad ética. la ética de la liberación de dussel se construye igualmente en torno a la distinción entre ética y moral. por moral, dussel entiende “l’ordre des conduites, des actions, des normes en vigueur, établies, dominantes, hégémoniques.”20 los principios de la moral son siempre históricos, relativos y situados culturalmente. “pour l’éthique de la libération, le domaine ‘éthique’ par rapport au ‘moral’ indique l’espace, le lieu ou le moment de l’‘extériorité’.”21 la exterioridad designa al oprimido. al otro, al excluido de la totalidad que constituye un orden moral. la crítica ética parte de la negación del oprimido para re-cuestionar la validez de la norma moral. esta crítica negativa “a pour origine l’affirmation de l’opprimé comme autre, comme personne, comme fin, et en tant que tel dans l’extériorité de l’ordre moral.”22 mientras que todo orden moral es siempre relativo, la ética es una y absoluta : “autrui est l’au-delà absolu de tout système moral, politique, historique.”23 si bien la ética es absoluta, ello no significa que no tenga contenido. en su obra titulada ética de la liberación en la edad de la globalización y de la exclusión, publicada en 1998, dussel define dicho contenido a través de lo que denomina el “principio material universal de la ética.”24: “el que actúa éticamente debe (como obligación) producir, reproducir y desarrollar autorresponsablemente la vida concreta de cada sujeto humano, en una comunidad de vida (…).”25 tal como en ricœur, existe un abismo infranqueable entre la ética absoluta y la moral siempre relativa. sin embargo, tal como el filósofo francés, dussel plantea la necesidad de pasar por la moral. “sin el cumplimiento de la norma básica de la moral formal las decisiones éticas no adquieren ‘validez’ comunitaria, universal; podrían ser efecto de egoísmo, solipsismo o autoritarismo violento.”26 queremos llamar la atención de que los dos filósofos no se limitan a plantear esta distinción entre el polo absoluto de la ética y el polo relativo, aunque indispensable, de la moral. si ellos se limitaran hasta ahí, sus éticas se acabarían en la desesperanza de una conciencia desgraciada que sabe que la realización de la consideración ética está fuera de alcance de la acción moral. tal conciencia desgraciada no tendría más salida, so pena de caer o en la ilusión del historicismo o del totalitarismo, que la de limitarse a la disciplina de un antiutopismo conservador a la manera de karl popper. antes que ceder al fatalismo, ambos buscan pensar la manera en que los actores pueden crear y recrear las normas que les permitirán vivir mejor con y para otros en instituciones justas, o para decirlo en las categorías de dussel, aplicando mejor el principio material de la ética. este punto es completamente explícito en dussel. una de las categorías esencial de la ética de la liberación es la de “praxis de liberación”. esta consiste en la crítica del sistema normativo vigente y en la institucionalización de un nuevo sistema normativo. “praxis de libération (comme acte humain et comme catégorie) indique le moment complexe par lequel un peuple ébranle un système en vigueur, s’ouvre un chemin sur l’ancienne institutionnalité, transpose des phases intermédiaires et transitoires jusqu’à l’instauration d’un nouvel ordre pratique.”27 para dussel, “les grands processus de libération (…) sont des processus collectifs de rupture avec la morale institutionnelle, avec l’ordre en vigueur qui les domine.”28 sin embargo, este proceso no es una praxis anarquista 64 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue2 de destrucción. tiene por finalidad la producción de nuevas normas que permiten la producción y la reproducción de la vida de los que están excluidos de la antigua totalidad moral. pensando la praxis de la liberación, dussel se propone entonces pensar un proceso de creación normativa. se puede relevar también en la obra de ricœur el intento de pensar la creatividad normativa. en varias ocasiones en histoire et vérité (1955) como en el reciente parcours de la reconnaissance, (2004). ricœur explicita la figura de los actos morales “excesivos”, tales como los gestos de amor, el testimonio no violento, o los gestos de petición de perdón.29 para ricœur, estos gestos excesivos tendrían el poder de destabilizar las normas vigentes y motivarnos a recrear las normas del buen vivir en conjunto. estos gestos son como discursos poéticos que permiten pensar un pacífico vivir juntos como una proposición del mundo posible. ellos hacen presente la totalidad que considera la ética, un poco a la manera de la presentación de las ideas de la razón en el juicio reflexivo kantiano. citemos a ricoeur a propósito de la no-violencia: “il n’est pas en marge du temps, il serait plutôt “intempestif”, inactuel, comme la présence anticipée, possible et offerte, d’une autre époque qu’une longue et douloureuse “médiation” politique doit rendre historique.”30 a través de estos gestos simbólicos que nos dan esperanza en la posibilidad de un buen vivir juntos, ricœur, tanto como dussel, han intentado pensar la creación normativa. precisemos por último, que tanto en ricoeur como en dussel, el proceso de creación normativa requiere ser continuamente retomado. el “mal del mal”, para ricœur, consistiría en pretender efectuar totalmente la síntesis entre la ética y la moral. dussel afirma, en cuanto a él, que “la prétention d’avoir constitué un ordre éthique réel serait la plus épouvantable totalisation morale de domination.”31 esperamos haber podido demostrar que la finalidad común de pensar la creatividad normativa puede ser reconocida en los proyectos filosóficos de nuestros dos autores. afirmando esta tesis, nuestra intención no ha sido negar los desacuerdos que existen entre ambos. hemos querido más bien, defender la idea que analizados desde la común cuestión de la creatividad normativa, las diferencias de punto de vista que podrían contribuir a un proceso de mutuo aprendizaje, cada autor llamaría la atención acerca de una dimensión específica del problema común. terminemos esta ponencia señalando algunos puntos en los que tal aprendizaje sería posible. 3. un mutuo aprendizaje a propósito de la cuestión de la creatividad normativa la ética de la liberación de dussel podría, en primer lugar, reconsiderar la creencia de ricœur en la capacidad de un gesto simbólico para desestabilizar las normas vigentes e iniciar un movimiento de creación normativa. para ricœur, dando a pensar la vitalidad a la que refiere la ética, el gesto ya aludido nos daría acceso a un punto de vista crítico de las normas vigentes y a la vez a una idea directriz que guiaría la producción de nuevas normas. para dussel, tal gesto simbólico, como por lo demás toda producción de la imaginación no constituye más que una posibilidad (posible) para el sistema y por tanto arriesga ponerlo en cuestión. escribe de este modo: “no hay que crear proyectos futuros producto de la pura imaginación y la fantasía, ‘posibles’ para el orden vigente. hay que saber descubrir en la exterioridad trascendental del oprimido la ‘presencia’ vigente de la utopía como la realidad actual de lo imposible, sin el auxilio del otro, imposible para el sistema de dominación.”32 adoptando el punto de vista del oprimido, la ética de la liberación propone un punto de vista concreto y crítico en relación al sistema. ¿la filosofía ricœuriana de la creatividad normativa no tendría tambien interés en buscar en la experiencia concreta y material de los seres sufrientes lo que puede desestabilizar las normas vigentes? existe también otra cuestión a través de la cual, esta vez la filosofía de ricœur podría esclarecer a la ética de la liberación. se trata de la concientización de los actores. es preciso destacar que para dussel, el hecho empírico de la opresión no conduce necesaria y automáticamente a una crítica ética del sistema. para que las víctimas interpelen las conciencias éticas, es preciso que tomen conciencia de la negatividad y que se forme lo que dussel 65 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue2 denomina una “consensualidad crítica.”33 a propósito de este proceso de concientización, dussel se mantiene, nos parece, bastante ambiguo. se limita a destacar el rol que puede jugar la comunidad científica crítica en este proceso: “en el primer momento, es la conciencia crítica ingenua de la misma comunidad de les víctimas (…), en un segundo momento, la comunidad científica co-solidaria produce ciencia humana o social crítica como responsabilidad ética para con la víctima; en un tercer momento, comunitariamente, las víctimas mismas assumen el resultado científico-critico en su lucha porel reconocimiento: es conciencia práctica crítica illustrada.”34 ¿cómo se produce este proceso de concientización ? ¿basta producir un discurso científico crítico para concienciar a las víctimas? acerca de estas cuestiones, ricœur sería un buen interlocutor. todas sus reflexiones acerca de lo que llama refiguración, es decir la capacidad del relato de revelar y transformar las dimensiones de nuestra experiencia viva, debería permitir problematizar y profundizar esta cuestión de la concientización de los actores.35 hasta aquí hemos evocado brevemente diferentes puntos que podrían ser ocasión de un mutuo aprendizaje acerca de esta problemática común de la creatividad normativa. nuestro objetivo ha sido ante todo designar el lugar desde el que la confrontación de las filosofías de ricœur y dussel permitiría de ser recomenzada con mayor fecundidad. notas 1. este artículo es el resultado de la adaptación de la intervención hecha en la conferencia anual de la asociación caribeña de filosofía : “shifting the geography of reason vi : migrations and diasporas”, (12-15 août 2009, university of miami, coral gables, florida, usa). agradecemos juan pablo bermudez por la traducción al español del presente texto, así como por sus comentarios. 2. los textos de las intervenciones de dussel y de ricœur en el seminario de nápoles fueron publicadas inicialmente en una publicación italiana titulada filosofia e liberazione (cantillo, g. and jervolino, d. (eds.) (1992), capone editore, lecce). de igual manera fueron incluidos en el libro de enrique dussel, publicado en 1993 con el título: apel, ricœur, rorty y la filosofia de la liberacion, universidad de guadalajara, guadalajara. la traducción al inglés de dicha obra se tituló the underside of modernity, apel, ricœur, taylor, rorty and the philosophy of liberation (transl. by e. mendieta, humanities press, new-jersey, 1996), la cual contiene, entre otras cosas, las respuesta de dussel al texto de ricoeur (“response by enrique dussel: world system, politics, and the economics of liberation philosophy”) a la cual hacemos también referencia. 3. ricoeur, p. (1993), “respuestas de paul ricoeur: filosofia y liberación”, in dussel, e. (1993), apel, ricœur, rorty y la filosofía de la liberación universidad de guadalajara, guadalajara, pp. 167-175, p. 173. 4. ricoeur, p. (1993), “respuestas de paul ricoeur: filosofia y liberación”, op. cit., p. 167. 5. ibid., p. 168. 6. ibidem. 7. ricoeur, p. (1993), “respuestas de paul ricoeur: filosofia y liberación”, op. cit., p. 170. 8. ibidem. 9.ricoeur, p. (1993), “respuestas de paul ricoeur: filosofia y liberación”, op. cit., pp. 173-174. 10. dussel, e. (1996), the underside of modernity, apel, ricœur, taylor, rorty and the philosophy of liberation, transl. by e. mendieta, humanities press, new-jersey, p. 216. se propone la siguiente traducción: “gran horizonte común : el sistema mundial dentro del espacio de mercado global, dominado geopolíticamente por ciertos estados (hoy eeuu, europa occidental y japón) y bajo la hegemonía militar estadounidense”. 11. ibid., p. 220. se propone la siguiente traducción: “las críticas que lo acusan de leninismo y de marxismo estándar”. 12. ibidem. se propone la siguiente traducción: “los ‘pobres’ (carentes de medios institutionales e históricos para la reproducción de la vida) del planeta reclaman (un reclamo teórico y ético) una filosofía ‘económica’”. 66 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue2 13. ibid., p. 229. se propone la siguiente traducción: “es esencial desarrollar una economía que integre la ética como fundamento de su desarrollo”. 14. ibidem. se propone la siguiente traducción: “acepto la sugerencias y advertencias de ricœur. de hecho las presuponía, y creo que la economía sin política no es racional, sino un economicismo totalitario, injustificable desde el punto de vista de una filosofía de la liberación. sin embargo, estoy consciente de un cierto politicismo en habermas, ricœur et al.”. 15. dussel, e. (1993), apel, ricœur, rorty y la filosofia de la liberacion universidad de guadalajara, guadalajara, p. 150. 16. ibid., p. 148. 17. ricoeur, p. (1995), “avant-propos”, in le juste, esprit, paris, pp. 7-27, p. 19. se propone la siguiente traducción: “es bajo la condición de la imparcialidad que la indignación puede librarse del deseo de venganza que incita a la víctima a hacer justicia pour su cuenta”. 18. ricoeur, p. (1964b), “etat et violence”, in histoire et vérité, troisième édition augmentée de quelques textes, seuil, paris, pp. 246-259, p. 249. se propone la siguiente traducción: incluso bajo “su forma más ajustada, más legitima, la justicia ya es una manera de restituir el mal por mal”. 19. ricoeur, p. (1996), sí mismo como otro, siglo xxi de españa editores, madrid, p. 175. 20. dussel, e. (1989), “ethique de la libération”, in a. jacob (dir.), encyclopédie philosophique universelle, p.u.f., paris, pp. 149-154, p. 149. se propone la siguiente traducción: “el orden de las conductas, de las acciones, de las normas en vigor, establecidas, dominantes, hegemónicas”. 21. ibidem. se propone la siguiente traducción: “para la ética de la liberación, el dominio “ético” con respecto a lo ‘moral’ indica el espacio, el lugar o el momento de la ‘exterioridad’”. 22. dussel, e. (1989), “ethique de la libération”, op. cit., p. 150. se propone la siguiente traducción: “tiene por origen la afirmación del oprimido como otro, como persona, como fin, y en tanto tal, en la exterioridad del orden moral”. 23. ibidem. se propone la siguiente traducción: “el otro es el más allá de todo sistema moral, político, histórico”. 24. dussel, e. (1998), ética de la liberación en la edad de la globalización y de la exclusión, editorial trotta, madrid, p. 140. 25. ibidem. 26. ibid., p. 201. 27. dussel, e. (1989), “ethique de la libération”, op. cit., p. 151. traducción libre: praxis de liberación (como acto humano y como categoría) indica el momento complejo mediante el cual un pueblo sacude el sistema vigente, se abre un camino sobre la antigua institucionalidad, plantea fases intermedias y transitoria hasta la instauración de un nuevo orden práctico”. 28. ibidem. se propone la siguiente traducción: “los grandes procesos de liberación (…) son procesos colectivos de ruptura con la moral institucional, con el orden vigente que los domina”. 29. cf. loute, a. (2008), la création sociale des normes, de la socio-économie des conventions à la philosophie de l’action de paul ricœur, olms, hildesheim/zürich/new york, pp. 274-282 ; loute, a. (2010), “la creación social de las normas en paul ricoeur”, en éticas convergentes en la encrucijada de la postmodernidad, r. salas astraín (éd.), ediciones ucsh/ediciones uctemuco, santiago/temuco, 2010, pp. 151-179; loute, a. (2013), “the gift and mutual recognition : paul ricoeur as a reader of marcel hénaff”, in paul ricoeur and the task of political philosophy, johnson, g. and stiver, d. (eds.), lexington books, 2013, pp. 105-123. 30. ricoeur, p. (1964a), “l’homme non-violent et sa présence à l’histoire”, en histoire et vérité, troisième édition augmentée de quelques textes, seuil, paris, pp. 235-245, p. 241. traducción libre : ésta no está al margen del tiempo, sino que sería más bien “intempestiva, inactual, como la presencia anticipada, posible y ofrecida de otra época que, gracias a una larga y dolorosa “mediación” política, debe devenir histórica 31. dussel, e. (1989), “ethique de la libération”, op. cit., p. 150. se propone la siguiente traducción: “pretender haber constituido un orden ético real seria una espantosa totalización moral de dominación”. 32. dussel, e. (1993), apel, ricœur, rorty y la filosofía de la liberación, op. cit, p. 18. 33. dussel, e. (1998), ética de la liberación en la edad de la globalización y de la exclusión, op. cit., p. 463 67 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue2 34. ibid., p. 493. 35. ricoeur, al final de su intervención, insiste en la importancia de este proceso de refiguración: “a este respecto domenico jervolino ha subrayado la importancia de la función de refiguración ejercida en los textos sobre el nivel del actuar humano efectivo. es gracias a este proceso de refiguración que la critica textual se reinscribe en el centro mismo de la filosofía de la acción” (ricoeur, p. (1993), “respuestas de paul ricoeur: filosofia y liberación”, op. cit., p. 174). a propósito de domenico jervolino, cf. ; jervolino, d. (1991), “herméneutique de la praxis et éthique de la libération”, in greisch, j. et kearney r. (éds.), paul ricœur, les métamorphoses de la raison herméneutique, cerf, paris, pp. 223-230 ; jervolino, d. (1993), “pour une philosophie de la libération du point de vue cosmopolitique”, en actuel marx, n°14, pp. 175-184. bibliografía cantillo, g. and jervolino, d. (eds.) (1992), filosofia e liberazione, capone editore, lecce. dussel, e. (1989), “ethique de la libération”, in a. jacob (dir.), encyclopédie philosophique universelle, p.u.f., paris, pp. 149-154. dussel, e. (1993), apel, ricœur, rorty y la filosofia de la liberacion, universidad de guadalajara, guadalajara. dussel, e. (1996), the underside of modernity, apel, ricœur, taylor, rorty and the philosophy of liberation, transl. by e. mendieta, humanities press, new-jersey. dussel, e. (1998), ética de la liberación en la edad de la globalización y de la exclusión, editorial trotta, madrid. jervolino, d. (1991), “herméneutique de la praxis et éthique de la libération”, in greisch, j. et kearney, r. (éds.), paul ricœur, les métamorphoses de la raison herméneutique, cerf, paris, pp. 223-230. jervolino, d. (1993), “pour une philosophie de la libération du point de vue cosmopolitique”, in actuel marx, n°14, pp. 175-184. loute, a. (2008), la création sociale des normes, de la socio-économie des conventions à la philosophie de l’action de paul ricœur, olms, hildesheim/zürich/new york, pp. 274-282. loute, a. (2010), “la creación social de las normas en paul ricoeur”, en eticas convergentes en la encrucijada de la postmodernidad, r. salas astraín (éd.), ediciones ucsh/ediciones uctemuco, santiago/temuco, 2010, pp. 151-179. loute, a. (2013), “the gift and mutual recognition : paul ricoeur as a reader of marcel hénaff”, in paul ricoeur and the task of political philosophy, johnson, g. and stiver, d. (eds.), lexington books, 2013, pp. 105-123. purcell s. (2010), « space and narrative, enrique dussel and paul ricoeur: the missed encounter », in philosophy today, vol. 54:3, pp. 289-298. purcell s. (2011), « recognition and extoriority, towards a recognition-theoretic account of globalization », in etudes ricoeuriennes, vol. 2, n°1, pp. 51-69. ricoeur, p. (1964a), “l’homme non-violent et sa présence à l’histoire”, in histoire et vérité, troisième édition augmentée de quelques textes, seuil, paris, pp. 235-245. ricoeur, p. (1964b), “etat et violence”, in histoire et vérité, troisième édition augmentée de quelques textes, seuil, paris, pp. 246-259. ricoeur, p. (1995), “avant-propos”, in le juste, esprit, paris, pp. 7-27. ricoeur, p. (1996), sí mismo como otro, siglo xxi de españa editores, madrid. address correspondence to: alain loute chercheur associé, centre de philosophie du droit, université catholique de louvain, belgium alainloute@gmail.com 68 editor's notes analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) editor’s notes volume 36 owes its genesis to the 2015 icpic conference held at the university of british columbia. with the exception of the article by pournantzi, zacharos and shiakalli, all of the articles published here stem from work discussed and presented on at the vancouver conference. consequently, a very special thanks goes out to all those who had a hand organizing the icpic conference, especially susan gardner. i think the articles in this issue give a good sense of the range and caliber of the work presented there. thematically, the eight articles fall into three broad categories. the articles by strong, love, wang, green and pornantzi et. al., are studies on the effectiveness of philosophy for children in different environments, both within and beyond the k-12 classroom. the contributions by henry and robinson explore different concepts and hurdles encountered while running communities of inquiry, while mizell analyzes the conceptual sophistication of children’s imaginative play. together, the eight articles assembled here speak to both the on-going effectiveness of pfc in a variety of geographical and educational contexts (greece, taiwan, south africa, america, canada, england) and the impressive range of pedagogical resources that communal inquiry brings to the table –a range that extends well beyond k-12 schooling. i hope the current volume finds you all doing well and engaged in a project you love… pax et bonum jason howard chief editor jason j. howard viterbo university webmaster jason skoog viterbo university layout design assistant meredith skinner viterbo university editorial board patrick costello glyndŵr university susan gardner capilano university david kennedy montclair state university nadia s. kennedy stony brook university, suny richard morehouse, emeritus viterbo university félix garcía moriyón center for philosophy for children, madrid, spain joe oyler institute for the advancement of philosophy for children montclair state university john simpson university of alberta barbara weber university of british columbia publisher viterbo university, la crosse, wisconsin 45601 established in 1981 as analytic teaching at texas wesleyan college and transferred to viterbo in 1993. online copyright 2005. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis is a peer-reviewed, online, open access journal published annually and sometimes biannually. issn 2374-8257 book review: tinker thinkers book reviews for analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 35 (2014) 57 book review tinker thinkers review by richard morehouse tinker thinkers susan gardner and amy leask illustrated by amy moore enable training and consulting, inc., 2014. 40 pages (there is also an optional app that may be purchased) isbn-10: 1927425084 isbn-13: 978-1927425084 hile intended for young readers, this colorfully and cleverly illustrated book with a downloadable app, is nonetheless a rigorous examination of philosophical themes written in an interactive and conversational style. those of you who are familiar with professor gardner’s thinking your way to freedom: a guide to owning your own practical reasoning (2009) will find much of the same playfulness, coupled with thoughtful examples and clearheaded thinking, that can be found in her more academic work. amy leask is a developer of apps. on her webpage she identifies herself as a writer, educator and everyday philosopher. her website kids think about it: philosophy for kids is one of the ways she engages with young and not-so-young folks. both authors have invested much time engaging with and encouraging thinkers of all ages and walks of life, something that shines through in their book. using the metaphor of a builder’s toolbox, one that is filled with easy to follow models of good reasoning and well-formed arguments, gardner and leask take the young reader on an adventure of thinking. after introducing the metaphoric tools in their thinkers’ toolbox, the book engages its young audience in an examination of the utility of asking “why?” the strength of this little book is that after engaging children in a series of questions and answers, reasons (good reasons) are provided as examples of how to support one’s answers. the authors model what they are intending the young people to use, with each page providing a vygotskian scaffold for the next step in the learning process. vygotsky taught that education leads to fuller development, and gardner and leask (along with the illustrations of ami moore) pull the reader through these processes in a verbally and visually stimulating fashion. the nature of how to give solid support for one’s answers is demonstrated through an analogy with building, which the book illustrates visually and verbally in showing how building an argument is much like constructing a table. importantly each of the children (six in all: jacob, anjali, bai, ada, carlos and poppy) asks and answers questions throughout the book regarding the strength of arguments and the role of supportive reasons. many readers, both young and old, are sure to enjoy innovative ideas like “sneaky silent arguments” both in terms of how these can be discovered (identified) and countered. the inclusion of these “sneaky silent arguments” is not only a clever way to engage children, but also a helpful tool for anyone interested in uncovering the many ways such sneaky tricks are w http://kidsthinkaboutit.com/ book reviews for analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 35 (2014) 58 embedded in everyday discourse as well as performed in political and commercial advertising. drawing our attention to such tricks of the trade is something this kids book is great at, and is certainly a lesson we adults could probably use a bit more instruction in. gardner and leask’s approach is consistent with the tenets of philosophy for children. the book, while utilizing a narrative approach to develop its “story” about the elements of a good argument, also effectively incorporates more traditional pedagogical strategies like text-based questions and answers. although the book can be read by children on their own, my sense is that it is likely to be most entertaining and effective when used as a small group activity with an interested adult who can move through the narrative adventure of the book along with the kids. also, although i’m not as technologically savvy as your typical eight or nine year old, as i still don’t even have a tablet of my own, i’ll wager that the app version might even be more effective for engaging children on their own than the physical book. having multiple media options may not be as important for old guys like me, but i’m betting the kids just love it! this is a fun and valuable book that many young people will learn from and enjoy. address correspondences to: dr. richard morehouse, emeritus professor viterbo university, la crosse, wi. remorehouse@viterbo.edu book reviews for analytic teaching and philosophical praxis book reviews for analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 86 book review the prudence of love: how possessing the virtue of love benefits the lover review by robyn gaier the prudence of love: how possessing the virtue of love benefits the lover eric j. silverman lexington books, a division of rowman & littlefield, 2011 lanham, maryland, united states 211 pages isbn: 9780739139318 $29.95 u.s. paper he book the prudence of love: how possessing the virtue of love benefits the lover by eric j. silverman is a wellwritten and engaging work that furthers the discussion about what it means to regard love as a virtue. prima facie it may seem odd to speak about possessing the virtue of love since that entails that “love” is a noun rather than a verb. since “love” is typically used as a verb, perhaps some clarification here is in order. treating “love” as a noun does not negate its active role. so, for instance, when silverman defines love in a neo-thomistic way as “a disposition towards relationally appropriate acts of the will consisting of disinterested desires for the good of the beloved and desires for unity with the beloved, held as final ends” (19), he bridges the gap in these two senses of the word “love.” having a loving disposition and, hence, possessing the virtue of love, necessarily manifests itself in relationally appropriate acts according to silverman. it also may be initially puzzling to think that a loving disposition should benefit the lover, or that such benefits acquired through possessing a loving disposition should count in favor of seeking the virtue of love. silverman is clear that his project “examines the benefits of love from the detached third-person perspective” and that, from this perspective, insights may be gained “into the nature of love and the source of love’s value” (5). so, it is not as if silverman is seeking the motivational reasons as to why someone ought to care about developing the virtue of love but, rather, that the benefits of a loving disposition lack specificity in the relevant literature. although it is often taken for granted that possessing the virtue of love is beneficial to the lover, exactly why this is so is less than clear. silverman’s project, therefore, advances this ongoing discussion with careful reflection not only about the nature of love but also about well-being and the connections among love, well-being, and what it means to live an ethical life. silverman claims that the benefits of love he envisions are compatible with the three most popular theories of wellbeing: hedonism, desire-fulfillment, and an objective list account of well-being. hence, silverman’s project has the advantage of being able to accommodate different accounts of what constitutes one’s well-being, and proceeds to argue how love may benefit the lover regardless of the theory of well-being assumed. specifically, silverman claims that there are five distinct ways in which someone possessing the virtue of love derives benefit. these five benefits, according to silverman are that “love provides final ends that motivate enjoyable and beneficial activities, brings about psychic integration, motivates self-improvement, increases the lover’s epistemic goods, and makes relationships more harmonious, enjoyable, and tenacious” (93). silverman then addresses some potential problems, or objections, that others might have with his neo-thomistic account of love. for instance, he addresses concerns about the proper objects of love and whether unloving or apathetic agents may derive the benefits he associates with possessing the virtue of love. there are several complexities, however, with respect to understanding “the nature of love and the source of love’s value” (5). although silverman acknowledges such complexities, more than an acknowledgement is warranted to understand love’s nature and source of value. for example, love can be manifested in a variety of relationships within distinct domains including self-love, interpersonal love, and even impartial love (as in philanthropy). it is clear that silverman focuses upon the virtue of love as it is manifested in interpersonal relationships – particularly close t book reviews for analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 87 interpersonal relations, such as family and friends. it is less clear, however, why this is so. given silverman’s definition of love and his acknowledgement of self-love, according to his definition (75) it seems as though possessing love as a virtue should be fundamentally regarded as manifesting itself in terms of self-love rather than in terms of the potential for loving interpersonal relationships. there are at least two main reasons in support of the need for greater attention to self-love within silverman’s project. first, it might provide a better way for addressing the criticism that arises from love that becomes lost. an agent can only benefit from love manifested in an interpersonal relationship so long as the other person is alive and wills to be in the particular loving relationship. consider, for instance, the emotional, psychological, and spiritual pain of grief. when one’s beloved passes away, grief may become unsurmountable. it is hardly a benefit or comfort for the lover to appreciate and to reflect upon what once was (138). silverman hypothesizes, however, that the “overall benefits of the virtue of love” throughout one’s lifetime are “likely to outweigh the pain” of, say, a parent losing her child (139). but silverman does not give support for his hypothesis and, in any event, there is no guarantee that the overall benefits of the virtue of love will outweigh one’s pain. to avoid such a scale, it might be helpful to think about the virtue of love not as essentially rooted in interpersonal relationships but, rather, as essentially rooted in self-love. the difficulty with grounding the virtue of love as essentially manifesting itself in interpersonal relations seems evident in the following passage. silverman writes: [t]he person with the full virtue of love is better off than one with a single loving relationship that provides a small number of final ends that might be lost. death can eliminate the possibility of achieving the final ends associated with any particular relationship, thus preventing those ends from providing meaningful activity. furthermore, any particular relationship may fail for reasons outside of the individual’s control. if a person only has final ends from a single loving relationship, losing it can empty an entire life of meaning. in contrast, a loving person has many relationships that provide final ends including those with parents, children, spouses, friends, neighbors, co-workers, members of a shared faith, and fellow citizens (105). silverman’s understanding of loving interpersonal relationships is, therefore, an ideal. a loving person will have an array of loving interpersonal relationships. but, because such many and varied loving interpersonal relationships are, at least in part, beyond the individual’s control, the benefits derived through the manifestation of the virtue of love in interpersonal relationships simply cannot be assured to the lover. the second related reason for favoring an account of the virtue of love as manifested with a focus upon self-love rather than upon interpersonal relationships is that it neither alters nor loses any of the five benefits of love that silverman notes. in fact, as i claim above, there might be ways in which self-love more accurately secures benefits for the lover simply by not making these benefits depend upon factors beyond the individual’s control. self-love, when understood in terms of the neo-thomistic account of love, is understood as desiring both one’s ultimate good as well as one’s psychic integration. both desires sill involve risks to the agent. nevertheless, self-love may be a more promising path to take when trying to address the above worry –namely whether all of the lover’s benefits are lost with the passing of a beloved. or, perhaps more pointedly, whether it is possible that the pain of the passing of one’s beloved outweighs the benefits that were had in the relationship. finally, perhaps more careful transitions between love as a noun and love as a verb would enhance silverman’s project. for instance, silverman writes “one distinct benefit of the reciprocal relationships love engenders is that they give the lover access to epistemic goods that are only available in such relationships” (128). silverman is drawing attention to a benefit uniquely derived through reciprocal relationships. but his overall project is to discern how possessing the virtue of love benefits the lover, and there is a difference between possessing a virtuous disposition and participating in a reciprocal relationship that one could not possibly possess. hence to acknowledge benefits of potential, or even likely, relationships of someone with a virtuous disposition is to acknowledge only potential, or even likely, benefits. nevertheless, acknowledging likely benefits does not undermine silverman’s project, which succeeds in furthering the discussion about the nature and value of love. indeed, the prudence of love is a timely and clear work that book reviews for analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 88 should be of interest to those wishing to deepen their understanding of both the philosophical and psychological underpinnings regarding the nature and value of love. address correspondences to: dr. robyn gaier, viterbo university, la crosse, wi (rrgaier@viterbo.edu) analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 18 exposing cultural bias in the classroom: selfevaluation as a catalyst for transformation maribel v. bird abstract: the 21st century finds institutions of higher education struggling to meet the challenges created by a global society. one of those challenges is graduating students who are prepared to function effectively in a multicultural society. to assist students, some institutions seek to introduce them to as many cultures as possible by adding programs to the curriculum. the difficulty with this approach is that although our globalized society demands a broadened cultural competence, logistic constraints make it impossible to have a curriculum that is all-encompassing. in this essay i examine how, with the support of institutions, teachers and students should: engage in self-examination, become aware of societal biases and privileges for and against certain groups, and familiarize themselves with cognitive dissonance –all essential to the educational process of cultivating cultural competence. self-awareness plays a prominent role in the development of cultural competence, improving classroom dynamics, and the results of classroom discussions. after conducting a self-evaluation, faculty and students will be more conscientious of personal biases and more open and receptive to differences of opinion. a conversation that is free and allows informed dissent brings about intellectual growth and subsequent transformation. the kind of dialog that makes it possible for teachers and students to engage in an open discussion has been characterized as “encompassing” and “liberating” by scholars such as ira shor and paulo freire (1987). the “liberatory class” is the place that allows “thinking critically about the things that interfere with the critical thought” (shor and freire, 1987, p. 14). theorists such as paulo freire (1993), ira shor (1992), and stanley aronowitz and henry giroux (1991) argue that teaching is a biased and political endeavor. teaching is biased because teachers are not impartial entities. rather, they embody a reality that has been shaped through personal experiences and, more importantly, teachers incorporate in their lessons intangibles like past influences, values, and traditions inherent to their cultures. if we consider culture as that set of traits and values intrinsic to a particular group, it is easy to see that everyone belongs to several cultures. this is no less true for educators, even among a seemingly homogeneous staff; the circle of teachers who adhere to any particular set of values is going to be diverse, given the number of different groups that influence the characteristics and beliefs of each individual. in a sense, each teacher is unique because of the diversity of his/her cultural affiliations. if it is true that culture shapes the beliefs and values of every individual, then it stands to reason that teachers should also engage in self-examination. the final result of this self-analysis should be an awareness of the values and beliefs acquired through cultural affiliations or other life-changing experiences. by being cognizant of the cultural nuances and values influencing their lives, teachers are more likely to bring an authentic approach to classroom exchanges. a teacher who recognizes his/her own biases is more likely to incorporate various sides of an argument into the conversation, thus encouraging students to think more critically. without critical thinking there is no intellectual growth (which is ultimately what we want to accomplish in the classroom). furthermore, a teacher should become self-aware and uncover harmonious and/or contradicting beliefs and values intrinsic to the different cultures with which he/she identifies or traditions to which he/she adheres, and realize the effect of those values, beliefs, and rituals on current group interactions. this awareness will allow teachers to be more relevant to the lives of their students because the classroom discourse will be more inclusive. students are analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 19 less likely to freely discuss topics when they know the teacher struggles with contradictory points of view. the inflexible professor is the one who receives back the answers he or she predicted. educators should never underestimate students’ contributions or their ability to bring their personal experiences to bear on academic topics. if the students’ opinions are taken into consideration they will be more willing to bring them to the classroom discourse. in my experience as a university professor, i have observed students come to life when the subject area becomes pertinent to their realities. establishing connections and validating students’ ideas result in a higher level of engagement and much more meaningful interaction. moreover, while it is important for teachers to be aware of cultural biases and other external influences in order to be effective, it is the responsibility of higher learning institutions to provide opportunities for continuous education on these matters. this is especially true for institutions that house a seemingly homogenous faculty, for deliberate effort is needed in order to raise the consciousness of faculty on issues of cultural and societal biases, providing strategies to neutralize the impact of such biases in the classroom. these efforts may include hiring professionals to conduct a workshop or a series of workshops in diversity training. but whatever efforts are taken, we should realize that we need a variety of different means to facilitate exposure to cultural diversity. one example of societal bias usually overlooked is the concept of white privilege. while not overt, white privilege affects the way people relate to each other. peggy mcintosh (1988) describes white privilege “as an invisible package of unearned assets” (mcintosh, 1088, 4). examples of white privilege, according to mcintosh (1988), include having one’s race represented in the curriculum when addressing heritage and founding people, not being harassed when shopping alone, being able to rent or buy in the neighborhood of one’s choice, and even having the color “flesh” of a bandage more or less match the color of her skin. knowledge and understanding of white privilege prevents communication hurdles by equalizing the balance of power in the classroom. a teacher cognizant of society’s biases will be able to bring the race or group not represented into the discussion. in this manner, students will feel represented and validated. likewise, being more self-aware of society’s biases and cultural codes enables the teacher to realize that words convey messages that are powerful, and that sometimes their meanings could be misconstrued depending on the teacher’s intonation, body language, stance on issues, and the words’ contexts. for the most part, teachers are willing to embark upon analytical processes wherein they are able to argue, question, and even change their position on specifics related to a familiar content area, but very few are even aware that similar analysis should occur when teaching a subject that is new or falls out of their comfort zones. when planning a course, a teacher should go through a process of evaluating his/her emotions towards the topic. the targets of the scrutiny should be the feelings and emotions brought about by the content area. an in-depth examination and understanding of the emotions and values rooted in cultural beliefs are important. for example, a teacher developing a new course in latin american studies should understand his/her feelings toward different ethnic groups and revisit class, power, and political struggles and their impacts on peoples’ lives. whereas traveling to latin america would be the best way to connect with the people behind the text, connections are possible through different means such as movies, documentaries, one-on-one exposure, and the arts. teaching out of the comfort zone could become the best opportunity for a teacher to learn about him or herself. during the process of examining and evaluating personal attitudes and behaviors, faculty and students may experience cognitive dissonance. cognitive dissonance theory was developed by leon festinger in 1957. according to festinger (1957), individuals strive to maintain a consistency between pieces of knowledge. when there is a discrepancy between attitudes and/or behaviors it is called dissonance. the discomfort produced by dissonance urges the individual to make some adjustments to remove the discomfort. festinger (1957) argued that whenever cognition or beliefs are in conflict with behavior, the tendency is to modify or change behaviorbut that is not always the case. in some circumstances individuals continue to gather knowledge (or rationalization) rather than confront the dissonance. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 20 a person is able to get to the root of personal biases through the process of analyzing and validating conflicting attitudes and behaviors that result from cognitive dissonance. by recognizing biases, attitudes, and emotions towards others or certain issues, teachers will allow themselves to be open to grow and change with their students. what this means, is that in order to transform students, teachers should be open to their own transformations by challenging their own biases and assumptions. throughout the educational process, “teacher and students both have to be learners” (shor and freire, 1987: 33) and respect each other’s points of view. allowing students to pose questions and genuinely search with the students beyond the surface of an argument will open doors to new knowledge and growth. teachers need to confront the ever-present philosophical perplexities of questions like, “who am i”? “where do i come from?” “what do i believe and why do i believe it?” which are crucially relevant to being an effective and transformative teacher. in summary, it is important for teachers to be aware that sometimes culture, society, and/or attitudes toward a given subject area could obstruct teaching, not only in terms of the depth and breadth of an issue, but more importantly in terms of intellectual growth for themselves and their students. another important point to consider in regard to these issues is the standpoint of the first year student and the extent to which general education and the humanities play a significant role in the transformative education that will contribute to the development of freshmen students into global citizens. as it occurs with teachers, students have biases when they arrive at the university for the first time: they come with preconceptions, prejudices, assumptions, and expectations. the “ritualized conversation” (sleeter and mclaren, 1995) to convert students into citizens often uncovers a disconnect between students’ interests (shaped by their biases and expectations) and the subject of study (shaped by the teacher’s biases and values). for the most part, students arrive at college filled with curiosity and an appetite for learning. soon after arrival, many students find themselves sitting passively in one classroom after another, listening while the teachers lecture to them. teachers accustomed to lecturing to students might not realize how futile the exercise actually is. the practice wherein teachers deposit knowledge into students’ brains to be retrieved later has been called the “banking method” (freire,1993). for scholars such as mezirow (1991), banks (1966), freire (1993), shor (1992), aronowitz and giroux(1991) and others, the “banking” method of learning is not a responsible form of pedagogy because students accustomed to receiving knowledge passively (in order to regurgitate it upon being prompted) are not transformed through the process. these students are not actually learning but collecting information that most likely will never be critically analyzed, but simply used again in the same form and shape as it was originally received. a transformed student is one that has gone through several experiences that have provoked a self-assessment process. this self-assessment is an analytical process that results in an attitude or value change. students that have gone through this process are more likely to be open to change, unafraid of challenges, respectful of others, and overall better leaders. part of the job of the faculty, then, is to facilitate that transformation. the conscientious teacher should challenge conventional norms and knowledge by engaging in “problem-posing” (freire, 1993) and genuine acts of critical thinking. students and teachers should engage in critical analysis through discussion of key issues, seeking to act in order to change society. education, as proposed by freire (1993), shor (1992), aronowitz, giroux (199) and others, is not only political, but it is also radical, liberating, and transformative because it challenges the status-quo and seeks to effect positive social change. for shor (1992) and freire (1987), the teacher that takes into consideration the students’ cultures and includes the students’ voices in the discussion will learn with the students. students bring their perspectives to the classroom and are able to construct new, meaningful knowledge if empowered and encouraged to do so. by identifying groups and engaging students in the teaching and learning process (for example, through becoming aware of cultural biases) teachers and students will hopefully discover the hurdles that impede growth and transformational learning. it is clearer than ever before that teachers’ attitudes, biases, and prejudices can negatively affect not only the learning process, but can also add to some students’ isolation. it is obvious that bullying and a lack of sensitivity and empathy for students’ differences may push students to seek desperate measures. the problemanalytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 32 issue 1 21 posing approach to teaching and learning not only makes sense, but is transformational and promotes growth for teachers and students. transformational learning confronts cultural and political hurdles that affect teachers, students, and the institution. in this day and age information on any subject is readily available through the internet, and so memorizing information in a subject area is no longer as necessary. anyone can become “knowledgeable” on a topic within a few minutes by gathering information from different sources. nevertheless, only the student who is able to think critically will be able to process such a plethora of information in an efficient and competent manner. what’s more, we also need to recognize that transformative education does not occur overnight; it is a process. i argue that for real (authentic) transformation to occur, both the teacher and the student must engage one another in a dialogue within the classroom that examines long held assumptions on a variety of issues. this transformation will not occur unless teachers engage in posing problems to students in a way that enables them to also recognize the extent to which education itself can be used as a means of simply reinforcing political ideologies and promoting cultural hegemony. to do this effectively, teachers should examine and evaluate their own biases, engage students in open and respectful dialogue, and be willing to allow opposing views as part of the discussion. references aronowitz, s. & giroux, h. a. (1991). postmodern education: politics, culture, & social criticism. minneapolis: university of minnesota press. banks, j. a. (ed.). (1996). multicultural education, transformative knowledge, & action: historical and contemporary perspectives. new york: teachers college press. festinger, l. (1957). a theory of cognitive dissonance. stanford, ca: stanford university press. freire, p. (1993). pedagogy of the oppressed. (30th anniversary ed.). new york: continuum. mcintosh, p. (1988). white privilege and male privilege: a personal account of coming to see correspondences through work in woman’s studies. ma: wellesley college center for research on woman. mezirow, j. (1991). transformative dimensions of adult learning. san francisco: jossey-bass. shor, i. (1992). empowering education: critical teaching for social change. chicago: university of chicago press. shor, i. & freire, p. (1987). a pedagogy for liberation: dialogues on transforming education. westport, ct: bergin and garvey. sleeter, c. & mclaren, p. l. (eds.). (1995). multicultural education, critical pedagogy, and the politics of difference. new york: state university of new york press. address correspondences to: maribel v. bird viterbo university, la crosse wi e-mail: mvbird@viterbo.edu analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 31 plato and the virtues of wisdom eric russert kraemer introduction is wisdom a virtue? i think it is and also that it is an important virtue. but, it should be granted at the outset that the claim is controversial, that there are philosophers who either do not think of wisdom as a virtue1, or do not think of it as relevantly similar to other virtues. for example, stanley godlovitch comments: wisdom sits alone. we cannot rehearse or practice it. we cannot be prompted to assume it —wheth er for our sake or for the sake of others. we cannot expect, should we be in possession of it, to win friends and influence people. wisdom calls into prominence a state of mind rather than a readiness to act in specified ways. as such, its status as a virtue must remain rather aloof.2 while one may disagree with godlovitch’s five negative claims about wisdom, as i do, one can learn from him that any attempt to present wisdom as a serious virtue must not only be sensitive to the contrary view, namely that wisdom is an oddity, and must also be able to explain why this contrary view arises. in this discussion i begin by considering two reasons that might be given to support the contrary claim. i then propose a simple, if somewhat familiarly “ontological” argument for wisdom’s being a virtue. i then look to plato to see what kinds of thing the virtue of wisdom might be. attempting to accommodate as much of the positive platonic data i can, i propose a pluralistic account of virtue, setting out a half dozen specific virtues of wisdom. i recommend that when we call someone wise there is always one or another, or perhaps several of these specific kinds of wisdom-virtue to which we refer. i will argue that the pluralistic account can be used to explain both the controversy surrounding wisdom’s status as a virtue as well as other concerns that have been raised about it. attempting to forestall an obvious objection to such an account, namely that it is merely a hodgepodge, lacking all systematicity, i suggest an underlying conceptual core for all forms of wisdom, namely the disposition to make apt judgments. after clarifying and defending this account, i provide several instances of its explanatory power and turn to address some concerns the account raises. trying to anticipate yet another objection, i consider the role of reflection in wisdom. i argue that, while reflection is often a useful means to apt judgment, it is not a necessary feature of all instances of wisdom. i conclude by arguing that my account makes wisdom a more explanatorily attractive and a more interestingly egalitarian virtue, hence, a much less odd or “aloof” virtue than some have thought. two introductory concerns and an argument one factor that makes wisdom in general an especially difficult topic for philosophers to discuss is that we approach wisdom with a particular professional and largely self-imposed burden, namely we naturally tend to equate all wisdom worthy of the name with what it is that the best of our singular tribe--plato, aristotle, aquinas analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 32 among others--do especially well, namely provide profound insights about the deepest and most important questions. thus, it is common for philosophers to identify wisdom with weighty insight on thorny philosophical problems. so conceived, wisdom becomes an almost impossible trait for most human beings to acquire. but, if wisdom is impossible or almost impossible for most of us to acquire, then there would be little point to trying to get clear about wisdom. on this conception we are better served instead to concentrate our efforts on trying to understand the wisdom of those fortunate few who possess it. a related problem we face when thinking about wisdom is that we use the same word, “wise” to refer both to individuals as well as to the things that individuals write or say. unlike other traits that we recognize as virtues, such as courage and temperance, where the trait in question attaches to the specific actions of individuals, we often identify individuals as wise, not on the basis of what we know them to have done, but, on the quality of the things they write or say. unlike those who act courageously or with temperance, we often cannot point to specific, observable and characteristic activity in which the producer of wisdom engaged. since the wisdom philosophers publicly recognize is a product, it is natural for philosophers to question whether wisdom is also a distinctive process. as fools can utter wise maxims, parrot wise answers or claim allegiance to the wise theories, it is not hard to see how the virtue-status of wisdom could be cast into doubt. further, unlike such virtues as courage and temperance, it is not clear from experience what distinctive inner feelings, if any, are associated with wisdom. is there good reason to think that wisdom is a virtue? here is a simple argument for according the status of virtuehood to wisdom. we may call this the anti-luck argument. let us assume we can all agree that there are some wise products: maxims, saying, perspectives, theories, etc. how did these wise products arise? either they emerged wholly by accident or they came about by means of some process. but, given the number of products and given that some individuals are consistently associated with numbers of them, it would be irrational to accept the accident hypothesis. if so, then there must be a regularly employed process associated with wisdom.3 a regularly employed process that standardly produces good results is a virtue. so, it is reasonable to suppose that this process, whatever it is, is involved with the exercise of wisdom. thus, it is reasonable to accept, in addition to certain wise products, a virtue of wisdom.4 but, the claim that there is a virtue of wisdom is misleading, as it assumes that only one thing constitutes wisdom. i suspect that this assumption is a substantial part of what leads those such as godlovich to despair regarding wisdom’s status as a virtue. to reply more effectively to the wisdom-skeptics we are better served to postulate a family of different but related behavior traits that all deserve to be considered as different forms of wisdom. as i think our snobbism about what philosophers do has led many into skepticism about wisdom’s status as a virtue, i want to identify a prominent source of this snobbery as well as categorize different forms of wisdom by examining plato’s diverse comments on the subject. so, let us now turn to plato. plato on wisdom trying to pin plato down on the topic of wisdom is a considerable challenge.5 the problem is not that plato does not say much about it. our difficulty, rather, is the opposite problem: plato says much too much about wisdom and what he does say seems to change depending on the focus of the specific discussion in which he is engaged. unlike other virtues such as justice, temperance or holiness, of the many dialogues he wrote there seems to be no single dialogue whose central focus is to discover the true nature of wisdom.6 plato makes references to wisdom typically illustrate some other point, or criticize of some other view. and there are at least half a dozen different themes that plato expounds regarding wisdom, a topic that he discusses in many different dialogues throughout his philosophical career. let us now consider the various claims that plato makes about wisdom. the first and best-known theme, adulatory humility, occurs in early socratic writings. here is what he says in the apology: analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 33 but the truth of the matter, gentlemen, is pretty certainly this, that real wisdom is the property of god, and this oracle is his way of telling us that human wisdom has little or no value. it seems to me that he is not referring literally to socrates, but has merely taken my name as an example, as if he would say to us, the wisest of you men is he who has realized, like socrates, that in respect of wisdom he is really worthless. [23b] remarks such as these contain at least two messages. on the one hand we have the claim that “real” wisdom is only had by the gods; the flip-side is the assertion that for humans, real wisdom consists of knowledge of the extent of one’s ignorance. related to this early period we also find writings that suggest that the attainment of wisdom may only be possible once we have ceased to exist in our current human form, that is, upon death. thus, in the phaedo we discover the following: will a true lover of wisdom who has firmly grasped this same conviction—that he will never attain to wisdom worthy of the name elsewhere than in the next world—will he be grieved at dying? will he not be glad to make that journey? we must suppose so, my dear boy, that is, if he is a real philosopher, because then he will be of the firm belief that he will never find wisdom in all its purity in any other place. [68b] with wisdom as either a feature of the gods or of the pure soul, we see plato’s early contribution to the aloofness of wisdom campaign.7 this position is weakened in plato’s later writings. in the laws we find grudging acceptance of some human wisdom: the athenian: “wrong, arrogance, and folly are our undoing; righteousness, temperance, and wisdom, our salvation, and these have their home in the living might of the gods, though some faint trace of them is also plainly to be seen dwelling here within ourselves.” [10:906b] but, there are many different claims regarding wisdom to be found in plato’s writings. a second theme is wisdom as the supreme virtue. here from the protagoras:8 are these also parts of virtue? said i. wisdom, i mean and courage? most emphatically. wisdom indeed in the greatest of the parts. and each of them is different from the others? yes. has each also its own function? in a face, the eye is not like the ear nor has it the same function. nor do the other parts resemble one another in function any than in other respects. is this how the parts of virtue differ, both in themselves and in their function? it must be so, i suppose if the parallel holds good. yes, it is so, socrates. [330a]9 a third theme we find is plato applying wisdom to specific crafts or activities that are done especially well to our advantage, as in the following remarks from the euthydemus:10 consider the dangers of the sea. surely you don’t think that anyone has better fortune than wise pilots, as a general rule? of course not. well then, on a campaign, which would you like better to share danger and fortune with, a wise captain or an ignorant one? a wise one. and if you were ill, which would you prefer to run risks with, a wise physician or an ignorant one? a wise one. don’t you think, then, i said, that it would be better fortune to do anything along with a wise man, than with an ignorant one? he agreed. then wisdom everywhere makes men to have good fortune. for wisdom, i suppose, could never make a mistake, but must always do right, and have right fortune, or else it would not be wisdom any longer. [279d] analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 34 fourth, plato can be found equating wisdom with good counsel. in the republic plato tells us: and, moreover, the first thing that i think i clearly see therein is the wisdom, and there is something odd about that, it appears. what? he said. wise in very deed i think the city that we have described is, for it is well counseled, is it not? yes. and surely this very thing, good counsel, is a form of wisdom. for it is not by ignorance but by knowledge that men counsel well. obviously. [4:428b] a fifth broad theme in plato’s writing involves equating wisdom with various other virtues, or as the foundation of all virtue. in the symposium we come across the following revealing comment: wisdom and all her sister virtues, it is the office of every poet to beget them, of every artist whom we may call creative. now by far the most important kind of wisdom, she went on, is that which governs the ordering of society, and which goes by the names of justice and moderations. [209: a-b]11 and, sixth, in the laws plato discusses the relation between wisdom and reason as follows: ask me the question why we first call both things by the name of virtue, and then speak of them as two—courage and wisdom. i will give you the reason. one of them, courage is concerned with fears, and so is to be found in the brutes and in the behavior of mere infants. in fact, a soul may attain to courage by mere native temperament independently of discourse of reason, but without such discourse no soul ever comes to understanding or wisdom…[12: 963e] when we consider these various claims from plato on wisdom, regarding its almost inaccessible quality, its advantage, its practical nature, its relation to counsel, its importance, its foundational role for other virtues, yet its difference from all the virtues, it is hard to find a single interpretation. and, although plato often takes wisdom to be a virtue, hence a process, some times he takes wisdom to be a product, as in the following remark from the theatetus: socrates: and what makes people wise is wisdom, i suppose. theatetus: yes. socrates: and is that in any way different from knowledge? theatetus: is what different? socrates: wisdom. are not people wise in the things of which they have knowledge? theatetus: certainly. socrates: then knowledge and wisdom are the same thing? [145e] so, to rely on plato to provide a clearly enunciated, single theory of the virtue of wisdom would indeed be folly. what explanation might we give of these many different claims that plato makes regarding wisdom? one interpretation of the many accounts of wisdom in plato’s writings is that plato kept changing his mind on what wisdom was, and that one or another or perhaps none of these accounts is correct. the extreme wisdom skeptic will, of course, favor the latter pessimistic view, namely that what we are to learn from plato is that there is really no such thing as wisdom, or, at best, that it is nothing mere mortals can hope to possess. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 35 another interpretation, the one i favor, is that plato kept discovering different forms of wisdom, and that he nicely gives voice to these very different forms on different occasions. what i take to be the lesson that we are to learn from plato’s various positive comments is that we should think of wisdom as a virtue that is not a single sort of disposition; rather, we are to think of wisdom as something that can take an important variety of forms.12 once we have identified a significant set of such forms we will then be in the position to ask what, if anything, might unify them. we will also then be in a position to see how well we might respond to the various complaints against wisdom with which we began. the several virtues of wisdom let us suppose that a virtue is a behavioral disposition or trait which tends to promote the good, or, in humans, flourishing. let us also note that different virtues seem to apply to different aspects of human life, such as the individual aspect (temperance, prudence), the practice aspect (truthfulness, persistence) or the societal aspect (loyalty and generosity). thinking of these three different aspects helps us to consider the various forms that wisdom can take. if we try to think of different forms that wisdom as a virtue might take, then, taking our cue from plato we can identify (at least) the following six forms: [1] craft wisdom, as in the wise physician, [2] personal wisdom, as in “know thyself,”13, [3] the wisdom of counsel, [4] social wisdom14, [5] theoretical or esoteric wisdom15, and [6] wisdom as the meta-virtue, the virtue which rules the other virtues. to call someone wise, i suggest, is just to call that person wise in one or more of these different respects. is this the final list? some will be tempted to suggest additional forms of wisdom. before we do, we might also attempt to see if we can construct or deconstruct these allegedly new forms out of one or several of the six forms already mentioned. consider “conventional wisdom”. perhaps it is a diluted version of theoretical wisdom.16 again consider ‘practical wisdom’. though similar to craft wisdom, it seems not to be tied to any particular craft and to incorporate many elements of conventional wisdom as well. further, the skeptical perspective on wisdom—she is wise who knows not to make a claim to know—is certainly an important aspect of platonic and socratic thought. but, if it is appropriate to interpret one’s not claiming of wisdom in certain circumstances as itself a form of wisdom, then perhaps this, too, would fall under the meta-virtue aspect of wisdom described above. conversely, we can imagine some who would opt for a more parsimonious original list, who would suggest that we collapse various elements on the list of six to a specific form of craft wisdom, such as wisdom of counsel or social wisdom. or, perhaps one might propose reducing personal wisdom to meta-virtue wisdom. as i am not able to provide a convincing argument for this suggestion, i will not attempt to settle these matters here and choose to remain officially neutral regarding any enlargement and reductive efforts. my primary concern in the present discussion is merely to argue that a pluralistic approach to wisdom as a virtue, whatever its ultimate details, is preferable to privileging a specific form.17 my reasons for preferring a pluralist approach to wisdom are several. first, i take it as a basic datum, established with plato’s examples, that there are an important variety of ways in which we find beings to be wise. while we may think of some forms of wisdom as more valuable or more difficult to attain than others, it seems unfair to count only those who possess these latter forms as wise. second, the prospects it affords for analysis are more promising. if we begin with varied data to be analyzed, we may reach a more satisfying general account of what is the common feature of these diverse instances of the virtue of wisdom. third, the pluralistic approach better fits with what we find to be true regarding other virtues such as courage, temperance, prudence, and justice, namely that they come in a variety of degrees and that they are to be found in a variety of kinds of beings and situations. it would indeed be odd if wisdom turned out to be the only one of the major virtues that was tied to a single absolute standard and was to be had only by a small group of remarkable individuals (i.e., the gods and the near-gods, such as plato and the buddha). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 36 developing a pluralistic account what might defenders of such an account claim about the virtue of wisdom? the following three non-controversial claims strike me as worth enunciating. first, and most obviously, there are many ways in which one can be wise. some individuals have some craft wisdom (and most likely some practical and conventional wisdom) but no other. other individuals may have only great theoretical wisdom. still others may have considerable social wisdom. others may be wise counselors. some with significant personal wisdom will also have considerable meta-virtue wisdom. but, there is a second obvious point: being wise in one way does not guarantee having any other sort of wisdom. those who have craft wisdom may lack theoretical wisdom, and vice-versa. third, wisdom is, fundamentally, an epistemic virtue; it importantly involves knowledge. we should note that one can be wise with respect both to knowing how to do something and one can also be wise with respect to being able to apply a particular branch of propositional knowledge. being an epistemic virtue also brings with it many of the special features possessed by knowledge, including its intentionality.18 for example, like much knowledge, wisdom is not necessarily transparent to the one who has it. one can be wise in one particular manner without knowing that one is wise in that way. but, the analyst still wants to know: granted that there are half a dozen assorted forms of the virtue of wisdom, is there something that all of these dissimilar types of wisdom have that makes them all forms of the same virtue? perhaps. wise people possess knowledge that the non-wise lack. to call a person wise says something about the significance of her use of this knowledge either regarding some particular subject matter or regarding some range of areas. and, second, this use must also lead the wise person to make a judgment. without judging there can be no wisdom. that it is the combination of knowledge and judgment that forms the basis for all forms of wisdom as a virtue can be seen by considering the following two cases. imagine first a person, k, who is possessed of great information on some matter, x, but refuses to use this information to form a pertinent judgment regarding x in a situation that calls for judgment. while k may be a great resource for others who wish to evaluate the subject in question, k seems to lack wisdom regarding her subject of expertise. it is not enough to have relevant information and relevant evaluation skills; one must also be typically disposed to combine the information and skills to produce judgment in order to count as wise. envision a second individual, j, who happily makes a judgment regarding some matter, but who unfortunately lacks proper information structures regarding it. even if j’s judgment about x turns out to be correct, if it is not formed in the proper manner by a reliable process or mechanism, then j is clearly not wise, but simply a lucky guesser who might pass for wise until suitably queried about her judgment. what can we learn from the cases of k and j regarding the elements required for wisdom? let us propose the following. one feature that all of the six different forms of wisdom seem to have in common is the feature of judgment. a second requirement involves information. in order to be wise it is not sufficient just to be able to spout off the right sort of information. this information must somehow appropriately derive from the wise person as its source. but, we should not confuse wisdom with creation, invention or discovery in the strong sense of being the very first person to happen upon a particular truth, correct procedure or effective strategy. rather, as a source the wise person must rather merely be one who appropriately so judges regarding the item in question, and in so doing makes the knowledge her own. apt judgment, i claim, is what is common to all of the various forms of wisdom.19 let us see how this account fares with respect to the six forms of wisdom presented above. the wise craftsman judges that a particular method is appropriate to reach a particular result. the possessor of personal wisdom judges that she should follow a particular course of action. the wise counselor judges that a particular piece of advice is what is required for her client in a given situation. the wise judge determines that a particular analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 37 decision is best in a given social situation. the wise theoretician judges that a particular theory best addresses some problem at hand. and, the wise meta-virtuous person judges that one specific virtue, say courage, needs to be favored over another virtue, say prudence, in a specific context that has presented itself. thus, reliance on apt judgment seems to provide a unifying element across the multiple forms of wisdom put forward. what makes a judgment apt is determined by the kind of judgment it is. what is relevant for craft aptitude is determined by craft standards.20 what is relevant for wise counsel depends upon the specifics of the counseling situation as well as relevant data, theory and rules that apply. what is wise for the theoretician is determined by the relevant historical theoretical precedents, the kinds of problems that one is trying to solve, concerns about the various explanatory virtues that need to be balanced, etc. but this is still a bit vague. can we do better? one common epistemic mark that a judgment is apt is that it will strike the neophyte or uninstructed as insightful, that it puts information together in a way that feels “just right for the occasion”. but, although initially attractive as an explanation of what makes a judgment apt so as to count as wisdom, on reflection it seems more reasonable to admit that talk of insight related to wisdom is potentially confusing. there are two reasons. first, the wise person may not necessarily see her judgment as in any way special, but merely as what is called for on the occasion. so, insight, oddly enough, may function best as criterion of wisdom for those who lack it or lack it to the degree possessed by those more talented. second, although to see something as insightful is, standardly, to see it as wise, nevertheless seeing something as wise and something’s actually being wise are not the same things. appeal to insight is insufficient as a mark of wisdom. what is there about a particular insightful judgment that makes us call it an instance of genuine wisdom as opposed to a piece of mere superficiality? perhaps the best we can do is to appeal to the notion of ‘due consideration’, but ‘due consideration’ of what? it seems that acts of wisdom involve due consideration of a significant number of diverse factors. what makes wisdom distinctive is that these factors involve the potential for making conflicting decisions. further, in situations requiring wisdom there is no simple algorithm for determining which of these factors to count when. a wise person, we can summarize, is one disposed to make judgments that are apt with respect to giving due consideration for potentially conflicting factors not according to some single simple rule.21 to assess the adequacy of these additional requirements we need again to consider the various proposed forms of wisdom. when we do so, once more we see that each involves these added elements. the wise craftsperson must consider conflicting aspects of the crafting process, the different materials, forms, processes, etc. that must all be managed simultaneously. the possessor of self-wisdom needs to take into account all of the diverse elements of her history, personality, circumstances, and plan-of-life. the wise counselor must consider the very different and conflicting sorts of advice that might be given in a particular situation and hone the specifics to fit the context appropriately. the wise social planner needs to take into account the multiple elements of the social situation, the potential conflicts between them on particular plans, and the multiple goals that the particular society wishes to attain. the wise theoretician must consider the current state of the data regarding a particular subject matter, the various conflicting explanatory hypotheses that have been given, and their strengths and weaknesses. and, finally, the wise meta-virtue possessor needs to take into account all of the details of a particular situation and all of the other virtues that might apply as well as her long-term goals and commitments. thus, for each of these six forms of wisdom, multiple conflicting factors come into play in making the appropriate judgment and each requires due consideration before an apt judgment can be rendered. and, in each of these cases there is no single simple rule that one might follow to resolve conflict. the critical skeptic will, of course, not be happy with this final characterization, demanding an even clearer account. how many factors must be considered? how do we determine which factors are relevant? what is really involved in due consideration? how are apt judgments actually made? these are all questions for which no truly informative answers are currently available. and, in their absence, the critic may think herself justified in remaining skeptical about wisdom. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 38 but, i think it would be a mistake to take our current inability to specify better what is going on in apt judgment situations as an indication that wisdom is something about which we should be skeptical or to claim that wisdom is something about which we now have no understanding and will never understand. all of us can identify individuals whom we count as wise and on whom we count for wise counsel. so, it would be silly for us to invoke skepticism regarding real world wisdom. and, i think we can understand a number of things about wisdom, namely the six different forms and the several elements just listed.22 in the meantime, there is still a bit more that can be said about wisdom conceived as apt judgment. the account of wisdom as apt judgment has explanatory power. it can be used to explain why some have not taken wisdom to be a virtue but something else. this is because, unlike many other virtues, one often cannot observe the forces involved in an individual’s acting in a wise manner. further, we cannot directly view the judging process in others, only its product. thus, we can see how lack of observation in others and lack of attention to or lack of transparency regarding one’s own thoughts might lead one to deny that wisdom is a virtue process, and view it as only a sort of knowledge product. there is another useful explanatory aspect of the apt judgment account of wisdom. this concerns the fact noted in several of the platonic references cited above, that there seem to be situations in which we count wisdom as a virtue determinable, that is, as something general that can take a variety of forms, and then count other specific forms of virtue, such as justice, temperance, prudence, for instance, as virtue determinates, that is, as specific forms of the virtue of wisdom. without the common element of apt judgment, this might seem confusing. but, it is reasonable to suppose that there are many different kinds of apt judgment. thus, we should reject plato’s apparent claim cited above from the protagoras, that all of the virtues are completely different.23 if wisdom has many forms, then some of its more specific forms can also be specific virtues, where the specificity is determined by a particular circumscribed subject matter. thus, temperance is that form of wisdom regarding decisions about food, drink and sex; prudence is that form of wisdom regarding what is in one’s self-interest, leaving justice as that form of wisdom regarding how to regulate the state.24 the reflection question while the pluralistic account of wisdom here proposed does have many promising features there is a further important objection that needs to be addressed. this is the complaint that the current approach to wisdom has left out a very important element, namely that of reflection. you will notice that i have not included either contemplation or reflection as an explicit aspect of my account. some, however, will insist that all judgment involves a reflective element. i would not want to deny that there are many wise judgments that we do make reflectively. but, strictly speaking the account here proposed leaves open the possibility that there could be apt judgings that were non-reflective. is this a mistake? consider the example of the drugged priestesses at delphi who uttered significant deliverances from the gods. the priestesses were just the medium by means of which wisdom emerged; the medium is not necessarily itself wise. the same goes for the priests who interpreted the deliverances; they also, arguably, fail to qualify as wise, as they are but the interpreters of the gods. are such examples sufficient to demonstrate the need for reflection in an account of wisdom? perhaps the friends of reflection and contemplation are really still committed to the significance of insight for wisdom. they might hold that it is the experience of phenomenal insight that secures a consciousness requirement for attributions of wisdom. and, how does one get insight? it is natural to claim that insight requires both experience and deep reflection on this experience. the idea of being wise and young, and so without significant experience on which to reflect, is, to be sure, rather odd, it is hard to give ordinary examples; we are limited to a few limited religious exceptions (such as the young dali lama and the young jesus). thus, one often finds philosophers claiming that reflection and experience are both required for wisdom. but, although it seems correct to claim that much wisdom that we treasure involves reflection on experience, there seem to be at least two good reasons to think that reflection is not necessary for wisdom, as there do appear to be cases of wisdom analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 39 without reflection, some of which also require experience but some which do not. first, let us recall plato’s examples of different crafts. these suggest that one can speak of wise practitioners of various crafts, for example the wise pilot and the wise physician. while some competent practitioners may in specific cases want or need to reflect, others may not need or want to do so. perhaps reflection was helpful at an early stage of the learning process that brought the practitioner to her current state of expertise, but, for some instances of wise crafting, there seems not to be the need for continued reflection in all cases. and, second, there may also be at least two cases of wisdom without either reflection or experience. here’s the puzzle. is god wise? it seems appropriate to say “yes”. in fact the two most significant virtues we typically attribute to god are wisdom and justice.25 but, does god reflect? it seems appropriate either to say “no”, or perhaps better, to say that we really do not know one way or the other. while contemplation may be typical of certain wise humans, it would seem presumptuous to think that an omniscient being would need to reflect before coming to an appropriate judgment. and, of course, there is also the case of the angels that needs to be considered. could god create an angel who was wise without needing to reflect? that would seem well within god’s power. further, it also seems that much of what we have been told of angels reflects both their being wise and their not reflecting. so, for these two reasons, while contemplation may be useful for many apt judgings, i urge that we not make it a conceptual requirement on wisdom but rather rely on empirical efforts to determine contemplation’s proper role in specific forms of wisdom. conclusion it is time to draw this discussion to a close. i have here defended wisdom as a virtue, or rather as a half-adozen different kinds of virtue. i propose that what ties specific forms of wisdom virtue together is the concept of apt judgment. i suggest this approach helps us understand why many have had such a hard time with wisdom, following as they were the quixotic questioning of socrates in the early platonic dialogues. only recognizing as wisdom that possessed by the gods leads plato in the early dialogues to reject all other forms of wisdom, including many forms that he later came to discuss and value. some of us have been or will be blessed with craft wisdom, some with theoretical wisdom, and some with the wisdom of counsel. finding these as well as other forms of wisdom all around us is an empowering perspective, as it helps us better appreciate the many different gifts with which each of us has been endowed.26 endnotes 1 for a survey of theories of wisdom see sharon ryan’s discussion, “wisdom,” the stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (entry dated 1/8/2007),http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wisdom/. ryan discusses various views of wisdom, including those which equate it with believing one is ignorant, having knowledge/justification for one’s beliefs, having extensive factual knowledge, knowing how to live well, and being successful at living well. of these alternatives, only the last would seem to count as the sort of disposition required for virtue-hood. 2 see stanley godlovich, “on wisdom,” canadian journal of philosophy (march 1981), reprinted in christina hoff sommers and fred sommers eds., vice and virtue in everyday life, 2nd ed., san diego: harcourt brace jovanovich, 1989, p. 279. 3 my argument is a variation on descartes’ ontological argument for the existence god from meditation iii. there must be as much wisdom in the creator of the wise produce as there is in the product. mere chance does not explain this. a fool or amateur lacks the means to produce wise products. so, wise products must come from wise producers—so, wisdom must be a virtue, too. 4 an additional line of support comes from a point already noted above, namely we can recognize many who cite wisdom as lacking in wisdom, and do not hold them responsible for the wise comments they ape. 5 all citations are from edith hamilton and huntington cairns, eds., plato: collected dialogues, princeton: princeton university press, 1961 (6th printing, may 1971). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 40 6 we should not count attacks on the sophists as such an effort. here is a typically unhelpful remark from the phaedrus as to what is not sufficient for wisdom: “and so it is that you, by reason of your tender regard for the writing that is your offspring, have declared the very opposite of its true effect. if men learn this, it will implant forgetfulness in their souls; they will cease to exercise memory because they rely on that which is written, calling things to remembrance no longer from within themselves, but by means of external marks. what you have discovered is a recipe not for memory, but for reminder. and it is no true wisdom that you offer your disciples, but only its semblance, for by telling them of many things without teaching them you will make them seem to know much, while for the most part they know nothing, and as men are filled, not with wisdom, but with the conceit of wisdom, they will be a burden to their fellows.” [275a] 7 this is reiterated elsewhere, as in the following comment from the phaedrus: to call him wise, phaedrus, would, i think, be going too far; the epithet is proper only to a god. [278d]. 8 the same assertion occurs later in the laws: the athenian: “of divine goods, the first and chiefest is this same wisdom, and the next after it, sobriety of spirit; a third, resultant from the blending of both of these with valor, is righteousness, and valor itself is fourth. all of these naturally rank before the former class, and of course, a lawgiver must observe that order, next, he should impress it on his citizens that all his other injunctions have a view to these ends, and that among the ends, the human looks to the divine, and all the divine to their leader, wisdom.” [1:631c] 9 and, later in the same dialog we find the following claims: 352c: [prot]…but i above all men should thing it shame to speak of wisdom and knowledge as anything but the most powerful elements in human life., 358c: to ‘act beneath yourself’ is the result of pure ignorance; to ‘be your own master’ is wisdom. 10 these remarks fit plato’s theme in the meno that only the virtuous life is worth leading: soc: in short, everything that the human spirit undertakes or suffers will lead to happiness, then it is guided by wisdom, but to the opposite, when guided by folly. meno: a reasonable conclusion. soc: if then virtue is an attribute of the spirit, and one which cannot fail to be beneficial, it must be wisdom, for all spiritual qualities in and by themselves are neither advantageous nor harmful, but become advantageous or harmful by the presence with them of wisdom or folly. [88c-d] the same theme is echoed later in the laws: the athenian: “what lives, then, are there, and how many, from which, on a review of the desirable and undesirable, a selection must be made and erected into a self-imposed law, if the choice of the course which is pleasant and attractive as well as virtuous and noble may lead us to an existence of supreme human felicity? we shall, of course, name the life of temperance as one, and may count that of wisdom as another, that of courage of course as another, and that of health as another, thus making four in all, against which we may set four other types, the lives of folly, cowardice, profligacy, disease…” [5:733e] 11 in addition plato concludes the above claim from the meno with the remark: “if we accept this argument, then virtue, to be something advantageous, must be a sort of wisdom.[ibid.] 12 compare gilbert ryle’s distinction between “generic” and “specific” dispositions. see ryle, the concept of mind, london: hutchinson and co., 1949, chapter 5. 13 as in celebrated maxim from the oracle of delphi, “know thyself.” 14 social wisdom is that possessed by judges and urban planners, and is envisioned by plato in the republic. 15 theoretical or esoteric wisdom is wisdom regarding deep matters which at least the gods have for plato. 16 perhaps conventional wisdom is distinguished from theoretical wisdom by lacking all serious theoretical components whatsoever. for the origins of conventional wisdom see john kenneth galbraith, the economics of innocent fraud, new york: houghton mifflin, 2004, p. ix. 17 while i am non-committal on whether additional forms of wisdom are justified, i am firmly committed to the view that it is not possible to reduce all of the items on the current list down to just one item. 18 for a good overview of intentionality, see roderick chisholm’s entry, “intentionality,” in paul edwards, ed., the encyclopedia of philosophy, new york: macmillan publishing co., 1967, vol. 3, pp. 201-204. 19 compare ernest sosa’s discussion of epistemic virtue in reflective knowledge, oxford: oxford university analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 41 press, 2009. 20 aristotle rejects the suggestion that mere craft could count as virtue, as he requires that all virtuous actions also be just and temperate. (see his nichomachean ethics, chapter 4, 2.14.) but, aristotle’s objection is based on his requirement of the unity of the virtues, a requirement that the present view rejects—as i have claimed that there is no necessary unity of the various forms of wisdom alone. 21 there is the objection to be faced that many judgments will count as apt yet they are not wise; for example the perceptual judgment, that yonder there is a mountain goat (as made by a shepherd) may be accurate, yet it seems overblown to call it wise. thus, we need to understand an apt judgment as not merely an accurate judgment but one that uses a process the complexity of whose conflicting factors forces a significant piece of judging as opposed to a routine perceptual recognition. 22 whether humans will ever be able to make significant additional headway on understanding wisdom may turn out to be an empirical matter, to depend, not on philosophers, but upon what is learned in the future regarding how the brains of real wise people actually work. 23 plato claims in protagoras [330a] that the virtues are all different as are the parts of the face. it seems better to say, instead, that different virtues are formed by different arrangements of common elements, thus, comparable to the making of different “faces”. 24 one can see here the beginnings of an argument for a kind of conceptual unity of the virtues! 25 it seems odd to attribute courage, prudence or temperance to a being that is both omnipotent and omniscient. 26 i am very grateful for the hospitality and helpful discussion from participants at the viterbo university conference on wisdom, april, 2010. address coresspondence to: eric russert kraemer dept. of philosophy, university of wisconsin at la crosse, wi. kraemer.eric@uwlax.edu analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 53 characteristics of a high school classroom community of mathematical inquiry raymond siegrist when a community of inquiry is adopted for teaching mathematics, characteristics need to be identified to determine if a community of inquiry forms. one essential characteristic of a community of mathematical inquiry is that members develop their understanding of mathematics through dialogue. scholars in fields other than mathematics have emphasized the importance of incorporating dialogue in instruction: • the learning of content through the dialogical process enhances the understanding, retention, and application of the content (fernandez-balboa & marshall, 1994, p. 174). • dialogue … [is] the best available means we have for identifying among ourselves acceptable answers, workable solutions, and reasonable accommodations (burbules, 1993, p. 16). • [meaningful learning] is much more likely to occur when dialogue is present, for the simple reason that direct communication among equals is the only reliable and systematic dynamic available to those who would incorporate the viewpoints of others into their own personal perspectives (splitter & sharp, 1995, p. 83). dialogue is the medium by which students in a community of mathematical inquiry communally make their own meaning of mathematics. burbules (1993) views dialogue as “a continuous, developmental communicative interchange through which we stand to gain a fuller appreciation of the world, ourselves, and one another” (p. 8). a definition of dialogue is elusive, but several studies have described its characteristics. dialogue occurs when there is an open, unforced sharing by two or more participants. even in the light of disagreements a participant remains interested in, concerned for, and respectful of all other participants by following agreed upon maxims. all participation is guided by discovery on a topic of common interest with value given to all contributions of the participants. a continuous dialogue enables participants to construct knowledge and then reconstruct knowledge as diverse voices synthesize expressed ideas. transformation of knowledge occurs in a dialogue as participants propose, defend, abandon, and accept ideas causing new situations and possibilities to be discovered. inherent in dialogue is the need for each participant to take responsibility for his/her ability to influence the outcome (burbules, 1993; fernandez-balboa & marshall, 1994). another characteristic is that members of a community of mathematical inquiry work together in groups to solve more difficult mathematical problems than they could as individuals. vygotsky’s (1986) “zone of proximal development” supports the use of groups in communities of inquiry because students obtain assistance. if vygotsky is right, groups permit students to solve general problems that would be out of the reach of individuals. for students to be in their “zone of proximal development” during small groups, they have to be focused on the task at hand, and they have to express, listen to, defend, and evaluate the options created for solving any type of problem (schoenfeld, 1987). one strategy for using groups to solve mathematical problems reported by empirical studies is to have groups develop their processes and then present what they have created to the class for critical review (clarke, 1997; cobb, wood, yackel, nicholls, wheatly, trigatti, & perlwitz, 1991). in fact, instead of training for mastery of mathematical procedures presented by their teacher, in this process students become apprentices. students actanalytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 54 ing as apprentices take on more of the problem-solving role as they gain experience. as they gain experience under their teacher’s watchful eye, students are less likely to develop misconceptions about mathematics. students also benefit from another aspect of apprenticeship, initiation into a mathematical culture (schoenfeld, 1987). “having experienced mathematics in this way, students are more likely to develop a more accurate view of what mathematics is and how it is done” (schoenfeld, 1987, p. 205). one justification for adopting a community of inquiry approach put forth by splitter and sharp (1995) is that it encourages students to think like mathematicians or for students to learn to create mathematics the way mathematicians do. the third characteristic of a community of mathematical inquiry is self-correction; as students check their solutions they often correct mistakes. in mathematics, students typically are not asked to listen to explanations by other students to determine which ideas make the best sense; they are given what the teacher thinks is the best way to solve a mathematical problem. when students begin to negotiate their own mathematical meaning within the community, they must decide whether a given explanation is good enough to change their minds. when a conflict between ideas is resolved through communal dialogue, a self-correction occurs within the community. on the constructivist model, authentic learning is self-correction – the deliberate, intelligent reconstruction of one’s habits of thoughts, feeling and action in order to meliorate some aspect of one’s experience. self-correction further requires self-verification: that a student verify new knowledge to herself (gregory, 2002, p. 400). students begin to internalize standards of mathematical judgment modeled by the teacher, so they have criteria to gauge correctness of arguments and solutions (schoenfeld, 1987, 1996). the fourth crucial characteristic of a community of mathematical inquiry is that community members take risks. in this process, criticism and attacks can be made on ideas, but are not acceptable on the personal level. on this point students need practice in not attaching their personal worth to the acceptance of “their” idea. robertson (1999) points out that all members of the community must entertain the “possibility of being obligated to lose” (p. 5). members of the community need to abide by the idea that the explanation making the best sense is the one accepted. as schoenfeld (1996) states, “there is a feeling of trust, in that we must feel free to have our ideas (and not ourselves) compete.” (p.16). students free from personal assessment by the community are more likely to take risks when proposing assertions. polya (1954) asserts three “moral qualities” a person needs to do mathematics that also pertain to taking risks: intellectual courage: we should be ready to revise any one of our beliefs. intellectual honesty: we should change a belief when there is a good reason to change it … wise restraint: we should not change a belief wantonly, without some good reason, without serious examination (pp. 7-8). the fifth characteristic of a community of mathematical inquiry is that students consider, propose, and build on alternate approaches to problem solving. a common, general problem-solving strategy is to list several methods that might result in a solution. when a process is successful, students should not decide inquiry is finished. other ideas might lead to better insights, additional knowledge, or other areas of study (lampert, 1990). self-correction eliminates some alternate approaches to problem solving as unfeasible, but open inquiry requires investigating all ideas within the constraints of the initial problem. cobb, wood, and yackel (1992) offer some guidance: “the teacher might frame conflicting interpretations or solutions as a topic for discussion, thus encouraging students to explicitly negotiate mathematical meanings by engaging in mathematical argumentation” (p. 11). members of a community of mathematical inquiry should be able to provide justification for each step taken in the solution process. reasons need to be given by a student to the community for accepting or rejecting a claim. mason presents an outline for justifying mathematical arguments: first convince yourself. then convince a friend. finally convince an enemy (mason, burton, & stacey, 1984). “if the teacher’s guide is the source of analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 55 right answers, for example, this suggests that the basis for epistemic authority in mathematics does not rest within the knower” (ball, 1991, p. 7). but if the student has defended a conjecture or answer with reason, not only does the “epistemic authority” reside within the knower, the student has created her/his own meaning. students too often see the polished product of a teacher’s struggle with a topic or hours of investigation that did not lead directly to a viable process. “naïve conjecture and counterexamples do not appear in the fully fledged deductive structure: the zig-zag of discovery cannot be discerned in the end product” (lakatos, 1976, p.42). students need to engage in the polishing process, but for this to happen teachers must get students to change their focus. instead of a race to the correct answers, students need to focus on the investigation process, the connections among concepts, and the structure of mathematics (lakatos, 1976; peressini & knuth, 2000; tymoczko, 1985). in a community of inquiry, “knowledge is never presented as complete and sacred; rather, it is always open to further question and criticism” (harpaz & lefstein, 2000). schoenfeld argues that, “entry into that culture…may be necessary to understand and appreciate mathematics” (1987, p. 214). a sixth characteristic of a community of mathematical inquiry is that students inquire into the procedures of inquiry. in mathematics, when students think about what they are doing during the problem-solving process, they inquire into the procedures of inquiry (problem solving). when a teacher adopts a cooperative problemsolving approach, an underlying objective is for students to abandon rehearsals of rules and to plan how to solve complex problems. this objective requires students to adopt and practice a way to manage their problem solving. aspects of management include (a) making sure that you understand what a problem is all about before you hastily attempt a solution; (b) planning; (c) monitoring, or keeping track of how well things are going during a solution; and (d) allocating resources, or deciding what to do, and for how long, as you work on a problem (schoenfeld, 1987, p. 109-110). schoenfeld (1987) contends that if teachers fail to provide students a general way to “self-regulate” their problem solving attempts, students become frustrated when they cannot start a problem, they continue a strategy that never converges to a solution, or they run into a dead end with their selected strategy. therefore, in addition to learning a collection of processes and concepts, students must learn and practice a management system in order to become successful problem solvers. in other words, managing or thinking about problem solving differs from solving problems, but it is a necessity for problem solvers. schoenfeld (1987) suggests students reflect on the problem-solving process by asking, “how well do you keep track of what you’re doing when (for example) you’re solving problems, and how well (if at all) do you use the input from those observations to guide your problem solving actions?” (p.190). the seventh characteristic of a community of mathematical inquiry is that it supports students doing mathematics like mathematicians. one essential ingredient in developing a community of inquiry environment in high school mathematics is the creation of a culture of mathematicians (clarke, 1997; cobb, wood, & yackel, 1991; lampert, 1990; shoenfeld, 1987, 1996). in a community of mathematical inquiry, axioms and definitions remain open to reexamination by the community. when members of the community engaged in constructing a proof discover a deficiency, the need for revision is obvious. revisions of assertions by community members in the light of recently discovered inadequacies allow mathematics to advance (lampert, 1990). helped by a mathematician’s educated guessing about relationships, mathematics develops in a back-and-forth process between adjusting assumptions and revising conclusions. a conjecture is proposed to the mathematical community and stands until a counterexample is discovered or the conjecture is proven. students need practice in taking the risk to make conjectures; they must also understand that, because of limited insight, their conclusions might be incorrect (lampert, 1990). schoenfeld (1987) points out three important types of metacognition that mathematicians need to develop: a) a problem solver’s knowledge about his/her own thought process, b) a problem solver’s self-regulation, and c) analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 56 a problem solver’s beliefs and intuitions (p. 190). participation in a community of mathematical inquiry allows each of these qualities to be developed. students become better general problem solvers when these qualities are introduced and their application is practiced. many attempts at solving mathematical problems depend on the prior mathematical knowledge of the students. when students have a good sense of what they know, their efficiency as general problem solvers increases. in addition, students learn to explain how they solved general problems and constantly reflect upon their thought processes in a community of inquiry (carpenter & fennema, 1992). simply put, a student who self-regulates during a general problem solution is a better problem solver than one who does not keep track of what is happening. student beliefs, such as the belief that students must memorize rules to be successful in mathematics, should begin to change as their participation in the community matures (schoenfeld, 1987, 1996). studies showing outcomes of classroom communities of inquiry there is very little empirical literature on mathematical communities of inquiry. the most relevant literature incorporates community of inquiry characteristics as part of socio-constructivist approaches to teaching and learning mathematics. this literature is appropriate as a frame for a study on mathematical communities of inquiry because socio-constructivist approaches to teaching share many theoretical underpinnings as well as pedagogical approaches with community of inquiry: 1) “students have frequent opportunities to discuss, critique, explain, and, when necessary, justify their interpretations and solutions” (cobb, wood, yackel, & perlwitz, 1992, p.485). 2) “mathematics learning is a process in which students reorganize their activity to resolve situations that they find problematic” (cobb, wood, yackel, nichols, et al., 1991, p. 4). 3) learning occurs when students attempt to make meaning by actively negotiating with their peers (cobb et al., 1991; fawcett, 1938; lampert, 1990; schoenfeld, 1987, 1996). 4) “social norms are not static prescriptions or rules to be followed but are instead continually reconstructed in the course of classroom interactions” (cobb, wood, yackel, nichols, et al., 1991, p. 7). 5) students create mathematics as mathematicians (cobb et al., 1991; fawcett, 1938; lampert, 1990; schoenfeld, 1987, 1996). in a 1991 study, cobb, et al. designed instruments to assess mathematics achievement, computational proficiency, beliefs about success in mathematics, and motivation to study mathematics. ten second-grade classes (project students) were taught mathematics using an inquiry approach while eight classes (non-project students) were taught in a traditional manner. the instruments were administered at the end of a year. this study indicated that the project students retained more content, constructed more advanced concepts, cooperated with their peers to a greater extent, and did better on challenging tasks than the non-project students. the amount of time to teach the concepts of the curriculum using the inquiry approach was not a concern mentioned in this study. students in the project classes believed success in mathematics comes from attempting to understand mathematics while communicating with their peers about their thinking. in a follow-up study cobb, wood, yackel, and perlwitz (1992) tested former second grade students from five inquiry classes and six traditional classes. all students were in traditional third grade classes. scores on standard achievement tests together with results from instruments designed to assess computational development, personal goals in mathematics, and beliefs about mathematical success were used to compare students at the end of the year. the inquiry students maintained their edge in conceptual understanding and mathematical problem solving. beliefs of the inquiry students, that success in mathematics comes from attempting to understand concepts and from talking with their classmates about their thinking, persisted even after a year of traditional instruction. an early pretest-posttest, quasi-experimental study conducted by fawcett (1938) showed the viability of the inquiry approach. several geometry classrooms totaling seventy-five students were taught by the traditional method in two schools; these students became the control group. in the experimental group, a class of 25 students determined the pace and sequence of their learning, constructed their own definitions, and questioned assumptions. pretest scores were the same for all groups, but the experimental group scored significantly better on the posttest analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 53 despite the fact that the experimental group only covered half of the curriculum. two of fawcett’s (1938) conclusions were that “following these procedures improves reflective thinking” and that “the usual formal course in demonstrative geometry does not improve the reflective thinking of pupils” (p. 119). lampert (1990) conducted a classic qualitative, first-person study indicating how a middle school classroom could be set-up in a community of inquiry. she found many examples of how students tried to use irrational strategies to have their assertions accepted by other students. lampert used the work of polya (1954) and lakatos (1976) to identify how to establish a culture of mathematicians in the classroom and bring students to the realization of what it means to do mathematics. her students studied exponents like mathematicians by making conjectures and dialoguing about their thoughts. in her role as the teacher, lampert would at different times tell students whether their behavior was appropriate or inappropriate, model appropriate ways of behaving, or do mathematics with her students. the list of seven characteristics of a community of mathematical inquiry based on current literature establishes a starting point for determining if a community of inquiry exists. since additional characteristics could certainly be extracted from the literature, there is no claim that this list is exhaustive. each of the characteristics can be observed and measured by the frequency of its occurrence on the individual or class level. literature related to high school community of mathematical inquiry was limited to fawcett’s 1938 classic quantitative study about geometry students. lampert’s 1990 classic, first-person, qualitative study generalized student attempts to thwart dialogue in a middle school community of inquiry that would be applicable to the high school level. the cobb et al. (1991, 1992) studies demonstrated the effectiveness of a community of inquiry approach for mathematics at the second grade level. references ball, d. (1991). research on teaching mathematics: making subject-matter knowledge part of the equation. advances in research on teaching, (2), pp. 1-48. burbules, n. (1993). dialogue in teaching. new york: teachers college press. carpenter, t.p. & fennema, e. (1992). cognitively guided instruction: building on the knowledge of students and teachers. international journal of educational research, 17, 457-470. clarke, d. (1997). the changing role of the mathematics teacher. journal of research in mathematics education, 28(3), pp. 278-305. cobb, p., wood, t. & yackel, e. (1991). analogies from the philosophy and sociology of science for understanding classroom life. science education (75), 23-44. cobb, p., wood, t., yackel, e., nicholls, j., wheatly, g., trigatti, b., and perlwitz, m. (1991). assessment of a problem-centered second grade mathematical project. journal for research in mathematics eduaction (22), 3-29. cobb, p., wood, t., yackel, e. & perlwitz, m. (1992). a follow-up assessment of a second-grade problem-centered mathematics project. educational studies in mathematics (23), 483-504. cobb, p., yackel, e., & wood, t. (1992). a constructivist alternative to the representational view of mind in mathematics education. journal for research in mathematics education (23), 2-23. fawcett, h. (1938). the nature of proof [1938 yearbook of the national council of teachers of mathematics]. new york: columbia university teachers college bureau of publications. fernandez-balboa, j. & marshall, j. (1994). dialogical pedagogy in teacher education: toward an education for democracy. journal of teacher education, 45(3), 172-182. gregory, m. (2002). constructivism, standards, and the classroom community of inquiry. educational theory, 52(4), 397 408. harpaz, y. & lefstein, a. (2000). communities of thinking. educational leadership, 58(3), 54-57. lakatos, i. (1976). proofs and refutations: the logic of mathematical discovery. new york: cambridge university press. lampert, m. (1990). when the problem is not the question and the solution is not the answer: mathematical knowing and teaching. american educational research journal (27), 29-63. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 54 mason, j., burton, l., & stacey, k. (1982). thinking mathematically. new york: adison-wesley. peressini, d. & knuth, e. (2000). the role of tasks in developing communities of mathematical inquiry. teaching children mathematics, 6(6), 391-396. polya, g. (1954). induction and analogy in mathematics. princeton, nj: princeton university press. robertson, e. (1999). the value of reason: why not a sardine can opener? [on-line], 1 – 20. available: http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/eps/pes-yearbook/1999/robertson.asp scoenfeld, a. h. (1987). what’s all the fuss about metacognition? in a. h. schoenfeld (ed.), cognitive science and mathematics education (pp. 189-215). hillsdale, nj: lawrence earlbaum associates. schoenfeld, a. h. (1996). in fostering communities of inquiry, must it matter that the teacher knows “the answer”? for the learning of mathematics 16(3), 11-16. splitter, l. & sharp, a. (1995). teaching for better thinking: the classroom community of inquiry. melbourne: australian council for educational research. vygotsky, l. (1986). (a. kozulin, eds. & trans.). thought and language. chambridge, ma: mit press. tymoczko, t. (1985). new directions in the philosophy of mathematics. boston: birkhauser. address correspondences to: raymond siegrist suny college at oneonta box 146 fitzelle oneonta, ny 13820 siegrir@oneonta.edu analytic teaching and philosophical praxis analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 30 the significance of alcibiades’ speech in plato’s symposium rolf m. johnson abstract: critics of plato’s theory of love have maintained that he misrepresents the love of persons, treating them merely as a means to the love of the good or as an image of the idea in them, rather than the person herself. other critics claim that plato sees love as a purely acquisitive and egocentric desire that is fundamentally at odds with an ethical love such as biblical agape. i will argue that the second of these criticisms is just wrong, and the first, overstated. regarding the egocentric thesis, i will attempt to show that plato views love not merely as a desire to possess, but also as a generative urge to create. special attention will be given to the speech of alcibiades in addressing both of these charges. common construal of plato’s theory of love might be summed up as follows: love is a desire, arising from a lack or deficiency within the lover, to possess the good or beautiful forever, where the good/beautiful is understood as an eternal, unchanging idea or form existing in some transcendental realm of eternal essences.1 because this love is characterized as a desire rooted in need, critics have sometimes seen it as essentially acquisitive and thus egocentric. as one such critic has expressed it, “plato was fundamentally unaware of any other form of love than acquisitive love.”2 in the convenient language of c. s. lewis, it is a need love rather than a gift love. a second common criticism derives from the consideration that because the object of platonic eros is a transcendent form, plato failed to understand the love of persons. these critics hold, among other things, that plato “ignores, or largely misrepresents, the love of persons,” treating them merely as a means to the love of the good,3 or, in an alternative formulation, that for plato, “what we are to love in persons is the ‘image’ of the idea in them,” rather than the person herself.4 persons, the advocates of this criticism argue, can only be loved as means to the end of attaining the good. in what follows, i will offer a reading of symposium that responds to both of these criticisms. let’s begin by following plato’s analysis of love as it unfolds in diotima’s instructions to the young socrates. through a succession of steps, socrates learns that love is of beautiful things; the lover desires they become his; beautiful things are also good; possessing such things will make one happy; and finally, the lover wishes that they, and indeed the good itself, be his forever (206a). it might appear at this point that a complete theory of love has been presented, summed up thusly by diotima: “love is wanting to possess the good forever” (206a). what more, we might wonder, need be said? but just here the theory takes a surprising turn. diotima asks socrates, “what is the real purpose of love? can you say?” (206b). rather than giving either of the obvious answers – happiness or possessing the good forever – socrates responds, “if i could [say], . . . i wouldn’t be your student, filled with admiration for your wisdom, and trying to learn these very things” (206b). so the priestess provides the answer herself: “it is giving birth in beauty, whether in body or in soul.” (206b) the locution, “giving birth in beauty,” (emphasis added) was as peculiar in ancient greek as in modern english. we can sympathize with socrates, then, when he replies, “it would take a analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 31 divination to figure out what you mean [diotima], i can’t” (206b). so, once again, socrates’ instructor in the art of love comes to the rescue, but this time with an even more outlandish story of how we are all pregnant, both in body and in soul. pregnancy, it seems, is not, as we had always thought, the consequence of lovers’ union; rather, it is the cause of it. “pregnancy, reproduction,” she explains, “– this is an immortal thing for a mortal animal to do, and it cannot occur in anything that is out of harmony,” (206c). but “ugliness is out of harmony with all that is godly” (206d). hence the work of eros is to draw lovers towards beauty, towards that which “is in harmony with the divine” (206d). she next further astonishes her student when she adds, “you see socrates . . . what love wants is not beauty, as you think it is.” hadn’t she, after all, said precisely this only a moment before? (206a). so, in what i hear as a tone of exasperation, socrates demands, “well, what is it then?” diotima’s answer: “reproduction and birth in beauty” (206e). the transition is now evident. love has been expanded from a desire to possess to the seemingly quite different need to reproduce. no longer merely an acquisitive urge, love is also a generative, creative one. and what is it that links these two sides of love? the answer, clearly, is the addition of the word “forever” to the original formula – love not merely seeks to possess the good, it seeks to possess it forever. the reading of symposium that i wish to propose is that, abstractly, the good/beautiful is the object of love. but concretely, the way love manifests itself in our lives and in our relationships, can also be through the medium of reproduction, through “giving birth in beauty.” thus, we love not merely to gain the beauty lacking in ourselves (and possessed by the beloved), we love as well to create beauty and goodness in and with the beloved. if so, platonic eros is not reducible to an acquisitive urge for something the lover lacks. it can arise from the lover’s abundance and the need to give birth from that bounty. was not eros himself the child of both poverty and plenty? the question to which i would now like to turn is, how does this generative side of love, this “giving birth in beauty,” play out in interpersonal relationships? fortunately, the symposium provides some hints of the answer. let it first be granted, however, that plato’s primary objective was not to present a theory of interpersonal love; his main concern was with love of the absolute. but let us also remember that, for plato, the particular not only imitates the idea; it participates in it. this being so, the individual and the universal cannot be severed from one another. while the universal transcends the particular, through the medium of participation, it is also immanent within it. loving another human being, then, at least one who is lower than oneself on the platonic scale of values, is a matter of awakening in the beloved a deeper apprehension of the good/beautiful. it is on this matter of the love of persons that the speech of alcibiades is especially instructive. plato presents his theory of love in its abstract, conceptual form in the speech of socrates. then, he has alcibiades concretize that same theory by showing us how eros might play out in a particular human relationship. alcibiades, you will recall, arrived late at agathon’s symposion quite intoxicated, after all the others had spoken. when offered, he declines the opportunity to present his own speech in praise of eros, not only because of his drunken condition, but also on the grounds that praising anyone in the presence of socrates, even a god, would throw the philosopher into a jealous rage. so eryximachus suggests that he offer instead an encomium to socrates. at first, socrates opposes this idea, thinking that alcibiades intends to make fun of him. but when alcibiades swears to tell the truth, the philosopher responds by saying that he would very much like to hear truth analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 32 from the young man (214e). however, before launching into his encomium, alcibiades challenges socrates to interrupt him if he deviates from the truth at any point in his account, a challenge twice repeated in the course of the speech (217b & 219c). the fact that alcibiades never is interrupted suggests that plato intends that we should regard what follows as an authentic account of what transpired between student and teacher.5 in the course of his speech, alcibiades describes in detail his repeated attempts to seduce the older man, who, in usual form, has been flirting with the handsome youth for some time, much as we see him do with many bright young men throughout the dialogues. convinced of socrates erotic interest, but thinking him too shy to take the initiative, alcibiades provides him with increasingly obvious opportunities to express his love in the manner the younger man thinks appropriate. when socrates fails to take advantage of these opportunities, the future general takes matters into his own hands. he invites the philosopher to dinner, holds him in conversation until late in the evening, and then suggests that, in view of the weather and lateness of the hour, socrates crash at his pad for the evening. here is the climax (or should we say anti-climax) of the scene: the lights were out; the slaves had left; the time was right, i thought, to come to the point and tell him freely what i had in mind. so i shook him and whispered: “socrates, are you asleep?” “no, no, not at all,” he replied. “you know what i’ve been thinking.” “well, not really.” “i think,” i said, “you’re the only worthy lover i have ever had – and yet, look how shy you are with me! well, here’s how i look at it. it would be really stupid not to give you anything you want: you can have me, my belongings, anything my friends might have. nothing is more important to me than becoming the best man i can be, and no one can help me more than you to reach that aim . . . .” he heard me out, and then he said in that absolutely inimitable ironic manner of his: “dear alcibiades, if you are right in what you say about me, you are already more accomplished than you think. if i really have in me the power to make you a better man, then you can see in me a beauty that is really beyond description and makes your own remarkable good looks pale in comparison. but, then, is this a fair exchange that you propose? you seem to me to want more than your proper share; you offer me the merest appearance of beauty, and in return you want the thing itself, ‘gold in exchange for bronze.’ still, my dear boy, you should think twice, because you could be wrong, and i may be of no use to you. . . . when i heard this i replied: “i really have nothing more to say. i’ve told you exactly what i think. now it’s your turn to consider what you think best for you and me.” (218c-219b) not grasping the meaning of socrates’ response, and thinking that his frank words have “finally hit their mark” (219b), alcibiades crawls under socrates’ cloak and spends the night embracing his extraordinary lover. alas, as he confesses years later to his fellow drinkers, “my night with socrates went no further than if i had spent it with my own father or older brother!”(219 d). the question that begs to be asked regarding this episode is why socrates engages in such peculiar behavior – flattering the young men he meets, telling them how beautiful and brilliant they are, how irresistible he finds them, and then, apparently, never following through in the manner expected of an erotic lover? this question can best be answered by considering another: what would the message be if socrates did give sexual expression to his love for the young men of athens? once asked, the answer is obvious: he would be telling them that gold can, indeed, be exchanged for bronze, thereby fixating the young men’s erotic development at step one or two on the ladder of love. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 33 socrates does genuinely love the promising young men of athens, but not because they possess something he lacks and wants to possess. occupying a place on love’s ladder well above that of any of the young men he professes to desire, he has quite a different goal. after awakening their eros in the most obvious of ways, he holds them spellbound in conversation by means of which he strives to redirect their eros to higher and higher levels on what will later be called the great chain of being.6 socrates is playing his familiar role of midwife here, but in this context he does so by assisting in the “birth in beauty,” helping the student grow in his knowledge of the good and in a fuller realization of it in his life. alcibiades is sincere in wanting to be a better man, but in his vanity and moral immaturity, and especially his inability to resist the adulation of the crowd (216b), he has little grasp of what that might involve. had he understood, he would not have seen socrates’ rejection as an expression of hopeless arrogance and unbelievable insolence (219c). recall that when socrates first entered agathon’s house, the poet invited the philosopher to lie next to him so he might touch him and be filled with the wisdom just acquired on the neighbor’s porch (175d). like agathon, alcibiades too thinks that wisdom can be acquired through bodily contact. the eros that socrates has for alcibiades is not merely the interpersonal love symbolized by pausanias’ urania aphrodite – a love directed towards the mind rather than the body – it is a more disinterested and otherregarding love. he loves alcibiades not as a means to his own assent to the good – that is already well underway, if not fully realized – but to awaken in his student the desire and motivation for that same assent. one who has attained the good, to the degree that plato’s socrates has, relates to others in an essentially non-acquisitive way. bodhisattva like, he strives to assist others in their attainment. those who see plato’s vision of love as egocentric generally make two errors. first, they make the mistake of supposing that desire is inherently egocentric. from the fact that a desire is located within an agent, they seem to make the unwarranted inference that it must be for that agent. as one such critic pointedly remarks, “desire is always acquisitive.”7 but there is nothing contradictory, or even unusual, in individual a having a desire for the well-being of individual b, as aristotle’s analysis of true or perfect friendship attests.8 the second error consists in neglecting to notice that the desire to possess the good, to the extent that it is realized, renders the lover herself good. and good agents, even greek ones, are not wholly self-interested. moreover, individual a’s possession of the good takes nothing whatever away from b’s doing likewise. unlike objects of desire such as property or wealth, the good is not diminished by any individual’s “possession” of it. the opposite may well be the case: your attainment of the good may aid my similarly directed efforts. the second criticism of the platonic theory of love, that plato does not understand interpersonal love, has more merit – more merit, that is, if we were expecting to find there an anticipation of the modern ideal of interpersonal love as being a response to the unique individuality of the beloved. plato, as far as we can tell, held no such ideal. yet, as we have seen, socrates certainly does not love alcibiades merely as a means to an end. he sees clearly who the younger man is, sees both his remarkable strengths and weaknesses.9 finally, in trying to assist alcibiades in his wish to become a better man, he does not impose anything upon him against his will. he simply serves as midwife to alcibiades higher potential (which, alas, is never realized). to the critics’ continued protest that socrates does not value alcibiades for being just the unique individual he is, we might respond by observing that socrates does not have the ambition of establishing an intimate analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 34 relationship with him. rather, he loves the youth as a devoted teacher loves a gifted pupil. a common pitfall of such teacher to student love is that the former seeks to impress the latter with his greater knowledge and skill, placing this objective above that of contributing to the well-being of the student. when this happens, the otherregarding nature of the love is corrupted, and the pedagogical efficacy of the lesson diminished. let us note in conclusion that alcibiades’ drunken confession actually provides us with two different models of how persons may be loved – as reflections of a transcendent goodness (alcibiades’ love for socrates) and for the beloved’s potential to evolve to a fuller realization of that goodness (socrates’ love for alcibiades). although not exhausting the possibilities of interpersonal love, both are credible and coherent forms of that love, even if neither offers all that a modern reader might want in an account of the love of persons. we can be sure, though, that with the latter of these two ways of loving a person – the generative rather than acquisitive – the beloved is not loved merely as a means to an end or as an instantiation of some good the lover lacks. endnotes 1 as far as we can tell, in symposium plato uses “good” and “beautiful” as alternative names for the same reality. 2 anders nygren, eros and agape, p. 176. irving singer makes much the same point in the nature of love, vol. 1, plato to luther, p. 54 & 86. 3 singer, op. cit., p. 84-6 4 gregory vlastos, “the individual as an object of love in plato,” p. 26-32 5 this is true at least of the literary characters in plato’s dialogue, but perhaps of the historical socrates and alcibiades as well. if the latter, plato is once again defending his teacher from the charges brought against him in 399 bce. 6 arthur o. lovejoy, the great chain of being: a study of the history of an idea. 7 singer, op. cit., p. 86. 8 nicomachean ethics, book viii, 1156b, 9-12. 9 perhaps if his countrymen had seen as clearly, the peloponnesian war would have had a different outcome. references aristotle. nicomachean ethics. translated with an introduction and notes, by martin ostwald. the library of liberal arts, 1962 blakeley, donald n. the interpersonal aspects of eros in plato’s “symposium.” university microfilms intentional, 1984. (submitted in partial fulfillment for the degree of doctor of philosophy, university of hawaii, 1978.) ferrari, g.r.f. “platonic love.” in the cambridge companion to plato. edited by richard kraut, p. 248-76. cambridge university press, 1992. lovejoy, arthur o. the great chain of being: a study of the history of an idea. harvard university press, 1936. nussbaum, martha. “the speech of alcibiades: a reading of plato’s symposium. in nussbaum, the fragility of goodness: luck and ethics in greek tragedy and philosophy. updated edition, p.165-99. cambridge university press, 2001. -------“love and the individual: romantic rightness and platonic aspiration.” in love analyzed, edited by roger e. lamb, p. 1-22. westview press, 1997. nygren, anders. agape and eros. translated by philip s. watson. university of chicago press, 1982. plato. symposium. translated by nehamas & woodruff. hackett, 1989. singer, irving. the idea of love, vol.1, plato to luther. second edition. university of chicago press,1984. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 35 vlastos, gregory. “the individual as an object of love in plato.” in vlastos, platonic studies. second edition, p. 337. princeton university press, 1981. address correspondences to: rolf johnson, emeritus professor of philosophy western connecticut state university rolfj@mac.com analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 37 philosophy and the faces of abstract mathematics daniel fisherman s everal years ago, while teaching middle and high school mathematics at a small progressive school in upstate new york, i was asked to evaluate and reconceptualize the school’s approach to teaching mathematics. from its inception in the early 1960s, the school had prided itself on its progressive ideals. it was child-centered, committed to both project-based learning and to the social and emotional development of children, and a place where independent and critical thinking was highly valued. yet, it was clear that our mathematics program was not delivering results in line with our expectations. academically, our students were not low achievers. yet, to our dismay, very few of our middle and high school students actually liked their mathematics studies. in writing up my observations of student attitudes, i offered what i termed the “students’ six truths of mathematics”: 1. math is boring. 2. math is useless. 3. math is about getting the answer. 4. math is about memorizing the rules. 5. math fries my brain. 6. math proves that i’m stupid. these statements were not conjectures or inferences based on body language, performance, or general impressions. rather, since i was fortunate enough to work in an environment where students were encouraged to freely express their feelings about their school experiences, these were statements that i often heard in class. and they were quite an indictment of my teaching as well as those teaching the lower grades. needless to say, what ensued involved serious soul-searching and attempts at extensive change. while this experience with negative attitudes toward mathematics involved a relatively small number of students, substantial empirical data suggests that similar attitudes are widespread, particularly as students move through high school (middleton & spanias, 1999; national center for education statistics, 2001). quite disturbing is the finding that students with the highest educational aspirations maintain the most negative attitudes (wilkins & ma, 2003). as noted by middleton and spanias, “the problem is considered important enough for the national council of teachers of mathematics (nctm) to place the motivational domains learning to value mathematics and becoming confident in one’s own ability as two of its foremost goals for students” (1999, p. 65). clearly, the issue has received significant attention. unfortunately, mainstream proposals to improve attitudes toward mathematics learning are often too quick to stress the intractability of student disposition and motivation. a case in point is the high profile foundations for success: the final report of the national mathematics advisory panel (nmap, 2008). the nmap report offers dozens of empirically based recommendations for improving mathematics learning. foremost among them is the suggestion of the task group on learning processes to focus on influencing student goals and beliefs about analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 38 learning. this manifests in vague recommendations to change the “educational environment” to help children adopt “mastery goals” and learn to value effort over ability. while there is brief mention about offering more diverse, meaningful, and challenging tasks, there is little elaboration of what would constitute such tasks in the upper grades. indeed, the task group concludes with a curious qualification to the possibility of significantly changing attitudes. they state: intrinsic motivation declines across grades, especially in mathematics and the sciences, as material becomes increasingly complex and as instructional formats change. the complexity of the material being learned reflects demands of a modern workforce that may not be fully reconcilable with intrinsic motivation. at the same time, correlational evidence suggests that the education environment can influence students’ intrinsic motivation to learn in later grades. (pp. 4-17, emphasis is mine) clearly, though the task group expects that some of its recommendations hold promise for improving student motivation, it simultaneously puts a damper on expectations. specifically, the statement suggests that the complexity of the subject matter itself does not inspire a desire to learn. educators can both tweak the curriculum and enlighten students to the impact of effort on learning, but in the end, abstract mathematics – the mathematics of the college preparatory sequence – is not really all that interesting. rather, the task group statement reinforces what many educators and parents believe – that high school mathematics is, at its core, a required credential for higher education or a needed skill for the job market (roschelle, et al., 2008). i refuse to buy into such a view, and find the speculative nature of the italicized portion of the task group statement particularly distressing. instead of exploring the possibility that the problem rests with mathematics pedagogy, the task group recommends that we ask students to expend additional effort on tasks that they find inherently distasteful, offering the promise of higher grades and future economic benefit. this prompts the question why students should put out that effort, why college prep mathematics is worthy of a mastery goal. while i agree that much of the college prep math sequence is difficult to master, i do not believe that the subject matter forms the crux of the problem. rather, as the six truths suggest, the issue is one of perceived meaning. that is, students perceive the study of abstract mathematics to be meaningless, unconnected to the world, and of little personal relevance. this is not to say that students do not know, or are not shown, how mathematics connects to all sorts of domains. rather, students do not feel the import of such knowledge. they cannot conceptualize how binomial factoring and quadratic equations translate to the world and their lives. they cannot bridge the gap between their experience with mathematics, and what they have been told about its place in the world. in short, unlike other arts and sciences, they perceive abstract mathematics as sitting in a void. under such conditions, it is no wonder that students lack the intrinsic motivation to engage the domain. if this is indeed the case, we ought to focus on providing meaningful mathematical experiences to high school students. as such, we need to connect this abstract and seemingly insular activity to the world of the student. thus, in the remainder of this paper, i would like to do two things. first, i want to substantiate the claim that meaningful experience is causally tied to action. to this end, i will present and analyze hubert dreyfus and sean kelly’s theory of “shining,” a theory of action that postulates a causal path from meaningful experience to intrinsic motivation, and finally to “care-ful” or “effort-ful” action – precisely the path that would address the problem of motivation in high school mathematics. second, i shall argue that engaging students in philosophical issues related to mathematics connects abstract mathematics to the world, helping students feel the relevance of the domain. taken together, these claims suggest that philosophical engagement with mathematics can help students develop a more positive attitude toward the college prep math sequence. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 38 39 shining in their surprising best-seller, all things shining, hubert dreyfus and sean kelly (2011) address the existential dilemma of meaningful action in a secular world. specifically, they attempt to show that contemporary nihilism can be avoided by abandoning the belief in autonomous action. the book describes the evolution of the conditions for contemporary nihilism through a reading of various classic western texts beginning with homer’s odyssey and ending with moby dick. as the argument goes, the polytheism of the homeric greeks entailed a conception of self deeply integrated in, and influenced by, the external world, one lacking private experience and individual intent. as such, individuals saw themselves as acting according to the will of the gods, not fully in control of their own behavior. dreyfus & kelly then proceed to describe the subsequent history of western culture as the development of a “private” self, a history that culminates in the glorification of autonomy. this conception posed little problem to an understanding of meaningful action as long as there existed belief in a deity that provided external justification and criteria for action. however, in the absence of such a belief, reason for action vanished, leaving the now sole author of action – the individual – with the predicament of finding reasons to act. to dreyfus & kelly, existential crisis brought about by perceived meaninglessness of action is not the byproduct of a god-less world. rather, the problem can be attributed to the cartesian and kantian belief in an autonomous self. for the existential requirement that meaningful action demands external reason is wholly antithetical to the belief that human excellence requires action free from external influence. as dreyfus and kelly summarize the kantian position, “nothing outside of us – no god or other force, no impulse, no revered text, no parental demand, custom, or state decree – can be that upon which we base our actions when we are acting at our best” (p.141). thus, if we are to satisfy the existential requirement, we must abandon the kantian position and return to a homeric notion of self where the cause of action is, in some significant sense, external to the actor. stated differently, the possibility of a life perceived as meaningful demands that we value the call to action instead of the decision to act. for dreyfus & kelly, understanding experience as a call to action is a matter of acknowledging and appreciating the triangulated relationship between experience, action, and care that fundamentally characterizes human interaction with the world. this relationship undergirds the notion of “shining” the phenomenological quality of meaningful experience. according to dreyfus & kelly, experience in a particular domain has the potential to inspire care for that domain. care, in turn, causes domain-specific engagement, which itself results in additional experience capable of reiterating the cycle. such involvement is inherently meaningful, as the causal path from experience to care is not a matter of personal decision. rather, it is the result of phenomenological experience, an experience that “happens” to you, independent of any conscious act or decision. this is the experience of shining. as a perceptual characteristic, shining describes a quality of experience that inspires care, as when a child brought to her first baseball game becomes an immediate and devoted fan of a perennially bad team. in this case, some aspect of the child’s experience shines in a way that it does not for an individual for whom the game was “just a game.” when and for whom things shine, though, is not prescribed – again, shining is not about consciously deciding to like something. rather, it requires an openness to “being taken” by an experience, to forgo an explicit decision not to care. as dreyfus & kelly explain, “there are a wide variety of domains worth caring about and there are no objective, contextindependent principles for determining which domains these are. you just have to try it out and see” (p.219). consider the implications of this last statement. when we try something out for the purpose of seeing, we engage in action in order to be affected in some way – to see if we like it, dislike it, find it boring, meaningful, interesting, distasteful, etc. we may act, but such action is followed by our response to the results of action. and if that response motivates us to engage, we simply cannot attribute ourselves as the source of our actions. ipso facto, our actions are meaningful, as they are elicited by something other than us. indeed, we may say that phenomenologically meaningful experience calls us to act in a manner similar to the call of a deity. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 40 while the causal sequence from meaningful, shining experience to action seems somewhat intuitive, the reverse flow, from action to shining appears rather weak at first glance. for i can think of all sorts of actions that do not make my world shine – doing taxes, driving in traffic, booking a plane ticket online. indeed, dreyfus & kelly imply the fragility of this link when they state that “whether a domain is worth caring about is determined by whether it appropriately elicits further and further meaningful involvement with it” (p.219). in other words, once active engagement in a domain – e.g. computer programming – ceases to lead to meaningful experiences we should look for other domains – perhaps playing the oboe – to care about. certainly, this implies the possibility of a break in the cycle such that experience does not respond to action by shining. thus, unlike the sequence from shining experience to action, the reverse relationship seems transient, contingent, and uncertain. yet, caring action does maintain some effect on our experience. to explain this effect, dreyfus & kelly invoke the concept of poiesis, the process of discovering phenomenologically meaningful distinctions in the world through the nurturing of skill. while we often view skill building as repetitive, mindless action, dreyfus & kelly offer a less caricatured description of the activity, one where “learning a skill is learning to see the world differently” (p.207). thus, as the carpenter and surgeon hone their craft, they gain perceptual capabilities that enable them to discriminate progressively finer aspects of their domain. such differences in perception elicit and direct subsequent action. the chess master is instantly capable of seeing the best move to take. the professional quarterback immediately sees the intent of the defense in its pre-snap formation and knows where to throw the ball. the mathematician sees the likely avenues to a solution. all these happen, as wittgenstein (2001) says, “at a glance,” without conscious deliberation. instead, action becomes a product of perception, of how the world appears. in this way, skill building causes the world to illuminate the appropriate path of action – that is, poietic action causes the world to shine. given that shining elicits and directs future action, such experience is, by definition, meaningful. shining in education the shining of a domain establishes a virtuous cycle where the triangulated relation among care, poietic action, and meaningful experience is, to some degree, self-perpetuating. though it seems clear that the cycle is particularly vulnerable at the point where action elicits meaningful experience, poietic action that discloses the world in ever-finer detail often provides the reinforcement necessary to maintain iterations of the sequence – meaningful experience leads to care, care to action, and action to more meaningful experience. i would argue that as parents and educators, our views about educating children often imply belief in just such a cycle. when we bring our children to piano lessons and dance classes, our hope is that our children discover a domain that resonates with them. we hope that even the ambivalent efforts they put forth when first challenged to get a sound out of a clarinet, pirouette, or hold one’s breath underwater, will lead to experiences that elicit care for that domain, experiences that they will perceive as intrinsically worthwhile. and we expect that once they have these experiences, they will be motivated to continue to actively engage that domain. on the other hand, if the time comes when experiences stop being perceived as meaningful, either at the start of engagement or years later, we usually realize that it is time for them to move on. as dreyfus & kelly state, “one must be prepared... to regret having been drawn into such a world and to allow oneself to be drawn to a more rich and meaningful one” (p. 219). so when a child is not motivated to catch a fly ball or play piano scales, we often look for, or encourage them to suggest, other activities that might elicit their engagement. of course, this is not always the case. there are parents who, for any number of reasons, do not relent in the face of statements such as “i hate piano,” and “swimming is boring.” perhaps they believe that their children simply need more time in the domain before they can experience it as meaningful. or they feel that the skills and experiences are important even when perceived as meaningless. certainly, the latter rings true when it comes to formal education where both parents and educators rarely speak of “moving on” in the absence of care or meaningful experience. this presents an issue with the dreyfus & kelly model, for it seems analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 40 41 to imply that we have no choice but to endure meaningless experience when moving on is not an option. this is precisely the place where the nmap task group ends up when they claim that the subject matter of abstract mathematics “may not be fully reconcilable with intrinsic motivation” (p. 4-17). and as i stated earlier, it is precisely the attitude that i refuse to accept. the question then becomes what to do in the absence of shining. the answer to this question points to a weakness in the dreyfus & kelly model, for the model ignores the multitude and variety of types of engagement with a domain. it assumes that when i first started drum lessons at age nine, my experience reading quarter note patterns from a primer and playing them on a drum pad was the experience of drumming instead of simply an experience of drumming. it assumes that the experience of following the rules for solving first and second degree algebraic equations is what algebra is about. certainly, in both cases, the activity is part of what constitutes domain-specific engagement. however, domains wear many faces, and while one face of a domain may not elicit shining, another face may. it so happened that i enjoyed playing simple drum music on a pad. yet had i not, i may have been drawn in by being taught to play a rock beat on full drum set, or being allowed to bang willy-nilly to my heart’s content. as dreyfus & kelly state, you just have to try it out and see. but what you are trying out is rarely a monolithic endeavor. rather, it is comprised of numerous facets, a subset of which is presented in any particular interaction. this is particularly relevant when it comes to education, where a host of factors determines the domain face presented to students. trying it out also implies that domain-specific engagement is unmediated, a relation solely between the domain and the individual. however, i would argue that initial engagement with a domain is rarely unmediated, that the face of a domain is almost always presented by someone or something – teachers, parents, and peers as well as books, television, and other cultural elements. thus, in the domain of mathematics, consider the general finding, reported by roschelle et al. (2008), that despite spending comparable time in teacher training: american teachers typically focus on procedures, and their knowledge is generally rulebound and fragmented. chinese teachers demonstrate both algorithmic competence and conceptual understanding, and accordingly, their knowledge is typically more conceptual and interconnected. (p. 614) if this is, indeed, the case, we can only wonder at the difference between the mathematics experiences of chinese and american students. similarly, wilkins & ma report that high school attitudes toward mathematics are directly affected by their teachers, noting that “if teachers choose activities that portray mathematics as static, boring, and unchallenging, students may view the subject as unimportant, and they may not perceive the usefulness of it” (2003, p. 61). again, we are presented an example where presentation affects experience, perhaps to the point of determining whether a domain shines or not. in both cases, i am reminded of the six truths i mentioned earlier, and their relationship to meaningful experience in mathematics. that we engage domains through mediated faces suggests an answer to the question of what to do when an individual is not allowed to move on from a domain that does not shine – simply present different faces. of course, there will be some individuals for whom all possible faces fail to cause the domain to shine, but i find it surprising, to say that the least, that the nmap task group could so readily suppose that all faces of abstract mathematics would generally fail to illuminate. indeed, that seems to be the upshot of the task group statement. roschelle et al. direct a similar criticism to the task group when they state that “there are many possible learning progressions into, through, and beyond algebra that can be equally mathematically rigorous….some could offer students much more profound learning experiences, opening their eyes to the power and beauty of mathematics” (2008, p. 613). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 42 philosophy and the faces of abstract mathematics the effect of face is uniquely influential in the domain of school mathematics. to see why, consider the following interchange in a philosophy for children class involving ten eight-to-ten-year-olds on the subject of mindreading : adrian: if you study math and science really hard for a long time, you can then put the two together to figure out a way to be better at it [i.e. mindreading]. shawn: i don’t see how that can help you read minds any better. well, maybe science, but not math. (at this point, there is mumbling and gesturing that indicates general agreement with shawn’s claim.) me: why do you say science, but not math? shawn: well, science can tell us about things, about what’s going on inside our bodies. but math doesn’t. me: doesn’t what? shawn: tell us about our bodies. adrian: but math is science. they’re almost the same. when einstein built a nuclear bomb, he used both math and science to make the explosion. randy: i don’t see the point. what does a nuclear bomb have to do with mind reading? in this dialogue, shawn expresses what seems to be the general position of the group: while science can tell you about complex aspects of the world – in this case, mindreading – mathematics cannot. rather, mathematics sits in a void as a domain unto itself. while these are primary school children speaking, i suspect that such an attitude is even more widespread among high school students with regard to subjects in the college prep math sequence. certainly, both the complexity and abstract nature of the material would suggest additional challenges to helping students relate topics such as natural logarithms and exponential arithmetic to the world. wilkins and ma’s findings back this up, as they report a “substantial negative change in students’ attitudes toward and beliefs about the social importance of mathematics throughout secondary school” (2003, p. 52). as adrian’s response illustrates, though, there are children that see mathematics as deeply embedded in the world. to these children, the perception of mathematics is different. their engagement with the domain is infused with a pre-reflective understanding of its utility, its power, and often, its beauty. it is no wonder, then, that for children like adrian the domain shines. this is not to say that such a face is required for mathematics to shine. rather, math is simply more likely to shine when it is seen as embedded and relevant, as opposed to being situated by itself. as mathematics educators seeking to foster intrinsic motivation to study abstract mathematics in an environment where leaving the domain is not a possibility, it would seem to be our obligation to present a face of mathematics that displays its connection to the world, particularly when dealing with abstract topics such as polynomial arithmetic and congruence. this presents a catch-22, though, as an important purpose of engaging these topics involves learning to think abstractly. thus, attempts to reify the subject matter, to teach abstract mathematics using, for example, a project-based curriculum, could be seen as antithetical to the purpose of engaging abstract mathematics in the first place. put simply, abstract mathematics needs to be taught abstractly or we are not teaching abstract thinking. i have a particular sympathy for this line of thought. indeed, students may learn about the pythagorean theorem through its application in a construction project. however, to the degree that we focus on the practical use of the theorem, we ignore what i see as a fundamental purpose of learning geometry – to gain an understanding of, and appreciation for, the nature of deductive systems, where assertions can be accepted analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 42 43 only on the backs of previously derived propositions, accepted axioms, and definitions. central to such a goal is intimate and extended work with proof analysis and construction, activities that are inherently abstract. the same can be said about learning algebra, where a major goal of teaching the subject concerns gaining conceptual fluidity with arithmetic abstraction. approaching the subject matter by attending to its practical application, though, would require abandoning extensive engagement with the placeholder variables – the x’s and y’s – that constitute the essence of such abstraction. no doubt, much of the practical application of algebra is more than one degree separated from learning the material, as basic algebraic skills are generally useful as tools for solving problems encountered in higher level mathematics, engineering, and science. thus, for the large majority of students who expect to have no need for such skills, questions about personal utility are legitimate. for these students, mathematics pedagogy must help them perceive the present value of engaging the domain. this is precisely where engagement with philosophical discussions can play an important role. unlike efforts to embed high school mathematics in a practical milieu, philosophical engagement with the nature of mathematics offers the possibility of connecting mathematics to the world without potentially compromising the abstract nature of its study. it displays a face of mathematics that strict engagement with abstract topics fails to present. epistemological and ontological questions such as “is mathematics an invention or discovery?” allow students to address the relation of mathematics to material reality – whether math is a model that we use to understand the world or if it is somehow embedded in it. other questions suggest additional types of connections. we might ask if mathematics factors into our conception of what it means to be a person, or if it has the power to change our conception of self. these questions touch on issues of technology, cognition, and consciousness, which in my experience, elicit great interest among teens. we can also extend discussions to ethics by asking if we can or should use mathematics to help guide our ethical decisions. even the aesthetics of mathematics is a viable topic, as we might discuss the relevance of beauty to the domain – if, for example, one solution of a first order equation or geometric proof is more beautiful than any other. in each of these cases, we provide students the opportunity to explore the concerns of mathematics, and how those concerns relate to lived experience. take, for example, a snippet of an interchange about the ontology of geometry in a group of 9th through 12th grade students . in this case, the question that i initially posed was “is mathematics a discovery or an invention?” quinn: it’s just a model, a model of the world. amari: yes, the model is made from definitions, and we see how much we can say about them. but that doesn’t mean the definitions exist. they’re just definitions which we made up. me: so when we define a circle as the set of all points equidistant from a point, that’s just a definition. that’s what you’re saying? quinn: yes. points don’t exist – everything in the world has three dimensions and points don’t have any. alexis the definition is for a perfect circle, but things don’t have to be a perfect circle to be a circle. circles are circular. and the model works with those. quinn: just because the model works doesn’t mean we didn’t create it. and it works only approximately. alexis: but it works. quinn: i mean, circumference is πd. but if you measure something like a frisbee it’s not exactly πd. it can never be exact. alexis: but nothing is ever exact. and for something to work, it doesn’t have to be exact. amari: but that doesn’t mean it exists outside of us. this interchange formed but a small part of a multi-session discussion that touched upon several analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 44 philosophically-based mathematical issues including the nature of infinity and time. yet, i would think it evident even from this brief extract that these students were offered something that very few high school students experience. they were provided the opportunity to construct big-picture, comprehensive answers to the meta-questions of the domain – what we do when we do mathematics, why we do it, and how possible answers to these questions relate to both the first-order questions of mathematics learning and, more generally, contemporary life. this is a wholly different experience than hearing from adults about the utility of mathematics. rather than gain discreet information about its relevance to their future adult lives, students construct with their peers knowledge about what mathematics is – here and now – a knowledge that i suggest is more likely capable of transforming their perception of mathematics than any declarations of utility. in this way, we may say that philosophical engagement with mathematics has the potential to get students to feel the value of abstraction. indeed, i believe that the dialogue above had precisely this effect. to further appreciate the possibilities of participating in such discussion, consider the current perception of mathematics as disclosed by the six truths. in a worst case, mathematics is seen as getting answers by following rules. those answers sit in a void, and most students perceive the rules as facts requiring memorization instead of conclusions to logical arguments. in best case scenarios, i suspect that students learn from teachers, parents, and textbooks examples of how particular aspects of mathematics – natural logarithms, for example – are used by mathematicians, researchers, and weather forecasters. these students can probably spit back facts about the relevance and utility of mathematics. still, i take it that knowing this information does little more to make mathematics personally important than telling students that they need math skills for their future studies or careers. ultimately, it seems clear to me that helping students develop a more positive attitude towards mathematics requires more than simply imparting some rational understanding of its utility and connection to the world. rather, the goal should be a transformation of perception, where individuals pre-reflectively “see” the connection. and transformation of perception is the essence of dreyfus & kelly’s notion of shining. the shining face of a domain inspires care, and in doing so, beckons for domain-specific engagement. no doubt, the abstract nature of the college prep math sequence presents challenges to making the domain shine. as such, i have suggested that teachers need to explore the presentations of other faces of abstract mathematics, faces that can make the domain shine for the significant number of students who would turn their back on it if they could. philosophical engagement with mathematics presents just such a face. references ames, c. (1992). classrooms: goals, structures, and student motivation. journal of educational psychology, 84(3), 261-271. carpenter, t. p., corbitt, m. k., kepner, h. s., lindquist, m. m., & reys, r. e. (1981). results from the second mathematics assessment of the national assessment of educational progress. reston, va: national council of teachers of mathematics. dreyfus, h. (1988). mind over machine. new york: the free press. dreyfus, h. (1998). hubert dreyfus’ intelligence without representation. retrieved from cognitive sci ences center: http://www.class.uh.edu/cogsci/dreyfus.html dreyfus, h., & kelly, s. (2011). all things shining. new york: free press. middleton, j. a., & spanias, p. a. (1999). motivation for achievement in mathematics: findings, generali zations, and criticisms of the research. journal for research in mathematics education, 65-88. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 44 45 national center for education statistics. (n.d.). the nation’s report card: 2000 mathematics assessment results. retrieved from http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard national mathematics advisory panel. (2008). foundations for success: the final report of the national mathematics advisory panel. washington, dc: u.s. department of education. roschelle, j., singleton, c., sabelli, n., pea, r., & bransford, j. d. (2008). mathematics worth knowing, resources worth growing, research worth noting:a response to the national mathematics advisory panel report. educational researcher, 37(9), 610-617. scheffler, i. (1995). the concept of the educated person. in i. scheffler, & v. a. howard, work, education, and leadership (pp. 81-100). new york: peter lang. wilkins, j. l., & ma, x. (2003). modeling change in student attitude toward and beliefs about mathemat ics. journal of educational research, 97(1), 52-62. wittgenstein, l. (2001). philosophical investigations. malden, ma: blackwell publishing. address correspondences to: daniel fisherman, doctoral candidate montclair state university momshead@gmail.com analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 16 beyond epistemology and axiology: locating an emerging philosophy of mathematics education nataly chesky abstract this paper explores the need to move beyond epistemological and axiological discussions in philosophy of mathematics education by reframing the inquiry to include an ontological perspective. the main goal of this work is to envision a new relationship between philosophical discourse and mathematics education, one that takes into account ontological assumptions in mathematics and relates it to axiological objectives and epistemological claims. i begin with a description of the dominant view of mathematics education as depicted in u.s. policy reform discourses and contrast it with critical views of philosophy of mathematics education. i show that the deficiency of both perspectives is their lack of attention to the ontological assumptions inherent in mathematics education. lastly, i provide a preliminary sketch of a new type of philosophy of mathematics education, which brings ontological inquiry to the forefront, and i speculate on how this emerging philosophy of mathematics education might impact the field. introduction philosophy of mathematics education can be classified dichotomously based on the educational objectives that prescribe the goals mathematics education should strive towards, and the pedagogical theories that suggest effective teaching and learning strategies. we can call the former an axiological objective, since it places a normative value on educational goals, and the latter an epistemological claim, since theories on teaching and learning are always grounded on claims of how knowledge acquisition works. both the axiological and the epistemological discourses are present in the dominant views of mathematics education as depicted in national policy discourses in the u.s. as well as in the more critical views of mathematics education that are present in international scholarly venues. on the one hand, u.s. policy views of mathematics education are predominately interested in fostering strong cognitive competencies in mathematical problem solving. those that hold these views, while they pay homage to constructivist pedagogical approaches, tend to believe that mathematics education ought to emphasize content knowledge and expertise in computation for utilitarian ends, such as job skills, ensuring national economic competitiveness, and maintaining math literacy for citizenship and consumerist purposes such as filing taxes and understanding interest rates on credit cards (e.g. spillane, 2000; steen, 1997). on the other hand, critical views in philosophy of mathematics education emphasize both constructivist-learning pedagogies and the societal/cultural origins of knowledge. those who adhere to these views believe mathematics education ought to be used for raising critical consciousness in order to utilize the power of mathematical discourse to uncover social inequalities prevalent in modern day western society, which, it is believed, will inform the praxis of mathematics students and enable them to become change agents in their communities and in their personal lives (e.g. ernest, 1988; frankenstein, 1983; gutstein, 2006; skovsmose, 1994). i will argue in this paper that what is explicitly missing in both of these philosophical views of mathematics education is an ontological perspective. not only will taking ontology seriously help ameliorate the respective goals of both of these philosophies, but it will also add a new integral analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 16 17 component to each that has the potential to help shape the future direction of mathematics education in the u.s. by ontological, i am referring to the way in which mathematics and the entities/objects/processes that are utilized in its practice explain a model of the world as we have come to understand it. ontologically, we can say that an absolutist vision would be very different from a fallibilistic one in that the former would posit essential, unchangeable quantifiable objects, dimensions and relationships of the being of the world, and the latter would argue that the world is either unknowable or continuing changing and therefore immeasurable in the traditional sense. unlike epistemology and axiology, ontology has not been represented well in the discourse of philosophy of mathematics education. this, as i explain later in this paper, is unfortunate, since the link between epistemic claims about how we gain mathematical knowledge is directly related to where we believe such knowledge is located and what exactly such knowledge consists of. whether one posits a purely semiotic view of mathematics, as nominalist do, or a purely mental construct game of finite symbols, as intuitionists believe, ontological assumptions are implicit. after all, it is ontological assumptions that underlie all pedagogical theories and axiological objectives, and therefore ontology has a fundamental role to play in mathematics education discourse. this paper is separated into three parts. first, i provide greater detail on the two perspectives of philosophy of mathematics education that i mentioned above, and i explain how they might be improved by incorporating an ontological perspective. second, i delve deeper into my claim that an ontological perspective is needed in mathematics education. lastly, i theorize in what ways a philosophy of mathematics education in which the ontological dimension is recognized and explored might play a role in mathematics education in the future. the dominant perspective of mathematics education the current widespread public discourse on mathematics education dates back to at least the dissemination of a nation at risk in 1983, if not to the 1957 russian sputnik launch. this was a crucial historical moment for united states policy makers and, in turn, the public at large--the moment in which the former announced that we should be alarmed at our lack of mathematical abilities in relation to other nations.1 soon after the hysteria generated by the “report” dissipated, progressive educational approaches moved in, eager to reform traditional mathematics education. “new math” was the term given those pedagogical alternatives that sought to provide the mathematics learner with both a holistic and an abstract understanding of mathematics. this reform effort failed for conflicting reasons, and its detractors proclaimed it to be elitist, leaving a generation of mathematics students disinterested at best and antagonistic at worst toward the subject of mathematics (klein, 2003). after the perceived failure of “new math,” the pendulum swung in the opposite direction with “the back to basics movement,” which returned to a more traditional model that emphasized the learning of algorithms and procedural knowledge rather than conceptual or theoretical understanding. over the last several decades, mathematics education has increasingly taken center stage in educational policy discourse. particularly, after the 2009 pisa (program for international student assessment) results were released, which depicted united states students as mediocre in mathematics skills compared to their international counterparts, the national reform movement in mathematics intensified. most recently, the “stem” (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) policy reform initiative has taken the national stage for exemplary mathematics education reform policies. stem is not only a mathematics education reform package; it is also an interdisciplinary education policy combining science, technology, and engineering with mathematics. this is significant, since past policy reforms, driven by the need to maintain global competitiveness, concentrated on mathematics, foreign language, and science education. the differences may lie in the means believed to be needed to achieve this strengthening, as well as the deeply entrenched . analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 18 assumptions about what mathematics is and how it can be utilized. berry, ellis, & mark (2005) argue that the “reforms” in mathematics education were merely revisions since they do not qualify as elements of a true paradigm shift: they do not, that is, offer a different conception of knowledge, nor do they provide an essentially different pedagogical approach that would benefit the historically marginalized population of students that often times do not gain access to higher level mathematics knowledge. in other words, the changing axiological claims in policy reform discourses have not been significantly different since they are founded on similar, if not identical, epistemological and ontological ideas about mathematics. moreover, while reforms have emphasized different values mathematics education ought to serve such as democratic, cognitive, or utilitarian, their stance on where mathematical knowledge comes from and how best to teach it has not drastically changed. the discipline is still conceptualized according to an absolutist vision of mathematical entities--i.e. that numbers and functions exist regardless of human intervention or invention. the question for the dominant mathematics education discourses is then, how can such reforms achieve their own axiological objectives if they do not alter the way mathematics itself is taught, learned, and thought about? of course, this question does not call into doubt the rightness of the axiological claims being made, which is the primary target of critical theorists of mathematics education. however, as i explain in the next section, the critical perspective on mathematics education also remains reductive insofar as it does not situate itself within the complexity of the discourse of philosophy of mathematics as it relates to educational issues prevalent in the current u.s. political and educational climate. the critical perspective in philosophy of mathematics education many scholars oriented to critical theory (e.g. apple, 2005; atweh, 2007; giroux, 2005) have vehemently argued against recent policy practices such as no child left behind and president obama’s race to the top initiative for being ill-conceived, nondemocratic, and detrimental to the quality of our public schools. these scholars insist that mathematics education has served the elites, and subjected the working class to alienation and incomprehension. in order to address this social injustice, they have formulated two primary objectives. first, mathematics can be used to uncover such class inequalities by means of pedagogical techniques that foster inquiry into the social realities of students’ lived experience. second, mathematics itself should be exposed as a socially and culturally derived discipline that is not strictly tied to the western epistemological lineage. one type of critical philosophy of mathematics is critical mathematics education (e.g. gutstein, 2003; skovsmose, 1994), which was inspired by the work of paulo freire, who proclaimed that revolutionary leaders must also be educators. freire’s epistemology is antithetical to the western positivist paradigm since it views mathematics knowledge and education as never neutral; rather than a set of value-free objective truths, mathematics is seen as creating dichotomous power relations among different groups of people and then legitimizing these dichotomies to serve the needs of a ruling class. freire saw how “massified” consciousness is more prevalent in technological societies such as ours and is a major factor in determining the inability of subjugated people to actively engage in their own revolutionary agendas. therefore, developing critical mathematics pedagogies becomes increasingly urgent as societies become more technologically saturated. ethnomathematics (e.g. frankenstein, 1983, d’ambrosio, 2001), another critical perspective in philosophy of mathematics education, attempts to uncover the cultural foundation of mathematics by stressing that math knowledge is always generated in a historical context. ethnomathematics understands itself as a critical theory of pedagogy that attempts to resist hegemonic euro-western ideology in order to reestablish epistemological alternatives that are found in indigenous cultures. ethnomathematics certainly has much to offer, in that it broadens our cultural awareness of indigenous cultures, critiques western positivist claims on mathematics knowledge, and puts into ethical question how mathematics has historically marginalized certain groups of people. the weakness of this educational alternative is that it has little epistemological support, analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 18 19 and does not take into account inherent ontological assumptions about the nature of mathematics and how these influence cultural views on the field. katz (1999) argues that there is an epistemological incoherence in ethnomathematics, since there is historical proof that mathematical “discoveries” have arisen in separate locations--for example, the chinese and the greeks independently figured out the pythagorean theorem and pascal’s triangle. furthermore, ethnomathematics does not take into account the political and historical events that have led to the marginalization of certain forms of knowledge. for instance, teaching urban u.s. students about african villages does little to give them an understanding of how and why such villages have been colonized and continue to be places of intense human hardship. more to the point, teaching villagers in ethiopia about their own culture’s contributions to the discipline of mathematics lends little real support in their political and personal struggles to survive in a globally connected world that is dominated and controlled by a use of mathematics that tends to enforce rather than alleviate their marginalization. after all, like it or not, mathematics has a strong hold on western consciousness, and providing alternative examples is not enough to break that hold. not only is mathematics unanimously valued as a field of knowledge in our modern technological western society, it is also the cornerstone of the rationale abstract paradigm that many have argued defines our society’s current state (brubaker, 2008). hence, philosophers of mathematics education should ask themselves, in what ways does mathematics influence the society in which we live and how might they best counter or make more transparent such power? furthermore, we ought to seek out the fundamental causes of mathematical power over us. as neil postman wrote: “we must be aware not only of how to use mathematics, but also how mathematics uses us” (warnick & stemhagen, 2007, p. 304). this form of power is prevalent, not only in the way in which our capitalistic system works and our technological devices operate, but also in our rationales for educational assessment, teacher evaluation, and federal accountability legislation. but i want to suggest that by turning a critical eye on mathematics itself rather than just on its oppressive uses, math educators can assist us in changing the way in which we normatively believe the world operates, and can suggest to us what type of agency critical citizens might have in such a world. as it is, although critical mathematics pedagogies strive to empower students by enabling them to gain the tools needed to “read the world,” and thus to transform it (atweh, p. 7), we have no empirical proof that there is a causal relationship between becoming aware of social inequalities and becoming politically active in order to bring about change. one possible cause of this disconnect may be a failure to take into account, not just the epistemological but the ontological assumptions of mathematics. for example, a positivistic/empirical stance corresponds, as i have already suggested, to an ontological view that there are indeed certain entities in the world that can be described mathematically, which leads to the notion of a universal concept of number as being outside human social construction. inversely, a formalist or nominalist approach to mathematics implies a view that mathematical phenomena do not exist apart from their historical social context. positing one or the other of these two extremes in the context of democratic activism can lead to drastically different results. on the one hand, a positivist stance uses numbers without questioning their own relative relationship to one another. on the other hand, an educator with a more formalist ontological perspective highlights how quantitative data is used statistically with few questions about the efficacy of its truth claims. for example, an educator with the first view might show us numbers that “prove” that more african americans get sentenced to prison than their racial counterparts--but what does this statistic mean, and what other statistical information is needed to make more sense of it? indeed, the current standards movement in curriculum and accountability for teachers and teacher preparation programs is founded solely on a positivist ontological stance toward numbers that does not question the validity of numerical data, nor does it ask in what ways such data is variable and related to other social data that cannot be quantified. as such, these ontological assumptions do, in fact, affect our lives and our ways of perceiving the world. by making these assumptions explicit, perhaps a more complex view of mathematics might arise that can add to both the positivist and the formalist perspectives on mathematics education. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 20 the missing ontological perspective please consider the diagram below to explain the relationship between axiology, epistemology, and ontology in mathematics education. this diagram illustrates that axiological objectives in mathematics education presuppose epistemological claims as to how mathematics can be learned and thereby how it should be taught. as thom (1973) suggests, “all mathematical pedagogy, even if scarcely coherent, rests on a philosophy of mathematics” (p. 204). particularly in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, debates about the nature of numbers and the foundations of mathematics were widespread. unfortunately, very little work has been done in mapping these debates in philosophy of mathematics education. the following section attempts to give a preliminary sketch of how we might do so. as i have already suggested, there are traditionally two ways of conceptualizing the field of mathematics--absolutism and fallibilism. the former believes that mathematics has a direct link to empirical or rational truths outside the human subject, while the latter posits that all mathematical knowledge is based on cultural, social, and political forces, which are inherently flawed, evolving, and biased. absolutist theory includes realism and some forms of formalism and intuitionism. fallibilist theory includes nominalism and constructivism (ernest 2004). this simplistic dichotomy leaves much to be desired. for example, whether or not we posit an ontological status for mathematical truths or not, it is unclear how pedagogical practices might to be affected by the difference. indeed, neither seems very satisfactory given the complexity of the debates in current philosophy of mathematics discourses. each camp argues for their own view by critiquing the others or ignoring them all together. fallibilist theory ignores the paradigmatic paper published in 1960 by eugene wigner, titled “the unreasonable usefulness of mathematics,” which argues that there is an uncanny correlation between abstract mathematical formulas and the way they accurately describe natural phenomenon as experienced and understood by scientists (burbaker, 2008). by ignoring the empirical uses that mathematical abstraction continues to play in science, formalist accounts of mathematics lose credibility. on the other hand, by ignoring the existence of paradigm shifts that have led, for example, to the unanimous acceptance of the fallibility of euclidean geometry, absolutist accounts of mathematics appear stubbornly rigid and illogical. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 20 21 taking ontological assumptions into account when theorizing about ways to teach mathematics for optimal learning would not only introduce a healthy multiplicity into the field, but it would also help meet the dominant aims of mathematics education. take, for instance, a study done by chiou & anderson (2009) with undergraduate physics students, designed to assess their formative understanding of heat conduction based on mental model theory and an ontology-process analysis. the researchers found that “ontological aspects of the students’ mental representations including a student’s ontological beliefs, a definition, a presupposition about the ontological nature of things, i.e. the representational entities or elements that comprise an interpretation of phenomena” did, in fact, influence how students successfully acquire high level mathematical ideas (p 828) another researcher found that children’s mental models are, in fact, built upon the constraints of their own ontological and epistemological beliefs (brewer, 1994). brewer argues that studying children’s ontological beliefs and conceptual understanding will aid in facilitating their learning. by showing learners the structural and relational nature of mathematical concepts and entities, and laying bare the misunderstandings in their own assumptions about numbers, learners might feel more confident in their own process of learning mathematics. for young learners, this could be achieved by explaining the composite nature of numbers through an exploration of our base-ten system, and the use of a 100 chart to show the relationships between numbers. for middle school students, lessons on infinite numbers and transfinite numbers might greatly increase their understanding of mathematics early on so they do not have to wait for higher level high school mathematics, by which time most of them would either already have developed a dislike for the subject or have been excluded due to their grades. exploring ontological presuppositions are also very relevant for the critical perspective of mathematics education, which rests upon constructivist pedagogies. current constructivist pedagogies do succeed in changing the dynamics of a classroom and moving the power relations away from an authoritative teacher. this may help critical pedagogy’s axiological goal of raising the critical consciousness of math students, but without questioning the way in which western society has conceptualized mathematics and thereby utilized it to serve exploitative and arguably unjust systems and practices, critical consciousness cannot be reached. this is because mathematics itself shapes our perception of reality. fisher (2006) writes, “math is a means which we can use, and simultaneously it is a system to which we are subject” (p. 318). therefore, to gain the critical consciousness freire was advocating, we must become aware of the ways in which our society uses mathematics, and of how such usage affects our very understanding of our world and ourselves. by understanding the way in which our conception of mathematics influences the way we categorize and make sense and meaning of our world, we will be in a better position to critique and finally to change it. when we speak about democracy and access to knowledge as a social justice objective for mathematics education, what exactly are we assuming about the nature of mathematics itself and the way it ought to be used in our society? this is not only an epistemological and axiological question, but an ontological one as well. mathematics is so integral to our technologized world that is it foundational to the way we perceive the world. therefore, any philosophy of mathematics education must at the very least implicitly proclaim its ontological assumptions, argue for their value, and argue for how they are consistent with best practices. an emerging philosophy of mathematics education ernest (2004) suggested that we ought to view philosophy of mathematics education not as a single position, but as “an area of investigation” (p. 1). traditionally, philosophical research in education has focused on the practices of teaching and learning of mathematics, exploring what cognitive theories are best for mathematics learning objectives and what types of classroom organization best facilitate learning of mathematics. if we take ernest’s suggestion seriously, a new type of philosophy of mathematics education emerges--one that makes use of philosophical discourse as a reflective meta-language, which we can use to study the normative assumptions that inform the way we conceptualize mathematics, and how we put that analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 22 conceptualization into practice in the classroom. hence, this kind of philosophy of mathematics education would seek to understand how the discourses surrounding mathematics education could be understood in relation to entrenched societal values and beliefs and covert assumptions about how the world ought to operate and what functions humans play in such a world. a new research agenda emerges from this as well—one that takes into account the complexity of the discourse and is equipped to analyze it through a philosophical lens. by examining the ontological and epistemological assumptions embedded in policy discourse about mathematics education, we can better assess if they are coherent with our axiological aims. for this new attention to our implicit philosophical assumptions to be of use to classroom teachers, who are daily striving to help their students learn actual mathematics—and driven as they are by seemingly entrenched policy mandates—we must begin with the basic existential premise that mathematics, both as a discourse and as a set of concrete practices, frames our perceptions about the world. these perceptions then affect how we view political ideologies, educational practices, attitudes and beliefs about assessment, theories about how our minds learn, the status of economic pursuits as means to happiness, and relationships within and between our communities, both locally and globally. the emerging philosophy of mathematics, as it is sketched here, allows us to see the significance of mathematics as a societal knowledge system, and thereby grasp its crucial importance as an educational subject in a more complex way than either the critical theorist or the positivist policy makers can, given their inattention to the implicit beliefs that drive their practice. conclusion privileged voices in the conversation about mathematics education tend to claim, either explicitly or implicitly, that traditional learning can be enhanced through cognitive science advances and that better education in mathematics can solve all of society’s ills and maintain “the american way of life.” less privileged critical theorists would claim that this view of mathematics is in fact the cause of society’s ills, and that by either overthrowing it or by utilizing its power to harness counter-resistance, society can begin the project of self-reorganization in the image of justice, equity, and authentic democracy. both of these polemical discourses are implicitly hegemonic, in that they both attempt to garner leadership and power in order to influence the cultural and political dimensions of society (nielsen, 2003). the addition of a third dimension based on philosophical dialogue may or may not alleviate the tension between two sides of a simplistic ideological framework, but i do believe the added complexity of “thirdness” allows for a strong research agenda to emerge. in addition, identifying the ontological convictions associated with each allows for a more detailed deconstruction of the policy texts issued by either side, and sets the stage for new pedagogical theories for mathematics education to emerge. by way of conclusion, i would like to briefly review my overarching argument. first, mathematics education reform has historically been flawed, since it has consistently failed to fully understand the philosophical assumptions and theoretical components that inform its own framework. due to these incoherencies within policy reform efforts, both among the dominant cognitive-objectives school for mathematics education and in critical theory’s political objectives, neither axiological objective has come to fruition. in order to create a more cogent set of practices in mathematics education, and to foster not only strong cognitive levels of mathematics understanding in the public school system, but also a potential for praxis to change the world in which mathematics is so pervasive, a pedagogical domain of ontological inquiry needs to be introduced. i wonder not only whether we are teaching mathematics in the wrong way and for the wrong reasons, but also whether this is indicative of the values and assumptions that our society holds about reality and the way in which it functions. this question is, i believe, an important one, since mathematics is so central to our western rationalistic paradigm. critical perspectives on mathematics education have been too focused on alternative options, without really looking into the fundamental causes that have shaped our current educational system analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 22 23 and our society at large. inversely, dominant perspectives of mathematics education have been reductive and exploitative, serving economic agendas that benefit only a small minority of citizens. as a university faculty member in an elementary education department, i am often asked why i focus on mathematics education--surely there are other subjects that are more relevant to both public school and wider social reform efforts. why mathematics of all subjects? my answer to this question is based on the belief that our prejudicial preference for quantification and abstract rational thinking has led to many divisive consequences, both in educational practices and in societal normative values. after all, we can quantify the size of our wallet but not our capacity to love. if we valued our relationships rather than our bank accounts, and our environments rather than our warehouses, the world in which we live might be a very different place. and it is our ontological assumptions about mathematics that influence these values and beliefs. optimistically, i believe that a reconstruction of the subject of mathematics might help take us out of the socially unjust, environmentally devastated world that we have created, for the very reason that it stands at the center of our current knowledge paradigm and is therefore, at least indirectly, responsible for the current state of our society. simply, i believe that by changing how we think about teaching this beautiful subject, we may have the capacity to change much more. endnotes 1. for a complete historical overview of reform movements in the u.s. see (woodward, 2004). references apple, m. w. (2003). competition, knowledge, and the loss of educatioinal vision. philosophy of music education review , 11 (1), 3-23. atweh, b. (2007). pedagogy and socially response-able mathematics education. australian association of research in education (pp. 1-14). fermantle, west australia: curtin university technology. u.s. house. 110th congress, 1nd session. h.r. 2272, america competes act of 2007-09. retrieved from http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr2272/text berry, r. q. iii & ellis, mary w. (2005). the paradigm shift in mathematics education: explanations and implications of reforming conceptions of teaching and learning. the mathematics educator, 15 (1), 7-17. burbaker, a. (2008). between metaphysics & method: mathematics and the two canons of theory. new literary history, 30(4), 869-890. chiou, g. l. & anderson, o. r. (2009). a study of undergrad physics students’ understanding of heat conduction based on mental model theory and an ontology-process analysis. wiley periodical, inc. retrieved from http://www.wileyonlinelibracy.com. cobb, et. al. (1992). a constructivist alternative to the representatinal view of mind in mathematics education. journal of research in mathematics education, 23(1), 2-33. d’ambrosio, u. (2001). mathematics and peace; a reflection on the basic of western civilization. leonardo, 34(4), 327-332. de freitas, e. (2004). plotting intersections along the political axis: the interior voice of dissenting mathematics teachers. educational studies in mathematics, 55(259-274). ernest, p. (1988). forms of knowledge in mathematics and mathematics education: philosophical and rhetorical perspectives. educational studies in mathematics, 38, 67-83. ernest, p. (2004). what is the philosophy of mathematics education? contribution for dg 4. frankenstein, m. (1983). critical mathematics education: an application of paulo preire’s epistemology. journal of education, 165(4), 315-338. gabbard, d. e. (2000). knowledge and power in the global economy: politics and the rhetoric of school analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 24 reform. mahwah, nj: lawrence eribaum associative publishers. giroux, h. a. (2005). schooling and the struggle for public life. boulder, colorado: paradigm publishers. giroux, h. a. (2004). cultural studies, public pedagogy and the responsibility of intellectuals. communication and critical/cultural studies, 1(1), 59-79. gutstein, e. (2006). reading and writing the world with mathematics:towards a pedagogy for social justice. new york: routledge. katz, j. j. (1995). what mathematical knowledge could be. mind, 104(415), 491-522. kelly, a. e. (2008). reflections on the national mathematics advisory panel final report. educational researcher, 37 (9), 561-564. klein, d. (2003). a brief history of american k-12 mathematics education in the 20th century. in j. royer (ed.) mathematical cognition. information age publishing. lester, f. k. (2005). on the theoretical, conceptual, and philosophical foundations for research in mathematics education. zdm. 37(6), 457-467. macnab, d. (2000). raising standards in mathematics education: values, visions, and timss. journal of studies in mathematics. 42(1), 61-80. martin, d. b. (2008). e(race)ing race from a national conversation on mathematics teaching and learning: the national mathematics advisory panel as white institutional space. the montana mathematics enthusiast, 5 (2&3), 387-398. nielsen, r. h. (2003). how to do educational research in university mathematics? the mathematics educator, 13(1), 33-40. national center for education statistics. (2011). highlights from pisa 2009: performance of u.s. 15 year old students in reading mathematics, and science literacy in an international context. ues national center for education statistics institute of education science. national center for education statistics, u.s. department of education. retrieved from http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=2011004 resnik, m. d. (1981). mathematics as a science of patterns: ontology and reference. nous, 15 (4), 529-550. restivo, s. p., bendegam, j. p., & fischer, r. ed. (1993) math worlds: philosophical and social studies of mathematics and mathematics education. albany, ny. state university press rowlands, s., & carson, r. (2002). the contradications in the constructivist discourse. educational studies in mathematics, 79-102. skovsmose, o. (1994). towards a philosophy of critical mathematics education. boston: kluwer academic publishers. sinclair, n. (2001). the aesthetic is relevant. for the learning of mathematics, 21(1), 25-32. spillane, j. p. (2000). cogniton and policy implementation: district policymakers and the reform of mathematics education. cognition and instruction, 18(2), 141-179. steen, lynn. a. ed., (1997). why numbers count: quantitative literacy for tomorrow’s america. new york: college entrance examination board. teachers, n.c. (2000-2004). nctm standards. retrieved april 18, 2010, from http://standards.nctm. org/document/chapter3/numb.htm. thom, r. (1973). modern mathematics: does it exist? in h. a. g. (ed.), developments in mathematics education (pp. 194-209). cambridge: cambridge university press. warnick, b. r., & stemhagen, k. (2007). mathematics teachers as moral educators: the implications of conceiving of mathematics as a technology. journal of curriculum studies, 39(3), 303-316 woodward, j. (2004). mathematics education in the united states: past to present. journal of learning disabilities, 37(1), 16-31. address correspondences to: nataly chesky, assistant professor in teacher education, state university of new york at new paltz cheskyn@newpaltz.edu expanding the parameters of exploratory talk monica glina in this paper, i define exploratory talk and explore a number of examples that were analyzed using the data-analytic coding rules delineated by soter et al. (2007). then, i propose expanding the rules for exploratory talk outlined by soter et al. (2007) and suggest coding facilitator utterances as substantive contributions to the dialogue not intrusive interjections to the discourse. i argue that this approach recognizes the facilitator as an equal participant in the dialogue who is positioned to model good inquiry, cultivate shared possession of the discourse and redistribute power amongst participants. i suggest that a possible mechanism for realizing these goals is an instructional pedagogy that is participatory, liberatory, democratic and critical, such as p4c, which is defined by a community committed to intersubjective interaction and the (re)productive evolution of ideas. classroom discourse today is typically associated with a transmission model, which is characterized by the delivery of content from the teacher to the student (bonk & cunningham, 1998; duffy & cunningham, 1996). in a typical classroom, “teachers talk and students listen” (nystrand, 1997, p. 3), making students the passive recipients of knowledge who are vessels to be “filled” (freire, 2006). transmission, which is typically associated with teacher-centered practices, features more talking and questions from teachers than students; more direct, whole-group instruction; and places a greater focus on basic recall of information rather than consideration of complex topics (cuban, 1984). for example, knowledge questions, such as “what is a quadrilateral?” are captured by the three-step ire (initiation by the teacher, response from the student, evaluation/follow-up by the teacher) structure and require students to recall basic information. these kinds of “known-answer” questions are asked by teachers and are exceedingly common in traditional classroom discourse (cazden, 2001; french & mcclure, 1981). freire (1994) argued against teaching students disembodied facts and figures that they are asked to memorize, claiming that the educational system “inhibits creativity and domesticates (although it cannot completely destroy) the intentionality of consciousness by isolating consciousness from the world, thereby denying people their ontological and historical vocation of becoming more fully human” (p. 65). a pedagogical model of transmission, despite being the most efficient way to satisfy institutional and curricular requirements (brown, 2003), does not ordinarily leave room for reflective, participatory, dialogic inquiry (mccombs & whisler, 1997). the larger, theoretical framework of critical pedagogy (freire’s, 1994, 2006) is an educational practice that seeks to counteract the oppression inherent in the traditional approach to schooling and endorses positive social change through individual empowerment. it offers educators who wish to exercise a more critical, reflective approach to teaching an empowering pedagogy (mclaren, 1989) that encourages students to play an active role in their learning. proponents of critical pedagogy (freire, 1994, 2006; freire & macedo, 1987; giroux, 1994, 1997, 1998; giroux & mclaren, 1989) argue that a healthy participatory democracy requires personal responsibility and mutual trust amongst students and teachers, and that the fundamentals of democracy must be practiced regularly in order to master them. critical pedagogy offers a framework through which to understand power relations because it focuses on recalibrating the disequilibrium that exists among individuals, and it purports to offer a mechanism by which to 16 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 17 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 overtly address the conflict that exists between them. p4c is an instructional approach that manifests features of critical pedagogy, such as fairness, mutual trust, dialogue, compromise, commitment and personal responsibility towards oneself and others in accordance with democratic principles. therefore, p4c offers a practical, dialogical vehicle consistent with dialogic teaching by which participants in a community can operationalize some of the key theoretical claims asserted by critical pedagogy. current research suggests the recognized theoretical potential of dialogic teaching and the emerging evidence connecting it to important learning outcomes (gregory, 2007; mercer & littleton, 2007; reznitskaya et al., 2009; soter et al., 2008; wegerif, mercer & dawes, 1999). dialogic approaches are a departure from the transmission model and can cultivate participation and the co-construction of meaning. dialogic approaches encourage students to critically engage contestable questions, consider their own arguments, weigh the validity of the arguments of others, mediate their ideas through one another and challenge one another’s ideas and perspectives by offering alternative reasons and options for consideration. reflective inquiry and thinking-centered learning are characteristics of a student-centered classroom (mccombs & whisler, 1997) and are conducive to the kind of reasoned co-construction captured by an indicator of dialogic interaction, such as exploratory talk. in the following sections, i define the conventional, data-analytic parameters of exploratory talk and argue for an expansion of those parameters based on the potential outcomes of a dialogic, egalitarian pedagogy, such as p4c. the conventional conception of exploratory talk exploratory talk is characterized by the critical, reasoned co-construction of knowledge by two or more students (mercer, 2002; mercer et al., 2007), “with speakers following ground rules which help them to share knowledge, evaluate evidence, and consider options in a reasonable and equitable way” (mercer, 2000, p. 153). exploratory talk is talk “in which partners engage critically but constructively with each other’s ideas. relevant information is offered for joint consideration. proposals may be challenged and counter-challenged, but, if so, reasons are given and alternatives offered. agreement is sought as a basis for joint progress. knowledge is made publicly accountable and reasoning is visible in the talk” (mercer, 2000, p. 150). instances of exploratory talk address a single topic and occur primarily amongst students, and an episode of exploratory talk occurs when students proceed for at least three turns without any substantive interruptions from the facilitator. in their manual for analyzing discussion discourse elements, soter et al. (2007) operationalize mercer’s conception of exploratory and delineate specific rules for analyzing it. they write: by definition, students should do the bulk of the work in the construction of knowledge in episodes of exploratory talk; they are the ones who should be actively contributing and putting forward their views, even if the teacher is present. sometimes a teacher may interject in an episode of what is otherwise student-student exploratory talk, and you will need to decide whether the teacher’s utterance is part of the episode or disrupts the episode. if the teacher interjection does not substantially influence the course of the students’ talk (i.e., the students may have continued in this way without the interjection), then the teacher interjection should be coded as part of the episode. (soter et al., 2007, p. 34) thus, any interference from the teacher needs to be weighed to determine whether or not it is procedural and, therefore, does not disrupt the talk or if it is substantive and, therefore, drives the talk. if the utterance drives the talk, the talk cannot be considered exploratory (soter et al., 2007). the following four examples are part of a data set from a research study of dialogic interaction in fourthgrade classrooms in northern new jersey that were assigned to one of two treatment groups: p4c and regular instruction. the examples illustrate an instance of discourse that, under soter et al.’s (2007) conventional coding rules, does not qualify as exploratory talk (example 1) and three instances of discourse that do qualify as exploratory talk under the conventional rules (examples 2, 3 and 4). after i explore each of these examples, i make a case for expanding the conventional rules used to code exploratory talk. example 1 illustrates the type of discourse that would not qualify as exploratory talk. first, the students must be involved in the critical, reasoned co-construction of knowledge (mercer, 2002; mercer et al., 2007). in example 1, the facilitator poses the question, “anyone want to take a guess as to where they have to literally jam the needle?” students offer a variety of responses, such as “your shoulder,” “your neck,” “your foot” and “on their leg,” so one could argue that students are co-constructing an understanding of where an epipen is administered by collectively working toward the answer. however, only one of the students’ suggestions is accompanied by a reason (your derrière. doesn’t hurt there.). the purpose of exploratory talk is for students to offer well-reasoned, critical arguments, a criterion that is not represented by the talk in example 1. second, the talk in example 1 is primarily facilitator-directed. the facilitator asks a question (think of a place on your body.), the student provides an answer (your shoulder) and the facilitator validates the student’s response (oh, that’s a good place). this is entirely consistent with the three-step ire structure, which is common in traditional teacher-student exchanges. third, after posing the question, the facilitator nominates students to respond to her question. nominating a speaker is a procedural interjection and does not interrupt exploratory talk (see example 2). however, the facilitator in example 1 adds embellishments to her nominations that, according to soter et al. (2007), disrupt the talk. for example,“on their leg. but you know what? their leg is very big. where on your leg?” is one such disruption. by asking her student, “where on your leg?” she dictates the direction of the discourse in a manner of her choosing instead of relegating such decisions to the students themselves. because the facilitator almost exclusively drives the talk, it does not qualify and should not be coded as an instance of exploratory talk. example 1 facilitator: . . . . you know how most needles the point is very, very thin so they can get into your arm and everything? multiple students respond: yes facilitator: the epipen needles are actually much thicker and bigger because, and they do not go in the arm. anyone want to take a guess as to where they have to literally jam the needle? male speaker: ewww! facilitator: think of a place on your body. it could be your derrière. [multiple students laughing.] analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 18 facilitator: h? h (female speaker): your shoulder. facilitator: your shoulder. oh, that’s a good place. a? a (male speaker): your neck. facilitator: your neck. okay, i can understand why. t? t (male speaker): your foot. facilitator: your foot, okay. male speaker: most people usually do it on their leg. facilitator: on their leg. but you know what? their leg is very big. where on your leg? male speaker: your thigh. facilitator: the thigh area. j? j (male speaker): your neck. facilitator: your neck, k? k (female student): your stomach. facilitator: your stomach. d? d (female speaker): your back. facilitator: your back. s? s (male speaker): your derrière. doesn’t hurt there. [multiple students laughing.] facilitator: k? k (male speaker): um, your back. facilitator: your back. okay, well, the correct area actually is your thigh, which is right here. okay? and they have to get it in a tough place and what they do is, you can’t really, you know how they . . . ? they always have to clean the area first, and if you’re wearing long sleeves, they make you roll it up and everything. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 19 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 20 male speaker: [inaudible.] facilitator: usually. because of epipens, because you have to do it quick and because it’s so big, you have to pass through something. so they always go through the skin or through your clothing. …you know how doctors and nurses when they’re giving you a shot, they go like this, okay, and do it very gently, so you barely feel anything? multiple students speaking: [inaudible.] facilitator: what happens when with an epipen is that person usually is, you know if that person is having an allergic reaction that means you have to lay the person on their side, and you literally [makes a jamming gesture]. . . . example 2 illustrates an episode of exploratory talk, which begins after the teacher asks the question and includes the requisite three uninterrupted student turns. in this example, the teacher’s interjections are unobtrusive because they serve only to nominate the next speaker. students are able to co-construct arguments for the use of comic books in the classroom by offering cogent reasons. the episode ends once the teacher makes a substantive contribution by saying, “yup, we have it here for 5th grade; we just don’t use it.” example 2 s (female speaker): i think that we should start using comics here ‘cause it does help with your writing and your reading. facilitator: can you explain why you think that? [episode of exploratory talk begins] s (female speaker): because you have, um, say like you don’t like fiction stories, and you only like non-fiction stories. and then you start reading comics, and it’s like a fiction story. so you’re gonna learn what they’re all about, and then you’ll learn how to read a comic. you’ll like comic books and with writing, you’ll learn how to actually write one and see how you’re writing. [turn 1] facilitator: um, another comment, t? [procedural interjection; does not add to talk.] t (male speaker): i think we should make comics, i think we should make comics in our own head of what we think of like some adventures that we think of, and we should put ‘em in from our head to the comics. [turn 2] facilitator: comics. um, k? [procedural interjection; does not add to talk.] k (female speaker): i think we should use comics because like j said miss g. has comics and in 3rd grade our teacher miss r. also had comics. she had it, and everyone had this book. it wasn’t like a book; it was like a portfolio, and it had all these, all these stories. it wasn’t like a comic book for like fun and with adventures; it actually teaches us something about the lesson. like last time we were talking about measuring things, so it analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 21 was a story about a family of mice and they were trying to get through and then they were trying to run away from this guy. so they went on top of the ramp, and they were trying to go up so they would all fit and be able to go back into their mouse hole. so they had to, they had to compare all the mice weight, and they figured out which mice should go on which balance beam and then they can get back. [turn 3] facilitator: m? [procedural interjection; does not add to talk.] m (female speaker): um, also i agree with s because it does help you with writing. like it helps you write creative. and also i know what k’s talking about because it was a math comic book that we looked at. [turn 4] facilitator: yup, we have it here for 5th grade; we just don’t use it. [substantive interjection, which ends episode of exploratory talk.] in example 3, the beginning of a new episode is marked by t’s question. the episode is comprised of 7 uninterrupted student turns. the facilitator’s interjections serve to nominate the next speaker but neither disrupt nor contribute substantively to the content of, or redirect the talk. example 3 facilitator: you have a question, o.k., t? t (male student): um, i know that they didn’t want to tell the questions or like what maya said, but why did they spank him? he’s just a kid. kids were not like us. kids sometimes asks stupid questions, but that’s what they do ‘cause they want to know what they’re doing. so why’d they have to spank? facilitator: k? [procedural interjection; does not add to talk.] k (female student): well, i kind of agree facilitator: hold on a second, k has the floor. go ahead. [procedural interjection; does not add to talk.] k (female student): i kind of agree with maya because i think the only reason why they didn’t they were trying to question they spanked him because they didn’t really know how to answer him. they didn’t know what to say because maybe they don’t know what crocodiles eat or maybe they do, and they just don’t want him to know at such a young age. facilitator: s, sit up for me, please. a? [procedural interjection; does not add to talk.] a (male student): i disagree with k and m. the only reason they didn’t tell him is because the crocodile eats them. k (female student): i just said that. a (male student): you just said you agree with m. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 22 k (female student): and then i said at the end that maybe they might spank him because they don’t want him to know that crocodiles might eat him at such a young age. example 4 is an episode of exploratory talk in which students respond to the facilitator’s statement about thinking being a fundamental function. example 4 facilitator: so, thinking is actually totally fundamental. [beginning of exploratory talk] female student: actually, you wouldn’t just be standing there if you think ‘cause you sort of just move, and they give you a problem you don’t know and by just sitting there, you wouldn’t be doing anything; you’d just be looking at the problem doing nothing. male student: but you’d probably be thinking to try to solve it. female student: i know, but . . . [multiple students speaking.] facilitator: let’s talk one at a time. [procedural interjection; does not add to talk.] female student: i’m saying you’d just be sitting there. [multiple students speaking.] facilitator: i’m going to take these up now and leave copies for you guys if you want to use them for your journals. [procedural interjection; does not add to talk.] [multiple students speaking.] female student: you have to think because that’s the only way to solve a problem. facilitator: let me remind you or actually . . . i don’t know if we’ve talked about this, but let’s make the order of the group first one person talks at a time, which is kind of obvious right because then things get chaotic. and also, i don’t necessarily want to be the center of the discussion, so one person talk at a time and if you want to respond . . . we had a response here from m, for example. m could raise his hand, and whoever is taking, for example, if it’s r, calls on him. and then you call on the next person. or y. alright? alright, so c, do you have your hand up? [procedural interjection; does not add to talk.] c (female student): no. facilitator: no. where were we now? [procedural interjection; does not add to talk.] female speaker: we were talking about thinking. like, do we need to think? facilitator: and what had been said, and what had been sort of argued? [procedural interjection; does not add to talk.] r (female student): um, i think m wanted to say something. facilitator: okay. so let’s give it to m. [procedural interjection; does not add to talk.] m (male student): r said if you’re . . . if there’s a problem in front of you and you can’t figure it out, then you’re just gonna sit there. but you wouldn’t necessarily try to solve the problem. y (male student): but if you can’t think, how are you supposed to solve? facilitator: wait, y. let’s try to keep to this protocol just so we get used to it. now, somebody raise their hand and m, you pick them, and they’re gonna respond to you. either r or y. [procedural interjection; does not add to talk.] m (male student): y. y (male student): but if you can’t think, then how are you going to solve the question? facilitator: and now you pick. [procedural interjection; does not add to talk.] y (male student): i don’t know. facilitator: i just saw k. go ahead. pick somebody. [procedural interjection; does not add to talk.] y (male student): r. r (female student): that’s why you sort of need to think because you need to think if you want to answer a problem. k. k (female student): i think what m was trying to say was if you just stand there and look at the question, you will be thinking to solve the problem. r. r (female student): i think what she’s saying is since you can’t think if you don’t have the [inaudible] to think, you can just figure it out on a piece of scrap paper. k (female student): that’s what i was saying. r (female student): yeah. facilitator: okay. we have some new hands, r. [procedural interjection; does not add to talk.] r (female student): um, t. t (female student): i think that maybe i agree with k and m. if you’re working at something, it’s a problem, 23 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 24 unless it’s a math problem and then you’re probably reading it or thinking about it or thinking of its meaning, why it’s there. but if you have a problem in front of you, your brain, usually you are thinking about what you’re staring at, but if you’re not then you’re thinking or you’re working on another problem you have on your mind. not always necessarily if you’re looking at something, you have to be thinking about it. facilitator: but, what i’m hearing here is that you think because there is a problem. [substantive interjection, which ends episode of exploratory talk.] t (female student): well, not always. facilitator: like if you’re driving and there’s no problem, you don’t really think about how you’re driving. the episode in example 4 begins when the student responds to the facilitator by replying, actually, you wouldn’t just be standing there if you think ‘cause you sort of just move, and they give you a problem you don’t know and by just sitting there, you wouldn’t be doing anything; you’d just be looking at the problem doing nothing. students proceed through a number of turns, which are punctuated by procedural interjections by the facilitator, such as, “let’s talk one at a time,” “. . . let’s make the order of the group . . . one person talks at a time . . . ,” “so, let’s give it to m,” “we have some new hands, r” and “let’s try to keep to this protocol just so we get used to it.” one might even argue that, “where were we now?” and “and what had been said, and what had been sort of argued?” are procedural as well because they require students to engage in a cognitive assessment of the group’s progress, but they do not contribute to the substance of the talk or (re)direct it in any way. expanding the parameters of exploratory talk the rules used to code instances of exploratory talk in example 1 to example 4 are consistent with previous research and existing literature (mercer, 2002; mercer et al., 2007; soter et al., 2007). the examples that qualify as instances of exploratory talk assume a “procedurally strong” but “substantively weak” facilitator (kennedy, 2004; splitter & sharp, 1996), which captures the paradigmatic archetype of the facilitator in a dialogic discussion. facilitators promote the powerful cognitive and social dispositions whose outcomes follow from the rigor associated with reasoned inquiry. they cultivate the symbiotic impact that co-inquirers can have on each other by divesting themselves of the trappings typically associated with being the classroom content expert and deliberately assume a level of humility and “scholarly ignorance” (reed, 1992; splitter & sharp, 1996). however, a newly articulated coding system that treats the facilitator as an equal participant in the dialogue who models good inquiry and recalibrates power relations warrants exploration. by expanding the parameters of exploratory talk , the facilitator’s utterances would be coded to indicate that, in these utterances, he or she is behaving as an equal participant whose contributions are substantive and not disruptive. therefore, the facilitator emerges as both procedurally and substantively strong and shares with the community’s other participants the responsibilities associated with both procedure and substance. example 5 illustrates an excerpt that was coded using the expanded coding parameters. example 5 t (female student): i think that maybe i agree with k and m. if you’re working at something, it’s a problem, unless it’s a math problem and then you’re probably reading it or thinking about it or thinking of its meaning, why it’s there. but if you have a problem in front of you, your brain, usually you are thinking about what you’re staring at, but if you’re not then you’re thinking or you’re working on another problem you have on your mind. not always necessarily if you’re looking at something, you have to be thinking about it. facilitator: but, what i’m hearing here is that you think because there is a problem. [this substantive interjection would end this episode of exploratory talk if the conventional rules of exploratory talk were applied. however, a new coding structure could consider this utterance part of exploratory talk.] t (female student): well, not always. facilitator: like if you’re driving and there’s no problem, you don’t really think about how you’re driving. [this utterance would not be included in this episode of exploratory talk if the conventional rules of exploratory talk were applied because it happens after the substantive interjection, which ends the episode. however, a new coding structure could consider this part of exploratory talk.] [multiple students speaking.] facilitator: okay, i broke the rule and messed things up. i’ll raise my hand next time just like everybody else. t (female student): if you don’t concentrate on reading you’re not concentrating because there’s a problem, you will cause a problem. it’s that simple. you have to think what you’re doing at the moment. not just because there is a problem ahead of you because if you don’t think about it, your problem might get bigger. k (female student): pick someone. female student: pick someone! male student: i had his hand up. t (female student): i. i (male student): i’m talking to r. but if you’re solving a problem, don’t you have to think to write on the piece of paper? the non-procedural facilitator contribution in example 5, “but, what i’m hearing here is that you think because there is a problem,” would, under conventional coding rules of exploratory talk, effectively disrupt and, thus, end the episode. if, however, this teacher utterance was coded according to an expanded conception of equal participation, the episode would not end when the facilitator utters, “but, what i’m hearing here is that you think because there is a problem.” instead, the dialogue could conceivably continue for the duration of the excerpt in example 5. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 25 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 26 educators engaged in a critical, pedagogical approach are urged to approach education as transformative intellectuals rather than functionaries and serve as emancipatory models of authority (giroux, 1997). example 5 offers a specific move by the facilitator in the service of the emancipation and liberation of the community’s participants: “okay, i broke the rule and messed things up. i’ll raise my hand next time just like everybody else.” the facilitator’s procedurally strong move works to eliminate the hierarchical structure inherent in most classrooms by articulating his non-authoritative role as equal participant. reinforcing his words by modeling procedurally strong actions, he empowers his students to call on each other, co-construct meaning with one another and even call on him, suggesting a level of structural equilibrium within the group. this cultivates a community in which he can be procedurally strong and substantively strong; in the case of the latter, substance refers not to knowing and providing the right answers to “known answer” questions, but by contributing to the co-construction of robust, emergent discourse. evaluating the presence of liberatory practice encouraging students to call on, or nominate, speakers within the community of inquiry becomes a way in which to assess the collaborative license and participatory liberties the group has assumed and internalized. thus, nomination is one dialogic element that can help to corroborate the presence and the effects of liberatory practice within a community as manifested by its discourse. this is critical for determining whether or not discourse is eligible for coding using the new rules for exploratory talk; it is only when power has been effectively and successfully redistributed, that discourse qualifies for analysis under the new coding structure, and nomination is a sociolinguistic element that can suggest the degree to which the facilitator shares his or her power with the students. in a teacher-dominated classroom setting, the power to nominate may reside exclusively with the facilitator. however, a facilitator who shares the power to nominate other speakers can be seen as redistributing that power among all members of the classroom community. data from the previously aforementioned data set shows that in addition to nominations by the facilitator (example 6), four additional categories within nomination emerged in the p4c group that were not present in the group receiving regular instruction. these categories are the facilitator prompting student to nominate the next speaker (example 7), one student nominating another student (example 8), one student prompting another student to nominate the next speaker (example 9) and a student nominating the facilitator (example 10). example 6 facilitator: j, you have a question? what grabbed you? example 7 facilitator: okay. so r has offered us a kind of a synonym, you know, a word that means the same. you call on the next person, r. example 8 i (male student): r. example 9 m (female student): pick someone. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 27 example 10 e (female student): . . . .you don’t have any conscious of what’s around you or what your surroundings are or anything. nothing. dr v. the second and third types of nomination—the facilitator prompting a student to nominate the next speaker (example 7) and a student nominating another student (example 8)—are regularly promoted by the p4c facilitator. the interesting trend emerges in the final two actions: a student prompting another student to nominate the next speaker (example 9) and a student nominating the facilitator to speak (example 10). students seemed to appropriate and elaborate the technique used by the facilitator to distribute nominations. a student prompting another student to nominate the next speaker seems to signal that (1) the student has internalized the behavior of fairly and equitably nominating the next speaker, which has been modeled by the facilitator within the social setting; and (2) the student has taken that behavior, enhanced it as illustrated in examples 9 and 10 and begun to use it as part of his or her repertoire of behaviors. in the absence of a negative response from the facilitator, this behavior could eventually, according to dewey (1997a), become a habit. thus, the results suggest that nomination was present in the p4c group in a more varied sense and that students in the p4c group, who were encouraged to do nomination, reinterpreted their roles as nominators by changing the surface structure of the move. this is important for (dis)qualifying an episode of exploratory talk as eligible for coding using the new rules based on the role of the participants of the dialogue. adopting and adapting the original function of nomination implies deeper internalization of the roles of discussion participants, and student nominations can indicate the development of important disposition, such as respect for another’s right to be given “the floor” as primary speaker, the fairness that is integral to acknowledging this right and the caring involved in making certain the individual is given “the floor.” following vygotsky (1978), these behaviors are all are generated during the sociocultural exchange. first, they were modeled by the facilitator. then, they were reflected upon, cognitively accommodated and then incorporated by the other participants in the community. thus, learning led to development through the use of the language tool called nomination. the literature on the community of inquiry asserts that, “…the commitment to engage in a community of inquiry is a political commitment…it is only to the extent that individuals have had the experience of dialoguing with others as equals, participating in shared, public inquiry that they will be able to eventually take an active role in the shaping of a democratic society.” (sharp, 1993, p. 343) the facilitator not only models these democratic dispositions, but shares his power with the group, thus enabling participants to practice and, ultimately and ideally, internalize these behaviors. sharing the process of nomination in the p4c group represents an important step toward the redistribution of power. if the relational imbalance that exists between teachers and their students should be recalibrated toward an equality of power and praxis (freire, 1994, 2006), nomination in the p4c group seems to align with freire’s theoretical assertion because it sanctions the redistribution of power to all participants. exploratory talk within a liberatory pedagogy changing the complexion of exploratory talk becomes necessary when examined within the domain of an instructional approach (1) that engages in discussions around contestable questions for which not even the facilitator knows the ‘right’ answer, (2) whose facilitator is committed to participation by all participants and (3) whose facilitator creates a community (of inquiry) where authority is fluid and shared. liberatory, democratic and steeped in the dynamics of dialogical inquiry and socio-cultural theory (lave and wenger, 1991; vygotsky, 1981), p4c (lipman, 2003; lipman et al., 1980) is a pedagogical model that promotes the cognitive, aesthetic and affective development of children through teacher-facilitated group inquiry and dialogue (lipman, 2003). p4c uses structured philosophical dialogue not only to sharpen critical-thinking skills (e.g., banks, 1989; camhy analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 & iberer, 1988) but to cultivate a sensitivity toward and understanding of others’ values, interests and beliefs (lipman, sharp & oscanyan, 1980). with the facilitator as co-inquirer, guide and model, the community of inquiry functions as the arena for inquiry, dialogue and concept exploration. these attributes also serve as requisite tenets of exploratory talk around contestable questions and promote the move from the “logic of general notions” (dewey, 1985, p. 187), which proposes a universal, immutable truth to a logic of inquiry, which “help[s] men solve problems in the concrete by supplying them [with] hypotheses to be used and tested in projects of reform” (dewey, 1985, p. 189). thus, the epistemology of knowledge moves from seeking an immutable truth to seeking a temporal truth that develops organically out of the testing and reconstruction of a proposed solution; one arrives at a set of tentative results to solve a concrete problem that may have to be reconstructed based on new information and developments. it is only through a thoughtful, intelligent method of experimentation that a logic of inquiry can take place. this marks a shift from the staid practice associated with a didactic, monological approach, which, at its best, does not assist inquiry and, at its worst, inhibits inquiry, toward a method of inquiry that strives to (re)construct a theory that makes a positive difference and cultivates “initiative, inventiveness, varied resourcefulness, assumption of responsibility in choice of belief and conduct” (dewey, 1985, p. 1191). the implications for a shift of this nature are substantive because “it is only [through the conversion of classrooms into communities of inquiry] that the next generations will be prepared socially and cognitively to engage in the dialogue, judging and on-going questioning that is vital to the existence of a democratic society” (splitter & sharp, 1995, p. 343). this is consistent with freire (2006), who argues that educators should create an environment within which teachers and students use dialogue to learn and solve problems together. by inviting students to be equal contributors, the facilitator strives to redress the imbalance of power that is inherent in traditional classrooms. dewey (1997a) also argues that democracy depends on the willingness of educated global citizens to engage in social interactions that serve to improve the larger social good. freire’s (2006) seminal work with brazil’s poor farmers focuses on writing literacy. mclaren’s (1998) observations of students, parents and teachers from an inner-city canadian elementary school provide “insights into school life as it is lived by students and teachers” (p. 112). while critical pedagogy grows out of the need to resist oppression in very extreme circumstances, it also has wider implications for, as mclaren (1998) argues, classroom practice. specifically, critical pedagogy is integral to equalizing power relations and delimiting inequalities and injustices by redistributing authority and recalibrating the disequilibrium that can exist in traditional classroom. thus, it can be argued that it is critical for a teacher to be reflective of his or her practice in order to successfully create a liberating, educational environment. “education can only be liberating if everyone has a part to play in its development…this implies that all voices should be heard and all contributions are legitimate” (humphries & martin, 2000, p. 282). the coding structure for exploratory talk that i propose incorporates the contributions of all participants within a democratic, liberatory dialogue. specifically, it preserves the critical co-reasoning that exploratory talk suggests should take place amongst students, and it recognizes the dialogical and dispositional accessions modeled by the facilitator. the facilitator’s involvement in episodes of exploratory talk as an equal participant provides a context within which he can model critical, reasoned co-construction of knowledge (dialogical) and begin to shift power to all participants (dispositional). nomination, once again, emerges as an exemplar. by sharing the responsibility of nomination, or selecting, students to speak, the p4c facilitator, as model and mediator, accomplishes three crucial objectives: he introduces students to the inherently democratic practice of sharing the responsibility of nomination; by inviting students to facilitate the process of nomination, by taking an important step toward redistributing the power dynamic within the group, and by shifting it to all members of the community. in addition to inviting participants to share the responsibility of electing the next speaker, the facilitator can also invite students to negotiate and navigate turn-taking amongst themselves, which is also a critical component of explora28 tory talk. these aforementioned strategies are instrumental in redistributing power amongst the community’s participants, and the sum total of the facilitator’s actions suggests a willingness to share his power and authority with the group (kennedy, 2004). by shifting power from himself to all members of the community, the facilitator redefines the relationship among all the group’s participants, recalibrates the imbalance that can manifest itself in classrooms and, ultimately, inspires the group’s participants to consider him an equal participant. in this capacity, the facilitator moves well beyond the role of transmitter of knowledge and becomes responsible for “embody[ing] in [his] teaching a vision of a better and more humane life” (giroux & mclaren, 1989, p. xiii). the supposition that the facilitator is an equal participant rather than supreme arbiter presumes that the facilitator will be able to escape the role of authority figure. it can be argued, though, that acknowledging the possibility of such a re-characterization (i.e., the facilitator at least temporarily becoming equal to the rest of the individuals in the community) is vital because it enables the facilitator to recalibrate the potentially inherent power disequilibrium that can exist in classrooms. for example, the facilitator, who shifted his power to invite students to share in the process of nomination, could be seen as functioning in the capacity of a more experienced peer mentor as opposed to teacher-as-authority-figure. this, in a sense, permits him to be part of exploratory talk normally reserved for students. thus, shifting power is not only important for the rich co-construction of meaning to which the facilitator-turned-participant can substantively contribute but for modeling the actual process of power redistribution from within the framework of critical pedagogy, which “signals how questions of audience, voice, power, and evaluation actively work to construct particular relations between teachers and students, institutions and society, and classrooms and communities…” (giroux, 1994, p. 30). in conclusion, one could argue that the three criteria (contestable questions, inclusive participation and shared, fluid authority) render the conventional coding rules for exploratory talk deficient. first, students do not interact with ‘known-answer’ questions, which are characteristic of traditional classroom discourse, but engage, instead, with open-ended, contestable questions. second, the facilitator as the more experienced “peer” (vygotsky, 1978) is modeling good inquiry for the other community members and identifies himself as just another participant rather than supreme arbiter. the conventional iteration of the coding rules (soter at al., 2007) disregards the role of facilitator as a co-inquirer dedicated to concept exploration, meaning creation and pedagogical emancipation, who guides and models for participants by asking good questions, posing alternative views, seeking clarification, questioning reasons and supporting claims with valid reasons. as a result, the facilitator’s substantive inquiry moves and procedural contributions, which are integral to a liberatory pedagogy, remain unacknowledged under soter et al.’s (2007) rules for coding exploratory talk. in order to address this shortcoming, i proposed expanding the parameters of exploratory talk. i argued that it should recognize the substantive, dialogic contributions by the facilitator, who, as model and mediator, assumes the role of equal participant and enables him to enhance robust dialogic contributions with procedural contributions that not only propel the inquiry forward but can begin to recalibrate the power disequilibrium inherent in many classrooms. thus, expanding the parameters of exploratory talk befittingly acknowledge the efforts of all the community’s participants and provides a transparent mechanism through which to understand the dialogic interaction and group processes that are critical to inquiry and a more equitable power structure. in addition, a newly construed set of coding rules for exploratory talk could be used as a tool to help teachers analyze their own classroom discourse. by evaluating where they reside on the spectrum, they could begin the transition from a traditional, monological discussion style to a more dialogic approach to classroom discourse. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 29 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 references banks, j. 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(1999). from social interaction to individual reasoning: an empirical investigation of a possible sociocultural model of cognitive development. learning and instruction, 9(6), 493-516. ia new coding structure would still need to preserve the distinction between the students and the facilitator because differentiating between teacher and student moves in classroom discussions can be seen as one of the key objectives in analyzing classroom interactions. thus, facilitator utterances would not be classified using the same codes employed for students, nor would the facilitator be coded the same way as a teacher who is not participating as an equal contributor. address correspondence to: monica glina university of oslo dept. of educational research, post-doctoral fellow m.b.glina@ped.uio.no analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 32 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 1 the complexity of respecting together: from the point of view of one participant of the 2012 vancouver naaci conference susan t. gardner dedication: i would like to dedicate this essay to mort morehouse, whose intelligence, warmth, and good humour sustains naaci to this day. i would like, too, to dedicate this essay to nadia kennedy who, in her paper “respecting the complexity of ci,” suggests that respect for the rich non-reductive emergent memories and understandings that evolve out of participating in the sort of complex communicative interactions that we experienced at the 2012 naaci conference requires “a turning around and looking back so that we might understand it better.” thus, though “we cannot grasp the essence of the system in some determinate way, since each description provides a limited view, and portrays some aspect of the system from a specific position inside or outside it, and at a specific point in time,” nonetheless respect requires that we try “to take different ‘snapshots’ of such systems and attempt to make sense of them.” it is as a result of this urging that the following snapshot was attempted. my thanks to nadia for being such an inspiration, and to all the participants for making this conference such a memorable occasion. note: all references are to papers presented at the vancouver 2012 june/july naaci conference unless otherwise noted. since none are published as of yet (august 2012), referencing will be informal (see reference list) with the approval of the authors. my apologies for any misrepresentation or under-representation. my apologies, too, for non-representation of the fruitful contributions of non-presenters. does respect require unconditional regard? the notion of respect seems inherently confused. children are taught that they ought to respect their parents, their teachers, indeed, all their classmates. adults are lectured about the need for respecting all persons—a touchstone that some argue anchors human rights. but what precisely does this notion of respect mean? many believe that respect, as used in the above edicts, requires that one avoid acting or speaking in ways that the other, whether present or not, might find unpleasant or offensive (extreme cases being the exception). interestingly, this subliminal understanding became evident at the 2012 vancouver naaci conference when a number of those present expressed discomfort at “the way the conversation was going” following a presentation on the issue of “respect and the veil” (susan gardner). the central argument of gardner’s paper was that since face covering (as in the burka or the niqab) appears to those outside the practice as being potentially oppressive, and since those who wear the face covering know this (an analogy of crying fire in a theater), and since the face covering tends to preclude the possibility of genuine communicative interaction so that the presence or absence of oppression cannot be estimated (leaving those who are concerned about the oppression of women in an impossible bind), and since loyalty to the muslim tradition can be visibly upheld by wearing the hijab (head scarf), the paper concluded that “the practice of face covering and respect for that practice are . . . incompatible.” some who joined the communal inquiry following the paper suggested that the argument, in and of itself, was insulting to those women who “voluntarily” wear the face covering—an insult that was doubly egregious as it smacked of imperialist arrogance, i.e., that those outside the practice have no business judging those inside the practice. some expressed discomfort in subjecting this sensitive issue to overt critical inquiry at all—thus, at least subliminally, supporting the intuition that speaking in a way that the other, whether present or not, might find unpleasant or offensive was somehow disrespectful. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 2 this reluctance to get into the judging game (does respect not require that we avoid it?) was one of the central issues that was the focus on the 2012 naaci conference, so it is ironic that the distaste for judging emerged surreptitiously in a conference whose focus was to analyze this very issue. such reticence, interestingly, also underscored the point made by dale cannon in his paper “p4c, community of inquiry, and methodological faith” in which he noted the important role that faith plays in process of critical inquiry, i.e., that participants in communal inquiry must have faith that something of value will come from the process of doubt (hence the claim that the role of doubt is subordinate to and serves faith in reasoned inquiry). as cannon notes: “to give oneself over to reasoned inquiry clearly involves a sort of venture that is fraught with uncertainty and risk.” in this particular instance, faith in the method seemed weak. however, happily, it blossomed through most of the ensuing tangles over many equally contentious issues, a central one of which was the general topic of the degree to which respect required unconditional regard. respect does not require unconditional regard? the first paper of the conference, by its very title, i.e., “to tolerate means to insult,” took issue with the suggestion that a bland hands-off non-judgmental “tolerant” attitude is a form of respect. in it, barbara weber quoted marcuse as warning that “tolerance gives the aloof and uncaring majority of people a ‘legitimate reason’ (in form of an accepted value) to stand back, even when they are direct witnesses of social injustice or violence; and the ruling class welcomes this ‘cultivated indifference’ in the form of tolerance, because they can proceed with their practices and sustain the system of power” (95f). gardner, in an article published elsewhere (2009), makes a similar point, though with a tangential focus, when she warns the philosophy for children community against adopting “caring thinking” as one of its primary educational goals, as the very name tends to anesthetize both students and teachers against the frequent need not only to judge, but to stand up against injustice and individuals perpetrating harm. lena green referred to this point in her paper, entitled “philosophical inquiry as a means of teaching respect in south african classrooms,” in which she notes that “though teachers in south african schools are aware of the need to respect diversity, it is far from clear at what point diversity becomes unacceptable and is no longer a right.” green refers to gardner (2009) as arguing that “there are circumstances (e.g. bullying) in which approval and respect is not appropriate” (3,4). the argument that respect does not require unconditional regard also threaded its way through gardner’s paper “gifting freedom, not favour,” in which she argues not only that unconditional regard is not required, but that such an attitude can be ethically contemptible. this is so because selves and their corresponding sense of agency develop as a function of intersubjective practical reasoning, i.e., we become aware of (and hence gain control over) our actions as a result of the changing evaluative responses of others toward our own actions. a bland “‘i’m okay, you’re okay, and it’s okay’, within which nobody really cares what other people are doing or whether or not their cultural practices are acceptable” (weber), would quite literally obliterate the intersubjective mirror which keeps an agent’s freedom alive. jason howard, in his paper “claims of conscience and the space of reasons,” echoes a similar position with the argument that an individual’s sense of agency emerges in interpersonal judgemental interaction. howard quotes ricoeur as defining imputability as “the ascription of action to [an] agent, under the condition of ethical and moral predicates which characterize the action as good, just, conforming to duty, done out of duty, and finally, as being the wisest in the case of conflictual situations” (292). howard defines this awakening of our capacity for accountability as “conscience,” and he argues that its specific function is best understood when seen in reference to the core moral emotions of guilt, shame and pride. “more specifically,” he says, “conscience mediates the inherent volatility, disruptiveness and alienating effects of these moral emotions, empowering agents to see themselves as the author and proponent of these emotions rather than their victim.” i take howard to be arguing here that it is in response to the changing and potentially threatening judgments of others (hence shame and guilt), that conscience and its integrating power of reason emerges. thus, howard says that “we come to the analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 3 world of reasons as a way of appropriating the hold that values have on us,” and that “we come to care about rationality and the power of reasons not primarily because of a desire to be correct or consistent, as much as from the ability of reasons to disclose and amplify our capacities and concerns.” “one’s sense of self-worth,” in other words, “is always in negotiation with others, for better or worse.” mort morehouse, in his paper “thinking about ‘gifting freedom, not favour’ and our future,” also underscores the importance of intersubjective negotiation for self-maintenance by warning us about the potential deleterious impact of distorted communication on those who are immersed in social media in general, and who interact with robots in particular. morehouse refers to sherry turkle’s research (2011) on robots (e.g., companions for senior citizens, pets for children), as well as the use of texting and other electronic ways of connecting with others. with regard to robots, turkle’s research indicates that we seek uncomplicated affection from robots as well as uncomplicated affection toward these objects. morehouse notes that what is of concern to turkle is that, in these situations, the robots can become more real and often more consistent than “real” people, hence alerting us to the fact that such “unconditional regard” (of and to robots) can become so addicting that it can blind us to the freedom-diminishing impact of a responsibility vacuum. and morehouse also notes turkle’s concern about the safety and superficiality of connecting through social media, which tends to bring with it a diminished propensity to take the deep risks of uncertain connections in “lived” interactions. thus, morehouse quotes turkle as noting that many people “nurture friendships on social-networking sites and then wonder if they are among friends. they are connected all day but are not sure they have communicated. they become confused about companionship” (17). respect requires value-communicative-interaction the arguments presented by weber, gardner, howard and morehouse harmonize toward the message that due to our intersubjective dependency, respect requires that we attempt to engage in authentic dialogue with others—the authenticity of which would inevitably require honesty with regard to one’s evaluative stance. the approaches, however, slip slightly from each other with regard to the optimism for success of convergence. thus howard ends his paper with the comment that “nothing can or should undermine the imperative of finding common moral ground with others, least of all our conscience.” and weber ends her paper saying “in our movement towards the other, in this continuous approach and dialogue, we gain a momentary understanding (of ourselves, of the world, of other people). due to freedom and alterity, our understanding of the other will always remain fractal: he will forever elude our ultimate grasp. but this call will lead to the continuous return to his/her otherness.” in contrast to these hopeful positions that dialogue with the other is always possible and always potentially positive, gardner, since her investigation begins by focusing on the question of what kind of respect is owed a serial rapist/killer, is more obvious in recognizing that a meeting of minds may not be possible and, in many cases, should not be expected (e.g., the tragedy of the years of naïve american confidence that they would find common ground with the nazis, despite years of shocking jewish oppression long before the outbreak of the war, and even after the 1934 public declaration given by goebbels, the nazi propaganda minister, that jews were “the syphilis of all european peoples” (larson, 2011)). gardner argues that respect in the sense of striving toward mutuality may, in certain circumstances, be inappropriate, but that nonetheless “recognition respect” demands that we view the other as a member of the moral community in the sense that the person is capable of controlling his/her actions and thus s/he is someone who is accountable. thus, gardner notes that “though attitudes of disapprobation and indignation may short-circuit what darwall calls ‘appraisal respect’ (122), they are not in the least disrespectful in the sense of suggesting that i view you as other than a member of the moral community. as strawson points out ‘the partial withdrawal of goodwill . . . is, rather, the consequence of continuing to view (the other) as a member of the moral community; only as one who has offended against it’” (16). value-communicative-interaction: a tripartite distinction analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 4 the slippage between the above points of view, along with the initial intuition that there are areas that are truly none of our business (it is not our place to judge), suggest that, with regard to the claim that “respect carries the imperative of value-communicative-interaction,” there might ultimately be three positions: (1) the “intolerant,” (2) the “engaged,” and (3) the “tolerant.” based on his paper “taking interreligious dialogue to the m.a.t. (martial arts technique): toward a rethinking of respect and dialogue with the interreligious other,” eugene muhammad would, i think, only be prepared to recognize #2. i will therefore briefly comment on the potential disagreement with respect to #1 and #3 below. 1. the intolerant position: an imperative to demonstrate a “stand up and be counted” intolerance of those positions that appear to have no merit whatsoever and which will result in great harm (e.g., a serial rapist/killer, goebbels, bullies, etc). in such cases, one can be described as intolerant in the sense that, though one may enter communication with the other, one does so knowing from the start that one will not be persuaded (an initial position that would disqualify the claim of genuine dialogue), but knowing that communication ought to be attempted nonetheless in the hope that some kind of mutual understanding will lay the groundwork for effective accountability. muhammad, by contrast, seems to suggest that it is not only possible, but desirable, to engage in every dialogue with the understanding that one might be “converted.” he refers to terrorists to drive this point home. in contrast, one could argue that while there is huge merit to try, where possible, to bring oneself fully and authentically to the table, the result surely would simply be hypocrisy if one pretended to see the merits of a position that had no merit, e.g., someone who bayoneted children for fun. 2. the engaged position: an imperative to engage in “personhood-maintaining practical-reasoning with others” (gardner “gifting”), i.e., being prepared to continuously reason with others to try and parse out what sort of rules ought to govern the behaviours and judgements of all reasonable people. gardner reminds us that given that only genuine “second-personal reasoning” can contribute to the maintenance of our mutual freedom (as opposed to raw judgemental attitudes or the mental manipulation of ‘faux reasoning’ that can be destructive of our freedom), it is important that we make explicit the implicit assumptions that reasoners must make in order for this sort of reasoning to be efficacious. these assumptions are: (1) that we agree on a common non-subjective position-guiding reasoning process (i.e., you must be prepared to follow reason where they lead, including changing your mind); (2) that the goal is a common perspective anchored by reason (i.e., the goal is not just to persuade); (3) that our initial positions are different and that we are comfortable with that (i.e., something to be cherished); (4) that there is some common value-overlap (we know that a meeting of the minds is in principle possible); and (5) that we see one another as equal in this freedom-producing accountability relationship. it is of note that virtually none of these conditions are present in the “intolerant position.” 3. the tolerant position: an imperative to remain silent in the absence of invitation (despite what could be described as an imperative to think it out so as to understand one’s own position). in light of the fact that genuinely “engaged” dialogue is hard and time-consuming work, it is clear that it can and should only be activated with regard to behaviours and judgments that matter. and while there is no doubt that there can be much disagreement with regard to what behaviours and judgments really matter (see discussion above with regard to the veil), nonetheless, it is vital that we prioritize our commitments with regard to what we believe are fundamental for maintaining the good life for us all. in other words, there is lots of “stuff” about which we can, without shame or guilt, remain “aloof.” since muhammad is committed to the importance of pervasive deep authentic dialogue in general, and interreligious dialogue in particular, he would be concerned with the suggestion that i ought to simply “tolerant” your belief in the big pumpkin (or whatever). according to muhammad, religious people ought to dialogue “to the death,” i.e., enter the dialogue being prepared to convert. however, it is of note that for muhammad “a religious person is neither a fanatic nor someone who already has all the answers.” since such a description does not fit any religious person i know, muhammad’s view on the need to enter dialogue with those who “know they already to have all the answers” needs further discussion. respect for the power of relationship analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 5 the crucial mechanism that fuels self-conscious agency is the ability of the emerging (expanding) agent to see the changing evaluation of her actions in the responses of those in her social circle. there are two things of note with regard to this process. the first is the notion of the social circle. clearly the influence that any value judgement might have will vary as a function of the quality of the bond between the agent and the other. young johnny, for instance, will clearly care less about the negative evaluation of a grumpy neighbour than he will about the disapproval of his beloved mother. speaking in tune with the notion, eva marsal, in her paper, “the concept of respect – a philosophical challenge,” argues that the affective degree of respect felt or not felt is dependent on the relative proximity to the object,” and that the closer we “zoom in” on the referent, the more concrete the web of conditions becomes which induces us to say “we respect x.” this fact, that “the quality of the bond affects the quality of the influence,” while clearly having important pervasive general implications, has critical ramifications with regard to education in particular. that is, if we presume that agents live in a social world of concentric circles characterized by succeedingly weaker bonds, it follows that part of an educator’s job is to ensure that she is perceived within the influential inner circles of her students if she hopes to be effective. the second not-unrelated thing of note with regard to the process of perceiving the changing evaluation of one’s actions from the viewpoints of others lies in the notion of change. that is, since it is change in the evaluative stance of the other that acts as a “somatic marker” (gardner, “gifting”), it is important to keep in mind that what is perceived as negative will be a function of the baseline quality of the relationship. those who have had the privilege of swimming in a sea of highly positive regard can testify that even a hint of disappointment can have a life-changing impact. thus, since pervasive (as opposed to “unconditional”) positive regard helps to ensure a close-circle location thus increasing the potential for educative influence, and since pervasive positive regard also fuels the power to transmit a negative evaluation with minimal negativity (e.g., the raising of an eyebrow) which, in turn, helps preserve the inner location, it could be argued that pervasive positive regard, at least insofar as it is not unwarranted ( i.e., when intolerance is not more appropriate), may be an important element in respecting others, at least in the sense of optimizing value-communicative interchange. this claim that quality relationship underpins our interdependent self-consciousness calls to mind part of the message of jessica davis’s paper entitled “being participation: the ontology of the socratic method.” though her primary focus is on the use of the socratic method in educational settings, davis’s central message is that preserving/creating relationships is a basic good underived from other values. as davis points out “engaging as such is what it means to be. . . . we are participation.” thus, since i exist and grow as a function of our communicative interchange, and since you do as well, and since our responsibility for responsibilizing one another is, in the process, discharged, the inherent value of relationship per se becomes manifest. dialogue against the background of pervasive positive regard is valuable because, in a slight variation of davis’s words, it best facilitates the means by which each person develops their practical identity and engages in being. we are inherently interconnected and, as such, dialogue is a method conducive to self knowledge and wisdom; we can’t know anything – even ourselves – without recognizing our interdependent ontology. thus davis quotes paulo freire (89) as saying that “love is at the same time the foundation of dialogue and dialogue itself.” as a testament to this very principle, claudia ruitenberg and parvaneh ghazinezhad argue in their paper “is respecting children’s rationality in their best interest in an authoritarian society?” that the mere hope that youngsters might one day learn to own their own thinking is sufficient reward for attempting to engage them in transformative communal inquiry despite the dangers (both to students and teachers) of so doing in a highly authoritarian country. as a testament to the love of which freire speaks, parvaneh quite literally takes up this challenge. creating possibilities through respect in his paper “respect and dignity in the discourse between the private and the public space,” jan kleine argues that with regard to respect, we ought to do away with “artificial” forms, i.e., the kind of “public” respect as in respect for an office, e.g., the presidency, or the general “respect for persons,” and focus, instead on the analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 6 respect deserved (concrete or private respect). thus, according to kleine, a misbehaving president ought not to be respected. on the surface, this view seems to run counter to gardner who argues in favor of the need for “recognition” (or abstract) respect in the sense of “being prepared to participate in the game of interpersonal practical reasoning.” gardner notes however that this abstract respect actually requires that one be prepared to engage in “appraisal” or concrete judgments of others. gardner thus notes that “it is imperative to keep in mind . . . that participant reactive reasoning is inherently judgmental. i can send the message that i believe that you are free not to do what you are doing only through the message that you ought not to be doing what you are doing (or sending its mirror image of praise).” thus, where kleine sees a collision between recognition (abstract) and appraisal (concrete) respect, gardner does not. this may be because, from kleine’s point of view, public respect toward various offices or roles demands a kind of corresponding “submission,” and that this allows occupants to misbehave in ways that would otherwise be found utterly unacceptable, i.e., abstract respect might warp concrete respect. and there is surely merit to this view, i.e., that roles per se garner respect. thus, we expect, do we not, a kind of reverential attitude not only toward the obvious revered roles of heads of state or dignitaries, but also toward virtually anyone occupying publically recognized roles, e.g., doctors, lawyers, teachers, parents, etc. indeed, it is hard to see how a society could function without such role-respect. interestingly, eva marsal’s account of how students at the university for children in bretten, germany, reflect on the concept “respect” supports these very points. marsal quotes 8-year old laura as saying that she would have a whole lot of respect for the mayor who would soon be visiting her school, and 11-year-old louisa as saying that “respect is important because …if nobody respected anyone else there would be total chaos.” differences aside, however, kleine’s initial question as to why we should respect a misbehaving president lays bare a function of respect that often goes unnoticed, namely the importance of creating possibilities through respect. what i mean by this is that, in respecting roles per se (what most certainly would be classified as “abstract respect”), we create the possibility of an individual inhabiting that role. thus, in respecting the role of the teacher by, e.g., inhabiting the role of the student, i create the possibility of an individual becoming a teacher. if i did not, if instead i argued with every suggestion that the teacher made, or, in the words of 11-year-old marvin, if students just kept getting up and running around the classroom (marsal), the teacher would be unable to teach. and similarly, if i did not respect the role of self-conscious personhood by holding the other accountable, i would not create the possibility of other becoming self-conscious and hence accountable. what is particularly intriguing in the above cases is that, in neither of these instances, am i respecting an actual individual. i am, rather, respecting the possibility of what an individual might become. this is, in a sense, a forward looking, but presently vacant, respect. however, precisely because of its lack of concreteness, this sort of respect can be fragile since it is maintained solely as a result of mutual agreement. if we break ranks and start accusing the emperor of wearing no clothes, the emperor will indeed be seen as naked. if we refuse to insist that our students respect the role of the teacher, we will have no teachers. thus, kleine seems right in maintaining that roles per se seem to call for submission, even if the individual occupying the role falls short of expectations. however, in contrast to kleine, it could be argued that, at least for the roles that contribute positively to societal functioning, that is a small price to pay for role-maintenance; and that rather than losing respect for the role when an occupant falls drastically short of role-expectations, the appropriate response would be that that individual be dismissed from the role, precisely in order to maintain respect for the “possibility-creating” power of roles. on the other hand, kleine’s challenge rings out an important warning, namely that we ought to be blind neither to “naked emperors,” nor to royalty in servants’ garb. reflecting back on the “veil issue,” i have in mind here gender roles that persistently and stubbornly ensure that those occupying the male role are often saturated in unearned respect, while those who occupy the female role (particularly the mother role) often suffer from a analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 7 pervasive lack of “abstract respect” along with the limited possibilities that such lack of respect entails. what is interesting about the later situation is that it suggests that abstract respect for roles may, in part, be a necessary condition at least for some sorts of concrete individual (appraisal) respect (e.g., since mothering per se is not respected, excellence in motherhood isn’t either). what is interesting, too, about the latter situation is that, had the discussion with regard to “respect and the veil” been couched in terms of abstract respect (i.e., that the veil is worrying because of its impact on the “role of women” rather than women per se), it might have been seemed less potentially insulting to those actual women who wear the veil. all in all, then, it turns out that the distinction (and potential connection) between recognition and appraisal respect, or between abstract respect for roles that create (or limit) possibilities, and evaluative judgments of actual concrete others, is clearly one that needs to be kept at the forefront of our understanding, if we are to gain a deeper appreciation of the multi-dimensional role (marsal) that respect plays in our lives. silence as a sign of “respect deficit.” picking up on the theme of gender roles in the conference itself, it came as a shock to participants when it was noted near the end of the conference by our university of washington colleagues (jana mohr lone, sara goering, and david shapiro), who gave an intriguing presentation entitled “ the connection between respect, inquiry and philosophy for children,” that though the gender representation at the conference was equal (18 males to 18 females, including non-presenters), approximately 80% of voices in response to the various papers were male. when this was brought to our attention, it is of particular interest that 80% of the enthusiastic responses were again male—some saying they didn’t believe it, some saying they found it unsurprising given the pervasive, often invisible, forces of the patriarchal society in which we live, some talked about feeling self-critical because they knew they frequently occupied an inordinate amount of talk-time but seemed unable to stop, and some said that even if it were true, it wasn’t necessarily a bad thing since, after all, many females had not been aware of this inequity, thus echoing the second response that many of us have become habituated to the patriarchal status quo. the latter point, that the women in the room were unaware of and/or not upset by the male monopoly of talk-time, interestingly reflects a point made in christine ng’s paper, entitled “the ‘problem’ of quiet students,” in which she says that silence isn’t necessarily a bad thing, i.e., that silence on the part of participants in communal inquiry may be a function of the fact that they are so wrapped up in, and presumably benefiting from, the argument that they fail to notice the source of the comments, or even their own relative silence. nonetheless, though silence may not necessarily indicate a lack of inclusion or benefit, the bottom line of ng’s paper was that those who facilitate dialogue have a responsibility to create strategies that discourage monopoly and its co-variant, lack of overt participation, since, clearly, the greatest benefit of dialogical interchange accrues to those who are actively involved. active engagement, after all, ensures that one can grow as a function of testing one’s viewpoints against those of others, and it ensures that one gets practice in, and hence becomes more efficient at, quickly formulating one’s own views coherently. and, as was previously noted, overt engagement is also the active ingredient out of which relational bonds are formed—all of which leads us to an interesting paradox. on the one hand, believing that one is well-placed in one’s social relationships (e.g., the “respectsaturated male role”) is a necessary condition for being comfortable in throwing oneself into genuine dialogue, and yet, on the other hand, genuine and engaged dialogue is a necessary condition for creating relationship. thus, on the assumption that women (who occupy an under-respected gender role) tend to be more intimidated by bonded-dialoging, respect-saturated men than the other way around, and if the result is that men feel more comfortable than women in expressing their viewpoints, and, as a result, in fact do so, then this will create even stronger bonds between the men who are talking, who, in turn, will feel even more at ease to speak in the safe place in which they have already created bonds. it is thus a self-sustaining process, and it is to christine’s credit that she brings what’s in the shadow of those who talk front and centre in her paper. in that regard, we ought to heed ng’s argument that teachers and facilitators have a serious responsibility to be alert to the quiet voices who may be under-confident due to the “respect deficit” of the roles that they occupy, while at the same time being weary of the monopolizing voices of those who may be innocently blind to the “respect deficit” of others. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 8 and so, interestingly, we are back at the beginning. the first day of the conference brought an uncomfortable confrontation with the issue of women wearing literal veils (and how that may distort genuine participatory dialogue). in this discussion of talk-inequity, we found ourselves uncomfortably confronted with the issue of women wearing invisible veils (and how that may distort genuine participatory dialogue). in this regard, gardner (veil) quotes susan sherwin as noting that the capacity to at least recognize and possibly (perhaps even easily) resist structures that may be oppressive (40) is a necessary condition of gender equity. sherwin also notes that it is the society, not just the agent, that ought to be the subject of critical scrutiny under the rubric of what sherwin refers to as “relational autonomy” (42). this “scrutiny of society”—in this case our own interactions during the naaci conference—brought to light the lamentable fact that invisible oppressive forces can creep into the interactions of even well-meaning, self-reflective, highly intelligent, non-patriarchal individuals gathered within a community of inquiry, one of whose goals was to examine this very issue. and it demonstrates in spades that, if respect and the practice of veiling (visible or otherwise) are indeed incompatible, and if pervasive respect is the sort of ideal toward which we all aspire, then we all have our work cut out for us. children and animals call out for “individuating respect.” both david kennedy and wendy turgeon made a strong plea for ramping up our respect for children. though kennedy argued for the need to “listen to children,” it has noted that such an edict, as it stood, carries the danger of being misrepresented as a requirement even for helicopter parents to further intensify their tendencies to indulge (pamper, cosset) youngsters, some of whom are already be on the path of becoming whining, self-centred, spoiled, narcissistic brats (!). (that such a threat is real and has serious gender implication is the topic of elisabeth badinter’s recent book the conflict: how modern motherhood undermines the status of women.) a further suggestion was that what was needed for the flourishing of children was not so much listening per se, but rather authentic communication—though this suggestion too remains opaque. the possibility of an answer to what sort of respect children might require floated through wayne henry’s paper entitled “respect for non-human animals.” though henry’s defence of a “strong animal rights position” was met with some scepticism, the challenge that henry’s paper lays at our feet is daunting. since children are, in many ways, more like non-human animals than human adults (we don’t, for example, recognize the central adult human right/ responsibility of self-determination in either), we are seriously lacking in theoretical framework that sets out guidelines as to what is required with regard to the ethical treatment of either. this need to realign our view of both children and animal/nature is a message found throughout kennedy’s paper. though the title of his paper is “why children deserve to be listened to,” his general message (it seems to me) would not be drastically dislocated if one transformed its title to “why animality (wherever one finds it, e.g., child or nature) deserves to be listened to.” i say this because of kennedy’s insistence that we become sensitive to neoteny, i.e., the child within that remains through adulthood. since the new born child is, after all, a “mere animal,” becoming sensitive to neoteny surely requires that we become sensitive to our enduring animal nature. in line with this view, kennedy refers to marcuse (sensibility1969) in arguing for a new sensibility “which is marked most significantly by the way we experience nature and the lived world”; for an emergent paradigm which finds its primary narrative in a “new relation to nature,” and that “liberation of nature is the recovery of the life-enhancing forces in nature.” (marcuse, nature and revolution, 235). it is for that reason, kennedy argues, that we must transform education so that it is “grounded in an experience of nature as a totality of life to be protected and cultivated”—a suggestion that would support henry’s crusade to enhance respect for non-human animals. turgeon, too, speaks to this child/animal(nature) dyadic challenge. she notes that from the adult human standpoint, many believe that “nature (from rocks to plants to many animals) need not be honoured because as inert matter, as simply ‘natural,’ it has no moral standing. since nature cannot function as a moral agent, the call to acknowledge its status as a moral patient is still suspect.” she goes to note that “children and animals do offer us pause for thought: children as future-persons and animals as metaphorical humans with faces,” but that “too analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 9 often it is simply a pause and we return to our common ways of treating them.” and though the primary focus of turgeon’s paper is the child, much insight can be gleaned (as was done with kenndy’s paper) by substituting “animal” in many of trugeon’s references to the child. so when turgeon makes the case that there is a connection between respecting the child without (korczak) and respecting the child within (bachelard), one can likewise make the case that there is a connection between respecting the animal without and respecting the animal within. similarly, when turgeon makes the case that it is important to relearn how to see the world through the eyes of a child, one can easily make the case for the need to relearn to see the world through the eyes of the animal. intriguingly, turgeon actually refers to temple grandin, in this regard. grandin, an autistic, believes that she is able to see the world in a less conceptualized abstract manner than the way “normal” adult humans see it, i.e., that she believes that she sees the world more like animals do. in support of this point, grandin claims that, like animals, she actually sees trees, i.e., specific individuated trees, rather than mere instantiations of the concept of tree. if all of this is true, i.e., that our actual perception of the world becomes progressively less concrete as our ability for abstraction is enhanced, this child/animal dyadic challenge suggests that, aside from “respect for persons,” we ought to construct another basic category of respect, namely “respect for individuals.” that is, since we are progressively less able or less inclined to see individuals, and we ought to relearn how to do that. this edict, that we ought to “respect individuals,” asks us to don the eyes of the artist—to attempt to see what is right before our eyes. what is particularly interesting about the imperative that we ought to “respect individuals” is that seeing individuals would seem to be a necessary condition of eliciting emotive responses for those actual individuals (rather than for categories, such as “persons”)—something for which turgeon, kennedy, and henry all seem to be making a case. as well, this view is concurrent with the behaviourist claim that emotional responses at their most primitive (and perhaps at their most sophisticated) are elicited through perception: it is the stimulus that produces the response. marsal, too, notes the importance of what we actually see when she reminds us that the notion of respect is derived from the latin respicere, which means “to look back at” or “to look again,” i.e., that respect is a particular mode of apprehending the object: that the person who respects something pays attention to it and perceives it differently from someone who does not, and responds to it in light of that perception. marsal goes on to say (referring to dillon) that “the idea of paying heed or giving proper attention to the object which is central to respect often means trying to see the object clearly, as it really is in its own right, and not seeing it solely through the filter of one’s own desires and fears or likes and dislikes. thus, respecting something contrasts with being oblivious or indifferent to it, ignoring or quickly dismissing it, neglecting or disregarding it, or carelessly or intentionally misidentifying it” (4). in summary, then, if we step back and adopt a phylogenetic/epigenetic perspective, this view suggests that as we animals morph into persons, we may become so preoccupied with managing our self-worth in negotiation with others (howard) that we lose our ability to see any entity who is not a potential partner in this epic struggle, except in energy-saving ways as instantiations of abstract concepts. we can hypothesize that relearning to see other actual concrete individuals (outside of any reference to the struggle for self-worth) would bring with it emotive responses different in kind from those entangled in personhood: emotions such as wonder, amazement, and un-reflected appreciation, as opposed to the emotions of conscience, such as shame, guilt and pride (howard). it may be, too, that in “becoming present” to actual concrete others, we ourselves concretize our own individuality, i.e., we become more than simply the reflection in other people’s eyes. if such is the case, it behoves us to become more aware of the fact that we “animomorphs” rather than merely being “pedomorphs” (kennedy), and in so doing, we may relearn to see the world through the eyes of the animal within. and in so doing, hopefully, we will thereby honour henry’s plea to see and respect the animals without, and to honour turgeon and kennedy’s plea to see and respect the ever-morphing animals that we refer to as children. if we insert the “animal tag” into the final words of turgeon’s paper, the argument looks as follows: we discover our being in the world through the animal/child gaze and unless we can keep that gaze below the surface as still vital, we lose our centre. this demands that we respect the animal/child-within, even as korczak passionately argues for the animal/children without. respecting my animal/child-self will open up my vision of the animals/children around me in ways that i can acknowledge and hold in dialogue with my adult self and respecting animal/children around us reminds us of our own animal/child-self. both movements, within and without, require a relational openness to analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 10 the other as familiar and sharing in the “astonishment of being.” and that movement can open up a window to the larger challenge to respect being in all its manifestations. respecting the limits of communities of inquiry many who are loyal to the wonders of the learning experience imbedded in participating in communities of inquiry may leave conferences dedicated to that topic somewhat ill at ease due to its seeming absence (with notable exceptions, of course, such as the communal inquiry lovingly facilitated by rosario del collado at the 2012 naaci conference). this unease emerges because conferences on the topic of communal inquiry often tend to resemble the more traditional format of presentation, followed by questions. the 2012 naaci conference was no different. reflection on this fact brings to light two related issues, both of which speak to the question brought up by “team alberta” (rob wilson, john simpson, jason taylor) who challenged us to articulate where we go from here. the two issues related to lack of communal inquiry in conferences dedicated to that topic are: (1) whether teaching others how to facilitate communities of inquiry ought to be done solely through the use of that method, and (2) whether teaching practical reasoning, or practical wisdom, ought to rely solely on the use of communities of inquiry. beth dixon and charles list in their paper “breaking the rules of respect” seem inclined to accept suggestion 2. they argue, on the one hand, that conceptual analysis has limited use in guiding behavior in real world circumstances, and, on the other, they argue in favour of the educative merits of, for example, participants, having been given a stimulus (such as the tale of the dancing camel who thought she had become a splendid dancer), and thereafter communally exploring such questions as: should we aim to only please ourselves? should we always please ourselves? who should we listen to when critical advice is offered? and so on. dixon and list argue that, through such experiences, individuals gain the habit of taking into account the myriad of particular contexts in which they will be required to make nuanced judgements. what is interesting about dixon and list’s paper is that it ends with a plea for advice as to how best to teach various ethical concepts in varying circumstances (teaching respectful hunting was also an area that they explored). given that their paper demonstrated the efficacy of communal inquiry, one wonders why the unease as to how to proceed. the answer may lie in a subliminal recognition of the limits of the community of inquiry, at least insofar as it is served up “plain vanilla,” i.e., a short stimulus followed by facilitated discussion of the sort they describe. and it may be precisely the subliminal recognition of the limits of the community of inquiry that scaffolds the comfort that experts feel in abandoning the method in the very conference whose topic is the method. in recognition of the fact that respect for communal inquiry need not be exclusive, maughn gregory, in his paper “the teacher as satyagrahi, or, the necessary inter-relationship among socratic, critical and contemplative pedagogies,” explores the strengths and weaknesses of the different approaches named in his title. if we follow gregory’s line of reason, it would appear that, clearly, there are other ways of knowing/learning than through communal inquiry; why not apps, for example (leask)? and with regard to the lack of communal inquiry at the conference itself, a second look reveals that its use would, in fact, have been inappropriate. that is, had we attempted to treat presented papers as mere stimuli that had no worth other than the capacity to prod thought (as in the dancing camel), this would have been blatantly disrespectful to presenters who were offering up products of the communities of inquiry that they had carried out in their own heads, at the cost of considerable time and energy. and though, as graham mcdonough reminded us, in his paper “high school philosophy teachers’ use of texts: dominated, negotiated, or oppositional?” there is considerable risk in straying from a genuine interchange, i would venture to say that the analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 11 abandonment of the traditional rules of communal inquiry at the conference in no way diminished the value of the learning experience, even for (contra dewey) facilitating future communities of inquiry. that is, to the degree that we came away with an enriched and more complex view of respect, we will not only be more adept at handling that specific issue should it arise, but more importantly, we will be better equipped to understand what is required of us in maintaining respect in future situations of communal inquiry. parting ways with orthodox coi rules in this instance thus generates the suggestion that though it is hard to see how the targeted benefits of communal inquiry such as thinking for oneself, learning to listen to opposing views, and so on, can be gleaned in any other way, there are a myriad of other knowledge gains (gains that can indeed enhance the communal experience) that cannot be so gained, e.g., understanding why communal inquiry enhances one’s freedom, how to logically determine the strength of reasons, and so. to find our way forward, then, in response to team alberta’s challenge, will require ever further clarification of this issue. concluding comments from the point of view of one snapshot of the 2012 vancouver naaci conference, it seems that we learned, through a complex combination of didactic presentation and communal inquiry, that, aside from situations in which either intolerance or tolerance is required, we ought to heed the imperative to engage in the sort of authentic hard-nosed value-communicative-interaction that supports our interdependent self-consciousness and freedom. we also learned that, with regard to its context, pervasive (though not “unconditional”) positive regard maximizes both the efficacy and worth of such interchange. we learned, too, that (abstract) respect for future possibilities may be as important as, or is at least connected to, the (concrete) respect of actual others, and that, in this regard, that we ought to be alert to the oppressive potential of respect-deficit for those who occupy roles of comparatively low worth. and we learned that “respect for persons,” i.e., respect for autonomous rational selfconscious entities, ought not to so preoccupy us that we fail to see the value of, and hence respectfully respond to, individuals who are nonor merely-emerging-persons, and so, ourselves, be diminished in our failure to be “present.” and finally, we have learned the importance of nadia kennedy’s call to respect to the complexity of communicative interaction by “turning around and looking back so that we might understand it better.” this snapshot, that is the result of such “turning around,” is ultimately a product of the gifts we brought severally to, and through communal engagement in, the challenging project of trying to understand the complex notion of respect. it is in that spirit that this snapshot is submitted with a deep and abiding respect to all who so graciously contributed: presenters and non-presenters alike. list of presenters (and papers) at the 2012 vancouver naaci conference (last names in alphabetical order). rosario del collado community of inquiry demonstration. dale cannon. p4c, community of inquiry, and methodological faith jessica davis. being participation: the ontology of the socratic method beth dixon/charles list. breaking the rules of respect: character education in school and nature jason howard. claims of conscience and the space of reasons susan gardner. respect and the veil susan gardner. gifting freedom, not favour. lena green. philosophical inquiry as a means of teaching respect in south african classrooms maughn gregory. the teacher as satyagrahi, or, the necessary inter-relationship among socratic, critical and contemplative pedagogies wayne henry. respect and non-human animals. david kennedy. philosophies of childhood and children’s philosophies. nadia kennedy. respecting the complexity of ci jan kleine. respect and dignity in the discourse between private and public space amy leask. tap, swipe, and think: exploring the use interactive technology in introducing philosophy analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 1 12 to children jana mohr lone; sara goering, david shapiro. the connection between respect, inquiry and philosophy for children. eva marsal. respect and the philosophy of education mort morehouse. thinking about “gifting freedom, not favour” and our future eugene muhammad. taking inter-religious dialogue to the m.a.t.t. (martial arts as a teaching tool): rethinking respect for the other within inter-religious dialogue. graham mcdonough, laura pinto, dwight boyd. high school philosophy teachers’ use of texts: dominated, negotiated, or oppositional? chris ng. the “problem” of quiet students claudia ruitenberg and parvaneh ghazinezhad. is respecting children’s rationality in their best interest in an authoritarian society? wendy turgeon. bachelard and korczak on childhood: constituting respect for the child barbara weber. ‘to tolerate means to insult’ (j. w. v. goethe): towards a social practice of respect and recognition rob wilson, john simpson, jason taylor. building undergraduate communities of inquiry in philosophy, education, and schools other works cited badinter, elizabeth. the conflict: how modern motherhood undermines the status of women.trans. adriana hunter. toronto: harpercollins, 2011.print. darwall, stephan. the second-person standpoint: morality, respect, and accountability. cambridge, mass.: harvard university press, 2006. print. dillon, robin s. 2010. “respect”. in stanford encyplopedia of philosophy http://plato.stanford.edu/ entries/respect/ (2.1.2012). web freire, paulo. pedagogy of the oppressed. new york: continuum, 2000. gardner, s. ‘love thy neighbour? maybe not, in e. marsal, t. dobashi & b. weber (eds.). children philosophize worldwide. frankfurt: peter lang. 2009. print. larson, erik. in the garden of beasts. new york: crown, 2011. print. marcuse, herbert. “repressive tolerance.” ed. robert paul wolff, barrington moore, jr., and herbert marcuse. a critique of pure tolerance. boston: beacon press, 1969. print. marcuse, herbert (1969). “the new sensibility.” in an essay on liberation, 23-48. boston: beacon press. print. marcuse, herbert (1972). “nature and revolution.” in counterrevolution and revolt, 59-78. boston: beacon press. print. sherwin, susan. “a relational approach to autonomy in health care.” biomedical ethics: a canadian focus. ed. johanna fisher. toronto: oup, 2009. 35-43. print. strawson, peter f., “freedom and resentment,” the determinism and freedom philosophy website, (spring 2005), ed. ted honderich, url=<http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/dfwstrawson1.htm>. web. paul ricoeur. oneself as another. trans. kathleen blamey. chicago: university of chicago press, 1992. print. sherry turkle. alone together: why we expect more from technology and less from each. new york: basic books, 2011. print. address correspondences to: susan gardner, capilano university, north vancouver, ca sgardner@capilanou.ca analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 56 “sagely wisdom in confucianism” larry d. harwood i. introduction though westerners may count chinese confucianism as a religion, some are skeptical that confucianism is indeed religious, while others see in confucianism a kind of ethical humanism. huston smith noted the chinese proverb that as a people the chinese admit to being extraordinarily flatfooted,1 that is, with an eye toward the earth. by contrast, the west in general has derived much of its ethical framework from an overt theological and religious background.2 this is decidedly less so in china and in confucianism. as the sages of the chinese people, neither confucius nor lao-tzu is conceived of as a savior, as christ is in the christian religion. there are of course differences between taoism and confucianism. lao-tzu is reported to have said, “banish sageliness, discard wisdom, and the people will benefit a hundredfold.” however, in confucianism, sageliness is the personification of an acquired wisdom that benefits the people in a way denied by lao-tzu. in this paper i will examine the confucian notion of the sage, with some comparisons made along the way to taoism and finally to western thought. ii. as part of his humanistic emphasis, confucius appears to have regarded human nature as exceedingly malleable and thus one of the primary roles of leaders is to provide good ethical models for citizens. ethical character is thus of paramount importance not only for civic leaders, but also for others. in confucian eyes cultures may inordinately rely on laws and law enforcement to police humans rather than developing a significant ethical consciousness in people. in confucianism the meaning of life is negotiated through education, and specifically moral education. the intent of knowledge is not the acquisition of power, whether over humans or nature, as is easily inferred in francis bacon’s dictum that knowledge is equivalent to power. the function of knowledge gleaned from moral education for confucius is rather virtue or goodness. this difference may set westerners, living the legacy of bacon, far from confucius’s ideas. in the 20th century herrlee g. creel wrote of that difference as the old china’s trepidation about what china might become in any interaction with the western world: far more than these material things, the chinese valued the things of the mind. they could see the value of skill that could combine various materials to make a machine to produce goods cheaply, but they thought more highly of the art of making it possible for human beings to live together in harmony and happiness. they valued wealth—the chinese have always valued it—but they could see little usefulness in wealth that did not bring its owner satisfaction, a fuller enjoyment of life, and a sense of security in the esteem of his fellow-men. in these respects they were by no means sure that the way of the west was better. . . .3 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 57 the portrayal of confucius matches well creel’s description of the chinese people, for confucius in many ways molded much of the chinese cultural character. confucius—as he is presented in the analects, for example—is refined, culturally and intellectually sophisticated, reflecting a breath of knowledge capable of negotiating the infinite situations that living presents. he exudes the personification of wisdom. he is studied, thoughtful, and is found carefully sticking to the wisdom gleaned from predecessors—attention to history will therefore be important to confucius. the notion of wiping out cultural memory, such as that undertaken by qin shi huang di, the first chinese emperor, ruling a couple centuries after confucius, appalled the confucians of that emperor’s day. this emperor decides that the way to quell dissent against him is to first engage in burning the books attributed to the ancients, and when that does not stop the outcry against him, he buries alive the scholars, chiefly confucians, who dared to resist him. the point is, moreover, that confucius sees himself standing on the shoulders of a past culture—he is extending it. the emperor’s plan, by contrast, was to cut the wisdom of the past off at the knees, begin as if yesterday had never been. in this sense, of course, confucius can be seen as a romantic desirous of returning the older tradition. lao-tzu, by way of comparison, is more the romantic in the traditional sense—returning to the forest, the field, or the hermitage or monastery. in these actions there can be sageliness also, but of a different sort than that found in confucius. the impression one develops of confucius on reading the analects—the closest thing we have to the historical confucius—is that indeed of a formal man, but also a very moral man and one with an eye for details. confucianism is oftentimes seen as significantly about propriety and the analects lends some credence to such an interpretation. shirttails should be kept in, and things tidied up. i read some years ago of a claim by an author contending that a messy workplace or home space is indicative of a cluttered and messy mind. so too confucian thinking, pursuing the wisdom of sageliness, will insist upon order. without it, not much will happen that we would wish to happen. confucius’s notorious injunction about keeping mats straight reflects,4 moreover, not an obsession with mats but it does draw attention to confucius’s attention to details that matter, and to the fact that he views all of life as a piece. for confucius, all the parts and pieces of anything, to include virtually all details, matter. the mat is perhaps such a detail. as the entrance to a home, for example, there is plausible reason to think that the outside may reflect the inside. one scarcely sees a house with a littered and unkempt yard, only to find the inside of the house immaculate. proper form, then, is about living an ordered and reasoned life. the confucian is studied and scholarly, down to fine details, and ceremony and protocol serve as aids to such a life, not needless diversions—as the more spontaneous taoist will contend against the confucian. in much of the confucian notion of wisdom thus far explicated, we see little reference to matters religious, though we can find some; the emphasis nevertheless is upon an ethical humanism, which moves as naturally as does aristotle from ethics to politics. there is not, however, overt movement between heavenly wisdom and earthy wisdom, as westerners find in their religious traditions. confucians look toward earth. scott morton remarks that the forbidden city, architecturally, hugs the earth.5 the noticeable lines to the eye are virtually all horizontal, not vertical as in christian places of worship, for example. thus, in this sense the chinese have been at home on earth and have not, for the vast stretches of chinese history, been eager for originality or novelty, with which to propel their culture and nation out of the past. until the upheavals of the 20th century china on the whole maintained this kind of cultural composure. when they began to see themselves in competition with the western world, however, this questioning of chinese culture constituted something of an about face for a nation previously contented with a culture seeing little need for cultural interaction with other nations. this fact is no better illustrated than by a famous incident that occurred between the british ambassador macartney and his chinese hosts in 1793. macartney had been dispatched by his king george iii to persuade china into trading with the british empire. the british request fell on deaf ears, and is pointedly rejected in a surviving letter that qialong the china emperor at the time sent to king george of britain. i have but one aim in view, namely, to maintain perfect governance and to fulfill the duties of the state: strange and costly objects do not interest me. if i have commanded that the tribute offerings sent by you, o king, are to be accepted, this was solely in consideration for the spirit analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 58 which prompted you to dispatch them from afar. our dynasty’s majestic virtue has penetrated unto every country under heaven, and kings of all nations have offered their costly tribute by land and sea. as your ambassador can see for himself, we possess all things. i set no value on objects strange or ingenious, and have no use for your country’s manufactures. this then is my answer to your request to appoint a representative at my court, a request contrary to our dynastic usage, which would only result in inconvenience to yourself.6 iii. confucius’s humanistic orientation in his day may have been suspected as giving the ancestors less than their due, because of his primary attention to earth. his shift of focus, however, gleaned from the analects and other sources, seems to be that life in the present is perilously compromised when so little attention is given to it. he has for this reason, been seen by some, as a secularizer. when looked at in this light, his slight attention to heaven seems to suggest that he may have thought his countrymen obsessively religious by way of a supernaturalism of sorts. confucius may have drawn away from that previous kind of religious ancestral devotion in part because of the violent and oftentimes lawless age in which he lived. this may have forced the backward gaze of confucius to ponder the present. such chaotic social conditions may have been the cause that provoked confucius to turn his focus on human relations, and less perhaps on the heaven-human relationship. the christian gospels occasionally speak of violence in heaven; in confucianism there seems no such thing; the mandate of heaven charges the earthly rulers to keep peace on earth and maintain good will to one another. confucius, like other competing thinkers of his time—like lao-tzu and mo-tzu—reasons that a society that perpetually provokes war among its members lacks something significant. however, the discipline of a confucian sageliness will be lost on the taoist who views it as shriveling up the natural vitalities of the human person. it is to make a person into a fixture, but for confucius it is to refashion life into an order that will remove the disordered factionalism that beset so much of his society. the bonds between men, indeed between all members of society were fractured and broken in his day, and confucius and rival teachers proposed various ways in which a society torn by strife could be healed. though confucius spoke to the proper relationship between the ruler and his subjects—because this relationship was the one causing the most hurt to a society of people in his day—confucius also emphasized the necessity for the family to understand and abide by rules and regulations dictated by the responsibilities of family members. a confucius today would probably still contend that most of our large societal problems begin in the home. in confucianism, proper respect for parents, proper gender roles, and thus obedience, are central values—observance of them brings order into the world. it is not, however, the rules in confucianism that are paramount in this inquiry. rather, it is the confucian belief that rules in a sense are secondary or indeed somewhat superfluous to the sage, the truly good and wise man, whether that be the ruler or the citizen ruled. in this idea of an inner discipline, confucianism is somewhat close to an ideological distant chinese cousin, taoism. in taoism one confronts what has been described as a philosophy of nature which provides a philosophy of society or the state, though unlike the confucian vision. while taoism may resemble confucianism with such a goal, the resemblances seem to cease after that. while confucianism is about the conduct of human affairs, it discounts anything like the hermitage or the monastery. the isolation such institutions suggest for human community, so prized by confucius, would be chilling to someone trying to be more human. the taoist, like its reputed founder, however, would as soon ride off into the sunset and the forest to be forgotten. taoism gives in a sense as much advice as confucianism about human conduct, but it is advice that shows their glaring disagreements. taoism strives to instill in humans an appropriate humbleness, most noticeable perhaps in landscape analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 59 painting where humans are drawn to scale with contrasting larger trees and mountains and streams. taoism encourages the quiet, the meditative, the small, the pause, even going to the point of defining its central doctrine as inaction. inaction, however, is not doing nothing, but a will that calmly refuses to exert an apprehensive or auspicious plan, or, finished, that waits presumptuously for accolades. in the suggestions in the little five thousand character classic of taoism, the tao te ching, paradoxes abound. to not strive is to get the job done. to enable churning water to clear itself—let it sit. action as inaction appears mystically effective. not surprisingly, then, to the taoist the confucian looks like the hare of the lost race with the composed and therefore victorious tortoise, who paradoxically looked doomed to fail from the starting line and was mocked by the presumptuous and arrogant hare. the taoist likes spontaneity; the confucian likes a plan and the order that it evokes—the reification of names serves to accomplish a realizable peace for the confucian society. however, to the taoist this ordered life smacks of artificiality, but even more detrimental, a fate ensues similar to the fate of the tallest tree in a lumberjack’s first look at his work for the day, for such activity is attention-getting. for the sophistication of the confucian, the taoist substitutes raw but directed attention to physical nature; the taoist follows the careful and never clumsy or conniving nature. so too, moreover, the taoist will blur the distinction between good and evil. after all, that demarcation is made by humans; it may, after all be a distinction of which nature knows nothing. to the taoist, moreover, the tao is sacramentally present in the world of nature. though there might be little in confucius the man, and indeed in confucianism to suggest anything overtly or strongly religious in the western sense,7 there is in confucianism a certain conservatism that pervades his teaching, and it was much of this that the communists of the 20th century opposed. respect for parents, proper gender roles, and thus obedience are central values. respect for one’s elders and other persons of responsibility inculcates in confucianism a conferred blessing on a status quo, that while contributing to stability, could also impede progress. jonathan spence, in one of his many books on china relates the story of talking to a chinese after the 1989 incident of tiananmen square. the chinese man expressed his remorse that his country’s leaders had opted for such a violent solution to a protest for freedom and democracy. he went on to add, however, that she was “still your mother” even when her behavior was not so laudable.8 spence comments that maybe it is a mistake to think of your country as your mother; thus maybe confucianism inculcated this kind of complacency with an institution that on such occasion stood in the way of the people. of course confucius the man saw plenty of corruption in his day and protested, but confucian adherence to tradition has sometimes made the removal and the resistance to the respected older order more painful than it might have been if such strong familial and societal bonds were not so impervious to change. because china has had a long history of veneration, if not to say worship of ancestors, the implication of such veneration is that the chinese believed in a universe that had a spiritual component running through both the world of the living and the dead. proper respect for the deceased ancestors had its rewards, for by one understanding of the link between worlds, the deceased communicated messages to the living that were of value for negotiating life’s present trials and vicissitudes. neglect of the ancestors was to court disaster. the ancestors in a sense were only visibly absent; their presence was distilled from messages sent to the still living, who needed, above all else, to listen. to this day, respect for the ancestors is a staple of chinese family and society, and the early communists who prohibited burials of corpses due to the touted greater need for agricultural land, incurred the muted hostility of the chinese people for this sacrilege. even contemporary chinese christians, like brother yun, tells of his shock at learning about christians in america not even placing a headstone at the grave of their deceased relatives.9 iv. when we turn to consider what confucius said about a morality beyond the law, care must be exercised. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 60 confucius is easily dismissed into being a dreamy idealist when we find, for example, these words from the analects, (12/13): “i can try a lawsuit as well as other men, but surely the great thing is to bring about that there be no going to law.” however, while confucius recognized this goal as the ideal, he also admits the real need for a penal law that will govern citizens who are otherwise ungovernable. thus, the emphasis and preference upon moral education as making citizens moral did not preclude the necessary existence of laws and law enforcement for him. as a political philosopher, however, confucius did not simply stop at the necessary requirement of law to capture those individuals who will honor no laws. confucius also insists upon morality being exercised at another level, beyond that of the law. indeed, a society that is only held up or together by external fences will have to build them higher and mightier if the broaching of the boundaries grows excessive. confucius is simply suggesting that the outer law needs to work from within the citizen for maximum effectiveness. thus, to build the ideal state, the state will need an ideal leader. ultimately, confucius advocates what amounts to citizens capable of morally ruling themselves, as when he writes in the analects (2/3): the master said: ‘if you govern the people by laws, and keep them in order by penalties, they will avoid the penalties, yet lose their sense of shame. but if you govern them by your moral excellence, and keep them in order by your dutiful conduct, they will retain their sense of shame, and also live up to this standard. in this passage, confucius points out that morality can be cultivated or enforced. at the same time, he also indicates the extreme importance of the ruler ruling by example rather than crude mandate. indeed it is probable that the ruler will rule better by example than by the laws he has on the books for the citizens. in this sense, confucius affirms the notion that morality comes before the law, however much it is needful at times to use the law to enforce morality. this difference is most important, moreover, for powerful officials where a discrepancy by them has more drastic impact than it would at the level of an individual citizen. furthermore, confucius may even be willing to tolerate a ruler who will rule morally, whatever his inducement to be moral, simply because his example as ruling morally will be with powerful and positive affect among his citizens. even this possibility, however, makes the ruler more prudent than moral, and so this formulation is not preferred by confucius. indeed, the ruler should have a moral authority derivative from his true moral character, and in his example he should seek to instill the same into his citizens. one of confucius’s analogies for this relationship is beautifully stated in the analects (12/19): if your aspirations are for good, the people will be good. the moral character of those in high position is the breeze, the character of those below is the grass. when the grass has the breeze upon it, it assuredly bends. v. in the general and modern western conception of law and citizens, broadly speaking, the nation is conceived as one of laws and not men. leaders were thus not above the law, but law above all, and the duty of leaders is to uphold the law by which all are weighed. the confucian, by contrast, anticipates the effective leader as in a sense molding the office he holds, through his example of upholding moral principles he exudes. that leader is a sage, however, and not a strategist. the confucian perspective is sometimes said for this reason to be anti-legal, though this perspective certainly does not encourage lawlessness. if we relegate our comparison to differences, however, we are apt to think that western thinkers are far from confucius. in order to indicate something of a western resonance toward confucius on this point i shall consider how immanuel kant’s moral philosophy is similar to confucius. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 61 kant is famous for his remark that two things amazed him, the starry heavens above and the moral law within. his significant writings on ethics and the moral law are for the most part separated from religion, similar to confucius. in fact, at the conclusion of his famous essay entitled “what is enlightenment,” the chains that prevent such enlightenment, he contends, are religious. kant in effect is one of the turning points in the history of western ethics, not just for his famous explanations of deontological views on right and wrong, but also for his view that right and wrong bear ever smaller indebtedness to religious belief. one might say, per our previous comments on confucius, that kant is perhaps in historical attitude like confucius, with regard to confucius’ estimation of the excessive religiosity of the sage’s day. kant’s ethical view is that what makes an action right or wrong is the motivation or intention with which one undertakes the moral choice made. he therefore holds that the purest thing in ethics is the good will, meaning a will with good intent, and not one swayed by possible consequences. kant holds that a consideration of possible consequences as determining moral choice is itself immoral, meaning it is a consideration of prudence, with little relationship to real morality. the humanism of kant’s duty ethic warns against the mistreatment of people by advocating a notion of intrinsic rights which kant gives to human subjects. this simply means that people have certain rights which as a matter of moral integrity we should respect. we therefore should never use (abuse) a person for our own gain, because this is to use a person as a means to our gain, without respect to their wishes, or freedom—for kant a huge ethical violation. such action is therefore disrespectful of another person as a person, as grist and gain for our own selves, whom we value less than our own selves. kant will have none of that, but most important is what he says about what makes a moral person indeed moral and the resemblance to confucius’s notion of true human wisdom. to some—though not to confucians i suspect—kant holds a rather strenuous notion of who qualifies as a truly moral person. that person is not necessarily a person who never commits a crime, for the absence of criminal activity may be the simple result of one having estimated the costs of getting caught too high. in other situations that same person may have done the opposite. such a person really has no moral boundaries that he has laid down for himself; indeed others, the lawgivers, have laid them down for him, by reason of fearing what this individual might do in a lawless society. he is not really a moral person when he merely and prudently stays on the side of the law rather than goes against it. ultimately, this person can be considered to be a consequentialist—they are considering the pain and unhappiness of possible jail time as a reason not to do what they might otherwise prefer to do. in kant’s mind, no such person is truly moral, only prudently practical. this is because they would live different moral lives, if they did not have to contend with the possibility of police, for example. laws are indeed necessary for such people, because without such laws to enforce morality, society would be in mortal peril. laws are needed; but the prior question is also needed; why are the laws needed? they are needed for the immoral person who will not be “moral” at all without them. the most we can hope for from such a person—but even that is to say too much—is that they need moral authorities or the lawgivers, because they are incapable of giving themselves the law. in kant’s words, they have not self-legislated the moral law for themselves. they need someone to do it for them. they are not therefore, in another matter of speaking, mature or enlightened, but still children, who, even as adults, still require the tutelage of others, because they have not taught themselves the moral rightness of the law. in a sense, then, law is made for people without sufficient moral foundation to feel the constraints of morality without the constraints of the law added. law, therefore, truly is made for the lawless. so, contrary to the general western notion of thinking of such a notion as dispensing with the need for law and as encouraging lawlessness,” we find kant affirming much of the same point made by confucius. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 62 vi. conclusion the internal nature of morality with reference to external law seems easy enough to grasp. that is, it seems thoroughly cogent to argue that behavior is preferable that is self-governing rather than behavior requiring governance. it is thus admittedly a theoretical distinction by which we rightly gauge the better behaviors. even the new testament speaks of that “perfect love which cast out fear.” however, to attempt to prompt perfection by removing regulation is to court responses that may end up requiring regulation. i think kant and confucius would admit this judgment and the necessity of penal law and prisons, but nevertheless argue that their distinction is one ever calling us to moral improvement by acknowledging the difference. in other words, there is a standard of sorts by which moral advance is encouraged, and to speak of it often is to remind subjects of the moral hazard of ignoring the fact that that morality is best which needs regulation least. there is a difference of sorts on this point between confucius and kant, however. kant wants to argue that morality should be ultimately autonomous, whereas for confucius one way of cultivating a people is with a leader who is cultivated morally and thus offers good moral example to citizens by the way the ruler lives and governs. confucius’ argument for exemplary living from the ruler might be distilled down to “do as i do,” on the part of the moral ruler. kant i think would accept such a program to a degree, and probably the differences between confucius and kant on this point are the historical centuries that separate them more than anything else. moreover, confucius and kant, i think, would be in agreement that the moral person is indeed the wise person. the wise person is not a technocrat, nor wise simply because they are smart or prudent, but wise because they can manage themselves as humans. far from human wisdom isolating the wise individual from others, others lacking wisdom are drawn to the wise person. the wise person is not sealed off from others, but affords others a contact with himself that benefits them. the wisdom the wise person possesses is not encyclopedic wisdom, but the wisdom of knowing how to rightfully live with self and with others. knowing how to live places such a person in a position to be emulated by those adrift morally and so too distant from wisdom. the wise person is the sound person who draws others to the moral example provided with a life. there is symmetry in such an individual that awakens those without to the moral truth that resides within such a person, while it exudes praise to onlookers. ultimately, therefore, the communication of such wisdom should be one of the highest aims of education. if the meaning of life is in education, as confucius taught, the meaning of education is to live rightly. endnotes 1 huston smith, the world’s religions, revised edition, san francisco, harper, 1991, p. 157. 2 this is not to ignore the greco-roman heritage of the west, but to simply point out the presence of a strong religious heritage within the broad tradition of the west. 3 herrlee g. creel, chinese thought from confucius to mao tse-tung, chicago: university of chicago press, 1953, p. 2. 4 confucius, the analects, book x, chapter ix. 5 w. scott morton and charlton m. lewis, china: its history and culture, 4th edition, mcgraw-hill, 2005, pages 126-7. 6 morton and lewis, p. 152. 7 theodore t.y. yeh, in his confucianism, christianity and china, new york, philosophical library, 1969, writes the following, p. 203, “a confucian may be aware of faults due to the effects of environment, but he is hardly aware of sin in the christian sense of relating him to a god and to his fellowmen. there can be no need of grace or of a saviour, with sin being only an ‘impropriety.’” analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 63 8 jonathan d. spence, the search for modern china, new york: w.w. norton, pp. 746-7. 9 brother yun, the heavenly man, by brother yun with paul hattaway, monarch books, london, 1985. address correspondences to: larry harwood viterbo university la crosse, wi ldharwood@viterbo.edu analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 58 engaging in critical dialogue about mathematics1 marie-france daniel abstract the goal of this paper is to highlight the fact that the philosophy for children approach (p4c) can be used to stimulate pupil’s reflection within the framework of school subjects such as mathematics. first we situate p4c within the field of socio-constructivist epistemology. then, p4c as adapted to mathematics (p4cm) is introduced. finally, we describe an experiment linked to five types of exchanges (anecdotal, monological, simple dialogical, semi-critical dialogical, and critical dialogical), manifested between the beginning and the end of a school year while the pupils were learning to philosophize about mathematics. in the discussion, emphasis is placed on the educational interventions of the teachers who facilitate the p4cm workshops. key words: philosophy for children; mathematics; socio-constructivist epistemology; critical dialogue. in many countries, mathematics seems to be the bane of both pupils and teachers. many pupils fail in this subject, starting in elementary school. many pupils have a difficult relationship with mathematics. many are those who do not understand its meaning or do not see its usefulness or who have negative biases with regard to the subject (i.e. too abstract, too difficult to understand, etc.). some pupils try to avoid any situation which might confront them with problems with mathematical content because they are convinced they cannot succeed in this discipline because they do not have “mathematical logic” or are not a “math wiz.” these attitudes reflect established beliefs that are not entrenched or a priori judgments that constitute barriers to the learning process (lafortune & solar, 2003; lafortune et al., 1999, 2003). according to lafortune et al. (1999, 2003), in a majority of classrooms, teaching mathematics consists of “teaching to learn.” so educational approaches focused on reflection are hardly used, or not at all. a justification that is often cited by teachers is lack of time, too little time to do activities with the pupils other than those that are directly related to the subject content. consequently, many pupils come to think that “learning math” means memorizing procedures, applying them and finding exact answers. at the end of the 1990’s, philosophy for children adapted to mathematics (p4cm) was proposed with the objective of guiding second-cycle elementary school pupils in critical reflections regarding prejudices about mathematics and about philosophical-mathematical concepts adapted to teaching programs for these pupils. experiments conducted with groups of pupils aged 9 to 12 years have indicated that p4cm positively stimulates reflection and dialogical competencies in these pupils. in the following pages, we introduce three socio-constructivist epistemological principles, which are also inherent in p4c. then, we present the p4cm material that was used in the classrooms. finally, we describe an experiment that involved learning to engage in philosophical dialogue about mathematical questions. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 59 philosophy for children and socio-constructivist epistemology the philosophy for children (p4c) approach, introduced in quebec in 1982 by anita caron, was conceived by matthew lipman and his colleagues at montclair state university (n.j.) early in the seventies. this approach differs from traditional educational approaches in that instead of searching for “the” correct answer (the one in the manuals and expected by the teacher), youngsters learn to ask relevant questions, to think on their own and to discuss problems through philosophical dialogue among peers (lipman, 2003; lipman et al., 1980). p4c is inspired by the pragmatist educational philosophy, which focuses on the child’s global development and emphasizes the needs and interests of youngsters as well as their everyday experiences (daniel, 1997). and p4c is related to a socio-constructivist epistemology (daniel, 2005). in view of the strong influence of socio-constructivism in quebec school-teaching programs (mels, 2002) and programs in other countries, it is important to present three of its principles, which reflect the pragmatist aims of the lipmanian approach. the first principle concerns the constructed nature of knowledge; the second concerns the viable nature of knowledge; and the third concerns its social nature (see among others: glasersfeld von, 1994, 2004; jonnaert & m’batika, 2004; jonnaert & masciotra, 2004; legendre, 2004; masciotra, 2007; masciotra et al., 2008; and pallascio, 2004). the first principle, concerning the constructed nature of knowledge, implies that knowledge is not an objective reality predetermined outside the subject, but rather a construction of the subject-in-search-ofknowledge (dewey, 1967; ruel, 1994). in other words, reality only exists within the subject and depends on the subject; it must be constructed and not discovered; it thus places the subject in a position of active researcher (actor) rather than passive reception (receptor). in p4c (and p4cm), three consequences of applying this principle are: developing responsibility in the pupil, developing the pupil’s involvement in the collective process of knowledge production and, in so doing, developing the pupil’s self-esteem. the second principle emphasizes the viable nature of knowledge; it thus confronts the notion of “truth.” indeed, according to pragmatists and constructivists, truth is never final; it is an open process that is never reached since it is relative to norms that are accepted at the time and to criteria temporarily established by a group, a society or a culture. for example, we know that each scientific community, each school of thought accepts as “true” what suits it, and yet at times the interpretations of some of these communities happen to be contradictory, each one justifying its perspective according to specific and different theoretical frameworks. constructivists speak of the “sustainability” or viability of knowledge, terms that refer to a search for explanations and sustainable interpretations of how the world works; pragmatists use the term “contextualization,” which means that these explanations and interpretations result from an adaptation linked to the context and that they stem from experience. thus, sustainability or contextualization of knowledge implies a diversity of supported and justified explanations and it rests on sharing within a community of peers. indeed, it is to the extent that it is experientially or theoretically justified, then reaffirmed by various subjects, that constructed knowledge is validated and considered “true” (bayles, 1966; glasersfeld, von, 1994, 2004). in the context of p4c, it is the sustainability of the pupils’ constructed knowledge that determines its validity – more than its correspondence to established scientific knowledge. consequently, pupils are called upon to experiment, justify and confront their points of view. the third principle emphasizes the social character of the knowledge production process. it is based on, among others, vygotsky’s (1985) theoretical principles, which postulate that people construct their knowledge through language and social interaction. as mead (1972) explains, socio-cognitive processes are deployed based on stimulation of complex thinking skills, which develop through a person’s relationships with her environment. in other words, social interactions are as fundamental to cognitive development as language itself, and increasing sophistication in the knowledge-construction process cannot occur without the subjects’ analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 60 interactions, in particular language interactions (auriac, 2007; larochelle & désautels, 2001; le cunff, 2009; vygotsky, 1985). the third principle leads pupils to transcend simple memorization and actively engage in a conscious and voluntary inquiry process with their peers. it is through cognitive conflicts that emerge from divergent points of view among peers that pupils are brought to question and to doubt reality, suggest alternative solutions, criticize suggested alternatives, and identify criteria to bring to light the most coherent solution (dewey, 1925, 1983; fourez, 1998; larochelle, 1998; larochelle & désautels, 2001). thus, the third socio-constructivist principle refers to the complexity of pupils’ thinking. this complexity is made possible through philosophical dialogue among peers, without which it would be difficult to construct, transform and enrich meanings regarding mathematical problems and concepts. philosophizing about mathematics inspired by the p4c approach, a team comprised of a philosopher of education and two mathematicians conceived material to help youngsters at the end of elementary school to dialogue about and reflect on mathematics in a critical manner (daniel et al., 1999, 2004) . this material does not pretend to fall within the scope of the philosophy of mathematics. it simply aims to stimulate pupils toward an autonomous and critical comprehension of mathematical problems and concepts included in their study programs , as well as biases and stereotypes that are often attached to this subject. the philosophy for children adapted to mathematics (p4cm) material includes a philosophical novel and a manual for teachers. the novel, titled the mathematical adventures of matilda and damian, presents the questions and reflections of end-of-elementary school pupils regarding mathematics. it tells the story of matilda who succeeds very well in math but is worried that her reputation as a “math wiz” may make her unattractive to matthew. damian, who excels at art, hates math and has all kinds of negative prejudices toward the subject. the manual includes approximately 300 philosophical-mathematical discussion plans and activities to explore questions such as: is there such a thing as a perfect cube? is zero equal to nothing? if you were able to count every grain of sand on the planet, would you say the number is infinite or indefinite? is math useful in your life? does the teacher know everything?, etc. following is an excerpt from the novel: matilda goes into her bedroom and slams the door shut. as usual, she takes off her shoes, drops her backpack in a corner and throws herself on her bed. ohhhh she feels good! matilda likes her bedroom. it is a little green room with a square floor. -oh! one could say it’s almost a cube! isabel spoke to us about cubes this morning, in geometry class. what exactly did she say? matilda frowns, trying to recall. the words of isabel, her teacher, slowly come back to her. things always happen like that in matilda’s head. first, her thoughts form a type of large, thick cloud. then, one by one, her ideas emerge from the thickness of the cloud. only then can she can grasp and inspect them. while continuing to think reflectively, matilda vaguely looks around her. she wonders: can a room really be a cube or does it just look like a cube? isabel said, i remember now, that it was impossible to have an absolutely perfect cube on earth. that’s astonishing! matilda tries to think some more about this question, but she is tired. she gets bogged down in her ideas, gets impatient and, finally, gives up. “tomorrow, i will ask isabel to clarify this. after all she is the teacher! she must surely know all about geometry.” matilda’s thoughts take wing, freed from their mathematical problem. she starts to dream about matthew. she would so like him to be her boyfriend. (need pp. #) to fully exploit the first philosophical-mathematical concept in this chapter (can a perfect cube exist?) – which analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 61 pupils do not fail to question – the teachers’ manual suggests a concrete activity for pupils, that is, the drawing of a cube. then, to guide the teacher in her socratic maieutics regarding the perfection (or imperfection) of a cube, the manual proposes the following discussion plan: are the drawings you just made cubes or do they just look like cubes? why? is a cube a square? explain the similarities and the differences. how many square faces, summits and edges can you find on a cube’s surface? does the number of faces, summits and edges vary according to the size of the cube? why? establish a parallel between a cube and some other thing. for example, take the word “tree.” is the word itself a tree or just a concept that encompasses every type of tree that exists on the planet? what is the difference between the word “tree” and a real tree? can you answer the question matilda asks herself: what is the difference between “being a cube” and “looking like a cube”? (need pp. #) the p4cm material is said to be philosophical in that it contains open-ended questions that enable pupils to reflect upon a diversity of viable and reliable answers. to answer these philosophical-mathematical questions, pupils must actively engage in a critical reflection process. and since the process is too complex for individuals to achieve results, it is carried out with peers. reflection within a community of inquiry, because of the diversity of points of view it presupposes, stimulates pupils at the cognitive level. also, as verbal interactions are required to answer the philosophical-mathematical questions, pupils are stimulated on the discursive level (among others: daniel et al., 2002, 2005). the following section focuses on learning philosophical dialogue. description of an experiment the p4cm material, because it resides within the scope of the philosophical process suggested by lipman and his colleagues, is likely to foster critical exchanges among pupils. indeed, first, pupils use the story of matilda and damian as a pretext to question philosophical-mathematical concepts or biases regarding mathematics. then, with reference to the story, pupils formulate questions they would like to discuss with their peers. and, finally, they exchange among each other, with teacher guidance, so that as a group they can construct elements of answers that are reliable and viable. the objective of the third step is not to let pupils “talk” (daniel, 2000, 2009), nor to encourage argumentation, as in a competition (see dolz and schneuwly, 1998; le cunff, 2009), but to encourage pupils to dialogue philosophically in a perspective of cooperation, where each individual intervention contributes to enriching the group’s perspective. the essence of p4cm is found in learning to dialogue about mathematics. philosophical dialogue requires regular and continuous practice (approximately one hour per week for at least one school year). a study conducted in australia, mexico and quebec , in eight classrooms of pupils aged 10 to 12 years who used p4cm, revealed that the exchanges can remain anecdotal or monological during the entire school year if they are not adequately guided by the teacher (daniel et al., 2002; daniel & delsol, 2005). we considered an exchange to be anecdotal when youngsters speak in a non-structured manner about personal and particular experiences. when this is the case, pupils are not engaged in a process of inquiry, they do not share a common goal and they are little or not at all influenced by peer interventions. furthermore, they do not justify their points of view and their opinions are presented as conclusions. following is an example of an anecdotal exchange centred on personal experiences: teacher: in the story, why doesn’t ramon like math exams? pupil 1: i become nervous during exams. pupil 2: because sometimes, i, because i worry. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 62 pupil 3: because i am nervous. we considered an exchange to be monological to the extent that pupils begin to engage in a personal process of inquiry that is essentially oriented toward a quest for “the” correct answer. each pupil intervention is independent from the others, and answers are juxtaposed to one another. the analysis illustrates that in this type of exchange, pupils have difficulty in justifying their opinions. it is only when philosophical praxis is established and when pupils have become aware of their individual rights (e.g. to think in an autonomous matter) and responsibilities (e.g. to share their thoughts) that they start to de-center from their own points of view and start to listen to those of their peers. pupils are then able to dialogue; they begin to form a “community of inquiry” and they actively participate in the reflection as they are motivated by a common goal (daniel et al., 2000). but to dialogue does not inevitably mean to dialogue in a philosophical or critical manner, as pupils may co-construct their point of view without evaluating the validity, usefulness, or viability of the statements or criteria in question. in a non-critical dialogue, pupils respect differences of opinion; they construct their points of view based on those of their peers; they begin to justify their positions. however, they do not yet “philosophize” concerning mathematics even though they are situated within a philosophizing learning process. following is an example of a non-critical dialogical exchange: teacher: why do you say geometry is an interesting subject? pupil 1: because it is part of our daily lives. pupil 2: that’s true because at school, for example, we learn to measure figures and when we’re older and we will want to buy some land, we will know how much land we have. pupil 3: i agree with pupil 2. and also because with geometry, for example, architects can build schools, buildings and all, stores and all that we need in our lives like pupil 1 said. non-critical dialogue, or simple dialogue, is the type of exchange that seems the most valued by the current school systems. indeed, intrinsically, it includes values that are highly regarded socially, such as pluralism, accepting differences, and tolerance of differences of opinion. however, despite its dialogical nature, this is not enough to help young generations meet the challenges of the 21st century. indeed, our study revealed that simple dialogue fell within the scope of an epistemology we refer to as relativism (daniel et al., 2005; daniel, accepted). relativism carries meanings that are both positive (openness, respect, tolerance, etc.) and negative (tolerance can lead to intellectual complacency to the extent that any premise is acceptable and accepted). complacency, which is a pitfall in any non-critical exchange, anchors youngsters in a mentality of nonquestioning, acceptance, and even passivity. in fact, our analysis of exchanges among pupils brought to light three types of dialogical exchanges: noncritical, semi-critical and critical. the semi-critical dialogical exchange is manifested when, in a context of interdependence, some pupils are sufficiently critical to question the statements of their peers, but the latter are not critical enough to be cognitively influenced by this criticism, so that the criticism does not lead to a transformation (nuance, clarification, etc.) of the perspective. following is an excerpt of a semi-critical dialogical exchange: teacher: can we speak of a perfect cube? pupil 2: i say maybe it’s possible, to have a perfect cube, because if you take 4 (sic) squares and if you look at them, then with a blade, you take a little bit away… you keep on taking away little bits until they become equal… pupil 3: at the end, you’re going to need instruments that are too small to do analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 63 something. pupil 4: you’d have to be lucky […]. pupil 3: no. i don’t think that if you measure the centimeters… after, you have to comeround to millimeters, then you come to hundredths of mm, then to thousandths of mm, you keep going like that. you’ll never be able to make a perfect cube if you measure […] pupil 2: you could take geometry blocks. pupil 5: yes, but geometry blocks aren’t all equal. [… the makers] make them as equal as possible, the most perfect possible, but that doesn’t mean they’re perfect, perfect, perfect. they may seem perfect to us, but… pupil 2: i say it might be possible to have a perfect cube. as to the dialogical critical type of exchange, it is manifested when the pupils’ points of view contribute not only to improving the group’s perspective, but to transforming it (rorty, 1990a, 1990b, 1991). this type of exchange implies the following criteria: explicit interdependence among pupils; the inquiry is focused on construction of meaning (vs. search for truth); pupils are aware of the complexity of their peers’ points of view; they search for divergence and consider uncertainty to be a positive cognitive state; criticism is sought for its own sake, as a tool to further comprehension; pupils spontaneously justify their points of view coherently and completely; a social/ethical preoccupation can be observed in their interventions; statements are articulated in the form of hypotheses to be verified rather than as closed conclusions. following is an extract of a dialogical critical exchange: teacher: last week, we looked at the order of animals and the order of maths, which ones you thought were higher. can one of you (…) take up the discussion where we left off? pupil 2: i would place humans in fourth or third place or maybe second because i don’t think we deserve to go at the top for what we’ve done to all those animals and how we’ve had wars. and like animals don’t care, i mean they have wars sometimes but it’s when they need to be in the higher group to be respected more. (…) so i think that animals are a higher level than humans but they respect other people and we tend to be selfish. pupil 4: i think that humans are the only ones that can do math, because it’s like english: humans invented english. and math is just like another language that we invented. we use it to understand things, to do the things we have to do well, to understand the reasons behind things. like why the sky is blue and why we can’t float or fly. so we invented maths to explain these things. (…) but the animals they just think sky and they don’t really think about it, because they’ve got one main instinct which is eat and reproduce. teacher: and how does that affect the order of things? pupil 4: oh, well if it’s the order of how smart they are, i think humans would have to be at the top. teacher: humans would have to be. why? what criteria are you using? pupil 4: on how complex they are. and that we’ve got other intelligences, like i said yesterday, empathy and sympathy and stuff like that. pupil 5: i agree because if i had to rank any of the animals in a higher order or whatever, i think i’d put humans on the top as well because (...) we do things for our own pleasure and usually we do them of our own accord. we usually do whatever we want because we’ve got better resources for it and we’ve created more things. it’s just our brain power is larger. i don’t know if it is but i think that our brain power is larger. pupil 6: i disagree with pupil 5 when he said they don’t build things. they build nests, analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 64 they build burrows, they have got to work out how to build them, that’s not really easy. and they only kill what they need. pupil 5: [...] i think i sort of changed my mind. i sort of agree with pupil 6 (…). then there are like two different paradigms. pupil 6: yes, there is the intelligence to think how to make things and the intelligence of how to use these things. we are both the most stupid and the most intelligent. in short, the experiment we conducted in three countries led us to understand that pupils from elementary school have the competencies to philosophize about mathematical concepts and problems. the p4c method, inherent in the p4cm material, helped them to dialogue in a critical manner with their peers. discussion observations in quebec, australia, france, méxico and elsewhere have shown that most pupils who participate in p4c workshops have trouble philosophizing or engaging in critical dialogue, no matter what the framework in which these sessions take place (ethics, violence prevention, language arts, or mathematics). after analysis, we have come to understand that this difficulty is neither associated with the pupils’ cultural background, nor with the school subject in which these philosophical workshops take place. we have also come to understand that difficulties in philosophizing were not due only to a cognitive or epistemological limit in younger pupils – even though age is a factor (see daniel & gagnon, 2012). we observed that it stemmed from, among other things, the stimulation-reflection relationship between teacher and pupils. following are four typical sessions that brought to light some intrinsic relationships between teacher questions and pupils learning to philosophize: a) when the teacher did not closely monitor the pupils’ reflection, in other words when she let them “talk” about questions they had formulated when they were collecting questions (e.g.: why is math boring? why is math stressful? why do we do math?), most of the time pupils discussed idiosyncratically on more than one idea at a time – instead of expanding on one by providing definitions, by identifying relationships, by finding causes and consequences, etc. they did not focus on a common objective (e.g.: the origin of negative prejudices toward mathematics), instead focusing on a diversity of specific objectives relating to their interests (their fears or frustrations) regarding the subject; their exchange was linear since it was only slightly or not at all argumentative; finally, the classroom remained an aggregation of individuals who generated ideas juxtaposed to one another, instead of actively participating in a dialogue within a community of inquiry. b) when the teacher (contrary to the previous situation) kept to her traditional role, despite the use of philosophical material, and focused on questions related to the discipline (e.g.: how many square faces are in a cube? how many edges are there?) without following through on this theoretical learning with a philosophical reflection about, among other things, “similarities and differences” (e.g.: does the number of faces and edges vary according to the size of the cube? why?), then pupils set as their objective to answer the teacher’s questions correctly, rather than aiming at the construction of meanings together with their peers. in addition, they waited for the teacher to question them to state their points of view instead of embarking upon an autonomous inquiry. c) when the teacher de-emphasized her role as a “transmitter” to favour her role as a “guide” and supported the pupils in their reflections (e.g.: who can provide an example to illustrate what x just said? who can offer another example? who agrees with what x just said?) without, however, stimulating their argumentative and critical skills (see examples in d), then pupils learned to think autonomously but did not learn to argue; they sometimes opposed their peer’s ideas, but more in a perspective of confrontation than negotiation; they were hardly ever able to completely justify their points of view; instead, they used personal examples to demonstrate their points of view. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 65 d) when the teacher encouraged pupils to reflect on mathematics (e.g.: can you define what a cube is? does what you just said imply that …?), when she fostered pupil interaction (e.g.: regarding what x just said, do you think that…?, who can answer y’s question? look at z when speaking to him), when she asked for justifications (e.g.: why do you say that geometry is an interesting subject? what criteria do you use to say that humans are more intelligent than animals?), when she stimulated criticism (e.g.: who disagrees with x’s idea? who can refine what y just said? who has a counter-example? who can reformulate and clarify what was just said? among the criteria we have just named, which seems most reliable or appropriate?), etc., then it was observed that pupils learned to respect divergent points of view, to justify their opinions, to evaluate the statements of their peers and their own in a constructive manner, to realize that criticism, when formulated positively, contributes to enhancing perspectives; in short they learned to philosophize about mathematics. in sum, as shown from certain analyses, the implementation of philosophical dialogue among youngsters is not spontaneous, and the mobilization of critical thinking is not innate. also, it is fundamental that, in a philosophical workshop, the role of the teacher be anchored in rigorous and critical questioning. one of the challenges facing teachers who use p4cm with elementary school pupils consists in becoming aware of the differences between, on one hand, conversation (monological exchange) and dialogue and, on the other hand, between non-critical dialogue and critical dialogue. without awareness of these differences, youngsters’ exchanges may stagnate in simple conversation and, consequently, not help them to think critically about the mathematical problems they must solve, and not help them develop reliable and valid judgments regarding the meaning of concepts related to their learning in this subject (see daniel, accepted). conclusion it is both appropriate and necessary to help pupils to philosophize in all school subjects, particularly in mathematics, because many pupils have trouble succeeding in the subject. philosophizing implicitly refers to learning to dialogue and, more specifically, to learning to engage in critical dialogue among peers. this is because, essentially, criticism (presented in the form of questions, doubts, counter-examples, etc.) is likely to create a cognitive imbalance that is sufficient to trigger in pupils a reflective process that can lead to comprehension of complex concepts – for example, in mathematics, concepts such as the perfection of geometric forms, infinite vs. indefinite, the role zero plays, etc. only critical comprehension is likely to lead to the transformation of perspectives, of negative biases or of unfounded beliefs regarding mathematics. in the critical dialogue learning process, it is the teacher’s responsibility to question pupils. model questions are suggested at the end of the paper. endnotes 1. this paper was originally published in french in 2011. daniel, m.-f. philosopher sur les mathématiques par le biais du dialogue critique. in m. gagnon et m. sasseville (dir.) la communauté de recherche philosophique. applications et enjeux (pp. 41-57). québec : les presses de l’université laval. references auriac, e. (2007). discuter, argumenter, raisonner à l’école primaire. document de présentation pour l’habilitation à diriger des recherche (hdr). clermont-ferrand: france. bayles, e. (1966). pragmatism in education. new york: harper & row. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 66 daniel, m.-f. (2000). from talking to dialogue. critical and creative thinking, 8(2), 1-7. daniel, m.-f. (1997). la philosophie et les enfants. les modèles de lipman et de dewey. brussels: les presses de l’université de boeck. daniel, m.-f. (2005). présupposés philosophiques et pédagogiques de matthew lipman et leurs applications. in c. leleux le parlement de la communauté francophone de belgique (ed.) la philosophie pour en fants – le modèle de lipman en discussion. brussels: les presses de l’université de boeck, 25-47. daniel, m.-f. (2009). une pratique pédagogique pour stimuler le processus d’apprentissage du dialoguer: des expérimentations au préscolaire et au primaire. in. r. bergeron, g. plessis-bélair, l. lafontaine (eds.). la place des savoirs oraux dans le contexte scolaire d’aujourd’hui. quebec city: les presses de l’université du québec, 247-268. daniel, m.-f. (accepted). relativism: a threshold for pupils to cross in order to become dialogical critical think ers. childhood & philosophy, daniel, m.-f. & auriac, e. (2011). philosophy, critical thinking and philosophy for children. educational phi losophy and theory, 43 (5), 415-435. daniel, m.-f. & delsol, a. (2005). learning to dialogue in kindergarten. a case study. analytic teaching, 25(3), 23-52. daniel, m.-f. & gagnon m. (2012). pupils’ age and philosophical praxis: two factors that influence the devel opment of critical thinking in children. childhood & philosophy, 8 (15), 105-130. daniel, m.-f., lafortune, l., pallascio, r., sykes, p. (1999). 2nd edition. les aventures mathématiques de mathilde et david. quebec city: éditions michel cornac. daniel, m.-f., lafortune, l. pallascio, r., schleifer, m. (2000). developmental dynamics of a community of philosophical inquiry in an elementary school mathematics classroom. thinking, 15(1), 2-10. daniel, m.-f., lafortune, l., pallascio, r., sykes, p. (2004). philosopher sur les mathématiques et les sci ences. guide d’accompagnement des aventures mathématiques de mathilde et david. 3e édition. que bec city: éditions michel cornac. daniel, m.-f., lafortune, l., pallascio, r., splitter, l., slade, c. de la garza, t. (2005). modeling the develop ment process of dialogical critical thinking in pupils aged 10 to 12 years. communication education, 54(4), 334-354. daniel, m.-f. splitter, l., slade, c., lafortune, l., pallascio, r., mongeau, p. (2002). are the philosophical ex changes of pupils aged 10 to 12 relativistic or inter-subjective? critical and creative thinking, 10(2), 1-19. dewey, j.(1925). comment nous pensons. paris, flammarion dewey, j. (1967). l’école et l’enfant. neuchâtel: delachaux et niestlé. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 67 dewey, j. (1983). démocratie et éducation. introduction à la philosophie de l’éducation. artigues-près-bor deaux: éditions l’âge d’homme. dolz, j. & schneuwly, b. (1998). pour un enseignement de l’oral. initiation aux genres formels à l’école. paris: esf édi teur. fourez, g. (1998). se représenter et mettre en œuvre l’interdisciplinarité à l’école. revue des sciences de l’éducation, xxiv (1),31-50. daniel, m.-f. (2011). philosopher sur les mathématiques par le biais du dialogue critique. in m. gagnon and m. sasseville (eds.) la communauté de recherche philosophique. applications et enjeux (pp. 41-57). quebec city: les presses de l’université laval. glasersfeld von, e. (1994). pourquoi le constructivisme doit-il être radical? revue des sciences de l’éducation, xx (1), 21-29. glasersfeld von, e. (2004). constructivisme et curricula. in p. jonnaert & a. m’batika (eds.) les réformes cur riculaires. regards croisés (9-35). quebec city: les presses de l’université du québec. jewell, p. & paterson, s. (2008). teaching ethical strategies through the maths curriculum. critical & creative thinking, 16 (1), 79-101. jonnaert, p. & masciotra, d. (2004). constructivisme: choix contemporains. quebec city: les presses de l’université du québec. jonnaert, p. & m’batika, a. (2004) (eds.) les réformes curriculaires. regards croisés. quebec city: les presses de l’université du québec. lafortune, l., daniel, m.-f., pallascio, r., schleifer, m. (1999). evolution of pupils’ attitudes to mathematics’ when using a philosophical approach. analytic teaching, 20(1), 33-45. lafortune, l., daniel, m.-f., mongeau, p. & pallascio, r. (2002). philosophy for children adapted to math ematics: a study of its impact on the evolution of affective factors. analytic teaching, 23(1), 11-20. lafortune, l., daudelin, c., doudin, p.-a. (2003). conceptions, croyances et représentations en maths, sciences et technos. quebec city: les presses de l’université du québec. lafortune, l. & solar, c. (2003). femmes et maths, sciences et technos. quebec city: les presses de l’université du québec. larochelle, m. (1998). la tentation de la classification… ou comment un apprentissage non réflexif des savoirs scientifiques peut donner lieu à un problème épistémologique. recherche en soins infirmiers, 52, 72-80. larochelle, m. & désautels, j. (2001). les enjeux socioéthiques des désaccords entre scientifiques: un aperçu de la construction discursive d’étudiants et étudiantes. revue canadienne de l’enseignement des sciences, des mathématiques et des technologies, 1(1), 24-39. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 68 le cunff, c. (2009). enseigner ce que parler veut dire. in r. bergeron, g. plessis-bélair, l. lafontaine (eds.) la place des savoirs oraux dans le contexte scolaire d’aujourd’hui. quebec city: les presses de l’université du québec, 199-222. legendre, m.-f. (2004). cognitivisme et socio-constructivisme: des fondements théoriques à leur utilisation dans l’élaboration et la mise en œuvre du nouveau programme de formation. in p. jonnaert et a. m’batika (eds.). les réformes curriculaires. regards croisés. quebec city: les presses de l’université du québec, 13-45. lipman, m., sharp, a.-m. & oscanyan, f. s. (1980). philosophy in the classroom. 2nd edition. philadelphia, pa: temple university press. lipman, m. (2003). thinking in education. cambridge: cambridge university press. masciotra, d. (2007). le constructivisme en termes simples. vie pédagogique (143), 48-52. masciotra, d., roth, w. m. & morel, d. (2008). énaction. apprendre et enseigner en situation. brussels: les press es de l’université de boeck. mead, g. h. (1972). mind, self and society. from the standpoint of a social behaviorist. chicago, il., the university of chicago press. ministère de l’éducation, des loisirs et du sport du québec (2002). programme de formation de l’école québécoise. éducation préscolaire enseignement primaire. quebec city: gouvernement du québec. pallascio, r. (2004). constructivisme/socio-constructivisme. les réformes curriculaires. regards croisés (pp. 177 185). quebec city: les presses de l’université du québec. rorty, r. (1990a). science et solidarité, la vérité sans le pouvoir cahors: l’éclat. rorty, r. (1990b). l’homme spéculaire. paris: seuil. rorty, r. (1991). objectivity, relativism, and truth. cambridge, ma: cambridge university press. ruel, f. (1994). la complexification conceptuelle des représentations sociales discursives à l’égard de l’apprentissage et de l’enseignement chez de futurs enseignant(e)s de sciences. faculté des sciences de l’éducation de l’université de laval. doctoral thesis. vygotsky, l. (1985). pensée et langage. paris: éditions sociales. address correspondences to: marie-france daniel, université de montréal, department of kinesiology, c.p. 6128, succ. centre-ville, montréal (qc) h3c 3j7 canada marie-france.daniel@umontreal.ca analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 79 the clifford/james debate richard hall theoretic philosophy knows no passion save the passion for truth, has no fear save the fear of error, cherishes no hope save the hope of theoretic success. --josiah royce evidentialism, a doctrine of epistemic justification stipulating that a belief is warranted if and only if it is supported by evidence, is a central tenet of anglo-american empiricism particularly in its form as logical empiricism or positivism. advocated by locke and hume, it is found early on in this tradition. perhaps the most impassioned advocate of evidentialism is the english mathematician and philosopher, william k. clifford, who in his “the ethics of belief” gave this doctrine a moral twist by declaring uncompromisingly that to believe anything on insufficient evidence is not merely imprudent or foolish, but morally wrong no less. clifford is perhaps remembered today outside of mathematical circles for william james’ riposte to him in the “will to believe.” james contended that we are not in the wrong to believe things without sufficient evidence; indeed, we have the right, no less, in certain cases so to believe. james’ contention is based on his exposure of an unacknowledged bias behind clifford’s stricture against believing on insufficient evidence, namely, the fear of error. however, james appeals to another bias, no less legitimate than the fear of error, which justifies believing on insufficient evidence, namely, the hope of truth. in what follows i hope to show that, though it may not be initially apparent, james is actually closer to clifford’s views than one might suppose. both are pragmatists (clifford in spirit if not in name), and james no less than clifford is committed to the empiricist principle of verification. james, moreover, concedes that clifford’s epistemological strictures should be observed in assessing scientific beliefs, but makes a qualified exception for moral and religious beliefs. james, i think, does not so much refute clifford’s evidentialism—much of which he accepts—as significantly qualify and even expand upon it. i shall begin by explaining why clifford holds such a strong evidentialist view, and then go on to consider james’ response. this is followed by a consideration of their agreements and differences, and finally by an assessment of the merits of james’s response. clifford begins with a parable of a ship-owner who is about to send a ship to sea. he cannot be absolutely sure of the ship’s seaworthiness. it is an old ship, not originally well built, and having undergone many repairs. he could wait to have the ship thoroughly overhauled and refitted, but at great expense. he nevertheless suppresses his doubts; after all, the ship had weathered many voyages, and in rough seas, safely arriving back in port. he sends the ship on her way. the ship sinks and all on board drown. the ship-owner is blamable, avers clifford, “because he had no right to believe on such evidence as was before him.” his belief in the vessel’s seaworthiness was ill gotten since “he had acquired his belief not by honestly earning it in patient investigation, but by stifling his doubts.” even had the voyage been successful, the ship-owner would still not escape censure because he acted on a belief with insufficient evidence. it is not the belief itself, or the baneful consequences of the action ensuing from it, which confers moral blame on its holder, but the inadequacy of the evidence for the belief. hence, clifford’s uncompromising dictum: “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for any one, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.” further, “if a man, holding a belief which he was taught in childhood or persuaded of analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 80 afterwards, keeps down and pushes away any doubts which arise about it in his mind,” then, admonishes clifford, “the life of that man is one long sin against mankind.”1 holding a belief is not just a cognitive matter, but is essentially a deeply moral one. today, unfortunately, we can update clifford’s fictional parable with actual historical events from our recent past such as the first space-shuttle disaster, the oil spill in the gulf of mexico, and the mining accidents in west virginia. in all these cases where avoidable negligence was found there were men whose thought processes may have resembled the ship-owner’s. but what exactly is morally wrong about believing on insufficient evidence? clifford explains that beliefs are not wholly private, innocuous, inconsequential, and ephemeral mental states. they are incipient actions, as acorns are incipient oaks. any belief, however seemingly trivial, has the potential of issuing in behavior—if not immediately, then in the future. beliefs can be sundered from their corollary actions only in theory. “he who truly believes that which prompts him to an action,” says clifford with a biblical flourish, “has looked upon the action to lust after it, he has committed it already in his heart.” like landmines, beliefs may remain dormant for years only later to explode into action with the right stimulus. “if a belief is not realised immediately in open deeds, it is stored up for the guidance of the future.”2 clifford, moreover, notes that a belief is efficacious in ways other than being productive of behavior. it is psychologically efficacious at the personal level insofar as it ineluctably enters into relations with other beliefs we hold, reinforcing or weakening them, thereby helping form a composite of belief. a belief, according to clifford, goes to make a part of that aggregate of beliefs which is the link between sensation and action at every moment of all our lives, and which is so organized and compacted together that no part of it can be isolated from the rest, but every new addition modifies the structure of the whole. no real belief, however trifling and fragmentary it may seem, is ever truly insignificant; it prepares us to receive more of its like, confirms those which resembled it before, and weakens others; and so gradually it lays a stealthy train in our inmost thoughts, which may some day explode into overt action, and leave its stamp upon our character forever. yet a belief is sociologically efficacious at the social level. a belief, though it may be possessed by us as individuals, is not our private possession but something held in the public trust. our beliefs emerge from a matrix of belief built up from the larger culture of which we are parts, and they in turn react upon it. clifford evinces here a fine sense of the sociology of belief: and no one man’s belief is in any case a private matter which concerns himself alone. our lives are guided by that general conception of the course of things which has been created by society for social purposes. our words, our phrases, our forms and processes and modes of thought, are common property, fashioned and perfected from age to age; an heirloom which every succeeding generation inherits as a precious deposit and a sacred trust to be handed on to the next one, not unchanged but enlarged and purified, with some clear marks of its proper handiwork. into this, for good or ill, is woven every belief of every man who has speechof his fellows. an awful privilege, and an awful responsibility, that we should help to create the world in which posterity will live.3 no man is an island; as long as we hold beliefs at all, they must, however indirectly and minutely, affect the larger culture for good or bad, and in the mass they will prove enormously consequential. consequently, because beliefs ineluctably issue in action, and have such a powerful influence on both ourselves and on others, it behooves us to choose them very carefully, to suppress no doubts about them, to scrupulously and rigorously examine and test them to determine whether or not they hold water—what “an awful privilege, and an awful responsibility, that we should help to create the world in which posterity will live.” thus clifford’s extreme and uncompromising evidentialism. for clifford, then, skepticism respecting beliefs together with their acceptance only upon sufficient evidence analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 81 is a moral imperative since belief, “that sacred faculty which prompts the decisions of our will, and knits into harmonious working all the compacted energies of our being, is ours not for ourselves, but for humanity.” and because of the social efficaciousness of beliefs, none of us, no matter how lowly, is exempt from the duty of scrupulosity with respect to our own—“no simplicity of mind, no obscurity of station, can escape the universal duty of questioning all that we believe.” incredulousness for clifford is the highest virtue so, “whoso would deserve well of his fellows in this matter will guard the purity of his belief with a very fanaticism of jealous care, lest at any time it should rest on an unworthy object, and catch a stain which can never be wiped away.” a paradigm of one who guarded the purity of his belief with his incessant and conscientious quest for more and more evidence to support it is charles darwin. darwin delayed for years the publication of on the origin of species lest he had insufficient evidence for his theory of natural selection. it was only when he feared that alfred russel wallace might jump the gun on him and publish his own similar findings that darwin published his. belief, stipulates clifford, “is rightly used on truths which have been established by long experience and waiting toil, and which have stood in the fierce light of free and fearless questioning,” otherwise “it is desecrated when given to unproved and unquestioned statements.”4 if so, then belief is indeed rightly used on darwin’s theory. clifford, though, does make some significant qualifications to his otherwise stringent evidentialism. first, we may accept certain beliefs as true without ourselves having acquired the requisite evidence for or personally tested them if that evidence has been acquired by others, or they have been tested time and time again by those qualified to do so and shown not wanting. thus, says clifford, “certain great principles, and these most fitted for the guidance of life, have stood out more and more clearly in proportion to the care and honesty with which they were tested, and have acquired in this way a practical certainty.”5 such presumably are moral precepts like the golden rule and scientific laws like newton’s laws of motion and boyle’s law of gases. second, we may properly believe what is only probably true (what lacks evidence sufficient for certainty) because the results of such belief may vindicate our belief in future probabilities: “there are many cases in which it is our duty to act upon probabilities, although the evidence is not such as to justify present belief; because it is precisely by such action, and by observation of its fruits, that evidence is got which may justify future belief.”6 for example, meteorologists in forecasting the weather deal exclusively with probabilities; however, their forecasts are necessary to navigation on the seas and in the air and so must be made. and if their predictions turn out true more times than not, then our future belief in these probabilities together with the actions taken because of them is vindicated. third, scientists sometimes need to believe things which go beyond their experience and so have no empirical evidence. induction is one of those great principles most fitted for the guidance of life that clifford speaks of, but, as hume noted, it cannot be empirically validated since it involves predictions about future events of which no one has had experience. a child burnt yesterday dreads the fire because she believes inductively that the fire today or tomorrow will burn her as well. however, though she has as yet no experience or real evidence of today’s or tomorrow’s fire for her belief, she is nonetheless justified in so believing because of the uniformity in nature. clifford allows, “we may go beyond experience by assuming that what we do not know is like what we do know; or, in other words, we may add to our experience on the assumption of a uniformity in nature. . . . we may fill in our picture of what is and has been, as experience gives it us, in such a way as to make the whole consistent with this uniformity.” however, “no evidence,” cautions clifford, “can justify us in believing the truth of a statement which is contrary to, or outside of, the uniformity of nature.” here clifford presumably has in mind belief in miracles. moreover, we have no warrant “to believe that nature is absolutely and universally uniform.” the principle of the uniformity in nature “only tells us that in forming beliefs which go beyond our experience, we may make the assumption that nature is practically uniform so far as we are concerned. within the range of human action and verification, we may form, by help of this assumption, actual beliefs; beyond it, only those hypotheses which serve for the more accurate asking of questions.”7 though clifford is skeptical of the veracity of revealed religion in references to the pronouncements of buddha and mohammed, nowhere does he mention christian faith in particular, the implied gravamen of his attack analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 82 on belief ill supported by evidence. however, that implication was not lost on his contemporaries. tom flynn writes, “to victorian intellectuals caught in the fury of that era’s crisis of faith, clifford’s essay served up a corrosive tonic whose ingestion must surely have seared away the last vestiges of faith. so it seemed to rationalists who embraced its forbidding evidentialism—and to champions of the church who struggled to reply to it.”8 clifford, along with such as thomas huxley and henry thomas buckle, belonged to a generation of religious skeptics and agnostics. james was of the same generation but, owing no doubt to his upbringing and temperament, did not join the chorus of these cultured despisers of religion. he was as well aware as they of science’s challenges to faith and of the obsolescence of some traditional religious beliefs. however, as a psychologist, he believed that religion is an ineradicable part of human nature—a virtual instinct—and that at its best it has therapeutic value for the individual and an ameliorative effect on society; and, as a philosopher, he believed that religious experience in its mystical form might be an avenue to knowledge inaccessible to reason and the scientific method. for james, religion is an indispensable and inestimable form of life still possible within and compatible with a scientific worldview. james demonstrated that one could be both scientifically enlightened and authentically religious without suffering cognitive dissonance as a result. james’ defense of religion is an example of the mediatory role he assumed of reconciling ideological extremes and an expression of his metaphysical pluralism. broadly considered, his “will to believe” (more accurately, “the right to believe”), together with his the varieties of religious experience, is james’ apologia for religious faith. more particularly, it is a polemical rejoinder to clifford. james takes clifford to task on three points. first, he challenges the plausibility of clifford’s epistemological criterion of evidential sufficiency. second, he detects an unexamined emotive bias behind clifford’s insistence on sufficiency of evidence as the sole warrant for belief. and third, he shows that clifford’s stringent requirement for warranted belief may, paradoxically, block the road to truth. with respect to evidential sufficiency, nowhere does clifford specify its criterion, an infallible mark by which one could know that it has been reached; he only assumes that there is one. for james, anyway, the quest for that criterion is a fool’s errand. “objective evidence and certitude are doubtless very fine ideals to play with, but where on this moonlit and dream visited planet are they found?” he asks rhetorically. he notes further, “no concrete test of what is really true has ever been agreed upon.” for example, the rationalist’s test of “the inconceivability of the opposite,” the empiricist’s test of “the capacity to be verified by sense,” or the idealist’s test of “the possession of complete organic unity or self-relation, realized when a thing is its own other,” have all been found wanting. and what has been claimed as objectively certain and self-evident by some has been denied by others. “apart from abstract propositions of comparison,” says james, “we find no proposition ever regarded by any one as evidently certain that has not either been called a falsehood, or at least had its truth sincerely questioned by some one else.” indeed, certainty has even been claimed for mutually contradictory beliefs such as those constituting kant’s antimonies. james’ diagnosis for this state of affairs is “that the intellect, even with truth directly in its grasp, may have no infallible signal for knowing whether it be true or no.”9 in his reply to clifford, though, james considers not just the epistemology of belief but the psychology of belief as well. ever the psychologist, james discerns lurking behind clifford’s stricture against believing on insufficient evidence a certain attitude or dispositional imperative, namely, “we must avoid error.” this is the counsel of fear, the fear of being duped. better by far to be secure in unbelief, than to believe and risk being wrong and so made a fool of. yet there is an alternative attitude or motive, which james identifies, no less legitimate and compelling in determining what to believe, and that is, “we must know the truth.”10 this is the counsel of hope. from fear of error we may miss out on truth. both attitudes entail risk. avoiding error at all costs risks losing truth; seeking truth, come what may, risks being duped. note that neither of these epistemological motives—the fear of error or the hope of truth—is amenable to evidential validation. but each is appropriate depending on the kind of beliefs being weighed. whether one should be motivated by fear of error or desire for truth in choosing among beliefs depends on the kind of choice before us. james stipulates, “let us give the name of hypothesis to anything that may be analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 83 proposed to our belief.” a choice between beliefs he calls an option. james classifies options according to whether they are dead or live, unforced or forced upon us, and trivial or momentous in their consequences. a dead choice or option is one where the choice of believing or not believing does not even arise because we have no interest in it. whether to believe that neptune may be the cause of storms at sea or not is such a dead option. a live option is one where the choice of believing or disbelieving is of vital interest to us such that we are willing to act on it. whether to believe that democracy is the best form of government or not is an example of a live option. beyond this, an option may be unforced or forced upon us. either believing that acupuncture works or does not work is a choice that i have to make one way or the other. finally, an option may be trivial or momentous. a trivial option concerns a choice between beliefs where the consequences of choosing are unimportant. believing that sitting on the left side or the right side of the bus is the better choice is such a trivial case. by contrast, a momentous option is one that is live for us and unavoidable, and occurs but once in a life time; moreover, the choice once made can never be undone and is enormously consequential for us. thus, the choice between sinking all my life’s savings in an investment scheme or not would be a momentous one. it is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity. once the choice is made, there is no turning back. the consequences involved are tremendous. i stand to loose everything in this risky venture or might become a millionaire. it is exactly this kind of option that robert frost poignantly illustrates in his poem, the road not taken. deciding which road to take in frost’s yellow wood would be momentous in the extreme since once made there is no returning, and the road actually taken, the poet says retrospectively, “made all the difference.” an option that is live, forced upon us, and momentous is what james calls a “genuine” option.11 now in cases where our options or choices are not genuine, that is, neither forced upon us nor momentous, then we should adopt the cautious attitude of avoiding error. “wherever the option between losing truth and gaining it is not momentous,” advises james, “we can throw the chance of gaining truth away, and at any rate save ourselves from any chance of believing falsehood, by not making up our minds at all till objective evidence has come.” this is the case in choosing among scientific hypotheses. “what difference, indeed, does it make to most of us whether we have or have not a theory of the röntgen rays, whether we believe or not in mind-stuff, or have a conviction about the causality of conscious states?” james asks rhetorically. “it makes no difference. such options are not forced on us. on every account it is better not to make them, but still keep weighing reasons pro et contra with an indifferent hand.” to update james’ own examples, the option of believing either that homo sapiens originated in africa or in asia, for example, is not momentous. it does not demand an immediate decision, and the consequences of believing either way are not overwhelmingly important. here our belief ought to be strictly determined by the evidence, and only when the amount of evidence is, in some sense, sufficient need we make up our minds. the same is true in cases of testing drugs for human consumption. here we must avoid error at all costs, since human life and health depend upon it. we can afford to wait until all the results of rigorous testing are in, since the results of failing to do so might be catastrophic. laboratory personnel who test drugs are in the same position, with the same responsibility, as clifford’s ship owner. with respect to accepting or rejecting scientific hypotheses, then, james completely agrees with clifford’s stricture against accepting nothing without sufficient evidence. james affirms that the fear of error should motivate the scientist, and that shunning error is properly endemic to the scientific method: the most useful investigator, because the most sensitive observer, is always he whose eager interest in one side of the question is balanced by an equally keen nervousness lest he become deceived. science has organized this nervousness into a regular technique, her so-called method of verification; and she has fallen so deeply in love with the method that one may even say she has ceased to care for truth by itself at all. it is only truth as technically verified that interests her. the truth of truths might come in merely affirmative form, and she would decline to touch it.12 having conceded this much to clifford, however, james goes on to argue that sometimes we have no choice but to believe things for which at the time we have insufficient evidence, for refusing to do so might lead to the loss of truth and a diminished life. and among those beliefs are just those religious beliefs clifford repudiated, analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 84 moral beliefs, and metaphysical doctrines. options concerning which moral beliefs to hold, if any, are genuine since they are unavoidable and momentous. yet they cannot be decided empirically, and so the issue of evidential sufficiency hardly occurs. that decision now devolves upon the will. “the question of having moral beliefs at all or not having them is decided by our will,” maintains james. “are our moral preferences true or false, or are they only odd biological phenomena, making things good or bad for us, but in themselves indifferent? how can your pure intellect decide?” moreover, says james, “if your heart does not want a world of moral reality, your head will assuredly never make you believe in one,”13 whatever the evidence in its favor. and, i might add, it is not just moral beliefs that elude definitive empirical justification, but also beliefs about values generally such as aesthetic beliefs concerning the nature and value of beauty and of art. but above all it is religious beliefs that james is particularly anxious to vindicate, a vindication that would be continued later in his varieties. james reduces all religions down two fundamental affirmations, namely, that good will out—“the best things are the more eternal things”—and we are immediately better off if we believe this. our option is either to believe these propositions to be true or not. obviously, this option, like the moral, is live, momentous and inescapable—in a word, genuine. yet again there is no evidence sufficient to determine that one choice is true and the other false. and to remain agnostic by refusing to decide one way or another is itself a choice motivated as well by the fear of error. since the intellect cannot decide the issue it is left up to the will or what james calls our “passional nature”: “our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds.”14 now in the cases of genuine options concerning our moral and religious beliefs which, unlike the case of scientific beliefs, elude immediate empirical justification, observing the dictum of “seek truth” is entirely appropriate. here the conflict is not between the intellect and the will, but between two attitudes—the fear of error and the hope of truth. and the impulse to seek truth is no less legitimate than the caution to avoid error—indeed, given what is at stake, it is the more reasonable. furthermore, in the case of such beliefs, our willingness to seek truth even in the teeth of insufficient evidence and the threat of being duped may actually bring about the truth sought. james assures us, “faith in a fact can help create the fact ” for there are “cases where a fact cannot come at all unless a preliminary faith exists in its coming.”15 thus, if we truly desire a world of moral reality, believe in and act on it, then we may discover and come to know the truth of that reality. we may find a world responsive to and chiming in with our moral impulses, judgments, and actions. however, if we do not want such a world, and do not believe in and act on it, then we shall make no such discovery. the same is especially true of religious beliefs. religion is “a postulator of new facts,” says james, such that “the world interpreted religiously is not the materialistic world over again, with an altered expression; it must have, over and above the altered expression, a natural constitution different at some point from that which a materialistic world would have. it must be such that different events can be expected in it, different conduct must be required.”16 so, if those expectations are met, and that different conduct is forthcoming, then our religious beliefs are vindicated. we may come to discern the hand of providence in the course of human events after all, particularly if we act to turn that hand. however, if we lack the requisite faith, then we will be blind and indifferent to this world differently constituted according to faith. emerson finely expresses the way the world might appear to one having moral or religious faith: “as the world was plastic and fluid in the hands of god, so it is ever to so much of his attributes as we bring to it. to ignorance and sin, it is flint. they adapt themselves to it as they may; but in proportion as a man has any thing in him divine, the firmament flows before him and takes his signet and form.”17 although he does not mention them in “will to believe,” choices between opposed metaphysical beliefs are also among those where the truth-seeking disposition is appropriate. this is particularly so in the case of stale-mated oppositions where good reasons can be given for either choice but there is insufficient evidence to decide decisively in favor of one over the other. an example of such is the opposition between determinism and indeterminism (free will). because this is an issue that concerned him personally, james confronted and resolved it head on. in his essay, “the dilemma of determinism,” james claims that it is impossible for this issue to be decisively resolved empirically: “facts practically have hardly anything to do with making us either determinists or indeterminists.” consequently, as is the case with moral and religious believes, it is left for the will to decide. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 85 (what makes us determinists or indeterminists is what james calls “different faiths”18 or sentiments.) and that is exactly what happened in james’ own case. james had long been beset with deep depressions, fear of insanity, hypochondria, listlessness, and indirection. but then he had an epiphany of sorts upon reading the french psychologist, charles renouvier. in a diary entry for april 30, 1870, he writes, i think that yesterday was a crisis in my life. i finished the first part of renouvier’s second essais and see no reason why his definition of free will — “the sustaining of a thought because i choose to when i might have other thoughts”— need be the definition of an illusion. at any rate, i will assume for the present — until next year — that it is no illusion. my first act of free will shall be to believe in free will.19 though he had no evidential warrant for this belief, the beneficial results of his acting upon it were remarkable. his life now had direction; he overcame his various psychological ailments, and went on to become a great psychologist and philosopher. neither of these emotional stances, fear of error and hope of truth, is more or less acceptable than the other. each is appropriate within its own sphere. thus, the motive of avoiding error is appropriate within the sphere of scientific investigation, whereas the motive of seeking truth is appropriate within the spheres of religious faith, moral commitment, and metaphysical outlook. however—and this is significant—even in the case of moral and religious beliefs james himself does not abandon a form of evidentialism; even they are open to and demand some form of empirical verification—but at a later time. this possibility is allowed in his conception of “belief” in “will to believe”: “let us give the name of hypothesis to anything that may be proposed to our belief.” now a hypothesis is a belief that is held tentatively until empirically verified by tests. moral and religious beliefs, then, are just such hypotheses. like scientific hypotheses, they stand to be tested. scientific hypotheses are tested through experimentation. moral and religious hypotheses can be tested only by applying them in practice, by acting on them, looking for their consequences to see whether our expectations regarding them are met. in varieties, james states that the truth of religious beliefs is to be validated by their practical fruits. he gives the example of belief in god. those who hold this belief typically expect that god will guarantee that “the best things are the more eternal things.” since this expectation must be either met or not met, then belief in god is a bona fide hypothesis; it, like a scientific hypothesis, is in principle verifiable and falsifiable (though it would be difficult to determine when this verification or falsification occurs). here is james account of the hypothetical nature of theism as found in varieties: god’s existence is the guarantee of an ideal order that shall be permanently preserved. this world may indeed, as science assures us, some day burn up or freeze; but if it is part of his order, the old ideals are sure to be brought elsewhere to fruition, so that where god is, tragedy is only provisional and partial, and shipwreck and dissolution are not the absolutely final things. only when this farther step of faith concerning god is taken, and remote objective consequences are predicted, does religion, as it seems to me, get wholly free from the first immediate subjective experience, and bring a real hypothesis into play. [561-62] as mentioned above, james regards religion as “a postulator of new facts,” though he is agnostic about their nature: “what the more characteristically divine facts are, apart from the actual inflow of energy in the faith-state and the prayer-state, i know not.”20 if, indeed, the remote objective consequences in fact come to pass, then this serves as some validation for the beliefs in question. however, for us to know this, we need to take the first step by actively seeking truth, even at the risk of being duped. in other words, the evidence for our moral, religious and metaphysical beliefs needs to be forced by our first assenting to them. this was certainly the case with james’ belief in free will, the life-changing effects of which were its vindication and a retroactive sign of its truth. during the discussion of this paper after its oral presentation the following question was raised: how long should one wait for the future confirmation and vindication of moral and religious hypotheses that james alanalytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 86 lows? james sets no time limit, nor is it necessary. it may come sooner or later in the course of life; if not sooner, then the faith that it will come later is part of the experiment—to give up on the hypothesis too soon would forever preclude its verification. my sense is that their confirmation typically comes not as a damascus road revelation (though it may do so) but slowly and incrementally, and even ambiguously. this question, though, stands to be settled empirically. surveys may be done to determine how many people lose their faith and the reasons for it, and how many persist in their faith and for what reasons. and those reasons may be that they see practical benefits accruing to them over time as a result of their faith. some studies, albeit highly controversial, have already shown that people of faith are happier and live longer than those without faith. james and clifford, then, are not as far apart as one might think. both are pragmatists of sorts insofar as they alike hold to a behavioral conception of beliefs as preparations and guides to action which are validated by the occurrence of their expected results. james, in his “philosophical conceptions and practical results,” affirms, “beliefs, in short, are really rules for action,”21 which parallels clifford’s affirmation that “no belief is real unless it guide our actions, and those very actions supply a test of its truth.” both are empiricists in their equal insistence that beliefs must be verified empirically. no belief is to be accepted on faith (for james not, ultimately, even religious beliefs) but rigorously and continuously investigated: according to clifford: in regard, then, to the sacred tradition of humanity, we learn that it consists, not in propositions or statements which are to be accepted and believed on the authority of the tradition, but in questions rightly asked, in conceptions which enable us to ask further questions, and in methods of answering questions. the value of all these things depends on their being tested day by day. the very sacredness of the precious deposit imposes upon us the duty and the responsibility of testing it, of purifying and enlarging it to the utmost of our power.22 clifford here conceives of science less as a body of received knowledge than as a method of inquiry, where truth can by approached only asymptotically since truth itself is ever evolving. this is a pragmatic conception of science and truth that james would definitely accede to. in pragmatism, james states, “the truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. truth happens to an idea. it becomes true, is made true by events. its verity is in fact an event, a process: the process namely of its verifying itself, its veri-fication. its validity is the process of its valid-ation.”23 furthermore, clifford and james alike concede that certain beliefs may be rightly held without sufficient evidence. clifford specifically includes among them assumptions like the principle of uniformity in nature, the viability of induction, and the trustworthiness of statistical probabilities; james specifically includes moral, religious, and metaphysical beliefs. further, both think that such beliefs are vindicated by their usefulness. thus for clifford the belief that nature is uniform is vindicated by the useful results that come from applying it: “and practically demonstrative inference—that which gives us a right to believe in the result of it—is a clear showing that in no other way than by the truth of this result can the uniformity of nature be saved.”24 and for james religious belief, as a postulator of new facts, is vindicated if those facts are forthcoming. james’ departures from clifford stem from his being a more consistent and thorough-going pragmatist (and empiricist) than clifford. he thus enfranchises religious beliefs as inductive hypotheses, putting them on the same epistemological footing as scientific hypotheses—their validation too must await experimental results in the form of expectations fulfilled. religious beliefs, no less than scientific ones, may be treated hypothetically, and in this way deserve a chance for their future verification. james, no less than clifford, demands evidence for even religious beliefs. he is no fideist. but, unlike clifford, he is willing to wait for that evidence to emerge later in their case, whereas clifford wants evidence now before risking belief. this marks the chief difference between james’ empiricism and that of traditional empiricists like clifford. according to ralph barton perry, “whereas according to the traditional view experience has spoken, according to james experience has yet to speak, and its response will be proportional to the boldness and happy inspiration with which it is interrogated.” james believes that the prospect of finding truth justifies waiting for the results of that interrogation. “the truly empirianalytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 87 cal mind,” says perry, “imagines curious possibilities and gives nature every chance to reveal itself in unfamiliar ways.”25 on this account, james was possessed of a truly empirical mind. we shall never know whether certain beliefs are true—miss out on their truth—or false unless we take the risk of believing and acting on them. “but the skeptic who does not formulate any hypotheses,” according to edward c. moore, “can never correct them by the discovery of errors or reinforce them by the act of having them lead him successfully.”26 and as james says, “a rule of thinking [clifford’s] which would absolutely prevent me from acknowledging certain kinds of truth if those kinds of truth were really there, would be an irrational rule.”27 the issue joined by james and clifford over what conditions should be met for our acceptance of a belief is a long-standing one dating back at least to hume. it is, as james would say, a live and momentous one, especially so today. it is the very issue between the so-called new atheists and the religionists who oppose them. richard dawkins, sam harris, daniel dennet, paul kurtz, and company, are uncompromisingly committed to clifford’s position, whereas their opponents, at least tacitly, side with james. clifford’s stricture that only beliefs based on sufficient evidence are warranted is a stock-in-trade argument against theism. one might say that evidentialism has become a perennial problem of philosophy, and an importunate one at that. consequently, it deserves to be addressed across the university curriculum and not just in philosophy courses where, of course, it should be given careful consideration. how, then, might evidentialism be addressed in the classroom? the opportunities for doing so abound particularly in those fields like the natural and social sciences where theories proliferate. a theory, or hypothesis, is, using james’ terminology, “anything that may be proposed to our belief,” where we have the option either to accept or reject. students might be required to classify options according to whether they are alive, forced upon them, and momentous. in the case of scientific theories, where the options are not genuine insofar as they are neither momentous nor forced upon us, the cautious avoidance of error ought to be the rule and evidence must be demanded for their acceptance (something on which both james and clifford agree). however, the students’ option or choice among theories becomes particularly acute in those cases where theories conflict, and where the evidence on either side does not decisively outweigh that on the other, which is especially true of those theories in the social sciences that are not falsifiable—think, for example, of the various conflicting theories of personality in psychology. the students might be asked to choose among such conflicting theories, and give reasons for their choices, and to consider what criteria might be brought to bear in making a choice. furthermore, they might be instructed to identify those deep assumptions covertly made in science where sufficient evidence is lacking (something clifford concedes) such as the principles of induction and of the uniformity in nature, and why those assumptions are warranted. addressing the issue of evidentialism would enable students to realize that science is not a static body of holy writ but a pragmatic method of inquiry into truth that is never complete and final (on which james and clifford again agree), to avoid the pitfall of “scientism,” and to better appreciate the rightful place science occupies in the economy of human life—to wit, to bring home to them the point of hamlet’s remark, “there are more things in heaven and earth, horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy.” the most opportune place to address the issue of evidentialism is, of course, in courses in philosophy— especially epistemology, philosophy of science, and philosophy of religion—which cry out for a discussion of this issue. the following questions might be profitably raised there: what counts as evidence for a belief? what makes the evidence in support of a belief sufficient for its acceptance; in other words, what are the criteria of sufficiency? do the criteria or standards of evidential sufficiency necessarily shift from field to field so that what is appropriate in one field of inquiry may not be so in another; that is, do these standards depend on the object of inquiry? thus, beliefs that might pass muster in a court of law may not do so in a laboratory. aristotle’s remark that standards of precision necessarily differ from field to field, e.g. those in mathematics are more stringent than those in the social sciences, might apply as well to the standards of evidential sufficiency required by those fields. finally, what are we do with those moral, religious, and metaphysical beliefs that seem incapable of achieving evidential sufficiency? should we dismiss them as nonsensical, as do the logical positivists, or as immoral, as does clifford, or hold them tentatively as recommended by james? analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 88 let me conclude with what i think are the indisputable merits of james’ position. james teaches us the wisdom of following the middle way. he shows us how to shake off the shackles of a constrictive scientism and stultifying skepticism without falling into the abyss of irrational subjectivism and anti-intellectualism. he exposes the inexpugnable psychological factor, the emotional bias, the voluntaristic element, lying behind all forms of epistemological justification. he thereby redeems ethics, religion, and metaphysics from the exile to which positivism sends them. he demonstrates that the faith of the moralist and the religionist is not unfounded, without betraying the spirit of scientific empiricism. as moore puts is, “this act of faith—the belief that there are answers and we can find them—is intrinsic to all of james’s philosophy. he insists upon an element of belief— over and above what we can prove rationally or experimentally—in all of the knowledge process.”28 i close with a quotation james takes from fitz james stephen. it neatly and poignantly expresses james’ counsel to seek and hope for truth even when sufficient evidence is wanting: we stand on a mountain pass in the midst of whirling snow and blinding mist, through which we get glimpses now and then of paths which may be deceptive. if we stand still we shall be frozen to death. if we take the wrong road we shall be dashed to pieces. we do not certainly know whether there is any right one. what must we do? “be strong and of a good courage.” act for the best, hope for the best, and take what comes. . . . if death ends all, we cannot meet death better.29 endnotes 1 william k. clifford, “the ethics of belief,” in lectures and essays (london: macmillan, 1879), pp. 164, 175. 2 ibid., p. 168. 3 ibid., pp. 168-69. 4 ibid., pp.170, 171, 170-71, 170. 5 ibid., p. 177. 6 ibid., pp. 177-78. 7 ibid., pp. 199-200, 203, 204 8 tom flynn, “clifford in whole,” free inquiry, xxx, no. 1 (december, 2009/january, 2010), 63. 9 william james, “the will to believe,” in the will to believe, and other essays in popular philosophy (new york: dover publications, inc., 1956), pp. 14, 15, 16. 10 ibid., p. 17. 11 ibid., pp. 2, 3. 12 ibid., pp. 19-20, 21. 13 ibid., pp. 22-23. 14 ibid., pp. 25, 11. 15 ibid., p. 25. 16 william james, the varieties of religious experience, a study in human nature (new york: the modern library, 2002), pp. 562-63. 17 ralph waldo emerson, “the american scholar,” in ralph waldo emerson: selected essays, lectures, and poems, ed. by robert d. richardson, jr. (new york: bantam books, 1990), p. 94. 18 william james, “the dilemma of determinism,” in the will to believe, and other essays in popular philosophy (new york: dover publications, inc., 1956), pp. 152, 153. 19 ralph barton perry, the thought and character of william james, i (boston: little, brown, and company, 1936), 323. 20 james, varieties, pp. 561-62, 563. 21 william james, “philosophical conceptions and practical results,” in william james, writings 1878-1899 (new york: the library of america, 1992), p. 1079. 22 clifford, “the ethics of belief,” pp. 183, 197-98. the definition of “belief” as a rule or guide for action originated with alexander bain, a scots psychologist, who defined belief as preparedness for action. clifford makes no mention of his having derived this definition from bain. however, nicholas st. john green, analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 89 who along with peirce and james was a member of boston’s metaphysical club that met in the early 1870s, took up the idea from bain and suggested it to others in the club. in response, peirce wrote “the fixation of belief” and “how to make our ideas clear” that were published in popular science monthly. thus, bain’s idea contains the seeds of pragmatism. see thomas s. knight, charles peirce, the great american thinker series (new york: washington square press, inc., 1965), pp. 45-46. 23 william james, pragmatism, in william james, writings 1902-1910 (new york: the library of america, 1987), p. 574. 24 clifford, “the ethics of belief,” p. 203. 25 perry, william james, i, 558. 26 edward c. moore, william james, the great american thinker series (new york: washington square press, inc., 1965), p. 98. 27 james, “the will to believe,” p. 28. 28 moore, william james, p. 98. 29 james, “the will to believe,” p. 31. address correspondence to: richard hall fayetteville state university fayetteville, north carolina rhall@uncsfu.edu editor's notes analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 37 issue 2 (2017) editor’s notes the four articles that make up the second issue of volume 37 are a response to a call for papers on the topic of art, creativity and the community of inquiry. the first article by moriyón explores how the community of inquiry can be seen as an artistic performance, reinforcing the dynamic relationship between higher-order critical thinking and creativity. the second piece by garside and myskiw explains the challenges and benefits that come from implementing artistic activities in a darearts program in british columbia, canada, and discusses the structural similarities between this program and the community of inquiry. the third article by kenyon and terordedoyle provides another thoughtful reflection on the implementation of artistic projects in the classroom, and discusses how their efforts to engage prekindergarten children in pfc were greatly enhanced through artistic activities. finally, we have turgeon’s contribution, which looks at david weisner’s art and max and suggests a number of novel ways this children’s book can be utilized to examine several rather deep issues surrounding art, authorship, and artistic practices. the compilation of book reviews by richard morehouse rounds out our current issue as he looks at a series of texts and teacher manuals designed to help educators implement philosophy for children in their classrooms. taken together, this issue offers both thoughtful theoretical reflections on the nature of art and creativity as well as concrete practical examples of how artistic practices have been utilized to enhance the experience of pfc. i hope the current volume finds you all doing well and engaged in a project you love… pax et bonum jason howard chief editor jason j. howard viterbo university web page master jason skoog viterbo university layout design assistant jan wellik viterbo university editorial board susan gardner capilano university david kennedy montclair state university nadia s. kennedy stony brook university, suny richard morehouse, emeritus viterbo university félix garcía moriyón center for philosophy for children, madrid, spain joe oyler institute for the advancement of philosophy for children montclair state university john simpson university of alberta barbara weber university of british columbia publisher viterbo university, la crosse, wisconsin 45601 established in 1981 as analytic teaching at texas wesleyan college and transferred to viterbo in 1993. online copyright 2005. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis is a peer-reviewed, online, open access journal published annually and sometimes biannually. issn 2374-8257 socratic philosophizing with the five finger model: the theoretical approach of ekkehard martens analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 3 5 , issue 1 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 39 socratic philosophizing with the five finger model: the theoretical approach of ekkehard martens abstract: socratic philosophizing is an open process of thinking that follows a net of methods. martens develops his five finger model in accordance with socrates and the history of philosophy. philosophizing within the community of inquiry is characterized by attitudes of curiosity, openness, and the willingness to make oneself understandable as well as to understand the other person in return. there are five core philosophical methods that assist in making such philosophizing successful: phenomenology, hermeneutics, analysis, dialectics and speculation. these five methods are understood as reflective operations which are learned in an elementary way and practiced step-by-step: (phenomenological) to be able to describe something exactly, (hermeneutial) to understand oneself and others, (analytical) to clarify in a conceptual and argumentative way how something is understood), (dialectical) to ask and to disagree, (speculative), to fantasize how something could be understood. marten’s five finger model builds on these methods in order to help children build broader and distinct questions through philosophizing. to illustrate this we will present an interactive game that can be used to introduce the teaching themes of who am i?, partnership, tolerance, and foreign cultures. the game is called “distance and closeness.” the game was evaluated afterward using the framework of the five finger method. hat am i actually doing? and what do i want to reach with it? these questions are, according to friedrich nietzsche, “the most personal questions of the truth.” martens takes them as his starting point in order to show the necessity of instructing children to think. following kant’s and nietzsche’s call to orient oneself through thinking, martens places the question of truth as an anthropological constant at the centre of education. it is possible to take aim at questions of truth with the reasonable and elementary thinking of every person, including children. for instance, socrates would philosophize with a wealthy boy, lysis, about what parental love means, even when his parents would not allow him to ride in his father's chariot and hold its reins in a race, although they loved him (plato, lysis, 208a). socratic philosophizing is an open process of thinking ahead between dogmatic ideology and arbitrary thinking, and follows a net of methods which can not only be adopted in conversations and discussions, but also within texts, images and games. in plato’s early dialogues (e.g. laches: dialogue about learning to fence as an education tool to become brave) the following methods can be observed: o the heart of the discussion is built upon concrete personal and social experiences o problematic experiences of the conversational partners are accented o central notions of argumentation are clarified o the clarification of questions occurs in a controversial discussion of thesis and antithesis, and opens into a synthesis or preliminary answer w eva marsal analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 3 5 , issue 1 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 40 o the thoughts are pervaded by metaphors and thought experiments the five finger model of ekkehard martens martens develops his five finger model in accordance with socrates and the history of philosophy. “reflecting in cooperation” and “elementary philosophizing” within the community of inquiry are characterized by attitudes of curiosity, openness, and the willingness to make oneself understandable as well as to understand the other person in return. besides, it becomes easier in the community of inquiry to self-correct and make one’s own argumentation stronger. for this process to occur, philosophical methods exist that can assist in making philosophizing successful: phenomenology characterizes looking; hermeneutics includes understanding; analysis relates to deepening; dialectics construes the back and forth or pro and contra nature of discourse; and speculation involves imagining. these five methods are understood as reflective operations which are learned in an elementary way and practiced step-by-step: to be able to describe something exactly (phenomenological), to understand oneself and others (hermeneutical), to clarify in a conceptual and argumentative way how something is understood (analytical), to ask and to disagree (dialectical), to fantasize how something could be understood (speculative) (martens, 2010). phenomenological:  to observe and describe something in an accurate and differentiated way.  for example: what was the story about? what attracted your attention? describe what did x do, say, feel, and think, etc.? the greek word, phenomenon, in its literal translation means “what appears.” socraticaristotelian methods emerged from the concrete experience of something that was always selfevident suddenly becoming problematical. now these problematic phenomena are to be examined accurately. it is thanks to the emphasis on phenomenology that philosophical thinking does not become stuck in the abstract, but always has a reference to concrete experiences. in this method, what is real precedes what is purely imagined. thus bernhard waldenfels, a leading representative of the newer phenomenologists, propagates a “return to the things themselves” and, in a variation of kant’s sapere aude, says “have the courage to make use of your senses!” (1992, p. 13). for waldenfels phenomenology is philosophy “from below,” liberation from the bonds of preconceptions, traditional reservations and methodological constraints, which stands in opposition to the systematic thinking of neokantianism, in which the constructs are formed “from above.” however, the central problem of phenomenology is the question, “what are the things themselves?” the epistemological or defining question, “what is x?” can be translated analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 3 5 , issue 1 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 41 phenomenologically as “how does something reveal itself to me as x?” the most important elements of a non-ontologically understood phenomenological method are double reduction and the bodily dimension of knowledge. the first step of the double reduction is phenomenological reduction, e.g., observation and description free of prejudice and theory. with a flower, that would be the awareness of one’s own feelings and experience, e.g., mediated naiveté. with the second step an eidetic reduction occurs: the “thing itself” appears not as an essential form (husserl) which can be intuitively grasped, but is, according to waldenfels (1992, p. 15), a kind of regulative limiting concept: “it isn’t that the object is simply one and the same, it reveals itself to be the same in the interchange between the given and the intentional” (waldenfels, 1992, p. 15). this leads to the following set of considerations:  proximity/distance  the expected/the imagined  what is evaluated/dealt with/aspired to  cultural influences the bodily dimension of knowledge occurs through the senses. in the example of “recognizing flowers” (berger and luckmann, 1995, p. 11f) the bodily dimension of cognition is given by the fragrance as well as the feel and the uses of the flower. martens summarizes the epistemological position as follows: “we can only really recognize something as something if we first eliminate all theoretical patterns of explanation and instead describe the phenomenon as thoroughly as possible in the variety of its appearances and also pay attention to how we access it in terms of our life-world, its physicality and problem orientation” (martens, 2010, p. 72). hermeneutical:  to understand somebody. how you or another person understand or regard something.  show empathy: “how did x feel?” etc. literally translated, the greek word (gr. hermeneutike techne) is, “the art of hermes,” which means, “the art of interpreting” (martens, 2010, p. 75) and connects the divine with the human word, and the writer with the reader of the text. the application of the hermeneutical method consists of reading texts, understanding and interpreting the message of a text outside of its context. therefore, the original aim of hermeneutics is the understanding of content, which can be difficult to decode. everything can be seen as a text that has to be decoded, for example, that of our own feelings and the facial expressions of our opponents. hermeneutics is about the improvement of one’s own interpretation as well as foreign interpretations as believable arguments (aristotle). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 3 5 , issue 1 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 42 friedrich schleiermacher (1768-1834) was mainly concerned with the sense of hermeneutics as method; he was moved by the question how the reader could understand a text. according to martens, for schleiermacher the method of understanding was a “psychological process of intuiting the intentions of the author from the total context of his text and his life” (martens, 2010, p. 75). wilhelm dilthey (1833-1911) expanded upon this view. according to dilthey, hermeneutics was a method of understanding the interrelationships of meaning and therewith a special method of the humanities in contrast to the sciences, the latter giving priority to explanation instead of interpretation. on the other hand, martin heidegger (sein und zeit) and his student hans georg gadamer (1900-2002) in wahrheit und methode (1960) understood hermeneutics as a branch of philosophy. for them the goal of hermeneutic philosophy is the interpretation of the understanding of being which distinguishes humans in their existence from everything else that exists. thus gadamer developed the hermeneutic method as a process of understanding, i.e., as a process of the “dialectic of question and answer” (gadamer, [1960] 1990, p. 271). in this process, we have 1) the preliminary sketch, 2) the understanding of the text, and 3) the fusion of horizons that alternate among themselves. that is, we read a text with our expectations, understand its individual statements in the context of the whole, and understand the whole from the individual statements. this process is called the “hermeneutic circle” (martens, 2010, p. 76). however, according to dilthey, intuitive understanding is only a heuristic principle, not a sure method of cognition, since the verification of hypotheses is lacking. analytical:  to conceptually verify with arguments what somebody intimates.  describe the arguments of x? why does x think that way? what are the reasons of x? taken literally, the greek word (gr. analysein) translates to abrogation, and liberation. at the same time, it is about disintegration of conceptual and argumentative difficulties and perplexities. this aim is the prime action of philosophy: the clarification of sentences in contrast to simply holding sentences. wittgenstein writes in the tractatus logico-philosophicus (1921). “philosophy is not a doctrine, but an activity [...] philosophy should [...] clarify thoughts and draw clear boundaries” (wittgenstein, 4.112). the model for contemporary analytical philosophy was socratic philosophizing as a conceptual-argumentative “giving account” through “what-is-that-questions” (martens, 2010, p. 80). socrates already had this exemplary function in ancient times: aristotle, like socrates, refers only to the logical form of concepts to clarify them. from socrates aristotle learned “intellectual midwifery,” e.g., the recourse to “logical, conceptual, or linguistic-analytical techniques,” and thus achieved a distinction between pseudo-knowledge and knowledge that is well-grounded (aristotle, 1935, xxx 4). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 3 5 , issue 1 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 43 analytical philosophy’s claim is to clarify central concepts and arguments of everyday and scientific language. analytical philosophy today represents a linguistic turn: that is, the philosophical problems are understood exclusively as linguistic; it is not what exists that is investigated, but language about what exists. through this, as wittgenstein explains in philosophical investigations, the functioning of language games can be understood. martens develops this process further: “if one analyzes more precisely the way designations such as “intentional,” “considered,” “spontaneous,” or “responsible” are attached to the concept “freedom,” or that freedom can be understood as “freedom from” or “freedom to,” then onesided or distorted examples of usage can be corrected, not through recourse to an ideal linguistic meta-rule, but to experiences of intrapsychic phenomena (bieri, 2001)” (martens, 2010, p. 83). the solution to the philosophical problem is thus found through insight into the language game. dialectical:  the act of talking back and forth, disagreeing with one another and arguing about contentious issues  do you agree with x, why or why not? the dialectic (gr. dialektike techne), is the art of discussion which means “to runaway of the logoi” (martens, 2010, p. 85) ultimately leading to comprehension through endlessly talking back and forth. the process of the dialectic back-and-forth includes the following elements:  phenomenological experience of the external facts  one’s own moral feelings  hermeneutical discussion of texts concerning the problem at hand  one’s own interpretation of the meaning of experiences  persistent interrogation of the problem at hand  a feeling for what is humane the interaction of these factors leads to insight concerning how the problem might best be resolved. for heraclitus, being itself is dialectically structured in the sense of internal contradictions and tensions. heraclitus clarifies this by pointing out these pictures: “we step and do not step into the same rivers; we are and are not.” (fragment 49a) or “cold things become warm, and what is warm cools; what is wet dries, and the parched is moistened” (fragment 126) or: “what opposes unites, and the finest harmony stems from opposing tones, and all things come about by strife.” (fragment 8). heraclitus mirrors the experience of contradictory, tensionfilled phenomena in natural occurrences or personal/social life situations. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 3 5 , issue 1 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 44 the modern representatives hegel und marx understand dialectics as the philosophy of being in which intellectual and social being is grasped in three steps, as thesis and antitheses leading to a synthesis. the aim of dialectics as a process of dialogue consists in the clarification of controversial notions and arguments in a real process with other people. in this process, personal and shared conceptions should be considered and corrected. this is what socrates meant by demanding: “always give an account of yourself and others” (martens, 2010, p. 86). that means “logon didonai;” one should not cling to arbitrary beliefs, but find good justifications for one’s position and beliefs. speculative:  fantasizing and speculating how to understand something totally different  what else could x be? how would you do x in the future? which wish do you have with regards to x? philosophy often seems to be “crazy” and aimlessly speculative. for many such unusual, almost incomprehensible, abstract ideas and considerations are seen as sheer folly. philosophers appear as other worldly, abstruse eccentrics who indeed define and argue in an acute way, but who do not really have anything practical and reasonable to say. “speculation derives from the latin word speculari and means to explore something from a vantage point; that means in a positive sense to stand above the things.” here the awareness we gain can appear as “a sudden light” (martens, 2010, p. 91). in a broader sense speculative awareness is “intuition,” “bold formulation of hypotheses,” fantasy and creativity, which means the irreducible initial point or endpoint of philosophical awareness. for speculative philosophy, there is no method under which it can be subsumed in the narrower sense, for such restriction would stifle knowledge and not ignite “a sudden light.” the speculative elements in philosophizing are “crucial experiences,” “magic moments,” creative coincidences, had by all the great philosophers, like augustine, descartes, kant, wittgenstein, arendt, popper, nussbaum, etc. they are not easily available, but one can leave oneself open for them. with the help of ekkehard marten’s five finger model (martens, 2010, p. 11), children can learn to build broader and distinct questions through philosophizing. an example for working with ekkehard marten’s five finger model: philosophizing about the game “distance and closenss” analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 3 5 , issue 1 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 45 as an example i will show an interactive game as an impulse for philosophizing with the help of ekkehard marten’s five finger model. the game is called “distance and closeness.” in it the class is divided into two groups, lined up in pairs in two rows about 2 meters apart. one partner slowly approaches the other and stops at the point where either party seems to begin to feel uncomfortable. applying marten’s five finger model opens up the rich experiences and beliefs such a simple game can elicit. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 3 5 , issue 1 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 46 the game was evaluated afterward using the framework of the five-finger method: phenomenological, hermeneutical, analytical, dialectical und speculative. to illustrate what the students got from the experience, here are some excerpts from the dialogues. on the phenomenological level, the children talked about their observations: k16: i was laughing a little, and so was my partner. k17: i paid attention, like, to how my partner’s expression looked and how she had her mouth. k 18: that you look your partner in the face, and how it looks and what he does. k 19: i was always looking into my partner’s eyes, and i really liked that. it was a lot of fun. the players primarily observed their partners. they were most interested in the partner’s facial expression, which they tried to read, and not the body posture. the second step, self-perception and perception of the other, was developed hermeneutically. this second step is supposed to help the children develop reliable access to their own private inner world and minimize self-delusion and self-doubt about achieving such access. insight about one’s own participation in the game, through the act of distancing and the interchange of perspectives, makes possible an access to the private worlds of others. central here is the question concerning the reasons why people felt what they did during the game. two explanations predominated, one interactive: “i thought it was fun because you looked at your partner” (k 34), and the other situational: “i liked it that you did something you never did before” (k 37). most of the children prefer to explain their positive feelings through recourse to the social experience; they interpret the friendly facial expression as permission to come closer: k 69: i could tell by the expression on my partner’s face that he was saying ok, i could come closer. k 70: so when you look someone in the eye, you have the feeling you can tell if he wants it or not. k 75: because his eyes had a friendly expression, and it looked to me as if i could come closer. k 78: when my partner laughed i knew right away i could go one more step. (k 88) takes this interpretation to be a general norm and applies it to her own situation: “i haven’t known jana for very long yet because she skipped a grade, she skipped second grade, and i knew i could go further anyway because she laughed and then i laughed too, and then…” the children who attribute the way they feel to the situational aspect either feel animated by the new experience, “i thought it was fun too, because we never did that, and then we laughed some too” (k 72), or else they feel unsure of themselves: k 85: because you never did this before, and then it’s kind of strange. k 86: you feel a little unsure of yourself sometimes. should you go ahead or should you stop. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 3 5 , issue 1 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 47 k 87: and because you feel nervous. since thinking and speaking are closely related, an important goal of philosophizing with children is the promotion of language ability. because many of the children felt nervous, they worked out the range of meanings for this state of mind with the help of their experience. for example: k 112: sometimes it depends on how nervous you feel. it could be that you’re nervous, that you’re happy. for example maike and i, we’re in ballet, and we have a performance on saturday, and we already did that last year, and we are happy, too, and nervous. k 116: with stage fright, you’re mostly nervous and mostly afraid about whether you’ll do it right or wrong. k 118: you don’t know if you should go a little closer or not, if the other person wants you to or…. k 120: you’re kind of excited, too. k 122: you think… uh oh, should i go one step farther? what is the other person thinking? should i go now? together the children consider in what other contexts they could use the concept “nervous:” k 126: so for example, when you’re at a funeral you’re kind of nervous and sad, somehow. k 128: i went to see a film yesterday with my friends. while i was waiting for them i was nervous that they wouldn’t be coming anymore, because it was already five minutes before it was supposed to start. k 142: sometimes i’m nervous because, like when it’s my parents’ birthday, what i want to give them. k 144: before an exam you’re nervous, too. the children came up with a wide spectrum for the concept “nervous”. the insecurity that is the basic feeling underlying the concept “nervous” refers to qualities of experience with an uncertain outcome or which can be designated as “hope for something” or “fear of something.” with the help of the dialectic method, the palette of various opinions, positions, and states of mind can be surveyed. k 155: some children, they think no, i don’t want that, and others, like johanna and me, we got pretty close, and some have a bigger distance, because they think no, i don’t want to go any farther. k 156: i didn’t get so close because i thought my partner didn’t want me to come any nearer. k 158: i got really close because i’ve already known maike for a long time. k 159: since my partner was grinning so much i went farther. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 3 5 , issue 1 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 48 k 161: my partner was about this far away and then i whispered to him, “you can come closer”….but he stayed where he was. almost all the reasons given for choosing a given distance relate to the relationship level between the play partners. the signals received regulate the distance. however, some children don’t respond to non-verbal or even verbal (k 161) exchanges, but only pay attention to their own inner state of mind. the speculative method offers a multitude of impulses; for example, the transfer to the future: k 163: maybe i would take look, if i think, yes, she looks pretty nice, and then maybe i’d talk to her. k 188: for someone who doesn’t look so friendly, i’d ask if he…it could be that he’s having a bad day, or if he… k 192: if the person looks so angry, if he’s a tough guy or something. k 196: i’d wait first and see how he is or something. i’d see how he is in the schoolyard, if he fights with other children, then i wouldn’t talk to him. k 197: if maybe he’s having a day when he thinks it’s stupid, first i’d wait till the next day to see how he looks at me then. k 203: if you have a friend that you’ve known for a long time and know she’s a good friend, she can’t look so nice and friendly all the time. k 205: it could also be that the other person is really mad at you or someone else, then i’d ask if it’s because of me or if i can do something to make things better. k 207: well if i got sent off to camp and didn’t have any friends there, and i’d see someone sitting there all alone with no friends, i’d go up to her and ask what her name is and so on. the most important learning experience the children gained from this game was reflecting about the other person’s state of mind. for one thing, it became clear to them that one can draw conclusions from the facial expressions of others, about their willingness to be approached, but that the opposite conclusion should not be generalized. a “closed-off” expression would not necessarily indicate personal rejection, but could result from many other circumstances. the game encouraged the children to discuss in a multifaceted way the topic of approaching a play partner. references aristotle, (1935). metaphysics, volume ii: books 10-14. oeconomica. magna moralia: loeb classical library. harvard university press. berger, p. l., and t. luckmann. (1995). modernität, pluralismus und sinnkrise. gütersloh: bertelsmann stiftung. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 3 5 , issue 1 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 49 bieri, p. (2001). das handwerk der freiheit: über die entdeckung des eigenen willens. münchen. carl hanser. gadamer, h. g. (1990). wahrheit und methode: grundzüge einer philosophischen hermeneutik. in: gesammelte werke: bd 1. tübingen: mohr siebeck. heraclitus. (1991). fragments. phoenix supplementary volumes, xxii; pre. t. m. robinson (translator, ed.), ca: univ of toronto press. marsal, eva. (2008). “didactic implementation of ekkehard martens’ five finger model. example: the unit ‘who am i?/ dealing with capabilities.” thinking: the journal of philosophy for children, volume 18 (4), 19-22. marsal, eva and takara dobashi. (2007). “i and my family comparing the reflective competence of japanese and german primary school children as related to the ‘ethics of care’.” childhood & philosophy, volume 3 (6), 267-287. martens, e. (2010). methodik des ethikund philosophieunterrichts: philosophieren als elementare kulturtechnik. (5th ed.) hannover: siebert. nietzsche, f. (1999). morgenröthe – gedanken über die moralischen vorurtheile. (1881). münchen: dtv. plato. (1925). lysis, symposium, gorgias. translated by w. r. m. lamb. volume iii, loeb classical library, 166. harvard university press. schleiermacher, f. (1977). hermeneutik und kritik. (1838). manfred frank (ed.) frankfurt: suhrkamp. waldenfels. b. (1992). einführung in die phänomenologie. münchen: fink. wittgenstein, l. (2014). tractatus logico-philosophicus. (1921). translated by c.k. ogden c.k. international library of psychology, philosophy, & scientific method. london: routledge. wittgenstein, l. (2009) philosophical investigations. (1953). translated by g.e.m. anscombe and p.m.s. hacker. oxford: wiley-blackwell. address correspondences to: eva marsal, professor of philosophy university of education, karlsruhe bismarckstr. 10, 76133 karlsruhe, germany eva.marsal@ph-karlsruhe.de analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 80 philosophizing with children in the course of solving modeling problems in a sixth grade mathematics classroom diana meerwaldt, rita borromeo ferri, patricia nevers keywords: 6th grade mathematics, modeling problems, transfer, different types of philosophizing, empirical study introduction while the concept of a community of inquiry based on dialogue is an integral part of philosophy for chil-dren (lipman 1988, 2003; morehouse 2010), this concept is less prevalent in mathematics and science classes. in these subjects emphasis is usually placed on transmitting factual information as accurately and completely as possible. children expect the teacher (or some other authority) to tell them what the “right” answer to a question is, and teachers expect children to reproduce that answer. there is little opportunity for uncertainty, query and dialog (see gallas 1995, pp. 7-16; sprod 2011, p. xiv). discussions are often conducted between individual students and the teacher, but not among the students themselves. this style of teaching generates a kind of pressure that many children find onerous (hausberg 2007). in addition, it encourages a vision of mathematics and science as fields of study that are highly abstract, detached from reality, and unfathomable. pupils leave the classroom thinking that there is a predetermined right and wrong answer for everything in these subjects and no room for discovery. therefore proponents of constructivist science education (e.g. driver 1994) and philosophizing in science classes (see nevers 2009; sprod 2011), and advocates of modeling activities in mathematics classes such as g. kaiser (2006) and r. borromeo ferri (2006, 2010), have proposed ways to enrich traditional classroom teaching in order to promote the active construction of knowledge by children and better conceptual understanding in science and math. our paper presents an attempt to further this goal by philosophizing with children in the course of mathematical modeling exercises in a sixth grade math class. although philosophizing and mathematical modeling differ in the content of the problems they address, both approaches involve problem solving through dialogue in small groups. because of this similarity, we felt that practice in philosophizing might have an enhancing effect on modeling activities. d. meerwaldt (2009) has proposed several reasons why philosophizing may enhance student understanding during modeling activities. first of all, the problems selected for mathematical modeling, like the problems discussed when philosophizing with children, are complex and embedded in a narrative context. solving them requires in-depth reflection on the part of the teacher and pupils, just as the solution of philosophical problems does. secondly, the problem solving methods and skills employed in both approaches are similar, including cooperative learning and dialogue, analytical thinking and reasoning, critical reflection on worldviews, imagination and creative thinking. thirdly, since both modeling and philosophizing with children are directed towards everyday problems and questions that children themselves find interesting, learning should be more meaningful. finally, both modeling and philosophizing require that the teacher assume the somewhat novel role of a mentor rather than that of an instructor. since it was beyond our means to test the idea of enhancement quantitatively, we designed a unit to demonstrate how philosophizing might be combined with mathematical modeling exercises in a sixth grade class, as described in this paper. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 81 philosophizing with children in germany in germany, the practice of philosophizing with children was initiated in the 1920’s and 1930’s and further developed in the 1980’s and 90’s by, among others, helmut schreier (1993) and ekkehard martens (1999), both former researchers and educators at the university of hamburg. the expression “philosophizing with children” (philosophieren mit kindern, pmkj) was chosen instead of the term “philosophy for children” in order to emphasize the socratic process involved. as martens (2009) indicates, philosophizing in the socratic tradition encompasses specific philosophical problems, an attitude of puzzlement and wonder, and certain types of philosophical thinking. martens, a scholar of philosophy as well as theory and methods of teaching philosophy, maintains that philosophizing is a basic cultural technique that is just as important as reading, writing and arithmetic, and he identifies five basic forms or “methods” of philosophical thinking, which include (2009) phenomenological thinking: precisely and accurately describing something hermeneutical thinking: understanding oneself, someone else, a text or a situation through iterative interpretation; expressing one’s interpretation in different ways analytical thinking: separating something into its component parts, comparing and contrasting them, classifying and naming them, clarifying the terms employed, and determining the relationships between parts dialectical thinking: viewing something from different perspectives; acknowledging, weighing and tolerating different perspectives speculative thinking: employing fantasy and imagination to explore new avenues of thought (pp. 106-109). for some teachers, philosophizing most likely means examining a traditional philosophical topic from a field such as epistemology or ethics by employing critical, analytical thinking. reasoning and argumentation are considered the main tools of such philosophical discourse. however, as martens has argued persuasively, other types of thinking and their attendant cognitive skills may also be valuable for achieving in-depth understanding of a topic. of those listed above, most philosophers would probably not question the value of phenomenology, hermeneutics and dialectics as types of thinking that might increase greater understanding of a topic, and most science and math teachers would probably agree. but the idea of speculation as a valuable cognitive tool is more controversial. as martens explains (2003, pp.89-95), speculation is quite different from analytical thinking, which predominates in modern philosophy, science and math. it involves departing from objective knowledge and logical rationality and exercising imagination and divergent thinking instead. while its importance in the arts is probably unquestioned, its value in math and science is not as securely established. speculation is a kind of thinking and discourse that many children especially enjoy (hausberg 2007; höger 2007). when they are allowed to express it in philosophical discussions, their contributions may resemble “stream of consciousness” thought rather than tight argumentation, as some of the passages in the following documentation indicate. the popularity of speculation is understandable since it permits children (and adults!) to exercise what egan (1997) refers to as mythic understanding, a manner of thinking typical of pre-scientific periods of cultural evolution and pre-literate phases of cognitive development. egan regards this kind of understanding as a legitimate means for delving into new areas of knowledge. the possible significance of this type of thinking has been demonstrated in various studies. mähler (2005), for example, has examined the development of what she calls “magical” thinking, which resembles egan’s concept of mythic understanding. she finds that young children 4-6 years of age are quite capable of logical thinking but clearly enjoy magical thinking and voluntarily employ it when exploring unknown cognitive terrain. in another set of investigations philosophical discussions were used to examine children’s moral attitudes toward analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 82 nature (nevers et al. 1997, 2006; gebhard et al. 2003). the results show that when children are allowed to speculate, they often draw upon anthropomorphism as a form of imaginative, pre-conceptual thinking, which they use to better understand and moralize nature. calvert (2000) investigated children’s use of metaphors in philosophizing and discusses their significance on the basis of cassirer’s ([1953] 1994) and langer’s (1942) concepts of symbolism and presentational symbols. she has pursued the integration of creative, imaginative thinking into discussions with children in numerous practical exercises in germany. engels (2004) argues that fantasy and imagination are fundamental to thought experiments, which he feels are a vital aspect of creative thinking, and which freese (1995, pp. 25ff) considers to be the ultimate method of epistemology. finally hausberg (2013) has demonstrated empirically that speculation is one of many skills furthered by philosophizing with children that enhance creativity. in the mathematics classroom this kind of thinking can be seen when children ponder questions like: how big is infinity? what exactly does zero mean? what would our world be like without numbers? are numbers something people have made up? can we really describe the world with numbers? sometimes children pose these questions themselves in the course of instruction. exploring such questions in math class encourages reflectiveness and intellectual ownership, as prediger argues (2005, p. 98). promoting deeper reflection during mathematical modeling mathematical modeling has already been recognized and put to use as a procedure for encouraging greater cognitive openness in mathematics classes (blum & niss 1991; kaiser & sriraman 2006; borromeo ferri 2010). it involves the use of open problems rather than closed ones – that is, problems for which more than one solution is possible. moreover, the problems posed are complex, real-life ones that can be solved with the help of mathematical models. problems of this kind challenge pupils to make connections between the real world and mathematics and vice versa through what is known as a “modeling cycle” (borromeo ferri 2006; figure 1). to understand how a modeling exercise differs from the usual exercises presented in math classes, consider the following two examples: a. traditional exercise: on family day at the fair a single ride on the roller coaster costs 4 €. how often can tim ride the roller coaster when his mother gives him 20 €? b. modeling exercise: a family that lives in hamburg is planning a trip to an amusement park. they have two choices, either the “dom” in hamburg or the “heidepark” in the nearby city of soltau. which choice is the best for the family? present good reasons for this choice. the first exercise requires a very simple calculation leading to an unequivocal result: 20 ÷ 4 = 5. the correct answer is: tim can ride the roller coaster five times. it doesn’t matter how plausible it is that tim would really ride the roller coaster five times, nor whether he would really choose to spend 20€ this way. the calculation is correct even if the exercise is meaningless. the modeling exercise, on the other hand, is embedded in a larger narrative context. completing the modeling exercise requires that the children understand the greater context of the problem, elaborate it, and establish their own parameters for finding a solution. they have to decide how many members the family has, how much money is available for the trip, the day on which the trip is to take place, how the family plans to get to the park and the costs that ensue, whether they want to have lunch at the park or not and the expenses involved, and what rides they want to take. an exercise of this kind is open, complex, realistic, authentic and solvable with the help of mathematics (maaß 2007, p. 12). furthermore, solving it and comparing different solutions requires dialogue among the pupils. the following modeling task was used in the study described in this paper. we would like to illustrate how the modeling cycle works on the basis of this task: one winter day when the teachers and children arrive at their school, they discover that someone has broken analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 83 into it. there are footprints in the snow that have probably been made by the thief. in order to investigate the crime the police want to rope off the school so that no one else can enter it. 1.) how much rope do the policemen need to close off the school? 2.) judging from the footprint left behind, how tall was the thief? . mathematical model mathematical results real results real model mental representation of the situation real situation rest of the world mathematics 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 understanding the task 2 simplifying/structuring the task; using/need of (emk), depends on the task 3 mathematising; emk is needed here strongly 4 working mathematically, using individual mathematical competencies 5 interpreting 6 validating extra-mathematical knowledge (emk) extra-mathematical knowledge (emk) 6 figure 1. the modeling cycle according to borromeo ferri (2010) the real situation in the cycle, depicted in figure 1, can be presented to the children in different ways – in written form, for example, or as a picture. in the case in point the situation was presented as a story. the problems posed by this situation are to determine exactly how much rope the policemen need to close off the school and how tall the thief is. the second step in the cycle is the so-called mental representation of the situation. this occurs at an unconscious level, but as we know from empirical research, in order to understand the problem it is necessary for the children to visualize the given situation. specifically this means that the children must imagine their school building and the rope; perhaps they may also imagine the janitor, the broken door and the policemen. this provides an opportunity for many different kinds of associations. the pupils then simplify the problem and make some hypothetical assumptions. in the present case they must decide which part of the school building should be closed off – the whole building, for example, or only part of it. to do this, the children have to deal with the floor plan of the building, and they have to acquire or apply knowledge about scales and measurement. the next step is to create a mathematical model based on these assumptions. this can be done in several different ways. one possibility is to directly measure the lengths of rope determined as necessary on the basis of the floor plan, add them up, and then convert this value to meters or some other standard unit of measurement. mathematical competencies required to perform this step include addition, multiplication, dealing with several different units of measurement and conversion. depending on the assumptions the children make, the mathematical results can range from 8m, if the main and the side entrances are closed off, to 350m, if the entire school is enclosed. the pupils have to interpret their results and then decide whether or not their results are realistic. this process of weighing and evaluating results is called validation. if the children come to the conclusion that their results are not realistic, they have to reassess their modeling process (blum and borromeo ferri, 2009). in the present study the first steps of this procedure were performed in small analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 84 groups, while validation was conducted in a plenary discussion. both parts require dialogue. for the second part of the modeling exercise concerning the size of the thief, the children were given an outline of a footprint on a piece of paper. they were asked to imagine the real footprint and the thief who produced it. perhaps they also might imagine the kind of shoe that would produce such a footprint. then they must decide what measurements they need. to solve this problem they have to estimate the relationship between shoe size and body size and apply this to the footprint. to do this they might measure this relationship with one member of their group or determine the average value of measurements derived from several different people. at any rate, a mathematical relationship between shoe size and body size is determined and applied to the footprint they have been given, which is 32 cm long. using algebra they can then estimate the size of the thief. assuming that the relationship between shoe size and body size is 1:6, the mathematical result would be 32 x 6 = 192 cm. in reality the size of a person with a footprint corresponding to european shoe size 46, which is 32 cm long, could be between 180 cm and 200 cm. design of the investigation in order to examine the possibilities of combining modeling and philosophizing, a sixth grade class at an upper level school (“gymnasium”) in hamburg was chosen that included 10 boys and 18 girls. the class had had no experience with modeling, but it had been philosophizing since the beginning of the fifth grade; some of the children had even begun in primary school. thus the class was well on its way to becoming a community of inquiry even before the study was performed. since successful philosophizing requires practice, it was thought that the prospects for an observable influence would be more promising with this class than with one that had had no such experience. a unit was developed that covered 8 hours of class time and included the modeling task described above. before being exposed to the modeling task, the class had already had experience in calculating the area of surfaces. at the beginning of the unit the class was divided into two groups. one was given the opportunity of philosophizing – in three different group discussions – about different topics related to the modeling task, while the other half worked individually drawing and making posters without communicating. then both groups were given the same modeling exercise. we hypothesized that if philosophizing has a very direct and immediately observable effect, the two groups might differ in their modeling performance. as described above, solutions to the problem were developed in small groups and presented in the form of posters. then the various different solutions were evaluated in a plenary session referred to as validation in the modeling concept. during different phases of the investigation the groups were observed through video documentation and field notes. both the videos and posters were analyzed as part of the investigation. in addition, the pupils were asked to complete a questionnaire at the end of the unit. the following questions served as guidelines for the analysis of the data we gathered: what effect does philosophizing have on the modeling process? are the students in the test group better able to understand the problem? do they communicate differently than the control group while working on the modeling exercise? does the test group show any differences in validating its results? does the entire class exhibit skills in modeling that could be attributed to their past experience in philosophizing? obviously a limited case study of this kind does not permit any scientifically valid conclusions to be drawn. however, as a heuristic procedure it might reveal interesting tendencies and raise valuable questions for further study. regarding the content of the problems addressed while philosophizing in a math class, an obvious choice would have been problems in the philosophy of mathematics such as the handful listed above (p. 5). however, to establish a more direct connection between philosophizing and mathematical modeling, we chose topics more directly related to the specific modeling task used that might enhance understanding of this task, its narrative context, and the nature of the process of mathematical modeling. in the test group three different topics and three different types of philosophizing were employed over the course of three different discussions. the first analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 85 discussion dealt with a matter of ethics and had nothing to do with mathematics per se. it is based on a wellknown story derived from lawrence kohlberg’s studies of moral development – the story of heinz, who contemplates breaking into a pharmacy to steal medicine for his dying wife. since both the modeling task and the story involve theft, the heinz dilemma was chosen as a warm-up exercise to encourage the children to consider possible motives and explanations for theft in the modeling task. the second discussion had to do with clarifying concepts, although in this case the concepts are not ones typically discussed in philosophy classes. instead, the terms “mathematics” and “reality” were explored conceptually. since modeling involves relationships between mathematics and reality (see figure 1), it seemed reasonable to address this relationship before the concept of modeling and the first modeling exercise were presented. the third discussion journeyed deep into the realm of speculation and involved imagining how a person might succeed in leaving no footprints behind, and what the consequences would be. this last discussion was carried out before the children were asked to estimate how tall the thief was on the basis of his footprint. all three discussions were moderated by a facilitator as group philosophical discussions. the math modeling unit ended with a plenary discussion, in which the children compared and weighed the different mathematical solutions they had arrived at. although this discussion was not moderated, it closely resembled a philosophical discussion, since it required argumentation and persuasion. results from the three philosophical discussions 1) the first student response to the heinz dilemma was not one of ethical query, nor was it comparable to a strongly focused discussion about saving life vs. property rights such as one might find in a philosophy class. instead, the children began thinking about ways to raise a large amount of money in order to prevent the protagonist, heinz, from having to steal medicine. in addition they talked about the price of drugs and the financial situation of doctors and hospitals. this suggests that the everyday thoughts of children in response to the story may be quite distant from the ethical dilemma that the story is intended to induce. however, later on the discussion did take a more traditional turn, as the following excerpt illustrates: m: we have to take a radical view of the situation. he [heinz] has tried everything…. now all he has is the decision to steal or not to steal. … s1: well, i wouldn’t steal anything, because it’s like, like you do something that’s against the law, and if you rob somebody, like, i’d have a guilty conscience, because then the pharmacist would be hurt too, because the medicine is gone, so to speak. besides, the pharmacist would know right away who did it since he knows how badly he needs it, and everything would be useless anyway. m: so you wouldn’t break into the pharmacy. s2: i would, i mean, i don’t know exactly. i’d break in, because then he’d have helped his wife, but then he’d land in jail, and he’d be punished, but his wife would be alive. s3: well, it all depends. if his wife says “oh, i don’t want to live anymore,” then i wouldn’t do it. or else i would, another possibility would be to go to the government and describe the situation, because even if the government can’t help him with the theft, it just can’t be that if there’s a medicine that could keep her from dying, then the government should really take over, because it can’t just let a woman die. so he could really go to the government, and if that doesn’t work, then … m: so you’re saying it’s not just heinz’s problem, that it’s really a problem of the entire society? analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 86 s3: yes, because then you’d read in the newspaper “government lets woman die although medicine is available!” that wouldn’t be so good either. … s1: well, i also think he should do it [break into the pharmacy], because then he’d feel better if he’d done something good, because he’d have saved a life, so to speak, because it’s not so bad if the pharmacist loses some medicine than if a human being has to die, that such a stingy person lets her die. the children continued to talk about what it would be like to have a guilty conscience, the pros and cons of assisted suicide, and the extent to which we are able make an autonomous decision about life and death. the moderator made sure that the children honored the rules for a philosophical discussion that they themselves had established, and that they built upon each others’ contributions. she also summarized the discussion at various points and insisted that the children give reasons for their views. 2) a philosophical discussion about the concepts “mathematics” and “reality” was included since we felt that it might have some value in helping students understand what modeling entails. first of all, the children were invited to individually prepare a conceptual map for each of the terms. then a group discussion was initiated by asking each pupil to express briefly a thought he or she had regarding the terms. the associations the children mentioned included: fun, numbers, language, boring, tests, solutions, one of the co-investigators, teachers, teachers’ pets, man-made, calculations, addition, lots of homework, death. most of these associations appear to reflect the children’s view of mathematics as a school subject. then the moderator asked the children to explain what math is on the basis of what had been said and began a moderated discussion in the traditional manner of philosophy for children. excerpts from this discussion are presented below. s1: well, it consists of lots of numbers, a whole lot of homework and tests. s2: mmm, you need it all your life for, i don’t know, for example, for shopping. s3: it’s fun to be challenged. but if you’re not challenged, it’s boring. s4: i would say it’s something like a language, because, you know, there are many different languages and most people can do math. that’s why for me math is a language. … s6: well, i think it’s something man-made, to somehow get along better in life. but when you think about it, if math hadn’t been made, then we wouldn’t have needed it. because then it would be something like an apple that doesn’t even exist. m: oh, that’s an interesting question, whether or not we would need it if we didn’t have it. you mean that then we wouldn’t have any numbers and nothing that has to do with numbers? s6: well, then, in that case an apple would be, sure, then somehow, somehow, i don’t know, but i think in that case the thing wouldn’t be called a euro. it would be called something like a piece of gold. … analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 87 s7: mmm, i’m not so sure. sooner or later people would have figured it out anyway, because they would, well, just think if they had ten pots and would say “i have pots.” but then nobody knows how many and so you have to say it somehow. then maybe they would use their fingers to show how many they have and sooner or later there are numbers. m: you mean that numbers would come to be in any case? s7: yes, and i wanted to disagree with s1, because she said that mathematics consists only of numbers, but it consists of much more than numbers. there’s geometry too. s4: and letters. s8: and i wanted to say, i mean i think you could also do it this way, if you had ten pots, you could say pots, pots, pots, pots, pots, pots, pots, pots, pots, pots. s3: you mean pot, pot, pot. s8: yeah, exactly, that you say pot ten times, and when you then say pots, that could mean 10 pots. and when you say pots, pots, pots, then that’s thirty pots. s7: but then, actually, you’re back to numbers, because then, in principle, you have numbers, because for the number ten you have a symbol, because when they say pots it means ten pots, so to speak, and that is like our ten, so to speak. then that’s a number too. the children’s comments indicate that they see mathematics as something useful for shopping or “to get along better in life.” they also regard it as something personally meaningful since it can be fun. they are able to conceive of math as something with a structure like a language that can be learned. and they explore the significance of math by proposing a thought experiment, which allows them to go beyond the commonly held view of mathematics as a school subject and discuss questions like: what would it be like if we had no numbers? what are they good for? 3) the third discussion – about what kind of human being would fail to produce a footprint – brought the children back onto the track of the modeling story about breaking and entering in their school. the first idea one child expressed was that it might be a person in the form of a shadow. this led to other philosophical questions: is a shadow a person? what makes a living thing a living thing? another child suggested that a person who produces no footprints must be god, because there is no evidence for god, no “traces.” and yet another expressed the following idea: well, i think a person without footprints doesn’t exist anyway, a man, a human being who doesn’t leave any traces behind, but if he did exist, then there would be no real justice anywhere on earth, because then he could break into a place without leaving any traces behind. this discussion also gave the children the opportunity for creative speculation by imagining various different ways that one might avoid footprints: that must have been someone who floats on air. you’d have to have a kind of tank on your back that lets you breathe in and out. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 88 if you had a kind of jumpsuit made out of some kind of material that doesn’t allow anything to pass through it, then you could walk or touch something without leaving any traces behind. he could have a board that is weightless and floats on air and then some kind of shoes, there must be something like that, that are magnetic or something and don’t leave any footprints behind. while the value of such a discussion for learning math may not be immediately evident, its significance lies in opening children’s minds to imaginative and creative modes of thinking. providing an opportunity for divergent thinking is also in keeping with the “flexible attention policy” exercised by the highly innovative minnesota 3m company to encourage creative thinking, as reported by lehrer (2012, p. 29). according to this policy 3m employees are allowed to spend 15% of their workday pursuing speculative new ideas rather than focusing on the project to which they are assigned, a period which the employees call their “bootlegging hour”. perhaps speculating in the course of philosophizing in different subject areas could have a similar effect on children. results of combining mathematical modeling and philosophizing analysis of the videos and protocols used to document the unit shows no striking difference in communication among the pupils in the test group, who philosophized prior to beginning the modeling exercises, compared to the control group during the modeling exercises. communication in the test group was not any more respectful, open, or elaborate than that of the control group. instead, other factors such as individual personalities, group dynamics and gender seemed to be more significant for the kind of discussion that ensued. a study with a control group without any experience in philosophizing might provide further insights into the effects of philosophizing on communication styles. however, it is extremely difficult to find a valid control group that is similar to the test group in all respects except for experience in philosophizing. it should also be noted that the discussions among the pupils during the problem solving and validating phases were not moderated by an adult. this is very different from the moderated discussions commonly used when philosophizing with children. in a subsequent study involving the solution of an open problem in a biology class (hausberg 2013), the validating phase was conducted in the manner of a moderated philosophical discussion. in this case, the validating phase resembled a philosophical discussion much more distinctly than the discussions in small groups prior to the plenary discussion, which were not moderated. in the present study, the pupils in the test group did seem to be more engaged than the control group when the various different groups first presented their solutions. they seemed to question the solutions of other groups more actively. they were also more critical than the control group during the validating phase. it is not, of course, possible to attribute these differences with absolute certainty to the period of philosophizing that the test group experienced, but it seems likely. in general, the entire class exhibited a high level of reflective competence and was unusually active in validating compared to other classes observed informally during modeling exercises. since the class observed here was well trained in philosophizing, it is quite possible that this resulted in the greater ease in validating observed. the results of the questionnaire indicate that the class in general exhibited a high level of tolerance towards tasks with several different valid solutions. eighty three percent of the pupils reported that they enjoy exercises with different solutions. this is contrary to claims commonly made by teachers that pupils are easily frustrated if they are not told by an authority which answer is the “right” one. in a final feedback session the pupils in the test group agreed that they enjoyed the combination of philosophizing and mathematics. they were more inclined than the control group to see a connection between philosophy and mathematics. moreover, compared to the control group they felt that they had had a greater opportunity to apply their everyday knowledge to the modeling process and found the modeling procedure “easy.” analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 89 concluding remarks previous research has revealed various problems associated with using the modeling process in the classroom. first of all, modeling requires more independent thinking on the part of pupils than is usually expected in mathematics classes. moreover, they must be able to apply many more skills than simply calculating a particular result. they have to imagine a situation, propose a solution, discuss it with others, reason with them and weigh their results compared to others. for many pupils it is highly irritating to discover that several different solutions to one and the same problem are possible, and some find this difficult to bear. research on the modeling procedure has shown that certain beliefs about mathematics have a strong influence on the success of the solution process, and that voluntary reflection and validation are often skirted (borromeo ferri 2010). children still seem to search for the “right” answer and turn to the teacher for validation. the investigation reported here suggests that experience in philosophizing in math class as well as outside of it might serve to mitigate some of these problems. regular exercise in pondering und discussing open questions in the course of philosophizing appears to promote an attitude amenable to dealing with open problems in math and other subject areas as well. children learn to accept the fact that there may not be a single “right” answer to a particular problem. they learn to think independently and to question their own thoughts as well as those of others. furthermore, they learn to examine and question the nature of certain bodies of knowledge such as mathematics or history or science, thus assuming a critical, meta-cognitive position to such knowledge. in order to optimize its effects, we believe that practice in philosophizing should begin at an early level of schooling and be made a regular part of the school curriculum. in addition, it is important that philosophical discussions be clearly earmarked as such to avoid confusion with other learning processes. philosophizing can then provide space for children to express their thoughts freely and relieve them from the pressure to produce a “right” answer so common in many other learning situations, even though producing a “right” answer may well be justified in these contexts. if philosophizing is to be established as a basic educational practice that can be exercised in subject areas like math or science, it would be important to improve the philosophical background of teachers in these areas, as w. turgeon (2011/12) has also suggested for teachers active in p4c in the usa. an obvious solution would be to make training in philosophy and philosophizing mandatory for primary and middle school teachers. however, this training would have to be tailored to the specific needs of teachers. the problem cannot be solved by simply requiring all teachers to obtain a major or minor in philosophy since the aims and methods of these courses of study at most universities are usually far removed from the interests of future grade school teachers. there can be a great difference between “studying philosophy” and “philosophizing,” and the skills of the latter are not necessarily learned in the former. as such, training teachers in facilitating children’s philosophical conversations represents a new sub-field within philosophy, with strong implications for the future of childhood education across all the disciplines. references blum, w. & niss, m. 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(1993). über das philosophieren mit geschichten für kinder und jugendliche. begleitbuch zu „himmel, erde und ich. geschichten zum nachdenken über den sinndes lebens, den wert der dinge und die erkenntnis der welt“. heinsberg: agentur dieck.seischab, l. (2010). wie frei sind menschen und tiere? philosophieren in der sekundarstufe i über die spannbreite zwischen angeborenem und erlerntemverhalten. master’s thesis. hamburg: university of hamburg. sprod, t. (2011). discussions in science. promoting conceptual understanding in the middle school years. victoria, australia: acer press. turgeon, w. c. (2011/2012). the place of ‘philosophy’ in preparing teachers to teach pre-college philosophy. notes for a conversation. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis 32(2), 68-74. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 92 von chamisso, a. ([1813] 2005). peter schlemihl. from the german of adelbert von chamisso. tr. by sir john bowring. university of michigan: university library, michigan historical reprint series. author information diana meerwaldt universität hamburg epb fakultät fb erziehungswissenschaft von-melle-park 8 20146 hamburg germany rita borromeo ferri universität kassel fachbereich 10 mathematik und naturwissenschaften institut für mathematik heinrich-plett-straße 40 34132 kassel germany address correspondences to: prof. dr. patricia nevers schöner blick 1b 22587 hamburg germany tel. -49-40-86693378 penevers@web.de book review philosophy and childhood: critical perspectives and affirmative practices book reviews for analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 35 (2014) 59 book review philosophy and childhood: critical perspectives and affirmative practices review by richard morehouse philosophy and childhood: critical perspectives and affirmative practices walter omar kohan palgrave macmillan, 2014. 172 pages isbn-10: 1137469161 isbn-13: 9781137469168 he first bit of context for this fascinating work is that it unfolds before the reader in a subtle and intimate manner. for example, the chapter headings do not foreshadow the depth of content or method of the book, as they often do in other works. on the other hand, after reading the entire book thoroughly and reflecting back, perhaps something of the books’ extraordinary depth does begin to reveal itself in the way it’s put together. let’s begin with the following quote. given the centrality of collaborative philosophizing in our project, our goal has been to organize an experience without pre-determined methods or curriculum material, and to approach pedagogical practice like an artist, who needs not only skill and practical sensibilities but also radical openness to the world (p. 89). read out of context the above quote may seem like an idea that has been stated many times before and so may be expected to have little, if any, genuine impact on the reader. alternately, it might appear as an impossible dream of an armchair philosopher. however, read in context, that is, after the nearly 90 pages that precede and set up this passage, the statement is rife with meaning and significance for teachers and students alike. rather than explain the quotation now, i will attempt to place it within the larger context of the work. for now, let’s get back to examining the book idea-by-idea, chapter-by-chapter. even before the book begins, there is a forward by maughn gregory that needs to be recognized. dr. gregory notes that the book is an intersection of childhood philosophy and education that will challenge the reader both singularly and at their intersection points. maughn further states that the book is “idiosyncratic and universal”; something of no small order and no small accomplishment. this introduction prepares the reader for what is to come —a critique of p4c based on “[m]y own practice with children and educators” leading to a strong belief in the educational possibilities of the practice of philosophy with children and teachers along with “serious doubts (philosophical, educational, political) regarding the benefits of the application of the institute for the advancement of philosophy for children (iapc) model” (p. 3). one of kohan’s points is that there has been too much praise and condemnation and too little critique of the lipman program. kohan begins by recognizing three important elements of lipman’s approach to t book reviews for analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 35 (2014) 60 philosophy: 1) philosophy is about questioning (critical, creative, and caring thinking), 2) distributive thinking, and 3) self-corrective questioning (logical and dialogical inquiry). however, kohan calls lipman to task for limiting the scope, conceptualization, and form within which philosophical questions are asked. kohan argues that the power of philosophical questioning is in the ability or willingness to put “ourselves into the question” (p. 6). “collective philosophical inquiry always expands the field of the problematic in us, to us, within us” (p. 6). to do anything less is to stop being philosophical. kohan’s reading of jaspers is that philosophy is informed by wonder, doubt and commotion to which he adds dissatisfaction. this is, in my view, not only a part of kohan’s reading of the world, but also his reading of paulo freire. the presentation of the idea of dissatisfaction leads to a fuller examination of the relationship of philosophy, education and politics (section 1.3). there is more to the critique of lipman’s p4c in this short chapter, but i leave it to the reader to discover the implications of this critique for themselves. chapter 2 is “the celebration of 30 years of philosophy for children.” on a personal note, i was pleased to read that kohan included his participation in an early conference of the north american association for community of inquiry (naaci) as formative in his education along with three visits to mendham. for anyone who has not experienced an extended encounter at mendham, kohan provides some insight into its transformative powers, but in his spirit of critique which is the leitmotif of the work, he also includes his critique of mendham —its disconnection with the issues of the larger world. it is his discussion of invented memories: childhood, however, that, at least for me, struck home the most. the passage from manoel barros that kohan cites “all that i do not invent is false” mirror and extend piaget’s “to invent is to understand.” kohan’s discussion of lipman and sharp in his chapter “goodbye to matthew lipman (and ann margret sharp)” is personal and touching and provides a gentle transition to “the politics of formation: a critique of philosophy for children.” kohan’s critical voice here is to me reminiscent of erich fromm. among my memories of reading fromm for the first time so many years ago, is fromm’s use of etymology as a teaching tool. kohan continues this tradition with his presentation of “formation.” drawing on plato, kohan discusses the equivocal meaning of formation. in this text of the republic, it is someone external — the educator, the philosopher, the politician, the legislator, the founder of the pólis — who will think and plant in each child the seed of what he or she should be in the future. implicit here is the idea of education as giving form to another (p. 33). the child is to fit into a given society, and, by implication, a given social order. “when philosophy is practiced to affirm a politics —or a morality, a pedagogy, a religion, or any other determinate order— it disables. morals, pedagogy, politics, and religion are problems for philosophy, not arrival points” (p.41). kohan goes on to suggest that what makes philosophy possible is the empty space within which we can interrogate politics, religion and morality. this ends the first section of the book —“philosophy for children: critical perspectives.” the second part of the book is entitled “philosophy in children: affirmative practices.” the statement philosophy “in” children sets it off from both “for” and “with” children. what are the differences among the prepositions for, with and in? for implies doing something to someone, book reviews for analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 35 (2014) 61 with implies being together, and in is at least initially a bit of a puzzle. the chapters in this section provide a sense of what is meant by philosophy in children as each chapter contains classroom dialogue. part of my understanding of how kohan uses the preposition in here is exemplified by the phrase “in their own words.” kohan writes about the development of “self-determined subjectivity.” this may be why the dialogues are so important in this section of the book —they give voice to the subjectivity of the children. children’s subjectivity is often suppressed by the dominant voices of society. therefore, children, especially those at the margins of the dominant society, “need the intellectual and affective supplies in order to think more complexly and thoroughly about their lives” (p. 52). the stated goal of the project in the “philosophy at public schools of brasilia, df” is “to suggest a direction toward a collective construction, developed through philosophical inquiry” as a set of ideas that are “open, problematic, questioning contestable and subject to controversy” (p. 60). “(some) reasons for doing philosophy with children” is the title of the sixth chapter. the chapter is informed and shaped by the dialogue of the children taken from the details of the activities provided in chapter five. in the name of the students, kohan make a case for radical educational reform. he argues that education should find its focus on transforming ourselves and our relationships, rather than transforming others, i.e., students; and “second, that our politics is fulfilled, not in the end, but in the beginning and in process – in the transformation of thinking that enables us to think philosophically together and to think through philosophy” (p. 66). the usual etymology of philosophy is “a friend of, or lover of knowledge.” here the inversion of the etymology is suggested —friendship is both a condition and a beginning for thinking. it is both an old beginning and a new one; we do not think except in a friendly environment. while this understanding of philosophy may appear similar to how many who work in philosophy with children might talk about philosophy, i invite the reader to think again about what lies behind and beyond these words in light of the argument presented in this work, and argument for which i cannot, in this short review, do justice. “philosophizing with children at a philosophy camp,” chapter seven, documents some of kohan’s classroom work in korea, and is riveting in terms of the depth of philosophy he managed to achieve engaging the students. as this chapter illustrates, kohan is not afraid of bringing the ideas and words of political leaders and philosophers to students. the class opens with the students reading a short story “the story of the search” written by the mexican sub marcos, one of the leaders of the zapatista army for national liberation. the students also read plato’s apology of socrates as well as a short piece from the beginning of nietzsche’s zarathustra. what is so exciting about this philosophy camp is the depth of discussion achieved by the students and the skill of the facilitator at leading the discussion. while kohan does not state it, to this reviewer he recreated a mendham experience for these high school aged students. quite an accomplishment! i will now address the quotation that opened this review, which is arguably the core perspective at the heart of chapter eight entitled “does philosophy fit in caxis? a latin american project” (caxis is short for duque de caxis, a suburb of rio de janeiro). given the centrality of collaborative philosophizing in our project, our goal has been to organize an experience without pre-determined methods or curriculum material, and to approach pedagogical practice like an artist, who book reviews for analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 35 (2014) 62 needs not only skill and practical sensibilities but also radical openness to the world (kohan, p.89). this quote, coming as it does near the end of the book, struck me as a place to begin as it might shake the reader out of complacency while at the same time providing some enticement to engage with the ideas of this truly liberating work. to read this book is to enter into the world of radical philosophical educational theory and practice. to this reviewer it exemplifies paulo freire’s definition of praxis, that is, a radial integration of theory and practice, woven together so tightly it ends up redefining the very meaning of education. the final chapter is “philosophy as spiritual and political exercise in an adult literary course.” it continues the radical spirit of praxis that walter kohan advocates and models throughout the book, and leaves us with a vivid picture of how he has practiced philosophy with children. kohan’s book is one that inspires its readers to accept the challenge that comes with being both teachers and students of philosophy. the book is a must read! address correspondences to: dr. richard morehouse, emeritus professor viterbo university, la crosse, wi. remorehouse@viterbo.edu analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 62 teaching philosophy through paintings: a museum workshop savvas ioannou, kypros georgiou & ourania maria ventista abstract: there is wide research about the philosophy for/with children program. however, there is not any known attempt to investigate how a philosophical discussion can be implemented through a museum workshop. the present research aims to discuss aesthetic and epistemological issues with primary school children through a temporary art exhibition in a museum in cyprus. certainly, paintings have been used successfully to connect philosophical topics with the experiences of the children. we suggest, though, that this is not as innovative as the conduction of a dialogue in a museum. results were mostly positive. pupils participated in the discussion and they gave intensive definitions of beautiful paintings and counterexamples for given definitions. the structure of inductive arguments and the difference between belief and knowledge were discussed. progress in the analysis of inductive arguments was slightly noticeable, but it is likely that this was due to limited time spent on analysing those arguments. furthermore, more sessions are needed to make generalisations for the effectiveness of the philosophy for children program in a museum instead of a traditional classroom. even though there is discussion about the different stimuli of the discussion, it might be worth considering the effectiveness of different contexts where the discussion can take place. keywords philosophy for children – museum workshop – paintings – aesthetics epistemology introduction hilosophy for children was developed in the usa in the late 1960’s by matthew lipman and it is currently being taught in approximately 60 countries (sapere, 2015). primary school philosophy is about “providing children with the opportunity to explore fundamental aspects of their experiences which are already meaningful to them, in order to become more sensitive to their philosophical dimensions (ethical, logical, metaphysical, epistemological)” (ventista & paparoussi, 2016, p. 613). this paper aims to present a philosophy for children intervention in a different context than usual. it presents how p4c can be implemented in a museum as a workshop. this paper presents a museum workshop focusing on aesthetics and epistemology. this paper will suggest a new way of teaching p4c combined with museum education. even though this paper does not make any causal claims about the effectiveness of teaching p4c in a museum, it does set a new context for further investigation. the aim of this research was to investigate whether fifth-grade primary school children can engage in a philosophical dialogue concerning aesthetic and epistemological issues and be critical of their and other’s opinions. this research also aimed to experiment with a new way of p analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 63 implementing a philosophical dialogue; that is, philosophizing through a workshop in an art museum. another aim was to develop the verbal reasoning of children about philosophical issues. at the beginning, topics of aesthetics and epistemology related to the workshop will be presented and approaches for teaching philosophy in primary school will be described. then, this paper will briefly explain the exhibition and the paintings used as stimuli for the philosophical discussion. the material created will be presented and the ways that year 5 students acted on them will be reported. theoretical background aesthetics and epistemology aesthetics and epistemology are two sub-fields of philosophy. the description of them in this paper and the workshop about them were based on the tradition of analytic philosophy. a philosophical inquiry into art refers to the “philosophical discourse about conceptual questions raised by experiences with aesthetic objects (metal-level)” (russell, 1991, p.95). for hagaman (1988, p.19), aesthetics is a branch of philosophy that analyses; [t]he basic concepts and language people use in thinking and talking about art: beauty, expression, representation, symbolism, and the like. additionally, they investigate questions in which these concepts are embedded: what is the function or purpose of art? do criteria exist for distinguishing a good work of art from a poor one? […] what is the relationship between an artist's intent and a viewer's response? […] and of course there is the big one: what is (or isn't) art, anyway? aesthetic questions are close to children’s experience. for example, they discuss whether certain art works are beautiful or not. they argue that something is beautiful based on certain criteria. their teachers explicitly and implicitly judge some artworks of theirs and others as beautiful. concerning epistemology, for steup (2016, para.1) [d]efined narrowly, epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief. as the study of knowledge, epistemology is concerned with the following questions: what are the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge? what are its sources? what is its structure, and what are its limits? as the study of justified belief, epistemology aims to answer questions such as: how we are to understand the concept of justification? what makes justified beliefs justified? according to audi (2011), epistemology investigates particular sources of knowledge and justification: perception, introspection, memory, a priori intuition (reason in one sense of the term), testimony, and inference. we know and are justified to believe several things because of analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 64 those sources. a belief is justified, if it is grounded in those sources which give justification for beliefs. the art exhibition provided a suitable environment to discuss specific issues about those sources. one of them is visual perception (e.g., seeing a bird) which is a type of perception. usually, seeing an object entails that this object really exists. people may assume that beliefs about the external world are justified because we perceive it to be so. however, the world is not always as it looks like. it may seem to us that we see something, but we are mistaken about it. there are cases that it seems to us that an object is perceived, but it’s not really there (hallucinations). another case is seeing a hologram of a cup of coffee that is indistinguishable from a real one and mistake it for a real cup of coffee. according to audi (2011, p.185-193), inductive inference is one type of inference. when we reason inductively, the premises of a strong inductive argument provide good grounds for believing its conclusion, i.e., there is a high probability that the conclusion is true, if the premises of the argument are true. the premises are based on beliefs we have. still, even the likeliest conclusion may be false. inductive reasoning is probabilistic reasoning and a form of probabilistic knowledge. an inductive argument can be inductively strong or inductively weak. it’s inductively strong, if its conclusion is highly probable. it’s inductively weak, if its conclusion is not very probable. justification and knowledge is transmitted in inductive inference only if the underlying argument is inductively strong. teaching epistemological issues in primary school students is not usually the focus of educational research. a literature review didn’t find any research about teaching epistemological issues in an art museum. we believe this is possible and the following workshop was a way to test it. children already argue about several issues in their daily life. they argue for and against views, and consider the views of classmates and adults. engagement with epistemological issues could help them to recognise the relevance of issues concerning justification and knowledge, when they formulate beliefs. recognizing the difference between belief and knowledge could help them analyse better their and others’ opinions. the discussion with their classmates could help them to contemplate whether their beliefs are justified or not. the particular art exhibition provided a great opportunity to initiate a discussion with children about the aforementioned epistemological issues. approaches for teaching philosophy in primary school there are different approaches for teaching philosophy with young children. different researchers debate about the material which could stimulate the discussion and the activities that could be included. in this article, the context of the discussion is also questioned. the dialogue should not necessarily take place in a classroom. for example, vansieleghem (2011) implemented a philosophy for children session in cambodia through a walk. later, this research will suggest the implementation of the sessions in a museum. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 65 concerning the different stimuli, glasser (1992) argues that any material could be used to initiate a philosophical inquiry or extend a theme of the iapc (institute for the advancement of philosophy for children) materials. those could be poetry, songs, and stories. additional resources could also be used to explore themes that are not mentioned in the iapc materials (e.g., environmental issues). glasser (1992) recommended that plays, films, games, chance events in the classrooms, and the subject matter of any discipline could also be used to create a philosophical inquiry. what is more, paintings and children’s drawings had been also used by teachers to discuss a philosophical issue (jespersen, 1993). furthermore, the curriculum for ethical education in primary schools in germany also recommended the use of paintings to philosophize with children (brüning, 2008). various methods for discussing philosophical issues were suggested. venable (2001) suggested role play as a strategy for teaching and learning aesthetics. role play can be inspired by current events, scandalous or unusual artwork, activities of artists, galleries, and museums. moreover, russell (1991) mentioned that “puzzle cases” can be utilized to confront aesthetic questions. for brüning (2008), another method of philosophizing with children is thought experiments with ideas. this method aims to develop the philosophical imagination of children. it asks us to imagine what we would do or what the world would be like under certain imaginary situations. according to hagaman (1988), discussing a painting can be used as an initiation for talking about global and abstract ideas of aesthetics. the underlying meanings of a specific work of art can be discussed and then, discussion about the meanings of all works of art can be started. liptai (2005) maintained that while purpose-written philosophical texts are used just for initiating the philosophical inquiry and don’t have intrinsic, aesthetic qualities, works of art have a different kind of physical reality and unavoidable aesthetic qualities. a work of art appeals to the eyes in a different way than a text. it helps pupils who are visual or kinaesthetic learners to focus on the stimulus. children with short attention span and fidgety limbs can also be helped because questioning starts sooner. children are magnetized by a work of art, and hence, they are forced to revisit it a lot of times and gain new and deeper layers of meaning. works of art can be remembered by the children, influence their aesthetic choices, and function as reference points, as resources, and as thinking repertoire. a good stimulus for initiating a philosophical enquiry can be a work of art that is problematical and controversial, and thus, it motivates children to reconceptualize the categories of aesthetics and taste (e.g., beauty and ugliness) and leads them to construct (new) criteria. an aesthetic inquiry uses the aesthetic object for more than just a trigger for discussion. we suggest that topics in aesthetics and epistemology can be discussed with primary school students through an art museum workshop. paintings can be used to initiate philosophical discussions that are suitable for their age and relevant with their experience. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 66 the context is crucial for the philosophical discussion. brüning (1987) emphasized the importance of presenting the philosophical problem in a context that enables children to discuss it. instead of beginning with posing a complex and abstract question, it’s better to analyse a concrete situation as a starting point. a visit to a museum could be more beneficial than discussing paintings in or outside of the classroom. in the classroom, the pupils wouldn’t have the space to do the activities that are possible in the museum. in and outside of the classroom, the pupils aren’t close to the real paintings. the proximity to the paintings could help the children to notice details of the painting that they wouldn’t notice otherwise. a philosophical discussion can arise by discussing those details. murris (2000) argued that both children and adults should analyse our concepts by focusing on how the words that denote our concepts are used in everyday circumstances. analysing concepts out of the context of their use generates problems and doesn’t help at all. a concept doesn’t have an absolute, universal meaning outside the particular context in which it is used. russell (1991) suggested some procedures that are steps for learning principles of concept analysis. first, case delineation elucidates a concept by examining different cases of its use. second, concept comparison elucidates a concept by contrasting it to similar concepts. third, definition elucidates a concept by formulating and/or assessing a definition of the concept. while formulating and assessing a definition, it should be confirmed whether the definition is not circular and covers all and only the cases of the concept. counterexamples can be used to show that a definition is not satisfactory. case delineation can lead to a definition. benefits of museum education research revealed that it’s beneficial for children to visit museums and participate in programmes there. to begin with, pupils that participated in museum multi-visits generated more instances of critical-thinking skills and used various critical thinking categories compared to pupils who didn’t participate in this programme (adams et al., 2007; burchenal & grohe, 2007). second, a multi-visit program in an art museum created positive attitudes in children toward art museums and art in general, and compared to a control group, participators of this program were able to express better their appreciation and love for works of art and articulated better their responses toward art (falk, 1999). furthermore, in museums, shy and unconfident children “became more open and assertive, able to hold their own in conversations, and able to explain what they had done and why” (hooper-greenhill, 2004, p.437). moreover, children with learning difficulties were more confident and focused in museums compared to classrooms (hoopergreenhill, 2004). jeffery-clay (1998) noticed that a museum is an ideal environment that allows pupils to move and explore freely and work at their own pace. this environment encourages group interaction and sharing. the personal experience with real objects can make them curious and encourage them to investigate and compare the objects with their own lives and experiences. this can lead analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 67 children to question their knowledge structures, and hence, adding to or rebuilding those structures. methodology aim of the workshop the workshop aimed to help the children to formulate and assess intensive definitions that mention necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of a concept. for russel (1988), a “perfect” intensive definition “(1) "is not circular," (2) "describes all of the things it is supposed to define," and (3) "describes only the things it is supposed to define." the latter two principles refer to necessary and sufficient conditions, respectively” (p.284). an intensive definition is a summary statement of what is common and unique to the instances of a concept. philosophical inquiry is concerned with formulating intensive definitions. in contrast, an extensive definition is a mere list of examples or attributes that explain the concept. in the workshop, we aimed to improve the philosophical skills of the students in the following philosophical issues:  assessing and formulating definitions of beautiful paintings.  the distinction between “believing something” and “knowing something”. how beliefs are formulated through perception? the workshop focused on general conditions that must be fulfilled in order to have perception that gives us beliefs that constitute knowledge. focus was on two types of perception: vision and hearing.  the structure of inductive arguments. what premises must be true to give us justification for our conclusions? how can the conclusion of an inductively strong argument be proven wrong? what are some examples? the exhibition the loukia & michael zampelas art museum hosted the solo exhibition of cypriot woman artist kyriaki phili, entitled speculum mundi, from the end of april to the end of may of 2017. the exhibition displayed works which are visual references to historic paintings as well as works with stills taken from film. her two main visual references are the paintings of johannes vermeer and luchino visconti’s film, death in venice. she used pencil, oil, sand as materials to make her paintings. further, the exhibition included a video. kyriaki phili attempted to generate a new reading for selected artworks by vermeer by modifying particular symbols of the historic paintings. consequently, a new narrative and inevitably a new meaning emerges. photos of the main paintings that were examined by the children can be found in the appendix. a fifth-grade primary school class attended the workshop. the class consisted of 12 students. the primary school of the students is close to the centre of nicosia, the capital city in cyprus. the sample selection is not random and the school was selected because of the proximity to the analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 68 museum. it was assumed that the workshop was suitable for children from 9-12 years old. therefore, the fifth-grade was considered an appropriate selection. implementation of the workshop the workshop lasted for two hours. two of the authors of this paper, who are qualified teachers, implemented the workshop. the workshop included several kinds of activities: discussion, performing plays, and drawings. a variety of activities is needed as different students can contribute to the philosophical inquiry in different ways. according to hagaman (1990), while discussing with children, some pupils can be models for the rest because they have better verbal skills and are confident to share their thoughts. other pupils can be models in other activities, such as performing plays on a theme or an idea which is related to the dialogue. a variety of activities can be used to develop a community of inquiry into philosophical issues. this inquiry could be impossible for a pupil studying individually. following gregory’s (2007) suggestion, the role of facilitators was to (a) model and request good dialogue moves and (b) to help the children recognize in which stage of the dialogue they are and how the dialogue progresses. during the dialogue, the facilitators were intervening to detect assumptions that were not recognized by the children, suggest important different views that were not mentioned by the children, and help children to move from one stage of the dialogue to the next. it was the first time that pupils engaged with issues of aesthetics and epistemology. for this reason, we thought it suitable to focus on encouraging pupils to give counter-examples for given definitions, and then, propose improved definitions that don’t have the above mentioned counterexamples. weekly philosophical sessions could examine the aforementioned and related issues in more depth. a visit to the museum can be considered an example which facilitates experiential learning. the students can act differently when they are in the museum. even though they interact with their classmates, they do not adhere strictly to the rules of the classroom and they do not strictly belong to a classroom community. they can focus on their own feelings when they see the authentic paintings and they can be inspired. in the museum, the students had the opportunity to see the authentic paintings and they were also asked to paint their own drawings. an evaluation sheet (see appendix) was developed and administered as a pre-test and post-test to all the children, who participated to the workshop. the tests were used to identify the children’s understanding and verbal reasoning about the aforementioned issues. more precisely, they were used to discover whether the workshop helped the children to understand the aforementioned aesthetic and epistemological issues, give intensive definitions about them, and evaluate definitions by noticing unnecessary and insufficient conditions and giving counter-examples. the pre-test was used to recognize the views and philosophical skills of the children prior to the implementation of analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 69 the workshop. the pupils faced difficulties on giving definitions and completing the exercises related to inductive arguments. therefore, the workshop proceeded by emphasizing improvement on those areas. almost all the pupils gave counter-examples for the given definitions. the post-test was used to uncover whether there was any change on the views and skills of the pupils and help them with any difficulty they still face. the facilitators were checking the answers of the pupils and helping them to fill the sheet by reminding them what they did so far or trying new ways to help them. during both tests, the pupils needed the most guidance in the exercises related to inductive arguments. the evaluation sheet was testing whether pupils could implement specific philosophical skills. in 1 (a) and 1 (b), the pupils should have given a counter-example for each definition. in 1 (c), the pupils should have stated an intensive definition. in 2 (a), the pupils should have recognized that we don’t know and explained why. in 2 (b), the pupils should have described one or more circumstances. in 2 (c), the pupils should have given a counter-example for the definition. in 2 (d), the pupils should have stated an intensive definition. in 3 (a), the pupils should have recognized which inductive argument is better and explained why. in 3 (b), the pupil should have written one premise that makes the conclusion of the inductive argument more likely to be true. in 3 (c), the pupils should have described one situation that if it really happens, the conclusion of the inductive argument is false. in 3 (d), the pupils should have mentioned what is similar in the aforementioned inductive arguments (if the premises are true, the conclusion is likely to be true, but it is not certainly true). after giving time to students to complete the pre-test, the evaluation sheets were collected and the activities sheet (see appendix) was given to them. each activity had a different aim. in activity 1, the aim was for the children to formulate and assess definitions of “beautiful paintings”. pondering what it is to be beautiful could help pupils to analyse paintings thoroughly and hence, appreciate their complexity. while the mimic game was happening, the kids that did the mimic were asked to tell us why they thought this specific painting was beautiful. the mimic game was used to help the children to recognise characteristics of the paintings. the children were going close to the paintings and were describing what exactly they found beautiful and why. other pupils were encouraged to go close to the painting and mention reasons that they agree and disagree with the other children. being close to the real paintings help the student to spot details of the paintings that could be missed in the classroom. after the mimic game was over, the teachers summarized what characteristics the children found beautiful in the paintings. the teachers asked whether all the paintings that are beautiful have any of these characteristics and whether only the paintings that are beautiful have any of these characteristics. after a brief discussion, pupils were asked to find other paintings that have the characteristics that they like and decide whether those paintings are beautiful or not. they were expected to argue for or against their initial views. their classmates were asked if they agree or not and why. after discussion, those characteristics were found inadequate for defining the beautiful paintings, and the children were asked to propose other characteristics. during the discussion, the children were encouraged to criticize the views of their classmates. e.g., “does this definition cover all the beautiful paintings?”. “does this analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 70 image 1 – “girl during a music lesson” definition cover only the beautiful paintings?” children were comfortable in their own opinions, as evidenced by the fact that no consensus was formed. in activity 2, the aim was for the children to recognize the distinction between “believe” and “know” and discuss which conditions must be fulfilled so my belief can constitute knowledge. contemplating the distinction between belief and knowledge could lead pupils to be more critical about their views and consider how certain they should be about them. one of the teachers drew three times the woman who wears a hat in the painting. each time, he drew her hat and clothes with different colours. the three triplet nieces were named differently, and the children were asked to guess based on the portraits which sister stole the diamond ring. then, they were asked to tell us why they chose the specific sister. the goal of the activity was for the pupils to formulate hypotheses about which woman is the murderer and recognise that their views were only assumptions and that they cannot be certain about them. they were also asked to tell us whether they only believe the specific sister was the thief or whether they also know that it was her. the pupils were led to contemplate how certain they were about their views and what could make them doubt their beliefs. whenever a child said that he/she knew, the teachers mentioned good reasons given from other students for believing that another woman was the thief. they were asked to describe what exactly doesn’t make them sure about their belief in this scenario. it was recognised that in this scenario, the mist prevents us from being sure about our beliefs. then, the kids were encouraged to mention other cases in which we believe something, but we cannot be sure and know that it’s true. “under what conditions are we not sure about the truth of our beliefs?”. the distinction between belief and knowledge was discussed. sometimes we believe that something is true, but we don’t know it is true because the conditions of the environment or our physical condition hinder us from doing so. ideal conditions for our beliefs to constitute knowledge were mentioned by the children. the teachers summarized those ideal conditions, and asked whether our beliefs constitute knowledge whenever those conditions are fulfilled. the discussion was continued with more counter-examples and discussion between the children. during the discussion and at the end of it, the teachers were stating all the conditions that analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 71 image 2 – “adzio” the children mentioned in the form of the following definition: “we believe something and know it is true, if ….”. in activity 3, the students were required to analyse the structure of inductive arguments and produce examples of them. children use inductive arguments in their daily lives without recognising it. if they do recognise it, they will probably be more critical about their views and think about how sure they should be about them. after the children completed the exercises, it was noticed by the teachers that all the children have drawn a woman as the owner of the items. the children were asked to explain why they chose to draw a woman. the children mentioned that the earring belongs to a woman. the structure of the children’s arguments was made clearer by the facilitators. they were asked what alternative situations can be true. given answers were that a man bought the earring for a present to his wife and that it’s not even an earring but an olive instead. this led the children to recognise that the available evidence could be used to support another conclusion. two more paintings were discussed with the students. those paintings depicted the half part of a male and female human body respectively (image 1 and image 2). the children were asked to guess what is the other half missing. most of the answers were that the man wears pants and the woman wears a skirt. the children were asked to justify their answer and tell different alternatives that can be true. some children justified their answers by mentioning what they observed so far (men wearing pants, women wearing skirts). memory was described as a source of justification. then, the teachers told the children that what they have done so far in this activity is similar to what we do in our life every day. we come to some conclusions about the world around us by using some beliefs we have about it. “but, how certain are we for the truth of the conclusions?” through the discussion, the children realized that the conclusions are highly probable, but we cannot be certain of their truth. what we observed and observe give us some reasons for believing the truth of the conclusions, but we still cannot exclude alternative situations to be true. then, the children were asked to give examples of other similar arguments, but few of them participated. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 72 results and discussion we spotted some positive differences, when we compare the pre-test and post-test of each pupil. in 1 (a) and 1 (b), 2 and 4 pupils respectively gave more or different counter-examples for the given definitions of beautiful paintings. in 2 (a), in the pre-test, 3 pupils said that they don’t know that he is their friend because of the mist, and in the post-test, they gave a more detailed explanation of why they don’t know. in 3 (b), 4 pupils gave a different premise that makes the conclusion more likely to be true. in 3 (c), 2 pupils gave different explanations of what sotiris thought wrongly. while there were some positive effects, it seems that more sessions are needed to notice big improvement in the philosophical skills of pupils. the 2-hour session had some impact on the answers of the children, but more time is needed to develop more skills. another difference was that some pupils became more sceptical after the workshop. in the pre-test, 2 pupils gave definitions of beautiful paintings and 3 pupils gave definitions of knowing something exists that we believe we saw. however, they didn’t give any definition in the post-test. this may have happened because the workshop helped the students to be critical about their views and reduce their certainty for what is the definition of some concepts. the pupils were experimenting with different definitions during the workshop, but they may have not wanted to commit to one specific definition during the post-test. it is possible that later, they will ponder about those philosophical issues longer because of this uncertainty. on the other hand, this change may have happened because we confused the children during the workshop. however, their willingness to participate with insightful comments during the activities make this hypothesis unlikely to be true. it seems that time is needed to encourage students to write down their views, even if they are not certain about them. it seems that topics in aesthetics and epistemology can be discussed with primary school students. children found the activities interesting and comprehensible. they participated in all of them, even though, altogether, they lasted for two hours. the pupils were enthusiastic to share their views, argued for them, and changed them when they heard a counter-example. still, this was the first time that the children participated in a philosophical dialogue, and hence, the teachers needed to intervene often to progress the dialogue. activity 3 needed the most intervention from the teachers. this shows that more time is needed to make clear the structure of inductive arguments and help pupils to give examples of this type of argument. the visit in the museum was a suitable stimulus for initiating a philosophical discussion. the paintings were easily used to relate the philosophical issues with the experiences of the children. moreover, the paintings were excellent stimuli to maintain focus on the topics. there were not as many distractions as in the classroom. the environment had mostly stimuli related to the topic of the workshop. therefore, the discussion didn’t have any digression. this is in agreement with hooper-greenhill (2004) who supported that pupils participate more often and are more confident and focused in a museum. furthermore, children engaged the philosophical topics through playful activities that would be impossible to be implemented in a classroom. they found analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 73 those activities interesting, and as a result, they participated lively in the discussion. this engagement of the students in the discussions and the story-based activities are likely to promote the retention of the museum experience by the students later in time and establish learning. more specifically, according to anderson et al. (2002), children usually recall and describe museum experiences that were embedded in the medium of story. this is not surprising as engagement with stories is a common and enjoyable part of a child's everyday culture. this finding reveals “the importance of tapping into the familiar socio-cultural aspects of children’s everyday experience to mediate learning” (anderson et al., 2002, p.223). this workshop was a first step for improving the verbal reasoning of pupils. for russel (1988), verbal reasoning refers “to the use of words to articulate thinking that is logically sound and based on examples that support or do not support a position on the conceptual issue in question” (p. 282). reasoning is an important part of philosophical inquiry. cam (2016) mentioned the basic operations of reasoning: logical justification and inference. he suggested that pupils can carry out these operations, even if the terms “justification” and “inference” are not used. ‘giving a reason’ can be used to introduce logical justification, and ‘draw a conclusion’ can be used to introduce inference. logical “justification is the giving of reasons in support of a suggestion” (p.8). the term ‘because’ can be used when the pupils carry out a logical justification. according to brüning (1987), giving and examining reasons for opinions and beliefs is a feature of philosophical thinking. it should be examined whether the reasons for believing something are good or not. people have a good reason for believing something when a warrant can serve as a reason for having this reason. for cam (2016), inference happens when “we reason in order to draw conclusions or to infer one thing from another” (p.9). the term ‘therefore’ can be used when the pupils carry out an inference. of course, one session is not enough to notice significant improvement in the verbal reasoning of pupils. time is needed to make pupils accustomed to give reasons for their views and evaluate critically their reasons and that of others (fair et al. (2015). however, the lively participation of pupils gives us a reason to examine more thoroughly the effects of teaching philosophy this way. limitations and future directions there were some limitations on this research. first, the workshop was implemented with only 12 students, and hence, the results cannot be generalized. second, there was only one session, and thus, we couldn’t go into depth in the aforementioned philosophical topics and test whether significant improvement can be identified. future sessions could examine the aforementioned issues in more detail and talk about relevant topics. we assumed that some paintings are beautiful and some are not, but is this true? are there objective criteria that can distinguish beautiful paintings from poor ones? what is the difference between being justified in believing something and knowing something? what is the analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 74 difference between being justified and truly believing something and knowing something? what are some problems of the inductive arguments? creating a randomised controlled trial to examine the effectiveness of conducting philosophy in museums compared to the normal classrooms is recommended. the environment as an intervention could play a significant role, particularly in an intervention like philosophy where the thinking should be stimulated appropriately and it does not necessarily require a typical environment with students sitting at their desks. conclusions the implementation of the workshop had positive results. primary school children can discuss topics of aesthetics and epistemology and found them interesting. analysing paintings seems to be a good way to raise questions and discussion about belief, knowledge, and perception. more research is needed to analyse the peculiarities of this area of philosophy. for example, are some educational materials more effective than others to initiate an epistemological discussion? are some epistemological topics too complex to be comprehended by children? there was a lot of participation in the philosophical topics discussed. a variety of definitions of beautiful paintings and counter-examples were given. students were trying to distinguish between belief and knowledge and analyse the structure of inductive arguments. doing the philosophical discussion in the art museum was helpful. the children could focus in the discussion by paying attention to the paintings. it’s quite probable that the children were focusing more time on the paintings than they would if they were seeing a photo of them. they were observing the paintings from different distances because they wanted to see every detail of the paintings, and hence, they had more stimulus for participating in the discussion. the paintings also helped them to connect the philosophical topics with their experiences. moreover, the playful activities attracted the attention of the children. they participated in the discussion because they wanted to solve the mysteries. walking around the museum and going closer and further away from the paintings helped the children to get into the mood of exploration. it would be impossible to implement those activities in a classroom because of the lack of paintings and space. from this experience, we conclude the benefits and drawbacks of discussing philosophical issues in a museum should be the topic of further research. acknowledgements we would like to thank michael zampelas, who is the chairman and managing director of loukia and michael zampelas art museum, for the opportunity to implement the workshop there. we would also like to thank kyriaki phili for her permission to use photos of her paintings. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 75 references adams, m., foutz, s., luke, j., & stein, j. (2007). thinking through art: isabella stewart gardner museum school partnership program year 3 research results. annapolis: institute for learning innnovation. https://www.gardnermuseum.org/sites/default/files/uploads/files/year_3_report.pdf . accessed november, 3, 2017. anderson, d., piscitelli, b., weier, k., everett, m., & tayler, c. (2002). children's museum experiences: identifying powerful mediators of learning. curator: the museum journal, 45(3), 213-231. audi, r. (2011). epistemology: a contemporary introduction to the theory of knowledge (3rd ed.). new york, ny: routledge. brüning, b. (1987). what is a philosophical discussion with young children? analytic teaching, 8(1), 87-92. brüning, b. (2008). philosophizing with children at universities and schools in germany. thinking: the journal of philosophy for children, 18(4), 2-5. burchenal, m., & grohe, m. (2007). thinking through art: transforming museum curriculum. journal of museum education, 32(2), 111-122. cam, p. (2016). basic operations in reasoning and conceptual exploration. journal of philosophy in schools, 3(2), 7-18. fair, f., haas, l. e., gardosik, c., johnson, d. d., price, d. p., & leipnik, o. (2015). socrates in the schools from scotland to texas: replicating a study on the effects of a philosophy for children program. journal of philosophy in schools, 2(1), 18-37. falk, j. h. (1999). museums as institutions for personal learning. daedalus, 128(3), 259-275. glasser, j. (1992). what’s so special about this story anyway? analytic teaching, 12(2), 45-52. gregory, m. r. (2007). a framework for facilitating classroom dialogue. teaching philosophy, 30(1), 59-84. hagaman, s. (1988). philosophical aesthetics in the art class: a look toward implementation. art education, 41(3), 18-22. hagaman, s. (1990). the community of inquiry: an approach to collaborative learning. studies in art education, 31(3), 149-157. hooper‐ greenhill, e. (2004). learning from culture: the importance of the museums and galleries education program (phase i) in england. curator: the museum journal, 47(4), 428449. jeffery-clay, k. r. (1998). constructivism in museums: how museums create meaningful learning environments. journal of museum education, 23(1), 3-7. jespersen, p. (1993). problems with philosophy for children. analytic teaching, 14(1), 69-71. liptai, s. (2005). what is the meaning of this cup and that dead shark? philosophical inquiry with objects and works of art and craft. childhood & philosophy, 1(2), 537-554. murris, k. (2000). can children do philosophy?. journal of philosophy of education, 34(2), 261-279. russell, r. l. (1991). teaching students to inquire about art philosophically: procedures derived from ordinary-language philosophy to teach principles of concept analysis. https://www.gardnermuseum.org/sites/default/files/uploads/files/year_3_report.pdf analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 76 studies in art education, 32(2), 94-104. sapere(2015). what is p4c? available at: http://www.sapere.org.uk/default.aspx?tabid=162 (access: 15 april 2017) steup, m. (fall 2016 edition). epistemology. in e.n. zalta (ed.), the stanford encyclopedia of philosophy.retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/epistemology/ . vansieleghem, n. (2011). philosophy with children as an exercise in parrhesia: an account of a philosophical experiment with children in cambodia. journal of philosophy of education, 45(2), 321-337. venable, b. b. (2001). using role play to teach and learn aesthetics. art education, 54(1), 47-55. ventista, o.m. & paparoussi, m., (2016). how to introduce a philosophical discussion in your classroom: a community of enquiry in a greek primary school. childhood & philosophy, 12(25),611-629. http://www.e-publicacoes.uerj.br/index.php/childhood/article/view/24994 appendix evaluation sheet (pre-test and post-test) did you know that philosophers wonder about different issues that concern us? let’s see some of them? 1. (a) do you agree with this definition? what do you think? a painting is beautiful only if it represents exactly the nature or can it be beautiful even without representing the nature? _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ (b) why are some paintings beautiful and some are not? “a painting is beautiful, if it represents exactly the nature” “a painting is beautiful, if it has a lot of colors”. http://www.sapere.org.uk/default.aspx?tabid=162%20%20 https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/epistemology/ http://www.e-publicacoes.uerj.br/index.php/childhood/article/view/24994 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 77 do you agree with this definition? a painting is beautiful only if it has a lot of colors or can it be beautiful even without having a lot of colors? _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ (c) can you think of a better definition that reveals which paintings are beautiful? _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ 2. (a) it is foggy. someone is approaching, but we can’t recognize his characteristics clearly. he looks like a friend of ours and we believe he is our friend. can we say that we know that he is our friend? yes? no? why? _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________ (b) we have a lot of beliefs about what exists around us and in the rest of the world. can you think of some circumstances that would stop us from creating precise views about the world around us? _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ when we discuss with other people, we tell them about many things that we believe and know. but what is the difference between “believe” and “know”? imagine the following scenario: analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 78 (c) we believe that we see something. but do we know that it actually exists? a definition of whether we know that something exists that we believe we saw is the following: do you agree with this definition? why? _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ (d) can you think of a better definition? _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ 3. (a) during our lives, we come to a lot of conclusions about many situations by giving arguments. george and andreas heard someone shouting and came to different conclusions through the following arguments: george: i hear someone shouting, but i don’t see him. the voice is similar to kostas’ voice. conclusion: probably, then, kostas is shouting. andreas: i hear someone shouting, but i don’t see him. i don’t see john. conclusion: probably, then, john is shouting. which conclusion is better and more persuasive? why? _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ (b) look at the following argument: the pencil of maria has been broken. ______________________________________________________________________________ conclusion: probably, then, anna broke maria’s pencil. what should we fill to make the conclusion more likely to be true? “we believe we saw something and we know that it exists, if there was good visibility”. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 79 (c) sotiris came to a conclusion. but the conclusion is false! why is the conclusion of this argument wrong? what did sotiris think wrongly? _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ (d) how are the above arguments similar to each other? _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ activities sheet welcome to the loukia & michael zampelas art museum. you are in the temporary exhibition speculum mundi. 1. look carefully at the works of kyriaki phili. write in the following box the title of the art work that you think it is the more beautiful and tell us why. i listen to the sound of a musical instrument. this sound is similar with the sound of a guitar. conclusion: probably, then, someone is playing guitar somewhere close. name: ……………………………………………………………………………………… the more beautiful art work in this exhibition is the one with the title …………………………………………………………………………………………….. it’s the more beautiful because ………………………………………………………………………………………….………… ……………………………………………….…………………………………………………… ……….…………………………………………………………….…………………………… ……………………. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 80 a mimic game will start soon. can you mimic the content of your favorite work to help the other kids to recognize it? 2. go and sit in front of the following art work. “in lido of venice” solve the mystery! in a misty summer day, there was a robbery! someone stole a diamond ring from the house of mrs. richy. the above photo was taken by the camera of mrs. richy’s house. it looks like the thief was wearing a hat. the only people who were wearing a hat that day were the triplet nieces of mrs. richy. let’s meet them? which of the three sisters can be this mysterious woman? we have just met the triplet nieces. write in the following box which of the 3 sisters you believe that she appears behind the mist in the painting. how sure are you about your answer? draw yourself to the step that represents your view. ……………………………………………………………………… … analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 81 paint the figure by using the colors that represent the sister that stole the ring. where would you draw her look? analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 82 3. look at the following art work. find it and sit in front of it. “locus i” draw in the following box the things that belong to someone. can you imagine their owner or owners? draw him/her/them in the above art work and give him/her/them name/names. i painted ………………………………………………………………………………….. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 38, issue 1 (2017) 83 address correspondences to: savvas ioannou, doctoral researcher school of philosophical, anthropological and film studies university of st andrews savvasioa@hotmail.com kypros georgiou, museum educator loukia & michael zampelas art museum kypros1991@hotmail.com ourania maria ventista, doctoral researcher and teaching assistant school of education durham university o.m.ventista@durham.ac.uk picturebooks, pedagogy, and philosophy a review of joanna haynes & karin murris’ picturebooks, pedagogy, and philosophy by richard morehouse. richard morehouse picturebooks, pedagogy, and philosophy joanna haynes & karin murris routledge new york and london 269 pages $49.95 us paper; hardcover $135.00 there is no guideline or insurance policy to cover the new and unfamiliar territory that we enter by encour-aging children to think independently, to question and to engage in dialogue” (haynes & murris, 2012, p. 183). i chose this sentence to open this review as it provides a quick picture of the nature and style of the book. this work provides no easy answers for the uses of picture books but instead is a comprehensive examination of how picture books contribute to our understanding of pedagogy and philosophy. if one reflects on the title, one may notice that it does not include a reference to philosophy for children. this appears to be intentional. my sense is that the authors consider themselves educators of philosophy who use picture books as a way to teach philosophy. while the authors advocate for the teaching methodology that is grounded in the work of matthew lipman and others involved in philosophy for children (p4c), the authors do not wish to only address this narrower audience. they are educators and philosophers who use p4c as a part of their teaching approaches. “picturebooks and philosophy for children (p4c) provide a framework to support adults’ exploration with courage and confidence” (haynes & murris, 2012, p. 1). the semantics here are important. the authors are saying that in addition to being a methodology for teaching, p4c is a way of looking at and understanding philosophy and picture books in the classroom and as a way of supporting this exploration by adults. the introduction to the book, entitled “censorship and controversy in the classroom,” is used to raise awareness of censorship and problems that could occur in reading and discussing picture books philosophically. haynes and murris are concerned about the effects of emotions and the “upheaval of thought” that accompanies the growth of our knowledge (p. 2). to gain a working sense of the emotional affects and the upheaval of thought that happen when children are engaged in thinking and talking together, the authors draw on deep and wide reading in the nature of the child, the nature of education and the nature of literature from writings of philosophers, social scientists and social theorists (psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists) and educators as well as their own experience and reflection. the introduction is peppered with some great panels (p. 7; p. 10; p. 11; p. 12; p. 13 & p. 14) from some exciting and interesting picture books and end with a diagram showing arguments against avoidance and censorship in dialogues around picture books (p. 17). this chapter may move the reader to begin a small experiment in a class, or to a deeper examination of picture books as tools for philosophical discussion; it may even move potential users of picture books to a fuller embrace of picture books as a method of teaching philosophy. if the readers are engaged by this introduction, they will be pulled further into experimentation and reflection on picturebooks, pedagogy, and philosophy. 69 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 70 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 “provocative picturebooks” is the first section of the book. the next two sections of the book are entitled “being a child” and “philosophical listening.” “provocative picturebooks” is not merely a titillating section teaser title but a signal of what is to come: “playing with dangerous picturebooks” (chapter 2) and “not so innocent picturebooks” (chapter 2). chapter 3 is on the move “from philosophical novels to picturebooks.” this section should prove of great interest to practitioners of p4c who have dismissed picture books without using them. sadly, after 30 years of sporadic work with children, and teachers using philosophy for children approaches, i place myself in that group, but not for much longer. the move to picture books presented in chapter 3 requires a close reading, as do the 50 plus pages that come before it. the quote that follows is a good example of the depth of the authors’ understanding of the scholarship that they utilize. while they do not source this particular idea (nor should they), my own reading led me to recall the early and more recent work of jerome bruner. the authors write, “literature that contains both the everyday and the strange and unfamiliar mediates philosophical understanding. philosophical enquiry requires delicate facilitation between the abstract and the concrete, otherwise learners and teachers lose themselves in meaningless abstraction” (p. 62). to me, this quote is reminiscent of acts of meaning (1990) in which burner writes about the canonical and the unusual. the passage from haynes and murris also resonates with bruner in both toward a theory of instruction in which he discusses ways to make pedestrian content fresh and lively (1966) and the culture of education in which he challenges us to understand and re-think our intuitive or folk pedagogies (1996). as an aside, the early bruner was also an influence on the thinking about and the development of lipman’s community of inquiry approach to p4c. within the same paragraph, the authors further enrich the readers’ understanding of how education and philosophy inform each other. haynes and murris cite jean-francois lyotard on the nature of philosophical texts. a reading is only philosophical when: … it is autodidactic, when it is an exercise in discomposure in relationship to the text … teaching philosophy is not the transmission of a ‘body’ of knowledge, knowledge of how thing should be done or what to feel – but simply that it is to be done (pp. 61 -62). lyotard’s point is also lipman and colleagues argument for “doing philosophy”. haynes and murris articulate and extend these ideas first in this chapter and then throughout the book. while not wishing to undervalue the next three chapters of this section, “picturebooks as philosophical texts,” “emotions and picturebooks” and “literary and philosophical responses to picturebooks,” as they contribute greatly to understanding this provocative book, i hurry on to yet another all too brief examination of the second section entitled “being a child.” but before leaving “provocative picturebooks,” i refer the reader to the conclusion of the section. haynes and murris offer an outline of what they considered significant when selecting picturebooks for children and adults. the authors organize their criteria into three groups: epistemological, ethical and political, and aesthetic (pp. 121 – 122). this summary is very helpful given the nuanced enunciation of the ideas in this section. the reader, however, should not use these two pages as shorthand for understanding the material, but rather as a vehicle for reflecting on their own understanding of the ideas presented here. “being a child” is the second section of the book. the four chapters are entitled “slippage between realms,” “taking dogs and moving bears: the realms of meaning,” “philosophy, adult and child” and “authentic ownership of knowledge and understanding.” i will condense the content of “slippage between realms” with a quote that begins the chapter, it “explores the relationship between art and reality” (p. 125). the authors’ investigation of art and reality is rigorous and comprehensive. i have one small exception to their accuracy. they cite kieran egan as correctly arguing for a broader and more nuanced understanding of experience, but incorrectly citing egan as agreeing with dewey regarding the challenge of moving from the local to the exotic (cf, egan, 2002, pp. 107 -114). “taking dogs and moving bears: the realms of meaning” focuses on imaginative philosophizing, in other words, how the child and child-like play with ideas, pictures and words in a community of inquiry that can contribute to philosophy. perhaps it does not need to be said in this review that philosophy inform our work with children, but work with children also informs philosophy. additionally, careful attention to what children say and listening with a philosophical and non-judgmental hear, can also inform developmental psychology. “philosophy, adult, and child” argues that p4c can be transformative of educational practice by providing an approach to inclusivity of both contents and participants via the community of inquiry. in the following statement, the authors’ nuanced perspective on p4c is clearly stated. they write, “our approach is to consider good conditions for critical and responsive enquiry and dialogue based on contextual experiences, rather than proposing universal approaches to p4c” (p 157). the authors are also supportive and cautious about the role of measurement of achievement. they argue that independence and the exercise of agency may be stifled if measurement exerts too large a presence in the teaching and learning environment (p. 161). the chapter ends with a list of key areas of choice for teachers to consider when making decisions regarding the relative risk and merit of teaching within the moral domain. “philosophy, adult, and child” and the book, as a whole, are examples of “thinking aloud,” which i characterize as an invitation to observe the authors’ thinking processes as well the content of their thoughts. their approach allows readers to feel they have an invitation to think for themselves by using the depth, breadth, and contours of the information provided. my comments on the previous chapter provide a helpful bridge to “authentic ownership of knowledge and understanding,” the last chapter of this section. in this chapter, the readers are invited to embed the idea of an open-ended dialogue that nonetheless provides a safe environment for disagreement and the “owning” of one’s voice into his/her work with children and adults. this openness and skepticism is grounded in a classroom culture that is supportive of individuals in their personhood. paradoxically, to own one’s knowledge and understanding, a person needs to be open-minded and to have opinions, to speculate about and give support for what is as well as what might be, to acknowledge the ideas of others and to disagree with them, and sometimes with one’s own ideas. the culture of the classroom advocated here might well be called a democratic laboratory (p. 183). the three chapters that end the final section, “philosophical listening,” of this enjoyable and thoughtprovoking book are as follows: “listening and juggling in philosophical space,” “listening and not listening in schools,” and “toward a critical practice of philosophical listening.” my comments on “toward a critical practice of philosophical listening” will provide the bookend for this review. this chapter lives up to its title and provides an integrative retrospective for the book. “throughout this book the community of philosophical enquiry has been proposed as a radical approach to education” (p 218) and a challenge to the delivery model of teaching. the authors convincingly argue that a community of philosophical enquiry is embodied and situated. the approach demands an acknowledgement of children’s diverse, lived experiences (p. 219). a last quote provides a verbal illustration of the scholarship, engagement, and humility exemplified by haynes and murris: given the obstacle and pitfalls in trying to make changes in schools, importing teaching ideas analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 71 or top down professional development, we propose a critical framework for learning about p4c through experience, drawing on action research, and practical philosophy. … whilst we are willing to share and theorize about our experiences with others, we avoid positioning ourselves as ‘having the answers’ to give to other educators. (p. 225) this book demands a close reading as the authors have extracted a rich vein of knowledge from their wide and diverse reading, and integrates their experience and wisdom as illustrated by the well-woven fabric of critique and examples that are at the heart of this work. references bruner, j. (1956). a study of thinking. cambridge, ma: harvard university press bruner, j. (1966). toward a theory of instruction. cambridge, ma: harvard university press bruner, j (1990). acts of meaning. cambridge, ma: harvard university press bruner, j. (1996). the culture of education. cambridge, ma: harvard university press egan, k. (2002). getting it wrong from the beginning: our progressivism inheritance from herbert spencer, john dewey, and jean piaget. new haven, cn: yale university press. address correspondences to: richard morehouse emeritus professor of psychology viterbo university la crosse, wi remorehouse@viterbo.edu analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 72 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 1 evaluating fromm’s theory of love and its pedagogical significance marcus schulzke abstract: erich fromm presents an expansive conception of love, according to which love is a universalistic orientation toward others that promotes autonomy and mutual respect for humanity. this is a compelling theory, but it suffers from several conceptual limitations, such as vagueness and unresolved internal contradictions. after exploring these challenges, i show how they can be overcome in ways that clarify fromm’s theory of love and its significance for formulating ethical norms that should govern specific relationships. once it is rehabilitated fromm’s conception of love provides a way of explaining how the teacher-student relationship can rely on hierarchy and authority while still promoting autonomy and empowerment. specifically, it shows that the basis of the teacher-student relationship lies not in differences of knowledge or authority, which are only enabling conditions for this relationship, but rather in the mutual recognition that teachers and students are engaged in the same pursuit of knowledge. introduction rich fromm is unique among twentieth-century western philosophers in making love a central concept in his work. to do this, fromm relies on a far more expansive and substantive conception of love than is found in theories that associate love with affective attachments to specific objects or people. as fromm describes it, love is not an attitude toward a particular object – whether an individual, an object, or a group – but rather a universal orientation towards people in general, which is premised upon the recognition of a shared human nature. this love is not narrowly-focused, as other conceptions of love so often are, but rather pushes individuals to overcome any attachments that are exclusionary and that may therefore serve as the basis for factionalism. fromm further argues that the type of love he describes establishes the basis for non-authoritarian relationships, making love a powerful and comprehensive ethical concept. fromm's theory of love provides a useful framework for thinking about how love plays a role in pedagogy – a framework that fromm himself helps to establish. he occasionally describes love as it exists between teachers and students as being a paradigmatic example of his conception of love. there is much to gain from applying fromm's theory of love as a theory of pedagogy. it can explain the dynamics of a healthy relationship between teachers and students, what roles each should perform, their respective ethical obligations, and how the hierarchical relationship that exists between them can avoid becoming oppressive or authoritarian. however, despite these strengths, fromm's theory of love is imperfectly developed as it applies to the teacher-student relationship. it faces at least two significant challenges that have to be overcome for fromm’s theory of love to be a convincing theory of pedagogy. first, fromm fails to explain what specific quality or qualities a universal love between teachers and students is based on. this is a serious omission. fromm's theory of love presupposes that people share certain qualities that are so valuable that they can serve as the basis for generalizing love beyond specific individuals, to include large e analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 2 groups of people or even humanity in general. without an account of what qualities are valued in pedagogical relationships, it is unclear how love can take on a universal character. second, although fromm insists that the teacher-student relationship is based on a non-exploitative form of hierarchy, he fails to explain how any type of hierarchical relationship can be reconciled with love, which he often defines as being based on equality. this problem is especially serious because it extends beyond the pedagogical context narrowly defined to any type of hierarchy in which one person facilitates another’s acquisition of knowledge. this includes relationships such as those between psychologists and their patients, parents and children, or friends of unequal status. i will explore fromm's theory of love as it applies to the teacher-student relationship and develop it to overcome the omissions and apparent contradictions left in his descriptions of that relationship. specifically, i will argue that the two problems i raise in regard to fromm's explanation of the teacher-student relationship can be overcome by importing fromm’s theory of human nature into his theory of pedagogy. fromm argues that all humans undergo the experience of being detached from their ‘primary bonds,’ including their family, their home, and their early beliefs, as they grow up. this creates a constant demand for orienting oneself in the world and actively constructing an identity. this struggle is difficult and, fromm argues, often leads people to find security in relationships of domination or subordination, which require the sacrifice of autonomy. i will argue that what makes teachers and students fundamentally equal, despite their different levels of knowledge or ability, is that they are both engaged in the project of orienting themselves in the world through education. teachers and students both seek to find security in knowledge, rather than in authoritarian relationships, which allows them to form loving relationships with each other and to support each other’s efforts while also respecting each other’s autonomy. the first section of this essay provides a brief overview of fromm's theory of love and explains some of the strengths of this theory. as i will show, fromm's conception of love establishes a basis for a universalistic ethic that is not purely rationalistic but that also recognizes the importance of affect. the second section discusses fromm's applications of his theory of love to the teacher-student relationship and the specific advantages of applying his theory in this context. in the third section i explore the challenges that must be overcome if it is to have any value in a pedagogical context. in the fourth section i show how fromm's theory can be further developed to overcome the problems that are evident in his formulation of this theory. i also show that resolving these problems further adds to the value of fromm's theory of love. finally, in the last section i discuss some of the pedagogical insights that fromm uncovers with his theory of love. fromm’s theory of love fromm argues that the concept of love is invariably misunderstood in popular usage, and even in most philosophical accounts (1963, 1994: 135). love is frequently described as a type of particularistic orientation toward a specific object of love. according to this view, something or someone is loved because the object is unique and special; it is set apart from the rest of the world, even if only from a subjective viewpoint. this uniqueness makes the object appear to be worthy of being valued above all else. this conception of love also tends to present love as an emotion that must by nature be directed narrowly at a single object because the emotion of love is either indivisible or because it is devalued if it is directed at multiple objects. the object of love, being unique and extremely valuable, may likewise be devalued if it is divided or if multiple people are allowed to love it. the result, is that according to the conventional view, love is an essentially exclusionary emotion that links two people or a person and an object while also preventing others from sharing in that relationship. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 3 the popular conception of love appears most clearly in romantic love, which is generally described as a relationship between two people who form a unique affective attachment that cannot be shared with others. romantic love cannot be directed at those outside the relationship without threatening to destroy or devalue that love, and is therefore an extremely exclusionary conception of love. the love of friendship provides another example of this type of particularistic love. although this love may be shared between multiple friends, it is nevertheless directed narrowly at select individuals. like romantic love, love between friends is premised on marginalizing those who are not part of the relationship. outsiders are excluded from the relationship, and any intrusion by outsiders is regarded as being potentially threatening. worst of all, from fromm's point of view, is love for material objects, such a person's love for a car, a home, or some other possession. this type of love is not only directed at specific objects but reflects an attempt to find fulfillment in the experience of having something rather than in the more psychologically healthy orientation of finding fulfillment in modes of being, which is to say, in lived experience (fromm 2005). moreover, love for an object is exclusionary to the extent that only a single person may be able to partake in the loving relationship. fromm considers conventional views of particularistic love, whether romantic, friendly, or materialistic, to be deeply problematic. although he acknowledges that romantic love and the love of friendship exist and that they are important aspects of love, he thinks that they draw the boundaries of love narrowly, including one or several intimate connections while implicitly denying or devaluing links to other people. fromm objects that these and other instances of particularistic love are really based on misconceptions about what love really is. they mistake some limited manifestations of love with love itself. as he says, “love for a particular ‘object’ is only the actualization and concentration of lingering love with regard to one person; it is not, as the idea of romantic love would have it, that there is only the one person in the world whom one can love” (fromm 1994: 135). moreover, the pursuit of particularistic love for its own sake and not as a reflection of the universal conception of love encourages the formation of authoritarian relationships. because particularistic love is directed toward a unique object it encourages jealous guarding of that object from others. it may even provoke suspicion of the object of love itself if that object is a person whose love might be directed at someone else. those who only love in the particularistic way may attempt to control the object of their affection, thereby leading to authoritarian relationships with the object of love and potential competitors (1994: 136). although this jealousy and protectiveness may feel like love to some, fromm insists that the feeling is illusory and that any authoritarian impulses are antithetical to genuine love. in contrast to particularistic theories of love, fromm thinks that love is an expansive orientation that must be directed to large groups of people or to humanity in general. as he puts it, “love is not primarily a relationship to a specific person; it is an attitude, an orientation of character which determines the relatedness of a person to the world as a whole” (1963: 46). this type of love is based on the recognition that the attributes of the individuals we care about are actually characteristics shared by others – characteristics that may even be rooted in human nature. this love therefore denies particularity, and pushes us to extend the emotion of love beyond the confines of romantic love or love based on friendship to include all people who share in the qualities that we value. one of the ways fromm justifies extending love to all people is by maintaining that love directed at specific people is based on general human characteristics. he argues that what we really love in others are specific characteristics and that we are wrong to think that these characteristics are unique to a single person. any given characteristic may exist in many people, or, when the characteristics are rooted in human nature, to all people. fromm thinks that we must recognize that anything we love in another person is in fact something we love in all analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 4 others who share that characteristic. as he puts it, “the basic affirmation contained in love is directed toward the beloved person as an incarnation of essentially human qualities. love for one person implies love for man as such” (fromm 1994:135). therefore, fromm thinks that any feeling of particularistic love should push us to consider what we love in another person and then to recognize those characteristics of value in others and to extend love beyond the immediate object. he urges us to generalize love. as fromm describes it, love is a virtue or an activity, rather than a passive state of being or something that is received from others. it is, he argues, an art that a person must master in theory and practice, and that should be cultivated with the aim of achieving excellence. by this account, being a loving person is not simply having an object of love or being an object of love. rather, it is a matter of developing an orientation toward others and toward humanity as a whole. this orientation exists in the person who expresses love, even when there is no specific object to which it is directed (fromm 1963). fromm's theory of love creates a universal ethical standard that avoids reproducing some of the problems typical of universalist theories. one of the foremost challenges for universalist ethical systems is explaining why people should recognize responsibilities toward others, especially strangers. establishing some basis for extending ethical responsibilities to those with whom one has no personal attachments, without recourse to rewards, personal benefits, or shared identity, is a serious obstacle. the claim that individuals have a responsibility to treat all people equally, whether they are family and friends or strangers, is one of the most frequent targets of attack by those who maintain that moral universalism is implausible or unfair (miller 1995). one of the great strengths of fromm’s theory of love is that it is capable of answering this critique. first, fromm provides self-regarding reasons for thinking that one should love others. he argues that loving in the way he describes is psychologically healthy and that it is the only way in which individuals can enjoy the benefits of non-exploitative interpersonal relationships. second, he argues that love is essential for the well-being of society, and that societies become selfdestructive and harmful to their members when shared values are at odds with the demands of the kind of love he describes (fromm 1990a). it is helpful to compare fromm’s theory of love to kant's theory of universal respect in order to see how fromm’s effort to derive a universalist ethical theory from affective attachments improves on more purely rationalistic theories. fromm and kant both advocate universal ethical orientations, but they do so in much different ways. for kant, universalism is rooted in the concept of respect. in his writings on moral theory, kant argues that people must be respected in the sense that they are treated as ends in themselves and never merely as means to an end (1996a; 1996b). kant also emphasizes that respect is a feeling based on rational detachment. respect must be given to all others regardless of our emotional attitudes toward them, simply because other people are autonomous, rational beings. by contrast, love is a more engaged orientation. fromm describes love as an orientation that reason should push us to extend to all humans while also recognizing that it is rooted in affect, rather than reason, and that affect can provide a motive force that reason lacks (1963: 29). thus, fromm’s theory of love is similar to kant’s theory of universal respect in its attempt to specify a universal attitude, but fromm’s recognizes that there must be an affective component to ethical relationships that kant’s emotionless rationality explicitly rejects. of course, fromm's theory is not without its own faults. foremost among these, as i will show later, is that the theory is inadequately developed. although fromm discusses love throughout his work, he invariably does so from a fairly high level of abstraction and usually repeats himself a great deal. consequently, he fails to develop the theory in detail, to address likely objections, or to say much about how love is displayed in concrete examples. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 5 at times his descriptions of love also contradict themselves. among the most notable and problematic contradictions is that he alternately describes love being directed toward all people without exception and as being generalized to large groups of people based on shared characteristics that might not necessarily belong to all people. i will turn to some of these challenges in the next section as i focus my attention on fromm’s application of love to the teacher-student relationship. fromm and pedagogy fromm does not provide a substantive theory of pedagogy, but he does use the example of a relationship between teachers and students as one of his primary examples of how love can exist in a hierarchical context without giving way to domination. according to fromm, the model relationship between teachers and students is one that is based on his concept of love. he illustrates this by contrasting the teacher-student relationship with the relationship between a master and a slave, which is the exemplary case of a hierarchical relationship based on domination. in the master-slave relationship, the master wants something from the slave that the slave would not give voluntarily (fromm 1994: 187). the slave must be coerced into providing free labor against the slave's will, thereby creating a hierarchy that is sustained through coercion and the slave’s loss of autonomy. the master's superior status is both the means of coercing the slave and a mark of the master's success in doing so, making the relationship intrinsically authoritarian. the master-slave relationship is also one of perpetual hierarchy in the sense that the master works to ensure that the slave will remain forever subordinate and unable to become autonomous. teachers and students engage in the activity of learning in which the latter has authority over the former, but in which both are voluntary participants in the activity and both aim at the same goal: the improvement of the student (fromm 1994: 187). the teacher-student relationship also aims at destroying the hierarchy that structures it. the teacher and student are both concerned with elevating the student's status, bringing the student closer to the professor's level of knowledge (fromm 1994: 187). if successful, this effort ends the relationship and the hierarchy that it embodies, enabling the former student and teacher to relate to each other as equals. thus, unlike the master-slave relationship, the teacher-student relationship is a voluntary association that is mutually beneficial and that is directed at eliminating hierarchy. the ultimate goal of equality is especially interesting from the teacher's perspective. it means that a good teacher must strive to lose authority over the student and can be judged in terms of how effectively this authority is sacrificed. fromm’s discussion of the teacher-student relationship is useful for explaining the general orientation that teachers and students should have, especially since he is able to give pedagogy as an activity a universal purpose: decreasing the knowledge or ability gap between teachers and students. from this foundation, one can derive a range of responsibilities that teachers and students have to each other and to themselves. at the most basic level, each is responsible for treating the other in ways that reflect the virtue of love as fromm describes it. they must see each other not as particular objects of affection, which could lead to jealousy or the exclusion of loving relationships with others. rather, they must see each other as people who participate in a relationship that is universal in form and that is strengthened when particularistic relationships are avoided. the responsibility to endorse universal love is symmetrical, yet it is operationalized in different ways in light of the different roles students and teachers have by virtue of their hierarchical relationship. the teacher takes on the responsibility for ensuring that the position of authority is not used for exploitative purposes. that is to say, the teacher does not coerce the student and does not work toward goals other than the student’s improvement. the analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 6 student cannot be used as a free laborer or in ways that reinforce, rather than diminish, the teacher’s authority. from the student’s perspective the duties are less serious, but still important. the student must make a concerted effort to overcome the hierarchical relationship by learning from the teacher, and must also maintain his or her autonomy while relying on another person’s assistance. beyond this fairly brief example, fromm says little about the relationship between teachers and students specifically. nevertheless, he is deeply interested in the analogous relationship between therapists and patients, which can provide some additional insight into his thoughts on education. like the teacher-student relationship, the therapist-patient relationship is based on a non-authoritarian type of hierarchy, in which one person is supposed to facilitate another’s acquisition of information and stronger reasoning capacities. to avoid authoritarianism in this context, fromm recommends psychoanalysis that proceeds through subtle guidance, directing patients’ attention toward their problems and developing patients’ capacities of critical thinking and introspection. the analyst is supposed to facilitate the patient’s efforts at self-discovery and recovery without exercising coercion or heavy influence, thereby intervening in the patient’s life and cognition without threatening the patient’s autonomy (fromm 1994). in his later writings fromm is critical of freud’s tendency to project his own concerns onto his patients, and argues that this tendency reflects a latent authoritarianism in freud’s thought (1973). he is also critical of mainstream psychoanalysis, which he thinks is primarily directed at encouraging compliance with social norms, including norms that are irrational or destructive. even when it is not provided in an authoritarian manner, fromm thinks that therapy with this adaptive goal is complicit in reproducing larger patterns of authoritarianism and coercion in society (fromm: 1990a). one can extrapolate from this that education of any type must not be directed at projecting the teacher’s views onto the students or training the students to uncritically accept the prevailing social order. such education would, whatever the relationship between student and teacher, promote authoritarianism by socializing the student to be less critical or less autonomous. fromm’s work has had some influence on theories of pedagogy, especially those that insist that the teacherstudent relationship should have an affective dimension (freire 1992, 1998; fleming 2012; webb 2013). his theories of educative relationships more generally, especially the one that exists between psychologists and patients, have also helped to shape research on loving, non-authoritarian relationships (severin 1973). these appropriations of fromm’s theory of love reflect its usefulness and its potential to be implemented in practice. however, these studies generally fail to develop the theory in more detail than fromm himself, as they tend to focus more on operationalizing fromm’s theory than developing its nuances. they therefore leave some of the deep theoretical problems in fromm theory, especially those having to do with the relationship between love and authority, unresolved. evaluating fromm’s theory of love despite its strengths, fromm’s theory of love in the relationship between teachers and students suffers from several limitations. these follow from general problems of vagueness in fromm's theory of love and his failure to explain how his conception of love should be embodied in specific instances. i will discuss these problems in this section, and in the following section i will explain how his theory can be further developed in ways that overcome these limitations. my goal will be to make fromm’s theory of love in pedagogical relationships more theoretically sound and better able to specify ethical obligations for teachers and students. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 7 the first problem for fromm's theory of love in the teacher-student context, or in any context in which there is hierarchy, is that the existence of hierarchy seems to contradict fromm's claim that love requires equality. throughout his work, fromm criticizes affective responses that we conventionally call love but that are based on authority or dependency, and he strives to show how the appearance of love in these cases is false. he objects to describing these as instances of love precisely because they rest on inequalities that promote, or even require, domination and subordination. two of the best examples of this type of love are the love between a mother and her child and the love between a father and his child. fromm describes motherly love as the unconditional acceptance of a child. this is a generous type of love, but the child is all too often subsumed under the mother and deprived of autonomy because the child is completely dependent (fromm 1963: 39). motherly love is also passive for the object of love, not requiring any effort from the child. this results in the child failing to learn how to love in return and having a weakened capacity for love. fromm does not deny that motherly love may be called love, but he thinks that it differs significantly from the kind of universal love that can serve as the basis for ethical obligations more generally. fatherly love is, fromm thinks, more authoritarian. it is conditional love that depends on a child's adherence to strict rules of behavior (1963: 65). this demands more from the child than being a passive object of affection. nevertheless, fromm criticizes this type of love because it is directed at a particular object and because fatherly love has a tendency to deny a child's autonomy through overt coercion. as in motherly love, the hierarchical nature of fatherly love makes it an imperfect reflection of love. fromm continually defines his conception of love as an orientation that exists between equals, contrasting it with motherly or fatherly love and with authoritarian relationships that may be mistaken for love. for example, in escape from freedom, fromm says that “love is based on equality and freedom” (1994: 183). in the sane society he says that for a young child “father and mother are more objects of dependency or fear than of love, which by its very nature is based on equality and independence” (fromm 1990a: 35). moreover, throughout his work fromm emphasizes that equality is a basic condition of being able to love, saying that love can only exist where there is an absence of coercion (1963, 1973, 1994). one might argue that fromm does indicate a way out of this problem by saying that the teacher-student relationship is based on equality because equality of knowledge or ability is its ultimate end. however, this response would imply that because equality only exists at the point when the student knows as much as the teachers, teachers and students are only equal when their relationship dissolves. this would in turn mean that love can only exist once the practice of education ceases and that love cannot be the basis of the teacher-student relationship while education is underway. simply having the goal of equality is inadequate for explaining how a necessarily hierarchical relationship between teachers and students can be based on an egalitarian conception of love. thus, fromm does not clearly articulate how it could be possible for the teacher-student relationship to embody his conception of love as a relationship between equals, nor does there seem to be a way of easily explaining this in terms of ultimate goal of equality. this problem is especially challenging because fromm cites the teacher-student relationship as a paradigmatic example of a hierarchical relationship shaped by love. problems like this one have led some to criticize his understanding of authority and even to think that fromm is opposed to any type of authority. for example, schaar argues that, according to fromm, authority is always unjustified even when it is benevolent and produces good results for those subjected to the authority, as “any act analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 8 of submission means a crippling of one’s human powers” (1961: 105-6). he goes on to say that “fromm’s view on this comes close to saying that might is always wrong, that there can be no right in an authoritarian-inegalitarian relationship between two men. where there is a superior-inferior relationship there is evil” (1961: 105-6). this point rests on closely associating authority and authoritarianism, an association that fromm facilitates by failing to adequately explain his theory of hierarchy in the teacher-student relationship. nevertheless, as i will argue in the next section, it can be solved by further developing fromm’s theory of love and pedagogy. the second problem with fromm's account of love in the teacher-student relationship is with one of the arguments fromm uses to justify generalizing love beyond the conventional particularistic understanding of love. as i mentioned in the first section, one of the reasons that fromm thinks that we must extend love beyond narrowly defined relationships is that we can recognize the characteristics we love in individuals as universal characteristics that others share (1990b). fromm maintains that although the characteristics we value may be instantiated in a single person, they are characteristics that any person could have and that many do, making them universal qualities. although all people have the capacity to embody the characteristics that we find loveable, fromm clearly thinks that some people do not do so in practice, thereby making themselves unlovable. throughout his writings, fromm repeatedly cites examples of people who are so loathsome as to be beyond love. this is especially clear when he discusses the psychology of leading nazis or others with dangerous authoritarian tendencies (fromm 1973, 1994). thus, even though fromm sometimes describes particularistic love being generalized to a love of humanity, what he really seems to mean is that the characteristics that allow us to love others are shared by almost all other humans and that only those people who we consider to be truly monstrous place themselves beyond love. the salient question this raises is: what are the characteristics that allow people in particularistic relationships to generalize their feelings of love such that they apply to most of humanity? even more importantly, what are the characteristics that allow love in teacher-student relationships to become generalized such that teachers and students can feel the kind of universal love fromm describes? the problem is that fromm does not say exactly what characteristics of teachers and students make them loveable to each other and that would allow individual teachers and students to respond to each other with a kind of universal love that goes beyond particularistic relationships. moreover, this problem is compounded by the first one. if teacher and student are not equals, then this raises the possibility that their love might not even be based on the same characteristics. the characteristic or characteristics that are the basis for the teacher's love of the student might not be the same as those that are the basis of the student's love for the teacher. this possibility threatens to undermine fromm’s theory of love by allowing universal love to break down into various different, incommensurable different forms of love. rethinking fromm’s theory in this section i will argue that fromm’s theory of love in a pedagogical context can be further developed and that it can overcome the problems i identified in the previous section. i will do this by drawing on his comments about the human condition to explain how relationships of love can be simultaneously equal and unequal. my argument helps to clarify fromm’s theory of pedagogy and what that theory can contribute to our understanding of education. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 9 the problem of how the student and the teacher can be considered equal must be resolved by asking what they are equal in respect to. their respective roles depend on an inequality in their levels of knowledge or ability. the teacher must have greater knowledge or ability than the student in order to teach the student. however, i maintain that this inequality is only problematic based on fromm’s conception of egalitarian love if this inequality is the sole basis for the teacher-student relationship. put differently, an egalitarian loving relationship can exist between teachers and students if their love is not premised on the unequal roles that they play. this not only suggests a way of answering the first problem i raised but also the second. if there is a way in which teachers and students are equal, which exists apart from their unequal roles, then this common ground may also be the characteristic that can serve as the basis for generalizing love beyond particularistic relationships to all people. thus, both of the problems i raised in the previous section can be answered in the same way: by determining what shared human nature makes teachers and students equal in spite of their unequal levels of knowledge while also serving as the basis for generalizing love. to discover what this characteristic is, it is important to first consider what is universal in the human condition, as fromm describes it. fromm describes human nature in terms of a constant struggle to orient oneself in the world. humans are, he maintains, unique in our ability to create a distinctive human world. the world we create separates us from nature and from the natural, or primary, bonds that we have from birth or early socialization. every person must undergo the experience of becoming detached from primary bonds, such as the connection to family members, to a home, and to basic identities, as we grow up and must find our place in the social world. this process of leaving primary bonds forces us to develop new identities to replace those attachments that we are born into. it forces us to abandon the comforts of the life we take to be natural and to make our own choices. growing up and developing an identity is simultaneously liberating and potentially dangerous. as fromm sees it, the loss of primary bonds may be the basis for establishing new connections with others through free choice. these chosen relationships may be of a higher type than our natural relationships with family members if they are based on love and developed without coercion. losing primary bonds also allows people to choose their own beliefs and values, which is likewise potentially liberating or dangerous, depending on which beliefs and values are chosen. the freedom to choose may be the basis for leaving behind irrational attachments and developing a healthier and more productive belief structure based on the loving orientation fromm describes. it may also lead those searching for meaning to turn towards ideologies of hate or authoritarianism. the freedom to choose one’s own way of life and one’s values is so frightening that it frequently leads people to sacrifice their autonomy in exchange for security. many people desperately seek out any relationship that can provide a feeling of connectedness, simply because being alone and being self-reliant is psychologically stressful (1994). this may lead people to unhealthy relationships of domination or submission that provide a feeling of safety. those who wish for relationships or guidance from others as a way of escaping from their own freedom and avoiding the struggle of orienting themselves are prone to either falling under another person’s control or developing a sadistic wish to control others. with this basic human quality in mind, it is possible to return to the problem of explaining how the teacher and student can be considered equal even though their relationship depends on hierarchy. the apparent contradiction can be resolved by distinguishing different senses in which they may be considered equal. teachers and students are, like all people, equal in the sense that they share engagement in the endless project of orienting themselves in the world once they lose their primary bonds. however, what sets teachers and students apart from analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 10 others is their strategy for coping with this detachment. they attempt to orient themselves in the world by learning more about it. the teacher knows more than the student and is in a position to impart that knowledge to the student, thereby making them unequal in how far they have progressed in acquiring knowledge. nevertheless, they are equal on a more fundamental level because, regardless of their level of knowledge, they are engaged in the same project of overcoming the loss of primary bonds through learning and doing this in ways that avoid the submission to authority or domination of others. this answers the two problems i raised in the previous section. it is this, the common pursuit of knowledge rather than the possession of knowledge, and the shared struggle of orienting themselves in the world, that make student and teacher equal despite their different levels of knowledge. teachers and students can recognize in each other the desire for the same kind of understanding of the world and the equalizing effect that this pursuit has, because it is based in a fundamental human need that transcends ephemeral hierarchies between teachers and students that are necessary for learning. moreover, this fundamental equality – the shared curiosity about specific subjects and the world in general, as well as the shared commitment to pursue knowledge – is the characteristic that teachers and students value in their particularistic relationships. because teachers and students both value this quality, it can be generalized to give that particularistic love a universal form, with anyone in the role of a teacher or a student being able to love that shared quality in all others who engage in the educational process. pedagogy and love thus far, my analysis has focused on resolving some fairly abstract theoretical questions in fromm’s theory of love, and his comments on love in a pedagogical context specifically. this theoretical task is critical for any effort to apply fromm’s theory in practice, as overcoming the challenges inherent in fromm’s theory and further developing his concept of love provides a much stronger foundation for attempts to operationalize that theory. in this section i will discuss some of the important normative implications that arise from understanding the teacherstudent relationship as being based on fromm’s concept of love and how these can inform education. first, fromm repeatedly cautions against having an acquisitive orientation, which is relating to the world as a repository of objects to be possessed. he maintains that living productively and happily requires that one focus on ‘being’ rather than ‘having,’ which is to say, on living actively and being open to new experiences rather than attempting to accumulate as much as possible (2005). focusing on living as an activity that is intrinsically meaningful, rather than living in service of acquiring possessions is, fromm argues, difficult because it prevents one from finding security in material well-being. nevertheless, he maintains that refusing this security and embracing the insecurity of the free search for productive orientation is essential for being psychologically healthy and for being able to love others. by extension, we can reason that in the pedagogical context, the goal of education is not simply, or even primarily, possessing knowledge. having a great deal of knowledge, like having material possessions, may help to alleviate the psychic difficulties inherent in being detached from primary ties and developing one’s identity. however, acquiring knowledge simply so that it can be possessed threatens to become a purposeless venture of perpetual accumulation. from a pedagogical standpoint, the implication is that education should not merely be designed to impart information but to make students better able to process information and to create new information. in other words, education based on universal love should be directed not only at imparting information, but that its primary goal should be teaching students the various ways in which information shapes who we are and how we act on a more substantive level. this includes teaching how to critically evaluate information and how to produce analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 11 new information. the emphasis on being over having also serves as further evidence that the teacher and student’s unequal levels of knowledge is less important to their relationship than their equal interest in the activities of learning and producing new information. second, when it is developed in the way i suggest, fromm’s theory of love suggests that the primary purpose of education in every context should be teaching that facilitates the project of learning to live without the security of primary bonds. education must also be directed at preventing students from falling victim to authoritarian relationships that offer security at the cost of autonomy. the teacher-student relationship is linked to the desire to know more about the world in order to orient oneself in it and to cope with life without primary bonds. education is a necessary precursor to being able to successfully navigate these challenges, and this seems especially true given fromm's insistence that it is very difficult to avoid falling victim to some type of authoritarian relationship. consequently, whatever the specific subject matter a teacher attempts to convey, education should somehow be directed at enabling students to further develop their own identities and to become better able to live in the world without being overwhelmed by the loss of primary bonds, and without falling victim to the temptation of finding security in authoritarian relationships. third, fromm’s understanding of love in a pedagogical context highlights how important it is that teachers not attempt to exert too strong an influence on the student’s development, and that they avoid claiming to be absolute sources of knowledge. authoritarian influences, whether individuals or ideologies, often purport to have complete certainty. the authoritarian pedagogical stance is that of a person who claims to have the information that can alleviate the student's ignorance and to be unaffected by ignorance. to make this claim to certainty, whether explicitly or tacitly, is to claim an exemption from what fromm identifies as the human condition – the condition of being cut away from primary bonds and forced to search for orientation in the world. the pretension to certainty can be an extremely attractive quality in a teacher because certainty offers security, but it also eliminates the fundamental equality that can serve as the basis for a loving teacher-student relationship. this is not merely a theoretical problem. if a teacher purports to have the final answer to all problems, then the teacher threatens to hinder students’ autonomous intellectual development. rather than helping students to discover the world for themselves, the authoritarian pedagogical relationship is premised on making students uncritically accept everything the teacher says. this also places the student in the position of a consumer that can only possess information, rather than the position of an autonomous actor who can use and create information. based on fromm’s theory of love and pedagogy as i have described, it is possible to see that a much healthier teacher-student relationship can develop if teachers encourage students to think independently and even to dissent. if teachers and students are fundamentally equal in their search for orienting themselves in the world, then they can arrive at different viewpoints even if the teacher knows more than the student. finally, although the teacher cannot provide definitive answers in the search for orientation without risk of either becoming authoritarian or destroying the basis for equality, the teacher can facilitate this search for orientation by exposing irrational authorities. fromm argues that one of the most important parts of overcoming primary attachments is distinguishing those that are irrational or threaten personal autonomy from those that are healthy. this is by no means an easy process, as it requires careful consideration of which relationships and identities promote personal autonomy and which threaten it. however, a good teacher can assist in making this judgment, especially with respect to the teacher’s area of expertise. for example, political science teachers can help students evaluate which relationships promote healthy political life and which interfere with it, psychology teachers can help students evaluate their personal relationships, and teachers in the natural sciences can help analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 12 students better understand their relationships with the natural world. thus, whatever the subject matter, there are opportunities for exposing and challenging irrational authorities that would hinder love. conclusion as i have argued, fromm provides a strong position from which to theorize the relationship between pedagogy and love. he accounts for how love can serve as a general orientation between teachers and students, rather than a particularistic orientation between pairs of people, and how the tendency of feelings of love to devolve into authoritarian feelings of domination or submission can be avoided. fromm’s theory is incomplete and in need of greater theoretical specificity, but it is one that merits attention and further development because it provides a convincing account of ethical universalism that acknowledges the importance of affect, and that does not attempt to reduce ethical obligations to disinterested rationality. my argument is that love between teachers and students can be grounded in a shared pursuit of knowledge in response to a human feeling of becoming detached from primary bonds. both teachers and students are equal insofar as they are engaged in a common pursuit to develop their own identities in ways that avoid entanglement in authoritarian relationships. reflecting on the potential for universal love between students and teachers based on this shared characteristic helps to clarify the ethical obligations each have toward each other and toward themselves. references fleming, t. (2012) fromm and habermas: allies for adult education and democracy. studies in philosophy and education. 31(2) 123-136. freire, p. (1992). pedagogy of hope. new york: continuum. freire, p. (1998). pedagogy of freedom: ethics, democracy, and civic courage. lanham, md: rowman & littlefield. fromm, e. (1963). the art of loving. (new york: bantam books, 1963). fromm, e. (1973). the anatomy of human destructiveness, new york: holt, rinehart and winston. fromm, e. (1990a). the sane society. new york: henry holt and company. fromm, e. (1990b). man for himself: an inquiry into the psychology of ethics. new york: henry holt and company. fromm, e. (1994). escape from freedom. new york: henry holt and company. fromm, e. (2005). to have or to be?. new york: bloomsbury. kant, i. (1996a). critique of practical reason. new york: cambridge university press. kant, i. (1996b). the metaphysics of morals. new york: cambridge university press. miller, d. (1995). on nationality. oxford: clarendon press. schaar, john holmer. (1961). escape from authority: the perspectives of erich fromm. new york: basic books. severin, f. t. (1973). discovering man in psychology: a humanistic approach. new york: mcgraw-hill. webb, d. (2013). pedagogies of hope. studies in philosophy and education. 32(4):397-414. address correspondences to: marcus schulzke mschulzke@albany.edu enrique dussel: ética y política alejandro moreno lax resumen: en estas páginas resumiremos la obra completa de enrique dussel, poniendo especial atención a la evolución de su ética de la liberación y sus repercusiones en la política de la liberación, con sus dos ideas fundamentales: la pretensión ética de bondad y la pretensión política de justicia. abstract: in these pages we will summarize enrique dussel’s complete work, paying special attention to the evolution of his ethics of liberation and its consequences for the politics of liberation, specifically his two fundamental ideas of the ethical pretension of kindness and the political pretension of justice. i vamos a recorrer las distintas etapas del pensamiento de enrique dussel siguiendo la evolución de su pro-puesta ética así como sus repercusiones en su actual política de la liberación, con el fin de mostrar de forma sintética la fervorosa actualidad de este autor para el presente. enrique dussel nace en mendoza (argentina) en 1934, y desde entonces ha publicado más de 50 obras. la voracidad de su producción intelectual es paralela a la intensidad de sus continuos viajes por todo el mundo, animada ya desde su juventud por la diversidad de ciudades en las que vivió, trabajó y estudió: mendoza, donde logró la licenciatura en filosofía; madrid, donde logra el doctorado en 1959 con la tesis el bien común. su inconsistencia teórica, y donde paradójicamente descubre américa latina, al entrar en contacto en la residencia guadalupe con otros compatriotas del continente; nazaret, atraído por el sacerdote paul gauthier, y donde trabaja como carpintero durante dos años; münster y mainz, donde continúa con sus estudios universitarios; sevilla, donde estudia en el archivo de indias entre 1964 y 1966; y parís, logrando en 1965 la licenciatura en ciencias de la religión en el instituto católico y en 1967 el doctorado en historia por la sorbona, con la tesis les evêques hispano-americains, defenseurs et evangelisateurs de l’ indien (1504-1620). esta brillante formación académica, inusitada en aquella época tratándose sobre todo de un latinoamericano, le mantuvo apartado durante una década de su tierra natal, pero constituye el germen de quien se convertirá en todo un «caníbal» de la filosofía. es muy difícil encontrar en la literatura filosófica postmoderna de hoy, tan fragmentaria y especializada, autores con una semejante voluntad de sistema, de articular corrientes más allá de la mera reinterpretación de clásicos repetidos hasta la saciedad, de renovación continua, de atención a los nuevos debates y a sus propios críticos, y, sobre todo, de creatividad. 46 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 47 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 ii la primera etapa del pensamiento de dussel estuvo muy influida por la ontología de heidegger y la hermenéutica de paul ricoeur, ya siendo el autor consciente de la «intencionalidad filosófica» de su proyecto: elaborar una filosofía latinoamericana original. en esta década de los sesenta, como habilitado en la universidad del nordeste y en la universidad de cuyo, escribe el humanismo semita1 (1963, aunque publicado en 1969), el humanismo helénico2 (1964, aunque publicado en 1975), y el dualismo en la antropología de la cristiandad3 (publicado en 1974). en estas obras practica el método de interpretar la representación existencial que se hace una cultura de sí misma a partir de su narrativa simbólica, y lo aplica a los tres fenómenos antropológicos y culturales más decisivos para la formación del hispanismo invasor de américa desde 1492: el pensamiento judeocristiano y el pensamiento griego. estos ensayos de filosofía de la cultura estaban encaminados a un proyecto posterior que nunca se tematizó como tal: elaborar una filosofía latinoamericana a partir de una exégesis de todo el legado ético-mítico precolombino. en esta etapa ya se reflejan algunas de las características que acompañarán toda la obra del autor: 1) un interés por una ética afirmativa como filosofía primera; 2) un método filosófico capaz de integrar textos no convencionales para la historia de la filosofía; 3) un uso permanente de la historia como premisa para un pensamiento siempre «situado» geográfica y temporalmente; 4) una crítica al dualismo cuerpo-mente, ya en los griegos, y que posteriormente rastreará en todo el pensamiento occidental hasta habermas; 5) un anhelo por construir categorías propiamente latinoamericanas. dussel, a fin de cuentas un inmigrante de una nación excepcionalmente enriquecida dentro del contexto latinoamericano, había descubierto la realidad de la pobreza en distintas comunidades árabes de israel en 1959, encuentra en la antropología semita una cosmovisión que preconiza sus posteriores desarrollos éticos: si la originalidad de la antropología semita es presentar al hombre como unidad indivisible, la originalidad de la ética hebrea es la de haber guardado ese monismo en el plano moral. si todo lo real ha sido creado por yahveh, el bien y el mal moral, es decir, los actos humanos en tanto buenos o malos tienen una fuente única creada: el corazón humano –y no un dios-. siendo operados por el hombre –el bien y el malno pueden ser ya “criaturas” (cosas), por cuanto el hombre no crea, sino que fabrica, modifica. el mal y el bien será una relación intersubjetiva4. en adelante veremos cómo poco a poco dirigirá sus reflexiones hacia una ética de la liberación cuyas notas constituyentes serán el materialismo anti-dualista y la alteridad intersubjetiva. iii pero a finales de los años 60 ocurren varios sucesos que obligan a dussel a desplazar sus supuestos filosóficos. es el inicio en toda américa latina de las dictaduras militares de seguridad nacional auspiciadas desde el pentágono de eeuu: brasil, argentina, chile, etc.; los movimientos contestatarios de origen universitario (con la matanza en 1968 de 200 estudiantes en la plaza de tlatelolco en méxico d. f. o el llamado «cordobazo» en argentina); el desarrollo de la teoría de la dependencia con fernando henrique cardoso, celso furtado o andré gunder frank, el nacimiento de una literatura latinoamericana politizada con alejo carpentier o gabriel garcía márquez, la lectura política que hace herbert marcuse sobre la ontología y los movimientos nacionales de liberación en áfrica, américa latina y asia. además, dussel lee hacia 1969 la obra del belga de origen judío emmanuel lévinas, totalité et infinie, decisiva para sus nuevos planteamientos. el fenómeno de la liberación nace intelectualmente no sólo a través de la sociología crítica, sino también en el ámbito de la teología5, la pedagogía6 y la filosofía latinoamericana. se trata de un movimiento de clara vocación ética y política que arranca con una subversión de términos: si hasta entonces se hablaba de naciones subdesarrolladas y naciones desarrolladas, ahora comenzó a hablarse del fenómeno de la dependencia y la liberación, junto a los dos sujetos que le son propios, el opresor y el oprimido. el giro fue evidente: el desarrollo de unos pocos produce el subdesarrollo de la mayoría en proporciones desorbitadas; o lo que es lo mismo, dependencia y subdesarrollo están directamente relacionadas. dussel, lector de lévinas, participó activamente en este proceso, despertando, como él mismo dice, del «sueño ontológico» heideggeriano. en el filósofo judío descubre la tesis de que, frente a la idea de sustancia (aristóteles), de espíritu (hegel) o de comprensión (heidegger), lévinas propone una reflexión del gozo sensible anterior a la razón cognoscente, a la vez que la noción de socorro al prójimo en tanto que otro desconocido, que tampoco es una comprensión cognitiva, sino una hospitalidad instintiva ante el dolor de la víctima resultado de esta pulsión de alteridad del hombre. se trata de la anterioridad del existente respecto al ser, del cuerpo frente a la conciencia; en otros términos, de la comprensión de la totalidad a la infinita revelación de la alteridad. el filósofo argentino comienza a releer la historia del pensamiento occidental en clave «totalizante», siguiendo a lévinas, detectando en todos los momentos filosóficos más destacados una dialéctica de la totalidad y una ontología de la identidad, desde parménides hasta heidegger. la dialéctica de la totalidad consiste en la comprensión del sentido de los entes del mundo; no es simplemente el mundo de los entes, sino la realidad tal y como le atribuimos un significado; es el mundo en su horizonte hermenéutico, el ser-en-el-mundo, como dice heidegger. la diversidad de los entes dispersos u objetos reales mundanos, económicos, naturales, etc., alcanzan unidad en esta operación totalizante del sujeto como actor cognitivo y separado de sus relaciones intersubjetivas, del caraa-cara propio del humanismo semita. esta operación de reunir lo disperso en una misma unidad de significado es lo propio de la ontología y su deseo de identificación. identificar es subsumir lo diverso en lo mismo, la alteridad en la ego-idad, la multiplicidad en la unidad: la diferencia de los entes indica, con respecto al fundamento, dependencia; con respecto a los otros entes, negatividad: uno no es el otro, son diferentes. la totalidad de los entes o partes diferentes se explica o se fundamenta en la identidad del ser del todo. ser, identidad y fundamento son el desde-donde surge el ente, la diferencia y la dependencia. depende el ente porque se funda en el ser del sistema7. el pensamiento occidental es eurocéntrico porque es ontológico y dialéctico, es decir, porque identifica desde sus propias categorías la diferencia de aquello que le es extraño, tornándolo dependiente de este proceso ontológico de identificación que aspira a una totalidad. la totalidad subsume la diferencia, como en el noûs de aristóteles que subsume la dependencia de la mujer, los niños o los esclavos respecto del varón político; o el «yo pienso» de descartes, que racionaliza el «yo conquisto» de hernán cortés; o el estado de hegel, cuya identidad se compensa con la emigración a las colonias de quienes viven en condiciones precarias8. dussel supera la ontología y la dialéctica por medio de la metafísica (o trans-ontología) y la «analéctica» (o más allá de la dialéctica). estas reflexiones ya se encuentran en distintos artículos desde 19719, como el denominado «metafísica del sujeto y liberación», una ponencia presentada en el ii congreso argentino de filosofía en la ciudad de córdoba (y que, según el autor, fue la primera vez que se empleó el término de «filosofía de la liberación»). a la pregunta del libro de salazar bondy ¿existe una filosofía en américa?, dussel argumenta que: analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 48 la tarea de la filosofía latinoamericana que intente superar la modernidad, el sujeto, deberá proponerse detectar todos los rasgos de ese sujeto dominador nordatlántico en nuestro oculto ser latinoamericano dependiente, oprimido. (…) la metafísica, como la relación veri-ficante del pensar al mundo se funda, en último término, en lo ético: la relación de hombre a hombre, hombre que enfrenta a otro hombre como un rostro que trasciende a toda comprensión mundana veritativa como una libertad desde la que emerge, desde el misterio, una palabra revela lo imprevisible. lo ético, hombre-hombre, concretamente: opresor-oprimido, viene a fundar toda vocación filosófica. (…) es posible sólo con una condición: que, desde la autoconciencia de su alienación, opresión, sabiéndose entonces estar sufriendo en la propia frustración la dialéctica de la dominación, piense dicha opresión; vaya pensando junto, “desde dentro” de la praxis liberadora una filosofía ella misma también liberadora. es decir, la filosofía, que emerge de la praxis y que la piensa, es la filosofía postmoderna cuando parte de una praxis que supera la dialéctica del sujeto como dominador-dominado10. este es un texto lleno de lévinas, donde la praxis de liberación tiene un método filosófico que denomina analéctica. se trata de la superación de toda ontología totalizante a partir de una metafísica de la alteridad: la relación de proxemia, de cercanía con el otro, con lo diferente a mi identidad, la cual es una experiencia ética (y no óntica) que nunca se agota porque es infinita. la metafísica consiste en esa infinitud más allá de la ontología, y su práctica, que se da en el cara-a-cara entre humanos, es una ética. el neonato viene al mundo desde esa experiencia original, primera y metafísica, de proximidad y sensibilidad, que supone madre-hijo, y sólo después, con el crecimiento, la cultura y la socialización llega el proceso de alejamiento y objetivación hermenéutica y cognitiva de los entes. en esta década de los 70, y concretamente en su filosofía ética de la liberación, de 1973, conviven en dussel una nueva metafísica del otro y una nueva ética «analéctica», de corte levinasiano, junto a una ética todavía heideggeriana; dussel transita de una ética existencial del poder-ser hacia una analéctica como metafísica del otro: el fundamento de la ética es el ser del hombre que se com-prende existencialmente como poderser11. ese ser como poder-ser ad-viniente, com-prendido dia-lécticamente, en posición existencial, es idénticamente el deber-ser12. el ser como poder-ser es entonces deber-ser; el poder-ser, como origen desde el cual parte hacia una libertad la ex-igencia como ob-ligación, es el deber-ser13. esta es todavía una ética del sujeto, escrita como capítulo hacia 1970, que convive con una nueva metafísica levinasiana que expresa en páginas posteriores, escritas después de una estancia en 1972 en europa donde dialogó con el propio lévinas: la filosofía no sería ya una ontología de la identidad o la totalidad, no se negaría como una analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 49 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 50 mera teología kierkegaardiana, sino que sería una analéctica pedagógica de la liberación, una ética primeramente antropológica o una meta-física histórica. la crítica a la dialéctica hegeliana fue efectuada por los posthegelianos (entre ellos feuerbach, marx y kierkegaard). la crítica a la ontología heideggeriana ha sido efectuada por lévinas. los primeros son todavía modernos; el segundo es todavía europeo. seguiremos indicativamente el camino de ellos para superarlos desde américa latina. ellos son la pre-historia de la filosofía latinoamericana y el antecedente inmediato de nuestro pensar latinoamericano14. todos ellos tienen un límite: son europeos que piensan desde el «centro» del sistema, desde la totalidad de la metrópoli dominadora de sus colonias, desde el sistema del capitalismo mundial. dussel interpreta el «otro» como el indio excluido, el africano, el pueblo excluido, la nación explotada. de todas formas, y como reconocerá años después, se trataba de una visión pasiva del otro, como de un sujeto al que hay que servir pero que no tiene acción propia más que el ser escuchado. el otro representa ese pasaje «analéctico» de la totalidad identificada y conocida a la infinitud del rostro desconocido y excluido. este método analéctico será la nueva «ética metafísica» que descubre y desarrolla dussel a lo largo de los años 7015, aplicándolo a la económica, la política, la erótica o la pedagógica, detectando sus distintos momentos de dominación y de exclusión, y también de liberación. desde entonces el trabajo intelectual de dussel como filosofía de la liberación se radicaliza y se politiza, se convierte en una crítica del presente con todas sus consecuencias, a veces tan negativas como en 1973, con la bomba que le colocaron en su casa de mendoza un grupo de ortodoxos peronistas de derecha. junto a él aparecen otros iniciadores del pensamiento de la liberación como oswaldo ardiles, juan c. scannone, salazar bondy o leopoldo zea. también horacio cerutti, aunque con grandes diferencias respecto a dussel. iv la dictadura militar argentina le obliga al exilio, y dussel emigra a méxico gracias a leopoldo zea. poco a poco, el filósofo argentino comprende que su análisis metafísico y ético necesita articularse en el contexto histórico donde se producen las relaciones de dominación y dependencia entre las naciones del «centro» europeo y la «periferia» postcolonial. el nuevo tránsito de la filosofía de dussel se produce de la analéctica de la totalidad como exterioridad del otro empobrecido al nuevo análisis del capitalismo como economía de explotación mundial y fuente de la pobreza latinoamericana. dussel acude al marxismo a pesar de los dos problemas que se le plantean: la creciente desacreditación del socialismo real soviético y su visión de marx como filósofo europeo de la totalidad16. los análisis del marxismo estándar europeos de tipo althusseriano le parecían insuficientes por su economicismo científico, excesivamente dogmático para un nuevo análisis que se pretende emprender desde el enfoque original de américa latina. el argentino, descendiente de alemanes de tradición marxista, se ve obligado él mismo a leer en su totalidad, «palmo a palmo», como dice, la obra de otro filósofo judío17, karl marx, acudiendo directamente al instituto marxista leninista de berlín, que por aquella época trabajaba en la publicación de las obras completas de marx y engels. lee todos los manuscritos con cuidado y atención, especialmente los grundrisse y las cuatro redacciones del capital, con el privilegio de leer toda la obra antes de ser publicada. dussel se zambulle totalmente en la obra de marx en los años 80, paradójicamente una década de abandono generalizado del marxismo en europa, de la histórica caída del muro de berlín en 1989 y la disolución definitiva de la urss en 1991. de nuevo contracorriente, el argentino descubre un marx que considera desconocido e inconcluso, lleno de posibles desarrollos y muy pertinente para el pensamiento latinoamericano. en esta época publicará la producción teórica de marx18, donde estudia «la primera redacción del capital» (los grundrisse, de 1857-1858), hacia un marx desconocido19, donde estudia la contribución de 1859 y los manuscritos del 61-63 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 51 (la llamada «segunda redacción»), y el último marx (1863-1882) y la liberación latinoamericana20, donde estudia la tercera y cuarta redacción. dussel estudia la lógica del capital encubierta por la economía política como producción de valor. el capital como función del crecimiento ilimitado de la tasa de ganancia produce un valor de uso y un valor de cambio que, en realidad, fetichiza y encubre aquello que en realidad subsume: la dignidad del trabajo como fuente de todo valor, como infinitud creativa de la corporalidad subjetiva. el marx que nos presenta es profundamente ético, dejando de ser un filósofo de la totalidad para convertirse en el modelo filosófico de la alteridad y la exterioridad: el marx que nos importa no es “el que entró en crisis” en europa –allí era un marx científico para el positivismo, teleológico históricamente, materialista dialéctico, etc. “nuestro” marx se sitúa, en cambio, en el nivel de las necesidades vitales básicas: es un marx económicoantropológico, ético, de un “materialismo” productivo que permite al mismo tiempo fundar una liberación nacional y popular, [dado que] lo esencial es el comer21. sus reflexiones sobre el concepto de trabajo vivo expresan su nueva concepción de la infinitud: “fuente” trascendental a la “totalidad” del capital: lo no-capital, el no-ser del capital, la realidad del “trabajo vivo”: a esto lo hemos llamado “exterioridad”’: lo “anterior” (en la lógica dialéctica del concepto, y en la realidad histórica), lo “exterior” (lo que surge en la circulación todavía no capitalista: desde un punto de vista lógico [circulación del nocapital todavía] e histórico [el mercantilismo precapitalista]), lo trascendental por anterioridad. porque es “trans-ontológico” (si lo ontológico es el ser del capital como fundamento: el valor que se valoriza), porque está “más-allá” que la totalidad (con anterioridad y exterioridad) lo denominamos lo “meta-físico” (si se entiende que “meta” indica lo “más-allá”, y “fysis” el ser mismo). el “trabajo vivo” es así la “fuente meta-física’” o que guarda exterioridad con respecto al capital como tal (como “totalidad”). este punto no ha sido nunca vislumbrado con claridad por el marxismo posterior a marx22. v a partir de estas investigaciones sobre la obra de marx, dussel se lanza a la construcción de una nueva ética «naturalizada» con fundamentos materiales, de contenido. a lo largo de los años 90 comienza a discutir públicamente con figuras relevantes de europa y eeuu como p. ricoeur, g. vattimo, r. rorty o k.-o. apel. de hecho será éste filósofo alemán, padre de la ética del discurso, su principal interlocutor. desde el año 1989, invitado por raúl fornet-betancourt a un encuentro hispano-germano en friburgo denominado «fundamentación de la ética en alemania y américa latina», se sucederán durante más de una década una serie de encuentros entre dussel y apel en alemania, brasil, méxico, rusia y el salvador. la importancia de confrontarse con el formalismo ético es importante para dussel porque 1989 es el año de la caída del muro de berlín, lo que filosófica analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 52 mente significaba una derrota definitiva para el marxismo en favor de un triunfo incontestable y definitivo del pensamiento liberal-kantiano, paralelo a la imposición del capitalismo neoliberal como el supuesto «fin de la historia». el argentino quiere proponer una ética de contenidos materiales válida en américa latina y en todas las culturas del mundo, lo que llamará una ética de la liberación, de ahí el interés por debatir con el máximo representante, junto a j. habermas, de una ética formalista o procedimental denominada ética del discurso. por un lado, apel23 sostiene que la ética del discurso comprende una «parte a», ideal, que contempla las reglas formales o ideales de la argumentación y conforme a una comunidad ideal de habla, con el fin de lograr consensos de tipo jurídico-normativo, y una «parte b», material, donde una comunidad real e histórica que, aunque no comprende a todos los afectados, por responsabilidad co-solidaria pactan consensos con el fin de corregir la existencia de las desigualdades y asimetrías existentes, funcionando como idea regulativa la mencionada comunidad ideal de habla, a la que todo proceso de argumentación debe aspirar. con esta «parte b» trata de contestar a la primera crítica que le hace dussel: es empíricamente imposible reunir de facto a todos los afectados en una discusión racional de validez intersubjetiva. el argumento esgrimido por dussel está en la finitud de la inteligencia humana para descubrir el alcance potencialmente infinito de afectados que deberían formar parte de la discusión, máxime en una sociedad globalizada como la nuestra. se trata de una nueva totalización que incluye implícitamente un momento inevitable de encubrimiento del otro. la segunda crítica se dirige al formalismo de los actos de habla de una comunidad ideal de comunicación, proponiendo en cambio la interpelación dentro de una comunidad real de comunicación cotidiana. la interpelación es la acción vocativa del pobre que no posee competencia lingüística, pero que se comunica como epifanía, como rostro de lo desconocido y excluido. de este modo, la propuesta que dussel lanza a apel, evidentemente, es la de un pronunciamiento a favor de su propia ética de la liberación, aunque asumiendo los presupuestos de la ética del discurso como parte integrante de la arquitectónica general del proceso ético de liberación. para dussel: no se trata sólo de que la norma básica deba aplicarse a lo empírico-histórico, sino también y principalmente de que la norma básica formal tenga por función la aplicación del principio material, (pues) la norma material es la condición de posibilidad de «contenidos» de la «aplicación» de la norma formal, en cuanto que si se argumenta es porque se intenta saber cómo se puede (debe) reproducir y desarrollar la vida del sujeto humano aquí y ahora”24. dicho de otra manera, para el filósofo argentino todo procedimiento formal de discusión siempre se refiere a un momento material relacionado con la producción, la reproducción y el desarrollo de la vida humana. éste es, de hecho, el argumento fuerte que desarrollará en su ética de la liberación de 1998, la que podemos considerar como su primera obra de madurez. vi paralelamente a los distintos encuentros con apel, dussel trata de complementar sus estudios sobre marx con los aportes neurocientíficos de gerald edelman25 y con el naturalismo evolutivo de humberto maturana26. la ética de la liberación está dividida en dos partes fundamentales: una ética material de la vida como ideal y una ética crítica de la opresión real, cada una de ellas con tres principios respectivos: el principio de verdad práctica, el principio de validez formal y el principio de factibilidad, para el primer caso; y el principio crítico-material, el principio crítico-discursivo y el principio de liberación, para el segundo caso. esta ética de la vida trata de articular tres aspectos éticos de la razón sin instancia última, sin una jerarquía entre ellos, inspirándose, si se nos permite la generalización, en karl marx, jürgen habermas y max weber; o lo que es lo mismo: la materialidad del trabajo vivo, la formalidad de la ética del discurso y la factibilidad de la razón instrumental. lo que llamará pretensión de bondad es su fin último. a pesar de ello, sí es cierto que en esta ética parece haber un predominio de lo que denomina la universalidad de la vida; la vida en el sentido de la sensibilidad material existente en cualquier sujeto humano. el concepto de vida en dussel ha de entenderse como corporalidad perceptiva, sensible y necesitada, que pertenece a un sujeto ético consciente, libre y responsable de sí, que busca su propia conservación, reproducción y crecimiento. también influido por xavier zubiri y frank hinkelammert, la vida es el modo en que está mediada toda nuestra realidad y toda nuestra objetividad y, por tanto, toda nuestra racionalidad. por ello, la condición de posibilidad de toda mediación real es la vida, pues para que exista un ser tiene que existir como estar, como vida, y todo lo que esté fuera de ella no es vida ni ética. se trata de un principio de razón cuya universalidad está en los propios mecanismos auto-regulativos del cerebro, siendo su espontaneidad anterior a cualquier desarrollo de la conciencia reflexiva. la racionalidad del cerebro que ordena la persistencia en la vida es el primer mandato para cualquier forma de realidad objetiva, pues él es quien dirige la verdadera astucia de la razón. dice dussel que: el cerebro es el órgano directamente responsable del “seguir-viviendo”, como reproducción y desarrollo de la vida humana del organismo, de la corporalidad comunitaria e histórica del sujeto ético, (pues) el sistema nervioso cerebral actúa por selección, a partir de un criterio universal de dar permanencia, reproducir, desarrollar, hacer crecer la vida del sujeto humano, y esto desde el nivel vegetativo hasta el cultural o ético más heroico o sublime”27. ésta no es una ley racional válida para occidente, sino una verdad objetiva y material que reclama a cualquier comunidad y civilización de la historia humana. a partir de estas premisas cabe establecer la racionalidad de la vida como: principio de la obligación de producir, reproducir y desarrollar la vida humana concreta de cada sujeto ético en comunidad. este principio tiene pretensión de universalidad. se realiza a través de las culturas y las motiva por dentro, lo mismo que a los valores o las diversas maneras de cumplir la «vida buena», la felicidad, etc. pero todas estas instancias no son nunca el principio universal de la vida humana. el principio las penetra a todas y las mueve a su auto-realización”, pues “toda norma, acción, microestructura, institución o eticidad cultural tienen siempre y necesariamente como contenido último algún momento de la producción, reproducción y desarrollo de la vida humana en concreto28. en esta formulación está la idea de «disfrute» de lévinas29 y el naturalismo del marx30 «humanista» de althusser. pero la pulsionalidad del principio no es exclusivamente solipsista o individualista si tenemos en cuenta que el ser humano, además de los procesos instintivos y autorregulados del cerebro, posee también una capacidad de reflexividad y de conciencia, lo cual le distingue de cualquier otro ser viviente; es el momento de la conciencia 53 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 54 naturalizada. se trata de la condición heterónoma del ser humano (y no exclusivamente autónoma), la cual le impele irremediablemente a asumir formas de responsabilidad (tutelar o contractual) que exceden a la responsabilidad por la vida propia31. hacerse cargo del resto de seres humanos, es decir, preservar la vida de quienes nos rodean, no consiste en un mero mandato moral escrito en un papel o en unas tablas de la ley, sino que pertenecen originariamente a la propia condición del ser humano. a partir de esta doble constitución del ser humano como ser autónomo y heterónomo, como «poder vivir» y como «poder dar vida», dussel se enfrenta al problema de la falacia naturalista de hume32, es decir, el tránsito de un juicio de hecho resultado de una determinación causal a un juicio normativo resultado de una exigencia moral, o lo que es lo mismo, del ser natural al deber ser moral. para negar esta supuesta falacia apela a la innegable autoconciencia de todo individuo sobre sus propios actos, así como a su consecuente dimensión de responsabilidad hacia sí mismo y corresponsabilidad hacia los demás: pareciera entonces que todo enunciado descriptivo de momentos constitutivos del ser viviente humano como humano incluye siempre, necesariamente (por ser un sujeto humano y no otra cosa) y desde su origen, una autorreflexión responsable que «entrega» su propia vida a la exigencia de conservarla –y más si se considera que la motivación del puro instinto específico se ha transformado en exigencias de valores culturales33. con estos argumentos ya expuestos, y con el fin de ser conciso, cabe decir que la razón pragmática-discursiva de habermas (momento intersubjetivo del consenso) y la razón instrumental de medios-fines de max weber (momento fáctico de aplicación estratégica) serían los otros complementos racionales, éticos, de esta primera parte de la ética material de la vida como ideal. en la segunda parte, que consiste en una ética crítica de la opresión real, parte del momento de la existencia del otro como víctima del sistema y de la legalidad, como pobre, como excluido. es el momento del principio ético crítico-material, que se corresponde con el incumplimiento del principio material de verdad práctica. el funcionamiento de todo sistema social es siempre imperfecto dada la existencia de grupos sociales que no pueden desarrollar sus potencialidades de vida, sus aspiraciones de felicidad o, lo que ocurre en muchas ocasiones, ni siquiera conservarse como mera facticidad, como mera existencia que sobrevive; es el homo sacer de agamben. dussel, en contra del pensamiento liberal, plantea una interesante distinción entre la legalidad y la legitimidad: legal es toda norma institucionalizada dentro de un sistema vigente (político, económico, cultural, etc.) que genera inevitablemente víctimas de algún tipo; legítima es la acción de la víctima que quiere transformar dicho sistema en otro que cumpla el principio material de la vida. esta es una distinción que dussel aclarará mejor en su política de la liberación ii. arquitectónica, de 2009. en la medida en que esto ocurre, las acciones (conforme a lo que denomina principio de liberación) emprendidas por los grupos oprimidos (a partir del consenso logrado conforme al principio crítico-discursivo) se pondrán en marcha transformando algunos aspectos de ese sistema formal vigente o incluso llegando a una transformación total, lo que se conoce como revolución. transformación y revolución son dos velocidades diferentes para tomar una posición crítica ante la realidad, ya que morir: es el criterio negativo y material último y primero de la crítica en cuanto tal34. las acciones emprendidas por estos grupos excluidos estarán siempre fuera de la legalidad, pues su objetivo es transformar dicha legalidad misma, pero sus acciones serán legítimas35, pues están orientadas a modificar una situación opresora que les impide construir cualquier proyecto de felicidad; la acción será tanto más legítima cuanto mayor sea la dificultad de producción y conservación de la vida como pura existencia empírica. desde la óptica de la alteridad (del otro), que es la víctima, tanto legalidad como legitimidad nunca coinciden, pues la legalidad es sedimento del sistema opresor, es ya una forma de muerte. de este modo no se contempla la muerte como violencia, sino mediante un dudoso eufemismo que dussel denomina «coacción legítima» o acción crítica. no cabe hablar de asesinato o matanza en el sentido de acto violento, sino como coacción legítima al servicio del principio racional de la vida. se trata de una tesis bastante discutible. legítimo, en definitiva, es lo que resulta del llamado principio liberador, según el cual, toda norma, acción, táctica, etc., debe ser el resultado de una decisión simétrica validada intersubjetivamente por los interlocutores, las víctimas, y puesta en práctica efectivamente con el fin de liberar a las víctimas de una situación real que le impide desarrollar sus potencialidades humanas en favor de una situación futura donde sí le sea posible. pero a esta ética de la liberación, que se autodenomina ser una «ética de la vida», suscita algunos interrogantes, ¿por qué la vida no se plantea también como una cuestión de ética medioambiental? si el recalentamiento global del planeta, con sus devastadoras consecuencias, afecta a todos por igual, ¿quién es el oprimido? ¿no sería la humanidad en su conjunto? y más aún, si la naturaleza es el afectado ¿no es insuficiente el «rostro del otro» cuando se trata de un ser vivo no humano36? también se echa en falta una discusión con el actualísimo debate de la bioética más allá de cuestiones escolásticas sobre el aborto o la eutanasia: ante posibles prácticas de clonación o eugenesia con seres humanos con fines perfectivos ¿podrían ser catalogados estos híbridos y cyborgs como oprimidos del sistema vigente? ¿qué sentido tendría la liberación para ellos y ellas? vii la década de 2000 la ha dedicado dussel fundamentalmente a la filosofía política, un campo de aplicación (como tantos otros) de la ética, ya que la ética no tiene un campo específico sino que se manifiesta en todos: la economía, la política, los medios de comunicación, el deporte, etc. si en la ética de la liberación encontramos una introducción histórica, una fundamentación de principios y una crítica, ahora ocurrirá lo mismo con la política, solo que a cada una de dichas partes le dedicará todo un libro. esta trilogía, denominado política de la liberación, pertenecen al mencionado período de madurez del autor, cuyo estilo es cada vez más articulado, técnico, lleno de discusiones con los principales autores y las distintas corrientes actuales; en definitiva, es un proyecto cuya envergadura recuerda al de hegel, salvando las obvias diferencias. la primera gran obra de este período37 es la política de la liberación. historia mundial y crítica. consiste en un trabajo histórico que pretende una subversión de la filosofía política tradicional, tanto para el esquema convencional que se sigue a nivel universitario como para el debate propio de la filosofía occidental. bajo la idea de giro descolonizador plantea la cuestión desde una perspectiva mundial, al hilo del discurso político que ya está presente en las primeras grandes civilizaciones: egipto, mesopotamia, china, india, el imperio azteca y el imperio inca, grandes culturas de enorme complejidad en su organización política (es el trabajo de la narrativa simbólica que le inspiró ricouer). en este sentido, es muy insistente en demostrar el antecedente de la cultura egipcia y la cultura comercial fenicia en la formación del demos griego. el libro sigue un esquema pretendidamente anti-eurocéntrico, reduciendo la historia de europa a una simple etapa más de la historia de las ideas políticas. dussel insiste una y otra vez en que, hasta el siglo xv, siglo de la invasión de américa, europa occidental era un rincón del mundo alejado de las grandes rutas del tráfico comercial árabe, indostánico y chino. de hecho, la verdadera hegemonía mundial no la alcanzará hasta las fechas de la revolución industrial inglesa en 1800, derrocando así el hasta entonces predominio de china, según una analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 55 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 original interpretación de a. g. frank38. dussel utiliza el término de la liberación en esta política de la liberación en un sentido estrictamente intelectual; es decir, trata de liberar la filosofía de los encubrimientos teóricos occidentales que ocultan la riqueza histórica, cultural e intelectual de los distintos períodos del pasado, las distintas formaciones políticas y las múltiples reflexiones de lo político. reducir el pensamiento a un estrecho viaje desde grecia hasta eeuu o a un corto tiempo desde el mundo antiguo hasta la posmodernidad son algunas de las simplificaciones tradicionales que, todavía hoy, se siguen cometiendo con una inocencia que dussel tacha de helenocéntrica (por instalar el origen de la filosofía política en la gracia antigua), occidentalista (por menospreciar la importancia filosófica de los textos orientales de europa, como bizancio) y eurocéntrica (por el menosprecio generalizado a todas las producciones del mundo alejadas de occidente). no elabora una mera historia de las ideas políticas, ni tampoco un sistema de ideas políticas. antes bien, se trata de un metarrelato (en el sentido de lyotard), intencionadamente subjetivo y situado desde una perspectiva latinoamericana. este enorme relato no sólo desmonta la estructura filosófica occidental, sino que además tiene una triple intención: demostrar la mundialidad milenaria de la filosofía política, reconstruir el relato filosófico latinoamericano como originario de la modernidad en el siglo xvi y legitimar el estatuto epistemológico de la propia filosofía del autor, la filosofía de la liberación. es más, nuestro autor defiende la universalidad de su filosofía en la medida en que representa el marco teórico de toda filosofía que esté, por un lado, contextualizada en una praxis temporal y geográfica concreta y, por otro lado, elaborada desde una perspectiva no occidentalizada conforme al concepto de pueblo, fuente del poder político y víctima encubierta por la mayoría de sistemas políticos de la historia. aunque sea brevemente, es interesante destacar la importancia que dussel atribuye al siglo xvi portugués y español, una etapa intelectual que vivió el «yo conquisto» de hernán cortés cien años antes de que descartes, alumnos de jesuitas españoles en la flèche, proclamara el famoso «yo pienso». el primer debate moderno es el que dirime la escolástica española del siglo xvi en torno a la justificación de la conquista contra los indígenas sin alma (como ginés de sepúlveda) o su defensa como alteridad (como bartolomé de las casas). éste último representaría, 300 años antes que kant, la primera crítica del presente: con esto españa quedaría redefinida como el primer estado «moderno», y américa latina, desde la conquista, sería el primer territorio colonial de la indicada modernidad. moderna, entonces, en tanto que es la «otra cara» bárbara que la modernidad necesita para su definición. si esto fuera así, los filósofos españoles y portugueses (aunque practicaron una filosofía de cuño escolástico, pero por su contenido moderna) y los primeros pensadores latinoamericanos del siglo xvi deberían ser considerados como el inicio de la filosofía de la modernidad. antes que descartes o spinoza (ambos escriben en ámsterdam, provincia española hasta 1610, y estudian con maestros españoles), debe considerarse en la historia de la filosofía política moderna a un bartolomé de las casas, ginés de sepúlveda, francisco de vitoria o un francisco suárez39. precedido por una obra sintética y de fines pedagógicos40, en 2009 publica su política de la liberación ii. arquitectónica, uno de sus libros más importantes hasta ahora, si no el que más. es un trabajo de ontología política que subsume los supuestos éticos anteriormente explicados, donde la pretensión de bondad (éticamente no cabe hablar de un acto perfecto) es reinterpretada en la política como pretensión de justicia (políticamente no cabe hablar de acciones o instituciones perfectas, sin discordia y sin repercusiones negativas): 56 se trata de una subsunción determinante de los principios éticos por parte de los principios políticos. la «pretensión de bondad» del acto ético es subsumida en una más compleja e institucionalizada «pretensión política de justicia», en un campo específico práctico, en tanto cumple las exigencias de la normatividad propia de la política como política. el que no cumple con las exigencias normativas de la política no es sólo un mal ético, sino que comete una injusticia política, cuyas contradicciones, debilitamiento del ejercicio del poder consensual (potentia), ineficacia o corrupción (fetichismo de la potestas) se dejará ver a corto o largo plazo41. siguiendo de cerca a schopenhauer, establece que la fuente del poder está en nuestra voluntad-de-vivir, en la afirmación de nuestra supervivencia por nuestras intenciones y acciones. este momento, que es previo a toda constitución política, representa un fundamento afirmativo del poder (en contra de una larga tradición europea que entiende el poder como dominación: hobbes, kant, webber, schmitt, foucault, etc.). se trata de un poder-actuar como capacidad para afirmar la vida. este primer momento del poder, y ahora siguiendo a spinoza, se «manifiesta» como potentia, como capacidad popular en tanto que fundamento positivo de lo político (o también poder político en-sí) de instituir y estabilizar el poder-vivir como poder político obedencial, la potestas, que representa el momento de lo que llama «la escisión ontológica». se trata de dos momentos fundamentales de la política, inevitables en toda agrupación social histórica: esta pura potentia inmediata, el mero poder político de la comunidad política indiferenciado, sin mediaciones, sin funciones, sin heterogeneidad es anterior a toda exteriorización. es el «ser en-sí» de la política; es el «poder en-sí». es la existencia todavía irrealizada; es una imposibilidad empírica. sería el caso de una comunidad en el ejercicio de una democracia directa que determinaría en cada instante todas la mediaciones para la vida y todos los procedimientos unánimes de las tomas de decisiones. como esto es imposible, acontece la «escisión ontológica» originaria, primera. la potentia, el poder político de la comunidad, se constituye como voluntad consensual instituyente: se da instituciones para que mediata, heterogénea, diferenciadamente pueda ejercerse el poder (la potestas de los que mandan) que desde abajo (la potentia) es el fundamento de tal ejercicio (y por ello el poder legítimo es el ejercicio por los que mandan obedeciendo a la potentia): poder obedencial. al poder político segundo, como mediación, institucionalizado por medio de representantes, le llamaremos potestas42. de esta manera, y de un modo análogo a la ética, la política como tal se articula como un poliedro que tiene tres aspectos fundamentales, siendo cada uno de ellos, a su vez, también poliédrico: las acciones, las instituciones y los principios. la complejidad de lo que llama «el campo político» le obliga a discutir contra el pragmatismo estratégico y decisionista de la filosofía política conservadora o anarquismo de derecha (como carl schmitt, que privilegia el momento de las acciones); contra el legalismo kantiano liberal (como habermas, que privilegia el analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 57 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 ámbito jurídico de las instituciones); y contra el principalismo voluntarista de tipo anarquista (como antonio negri o john holloway, que privilegian el necesario pero insuficiente ámbito de los principios). consecuente con su ética de la liberación, dussel considera la aplicación de la ética al campo político por medio de una articulación sin instancia última de tres momentos normativos implícitos en toda sociedad histórica y política, que a su vez subsumen los principios éticos: la obediencia al principio material de verdad práctica como deber del querer vivir de una comunidad conforme a un principio político de fraternidad (subsunción del principio ético-material de la vida); la obediencia al principio formal de igualdad en la participación discursiva de las tomas de decisiones políticas que afectan a la vida de la comunidad conforme a un principio democrático o de legitimidad institucional (subsunción del principio ético-formal del discurso); la obediencia al principio de factibilidad como libertad en la aplicación de las posibilidades ecológicas, económicas, técnicas, etc. para la consecución de preservar y desarrollar la vida en comunidad, conforme a un principio político a la vez instrumental y estratégico (subsunción del principio ético de factibilidad). así lo resume dussel: podemos afirmar que el cumplimiento serio de estos tres principios políticos permiten honestamente al agente político (o a la institución) tener al menos una «pretensión política de justicia», intersubjetiva (en cuanto a la vigencia de su conciencia normativa) y objetiva (con legitimidad real, no solamente legal o formal). pero es más, el cumplimiento de estos principios constituyen la posibilidad real de la existencia de lo que llamamos poder consensual no fetichizado como mediación para la sobrevivencia (no sólo como permanencia sino como acrecentamiento histórico-cualitativo de la vida humana) que se produce por momentos que son fruto de las exigencias de los nombrados principios43. la idea de obediencia es muy importante en esta reflexión, pues trata de desconstruir la tradicional negatividad que se le suele atribuir al poder entendido como «los que mandan, mandan mandando», frente a una visión afirmativa del poder político, bien formulada por el zapatismo de chiapas como «los que mandan, mandan obedeciendo». contra el utopismo anarquista, dussel indica la inevitabilidad de las instituciones políticas de mando, pero también frente al realismo político desde maquiavelo, establece el funcionamiento de la política institucionalizada como un servicio obedencial de unos representantes comprometidos con afirmar la voluntad de vivir de una comunidad. en última instancia se trata de legitimar la capacidad política de la llamada sociedad civil para fiscalizar al poder, para controlarlo, para exigirle, para participar en él, para promover una opinión pública crítica, para recordar y defender los fines últimos del campo político en el sentido de proteger y desarrollar la vida de forma sostenible en el largo plazo («la vida perpetua», parafraseando a kant), en un sentido económicamente justo, ecológicamente equilibrado, culturalmente simbolizado. se trata por tanto de defender los nuevos movimientos sociales como los representados en los distintos foros sociales mundiales desde porto alegre desde 2001, los movimientos indigenistas, sindicales, estudiantiles, etc. son ellos, más allá del simple bipartidismo institucionalmente generalizado, los que mejor analizan y reflejan los desequilibrios e injusticias de todo sistema político vigente, y los que mejor anticipan las futuras propuestas que mejor regenerarán la tendencia del poder a «fetichizarse», es decir, a convertirse en autorreferente y siervo de sus propios intereses, y no lo intereses obedienciales de la comunidad a la que representan. pero cabe señalar una objeción de método a esta impresionante obra. si la filosofía de la liberación es un discurso de inclusión del excluido como fetichización teórica y práctica del poder autorreferente (colonial o postcolonial), parece que en su desarrollo como filosofía política de la liberación no termina de articular el momento específicamente político de la sociedad tribal, al entregar el momento de las «instituciones» al nacimiento de las 58 ciudades en la etapa neolítica y reduciendo las sociedades anteriores a una proto-política44. parece que este aspecto no queda suficientemente claro, y en este sentido la antropología política de un pierre clastres45 es muy útil. las sociedades tribales no sólo no desaparecieron con la «revolución neolítica», sino que llegan hasta nuestros días, constituyéndose como el modelo social más longevo, estable y sostenible de la historia de la humanidad. en tanto que sociedad, como también señala antonio campillo46, además de cumplir con un campo económico, familiar o simbólico, presentan un campo específicamente político en el que la figura de un jefe carismático representa una forma de poder servicial (y no un precedente monárquico). por eso, los miembros de la sociedad tribal se «instituyen» con determinadas trazas corporales una identidad política que normalmente reciben en el ritual de tránsito de la infancia a la madurez, y se caracterizan por su beligerancia ante una posible dominación política de tipo estamental o estatal, interna o externa, de ahí su condición de ser sociedades contre l´état. por último, y como ha reconocido el propio dussel después de la publicación de esta obra, tampoco queda suficientemente integrado el papel activo que debe componer el amplio ámbito de la sociedad civil organizada dentro de nuevas e inéditas instituciones políticas dentro de una, hasta hoy, inexistente democracia participativa. estas consideraciones, que el autor no introducirá hasta la tercera parte de esta trilogía, todavía inédita, van a encarar una nueva ontología política constitutivamente participativa, donde las instituciones de democracia participativa jugarán un papel a la vez propositivo y fiscalizador, creativo y judicativo, respecto de las instituciones representativas. esta novedad, que debe constituir una verdadera revolución política en este siglo xxi dentro del marco institucional, pone en evidencia que esta arquitectónica, aunque crítica, todavía se encuentra dentro del esquema representativo-liberal que triunfó hace 200 años. dussel, que quiere continuar en política el proyecto deconstructivo que marx emprendió en economía contra las categorías de la economía burguesa, se ve obligado de nuevo a revisar su misma obra. notas 1. dussel, enrique, el humanismo semita, buenos aires, eudeba, 1969. 2. dussel, e., el humanismo helénico, buenos aires, eudeba, 1975. 3. dussel, e., el dualismo en la antropología de la cristiandad, buenos aires, editorial guadalupe, 1974. 4. el humanismo semita, cit., p. 39. 5. gustavo gutiérrez publica su teología de la liberación en 1971. 6. paulo freire publica su pedagogía do oprimido en 1968. 7. dussel, e., filosofía de la liberación, buenos aires, ediciones la aurora, 1985, p. 38. la edición original es de 1977, escrita desde el reciente exilio mexicano, y por tanto, sin bibliografía. 8. precisamente para combatir este prejuicio, el propio dussel, junto a eduardo mendieta y carmen bohórquez, acaba de editar un diccionario de más de mil páginas denominado el pensamiento filosófico latinoamericano, del caribe y «latino», méxico, crefal/siglo xxi, 2009. se trata de un texto elaborado por más de 100 colaboradores. 9. recogidos en una antología de ensayos denominada américa latina: dependencia y liberación, buenos aires, fernando garcía cambeiro, 1973. 10. «metafísica del sujeto y liberación», en: américa latina: dependencia y liberación, cit., pp. 87-88. 11. dussel, e. para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana i, buenos aires, siglo xxi, 1973, p. 52. 12. para una ética i, cit., p. 64. 13. para una ética i, cit., p. 89. 14. para una ética i, cit., p. 156 15. dussel, e., para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana, t. i y ii, buenos aires, siglo xxi, 1973; tomo 3, méxico, edicol, 1977; tomos iv y v, bogotá, usta, 1979-1980. 16. para una ética ii, cit., p. 47. 17. de nuevo, la experiencia que tuvo dussel durante su juventud en israel fue determinante en sus lecturas posteriores de los dos autores más influyentes en su obra: lévinas y marx. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 59 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 33 issue 2 18. dussel, e., la producción teórica de marx. un comentario a los grundrisse de marx, méxico, siglo xxi, 1985. 19. dussel, e., hacia un marx desconocido. un comentario de los manuscritos del 61-63, méxico, siglo xxi, 1988. 20. dussel, e., el último marx (1863-1882) y la liberación latinoamericana, méxico, siglo xxi, 1990. 21. el último marx, cit., p. 268. 22. el último marx, cit., p. 371-372. 23. un desarrollo de la parte a y la parte b de la ética del discurso de apel se puede encontrar en el primer encuentro que tuvo con enrique dussel, con la conferencia titulada “la ética del discurso como ética de la responsabilidad. una transformación postmetafísica de la ética de kant”. todos estos encuentros están recogidos en la obra dussel, e. y apel, k. o. ética del discurso y ética de la liberación, madrid, trotta, 2005. 24. ética del discurso y ética de la liberación, cit., p. 350. 25. edelman, g. m., the remembered present. a biological theory of consciousness, nueva york, basic books, 1989. 26. maturana, h., el árbol del conocimiento. las bases biológicas del entendimiento humano, santiago de chile, editorial universitaria, 1985. 27. dussel, e., ética de la liberación en la edad de la globalización y la exclusión, madrid, trotta, 1998, § 60. 28. ética de la liberación, cit., § 57. 29. lévinas, emmanuel, totalité et infini. essai sur l´éxtériorité, parís, librairie générale française, 2003, capítulo a de la sección ii: “la separación como vía”. 30. marx, karl, manuscritos de economía y filosofía, madrid, alianza, 2003, p. 192. 31. hans jonas, en el principio de responsabilidad, argumenta de un modo similar en torno a nuestra facultad de la responsabilidad, a la vez natural y ética, en: jonas, h., el principio de responsabilidad, barcelona, herder, 2004, p. 160. 32. david hume, tratado de la naturaleza humana ii, libro iii, 1, madrid, editora nacional, 1981, p. 671. 33. ética de la liberación, cit., § 108. 34. ética de la liberación, cit., § 363. 35. todo lo contrario que en weber, que entiende el estado (o la legalidad) como “un instituto político de actividad continuada, cuando y en la medida en que su cuadro administrativo mantenga con éxito la pretensión al monopolio legítimo de la coacción física para el mantenimiento del orden vigente”. en: weber, max, economía y sociedad, méxico, fondo de cultura económica, 1984, p. 43-44. 36. esta es una crítica muy acertada de jacques derrida a lévinas en el animal que luego estoy si(gui)endo, madrid, trotta, 2008, p. 128. 37. en 2001 publica una recolección de ensayos de teoría política que denomina hacia una filosofía política crítica, bilbao, desclée de brouwer, y en 2007 una obra semejante denominada materiales para una política de la liberación, méxico, plaza y valdés. 38. frank, a. g., reorient. global economy in the asian age, berkeley, university of california press, 1998. se trata de una tesis que reconoce el propio adam smith en su riqueza de las naciones. 39. política de la liberación i, cit., p. 13. 40. me refiero a 20 tesis de política, méxico, siglo xxi, 2006. 41. dussel, e., política de la liberación ii. arquitectónica, madrid, trotta, 2009, § 372. 42. política de la liberación ii, cit., § 259. 43. política de la liberación ii, cit., § 375. address correspondences to: alejandro moreno lax philosophy department university of murcia alezheia@yahoo.es 60 the philosophy for children hawai'i approach to deliberative pedagogy: a promising practice for preparing pre-service social studies teachers in the college of education analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 1 the philosophy for children hawai‘i approach to deliberative pedagogy: a promising practice for preparing pre-service social studies teachers in the college of education amber strong makaiau ith the introduction of the college, career, and civic life (c3) framework for social studies state standards (2013), the national council for the social studies (ncss) has given new direction to k-12 social studies education in the united states. among the notable changes is the expectation that primary and secondary teachers will use a deliberative pedagogy (longo, 2013; carcasson, 2013; manosevitch, 2013; molnar-main & kingseed, 2013) to teach elementary and high school social studies. while this is excellent news for advocates of democratic education (dewey 1916; freire 1970; apple & beane, 1995; gutman 1987; vinson 2006; parker, 2010; the campaign for the civic mission of schools, 2011; hess & mcavoy, 2015) it presents new challenges to colleges of education, which will take on much of the responsibility for introducing deliberative pedagogy to pre-service teacher candidates who did not have the opportunity to experience a deliberative pedagogy as part of their own k-12 schooling. the purpose of this paper is to offer the philosophy for children hawai‘i (p4chi) approach to deliberative pedagogy as a promising practice for colleges of education that are looking to provide pre-service social studies teachers with strategies for employing a deliberative pedagogy in the k-12 setting. p4chi is a method of teaching that i have used for over fifteen years in my work as a high school social studies teacher, legislative internship program coordinator, and most recently in my position as a teacher educator in the university of hawai‘i at manoa. to introduce the p4chi approach to deliberative pedagogy i begin with a brief overview of the history of p4chi and the connection between p4chi and the wilder field of deliberative pedagogy. next, i draw from my experiences to explain how p4chi works in the context of teaching deliberative pedagogy in the college of education. i share: (a) how p4chi supports teachers in fostering respectful and ethical civic relationships, (b) tools used by p4chi practitioners to distribute power and open up space for multiple perspectives, (c) p4chi strategies for promoting dialogue, deliberation, inquiry, and civic action, and, (d) challenges faced by pre-service teachers as they move towards implementing a deliberative pedagogy in k-12 classrooms outside of the university. at the article’s conclusion i circle back to the idea that in order to develop a deliberative pedagogy of their very own, pre-service teachers must have opportunities to experience (dewey, 1929) deliberative pedagogy in the college of education. w analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 2 philosophy for children, p4chi and deliberative pedagogy with roots reaching deeply into american pragmatism and the thought of philosophers such as john dewey and william james, philosophy for children (p4c) is a widely respected international movement in education. it was started around 1969 when matthew lipman, a colombia university philosophy professor, observed that children did not think as well as they could or should in a democratic society (lipman, 1988). to address these issues lipman created a curriculum that incorporated the skills of logic and reasoning found in the practice of philosophy to improve students’ thinking in the k-12 setting. in an effort to extend lipman’s original curriculum and vision to a variety of geo-cultural contexts, a number of p4c centers have been established worldwide. among these centers is the uehiro academy for philosophy and ethics in education (uapee) at the university of hawai‘i at manoa. the uapee is the home of p4chi, which is thomas jackson’s (2001; makaiau & miller, 2012) culturally responsive offshoot of lipman’s original approach. the goal of p4chi is to move school culture from a top-down model to a community-based, participatory model grounded in sound pedagogy and effective educational philosophy. to accomplish this goal, p4chi practitioners convert traditional classrooms into intellectually safe communities of inquiry where students and teachers develop their abilities to think for themselves in responsible ways. although it wasn’t labeled as such, p4chi has always been conceptualized and practiced as a deliberative pedagogy. based off the ideas found in democracy and education (dewey, 1916), p4chi provides individuals with the “experience of dialoguing with others as equals, [and] participating in shared public inquiry [so] that they [are] able to eventually take an active role in the shaping of a democratic society” (sharp, 1993, p. 343). it is a pedagogy, which carries out the notion that democratic education is more than just a content area that can be transmitted via power point, lecture, and closed-ended questioning at the end of a civics text book. instead, it is characterized by “reflection and action upon the world in order to transform it” (freire, 1970, p.33). through dialogue and deep thinking, students and teachers deliberate “problems of democracy” (matthews, 2014, p. xvii), and work together to make a positive impact on the lives of citizens (horton & freire, 1990; matthews, 1994; gastil & levine, 2005; nabatchi, gastil, weiksner, leighninger, 2012). it is an overall approach to education that transcends discipline, age, and grade level by incorporating “deliberative decision making with teaching and learning” (longo, 2013, p. 49) into a student’s entire schooling experience. defined by both a theoretical framework and actual set of classroom strategies, the p4chi approach to deliberative pedagogy aims to produce a number of observable outcomes. students and teachers who practice p4chi are seen:  asking meaningful, relevant, and purposeful philosophical questions;  exploring questions, topics, and problems of democracy that are important and interesting;  accessing sources of information representing multiple viewpoints and cultural backgrounds;  thinking about complex issues with diverse groups of people; analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 3  reasoning for themselves;  engaging in deliberative dialogue;  listening with empathy;  treating others with respect;  reading and writing;  and taking responsible action when it is just and necessary. in the next section i will share how i’ve used a number of p4chi strategies to both accomplish the educational outcomes listed above and teach pre-service social studies teachers methods for practicing deliberative pedagogy in the k-12 setting. deliberative pedagogy in the college of education dewey (1916) argued against seeing teaching as the transmission of ready-made ideas to students, and such is the case with teaching about deliberative pedagogy in the college of education. p4chi is not a prescriptive practice that can be easily passed on through a traditional power point or lecture. instead it is a theory of education and set of classroom practices that must be experienced by teachers, and then molded by them to fit their particular teaching style and context. it is for these reasons that i use the p4chi approach to deliberative pedagogy to teach about the p4chi approach to deliberative pedagogy. organized into four main sub-headings, the following are brief examples of what the p4chi approach to deliberative pedagogy looks like in my classroom at a large public research university that services multi-ethnic students from across the u.s. and pacific rim. respectful and ethical civic relationships one of the defining features of the p4chi approach to deliberative pedagogy is students and teachers working together to create “intellectually safe” (jackson, 2001, p. 460) classroom communities of inquiry. i start this work on the first day of class when i challenge my social studies teacher candidates to come up with examples and counter-examples of what an intellectually safe learning environment looks like. not only does this activity help us to establish norms for respectful and ethical civic relationships, but it also introduces my students to the idea that “democratic dispositions –to be open-minded, to trust others, to be committed to finding a common ground that transcends difference– do not happen by default” (flanagan, 2013, p. 163). instead, they must be taught, and as my pre-service social studies teachers reflect on their own experience of co-constructing the definition of intellectual safety with their classmates, they come to see how defining, modeling, and practicing respectful and ethical civic relationships must be ongoing activities in a democratic classroom. distributing power and accessing multiple perspectives another key feature of the p4chi approach to deliberative pedagogy is the “community ball” (jackson, 2001, pp. 460 – 461). seated in a circle, my students and i use the community ball to mediate turn taking and open up space for multiple perspectives to be heard during our classroom deliberations and inquiry. the rules of the community ball are: (1) only the person with the community ball speaks, (2) the person with the community ball chooses who speaks next, and (3) analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 4 you always have the right to pass. put in place to shift the traditional power structures found in most classrooms, the rules of the community ball help to cultivate and nurture a collaborative civic space in which no one perspective is dominant, and every voice is valued. they also work to redefine teachers and students as co-inquirers (freire, 1970) who recognize that in order for the work of a democracy to move forward, everyone must constantly be learning together (matthews, 2014). dialogue, deliberation, inquiry, and action there are two additional strategies found in the p4chi approach to deliberative pedagogy, which are essential for promoting dialogue, deliberation, inquiry, and action. they are the good thinker’s tool kit (gttk) and plain vanilla. the gttk is a set of seven philosophical moves that assists students and teachers in generating questions, making claims, and in thinking responsibly about the problems of democracy (matthews, 2014). used in concert with the gttk, plain vanilla is a fivestep inquiry process that structures classroom deliberations. the five steps are: (1) read, (2) question, (3) vote, (4) dialogue, and (5) reflect (jackson, 2001; miller, 2014). in the 2014-15 school year alone, my pre-service social studies teachers used the gttk and plain vanilla to question and deliberate with one another about topics such as: “is it true that teaching is a political act? what are some counter-examples to the notion that standards-based education reforms make the schooling experience of diverse populations more equitable? what about the histories of people that are left out of the standards? what are the implications of non-native hawaiian social studies teachers teaching hawaiian history? what are the reasons for the high teacher turnover rate in hawaii, and what does this imply about the profession? is it true that what we do in our classrooms will impact how students act in society?” to aid in their reflection, i follow up with my students at the end of each plain vanilla process by asking them to explain what they learned from one another, and how they intended on using their new perspectives and points of view to take informed action in their k12 classrooms. challenges i have learned a lot from listening to my pre-service teachers’ reflections, including the challenges they believe they will face in implementing a deliberative pedagogy in their classrooms outside of the university. as a whole they connect with the theoretical foundations that support a deliberative pedagogy, and in the context of their own educational experience, they find the p4chi strategies enjoyable, engaging, and meaningful. however, when i ask them to elaborate on how they will use these theories and strategies to shape their future practice, they voice great concerns about having enough time for inquiry, deliberation, and informed civic action in their eventual placements as certified k-12 classroom teachers. worried about the external pressures being put on them by principals, statewide mandates, and national initiatives, they lament that they would love to implement a deliberative pedagogy, but they don't have the time to “get through” the content that will be covered on our state’s high stakes exams. as i listen to what they have to say i know that their concerns are real, but i also know that they will be able to draw from their experiences with p4chi in the college of education to become k-12 classroom teachers who are “real fixers” (matthews, 2014, p. xvii). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 5 creating teachers who are real fixers real fixers, or the people who make our democracy work as it should “aren’t interested in quick fixes. they deal with obvious problems [like failing schools]…however they sense that more fundamental and systemic problems are behind the obvious and that these have to be dealt with” (matthews, 2014, p. xvii). over the years, i have observed that teachers who experience p4chi at the university become more adept at identifying those more fundamental and systemic problems, and they use what they learn in the college of education to address these problems with a deliberative pedagogy of their very own. as a part of this process they come to see themselves as real fixers. they acknowledge that one of the many purposes of education is to move forward, but they also know that the community building and inquiry that is necessary for making meaningful progress in schools takes time. they are “not in a rush” (jackson, 2001, p. 465), and neither should colleges of education be as they work to develop teachers who are prepared to address the problems of democracy (matthews, 2014) in classrooms, schools, and communities. concluding thoughts “can students be educated for a democracy in a non-democratic classroom” (parker 2010, p. 11)? the answer is no, and as educational initiatives like the (c3) framework for social studies state standards gain momentum in promoting the use of a deliberative pedagogy in the k-12 setting, colleges of education must respond by making sure that teacher candidates have opportunities to experience a deliberative pedagogy as a part of their teacher preparation programs. in this article i offer p4chi as a promising practice for colleges of education that are looking to take on this new challenge. adaptable to a variety of different teaching contexts, the p4chi approach to deliberative pedagogy fosters ethical and responsible civic relationships, provides students and teachers with the tools for distributing power and accessing multiple perspectives, and creates opportunities for dialogue, deliberation, and action. it is “an educational practice that itself is both liberatory and participatory, that simultaneously creates a new society and involves the people themselves in the creation of their own knowledge” (horton & freire, 1990, p. xxx). i like to imagine what this new society will look like if students and teachers, from kindergarten to graduate school, experience a deliberative pedagogy throughout their schooling. “perhaps we will [all] begin to remember a now half-forgotten idea that was to guide the purposes and programs of our public schools. the idea was, and is, democracy” (apple & beane, 1995, p.2). references apple, m. w. & beane, j. (1995). democratic schools. alexandria, va: ascd. the campaign for the civic mission of schools. (2011). guardian of democracy: the civic mission of schools. philadelphia, pa: johnathan gould. carcasson, m. (2013). rethinking civic engagement on campus: the overarching potential of deliberative practice.” higher education exchange, 37 – 48. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 6 dewey, j. (1916). democracy and education: an introduction to the philosophy of education. new york: the free press. dewey, j. (1929). experience and education. new york, ny: macmillan. flanagan, c. a. (2013). teenage citizens: the political theories of the young. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. freire, p. (1970). pedagogy of the oppressed. new york: continuum. gastil, j., & levine, p. the deliberative democracy handbook: strategies for effective civic engagement in the 21st century. san francisco: jossey-bass. gutman, a. (1987). democratic education. princeton: princeton university press. hess, d. & mcavoy, p. (2015). the political classroom: evidence and ethics in democratic education. new york, ny: routledge. horton, m., & f. 1990. we make the road by walking: conversations on education and social change. philadelphia: temple university press. jackson, t. (2001). the art and craft of gently socratic inquiry. in a. l. costa (ed.) developing minds: a resource for teaching thinking (459 – 465). alexandria, association for supervision and curriculum development. lipman, m. (1988). philosophy goes to school. philadelphia, pa: temple university press. longo, n. v. (201). deliberative pedagogy in the community: connecting deliberative dialogue, community engagement, and democratic education. journal of public deliberation, 9(2), 1 18. makaiau, a. s. & miller, c. (2012). the philosopher’s pedagogy. educational perspectives, 44(1 & 2), 8 – 19. manosevitch, e. (2013). the medium is the message: an israeli experience with deliberative pedagogy. higher education exchange, 60 – 68. matthews, d. (1994). politics for people. chicago: university of illinois press. matthews, d. (2014). the ecology of democracy: finding ways to have a stronger hand in shaping our future. kettering, oh: kettering foundation press. miller, c. e. the plain vanilla process. (paper, university of hawai‘i, manoa, hi, may 15, 2014). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 7 molnar-main, s., & kingseed, l. (2013). public learning in public schools: how networks of teachers and public partners can support civic learning. connections. retrieved from http://kettering.org/periodicals/connections-2013-citizens-in-democratic-politics/ nabatchi, t., gastil, j. g., weiksner, m. & leighninger, m. (2012). democracy in motion: evaluating the practice and impact of deliberative civic engagement. oxford: oxford university press. national council for the social studies. (2013). the college, career, and civic life (c3) framework for social studies state standards. silver spring, md: the national council for the social studies. parker, w. (2010). social studies education e21. in w. parker (ed.), social studies today: research and practice (3 – 16). new york: routledge. sharp, a.m. (1993). ‘the community of inquiry: education for democracy’ in m. lipman (ed.), thinking children and education, ed. by m lipman, hunt publishing company, dubuque, pp. 337 – 343. vinson, k. d. (2006). opression, anti-opression, and citizenship education. in ross, e. w. (ed.), the social studies curriculum: purposes, problems and possibilities (pp. 51 – 76). albany: state university of new york press. address correspondences to: amber strong makaiau makaiau,university of hawai‘i at manoa amakaiau@hawaii.edu mailto:amakaiau@hawaii.edu analytic teaching and philosophical praxis analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 36 love: through the lens of pitirim sorokin joseph g. d’ambrosio, anna c. faul, & research fellow abstract: understanding the virtue of love has challenged scholars for centuries but in recent years science has produced substantial scholarship in understanding the complex meanings that we attribute to the word “love.” this article explores love through the lens of pitirim sorokin, an eminent harvard sociologist, who developed an intricate framework to understand what he called “other-regarding or altruistic” love. it is proposed that his theoretical framework can act as a gauge of love-producing actions helping guide humans to more authentic, meaningful and engaged relationships. conflict continues to increase in the world both on a micro and macro level and having a theory of love that can help reduce the devastation conflict creates is necessary for our continued human existence. ate begets hate, violence engenders violence, hypocrisy is answered by hypocrisy, war generates war, and love creates love. unselfish love has enormous creative and therapeutic potentialities, far greater than most people think. love is a life-giving force, necessary for physical, mental, and moral health…only the power of unbounded love practiced in regard to all human beings can defeat the forces of inter-human strife, and can prevent the pending extermination of man by man on this planet” (sorokin, 1954a, p. 13). the word “love” is difficult to define because it serves different purposes and carries various meanings (berscheid, 2010). in many ways, society forfeited an understanding of love to mystics, poets, philosophers, theologians, songwriters and lovers, failing to provide an operationalized definition of what it means to love one another. in the 50s maslow noted that although love was a central part of human life empirical research literature hardly mentioned it (maslow, 1954). during the late 50s and 60s, researchers touched on love through the lens of attachment and interpersonal attraction theories (bowlby, 1958, 1969; harlow, 1958; heider, 1958). the 70s and 80s witnessed love as a topic for behavioral scientific study (rubin, 1970; weis, 2006). biological, taxonomical, and implicit and cultural theories were developed, that included psychometric and neuropsychological approaches in attempts to help explain what we mean by the word “love” (berscheid, 2010; sternberg & weis, 2006). the 2000s have seen the focus shift toward observable behaviors that represent love (levin & kaplan, 2010). long before love became a subject for the scientific journals, pitirim sorokin, one of the most prominent sociologists of the twentieth century, some who call the father of modern sociology, created an entire treatise on the subject of love (oord, 2005; sorokin, 1954a). hailed as one of the most extensive treatments on love by hazo (1967) it was not until 2000s that sorokin’s work was applied to the scientific study of love (levin & kaplan, 2010; post, 2003). besides having an outstanding academic career, sorokin was a prolific and insightful writer who wrote volumes of works on sociology. what made him different is that he devoted much of his scholarship to a topic that many believe has no place in the empirical and scientific world that guides research. this was especially poignant during his day when positivism and scientific thought filled the halls of academia. in spite of the resistance he met with his peers, which has been fully documented (johnson, 1995; sorokin, 1954a), sorokin is able to merge the boundaries of philosophy, psychology and sociology with his research on love. his approach “h analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 37 emanated from the 19th century russian tradition of “integralism,” that brought together knowledge from religious, scientific and realistic perspectives of society and culture to academic study (johnson, 1995). the purpose of this article is to add to the understanding of “love” as conceptualized through the lens of pitirim sorokin. his understanding most closely relates to “compassionate love” that has recently been operationalized in the literature (oman, 2011; underwood, 2009). while sorokin’s explanation of love aligns with many descriptions of love discussed by erich fromm (love is an activity), (1963), soren kierkegaard (love emanates from a supernatural source) (1949), max scheler ( love is an act and movement) (1954), sigmund freud ( the life instinct is love) (1949), carl jung (love expresses itself in the form of compassion, philanthropy and social service) (1928) and so many others who looked at love as either acquisitive or benevolent, sorokin developed an intricate analytical schema that is missing in other explanations of love. sorokin conceptualized a heuristic model of love from an other-regarding or altruistic viewpoint and applied his theory to actions that promote the virtue of love. he believed that other-regarding or altruistic love actions are of paramount importance to the world (sorokin, 1954a). the continued violent crises in the world attest to the need for a theory that can guide humanity to a more peaceful co-existence. sorokin developed an elaborate analytical model to explain love and its production, accumulation and distribution. he analyzed love’s causes and effects, the higher and lower forms of love, the human and universal significance of love and its implications for other areas of study. he defined love as “a meaningful interaction or relationship between two or more persons where the aspirations and aims of one person are shared and helped in their realization by other persons” (sorokin, 1954a, p. 13). one should neither hinder another, nor cause pain or sorrow, rather, one should offer love that exudes itself in a way that allows another to flourish. many benefits come from love, namely, one can escape from loneliness, beautify one’s own life and others, make one “noble and good, and experience the freedom that love provides when it is done without obligation or constraint”(sorokin, 1954a, p. 12). sorokin’s theory promotes his understanding of “integral truth” that unifies the ideational, idealistic and sensate mentalities and combines the empirical truth of the senses, the rational truth of reason, and the super rational truth of faith (johnson, 1995). he spent considerable time discussing the human mental structure, creativity and cognition in a way that is indicative of his time and culture. sorokin explained that the supraconscious is indispensable for the practice of “sublime love,” the crux of which is understood as benevolence. he posits that the goal of mankind is to become aware that our true core or supraconscious is not our body, our unconscious, bio-conscious or socio-conscious egos “with all their trappings,” but the manifestation of a highest ideal that he identifies as the supraconscious. the supraconscious is an axiom of true love emanating from our connection with the supreme being that sorokin refers to as “god.” sorokin believed that everyone has a supraconscious that can guide him or her, devoid of ego, in pursuit of supreme love of the “highest moral value.” he referred to a supreme love that “transcends our conscious ego and the relational hedonistic, utilitarian, and eudemonistic interests,” of humans but that is not possible without divine aid (sorokin, 1954a, p. 126). it is in this premise that sorokin aligned with the belief that humans can overcome anger and conflict if they are able to develop human character that is energized by a divine presence, the product of which is love. sorokin acknowledged that this belief is questioned by many “scholars of both the social sciences and humanities” (sorokin, 1954a, p. 98). he seemed to imply that a circle of love envelops us, although it is inaccessible by humans on a conscious level but always accessible on a supraconscious level. sorokin attempts to verify his understanding with empirical evidence in an extensive analysis of the supraconscious (sorokin, 1954a). he viewed our supraconscious as a connection with a divine presence that originates and provides love to humanity. this reasoning is the antithesis of many who believe that humans are materialistic, egoistic, self-interested and motivated by what is pleasurable/good or painful/bad (hudson, 1980). the debate about man’s innate nature, analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 38 was at the forefront of intellectual circles during the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries and continues until today (frantz, 2005). the belief that humans are motivated by benevolence and duty aligns with sorokin’s understanding of the supraconscious (sorokin, 1954a). another important focus of sorokin’s theory is that loving character can be developed, produced, accumulated and distributed. he looked at love as energy that theoretically can be manipulated as is done in manufacturing processes based on physical, chemical and biological phenomena. he acknowledged that love energy begins at its “unorganized natural stage” (sorokin, 1954a, p. 37). love is produced by the interaction of human beings but there is no method to assure that love and not hate is produced. typically, this production takes place in families or small groups that reduces as the group grows. he posits that in order to produce love a society must support cultivation of what he calls “apostles or heroes of love” that can spread love energy. he encourages the fields of science, philosophy, religion, technology and the fine arts to act as gigantic power stations that can support this process (sorokin, 1954a, p. 41). this has to be coupled with love production in what sorokin referred to as the “rank and file,” (i.e. the great mass of people) that populate our cities, by their abstinence of hateful actions toward one another and by groups and institutions that will give space for the rank and file to produce love. he also posits that in order for the rank and file and group production to increase, there must be a total cultural shift that values love over hate and freedom over bondage. love, like other forms of energy, can be accumulated and stored in individuals, groups and culture. in order for the world to change it is necessary to paradigmatically shift from a disorganized production state to an organized state that intentionally reorganizes around the principles of love. distribution of love can occur once accumulated in relation to the particular needs of persons and groups. sorokin stated that this is not a “utopian musing” rather a realizable matter (sorokin, 1954a). sorokin explored both the human and cosmic dimensions of love and explained them as forms that encompass the totality of love. he labeled love’s composition as forms of being, namely, religious love, ethical love, ontological love, physical love, biological love, psychological love and social love. together these forms of love allow a complete explanation of love in its human and supernatural existence. he explained that these forms of being can be metaphorically depicted as an iceberg with the psychological and social forms being the part of the iceberg that we see and the other forms, namely, religious, ethical, ontological, physical and biological, as under water and not visibly seen but present nonetheless, (sorokin, 1954a) as depicted in figure 1 below: figure 1. multidimensional theoretical forms of love psychological social religious ethical physical biological ontological iceberg above water iceberg below water water line analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 39 sorokin used this understanding of love to guide his research of different cultures, societies, religious figures, mystics, religions, literature, reformers and common citizens (sorokin, 1954a; sorokin, 1950, 1958). the religious aspect of love is identified as a higher power that sorokin called god. this ultimate source is both the “qualitative and quantitative infinity” that is the “infinite cosmos of love” (sorokin, 1954a, p. 3) and is derived from a higher power. this inflow of love forms the basis of his energetic understanding of love that is used throughout his theory. he referred to this aspect of love from the greek definition of love as a synthesis of eros and agape. by combining these concepts he forged love into an explanation of the human striving for divinity in union with god. his belief in a higher power as the source of love permeates his work. ethical love is enmeshed with goodness itself and inseparable from truth and beauty. it is the aspect of love shown by the way people promote truth that is pure and beautiful because it is untarnished by impure motivation or action. ontological love is the greatest form of “unifying, integrating, harmonizing, creative energy or power” (sorokin, 1954a, p. 6). sorokin explained ontological love as the core of love that makes the world function and without which would cause collapse of the physical, biological, and sociological world. he likened love to an “ontological power,” not just an emotion, which is formulated as an energy that can be used to counteract evil, destroy death and engender immortality. the physical aspects of love are shown as the physical forces that “unite, integrate, and maintain the whole inorganic universe in endless unities” (sorokin, 1954a, p. 8). it is that energy that unites us and is what he referred to as a unified organized cosmos. the biological counterpart of love is based in the generation of cellular cooperative interactions that bind all things. this amounts to a life force or vital energy that guides and directs human-kind (sorokin, 1954a). this reasoning is in line with laws of quantum physics that developed in the 1920s and are popularized today (o'murchu, 2004). the biological aspect of love is grounded in the basic processes of life that causes cells to unite to create living things. it is that love that brings people together to procreate and without which would be the end of civilization. the psychological aspect of love includes the emotional, affective, volitional, and intellectual elements of the love experience. it expresses itself in the form of “empathy, sympathy, kindness, devotion, admiration, benevolence, reverence, respect, adoration and friendship. these experiences are contrary to “hatred, enmity, dislike, envy, jealousy, antipathy, and other forms of hate” (sorokin, 1954a, p. 10). love in the psychological realm is “altruistic” by its nature because in its true form it is devoid of ego. for example, in true friendship one does good things for another because it is good for that person, not because anything is desired in return. psychological love fills our loneliness, beautifies our life and gives us true freedom marked by fearlessness and power that gives us the highest peace of mind (sorokin, 1954a, p. 11). the social aspect of love is “meaningful interaction or relationship” with another who shares mutuality of connectedness. sorokin referred to the terms, “solidarity, mutual aid, cooperation” to connote forms of social relationship encompassing love (sorokin, 1954a, p. 13). sorokin also made a binary distinction between acquisitive and benevolent inclinations much like the psychological theorists of the 70s. unlike other theorists, he believed that pursuit of selfish goals was love but of a lower order. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 40 the examples given in this article refer to the psychosocial domains of love conceptualized by sorokin because they are the ‘visible’ forms of love that can be understood more easily than the other forms of love posited. however, while the psychological and social are the visible empirical forms of love, it is important to understand that love, as a whole, cannot be fully realized without its religious, ethical, physical, biological and ontological aspects. in addition to the seven forms of love, sorokin posited five dimensions that make up an analytical model of love. he believed that the five dimensions are “manageable and not too complex” and “serves us in many theoretical and practical ways”. they can be expressed as vectors that can be used to explain love in each of the love forms. levin described the forms of love and dimensions as two axes with the forms of love looked at as nouns and the dimensions as adjectives (levin & kaplan, 2010). the five dimensions are as follows: 1) the intensity of love, 2) the extensity of love, 3) its purity, 4) its adequacy, and 5) its duration. sorokin acknowledged that because of the indistinct nature of love the dimensions had both scalar and non-scalar characteristics. it is difficult to know the range of how many times greater one act of love is from another or whether it is lower, higher or equal to another act. although, it is possible to empirically witness acts of love and know that one act is greater than another. for example, holding a door for someone is a much lower act of love than risking one’s life for another. while the range of love is not scalar, the actions associated can be scalar and measured quantitatively (sorokin, 1954a). to sorokin this was of little consequence because if scalar measurement was not appropriate, measurement could be accomplished by innate knowledge or rational reasoning (sorokin, 1954a). it must be noted that although sorokin referred to the ways and power of love he interchanged the word “love” with “altruism” throughout his work. he referred to acts that produce and maintain the psychological and/or physical good of others as altruism (sorokin, 1958). he further described the varying types of altruism on an egoism-altruism scale, with one extreme being the pursuit of one’s own good at the expense of another, to those other regarding acts that produce and maintain the good of others. he referred to non-altruistic behavior of those who help because they are being paid, and pseudo-altruism as those that preach love but don’t practice it. the five dimensions of love although sorokin did not promote psychometric analysis of the five-dimensional model, for purposes of understanding, “scalar” terminology will be used below to outline an understanding of love from the lens of sorokin. ironically, sorokin was adverse toward efforts to create psychosocial rating scales, and labeled them “illusions,” “sham mathematics” and “quantiphrenia” because he believed that the only valid mathematical social science was quantification of observable events, such as behaviors (sorokin, 1958). therefore, the following analysis of the five dimensions focuses on behaviors that explain different parts of sorokin’s conceptualization of love. intensity. actions vary widely in respect to the intensity of love actions. these are actions that result in some emotional or physical loss. the intensity of one’s actions can range from a minor act of kindness, for example giving up a seat on a bus for someone, where emotional or physical loss is little, to the boundless, all-giving, and all-forgiving love actions such as giving one’s greatest values, for example, one’s life or one’s health (sorokin, 1954a). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 41 when someone gives a few cents to the hungry from a large possession of money, the action is low in intensity but still an action of love. when someone offers up a seat to another person in a bus, the action is low in intensity but still an action of love. however, when one gives something of personal value to someone else, for example, giving up self-care as a long-term caregiver for the sake of the person receiving care, or sacrificing one’s own life to save another, those actions are at the highest possible level of intensity (sorokin, 1954a). if one is willing to take up a cause of civil rights, for example, knowing that one’s life can be at risk, such actions are of high intensity (post, 2003). martin luther king jr. and nelson mandela come to mind as examples of people who expressed love of high intensity. sorokin is of the opinion that the zero point of intensity on a scale is neither love nor hate but if an actions falls below zero it represents hate, above zero it represents love, although ranging from low love to high love. when someone preaches love but does not practice it, the intensity of love is near the zero point. when the preaching of love is used to mask selfish and hateful hypocritical actions, these actions fall below the zero point and become hateful actions and the antithesis of intensive love actions. (sorokin, 1954a). extensity. extensive love actions vary from “the zero point of love of oneself only, up to the love of all mankind, living creatures and the whole universe” (sorokin, 1954a). it can be understood as actions that are given without regard for who the receiver is or how different they are from the giver. between extensity degrees “lies a variety of extensities: love of one’s own family, a few friends, love of all the groups one belongs to, to loving the whole universe” (sorokin, 1954a, p. 16). according to sorokin, narrow love is when it is applied to only a few persons intimately known by the giver. wide love, on the other hand, is love of all living creatures, regardless of how different or similar they are to the giver (sorokin, 1958). the zero point of love extensity according to sorokin is, loving oneself only. narrow and wide love actions can be applied in similar fashion to hate actions, starting with hating oneself, and growing wider into hating the whole world and viewing everyone as his/her enemy(sorokin, 1958). the high end of extensity has been compared to “agape” love extended in the judeo-christian theologies. extensive love is “unlimited, freely given, sacrificial love” and not dependent on the worthiness of the object (post, 2003). mother theresa is an example of someone who achieved high extensity by her actions with the poor and discarded. highly extensive love is in contradition to limiting love actions that are directed to a small group and purposefully refrained from sharing love with others or the rest of humanity. we see this daily as we watch the news and see one group oppressing another group or taking resources for their group at the expense of another. extensive love is focused on the good of another simply because that person exists (post, 2003). one who generates hate toward another or toward humanity would measure on the negative side of the extensity scale. purity. pure love actions are those actions that are performed because of the inherent value of love itself, not for the sake of pleasure or utility (sorokin, 1958, p. 64). these are actions that are motivated by love alone without expectations. purity of love ranges from love motivated by love alone, without the taint of a “soiling motive” of utility, pleasure, advantage or profit, down to a “soiled love” where love is but a means to a utilitarian end where love is only the “thinnest trickle in the muddy current of selfish aspirations and purposes” (sorokin, 1954a, p. 17). actions that are high in purity are not generated with the potential desire to create a reaction from the receiver of love. rather, they are generated for the sake of the love that is shared, even when negative reactions from the receiver may ensue. actions that are motived only by uni-directional love, with no regard for how the receiver acts or reacts, is love at the high end of the purity scale. purity is “….love for love’s sake, asking nothing in return, letting your position always be that of the giver. pure love knows no bargain, no reward. love knows no analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 42 fear, no rival” (sorokin, 1954a, p. 17). sorokin uses the statements of saints of the occident and the orient to describe this love: “….each loved god and would love him even if he were to condemn them to an eternal hell, for such a lover are perhaps the most striking expressions of the purest love” (sorokin, 1954a, p. 17). sorokin does however admit that in pure love actions a certain amount of pleasure or utility may follow as a by-product of love actions. however, if these other regarding actions are mainly performed for the sake of pleasure or utility, it is impure love that measures very low on the pure love scale (sorokin, 1958). on the other hand, sorokin did acknowledge that conduct opposed to love conduct is anti-loving or egoistic. such actions are actions of hatred and enmity (sorokin, 1954a, p. 63). this places actions that are guided by hate on the negative side of the purity scale. although it seems difficult to distinguish between intensity and purity, sorokin attempts to differentiate intensity from purity by attaching a greater thought process to actions that speak of intensity. these actions seem to be those where people willingly make active decisions to incur emotional or physical loss for the sake of another. with pure love, it seems there is less cognition involved and love is given spontaneously, just for the sake of love. these are acts that intuitively respond to the needs of others, without involved cognitions. although some utility may be involved in these actions, it comes as a by-product and not as a carefully thought out process. also, with purity no bargaining is involved and the actions of the receiver, either hateful or loving, are of no consequence to the giver. with intensity, sorokin does not discuss the reactions of the receiver. he only focuses on the act of giving, and the willingness to incur emotional or physical loss. adequacy. adequate love actions are those where the motive to love aligns with good and loving consequences for another. they can be simple actions that align; for example, in a relationship if one partner chooses to cook a special meal because he/she is aware that their over-worked partner enjoys coming home to a home cooked meal, the motive to love aligns in positive consequence for his/her partner. in more difficult situations, a divorcing individual may decide to show love by giving his/her former spouse the house if the former spouse is going to be the main caregiver of the children. this will be an act of adequate love where the objective consequence is stability for the former spouse and children. it becomes “wise and creative love” and is at the top of the adequacy scale. adequate love varies from a complete discrepancy between the subjective goal of the love action and the objective consequence to the receiver, up to their complete unity (sorokin, 1954a, p. 17). throughout sorokin’s writings he referred to an objective standard that guides society. meeting the standard makes you a “good neighbor” or an “apostle“ of love. no society can be satisfactory without a mix of “apostles”, who are great altruists and “good neighbors,” who are ordinary people doing acts of good will without any legal duty or moral obligation, devoid of advantage or profit (sorokin, 1950). understanding the objective standard makes it easier to differentiate between adequate and inadequate other-regarding actions as well as anti-adequate or hateful actions. sorokin differentiates between wise and creative love actions and love actions that are “inadequate, unwise, ignorant, or blind ” (sorokin, 1954a). wise and creative love actions are “devoid of harmful effects for the other party while blind love actions prove harmful to the other party”(sorokin, 1958, p. 64). in cases of wise and creative love actions, the subjective goal unifies with the objective consequence. in cases of “inadequate, unwise, ignorant or blind love” actions, the subjective goal is in disagreement with the objective consequence, sometimes up to a point of causing harm. sorokin refers to the unity of the subjective and objective as “adequate love” and the disagreement of the subjective and objective as “inadequate love”(sorokin, 1954a). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 43 inadequate love takes on two forms. the first is where a love action is subjectively authentic, but its objective consequences is very dissimilar or even opposite to the subjective goal of the love action; and second, where there is no subjective goal to express a love action but the objective consequences of the action, even though it may not have a love intent, benefits another and appears as love. sorokin gives the example of a “mother who truly loves her children and wants to make them lovable (honest, industrious, and good) and begins to pamper them, satisfy all their needs yet fails to discipline them. through such actions she spoils her children, and makes them capricious, irresponsible, weak, lazy and dishonest”(sorokin, 1954a, p. 17). in such a case the goal of the mother (i.e. to give great love to her children) differs greatly from the consequences that occur to the children (i.e. the children become spoiled). this type of inadequate or blind love is not guided by truth or wisdom. it also ends up not being in agreement with its objective consequence and ultimately destroys itself instead of benefiting the beloved (sorokin, 1954a, p. 18). the second type of inadequate love is where there is no subjective intention to share love but even though motivated by something else it objectively results in a loving consequence. these actions can range from those cases where there is no love motive to those where love is a dominant characteristic and finds expression in activities and achievements that benefit another. these types of activities are where one acts with another goal, such as composing a song or writing a book, and through the beauty of the song or book, it touches and transforms another’s soul. while the creators may not intend great love toward others, the result cannot help but create love because as sorokin says, love is created by “the unity and mutual transformability of these forms of energy” (sorokin, 1954a, p. 19). sorokin discussed conduct opposed to loving actions as anti-loving or egoistic representing actions of hatred and enmity. it is assumed that adequate hate can be seen as hate actions where the subjective hate actions are united with the objective negative and harmful manifestations to the receiver. duration. “duration varies from the shortest possible moment to years or throughout the whole life of an individual or a group” (sorokin, 1954a, p. 16). continuous and durable love is the highest expression of duration while a short moment is the lowest expression of duration (sorokin, 1958). duration has to have a love component or else it is not enduring love. an example provided by sorokin of long, enduring love, is that of a mother caring for a sick child for the child’s whole life or the great apostles discharging their love mission throughout their lives (sorokin, 1954a). in sorokin’s autobiography he uses the example of his father’s love for his mother. she died at a young age, leaving him to care for three young children. he never remarried and remained faithful to her to the end of his life, even though her death turned him into a broken man. sorokin noted that “love that transcends the death of the beloved and endures to the end of the lover’s life is a rarity today…transcendent love has been, and still is, the finest, the holiest and most beautiful ideal in human life – truly immortal and sublime” (sorokin, 1963, p. 17). the negative side of duration emanates from actions that are full of hate where a person chooses to use hate as the motive that drives his/her world. this forms part of anti-love actions described by sorokin (1954a, p. 63) that are egoistic and hateful in nature. people who allow hate to fill their lives get consumed by this hatred, and allow all their actions toward others to be driven by hate alone. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 44 the multidimensionality of love the dimensions of love conceived by sorokin are multidimensional and are therefore, both independent and dependent on each other for a true understanding of love to be developed. if one were to be high on each dimension then one would have achieved supreme love that is transcendent. for most people they may be high on one dimension and low on another because transcendent love is difficult to achieve. for example, one could be quite high on intensity by giving something of value to another person that is an emotional or physical loss to oneself, but only done one time in a lifetime which is low on duration (sorokin, 1954a). in order to fully understand the interplay of these constructs, it is necessary to look at the combinations that the dimensions can provide. measuring high on all dimensions is rare and is less frequently found in the world. different combinations of dimensions are more likely. for example, as extensive love increases, intensive love many times decreases. it is necessary to keep people closer in order to keep giving intensive love. by keeping them closer people tend to understand what is important to each other or the group so that high intensive love can be given. the more love is expanded and extensive love increases, intensive love has a tendency to decrease. this is because the energy used to love many dissipates accumulated love energy. for example, if a person expends extensive love energy on a large group of people, the intensity of this love will be diminished. there will not be enough love energy left for the large group that will allow for intensive love that requires knowledge on an intimate level and an understanding of what people really need. when durational love is measured with intensive love it tends to decrease with an increase in durational love. it is difficult to maintain intensive love for a long period of time without an inflow of replenishing love. if love is returned then intensive love has an option to increase over a longer period of time. the relationship between intensive love and pure love are fairly uni-directional, as one increases, the other follows. if love is of low intensity, pure love will generally be low too. intensive love and adequate love exhibit a rather “indeterminate and loose” relationship (sorokin, 1954a, p. 29). the love actions could be intensive (great emotional or physical loss) yet fail to align with what the receiver needs. the relationship of extensive love and adequate love is bi-directional. this is because it is harder to love adequately and objectively and evaluate the consequences of love actions when the magnitude of extensive love increases (sorokin, 1954a). for example, it is difficult to align with a larger group and really understand what will be a love action that objectively will be good for the group, because it is difficult to have knowledge or wisdom of many in comparison to a smaller more intimate group. the relationship between durational love and pure love is fairly consistent. the purer the love, the more lasting it tends to be. this is exhibited when one loves purely, expecting nothing in return. in these cases, the relationship tends to last longer because the need for reciprocity is non-existent. there is a positive relationship between pure and adequate love. pure love, or loving for love’s sake, tends to be adequate because it almost always is for the good of the other because it takes the other’s interest into account. a pure subjective act almost always takes the objective consequence into consideration before the act is carried out because the intention has to be a perfect manifestation of love in order to be considered pure love. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 45 application sorokin’s operational five-dimensional theory of love encourages appraisal of actions toward others that are useful for daily human interaction. the breadth of perspective allowed by viewing actions as intensive, extensive, pure, adequate or durational permits people to gauge love actions from a salutogenic perspective, which is much needed for the continued survival of our species. consciously reflecting on individual or group actions from the five-dimensional perspective can help in promoting in and out-group love. the theory can be implemented across different love constructs (romantic, companionate, parental, etc.). from a micro perspective, inculcating the five dimensions may help interpersonal relationships flourish. being willing to emotionally or physically lose something precious for another (intensive love), knowing that the loss will benefit others (extensive love), understanding that love actions will not be returned (pure love), aligning with another’s needs (adequate love) and doing it for a long time (durational love) will encourage the flourishing of humans guided by love as envisioned by sorokin. from a macro perspective, the intentional and deliberate use of the five-dimensional theory would enable organizations or countries to gauge their actions from the virtue of love that promotes growth and harmony versus pathogenesis. for example, a company whose sole goal is to create capital for its investors may make different decisions if love of others was included in their decision-making schema. if they realized that increasing capital at the expense of humanity would be anti-extensive love that hurts the organization and society, they may be reluctant in making decisions for profit only. for countries that have conflict, analyzing difficult international decisions from the five-dimensional perspective may bring us together as one world, rather than a group of competing entities. imagine if countries were willing to take actions that result in self-loss (intensive love), benefit those outside their borders (extensive love), demand nothing in return (pure love), align with other countries’ needs (adequate love), and do it consistently over a long term (durational love). if this occurs our world would become a generative beacon of love, with war and suffering unnecessary. as sorokin said, this is achievable and is not the path for only spiritual masters, rather, it is the path for the common human being (sorokin, 1954a, 1954b). conclusion the application of sorokin’s five-dimensional theory is applicable across cultures and is a way to understand the virtue of love that can be used to guide humanity to a peaceful and harmonious existence. the time has long come to embrace a new way to conceptualize love. the virtue of love, through the lens of sorokin, provides an analytical framework that is timely, easy to understand and has the potential to change human interaction. failure to embrace love at this point in history may be tantamount to creating our own destruction. only the virtue of love has the potential to save us. references berscheid, e. (2010). love in the fourth dimension. annual review of psychology, 61, 1-25. bowlby, j. (1958). the nature of the child's tie to his mother. international journal of psycho-analysis, 41, 350-373. bowlby, j. (1969). attachment and loss: vol. 1. attachment (2nd. ed.). new york: basic books. frantz, r. (2005). two minds: intuition and analysis in the history of economic thought. new york: springer. freud, s. (1949). an outline of psychoanalysis. trans. by james strachey. new york: w.w. norton & company. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 46 fromm, e. (1963). the art of loving. new york, new york: bantam books, random house. harlow, h.f. (1958). the nature of love. american psycholologist, 13, 673-685. hazo, r.g. (1967). the idea of love. new york: frederick a. praeger. heider, f. (1958). the psychology of interpersonal relations. new york: wiley. hudson, w. d. (1980). a century of moral philosophy. new york: st. martins press. johnson, b.v. (1995). pitirim a. sorokin: an intellectual biography. lawrence, ks: university press jung, c.g. (1928). contributions to analytical psychology. trans. by h.g. and cary f. baynes. london: routledge & kegan paul. kierkegaard, s. (1949). works of love. either/or. vol i, trans. by david f. swenson and lillian marvin swenson; vol. ii trans. by walter lowrie. princeton, n.j.: princeton university press. levin, j., & kaplan, b. h. (2010). the sorokin multidimensional inventory of love experience (smile): development, validation, and religious determinants. review of religious research, 51(4), 380-401. maslow, a.h. (1954). motivation and personality. new york: harper. o'murchu, d. (2004). quantum theology: sprirtual implications of the new physics. new york: crossroad. oman, d. (2011). compassionate love: accomplishments and challenges in an emerging scientific/spiritual research field. mental health, religion & culture, 14(9), 945-981. oord, t. j. (2005). the love racket: defining love and agape for the love-and-science research program. zygon: journal of religion & science, 40(4), 919-938. post, s. g. (2003). unlimited love: altruism, compassion and service. radnor, pa: templeton foundation press. rubin, z. (1970). measurement of romantic love. journal of peronality and social psychology, 16, 265-273. scheler, m. (1954). the nature of sympathy. trans. by peter heath. london: routledge sorokin, p. a. (1954a). the ways and power of love: types, factors, and techniques of moral transformation. philadelphia, pa: templeton foundation press. sorokin, p. a. (1963). a long journey. new haven, ct: college and university press. sorokin, p. a. (ed.). (1954b). forms and techniques of altruistic and spiritual growth. boston: beacon press. sorokin, p.a. (1950). altruistic love. boston: the beacon press. sorokin, p.a. (1958). the reconstruction of humanity. hartford, me: greenleaf books. sternberg, r.j., & weis, k. (eds.). (2006). the new psychology of love. new haven: yale university. underwood, l.g. (2009). compassionate love: a framework for research. in b. fehr, sprecher, s. & underwood, l.g. (ed.), the science of compassionate love (pp. 3-26). malden:ma: wiley-blackwell. weis, k. (2006). introduction. in the new psychology of love, eds sternberg, r.j. & weis, k. new haven: yale university press. address correspondence to: dr. joseph g. d’ambrosio, kent school of social work, university of louisville, louisville, kentucky, 40292; joe.dambrosio@louisville.edu, mailto:joe.dambrosio@louisville.edu dialogic schooling analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 35 , issue 1 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 1 dialogic schooling abstract: this paper offers a genealogy of dialogic education, tracing its origins in romantic epistemology and corresponding philosophy of childhood, and identifying it as a counterpoint to the purposes and assumptions of universal, compulsory, state-imposed and regulated schooling. dialogic education has historically worked against the grain of standardized mass education, not only in its view of the nature, capacities and potentialities of children (and therefore of adults as well), but in its economic, political and social views, for which childhood is understood as a promissory condition. dialogic education is oriented to what dewey called “a future new society of changed purposes and desires,” made possible by an emergent form of social character. it has followed its own developmental trajectory from its origins in pestalozzi’s rousseau-inspired innovations, through anarchist theory and practice and the progressive education movement, to its current most salient formulation in the democratic education movement, whether as an enemy within the gates of standardized education or as expressed in innumerable alternative forms of schooling or unschooling. the paper highlights several key characteristics, gleaned from all those forms, of the dialogic school—identified as intentionality, transitionality, emergence, aesthetic temporality, interdisciplinarity and group governmentality--and argues further that community of philosophical inquiry theory and practice as a form of post-socratic group dialogue that emerged in the 1970’s, is a pedagogical praxis that offers a grand operational template for dialogic education as a form of schooling. would like to engage a conversation in which we explore the necessary and sufficient conditions of a school for children and youth constructed consciously and deliberately as a dialogic social and institutional form. in order to do so, i must begin with my own prejudices, and must leave open for disagreement even the belief that a school should be a dialogic social and institutional form, or that what we know as community of philosophical inquiry (cpi) —which i consider the urdiscourse of dialogic schooling— is either necessary or desirable in the education of children and youth at all. a geneology of dialogic education first to my particular prejudices, in the form of a historical narrative. as i understand it, dialogic education as a movement is roughly 200 years old in the west, and arose as one expression, generated by a unique mix of enlightenment and romantic impulses, of a view of childhood and its role in cultural evolution. the view of childhood is best expressed in the particular romantic idiomatic use of two mutually determining signifiers, “innocence” and “genius.” here “innocence” means, not blamelessness or absence of experience, but as m.h. abrams, in his magisterial work on i david kennedy analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 35 , issue 1 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 2 the romantic imagination, after schelling, terms “the absolute unity—the ‘identity’ or ‘indifference’ (the utter lack of differentiation)—of subject and object;” an “original unity” that is “sundered by the process of thought” (abrams, 1971, p. 180). using other terminology, we might call this the human condition before the father, before the superego and what lyotard (1992) called the “mainmise.” in the romantic narrative, as in the christian, we “fall” out of this condition into the state of separation which is adulthood, and the developmental goal of life is to recover it. as such, childhood becomes for the adult a prophetic condition. as novalis (1989, p. 50) said, “the first man [sic] is the first spiritual seer. to him, all appears as spirit. what are children, if not such primal ones?” and schiller (1966) states the romantic mythos of the life cycle succinctly: they are what we were; they are what we should once again become. we were nature just as they, and our culture, by means of reason and freedom, should lead us back to nature. they are, therefore, not only the representation of our lost childhood . . . but they are also representations of our highest fulfillment in the ideal . . . (p. 85). as representation, child as “genius” stands for that core of feeling and creativity lost to rationalism and cultural conformity, and the primary vitalistic animism of perception itself. but romantic literature and philosophy, unlike the victorian sentimentalization of childhood “innocence,” made a clear distinction between the real child and the child as prophetic statement. schiller (1966, p. 87) calls the child “a lively representation to us of the ideal, not indeed as it is fulfilled, but as it is enjoined.” childhood is doomed to die in each person, because “child” means relative undifferentiation, and, as coleridge pointed out, differentiation is “the necessary condition for progressive development.”1 that progressive development is in the realm of culture, which we may read as education. schiller goes further in his on the aesthetic education of man (1954/1795) and identifies that form of education as most fully expressed in a dialogue between the rational and the sensuous, reason and desire, or what dewey would later call habit and impulse—a dialogue that is epitomized in what schiller calls the “play impulse,” and what w.d. winnicott (1971) called the realm of “transitional space.” the latter may be characterized as that form of temporality most typically associated with the experience of creativity in deep play, intensive inquiry, art, philosophy, and relational intimacy.2 the second element of the romantic origins of the dialogic vision of education—that is, its role in social and cultural evolution—flows naturally from the first, and is also signaled in schiller’s “what we should once again become,” as well as in arendt’s (1958) concept of natality; in dewey’s pragmatist reconstructionism and more specifically in count’s and brameld’s social reconstructionist movement (for which see ozmon & craver, 2008, pp. 158–87); in the history of anarchist education (suissa, 2010); in critical theory in education; in the contemporary democratic schools movement; and in evolutionary anthropology in the form of the implications of recent brain development research for neoteny theory (i.e. the extraordinarily long human childhood, and pedomorphism as a primary species trait. see montague, 1989 and kennedy, 2014). all may be grouped under the romantic narrative of the dialectical return—a “going forth which is also a analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 35 , issue 1 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 3 division, and a return which is also a reunion” (abrams 1971, p. 253). in secular, diachronic terms this could be expressed as cultural evolution—as the reconstruction of cultural practices that leads to the emergence of a critical mass of adults who are more intelligent in the broad sense of a better balance and integration between cognitive and emotional centers, greater cognitive and emotional autonomy, stronger metacognitive and executive function, more flexible and adaptive habits, increased capacity for empathy, and greater sensitivity and identification with the natural environment. dialogic education is oriented to what dewey called “a future new society of changed purposes and desires” (p. 96), a more pedomorphic society, which in his terms may be described as one composed of more adults whose habit structures are more adaptive, who are more capable, of “. .. utiliz[ing] . . . [impulses] for formation of new habits, or what is the same thing, the modification of an old habit so that it may be adequately serviceable under novel conditions,” who recognize “the place of impulse in conduct as a pivot of re-adjustment, in a steady re-organization of habits to meet new elements in new situations.” (1922, p. 104).3 the guarantor of this reconstruction is a corresponding society that is transitioning to what marcuse called “. . . a higher stage of development: ‘higher’ in the sense of a more rational and equitable use of resources, minimization of destructive conflicts, and enlargement of the realm of freedom” (1969, p. 3). this emergent modal personality promises to make possible, in david graeber’s words, “. . . the creation of alternative forms of organization on a world scale, new forms of communication, new, less alienated ways of organizing life, which will, eventually, make currently existing forms of power seem stupid and beside the point” (2004, p. 40). dialogic education as a way of thinking about children and childhood and as a set of pedagogical and curricular practices emerged during the same half century as did its antithesis—universal, stateimposed and regulated, compulsory education. over the course of the 19th and 20th centuries the latter developed into an educational system devoted to a form of subjectification in the production of workers tooled to take their place in a hierarchical economic system for which the poverty of the many is considered necessary for the wealth of a few; of citizens conditioned to tolerate and participate in often corrupt quasi democratic practices that function to maintain that same economic system; of consumers conditioned to understand the material conditions imposed by that economic system as the only possible ones; and of so-called “patriots” willing to risk their lives in acts of stateinstigated violence and terror—whether in wars or police actions—designed primarily to maintain that system. dialogic education has, then, historically been working against the grain of standardized mass schooling, not only in its view of the nature, capacities and potentialities of children, but in its economic, political and social views, for which childhood becomes a promissory condition. dialogic education has followed its own developmental trajectory from its origins in pestalozzi’s rousseau-inspired innovations, through the progressive education movement and to its current formulation in the democratic education movement, whether as an enemy within the gates of standardized education or as expressed in innumerable alternative forms of schooling or unschooling. i want to highlight several key characteristics, gleaned from all those forms, of the dialogic school, and argue further that community of philosophical inquiry theory and practice as a form of post-socratic group dialogue, which emerged in the 1970’s, is a pedagogical praxis that offers analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 35 , issue 1 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 4 a grand operational template for dialogic education as a form of schooling. i would not want to claim that the characteristics of dialogic schooling that i identify are necessary and sufficient conditions for dialogic education per se—it could be that, whatever the historical and cultural form a school takes, the qualities of intentionality, transitionality, emergence, aesthetic temporality, interdisciplinarity and group deliberation, however encouraged and expressed, can be present. as for the quality of participatory democracy and sharing of power i am not so sure, which raises a whole host of problems that i cannot go into here. the characteristics i identify are as follows. an intentional community dialogic education understands school as an intentional community, specifically one in the form of an adult-child collective. as an intentional community, it is assumed that teaching and learning are two aspects of one process, which is present and operative both among teachers and students; that both understand the community of school as a site dedicated to transformation —personal, epistemological relational, institutional, cultural, and political. although different capacities, forms of intentionality and different knowledge bases, may be called on by adults and children, they share in the intentional community of school the practice of constructing new knowledge, and in the application of that knowledge in the real world. we may connect this common (in school) adult-child project with the arendtian concept of natality and the deweyan (and neuroscientific) concept of plasticity: the child embodies the concrete —in the form of actual neuronal networks, brain-based potentiality for new concepts, new understandings of the world— understandings that meet the need for adaptation to a constantly changing environment that we as a species are always facing. as such, the child represents the bridge across the gap between our present ontological and epistemological intuitions and convictions, and intuitions and convictions more suited to our emerging circumstances. the school is the place where both adult and child stand in this gap and work/play—the adult maieutically, the child creatively—on the ongoing reconstruction of our conceptualization of the natural and the social worlds. i understand this to be the basic project of the dialogic school. as such it is a futuristic institution—one that tends to interrupt rather than, as traditional schooling does, reinforce the routinization of daily life and the cultivation of cultural, economic and social fatalism. a transitional space as a transitional space, the dialogic school is the site where the reified distinctions between the “real” and the possible are interrupted and interrogated in the course of inquiry. it is most fully entered and expressed through the arts, literature, scientific and mathematic inquiry. transitional space is the space of the artist’s studio and the experimental laboratory, and the magical performative space of music and dance and theatre, as well as the group deliberative space of the kiva or council chamber—the space of what buber called “meeting.” it is the space of “extraordinary investigations,” of embodied inquiry, which implies that by definition it is based on themes and topics that are of analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 35 , issue 1 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 5 real interest to children, of which more in the next section. as a temporal zone, it is what gadamer (1975, p. 108) calls the “temporality of the aesthetic,” which he identifies with “pure presence,” and which dewey (2005) identifies with what he calls “consummatory experience.” we may simplify this somewhat by identifying it as a temporal space in which the interplay of the three kinds of lived time that have come to us from the greek language—chronos, kairos and aion, or clock time, ecstatic time (epiphany, manifestation) and “timeless” time—is not just allowed but encouraged, in the form of a variety of settings and activities, and adults primed for the mediation of children’s desire (or “impulse”) into meaningful projects. in fact there is a fourth word for a kind of temporality in greek, which comes to us from aristotle, and from which our word “school” descends: skole, which is typically translated as “leisure,” but which is perhaps better understood as “free time.” aristotle (ackrill, 1987, pp. 538–539; and see the most excellent masschelein & simons, 2013) distinguishes this form of lived time from work and from play and relaxation, which represent simply the absence of work. skole, free time, is the time of inquiry, and what contemporary play theorists, from erikson to vygotsky to csikszentmihalyi (2008) would call “deep play,” or “flow” today. the transitional is also the space in which we undertake, by way of critical and creative thinking and inquiry, the deconstruction and reconstruction of our epistemological universe; and we do that across all the disciplines. the transitional spaces between chemistry and physics and biology, mathematics, linguistics, anthropology, history, sociology, political science and economics is in fact one polyvocal analogical space. consider, for example, how an inquiry into the life and habitat of dolphins can involve all of these disciplines, and in such a way that the boundaries of each are pushed, such that we are forced, in this case, to reconsider the deep concepts in neuroscience, theory of language and communication, cognitive theory and intelligence, interspecies communication, and so on. and as i will argue below on the role of cpi, philosophical dialogue is the master-discourse of transitional interdisciplinary space, because it tends to find its way toward concepts that underlie the disciplines—concepts that are, as splitter and sharp (1995) have pointed out, common, central and contestable, like for example “fact,” or “observation,” or “cause,” or “proof” or “thinking” itself. an emergent curriculum school as the practice of transitional space implies an emergent curriculum, in which the form and content of what is studied is arrived at through teacher-student-parent dialogue and negotiation. in dialogic education, the curriculum must have room to follow up on the further implications it is constantly generating. it must allow for chaotic emergence. this suggests, but does not solely require, a curriculum organized around individual and group projects, as well as thoroughgoing differentiated instruction, allowing for learning through direct instruction, individual research, peer interaction, programmed computer instruction, web-based learning, flipped classroom & etc. the notion of emergent curriculum turns the simplistic but almost universally held notion of curriculum as a fixed body of knowledge to be delivered by a teacher on its head, and renders the role of the teacher an artist or artisan, and a prime interlocutor with children and childhood itself. it offers analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 35 , issue 1 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 6 one powerful solution to what freire (1965) called the “teacher-student contradiction,” in reconfiguring the two as inquirers, with complementary goals. a participary democracy school as a child-adult collective and intentional community requires a decision-making structure that allows for the full scope of deliberative, participatory democracy. as the democratic schools movement claims, full democratic process, in which power is shared and negotiated by the collective, is a necessary condition for the emergence and success of authentic democratic political forms and practices in the larger culture. here school is understood in the deweyan sense of embryonic society, in which adults and children work at what the democratic education movement calls “conscious social reproduction” of a political form, through—again dewey (1916)—cultivating “social democracy,” democratic process taken to the level of everyday life: direct democracy. in the dialogic school students themselves, in the company of teachers, investigate and impose sanctions in disciplinary matters, negotiate curriculum, make and remake community rules—in self described democratic schools, this is accomplished through the well-known “weekly meeting”—and deliberate on political issues, both internal and external to the school. a community of philosophical inquiry finally, i am suggesting that dialogic education finds its most complete form in the overarching, ongoing practice of communal dialogue—a practice that is realized in its most clarified form in community of philosophical inquiry (cpi). this assumes an understanding of the practice of philosophy as an ongoing interactive, embodied, polyphonic conversation, dedicated to the reconstruction of beliefs—about self, other, justice, human and animal, god(s), conditions of truth, the nature and status of knowledge claims, ethics and morality, beauty and the good, happiness, the supernatural, technology, and so on. and as suggested above, there is the further assumption that these beliefs underlie/inform/are a dimension of/provide a framework for the universe of concepts through which we approach the disciplines—measurement, fact, truth and validity, causality, objectivity, falsifiability, and so on. in the dialogic school, cpi is the master-practice that trains us in the critical, creative and valuing skills and dispositions with which we reconstruct the disciplines as we inquire, thus breaking down the historical barriers between them; with which we govern our intentional community through deep democratic process; and through which we pursue the ongoing clarification of belief and the interrogation of philosophical assumptions that promises a reconstruction of epistemological and ontological convictions that better match an emergent future. cpi is where the various narratives of the members of the school community intersect and where they are voiced. as such it is a collective “sounding” space and a space of intersubjective revelation. it is also an epistemological space in which those new meanings that emerge from the skole (the free time) of the dialogic school open up to view—new ways of understanding the natural world and our analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 35 , issue 1 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 7 relation to it, new ways of understanding the potential and the limits of direct democracy, and new ways of understanding the relationship between knowledge and action. as i have already argued, it is conceivable that the characteristics of dialogic education described here could be expressed in any given traditional form of schooling in less conscious and systematic ways; and it is probable that even in a traditional school some teachers, given a modicum of professional autonomy, will incorporate one or more of these characteristics in their individual classrooms, thus leading to a mixed picture. perhaps what i am trying to articulate here is the platonic “form” of the dialogic school. on the other hand, platonic forms are by definition unrealizable in the material world, whereas these characteristics are and have been realizable. many further questions remain. is there one characteristic that cannot be done without—participatory democracy, perhaps? how much, having one, does one have the others—that is, how mutually implicative are they? how vulnerable are they to the perverse contingencies of human embodiment; for example, are they at risk when a teacher or a school has a “bad year,” or a “bad group” of children? do they in fact represent limit conditions, unattainable in everyday practice, and thus indeed must be characterized as a platonic form? do they translate across history and culture, and if not, how liable are they to culturally relativist critique? how liable to the post-modern critique of humanism (biesta, 2006)? and no doubt more questions remain. meanwhile, how concretely applicable are they to the “real” world? that is, could they be implemented tomorrow in a setting with sufficient resources, by individuals who fully understood them and were committed to their realization? it seems to me that the history of dialogic education, from its inception as counterpoint to mass, state imposed and regulated schooling to its current expressions today, is testimony both to its practicability and its durability, grounded as it is, not just in lived experience, but in the evolutionary aspirations of the human species. endnotes 1. for a more complete discussion of this concept, see my “child and fool in the western wisdom tradition,” in kennedy 2006b, pp. 45-68. 2. again, see kennedy 2006a and 2006b for a fuller discussion. 3. this ideal could also be stated, following winnicott (1971), as an adult who is more capable of negotiating “transitional space,” and following schiller (1965), as an adult who is more sensitive to the “play impulse,” which in marcuse’s rendition is related to the emergence of “sensuous reason.” references abrams, m.h. (1971). natural supernaturalism: tradition and revolution in romantic literature. new york: norton. ackrill, j.l. ed. (1987). a new aristotle reader. princeton nj: princeton university press. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 35 , issue 1 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 8 arendt, h. (1958). the human condition. chicago: university of chicago press. biesta, g. (2006). beyond learning: democratic education for a human future. paradigm press. csikszentmihalyi, m (2008). flow: the psychology of everyday experience. new york: harper. dewey, j. (1916). democracy and education. new york: macmillan. dewey, j. (1934). experience and education. new york: macmillan. dewey, j. (1988/1922). human nature and conduct. carbondale il: southern illinois university press. dewey, j. (2005). art as experience. new york: perigee. erikson, e.h. (1963). childhood and society. new york: norton. freire, p. (1968). pedagogy of the oppressed. new york: seabury. gadamer, h-g. (1975). truth and method. new york: crossroad. graeber, d. (2004). fragments of an anarchist anthopology. chicago: prickly paradigm press. kennedy, d. (2006a). the well of being: childhood, subjectivity, and education. albany: suny press. kennedy, d. (2006b). changing conceptions of childhood from the renaissance to post-modernity: a philosophy of childhood. lewiston ny: the edwin mellen press (available at academia.edu). kennedy, d. (2014). neoteny, dialogic education, and an emergent psychoculture: notes on theory and practice. journal of philosophy of education 48,1 (feb). lyotard, j.f. (1992). mainmise. philosophy today 36,4 (winter): 419-427. marcuse, h. (1969). an essay on liberation. boston: beacon press. masschelein, j. & simons (2013). in defense of the school: a public issue. trans. j. mcmartin. leuven: e-ducation, culture & society publishers. montagu, a. (1989). growing young. second edition. new york: bergin & garvey. novalis (1989). pollen and fragments, trans. a. versluis. grand rapids mi: phanes press. ozmon, h.a. & s.m. craver (2008). philosophical foundations of education. eighth edition. upper saddle river nj: pearson. schiller, f. (1965/1795). on the aesthetic education of man. trans. reginald snell. new york: frederick ungar, 1965. schiller, f. (1966) naive and sentimental poetry & on the sublime: two essays. new york: norton. splitter, l. & a. sharp (1995). teaching for better thinking. melbourne: acer. suissa, j. (2010). anarchism and education: a philosophical perspective. oakland, ca: pm press. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 35 , issue 1 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 9 vygotsky, l. (1978). mind in society. cambridge: harvard university press. winnicott, d.w. (1971). playing and reality. new york: basic books. address correspondences to: david kennedy, department of educational foundations montclair state university kennedyd@mail.montclair.edu analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.2 1 developing communities of inquiry in the uk: retrospect and prospect patrick j.m. costello introduction my aim in this article is to offer a critical evaluation of the development of communities of inquiry in the uk, with particular reference to the teaching of philosophy in schools. the paper is divided into four sections. in the first, i examine some key aspects from an historical perspective. the second section focuses on the question: ‘should children be taught to think philosophically?’ having discussed the teaching of philosophical thinking in the uk, i outline a typical example of a dialogue undertaken with primary school pupils. finally, i consider future prospects for developing communities of inquiry. developing communities of inquiry in the uk: retrospect i first became interested in the teaching of critical thinking in the early 1980s. at that time, my research focused principally on issues within the philosophy of education. in particular, i was concerned to examine the concept of ‘indoctrination’, to contrast it with terms such as ‘education’, ‘training’, schooling’ etc. and to explore the extent to which indoctrinatory practices are evident in schools. as i progressed through the extensive literature on ‘indoctrination’, i became increasingly dissatisfied with analyses of the concept, offered by philosophers of education and others, who argued that it is necessarily a pejorative term, denoting, for example, unworthy intentions and teaching methodologies. in this, it was thought to be distinctive from ‘education’, which was viewed, by definition, as a ‘good’ thing, engaged in by well-meaning and enlightened individuals. as i have argued elsewhere (costello, 2000), an adequate analysis of the concept of ‘indoctrination’ is rather more complex than much of the literature indicates. while it is certainly true that indoctrination is, at least in some sense, an ‘illness’ which permeates educational institutions, i suggested that it is also unavoidable (and therefore justifiable) in certain contexts. furthermore, given the current prevalence of references to ‘indoctrination’ and ‘indoctrinatory teaching’ in the educational press and elsewhere, both nationally and internationally (see spillius, 2009 and harnden, 2009 for an example of the latter), it is essential that student teachers and their more experienced colleagues should develop a sound understanding of this concept and consider the implications which this may have for their practice in schools. utilising the metaphor of an ‘illness’ to understand some of the forms and functions of indoctrination within educational settings was useful because it led me to seek a ‘cure’ or ‘antidote’ for them. having made a distinction between justifiable and unjustifiable indoctrination and developed the view that certain indoctrinatory outcomes of the teaching process are to be combated, i looked for an appropriate educational vehicle to accomplish this task. in order to be successful, it seemed to me that any such approach would need to contain appropriate pedagogic materials which: (1) enabled children to learn the skills of thinking, reasoning and argument, and (2) were underpinned by a sound theoretical foundation. it was at this point that i became aware of matthew lipman’s ‘philosophy for children’ programme through his thinking: the journal of philosophy for children. coming from a background of philosophy myself, i immediately warmed to the idea that young children should be exposed to the teaching of logical, ethical (and more general philosophical) reasoning at a young age. subsequently, i developed my own approach to the teaching of philosophy in primary schools, and undertook analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.2 2 classroom-based research, the results of which were reported in my doctoral thesis (costello 1990). in 1992, i participated in the twelfth annual international conference on critical thinking and educational reform, which was held at sonoma state university in california. attended by some 1250 delegates, the conference lays claim to being the largest forum for the discussion of critical thinking in the world. according to the conference proceedings, 289 presentations were made by contributors from australia, great britain, canada, chile, korea, south africa, switzerland and the usa. while many participants argued for the introduction of a ‘thinking skills’ curriculum into schools, it was only on seeing the substantial number of books on the subject, which were on sale at the conference, that i came to understand the extent to which teaching thinking has become an integral part of educational provision in the usa and elsewhere. while british research output on the teaching of critical thinking has not been as substantial as that in the usa, over the last two decades a number of major publications have appeared. the first two of these (coles and robinson 1989; fisher 1990), present accounts of the major approaches to the subject and these have been followed by several texts which offer more individualistic approaches to practice (fox 1996; fisher,1996, 1998; quinn 1997; murris, 1992; costello, 2000). more recently, books have been published which focus on how to teach thinking and learning skills (simister, 2007); learning through enquiry and dialogue in the primary classroom (haynes, 2008); developing thinking and understanding in young children (robson, 2006); thinking skills in education (mcgregor, 2007); philosophy for children (bowles, 2008); philosophy in schools (hand and winstanley, 2009); and philosophy with teenagers (hannam and echeverria, 2009). all of these publications have at their core a concern that schools and other educational settings should provide an appropriate environment in which children’s thinking and valuing processes may be supported and enhanced. in an earlier article published in this journal (costello, 2007a), i suggested that the concept of a ‘community of inquiry’ is now widely used by educators, whose aim is to enable their pupils (or students) to develop and demonstrate an ability to think, reason and argue effectively, both orally and in writing. i referred to the work of matthew lipman and his colleagues, who have offered their own conception of a ‘community of inquiry’ (lipman et al., 1980). the development of communities of inquiry in the uk, in the context of teaching philosophy in schools, has been strongly influenced by lipman’s work. should children be taught to think philosophically? as i have argued elsewhere (costello, 2000), philosophy (by which i mean a thorough endeavour to develop, clarify, justify and apply our thinking, principally, though not exclusively, with regard to the teaching of logical and ethical reasoning), provides an ideal means by which teachers may encourage children to articulate views, express arguments and reflect on their own thinking and that of others. at first glance, the claim that children should be introduced to philosophy, as i have defined it, is a remarkable one. the sceptic might be forgiven, then, for reacting with incredulity to the argument which i have advanced suggesting that children are capable of engaging in philosophical discourse from the early years of their education. however, several writers have argued convincingly that this is so. perhaps the most well known book in this area is philosophy and the young child by gareth matthews, in which he cites a number of instances of children displaying philosophical puzzlement. for example, ursula (three years, four months) says: “i have a pain in my tummy”. her mother replies: “you lie down and go to sleep and your pain will go away”. ursula retorts: “where will it go?” (matthews 1980, p. 17). according to matthews: “ursula’s question – ‘where will it go?’ is an invitation to philosophical reflection. one can accept the invitation or not, as one chooses’ (p. 18). all too often, adults are unwilling or unable to engage children in such reflection. historically speaking, the teaching of philosophy in british schools has been advocated against an educational backcloth that has hardly been conducive to its development (costello, 2000). the advent of the national curriculum, with its strong emphasis on the acquisition of subject knowledge, its adherence to attainment analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.2 3 targets and levels of attainment, and its advocacy of a broad spectrum of study across disciplines, has meant that teachers have had little opportunity to foster an intellectual environment in which critical thinking might flourish in the classroom. consequently, the discussion of philosophical ideas has been (and continues to be) a seriously neglected element in the education of children. no doubt a major reason for this unfortunate state of affairs is a widespread acceptance of the notion that such children are simply not equal to the task, since they are largely incapable of the mature reflection and rational thought which philosophy presupposes (see, for example, levine, 1983 and gazzard, 1983). philosophy, it is argued, belongs to the later years of secondary education, if not to universities and colleges. given this (and before arguments for the teaching of philosophy in schools could be advanced and educational programmes developed), it was necessary for proponents of such teaching to counter the view that philosophy is exclusively the preserve of the adult mind. this view is by no means recent in origin, having been espoused by both plato and aristotle. in the republic, plato argues that dialectic (philosophy) can only be introduced to those who have completed many years of training and study and who have reached the age of thirty. he suggests that to introduce philosophy at an earlier age is fraught with difficulties: and there’s one great precaution you can take which is to stop their getting a taste of [philosophical discussions] too young. you must have noticed how young men, after their first taste of argument, are always contradicting people just for the fun of it: they imitate those whom they hear cross-examining each other, and themselves cross-examine other people, like puppies who love to pull and tear at anyone within reach (1974, book 7, 539b). aristotle argues that the young lack the requisite experience of living to profit from his lectures on politics (to which ethics is a kind of introduction). in their contributions to philosophical discussions, the young merely echo the pronouncements of others. this is in contrast to their ability to become competent in mathematics, the truths of which are derived without recourse to experience: one might further ask why it is that a lad may become a mathematician, but not a philosopher or a natural scientist. probably it is because the former subject deals with abstractions, whereas the principles of the two latter are grasped only as the result of experience; and the young repeat the doctrines of these without actually believing them, but in mathematics the reason why is not hard to see (1976, book 6, chapter 8, 1142a, 16-19). more recently, several well-known professional philosophers have argued against the possible inclusion of philosophy in the curricula of schools. for example, in her book a common policy for education, mary warnock (1988) suggests that philosophy is properly the preserve of the university undergraduate. her comments are, at times, both platonic and aristotelian in flavour. to begin with, we are told that philosophy is not ‘an appropriate subject for study by pupils at school’ (p. 57). warnock offers the following statement to support this thesis: i do not think it possible to study philosophy profitably without entering fairly deeply into the history of the subject, and for this there is not time at school, nor could it be a subject that would interest more than a few pupils. instant philosophy, philosophy that springs into being in the bath or on the television screen, is fun, but it can hardly be serious (p. 57). rather than being introduced to philosophy at school, warnock suggests that it is preferable for pupils to acquire a thorough grounding in and sound understanding of subjects such as mathematics, literature, history and so on, to which the tools of philosophy may be applied at a later date. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.2 4 what are we to make of warnock’s arguments? it seems to me that they are unconvincing because they contain assumptions which are both unargued and untenable. we need to ask the following questions: (1) in order to engage in philosophy, why is it necessary to enter “fairly deeply into the history of the subject?” (2) why should philosophy be thought to be of interest only to a few pupils? (3) must philosophy be serious to the exclusion of fun? with regard to the first question, i see no reason to assert that children who are being introduced to philosophy must imbibe, at the same time, a deep knowledge of the history of the discipline. indeed, i can think of nothing which is more likely to provoke disinterest in the neophyte philosopher than this approach. on the one hand, the pupil is asked to engage in a discussion of ideas which are both new and exciting. on the other, he or she is to be given a history lesson involving a ‘roll-call’ of famous names accompanied by a résumé of their main texts and theories. this is not to denigrate the importance of the history of philosophy. it is simply to indicate that philosophy is first and foremost an activity it is something one does. furthermore, i would suggest, children are fascinated initially by philosophical inquiry precisely because it is so different from anything else which they are offered in the school curriculum. to identify this new subject too closely with a more familiar (and perhaps unpalatable) discipline is to run the risk of the former being rejected by the pupil along with the latter. protagonists of ‘children’s philosophy’ believe that it is possible (and indeed desirable) to engage in philosophical discussions with young children without requiring them to be imbued with an historical knowledge of the discipline. turning to the second question, warnock offers us no evidence to support her contention that philosophy will be of interest only to a small minority of pupils. indeed, the entire history of philosophy for children serves to refute this argument. one has only to witness young children discussing philosophical issues to see how keen they are to talk, to debate, to reason, in short, to participate in a community of inquiry. on the other hand, the argument that only a few children might become attracted to ‘philosophy’, as articulated by warnock, is all too understandable. in her view, whatever else one is doing when one is discussing philosophical issues, one is certainly not having fun. yet one of the reasons why the children to whom i have taught philosophy over the years looked forward to our sessions is precisely because they enjoyed the discussions so much. in undertaking research for my doctoral thesis (costello 1990), i taught philosophy to children in three primary schools. before concluding my work, i asked children what they thought about our discussions. in response to the statement ‘what i like about philosophy is…’, i received comments such as: you are free to say what you feel about situations. • we all do it together. you get a chance to speak. • i like the puzzles and the arguments and the discussions. • talking with each other. • that it is good listening to other people’s verdicts and arguments.• because we don’t have to write and i am a slow writer. and we discuss things more and don’t just leave • it at one answer. talking about everything around us.• in arguing for the existence of a dichotomy between those activities which are serious and those which are ‘fun’, warnock reminds me of the stern elementary school teacher who demarcated rigidly between ‘work’ and ‘play’, and who saw the latter as important only insofar as it enabled children to engage in their studies with renewed vigour. what warnock offers us is simply her own conception of what the study of philosophy should involve. this view must stand or fall on its ability to compete with alternative conceptions, such as those offered by lipman and other protagonists of philosophy for (or with) children.1 warnock’s stand-point is both narrow analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.2 5 and restrictive: it encapsulates neither what philosophy can be nor what children can achieve (see costello, 2000 and part one of hand and winstanley, 2009, for additional discussion of this theme). teaching philosophical thinking in the uk as a pre-requisite for developing effective programmes for the teaching philosophical thinking in the uk, it was necessary to undertake critical reflection concerning three key theoretical issues (costello, 2000; 2007a; 2007b): offering an evaluation of some of the central theoretical foundations of lipman’s philosophy for chil-• dren programme. exploring a potential obstacle to promoting effective thinking in children: the problem of indoctrina-• tion in educational settings. offering a robust and convincing response to the question: ‘how can supporters of children’s philoso-• phy convince the sceptic that what is taking place in the classroom is genuinely philosophical?’ in a review of michael pritchard’s book, philosophical adventures with children (1985), miller attempts to counter the most potent criticism which has been made of the ‘philosophy for children’ movement, namely that it fails to refute the popular view that ‘children are utterly incapable of real philosophical thinking’ (1986, p. 46). in order to do this, he catalogues the means by which advocates of lipman’s philosophy for children programme can seek to convince others that they are successful in enhancing philosophical thought in their students. he suggests that: “previous evidence for the success of the programme can he roughly divided into three categories: (1) the testimony of those who have used the programme, (2) tapes and transcripts of actual sessions, (3) the results of objective tests [undertaken] by children exposed to the programme” (p. 46). miller discusses the third category only briefly, since, as he says, there are no objective tests to assess the quality of philosophical reasoning. a number of tests in other subjects, e.g. reading, mathematics and critical reasoning, may be offered to children, both before and after they have studied philosophy, in order to indicate the extent to which this study has improved their performance in other academic subjects. however, such tests tell us little about children’s progress in philosophy itself. the obvious difficulty with teachers’ testimony as a means of demonstrating children’s philosophical ability is, as miller recognises, that such testimony can be based on selective bias. this may be true inasmuch as teachers, either wittingly or unwittingly, succumb to the temptation to include only that evidence which is conducive to the fulfilment of their expectations. indeed, in the absence of further proof, teachers become susceptible to the charge that many, if not all, of their findings are, at least to some extent, exaggerated. consequently, it is incumbent on protagonists of children’s philosophy to offer substantial transcripts of taped discussions. such an approach is important because the difficulties associated with selective bias are minimized. of course, they may not be avoided completely, since it is possible, and indeed necessary, to offer transcripts of selected audioor videotapes. to circumvent this problem, the researcher should be expected to provide evidence that a number of children’s dialogues have taken place. one familiar problem remains. this concerns the possibility that, having examined the transcript of a philosophical discussion, the sceptic may simply dismiss it as ‘children talking’. in other words, the philosophical nature of many of the comments made may pass unnoticed. as miller points out: “pritchard is well aware of the probability that someone who does not quite know what to look for and or doesn’t want to see it, will not find genuine philosophical insights in the children’s conversations without help” (p. 47). in order to provide assistance in this matter, pritchard punctuates children’s dialogues with his own commentaries, indicating where philosophical problems are being examined. thus, it becomes extremely difficult for the sceptic to assert that the subject matter of philosophy is not central to the discussions. miller’s comment is apposite here: a sceptic could he exposed to examples of good philosophical discussions by children and come away unconvinced. she could fail to see the philosophical content of an actual conversation due to her own analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.2 6 prejudice and/or lack of training... by providing plenty of commentary pritchard minimised the likelihood that the philosophical content of the transcripts he reproduced will not be seen (p. 47). this is the approach i have adopted in undertaking my research in primary schools. in so doing, my aim has been to suggest that the disdain shown by some professional philosophers towards what takes place in the classroom in the name of ‘philosophy’ is unwarranted. annotating dialogues should ensure that readers are able to judge how proponents of children’s philosophising themselves view the work presented, in terms of its content and quality. if, as a result of this rigorous approach, differing perspectives are articulated concerning whether or not what is taking place in schools is genuinely philosophical, then at least the debate will be well informed by the evidence that has been gathered. the best way to refute arguments against the teaching of philosophy in schools is to show in some detail that children are able to engage, in a competent fashion, in philosophical debate and argument. this i have demonstrated elsewhere, in the context of the primary school (e.g. costello 1995; 2000). my own approach to teaching philosophy in schools has involved four aspects. firstly, i have written a number of short stories, involving three children who inhabit a fantasy world. a second method of engaging children in philosophical reflection is to offer them samples of reasoning (embedded in logical, ethical and more general philosophical problems) to discuss. thirdly, diagrammatic representation (e.g. overhead projector transparencies and powerpoint slides) may be used to initiate discussions. this is particularly important for children who are poor readers but whose reasoning ability may be as good as, or better than, that of their peers. finally, more recently, i have begun to write narratives that encompass the life of the contemporary classroom (costello, 2007a). related to this work (and in keeping with a continuing focus on the development of communities of enquiry in education), i have also undertaken research and publication on the theory and practice of argument (andrews, costello, and clarke, 1993; costello and mitchell, 1995), and personal, social and moral education (bowen and costello, 1996-1997). my response to the question ‘should children be taught to think philosophically?’ is an unequivocal ‘yes’. philosophical training must he given to children at an early age (see ridley, 2006), since without it they will merely appropriate the standard (and often unreasoned) beliefs and opinions prevalent in their immediate environment. the teaching of philosophy to children can do much to counteract the prejudices and uncritical thinking which are a fact of everyday adult life. it is the responsibility of the philosopher, one of whose tasks is to clarify our thinking, to initiate such teaching. in order to illustrate how this might take place, i offer the following dialogue with a class of 10and 11-yearold children, who discuss issues raised by the question ‘what makes you you?’ (see appendix 1). contributions made by pupils whom i have not been able to identify have been included without attribution. one of the aims of my commentary in the text is to make connections between the arguments children offer and those employed by professional philosophers. indeed this exercise is based on reuben abel’s man is the measure: a cordial invitation to the central problems of philosophy (1976), which was the first book it was suggested that i should read when i began to study philosophy, as an undergraduate, in the late 1970s.2 pc: ‘what makes you you?’ is the question we are going to discuss, and the first thing ian said was what? ian: the personality. pc: the personality. what do you mean by that, lan? can you say a little bit more to me about that? ian: what makes you you is there’s a decision, and the decision you make on that, that’s your personality. that’s what you would say. that’s what that person would say. pc: ok. ian: that’s their personality. pc: excellent. michael? michael: your soul. pc: what’s a soul, michael? analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.2 7 michael: the personality, you, what makes you you. pc: it’s your soul. that’s a very interesting thought. any other thoughts? what were you going to say, christopher? christ. s.: i was going to say that myself. pc: you were going to say ‘soul’ as well? christ. s.: shall i tell you why? pc: yes. i want to know why. christ. s.: because we were doing topic-work about aidan and miss g said ‘what does…’ well, actually, it was st cuthbert, but he saw the soul of st aidan. so miss g asked us what the soul was and we eventually came up with that your soul is what makes you you. (comment) this view competes with that offered by clarence durrow, in his well-known article ‘the myth of the soul’. darrow (1972, p.291) suggests that ‘there is, perhaps, no more striking example of the credulity of man than the widespread belief in immortality. this idea includes not only the belief that death is not the end of what we call life, but that personal identity involving memory persists beyond the grave… if it is not certain that death ends personal identity and memory, then almost nothing that man accepts as true is susceptible to proof’. furthermore, moseley (2008, p. 209) notes that ‘while early modern philosophers felt the need to agree in the existence of soul from social or political pressures or mere force of habitual indoctrination, by the nineteenth century, atheists and sceptics were stripping the concept apart with [gilbert] ryle arguing that it is merely a ‘ghost in the machine’, a non-existent imaginative creation of our own mind’. see also: braddonmitchell and jackson (2007), matthews (2005) and sorabji (2006). pc: oh super. so i’ve ... come upon a subject that you’ve already touched on before. did miss g ask you what the soul looks like? chorus: yes. terry: yes, but you can’t see it. pc: terry? terry: you can’t see it. pc: well, i can’t see my liver either, can i, eve? but i have a good idea what my liver looks like. ___ it’s invisible. pc: it’s invisible. [laughter] pc: what do you think, helen? helen: it’s a ghost-like figure that you can’t touch. pc: a ghost-like figure that you can’t touch. christopher? christ. s.: nobody actually knows what it looks like because nobody has seen one... well, cuthbert saw one, but he didn’t... he thinks he saw one. but he didn’t actually explain what it was. well, he did, but... [laughter] pc: but what? i’ve lost that bit. ___ there’s lots of different stories. there’s some stories ... some books say he saw this and some books say he saw something else. so, you don’t actually know what he saw. pc: so, let me ask you this: if we don’t know what the soul looks like and if cuthbert thinks he saw one, but we’re not sure whether he did, how do we know that what makes you you is your soul? how do we know that? what’s our... what am i looking for? (comment) here my aim is to establish appropriate grounds for claims to knowledge. see baggini (2002, chapter 1); law (2007, pp. 49-63). ___ explanation. pc: explanation or…? analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.2 8 ___ argument. pc: argument or ... ? ___ reason. pc: reason or ... ? ___ proof. pc: what’s our proof that, in fact, we have a soul? what’s our proof? because you just said to me ‘what makes you you is the soul.’ and i’m saying to you: ‘well, no one has seen that.’ have you seen your soul, sarah? [sarah shakes her head] pc: not at all? not even once? no? [sarah shakes her head] pc: have you seen your soul, louise? louise: no. pc: no? have you seen your soul, scott? scott: no, because no one knows what it looks like. pc: well, if no one knows what it looks like, how do we know we have a soul, christopher? christ. s.: i don’t know, but i think i’ve heard of ‘soul’ meaning... pc: meaning? christ. s.: like you were sort of on your own. ian: that’s ‘solo’. [laughter] pc: well let’s leave this idea of a soul for a moment. what other answers might we give to this question: ‘what makes you you?’, christopher? christ. s.: how tall you are, the colour of your eyes, how big your ears are, how big your nose is. (comment) christopher subscribes to the philosophical view that the problem of personal identity can be resolved by referring to an individual’s bodily features. ___ how big your mouth is. pc: ok, jenny? jenny: heritage. pc: heritage. say something about that to me, jenny. jenny: it makes you look how your mother and father look. (comment) reuben abel (1976, p.188) asks: ‘is ancestry part of the person? the genes you inherit from your parents, and which were fixed at the moment of your conception, will normally be transmitted unchanged to your descendants.’ pc: ok, christopher? christ. s.: well, i think it could be your brain, because your brain makes you do things, and your brain makes your decisions. pc: all right. any other thoughts on what makes you you? ben? ben: your bones, because if you didn’t have any bones, you’d be floppy. pc: your bones. yes. and some people... say: ‘i’ve got large bones,’ and some people say: ‘i’ve got small bones.’ ok. let me ask you this, then. let us say you decided this evening: ‘oh well, i’ve had enough of wearing the same old clothes that i always wear. on saturday, i’m going to go into town and i’m going to buy myself some new clothes.’ and you go into town and you spend a fortune buying some new clothes. but the thing about these new clothes is they are not at all like any other clothes that you previously liked. let’s say your favourite colour used to be blue; you decide: ‘everything i buy is going to be black.’ let’s say your favourite fabric was silk; you say to yourself: ‘no more silk for me leather.’ and you put your new clothes on and you’re walking in the city analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.2 9 centre, and you’re feeling very happy with yourself. and then you say to yourself: ‘i know. i am going to have a new hair-do. lots of people compliment me on my ginger hair, but i’m going to have a change. i’m going to go blonde. lots of people have complimented me on my curly hair. i’m going to have a change and i’m going to have it all straightened out. i don’t want to be blonde any more. i’m going to go dark.’ now, imagine that you went into town and you bought a lot of new clothes, you went into the hairdresser’s and you got a new hair-do, a new hair-style. would you be the same person? (comment) in discussing personal identity, john hospers (1989, p.410) asks: ‘“under what conditions is x the same self, or the same person as before?” that is, what mental or physical changes can occur in mr x without his ceasing to be mr x?’ similarly, law (2007, p.123) asks: ‘when we look through photograph albums, we see photos of ourselves at different stages in life. what makes each of these individuals the same person?’. for an extensive examination of the concept of ‘personal identity’, see noonan (2003). ___ yeah. ___ no, you wouldn’t have any money left. [laughter] pc: that would be one difference. you would have no money left, but would you be the same person, do you think, jenny? jenny: inside you would but outside you wouldn’t. pc: can you say a little bit more to me about that? jenny: well, say you were a very nice person. pc: yes. pc: you’d still be a very nice person, but you’ve just had a new hair-do and got new clothes. (comment) jenny suggests that the notion of ‘personal identity’ incorporates both mental and physical aspects. pc: so, you are a different person on the outside, for you. what do you say, christopher? christ. s.: well, if ... you took everything off and cut all your hair off, if you did it with your new image and your old image, you’d still look the same. pc: except for the hair... ian: you wouldn’t have any hair, would you? pc: let’s say i go on a diet. i say to myself: ‘no more sweets for me.’ ___ no more ‘mars’ bars. pc: i like sweets, so it’s very unlikely i’m going to do that. but let’s say i do, and come in to you in a month’s time and i say: ‘i’ve lost two stones. i feel like a new person.’ am i? ___ no, you’re not. pc: am i a new person, abigail? abigail? no, because you can’t change what you are inside. pc: what can’t you change then? give me some examples. that’s a very good comment. give me some examples of what you can’t change. because you’ve said i can change my hairstyle, i can change my figure, i can change my clothes. what can’t i change, abigail? abigail: you can’t change your personality. pc: can you not? ian: you could because you could stop doing what you used to do and do other things. pc: can you give me an example of that? (comment) as this part of the dialogue demonstrates, asking questions, inviting participants to reflect critically on the views they have expressed and requesting examples to illustrate their thinking are essential to the teaching of philosophy. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.2 10 ian: well, say you never ever took white sugar, you always have brown sugar in your tea or whatever. pc: ok. ian: and you hated coffee. pc: yes. ian: then you started having coffee and never have tea, or always have white sugar... pc: yes. ian: that would be changing your personality, in a way. pc: ok carl? carl: i think what makes you you is your philosophy of the world. the decisions you make. (comment) carl argues that a person’s mental functions are central to his or her personal identity. pc: ok. so, it’s your personal philosophy of the world that makes you you. well, let’s say, talking about abigail’s point that you can’t change what’s inside, let’s say i’m a liar, and let’s say i’m a thief, and let’s say i’m a bully. and, consequently, i’m not very popular, as you can imagine. but one day i go home and i say to myself: ‘from now on i’m not going to be like that any more. i’m never going to tell any more lies. i’m never going to steal things that do not belong to me, take things that do not belong to me, and i’m not going to bully anyone any more.’ have i not changed inside and therefore become a different person, carla? carla: in a way it is inside, those feelings of kindness, instead of being just like a bully. pc: so, have i become a different person, carla? carla: not entirely a different person. pc: ok. carla: because on the outside you have changed, though on the inside you’ve probably changed. (comment) carla distinguishes between one’s overt behaviour and one’s disposition to act in a particular way, which may be motivated by a number of different considerations. as shakespeare’s richard ill (act 3, scene 1) notes wryly: ‘nor more can you distinguish of a man/than of his outward show, which, god he knows/seldom or never jumpeth with the heart’. pc: ok. christ.: you’re not an entirely different person unless you’re born again... because you’re always you, aren’t you? (comment) christopher suggests that bodily activity is constitutive of personal identity. as anthony o’hear (1985: 244) notes, this view concurs with that adopted both in law and in everyday life. pc: ok. i’ll come back to that point. a very good point. christopher? christ. s.: well, i couldn’t say to myself: ‘i want to be like paul r’ ... and anyway, even if you stopped being a bully and was really nice, you’ve changed what you do but you haven’t changed how you speak and what your eye colour is, and things like that. so, you’ve just sort of changed a bit of you. pc: let’s say i said to myself: ‘not only am i going to change my hairstyle and my clothes, but i’m also going to change my personality. i am going to behave differently towards people from now on.’ so i’ve made some outward changes and some inward changes. am i now a totally different person, christopher? christ. s.: no, because... it’s hard to explain really but you are not a new person because you’re still you. you’re still you aren’t you? pc: right. well, let me push you a little bit more. imagine that i’m poorly... my heart isn’t working very well ... let’s say i need a new heart. and the surgeon at the royal infirmary rings me up and says: ‘mr. costello, we have a new heart for you. i am going to perform the operation tomorrow morning.’ analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.2 11 tomorrow evening i wake up, open my eyes, look around me, see familiar sights. i feel quite well. on the other hand, i’ve got someone else’s heart inside me, haven’t i? so does that mean, terry, that i’m a different person? (comment) the relationship between organ transplantation and personal identity is discussed in lamb (1985, pp.89-90) and baggini (2002, pp.81-82). terry: you’re yourself ... you’re the same person, except you’ve got a different heart. pc: but i might have mr smith’s heart. i’ve got a part of mr smith inside me. doesn’t that mean i’m a different person? terry: no. pc: jill? jiil: you’re still the same. pc: ok. abigail: well, you can’t change your brain. (comment) the notion of brain transplantation has been the subject of much philosophical discussion. see, for example, shoemaker (1963); o’hear (1985, pp.246-53). as baggini (2002, pp. 81-82) notes: ‘we know people can continue to live with transplanted and synthetic organs and limbs. so what if we could be entirely replaced by such body parts? isn’t this compatible with survival? because of this, most defenders of this view [that continuity of bodily existence alone is necessary and sufficient for identity] say that the crucial organ is the brain, as this controls thought. everything else could be replaced but not the brain’. pc: go on. you can’t change your brain. i’m interested in that line. right, have a think about that and i’ll come back to you. helen? helen: well, even if you have got mr smith’s heart, all your heart does is pump blood round your body. so, in a way, you can’t change your personality from that. (comment) unlike a number of patients who have received transplanted hearts, helen does not believe that the recipient of such an organ is likely to acquire certain personality-traits of the donor (see lamb, 1985, pp.89-90). recently in the uk, a newspaper article entitled ‘transplant made me obsessed with chores’, reported the case of a man who ‘developed a cleaning obsession after the transplant of a cornea that he says “must have come from a woman”’. having previously left household tasks to his partner, the man added: i can now notice every speck of dust and dirt and can’t help but have a go at cleaning it up as i go along’ (cockcroft, 2009, p. 7). pc: ok. carl? carl: your attitude makes you different. like yesterday, when we were doing those votes, not everybody got the same answer. people had different views on what was good and what was bad. pc: that’s right ... christopher? christ. s.: even if you did have your heart changed, you’d still have your skin the same, so you’d still be the same person. and you couldn’t really change all of you. you couldn’t get all the rest of somebody else’s body because your body would be somebody else. [laughter] pc: right, let me give you this example. joanna goes out to afternoon break and she’s playing. she falls over on the yard and bangs her head on the concrete, and is knocked unconscious. when she wakes up, she can’t remember who she is, what her name is. she can’t remember any of you. she doesn’t know who miss g is. she doesn’t know who i am and, what’s more, she cannot even remember anything about her past life. now, roddy, is she the same person? (comment) memory has also been advanced as a criterion of personal identity. see abel (1976, pp. 191-192); hospers (1989, pp.413-415); o’hear (1985, pp. 243-253); baggini (2002, pp.80-81). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.2 12 roddy: yes. pc: so, if i said ‘what’s your name?’ she says: ‘i don’t know.’ how many brothers and sisters have you got? ___ she wouldn’t be able to speak. joanna: none. pc: none. any sisters? joanna: one. pc: right, let’s say, i’ll ask her: ‘how many sisters have you got?’ and she says ‘l don’t know.’ and say her [mother] comes to pick her up in the evening [and she says:] ‘come on now, joanna, it’s time to go home.’ [joanna says:] ‘i don’t know you, who are you?’ [laughter] pc: is she still the same person? because now... something [has] happened to the brain. you were saying to me before: ‘if something happens to the body... if i get a new heart, i’m still the same person.’ but now her attitudes are going to change. let’s say she previously liked vanilla ice-cream and i offered her some. she says: ‘no, i can’t stand that, i’ll have some of that red stuff. what’s that?’, i say, ‘oh, strawberry, oh yes.’ whereas previously she’d really disliked strawberry. so, carl, her attitudes have changed as a result of this fall. is she not now a different person, christopher? christ. s.: no, because all that’s happened is she’s been knocked unconscious and she can’t remember anything. the rest of her is still the same. it’s just that the brain is not working that well. [laughter] pc: jenny? jenny: well, in about 30 or 40 years’ time they will be able to change your whole body. pc: so, what point are you making there? jenny: so, you won’t have to be the same person. pc: ok. listen to this example. roddy also decided he is going to go out and play on the yard this afternoon, and, would you believe it, he falls over, like joanna, and bangs his head on the concrete. now, his condition is a little bit different. when he wakes up, this is what he says: ‘my name is thomas.’ [laughter] pc: how many brothers have you got, roddy? roddy: two. pc: two brothers; and how many sisters? roddy: none. pc: none. two brothers. ‘my name is thomas,’ he says, ‘and i have four brothers.’ ___ and a sister. ___ and two cats. pc: and three sisters. ___ and a dog. pc: and, of course, christopher, [who] is a very sensible boy, says: ‘you must be joking. your name is roddy. you sit next to me in class. this afternoon we were discussing philosophy with mr costello.’ he says: ‘who? oh, i don’t remember any of that. anyway, i thought philosophy was something that you did at university. it can’t be true [that] i’ve been learning philosophy all term with mr costello.’ now he believes his name is thomas. he thinks he’s got four brothers and three sisters. joanna, hasn’t he surely now become a different person? joanna: no. pc: no? why not? ... he names the brothers for me: adam, bill, charlie and dave. ‘you should meet them. they’re such nice fellows,’ he says. where do you live, roddy? roddy: 65 high street. pc: 65, high street. he says: ‘i live in 108 new street, and what’s more, jenny, you can come round for tea tonight.’ now, surely at this point, we would want to say, ben... that roddy has become a different person? analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.2 13 roddy: no. pc: ruth? ruth: if he couldn’t remember anything, he wouldn’t know that jenny’s name was jenny. pc: no. that’s true. christ. s.: he could say: ‘i’ll invite gertrude round to my house.’ pc: yes, he could ... now, one more experiment. let me see who i’m going to get to be in this experiment. michael, stand up, and katie, stand up. now, let’s say someone performed an experiment on these two ... and this is what happened as the result of the experiment. katie’s memories and attitudes, and, as you might say, carl, philosophy of life, all transferred to michael. michael’s attitudes and values and his philosophy of life transferred to katie. ___ that happened in ‘laurel and hardy’. pc: yes it did happen in ‘laurel and hardy’, i remember that. yes, now, what’s your favourite colour? michael: blue. pc: that’s your favourite colour now. and what’s yours? katie: pink. pc: yours is pink. and what’s your favourite chocolate bar? michael: ‘dairy milk’. pc: ‘dairy milk’. what’s yours? katie: ‘kit-kat’ . pc: ‘kit-kat’. so, yours is ‘kit-kat’ and yours is ‘dairy milk’. now, if that had happened, and, say, someone was capable of swapping these persons’ memories and attitudes and values and so forth. would it not be now the case, that, although this person, to all of you, looks like katie, she is really michael because she thinks like michael. she acts like michael ... now if that was the case, i know it’s an hypothesis, it’s not really factual. but if that could take place, would they not now be different people ... chrit.? chrit.: the brains would be different, but they’d still be the same ... they’d still look the same but they’d have different ways of thinking and different brains. pc: so, would they be the same person? this is what i want to know. terry: they won’t have different brains. the brains won’t move like that. ___ well the thoughts won’t either. pc: well, let’s say we could have an experiment that would transfer these thoughts. let’s just say it was possible. christopher, would they not now be different people? christ. 1.: well, i’d say: ‘yes’, because, well, they’ve both been changed round, so katie would be michael and michael would be katie. pc you think that. what do you think, jenny? jenny: their dna won’t have changed. (comment) jenny’s argument also recognises the importance of the physical aspect in determining a person’s individuation. however, in being concerned with the basic biochemical structure which causes such individuation, she focuses on the absolute determinant of external characteristics. pc: what’s dna? jenny: it’s the genetics inside your body. pc: excellent. and what difference would that make, jenny? jenny: they’d still look the same. pc: they’d still look the same. so, even though we had to get used to the fact that katie’s favourite chocolate bar was ‘kit-kat’ now, and that her favourite colour was blue, when we look at her we’d still say: ‘well, that’s katie. that doesn’t look at all like michael ... and vice versa. ok. ... one last question needs very careful thought. if a witch came along or a warlock what is a warlock? analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.2 14 ___ is it just like a little man? ___ a creature in the shape of a man? pc: perhaps. eve? eve: a male witch. pc: a male witch. you see them in fantasy stories. if one of them came along, a warlock or a witch, and turned you into a frog, would you be the same person? (comment) at this stage, the presumption is that the frog still displays the thought patterns of a human being. john hospers (1989, pp. 410-411) discusses a similar example concerning a man who turns into a monkey. in addition, franz kafka’s story the metamorphosis (in glatzer, 1988), focuses on someone who changes into a beetle while retaining his original personality traits. see also baggini (2002, pp. 79-83). chorus: yeah. pc: carl? carl: yeah, it’s just like when you changed your hairstyle and your clothes. you just changed into a frog. ___ yeah, it don’t matter. you’ve just turned into a frog. pc: but you jump like a frog, don’t you, carl? carl: that’s because your muscles have changed. pc: but you’re still the same person? mark: you’re the same person. it’s just that you’ve shrunk, changed the colour of your skin, lost all your hair and ... pc: what else? mark: ... don’t wear any fancy clothes. pc: now, after all of those changes, mark, you tell me that you’re still the same person? mark: yeah. pc: what do you think, jenny? jenny: your thoughts haven’t changed. pc: your thoughts haven’t changed. let’s say that not only did this witch turn you into a frog, but she also gave you the thought patterns of a frog. ___ oh no! pc: whatever they might be. chrit.? chrit.: i think you are completely different, then. ___ i don’t. pc: what if she has given you the thought patterns of a frog, but left you physically exactly as you are so you are thinking like a frog but you look like yourselves? chrit. ? chrit.; i don’t think you’re different then. pc: so, you need physical change and mental change. jenny? jenny: if she gives you the thought of a frog and you’re still as you are, you haven’t actually changed just your insides. pc: ok. paul? ... paul: right, well just say, like if you... take everything out of my body and put it into, say, dean’s body? ... pc: yes. paul: ... and take all his things, and put it into mine. we’ll be completely different people, but we’ll be under the same name. pc: ok. scott: mr costello. pc: yes, scott. scott: when you’ve changed your personality into a frog, but you’re still human, all it does, it makes your brain think that that’s a frog. but you’re still the same person. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.2 15 pc: last comment from jenny. jenny: well, to change the whole of you, you’d have to get your dna out, and work out all the patterns and what they mean, and then stick it back in in a different way. developing communities of inquiry in the uk: prospect i would argue that communities of inquiry in the uk may be further developed within the context of the following key themes: the increasing prominence of (and importance attributed to) teachers’ research projects. • the growth of organisations that aim to promote the teaching and learning of thinking skills (including • philosophy). the prevalence of publications in this field.• new directions for research and practice.• as regards the first of these, the relationship between research and teachers’ professional development is a close one. in recent years, a welcome and much-needed debate has taken place about the nature of continuing professional development (cpd) for teachers and how this might be improved. for example, the general teaching council for wales (gtcw) (2002), in a document entitled ‘continuing professional development: an entitlement for all’, offered draft advice to the national assembly for wales concerning a range of issues. the gtcw argued that “all teachers should be entitled to high quality and well-planned cpd provision throughout their career” (para. 19). it is noted (para. 14) that: “cpd activities take many forms. these range from attending courses to school-based learning and undertaking action research.” two excellent examples of action research projects to support teachers’ cpd are best practice research scholarships (bprs) in england and teacher research scholarships (trs) in wales. as regards bprs, qualified teachers currently working in schools (including nursery, independent and non-maintained schools) have been eligible to apply and funding of up to £2500 has been awarded to support the development of research projects that focus on classroom practice. as a condition of proposals being accepted, a tutor or mentor must be appointed to assist teachers in completing research projects successfully. offering some expertise in research methodology, the tutor/mentor is required to make a formal statement indicating how and when he/she will support projects being undertaken, as well as to monitor, evaluate and help to disseminate research findings. the gtcw’s trs scheme commenced in 2001-2002. funding of up to £3000 has been made available to teachers to enable them to undertake action research projects, supported (as in bprs) by a tutor/mentor. i have acted as a mentor to two groups of teachers who received gtcw scholarships. the first group, based within wrexham education authority, undertook action research projects in a broad range of areas. the second, also sponsored by the national union of teachers (nut, 2003), completed projects on the teaching and learning of thinking skills (including philosophy) in infant and secondary schools. this involved attendance at two residential seminars, where teachers were introduced to aspects of research methodology, issues relating to thinking skills, the development of research projects, data collection and analysis, and writing research reports (costello, 2003; 2007c). the gtcw trs scheme was evaluated in two ways. firstly, three comprehensive reports were produced by egan and james (2002, 2003, 2004). the first of these involved the development of an evaluation pro forma for teacher researchers; a questionnaire concerning the effectiveness of the scheme, which was sent to their headteachers; a questionnaire for tutors/mentors; and a series of interviews with teacher researchers, headteachers and line-managers. the report indicated the following benefits to teachers from undertaking action research projects (2002, p. 15): the development of individual needs and skills; motivational and career factors; engagement with good practice; time to develop reflective practice; work-based learning; working collaboratively with other professionals; and learning and teaching gains. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.2 16 in addition, i undertook my own evaluation of the impact of trs on enhancing teachers’ professional development (costello, 2003). following the evaluation pro forma produced by egan and james, i asked two questions: how effective do you consider the chosen activity to be in enhancing your professional knowledge, • skills and expertise? please circle your response (1 = very effective; 4 = very ineffective) how could you further develop the work you have undertaken? please specify.• all respondents indicated that their chosen activity was ‘very effective’ in enhancing their knowledge, skills and expertise. written comments included the following: it has made me look at what i do ‘day in, day out’. i haven’t really been doing anything new, but i have • become aware of what i’m doing and have looked at the results of my strategies in the teaching and learning process. i have probably become even more aware of the needs of the pupils i teach and the need to continue to look for new ideas. i have most certainly become more confident in myself and it has given me the ‘feel good factor’. i would like to move on… time to read and research. networking and sharing practice. focus on mentoring: i feel confident to • undertake more research. focus on learning and teaching in general: i have adapted ideas from target groups to other classes. the research project has been excellent in enhancing my professional development, as prior to this i • was not even aware of what thinking skills were, let alone being able to implement them in my classroom. it is also an opportunity to undertake research which is directly related to improving teaching and thus learning. very effective. the first course produced new ideas. the research process helped me to develop think-• ing skills strategies and spread them through the faculty. it improved my skills and those of other teachers within the faculty. in the context of thinking skills, responses to the second question included the following: i wish to develop further thinking skills strategies within the classroom and perhaps extend to a whole • school approach across key stages. it would also be useful to do another research project which could build on the one already undertaken – perhaps to implement thinking skills across the curriculum. i would like to form a working group within the school to develop thinking skills activities across the • curriculum, in order to spread good practice. i now want to continue my research and spread good practice across the whole school. thinking skills • should be a key area in whole-school curriculum development. i personally would like to initiate this and research my findings. in recent years in the uk, we have seen the development and growth of organisations that aim to promote the teaching and learning of thinking skills (including philosophy). for example, the society for advancing philosophical enquiry and reflection in education (http://sapere.org.uk), dialogue works (http://www.dialogueworks.co.uk) and the council for education in world citizenship – wales (http://cewc-cymru.org.uk), offer training courses and resources for teachers. the success of these organisations is linked, in part, to the increasing attention now being paid by policy makers to developing children’s thinking skills. in the context of a revision of the school curriculum, the welsh assembly government (wag) has implemented a ‘developing thinking and assessment for learning’ programme, in partnership with schools and local education authorities. in its document why develop thinking and assessment for learning in the classroom?, wag (2007, p.4) suggests that ‘metacognition (thinking about thinking) is at the heart of the learning and teaching process’ (see also wag, 2008a; 2008b; 2008c). i have already referred above to the increasing prevalence of publications in the field of thinking skills and philosophy. in addition to books on these themes, it should be noted that teachers in the uk also have access to analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.2 17 the journal teaching thinking and creativity (http://www.teachingtimes.com), the central aim of which is to raise standards of teaching and learning by developing children’s thinking skills. the importance of the internet in the lives of young people has been highlighted in recent research, which indicated that: (1) an estimated 71% of 16 to 24-year-olds have internet access; (2) 75% of those questioned within this age group said that they ‘could not live without it’ (wray, 2009, p.10). given this, and in looking ahead to new directions for research and development, one promising area should be mentioned: the role of new technologies in developing communities of inquiry (see haste, 2009a, 2009b; howard (forthcoming)). as haste (2009a) suggests, such technologies: enable young people not only to access but to modify and integrate information, to do so collaboratively, and also to enter virtual space in which role-playing and the negotiation of alternative worlds with others require intensive concentration and considerable cognitive, social and affective skills. the data suggest that such activities can have a positive effect on civic awareness and agency; their implications for moral awareness are being explored. however, a second implication is the profoundly different form of education as praxis, in which the child is an active agent, not the passive target of teaching. this revolution must be taken seriously. concluding comments in conclusion, i suggest that the development of communities of inquiry in the uk has been, and continues to be, an important endeavour. looking back to where we began in the 1980s, it is pleasing to see that the substantial work of individuals, groups and organisations in this field has made a substantial impact on practice in schools and has been recognised by policy makers as being vital to pupils’ educational and personal development. as the above dialogue demonstrates, it is essential to improve the quality of children’s philosophical reasoning and argument if they are to emerge from compulsory schooling as reflective citizens who are willing and able to play a full part in helping to shape the society to which they belong. appendix 1: what makes you you?3 would you be the same person if you changed your hairstyle/mode of dress?• 4 if you were given a new heart, would you be the same person?• if someone is a liar/thief and then changes for the better, is he/she still the same person?• if i decided to go on a diet and a month later i said: ‘i’ve lost two stones, i feel like a new person,’ am i?• robert falls over on the school yard and bangs his head on the concrete. when he wakes up, he is un-• able to remember who he is or anything about his past life. is he the same person? if robert wakes up and says his name is thomas and that he has three sisters (whereas robert has • none) and goes to st. paul’s school (whereas robert goes to st. philip’s school), is he the same person? endnotes the term ‘philosophy for children’ refers to the teaching programme devised by matthew lipman and 1. his colleagues at the institute for the advancement of philosophy for children (iapc); philosophy with children’ refers to other (non-iapc) programmes and approaches to teaching and learning in this field. this dialogue was presented in (costello, 1995), as part of a book chapter which focused on the contribu-2. tion made by the teaching of philosophy in schools to the theory and practice of argument. looking at the dialogue again, i found it a useful exercise to consider critically the comments made in the text. as is usually the case with philosophical thinking, it was clear that some additional commentary was required and so this has been added. for the benefit of readers who are interested in considering the key philosophical themes being addressed, i have also drawn upon some more recent examples from the literature. this exercise examines the philosophical problem of personal identity (madigan, 2009), which falls within 3. the broader area of philosophy of mind (heil, 2004; kim, 2006; searle, 2004). as regards the first quesanalytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.2 18 tion, see abel (1976, pp. 186-187). see abel (1976, pp.186-187).4. references abel, r. 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(forthcoming). fantasy role-playing and the philosophical community of inquiry. kim, j. (2006). philosophy of mind. second edition. cambridge, massachusetts: westview press. lamb, d. (1985). death, brain death and ethics. london: croom helm. law, s. (2007). philosophy. london: dorling kindersley. levine, s. (1983). the child-as-philosopher: a critique of the presuppositions of piagetian theory and an alternative approach to children’s cognitive capacities. thinking: the journal of philosophy for children, 5(1), 1-9. lipman, m., sharp, a.m., oscanyan, f.s. (1980). philosophy in the classroom. second edition. philadelphia: temple university press. mcgregor, d. (2007). developing thinking, developing learning: a guide to thinking skills in education. maidenhead: open university press/mcgraw-hill. madigan, t. (2009). food for thought: rur or ru ain’t a person? philosophy now, 72, 48. matthews, e. (2005). mind: key concepts in philosophy. london: continuum. matthews, g.b. (1980). philosophy and the young child. cambridge, mass.: harvard university press. miller, r.b. (1986). how to win over a sceptic. thinking: the journal of philosophy for children, 6(3), 46-48. moseley, a. (2008). a to z of philosophy. london: continuum. murris, k. (1992). teaching philosophy with picture books. london: infonet publications. national union of teachers (2003). investigating thinking skills: teacher research into using thinking skills, approaches in the classroom. london: nut. noonan, h.w. (2003). personal identity. london: routledge. o’hear, a. (1985). what philosophy is: an introduction to contemporary philosophy. harmondsworth: penguin books. plato (1974). republic. second edition (revised). harmondsworth: penguin books. pritchard, m.s. (1985). philosophical adventures with children. lanham: university press of america. quinn, v. (1997). critical thinking in young minds. london: david fulton publishers. ridley, k. (2006). thinking skills in the early years: a literature review. practical research for education, 36, 13-18. slough: national foundation for educational research robson, s. (2006). developing thinking and understanding in young children: an introduction for students. abingdon: routledge. searle, j.r. (2004). mind: a brief introduction. oxford: oxford university press. shoemaker, s. (1963). self-knowledge and self-identity. new york: cornell university press. simister, c.j. (2007). how to teach thinking and learning skills: a practical programme for the whole school. london: paul chapman publishing. society for advancing philosophical enquiry and reflection in education (undated). http://sapere.org.uk . electronically accessed 1 november, 2009. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 30 no.2 20 sorabji, r. (2006). self: ancient and modern insights about individuality, life and death. oxford: oxford university press. spillius, a. (2009). obama is accused of imposing his ideology on schools. the daily telegraph, 5 september, 13. teaching thinking and creativity (undated). http://www.teachingtimes.com . electronically accessed 1 november, 2009. warnock, m. (1988). a common policy for education. oxford: oxford university press. welsh assembly government (2007). why develop thinking and assessment for learning in the classroom? http://wales.gov.uk/topics/educationandskills/curriculumassessment/thinkingandassessmentforlearning/? lang=en . electronically accessed 2 december, 2009. welsh assembly government (2008a), framework for children’s learning for 3 to 7-year olds in wales. cardiff: wag. welsh assembly government (2008b), personal and social education framework for 7 to 19-year-olds in wales. cardiff: wag. welsh assembly government (2008c), skills framework for 3 to 19-year-olds in wales. cardiff: wag. wray, r. (2009). half of young people happiest in cyberspace. the guardian, 14 october, 10. address coresspondence to: professor patrick costello school of education and community glyndŵr university, wales plas coch campus mold road wrexham ll11 2aw uk email: p.costello@glyndwr.ac.uk analytic teaching and philosophical praxis analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 39, issue 1 (2018) editor’s welcome the six articles that make up the current issue of volume 39 focus largely on the assessment or implementation of philosophy for children (p4c), with one article that looks at educational policies around disabled students. the first article by sue lyle explores the value of p4c when teaching about issues of environmental sustainability and global citizenship. the second piece by yan, walters, z. wang and c. wang provides an informative meta-analysis of the effectiveness of p4c from a global perspective, contrasting the results of western versus non-western countries. newby, gardner and wolf look at the challenge of implementing a community of inquiry with a children’s soccer team, while the fourth article by yarmel offers an interesting reflection on the role that crises play in the community of inquiry. the fifth article by hines changes gears to explore the different ways that policies on children with disabilities are implemented in elementary schools across the u.s., and some of the troublesome lessons that “abled” students may draw from these differences. the final article by wolf and gardner investigates the notion of conceptual analysis, showing its centrality for daily life and why p4c is especially well-equipped to cultivate it. collectively, the six articles provide an array of perspectives that highlight the resourcefulness of p4c as well as some challenges with implementing it, and remind us of the many prejudices our students are liable to internalize as the world outside the school translates into the hidden curriculum within. i hope the current volume finds you all doing well and engaged in a project you love. pax et bonum jason j. howard chief editor jason j. howard viterbo university web page master jason skoog viterbo university copy editor jan wellik viterbo university editorial board sara cook viterbo university susan gardner capilano university susan hughes viterbo university david kennedy montclair state university nadia s. kennedy stony brook university, suny richard morehouse, emeritus viterbo university félix garcía moriyón center for philosophy for children, madrid, spain joe oyler maynooth university, kildare, ireland barbara weber university of british columbia publisher viterbo university, la crosse, wisconsin 45601 established in 1981 as analytic teaching at texas wesleyan college and transferred to viterbo in 1993. online copyright 2005. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis is a peer-reviewed, online, open access journal published annually and sometimes biannually. issn 2374-8257 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 74 agape: love and art in community kathryn a. mcfadden abstract: in the new testament the early christians adopted the notion of absolute, creative and excessive love— agape—as a comprehensive fatherly love that god possesses for mankind, which as a consequence extends to a love of one’s fellow man. this paper is an investigation of agape and its relevance in contemporary art. like a work of art, agape has an immanent creative component in that it generates value in its object. agapic art is largely activated in the space of community. i unpack my thesis examining several contemporary artworks beginning with a public installation in 2010 commissioned after the murder of a student at the university of virginia. i deploy my research through multiple lenses, including the thinking of arendt, freud, heidegger, lewis and nancy. art provides the heideggerian clearing of light in a world that is witness to the darkness of terroristic threats, domestic violence and ethnic hatred. the list goes on, because now—as in all of history—the human instinct for aggression sees no end in sight. works of art that express agape are gifts of optimism to the living. death and art in a university community n may of 2010, lacrosse player yeardley love was by all reports an energetic, gleeful 22-year-old senior lacrosse player at the university of virginia. with bright blue-gray eyes and an engaging smile, love was a few weeks from graduation when her roommate found her lifeless and broken body. an investigation revealed love had been violently beaten and shaken in her apartment in charlottesville by her ex-boyfriend and next-door neighbor, george huguely. during the murder trial, scrutiny of the defendant revealed he not only had a record of trouble with police for public drunkenness, he also had a history of verbal threats and violence towards love throughout their relationship. this element of their relationship had previously been obscured by their campus reputations as standout lacrosse athletes. the university and local community were devastated by the crime, which garnered the attention of national media. for a few days the campus was paralyzed in shock before the university president formally addressed the students, and a candlelight vigil was held. the annual graduation festivities were distressed by love’s tragic death; lingering feelings of confusion, sadness and helplessness about how something so unimaginable had happened in an academic community dedicated to the ideals of higher education and outstanding college sports. over the following summer, the new president of the university of virginia teresa sullivan planned a “day of dialogue” for the fall semester. this was to be a day dedicated to community building and violence prevention at the university. she invited associate professor of art and architecture sanda iliescu to consider designing a public work of art for the campus-wide event. at first reluctant, iliescu became convinced when the administration answered her question, “why art?” with the explanation that art tends to be left out or taken for granted. iliescu was also promised financial backing and complete control of the project.1 iliescu conceived of a work of art that would symbolically counter the act of lethal aggression upon love by bringing the campus community together. she designed a two-part public site-specific art installation titled lines of darkness and light (2010). in the first part of the project, which took place in the early fall semester (september 17 i analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 75 – 27, 2010) iliescu veiled the ten, white neoclassical columns of the south porch of the rotunda in black cloth. the choice of this location is significant: president thomas jefferson designed the rotunda in 1822 as the “architectural and academic heart of his original community of scholars.”2 the sight of the rotunda in the middle of the campus is commanding, and recalls the great pantheon in rome on which it is modeled. for iliescu the veiling of the columns was a symbol of communal lamentation that brought the university populace together in a shared experience of loss. in a statement about the project iliescu commented, we are fortunate at this university to have such a powerful symbol for our collective will: the rotunda. what better way to put such sad events into focus than by taking the beautiful classical columns facing the lawn and temporarily veiling them? these columns are so bright, so suggestive of optimism, enlightenment, and natural grace. it is fitting that for a brief period we have the courage to transform them by lightly and delicately covering them. they will, for a brief period, turn heavy, melancholy, and introspective. when the veils are taken down, through contrast, the gleaming, luminous columns will move us more. my hope is that they will become brighter, and at the same time deeper. the memory of aristotle's "melas," or essence of darkness, will transform and enrich the columns, as we continue to reflect and perhaps ask ourselves: "remember when the bright columns were veiled?" 3 the second part of the project was a participatory event that took place on the final day of the column covering. ten colorfully painted voting-box type structures made of recycled wood were placed on the rotunda lawn. they were designed to provide a contrast to the darkness of the veils. next to each box was a stack of envelopes each containing a pencil and piece of blank paper. all members of the university community were invited to record two thoughts on the paper—either anonymously or signed—then return the paper to the envelope and insert it into a wooden box. one reflection was to be a regret of the previous year and the other a hope for the upcoming one. the latter illustrates the idea of the “collective will” iliescu mentions. the compilation of these personal remarks is archived and accessible to members of the university as a future source of inspiration for creative works such as poetry, music composition and visual art. the overall theme of iliescu’s project was that of loss and regeneration. the temporary veiling of the columns provided the university community with the opportunity to contemplate the loss of members love and huguely4 as well as a rupture of community security. by contrast, the envelope project generated ideas and thoughts that would become a permanent record and part of the ongoing history of the university. community care this paper intends to make the relationship of love and contemporary art more cogent by locating agapic love in particular works of art and examining these works in terms of philosophical concepts. love has been the subject of philosophical debate since plato wrote the symposium.5 in the new testament the early christians adopted the notion of absolute, creative and excessive love—agape—as a comprehensive fatherly love that god possesses for mankind, which as a consequence extends to a love of one’s fellow man. christian theology holds that god the father offered his son jesus christ to humankind as the consummate sacrificial act of love. christ’s crucifixion on the cross was intended as the salvation of mankind, which had been in jeopardy since the original sin of adam and eve. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 76 in christ’s sacrifice agape is established as a perfectly giving love, as opposed to the egocentric love of eros. contemporary philosopher soble writes, eros is a love that responds to merit or value of its object, while agape creates value in its object as a result of loving it, and exists independently of, or regardless of any merit or lack of merit in it object. 6 like a work of art, agape has an immanent creative component in that it generates value in its object. art—as a creative endeavor—may offer gestures of overarching care for fellow humanity. for example, iliescu’s lines of darkness and light creates a time and space in which the subject may consciously consider a quality of life with others, establishing a potential to improve that life. this has a cogent application in our contemporary world because works of art that open up opportunities for agape help individuals maintain a balance of caring and thoughtful communities. the hallmarks of agape are twofold: charity and “unconditionality.”7 in regards to the former, another denotation of agape was a christian “love feast” or meal, to which the poor were invited as a rite of fellowship, in the manner of christ’s last supper. this inclination of charity, or caritas, is key to christian agape in terms of modeling the altruistic life of christ. in terms of the un-conditionality of agape, important early christian doctrine is found in the new testament that includes the first epistle to the corinthians by the apostle paul, if i speak in the tongues of men and of angels, but have not love, i am only a resounding gong or clanging symbol. 2 if i have the gift of prophecy and can fathom all mysteries and all knowledge, and if i have a faith that can move mountains, but have not love, i am nothing. 3 if i give all i possess to the poor and surrender my body to the flames, but have not love, i gain not nothing. 4 love is patient, love is kind. it does not envy, it does not boast, it is not proud. 5 it is not rude, it is not self-seeking, it is not easily angered, it keeps no records of wrongs. 6 love does not delight in evil but rejoices with the truth. it always protects, always trusts, always hopes, always perseveres. 8 love never fails. but where there are prophecies, they will cease: where there are tongues, they will be stilled: where there is knowledge, it will pass away. 9 for we know in part and we prophesy in part, 10 but when perfection comes the imperfect disappears. 11 when i was a child, i talked like a child, i thought like a child. when i became a man, i put childish ways behind me. 12 now we see but a poor reflection as in a mirror; then we shall see fact to face. now i know in part; then i shall know fully, even as i am fully known. 13 and now these three remain: faith, hope and love. but the greatest of these is love. 8 in the original greek language paul uses the term agape (ἀγάπην), which he characterizes as the kind of love christians should have for everyone. while this passage imposes a nearly impossible list of qualities for loving each other, it underscores the essence of a love that stresses the benevolent act of loving, rather than the situation of being loved.9 community is a wide-ranging term; the most encompassing oxford english dictionary definition is “a body of people or things viewed collectively,”10 which could be as sizable as all the citizens of china or all the members of facebook. most definitions of community include the constituent of something in common, such as place, culture, ideology, identity or interest. throughout our lives we may be engaged in a number of communities that are transient and overlapping, such as a school, neighborhood, or house of worship, etc. yet the notion of community is not dependent on a subject’s geographical location or obvious social cohesion. considering community most broadly across time, community is a posteriori. hannah arendt writes, “based on kinship, the analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 77 human community is thereby a society with and from the dead; in other words, this community is historical.”11 arendt asserts the commonality all beings share is to be born, and eventually to die. the philosopher jean-luc nancy agrees community is historical, but not that it belongs to time.12 we are beings together in time, always becoming, in the “pure present,”13 the now. nancy writes, “it is a matter of the space of time…which gives to “us” the possibility of saying “we”—that is, the possibility of being in common and of presenting or representing ourselves as a community…”14 for nancy, community exists in the eternal present. nancy believes there is no way we live in the absence of community. he writes, “community is the community of others, which does not mean that several individuals possess some common nature in spite of their differences, but rather that they partake only of their otherness.”15 here nancy tells us that our existence as individual subjects, what he terms our “selfness”, is always already a mark of our otherness established in community. the self resides within otherness. in a reversal of the cartesian standard, nancy states, “i am ‘i’ (i exist) only if i can say ‘we’...we are others –each one for the other and each for him/herself –through birth and death, which expose our finitude.”16 he understands that we are born into a life with other beings for which we need to be present. in this way nancy decenters subjectivity by placing responsibility in the communal. this responsibility is demonstrated in lines of darkness and light, where the lamentation for ms. love is a cooperative act. nancy’s project is to expand martin heidegger’s ontological construction of being: we are not beings alone, but beings in relationship to others. this relationship is what heidegger terms “being-in-the-world” or dasein. this means everything we think and do—our entire existence—is shaped by an a priori interconnection to others. for heidegger dasein is the essential perspective of understanding what it is to be human. he also asserts that an important aspect of being-in-the-world is the fundamental notion of care or sorge, or taking responsibility: for yourself, for others, and for things in the world.17 creating art is one way of demonstrating care. iliescu’s lines of darkness and light is a work of art concerned with care for the community. the project provided a transitional interval for the campus in the aftermath of a crisis, which allowed individuals to comprehend their relationship to others in a new way, and to their visual surroundings as well. this is particularly evident in the act of veiling and unveiling the extraordinary rotunda columns: concealing their brightness with darkness, and then restoring their light. the sight of the columns was taken for granted. heidegger claims that art is a way to jog us out of our everydayness. that community takes place in time—that it is historical—is key to heidegger’s philosophical thought because as beings we are finite and often move through life without a consciousness of being. to be is to exist, but to be is to also ask questions about life and to demonstrate care beyond the everydayness of existence. making art provokes questions and contemplation about existence as a way of being since it heightens consciousness. heidegger calls this moment of truth “clearing” because it allows insight on behalf of the subject, in the way an opening in the forest allows the sunlight to shine undiminished by the shade of the trees. we are born into language; the subject is determined by language because the other (the community of others) is where language and speaking arises.18 maurice blanchot argues that this linguistic communication makes up the essence of our existence with others. while heidegger wrote of the singular subject’s finitude, blanchot argues that it is someone else’s death that founds community. he writes, “there could not be a community without the analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 78 sharing of that first and last event which in everyone ceases to be able to be just that (birth, death).” 19 blanchot continues, if the community is revealed by the death of the other person, it is because death is itself the true community of mortal beings: their impossible communion. the community therefore occupies the following singular space: it takes upon itself the impossibility of its own immanence, the impossibility of a communitarian being as subject. in a way the community takes upon itself and inscribes in itself the impossibility of the community. . . a community is the presentation to its members of their mortal truth…(one may say as well that there can be no community of immortal beings. . .). it is the presentation of finitude and of excess without possibility. 20 what i take blanchot to mean here is that within our interdependence on others, we realize that at the same time we are in community, it is never secure: someone will die. even if we die alone, our death is never a solitary event: someone will bury us. the vulnerability of community can be seen in iliescu’s lines of darkness and light in the ritual of communal lamentation. and these intentions are remarkable in another contemporary artist who also works within public space: krzysztof wodiczko. like iliescu, he employs architecture as a medium, but he sees structures as metaphors for the body or other objects.21 his hiroshima projection (1999) was a public video projection onto the a-bomb dome in hiroshima, japan.22 this is the site of the first atomic bomb detonation in 1945 by the united states during world war ii. it was the only structure that remained standing after the explosion, which sits on the banks of the aioi river and is now a unesco world heritage site. seventy thousand people were instantly annihilated in the attack and 70,000 more died from burns and other injuries. wodiczko interviewed the elderly survivors of the hiroshima bombing, recording their eyewitness accounts of the explosion. he also videotaped the gestures of their hands while they told their stories of horror, pain and loss. arendt and blanchot’s notion of death as testimony to community is evident in hiroshima projection because he brings together the intergenerational community of hiroshima’s dead and living. wodiczko writes, i started working on my hiroshima projection with the assumption that we were going to ‘reactualize’ the a-bomb dome monument (one of the few structures that survived the bombingjust underneath the hyper-center of the explosion) and reanimate it with the voices and gestures of present-day hiroshima inhabitants from various generations...so all those generations somehow connect through this projection, not necessarily in agreement in terms of the way the bombing is important and the way the meaning of that bombing connects with their present experiences. the fallout of the bombing is physical and cultural, psychological. 23 wodiczko’s plan to “reactualize” and “reanimate” took place on a monumental video projection onto the façade of the a-bomb memorial and the aioi river. the projection, which includes the audio of his interviews, features the gestures of the hands of the interviewees in their often-tearful narration. the largely unconscious hand gestures of the speakers also enacted a symbolic ceremonial pouring of tea into the river. wodiczko states, a memorial should be a vehicle through which the past and future converge. the river became a graveyard for both people and buildings in hiroshima. as both a tragic witness but also as a hope, because it is moving there is new water coming. 24 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 79 here again is the theme of loss and regeneration. wodcizko’s intervention literally and figuratively broke the terrible fifty-four year old silence of the a-bomb dome. much like iliescu’s lines of darkness and light, hiroshima projection creates a heideggerian clearing of understanding through creative care of community. the impossibility of loving thy neighbor c. s. lewis’s book four loves explores the christian adaptation of the original greek types of love. in the chapter titled “charity” he discusses agape, what he considers the greatest of the four loves. he writes, “for most of us the true rivalry lies between the self and the human other, not yet between the human other and god.” 25 [italics mine for emphasis.] this conflict between subjects in community is an important aspect of understanding agape, because it is a type of love embracing an idealistic attitude toward everyone, including people that we might think of as unlovable: adversaries, terrorists, drunks, rapists, and the occasional in-law. in its boundless nature agape is paradoxically an unattainable type of love because to love everyone is an unachievable task. freud addresses this demand in his late essay civilization and its discontents. in response to the commandment ‘love thy neighbor as thyself,’ he writes, the element of truth behind all this, which people are so ready to disavow, is that men are not gentle creatures who want to be loved, and who at the most can defend themselves if they are attacked; they are, on the contrary, creatures among whose instinctual endowments is to be reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness. as a result their neighbor is for them not only a potential helper or sexual object, but also someone who tempts them to satisfy their aggressiveness on them, to exploit his capacity for work without compensation, to use him sexually without his consent, to seize his possessions, to humiliate him, to cause him pain, to torture and kill him. 26 freud asserts that the love commandment is antithetical to society because the human tendency for aggression will always battle with reason. doris salcedo is a contemporary sculptor whose oeuvre addresses the universal condition of the subject’s inhumanity to others. a native of columbia, she is based in the capital city of bogotá, and has been a witness to the longstanding violence of the drug wars in her country. her work tends to be based on the experiences of victims in highly symbolic representations. salcedo’s shibboleth (2007) is a site-specific installation commissioned for the monumental space of the tate modern’s turbine hall in london. in situ for six months between 200708, it consisted of a cement floor with fissures that meandered the length of the space. the conception of the work was inspired by seeing visitors at the tate walk around in awe of the grandeur they projected onto the immense loftiness of this industrial space, a former power plant.27 salcedo asserts that such an industrial space did not deserve this sense of wonder; it could not compare to the architectural achievements of hagia sophia or the egyptian pyramids. she intended to create another perspective with shibboleth, referencing an ancient hebrew term that acted as a test of pronunciation used to identify foreigners. for the duration of salcedo’s installation the turbine hall became an unsafe place to walk around without caution; one needed to look down instead of gazing into the lofty heights of the structure. salcedo literally placed all visitors to the tate modern in physical jeopardy: a similar danger experienced by non-whites and immigrants as they cross borders into white euro-centric culture. the enormous gaps in the tate floor forced visitors to confront the boundaries of an abyss, to contemplate the crack in civilization between people that is racial hatred. she states, analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 80 i wanted to inscribe in this modernist, rationalist building an image that was somehow chaotic, that marked a negative space, because i believe there is a bottomless gap that divides humanity from inhumanity, or whites from nonwhites. i wanted to address that gap, which i thought was mainly perceived in the history of modernity. 28 salcedo’s shibboleth speaks to the loathing freud describes in civilization and its discontents as a default human state of being. although freud is convinced of humanity’s innate aggression, he does admit, “it is always possible to bind together a considerable number of people in love, so long as there are other people left over to receive the manifestations of their aggressiveness.”29 for freud the occasional expression of agape is a trade-off for our need to feel security and happiness. freud sees religion as an illusion, yet for many individuals their religious faith is a source of happiness. according to freud, the seeking of pleasure and joy along with the absence of pain is at the heart of the human endeavor. he believes the pain of our relationships with others is the cause of most of our misery. at the same time he insists it is better to join forces in the human community rather than the option of isolating the self, “then one is working with all for the good of all.”30 he seems to have art in mind when he notes that the pleasure we experience in an imaginative work frees our mind from anxieties.31 regarding the commandment of “love thy neighbor,” nancy deconstructs christianity in terms of the impossibility of this law.32 he asks, “… would not precisely the impossibility of this love be the very thing that produces the very concept, content and reality of this love?”33 since christianity asks us to have faith that the impossible is possible, then so go its commandments. nancy also states, “the fact that it is impossible is why it is the answer.”34 yet arendt’s understanding of loving thy neighbor belies a motive of something that is possible: love for love’s sake. she writes, “love proves its strength precisely in considering even the enemy and even the sinner as mere occasions for love. it is not really the neighbor who is loved in this love of neighbor—it is love itself.”35 creative caritas martin luther king jr. staked a claim for agape in the mid-20th century. in an essay titled “the power of nonviolence” he argues for the tactic of non-violent resistance in the civil rights movement based on agape, the greek language uses three words for love. 36 it talks about eros. eros is a sort of aesthetic love. it has come to us to be a sort of romantic love and it stands with all of its beauty. but when we speak of loving those who oppose us we’re not talking about eros. the greek language talks about philia and this is a sort of reciprocal love between personal friends. this is a vital, valuable love. but when we talk of loving those who oppose you and those who seek to defeat you we are not talking about eros or philia. the greek language comes out with another word and it is agape. agape is understanding, creative, redemptive good will for all men. biblical theologians would say it is the love of god working in the minds of men. it is an overflowing love which seeks nothing in return. and when you come to love on this level you begin to love men not because they are likeable, not because they do things that attract us, but because god loves them and here we love the person who does the evil deed while hating the deed that person does. it is the type of love that stands at the center of the movement that we are trying to carry on in the southland—agape. 37 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 81 king remains grounded in a theological reasoning, asserting the basic christian belief of god’s merciful love that humans should emulate. perhaps it is impossible to completely secularize the concept of agape with its roots in god-centered beliefs. yet by doing this, we extend the essence of agape into the global community of diverse beliefs; agape by nature is a wholly inclusive concept. the idea of non-violence as a creative approach to the struggle for civil rights is compelling. creativity suggests originality, resourcefulness, inventiveness and imagination. creativity begins with questions, not answers. it is open-ended and seeks the new. anders nygren, a swedish lutheran theologian also describes agape as a “creative” type of love.38 it is spontaneous and unmotivated, rules or laws do not mandate it. nygren writes, “agape does not recognize value, but creates it.”39 can it not be said that works of art do the same? while art may arise from any source of inspiration, there are no rules, and it is not fixed in any established ethical codes. in the 1990s relational aesthetics emerged as a new field of avant-garde artistic praxis designed to create “hands-on utopias” 40 via the construction of intersubjective opportunities. a renowned example is the work of rirkrit tiravanija, who in 1992 created a work called untitled (free) within a gallery space in new york city.41 there were no familiar objects of art such as paintings or sculptures to view. rather he set up the space with an improvised kitchen alongside tables and chairs, cooking and serving rice and curry prepared on the spot to gallery visitors who sat around and talked to each other or at least enjoyed a complimentary meal. tiravanija brought something innovative to the practice of art in that the “art” consisted of the interaction and participation of individuals in the gallery, the food acting as a catalyst for sensual experience and open dialogue. bourriaud states, “a work of art has a quality that sets it apart from other things produced by human activities. this quality is its (relative) social transparency.”42 tiravanija’s subtitle of free is important. traditionally art is a commodity, yet he provides the food at no cost to the participant, thus upholding the notion of art as pure lived experience. it is possible to think of this art— tiravanija’s micro-utopia—as an act of gift and goodwill, an expression of agape within a “concrete space.”43 tirivanija’s project, a version of a soup kitchen, is not intended for the homeless and poor. visitors to the gallery were members of the art world: gallery-goers, artists, critics, art students, etc. yet the income or social status of recipients to whom gifts are offered does not diminish the act giving. the bottom line is that a charitable soup kitchen or tirivanija’s aestheticized one both uphold ideas of kindness and connection within community. and while untitled (free) is not a response to an event like lines of darkness and light and hiroshima project, all of these works of art are an extraordinary gesture to others within ordinary life, which allows for moments of thoughtful community. for a little more than two years (2007 – 09) the brooklyn-based brazilian-born artist vik muniz44 and film director lucy walker worked on a two-part project in the outskirts of rio de janeiro, located in the world’s largest garbage dump called jardim gramacho.45 using video and photographs, they documented men and women of all ages who make their living recovering recyclable materials amongst the landfill’s mountainous piles of refuse. the workers there confront unimaginable quantities of suburban and slum household trash, as well as rotting corpses, exposure to leprosy, and all manner of hazardous materials. literally risking life and limb in every aspect of their daily scavenging, and barely paid for their efforts, these impoverished laborers are called catadores. muniz and walker recorded the landfill’s desperately dangerous working conditions in addition to the living situations of the catadores or scavengers. in spite of long hours the catadores exist in abject poverty in one of rio de janeiro’s renowned open-sewer favelas, or shantytowns. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 82 muniz’s photographic project pictures of garbage evolved out of the making of the film waste land (2010) that focuses on the heartfelt stories of a number of individual catadores in jardim gramacho. after getting to know the workers through the filming, muniz invited them into a unique artistic collaboration.46 in addition to making conventional photographic portraits of subjects posing for the camera, muniz worked alongside the catadores to create monumentally scaled classical self-portraits (up to 72 feet high) concocted out of the very recyclables they collected. the composition of the images are based on portraits from the canon of european art history, such as david’s death of marat and picasso’s woman ironing. when completed the assemblages were photographed, and printed. the materials used were then recycled. while the idea of a “garbage portrait” may sound at the least disagreeable, waste land along with pictures of garbage is a revelation of dignity, hope and good will. the film captures the subjects participating enthusiastically in the making of their portraits. they demonstrate feelings of honor and pride to be a part of designing a personalized work of art that others outside of their world will see. the creative task of carefully assembling the trash into their own image raises them out of their often-grim realities. individual reactions to the art-making process captured in the film reflect the sensibility of belonging to something greater than themselves. waste land and the pictures of garbage series celebrate a community of working individuals in a part of the world few people know—or care to know. the projects evoke compassion from the viewer. it seems nearly impossible not to feel empathy and concern for the souls that populate jardim gramacho because the cameras capture them in a completely candid state. a catador’s wit, intelligence and personality unfold as the camera follows them around for extended periods of time, recording despair alongside dreams. some workers die and some thrive, yet all are changed by the experience of art. during the project muniz raised money by selling one of the portraits from the pictures of garbage at auction in london for over $64,000. he turned over all of the profit to the garbage pickers association of jardim gramacho.47 this association, which established the recycling center, provides job contracts, a medical clinic, a day care center and other community resources.48 when the project concluded muniz held gallery exhibits internationally in which the sales of over $300,000 were given to the subjects. while the abundant monetary reimbursement for pictures of garbage was an undeniable economic boost to the catadores it is also—and perhaps more importantly—the artistic collaboration that stands as an example of agape as art and love in community. this collaboration resulted in the subjects celebrating their lives and their community in a number of ways. a new york times review of waste land contains this quote from a catador who attended the museu de arte in rio for the first time in order to see pictures of garbage: “sometimes we see ourselves as so small but people out there see us as so big, so beautiful.’ ”49 pictures of garbage gives faces to the faceless. like agape it creates value out of what seems (or feels) worthless. this value possesses meaning for what it is to be. conclusion agapic art is largely activated in public space, the space of community. the members of the university of virginia campus who participated in lines of darkness and light, the new york visitors to untitled (free), the witnesses to hiroshima projection or the viewers of muniz/walker’s waste land remain for the most part anonymous individuals who may (or may not) be altered by viewing or participating in the projects. this does not negate the idea that agapic works of art are acts of care. this care is evident in gifts of opportunity, which contain the potential to uphold ever-present community taken for granted in our everydayness. in this way agapic art analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 83 creates value. arendt asserts that, “…love is derivative—derived from hope.”50 art provides the heideggerian clearing of light in a world that is witness to the ongoing darkness of a-bomb threats, domestic violence, and racial hatred, not to mention recent mass killings in movie theaters or elementary schools. the list goes on because now, as in all of history, the human instinct for aggression sees no end in sight. it is for this reason that we need agapic art to provide the glimpses of a community joined in hope, momentarily abating our vulnerability to unhappiness and death. agapic art celebrates the light needed to live. iliescu remarks upon this optimism in her description of the symbolic uncovering of the rotunda’s columns in lines of darkness and light.51 wodcizko points out the hope contained in the coming of new water of the river at the a-bomb dome. a gallery goer is cheered by a complimentary bowl of curry. a catador sees the hope of recognition through her portrait. works of art that express agape are gifts of optimism to the living. endnotes 1 personal interview with sanda iliescu on july 9, 2012. 2 http://www.virginia.edu/rotunda/rotundahistory.html 3 http://www.virginia.edu/dayofdialogue/dayofdialogue/artproject.html 4 the community also suffered the loss of this young man who had been a star athlete and popular student. he not only took love’s life but also managed to destroy his own future as a free individual and contributor to society. huguely’s trial concluded with a conviction of second-degree murder and grand larceny. the jury recommended 26 years in prison; he was sentenced to 23 years, and recently (2013) his lawyers have filed an appeal claiming he did not receive a fair trial. 5 in the symposium (385 – 380 b.c.e.) plato addresses notions of love using the voice of his teacher socrates. the dialogue concerns a drinking party in which interlocutors take turns speaking about love, its genesis, justification and various forms of expression. the symposium explains love as a ladder: the bottom of the rungs as lust or sexual attraction (eros) and the top is something that transcends the body to help the lover access divinity. 6 alan soble, “introduction” in eros, agape and philia: readings in the philosophy of love (st paul: paragon house, 1989), xxiii. 7 david l. norton and mary f. kille, philosophies of love (totowa, nj: rowan & littlefield publishers, 1988), 153. 8 st. paul, holy bible: new international version (meadrow, uk: international bible society, 1984), 811. 9 david l. norton and mary f. kille, philosophies of love (totowa, nj: rowan & littlefield publishers, 1988), 156. 10 oxford english dictionary. http://www.oed.com/view/entry/37337?redirectedfrom=community#eid (accessed june 6, 2012) 11 hannah arendt, love and saint augustine, (chicago: university of chicago press, 1996), 103. 12 jean luc nancy, the birth to presence (stanford: stanford university press, 1993), 143. 13 ibid., 151. 14 ibid., 151. 15 jean luc nancy, the birth to presence (stanford: stanford university press, 1993) 155. 16 ibid., 155. 17 barbara bolt, heidegger reframed (london: i.b. tauris & co. ltd, 2011) 17. 18 jacques lacan, the four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis: the seminar of jacques lacan, book xi (new york: w. w. norton & company, 1978) 198. 19 maurice blanchot, the unavowable community (barrytown, ny: station hill press, 1988) 9. 20 ibid., 11. 21 phil freshman, editor, public address: krzysztof wodiczko (minneapolis, mn: walker art center, 1992), 101. 22 wodiczko was the recipient of the hiroshima art prize with the condition of displaying a retrospective. he proposed the hiroshima projection as a large-scale public art project to take place the day after the anniversary of the bombing. 23 http://www.art21.org/videos/segment-krzysztof-wodiczko-in-power (accessed august 4, 2012) 24 transcribed from video interview. http://www.art21.org/videos/segment-krzysztof-wodiczko-in-power (accessed august 4, 2012) 25 c.s. lewis, four loves (new york: harcourt, inc.: 1991), 118. 26 sigmund freud, “civilization and its discontents” in the freud reader (new york, ny: norton & norton publishing, 1989), 749. 27 the tate modern occupies the site of the former bankside power station, which was in operation between 1947-1981. after its conversion in 2000, it measures almost 325 feet in height. http://www.virginia.edu/rotunda/rotundahistory.html http://www.oed.com/view/entry/37337?redirectedfrom=community#eid http://www.art21.org/videos/segment-krzysztof-wodiczko-in-power http://www.art21.org/videos/segment-krzysztof-wodiczko-in-power analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 84 28 this quote is transcribed from a video interview with salcedo on the art21 website. http://www.pbs.org/art21/artists/dorissalcedo 29 sigmund freud, “civilization and its discontents” in the freud reader (new york, ny: norton & norton publishing, 1989), 751. 30 ibid., 730. 31 sigmund freud, “leonardo da vinci and a memory of his childhood” in the freud reader (new york, ny: norton & norton publishing, 1989), 443. 32 european graduate school faculty lecture. round table discussion with jean-luc nancy, avital ronell and wolfgang schirmacher. european graduate school. http://www.egs.edu/faculty/jean-luc-nancy/articles/love-and-community/ (accessed june 6june 9, 2012). 33 european graduate school faculty lecture. round table discussion with jean-luc nancy, avital ronell and wolfgang schirmacher. european graduate school. http://www.egs.edu/faculty/jean-luc-nancy/articles/love-and-community/ (accessed june 6 june 9, 2012). 34 european graduate school faculty lecture. round table discussion with jean-luc nancy, avital ronell and wolfgang schirmacher. european graduate school. http://www.egs.edu/faculty/jean-luc-nancy/articles/love-and-community/ (accessed june 10, 2012). 35 hannah arendt, love and saint augustine (chicago, il: university of chicago press, 1996), 97. 36 while dr. king makes a claim for three words in greek love, there are actually four. he does not mention storge, a type of familial love that exists between parents and their children. a further meaning of storge is a strong affection and commitment held between friends. 37 http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=1131 38 david l. norton and mary f. kille, philosophies of love (totowa, nj: rowan & littlefield publishers, 1988), 159. 39 ibid., 159. 40 nicolas bourriaud, relational aesthetics (paris: les presses du réel: 1998), 9. 41 recently the museum of modern art in new york city recreated tiravanija’s untitled (free) from november 17, 2011 – february 8, 2012 serving rice and curry from noon to 3 pm daily. 42 nicolas bourriaud, relational aesthetics (paris: les presses du réel: 1998), 41. 43 ibid., 46. 44 muniz’s photographic oeuvre typically includes the creative use of materials such as dust, sugar, and airplane exhaust, sometimes in mimesis of master works from art history. 45 ironically the term jardim is portuguese for garden. 46 http://www.wastelandmovie.com/ (accessed august 7, 2012) 47 http://www.wastelandmovie.com/pdf/waste-land-press-notes.pdf (accessed august 7, 2012) 48 jardim gramacho closed in 2012. 49 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/24/arts/design/24muniz.html?pagewanted=all (accessed august 7, 2012) 50 hannah arendt, love and saint augustine (chicago, il: university of chicago press, 1996), 42. 51 http://www.virginia.edu/dayofdialogue/dayofdialogue/artproject.html (accessed august 8, 2012) bibliography arendt, hannah. love and saint augustine. chicago, il: university of chicago press, 1996. blanchot, maurice. the unavowable community. translated by pierre joris. barrytown, ny: station hill press, 1988. bolt, barbara. heidegger reframed. london: i. b. tauris & co. ltd. , 2011. bourriaud, nicolas. relational aesthetics. paris : les presses du reel, 1998. european graduate school. "love and community: a round table discussion with jean-luc nancy, avital ronell and wolfgang schirmacher." european graduate school. august 2001. http://www.egs.edu/faculty/jean-luc-nancy/articles/love-and-community/ (accessed june 6, 2012). freshman, phil, ed. public address: krzysztof wodiczko. minneapolis, mn: walker center for the arts, 1992. freud, sigmund. the freud reader. edited by peter gay. ny, ny: w. w. norton & company, 1989. http://www.pbs.org/art21/artists/doris-salcedo http://www.pbs.org/art21/artists/doris-salcedo http://www.egs.edu/faculty/jean-luc-nancy/articles/love-and-community/ http://www.egs.edu/faculty/jean-luc-nancy/articles/love-and-community/ http://www.egs.edu/faculty/jean-luc-nancy/articles/love-and-community/ http://www.wastelandmovie.com/ http://www.wastelandmovie.com/pdf/waste-land-press-notes.pdf http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/24/arts/design/24muniz.html?pagewanted=all http://www.virginia.edu/dayofdialogue/dayofdialogue/artproject.html analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 85 gerson, lloyd. plotinus. 2008. plato.standford.edu/entries/plotinus (accessed august 1, 2012). iliescu, sanda. day of dialogue, u. va. february 6, 2011. http://www.virginia.edu/dayofdialogue/dayofdialogue/artproject.html (accessed june 23, 2012). lacan, jacques. the four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis: the seminar of jacques lacan book xi. edited by jacques-alain miller. translated by alan sheridan. new york, ny: w. w. norton & company, 1978. lewis, c. s. four loves. new york, ny: harcourt, inc., 1991. moseley, alexander. philosophy of love: an overview. edited by james and dowden, bradley fieser. james fieser. august 8, 2010. www.iep.utm.edu/love/ (accessed august 1, 2012). nancy, jean-luc. the birth to presence. translated by brian holmes and others. standford, ca: stanford university press, 1993. ———.the inoperative community. edited by peter connor. translated by lisa garbus, michael holland, simona sawhney peter connor. minneapolis, mn: university of minnesota press, 1991. norton, david l. and kille, mary f. philosophies of love. totowa, nj: rowan & littlefield publishers, 1988. paul, st. "holy bible: new international version." 811. meadrow: international bible society, 1984. plato. symposium. ———. the republic. russell, bertrand. a history of western philosophy. new york, ny: touchstone: a division of simon and schuster, 2007. salcedo, doris. art21/pbs. october 7, 2009. http://www.pbs.org/art21/artists/doris-salcedo (accessed july 14, 2012). soble, alan. eros, agape and philia: readings in the philosophy of love. paragon house , 1998. virginia, the rector and visitors of the university of. history of the rotunda, university of virginia. june 4, 2009. http://www.virginia.edu/rotunda/rotundahistory.html (accessed june 23, 2012). wodiczko, krzysztof. the hiroshima projection. 2001-2012. http://www.art21.org/images/krzysztof-wodiczko/thehiroshima-projection-1999-0 (accessed july 30, 2012). address correspondences to: kathryn a. mcfadden, doctoral candidate, institute for doctoral studies in the visual arts philadelphia, kmcfadden@idsva.org academic philosophy: an uncommonly creative, imaginative and challenging curriculum,” consisting of six texts: question mark, theo rising, mark and theo make their case, xperiment, finding faith, and will power (all authored by sharon kaye, illustrated by jordan novak or christopher tice, and published by roya fireworks press, 2017) 41 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 37, issue 2 (2017) review of “academic philosophy: an uncommonly creative, imaginative and challenging curriculum” richard morehouse question mark (110 pages) perfect bound $30 saddle stitch $ 25 teacher manual, level a, philosophy curriculum (34 pages) $ 12.50 theo rising (111 pages) perfect bound $30 saddle stitch $ 25 teacher manual, level b, philosophy curriculum (34 pages) $ 12.50 mark and theo make their case (110 pages) perfect bound $30 saddle stitch $ 25 teacher manual, level c, philosophy curriculum (29 pages) $ 12.50 xperiment (58 pages) perfect bound $17.50 saddle stitch $12.59 level d, philosophical (guidebook 25 pages) $12.50 finding faith (74 pages) perfect bound $17.50 saddle stitch $12.59 level e, philosophical guidebook (26 pages) $12.50 will power (77 pages) perfect bound $17.50 saddle stitch $12.59 level f, philosophical guidebook (29 pages) $12.50 sharon kaye, author jordan novak or christopher tice, illustrators roya fireworks press: unionville, ny, 2017 42 his series of books and accompanying guides as a group are labeled “academic philosophy: and uncommonly creative, imaginative & challenging curriculum” in the promotional brochure. sharon kaye is the author of the series but there are two different illustrators. jordon novak illustrates question mark, theo rising, and mark and theo make their case and christopher tice illustrates the rest of the series. the first three sets of teacher materials are labeled teacher manual, while the last three sets of teacher materials are called philosophical curriculum guidebooks. each set of materials for the teacher is also labeled levels, a through f. as the included brochure states, the alphabetic labeling is provided for flexibility when using these materials in different grade levels, for example a (ages 5 and up), b (ages 6 and up), and so on. the front covers of each book are similar in appearance though it is quite easy to see that they are illustrated by two different artists. the books are attractive and inviting. each book comes with support materials, i.e., teachers manual for a, b, and c, which lists the theme of each book and includes a summary of the story, philosophical bases, discussion questions, and activities for each chapter. the philosophical guides for books d, e, and f have an activities section and suggestions for further exploration. the teaching material also has a statement about the central philosophical skills to be developed in the first three books. books d, e, and f teacher material have themes or questions to be explored. the philosophical themes to be developed in question mark (level a philosophy curriculum) are questioning, doubting, and certainty. theo rising (level b philosophy curriculum) is about theorizing; posing an inquiry, examining competing theories, and using criterion for theory evaluation. mark and theo make their case (level c philosophy curriculum) addresses the philosophical skills of identifying a problem, making an argument, and making objections. the next three books make a shift in appearance and content. they become less about an open-ended sense of wonder and more about developing specific philosophical skills. this is not to say that the first three books do not engage students as philosophers, or that the last three books do not instill and enhance a sense of wonder, but to this reader, there is a noticeable shift in tone and spirit between the first three books and the others in the series. the philosophical skills to be developed in xperiment are selective rule-breaking, engaging thought-experiments, and proposing alternatives, and the book’s theme is focused on the classical philosophical problem, what is justice? finding faith is intended to develop the skills of following a complex argument, suspending judgment, and having the courage to stand by your convictions, while its theme is exploring arguments for and against the existence of god. will power works to develop the philosophical skills of making careful observations, defending a position, and tolerating ambiguity. the theme of this final volume is “the gripping and ongoing debate between fate and free will” (kaye, 2017, p.1). with that quick overview, i would like to place these works in a larger context before going into details about the books in this series. it is widely known in many education circles that matthew lipman1 and others began developing a curriculum in the late 1960s with the first publication of the novel, harry stottlemeier’s discovery published in 1969 with the aid of a small grant from the national endowment for the humanities. since that time, the teaching of philosophy for children has spread around the world and its original formulation has morphed into many modified and/or parallel t 43 versions, including that of gareth b. matthews2, and those who started and modified lipman’s approach and content, including joanna haynes3, karin murris4, laurence j. splitter & ann m. sharp,5 susan gardner6, susan wilks7, and walter kohan,8 to name a few. any of these books would provide a helpful guide to a teacher wishing to use “academic philosophy: an uncommonly creative, imaginative, & challenging curriculum.” a careful reading of teaching for better thinking: the classroom community of inquiry (splitter & sharp, 1995), picturebooks, pedagogy, and philosophy (hayes and murris, 2012), or the socratic classroom: reflective thinking through collaborative inquiry (chesters, 2012) would provide a beneficial aid for anyone using this curriculum. i recommend these books before a teacher leaps into the teaching of philosophy. for myself, i began teaching lipman’s harry stottlemeier’s discovery with little knowledge of philosophy for children; however, i had the harry manual as a tool for teaching as i began this experiment in the late 1970s, and so i recommend the “academic philosophy” series with the assumption that those who use it will have additional support materials, or at least will be familiar with pfc teaching techniques. armed only with harry and the manual, the support of several classroom teachers and school administrators, my incursion into philosophical inquiry with 5th grade students was successful enough to sustain my interest and increase my scholarship in philosophy for children and community of inquiry over nearly four decades. so while i do not think extended training in teaching philosophy to young children is required to make good use of sharon kaye’s materials, i do think that some knowledge of philosophy and how it might be best taught in elementary and middle schools is essential. to provide a full critique of each of the books and accompanying support material would require an extensive and overly lengthy review, and so my goal is simply to highlight some important points about the different texts. the first three books are closely linked to themes introduced in the first work, question mark, in that each of the three works builds on questioning, which leads to theorizing, and problem-solving. the next three volumes are also thematically linked. these works focus on the relationship between competence, autonomy, and relatedness. the interrelationship between these three themes is present in all three volumes, though each volume has a slightly different emphasis. both for reasons of personal interest and the conceptual development of the themes within these two sets of volumes, i have chosen to focus my comments on the level a volume, question mark, and level d volume xperiment. the author states at the beginning of the teacher manual of question mark, "as the instructor, you can think of this volume as a single picture book with fifteen chapters or as a series of individual picture books that build a storyline" (kaye, 2017, 1). the manual for question mark is divided into three parts: questioning, doubting, and being certain. the even pages of the manual are organized under the following titles: summary, philosophical basis, discussing questions, and activities. the summary is straightforward and is made up of three sentences. the section “philosophical basis” contains four short paragraphs. kaye relates this chapter to plato’s allegory of the cave from the republic. the sections focused on “philosophical basis” are troubling for this reviewer, not just because they are too short to explain much about the philosopher’s ideas, but also because the teacher/facilitator (or at least this reviewer) is left unclear how references to specific philosophers, for example, “kierkegaard’s ideas about ‘who am i’,” helps the teacher or students better understand the text. perhaps its purpose is to encourage students (five and six-year-old pupils) to think more deeply on their own and how we “create who we are through 44 personal choice and commitment” (kaye, 2017a, p. 8), but it is not entirely clear if that is the goal. that said, question mark (the picture book) does an amazing job of raising intriguing questions, but other than stimulating the teacher’s appetite there is not sufficient concrete direction provided for the teacher to build on the activities. i think encouraging young children to explore questions like ‘who am i’ and ‘what is the nature of reality’ can enhance and deepen what children may already think, but how does knowing a little about søren kierkegaard help the teacher or the students know how to address these big questions. what is the likelihood that the teacher of this picture book will have the training and background to dig into fear and trembling9 and productively translate these ideas into a useful format for young children? volumes d, e, and f begin with a different type of philosophical wonder. if the first three volumes are about child-like wonder that expands the mind, stimulates the imagination, and challenges assumptions in playful ways, the second set of volumes are more focused on thematic examinations that challenge the early adolescent mind. adolescence is about constructing systems and theories (morehouse, 2011, p. 10). “what is particularly surprising is [the adolescent’s] facility for elaborating abstract theories … the majority talk only about a small part of their personal creation and confine themselves to ruminating about them intimately and in secret, but all of them have systems and theories that transform the world in one way or another” (piaget, 1986, p.61). these volumes allow and encourage adolescents to make some of their ideas public, and kaye is to be commended for her efforts in this regard. xperiment is a fine example of how adolescent inquiry on meaning-making can become a part of classroom discussion. the story revolves around a group of kids, a school playground, a neighborhood junkyard, some territorial disputes, and an adult who guides them by raising questions. in the process, justice and self-governing are explored. the story is captivating and the guide using bloom's cognitive taxonomy to aid student discussion is helpful. this and the other two volumes (finding faith and will power) provide equally compelling stories that examine important themes relevant to young adolescents who are already privately ruminating about life, and coaxes them into discussing these issues openly amongst their peers. my biggest concern with using these texts is the lack of material they provide on the pedagogy of teaching philosophy to young people. i would recommend that after familiarizing themselves with the series, prospective teachers should carefully read up on some material specifically focused on teaching philosophy to children. the first on my list is the socratic classroom: reflective thinking through collaborative inquiry (chester, 2012) followed by thinking in education (lipman, 2003). i recommend chester as the first read as it looks to a broader range of philosophic material for children, and lipman second because his work is both pioneering and continues to be useful to anyone who might teach philosophy with children. there is no doubt that “academic philosophy: and uncommonly creative, imaginative & challenging curriculum” is a great series of books that will challenge young people and the adults who work with them. the texts are best seen as supplementary material to help facilitate philosophical discussions rather than teach people how to do pfc; provided teachers are up to the pedagogical challenge of enacting philosophy with students, the series looks to be of great help. 45 endnotes 1 lipman, m., sharp, a.m. and oscanyan, f.s., 2010. philosophy in the classroom. temple university press. 2 matthews, g.b., 1976. philosophy and children's literature. metaphilosophy, 7(1), pp.7-16. 3 haynes, j. 2002. children as philosophers: learning through inquiry and dialogue in the primary school. london: falmer/routledge. 4 haynes, j. & murris, k. 2012. picturebooks, pedagogy, and philosophy. london: routledge. 5 splitter, l. j. & sharp, a.m. 1995. teaching for better understanding: classroom community of inquiry. melbourne: acer. 6 gardner, s.t., 2008. thinking your way to freedom: a guide to owning your own practical reasoning. temple university press. 7 wilks, s. 1995. critical & creative thinking strategies for classroom inquiry. portsmouth, nh: heinemann 8 kohn, w.o. 2014. philosophy and childhood: a critical perspective and affirmative practices. new york: palgrave 9 kierkegaard, s., 2013. kierkegaard's writings, vi: fear and trembling/repetition (vol. 6). princeton university press. references kierkegaard, s., 2013. kierkegaard's writings, vi: fear and trembling/repetition (vol. 6). princeton university press. morehouse, r. 2011. a developmental perspective on creativity, critical thinking, and problem solving: toward a framework for educators, part two. education today. education today 61(1):7–– 13. piaget, j. (1967). six psychological studies. d. elkind (ed.). random house. address correspondences to: richard (mort) morehouse, phd praxis 115 5th avenue south, suite 409 la crosse, wi 54601 remorehouse@viterbo.edu philosophy, pedagogy and personal identity: listening to the teachers in pfc analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 37, issue 1 (2016) 30 philosophy, pedagogy and personal identity: listening to the teachers in pfc geoff baker and andrew fisher introduction hilosophy for children (p4c) has enabled schools to engage with what is typically thought of as an ‘academic’ discipline and has provided the opportunity to unlock a rich educational experience for children from a diverse range of backgrounds (madrid, 2008; topping and trickey, 2007; douglas, 2003). a wide range of qualitative and quantitative studies have emerged looking at p4c in terms of the development of students at the social, academic and emotional level (topping and trickey, 2004; hand and winstanley, 2009; lane and lane, 1986; williams, 1993; trickey, 2006; lone, 2001; reed, 1987; murphy et al., 2009). however, while there have been many p4c papers that have ‘teacher’ in the title, these are often about teacher training – including ‘hints and tips’ (e.g. lipman, 1987; mariefrance, 1988; popen, 1996; burgh and o’brien, 2002; johnson and pines, 1979) and curriculum development (e.g. malanga, 1988; weinstein, 1986; cam, 2006; stan, 1996; wilks, 1993). relatively few studies have looked at the effect of teaching p4c on teachers themselves (notable among these are splitter, 2000a and 2000b; yeazell, 1979). this paper considers how p4c affects teachers, in particular whether teaching p4c has led teachers to develop new pedagogical approaches, different ways of thinking critically and whether it has changed how they engage with their students, colleagues and their school. the paper centred on a case study of one group of teachers at a large primary academy in the uk that has been delivering p4c for the last two years at all levels from reception through to year 6. the school is situated in an economically deprived coastal area of the uk. nearly two thirds of students at the school are eligible for the pupil premium, a key indicator of economic deprivation, which is significantly above the national average. the number of students with a statement of special educational needs and the number of students for whom english is not their first language are both above average. students in the school have a weekly p4c class that lasts for 45 minutes and is structured around a particular stimulus that the teacher locates for each lesson. the senior leadership team has been particularly supportive of this approach and consequently all staff members have received level 1 training from the society for the advancement of philosophical enquiry and reflection in education, an organisation that aims to promote p4c in the uk. the authors of this paper completed three in-depth semi-structured interviews with members of staff from the school: the vice principal, the p4c curriculum leader and a class teacher, all three of whom taught regular p4c sessions for an entire academic year. the three participants volunteered to take part as they all had particular interests in p4c. each interview lasted for around thirty minutes and a series of common questions were put to the interviewees, with particular areas explored with supplementary questions where appropriate. the interviews were then transcribed and themes drawn out by each of the interviewers, coding the scripts independently and then comparing their notes. four key themes were identified and they form the structure for this paper, being the link between p4c and approaches to teaching; approaches to students; links within the professional community and approaches to the purposes of education. p 31 as a case study the generalisability of the conclusions is limited, offering only an investigation into how the teachers in this particular setting experienced teaching p4c. however, aspects of transferability can be drawn out through ‘particularisation’ as the conclusions of the case study are compared with the findings of broader research (stake, 1995; thomas, 2010). p4c and approaches to teaching in the interviews the teachers conceived of p4c as an ‘approach’ to teaching, rather than a particular subject to be taught. they saw the purpose of teaching p4c as ‘moulding’ and ‘modelling’ a ‘mindset’ in students. these are very involved and active ways of describing teaching. this was notably seen in one comment that ‘philosophy is more of an approach. it is training them in a different mindset’. the teachers were clear that the ’mind-set’ that they were trying to ‘mould’ and ‘model’ involved ‘independence’ in the students – the ability to think for oneself: ‘i’ve learnt that … in p4c they do it all … i’ve learnt that if you take a step back and you let the children they almost teach themselves … rather than me at the front saying “do this”, “do that”.’ this is not too surprising as the research on p4c regularly alludes to the importance of promoting independence, deep thinking and reflectiveness in the students (lipman, 1987; cam, 2006). perhaps more surprising is how the teachers articulated what seemed to be a direct relationship between the teachers’ own cultivation of philosophical skills in themselves and their ability to create independence in the students. one respondent claimed ‘delivering p4c … is about developing independence within the staff themselves’, and another that ‘i know for myself, it has made me much more reflective, and think about my questioning skills, and how i can question the children differently’. p4c has helped, in the words of one of the teachers, ‘tune-up’ their own questioning and thinking skills. teaching p4c develops a reflectivity and independence in teachers, and it is this that seems to set p4c apart from other subjects in the curriculum. this ties in with the conclusions of lipman et al. (1980) who argue that to teach p4c the teacher ought to become sensitive to philosophical speculation. likewise, it is supported by qualitative and quantitative studies on ‘modelling’ (for example yeazell, 1979; burgh and o’brien, 2002). philosophy is more than just a subject and perhaps its ‘signature pedagogy’ is to engage students in a way of thinking – a pedagogy that requires more of an embodiment of the meta-cognitive skills as part of teaching (chick et al., 2009). another theme was that teachers of p4c talked about having to learn again how to ‘feel comfortable’ in the classroom, particularly with letting the children ‘just talk’ and about starting a lesson with no set plans or ‘correct answers’. for example: ‘you have to be more confident in letting things run their course … it took a little while for teachers to be comfortable teaching it. because you are encouraged not to force the children to speak – there can be children who sit back and rarely say anything’. this different approach meant that the teachers were more aware of how they were perceived by colleagues, parents and governors. again, this notion finds wider corroboration in the literature, with reed (1987: 83) claiming: the teacher in a philosophy for children discussion … must, to some extent, be ignorant about what is being discussed. there must be something which is really problematic for her, she must be as much of a student and scholar as her students. in a public school classroom, however, the ignorance which is prized in philosophy for children is denigrated there. although these features of p4c were lauded as positive, the interviewees also recognised that the freedom of students to explore ideas openly – to follow the inquiry where 32 it leads – depends on the teachers’ management of a rigorous process of inquiry. ‘[p4c sessions are] those sessions – how can i put this without sounding lazy … it is the sort of thing that you can do off the top of your head. so you don’t sit down and really, really plan it’. another stated that ‘i need to do some observations to make sure it is done properly. that it hasn’t become wishy washy … no planning just, you know, just stick something on from a youtube video and see what the kids say’. thus, while the p4c teacher should maintain ignorance and curiosity about the outcome of the inquiry, at the same time she or he must exercise expertise in the method of philosophical inquiry. as wilks (1993) has noted, this approach precludes a certain kind of planning in which every step of the experience is controlled, there is a greater reliance on the philosophical professionalism of the p4c facilitator in order for the students’ inquiries to be rigorous, engaging, productive and meaningful. indeed, there may well be a hidden effect here. in light of evidence (such as gordon, 1984) that the attitudes of teachers effect student achievement, the way in which p4c is approached by the teacher themselves may well have a disproportionately significant impact on outcomes. given that p4c requires a different type of planning as compared to other subjects, schools must ensure that accountability remains rigorous, using methods that are more appropriate than simply checking plans, such as regular learning walks. given the nature of the group we interviewed – self-selecting staff interested in p4c – it was no surprise that this professionalism was evident. this was seen in the comment of the respondent who noted: for me [p4c] is something i need to look into [before the lessons] because [if you don’t] that could be why the children aren’t so, you know, engaged with it. and i think that might be a generalised thing around the school [amongst other teachers teaching p4c]. it is not like maths when you have to have the resources there. there is no school theme … it is literally what you want to do. this also shows why professional development in p4c is vital. as one interviewee commented: ‘i think [p4c] could be seen as the easy option. but we had really good training on it … it is essential to have training; otherwise it just becomes circle time’. not only is good initial training vital, but these interviews made clear that the opportunity for p4c teachers to share resources, collaborate, and take continued professional development were equally important. another fascinating idea that emerged was the potential role of p4c in creating ‘outstanding’ teachers. the interviewees cited p4c as an approach that could act as a ‘bridge’ assisting a teacher to move from ‘good’ to ‘outstanding’. you can force someone to be a good teacher. you can take [anyone] and tell them do this and do that … but getting them to outstanding is a whole different thing. p4c can be used as a pedagogical bridge to get staff to take that leap in their practice from good – which is simply something about what you do – a tick box. this sentiment was supported by another respondent, who noted that: teachers who are teaching with this whole idea of critical thinking and problem solving are our outstanding teachers who, if the lesson is not going well, will introduce something completely left of field and bring that in. not on the plan, not anywhere near the plan, but actually that is what they need. and they do that because of their experiences and because they are critical thinkers and because they are not ‘tick box’ teachers. but because they are thinkers – they are i guess philosophers. 33 given the training that teachers have undertaken and the nature of their work it is likely that most will have some natural ‘philosophical ability’, which training in p4c can refresh or develop. it could be argued that one of the unintended consequences of teaching p4c is that teachers’ own will to become yet more philosophical can also be strengthened in this process. p4c and approaches to students there was a general consensus amongst the teachers that in contrast to other subjects, p4c was ‘fairer’ to the students, in two ways: it enabled students to use and demonstrate to teachers and peers a wider range of abilities and personality traits than are typically called on in the classroom, and it enabled students who struggle with certain academic skills to demonstrate their intelligence and thoughtfulness. interviewees attributed both aspects of ‘fairness’ to the fact that p4c is based around discussion. importantly, in order to discuss you do not need great writing skills, reading skills, or great grammar but rather, you need the time and space to consider deep questions, the give-and-take of being questioned and listened to by teachers and peers, and the confidence to share your insights openly and to self-correct as you pursue a line of inquiry. this is seen in the work of murphy et al. (2009) who argue that p4c is one of the strongest discussion programmes that exist. philosophical discussion allowed teachers to discover different aspects of students’ personalities and abilities, with respondents noting that they were able to see students exhibit ‘different skills they did not know they had’ or ‘values and principles that showed me they were really thinking about things’. on the other hand, as one teacher made clear, one of the most important things a p4c teacher may discover about students is not something new, but evidence of intelligence and ability the teacher had rightly suspected: it hasn’t changed how capable i think the kids are because i always thought they were capable. it confirmed my beliefs about them … because it is a talking subject it doesn’t leave out children who can’t write or aren’t very good at maths. it can include everyone. it was also noted that ‘because p4c doesn’t involve writing, it shows better everyone’s potential’. this said, it would present particular issues for students who struggled to speak in a group. although targeted support could go a long way to engage these students, a consequence of this means that it could be argued that it is not quite the case that discussion levels the field for everyone, but that it changes the field so that some students who struggle in other ways have a chance to excel. p4c and the professional community an interesting feature of the interviews conducted with staff was the number of occasions participants referred to themselves as ‘sharing’, ‘testing ideas with colleagues’ or ‘asking [each other] for advice’. teaching is by its nature a social activity and in all subjects at all levels teachers will be working within a community (bolam et al., 2005). the nature of p4c, however, seemed to open up more the idea of collaboration. when these issues were probed in the interviews, the interviewees said that this was because they were teaching a new subject, meaning that everyone was in the same position, so there was not the usual pressure of appearing to know what was going on. the fact that p4c moves away from simplistic concepts of correct and incorrect answers was also seen as a factor in encouraging colleagues to share ideas without being afraid of how their ideas would be received. understanding this, our teachers were eager to ask for, and share ideas about how to practice 34 this artful pedagogy. perhaps most significant, though, was that space was set aside to promote collaboration. interviewees noted that senior leaders felt that p4c would only succeed if people shared their ideas and experiences with colleagues. as such, they went out of their way to do this. it was also noted that the p4c approach has an ‘egalitarian’ feel about it. teachers and tas worked together, sharing experiences and ideas. as they were trained together there was a sense that a traditional school hierarchy did not function in the same way within this group, and that p4c sat outside the traditional scope of teaching activities. for example, one comment made was that ‘it has been quite liberating teaching p4c. i’ve said to tas working for me “if there is any question you want to ask, any stimulus you want to use. just go for it”’. consequently, with the p4c model there was a sense that there was more opportunity for involvement from those who were not teachers. the interviewees noted that in redefining the scope of a professional community, new ideas and approaches were brought to the table. therefore, both the approach of p4c and the inclusive training that this particular school adopted meant that the professional community became cohesive and mutually selfsupporting. this collaborative way of working together was seen as a particularly positive impact of p4c at the school. a positive impact noted by our teachers, and related to our observations on p4c, was that their involvement with p4c had prompted teachers at this school to use this approach in other areas of their teaching. consequently it was felt by the interviewees that they had made significant advances as professionals since delivering p4c as they had cultivated questioning, reasoning, meta-cognition and other philosophical skills, had learnt more from their colleagues and had a chance to have their own views and experiences celebrated. the comments are in line with work on professional learning communities, where the focused collaboration of professionals is viewed as being one of the most important ingredients to bringing about authentic change in a school (bolam et al., 2005; louis and marks, 1998; stoll et al., 2006). p4c and approaches to the purpose of education on a more fundamental level, the comments from the interviewees revealed that their experience of p4c had forced them to look more broadly at their own approach to education. in the first place, they noted that teaching p4c made them reassess their views about what it was they were actually trying to do when teaching and what they were seeking to engender in their students. in many ways the skills / knowledge debate appears outdated in higher education, with most practitioners holding the view that university level learning is not simply about knowing facts (harvey, 2000; knight and yorke, 2003). however, this debate continues in schools. in recent years, the work of hirsch (2006) has led to a ‘core knowledge’ movement, which has stipulated exactly the things that students at different age groups should know. in the uk this has led certain academy chains to unashamedly adopt a more traditional pedagogical approach that focuses on rote learning and memory skills (christodoulou, 2014). in contrast, all three of our interviewees noted that p4c requires very little knowledge of things, but a great deal of understanding, high level thinking, and skill in managing an inquiry so that it will go somewhere. as one respondent noted, ‘it is a completely different approach to teaching’. when discussing p4c all three spoke about the transferable nature of the qualities it built, such as ‘in the outside world we have to act on our own initiative. and if we don’t do this, kids won’t have this ability’. this point was not drawn out through careful interviewing technique. rather, the interviewees recognised the 35 significance of their comments, as expressed by one: ‘it has changed my mind about what education is. it shouldn’t just be about the knowledge curriculum’. this changed view of the purposes of education locates p4c teachers in a broader social and academic debate about the ideological and political ramifications of p4c (for a good overview see gregory, 2011). in particular this has concerned the impact of p4c on the child. for example, a parent may worry, if ‘everything’ is being questioned in p4c then what about their child’s faith in god? similarly, educators who see themselves as agents of ‘the state’ may worry about losing absolute control of what is talked about in the classroom, or the judgments students make about philosophical issues (ghazinejad and ruitenberg, 2014). the staff we interviewed were aware of how their p4c practice related to some of these social and political controversies in education. interestingly, our interviewees said p4c has given them a reason to contribute their new insights about education to these debates. in recent years p4c has gained popularity amongst schools in the uk and visibility in the media, and has a growing amount of empirical evidence supporting its positive benefits. our interviewees were also aware of these developments, and remarked on how these developments gave them a license to defend p4c and the purposes of education it points to, without seeming to belong to a particular political camp. teachers often find themselves in a position where they must resist pressure from educational stakeholders with particular agendas (such as ‘the campaign for real education’ http://www.cre.org.uk), or must make a case to governors, or create a bid for funding. in such cases, our interviewees noted, a political language and expertise is not required, so long as they can speak intelligently about p4c’s approaches to teaching, students, educational professionalism and the purposes of education. in a very real sense then, p4c has been liberating for these teachers and senior leaders. it has allowed them to advocate a particular outlook on the politics of teaching and education without being painted in a certain political light and without therefore being silenced before they have said anything. conclusion in our discussion and reflection on the experiences of staff involved with p4c a number of themes emerged. p4c affected approaches to teaching. staff had initially considered the teaching of p4c as a distinct discipline, but in doing so had become more reflective about the nature of teaching in general. the critical spirit that teaching p4c required could not be made up but had to derive from the teacher’s own reflexivity and independence of thought. this meant that there emerged the idea that there was a proportionate relationship between the teacher’s own philosophical ability and their ability to teach p4c. this was directly linked to the perceived requirement for good quality teacher preparation in p4c and ongoing professional development. moreover, this needed to take place within a robust professional community where ideas can be tested and shared, and where teachers can ask one another for advice. such training, accountability and transparency is the best way to prevent a potential ‘laziness’ which p4c may enable. p4c was discussed against the backdrop of a more general reflection on the nature of education; teaching something ‘different’ like p4c meant that teachers were prompted to ask ‘why do i teach in the way that i do?’. this in turn meant that they were starting to think through, and position themselves in relation to, certain political and ideological debates – 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(1988) ‘extending philosophy for children into the curriculum’. analytic teaching, 8(2), pp. 19-31. wilks, s. (1993) ‘the implementation of philosophy into school curricula as a chang process: hints for teacher educators’, analytic teaching, 14(1), pp. 27-32. williams, s. (1993) evaluating the effects of philosophical enquiry in a secondary school. derbyshire, derbyshire county council. 38 yeazell, m. (1979) ‘what happens to teachers who teach philosophy to children?’ thinking, 2(3-4), pp. 86-89. address correspondences to: dr geoff baker visiting fellow in education liverpool hope university geoff.baker@live.co.uk professor andrew fisher associate professor of philosophy university of nottingham mailto:geoff.baker@live.co.uk analytic teaching and philosophical praxis analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) editor’s notes the original inspiration for the papers collected here was in response to a conference on the virtue of love held at viterbo university in spring of 2013. i also put out a call for papers on the topic “understanding the virtue of love” shortly after the conference and i am pleased to say, between the conference and the cfp, the journal had one of its largest submission pools. we managed to narrow down the submissions to seven papers, all of which dealt with overlapping but distinct concerns related to the virtue of love and, most importantly from the standpoint of the journal’s mission, how the virtue of love relates to pedagogy. the seven essays assembled here provide an eclectic approach to understanding the virtue of love. two papers, schulzke’s on erich fromm and d’ambrosio and faul’s on pitirim sorokin, introduce readers to two comprehensive accounts of love by two important 20th century theorists whose work on love continues to garner little detailed attention. johnson’s paper on “the significance of alcibiades’ speech in plato’s symposium” and ware’s on “what good is love?” nicely complement each other, with each exploring the rich interrelationship between beauty, eros, and virtue in plato, and each attempting to defend, albeit in different ways, the resources of plato’s thought for showing us how to think about the virtue of love. william r. jarrett’s “love or tolerance? a virtue response to religious violence and plurality” does a commendable job showing the limitations with notions of tolerance, using this point to argue for the supremacy of caritas as a concept that can better accommodate the complexity of religious, and even secular, diversity. bernardo caslib, jr.’s paper also takes up the concept of caritas and uses it as the educational fulcrum for an innovative project in experiential learning that brings together filipino college students with elderly and marginalized populations. finally, kathryn a. mcfadden’s “agape: love and art in community” explores the many ways that contemporary works of art have been used to reinvigorate community and disclose a sense of love, seeing art as a means of bearing witness to the love of life even in the midst of tragedy and loss. i hope you enjoy the issue. pax et bonum jason j. howard, chief editor chief editor jason j. howard viterbo university copy editor jacqueline herbers viterbo university layout assistant tyler r. mancl viterbo university web design master debra a. kappmeyer viterbo university contributing editors patrick costello glyndŵr university susan gardner capilano university david kennedy montclair state university nadia s. kennedy stony brook university, suny richard morehouse, emeritus viterbo university joe oyler institute for the advancement of philosophy for children montclair state university michel sasseville laval university john simpson university of alberta barbara weber university of british columbia publisher viterbo university, la crosse, wisconsin 45601 established in 1981 as analytic teaching at texas wesleyan college and transferred to viterbo in 1993. online copyright 2005. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis is a peer-reviewed, online, open access journal published biannually. issn 0890-5118 feeling the pull: ethical enquiry and the tension it creates for teachers analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 44 feeling the pull: ethical enquiry and the tension it creates for teachers grace robinson abstract: ethical topics are attractive starting points for philosophical enquiry with children who must live and learn together in classrooms that accommodate a plurality of values. however the appealing familiarity, practicality and accessibility of certain ethical topics can obscure the challenges such sessions present to teachers and their students. the teacher’s role as facilitator of philosophical enquiry requires her to encourage open-ended, conceptually-focused dialogue, fuelled by questioning that, for the most part, ‘doesn’t offer any new ideas or information to the group but simply attempts to make visible, clarify, or connect what has already emerged’ (kennedy 2014 p. 755). even where a facilitator does introduce new information, ideas, questions, or lines of enquiry, these contributions are not designed to lead the class to a particular conclusion. the facilitator typically assumes a ‘selfeffacing non-judgemental, and neutral role’ with regards to the verdicts reached by the children, intervening only where it will challenge the class to work harder and not to advance her own position. however the teacher also embodies the often-unarticulated role of ethical instructor. in this role she must inform, guide, praise, promote, encourage, incentivise, reward, uphold and police conventional standards of good character and conduct. when we examine these two roles in context as this paper does, we begin to feel the pull. how can a teacher create space in which ethical norms can be challenged – even rejected – in the spirit of intellectually vigorous philosophical enquiry whilst simultaneously upholding and reinforcing them as non-negotiable expectations? the paper argues that the tension between the roles of ‘teacher-as-philosophical-facilitator’ and ‘teacher-as-ethicalinstructor’ is not intractable, in fact when acknowledged and better understood, the apparently competing demands of these roles can be dissolved leading to an enriched ethical education for children. ethical enquiry thical topics are attractive starting points for philosophical enquiry with children who must live and learn together in classrooms that accommodate a plurality of values; a brief survey of practitioner resources finds concepts such as friendship, fairness, and freedom recommended to teachers as rich and rewarding topics for philosophical enquiry with children (e.g. lipman, 1983; worley, 2010 stanley, 2012). however the appealing familiarity, practicality and accessibility of certain ethical topics can obscure the challenges such sessions present to teachers and the children in their care. the ethical roles of the teacher the teacher has multiple roles of ethical significance, among them moral exemplar, adult in loco parentis, and official representative of a school, a state, a faith, or a pedagogy such as p4c. of particular interest in this context are two of these roles, the role of facilitator of philosophical enquiry and the role of ethical instructor. to highlight the subtle tensions exerted by these two e analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 45 roles, i begin by describing them in terms that may strike the reader as polarised. i do so to help the reader feel the very pull that teachers sometimes report experiencing. however we must examine this tension mindful of the fact that in reality, these roles are embodied by the very same person and the divisions between them are generally less stark than this. the teacher’s role as facilitator of philosophical enquiry requires her to encourage openended, conceptually-focused dialogue, fuelled by questioning that, for the most part, ‘doesn’t offer any new ideas or information to the group but simply attempts to make visible, clarify, or connect what has already emerged’ (kennedy 2014 p. 755). even where a facilitator does introduce new information, ideas, questions, or lines of enquiry, these contributions are not designed to lead the class to a particular conclusion. the facilitator typically assumes a ‘self-effacing nonjudgemental, and neutral role’ with regards to the verdicts reached by the children, intervening only where it will challenge the class to work harder and not to advance her own position. she follows the discussion ’wherever it may lead but without letting the enquiry drift or lose the agreed focus’ (murris and haynes, 2009, p.3). however that is not to say that she is personally indifferent about the issues under discussion, nor does it mean that she believes there is no right answer. she is careful to distinguish those views she subscribes to from those views she refrains from teaching (scolnicov, 1978 p. 395). her facilitation is not value-free since it embodies all kinds of philosophical, political and pedagogical commitments but when it comes to the subject of discussion, though she holds ethical views, she refrains from providing the children with an answer in the acknowledgement that she, like the children, is not an authority on what that answer might be. in the space created by her restraint, she expects the children to think. a facilitator must demand reasoned, and reasonable ethical thinking from her class but she cannot demand particular, predetermined ethical conclusions and stay faithful to the pedagogy of a community of enquiry. however the teacher also embodies the, often-unarticulated, role of ethical instructor. in this role she must inform, guide, praise, promote, encourage, incentivise, reward, uphold and police conventional standards of good character and conduct. ordinarily, when there is violence, disagreement, or theft in the classroom, the teacher is not a facilitator, a provocateur, a questioner or a co-enquirer –though she may assume these roles later in response to the incident. in that moment she is a moral adjudicator and authority, held responsible by parents, the state, and wider society for all aspects of character and conduct from cultivating kindness and compassion to instilling the importance of telling the truth, keeping promises, and respecting others' rights. when we examine these two roles in context, as this paper will, we begin to feel the pull. how can a teacher create space in which ethical norms can be challenged –even rejected– in the spirit of intellectually vigorous philosophical enquiry whilst simultaneously upholding and reinforcing them as non-negotiable expectations? feeling the tension in what follows, drawing on examples from my experience as a philosopher, teacher, facilitator and teacher-educator, i describe two challenges associated with the tension between these roles of ‘teacher-as-philosophical-facilitator’ and ‘teacher-as-ethical-instructor’. the first challenge is a consequence of failing to feel this tension at all and consequently analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 46 succumbing to the pull of either one role, or the other. a teacher may not feel the pull because she understands (or perhaps misunderstands) the demands of one of her roles to the neglect of the other. alternatively, she may recognise that she inhabits multiple roles but not see much practical difference between them. i have said previously that these differences are not as stark as i make out for rhetorical purposes, however they are distinct. where we don't recognise this we may encounter certain negative consequences: either philosophically superficial ethical instruction or ethically superficial philosophical enquiry. philosophically superficial ethical instruction philosophically superficial ethical instruction is generally the product of striving to fulfil the requirements of one’s role as ethical instructor to the neglect of one’s role as philosophical facilitator. at least in some cases, this may be a product of failing to feel the pull between the two roles or misunderstanding the subtle nature of one but not the other. we see this problem more clearly when we consider the use of moralising texts as stimuli for philosophical enquiry with children, especially where these texts are used in conjunction with moralistic facilitation – facilitation that pushes or praises a particular moral agenda. consider tusk tusk, a picture book recommended by some specialists in philosophical enquiry with children and critically discussed in the work of darren chetty. here is the full text: once, all the elephants in the world were black or white. they loved all creatures, but they hated each other, and each kept to his own side of the jungle. one day the black elephants decided to kill all the white elephants, and the white ones decided to kill the black. the peace-loving elephants from each side went to live deep in the darkest jungle. they were never seen again. a battle began. it went on...and on, and on...until all the elephants were dead. for years no elephants were seen in the world. then, one day, the grandchildren of the peace-loving elephants came out of the jungle. they were grey. since then the elephants have lived in peace. but recently the little ears and the big ears have been giving each other strange looks. (pete mckee, 1978) the moral message of this text –and the images that accompany it– is quite overt: trivial and irrational issues motivate hatred and violence and the consequences of hatred and violence is invariably destruction. tolerance of difference is the obvious solution, however violence and hatred will always resurface unless the triviality and irrationality of these positions can also be acknowledged and overcome. far from being a ‘thought-provoking and ambiguous’ text, it is a moral fable. ‘it remains fundamentally a didactic form, designed to draw in its readers through a compelling story and appealing, even cute, characters, and to teach important lessons through allegory.’ (grenby 2008 p. 11 cited in chetty 2013) it is possible of course, to encourage a class to ‘read against the text’. but it would require very careful and disciplined facilitation to problematise the moral perspective here, thereby rendering it suitable for rigorous, intellectually challenging, philosophical enquiry. a teacher may ask: ‘how analogous is this story to the experience of black children in this school?’ and in doing so open up a critical reading. but this is contingent on a number of contextual factors –such as the ethnic diversity of the classroom and the sensitivity of the teacher to issues of race– and it is likely in many settings that the moral message will dominate, effectively closing down critical debate. to the novice, time-poor, or fearful teacher insensitive to the demands of roles as instructor and facilitator, a text like this may present just enough rope to hang herself. the moral analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 47 message might be strong (and according to chetty, also wrong) but the possibility for philosophical investigation and interrogation is hampered by the didactic tone. the facilitator will compound this if she chooses this text precisely because she hopes to advance its moral message or if she fails to see a way in which she might problematise its central ideas. when she does this she acts according to what she perceives to be the requirements of her role as ethical instructor: promoting and praising the generally acceptable view that hatred is bad and tolerance is good. however she doesn’t feel the pull of her other role as facilitator of open-ended dialogue in which moral perspectives ought to be contested if they are to be deeply understood. these problem may arise for a number reasons of which i suggest three are most plausible. the first is that enquiries like these may be the work of novice facilitators new to philosophical enquiry. it is easy to see how ignorance or inexperience can lead to poor stimuli choices and moralistic facilitation. a second possibility is that for all teachers philosophical enquiry jostles for attention alongside a multitude of other curricular expectations and initiatives all to be addressed in a finite period of time. it is inevitable that teachers will sometimes wish to kill two birds with one stone using their philosophical enquiry time to address black history month, world book day, or anti bullying week. this conflation of two objectives may create conflicting priories for the teacher. these initiatives are rightfully ethically loaded, they advance ethical positions such as ‘black history must not be side-lined’; ‘reading is good for us’; ‘ bullying is wrong and should be eradicated’. teaching these topics may require the teacher to motivate these positions through example and argument and in a philosophical enquiry context, this may tempt her to guide, shape or even manipulate the enquiry to meet external objectives. there is often a place for these kinds of interventions in school life, but they do not sit comfortably in a community of enquiry. a final possibility is that fear motivates these kinds of session. according to murris and haynes, teachers have suggested that some of the stories used in p4c give ‘the wrong message’ to children. certain books ‘trigger an anxious and censorial reaction, cloaked as protectiveness, which seems to echo a current moral panic.’ (murris and haynes, 2009, p. 2) some teachers may sincerely want children to think about kindness or killing yet they remain concerned about the dangerous conclusions they may arrive at. ethically superficial philosophical enquiry ethically superficial philosophical enquiry is generally the product of striving to fulfil the requirements of one’s role as philosophical facilitator, to the neglect of one’s role as an ethical instructor. at least in some cases, this may be a product of failing to feel the pull between the two roles or misunderstanding the subtle nature of one but not the other. we see this issue most clearly in the use of certain kinds of ethical dilemmas in the context of philosophical enquiry with children. consider the famous trolley problem: edward is the driver of a trolley whose brakes have just failed. on the track ahead of him are five people. the banks are so steep that they will not be able to get off the track in time. the track has a spur leading off to the right and edward can turn the trolley onto it. unfortunately there is one person on the right-hand track. edward can turn the trolley, killing the one. or he can refrain from turning the trolley, killing the five. what should he do? (philippa foot, 1967) analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 48 the conflict in this stimulus and the intellectual challenge it creates is evident; indeed it is engineered this way. in any ethical dilemma an agent is required to do one of two (or more) actions; he can do each of the actions; but he cannot do both (or all) of the actions. consequently, it seems that the agent is condemned to moral failure; no matter what he does, he will do something wrong (or fail to do something right). (mcconnell, 2010). in selecting the trolley problem as a stimulus and by bolstering this by self-effacing, non-judgemental, neutral facilitation a teacher may feel she has found the perfect register for rigorous philosophical enquiry on ethical issues. the use of ethical dilemmas may at first seem attractive; they neatly capture competing moral considerations; divide respondents by intuition and opinion, and demand careful deliberation and clear reasoning. however philosophical dilemmas such as these present their own problems that are particularity evident in the classroom. ethical dilemmas, in particular, fail to engage a range of ethically relevant narrative features. they are often minimally temporal: you’re not in the world for long, save for the lengthy pause at the moment of decision when the time-critical moment of truth is often misrepresented, existing as an eternal pause in which the agent –in this case edward– may take all the time he needs to deliberate: ‘do i pull the lever?’ in doing so dilemmas prioritise cool intellectual reasoning over the affective heat of the time-pressured moment. ethical dilemmas are also deliberately inflexible and polarising and as a consequence, they fail to convincingly capture the causality and contingency of everyday life. some deny a world in which many options are live, what remains is a stark bifurcation: do you pull the lever or not? in doing so the moral imagination is denied the possibility of finding a third way. (robinson, 2014, p. 18) children confronted with this dilemma will say: ‘can i shout down to the men?’ ‘can i wave to the driver?’ ‘can i meet the families afterwards to say sorry?’ the answer is invariably ‘no’. to engage in this dilemma you must play by the rules without imaginative deviation. furthermore, most ethical dilemmas purposefully lack detail; the people that populate them are often nameless, ageless, and faceless; the places they live and die are anonymous. ethical dilemmas are often causally restricted with little or no attention paid to what happened before the present action or what will happen next. skeletal thought experiments typically lack psychological insight, characters such as thomson’s ‘fat man’ (a variant of the original trolley problem) rarely speak and so they cannot communicate their hopes and fears and as a consequence, such stories resist emotional engagement. (thomson, 1978). finally, unlike real ethical life or the rich narratives that represent it, the ethical dilemma frames the issue too tightly, effectively screaming: there is an ethical issue at stake here! (robinson, 2014, p. 18) by using dilemmas the teacher communicates something about the nature of ethics that she may not intend: that ethical issues are exclusively, intellectual, overt or unmistakable, and irreconcilable. for teachers who must be ethical instructors as well as philosophical facilitators, this presents a problem. besides these reasons for thinking skeletal dilemmas unsuitable for ethical instruction, we must also acknowledge that acts of killing are incredibly rare in real ethical life, and ever rarer for children. where they do exist they are more likely to be the result of extreme circumstances such as war, disaster and acute psychological distress. ‘those few who are faced with dilemmas that involve killing are often profoundly psychically wounded by their actions. even the thought of killing – of really pulling a lever amidst the screeching of breaks and screaming of terrified people – unnerves the ethically alert person. contemplating killing, is not an intellectual game; it is a profound act of the ethical imagination that requires both a clear head and a beating heart.’ analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 49 (robinson, 2014, p. 17) the use of some skeletal dilemmas present compelling intellectual challenges to students but in the classroom context where ethical instruction is also a priority, they risk making a game out of the serious business of the ethical education of children. the problem of ethically superficial philosophical enquiry may arise for a number reasons. firstly, teachers who have received formal philosophical training may understandably look to thought experiments –devices of the imagination used to investigate the nature of things– as reliable and rich stimulus for philosophical enquiry. this may also be true of teachers who have received instruction and mentoring from those with a formal philosophical education. the use of thought experiments in academic philosophy is commonplace, though sometimes contested. (gendler, 2000) from searle's chinese room and putnam's twin earth to jackson's mary the colour scientist; thought experiments have expanded and enriched academic philosophical discourse and beyond. their use in schools can also be found in the work of thinking space and the philosophy foundation among other organisations philosophising with children. thought experiments afford both academics and students a means by which they can explore an intended realm of investigation without new empirical data. however the uses of certain kinds of thought experiments, specifically skeletal dilemmas, are not always as useful as they may seem. such dilemmas by their very nature, scrimp on the contextual detail that helps children make connections with their everyday acts of ethical reasoning and become perceptive of the ethically salient features of complex situations. their emotional flatness implies emotions have no role in ethical deliberation. the intellectual stimulation such paired-down puzzles provide may appeal to the teacher-as-philosophical-facilitator. but in doing so, it may distract teachers from the equally important task of providing children with ethically educative experiences. these ethically educative experiences, which may also be philosophically rigorous, are more likely to be found in rich ‘flesh and blood’ narratives full of character, complexity, and contingency –since these are the factors at play in moral life. another explanation for ethically superficial philosophical enquiry may be found in the attitude of educators to ethics. where there is the belief that ethical reasoning is essentially an intellectual exercise, we are more likely to find the emotions and imagination are neglected. this attitude should come as no surprise since there is a long history in academic philosophy – found notably in kantianism and utilitarianism– of treating ethics as the concern of supreme rationality alone. a final explanation presents itself. there are many philosophy teachers who are external practitioners visiting schools for an hour a week to lead discrete philosophy sessions. for many reasons, these practitioners may not consider it their role to instruct children on ethical matters of conduct or character. even where such a practitioner does consider ethical instruction to be part of her role she may limit the exercise of their authority to simple practical matters such as good manners and compliance with basic rules, leaving instruction and intervention on significant matters such as bullying, homophobia, or racism to the class teacher. if an external practitioner considers it her role to talk with a class about bullying, without regard to incidents of bullying taking place within the class or without authority to police or punish bullying –or to protect the bullied– then she will not feel this pull. but that does not mean that it isn’t there. philosophising in a school setting cannot be disentangled from the child’s ethical development since it is –in part– the promise of this development that justifies the compulsory nature of schooling. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 50 a note on my examples by using these polarised examples, i am being descriptive rather than prescriptive. i suggest that these kinds of scenarios do sometimes occur and that where they do, this may be the result of failing to feel the pull of these two roles. often this is a result of an inadequate understanding of either ethical instruction or philosophical facilitation. we might think, for example, that ethical instruction necessarily involves the habituation of character traits that are uncontroversial. or we might think that philosophical facilitation is necessarily rationalistic and removed from everyday concerns. neither of these things is true, and these examples are designed to highlight this and prompt a more nuanced understanding of a teacher’s roles. it is not my intention to suggest that we ought to think of ethical instruction and facilitation in these impoverished ways. one might respond to this account by dismissing the sketches above as examples of bad practice. good quality ethical enquiry is neither moralistic and manipulative nor abstract and disconnected from everyday life and most teachers navigate this middle ground quite well. this is true, however, i should emphasise here that this occupation of the middle ground ought to be intentional and this requires an appreciation of the subtleties of both roles. these examples attempt to assist here by demonstrating how and why things might go wrong. feeling and fearing the tension the second challenge arises for teachers when the tension between ‘teacher-as-philosophicalfacilitator’ and ‘teacher-as-ethical-instructor’ is acknowledged but is considered intractable. here there is the risk that the teacher –fearful of moralising, trivialising, transgressing, or confusing– will avoid ethical topics altogether. this is most evident when we take a long view of philosophical interventions. consider, for example, the religious school that includes philosophical enquiry in school life but advocates that religious topics and ethical issues related to them are best avoided. in a school with a christian ethos and devout population, a teacher who recognises the tension created by her roles, might face a considerable challenge. how should she manage discussion around core beliefs and values (evolution, sex before marriage, or life after death) in such a way as advance those values whilst ensuring that they are also interrogated? one pragmatic solution is to avoid such issues favouring instead metaphysics, language, and logic where the tension is less likely to be felt. this approach is understandable but it is ultimately inadequate as a solution. primarily, this is because the consideration of ethical issues is a crucial part of a philosophical education. many ethical issues –among them secrets, divorce, recycling, and consumerism– have great relevance for students, connecting with everyday experiences that are both mundane and deeply mysterious. not only are these issues current for children and young people, they also have enormous significance for their future and the future of the society at large. questions of how to treat a partner or how to treat the planet will resonate throughout the lives of young people and the consequences of unreflective actions will be felt by others. this is not to suggest that dealing with ethical issues in the philosophy classroom will resolve these problems. while they are undoubtedly connected to children’s lives, they are also widely contested. within the community of enquiry children will encounter conflicting and contradictory views; indeed throughout the course of their lives, the later views of young people and adults may well conflict analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 51 with those of childhood. the value of dealing with ethical issues in childhood is not to arrive at neat answers for future reference. its value is in rehearsing those intellectual, emotional, and imaginative skills that will be required when confronting ethical problems now and in the future; or to put it another way, to cultivate the virtues. it is precisely because ethical issues are both deeply connected to everyday life and deeply contested that they present such a valuable educational challenge to students. far from being a soft-touch subject, ethical issues explored philosophically –especially those presented in rich narrative contexts– make significant intellectual demands on students to judge, justify, hypothesise, exemplify, compare, contrast, critique, analyse, and summarise. simultaneously they ask us to engage affectively, feeling sympathy, pity, compassion, anger, disgust, hope, forgiveness, and even love. few educational experiences demand that we respond as holistically as ethical educational experiences. a further reason why dodging ethical issues in philosophical work with children won't do is this: ethical issues will arise anyway. even sessions on logic must have content that will inevitably be provided by the children’s own experiences, concerns, and interests. children live and learn in a world imbued with value and there are very few learning experiences where these values can be excluded. finally, avoiding ethics for fear of the tension it might exert on the facilitator, fails to recognise the complementary nature of the roles of ‘teacher-as-philosophical-facilitator’ and ‘teacher-as-ethical-instructor’. in what follows i will elaborate on this. relieving the tension this tension is not intractable, in fact when acknowledged and better understood, the apparently competing demands of these roles begin to dissolve and an appreciation of this can enrich the ethical education of children. though the teacher-as-philosophical-facilitator and the teacher-as-ethical-instructor employ different methods, the outcomes they aim at are in fact complementary. this becomes clearer when we see the ethical education of children through an aristotelian lens. aristotelian ethical education involves the cultivation of virtue: both ethical virtues such as courage and intellectual virtues such as wisdom. becoming virtuous is achieved in stages according to aristotle who describes a process whereby individuals must develop the proper habits (hexis) during their childhood, and then, when their reason is fully developed, must acquire practical wisdom (phronêsis). ‘this does not mean that first we fully acquire the ethical virtues, and then, at a later stage, add on practical wisdom. ethical virtue is fully developed only when it is combined with practical wisdom’. (kraut, 2014) aristotle himself would consign children to the first phase until adulthood –with the exception of female children and slaves who are excluded from the development of virtue altogether. however i want to suggest that from this position where our actions and emotions are tested and corrected, through education we are all able to make the transition from relying on the instructions of others to thinking for ourselves. through this aristotelian lens we might regard ethical instruction as an essential part of ethical education. before they develop the good character to see compelling reasons for acting well and desire to act on those reasons for their own good, children begin the development of good character through obedience, imitation, and the formation of good habits. this requires both role models and authority figures that can instruct them on how to be and how to behave. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 52 we may rightfully have concerns about ethical instruction. it is contingent upon the teacher’s good character and the adequacy of the rules set out by the school or society. at its worst, ethical instruction can be ad hoc, unreflective, inflexible, prejudiced, and misguided. however even where ethical instruction is not at all like this, we should still have concerns since instruction alone is insufficient for the development of good character and the conduct that results from it. ethical education should aspire to more than the development of obedient rule-followers, mechanical creatures of habit, or mimics. actions that issue from these kinds of states might hardly be considered moral at all. providing children with an ethical education does not require us to suspend them in a state of unreflective passivity nor is this implied on an aristotelian view. in fact, aristotle’s use of hexis, from where the translation ‘habit’ derives, denotes an active condition –‘a tendency or disposition, induced by our habits, to have appropriate feelings’ (kraut, 2014). hexis is not automatic; it still involves choice. we must choose to habituate our emotions so that they respond appropriately to ethical challenges. though they may be pulled in different directions, a person who has been habituated in this sense finds themselves in a more stable position to judge how to act well for reasons she is committed to with the right kind of desires in play. such a person is in a state of readiness to act. (simon, 1986) it is our job as educators to create the conditions in which a child can actively and reflectively develop good character and act accordingly. here the teacher’s ability to facilitate philosophical enquiry is ally and not a foe. subjecting received ethical wisdom –of the kind communicated in schools rules or teacher’s admonishments– to philosophical investigation can bring it into the light where children and teachers alike can examine it. teachers should not fear that the standards of good character and conduct they promote fail to stand up to scrutiny of children, since where these standards do stand up to scrutiny, the children gain a deeper and more enduring appreciation of the norms, expectations, and values that shape their lives and they gain insight into their own developing character. in the rare cases where the standards recommended by teachers fail to stand up to scrutiny, questions are rightfully raised about their legitimacy. even in cases where instruction is the product of careful, perceptive, and reflective thought, the quality of thinking that produced these instructions cannot be expected of children who have not been offered their own opportunity to think in this way. philosophical enquiry helps us create these conditions, helping us to ‘develop a larger picture of human life, [in order that] our deliberative skills improve, and our emotional responses are perfected.’ (kraut, 2014) through the same aristotelian lens, we may appreciate that the facilitation of philosophical enquiry around ethical stimuli is the natural next step in a classroom already committed to supporting the development of good character and conduct however that is to be construed. although the development of practical wisdom is partly a matter of accumulating life experience, it is also a matter of perception; of being able to identify the salient features of a situation and being responsive to the right kinds of reasons. philosophising is an activity explicitly concerned with reasoning and here we begin to see its contribution to the ethical education of children. for aristotle, reasoning is intimately connected with living well; insofar as if we are rational, we aim at living well. the person who develops practical wisdom is in theory, someone who is able to navigate the complex ethical world without instruction motivated by the desire to live well. this is a worthy aim for ethical educators. however compelling in theory, experience in the classroom reveals some concerns about the limits of philosophical enquiry. at its worst it can be overly intellectualistic, disinterested, analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 53 abstract, pedantic and even myopic. those who use it many have no aspiration to cultivate good character and conduct and that within the classroom, the insights gained by children in ethical discussion, may have little or no bearing on how the classroom is governed or how the individual lives his life. even where philosophical enquiry is not at all like this, our concerns must remain since the facilitation of philosophical enquiry alone is insufficient for the development of good character and conduct. in order to analyse and understand virtue in a fruitful manner, children must first have accrued ethical experiences along with the pleasure that accompanies being good and the desire to be good that flows from that. this phase in the development of virtue is best supported by instruction. however, i do not mean to suggest that with the advent of philosophical enquiry comes the end of instruction. it is not realistic to expect children to ‘graduate’ from hexis to phronêsis while at school, in fact, we may well doubt if we ever ‘graduate’ in adulthood. the need for instruction in the form of examples, guidance, rules, and punishment in schools remains. however there is scope for the dialogue that takes place in a community of enquiry to shape these instructions. this is in keeping with the deweyan democratic spirit of a community of enquiry, which is thought of ‘as both seeking to attain desirable goals, and arguing over how to do so, and also as arguing over what a desirable goal is.’ (dewey, 1987, p. 56) if knowledge acquisition within a community of enquiry ‘is a public process with people agreeing and disagreeing about what counts as knowledge – something that can be challenged, evaluated and possibly changed (by everyone, including young children), then it follows that knowledge should be presented to children as contestable and always open to revision. (haynes and murris, 2009, p.10) this includes ethical knowledge of the kind espoused in ethical instruction in schools. philosophizing about ethical issues as a discrete activity that has no bearing on classroom life, is not an authentic option in this case. instruction provides the groundwork for enquiry and enquiry ought to inform future instruction. consequently, in order to do her job, the teacher must be both instructor and facilitator, and she should look beyond the tensions these roles create, to the complementary nature of their aims. i do not intent to dissolve this distinction entirely, suggesting contrarily that facilitators should push or prohibit certain agendas, or that instructors should use every instruction as an opportunity for debate. there is a right time and place for the enactment of each of these roles and the teacher is best placed to make this judgment. however i do hope that a deeper understanding of these roles reveals that like so many distinctions, they are not so stark as they first appear. is it not possible that a teacher-as-ethical-instructor could become more philosophical? or that a teacher-as-philosophical-facilitator could become more instructive? finally, let’s not forget, that one and the same person embodies these two roles; and so the separation between the two can never be as pronounced as my nomenclature might imply. bibliogrpahy chetty, darren (2014) ‘the elephant in the room: picturebooks, philosophy for children and racism’ in childhood and philosophy. vol 10, no 19). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 54 dewey, john (1987) ‘liberalism and social action’ in the later works. joann boydston (ed.), carbondale: southern illinois university press, 1981-1990. vol 11, p. 56. foot, philippa (1967) ‘the problem of abortion and the doctrine of double effect’ in oxford review, vol. 5, pp. 5–15. gendler, tamar (2000) thought experiment: on the powers and limits of imaginary cases. oxford. routledge. haynes, joanna and murris, karin (2009). ‘the wrong message: risk, censorship and the struggle for democracy in primary school’ in thinking, vol. 19, no. 1, pp 2-12. kennedy, d (2004). ‘the philosopher as teacher: the role of a facilitator in a community of philosophical inquiry.’ in metaphilosophy, vol. 35(5), pp. 744-765. kraut, richard, (2014) ‘aristotle's ethics’ in the stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (summer 2014 edition) edward n. zalta (ed.), url = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/aristotle-ethics/>. lipman, matthew (1983). lisa. 2nd ed. iapc. new jersey. mckee, david (1978). tusk tusk, london, anderson press. robinson, grace (2014a). ‘measuring virtue: skeletal dilemmas or flesh and blood stories?’ in can virtue be measured? conference of the jubilee centre for character and values. available online at: url: ttp://www.jubileecentre.ac.uk/userfiles/jubileecentre/pdf/conference papers/can-virtue-be-measured/robinson-grace.pdf scolnicov, s. (1978) ‘truth, neutrality and the philosophy teacher’ in m. lipman and a.m. sharp. growing up with philosophy. philadelphia: temple university press, pp. 392 – 404. simon, yves r. (1986) the definition of moral virtue. vukan kuic (ed.) new york: fordham university press. stanley, sara (2012). why think?: philosophical play from 3-11. continuum, london. worley, peter (2010). the if machine: philosophical enquiry in the classroom. continuum, london. address correspondences to: grace robinson ucl institute of education grobinson01@ioe.ac.uk or university of leeds (g.c.robinson@leeds.ac.uk) body talk, body taunt – corporeal dialogue within a community of philosophical inquiry analytical teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 35 , issue 1 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 10 body talk, body taunt – corporeal dialogue within a community of philosophical inquiry abstract: this essay explores maurice merleau-ponty’s notion of flesh as it applies within the community of philosophical inquiry (cpi), the pedagogical method developed by philosopher matthew lipman to foster young people’s multidimensional thinking— critical, creative and caring—through collaborative dialogue. using a phenomenological framework, the essay aims to extend merleau-ponty’s conception of chiasmatic relations between self and other by appealing to the account of intersubjective dialogue presented in the work of phenomenologist and cpi scholar david kennedy. the guiding question focuses on hostility expressed corporeally in dialogue: how might the phenomenological experience of individual inquirers within a cpi be affected by the hostile interventions of body language? the essay introduces the notion of body taunting as the combined “vocabulary” of flesh—gestural, postural, physiognomic, kinetic expression—with which inquirers both deliberately and inadvertently provoke, dismiss, intimidate or alienate one another as they attempt to co-construct meaning. building on what kennedy calls “the lived experience of preverbal dialogue” (kennedy 2010, p. 45), the essay argues that body taunting poses a threat to the cpi’s emerging intersubjectivity by changing the chiasmatic relations between inquirers, making boundaries between self and other seem more pronounced, notably in moments when disagreement is communicated nonverbally in antagonistic ways that betray or contradict voiced arguments. hilosophizing with others on questions of deep existential significance can be a transformative experience on both intellectual and corporeal levels. yet within the community of philosophical inquiry (cpi), the pedagogical method developed by educational philosopher matthew lipman as part of the philosophy for children (p4c) program, the focus tends to be on the power of conceptual exchanges rather than embodied thinking. to foster multidimensional thought—or equal parts critical, creative and caring thinking—a cpi engages its members in collaborative dialogue on the issues that matter to them most, emphasizing the development of strong mental habits and reasonableness. however, as cpi scholar and practitioner david kennedy observes, this process is not solely intellectual: “thought moves us,” he writes. “even before we open our mouths we are making meaning together” (kennedy 2010, p. 207/193). co-inquirers in a cpi share the fulfillment and frustration of shared philosophical reflection not only through the content of their talk but also through their dialoguing bodies. p natalie m. fletcher analytical teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 35 , issue 1 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 11 this essay will explore the embodied dimension of the cpi experience, particularly as it involves hostility expressed corporeally in dialogue. using a phenomenological framework, i will aim to extend maurice merleau-ponty’s conception of chiasmatic relations between self and other by appealing to the account of intersubjective dialogue presented in kennedy’s theoretical work. how might the phenomenological experience of individual inquirers within a cpi be affected by the hostile interventions of body language? i will introduce my notion of body taunting as the combined “vocabulary” of flesh—gestural, postural, physiognomic, kinetic expression—with which inquirers both deliberately and inadvertently provoke, dismiss, intimidate or alienate one another as they attempt to co-construct meaning. building on what kennedy calls “the lived experience of preverbal dialogue” (kennedy, 2010, p. 45), i will argue that body taunting poses a threat to the cpi’s emerging intersubjectivity by changing the chiasmatic relations between inquirers, making boundaries between self and other seem more pronounced, notably in moments when disagreement is communicated nonverbally in antagonistic ways that betray or contradict voiced arguments. though not altogether undesirable, body taunting requires conceptual attention since it highlights a neglected dimension of the cpi experience—namely corporeal expression—that greatly affects its pedagogical effectiveness, notably its efforts toward multidimensional thinking and shared knowledge construction. i will begin by exploring the dialoguing body in a cpi from a phenomenological perspective, drawing on both merleau-ponty and kennedy’s interpretations; then propose the concept of body taunting as a threat to the self-other chiasm in a cpi, and finally emphasize the need for bodily self-correction that moves a cpi’s inquirers from taunt to tact.1 i. the dialoging body—a cpi from phenomenological perspective a cpi designates a dialogical space where a group of people are joined by a philosophical question they find intriguing and worthy of conceptual exploration, and that they try to resolve or better understand through structured conversation with the help of a trained philosophical facilitator. adapting the pragmatist ideas of charles sanders peirce and john dewey, lipman envisioned the cpi method as a collaborative thinking practice with the potential to instil in its members a spirit of self-correction characterized by open-mindedness, epistemological modesty, acceptance of fallibility, comfort with uncertainty, resistance to bias, and mutual support—a multilayered metacognitive disposition aiming toward enhanced awareness of thought processes (lipman 2003, p. 218). yet although the work involved is intellectual in character, a cpi is also a powerful corporeal experience. sitting in a circle, visible to one another and in close proximity, inquirers encounter each other’s lived experiences and resulting philosophical positions through their dialoguing bodies—beyond the content of their talk, they connect with each other’s tone of voice, facial expressions, gestural style, and overall bodily energy. this embodied thinking reflects a sensory, intercorporeal quality of the cpi method that would be lost or at least greatly compromised if the inquiry were attempted in a teleconference or online virtual space. and yet, the cpi scholarly literature focuses almost exclusively on the vocal outputs of this form of philosophical inquiry, with little regard for the role bodies play.2 analytical teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 35 , issue 1 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 12 in a strong cpi, however, the dialoguing body can take on a very specific, heightened state of attentiveness that greatly affects the ideas being voiced. when inquirers feel safe with one another, their bodies can quieten, allowing for a contemplative mood that is conscientiously at ease without being fully relaxed. their corporeal role in the dialogue alternates between that of the speaking body and of the listening body, using the gestural signs already built into the cpi method to indicate when they want to talk and how to nominate the next interlocutor.3 in deference to the difficult intellectual task at hand, the dialoguing body in a cpi is careful not to distract others with unnecessary physical movement while also revealing excitement about conversational themes, quandaries and epiphanies through bodily motions—sitting upright, shifting weight, leaning forwards, nodding, gesticulating with hands and bouncing with feet, or a host of these actions in tandem. the combined pressure and delight of collective inquiry is felt in the dialoguing bodies trying hard to give one another the attention needed for quality mental exchanges, while their nonverbal movements politely ask—or at times impatiently demand—“but what do you mean exactly?” this intercorporeal experience highlights the affective and aesthetic components of the cpi method—the particular atmosphere that is formed when people attempt to co-construct meaning, experiencing moments of convergence while maintaining their distinct individuality. phenomenologically, this corporeal dimension of the cpi recalls merleau-ponty’s notion of chiasmatic relations between the self and others. in his posthumous work the visible and the invisible, merleau-ponty uses the notion of flesh to capture the chiasmatic aspect of the self’s experience of the world and of other subjects—the constant intertwining or crisscrossing that occurs between sensing and being sensed, perceiving and being perceived.4 in his various writings, he notes how, “my body and the other person’s are one whole, two sides of one and the same phenomenon” (merleau-ponty, 1968, p. 215) and yet there is always a necessary écart (or gap) between them—the self and other cannot be conflated completely since “in order that there be communication, there must be a sharp distinction between the one who communicates and the one with whom he communicates” (merleau-ponty, 2007, p. 148).5 in his essay “the child’s relation with others,” merleau-ponty argues that this chiasm is gradually understood in childhood, as humans evolve from a “me which is unaware of itself and lives as easily in others as it does in itself” to an awareness of the “objectification of one’s own body and the constitution of the other in his difference” (merleauponty, 2007, p. 149). this evolution is made possible in part through a grasping and emulation of the body movement of others—an intersubjective process merleau-ponty calls “postural impregnation,” borrowing from developmental psychologist henri wallon. as phenomenologist katherine morris writes: the child finds himself surrounded by the bodies of others who sit and walk in particular ways, who gesture and gesticulate, who dance, and who utilize various objects. to learn how to walk, to gesture and to dance it to learn how these others do these things...there is a kind of ‘postural impregnation’ of my own body by the conducts i witness...in virtue of this layer of shared existence, i am always already ‘situated in an intersubjective world’ (morris, 2012, pp. 110/117). analytical teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 35 , issue 1 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 13 the self-other chiasm further extends to dialogue: despite a perpetual degree of divergence between views, “there is constituted between the other person and myself a common ground; my thought and his are woven into a single fabric...our perspectives merge into each other, and we co-exist through a common world” (merleau-ponty, 1958, pp. 354/413). applied to a cpi, the chiasmatic relations between self and other accentuate the potential for dialogue to enable an intersubject—which david kennedy defines in his collection of essays philosophical dialogue with children: essays on theory and practice as an “emergent whole that includes the other and that is always building and being built” (kennedy, 2010, p. 81). he describes dialogue as “a space of interrogation that is characterized by self-othering, or experiencing self as an other. in dialogue, we enter into the experience of lived difference—we no longer operate from the position of the boundaried, thematizing subject” (kennedy, 2010, p. 42). for kennedy, this is especially true in a cpi since its philosophical explorations address and destabilize its members’ fundamental assumptions about identity, knowledge and ethics, facilitating a meeting between different world-views: what is a self? what does it mean to know something? how can we achieve the good life? the intertwining of self and other is further evident in the very aim of cpi dialogue, which is for inquirers to think both for themselves and with others, achieving autonomous thinking as a result of collective meaning-making. this involves inquirers accepting what kennedy calls the “radical incommensurability of individual perspectives”—the fact that in spite of similarities our personal vantage points are distinctly our own—while also remaining open to being changed by encounters with the other and their viewpoints (kennedy, 2010, p. 105). in this space of shared knowledge construction, inquirers become co-creators of themselves and of others, in a constant negotiation to define their subjectivity as a “diverse unity” (kennedy, 2010, p. 138). according to kennedy, the dialogical self in a cpi is thus “a chiasmic self: it no longer knows exactly where the boundaries of self and other begin and leave off. it is a post-cartesian, a post-rational self” (kennedy, 2010, p. 27), one that represents “the new impossibility of thinking the self apart from...an interlocutor that it both is and is not” (kennedy, 2006, p. 116). the chiasmatic relations between self and other in a cpi are experienced not only intellectually through dialogical exchanges but also corporeally as inquirers share a common physical space with their dialoguing bodies. describing the cpi in part as a “community of gestures,” kennedy underlines the power of preverbal dialogue, which comprises the myriad exchanges that occur through body language before inquirers even begin to speak. referencing what merleau-ponty called our “total language”—our gestures, posture, gaze, kinesic style, etc.—kennedy remarks that when we enter a cpi, what takes places is not only an exchange of ideas but a “dialogue of body images” (kennedy, 2010, p. 194). as a result, a community of inquirers that grows close over time begins to apprehend the idiosyncratic body talk of its members: what was once unforeseeable or unfamiliar becomes endearing in its predictability—a sign of increasing intimacy—and reflects a recognition of each inquirer’s particular contribution to the group. the community gets to know each other not only intellectually but corporeally—a powerful aspect of the cpi experience that has not received the conceptual attention it deserves. analytical teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 35 , issue 1 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 14 ii. body taunting—a threat to the self-other chiasm? while powerful, however, the experience of dialoguing bodies in a cpi is not always a harmonious one, and can include hostility expressed not only verbally but also corporeally. though the issue of aggressive speech has been tackled from multiple vantage points in cpi scholarship,6 the question of bodily hostility remains largely unaddressed: how might the phenomenological experience of individual inquirers within a cpi be affected by the hostile interventions of body language? to capture one type of hostility expressed corporeally, i propose the concept of body taunting, which i define as the combined “vocabulary” of flesh—gestural, postural, physiognomic, kinetic expression—with which inquirers both deliberately and inadvertently provoke, dismiss, intimidate or alienate one another as they attempt to co-construct meaning. in everyday vernacular, taunting is understood as a kind of provocative exhibition of contempt. according to the new oxford dictionary, it is usually “a remark made in order to anger, wound, or provoke someone,” and comes from the french phrase “tant pour tant,” loosely translated as “tit for tat” (oxford, 2014, www.oxforddictionaries.com). it can be defined as a rejoinder in response to a comment deemed valueless or unworthy of consideration, perhaps as an indirect way of gaining the upper hand and subduing the person being taunted. a taunt can also be gestural, varying from inane acts like sticking one’s tongue out to coarser motions like giving someone the finger. but the concept of body taunting i am proposing points to hostile corporeal interventions that are less conspicuous though possibly as impactful. in a cpi, lived experience is under a kind of nuancing microscope: inquirers critically examine aspects of life to pinpoint the subtleties that often get overlooked, enabling them to problematize their epistemological, ethical, metaphysical, aesthetic, logical and political assumptions, and determine how the presumed definitions, criteria and categories with which they assess the world may be refined to help them better understand and engage with their everyday realities. this nuancing examination process affects not only the ways in which inquirers converse with each other—the effort towards clear, precise yet also illustrative language as well as sound, thorough and summative argumentation—but also the subtle manners with which their bodies interact as the dialogue progresses. body taunting is a term to describe what takes places when disagreement is communicated nonverbally in antagonistic ways that betray or contradict voiced arguments. i argue that body taunting poses a threat to the cpi’s emerging intersubjectivity by changing the chiasmatic relations between inquirers, making boundaries between self and other seem more pronounced.7 though not necessarily altogether undesirable (as i will later argue), body taunting can affect the inquiry process and the community’s dynamic, and thus requires analysis. body taunting can be palpable but hard to pinpoint—it is difficult to describe out of context because it embeds itself in the dialogical reasoning particular to a cpi session. some obvious noncontextual examples include seemingly sincere verbal statements (“that’s very interesting!” or “i see your point!”) that are contradicted by a shrug, eye roll or curled lip; or assurances of receptivity (“i’m open to that approach...”) coupled with closed, withdrawn body positioning. another instance could be feigned humility (“i’m not sure if what i’m about to say is important…” or “please correct me if analytical teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 35 , issue 1 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 15 i’m mistaken…”) accompanied by imposing, condescending posturing. in these cases, there is an attempt to keep up appearances verbally without the body’s commitment. to my mind, the more interesting cases of body taunting happen through a certain cluster of cpi “gathering” moves intended to keep the group on track and promote building between ideas. modelled by the facilitator at first, in a strong cpi these moves eventually get taken up by the inquirers, though sometimes in an antagonistic fashion that seems to counter their purpose.8 the move to summarize, for instance, is designed to remind inquirers of the key points made so far to ensure earlier ideas are not forgotten, to maintain consistency and continuity in the argument, and to slow down and possibly reorient the inquiry before it gets derailed. a body taunter may offer a summary that is helpful in terms of content, but sabotaged by oppositional body language of irritability and arrogance that suggests the inquiry is inadequate, nonsensical, and not up to par. with the move to clarify, a body taunter may achieve through verbal statements the goal of ensuring the group’s understanding and relevant, useful connections, but through body language express a pedantic, dogmatic attitude that implies a sense of superiority and elitism. finally, with the move to restate and interpret, a body taunter may succeed in identifying unacknowledged assumptions in the group’s thinking and explaining the implications of previous contributions, all the while using a slow, overbearing tone and patronizing gesticulations that insinuate disdain for the inquiry’s direction. whether intended or not, the rudeness happens at the level of body talk rather than in verbal exchanges. in these cases, the taunting element—what is provocative, dismissive, intimidating or alienating—is the incongruity between verbal and body language, and the added layer of disingenuousness. the dialoguing body is communicating something different than what has been voiced, resulting in mixed signals that estrange inquirers from one another. this incongruity complicates the interpretation effort that inquirers already undertake to try to address their given philosophical question. indeed, the cpi method is already very hermeneutically demanding: the process of expressing, understanding and building on different ideas with others constitutes intensive interpretive labour under the best of circumstances. referring again to merleau-ponty, when the “total language” seems internally inconsistent or contradictory, inquirers may be left in hesitation, wondering what to decode—speech? gestures? tone? either accidentally or deliberately, body taunting may cause a meaning reversal: as kennedy observes with regard to body talk, “gesture can gloss the linguistic even to the point of making words mean exactly the opposite of their usual meaning” (kennedy, 2010, p. 198). the target of the taunt—whether another inquirer, members of the group, or the inquiry process itself—is somehow belittled or ridiculed. this politicizes the interpretive work of the cpi by establishing a hierarchy between taunter and taunted, underlining power struggles that might have been loosening with the group’s evolution towards an ethos of intersubjectivity. two important potential losses may ensue from such body taunting. first, through hostility to other inquirers or the group, body taunting may hinder the self-othering process described above and accentuate the boundaries between self and other that were beginning to seem less noticeable, thus threatening the self-other chiasm. when body taunted, inquirers may sense the aggressive, antagonistic energy of their taunter to the degree that it silences their speech but also affects their analytical teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 35 , issue 1 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 16 body—they cower, recoil, sweat, shake, feel faint and stutter. their willingness or ability to talk may decrease, resulting in missing perspectives and an imbalance of contributions, which in turn damages the community’s dynamic. second, through hostility to the inquiry itself, body taunting may disrupt the sense of continuity and flow so sought after in a cpi atmosphere. in “the aesthetic dimension of the community of inquiry,” ann sharp, co-founder the p4c program alongside lipman, argues that two different modes of time—chronos and kairos—are at work in a cpi: the former reflects the ticking of the clock, the need to time manage the actual duration allotted for dialogue, while the latter fosters a kind of timing transcendence, where inquirers “become so involved in [their] activity that [they] actually forget the passing of minutes, and...live, at least temporarily, in a timeless realm” (sharp, 1997, p. 70). body taunting may directly affect kairos time through a corporeal expression of impatience that screams “i have no time for this!” and jerks the group back into chronos time. as sharp reflects, “in the experience of kairos we not only have to forget about the passing minutes, but in a real sense, we have to forget ourself...to be preoccupied with the self, however...is to move from the timeless back to the time-bound” (sharp, 1997, p. 70). on this account, body taunting can be seen as affecting the self-other chiasm by inhibiting the achieved levels of aesthetic experience that contribute to the transformative feeling of a consonance of minds among community members. given these potential losses to a cpi, what motivates body taunting in the first place? what might this specific type of corporeal hostility reflect? though the drives to body taunt may be multifaceted, four particular motivations seem reasonable to consider, and may exist alone or in combination. first, body taunting could be perceived as evidence of epistemological bias—a way of communicating the privileging of certain forms of knowledge at the expense of others. for instance, an inquirer who happens to be well-versed in certain intellectual traditions attached to a concept in the inquiry question may not be willing to entertain other approaches, opting to validate preferred ideological structures while communicating indifference or obstinacy through a body language that asserts “my mind is made up.” second, body taunting could reveal discomfort with uncertainty—a way of resisting the emergent, unsettled, contestable truth environment of the cpi method. in a cpi, philosophical positions are deemed to be open to revision as long as there is life experience to inform and nuance them: as sharp notes, “we cannot engage in such creative transformation...if we remain wedded to the idea that there is one absolute truth, and only our world view contains it” (sharp, 1997, p. 73). yet if everything is open to question, an inquirer who feels uprooted or unsettled by the process may express their aversion through bodily rigidity, while still seeming flexible in conversation. third, body taunting could betray a kind of intolerance—a way of conveying fear or insecurity when facing alternative perspectives or having personal prejudices challenged. this possibility is likely heightened in very socially diverse cpi groups since, as kennedy writes, “the more knowledge-perspectives i am exposed to—whether of gender, class, sexuality, selfunderstanding, religious belief, aesthetic value and so on—the more alternative versions of truth i encounter” (kennedy, 2010, p. 137). an inquirer may know better than to voice bigotry but not manage to hide its corporeal manifestation, especially in cases where the unfolding argument defies personal preferences or beliefs. fourth, body taunting could be a sign of egoism—a way of reinstating self-interest, individual expertise and claims to rightness. 9 since a cpi environment strives to decentre the ego and cultivate “a form of subjectivity appropriate for a democracy…which prioritizes the skills of dialogue and negotiation” (kennedy, 2013, p. 75), an inquirer who objects to the goal analytical teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 35 , issue 1 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 17 of distributed power and knowhow among the community may attempt to assert themselves corporeally as the leader, the elite, the specialist, without the decency to verbally query or disagree with other members. with all four motivations, body taunting risks adversely affecting the community’s co-construction of meaning by demarcating the self and other, and thus influencing the chiasmatic relations between inquirers. worse still, body taunts may be contagious among dialoguing bodies, resulting in greater estrangement between inquirers, and a more sharply felt selfother boundary. accordingly, the potential for multidimensional thought achieved intersubjectively may also be impeded: some perspectives or people may no longer be taken seriously (lack of caring thinking); there may be reluctance to engage with and evaluate unfamiliar views and arguments (lack of critical thinking); and inquirers may not perceive the need to look for missing perspectives, test possibilities and envision the implications of ideas (creative thinking). while these motivations toward corporeal hostility may seem reasonable, a significant challenge with body taunting remains: its very identification. how can inquirers be certain it is happening? can particular body talk be considered as taunting by some and inoffensive by others? problematically, inquirers may assume a bodily antagonism that is not present or intended, or misconstrue gestural language due to unfamiliarity or oversensitivity. if an inquirer is stiff in her body, her rigidity may be interpreted as a lack of receptivity instead of a mere corporeal mannerism that the community will learn to read as it gets better acquainted. similarly, an inquirer who is very sensitive about a particular moral or societal issue may read body taunting into another’s nonverbal communication until she learns more about his reasoning and gestural style. moreover, while inquirers cannot assume that everyone will read or interpret one another’s body talk in the same way, they also cannot surmise that an alleged body taunter will be aware of their dialoguing body’s effects on the group if not told directly what they are (or at least appear to be) doing. for instance, an inquirer with autism spectrum disorder (asd) who cannot read nonverbal cues may be unable to attend to other members’ “total language,” focusing only on the content of speech at the expense of body vocabulary, and thus remaining blind to body taunting in themselves and others. drawing on merleau-ponty, morris suggests that people with asd may not be lacking a theory of mind— which is one prevailing opinion—but instead a bodily understanding of others, making it difficult to perceive body talk in co-inquirers if the “exchange meaning was grounded in their bodies, not their intellects” (morris, 2012, p. 115). 10 in light of such problems with body taunt identification, members of a cpi must become aware of their presuppositions regarding body language “vocabulary” in the same way that they recognize assumptions in their conceptual frameworks. they must be clear about how they define gestures and words alike, or else risk “body talking” past each other and sensing disagreement or tension where none exists, which can ultimately threaten the selfother chiasm. iii. bodily self-correction—from taunt to tact in order to foster this corporeal awareness, body taunting should become another target of the self-corrective disposition cultivated in a cpi. as mentioned, lipman envisioned the cpi method as a collaborative thinking practice—a dialogical approach to philosophizing centred on analytical teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 35 , issue 1 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 18 metacognitive self-correction: “thinking inquiring into itself for the purpose of transforming itself into better thinking” (lipman, 1988, p. 41). yet his mission to “liberate students from unquestioning, uncritical mental habits” can be extended to unquestioning, uncritical bodily habits since these also affect the self-discipline and self-regulation so needed for successful cpi dialogues. like correcting bad posture, regulating body taunting habits might require a very diligent, almost artificial focus at first, and involve some overcorrection and awkward manoeuvring until more congruous body talk becomes possible.11 still, this effort towards a global sense of self-correction that includes mental and bodily habits is an important endeavour—one that reveals a neglected dimension of the cpi experience with potentially broad repercussions on its pedagogical effectiveness. pedagogically, the issue of body taunting can easily be raised in the post-dialogue assessment phase of a cpi, during which inquirers evaluate their inquiry session and overall community progress based on question prompts from the facilitator, such as: “did we make progress with our question?” and “did we share control of the dialogue?” here, the facilitator’s role is analogous to an x-ray, helping to reveal issues and processes beneath the inquiry’s surface so the inquirers have a chance to mull them over after the fast-paced, multifaceted dialoguing phase (kennedy, 2013, p. 149). though usually focused on appraising multidimensional thinking, the assessment phase can also make explicit certain problems arising within the group’s particular dynamic, such as issues with power, participation and communication styles. accordingly, it would be very easy for a facilitator who suspects body taunting or other types of corporeal hostility to raise questions about bodily interventions that amount to gauging, “were our dialoguing bodies interacting constructively?” during this assessment stage, the group can discuss and decide together what body vocabulary they find distracting or offensive, whether the bodily hostility they witness seems inadvertent or deliberate, and whether the body taunts warrant serious strategic consideration or only acknowledgement. this process must be particular to a cpi on the basis of need, since not all groups will necessarily respond to perceived body taunts in the same way—it is hard to gauge the afterlife of taunts given some groups might not notice or mind them, others might recognize and grow from them, and still others might disintegrate completely as a result of them. however, if body taunting is experienced by even a minority of inquirers, no matter how seemingly exaggerated or unreasonable the reaction, the community should consider its potential effects given their responsibility to one another within their cpi. this sense of accountability becomes all the more pressing when cultural differences within the group complicate their interpretive work, requiring collaborative clarifications and definitions of body vocabulary—what the group agrees is or is not appropriate for their exchanges. since awareness of body taunting might not be enough to eradicate it, what should matter is the effort towards constructive body talk. the cpi method should strive for nuance not only in speech but in “total language,” with the inquiry cared for both intellectually and corporeally. of course, this self-corrective disposition is not easy to maintain continuously. as kennedy writes, self-correction requires “a certain courage, abandon, and ability to endure,” notably when dialoguing bodies are being unreasonable, unclear, verbose, meandering, bigoted, and the like (kennedy, 2013, p. 200).12 inquirers may genuinely believe that they could have made better use of analytical teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 35 , issue 1 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 19 the dialogue time, so in a sense have to accept what kennedy calls “the little death of [their] own potential contribution” (kennedy, 2013, p. 217), and resist getting the last word with their bodies. if body taunting has affected the community’s solidarity, a self-corrective disposition may be even harder to maintain, since inquirers might feel they are the only ones trying, and sense the boundaries between themselves and others becoming increasingly pronounced. here, merleau-ponty’s notion of sympathy is helpful to understanding the dynamic of dialoguing bodies: sympathy does not presuppose a genuine distinction between self-consciousness and consciousness of the other, but rather the absence of a distinction between the self and the other. it is the simple fact that i live in the facial expressions of the other, as i feel him living in mine (merleau-ponty, 2007, p. 174). phenomenologist maurice hamington further argues that awareness of merleau-ponty’s selfother chiasm helps to enable care: “corporeal knowledge creates the potential of sympathetic perception that makes care possible,” he writes. “the common denominator capable of overcoming physical and social distance is our embodiment...through the intermingling of the flesh i have a glimmer of what the stranger experiences” (weiss, 2008, pp. 213/215). a genuine commitment to cultivating self-correction can therefore help nurture particular intellectual and moral virtues, from perseverance and reasonableness to empathy and humility. if body taunting becomes another target of a cpi’s self-corrective disposition, then an additional virtue to promote would be what i call bodily tact. in their article “tact and atmosphere in the pedagogic relationship,” hannu juuso and timo laine offer an insightful take on tact as “a certain moral intuitiveness” and “reactive sensitivity” that enables people to perceive the contextually significant features of a situation and the individuals involved (including gestural cues), and “be sensitive but at the same time strong, as tact may require straightforwardness, determination and...experience of the other’s vulnerability” (juuso, 2004, pp. 6-9). extended to dialoguing bodies, tact would require an effort towards congruity between verbal and body language so that inquirers can focus on the interpretive work of deciphering and making meaning out of the content of contributions, with minimal mixed signals to distract them from that already exacting task. it is important to note that disagreement and tensions are welcome as the aim is not an aloofly neutral or emotionless bodily presence, but rather a body vocabulary that is in harmony with voiced arguments to prevent unnecessary provocation, dismissiveness, intimidation or alienation caused by perceived contradictions between words and gestures. as such, bodily tact would enhance the chiasmatic relations between self and other, and help to highlight merleau-ponty’s notion of sympathy when disagreement and tensions do arise in the community as a result of conflicting world-views. a tactful dialoguing body would strive to maintain the authentic interest necessary for engagement in selfothering, especially in challenging moments, addressing communication issues directly rather than through oblique body taunts. analytical teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 35 , issue 1 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 20 at the same time, the virtue of bodily tact might also involve the recognition of body taunting’s possibly constructive effects, like the following two instances. first, body taunting could be perceived as a prompt for a necessary crisis in a cpi. as kennedy notes, a rupture is often necessary to “break the false sense of harmony” in a group and have inquirers confront each other’s differences and limitations (kennedy, 2010, p. 203). a body taunter could represent a version of the “rogues” or “loose cannons” that kennedy contends might help move the community into more authentic, honest interactions (kennedy, 2010, p. 197). since misunderstandings in a cpi are unavoidable given the difficult philosophical (and often ethical) content of dialogues, body taunting might bring about the crisis needed to raise the group’s accountability to each other and to the inquiry process, and acknowledge their epistemological biases, discomfort with uncertainty, intolerance or egoistic inclinations. second, body taunting could offer a potential form of resistance for inquirers who feel subjugated or ostracized during cpi dialogues. a domineering inquirer who is negatively affecting the group’s dialogical progress or potential for intersubjectivity might elicit an individual or collective response of body taunting from co-inquirers attempting to make his problematic behaviour explicit. inquirers who feel estranged might read each other’s body vocabulary as evidence that they are not alone, and gain the confidence necessary to confront their antagonist. in turn, this might help the body taunter recognize and reconstruct his body image: as kennedy writes, “in my own gestural accommodation to it, [i] am affording you a new understanding of your own gesture” (kennedy, 2010, p. 194). and so, though body taunting may often be detrimental, it is not altogether undesirable since it can illuminate strains and frictions in a cpi that might otherwise be ignored. moreover, an emphasis on bodily self-correction and the virtue of bodily tact also sheds light on wider implications for participation in philosophy as a collaborative thinking practice. for marginalized dialoguing bodies, the academic discipline of philosophy may produce hostile experiences since its intellectual traditions and theories have been largely male-dominated, ageist and heteronormative in character. awareness of body taunting as a possible threat to intersubjectivity and the self-other chiasm may illuminate philosophical perspectives that have been historically excluded, including those of children, women and queer communities. of course, it may be the case that collective philosophical dialogue includes a legitimate favoring of power struggles and hostility: as cpi practitioners gilbert burgh and mor yorshansky have argued, domination and even coercion might represent “honest and engaged involvement by students in a painful process of social reconstruction” (burgh and yorshansky, 2011, p. 447). yet if the cpi method strives for truly communal meaning-making, it must advocate for those who are in danger of subjugation or ostracizing because of their vulnerable societal positions, or else risk alienating them even further from philosophical practice. for instance, kennedy describes children as “voices from the margin” and “privileged strangers” (kennedy, 2010, p. 41), whose philosophical perspectives have been predominantly neglected because of an adultist stance that denies their intellectual and moral agency. yet as he remarks, this prejudice against their philosophizing capacities denies the ways in which children, by their very malleable, nascent nature, represent “the possibility for the emergence of new forms of subjectivity in the world” (kennedy, 2013, p. 67). as merleau-ponty notes, “we must conceive of the child not as an absolute other, nor as the same as us, but as a polymorph”—a being that can take many forms by virtue of its transitional state (kennedy, 2010, p. 62). philosophizing with children should therefore also include appreciation for the self-other chiasm analytical teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 35 , issue 1 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 21 and the possibility of intersubjectivity, and thus avoid corporeal hostility such as body taunting that may alienate young voices from genuine philosophical engagement. similarly, the inclusion and representation of gender and queer issues in collaborative thinking practices may lead to a “pedagogy of discomfort” that cpi theorist and openly queer scholar maughn gregory deems crucial for meaningful value inquiry: “the self-correction that is possible through such inquiry requires us to be vulnerable, not only to the painful possibility of coming to see one’s former judgments as misguided or immoral, but to distressing bouts of moral disequilibrium” (gregory, 2004, pp. 6263).13 and so, by accentuating the corporeal interplay between inquirers—or the dialogue of body images—a focus on bodily self-correction can give insight into participation and representation issues in philosophical practices like the cpi method, challenging the discipline’s male-dominated, heteronormative and ageist character, and further encouraging a move from taunting to tact. conclusion in this essay, i have focused on the embodied dimension of the community of philosophical inquiry experience, and specifically on the type of corporeal hostility i have called body taunting. i have used this label to help make explicit the palpable but overlooked incongruity that arises when disagreement is communicated nonverbally in antagonistic ways that betray or contradict voiced arguments. drawing on the phenomenological accounts of maurice merleau-ponty and david kennedy, i have argued that body taunting poses a threat to the cpi’s emerging intersubjectivity by changing the chiasmatic relations between inquirers as they attempt to co-construct meaning, making boundaries between self and other seem more pronounced through a corporeal hostility that is provocative, dismissive, intimidating or alienating. though perhaps necessary at times to address issues of accountability among inquirers, body taunting highlights the need for the cpi method’s self-corrective spirit to strive for nuance and clarity not only in speech but in “total language”— gestural, postural, physiognomic, kinetic expression—to ensure the inquiry and its dialoguing bodies are cared for both intellectually and corporeally. to foster the self-othering process that lends collective philosophizing its transformative power, a cpi’s members must ensure they establish their own definitions and uses for the various body “vocabularies” that complement their verbal exchanges, just as they would with the concepts they use in their philosophical positions. this corporeal awareness can be perceived as a kind of bodily tact that reflects merleau-ponty’s sense of sympathy and the chiasmic self that kennedy endorses. as sharp has noted, in an aesthetically strong cpi, “reading faces [and overall bodily energy] becomes as important as attending to words” (sharp, 1997, pp. 72-73). collaborative philosophical practices must take into account the role of dialoguing bodies if they are to achieve inclusiveness of participants and perspectives. analytical teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 35 , issue 1 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 22 endnotes 1. since its inception in the 1970s, the philosophy for children (p4c) program has grown into an international movement endorsed by unesco, and come to designate not only philosophy for young people but also for communities more generally. as such, this essay will not focus on children specifically but on people of any age engaged in a cpi practice. the essay is theoretical in character and the examples it presents do not result from empirical research—they are fictionalized instances included for illustrative purposes to help concretize the concepts proposed. 2. there are notable exceptions in the cpi literature such as the work of p4c co-founder ann sharp who argues that “the aesthetic dimension permeates every aspect of communal inquiry,” where aesthetic includes both intellectual and bodily responses (sharp, 1997, p. 76). 3. the specific gestures may vary from one cpi to another but usually involve raising hands to indicate a desire to speak, making eye contact with other inquirers to gauge who wants to build on the given position, and pointing to the next interlocutor when finished speaking. 4. for merleau-ponty, the flesh is different from skin: “the flesh is not matter...it is not fact or sum of facts ‘material’ or ‘spiritual’...the flesh is in this sense an ‘element’ of being” (merleau-ponty, 1968, p. 139). henceforth in this essay, the particular dimension of merleau-ponty’s notion of flesh that concerns intersubjectivity will be referred to as the self-other chiasm or as the chiasmatic relations between self and other. 5. as douglas low explains in merleau-ponty’s last vision, “this chiasm cannot be complete. there cannot be total fusion, for then the experiencer and the experienced would conflate, would become one, thereby making experience impossible. there must be an experience that puts us in contact with the world outside and yet separates us from it, keeps us at a distance from it” (low, 2000, p. 25). 6. of direct relevance to this essay, kennedy describes aggression that occurs within what he calls the “community of interest” (kennedy, 2010, pp. 204-205), and also with respect to power in his articles “power, manipulation and control in a community of inquiry” (2003) and “the psychodynamics of the community of inquiry and educational reform” (2000). 7. it is noteworthy that in this author’s experience as a cpi facilitator and philosophical practitioner, body taunting has been more of an issue with adults and teens than with children. according to merleau-ponty’s argument in “the child’s relation with others,” this may in part be because children are in the process of recognizing themselves as distinct from others and can therefore more analytical teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 35 , issue 1 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 23 easily be receptive to competing considerations and perspectives, decreasing the motivation to body taunt (toadvine and leonard lowlier, eds., 2007, pp. 143-184). 8. for a glossary of relevant moves and elements in the cpi method, see sasseville’s penser ensemble à l’école (2012). 9. to be clear, egoism here refers to the prioritization of the cartesian self, thought to be capable of pure, atomistic, disembodied existence (descartes, 1988, pp. 59-103), not to psychoanalytic theories like those of sigmund freud. 10. morris refers specifically to the childhood experiences of asd activist temple grandin, who developed a “library of mental videotapes” to help her make sense of other children’s behaviours in different contexts but could still not viscerally understand their gestural exchanges, believing them to be somehow magical or telepathic since they escaped her corporeal grasp (morris, 2012, p. 114). 11. as morris writes in relation to merleau-ponty, “it is by virtue of the body’s capacity to acquire habits that the past has a weight, and the weight of the past, we might say, both enables us to go forward and holds us back, it creates both momentum and inertia. on the one hand, without the capacity to acquire habits, we could not learn from experience, we could not acquire the skills and competences which enable us to do things that we could not do before. on the other, habits can be difficult to change, so that if i have learned to play tennis a bit inefficiently, correcting my bad postural habits is difficult” (morris, 2012, p. 69). 12. for kennedy, true self-correction in a cpi includes asking oneself tough questions, notably: “what am i really after? what am i willing to give up in order to get it? how am i a part of this group? how am i using it?” (kennedy, 2010, p. 208). 13. gregory’s observation about the vulnerability needed for cpi self-correction is reconcilable with many feminist accounts. for instance, in her seminal phenomenology article “throwing like a girl,” iris young notes how women might experience their embodiment differently which affects their sense of self-efficacy. the girl “develops a bodily timidity which increases with age. in assuming herself as a girl, she takes herself up as fragile” (young, 1980, p. 153). applied to a cpi, this could mean that female inquirers might be more hesitant in their body language and more easily affected by body taunting, notably if they have incarnated their performance of “girlness” to a high degree. though it is beyond the scope of this essay, an interesting supplement could include considering issues of performativity as they relate to gendered body vocabulary used in a cpi. as judith butler writes in “performative acts and gender constitution: an essay in phenomenology and feminist theory,” though women individuate their performance of gender, their performative acts still reflect societal norms: “as a corporeal field of cultural play, gender is a basically innovative affair, although it is quite clear that there are strict punishments for contesting the script by performing out of turn or through unwarranted improvisations” (butler, 1988, p. 531). analytical teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 35 , issue 1 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 24 references baldwin, thomas. (ed). (2007). reading merleau-ponty: on phenomenology of perception. abingdon: routledge. burgh, gilbert and mor yorshansky. (2011). “direct communities of inquiry: politics, power and group dynamics.” educational philosophy and theory, 43(5), 436-452. butler, judith. (1988). “performative acts and gender constitution: an essay in phenomenology and feminist theory.” theatre journal, 40 (4), 519-531. descartes, rené. (1988). discourse on method and meditations on first philosophy. indianapolis: hackett publishing. evans, fred and leonard lawlor. (eds.). (2000). chiasms: merleau-ponty’s notion of flesh. albany, new york: state university of new york press. gregory, maughn. (2004). “being out, speaking out: vulnerability and classroom inquiry.” the journal of gay and lesbian issues in education, 2 (2), 53-64. grosz, elizabeth. (1994). “lived bodies: phenomenology and the flesh.” volatile bodies: toward a corporeal feminism. bloomington and indianapolis: indiana university press, 86-111. juuso, hannu and timo laine. (2004). “tact and atmosphere in the pedagogic relationship.” analytic teaching, 25 (1), 1-17. kennedy, david. (2013). “childhood, schooling, and universal morality.” national society for the study of education, 112 (1), 61-79. kennedy, david. (2010). philosophical dialogue with children: essays on theory and practice. lewiston, new york: the edwin mellen press. kennedy, david. (2004). “communal philosophical dialogue and the intersubject.” international journal for philosophical practice, 18 (2), 203-218. kennedy, david and pavel lushyn. (2003). “power, manipulation, and control in a community of inquiry.” analytic teaching, 23 (2), 103-110. kennedy, david and pavel lushyn. (2000). “the psychodynamics of community of inquiry and educational reform: a cross-cultural perspective.” thinking: the journal of philosophy for children, 15 (3), 9-16. kennedy, david. (2006). the well of being: childhood, subjectivity, and education. albany, ny: suny press. kennedy, david. (1986). young children’s thinking: an interpretation from phenomenology. analytical teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 35 , issue 1 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 25 doctoral dissertation. berea, kentucky. leder, drew. (1999). “flesh and blood: a proposed supplement to merleau-ponty.” in donn welton (ed.), the body (pp. 150-177). malden and oxford: blackwell publishers ltd. lipman, matthew. (1988). philosophy goes to school. philadelphia: temple university press. lipman, matthew. (2003). thinking in education. 2nd ed. cambridge: cambridge university press. low, douglas. (2000). merleau-ponty’s last vision: a proposal for the completion of the visible and the invisible. evanston, illinois: northwestern university press. merleau-ponty, maurice. (2007). “the child’s relation with others.” in ted toadvine and leonard lowlier (eds.), the merleau-ponty reader (pp. 143-184). evanston, il: northwestern university press. merleau-ponty, maurice. (1958). the phenomenology of perception. london: routledge. merleau-ponty, maurice. (1968). the visible and the invisible. evanston, il: northwestern university press. morris, katherine j. (2012). starting with merleau-ponty. london: continuum. oxford dictionaries. oxford university press (2014). retrieved 15 april 2014 from http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/ sasseville, michel. (2012). penser ensemble à l’école: des outils pour l’observation d’une communauté de recherché philosophique en action. québec: presses de l’université laval. sharp, ann margaret. (1997). “the aesthetic dimension of the community of inquiry.” inquiry: critical thinking across the disciplines, 17 (1), 67-77. weiss, gail. (ed.). (2008). intertwinings: interdisciplinary encounters with merleau-ponty. albany: state university of new york press. young, iris. (1980). “throwing like a girl: a phenomenology of feminine body comportment motility and spatiality.” human studies, 3 (2), 137-156. address correspondences to: natalie m. fletcher concordia university montreal, canada nataliefletcher@gmail.com facilitation is no mere technical skill: a case study of a small group of 'different' students analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 63 facilitation is no mere technical skill: a case study of a small group of ‘different’ students lena green abstract: it is generally recognized that any inquiry must be sensitive to context and that facilitation is never simply a matter of following a set of rules. in this paper i list and discuss the particular challenges of facilitating an inquiry with a small group of adolescent boys, all of whom had difficulty in learning despite being of at least average intelligence. i describe some adaptations to the classic p4c model of inquiry that i found helpful and refer briefly to the progress made by the boys. i conclude that, although research suggests that children and young people who learn differently may be those most likely to benefit from p4c, we should not underestimate the facilitation challenges they present or the time it takes for cognitive and social gains to influence performance in school. the inclusive education movement, with its emphasis on accommodating diversity, implies that such children are increasingly present in regular classrooms. it is important that trainers are aware of this and ensure that teachers who are eager to create classroom communities of inquiry have sufficient quality training and support. my final comment is that, if facilitation is an art, we should not expect all teachers to become, or to wish to become, highly effective facilitators of philosophical inquiry after a brief training. introduction he rationale for the initiative reported in this paper was my need to explore how and to what extent i could help some of the young people i see in my educational psychology practice by arranging for them to engage regularly in community of inquiry dialogue. i reasoned that, although they struggled at school, they were certainly not stupid, and could benefit both socially and cognitively from this type of mediated experience. the philosophy club is not a therapy group but an experience of thinking together in an environment very different from that of the typical classroom. its practice is based on the assumptions of matthew lipman, the author of the original philosophy for children program. in a case study, numbers are not as important as in depth description. the intention is to illustrate a particular instance, in this case it is through work with a small number of adolescents with autistic spectrum and/or attention difficulties. as with any case study, no claim can be made that the findings are generalizable, except possibly by analogy. t analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 64 philosophy for children lipman argued that, although everyone can think, it is important to enable all members of society to think for themselves and to think well. lipman, sharp and oscanyan (1980) proposed more than 30 years ago that education should be structured for thoughtfulness, that children should be actively encouraged to think for themselves, and that the way to improve thinking is through dialogue with others. as he explains in his autobiography, lipman (2009) believed that this could be accomplished if schools introduced regular philosophy classes to children of all ages. he was well aware, however, that many teachers might find this a threatening addition to their professional role. his response was to create the philosophy for children program as a way of making it possible for regular teachers who were not philosophers to engage their students in philosophical inquiry. he did not recommend that students in schools should learn about philosophy, but that they be allowed to do philosophy, using some of the thinking moves that philosophers have found helpful. the pedagogy he proposed for philosophy lessons was based on collaborative inquiry. the classroom would become what he labelled a ‘community of inquiry’ with the teacher as a facilitator whose task was to monitor how the community thought rather than to tell students what to think. the subject matter of any inquiry was to be whatever the classroom community found interesting and wanted to explore. in order to provide the best opportunities for practising both critical and creative thinking, the teacher/facilitator would nudge the collaborative inquiry towards a philosophical question, i.e. one that could not be settled by recourse to accepted facts or expert opinion. the philosophy for children (p4c) program is known and implemented in many countries. other authors and practitioners worldwide have adapted or modified lipman’s original p4c materials, or use different ways of engaging participants, but the belief in collaborative inquiry as a community remains central. currently valued theories regarding the development of human thinking and learning (vygotsky, 1962, 1978; feuerstein, 1980; feuerstein, klein and tannenbaum, 1991, together with certain important piagetian notions) support this practice, although it contradicted some beliefs about learning and intellectual development prevalent in the 1970s when it was first introduced. there is a growing body of research indicating that regular participation in community of inquiry dialogue has many positive consequences. common findings are growth in confidence, reasoning ability, reflectiveness, interpersonal skills, evidence of higher scholastic achievement and even gains in measured iq. examples are the work of trickey and topping (2004, 2007), green (2009), marsal, dobashi and weber (2009), santi and oliverio (2012), reznitskaya (2012) and the study conducted in 2013 by sapere, the uk charity that supports philosophy for children. studies in south africa affirm the effectiveness of dialogic enquiry in regular classrooms, even in contexts where it is difficult to implement (green, 2008, 2012) there is also emerging evidence of its value in teacher education, both as a pedagogy for teachers to employ in the classroom and as a means of developing their own thinking (green and condy 2012). further details about research since the 1980s are to be found on the sapere website and on the website of the institute for the advancement of philosophy for children (iapc). becoming part of a community of inquiry is particularly important for children and young people identified as educationally at risk. they are often a mystery to themselves, with little analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 65 understanding of their own thinking and learning processes. they do not automatically develop the judgements and habits of mind that facilitate school success. they need to practice thinking and become aware of both what and how they think since they have real difficulty in formulating and expressing their thoughts coherently. they frequently have had little opportunity to acquire the social skills that enable shared inquiry and need to build habits of collaboration and perceive its benefits. their school experience has frequently been one of criticism and failure and they have little sense of themselves as competent and respected thinkers, despite their potential for insight and creativity. ward (2015) highlights the fact that, in his experience with over 100 young people, “p4c has given a voice to children who otherwise did not have one”. the role of the facilitator in a community of inquiry the quality of any community of inquiry, especially in the early stages, depends on the skill, sensitivity and patience of the facilitator. haynes and murris (2011) explain that philosophical inquiry in the p4c tradition is not a detached intellectual exercise but an opportunity for shared meaning making. the teacher/facilitator must be able to engage members of the community both emotionally and intellectually and, as lipman said, act as the midwife of their emerging thoughts. fletcher (2015) speaks to the importance of nurturing ‘the desire to be, share and grow’ –the motivation to engage authentically in a shared inquiry– and of the challenge this can be for facilitators. the role of facilitator demands flexible movement between critical, creative and caring thinking. she is both inside and outside the community –a collaborator sharing in the construction of meaning and a sensitive leader who tracks the process of inquiry in terms of its respectfulness, focus and reasonableness. in addition, she models the cognitive and social moves that she would like the community to be making (gregory, 2009). she encourages the expression of many different ideas yet insists that participants think before they speak or respond to the thinking of others. she may have to teach the community how to speak and listen to each other respectfully and how to step back and evaluate their own thinking. the aim of any inquiry, as gardner (1996) and fisher (1998) clearly state, is to make progress towards truth in the form of the most reasonable provisional answer to whatever question has been posed. in order to advance understanding the skilled facilitator models and encourages thinking moves, gives all ideas a fair hearing, examines arguments in order to strengthen or discard them, supports minority points of view and alternative positions, normalizes disagreement and is comfortable with opinions different from her own as long as they have been carefully explored and can be justified. (green and murris, 2014). in other words, she is “pedagogically strong but philosophically self-effacing” (jackson, 2002, page 465). as the community develops the facilitator’s role is, or should be, increasingly taken over by the participants themselves. she may offer her own opinions on occasion but has to be sensitive to the inevitable power differential (both real and perceived) between herself and those she works with. every context and every inquiry is different although there are some common features. techniques and practical skills are useful but facilitation of a philosophical inquiry, like good teaching, is an art. it requires not only a sound conceptual foundation but also the ability to analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 66 reflect critically and creatively in ever changing circumstances, plus the ability to ‘think on your feet’. it cannot be reduced to a set of learned practices. the case study the ongoing case study reported here is an attempt to establish what kind of practice can best mediate the attitudes and skills of collaborative inquiry with young people who are not ‘typical’ students. in the course of my practice as an educational psychologist i see many children and young people who find schoolwork difficult and are unhappy and/or bored in classrooms. i reasoned that, although there might be some challenges involved, many of them would benefit from being part of a community of inquiry. it could build their confidence, often destroyed by repeated failures at school. it could help them organize and articulate their thoughts and identify ways of managing what was difficult for them. it could be a source of pleasure in using their minds, something of which they had little or no experience. it would be an opportunity to expand their concepts and would, i hoped, eventually have some positive effect on their behaviour and/or their achievement in school. i chose to label the group the ‘philosophy club’ to mark the fact that this was not some form of extra lesson or learning support but a voluntary engagement in an interesting activity. the group was small, consisting of four adolescent boys aged between 14 and 17 from different schools and different backgrounds in terms of race, culture and religion. two of the boys had been diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactive disorder (adhd), one of whom was on medication. another was diagnosed with an autistic spectrum disorder and the fourth processed information slowly. all received some form of learning support, either at school or independently. the boys came voluntarily for an hour every monday afternoon over a period of 18 months, broken by school holidays and interrupted at times by illness or the need to use the philosophy club time for intensive examination preparation or extra lessons. the aim of the research dimension of the project was to discover to what extent p4c might need to be adapted for these young people and in what ways they might benefit from regular inquiry dialogues. i planned to track their development as thinkers and learners and monitor the process of philosophizing with them. the most appropriate research approach was a case study within the action research paradigm. action research, as described by carr and kemmis (1986: page 162) is “a form of self enquiry undertaken by participants in social situations in order to improve the rationality and justice of their own practices, their understanding of these practices, and the situations in which the practices are carried out.” this form of research involves an ongoing spiral process of planning, action and reflection. the information on which this paper is based includes session notes and observations, records of written feedback to individuals, transcripts of sessions, parent conversations and self-reports by the boys themselves. facilitation challenges identifying questions of genuine interest at first the boys struggled to come up with questions that they would really like to explore. it seemed as if they had stopped wondering, or if not, that they did not consider their questions to analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 67 be worth exploring together with others. it also took time before they trusted that what was of genuine concern to them was appropriate for our inquiry. the first question proposed by one of them was fairly impersonal –whether to save one beloved person or twenty strangers, in the unlikely event of being presented with this choice. although it took some work to relate this topic to familiar contexts, it was a start. i found that for several months i needed to be sensitive to the boys’ likely interests and suggest at least two possible topics from which they could choose. there were times, however, when the school day had presented concerns that were too salient to ignore and on these occasions i simply allowed the boys to talk and listened for philosophical implications that we might explore in the future. over time steven, joe, tom and edwin (not their real names) became much more confident and creative about proposing questions, as the selected examples to come will illustrate. a strategy i found to work well occasionally was to present a question that no-one was allowed to answer except by saying ‘that makes me think of another interesting question’ so that we built upon and extended each other’s questions. by collaborating in this way we created a bank of questions for times when no-one was feeling creative. sometimes it was useful to encourage a conversation, or pick up on a chance remark, often about some aspect of school life, and try to tease out with the group what questions were implied. difficulty in focusing and sustaining attention the boys did not easily remain focused on a specific question or topic or on each other’s opinions, especially, as was often the case, if these were not expressed succinctly. they had difficulty in managing their internal distractibility. their own thoughts were often not clear to them and they sometimes needed time to identify and formulate them in words. at other times they used too many words, as if in the hope that their meaning would somehow emerge if they made repeated attempts at it. it helped if the starting point was extremely interesting to them and captured their attention, which was something i had to learn by trial and error. i used stories, poems, pictures, various objects that they could handle, and videos/dvds. reading, and especially reading aloud, was not popular. texts had to be short. the wordy prose and unfamiliar context of the extract from les miserables that fisher (2001) suggests (the bishop’s candlesticks episode) did not appeal despite its interesting moral possibilities. moreover, this group was unanimous that the bishop had erred in trusting the thief and should have handed him over to the forces of law and order. the current visibility and prevalence of crime in south africa may have influenced this perspective. i used this extract at an early stage in the philosophy club’s existence and at that time did not choose to challenge the boys’ opinions and reasons. it was progress to have them express personal views and begin to listen to each other. later i reintroduced the topic when it became apparent that the boys were interested in evil, as presented in the innumerable movies that they recalled in great detail. they watched de boton’s dvd about philosophy but it did not excite them. i am not sure to what extent they picked up the main points he was making and it may be that, although they appeared to focus on the visual input, they did not pay systematic attention to the auditory analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 68 information in much the same way that they seemed to focus somewhat randomly on aspects of written text. when i experimented with art (postcard reproductions) as a starting point for inquiry i found that some members of the group tended to be uncomfortable with too much ambiguity, which may have been overwhelming given the rich but confused mix of their own thoughts. it was easier for them to respond to pictures of realistic objects or events. i had discovered that it was important to provide variety in terms of our starting point. this need for change and new stimulation was even more apparent when we focused on a specific question. the boys would each express an opinion and attempt to justify it with reasons but they soon felt that they had said all that could be said on a particular topic and wanted a change. if, as oyler (2015) suggests, the ‘length of string’ is an indicator of the quality of an inquiry, for a long time we did not do very well. it helped if activities were structured. i followed the classic guidelines. we created ‘ground rules’; we used a soft toy to signal the right to speak. i used laminated cards, each of which had one word on it, namely. agree, disagree, reason, question, connect and clarify. the boys were to pick up a card before speaking, ostensibly so that we would all know what kind of move they were making but also to help them identify their own thinking moves. however, while structure helped, there was also some resistance to it. if they were really engaged they often forgot the rules that we had agreed upon or decided to ignore them. it seemed as if they did not like this slowing down of their thoughts or the way it interrupted their attempts to focus on the content of what they wanted to say. it was a breakthrough when joe, not i, said at one point, “i think we should go back to using the toy”. structure in the form of a series of questions to direct an inquiry was extremely helpful. one of our early inquiries involved a brief extract from harry stottlemeier’s discovery –where lisa and her friends are speaking about ‘mind’. we read a short passage together (the spacing and size of the font helped) and then worked through the questions suggested in the manual. this experience highlighted for me the value of a series of clear, simply worded questions in focusing an inquiry. those who do not easily focus their auditory attention have difficulty recalling what they have heard and tend to retain only a fuzzy sense of what was said. it helped to ask other participants to repeat what someone had said, or to check for meaning myself, and at times, but not too often, to use a whiteboard to capture the process as it happened. i found this very difficult to do because the main threads of an enquiry (and often the main point of an utterance) would only emerge fairly late and it was hard to know what was important. i tried, however, to create a brief written summary or a visual map immediately after each session. by the following week the boys had usually forgotten what we had talked about. the ‘map’ was useful as a starting point for continuing an inquiry, as long as it did not involve a great deal of reading. i found, too, that after an extended period of concentration we needed a break. it worked well to introduce some kind of playful activity, such as a philosophy board game or an activity that involved answering ridiculous questions such as ‘would you rather walk on broken glass or slip your feet into shoes filled with snakes?’ another option was to introduce a simple creative analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 69 task, such as the example below in which individuals completed sentences about themselves that provided a starting point. my mind is like a computer because…. … because it stores memories in my brain and i can go back and remember things that i want to experience again. my mind is like a calm sea because… … my mind can make peaceful sounds that a sea makes. it can also put me on a beach. my mind is like an empty room because… … an empty room lit up by a candle to light the dark. an empty room because sometimes i could have nothing to think about or when i’m bored i can think of nothing. my mind is like a grasshopper because …a grasshopper that’s wild and delicate …because sometimes i would like to be left alone or i could be wanting to make sounds when i have nothing to do. my mind is like a bubble bath because… …because all the bubbles can represent things that are worth thinking about. i could be thinking many things. low self-esteem all members of our mini-community had a history of negative school experiences. they did not expect to be ‘right’ and disliked taking risks. they anticipated possible humiliation if they said what they thought. almost all those who joined the group were clearly anxious at first. it manifested as silence, or as the hesitant and apologetic offer of an opinion, or as a tendency to ‘put down’ and tease others, or to speak too much and too loudly. it helped to model respectful responses and, when intervention became necessary, to be very tactful about the wording of any comment that could be construed as a reprimand. i became increasingly aware of the significance of the physical and social setting. the boys sometimes appeared exhausted after a long school day of sport and lessons. they liked the fact that they sat informally on comfortable chairs or a couch, facing each other. this was highlighted for me when we discussed inviting new members and the comment was ‘you will have to get another couch’. after some months i asked for suggestions about improving the philosophy club. these included a coffee machine and a few more participants, especially if these could be girls. the philosophy club, as i had hoped, was developing an identity as a safe and comfortable social venue in which they could begin to take intellectual risks. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 70 insistence on relativist views opinions were expressed and often apparently strongly held. it was encouraging, however, that occasionally someone changed his mind as a question was explored. nevertheless, there was a very general tendency to insist that any viewpoint was ‘just my perspective’ and that other perspectives, whatever they might be, were equally valid. this attitude might be related to the emphasis on accommodating diversity in the very diverse context of post apartheid south africa but i was interested to learn from international colleagues that it was common in other contexts as well. it may also relate to a reluctance to take a stance in case it is proved to be ‘wrong’. i suspect now that it may take some time before these boys, whose experience of the world so far has tended to be fluid and inconsistent, are fully convinced of the value of reasoned justification. i can think of only one occasion when someone committed to a position. i had pushed the group about whether all perspectives were equally valid and after considerable discussion he said, “i think where the catch comes in is that if your perspective would put anyone else in harm or put yourself in harm that’s where the line is crossed between it’s ok and not…” group size and composition: the size and composition of the group limited somewhat the number of perspectives to which we had access. this was exacerbated when there were the inevitable absences from time to time. it also at times made individuals more ‘visible’ than they would have liked. i had never intended that the group should consist of less than six members, which would have allowed for the occasional absence. i had also anticipated a more or less even gender balance, but it did not happen this way. reasons may include the fact that conditions such as adhd and autism are more frequent in boys than in girls, but the main reasons for the group’s size and composition seemed to be either the priority given to extra lessons or sport, or difficulties with transport. the challenge for me was to have a range of options available for every session since attendance was unpredictable. opportunities for facilitator growth: in the early months i was forced to think creatively, to experiment with starting points that might engage the boys and to find ways of making questions the norm. i think i have become better at nudging thinking step by step towards philosophical questions, for example from ‘why do we have to learn about romeo and juliet’ to ‘what is the purpose of education’, about which the boys had a great deal to say. being unable to generate questions is one outcome of schooling that focuses almost exclusively on answers. lack of confidence about answers gives rise to lack of confidence about questions. generating more and better questions and becoming more confident went hand in hand. i became more alert to occasions when someone had taken a small step forward, and made comments such as ‘i notice that today you have been very careful not to interrupt tom –this is really helpful’ but i took care only to do this when it was justified and did not praise indiscriminately. although i was aware of the importance of a self-esteem, i learned from this group just how easily a belief in oneself as a person capable of worthwhile thoughts can be damaged by negative analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 71 school experiences and how this perception of the self can interfere with the social interactions that are a necessary part of growing up and learning. i learned, too, that the process of sharing thoughts appropriately sometimes has to be explicitly taught. because the group was small it was possible for me to observe carefully the thinking strengths and challenges of each individual, to notice small signs of growth and to feedback my insights to each individual in the form of a brief written report every six months. although managing attention and retaining focus remain challenges, i value the occasional rewarding glimpses of the unusual ‘takes’ on life and the rapid creative connections of which this particular community is capable. i have become more aware of each individual’s store of knowledge, both useful and extraordinary, and better able to link it to our enquiries. i have a much better idea now of what will not work in this context, although i still make mistakes. i am not yet sure how best to address the insistence that all perspectives must be treated as equally valid but i consult with colleagues and have found gardner’s recent update of her 1996 paper helpful. progress to date i have observed that the boys have become more confident and creative, more able to generate philosophical questions, and more able, at least at times, to remain focused on a particular question. they have begun to develop insight about themselves and understanding of the inquiry process, as the quotations below illustrate. o …i think the number one thing i’ve learned is self-control for example when i first started coming to philosophy club i would interrupt people to say my answer… o … i think what i find difficult in particular is because i’m worried i’m going to forget something while i say it… o …i think i have become more open to other ideas… o …i like the discussion in philosophy on points of view – your point of view why you think this is wrong and this is right…you can have many answers… o … i think that the difference between philosophy and a conversation is that philosophy usually poses a question that doesn’t necessarily have a definite answer but more challenges your perspective….ja so i think that it’s more in depth than a conversation and we have to talk longer and we have to search in ourselves to get the answers while talking and i think a conversation would just be…i don’t think that it’s lesser but i do think that it’s different… some of the questions generated by the boys over a period of approximately one year were: o what is evil? o can we know the real truth? o what is the right kind of education? o does everyone see the same? o are conventional ways (of bringing up children) still the best? o do human beings have free will? o if you speak about/acknowledge race does that make you a racist? o would it be a good idea if human beings could start life with old age and become younger? analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 72 o would it be a good idea if someone invented a chewing gum that knew everything? o if other people could read our thoughts would we have different thoughts? o is love at first sight possible? o if you cloned yourself would your clone have your memories? discussion in the case of this group the key facilitation issue was flexibility. i frequently could not use what i had prepared. the reason might be a pressing issue that was brought to the philosophy club or the energy level and mood of the group and of individuals. variety and structure were always important, as was careful attention to each individual and the management of interactions between them. in the sessions the boys involved became more confident, and more aware of the content and process of their thinking but i have no evidence of any direct transfer to school related tasks. parents reported that their sons liked the sessions but did not pinpoint any specific changes. at the start of the project i had hoped to be able to track improvements in academic achievement but i became aware that this was unrealistic for several reasons. if there were improvements in school grades it would be impossible to exclude the influence of factors such as extra lessons, good teaching, and the nature of school and home contexts. i might have chosen to ‘bridge’ more explicitly to schoolwork but this would have reduced the philosophy club to a special form of ‘extra lesson’ –and not a particularly successful one as each individual had different needs. even had i done so, cognitive interventions that make a significant difference to school learning tend to require at least two years of regular input, generally for more than one hour per week. it should also be noted that the south african curriculum, which pays lip service to critical and creative thinking, is becoming increasingly prescriptive and assessment driven. there may have been effects on thinking and behaviour both in and out of school in the form of confidence, attitudes to knowledge and to the ideas of others, of which i was unable to gather evidence. the main purpose of this paper was, however, to illustrate the challenges and time involved in making progress within this particular community. it may be ‘normal’ to expect progress within the community but communities vary in terms of the ease with which progress is accomplished and in terms of the extent to which such progress manifests itself in other contexts. lipman and his colleagues made very explicit the connection between experiences of dialogue and scholastic achievement. they questioned the assumption that, because the outcome of education is the ability to read and understand text, and to produce meaningful written text, the process of education should offer practice in such activities without the prior experience of dialogue. the skills acquired in dialogue, they argued, are a necessary prerequisite for the skills required in the classroom. many educationists now believe in the importance of talk prior to reading and writing. however, they tend to justify this practice as a means of activating existing schemas about a topic and often fail to recognize that dialogue also has a much more important function. it is through dialogue with others that children acquire the tools to think. listening to others and teasing out shared meanings prepares them to seek and find meaning in what they read. articulating, structuring and defending their own ideas in collaboration with others analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 73 becomes over time a way of thinking in private that can direct their written work. the thinking moves that are encouraged and practiced during dialogic enquiry create a growing repertoire of reflective skills and habits that enable thoughtful judgements. making thoughtful judgements is particularly difficult for children who are inattentive and frequently impulsive and they need many experiences that not only build habits of thoughtfulness but make them aware of the value of this kind of thinking. these are persuasive arguments. this small case study highlights the need for early and ongoing experiences of inquiry and suggests that we should be realistic about the time required for change to manifest itself in school contexts. there is nothing new in saying that all schoolchildren can benefit from p4c or that facilitation of an inquiry is not easy. it does need to be said, however, that schoolchildren who learn differently and/or need special accommodations may be those who most need the experience of dialogic inquiry in the p4c tradition and are at the same time those who present facilitation challenges that we would be unwise to underestimate. given the international move towards inclusive schools and classrooms every regular classroom is likely to be a diverse community and teacher training in p4c needs to take this into account. it would be pleasing to believe that education worldwide could be transformed if philosophical inquiry were inserted into every school curriculum and all teachers were trained to facilitate collaborative philosophical inquiry. it would also be naïve. facilitation of a philosophical inquiry, like teaching itself, is an art. it is not a competence to be acquired but a way of thinking, an ongoing learning experience which is only possible if one is comfortable with ambiguity and uncertainty. not all teachers are likely to be, or wish to be, effective facilitators of inquiry, even if they have received some training. this is particularly true in contexts where teachers themselves have not been encouraged to develop as thinkers and where there is not the possibility of regular collegial mentoring and support. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 74 references carr, w & kemmis, s. 1986. becoming critical. lewes: falmer press. fisher, r. 1998. teaching thinking. london: continuum. fisher, r. 2001.values for thinking. london: continuum. fletcher, n. 2015. aspirational eros in philosophical inquiry: cultivating the desire to be, share and grow. paper presented at the icpic conference, identity and philosophical inquiry in an age of diversity, vancouver. feuerstein, r. 1980. instrumental enrichment. baltimore md: university park press. feuerstein, r., klein, p.s. & tannenbaum, a.j. (eds.) 1991. mediated learning experience: theoretical, psychosocial and learning implications. london: freund. gardner, s. 1996. inquiry is no mere conversation (or discussion or dialogue): facilitation of inquiry is hard work! analytic teaching, 16(2) pp 102-111. green, l. 2012. evaluating community of inquiry practices in under-resourced south african classrooms. three strategies and their outcomes. in: santi, m. and oliverio, s.2012. educating for complex thinking through philosophical inquiry. napoli: liguori editore, 349-363. green, l and murris, k. 2014. philosophy for children. in: l.green (ed.). schools as thinking communities. pretoria: van schaik, 121-140. gregory, m.r. 2009. a framework for facilitating classroom dialogue. in: e, marsal, t. dobashi & e. weber (eds.) children philosophize worldwide. frankfurt am main: peter lang, 277-299. jackson, t. 2002. the art and craft of “gently socratic” inquiry. in: a.l. costa (ed.) developing minds: a resource book for teaching thinking. 3rd edition. alexandria, va: association for supervision and curriculum (ascd), 459-465. lipman, m. , sharp, a.m. & oscanyan, f. 1980. philosophy in the classroom. 2nd edition. philadelphia: temple university press lipman, m. 2008. a life teaching thinking. montclair: iapc. oyler, j. m. 2015. expert teacher contributions to argumentation quality during inquiry dialogue. unpublished doctoral dissertation, montclair state university. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 75 reznitskaya, a. 2012. dialogic teaching: rethinking language use during literature discussions. the reading teacher, 65(7), pages 446-456. splitter, l. j. & sharp, a.m. 1995. teaching for better thinking. melbourne: acer. taylor, j. & oyler, j. 2015. the identity of the facilitator. who is she and who should she be? paper presented at the icpic conference, identity and philosophical inquiry in an age of diversity, university of british columbia,vancouver. trickey, s. & topping, k.j. 2004. philosophy for children: a systematic review. research papers in education, 19(3). 363-278 trickey s & topping, k.j. 2007 collaborative enquiry for schoolchildren: cognitive gains at 2year follow-up. british journal of educational psychology, 77(4): 787-796, vygotsky, l.s. 1962 thought and language. cambridge, ma: mit press. vygotsky, l.s. 1978 mind in society. translation revised by a. kozulin. cambridge, ma: mit press. ward, j. 2015. engaging the disengaged with philosophy for children (p4c). http://saperep4c.wordpress.com/20150209/ accessed 26-09-15. websites http://www.montclair.edu/cehs/academics/centers-and-institutes/iapc institute for the advancement of philosophy for children http://www.sapere.org.uk uk p4c community address correspondences to: dr. lena green, extraordinary professor in the department of educational psychology, faculty of education university of the western cape, south africa lgreen@mweb.co.za http://www.montclair.edu/cehs/academics/centers-and-institutes/iapc http://www.sapere.org.uk/ the effects of participation in a p4c program on australian elementary school students analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 37, issue 1 (2016) 1 the effects of participation in a p4c program on australian elementary school students chadi youssef, marilyn campbell, donna tangen abstract: both academic attainment and student well-being are high priorities for schooling in australia. while many programs are implemented in schools to promote either academic success or mental well-being, one program, the philosophy for children (p4c) program claims to do both. this program is being widely implemented in australian elementary schools. a quasi-experimental study therefore explored the effects of participation in a philosophical community of inquiry (coi), a feature of the broader p4c program on year 6 students’ reading comprehension, interest in math, self-esteem, pro-social behavior and emotional well-being. it was found that reading comprehension increased. interest in math and self-esteem decreased and there was no change in pro-social behavior and emotional well-being for children who participated in the coi program compared to students who did not participate. implications for practice are discussed. key words: elementary school, philosophy, children, reading comprehension, mathematics, selfesteem, pro-social behaviour, emotional well-being introduction ith the introduction of the national assessment for plan (naplan) in 2008 in australian schools, and the public’s interest in schools’ results, increased emphasis has been placed on the academic attainments of children in elementary school. additionally, increasing mental health problems (national institute for health and clinical excellence, 2013; social and character development research consortium, 2010) have put the spotlight on elementary school children’s emotional well-being as well as the continued problem of bullying in schools leading to more teaching about pro-social behaviour. many separate programs to increase academic achievement and emotional well-being have been tried in schools such as you can do it, the friends program and aussie optimism (bernard & walton, 2011; neil & christensen, 2007; roberts, 2010). one educational program which has some claims for increasing both student academic results and emotional well-being is philosophy for children (p4c) (millett & tapper, 2012). this educational program is organized to encourage students to contemplate philosophical questions (lipman & bynum, 1976; lipman, 2001) and focus on the application of ethical, aesthetic, and logical inquiry, allowing students the opportunity to see issues from many different perspectives (lipman, 2003). the philosophical community of inquiry (coi) is a feature of the broader philosophy for children (p4c) program (cam et al., 2007). however, research suggests that p4c programs show contradictory results in terms of students’ improved academic outcomes and also affective domains (allen, 1988; gregory, 2011; imbrosciano, 1997; lone, 2001; mcdermott & fox, 2001; morehouse, 2010; vansieleghem & kennedy, 2011; weber & gardner, 2009). the purpose of the current research was therefore to examine the effectiveness of a philosophical community of inquiry (coi) intervention and to w 2 observe and quantify its effects on elementary school students’ reading comprehension, interest in math, self-esteem, pro-social behaviours and emotional well-being. reading comprehension various researchers have examined the effects of the p4c program on reading comprehension, following in the footsteps of investigations of the role of classroom discussions in improving reading comprehension (jo, 2000; murphy, wilkinson, soter, & hennessey, 2009). lipman and bierman’s (1970) study investigated the impact of a philosophical coi program on an experimental group of students who were exposed to a total of 18 40-minute sessions over nine weeks and found that students’ reading comprehension scores were higher for the philosophical coi group than for peer groups not engaged in the program. the effects of the program were still evident two and a half years later. furthermore, compared with traditional instruction banks (1987) found that the p4c program significantly improved the reading comprehension scores of 319, 4th to 6th grade african american students in a suburban area with low ses over a period of 24 weeks. using a sample of 100 students aged 11 years, yeazell (1982) also found that the p4c approach improved students’ general reading comprehension of all levels of ability compared to a sample of students traditionally taught. however, other studies have not found the p4c program benefited students’ reading comprehension. the dyfed county council (1994) study in wales focused on students aged 5 years and employed a whole class approach using ‘teaching philosophy with picture books’ (murris, 1992) as the stimulus for discussion. six schools in this study used two interventions (p4c and a reading activity), another six schools used the reading activity alone with a small group of children ‘at risk’ of reading difficulty, and a third group of six schools had no intervention. the schools were randomly selected, balanced for size and whether the language of instruction was welsh or english. the standardised tests of reading miscue analysis and reading comprehension yielded no evidence of differences between the groups. a major limitation of this study was that no details were provided about statistical analyses. attitudes to mathematics the effects of p4c have also been investigated in relation to students’ attitudes to mathematics (english, 1993; daniel, 1994; lafortune, daniel, pallascio, & sykes, 1995; smith 1995). lafortune and colleagues (1995) conducted an experiment that explored the affective dimension of learning mathematics. quantitative and qualitative results indicated from this study that the philosophical approach helped students aged 9 to 12 avoid developing more negative attitudes towards mathematics. a further experiment by lafortune et al. (2002) was carried out over most of a school year, with five classes in grades four, five and six (ages 9 to 12) involved in a community of enquiry and five classes as control in french schools in quebec. it was found that students in the control groups experienced far less pleasure when doing mathematics, and also felt less involved in the subject, than those in the experimental groups. self-esteem it has also been claimed that the self-esteem of elementary school students is enhanced by involvement with p4c (sasseville, 1994). a canadian study conducted by sasseville (1994) explored the effects of participation in a p4c program on student self-esteem. the experimental group comprised 124 students and the control group 96 students. the teachers involved received 3 12 hours pre-project training and 4 days training during the 5-month period of the research. on the piers-harris self-esteem test (bagley & mallick, 1978), philosophy students showed an overall statistically significant gain in self-esteem compared to students in the control group. the largest gains in selfesteem were with students with the lowest pre-test self-esteem, while those with high self-esteem actually showed a relative loss compared with the controls. however, a study by lafortune et al. (2002) found no differences in self-esteem between students who had been involved in a philosophical community of inquiry and those who had not been involved. participating in a philosophical community of inquiry does not appear to enable all students in such a program to develop an improved self-image (glaser, 1992; portelli & reed, 1995). according to phillips (1996), exposure to p4c could even work against the development of selfesteem, if one does not take into account the fact that there may be certain contradictions between promoting the development of self-esteem and promoting intellectual skills such as rigor and intellectual honesty. to ensure positive development of student self-esteem, daniel, lafortune, pallascio and schleifer, (1999) suggest that students must consciously link success to surpassing oneself in a cooperative context, rather than surpassing others in a competitive verbal sparring match. pro-social behavior to study the effects of p4c on children’s pro-social behaviour, collins (2005) used a pre/post controlled intervention study of p4c with 133 ethnically diverse students in five south australian elementary schools for two terms (6-months). the pre/post questionnaire tested students’ justificatory thinking abilities and dispositions. it was found that a philosophical coi intervention led to growth in the participants’ ability and disposition to consider issues empathetically and to weigh consequences for all concerned. p4c has also been described as a pedagogical vehicle by which students in the school community can address the attributes essential for a successful bullying intervention by promoting empathy, caring and respect and working toward rectifying the imbalance that exists between bullies and their victims in an effort to begin to readdress bullying behaviour (glina, 2009). however, tangen and campbell (2010) looked at the effects of a philosophical coi program on bullying comparing students’ selfreports on bullying between schools with and without a philosophy for children (p4c) approach. a sample of 35 students exposed to a philosophical coi and a matched sample of 35 students in other schools between the ages of 10 and 13 completed the student bullying survey. a higher percentage of p4c school students claimed to have both been faceto-face bullied and bullied others face-to-face in the year of the study than matched students at other schools with both groups showing similar involvement in cyberbullying (tangen & campbell, 2010). emotional wellbeing finally, p4c involvement has been shown to enhance elementary students’ emotional wellbeing. dawid (2005) investigated the effects of p4c on student emotional literacy; that is skills in self-awareness, emotional resilience, motivation, and handling of emotions and relationships. it was found that parents reported a significant increase in their children’s emotional intelligence in the experimental group as compared to the control group. however, some studies have found that students who were generally negative about learning philosophy had little understanding of why they were doing philosophy, and girls progressively lost interest in the program (leckey, 2001). 4 not only are there inconsistent results of the p4c program on children’s academic achievement and emotional well-being, the studies are dated and often do not present their statistical analysis. furthermore, much of the positive research has been reported in lipman’s own journal, creating interpretive problems which suggest problems of vested interest (reed, 1987; sternberg & bhana, 1996). there are very few studies that substantiate the claims made by p4c proponents, and few that include short and specifically, long-term follow-up (millett & tapper, 2012; trickey & topping, 2006). in addition, many of the studies lack methodological rigor. the utilization of the techniques of multilevel modelling as an analytic strategy is strongly recommended as it corrects for autocorrelation inherent in studies where clustering or nesting is present, as in previous studies on coi programs. this means that, where nesting was present, the research may have not been measuring the differences accurately, as without this strategy there is a higher probability of making a type i error. the current study addressed these gaps by researching how participation in a coi affected year 6 students’ reading comprehension, interest in math, self-esteem, pro-social behaviour and emotional well-being compared to a control group using multi-level modelling. method participants two hundred and eighty children (149 intervention group, 131 comparison group) from eight elementary state schools in the southeast region of queensland participated in the study. the sample was made up of 48% (n=135) females and 52% (n=145) males all in year 6 (with an age range of 10-12 years). measures test of reading comprehension (torch test mossenson et al., 1988). this set of tests consists of fourteen untimed reading tests which are suitable for students in year 3 through to year 10. the tests vary in length from approximately 200 to 900 words. a passage is administered to students and the students retell that passage in different words on a retelling form. the retelling form contains gaps relating to the original passage and the students are required to fill the gaps in one or more of their own words (mossenson et al., 1988). the tests were used to measure reading comprehension. validity is reported for torch tests in terms of content validity, obtained by a detailed examination of the content of the tests by different methods such as the selection of the items, and their appropriateness and representativeness, and also by comparing the items with accepted curricula (mossenson et al., 1988). the self-description questionnaire ii (marsh, 1992). the self-description questionnaire is an eight-scale instrument intended to measure seven aspects of self-concept of preadolescent children (ages 7-13) as well as their general sense of self-worth. the global score was used to measure self-esteem and the ‘interest in math’ sub-scale was used to measure students’ interest in math. the self-description questionnaire is acknowledged as one of the most reliable and valid measures of self-concept (byrne, 1996). internal consistency estimates ranged upward from a minimum .74 for the instrument. target factor loadings for each facet within the instrument reflected an average of around .70, with no loadings below .44. crossloadings ranged from -.17 to .27, and factor correlations were typically small (march, 1999). for the current sample, cronbach’s alpha was .94 for selfesteem and .94 for interest in mathematics. 5 the strengths and difficulties questionnaire ii (goodman, 1997). this short behavioral screening questionnaire is appropriate for children (5 to 16 year olds). it contains 25 items that are divided into 5 scales: 1) emotional symptoms (5 items); 2) conduct problems (5 items); 3) hyperactivity/inattention (5 items); 4) peer relationship problems (5 items); and 5) pro-social behaviour (5 items). it has been demonstrated as a reliable and valid instrument (muris, meesters, & van den berg, 2003). the pro-social subscale was used to measure students’ prosocial behaviours and the emotional symptoms subscale the students’ emotional well-being. reliability is generally satisfactory, internal consistency (mean cronbach .73) and retest stability after 4 to 6 months (mean 0.62) (goodman, 2001). for this sample the cronbach’s alpha for the pro-social behaviour scale was .62, and for the emotional well-being scale the cronbach’s alpha was .65. procedure the first author approached the principals of the participating schools requesting permission to conduct the research in their schools. once permission from the school principal and ethical clearance from both the queensland state education board and university ethical committee was granted, students were provided with written information regarding the research project and a consent form to take home prior to the commencement of the study. students who returned signed consent forms were included in the research. the first author administered all questionnaires and tests at three time points at baseline (time 1, june 2011), post six months later (time 2, december, 2011) and follow-up (time 3, june, 2102). all testing was done during class time to the students in both the experimental and control classes. study design and data analysis the study utilized a longitudinal time series quasi-experimental design with an experimental group and matched comparison group. for the current research this method was chosen because random allocation of the intervention was not possible. the study utilized a repeated-measures, following the participant’s longitudinally over three time points with pre-test and post-test data collected at baseline, six month, and twelve-month intervals. a 2-level multilevel model with age being represented by time (i) and students being represented by (j) was used in the multilevel model. the mlwin (rasbash, steele, browne & goldstein, 2012) was used as the philosophical coi program is multidimensional, and classes are nested. results table 1 presents the means and standard deviations for the variables. reading comprehension scores increased over time for both groups. however, there was a sharper rate of increase in reading comprehension among participants in the coi compared to students in the control group. students in the coi group had higher levels of interest in maths at pre-test than control students but this declined over time, while control students continued to increase their interest in maths over time. self-esteem scores remained relatively stable over time for both groups with a sharper increase for the comparison group. the pro-social behaviour scores remained relatively stable over time for both groups. the emotional well-being scores also remained relatively stable over time for both groups. 6 table 1 means and standard deviations for rc, math, se, psb, and ewb, by time and group reading comprehension (rc) age comparison philosophical coi time 1 11 (n=240) 47.68 (12.30) (n=110) 41.96 (11.67) (n=130) time 2 11.5 (n=246) 47.51 (12.18) (n=114) 44.68 (11.98) (n=132) time 3 12 (n=222) 49.60 (13.49) (n=105) 47.92 (12.38) (n=117) interest in math (math) age comparison philosophical coi 11 (n=240) 27.07 (8.35) (n=110) 28.16 (7.81) (n=130) 11.5 (n=248) 27.84 (8.59) (n=114) 26.13 (7.71) (n=134) 12 (n=223) 28.49 (8.44) (n=105) 26.57 (8.39) (n=118) self esteem (se) age comparison 11 (n=240) 28.98 (4.20) (n=110) 11.5 (n=248) 29.59 (4.57) (n=114) 12 (n=223) 30.00 (4.09) (n=105) 7 philosophical coi 28.93 (4.24) (n=130) 28.91 (4.24) (n=134) 28.77 (4.48) (n=118) pro-social behavior (psb) age comparison philosophical coi 11 (n=238) 7.53 (1.83) (n=108) 7.77 (1.76) (n=130) 11.5 (n=240) 8.04 (1.81) (n=112) 7.78 (1.91) (n=128) 12 (n=220) 7.74 (1.67) (n=104) 8.06 (1.66) (n=116) emotional well-being (ewb) age comparison philosophical coi 11 (n=238) 3.06 (2.24) (n=108) 3.53 (2.06) (n=130) 11.5 (n=240) 3.16 (2.09) (n=112) 3.42 (2.45) (n=128) 12 (n=219) 2.90 (2.22) (n=104) 3.06 (2.44) (n=115) note. rc=reading comprehension, maths=interest in math, se=self-esteem, psb=prosocial behavior, ewb=emotional well-being, sd=standard deviation. the final composite model for the growth curve for reading comprehension, interest in maths, self-esteem, pro-social behaviours and emotional well-being, was: ϒij = ϒ00 + ϒ01programi + ϒ10age_11ij + ϒ11programi x age_11ij + (εij + ζ01 + ζ01age_11ij) the multilevel model includes program as a predictor of both initial status and change. interpretation of its four fixed effects: (1) the estimated initial reading comprehension for the average non-participant was 47.13 (p < .001); (2) the estimated differential in initial reading comprehension between program participants and non-participants was -5.22 (p < .001); (3) the estimated rate of change in reading comprehension for an average non-participant was 1.50 (ns); and (4) the estimated differential in the rate of change in reading comprehension between program participants and non-participants was significant (p <. 01). 8 figure 1: results of a fitted multilevel model for change in reading comprehension. 9 figure 2: results of a fitted multilevel model for change in interest in math. 10 figure 3: results of a fitted multilevel model for change in self esteem. 11 figure 4: results of a fitted multilevel model for change in pro-social behavior. 12 figure 5: results of a fitted multilevel model for change in emotional well-being. discussion this study explored the effects of participation in a philosophical community of inquiry (coi) on year 6 students’ reading comprehension, interest in math, self-esteem, pro-social behaviour and emotional well-being. in summary it was found that students’ reading comprehension improved but their interest in mathematics and self-esteem decreased, while development of their pro-social behaviour and emotional well-being remained relatively unchanged compared to students who did not participate in the coi. the results of the current study suggest that the philosophical coi program improved reading comprehension for participants over one year faster than it did for students in the comparison group. these results are not surprising given that students in the philosophical coi engaged in a range of activities from talking, questioning and listening to writing, reading and drawing. the talking, questioning and listening, during the philosophical coi, interwoven with these other activities, could have aided reading comprehension as the program involved conversations that were ultimately and intrinsically linked with thinking. the findings suggest that students struggling with reading comprehension can significantly benefit from participation in a philosophical coi. these findings are consistent with the dyfed county council (1994), banks (1987) and yeazell’s (1982) studies, which also found that reading comprehension improved for students involved in a p4c program. on the other hand, exposure to a philosophical coi appears to have a negative effect on year 6t student’s growth in interest in math. the result is contrary to daniel, lafortune, pallascio and schleifer’s (1999) investigation, which found that students exposed to the coi became more interested in math. however, those studies which saw an improvement in students’ math interest used a mathematical coi and not a philosophical coi, which would have allowed students to exchange dialogue on mathematical and meta-mathematical matters. it is important to note that a philosophical coi and mathematical coi are not comparable in the sense that the content and material covered are different, although the method is the same. specifically, 13 student engagement in a mathematical coi, by which dialogue on philosophical content is replaced by dialogue on mathematical content, may moderate levels of students’ interest in math more effectively and positively, and would be expected to produce different interest in math results to that found in the current study. alternatively, perhaps time spent facilitating the coi subtracted time that could have otherwise been devoted to math lessons, resulting in the teaching of ‘basic’ math only, although this was not explored in the current study. it would seem, however, that both the content of the coi, as well as the method, influences students’ interest in math. both the experimental and control groups were comparable in their self-esteem scores at the beginning of the study. students exposed to a philosophical coi, however, experienced a significant decrease in self-esteem over one year, while students in the comparison group significantly improved in self-esteem. these results suggest that the philosophical coi was not only ineffective in increasing self-esteem among program participants, but actually harmed their self-esteem. the current results are in contrast to other studies such as sasseville (1994). sasseville (1994), did, however, note that the largest gains in self-esteem were with students with the lowest pre-test self-esteem, while those with high self-esteem at pre-test, actually showed a relative loss compared with the controls. this could have been because the students with low selfesteem were involved in the coi more than students with high self-esteem. others, however, such as lane and jones (1986) have shown that individuals with high self-esteem are more likely to assume active roles in social groups and to express their views frequently and effectively and that students' feelings about themselves affect their classroom performance and academic achievement (amini, 2004; marsh & o’mara, 2008). gazzard (2001) also suggested that when children cannot make decisions, they are prone to falling deeper into the pit of low self-esteem. it could be that the coi process is detrimental to the self-esteem of students, irrespective of baseline self-esteem levels, who do not take part in the coi, and therefore it is incumbent on the facilitator to engage all students in the coi, and not just allow a ‘few’ to dominate. phillips (1996) specifies that if students are placed in a coi where the focus is on the development of complex thinking skills, they are necessarily confronted with situations in which their ideas are contradicted, their justifications are challenged, and their arguments are undone. to ensure positive development of student self-esteem, it suggests that students must consciously link success to surpassing oneself in a cooperative context, rather than surpassing others in a competitive verbal sparring match. perhaps the way the coi was facilitated by the teachers allowed only the more confident speakers to engage in this discussion and thus students with low self-esteem felt even worse. portelli and reed (1995) have posited that the development of selfesteem relates to the respect of coming to value the self. this may not be possible after one-year exposure to a philosophical coi but may possibly occur after many years exposure to such a program. in this study exposure to a philosophical coi appears to have no effect on pro-social behaviour. the current findings on pro-social behaviour are similar to those of trickey and topping (2006) who also found that on a scale for teacher observation of student social skills in problematic situations, a random sample of experimental philosophical community of inquiry students gained no more than controls overall. this was surprising given teachers encourage students to be social and cultural beings who learn through interactions with others and that ideas that are generated during the socio-cultural exchange are reflected upon, cognitively accommodated and then internalized. it is believed that through this process students learn to think for themselves. in regard to the current results on pro-social behaviour in the current 14 sample, and in line with the analysis by daniel et al. (2000), it is suggested that the students in the current sample may require, at least, more than one year to enter into the community of philosophical inquiry and to experiment with the dialectical argumentation and that pro-social behaviour, as an end, would develop effectively in the medium to long-term. in the current research, exposure to a philosophical coi program appears to have no effect on emotional well-being on philosophical coi participants compared to a comparison group. although gazzard (2001) made the claim that a philosophical coi has a lot to offer those interested in improving the way they relate emotionally to the world around them, and dawid (2005) found that student’s emotional intelligence significantly increased after one year, the findings in the current study suggest otherwise. these findings are in contrast to assertions that when children experience a difficult emotion, exposure to a philosophical coi could help them find a way to develop thoughts and behaviours that strengthen the messages from the "left hemisphere to the emotional centre" (dawid, 2005, p. 47); further, that there is a possibility for the child to develop emotional flexibility if the child has experiences that comes from 'ah-ha' moments, which comes from seeing things in a different way and understanding them that way. strengths and limitations this study is the first on the effects of philosophical coi on students’ reading comprehension, interest in math, self-esteem, pro-social behaviours and emotional well-being in australia, using multilevel modelling. the use of this random coefficients technique, as an analytic strategy added statistical rigor to the study. the results, therefore, are believed to be a truer picture of differences between the groups than previous studies’ results. it is noted, however, that due to the small number of clusters and small number of level 1 participants, further research using a larger data set is needed to fully substantiate the results. in addition, it is also important to note that although there has been research on coi’s conducted with younger children, the current research focused only on students in year 6. implications for practice with an already overcrowded curriculum, these results need to be carefully considered before widespread implementation of the coi in elementary schools. additionally, it is recommended that the philosophy taught to future philosophical coi facilitators be practically oriented rather than the typical academic approach that is standard in university philosophy courses. it is suggested that ongoing coaching may also help first time implementers of philosophical coi sessions. pre-service teachers aspiring to be facilitators of the philosophical coi need to be encouraged to develop their “ability to examine and identify the personal characteristics, beliefs and attitudes that make them who they are and influence the way they think about teaching and learning” (baum & king, 2006, p. 27). conclusion in the current study a philosophical coi intervention found an increase in reading comprehension but diminished interest in math and self-esteem, with no changes for pro-social behaviour and emotional well-being in a group of year 6 students compared to those who did not experience coi. the focus of the philosophical coi being mainly on language (wordiness) may have accounted for both the significant increase in reading comprehension over time and the significant declining trajectory of interest in math among these year 6 participants. 15 references allen, t. 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(1982). improving reading comprehension through philosophy for children. reading psychology: an international quarterly, 4, 239-246. address correspondences to: chadi youssef school of cultural and professional learning, queensland university of technology (qut) cnr musk and victoria park road, kelvin grove, qld 4059, australia chadi.youssef@connect.qut.edu.au marilyn campbell school of cultural and professional learning, queensland university of technology (qut). cnr musk and victoria park road, kelvin gove, qld, 4059, australia ma.campbell@qut.edu.au donna tangen school of cultural and professional learning, queensland university of technology (qut). cnr musk and victoria park road, kelvin grove, qld 4059, australia d.tangen@qut.edu.au art & dialogue: an experiment in pre-k philosophy 26 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 37, issue 2 (2017) art & dialogue: an experiment in pre-k philosophy erik kenyon & diane terorde-doyle arly educators are in a bind. teacher education programs are calling on them more and more to help students practice critical thinking and develop intellectual character (ritchhart, 2002); yet school funding depends on meeting common core standards, which do not explicitly assess critical thinking until the high-school level (nea.org). add to that an over-engineered content curriculum, and thinking becomes a luxury that is quickly lost amid more immediate concerns (cabrera and colosi, 2012). as a result, we are raising a generation of “excellent sheep” who flourish amid standardized tests but are increasingly unable to think for themselves (deresiewicz, 2014). the problem, we suggest, is that today’s teachers are in such a rush to give students the answers that they are not allowing them time to ask the questions. as a result, students cannot find the “deep structure” of issues. bodies of knowledge thus strike them as disconnected facts, quickly forgotten. the solution, as suggested by recent work in cognitive science, is to teach critical thinking through teaching content (willingham, 2007). in what follows, we propose a way of organically integrating content and thinking through games, story books and art. with this, we put children into the driver’s seat, encouraging them to ask their own questions, to propose their own answers and to join their peers in joint inquiry through dialogue. in a word, we propose teaching children philosophy as early as possible. tom wartenberg has made considerable progress with his picture-book philosophy curriculum designed for elementary schools (wartenberg, 2014). but what of younger children? combining the resources of rollins college’s philosophy department and child development and student research center, we set out to find “how low can we go?” over four terms’ of trial and error, we have adapted and distilled wartenberg’s methods into a model that works for the center’s 4-yearolds, and we have tested this model on a larger scale through a one-term collaboration with the winter park day nursery. wartenberg’s storybook model as tom wartenberg has argued elegantly, figures from plato to descartes wrestled with the same “big ideas” that appear in familiar children’s books. while aristotle’s nicomachean ethics provides a useful springboard for thinking about courage, the frog and toad story, “giants and dragons,” presents many of the same issues and concepts. and it does so in a much more approachable way. writing for second-grade teachers, wartenberg argues against the assumption that to teach philosophy one must first have studied philosophy. on what wartenberg calls the ‘teachercentered’ model, the teacher knows the content, the students don’t, and the teacher’s job is to pour knowledge into students’ empty minds. by contrast, wartenberg articulates a learner-centered model, which recognizes that children are people with their own interests, concerns and ways of approaching things.1 e 27 wartenberg’s model channels children’s natural curiosity and imagination into discussions of big ideas about the world, knowledge and life. his typical lesson starts with reading a storybook aloud. after this, the teacher / moderator helps the group fill out a ‘story matrix’ or chart designed to focus children’s attention on the philosophically relevant big ideas at play in the story. when dealing with “dragons and giants,” for instance, the teacher may ask whether at various points in the story, frog and toad were (a) in danger, (b) afraid, (c) brave. from here, wartenberg offers a set of “discussion questions” designed to get children thinking about the relation of bravery to fear and danger: can frog and toad be brave if there is no danger present? are they brave if they are afraid? are they brave if they are not afraid? these questions lead the children from the particulars of the story to thinking about issues more abstractly. to facilitate this, the teacher encourages them to disagree with one another, to back their positions with examples from personal experience and to provide reasons for their views. in transitioning from one particular to another, children start to articulate the ‘big ideas’ that connect them. this exchange is structured by a series of nine rules which the moderator helps the children practice and internalize. the ultimate goal is not to arrive at a consensus, but to help children identify, articulate and give reasons for their own views about the big idea under discussion. we can attest to the fact that wartenberg’s model works beautifully with the elementary school students for whom it was developed and, when presented the right way, with older students as well.2 yet what of younger children, in particular those who cannot yet read? this is the question we set out to answer. an experiment in preschool philosophy the partnership between this article’s authors came about by accident. in spring of 2015, kenyon’s undergraduates were working at fern creek elementary which had to cancel two weeks of meetings on short notice. when asked whether we could work with the child development center (cdc) instead, terorde-doyle responded, “why not?” we thus took four lessons, which had been designed for a 5thand 6th-grade gifted course, and used them with 3and 4-year-olds. the first lesson was characterized by mutual incomprehension. by the fourth, though, we had made enough progress to see the potential. the following fall term, we made a concerted effort to see how low we could go. we initially drew the line at speaking in full sentences, and split our 3& 4-year-olds into two groups of roughly 8 each. each group met with undergraduate discussion-leaders in 20 minute blocks, 24 times over the course of 6 weeks. our guiding question has been: what would it take to adapt wartenberg’s model for use in preschool? by the time we were done, little of the nine rules, story matrix and discussion questions was left. given the cdc’s practice of referring to everyone as friends (children are “little friends”, college students and other adults are “big friends”), we came to refer to this as our “philosophy friends” project. in what follows, we will set out the philosophy friends model we have developed. this represents an intermediate stage in a larger project. longitudinal assessment of critical thinking in participant children as opposed to control groups would, of course, be ideal. the present study lays the groundwork of viable pedagogical methods that would make such a study possible. the evidence we have in support of our method’s success is anecdotal. nevertheless, we have noted changes in how children interact with teachers, parents and each other. all of this adds up to a change in the culture of our school that is striking enough to warrant further research. 28 we ourselves are pursuing such work at the cdc and hope that the present study will prove useful for others interested in similar undertakings. the rules of the game as with all preschool practice, initial structure largely determines the quality of the experience for children and adults alike. wartenberg gives nine rules of “how we do philosophy”…3 1. we think about what we heard. 2. we answer the questions as clearly as we can. 3. we listen carefully and quietly, with our hands down, to what someone is saying. 4. we decide if we agree or disagree. 5. we think about why we agree or disagree. 6. when it’s our turn, we say whether we agree or not and why. 7. we respect what everyone says. 8. we all have valuable comments to make. 9. we have fun thinking together! these rules work wonderfully well with the elementary school students for whom they were devised. our first step was to distill wartenberg’s nine rules into three --we listen; we think; we respond-and to present them in a way appropriate for our children’s developmental level.4 rule number 1: we listen. we symbolized the rule visually by moving a hand to an ear. in teaching the rule, we asked the children when they listen, how they listen, and why they listen.  some typical responses were, “when others are talking”, “with our ears”, “so we can be safe.”  recognizing that the rule itself was not enough for our purposes, we set out to practice listening skills with a series of activities.  children participated in musical listening games, distinguishing certain sounds from different musical instruments. we played telephone, as each child was told a word and asked to “pass it on” to their neighbor as we sat in a circle.  the game brought laughter and silliness as children whispered into each other’s ears.  the game itself, while fun and interactive, showed us that perhaps children needed to “play” with the concept of philosophy before actually philosophizing. over time, however, the skill took root. children got better at listening to teach other. at the same time, we adults got better at actually listening to children as we helped them articulate their own ideas. rule number 2: we think. we symbolized the rule visually by placing a finger to our heads and displaying an expression of deep thought. while easy to represent, the thinking rule required children to engage in a level of self-reflective ‘thinking about thinking’. the conversation about how we think was key in supporting their comprehension of this rule. we planned ways to connect their understanding of ‘thinking’ to particular moments in the day where we saw them actively thinking. there were many teachable moments when we verbalized for the children how their understanding was evolving. we asked the children to show us what thinking looked like. we asked, “how do we know if you are thinking?” we also began asking a series of open-ended questions at those points in the day when all students met as a single group. this became the time where we intentionally planned thinking games, just as we had planned listening games.  we asked questions like, “if you could be any animal, what would you be?” children pondered these questions and then displayed or spoke about their ideas. in keeping with our philosophy curriculum, we asked the children to show us their thoughts in actions, pretending to be the animal in dramatic representation. we supported their 29 reflection by noticing their pondering as they enacted these animal ideas and stating that “you are thinking with your brain.” we asked, “why did you choose that animal?” the answers reflected their state of mind, with some children stating, “it’s because mommy likes them,” or “i saw them at the zoo.” asking children what they are thinking is itself a philosophical undertaking. their comments exemplified the cognitive emphasis on children’s experiential base and their close affinity to familiar people and places. to get children to consider alternative reasons for their thoughts, we took every opportunity to ask them why they thought as they did. rule number 3: we respond. we invoke this rule by pointing to one child and then another saying, “<child 1>, do you agree or disagree with <child 2>? say why.” to practice this, we tape a line on the floor and have someone make a claim, e.g. about the best flavor of ice cream. everyone who agrees stands with that friend; everyone else moves to the other side of the line. we can then ask children why they have taken the stand they have, and we prompt them to use the phrase, “i (dis)agree because…” the habit of agreeing and disagreeing has led to a wide range of conversations during the children’s play experiences, such as a prolonged debate, initiated by the children themselves, about who owns the ocean. rule number 3 has been an eye-opener. as teachers, we are so often dictating process, structure, or behaviors for safety reasons and management control, that we seldom allow children the chance to form clear opinions, to decide whether they agree or disagree. in a word, the rules encourage a form of metacognition which empowers children to think for themselves. working with pre-k attention spans following wartenberg's model, we began our project by reading books with small groups of children and then working through a story matrix. given that our children could not yet read, we did this all aloud. we quickly realized that once the story was over, our children’s attention had moved on. attempts to stretch out an activity were torturous for all involved. to work around this problem, we began raising questions from our story matrix during the reading of our books. in reading dr. suess’ lorax, for instance, undergraduates focused the children on philosophically relevant details at key points during the story. the children made predictions, drew conclusions and engaged the philosophical puzzle of how many trees the once-ler should have taken. children commented: “he’s going to cut down all the trees.” “he’s going to make them sad when they are all gone.” “they would be happy if some of the trees were cut down.” one child reflected on how her dad had cut down a tree because her mother was allergic to its flowers. such instances of reflective thinking show the children taking positions, making assumptions and drawing conclusions (daniel and auriac, 2011). but when it came to asking open-ended discussion questions, discussion quickly went off the rails. 4-year-olds are simply not cut out to sit still and discuss abstract issues for more than a couple of minutes. our initial conclusion was that discussion of abstract ideas simply asks too much of a 4-yearold’s cognitive development. over time, however, we realized that our asking them to sit still was the real problem. we thus took two steps to meet the children where they are, allowing them to think in the embodied manner that comes naturally to them. 30 thinking with our bodies. first, we augmented wartenberg’s standard lesson by introducing our stories’ big ideas through games and activities. for instance, as preparation for discussing moderation in the frog and toad story, “cookies,” we had our children mix paints. while they were occupied in this very hands-on activity, our undergraduate leader asked: is this too much blue? is this not enough red? is this green just right? by the time we turned to the story, the children had a working vocabulary of excess, moderation and deficiency. over time, we found that the activities made more of an impression than the storybooks. to prepare for discussing courage in “dragons and giants”, for instance, we blindfolded individual children and had their friends guide them around the room. four weeks later, when we were reading madeline for other purposes, a child brought up the blindfolding activity. by the end of term, our undergraduates were divided on whether it would be better to get rid of storybooks altogether when dealing with preschool. thinking through art. second, we recast wartenberg’s open-ended discussion questions as prompts for art projects: how many trees should the once-ler have cut down? what does bravery look like? how many cookies are just right? as children worked, we asked them about their creations. rather than get in the way of verbal discussion, the art enabled it. children who could not sit still to discuss abstract ideas would narrate their creations at length, engaging with us and with each other as they worked. in the terms of developmental psychology, the art project provided scaffolding for the free-flowing discussions which the children could not carry out while sitting still. in the spirit of the reggio emilia tradition, art provided a vehicle for learning that was ultimately not about the art.5 preparing carefully: philosophical puzzles & backwards course design early in the project, we enlisted our colleague from theater, thomas ouellette, to lead undergraduates through a workshop in reading storybooks aloud. after sitting through one of our sessions at the cdc, thomas commented, “this is the kind of thing where you have to prepare carefully and then just wing it.” this has become our mantra. according to the philosophy friends model, “careful preparation,” amounts to a form of backwards course design, as we start with our ultimate goal and work backward in our planning: the goal: children's discussion. what we are ultimately after is the children having their own discussion, which we facilitate by enforcing the philosophy rules. step 1: articulate a puzzle. to spark such discussions, we seek out questions that will allow children to articulate and plausibly defend opposing views. we are not, however, interested in matters of mere opinion; e.g., “what is the best flavor of ice cream?” nor are we engaging in the ‘socratic method’, if that is understood as asking questions which had already been answered by adults; e.g., “why do some rocks float?” rather, we seek out authentic philosophical puzzles, i.e. problems that matter, for which there is not a single clearly agreed upon answer at present, but mostly likely only 3 or 4 main contenders. for instance, “why should we share?” this question, which may seem simple, can be answered in a number of different ways, each of which has been defended in the philosophical literature: a. an authority told me to do it (relativism / divine command theory) b.it makes my friend happy (altruism) c. it makes me happy (egoism) 31 d. it makes everyone happy (utilitarianism) e. it treats everyone fairly (deontology / rights-theory)6 by choosing questions that we adults cannot answer conclusively, we set the stage for children to have substantive disagreements and make them our peers in very real ways. for instance, during an activity involving sweets, we asked children whether we should share left overs with their other friends. one child replied, “no” (egoism). another replied, “yes, because it’s being a good friend” (deontology). when pressed about why friends should share, another child responded, “because it’s happy when everybody’s happy” (utilitarianism). step 2: design activities. children have amazingly creative minds and tend to think in concrete terms.7 to introduce them to our puzzles, we devised a series of activities. unlike normal pre-k teaching, we encouraged disagreement, albeit within carefully controlled parameters. we would, for instance, set the children a task but give them insufficient resources for each of them to carry it out. such activities set the stage for teachable moments: when adam needs a paint brush, but susie doesn't want to share, we can ask both adam and susie their reasons and get them to listen to each other's. if a suitable story book is available we follow wartenberg's lead, albeit raising questions during the reading, not after it.8 while reading doctor seuss’ “if i ran the zoo,” the children were asked, “what if the zoo unlocked all the animals?” responses included: “i would lock the zoo up, i wouldn’t want the animals going crazy.” “are there rules at zoos?” “i would get new ones, they will show you tricks.” these exchanges tend to last no more than a minute, yet they plant the seeds of ideas. step 3: process ideas by creating art. the final step in our lesson planning is to devise a closing art project. if our mini-discussions plant the seeds, engaging with artistic media allow them to blossom. the switch from one kind of activity to another resets the attention clock in a way that allows children to keep processing their new ideas. to guide them along, we put our philosophical puzzles in the form of open-ended prompts, e.g. paint a picture of friends sharing, which will allow us to engage children in conversation while they work. while these lessons are carefully crafted around philosophical puzzles, what children experienced is a series of games, storybooks and art projects, albeit with a fair deal of talking along the way. in effect, we take the activities that fill a 4-year-old’s normal day and arrange them to serve a philosophical purpose. winging it: a culture of philosophy through this careful planning, we established an “intellectual environment” for thinking (ritchhart, 2002). during formal lessons, we observed children wrestling with puzzles, taking positions and engaging each other in critical discussion. on the playground, we noticed the use of philosophical vocabulary, as children began to structure their own interactions phrases such as “i disagree, because…” critical thinking seeped into everyday routines, and reflective thinking flourished. one child’s father, himself rollins faculty, reports that during bedtime stories his daughter informed him, “daddy, you’re doing it wrong. you’re supposed to ask questions.” for the children, philosophy was license to express and explore their thoughts on ethical puzzles and life’s big ideas. 32 over time, we realized a difference between how teachers and undergraduates approached the project. given that undergraduates met with children for relatively short periods through the week, there was a good deal of planning involved, as they actively sought to precipitate disagreement and discussion during the little time they had. the cdc’s teachers reported a shift in how they viewed their own interactions with children: rather than trying to snuff out disagreement and confusion, they came to fan the flames, albeit in productive, rule-governed ways. the project’s most lasting benefit is perhaps how it has transformed the culture of the school. while lesson plans carefully designed around philosophical puzzles provided the opportunity to practice new skills and nurture various perspectives, it was only after these skills and perspectives became second nature that the project really took off. our children took the driver’s seat, asked their own questions and engaged each other in thoughtful, rule-governed dialogue. when it comes to the content curriculum, such students are well poised to see connections between ideas and to retain what they have learned, for the simple reason that they are teaching themselves. the cdc is not a typical school but a developmental psychology lab blending the traditions of dewey’s lab school at the university of chicago and the art-based curriculum of reggio emilia. many of our students are the children of faculty, while all of them benefit from close daily contact with undergraduate researchers. this is a mixed blessing. while it provides the opportunity and the support for things like the current project, the fact that we could get a bunch of professors’ kids to do philosophy is not likely to impress skeptics. the point of the project is to bring about social change, inoculating students as soon as possible against the current culture of standardized testing. for that to succeed, we need to work on a much larger scale. in fall 2016, we thus put our methods to the test at winter park day nursery (wpd). while only three blocks from rollins’ campus, this pre-k serves families of a socio-economic status which is much more representative of a typical us state-supported school. while our long-term goal is a multiyear, formal assessment, our present goal was simply to find how well methods developed at a collegerun lab school would translate into a more representative pre-k. after six weeks working with four groups of six to eight 4-year-olds, our answer is quite definitely: yes. in general terms, children engaged in the philosophy project tend to develop along similar lines. we thus propose the following benchmarks for assessing children’s interactions during lessons, unstructured play time and at home: 1. engage with stories and activities at a basic level 2. give relevant answers to questions 3. disagree with peers in a civil way 4. give reasons for positions 5. revise positions based on peers’ reasons while our data collection up to this point has been anecdotal, our wpd groups generally made less progress than the one group running simultaneously at the cdc. the wpd groups did, however, make better progress than cdc groups did the first two terms we worked with them. this suggests that pedagogical method is at least as significant a factor as the children’s socio-economic status. in many respects, a 4-year-old is a simply a 4-year-old. by the end, most children had advanced to benchmark 3 or 4 and sometimes 5 during our meetings.9 the other significant factors came down to space, time and culture. at wpd, we worked with four groups in a single large room. children showed marked improvement those times we could bring individual groups outside and away from 33 the distraction of other groups. what’s more, half of the cdc’s 4-year-old’s had worked with a prior philosophy friends class when they were 3.10 just as importantly, their teachers have been at it longer: after four terms, the philosophy rules have become part of the cdc culture. logistical challenges working with wpd often left teachers unaware of undergraduates’ goals. as a result, children were exposed to mixed messages, as undergraduates would encourage disagreement only to have teachers tell them to reach a consensus. by the end of the project, we were all much more on the same page. a month later, teachers report that they have “become more open to introducing abstract ideas such as courage and friendship,” whereas before they would “assume the children were too young for that.” some have begun integrating such ideas into their cultural lesson plans, e.g. talking about peace and friendship in connection with china, and have come to a new appreciation that for some subjects, “everything is perspective.” for those engaged in early education, we hold out this change in school culture as a goal that has long-term value and may be accomplished within the pre-k system as it currently stands. in practical terms, this means teaching the three rules, embracing philosophical puzzles when they spring up, and treating children --at least in some registers-as our intellectual peers. while formal training in philosophy is not necessary to undertake such a project, the children’s wonderments and deep thinking inspired us grown-ups to expand our own horizons. it is in this last respect that children have something to teach us: if we honestly listen to what they think and join them as they explore life’s big questions, then we might nurture and develop the childlike wonder that aristotle once identified as the beginning of philosophy. references bang, molly. (1999). when sophie gets angry—really, really angry. new york: scholastic inc. cabrera, derek and laura colosi (2012). thinking at every desk: four simple skills to transform your classroom. new york: norton. daniel, m & auriac, e. (2011) philosophy, critical thinking and philosophy for children. educational psychology and theory 43 (5) 415-435. deresiewicz, william (2014). excellent sheep: the miseducation of the american elite. new york: free press. dr. seuss. (1971). the lorax. new york: random house. dr. seuss. (1950). if i ran the zoo. new york: random house. gaardner, jostein (2007). sophie’s world. new york: fsg classics. hertzog, nancy (2001), “reflections and impressions from reggio emilia: “it's not about art!”” in early childhood research and practice 3:1. kenyon, erik and diane terorde-doyle (2017), “the three rs of thinking: nurturing discussion in preschool” in ascd express 12:10. lobel, arnold (1971). frog and toad together. new york: harper collins. http://philpapers.org/s/marie%20daniel 34 matthews, gareth (1994). the philosophy of childhood. boston: harvard university press. matthews, gareth (1999). socratic perplexity and the nature of philosophy. oxford: oxford university press. mcclintock, michael. (2007). a fly went by. london: harpercollins children’s books. ritchhart, ron. (2002). intellectual character: what it is, why it matters, and how to get it. san francisco: jossey-bass. stuhr, john (2000). pragmatism and classical american philosophy. oxford: oxford university press. wartenberg, thomas (2014). big ideas for little kids. plymouth, united kingdom: rowman & littlefield. wartenberg, thomas (2013). a sneetch is a sneetch and other philosophical discoveries. west sussex: wiley-blackwell. willingham, daniel (2008). “critical thinking: why is it so hard to teach?” arts education policy review, 2008, vol.109 (4). 21-32. endnotes 1 wartenberg falls in line with the pragmatist tradition exemplified by john dewey, “education as growth” (1916) in stuhr 2000. 2 kenyon’s students have spent one term working with a 5thand 6th-grade gifted class at fern creek elementary and two terms working with 1stthrough 6th-graders at the walden community school, both in orlando. 3 wartenberg 2014, 44. 4 the following discussion of the philosophy rules is also laid out in our (2017) “the three rs of thinking: nurturing discussion in preschool”. 5 nancy hertzog (2001), “reflections and impressions from reggio emilia: “it's not about art!”” in early childhood research and practice 3:1. 6 as wartenberg argues, one does not need formal training in philosophy to teach it. yet, some background research into the history of philosophy will be quite helpful when it comes to identifying puzzles. jostein gaardner’s novel, sophie’s world (2007), offers a historical overview of western philosophy in a fun and accessible way. wartenberg, a sneetch is a sneetch and other philosophical discoveries (2013) takes a topical approach, introducing adults to philosophical big ideas through familiar children’s books. for those with a bit more background, matthews, socratic perplexity and the nature of philosophy (1999) is a goldmine of puzzles. 7 piaget’s developmental model might suggest that children’s concrete thinking would preclude them from the abstract thought required for philosophical discussion. matthews 1994 argues elegantly against this suggestion. 8 similar to our activities, a ‘suitable’ storybook is one that encourages questioning and disagreement. while there are certainly plenty of these out there, few of them are short enough to work for 4-year-olds. the works of arnold lobel and leo lionni are notable exceptions. 9 on one occasion, for instance, two children got into a raised-voice disagreement over whether each animal in michael mcclintock’s a fly went by caused the next to run away. they kept talking, however, eventually realized that they in fact agreed and then calmed down. to my thinking, this exceeds the level of rational discourse displayed in some recent presidential debates. during another discussion, prompted by molly bang’s http://na02.alma.exlibrisgroup.com/view/uresolver/01rc_inst/openurl?frbrversion=5&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:utf-8&ctx_id=10_1&ctx_tim=2016-10-13t12%3a20%3a36ist&ctx_ver=z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&url_ver=z39.88-2004&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com-eric&req_id=&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:article&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=critical%20thinking:%20why%20is%20it%20so%20hard%20to%20teach?&rft.jtitle=arts%20education%20policy%20review&rft.btitle=&rft.aulast=&rft.auinit=&rft.auinit1=&rft.auinitm=&rft.ausuffix=&rft.au=willingham,%20daniel%20t.&rft.aucorp=&rft.date=2008&rft.volume=109&rft.issue=4&rft.part=&rft.quarter=&rft.ssn=&rft.spage=21&rft.epage=29&rft.pages=&rft.artnum=&rft.issn=1063-2913&rft.eissn=&rft.isbn=&rft.sici=&rft.coden=&rft_id=info:doi/10.3200/aepr.109.4.21-32&rft.object_id=&rft.eisbn=&rft.edition=&rft.pub=heldref%20publications.%201319%20eighteenth%20street%20nw,%20washington,%20dc%2020036-1802.%20tel:%20800-365-9753;%20tel:%20202-296-6267;%20fax:%20202-293-6130;%20e-mail:%20subscribe@heldref.org;%20web%20site:%20http://www.heldref.org&rft.place=&rft.series=&rft.stitle=&rft.bici=&rft_id=info:bibcode/&rft_id=info:hdl/&rft_id=info:lccn/&rft_id=info:oclcnum/&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_id=info:eric/((addata/eric%7d%7d&rft_dat=%3ceric%3eej794281%3c/eric%3e,language=eng,view=01rc&svc_dat=single_service 35 when sophie gets angry-really, really angry, one girl said “it is okay to get angry but you still have to be nice,” while another held to her position, “you shouldn't get mad.” 10 at the time, these meetings where frustrating enough, e.g. children contradicting themselves without recognizing it, that we decided to focus our efforts on 4-year-olds instead. that said, the children we worked with at 3 ended up being the strongest of the group of 4s. this suggests that there is further work to be done in pushing the minimum age for philosophy even lower. while working through puzzles requires children to recognize and respond to contradiction between views, 3-year-olds are quite capable of learning the philosophy rules through games, and may be exposed to philosophical concepts (courage, friendship, fairness, etc.) even if they are not yet encouraged to interrogate those concepts. address correspondences to: erik kenyon director of student & faculty engagement hamilton holt school rollins college ekenyon@rollins.edu diane terorde-doyle dterordedoyle@rollins.edu mailto:ekenyon@rollins.edu the long-term impact of philosophy for children: a longitudinal study (prelimary results) analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 3 5 , issue 1 (2 0 1 4 ) 50 the long-term impact of philosophy for children: a longitudinal study (preliminary results) roberto colom, félix garcía moriyón, carmen magro, and elena morilla abstract: twenty years ago, the european school of madrid (esm) began to implement p4c. félix garcía moriyón trained a group of teachers through an intensive workshop and elena morilla coordinated the whole process thereafter. p4c was integrated within the regular curriculum and students attended one class per week since primary school (6 years of age) to the end of high-school (18 years of age). after obtaining informed consent from both the school staff and the students' families, a longitudinal study began in 2002 for investigating the presumed lasting positive impact of p4c over cognitive and non-cognitive factors, and also over academic achievement. to the best of our knowledge this research is unique because there is only one long-term study (malmhester, 1996) and the remaining research was made in the short-term (one year or less) (garcía & cebas, 2004). so far we have been following more than 400 students in the treatment group (p4c) and more than 300 students in a control group. as required, both groups shared closely similar social and cultural backgrounds: both are private schools in a small village, mainly residential, 18 km and 32 km away from madrid, same highway a-6, etc. students came from middleupper class families, and middle-upper social and cultural status. we recruited six cohorts from the p4c school and five cohorts from the control school across the years. data were collected at three time points: 2nd grade (8 years), 6th grade (11-12 years), and 4th grade of secondary school (16 years). the administered measures tapped cognitive abilities (igf and efai), basic personality traits (epq), and academic achievement (school grades and standardized tests). this research tests the hypothesis that "if p4c improves cognitive and non-cognitive basic psychological traits, then the treatment group will show greater scores in the standardized measures of both psychological factors". here we present a summary of the evidence accumulated in the past 10 years. these were the main results: (1) p4c promotes an average advantage of half a standard deviation in general cognitive ability (≈ 7 iq points), (2) the average advantage is especially noteworthy in the lowest tail of the cognitive distribution across the years, (3) lower percentages of participants in the training group can be found at the risk area, and (4) p4c children are more prone to pro-social behavior, but they are also a bit more emotionally unstable. introduction 4c was originally devised for enhancing cognitive and non-cognitive (affective) basic factors. matthew lipman reported one study assessing the impact of p4c in the first publication devoted to the program (lipman, sharp, oscanyan, 1980). the main question was: “is p4c educationally significant?” the answer was mainly positive for three areas: (1) reading and mathematics: the overall impact of philosophy for children on reading and math performance was highly significant. (2) reasoning: p analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 3 5 , issue 1 (2 0 1 4 ) 51 improvements in creative reasoning (the capacity to generate new ideas, to discover feasible alternatives, and to provide reasons) and formal reasoning were also significant. (3) academic readiness: teachers provided highly positive feedback; students were rated as showing more curiosity, greater orientation towards their tasks, more considerate of one another, and with better reasoning skills (p. 224). since this pioneer research, several studies have analyzed the program, not only considering cognitive skills, but also non-cognitive traits (garcía y cebas, 2005). the general trend supports a positive impact, but the evidence is largely heterogeneous (garcía, rebollo, colom, 2005; garcía, colom, lora, rivas y traver, 2002). it is noteworthy that, generally speaking, cognitive training programs do have a positive impact in the short-term, but the effect vanishes in the medium and long-term (baumeister & bacharach, 2000). therefore, the core question remains unanswered: is it possible to obtain long-lasting cognitive and non-cognitive improvements by doing p4c? the proper response to this question requires the administration of the program across the school years, not just for a reduced period of time. this was the main goal of the present longitudinal research. method overview this longitudinal research is planned for lasting twenty years. we strongly think this is the only way for obtaining a proper answer regarding the question of whether or not it is possible to promote cognitive and non-cognitive basic traits by doing p4c. the main dependent measures were (a) basic cognitive skills, (b) personality traits, and (c) academic achievement. table 1 shows when these features are measured. table 1 455 students were included in the treatment/experimental group (cem). as noted above, students attend p4c one hour per week across 12 school years (from first year of primary school to the end of highschool). iapc was the basic material during the compulsory period (10 years) and additional material was employed in the remaining two years. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 3 5 , issue 1 (2 0 1 4 ) 52 on the other hand, the control group was composed of 321 students recruited in colegio parque de galapagar (cpg). as seen above, these students mirror those recruited in the treatment group for the majority of the relevant socio-demographic variables. for obvious reasons, these students were not submitted to p4c. the recruitment process began in 2005. table 2 shows the number of students recruited in both schools across the years. table 2 standardized measures cognitive abilities were measured by two closely related standardized batteries: efai and igf (figure 1). these batteries comprise a set of subtests tapping verbal ability, numerical ability, spatial relations, and abstract reasoning. these four subtests are collapsed in a verbal (gc) and a non-verbal (gf) index. furthermore, these indexes are collapsed in a general ability score (g). figure 1 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 3 5 , issue 1 (2 0 1 4 ) 53 non-cognitive traits were measured by the epq-a and the epq-j. both batteries measure four basic personality traits: neuroticism (n), extraversion (e), psychoticism (p), and honesty (s) (eysenck & eysenck, 1989) (figure 1). finally, academic achievement was measured by obtained school grades and performance in standardized tests of academic skills. the main assessed school topics were language and mathematics. results here we show preliminary results obtained at two time points: 2nd and 6th of primary school. therefore, 281 students from the treatment group (p4c) and 146 students from the control group were considered in the present analyses. global findings figure 2 figure 2 shows the effect size (d) for cognitive ability (g, gf, and gc) and personality (p, e, n, and s). it can be seen that the treatment group outperforms (positive d value) the control group in g (general cognitive ability), gf (fluid or abstract ability), and gc (crystallized or verbal ability). the values are relatively large, because values greater than 0,2 are usually considered significant from an applied perspective (cohen, 1980). we converted these d values to the iq scale (mean = 100, sd = 15) for comparative purposes. the results indicate that there is an advantage favouring the treatment group equivalent to 7 iq points in general cognitive ability (g), 4 iq points in fluid-abstract intelligence (gf), and 7 iq points in crystallized intelligence (gc). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 3 5 , issue 1 (2 0 1 4 ) 54 regarding the measured personality traits, the obtained d values were substantially lower. the treatment group displayed higher levels of extraversion, neuroticism, and honesty along with lower levels of psychoticism. therefore, there is one small trend suggesting that p4c students are more extraverted, more honest, more emotionally oriented, but also less emotionally stable. further analyses figure 3 in addition to these global analyses, we also focused our attention in the lower trail of the ability distribution (80-90 and 90-100, figure 3). obtained results can be seen in figure 4. figure 4 the percent of students within the risk area is increased across the school years, as expected. students with lower cognitive ability scores in first grade face greater challenges in successive years. however, it is important to note that this accumulation is substantially less visible for the treatment group (p4c). in ‘time 2’, p4c students in the lowest tail of the cognitive ability distribution remain almost in the same range as in ‘time 2’, whereas there is a great increment analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 3 5 , issue 1 (2 0 1 4 ) 55 for the control group. these are really interesting results, because they imply that p4c is especially positive for the more disadvantaged students. discussion to date, p4c seems to evoke an average advantage of half a standard deviation in general cognitive ability (≈ 7 iq points). the abecedarian project, one of the best and most ambitious educational strategies aimed at fostering cognitive skills and coping with educational school failure, improves ≈ 5 iq points (craig et alia, 2012). we suggest that p4c is much more efficient because it requires much less investment (in terms of time, money, and effort) and it is naturally integrated within the school curriculum. p4c focuses on training teachers to conduct a philosophical inquiry, transforming the class room into a community of philosophical dialogue pursuing rigorous reasoning procedures. the positive impact of p4c seems especially noteworthy in the lowest tail of the cognitive distribution, meaning that fewer participants from the training group are found within the socalled 'risk area'. compulsory education usually favors those with higher cognitive skills and students with lower cognitive skills (particularly those under iq = 89) fail in school with a high probability (neisser et al., 1996, nisbett et al., 2012). improving their cognitive skills may enhance relevant copying strategies, and, therefore, could keep them outside the risk area. with respect to the considered basic personality traits, p4c children seem more prone to prosocial behavior (lower levels of psychoticism and higher levels of extraversion and honesty). this might be a consequence of converting the class room into a community of philosophical inquiry: empathy, agreeableness, cooperation, attentiveness, and so forth, become non-cognitive factors systematically fostered (garcia at al. 2002). nevertheless, they also show higher levels of emotional instability. this latter finding may be related with a key characteristic of the program: participants are always asked to make questions and avoid absolute evaluations with respect to our world. denying absolute truth is a philosophical approach opening children’s minds and inviting them to explore novel approaches. in closing, p4c seems to have a positive impact over basic cognitive abilities, namely, fluidabstract and crystallized-verbal abilities. the impact over the considered non-cognitive traits is less clear, but a trend may be highlighted. we acknowledge that these are preliminary results and it may happen that, at the end of the day, the observed positive trends fade away. there is still a lot of work remaining (for instance, scholastic achievement measures must be incorporated into the whole picture). finally, we note that cognitive training programs raise serious doubts among scientists. their presumed positive impact is frequently questioned. nevertheless, most of these programs depart from the main features characterizing our research. many of these programs are administered during short periods of time, lasting from four weeks to 24 months. it is really difficult to find cognitive training programs administered across the entire school curriculum and this is what we are doing in the present longitudinal research. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 3 5 , issue 1 (2 0 1 4 ) 56 references baumeister, a.a. & bacharach, v.r. (2002): early generic educational intervention has no enduring effect on intelligence and does not prevent mental retardation: the infant health and development program. intelligence 28 (3), 161-192. craig t. ramey, joseph sparling and sharon l. ramey (2012): abecedarian: the ideas, the approach, and the findings. create space independent publishing platform. crespo vasco, josé; xavier sellers boix; manuel j. sueiro (2005): tr3s tests de rendimiento escolar (madrid: tea). eysenck, hans jurgen & eysenck, sybil b. g. (1989): epq. a y j : cuestionario personalidad niños y adultos. madrid: tea ediciones, s.a. garcía moriyón, f. & cebas tudela, e. (2004): what we know about research in philosophy with children. retrieved from http://sophia.eu.org/ (last consult, 25/05/2013). garcía-moriyón, f., irene rebollo and roberto colom (2005): evaluating philosophy with children: a meta-analysis. in thinking. the journal of philosophy for children. montclair, pp. 14-22. garcía moriyón, f., colom marañón, r., lora cerdá, s.; rivas vidal, m. y traver centaño, v. (2002): la estimulación de la inteligencia cognitiva y la inteligencia afectiva. madrid: de la torre. lipman, matthew, ann margaret sharp and fred oscanyan (1988): philosophy in the classroom. pensilvanya: temple university press. malmhester, bo (1996): the 6 years long swedish project: "best in the world in thinking" paper presented at the icpic congress 1999 http://hem.passagen.se/bmr/barnfilosofi/english/6years.html?k#best in the world in thinking (last consult, 25/05/2013). santamaría fernández, pablo [et al.] (2005): efai, evaluación factorial de las aptitudes intelectuales. madrid: tea ediciones, s.a. address correspondences to: roberto colomo. universidad autónoma de madrid (uam) roberto.colom@uam.es félix garcía moriyón honorary professor, universidad autónoma de madrid. felix.garcia@uam.es carmen magro. colegio parque. galapagar (madrid) carmen.magro@colegioparque.com elena morilla european school of madrid, las rozas, madrid. emorilla@vodafone.es mailto:roberto.colom@uam.es mailto:felix.garcia@uam.es mailto:carmen.magro@colegioparque.com mailto:emorilla@vodafone.es analytic teaching and philosophical praxis analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 47 caritas and experience-based learning: teaching love to filipino college students bernardo n. caslib, jr. abstract: in this paper, i argue that love, specifically thomas aquinas’ notion of caritas, can be taught by employing experience-based learning. i attempt to present a strategy that i’ve employed in my own classes in a university in the philippines: by taking students to an institution for abandoned elderly, lessons in class are concretized in a real-world situation. composed of three steps: meaning making, paradigm-shifting and self-understanding, provenzo’s road map of learning was followed. this was implemented through classroom discussion, immersion, and writing reflections, respectively. using my students’ statements on things they have learned throughout the process, i have proved that this technique effectively bridged a 13th century concept with a concern that this generation is in need of fuller understanding, love. introduction rew leder, in his chapter in the book ‘teaching philosophy’1, introduces the notion of experiential learning: teaching by exposing students to out-of-classroom learning experiences that are intended to enrich these learners’ cognizance of usually distant, abstract concepts. he recognizes that teaching and subsequently, learning of students may be achieved by connecting concepts with real-life situations. he cites teachers who have provided “experiential examples in class”2 to facilitate better learning and better understanding of lessons by students. he suggests, however, that rather than just providing examples in class that mimic students’ actual experiences, we teachers could “design experiences for our students that provoke further philosophical reflection.”3 leder relays how he employs this strategy in his teaching asian philosophy: by allowing students to visit institutions such as a home for people with aids, he allows his students to grapple with the intricacies of topics in his course such as “personal identity, self-body relationship, karma, death and reincarnation, suffering and techniques for mastering and transcending it, compassion, interdependency, the caste system...”4 among others. through exposing students to circumstances that provide them deeper insights into life in general, they are able to appropriate concepts better in their own lives and in their general understanding of the world. even as he thinks that this technique is pedagogically sound, leder admits of questions and challenges that this method faces. one of these is its applicability in the realm of western philosophy. leder says, “and while these techniques may be suited to asian philosophy are they adaptable to topics in western thought?”5 this paper is an attempt to respond to this. in this work, i attempt to present a version of an experience-based learning strategy that i have employed for quite some time in my own classes6 in the university where i teach. i claim that this medium successfully complements classroom lectures on a particular variety of love, aquinas’s notion of caritas. this type of love, he d analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 48 elucidates, is based primarily on man’s rational faculty and not on his senses alone. in this paper, i first talk comprehensively about thomas aquinas’s concept of love in the summa theologica. this shall be the groundwork upon which i present a way love can be taught and how an out-of-classroom activity makes the learning experience richer for my students and how this technique becomes potent in bridging a 13th century concept with a concern that this generation is arguably in need of fuller understanding: love.7 thomas aquinas and love for thomas aquinas, there are two kinds of love, amor and caritas. amor refers to the love that is produced by the sensitive part of the soul. according to aquinas, beings in the world that have sensitive souls just like animals and humans are prone, foremost, to sensitive love or amor. aquinas’s vocabulary owes its origin to aristotle’s tripartite distinction of the kinds of soul. “the soul enlivens in three ways, cumulative like the point, line, plane series in geometry. the nutritive soul is simplest, involved in feeding, growth, and reproduction. it is the soul in plants and simple animals. most animals in addition have sensitive soul to sense and respond to the environment and enable desire and movement. the rational soul occurs only in humans.”8 when a lion senses a prey to feast on, this is the working of its sensitive soul and a manifestation, properly speaking, of amor. because of this amor, a passion, the lion does everything in its powers just so it can catch its intended victim because to it, the prey is attractive. it is beautiful. it is good. this is no different from a man who likes a particular woman. amor starts off in this man, by his seeing or rather, using aquinas’s term, apprehending the beautiful qualities that this woman has: qualities that appeal to this man’s appetite. this sensitive apprehension, meaning apprehension through senses, starts off the loving process. i do not think that this kind of love can be subjected to teaching. since this love hinges on the randomness of what appeals to a particular being’s senses, it varies from person to person, and its subjectivity deters us from teaching it. furthermore, the fact that it relies on the sensitive soul alone proves that intellect, or the capability to learn and be taught, cannot be employed. but aquinas introduces another kind of love: caritas. this shall be the concern of this paper in its attempt at showing that love can be taught. aside from amor, any thomist account of love cannot be complete without mention of another form of love: caritas or friendship. if love has a sensitive aspect, owing to the sensitive part of the soul that produces it, how about the rational aspect? can men get past what the senses can provide? if a man is attracted to a particular woman, a specific version of the good for him; if this woman is appetitive for him and he recognizes this, thus leading to generation of amor, what makes him different from a lion who hunts down a prey which it apprehends as good? building on aquinas’s own example, if a man loves a particular wine because it is good for him, what makes this love different from a dog’s when it would not leave its territory because the latter has been good to the former? what may explain a love that does not seemingly approach what is beautiful? in his monumental book, man’s search for meaning9, viktor frankl relates his thoughts, musings, and experiences in a concentration camp during world war ii. in one of his more poignant pages, he writes, “we who lived in concentration camps can remember the men who walked through the huts comforting others, giving away their last piece of bread. they may have been few in number, but they offer sufficient proof that everything can be taken away from man but one analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 49 thing: the last of the human freedoms—to choose one’s attitude in any given set of circumstances, to choose one’s own way.”10 if humans tend towards the good, and love is about moving towards something that promises beauty and the good to the subject, what may make one give his “last piece of bread,” his good, for another man? what good and beauty is there in an act that seems contrary to self-survival? at a time of sheer difficulty and frustration, why is one man capable of moving towards others who are not torches of beauty but of ugliness, desperation, and literally, death? what might attract the subject when the object of love is clearly not an appetible? this seems to be the deficiency in an account of love that is anchored only on what is perceptibly beautiful and good. thus, there is a need to delineate one that goes beyond what the senses apprehend, one that’s not limited and is unbounded. this is the love that is possible to teach and is worthy of such attempt. in frankl’s mention of the last freedom that remains with man even until the very end, he names man’s capacity to choose how to act as this particular freedom. is ultimate freedom in love found in amor? is absolute freedom in love guarded by the senses, limited by the spell of what is overt, manifest, or tangible? if so, how could we explain frankl’s firsthand experience of unconditional love void of the pursuit of beauty? furthermore, how is it possible to explain a sustained love between two individuals until the twilight of their lives even when the initial beauty that incited the appetite between the two and which was apprehended formerly is no longer present? could it be that there is much more than amor in man, and we are capable of much more than reacting to a stimulus, an appetible that takes the form of beauty and good? on the characteristics of caritas what makes one a friend? normally, a person is a friend when one wishes his friend the good. when one extends loving benevolence and goodwill towards another, he is a friend. when two people share the same language, joking about the same thing even if others outside their friendship do not understand what’s funny, that is normally taken to be friendship. when the whole world collapses into the world created by two people, one normally thinks this is friendship. friends are attracted towards each other because of each other’s goodness and beauty; but this, as opposed to a love of amor, is not solely based on what one perceives through the sensitive soul. friendship sees beyond what the naked eye can see, the beauty that can only be illuminated in the real communion of two souls. friendship hears not just what the auditory faculty allows but the throbbing of the deepest recesses of a person’s being. aquinas asks in st ii-ii, q, 23, a. 1 whether charity is friendship. he says that “..not every love has the character of friendship but that love which is together with benevolence: when, that is, we love someone so as to wish good to him.”11 recall that there is nothing in amor that promotes the target’s good. in fact, it is because of this good that one becomes an object of amor. without this good, the object will cease to be an appetible. friendship is different in the sense that it is not just based on the goodness of the appetible but also on its potential as a recipient of the good. this is what aquinas meant when he says in the same response: if, however, we do not wish good to what we love, but wish its good for ourselves, (thus we are said to love wine, or a horse, or the like) it is not love of friendship, but of a kind of concupiscence. for it would be absurd to speak of having friendship for wine or for a horse, yet neither does well-wishing suffice for friendship, for a certain mutual love is requisite, since friendship is between friend and friend and this mutual well-wishing is founded on some kind of communication. accordingly, since there is a communication between man and god, in so far as he communicates his happiness to us, there must be analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 50 some kind of friendship based on this same communication, of which it is written (i cor.i. 9): god is faithful: by whom you are called unto the fellowship of his son. the love that which is based on this communication, is charity. and so it is evident that charity is the friendship of man for god. 12 caritas therefore involves certain prerequisites, on the basis of this part of the summa. first, benevolence; as caritas allows a person to extend himself and go out of the province of his own good to wish good with all sincerity for another person. a friend is someone who looks after the welfare of his friend. this is clearly in stark comparison with concupiscence whose primary characteristic is its being drawn to an object that can satisfy its own needs and wants, or its own good. second, friendship involves mutual love. one normally finds claims of friendship between a man and an animal: say, a dog. aquinas does not think this is possible because friendship is only possible between two men who are capable of loving each other and who wish each other goodness. owing to its absence of a rational soul, an animal does not have the rational faculty to wish someone good. a dog can probably endear itself to a man only in so far as it sensitively apprehends the good that the man brings it. caritas allows for going beyond what the friend, the lover, can do to benefit the other friend or the object of love. this capacity to transcend the measuring of benefits in the world is only found in humans. the third characteristic of caritas is its being built on a stable ground, communication of happiness between friends. god communicates his love to man in so many ways, one of which is his sending his son to save mankind. despite his unworthiness, man is loved by god deeply. one does not experience this love through his sensitive faculty. it is through his intellectual faculty that man communicates with god. aquinas concurs: man’s life is twofold. there is his outward life in respect of his sensitive and corporeal nature, and with regard to this life, there is no communication or fellowship between us and god or the angels. the other is man’s spiritual life in respect of his mind, and with regard to this life there is fellowship between us and both god and the angels. 13 this is the perfection of love, caritas, for aquinas. but can friendship be directed among man? can man love others with the love of caritas? aquinas thinks this is possible. we can duplicate the love of god for man by channeling our love for god to others. aquinas thinks we can love a person in two ways: first in respect of himself, and in this way friendship never extends but to one’s friend; secondly, it extends to someone in respect of another, as, when a man has friendship for a certain person, for his sake he loves all belonging to him, be they children, servants, or connected with him in any way. indeed, so much do we love our friends that for their sake we love all who belong to them even if they hurt or hate us. 14 friendship is, then, more distributive. unlike amor that involves only the lover and the bearer of beauty, the appetible; in caritas, the object of love may multiply the love given by the subject of love to those whom he, the object of love, himself loves. but how does this replication of caritas happen in the world? can this be taught? analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 51 on teaching caritas and the use of experience-based learning is it really possible to teach students how to love? in my classes, i try to infuse my students’ minds with the wisdom of the philosophers and their own takes in grappling with the complexity of love. most college students come to my class with varying notions of love, none of which i am willing to dismiss as invalid. however, in my classes, one of my aims is to help my students systematize the way they understand the phenomenon of love, to balance the impressions that mass media, the internet, their societal norms teach them. i see that the most potent way to do this is to introduce them to the classical works in philosophy. roger straughan in the book, ‘can we teach children to be good?’15 reminds us that “one can teach children a mass of information, without teaching them to use that information; and one can teach them how to do all sorts of things, without teaching them to do those things on appropriate occasions.”16 the danger in limiting teaching and, subsequently, just learning inside the classroom is that it often results in a limited amount of learning, often characterized by a cognitive understanding of concepts that do not necessarily translate to these concepts being applied in the students’ lives. part of the reason is probably the lack of exposure to actual life experiences involving the said concepts. indeed, application of ideas is vital in the process of educating. straughan says, “teaching to…must, therefore, play at least as important a part in moral education as teaching that… and teaching how…”17 teaching to love is as important, if not more important, than teaching that love is this and that for a particular philosopher. eugene provenzo jr. provides a “road map” for experiential learning activities in social studies and humanities. he states that there are three critical stages of effectively performing active learning inside and outside the classroom: meaning making, paradigm-shifting and self-understanding18; which i implemented through classroom discussion, immersion, and writing reflections, respectively. the teaching methodology i followed was based primarily on these three stages in order to maximize the students’ in-depth engagement with the complex issues mentioned, using relevant and applicable standards. meaning making, the first step, seeks learners to understand the world around them better using pattern making and pattern perceiving. through the use of metaphors and relationship webs, analogies are made for students to come to terms with notions in a very real and personal way. an example of such was given by provenzo: a group of researchers (ericsson, chase and faloon, 1980) worked with a college student on memorizing randomly generated digit strings. by chunking such numbers into meaningful combinations (e.g., telephone numbers, on in this student’s case, winning times for famous track races), the student was able to memorize up to seventy numbers in a row. yet when presented with a series of randomly generated letter strings, the student did just as poorly (up to seven in a row) as before he had started practicing. learning thus seems to be supported by generating ever-expanding frameworks for knowledge. we remember things, be it chess positions or random numbers, if they are meaningful to us. they are meaningful to us if they are framed within our prior knowledge and if they help us make sense of our present situation. 19 i usually teach four introductory philosophy classes with an average of 30 students per class every semester, and the perennial concern is how these young filipino kids will appreciate concepts and abstractions that, though obviously gems of wisdom, are not just historically distant but also geographically and culturally cut-off from their own milieu. in order to establish the process of meaning making, i try to relate my lessons to their prior analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 52 experiences, and place examples in specific contexts as a way of transferring knowledge. i have mentioned endlessly in class that at a time when self-help gurus proclaim wisdom in matters of love, it pays to go back to the discourses that the classical world affords the present generation. we read works of plato, forms of good and beauty and their analogies to everyday objects; and how love is a perpetual attempt to reach the forms. we go back to aristotle and how friendship aims towards mutual goodness of friends, not very far from our perspective on true friendship in this era. we also read the summa of st. thomas aquinas and revisit the difference between amor and caritas, using examples previously mentioned. after each discussion, i encourage each one to actively participate in sharing their personal accounts of past experiences in which these ideas are used or can be applied. in these classes, after the topic on love, i invite my students to partake in an interclass activity: a visit to a home for abandoned elderly called ‘kanlungan ni maria-home for the aged, inc.’ (mary’s home) in antipolo city, philippines. for the visit, i enjoin my students to find suitable and willing benefactors who will help us finance our project especially for purchasing the goods such as medicines and supplies that we bring to the institution. the students spend a day in the institution interacting with the residents and even sometimes with the staff. some students play board games with the residents whom they fondly call ‘lolo ’(grandfather) and ‘lola’ (grandmother). others also help in feeding those who can no longer fend for themselves. while they while away their time, stories are shared, lives are bared, and realizations unfold. it is the second step, the paradigm shift, where they are exposed to an alternative environment much different from what they are accustomed to and enter genuine and difficult discussions, and so come to examine their uncontested assumptions and beliefs. some of the students never even lived with old people, and the rest who do, have never bothered to reflect and share deep insights with them. after the activity, i ask each student to write a reflection paper regarding what they learned. i will cite relevant excerpts from their papers to show how effectively the second step has been executed: how much are you willing to do to show your love to other people? one example that shows this quality of love is our act of visiting and talking with the people at kanlungan ni maria. as we interacted and shared stories with the people at the kanlungan, we willingly gave our time and effort to them. and we know we’ve done this out of charity and service. this is one of the best examples of applying what we learned in class about love. through the act of serving and interacting with the old people at kanlungan ni maria, we showed actions that are synonymous to what we consider love in action. (raytorres) what this student ably pointed out is what aquinas claims to be the first ingredient in caritas: benevolence. the students learned to write solicitation letters, trying to seek the help of other people. some managed to knock on every door of their respective condominium and apartment complexes to ask for financial assistance to raise the needed funds. some even approached big companies in the philippines to collect ample amounts of money or goods to purchase the medicines and supplies needed by the elderly in the institution. they did all these activities without expecting anything in return, with no promise of a corresponding grade incentive or reciprocation of their efforts by the residents of the home. for nothing certain in return, they went out of their comfort zones to contribute something for the benefit of these elderly people. another student communicates how she saw loving without expecting any good in return. in her account she recalled a resident in the institution: nanay (mother) bing lived the simple life of a teacher. she had a husband, yet did not have children. eventually, she decided to take an orphaned boy under his wings. she treated this boy as her own, took analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 53 care of him, loved him, sent him to school until he can stand on his own two feet. at present nanay bing is left in an elderly home, seemingly alone, and, for lack of better term, neglected and dismissed by the said son. and yet nanay bing continues to yearn intensely to meet her son again, most especially on her birthdays (notably the most important celebration of life of a person as an individual) and unite with him again regardless of his transgressions. pointing out the example of the unconditional love of a mother for a child, for nanay bing to want union from her son again in the celebration of her life, it is shown that love is indeed vital in completing the meaning of one’s life. (zia katrin ramos dela torre) the student that i quoted above came up with the realization that love can actually be mortifying because it does not just involve loving an object that will give the same love back. the rational faculty of man, just as aquinas says, is capable of going beyond measurement of the object’s worthiness of love. how this is so? the students found out by communicating with a woman who is a perfect example of such a lover, one who does not assess her gains in love. the woman mentioned is fully aware that there is little to no chance that her son will actively do her good, nevertheless; she continues to love and yearn for him. she just loves him because she thinks her son is worthy of her love no matter what. such a characteristic of love echoes not amor but caritas. another student highlighted how she saw communication as a prime element in love. she went on saying: in kanlungan ni maria, i realized a lot of things about life. the old people staying there have been through a lot of ups and downs. we are lucky enough to have ample times to listen to their jokes, stories, and lectures. there was an immediate attachment and of course, fun. as a communication major, this is a clear example that language is a good tool to connect to one another. however, some of them were not able to speak with us anymore. communication through language is no longer existent this time. yet i know and i felt the same thing while simply staying beside tata (father) ruben, and while playing sungka (mancala). there was happiness and i felt complete. (arrianne may estocapio) in the same way that love between god and man is mediated by communication, this student thought that the short bond she formed with the elderly amidst the difficulty in communication made her happy and complete. this is akin to what aquinas meant about love between god and man being complete only through communication. at the end of the day, this love brings happiness, the zenith of the loving process. exposure activities such as this do not just reinforce lessons inside the classroom; more importantly, they widen the world of the learner, as manifested in what my korean student wrote: through volunteer activity in kanlungan ni maria, i came to experience and develop love. i realized that extending love to others starts off from paying attention to others needs, getting away from ignorance. before i went to the kanlungan ni maria, i was completely unaware and partly ignorant of the difficulties experienced by others. there, i was surprised by each of the nanay’s (mothers’) stories and became embarrassed of the fact that even after having lived in the same country with them for almost 6 years, i was not even aware of their situation. nanay bing told me that she does not have any family member with her now because both her parents died and her husband is also gone. nanay annie had inborn disease which did not allow her to stand from her birth. moreover, she was abandoned by her parents and was raised in orphanage from when she was young. and all other nanays had their own stories to tell, each of which seemed very sad and gloomy. (sarah jeong) analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 54 the idea of caritas being distributive, meaning it is inclusive, has also been realized by my students through the activity. these students who are adolescents are bombarded by media and information online about variations of love that focus on its exclusivity: that it involves two people who squirm in the presence of one another, who promise eternity in each other’s arms; but these same students are often disillusioned because of their experiences, when this same kind of love results in anguish or worse, depression. having a firsthand experience in the act of caritas brings back their faith in love. that love is not exclusive and may be given, distributed and multiplied to as many people as one can is a comforting thought at a time when loving is almost always equated with utility. the last step, self-understanding, is characterized by “an ability for reflection, self-regulation, and critical thinking about our own beliefs and actions.”20 this was primarily the purpose of writing the reflection paper: for the students to initiate and engage themselves in the knowledge they were drenched in. without this, the practical benefits that one could reap from the knowledge taught can all go to waste. thus, the students in my class are encouraged to discuss and reflect on their immersion so they could engage on caritas not just when they are told to do so; rather, so they could find ways to perform caritas in opportunities within their daily lives. one student half-jokingly shared: remarkably, i found new things i could look for in a boyfriend, or symptoms that i have to be aware of if it’s true love. i used to have a list of standards to prepare myself for finding my other half. mass media made me yearn for superficial things in a partner like looks, money, or even intelligence. i never exercised my choice to choose for myself because i was predisposed and trained to “want” those standards. the immersion opened my mind to discussion and allowed me to rethink my ways. the intensity of love i felt and witnessed in kanlungan ni maria was quite too good be true, but now i have proof it exists. (angela balanza) the student, whether she knows it or not, realizes that her freedom to choose for herself and not be swayed by other factors, like mass media, has led to the use of her own will. as mentioned earlier, the use of one’s decisive choices is a product of man’s rational faculty; one that does not merely rely on our senses. although caritas has not materialized yet in the case of this student as she has not found a receiver of the action, she has learned to know its characteristics and how it can be truly achieved. with deepened insights, putting an idea into practice becomes inevitable. as philosophy is a very flexible discipline, what applies to a particular student does not translate to the exact same effect on another; thus, it was gratifying to see even some students benefit from the experience. not only were their perspectives about love realigned, but also their lifestyles. efficient self-understanding leads to a change in behavior, attitudes, and knowledge levels, as a particular reflection proved: i have a grandfather who lives far away from his wife, and i never truly understood why he always yearns for her even if she’s too old to not be cranky, wrinkled and forgetful. i found it confusing. but i was enlightened in our visit to the home for the aged; as i shared life stories with these people, i learned about a love that transcends time, a love that never expected anything, a love worth remembering. i was forced to rethink my relationship with my boyfriend, and ultimately, my relationship with my family. often, i overlook what good they bring to my life and seldom appreciate the things they do for me. i found ways to keep ties strong and more importantly, real. (miriam miciano) analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 55 experiential learning, or even learning in general, cannot be proven efficient unless students are able to “see the ‘big picture’ rather than they are just given a set of disconnected facts, when they are engaged in learning rather than positioned as passive spectators, and when they believe that such learning leads to meaningful outcomes rather than to predefined and predetermined goals.”21 as so many of my students have understood the otherwise broad and complicated concept of caritas not only from a cognitive standpoint, but also through meaningful applications in their lives, i would deem my method of teaching through experiential learning quite successful. without activities outside the classroom, abstractions in philosophy can be more confusing than clarifying. exposure to real-life manifestations of love brings about increased understanding and educative benefits for students. conclusion in this work, i have attempted to demonstrate that experiential learning is applicable even in studies of western philosophy, specifically in teaching about love, or a variation of it. love is a human endeavor and as such can only be learned in the presence of, and through experiences with, other humans. the philosophical texts that aim to illuminate our minds from the dark shadows of confusion brought about by love and its complexities may help light up the way; but it is my firm belief that only through experience generated by participating in pedagogical activities outside the four corners of the classroom, will allow students to grasp love is in its entirety. leder affirms the use of experiential learning in saying, “i have found that one of the most powerful ways to escape the classroom cave is to enter the many other caves our society constructs (ideally bringing our students with us) — the penitentiaries, homeless shelters, youth programs, hospices, senior centres, halfway houses — to humbly learn from the rich experience of those who therein dwell, and assist them, with whatever tools we have, in their own struggle for freedom.”22 i assent to this observation as i myself, as a teacher, have seen the potency of this approach for teaching. what better way to learn love than to experience it, and where else to experience love but outside the classroom, beyond those four walls that supposedly inform us but sometimes actually limit us as well. indeed, love can only be apprehended in full freedom. endnotes 1. drew leder, “escaping the cave: experiential learning in the classroom, community and correctional institutions,” in teaching philosophy, ed. andrea kenkmann. (london: continuum international publishing group, 2009), 81. 2. ibid., 82. 3. ibid. 4. ibid., 83. 5. ibid., 89. 6. the official course title is philo 10: approaches to philosophy. 7. summa theologiae i-ii, q. 26, a. ii res. 8. john peterman, on ancient philosophy (belmont, ca: thomson wadsworth, 2008), 171. 8. viktor e. frankl, man’s search for meaning (boston ma: beacon press, 1959), p. 86. 9. ibid. 10. ibid. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 56 11. st ii-ii, q. 23, a. 1, res. 12. ibid. 13. st ii-ii, q. 23, a. 1, res. 14. st ii-ii, q. 23, a. 1, res. 2 15. roger straughan, can we teach children to be good? (london: george allen & unwin ltd, 1982), 90. 16. ibid. 17. ibid. 18. eugene f. provenzo, 100 experiential learning activities for social studies, literature and the arts, grades 5-12. (california: corwin press). 19. ibid. 20. ibid. 21. ibid. 22. drew leder, “escaping the cave: experiential learning in the classroom, community and correctional institutions,” in teaching philosophy, 94. address correspondences to: bernardo n. caslib, jr., university of the philippines diliman, quezon city 1101philippines jr_caslib@yahoo.com book reviews for analytic teaching and philosophical praxis book reviews for analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 92 book review educational leadership and hannah arendt rreview by richard morehouse educational leadership and hannah arendt helen m. gunter routledge press, 2014 simultaneously published in the usa and canada 160 pages isbn: 978041582002 $145.00 u.s. hardback erhaps the best way to encourage academics to read this book is to examine the following quote. arendt asks humans to think about the relationship threads of what “i” and “we” are doing: the failure to recognize natality and pluralism, particularly evident in the mediocracy and ‘what works’ prescriptions. “i” and “we” cannot be spontaneous and do new things while “i” and “we” are filling in forms and working out how to handle the next inspection visit (105). while gunter’s comments here and throughout the book are directed toward an internationalization of methods and processes in elementary and secondary schools, many in higher education can sympathize and emphasize with this sentiment. before leaving my full time work in the university, i personally witnessed what appeared to me to be the dampening of the spontaneity and creativity that i grew to love as an intricate part of my teaching (and learning). this work in both intellectually engaging and challenging. the pull of the book comes from gunter’s deep understanding of the educational scene in the united kingdom and beyond. this wide and deep knowledge-base was somewhat problematic for this reviewer as she uses acronyms and short-hand labels to identify the british and international organizations that initiate and monitor the vast network of inspections and recommendation frameworks that constitute today’s world of education. one of her main antagonist is the elma (educational leadership and management). this was a new concept to me, not in a general sense but as used here as a cohesive and iterated system. according to their website the mlesma of british education, leadership, management and administration association is: the british educational leadership management and administration society (belmas) is an independent voice supporting quality education through effective leadership and management. ideas and practice, and the relationship between them, are what interest us. our members are a mixture of practitioners in schools, colleges and universities and working academics, encouraging a unique perspective which brings together the theoretical and the practical and encourages stimulating debate at our conferences and events (https://www.belmas.org.uk/). what concerns gunter about groups like this is that while claiming to be improving education, in practice they take all the individual initiative and imagination out of teaching and by implication out of learning. it is hannah arendt’s radical critique of this top down (gunter would say totalitarian) shaping of education that is problematic. she further argues that it is difficult even to “problematize” the important issues of education as there is no p https://www.belmas.org.uk/ book reviews for analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 93 conceptual space for leisurely thinking about education in general or specific classrooms in particular. gunter labels this approach the transnational leadership package (vii). gunter’s reading and application of arendt is what makes her critique both challenging and intellectually exciting. her use of arendt to thematize problems in the management of education should open the mind of many a reader to the subtle ways in which education is shaped, in ways both seen and unseen, through hegemonic systems of administration that trickle all the way down to the individual classroom. given her expansive familiarity with educational policy, a familiarity she assumes many readers will share, means her work may prove demanding for many at times, but this does nothing to detract from the soundness of her critique. the criticisms she raises against the totalitarian tendencies of educational bureaucracies should be taken seriously; and this holds even if aspects of her account would benefit from a more inclusive approach that recognized not everyone who shares her concerns about the administrative monopolization of learning will also be knowledgeable about the ins and outs of how these institutions work. address correspondences to: dr. richard (mort) morehouse emeritus professor of psychology viterbo university, la crosse, wi. remorehouse@viterbo.edu analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 46 modelling as a vehicle for philosophical inquiry in the mathematics curriculum lyn d. english philosophical inquiry in the teaching and learning of mathematics has received continued, albeit limited, attention over many years (e.g., daniel, 2000; english, 1994; lafortune, daniel, fallascio, & schleider, 2000; kennedy, 2012a). the rich contributions these communities can offer school mathematics, however, have not received the deserved recognition, especially from the mathematics education community. this is a perplexing situation given the close relationship between the two disciplines and their shared values for empowering students to solve a range of challenging problems, often unanticipated, and often requiring broadened reasoning. in this article, i first present my understanding of philosophical inquiry as it pertains to the mathematics classroom, taking into consideration the significant work that has been undertaken on socio-political contexts in mathematics education (e.g., skovsmose & greer, 2012). i then consider one approach to advancing philosophical inquiry in the mathematics classroom, namely, through modelling activities that require interpretation, questioning, and multiple approaches to solution. the design of these problem activities, set within life-based contexts, provides an ideal vehicle for stimulating philosophical inquiry. philosophical inquiry in the mathematics classroom on re-reading my copy of splitter and sharp’s (1995) book, teaching for better thinking, i first turned to the back cover and became excited again by their ideas, which i have incorporated in my research over many years (e.g., english, 2010a). the author’s pose the significant question, “what would happen if existing classrooms were transformed into communities of philosophical inquiry?” their response, adeptly illustrated in the book, indicates the opportunities afforded for students to grapple with the “big questions,” to “think for themselves,” and to appreciate that they can make a difference to the world. such a transformation, however, raises many questions itself. two such questions come to mind: do students see their learning of mathematics as a means of improving their life and that of others, both now and in the future? do their classroom experiences in mathematics engender such a perception? these are long-standing issues that require greater attention and continue to be the subject of debate by researchers in the broad field of social justice (e.g., sriraman, 2007). establishing a community of philosophical inquiry can broaden students’ mathematical learning to encompass issues of social justice. from my perspective as a mathematics educator, i envision communities of philosophical inquiry in a similar vein to splitter and sharp (1995). that is, a mathematics classroom that embraces philosophical inquiry is one that evokes a spirit of co-operation, trust, and ease—one in which there is a willingness to share, respect, question, and critique one another’s ideas on issues that are relevant, meaningful, and considered worthy of investigation. furthermore, i argue that for such communities to thrive, both students and teachers must be open and committed to the sharing of alternative ideas, to the critical questioning of mathematical and contextual assumptions, and to the continued enrichment of their thinking. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 47 although mathematics educators have been emphasizing for many years the centrality of problem solving and the range of thinking skills needed in dealing with “real-world” problems (e.g., jackson, shahan, gibbons, & cobb, 2012; lester & charles, 2003; national council of teachers of mathematics, 2000), research has shown that students still struggle with problem solving (e.g., english & sriraman, 2010; lesh, & zawojewski, 2007). again, communities of philosophical inquiry offer considerable promise in alleviating some of these difficulties because they can empower students to draw more extensively on their previous experiences and understandings both inside and outside of school. research that has explored philosophical inquiry in the mathematics classroom has drawn on the rich foundations set by matthew lipman’s philosophy for children (p4c e.g., lipman, 1988). the parallels between the conceptual underpinnings of his program and students’ mathematical learning have been well documented (e.g., daniel, 2000; de la gaza, 2000; english, 1994; lafortune et al., 2000; stoyanova kennedy, 2012a). for example, both p4c and mathematics education value students’ problem posing and solving, in which problem goals must be interpreted and defined, hidden assumptions identified, alternative courses of action considered, tentative solutions generated, and the reasonableness of conclusions assessed (kennedy, 2012b). further, the myriad thinking skills that lie at the heart of philosophy are essential to effective mathematics learning and problem solving. such skills, which have been repeatedly cited in the literature and do not need elaborating here, include creativity and innovation, critical and reflective thinking, deductive and inductive reasoning, investigative inquiry, and drawing informal and formal inferences, to name but a few. splitter and sharp (1995) provide a very comprehensive list of “strategies” that may be identified under the rubric of “thinking” (p. 9). philosophical inquiry and critical mathematics education as previously noted, issues raised in social justice studies of mathematics learning are at home in classrooms that embrace philosophical inquiry. more specifically, the increasingly important field of critical mathematics education targeting concerns of social justice, encompasses philosophical inquiry, yet specifically establishing such communities seems to be rarely addressed. nevertheless, the groundwork for these communities has been laid as evident in recent publications (e.g., skovsmose & greer, 2012; greer, mukhopadhyay, nelson-barber, & powell, 2009; gutstein, 2006) and in earlier works (e.g., mellin-olsen, 1987). in their introduction to their 2012 edited book, opening the cage: critique and politics of mathematics education, greer and skovsmose outline core elements of critical mathematics education. these include the observation and analysis of mathematics as it occurs in multiple socio-political contexts and the making and critiquing of value judgements, with the ultimate desire to generate change in accordance with these judgements. of particular relevance to this article is greer and skovsmose’s point that: within the field, there is heightened cultural and historical awareness, both within and beyond academic mathematics, and an increased acknowledgement of the ubiquity and importance of “mathematics in action” and the implications for mathematics education, including more curricular prominence for probability, data handling, modelling, and applications. (pp. 3-4) philosophical inquiry can heighten students’ awareness and understanding of these increasingly important content areas, content that cannot take second place to the inquiry processes being nurtured. rather, in a community of inquiry, concepts and processes are developed concomitantly in ways that stimulate and challenge students’ thinking about, and beyond, the content. at the same time, however, communities of inquiry are complex communicative systems (kennedy, 2012c) and engaging students in productive discourse that facilitates the development of content and processes is an evolving endeavour; one that should begin in the earliest years analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 48 of schooling (splitter & sharp, 1995). one approach to establishing these communities is through mathematical modelling experiences set within interdisciplinary, authentic contexts. i now consider some features of the modelling problems i have implemented from the early grades through the middle school and illustrate how philosophical inquiry is an inbuilt component. mathematical modelling and philosophical inquiry modelling is increasingly recognized as a powerful tool for not only promoting students’ understanding of a wide range of core mathematical and scientific concepts, but also for helping them appreciate the potential of mathematics as a critical tool for analyzing important issues in their lives, communities, and society in general (greer, verschaffel, & mukhopadhyay, 2007; romberg, carpenter, & kwako, 2005). for example, in tate’s study (1995) cited by greer et al. (2007) students in a predominantly african american urban middle school were asked to pose a problem negatively affecting their community, to investigate the problem, and to develop and implement strategies for solution. one particularly interesting problem that was posed addressed the presence of 13 liquor stores within 1000 feet of the students’ school. the students devised a plan to move the stores away and carried out their plan through various means including lobbying the state senate. mathematical modelling was an important tool in solving this real-world problem, as was evident in the students’ analysis of the local tax and other codes that led to financial advantages for the liquor stores. the students subsequently reconstructed this incentive system to protect their school community. students’ development of powerful models should be regarded as among the most significant goals of mathematics education, yet its appearance in the curriculum is still limited especially in the elementary and middle schools. my research and that of others, however, has shown that elementary school children are indeed capable of developing their own models and sense-making systems for dealing with complex problem situations (e.g., english, 2008; english, 2010b; lehrer & schauble, 2005). numerous interpretations of models and modelling have appeared in the literature, including with reference to completing word problems, conducting mathematical simulations, constructing representations and explanations of problem situations, and creating internal, psychological representations while solving a particular problem (e.g., doerr & tripp 1999; english & halford, 1995; greer 1997; lesh & doerr 2003). the definition of mathematical models that i have adopted in a good deal of my research is that of “systems of elements, operations, relationships, and rules that can be used to describe, explain, or predict the behavior of some other familiar system” (doerr & english, 2003, p. 112). within this perspective, i view modelling problems as realistically complex situations set within life contexts that engage student groups in mathematical content and thinking that extend beyond the usual classroom school experience. many of the modelling experiences my colleagues and i have created, such as the engineering-based water shortage problem addressed here, are realistic, open-ended problems where a client requires a team of workers to generate a product (a model) for solving a given problematic situation. in developing their models, students have to identify a process that the client can use to solve not only the given problem, but also similar problems, as indicated in the design principles i describe next. the structure of the modelling experiences reflects features of lipman’s p4c program in that the context and data presented are intriguing and often ambiguous with an element of uncertainty, and where multiple interpretations and solutions are possible. importantly, the problem must evoke the desire to question, debate, and challenge ideas, together with a keenness to work collaboratively in resolving the problem. design principles in creating such modelling experiences, i have been guided by a number of design principles advanced by analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 49 lesh and his colleagues (e.g., lesh, cramer, doerr, post, & zawojewski, 2003). these principles include those pertaining to model construction, documentation, personal meaningfulness, self-assessment, and generalization (e.g., english & mousoulides, 2011). with respect to the first principle, modelling problems require students to develop an explicit mathematical or scientific construction, explanation, description, or prediction of a meaningful complex system. such models need to focus on the underlying structural characteristics (key ideas and their relationships), rather than the surface features, of the system being addressed, and should be shared with others for constructive discussion and refinement. documentation of students’ deliberations and resultant models is a core component of the modelling problems. they are required to externalize their thinking and reasoning as much as possible and in a variety of ways, revealing insights into their conceptual development and understanding. more than a brief answer is required here; descriptions and explanations of the steps and decisions taken in constructing their models are to be included, together with the creation of various representations conveying their findings (e.g., lists, tables, graphs, diagrams, and drawings). as the term implies, the personal meaningfulness principle highlights the importance of selecting authentic contexts that are relevant, enticing, and of genuine concern to students. in my research, i have used interdisciplinary contexts in which opportunities for socio-political discussion are embedded. importantly, these contexts and the associated disciplinary content need to align with the teacher’s curriculum programs such as those involving mathematical, scientific, societal, and environmental understandings. students’ modelling experiences are thus not viewed as “add-ons” to an already crowded curriculum but as enriching existing learning and providing valuable links across disciplines. the design of these modelling problems also incorporates inbuilt criteria for self-assessment, with “self” referring to both an individual’s and group’s critical analysis of the models being generated. such analysis is akin to “reflective thought as an ongoing process of reconstruction,” which lipman adopted from dewey (1933) in the p4c program (kennedy, 2012a, p. 83). as illustrated in the modelling activity i describe next, self-assessment engages students in determining whether their final model is an effective one and adequately meets a fictitious client’s needs in dealing with the given problematic situation. such criteria also enable students to progressively assess and revise their models as they work the problem. the generalization design principle is an important feature of modelling experiences in that students’ models should be applicable to related problem situations, that is, problems that share similar underlying structural features. not only being able to recognize the structural commonalities between problem situations but also knowing to look for such similarities and how to apply one’s learning to these new situations is a powerful reasoning process across disciplines (english & sriraman, 2010). the importance of generalization, where students progress from particular issues to a “higher level of generality,” is a core feature of the communities of inquiry promoted by lipman’s program (kennedy, 2012a, p. 83). further supporting the underpinnings of philosophical communities of inquiry, these modelling problems are designed so that multiple solutions of varying mathematical and scientific sophistication are possible, enabling students with a range of personal experiences and knowledge to tackle them without fear of failure or ridicule. the opportunities for multiple feedback points during model development encourage students to rethink their models (e.g., through “what-if” questioning) and to discuss freely the strengths and weaknesses (with respect to the client’s criteria for success). this reflection is shared within a classroom that has generated a range of alternative models, with no one “correct” model. rather, follow-up discussion engenders students’ thinking about the conceptual and pragmatic understandings that have been generated by different models. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 50 the water shortage problem one of the engineering-based modelling activities my colleague and i developed and implemented in middle school cyprus classrooms with 11 year-old students (english & mousoulides, 2011) is the water shortage problem (presented in the appendix). the problem begins with students being “sent” a letter from a client, the ministry of transportation, who needs a means of (model for) selecting a country that can supply cyprus with water during the next summer period. the letter asks students to develop such a model using the given data, as well as search for additional information using available tools such as google earth, maps, and the web. the quantitative and qualitative data provided for each country include water supply per week, water price, tanker capacity, and ports’ facilities. students can also obtain data about distance between countries, major ports in each country, and tanker oil consumption. after students develop their model, they are to write a letter to the client detailing how their model selects the best country for supplying water. as an extension of this problem, students are given a second letter from the client including data for two more countries and are asked to test their model on the expanded data and improve their model, if needed. the environmental engineering context of the water shortage problem is an authentic one for the students in cyprus, where water has been rapidly drying up since the 1970’s. the lack of drinkable water in cyprus is a major problem, with water supply to homes limited. the water issue features prominently in the cypriot media and for all members of the community, including students, this is an authentic problem whose solution appears hindered by conflicting political agendas. as indicated in the following examples, this problem generated substantial discussion that resonated with that of a community of philosophical inquiry. in particular, the students were concerned about the socio-political and environmental issues that they drew from the problem context. philosophical inquiry and conceptual development in the water shortage problem consideration is given here to the discussion of two student groups whose model development was influenced by a consideration of the above issues. the first student group, like a few other groups, initially decided to exclude some of the data in particular water supply per week and port facilities. using the provided data, the students calculated total oil cost per trip by multiplying oil cost per 100 km by distance and then dividing by 100. they then calculated water cost per tanker by multiplying water price by tanker capacity, and next calculated the total cost per trip by adding oil cost and water cost. finally, they calculated the water price per ton by dividing the total cost by tanker capacity (as shown in table 1). using their data, the group decided that greece was the most appropriate country for the purchase of their water. table 1: one group’s interim model country distance (km) oil cost water cost per tanker total cost average water cost per ton egypt 420 € 84000 € 120000 € 204000 € 6.80 greece 940 € 235000 € 100000 € 335000 € 6.70 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 51 lebanon 260 € 52000 € 156000 € 208000 € 6.94 syria 280 € 56000 € 150000 € 206000 € 6.87 not satisfied with this model, however, the group then extensively discussed sea pollution. based on the newspaper article that they had worked on during the first session of the modelling activity, one student raised the question of whether it would be wise to buy water from greece. he mentioned that the distance from pireus to limassol was more than three times greater than the distance from lebanon and syria, and proposed to buy water from egypt or syria, the second and third country in distance ranking. an extract from the students’ discussion appears below: student a: it is much better to buy water from a country close to cyprus. student b: why? student a: it is good to minimize oil consumption. that’s why. student c: yes, you are right, but we decided to use water cost per ton in our solution, not only oil consumption. student a: i agree. i am not saying to focus only on oil cost. but i believe that we need a solution that takes into account that it is better to buy water from a country near cyprus, like lebanon, as to avoid more oil consumption. student b: exactly, especially since oil is getting more and more expensive. student a: it is not the only reason. we need to think of the environment. especially in our case, we need to minimize mediterranean’s pollution from oil and other waste. the students also documented in their reports that all countries in the mediterranean sea should be fully aware of sea pollution and therefore try to minimize ship oil consumption. another student suggested buying water from syria, since water price is not that expensive (compared to the price from greece and egypt). the students finally ranked countries in the following order: syria, egypt, lebanon, and greece and decided to propose to the local authorities to buy water from syria. another group of students became concerned about the port facilities factor, a component that some student groups chose to ignore in the models they generated. this group decided to quantify the factor and integrate their calculations within the port facilities data. a subsequent discussion focused on the amount of money necessary for improving the ports’ facilities and how this amount of money would change the water price per ton. to assist them here, the students asked for more information about the amount of money necessary for improving port facilities in syria, lebanon, and egypt. they were surprised when they learned that improving the ports’ facilities would cost from five to ten million euro. this feedback prompted concerns regarding socio-economic considerations: student c: ten million euro? that’s huge. the government cannot pay so much money. student d: it is obvious that we will buy water from greece. it is more expensive than water from the other countries, but at least we will not pay for improving port facilities. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 52 researcher: i agree with you that ten million euro is not a small amount of money. but, don’t you have to think of that amount in terms of the whole project of importing water in cyprus? student d: do you mean thinking of this amount in comparison to how much importing water in cyprus will cost? researcher: exactly! during their second round of model improvement, the students debated issues related to tanker capacity and oil cost, and how these factors might relate to their solution, not only in terms of the mathematical relations. they were aware of energy consumption issues, discussing in their group that oil consumption should be kept as minimum as possible. when their teacher prompted them to decide which factor was more important, water price or oil consumption, the students replied that it would be better to spend a little more money and to reduce oil consumption. the group also made explicit that it was not only oil consumption but also other environmental issues, like the pollution of the mediterranean sea, which needed to be considered. finally, this group proposed syria as the best place from which to buy water, since its costs were quite reasonable and it is the closest to cyprus. discussion and concluding points in this article, i have tried to show how philosophical inquiry can enhance students’ mathematical learning, with a focus on modelling experiences set within thought-provoking contexts. however, as i indicated many years ago (e.g., english, 1993; 1994) and as kennedy (2012a) reiterated recently, philosophical inquiry is not just restricted to problem solving per se. rather, such inquiry can and should become a natural component of all mathematics learning, with students being at ease in sharing and questioning one another’s ideas and creations. implementing philosophical inquiry in the mathematics classroom is a multi-pronged approach. consideration needs to be given to the concepts and understandings to be developed, the context in which these will be housed, the thinking and reasoning processes to enhance this learning, and the features to be developed in the classroom community. addressing each of these components in detail is of course beyond the scope of this article. however, it is worth emphasizing again the importance of selecting task contexts that engender learning of a critical and reflective nature, and of the need to nurture a classroom community that is open to, and values, such learning. with respect to context, mukhopadhyay and greer’s (2007) “education for statistical empathy” (p. 169) provides an excellent example of how we might address the two questions i posed at the beginning of this article. with the avalanche of data students face on a daily basis from various sources, they need more than ever before to be critical consumers of information. mukhopadhyay and greer refer to mass gun killings as a case in point when mathematics is a powerful tool for analyzing and questioning issues pertaining to contemporary life. a classroom community of philosophical inquiry can help students appreciate how they can apply their mathematics learning to reveal the “untold messages” behind data-laden media reports, and to question what might be done to address these problematic issues. nurturing reflective and critical learning in the mathematics classroom is receiving increased attention (e.g., cengiz, 2013; barlow & mccrory, 2011) but substantially more is needed. as prediger (2005) stressed, students should not only be given opportunities to be reflective, but also to develop the skills and disposition to do so. being able to question and research, reflect on findings, describe and justify conclusions, and communicate and evaluate end-products is fundamental here. mukhopadhyay and greer’s (2007) “cycles of discussions to foster analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 53 statistical empathy” (p. 175) provide a valuable framework for generating and sustaining such 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(2012b). what are you assuming? mathematics teaching in the middle school, 18(2), 86-91. kennedy, n. s. (2012c). community of inquiry as a complex communicative system. analytic teaching and philo sophical praxis, 33(1), 13-18). tate, w. f. (1995). returning to the root: a culturally relevant approach to mathematics pedagogy. theory into practice, 34, 166-173. appendix there is trouble in paradise: severe water problem shortage in cyprus nicosia. alex chris, a landscape gardener working for several foreign embassies and private estates in nicosia, said many of the capital’s boreholes are now pumping mud. “i installed one expensive garden with 500 meters of irrigation pipe in nicosia a few months ago,” he said. “last week they called to tell me the system had stopped and their trees and lawns were dying. i found that sludge had been pumped through the pipes and then solidified in the heat. it was like cement”. last week, people all over cyprus received a water conservation advisory via mail, reporting “extremely dry conditions in cyprus as a result of a lack of rain.” the mail suggested several measures the cyprus water board would take to conserve water. water shortage in cyprus is among the country’s most important problems. however, water shortage, is common in much of the world. in fact, half the planet’s population is expected to face an insufficient water supply by 2025. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 56 emergency water rationing as well as a request to import water from nearby countries was ordered as a result of a severe water shortage due to a drought over the last four years. reservoir reserves have plunged dangerously low and desalination plants cannot keep up with a growing demand for water. cyprus has two desalination plants running at full capacity, with a third due to come on stream in june. the island’s reservoirs are now 10.3 percent full and there has been little rainfall since 2003. “cuts are essential to cover the needs of the population. this is an extremely grave situation,” said a government spokesman. the island is increasingly relying on desalinization plants for water, but they can only provide 45% of demand, and their operation is energy heavy. the head of the cyprus water board said: “we don’t desalinate lightly, without being aware of the consequences. it is energy-consuming … and this causes (greenhouse gas) emissions cyprus that has to pay fines for.” water has always been a valuable commodity on the mediterranean island, which has one of the world’s highest concentrations of reservoirs. the country is used to regular periods of drought due to its location and climate, but there has been a sharp decrease in rain in the past 35 years. since 1972, rainfall has decreased 20% and runoff into reservoirs has decreased by 40%. the demand for water in cyprus, for now, outstrips supply. experts estimate the island will need almost 5,09 million cubic meters of water until the new year. kouris, one of the island’s largest and most important dams, currently stands less than 2.5% full, with 3.23 million tons of water. cypriot officials decided to sign a contract with a nearby country, to import more than 12 million cubic metres over the summer period starting at the end of june. officials will also sign a contract with a shipping company to use oil tankers for supplying cyprus with water. the tanker supply program will continue until a permanent solution to the problem has been reached. the water will be pumped directly into the main water supply pipelines with any surplus going to the reservoirs. readiness questions 1. who is alex chris? 2. what is kourris? 3. how many desalination plants for water are currently in cyprus? 4. why does the cyprus government not build more desalination plants to cover country’s water needs? 5. which solution did the cyprus water board decide to adopt for solving the water shortage problem? the problem cyprus water board needs to decide from which country cyprus will import water for the next summer period. using the information provided, assist the board in making the best possible choice. lebanon, greece, syria, and egypt expressed their willingness to supply cyprus with water. the water board has received information about the water price, how much water they can supply cyprus with during summer, oil tanker cost and the port facilities. this information is presented below. write a letter explaining the method you used to make your decision so that the board can use your method for selecting the best available option not only for now, but also for the future when the board will have to take similar decisions. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 57 country water supply per week water price tanker capacity tanker oil cost port facilities for tankers (metric tons) (metric tons) (metric tons) (per 100 km) egypt 3 000 000 € 4.00 30 000 € 20 000 average greece 4 000 000 € 2.00 50 000 € 25 000 very good lebanon 2 000 000 € 5.20 30 000 € 20 000 average syria 3 000 000 € 5.00 30 000 € 20 000 good address correspondences to: lyn d. english queensland university of technology, australia l.english@qut.edu.au the case for philosophy for children in the english primary curriculum analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 8 the case for philosophy for children in the english primary curriculum rhiannon love abstract: the introduction of the new national curriculum in england, was initially viewed with suspicion by practitioners, uneasy about the radical departure from the previous national curriculum, in both breadth and scope of the content. however, this paper will suggest that upon further reflection the brevity of the content could lend itself to a total re-evaluation of the approach to curriculum planning in individual schools. this paper will explore how, far from creating a burden of extra curriculum content, philosophy for children (p4c) can in fact be a driver for the whole primary curriculum. with the renewed focus on spiritual, moral, social and cultural development (smsc) in england, it will investigate the potential for p4c to engage and enhance these areas, which often are neglected or side-lined in the primary curriculum. it will consider the benefits to a class, and indeed school, of creating communities of enquiry and how they can influence school ethos, values and vision. the paper will also share reflections on my own practice as a new trainer with sapere over the past two years of training student teachers, colleagues at the university as well as local primary school teachers and head teachers. in addition it will share examples of good practice from three schools where philosophy for children has been successfully integrated in a variety of models across the whole school curriculum. key words: philosophy for children, p4c, curriculum, community of enquiry, primary, education, democratic figures fig. 1 statutory requirements of spoken language ks1 & 2 (dfe, 2013:17) fig. 2: excerpt from the un convention on the rights of the child (unicef, 2012) introduction rationale n my role as senior lecturer in teacher development at winchester university, i am constantly questioned by both students and teachers about the practicality of fitting yet another subject into the primary curriculum. this provided the impetus for this paper, in order to be able to articulate to both students and teachers the case for p4c in the primary curriculum, with specific examples of how p4c links with the national curriculum and how this might look in practice in a primary school. i 9 the introduction of the new english national curriculum was initially viewed with suspicion by practitioners (edwards, 2013; hannam, 2013; mackinlay, 2014), uneasy about the departure from the previous national curriculum (nc), in both breadth and scope of the content. this paper will explore how, far from creating a burden of extra curriculum content, p4c could in fact be a driver for the whole primary curriculum. it will consider how p4c might effectively and with integrity link to the aims of the new nc (dfe, 2013), whilst also acting as a driver for values education; oracy skills and inclusive practice, as well as a focus for pupil voice and democratic classrooms. with the renewed focus on spiritual, moral, social and cultural development (smsc) in england (dfe, 2014), the paper will also investigate the potential for p4c to engage and enhance these areas, which often are neglected or side-lined in the curriculum (peterson, lexmond, hallgarten, & kerr, 2014). the paper will share reflections on my own practice as a new trainer with sapere over the past two years of training student teachers, colleagues at the university as well as local primary school teachers and head teachers. it will also share examples of good practice from three schools where philosophy for children has been successfully integrated in a variety of models across the whole school curriculum. the questions i aimed to investigate were – can p4c be effectively linked with the primary curriculum? what potential benefits might result from this? what objections might be posed to this? what issues have arisen in reflecting on my professional practice in teaching student teachers and teachers about using p4c in their practice? setting the scene the movement known as p4c/pwc was first developed in the late 1960’s in the usa by matthew lipman (fisher, 2013). building on the work of dewey, lipman (2003) developed the p4c programme where children form a community of enquiry (coe) to collaborate in their search for meaning and understanding. p4c is perhaps the most widely known pwc programme and will be the term i use to cover all aspects of philosophy for/with children. in p4c children are encouraged to question, to think, to reason and to make connections between philosophical concepts and their own experiences (murris, 2000), as well as to generate their own questions as a focus for the enquiry. central to p4c is the aforementioned coe, this pedagogical approach has been well-researched (fisher, 2007; murris, 2008) and is crucial to the success of p4c. there are key features of the coe, ranging from the physical eg. pupils sit in a circle to encourage a feeling of equality, to the more intangible within the coe, pupils develop a sense of security, which encourages them to share their opinions honestly, but also to collaborate towards a shared purpose (jenkins & lyle, 2010; splitter, 2014). certain dispositions or attitudes are encouraged in the coe; although the ability to reason is crucial, so too is being open to be reasoned with, coupled with a willingness to consider other opinions (splitter, 2014). these dispositions are often referred to as the ‘4 c’s of p4c’ – namely collaborative, critical, caring and creative attitudes towards thinking and being (fisher, 2013; splitter, 2014; sapere, 2015; ward, allsopp, shergill, yates & smith, 2015). 10 literature review a decision was made to focus the paper specifically on the more holistic attributes or benefits of p4c, as this was what had made an impact on my teaching career and on the children i taught. this area has generated limited research, possibly due to the current focus in schools on data or performance, which can lead to a fixation on the impact of p4c being ‘measured’, meaning that academic attainment is rated above more philosophically informed outcomes such as self-esteem, empathy, equality and inclusion (haynes & murris, 2011b; murris, 2008). the area of critical thinking, or p4c as a thinking skills’ programme has been extensively researched (topping & trickey, 2007; trickey & topping, 2004), similarly much research has been undertaken to examine the positive effects of p4c’s dialogic approach to teaching and learning, (cassidy & christie, 2013; fisher, 2007; jenkins & lyle, 2010; splitter, 2014), and the decision has been made to limit discussions pertaining to both of these areas to where it has wider curriculum relevance. over the last three decades interest in p4c has grown, provoking an ongoing debate into its relevance and appropriateness for children and how it might fit into the curriculum (haynes & murris, 2011; gaut & gaut, 2013). p4c has advocates amongst teachers, academic philosophers and teacher educators, however the challenge of how or if it can become part of mainstream education, which values individual, often academic achievement almost exclusively, remains (murris, 2008). approaching the national curriculum in a philosophical way means looking beneath the surface, to the questions and concepts that interest children (sapere, 2015). daniel and auriac (2011) and haynes and murris (2011b) suggest that p4c is an approach that goes beyond taught p4c lessons, with connections possible to all areas of the curriculum, this has been challenged though, with authors suggesting that the specific skills and disciplines of philosophy would be best served in discrete subject sessions (splitter, 2014). a key objection towards p4c centres around the question of whether children are actually able to philosophise (fox, 2001; murris, 2001; haynes & murris, 2011). often citing piagetian cognitive theories of development, the argument is that young children are incapable of abstract, philosophical thought, seen by many as only developing in secondary aged children, sometimes as late as 15 or 16 (fox, 2001). this objection is firmly rebutted by advocates of p4c, who contest that young children are indeed capable of thinking abstractly, considering concepts such as bravery, fairness, goodness and evil, but associated with their own experiences and everyday life (egan, 2011; murris, 2001). another common misconception amongst critics of p4c is that they compare child philosophers with adult ones (murris, 2001). the first argument to that objection is to make a distinction between academic philosophy, where one studies philosophers and their ideas and practical philosophy, eg p4c, where children are encouraged to philosophise (cassidy & christie, 2013; murris, 2000). p4c is a prime example of a socratic view of philosophy, where it is a way of life and a way of being and doing (murris, 2001). in addition, p4c practitioners would concur that young children do not enquire philosophically like academic philosophers, but neither do they approach mathematics like academic mathematicians, yet we still encourage them to learn maths (murris, 2001), likewise many other areas of the curriculum. 11 national curriculum links the national curriculum (nc) (dfe, 2013) arose out of ‘a desire to drive standards and raise expectations’ (hcc, 2014:2). no longer a prescriptive document (mackinlay, 2014), schools have the freedom to design their own programmes, including other subjects or topics of their choice (dfe, 2013). the nc document highlights explicit skills and content expected to be taught to children at different key stages; a selection of these skills will be examined for their links to p4c. in english for example, teachers are expected to teach children to speak with clarity and confidence, they should “learn to justify ideas with reasons; ask questions to check understanding; develop vocabulary and build knowledge; negotiate; evaluate and build on the ideas of others; and select the appropriate register for effective communication” (dfe, 2013:10), as well as having the ability to challenge and amend misconceptions. these skills are seen as crucial for pupils to be able to take their future place as members of society and are used across the curriculum to support their social, linguistic and cognitive development. these oracy skills have been shown to improve with introduction to p4c; trickey and topping (2004) found p4c to be the cause of children showing significant improvements in their communication, confidence, participation and social behaviour in just 6 months of p4c input. the statutory requirements for s & l (dfe, 2013:17) (seen in fig.1) lay out specific skills that must be taught across ks1 & 2. the italic sections demonstrate skills that research has argued can be developed by p4c (colom, moriyón, magro, & morilla, 2014; sapere, 2013; topping & trickey, 2007; trickey & topping, 2004): statutory requirements pupils should be taught to:  listen and listen and respond appropriately to adults and their peers  ask relevant questions to extend their understanding and knowledge  use relevant strategies to build their vocabulary  articulate and justify answers, arguments and opinions  give well-structured descriptions, explanations and narratives for different purposes, including for expressing feelings  maintain attention and participate actively in collaborative conversations, staying on topic and initiating and responding to comments  use spoken language to develop understanding through speculating, hypothesising, imagining and exploring ideas  speak audibly and fluently with an increasing command of standard english  participate in discussions, presentations, performances, role play, improvisations and debates  gain, maintain and monitor the interest of the listener(s)  consider and evaluate different viewpoints, attending to and building on the contributions of others  select and use appropriate registers for effective communication. fig. 1 statutory requirements of spoken language ks1 & 2 (dfe, 2013:17) 12 speaking and listening are fundamental skills, not only for developing intelligence (cassidy & christie, 2013; fisher, 2013; jenkins & lyle, 2010), but also for our ability to communicate and thus form relationships. research shows that the quality of classroom talk has the power to enable or inhibit cognition and learning (alexander, 2006; fisher, 2007). additionally, schools who embedded p4c into their literacy curriculum with the aim of improving s & l found that incorporating philosophical enquiry also improved the quality of children’s writing (ward et al., 2015); the opportunity to initially orally articulate their thinking impacting on their subsequent written tasks. in mathematics, the nc requires children to ‘reason mathematically by following a line of enquiry, conjecturing relationships and generalisations, and developing an argument, justification or proof using mathematical language’ (dfe, 2013:99), whilst encouraging pupils to also appreciate, enjoy and be curious about the more aesthetic side of mathematics’ beauty and power. in science, again the importance of spoken language is reiterated, enabling children to share their thoughts with clarity and precision. pupils must be taught to experience, be curious and ask questions – exemplification given ‘is a flame alive? is a deciduous tree dead in winter?’ (dfe, 2013:151) – arguably carries a philosophical dimension. in art and design and design and technology, the nc (dfe, 2013) advocates creativity as well as criticality – two of the 4 c’s of p4c (fisher, 2013; sapere, 2015). this focus on creativity is encouraging as initially the draft curriculum raised concerns that the emphasis was on knowledge acquisition to the detriment of creativity (mackinlay, 2014). in geography, teachers are called to ‘inspire in pupils a curiosity and fascination about the world and its people that will remain with them for the rest of their lives’ (dfe, 2013:187). in this subject there is great scope for p4c due to the underpinning philosophical concepts – for example: ownership, place, responsibility and sustainability to name but a few (sapere, 2015). similar links with p4c skills can be seen in many other curriculum areas of the nc document (dfe, 2013). in addition, the idea of enquiry-led learning promoted in the nc (dfe, 2013), is also an integral element of p4c; which trains teachers to facilitate philosophical enquiries with rigorous reasoning at its heart (colom et al., 2014). this is supported by haynes (2014) who states that this enquiry-led approach needs to be embedded across the curriculum and fisher (2007), who writes that children ‘need to be exposed to and involved in enquiry with different voices, ideas and perspectives’ (p616), as through this dialogue they will start the process of making meaning. using p4c as a driver for other agendas it might therefore be claimed that p4c can be integrated into many different areas of the curriculum, including helping to achieve the aims and statutory requirements of the nc (dfe, 2013). however there are also arguments for using the pedagogy to promote a range of different initiatives; sapere (2015) documents examples across the world where p4c is being used for agendas as varied as democracy, social improvement and values/morality. as murris (2008) writes, the education climate currently is such that many who would endeavour to include p4c in primary schools are validating their arguments by ‘highlighting its compatibility with a number of current agenda items for education—raising standards, teaching thinking skills, creativity, citizenship, inclusion and emotional literacy’ (p672). haynes and murris (2011b) warn however that ‘in order to get a foot in the classroom, pwc practitioners often justify the inclusion of pwc in the curriculum by arguing that it will produce more ‘skilled’ thinkers, readers, writers, team-players, selves or citizens’ (p289). their fear is that considerations of how p4c can enrich education can be lost in the need to justify target-driven initiatives. 13 p4c as a values driver/moral education the temptation for p4c to be linked to different agendas or initiatives might be seen as understandable as many of the holistic effects of the programme can be seen to enhance other areas, sometimes referred to as the hidden curriculum (kirk, 1992), which traditionally are seen to be unintended lessons, values or norms that are side effect of the taught programme . working within a coe helps instil and perfect cogitative, emotional and behavioural habits in children, as they are constantly being reminded of, or referred to, the dispositions or 4 c’s of p4c (critical, caring, collaborative and creative thinking) (fisher, 2013; sapere, 2015; splitter, 2014; ward et al., 2015). the intention of teaching children in this way is to help them make better judgements, and to take into account their emotions and those of others, one of the aims of the nc (dfe, 2013). p4c is being increasingly used as a platform or driver for values or moral education. education is in favour of teaching children to become active and responsible citizens (costello, 2013; dfe, 2013) with opportunities highlighted in the nc (dfe, 2013) e.g. in the pe programme of study it stipulates that children are exposed to situations that ‘build character and help to embed values such as fairness and respect’ (p198) and in design and technology pupils need to learn to ‘solve real and relevant problems within a variety of contexts, considering their own and others’ needs, wants and values’ (p184). intrinsic to the p4c pedagogy are values such as tolerance and respect. differences of opinion between people are welcomed for the opportunities to learn from each other, constructing new collaborative meaning in the process (murris, 2008). in the coe, characteristics such as ‘empathy, agreeableness, cooperation, attentiveness, and so forth, become non-cognitive factors systematically fostered’ (garcia et al., 2002 in colom et al., 2014: 55), helping to develop both children’s thinking and their moral and social development (haynes & murris, 2013). an example of this can be seen in rokeby school (a community secondary school for boys, located in the london borough of newham), where p4c is credited for the transformation of behaviour (ward et al., 2015). the school claims that p4c is core not only to the academic progress at the school but also supporting behaviour. they have seen the coe strengthening the community of the school, leading to an increase in team spirit and respectful behaviour. there are objections voiced towards this approach, with concerns that a focus on promoting tolerance, understanding and respect can lead to criticality being lost, and an ensuing reluctance to challenge opinions or beliefs (haynes & murris, 2011b). gardner (1996) would argue however, that skilful facilitation by the p4c teacher ensures that enquiries are not ‘mere conversation’, rather push at all times for depth and progress towards truth (p102). respectful dialogue is at all times non-negotiable in p4c, yet crucially there is the understanding that ideas, practices and opinions must be justified and critically examined (haynes & murris, 2011b). hayes (2014) states that in his view children have little to contribute to philosophical issues, that typically, ‘their insights come down to the banalities’ (online). this objection is both patronising and belittling towards children. children should be encouraged to care about social justice, to make judgements about beliefs and opinions of themselves and others, but most importantly, be open and ready to amend their opinions as necessary, as splitter (2014) suggests, ‘ we should always allow room for that small voice that whispers to us, even in the face of our strongest convictions, “yes, but i might be mistaken”’ (p105). this theme is examined further in the reflections on my professional practice. 14 using p4c to enhance smsc closely linked to the area of values is spiritual, moral, social and cultural development (smsc). clearly stated at the start of the nc as part of the aim for a ‘broad and balanced curriculum’(dfe, 2013:5), smsc is intrinsically linked to a more holistic primary curriculum. smsc, although present in education documentation since the 1980s, is experiencing a renewed focus in recent ofsted (office for standards in education, children's services and skills) inspections (dfe, 2014). one of the challenges that schools face is how to make smsc a meaningful part of their curriculum, rather than a reaction to the ofsted agenda (peterson et al., 2014). peterson et al. (2014)’s report found that the majority of schools paid either cursory attention to smsc or attempted to fit it in everywhere, leading to superficial coverage at best. they reported that the key area of neglect concerned spirituality. this is possibly due to the indeterminacy of meaning, as well as teacher discomfort and lack of confidence around the ‘teaching’ of spirituality. rowson (2014) argued that the term ‘spirituality’ lacks clarity because it is so wide-ranging; ‘our search for meaning, our sense of the sacred, the value of compassion, the experience of transcendence, the hunger for transformation’ (p18). all of these are fundamental features of humanity and as such vital that they are shared and explored in a safe way with children (peterson et al., 2014; rowson, 2014). central to the definition given by ofsted for spirituality (dfe, 2014), is reflection – this is built into the coe, and therefore is perfectly attuned to the demands of smsc. themes or concepts which are dealt with in p4c (such as truth, beauty, morality, wisdom, reality, goodness etc.) are also those that lie at the heart of smsc and children should be encouraged to think about and reflect upon their importance in both their lives and in that of society (splitter, 2014). democratic classrooms/pupil voice one of the arguments for embedding a p4c pedagogy into the primary curriculum is centred around the idea of democratic practice in schools – sometimes referred to as rights respecting education, strongly linked to the un charter, and issues of pupil voice (fisher, 2007; murris, 2008; haynes & murris, 2013). murris (2008) highlights this, positing that democracy is understood to include ‘moral principles such as freedom and equality of opportunity and implies that schools make space for children to actively participate as citizens in contexts that are meaningful to them’ (p670). this is a significant epistemological shift as education is traditionally undemocratic, with children obliged to attend and with little choice, particularly at primary level, over what they study (haynes & murris, 2011b). for schools this may mean a re-evaluation of current structures as, if this is to be more than mere lip-service to democracy, it will mean creating space for children’s voices to be heard on wide ranging issues, not only in the classroom, but also regarding wider decision making, such as curriculum and ethos (haynes & murris, 2011b). the p4c approach to education strives to move away from the traditional classroom of the authoritarian teacher, towards a dialogic environment, where children’s voices are listened to and dialogue is key to their development as learners (fisher, 2007; jenkins & lyle, 2010; haynes, 2014). this approach to teaching also supports united nation convention on the rights of the child articles 12 – 14 (unicef, 2012) as seen in figure 2, italics indicating potential links with p4c. 15 figure 2: excerpt from the summary of the un convention on the rights of the child (unicef, 2012) traditional teacher-centred approaches have been criticised, due to their limitations for children to have either the space to voice their own ideas, or to respond to those of others (jenkins & lyle, 2010). p4c and similar approaches change the power structure in the classroom, creating new classroom dynamics, where the children’s voices aspire to have equal weight to that of the teacher (haynes & murris, 2011a). fisher (2007) states ‘they [the children] need to be given a voice, a voice to question, to challenge, to construct and deconstruct the meanings around them’ (p620). this redressing of the balance of authority in the class, where children have equal right to participate and for their views to be heard, (haynes & murris, 2011b) is not without issue. some teachers see this as a lack of control, or a diminishing of the role of the teacher (haynes, 2014), rather than an empowering of the children (lyle & thomas-williams, 2011; splitter, 2014). it is important to note however, that this right to participate does not become an insistence that all participate; contrary to the implication by ecclestone and hayes (2009) that children who do not respond are seen to be ‘repressing feelings and concealing inner trauma’ (p43), coercion has no place in the coe, children are free to participate as and when they feel comfortable to do so (haynes & murris, 2011b). p4c as inclusive practice inclusiveness is a fundamental principle of p4c (cassidy & christie, 2013). its primarily oral nature enables all pupils to participate, giving an equal voice to less academically able students, excluded from much of the curriculum biased towards writing (alexander, 2006; murris, 2008; ward et al., 2015). additionally, it practises and develops these oral skills which are essential for pupils to participate confidently in society (dfe, 2013). benefits of p4c have also been shown to include aspects such as increased self-esteem, gains in literacy and numeracy, significantly in those less able; transformed attitudes towards learning and more thoughtful and reflective responses across the wider curriculum (topping & trickey, 2007). increasingly english schools are seeing p4c as a potential approach for helping disadvantaged children to close the attainment gap, often reporting changes noted after only a few p4c enquiries. children, whose voices previously were rarely shared, demonstrating willingness to participate in the coe, surprising themselves and others with their depth of thought, consequently boosting self-confidence across the curriculum article 12 (respect for the views of the child) every child has the right to say what they think in all matters affecting them, and to have their views taken seriously. article 13 (freedom of expression) every child must be free to say what they think and to seek and receive all kinds of information, as long as it is within the law. article 14 (freedom of thought, belief and religion) every child has the right to think and believe what they want and also to practise their religion, as long as they are not stopping other people from enjoying their rights. governments must respect the rights of parents to give their children information about this right. 16 (sapere, 2015). topics such as death, bereavement, image, fears and friendship can be explored collaboratively, within the safe philosophical space created by p4c, enabling children to explore areas not often covered by the curriculum, but also have their opinions heard and validated by others (ward et al., 2015). benefits of p4c as mentioned in the introduction, the focus for this paper was enquiring into the more holistic benefits of p4c. ecclestone and hayes (2009) are vociferous critics of p4c as an example of what they see as ‘therapeutic education’, which seeks to encourage empathy, self-esteem and emotional literacy; leading in their opinion to ‘the debasing of education’ (p151). they claim that p4c is easily hijacked into indiscriminating advancement of ‘emotional well-being’ at the expense of criticality, logic or reason (p33). ecclestone and hayes (2009) claim that there is a lack of challenge from teachers over the content of the dialogue, with ‘all views accepted unconditionally’ (p33). whilst this might occur with inexperienced facilitators, these objections can be refuted as they concern incorrect application of p4c rather than the pedagogy itself, which will be explored subsequently in more detail. in addition to the many holistic benefits of p4c already discussed, one significant benefit is that of the collaborative nature of p4c. many theorists expound on the benefits of working collaboratively (burke & williams, 2008). the inherent structure of p4c provides an opportunity for genuine collaboration, where the process of learning itself is a shared one (cassidy & christie, 2013). the coe is set up to facilitate collaborative learning, the principle that together the community is moving towards a new, shared understanding of the question at hand (haynes & murris, 2013). the collaborative nature of p4c provides children with opportunities to hear different points of view, alternative insights and ways of thinking as well as the opportunity to critically analyse and judge the reasoning behind the thinking and thus change their mind. examples of good practice from three schools the first school i visited is a small village primary school (4 – 11 year olds) with approximately 100 children on their roll, where p4c was introduced in 2011. initially trialled in one class, the motivation for introducing p4c was to try to raise the level of questioning in religious education (re) from the typical ‘teacher-led’ question/answer to genuine dialogue, led and progressed by the children, with the teacher as a mere ‘facilitator’. the curriculum for re in hampshire is centred around both concepts and enquiry and therefore seemed to be a natural partner for p4c. after introducing p4c the change made to the class’ dialogue was marked, not only that, but the school reported that within weeks of it being introduced to this class they experienced an unexpected impact in the behaviour of the children. although not previously a class that had great behavioural issues, the lunchtime support staff noticed two significant impacts – firstly that the children were not needing adult intervention to help them to resolve their conflicts, and secondly that when the children were resolving their conflicts, their language had changed – they were using the language they had been introduced to in their p4c lessons, to help them to disagree respectfully and courteously and to be able to reason with each other. this impact led to the whole school – teaching and support staff being trained in p4c. although primarily used to enhance re, the school reported that they found it was a perfect method to explore their values as a school and subsequently it has been embedded across the curriculum. the school was chosen to feature on ofsted’s (the school inspection service) good practice website, where it was mentioned that ‘the school has effectively integrated ‘philosophy for children’ (p4c) within re, as a result, re has 17 been a catalyst for wider developments in teaching and learning across the school.’ within a year the school was inspected by sias (the church school’s inspection service) where the provision for re was rated outstanding, with specific reference made to the impact of p4c, and in particular the skills of questioning, thinking and reflection, they saw used throughout the curriculum. the second case study was a large church of england junior school (7 – 11 year olds), with a school roll of approximately 240 children. as a sapere silver award p4c school, all members of staff have completed sapere level 1 p4c training, in addition they also employ an experienced p4c facilitator (who is also an accredited sapere trainer) for 1 ½ days/week to lead p4c, aiding with planning, facilitation, training and supporting teachers etc. in this school p4c, although used across the curriculum, is primarily seen linked with english and in particular to support and improve writing. they have found that through p4c enquiries the children have become more engaged with stories, poems and literary texts; in addition to developing the skills of reading, writing, speaking and listening. through engaging with the text in a deeper way, the children are subsequently more able to ask questions, think and talk more deeply about important issues in life, and in response their writing has more purpose. moreover as the children have the chance to articulate their thinking about concepts, sharing their ideas through philosophical enquiry, they then transfer these ideas to their writing (allsopp, 2015). on a learning walk around the school it was clear that p4c had a high status, with displays in every classroom, including the writing resulting from the philosophical enquiries (one of the class questions here was ‘could you survive on your own?’ – all tied in with a stimulus about the mars space programme). the third case study school was a large urban community primary school (4 – 11 years) with approximately 210 children on their books. as with the previous case study, all teaching staff were trained in p4c to level 1 with sapere. the teacher i spoke to reported how p4c had changed how they worked as a school. p4c was now so much part of the school’s ethos that it was apparent in all parts of school life and had inspired a move to genuine democratic practice throughout the school. as well as carrying out full p4c enquiries in class, the school used the p4c approach to make all of the decisions in the school, with the children actively involved in all decision making – from the topics that they study each half term, to the furniture in the library, to the colour of the bathroom walls! one teacher told me that making decisions without involving the children would be unthinkable. questioning is at the heart of the school’s curriculum, which was evident in the displays around the school. the skills learnt through p4c are utilised in all areas of school life, whether evaluating the topics they have just studied, choosing the learning values for the school, or engaging in dialogue around the charities they want to support that year. the teacher explained how dialogue had become a central feature of the school, with children confident to engage in both partner, small group and whole group dialogue, with emphasis on pupil voice, where everyone has a right to have their opinion heard. the teachers at this school felt that p4c had significantly impacted on their teacher identity, particularly identifying how they felt they not only listened more to the children now, but also that how they listened to the children had changed: previously they had been listening for a particular response, now they felt that they were genuinely listening to what the children were saying, also they felt they were now confident to push for more depth from children’s answers. 18 reflections on p4c training brookfield (1995) suggests reflective practice can help challenge certain assumptions, some of which resonated with regard to p4c. one assumption that he contests, is the idea that students do not like or need to have didactic lectures. he discusses the importance of grounding in a subject area before students are able to engage critically with new ideas/thinking. this is reassuring as my introduction to the p4c module is very theoretical, explaining the pedagogy behind p4c as well as its background. another assumption that brookfield (1995) raises, concerns seating students in a circle. this is central to p4c, suggestive of democratic principles and practices, however brookfield suggests that for less confident students, the circle can be ‘a painful and humiliating experience’ (1995:9). he defends this position by expounding that the circle, whilst a place of safety to many, on the contrary can remove privacy; demand performance and become oppressive. i found this quite disquieting to read as it challenges all the theory i have so far read about the benefits of circles (lang, 1998; splitter, 2014) and will continue to reflect on brookfield’s warnings in my own practice. however, this reinforces the importance of the coe as discussed previously (cassidy & christie, 2013; haynes & murris, 2013). only once the community is built, will all participants feel confident to speak out, to disagree and to allow their thinking to be challenged (splitter, 2014). brookfield (1995) continues that the group power dynamic can reflect inequities and that in order to combat this the teacher must model both respectful disagreement as well as constructive criticism, or critical and caring thinking in p4c terminology (fisher, 2007). in one module with students, one member of the community made a joke at another student’s expense. although meant (and taken) in fun, i felt it was important that it was challenged, as it directly contradicted one of the 4 c’s caring thinking (fisher, 2007; splitter, 2014) and potentially could deter less confident students from participating. preparing students/teachers to facilitate p4c burke and williams (2008) found that a crucial element to the success of their work on critical thinking in schools was the preparation of the teachers, advocating the use of modelling to enable teacher confidence. whilst i too would support this, their strategy was to use videos of good practice, whereas for me part of the ingredient for a successful course is that the teachers/students can see the trainer’s genuine enthusiasm/belief in what they are training – it remains open to question whether a video would be as successful at conveying this element. burke and williams (2008) advocate ongoing support throughout the initial training process. i agree that support needs to continue until the practitioner is fully confident, however in my observations of practice in schools occasionally too much support has been provided. this can have a detrimental effect as teachers can come to rely on it, without taking the risks, which inherently lead to furthering expertise and practice. challenges of training a key component of p4c is the centrality of engaging with concepts (splitter, 2014), therefore it is necessary to dedicate sufficient time with teachers or students preparing them not only to become familiar with concepts, but also how to discuss them, work with them, help children to engage with them and make connections between them. working with concepts is one of many challenges of training in p4c. a key challenge is philosophy itself. most teachers or students desiring to train in p4c have no formal background in philosophy (haynes & murris, 2011b; splitter, 2014). this can cause tensions in the philosophy community, with some members insisting that a knowledge of academic philosophy, and in particular logic, is crucial for teachers 19 to help children make progress (haynes & murris, 2011b; murris, 2008). splitter saw a danger that if students were not engaged in genuine inquiry, grappling with concepts on a philosophical level, their thinking could potentially be stuck at ‘the level of the purely experiential and anecdotal’ (2014:96). sapere (2013) suggest that as p4c involves practical philosophy not academic philosophy, qualifications in philosophy are not necessary, however trainers do need to provide at least a philosophical overview, in order to help teachers to facilitate appropriately (haynes & murris, 2011b; splitter, 2014). the necessity of philosophical rigour can cause anxiety for teachers, leading to concerns that they will not be capable of enabling the children to form philosophical questions (haynes & murris, 2011b), indeed this was my own fear when i was introduced to p4c, which thankfully was proved unfounded – thus reinforcing splitter’s (2014) belief that children can deal with very complex philosophical concepts as long as they are suitably presented. another significant challenge for trainees is the shifting power roles in the p4c classroom. in my experience this is greeted with enthusiasm by student teachers, keen to foster a democratic, child-centred classroom; equally some experienced teachers embrace this opportunity to encourage the child’s voice. however other teachers take a more traditional view of power in the classroom, confident in their role as the authority figure, their inclination is ‘to anticipate and correct, respond and direct an answer toward the goals of the lesson’ (haynes & murris, 2011b: 287). for these teachers, the unpredictable nature of p4c, ‘the questioning and democratic nature of the community of enquiry can be demanding and unsettling […] presenting unaccustomed challenges and moral dilemmas’ (haynes & murris, 2011b: 285). equally, the fact that the enquiry cannot be planned to the last detail is disconcerting to some teachers. with student teachers it is necessary to give them ‘permission’ to move away from the traditional lesson plan, learning objectives and success criteria, to follow a more fluid enquiry that is genuinely led by the children – something that again can cause disquiet in certain experienced teachers who prefer the more ‘controlled’ classroom. teachers have commented to me that initially the freedom of the enquiry can feel threatening and requires an element of trust in the pupils and the community. one such teacher subsequently reported that this has invigorated not only her teaching, but herself as an educator. this new vision of themselves as facilitator is crucial for the success of the community, with the two key roles; firstly to enable the pupils to engage in the community’s dialogue, and secondly to encourage them to engage critically – by constantly seeking pupils to give reasons, challenge assumptions and provide examples (splitter, 2014). one common misconception amongst trainees concerns the ‘safety of the community’ (haynes & murris, 2011a: 295). when discussing this fundamental feature, whereby the coe becomes a place where children dare to share their emerging thoughts and opinions, it is important to clarify that this is not to encourage permissiveness. the erroneous product of the idea that there are no right or wrong answers in philosophy, is a belief that ideas cannot and should not be challenged, potentially leading to ‘intellectual complacency’ (haynes & murris, 2011b; murris, 2008; splitter, 2014: 92). haynes and murris (2011b) suggest that this misunderstanding results potentially in a lack of rigour. they suggest normalising disagreement in the coe, where each participant is listened to courteously, with their views considered, however with criticality present, where ‘some contributions can still be treated as invalid, incorrect or irrelevant by the community of enquiry’ (haynes & murris, 2011b: 295). this can prove disquieting for teachers anxious to promote a harmonious classroom, the idea that disagreement can be positive and provide critical learning opportunities for children should be explored with trainees, otherwise it can lead to teachers deliberately avoiding potentially controversial topics for enquiry (murris, 2008). 20 in my experience of training both students and teachers in p4c, i have found that these challenges conversely become positive, causing educators to reassess both their philosophy on education as well as their personal philosophy as teachers. this is supported by haynes & murris (2011b) , who discuss the idea of ‘recurring moments of disequilibrium’ (p291); moments of experience that are troubling or disturbing for [student] teachers. murris (2008) adds that although these moments highlight the challenges for trainees, it also emphasises the rich opportunities that p4c can bring to the classroom and to the teacher. as the trainee (and indeed the class) learn how to become a coe through active participation, their practice will be shaped, informed, renewed and potentially transformed (murris, 2008); ‘disequilibrium is a positive force that opens up a space in which educators need to reflect upon their values, their beliefs about learning and teaching, and ultimately encourages educators to rethink their own role’ (murris, 2008: 667). reflections on training students considering brookfield (1998)’s lenses of reflective practice, all four lenses seem applicable when training students. firstly my own experience of being trained in p4c is something i draw on constantly in my sessions, ensuring i share with them my experiences – both positive and negative, to help them to develop their facilitation. reflection opportunities from the students are timetabled in throughout our seminars, discussing their growing understanding of the theory, but also sharing their own experiences as they start to practise in schools, with a final module evaluation at the end. again this is modelling practice (burke & williams, 2008; lyle & thomaswilliams, 2011), as reflection is built into p4c enquiry – individual, collective and facilitator. brookfield (1995) emphasises the benefit of reflection to avoid the risk of continually making potentially poor decisions/bad judgement calls. as a new trainer in p4c i have been moderated both in training students and tutors. this has provided me with opportunities for reflection through another of brookfield (1998)’s lenses – that of colleagues’ perceptions. my personal reflection post-training, was a concern that i had overloaded the day – however my mentor shared that she felt the day was a good balance of theory and practice. as brookfield (1998) writes, we can focus on our own perceived ‘failings’, therefore the affirming feedback of an experienced practitioner was very encouraging. additionally she was also able to discuss different strategies and approaches she employs in the training, which i will incorporate into future modules. i am aware that brookfield (1998)’s fourth lens uses theoretical, philosophical, and research literature as a reflection tool. using literature to support practice is embedded in winchester’s degree programme and as such is incorporated throughout the module. in this way, the students benefit from a level of underpinning with research and theory that is not possible in the commercial 2 day sapere course. reflections on training tutors over the past two years over 30 curriculum tutors from teacher development at the university of winchester have undertaken p4c training. the first p4c course i ran was with tutors the fact that they were my colleagues was daunting and less daunting in equal measures. daunting because they were all very experienced lecturers at the university and i was apprehensive regarding their response to the course and myself, but equally it was less daunting as i knew they were genuinely interested in p4c and supportive of myself and my plans for the students. i was also nervous due to being moderated by sapere, in order to be accredited as a level 1trainer. at the end of the 21 first day the moderator and i shared our reflections it was useful having an observer, as the intense nature of the day would have made it hard to remember different aspects without their notes! this is similar to the peer observations we participate in at university – in contrast to the often negatively perceived lesson observations in school settings, these are collaborative and informative, intended on highlighting good practice and key reflections. we discussed ways i could improve the session for future courses, particularly trying to break up the quite intense first theory session with a couple of activities to change the pace a little. we also discussed potential amendments to day 2 as a result of our reflections – for example i decided to add extra detail about the six main branches of philosophy to add more clarity about potential philosophical areas and how this might influence stimulus choice. reflections on training teachers the level of experience that the teachers bring to the training is evident in comparison to the students. there are however potentially negative aspects to this, as sometimes the practice of p4c might challenge their own perceptions of education – as previously discussed. in running the first p4c training outwith the university, i had anticipated a level of nervousness due to the fact that this was a commercial course run for the diocese, in practice i experienced a level of collegiality and enthusiasm equal to the tutors’ training. what was particularly gratifying was the fact that the teachers immediately return to schools to use this approach with their classes, meaning the subsequent day’s training (one month later) starts with them sharing their reflections from their first enquiries, which is very rewarding to hear and, using brookfield (1998)’s lens analogy, means that they can benefit from their colleagues’ perceptions and experiences to further develop their own. conclusions reviewing the key questions the first question was ‘can p4c be effectively linked with the primary curriculum?’ my response is twofold. firstly that it should not be seen as an additional curriculum subject. finding time to include a separate programme would pose difficulties for most schools (burke & williams, 2008). incorporating p4c throughout the curriculum, whether to drive a particular area of focus or embedded in different subjects, has the benefit of incorporating the many p4c skills alongside the curriculum content (burke & williams, 2008). secondly, p4c should not be statutory. murris (2008) suggests that if p4c was compulsory, it ‘may be at risk of losing its philosophical rigour, and critical educational and political agenda’ (p676). whilst remaining convinced of the manifold benefits of p4c, it is one that depends on participants fully embracing both the training and the continuing development. the second and third questions, concerned the potential benefits of, and objections to p4c. one of hayes’(2014) criticisms of p4c is that it is akin to therapy. whilst there can be therapeutic outcomes, p4c facilitators and trainers would insist that this is not an intended outcome (murris, 2001), rather one of a variety of non-academic benefits. in both my own experience and from those i have trained, teachers often remark that p4c adds a new dimension to their teaching as well as to the way their pupils think (fisher, 2007). finally i examined the question of the issues that have arisen in reflecting on my professional practice in teaching student teachers and teachers about using p4c. lyle and thomas-williams 22 (2011), reported a concern that the skill necessitated for successful p4c facilitation might preclude inexperienced teachers or students. certainly training experienced teachers is very different to training students, however in my experience the impact it can have on students’ emerging teacher identity can be profound. last semester’s cohort named it as the best module of their degree and unanimously stated that it had impacted significantly on the kind of teacher they wanted to be. many of them highlighted the democratic principles of p4c as something they wanted to emulate in their future classrooms, seeing the philosophy behind p4c as more wide-reaching than a curriculum approach. future implications in response to student demand, two option modules will be run in p4c in the current academic year. in addition, we have increased the coverage of p4c in the first two years of the bed programme, meaning all students will receive an introduction to p4c sapere qualification. this semester has seen p4c training for both the pgce part time and secondary religious education groups, in response to direct requests – a practice likely to continue. training for a third group of ite tutors is planned for the spring, with planned cpd training with the diocese and church schools already timetabled for next year. works cited alexander, r. 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(2013). thinking skills and early childhood education. oxon: routledge. daniel, m., & auriac, e. (2011). philosophy, critical thinking and philosophy for children1. educational philosophy and theory, 43(5), 415-435. 23 dfe. (2013). the national curriculum in england key stages 1 and 2 framework document. london: dfe retrieved from http://www.gov.uk/dfe/nationalcurriculum. dfe. (2014). promoting fundamental british values as part of smsc in schools. departmental advice for maintained schools. london: dfe. ecclestone, k., & hayes, d. (2009). the dangerous rise of therapeutic education. oxon: routledge. edwards, j. (2013). fighting gove's nightmare vision for primary education. forum, 55, 429-434. egan, k. (2011). primary understanding: education in early childhood. london: routledge. fisher, r. (2007). dialogic teaching: developing thinking and metacognition through philosophical discussion. early child development and care, 177(6-7), 615-631. fisher, r. (2013). teaching thinking: philosophical enquiry in the classroom. london: bloomsbury. fox, r. (2001). can children be philosophical? teaching thinking, 4, 46-49. gardner, s. (1996). inquiry is no mere conversation (or discussion or dialogue) facilitation of inquiry is hard work! analytic teaching, 16(2), 102 111. gaut, b., & gaut, m. (2013). philosophy for young children: a practical guide. oxon: routledge. hannam, d. (2013). student participation and voice... and the new english national curriculum for citizenship education. connect, 203, 25 27. hayes, d. (2014). can kids do kant? retrieved 07/06/15, from http://theconversation.com/can-kids-do-kant-22623 haynes, f. (2014). teaching children to think for themselves: from questioning to dialogue. journal of philosophy in schools, 1(1), 131 147. haynes, j., & murris, k. (2011a). picturebooks, pedagogy, and philosophy. oxon: routledge. haynes, j., & murris, k. (2011b). the provocation of an epistemological shift in teacher education through philosophy with children. journal of philosophy of education, 45(2), 285303. haynes, j., & murris, k. (2013). the realm of meaning: imagination, narrative and playfulness in philosophical exploration with young children. early child development and care, 183(8), 1084-1100. hcc. (2014). primary update summer 2014. retrieved from http://www3.hants.gov.uk/primaryupdate-summer-2014.pdf accessed 5/03/15. 24 jenkins, p., & lyle, s. (2010). enacting dialogue: the impact of promoting philosophy for children on the literate thinking of identified poor readers, aged 10. language and education, 24(6), 459-472. kirk, d. (1992). physical education, discourse, and ideology: bringing the hidden curriculum into view. quest, 44(1), 35-56. lang, p. (1998). getting round to clarity: what do we mean by circle time? pastoral care in education, 16(3), 3-10. lipman, m. (2003). thinking in education. cambridge: cambridge university press. lyle, s., & thomas-williams, j. (2011). dialogic practice in primary schools: how primary head teachers plan to embed philosophy for children into the whole school. educational studies, 38(1), 1-12. doi: 10.1080/03055698.2010.540824 mackinlay, m. (2014). teachers’ response to curriculum reforms: primary. schoolzone educational intelligence retrieved from http://www.schoolzone.co.uk/schools/ncres/primary/curriculum_reform_report_pri mary_updated.pdf accessed 05/03/15. murris, k. (2000). can children do philosophy? journal of philosophy of education, 34(2), 261-279. murris, k. (2001). are children natural philosophers? teaching thinking, 5, 46 49. murris, k. (2008). philosophy with children, the stingray and the educative value of disequilibrium. journal of philosophy of education, 42(3‐4), 667-685. peterson, a., lexmond, j., hallgarten, j., & kerr, d. (2014). schools with soul: a new approach to spiritual, moral, social and cultural education. london: rsa: action and research centre. rowson, j. (2014). spiritualise: revitalising spirituality to address 21st century challenges. london: rsa action and research centre. sapere. (2013). ite unit final. oxford: sapere. sapere. (2015). p4c and the curriculum retrieved 17/04/15, from http://www.sapere.org.uk/default.aspx?tabid=139 splitter, l. j. (2014). preparing teachers to'teach'philosophy for children. journal of philosophy in schools, 1(1), 89 106. topping, k. j., & trickey, s. (2007). collaborative philosophical inquiry for schoolchildren: cognitive gains at 2‐year follow‐up. british journal of educational psychology, 77(4), 787796. 25 trickey, s., & topping, k. j. (2004). ‘philosophy for children’: a systematic review. research papers in education, 19(3), 365-380. unicef. (2012). a summary of the un convention on the rights of the child. retrieved 17/04/15, from http://www.unicef.org.uk/documents/publicationpdfs/betterlifeleaflet2012_press.pdf ward, j., allsopp, a., shergill, g. k., yates, j., & smith, j. (2015). newsletter 2015. in sapere (ed.). oxon: sapere. address correspondences to: rhiannon love senior lecturer (primary religious education & philosophy for children) department for teacher development, faculty of education, health and social care university of winchester winchester so22 4nr rhiannon.love@winchester.ac.uk analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 1 for a ‘non-mathematical’ learning of mathematics. a philosophical-educational reflection on philosophical inquiry and mathematics classes stefano oliverio ‘a , that is, “let no-one without knowledge of geometry enter:” the inscription displayed on the entrance to plato’s academy reminds us how close the relationships between mathematics1 and philosophy used to be. in this perspective, when we approach the issue of how philosophical inquiry can further maths’ teaching/learning, a sort of archaeological attitude (agamben, 2008) is in order, which delves into the layers of a long history, plumbs the recondite depths of western thought, and unearths what remains too often concealed either because it is taken for granted or because we have become unable to detect what constitutes the very way in which we think. accordingly, investigating the role and significance of philosophical inquiry for the learning/teaching of maths does not consist simply in reflecting upon the possibility of extending a specific pedagogical model (in this present case the philosophy for children approach) to another area of teaching or upon the didactic strategies necessary to do that (pivotal as they are) but, more radically, it means re-thinking the deep solidarity between what we are endeavouring to (re-)harmonize – maths and philosophy. but is that ancient and venerable harmony between mathematics and philosophy the one which we want to re-establish in our classrooms? or is the sense in which we understand philosophy when we appeal to its mobilization in math classes profoundly different from that which resonates in the academy emblem? one thing should attract our attention: the warning on the academy entrance intimated that math is a prerequisite for accessing philosophy, a visa to enter the domain of the philosophical. in contrast, by invoking a recourse to philosophical inquiry in math classes, we reverse the order and suggest that through the former we can approach the latter in more profitable, if not more effective, ways. what is entailed in such a change of perspective? actually, things are much more complicated; the academy admonition says not that math is the door through which we can enter philosophy, as if, by studying math, we could gain access to philosophy, but rather that only those who already have a knowledge of mathematics can pass the door which opens onto philosophy. in other words, no one without knowledge of math can hope to be admitted into a philosophical community, but this does not imply that all those who know math will be admitted; math is a necessary but not sufficient condition for philosophy. on the contrary, by proposing that through philosophical inquiry, following the model of lipman’s community of inquiry (lipman, 1988, 1991, 2003; sharp, 1987, 1996; splitter & sharp, 1995; d. kennedy, 1995, 1997, 2004a, 2004b, 2012), we can familiarize ourselves with math, we are turning the community of philosophy into a (possible) ‘door,’ into a way of access. what does it imply for philosophy? apparently, it is no longer the academy philosophy, that ‘after-the-door,’ but another kind of philosophy, but which one? analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 1 2 by questioning the relationships between mathematics and philosophy, within a learning/teaching situation, we are compelled to raise the question of what is philosophy when it ceases to be what is ‘after the door’ and becomes the ‘door’ itself, so that the community of philosophical inquiry (cpi) could be characterized, with a grain of irony, as that group which is at the door (of maths?). and, more interestingly, we should ask why this new status of philosophy reveals itself in a particularly clear way precisely when we endeavour to understand how philosophy can be mobilized to learn/teach maths. indeed, the texture of this present reflection holds together three topics which include philosophy, mathematics and learning/teaching. even better, it attempts to bring their unity to light. as i will attempt to show, investigating math means constitutively inquiring into learning/teaching and this, in turn, appeals to an exploration of what philosophy is and what it can be. if plato’s academy is something more than an experience in western pedagogy and has become the prototype of every higher education institution, it is because it articulated in an epoch-making way the relationships between mathematics, learning/teaching, and philosophy. and it did it with the force of a commandment (it is noteworthy that the warning on the academy entrance is in the imperative mode). questioning this imperative, reversing the order--in any meaning of the word--and making maths and philosophy not two steps in a sort of evolutionary sequence but the allies in an educational project which tries to re-define what learning and teaching are, all this is ultimately what the whole reflection on cpi and maths classes amounts to. 1. away from the ‘mathematical’ despotism: the need for a recovery of philosophical inquiry why did people have to know mathematics in order to enter the academy? to capture the meaning of the admonition we have to understand to what end an institution such as the academy was founded. to put it in a nutshell, the academy was plato’s response to the scandal of socrates’ death, and it is connected with an overturning of that idea of philosophy of which socrates had been the embodiment. in his later studies on socrates, gregory vlastos emphasized that the elenchus (the socratic method based on questions-answers) is an inquiry which, although it aims at truth, does not envision the same truth as that of mathematical reasoning. on the contrary, the ‘mathematical truth,’ and the specific method connected with it – the ‘hypothetical’ method which is spoken of in meno 86e (ex hypothéseos skopeîsthai, we read there) –, is what plato will substitute for the socratic method in order to obviate the shortcomings of the latter (we will see later what they were). the procedure of socrates, as vlastos reconstructs it, is clearly marked in its stages: 1) the interlocutor asserts a thesis p, which socrates considers false and targets for refutation. 2) socrates secures agreement to further premises, say q and r […]. the agreement is ad hoc: socrates argues from {q, r}, not to them. socrates then argues, and the interlocutor agrees, that q and r entail not-p. 4) socrates then claims that he has shown that not-p is true, p false. (ibid., p. 11) in other words, socrates operates on the beliefs of his interlocutors, and aims at showing their contradictions. what is most significant in the socratic method is that it is a real inquiry because the philosopher has no guarantee of success and no absolute ground on which to found his argumentation. as a matter of fact, all steps are negotiated with his interlocutors. this notwithstanding, socrates is sure that he will always be able to prove the fallacy of the belief p, to stick to the aforementioned example. according to vlastos, socrates harbors this conviction not because he believes that he owns a godly wisdom but, on the contrary, because he has only a human wisdom (anthropíne sophía, we read in apology 20d-20e), that comes from his previous inquiries, which had borne out the consistency of his own system of beliefs, while “[a]ll others, when tested for consistency, have failed”(vlastos, 1994a, p. 27). by drawing upon such an interpretation, and with a certain hermeneutical bending, we could venture the analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 3 idea that the trust in the consistency of his own system of beliefs is a presupposition of socrates’ inquiry only insofar as it is the outcome of previous inquiries, without being anchored to any warranty going beyond the inquiry itself. in any discussion socrates bets on the robustness of his system of beliefs, tests it and exposes it to the risk of failure but, simultaneously, by doing that, he corroborates it whenever he shows the inconsistency of beliefs contradictory with his. the educational implications of such a procedure are that socrates’ position is not absolute in principle (despite his charisma risking overshadowing this fact): as far as i understand him, appropriating vlastos’ reflections, socrates is not a doctrinaire teacher but rather one engaged in a real dialogue, and, accordingly, a common inquiry can occur, in which socrates is also a learner (insofar as he learns that actually his beliefs are the only ones to avoid contradiction). as he does not have any godly wisdom but only a human one, his philosophizing is always a co-philosophizing (symphilosopheîn), which is a communal philosophical inquiry animated by a co-educative tension. in this procedure, knowing and educating each other are two sides of the same coin. and such a wisdom is human because it does not pretend to be absolute, it is an inquiry not a quest for certainty, to use a deweyan (1984[1929]; 1986[1933]; 1986[1938]) vocabulary. but “how could it have happened that each and every one of socrates’ interlocutors did have those true beliefs he need[ed] to refute [from] all of their false ones?” (vlastos, 1994a, p. 29): this is a question – vlastos remarks – which never came from socrates, but plato attempted to answer through “[t]hat wildest of plato’s metaphysical flights, that ultraspeculative theory that all learning is ‘recollection’” (ibidem). what is most interesting in this context is, however, the reason why plato felt the need to lay a metaphysical foundation for socrates’ method. the scandal of the trial and of the death of his master convinced plato that the inquiring method of socrates, destitute of any metaphysical anchoring, was constantly exposed to the danger of succumbing to its limitations. plato endeavored to find a kind of ‘thinking’ which could be a rival in strength with the effective and actual force of the leaders, of the athenian democracy, to which he had been a witness during the trial. he identified such a ‘forceful’ kind of thinking in mathematics. indeed, as hannah arendt (1965) remarked, in a completely different context, plato started the tradition of insisting on: the compelling nature of axiomatic or self-evident truth, whose paradigmatic example […] has been the kind of statements with which we are confronted in mathematics. le mercier de la rivière was perfectly right when he wrote: “euclide est un véritable despote et les vérités géométriques qu’il nous a transmises sont des lois véritablement despotiques. leur despotisme légal et le despotisme personnel de ce législateur n’en font qu’un, celui de la force irresistible de l’évidence;” […]. in our context it is important to note that only mathematical laws were thought to be sufficiently irresistible to check the power of despots. (arendt, 1965, p. 193) as a consequence of the scandal of the trial and death of socrates, plato operated an epoch-making shift and what his master had refused (that is, the ‘mathematical’ research of the meno) is mobilized to give strength to socrates’ thinking. from that point on no one without any knowledge of mathematics would be allowed to enter the academy. mathematics became a sort of fortified outpost which protected philosophy from lapsing into the ultimately losing confrontation with the dóxai, the opinions of the city. philosophy is no longer an inquiry investigating the beliefs of subjects but a kind of mathematical thinking, which derives consequences from first principles which are self-evident. in this new thematic constellation, at least as i am interpreting it, the alliance between mathematics and philosophy occurs at the expense of inquiry understood as a kind of research which has no guarantee, no axiomatic certainty, no absolutely firm ground. it is important to bear in mind this fact because here we find both the reasons for the mistrust that the proposal of using p4c for maths classes can encounter and those for a possible failure of such an educational proposal, when it is not clear to which idea of philosophy we are referring. indeed, on the one hand, to the extent that math continues to be considered the paradigm of ‘compelling reasoning,’ any mobilization of p4c could appear to be inappropriate, if not detrimental, insofar analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 3 4 as it risks ‘infecting’ with discussion and dialogue what should be intrinsically monological because absolutely certain. on the contrary, what will be argued here is that there is – in a quasi-deweyan sense (1980[1917]) – a need for a recovery of mathematics which is parallel and even interwoven with the need for a recovery of philosophy, to which lipman much more than dewey gave educational expression (oliverio, 2012b). on the other hand, this recovery is possible only if we are clear about what kind of philosophy we are speaking of and about the radicalism of lipman’s proposal of the community of philosophical inquiry, which represents a counter-movement in comparison with the academic one. to put it in a slogan: through p4c and cpi lipman realizes, at an educational level, a ‘back to socrates’ (lipman, 1988, p. 12) movement, socrates being the name for the search for a ‘human wisdom’ as opposed to the ex hypothéseos skopeîsthai characterizing mathematics. as the socratic method, as far as i have presented it in vlastos’ wake, predominantly addressed ethical issues, it could be suggested that p4c and cpi can and should be used in math classes only when we are interested in exploring the moral and political dimensions of mathematics. while it is plausible that this represents one of the opportunities offered by p4c applied to maths classes (n.s. kennedy, 2012a), it does not exhaust the range of possibilities. we should understand in what sense socrates’ inquiry is an ethical one. as far as i construe his undertaking, socrates attempts to bring his interlocutors to ethics passing through an examination of morals. ‘moral’ comes from latin mos and refers to the mores of a society, to that set of rules which are codified and are often taken for granted and complied with without any personal commitment. in contrast, ‘ethics’ comes from the greek éthos, which originally means ‘the appropriate place.’ the ‘ethical’ inquiry properly understood does not deal (only and primarily) with morals but with how the individual positions him/herself in relationship to the world, and it concerns, consequently, the whole being-in-the-world of individuals, their existence and, more particularly, the ways they find something existentially meaningful. ‘ethical inquiry’ is a search for meaning and, from this perspective, the entire lipman and sharp enterprise, insofar as it is directed to meaning (lipman et al., 1980), is ‘ethical’ and therefore ‘socratic.’ accordingly, engaging with mathematics through ethical-socratic inquiry (= lipman philosophical inquiry) adds up to more than investigating the moral or political dimensions of math. it rather concerns the question of to what extent math is meaningful, how it can be and how individuals make sense of it. it is a search for meaning while learning math: in this perspective it is ‘ethical.’ it allows individuals to find ‘the appropriate place’ for math in their existence. and this happens not only at a strictly moral but also at an ‘epistemological’ level (see below § 3). before investigating in more detail the educational and pedagogical implications of this shift, i want to explore what the philosophical-educational characteristics of the academy are so that the peculiarities of the cpi approach can stand out more clearly. 2. the overthrow of the academic model and the ‘pragmatic’ learning in describing the academy, i will focus not on the historical debates occurring there (which still represent a paradigm for intellectually open discussion [berti, 2010]) but rather on the quasi-archetypical image of it which has congealed in the western tradition. the exploration of this image will allow us, on the one hand, to identify the differences of lipman’s (and more generally a pragmatist) understanding of philosophical inquiry in comparison with the traditional educational model and, on the other, to highlight how the predominance of ‘mathematical’ despotism affected the academic view of philosophy. in the academy, the reality of philosophy consists primarily and essentially in the philosopher’s vision of the principles, the absolutely metaphysical ideas, that constitute the very core of the world. this vision is not the outcome of a common inquiry but of the ‘intimacy’ of the philosopher, in his solitude, with the object of his theory. the seventh letter (341b-341c) bears witness to such a view of philosophy. plato opens up a analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 5 gulf between the ‘theoretical activity’ of the philosopher and teaching; the former cannot be taught stricto sensu, teaching will always be not only a derivative activity but one that cannot convey what is the innermost nature of theory. consequently, also any cooperation is excluded: inquiry is solitary, it is hardly inquiry in an appropriate sense; as a matter of fact, it is vision (theoria, in greek). against this backdrop, the imperative on the entrance of academy is comprehensible: the paradigm for such a theoretical activity is the mathematician isolated from the world of worldly appearances and immersed in the universe of numbers (purely ‘abstract’ entities, the intercourse with which is an isolated mental matter and excludes any inter-human intercourse). hierarchically subordinate to this first reality is what paul landesberg (1923) calls “the second reality of philosophy,” which is constituted by the disciples of philosophers and propagates in the successors of philosophers during the ensuing centuries. the writings of philosophers are one of the means of spreading this second reality but they “are in no way a reality of philosophy but precisely only printed or written paper” (landesberg, 1923, p. 95). the genuine life of philosophy is realized in the vision, which belongs to the philosopher and is then (partly) communicated to disciples and successors. in the academy device, while the first level reality can exist without the second level (= the innermost core of philosophy – the vision of the thinker – does not need a community of co-inquirers), the second is nothing without the first. it is important to note two things: first, in this perspective, the circle of disciples is only a bridge between philosophy in its real essence and its socialization and dissemination. students are not a part of the very reality of philosophy, and do not participate in the production of thoughts but only in their communication. and, second, their function is, though, superior to that of the writings because “philosophy is real only when it is realized and taught: in philosophizing” (ibidem). to put it schematically: level 1 = the isolated philosopher’s vision/theory = the innermost reality of philosophy; level 2 = the circle of disciples = the communicated reality of philosophy; level 3 = the writings = the means of communication, therefore destitute of any real bonds with the reality of philosophy (indeed, they are connected with level 2, but as the connection is only instrumental, they do not affect in any way the reality). with this model in mind, we can assess the novelty of the idea of a classroom turned into a community of philosophical inquiry. in cpi, philosophy does not exist prior to and outside the circle of students who cophilosophize. and students are not disciples of a philosopher, whose vision they rehearse or re-cite, but they are the producers of thoughts within a plural setting (level 2 > level 1). philosophy is here not the outcome of an isolated soul/mind immersed in the contemplation of ideal entities but of a distributed thinking occurring in a space-temporal context. and written texts are not the soulless ‘materialization’ of philosophy but, on the one hand, under the form, for instance, of ‘philosophical novels,’ they are what triggers the philosophical inquiry, without which no philosophy would exist, and, on the other hand, – under the form of the agenda on the paper-board – they are what embodies the distributed thinking of the cpi (and, consequently, they are not only written paper but the ‘objective correlate’ (in t.s. eliot’s phrase) of the philosophical activity). thus, the academic schema is completely reversed. it is crucial, however, to highlight that, thanks to the cpi approach, it is not a mechanical reversal which we have to do with here, but rather a real deconstruction, that is, in a quasi derridean vein, something that activates and operates on what remained unsaid and concealed in the academy model. this is the case in at least two respects: first, in the academy model, as disciples occupy a middle position (between the vision of the thinker and its social dissemination) and as they constitute what ‘actualizes’ philosophy because philosophy is humanly actualized only when it is taught (see landesberg, 1923, p. 95), they are a sort of intermediary and have, then, precisely the mediating position of the philosopher, such as pierre hadot (2002) magnificently analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 5 6 depicted it by comparing socrates and eros. the real philosophy in the ‘socratic’ sense resides not in the self-secluded soul/mind of a philosopher en-visioning first principles but in the co-educative dynamics of a communal inquiry. there is no genuine philosophy if not within a co-philosophizing as educational relation. secondly, when speaking of writings and condemning them in comparison with the first reality (the spark in the psyche of the thinker), plato uses an interesting word: súggramma, that is, the semantic root for writing (-gramma) and the prefix sun(=with). the platonic textuality suggests that the writing and the cooperative dimension of philosophy as an inquiry are intimately interwoven. and if, as we can state through a hermeneutical twist of landesberg’s text, writings – insofar as they are re-actualized in that wordly realization of philosophy that its teaching – are “the lasting power of [the] birth” of philosophy (landesberg, 1923, p. 95), then it is within a session of philosophical inquiry, set off by a philosophical novel and – possibly – culminating in another written text (the written agenda), that philosophy comes into the world over and over again. better, philosophy is nothing but a continuing re-birth within the context of a communal inquiry made possible by writings and animated by an educational tension. the static ‘mathematical’ contemplation is replaced, then, with a movement of re-birth. a second dimension of ‘mathematic,’ one which is related directly to learning, needs to be investigated. in order to define ‘mathematics’ heidegger (1987) refers to tà mathémata, the things insofar as they are learnable, from which he distinguishes tà prágmata, that is, the things insofar as they are that with which we have to do, to deal with, something related to práxis understood as any human doing. if tà mathémata are the learnable things, what is learning? according to heidegger, learning is a kind of acquisition, a ‘taking’: the mathémata are the things insofar as we take cognizance of them as what we already know in advance […]. such a proper learning is thereby an extremely remarkable taking, a taking where who takes takes only that which fundamentally he already has. (heidegger, 1987[1936], p. 56) what the student already has and is, therefore, learnable, ‘the mathematical’ in heidegger’s sense as i am idiosyncratically reading him, is what is alien to the existential level and belongs to the ideal realm, that is, to that domain accessible only to a disembodied, self-secluded reason. what happens when such a kind of learning, which treats things ‘mathematically,’ that is, as learnable things (=ultimately known in advance, in the sense that they are cogently valid and are to be demonstrated and not discovered through an inquiry), is replaced with a ‘pragmatic’ learning, that treats its contents (even the specifically mathematical ones, that is, numbers, etc.) as something which we have to do with? if we can construe the entire lipmanian undertaking ‘pragmatically,’ that is, as a way of putting philosophy into practice, of educating for doing philosophy (lipman, 1988, p. 12), the issue we should finally investigate is what happens when this way of understanding philosophy is used for math classes, for teaching precisely that subject-matter that seems the least susceptible to any ‘pragmatic’ learning, and so much so that it is the very paradigm – in the academy – of the flight from existence into the domain of the abstract. in § 1, i have spoken of an ‘ethical’ approach to mathematics, one that explores, through philosophical inquiry, the meaning of mathematics within one’s own existence; in this paragraph, the idea of a pragmatic learning was put forward. it is time, now, to outline how the deployment of philosophical inquiry can act on math classes in an ‘ethical-pragmatic’ perspective. 3. the tears of philippa: philosophical dialogue and math classes in his obituary for rorty, the italian mathematician giorgio bagni (2007) pointed out the significance of rorty’s philosophy for math education by insisting on his anti-platonism: analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 7 as a matter of fact, a platonic approach cannot be stated uncritically in educational practice […] the connection between knowledge and social practice is really a crucial issue from the educational point of view […] richard rorty strongly underlined the crucial importance of the community as source of epistemic authority […]. (p. 2) bagni’s remarks are interesting because they allow us to outline the specificity of a lipmanian approach to math. to say it with a formula, we could state that lipman occupies a middle ground between plato and rorty, avoiding the shortcomings of both approaches. while it can be maintained – and this has been the topic of the previous paragraphs – that a non-platonic stance towards philosophy and mathematics can represent a major gain for math education, it is moot whether a typically rortyan emphasis on solidarity instead of objectivity (rorty, 1991) would represent real progress in math education. in other words, while bagni appears to be enthusiastic, in his few lines praising rorty’s philosophy, about the prospects that the latter opens up to math education, i would like to highlight that rorty’s stress on community is profoundly different from lipman’s and that, while the latter can add to the meaning of math learning/teaching, the former risks dissolving it. indeed, due to his misgivings with the notion of inquiry, it is debatable that rorty would accept serenely the idea of a community of philosophical inquiry. he would have probably found it still too mortgaged by an ‘objectivity-oriented’ attitude, as if the value and the raison d’être of the community were external to it and to the solidarity-principle. as was sagaciously remarked (silva, 2010), rorty and lipman represent two misreadings, in a bloomian (1973, 1975) sense, of dewey’s legacy and i would tend to believe that, while lipman can play a major role in reconstructing the practices of math education, rorty can provide us with helpful suggestions for the pars destruens but can have little import on the pars construens. indeed, the core of the rortyan insistence on solidarity is that only dialogue counts and not also what the dialogue is directed to. the peril i see in this perspective is that it represents only the antipodean opposition to the academy model i have depicted. if in the academy community counted for nothing, as far as the theoretical searching for truth was concerned, in rorty’s device the search for truth counts for nothing. the notion of “conversation” captures beautifully this change of perspective. if it is obviously possible that within a solidarity-oriented community a continuous adding to the repertoires of meanings occurs (indeed, it is the mark of a flourishing community), this is not the outcome of an inquiry understood as a search for truth. on the contrary, as susan gardner has magnificently argued, “progress toward truth is vital to the practice of inquiry and […] if such progress is not made, the term ‘community of inquiry’ becomes a misnomer” (gardner, 1995/1996, p. 102). the pedagogical repercussion of these distinctions (conversation ≠ dialogue; rortyan community ≠ lipmanian community) is that in a conversational approach looking over the development of the inquiry during a class (or a p4c session) can be overlooked – let the pun be allowed – because the mere progress of conversation is enough and can contribute to the strengthening of the solidarity of the community. in contrast, in the cpi it is crucial that the glue of the community, that is what holds the latter together, is the commitment to a search for truth (leaving, for the moment, aside a more clear characterization of this truth). ignoring this search is calamitous for a p4c session (many of us are painfully aware of how what goes on in classrooms is too often not a p4c session but a nice conversation starting from lipmanian texts and sticking to some lipmanian procedures). and this would be even more the case, if we wanted to mobilize this conversationally-weakened kind of cpi for math education. the search for truth, without being a capitulation to a ‘platonic objectivity,’ supplies the community with an inquiring horizon, which should structure the relationships occurring in it and give the dialogues a direction (what gadamer (1960) would call the logos of the dialogue). the teacher oversees such a direction analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 7 8 by contributing to the harmonizing of the different strands of the dialogue (corresponding to the different positions of the students, which are not to be reduced to uniformity) in a dialogic-unity-out-of-differences. i am insisting on this idea of a dialogue directed to (a non-platonically-objective) truth to prepare a conceptual platform for the discussion of the role of philosophical inquiry within math classes, by putting in relief both the ways in which this approach is linked with other experiences in math education and its peculiarities, which, in my opinion, allow it to eschew some drawbacks. paul ernest (1994) focused on the dialogic nature of mathematics itself, showing how it “sits at the crossroads of two major currents of modern thought, the recent fallibilist tradition in the philosophy of mathematics, and the multidisciplinary use of the conversation as a basic underlying metaphor for human knowing and interaction” (p. 33). as to the first current, its main feature consists in the rejection of the following four theses: 1. there is a secure and fixed basis of truth on which mathematical knowledge is founded; 2. there are wholly reliable logical deductions of mathematical theorems from explicit premises; 3. absolute mathematical knowledge based on impeccable proofs is an ideal which is attainable; 4. the logical properties of mathematical proof alone suffice to establish mathematical knowledge without reference to human agency or the social domain. these theses underpin the traditional absolutist views of mathematical knowledge and establish its monological character. they are also central assumptions of cartesian rationalism and the modernism based on it. (ibid., p. 35) it is true that these theses belong to modern rationalism but, as i have tried to illustrate above, they have their most ancient forebear in the academy model. as to the second current mentioned by ernest, he summons different thinkers such as rorty, wittgenstein and gadamer. in order to launch an alternative to the monological tradition in math education it could be appropriate to display such a panoply of philosophies, yet i would tend to consider the ‘conversational’ strand of this new dialogic tradition less promising for math classes. even if we take leave of the absolutist view, it is important to bear in mind that inquiry, also within mathematics, demands a direction to truth and, therefore, that some ‘dialogic philosophies’ are more suitable than others in order to underpin a renewal of math learning/teaching. ernest shows also how the dialogic nature of mathematics “encompasses its textual basis, some of its concepts, the origins and nature of proof, and the social processes whereby mathematical knowledge is created, warrented and learnt” (ibid., pp. 44-46). apart from the misgivings about the idea of conversation, i agree with the main point made by ernest. but if his argumentations permit us to find, within the domain of mathematics education, a respondency to the (philosophical-educational) reflections conducted in this present paper, they do not constitute per se the ‘proof’ that something like philosophical inquiry/dialogue is beneficial for math classes. to put it in the p4c vocabulary, my discussion plan will be finally the following: if maths education should always have a dialogic nature (in keeping with the dialogic nature of mathematics itself), when, why, to what end and in what forms is a typically philosophical dialogue helpful? over the last years nadia stoyanova kennedy has been investigating such issues and has spoken of “interruption,” by drawing upon a biesta (2006; 2010) notion. what is interrupted is the “normal order” ruling over the pedagogical praxis in classrooms and the interruption “may be as straightforward as prompting analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 9 students to question their own understandings of a concept under discussion, to reflect on what they know and what they do not know, to question their peers’ understanding of the concept” (n.s. kennedy, 2012a, p. 261). so understood, interruption is a quasi-socratic, torpedo-like move, which prevents students from falling into a ‘disciplinary’ slumber, that is, into the risk of taking for granted the concepts of a discipline (as socrates’ fellow-citizens took for granted the mores of their city). and it permits individuals to reconnect the learning of the discipline to the broader context of their own being-in-the-world (the ethical dimension of learning math, in the sense spelled out above). it is important to appreciate the peculiar note of the notion of “interruption:” it does not refer to a breaking-in from without, but to something that, by operating on the interstices of the bodies of disciplines, breaks the spell of the monological closure – always looming over every discipline – and opens up a space for discussion and dialogue. this kind of inter-ruption is the condition for the ‘interest,’ understood etymologically as the being in-between, at the door, to use once again the metaphor i have started with. if it opens up a space for dialogue, which reconnects math in its dialogic nature to human transactions with the world, philosophical inquiry represents also a radicalization of the inquiring nature of mathematics itself. john mason (2002, p. 109) has beautifully spoken of a “conjecturing atmosphere” which sustains learning of mathematics. and in an analogous vein, derek holton (1997), by building upon legrand’s idea of the débat scientifique, remarks: under le débat scientifique, […] students are seen as participants in a scientific community whose methods of development include conjectures, proofs and regulations. scientific debates can arise spontaneously, as when a student asks a question, or can be intentionally provoked. the guiding principles for scientific debate include: disturbance – students must encounter and deal with conflict; inclusiveness – everyone should have an opportunity to understand what we try to teach; and collectivity – collective resolution of issues shows how to work with contradictions and to respect the views of others. now it may seem strange that what is labelled “scientific” has such a strong social underpinning. maybe this can be explained by noting that the point of the exercise is to allow students to engage in “scientific debate.” this requires an atmosphere where conjecturing is supported, where students feel free to put forward their ideas, where they are not embarrassed to make a mistake, and where they feel that they are able to modify the ideas of others. (p. 4) i have quoted at length this passage because it refers to a socio-epistemic dynamics very similar to that in the cpi: what is, then, the specificity of the cpi? if the philosophical dimension has to be more than a contentingredient, it should represent rather a difference in that dynamics. to capture this point we have to refer back to the very idea of the community of philosophical inquiry. the phrase was drawn by lipman from peirce (d. kennedy, 2010, p. 15), but with a major qualification, expressed by the adjective ‘philosophical.’ in peirce, inquiry is stirred by a “genuine doubt,” that is, by something that intervenes to disrupt our beliefs. genuine doubt is some real “indecision, however momentary, in our action” (to use the peircean expression), which is obviously quite different from the kind of interruption which philosophical inquiry produces. the whole project of a community of philosophical inquiry would be, therefore, ultimately, pace lipman, non-peircean, and disconnected from the way a scientific community works and unable to have effects on inquiries concerning science (and also math, for that matter). but things are, actually, more complicated and by understanding in what sense lipman is really faithful to analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 9 10 one dimension of the peircean legacy we can appreciate also the contribution which cpi can provide maths classes with. as browning (1991) noted, by 1905: peirce recognized a form of philosophically significant inquiry which did not have a starting point of genuine doubt. […] the preferred form of philosophical investigation is [...] that which serves both to lead towards and encourage genuine doubt and to proceed, once such doubt has been so brought about, to its destruction by belief. but on this view the starting point of philosophical investigation is no longer genuine doubt, which now occupies a middle point in the investigation, but something quite different. this new starting point, though not adumbrated in any detail by peirce, appears to consist in or be instituted by a sort of voluntary act in which one “sets himself” to reflect upon and examine certain of his beliefs. (pp. 20-21) the ingenuity of lipman consisted in the fact that, without presumably having any accurate knowledge of peirce’s thinking, he was able to grasp one important element in the latter’s epistemology and to translate it into a powerful educational device, that is the cpi. when used for the learning/teaching of disciplines, the cpi is the pedagogical approach which, by soliciting philosophical doubts (step 1), can contribute to the emergence of ‘genuine doubts’ (step 2), without which no true inquiry (step 3) can be realized. indeed, it is often insufficient to promote courses of (non-philosophical) inquiry, which may remain incapsulated in the matrix of the discipline. it is obviously welcome to use any kind of teaching strategy, which prevents students from lapsing into the trap of what leibniz called psittacism, the parrotism in the re-citation of lessons. but not always, despite their merits, can inquiry-based methods obviate adequately this risk. as a matter of fact, if not generated by a genuine doubt, the inquiry which develops, brilliant and interesting as it may be, can be less fruitful in terms of a real understanding of the topic than expected. the students risk playing more the role of kuhnian (1970) puzzle-solvers than that of peircean inquirers. consequently, a significant move of the teacher could/should be that of promoting the emergence of a genuine doubt via the mobilization of philosophical inquiry, according to a peircean-lipmanian model. i will provide a short example of what i mean. in a 4th grade class in italy pupils had to order the following measurements in an ascending order: 7.50 dm; 8.1 dm; 7.8 dm; 7.09 dm; and 8.15 dm. and the following dialogue took place (see sorzio, 2013, pp. 143-144): 1) tommaso: “seven point nine is smaller … because of the zero.” 2) giulia: “because the zero does not have any value, you can then say 7.9.” 3) andrea: “but there is also 7.8.” 4) tommaso: “that’s true, ‘7 point 9’ because nine is a millimetre.” 5) teacher: “who agrees?” 6) all: “yeahhhhh!” 7) teacher: “give me then a good reason.” 8) silvia: “because 7 is a decimetre, 0 is a centimetre, 9 is a millimetre.” 9) teacher: “0 is not a centimetre, it is zero centimetres. and 7.8, what is it?” 10) all: “7 decimetres, 8 centimetres.” 11) teacher: “then, why is 7.09 smaller, can you explain it well?” 12) silvia: “because centimetres are bigger than millimetres.” 13) giulia: “no!” 14) silvia shows centimetres and millimetres on the ruler. 15) teacher: “why is it smaller? 16) tommaso: “because it has the millimetres ... because the zero does not have any value ... it is the zero that indicates …” 17) teacher: “no, no, it is not because the zero has no value ... it is because the zero indicates ...” analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 11 18) all: “the centimetres.” 19) teacher: “7 refers to the decimetres, the 0 tells us that this measurement is 0 centimetres and 9 millimetres, and the other is 8 centimetres, and then ...” 20) tommaso: “7.9.” 21) silvia: “7.09.” 22) teacher: “and then, what is the following number?” 23) tommaso: “7.8.” 24) teacher: “are you sure?” 25) giulia: “yes, because we take a small step back.” 26) teacher: “no, reflect.” 27) andrea: “7.50.” 28) teacher: “why?” 29) andrea: “because 5 centimetres is smaller than 8 centimetres.” 30) teacher: “who agrees? who disagrees?” many disagree. 31) tommaso: “5 is smaller than 8 because the 0 doesn’t have any value.” 32) teacher: “you should not see the zero as smaller but as something that indicates a smaller element.” 33) silvia: “this 0 should be 0 millimetres; 0 millimetres is not on the ruler and therefore millimetres are not there because if it is 0 they are not there.” 34) teacher: “so, 8.1 and 8.15, which is the smaller?” 35) tommaso: “8.15 is smaller because here we have the millimetres.” 36) teacher: “and for this reason is it smaller?” 37) tommaso is perplexed and some disagree. 38) andrea: “8.1 and 8.15 would be 8 dm and 1 cm., and 8.15 8 dm, 1 cm and 5 mm [the others agree] here it is only one centimetre and here it is in advance by 5 mm.” the dialogue here is often on the verge of turning into a sort of puzzle-solving. the ‘logic’ of the interruption could suggest, instead, that at move 17) the teacher could have ‘expanded’ her intervention up to a philosophical level and opened up the space for a different kind of questioning, instead of almost intimating the right answer, by referring to the words of tommaso at 16). before going back to the mathematical problem, she could have asked: what is the ‘value’ of zero? what do you mean by saying that zero has no value? are zero and nothing the same thing? when we have zero, do we refer to nothing? what is nothing? is it the same as zero? it is apparent that one of the issues of the dialogue (although not the only one) concerns the idea of zero having a/no value, and that this represents a sort of “epistemological obstacle” (bachelard, 1938) to fully understand how to order the measurements. staying only within a purely mathematical framework, that is, within a purely intra-disciplinary discussion, could lead finally to the right answer but without a full ‘grasp’ of the concepts. the philosophical interruption could offer the chance to fine-tune the understanding of some concepts and to establish a theoretical platform to go back to the mathematical inquiry with more awareness. the new zealand mathematician and math educator bill barton invented an interesting story, included in his book the language of mathematics, which aims at “argu[ing] that mathematics is a human creation [and at] show[ing] that in the origins of mathematics humans had the opportunity to create it differently that (sic!) they did” (barton, 2009, p. 73). he builds on notions with which i would tend to agree, such as, for instance, the central role of communication and language (see also devlin, 2000), the importance of the metaphor and the embodiment (see also lakoff & nunez, 2000), and the need to reconnect mathematics and experience, but he gives these notions a radical ‘spin,’ which, in my opinion, is too affected by some strands of postmodern thinking and epistemology, while i would rather suggest situating them within a deweyan, post-postmodern (hickman, 2007; oliverio, 2013) framework. but this is a line of discussion which exceeds the scope of this analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 11 12 paper. in the fictional story (barton, 2009, pp. 73-77) a teacher sets this problem: ‘1/4 + 3/8 = ?’ and receives four different answers: johnny: 1/4 + 3/8 = 4/12 mere: 1/4 + 3/8 = 5/16 tom: 1/4 + 3/8 = 3/32 philippa: 1/4 + 3/8 = 5/8 barton is brilliant in describing how johnny, mere and tom provide ingenious explanations (ultimately rooted in the possibility and legitimacy of other kinds of mathematics), and, consequently, in driving home his point that “[t]he four ways of ‘adding’ (that is, combining) fractions are all valid in their contexts” (p. 77), because mathematics is languageand culture-sensitive and, for this reason, a teacher “may be more careful about using the words ‘right’ and ‘wrong,’ preferring rather to mention conventions more often, or to explain the context of mathematical concepts” (ibidem). as i have already said, i would not subscribe to the radicalism of his proposal, but i am interested here in what happens to philippa, the only pupil who had given the ‘right’ (pace barton) answer. she is invited to explain why she got that result after the explanations of her classmates: philippa refused to move. “i’m the only one who got it wrong,” she sobbed. “i thought i had learned the correct method, but when i look at it, it makes no sense. i can understand writing one quarter as two eights, but there is no reason to add only the top numbers and not the bottom ones. that doesn’t seem right. why would you do that? all the others have got a reason for what they did, and i don’t.” philippa learned the method the teacher had taught the class, but had no example to illustrate it, and no rationale for her technique. she was bright enough to understand the methods the others had used, and they made sense for her. her own method made no sense, and no matter what the teacher said, philippa was too deeply embarrassed to be comforted. (barton, 2009, pp. 76-77. italics added) while johnny, mere and tom are ready to give reasons, because their answers are ultimately grounded in their experiences and in their worlds-of-life, philippa does not succeed in providing that kind of justification and, consequently, she is cast into despair and begins nurturing doubts about her proficiency in maths (finally, she thinks she is wrong, although she should know that the calculations she made were right). opposite to the author’s intention, i interpret this story not as a parable on the plurality of the mathematical worlds but rather as an illuminating apologue about how much an ‘existential’ understanding of mathematical procedures, concepts, methods, etc. is needed, if we want to have an accomplished knowledge of maths. this requires a ‘non-mathematical’ but ‘pragmatic’ learning of mathematics, to use heidegger’s vocabulary. there is the need to refer mathematics back to the lebenswelt (husserl, 1959), in order to contrast the “alienation of the sense” of the mathematical formulae (ibid., § 9f) and their mechanization (ibid, § 9g). what is – in husserl – a grand narrative about the destiny of western civilization recurs on a smaller scale in every class. in barton’s story, the teacher postponed until the ensuing lesson the explanation to the class of why philippa was ‘right’ and “felt the wave of relief as the bell rang, and went off to rethink what it was that she was doing in mathematics” (barton, 2009, p. 77). the teacher was unable to find any word of comfort for philippa. and, surely, drawing upon her pedagogical armory in math teaching risked being ineffective. the tears of philippa denounced not a lack in proficiency in adding up fractions but in making sense of this. and, moreover, how could the teacher foster a really transformative learning (in a quasi mezirowian (1991) sense) in johnny, mere and tom and not just confine herself to inflicting a mathematical explanation on them without conveying the sense of why they should abandon their theories grounded in their experience? without analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 13 promoting philosophical inquiry, the teacher might never be able to stop philippa’s tears. endnotes 1. while the motto on the entrance to the academy refers to geometry, it can be extended to mathematics too. in this present paper i will consider the expression “´aγεωμέτρητος” as equivalent to “the one who does not know mathematics.” i can not provide here a more specific justification of such a move (see husserl, 1959). references agamben, g. 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(2013), la costellazione post-postmoderna. educazione, filosofia e scienza tra rorty e neurath (e dewey), in e. corbi, s. oliverio (eds.), oltre la bildung postmoderna? la pedagogia tra istanze costruttiviste e orizzonti post-costruttivisti, lecce: pensamultimedia. rorty, r. (1991), solidarity or objectivity, in objectivity, relativism and truth. philosophical papers, vol. i, cambridge: cambridge university press. sharp, a.m. (1987), what is a community of inquiry?, journal of moral education, 16(1). sharp, a.m. (1996), self-transformation in the community of inquiry, inquiry: critical thinking across the disciplines, 16(1). silva, h. (2010), notas sobre a filosofia da educação de matthew lipman a partir do pragmatismo de john dewey e do neopragmatismo de richard rorty: um exercício de desleitura, in anais do v colóquio international de filosofia da educação, uerj, 7-10 settembre 2010. sorzio, p. (2013), il curricolo come ambiente diincontro tra schemi cognitivi individuali e oggetti simbolici. un approccio realista al costruttivismo, in e. corbi, s. oliverio (eds.), realtà tra virgolette? nuovo analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 15 realismo e pedagogia, lecce: pensamultimedia. splitter, l., sharp, a.m. (1995), teaching for better thinking. the classroom community of inquiry, melbourne: australian council educational research (acer). vlastos, g. (1994a), the socratic elenchus: method is all, in id., socratic studies, new york: cambridge university press. vlastos, g. (1994b), socrates’ disavowal of knowledge, in id., socratic studies, new york: cambridge university press. address correspondences to: stefano oliverio sinapsi centre -university of naples federico ii stefano.oliverio@unina.it analytic teaching and philosophical praxis analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 40, issue 2 (2020) editor’s welcome doubtless the last year, thanks to covid-19, has presented us with challenges we were unprepared for—disruptions to community and education that have strained the patience and resourcefulness of us all. my hope is that this recent issue of analytic teaching and philosophical praxis can serve as a reminder of all the work that still needs to be done to help empower children and young adults as well as inspire you with innovative suggestions on how to expand your teaching toolkit. the issue opens with two timely articles that explore the complicated prejudices and discrimination young people continue to experience by adults. vitale & miller’s “epistemic violence against young activists” looks at the many ways young people are ignored and “quieted” by adults, which becomes especially clear against the backdrop of recent youth movements like those advocating for gun control, climate reform, and racial equality. anderson’s article “pfc and voice” continues this theme in exploring how philosophy for children (pfc) may inadvertently perpetuate the silencing of young people. both articles conclude with concrete suggestions on how pfc can help alert facilitators to the kinds of epistemic injustices children often face as well as provide alternate spaces for more respectful interactions with young people. the next two articles look at how we conceive of communities of inquiry, using different methodological approaches to expand facilitators’ practices. weber’s “phenomenology as a voice of childhood” turns to merleau-ponty, in particular, and his ideas of embodiment to suggest cpi’s would benefit from focusing attention on the lived experience and sensory world of participants rather than just collaborative reasoning and argumentation. castleberry & clark’s “expanding the facilitator’s toolbox” employ vygotsky’s ideas to provide new meta-frameworks and metaphors to enrich how we understand the task of facilitating philosophical inquiries as well as strategies to improve facilitation. the last three articles move outside the purview of philosophy for children to engage other issues germane to education. bobro’s “dialogue and writing philosophy” makes a strong case for why philosophy instructors should consider assigning the writing of philosophical dialogues instead of, or in addition to, the standard philosophy essay. farfan’s “the perpetual crisis” is an instructive reminder of how the recent justification of stem education recycles arguments from past philosophers, especially plato and rousseau, that build on a sense of crisis to enact educational reform. finally, svanøe’s “learning morality through literary mimesis” tackles the problem of how literature might complement moral education, using the lens of ricoeur’s notion of mimesis to walk through the many challenges that arise when we see literature as a method of moral instruction. this issue wraps up with two book reviews. richard morehouse looks at wendy turgeon’s philosophical adventures with fairy tales: new ways to explore familiar tales with kids of all ages (2010) while sergey borisov highlights the timeliness of maria davenza tillmanns’ why we are in need of tails (2019). as always, i hope this current issue of at&pp finds you well. pax et bonum, jason j. howard chief editor jason j. howard viterbo university web page master jason skoog viterbo university copy editor jason j. howard viterbo university editorial board sara cook viterbo university susan gardner capilano university susan hughes viterbo university david kennedy montclair state university nadia s. kennedy stony brook university, suny richard morehouse, emeritus viterbo university félix garcía moriyón center for philosophy for children, madrid, spain joe oyler maynooth university, kildare, ireland barbara weber university of british columbia publisher viterbo university, la crosse, wisconsin 45601 established in 1981 as analytic teaching at texas wesleyan college and transferred to viterbo in 1993. online copyright 2005. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis is a peer-reviewed, online, open access journal published annually and sometimes biannually. issn 2374-8257 book reviews for analytic teaching and philosophical praxis book reviews for analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 89 book review addressing tensions and dilemmas in inclusive education: living with uncertainty review by paula hamilton addressing tensions and dilemmas in inclusive education: living with uncertainty brahm norwich routledge, 2013 usa and canada 189 pages isbn: 9780415528481 $40.95 u.s. paper; hardcover $155.00 he main theme of ‘addressing tensions and dilemmas in inclusive education’ is the theoretical examination of the philosophical tensions and complexities associated with the provision of inclusive education for children and young people with disabilities and learning difficulties. a contemporary mix of concepts, values and boundaries, the field of inclusion is complex and highly contested (boyle and topping, 2012; westwood, 2013). brahm norwich, a professor of educational psychology and special educational needs (sen) at the university of exeter in the uk, is an established writer in this field. unlike many books of its genre, this text goes beyond a descriptive account of the ideological values of inclusive education and how learners with disabilities and learning difficulties can be supported. much of norwich’s work is aimed at the critical exploration of ambiguities and tensions, bridging a gap within extant literature. this well structured, scholarly text is organised into nine chapters, with key themes revisited and critiqued throughout. the introductory chapter provides a clear theoretical stance; norwich adopts a ‘realist’ rather than ‘utopian’ version of inclusion and tends to engage in debates to the ideological left. five main tensions are presented: participation-protection; choice-equity; generic-specialist; real-relative; knowledge as investigation-emancipation, which norwich argues, underpin many of the conflicts associated with contemporary education for disabled learners. in chapter two, norwich critiques the emergence of sociological theories and tensions that arise from the polarisation of medical, individual and social models of disability. drawing upon global research, chapter three presents various classification systems used to group learners who have special educational needs. norwich asserts the term sen has given rise to an ambiguous hierarchy of general categories of deficiencies that give little consideration to specific contexts and individual needs. chapter four examines conflicting perspectives relating to the purpose of education and the curriculum. norwich explores models of curriculum design in terms of commonality and differentiation. while supportive of common programmes, he argues there remains a need for more specialised programmes. chapter five appraises tensions arising from ‘generic-specialist’ teaching and ‘rights-needs’ based approaches. norwich asserts that universal inclusive pedagogy – learning together, addressing individual needs, avoiding ability labelling, grouping and withdrawal – is based on false dichotomies. instead, he veers towards moderate (maximal) inclusive pedagogy, and is supportive of the wave model which connects generic and specialist pedagogy. in chapter six, norwich undertakes further analysis of dilemmas of difference which exist for disabled/sen learners. consideration is given, in chapter seven, to concerns from the perspectives of learners and their parents. concepts of parent-partnerships are analysed, as are the complex relationships that often exist between disabled children and adults. a philosophical analytical lens is adopted in chapter eight to pursue prior concepts. with regard to inclusive education research, norwich stresses the importance of fostering relationships between diverse disciplines, methodologies and theoretical stances. norwich concludes the book by restating the key dilemmas and arguments considered and providing a summary of theoretical principles, which he proposes will inform how tensions and dilemmas can be addressed in practice. t book reviews for analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 90 each thought provoking chapter presents more questions and dilemmas than it does in providing straightforward resolutions. this, however, is not out of context as norwich is highly critical of the indifferent thinking style often associated with the analysis of values, pressures and constraints related to issues in inclusive education. he warns against the ready acceptance of over-simplified explanations and in viewing polarised concepts as oppositional positions. instead, he advocates a style of thinking which recognises the complex interaction between plural values but which works to achieve a balance between opposing positions, while acknowledging that resolutions may be less than ideal, involve residual tensions and lead to negative consequences for some individuals. norwich calls for the deconstruction of polarised theories and uncertainties which trouble inclusion and general education and for the findings to be presented to policy makers as a series of ‘aporias’. this critical and deconstructive approach provides a useful tool for acquiring further insight into the contemporary contradictions that often exist between ‘policy intention’ and ‘policy reality’. despite a plethora of inclusive policies in the uk, the movement toward effective inclusion ‘remains a work in progress’ (westwood, 2013:6). all too frequently, the reality of classroom communities is overlooked, preventing inclusive principles from effectively translating into practice (westwood, 2013). this book undisputedly makes a valuable contribution to the field of special education, however, i have a couple of minor criticisms. firstly, norwich argues that the broader definition of inclusion ‘distances inclusive education from the specific circumstances of disability and difficulties’ and ‘that the interests of those with disabilities might be secondary to or overlooked when pursuing other less [my use of italics] minority interests; for example gender and socio-economic class interests’ (norwich, 2013:3,4). whilst appreciating that the assimilation of sen into the wider concept of inclusion may have taken some focus off issues facing learners with disabilities, what does norwich mean by less minority interests? does it imply that there is a hierarchy of importance attached to aspects of diversity? if the narrow sen definition of inclusive education is to be reinstated, this could result in the needs of other groups of learners at risk of marginalisation, underperformance and discrimination being overlooked. there is evidence to suggest that sen and disability remains the dominant feature of inclusive education, theoretically and in practice (armstrong and richards, 2011; nutbrown and clough, 2013). even norwich reports how ‘an analysis of the uk bei, australian education index and us (eric) databases between 3 and 15 times as many papers on inclusive education or inclusion were about sen/disability as about gender or ethnicity’ (norwich, 2013:4). in the attempt to prevent any further watering down of matters associated with sen/disability, we cannot afford not to pay due diligence to other aspects of diversity and dilemmas of difference. i would also like to comment on the fleeting reference made to the relationship between sen/disability and other aspects of diversity, especially where an individual is affected by multiple areas of difference. the paradoxes associated with intersecting differences in gender, ethnic and linguistic diversity, social class and sen/disability would have offered additional complexities and dilemmas to explore. there is much research to indicate that the following learners are more at risk of being identified or labelled as having specific learning needs or behavioural difficulties: boys; male learners of african and caribbean origin; children with language difficulties/differences; and children living in poverty (boyle and topping, 2012; smith, 2012). for example, research undertaken by hamilton (2013) shows the complexity of identifying special educational needs among migrant worker children new to the uk as factors associated with diversity of culture, language, educational systems, gender and social class fuse together complicating the context and possible diagnosis. finally, although comprehensive theoretical conclusions are presented, i am not sure how effectively these will be translated into practice. norwich (2013:2) proposes that the theoretical conclusions he provides will ‘frame how practical issues are approached and decisions made’. however, due to the complexity of the dilemmas considered and lack of clear-cut or final solutions, there is a risk that his theoretical guidance will remain ‘in text’ rather than used to critically explore excessive differences, tensions and dilemmas in practice. concise recommendations, relevant to practice, could have been offered at the end of each chapter, making it more likely that norwich’s valuable contributions find their way into educational settings. these minor gripes aside, this is a well researched and comprehensive text. it contains powerful and critically reflective messages, offering readers new ways of forward thinking. this book will be essential reading for post-graduate sen/disability specialists – a text not to be missed – however, i am sceptical as to how widely accessible it will be to undergraduate students and school practitioners. book reviews for analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 91 to conclude, as theoretical ambiguities habitually frame policies and practices associated with general and inclusive education, it is vital to adopt norwich’s style of thinking; the rejection of over-simplified explanations, the deconstruction of polarised concepts, the critical exploration of tensions and dilemmas of difference. not only can such thinking lead to a better appreciation of one’s own political and professional stance, it can result in educators moving beyond simply responding to government policies and initiatives to a more informed and powerful position that can take forward the movement of effective inclusive education. references armstrong, f. and richards, g. (2011), introduction, in richards, g. and armstrong, a. (eds), teaching and learning in diverse and inclusive classrooms, pp.1-6. oxon: routledge. boyle, c. and topping, k. (2012), what works in inclusion? berkshire: open university press. hamilton, p. (2013), ‘including migrant worker children in the learning and social context of the rural primary school’, education 3-12, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 202-217. nutbrown, c. and clough, p. (2013), inclusion in the early years. second edition. london: sage. smith, e. (2012), key issues in education and social justice. london: sage westwood, p. (2013), inclusive and adaptive teaching: meeting the challenge of diversity in the classroom. oxon: routledge. address correspondences to: dr. paula hamilton, glyndŵr university wrexham, uk p.hamilton@glyndwr.ac.uk investigating pre-school children’s ability to formulate logical arguments analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 89 investigating pre-school children’s ability to formulate logical arguments vasiliki pournantzi, konstantinos zacharos, maria angela shiakalli abstract: this paper attempts to investigate five and six-year old children’s ability to formulate logical reasoning. more specifically, our interest focuses on the investigation of young children’s ability to use arguments based on logical reasoning. can pre-school children build arguments based on logical reasoning such as deductive reasoning, or forms of indirect reasoning? can teaching contribute to the development of you children’s ability to manipulate logical reasoning in the forms previously mentioned? these are the basic questions we attempt to answer in this paper. thirteen pre-school children participated in the study. the children were involved in organized dialogues in order to investigate their ability to build logical argumentation. our findings showed that the children had the ability to use arguments with structures, resembling reasoning found in formal logic such as deductive reasoning, inductive reasoning, as well as reasoning based on the law of excluded middle. keywords: pre-school, logical arguments, deductive reasoning, indirect reasoning introduction an pre-school children use basic concepts encountered in the science of logic which consist of basic conditions for the development of scientific thought? the aim of this paper is to investigate young children’s ability to use specific forms of justification which are found in the science of logic, such as, deductive reasoning, forms of indirect proof, cause-andeffect relationship, or arguments based on the inductive method. numerous meanings have been given to the concept of logic: it may be used with the concept of common sense or as the principles of predicate calculus, or as a mathematical subject, as well as a branch of philosophy. for the purposes of this study logic is defined as the science consisting of the semantic and syntactic aspects aiming at the formulation of conclusions which stem from a group of premises (durand-guerrier et al. 2012). arguments and justification often appear in our speech, especially when formulated in order to justify a conclusion. in other words, arguments are forms of justification or conclusion. in order to prove (or justify) a claim, we construct an argument, a group of sentences, with strict or looser structure, which lead to a conclusion. c analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 90 one of the aims of institutionalized education is the gradual passing from informal forms of knowledge and the everyday use of language to the use of scientific language and, hence, to forms of arguments which are found in science. argumentation differs from everyday conversation as it is a more organized and systematic form of verbal communication (daniel 2005). contemporary curricula, as early as pre-school, aim at the development of children’s creative and critical thinking (van de walle 2007; shiakalli, and zacharos 2014; zacharos et al. 2011). in recent decades a particulate research interest has developed in the area of teaching subjects relevant to and consisting of, reasoning which are based on the science of logic. there is also a growing interest for the introduction of school subjects defined as philosophy for children (colom et al. 2014; gasparatou, and kampeza 2012; lipman et al. 1980). this specific research and teaching interest, aims at developing children’s ability to justify, as well as to raise their awareness concerning social and ethical issues. the above mentioned interest also extends to the correlating inand pre-service teacher training, concerning the use of logical reasoning in education (durand-guerrier et al. 2012). the assessment of research within the area of philosophy for children shows a positive contribution of the previously mentioned teaching interventions, in areas such as reading and mathematics, children’s reasoning ability improvement, as well as improvement in teacher academic readiness (colom et al. 2014). critical thinking development allows people to construct logical meaning, justify their thoughts with logical arguments and, thus, persuade others about their correctness. it also allows people to evaluate their own practices on the one hand, and agree or disagree with others’ opinions justifying their choice, on the other. thus critical thinking is, essentially, about the important aspects of the educational process that enhance the development of metacognitive thinking strategies and arm the student with the ability to reflect on the process of learning (fisher 2007; ergazaki et al. 2005). moreover, it is about practices simulating the evidentiary procedures which are established in education, and more specifically in mathematics education, where elements, such as claim (the statement of the argument), data (data justifying a claim) and warrant (the inference rule allowing data to be linked to a claim), are found (toulmin 1958. in arzarello et al. 2009, p. 41). the teacher’s role is important in children’s critical thinking development since it is he/she who is responsible for the creation of a learning environment, where formulation of claims, questions, controversies and synthetic reasoning, are allowed to thrive (haynes 2008). the study presented in this paper refers to forms of argument, which are found within the science of logic, and are accessible by educational practice. more specifically, we present forms of reasoning which, according to bibliography, can be comprehended, and used by, young children and thus, can become subjects of teaching. we then present our research questions and our investigative method. lastly, we analyze and comment on our data and discuss our argumentation concerning the possibility of systematically engaging pre-school children in forms of reasoning. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 91 theoretical remarks the concept of argument argumentation is a form of logical thinking, developed during the process of a person’s cognitive development. it consists of an entity of isolated, though interrelated, propositions, each having a different degree of generality. aristotle systematically attended to the forms of argument and his conducts comprise the basis for the development of the science formal logic. in this paper, we deal with arguments in the form of deductive reasoning, as well as arguments based on indirect reasoning (genesereth, and kao 2013; getmanova 1989). arguments based on deductive reasoning, in their simplest form, consist of two premises and a conclusion. thus, the structure of simple deductive reasoning is: all p are q (first premise); t is a constituent of p (second premise); therefore t is q (the conclusion). a type of indirect reasoning, is reasoning which in formal logic is found as “modus tolens”, and is based on the principle identified as “law of excluded middle”. a verbal expression of this type of reasoning would be: if p is true, then q is true (first premise), but if q is not true (second premise) then p is not true either (conclusion). this type of reasoning is based on an internal structure, and the conclusion arises as a unique and unambiguous consequence of the two introductory statements (premises) of claims of the two premises. the relationship between premises and conclusion resembles the relationship between cause-and-effect. “the ‘if’ part explains the ‘then’ part” (grabiner 2012, p. 163). a person with highly developed theoretical thought perceives premises as a single logical system, from which the conclusion is implied. in these cases, the conclusion does not require personal experience; it is derived from the logical validity of the reasoning. such forms of logical operations are basic forms of expression of human thought. while the above mentioned logical schemata seem as basic properties of human logical thinking, according to the cultural-historical approach, the development of logical schemata is related to cultural factors (luria 1976). luria (1976) experimentally studied the above hypothesis and found that the ability to perceive the structure of reasoning as a single system is a result of social transfer. respectively, in a study by scribner (1977) the term «empirical bias» is used to state the tendency of some people living in traditional societies, to base their conclusions on everyday experiences instead of reasoning facts. this type of reasoning is characterized as “empirical”, unlike reasoning which is based on the content of sentences (premises) and is characterized as “theoretical”. children’s ability to use reasoning according to j. piaget (1956), up to the age of twelve, children cannot form complete reasoning, especially when the structuring data are hypothetical or conflicting to their experience. when young children are faced with a logical problem they adopt an empirical approach rather than a methodical theoretical model corresponding to the structure of the given reasoning. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 92 according to piaget (1953) children’s ability to develop logical thinking and logical thinking understanding as well as the ability to formulate arguments, presupposes their familiarization with operational systems such as “the classification or the inclusion of classes under each other. for example, sparrows (a) < birds (b) < animals (c) < living beings (d)” (p. 13). moreover, piaget (1953, p.3) claims that young children find it difficult to reason about a whole and its parts at the same time, and that the ability of transitivity (for example, when a=b and b=c, then a=c) is absent from a child before the age of seven or eight. operational systems, as those mentioned above, play an important role in the structuring of logical reasoning since “all effective knowledge is based on such a system of operations” (piaget, 1953, p. 7). but, within piaget’s epistemological frame the development of reasoning is mainly a spontaneous aspect of intelligence rather than a matter of teaching (piaget, 1973). more recent, studies show that young children have a greater chance to succeed in tasks which are designed in a manner that triggers their interest (donaldson, 1984). other findings show that four and five year old children, demonstrate the ability to use deductive reasoning (dias and harris 1988; 1990; richards and sanderson 1999) and can evaluate the truth or untruth of a sentence, recalling arguments made in a previous time (koenig et al. 2004). in fact, young children could respond to deductive reasoning even in the cases where the premises described imaginary situations inconsistent to their experiences. often children’s answers were justified, and based on, information given by the premises (dias and harris 1990; dias et al. 2005). in a similar study by richards and sanderson (1999), pictures were introduced in order to help children with reasoning data memorisation. their findings show that the use of pictures led to more correct answers. to sum up, studies show that children, as young as pre-school, are able to distinguish between real and imaginary situations. moreover, children accept the contracts described in imaginary situations, even in situations of counterfactual thinking, and accept the premise claim as a starting point for following the reasoning process (harris 2001; skolnick and bloom 2006). similarly, four and five-year old children succeeded in the case of inductive reasoning, where they were asked to think within situations contradicting reality (german and nichols 2003). difficulties were encountered when the chain of sentences constructing the reasoning process was long, thus making it difficult for the children to follow the sequence of events (beck et al. 2006). it should be noted that all research to which we have referred above, was conducted within a framework which assisted children to accept the hypothetical situations and, thus, succeed in the reasoning process activities (dias and harris 1990; richards and sanderson 1999; leevers and harris 2000). other studies conducted in order to investigate the forms of argumentative verbal interaction between pre-school children, found that systematic occupation with such practices improved the quality of children’s arguments (daniel 2005; gasparatou and kampeza 2012). it was noted that children were able to substantially move from their personal experiences and egocentric approaches, towards the development of more complex thinking skills such as justification, constructive criticism of peer arguments, argument assessment and challenge. the development of such ability sheds light on the contribution of systematic teaching intervention within the sphere of the process of reasoning (daniel 2005). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 93 the contribution of verbal interaction argumentation and reasoning process development, at the early stages of schooling, are solely based on the classroom forms of verbal interaction, since it is through such interaction that a common framework of meaning is established (storm et al. 2001; mercer 1995; mercer and wegerif 1999; mercer and sams 2006). children are guided to co-operate in order to (a) help each other in creating and building arguments, (b) strengthen their opinions or accept different approaches, (c) focus on new aspects of knowledge. of course children’s participation in group activities does not necessarily ensure a meaningful involvement in the learning process (mercer and sams 2006), since this presupposes each team member’s familiarization with the practices of team co-operation. it is here that teacher interventions are essential. firstly, the teacher guides children through ways of communication development. secondly, he/she is responsible for the the formulation of groups in a way that all members are able to contribute to the construction of meanings and, eventually, knowledge. in analyzing the forms of verbal interaction, mercer (1995), distinguished between three typological interactions: (1) disputational talk, which is characterized by participant conflict and disagreement and individual decision making, (2) cumulative talk, where members positively construct verbal communication without criticism of what has been said. in this way the construction of common knowledge is cumulated and is characterized by repetition, confirmation, and processed reformulations, (3) exploratory talk, which is considered the most productive type of talk, since members discuss each other’s ideas critically but also with a positive attitude towards creating a synthesis of all ideas. research questions the research questions we set out to answer in the paper are: can pre-school children use arguments based on logical reasoning such as deductive reasoning or forms of indirect reasoning? can teaching contribute to the development of pre-school children’s ability to use the above forms of logical reasoning? the formulation of our research questions was based on the criteria that deductive and indirect reasoning are forms widely negotiated by the science of formal logic and are objects of research and teaching interest, as previously mentioned in this paper. methodology sample this paper presents a case study (cohen et al. 2007) carried out in april 2014 at a public preschool setting in greece. the sample consisted of thirteen children (referred to as s1-s13 in this paper) nine boys and four girls (aged 5,5 -mean) from middle class backgrounds. in greece preschool analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 94 involves two years of schooling. all participants had attended at least one year of formal pre-school and were familiar with adult-child teaching interactions. none of the children had been involved in forms of reasoning processes or argumentation within the school context. research design the study consisted of five autonomous teaching interventions. in total, the researcher conducted eight meetings (one meeting per day) with the children, two preparatory meetings in order for the children to familiarize with the researcher, and one meeting during which the “rules” of the communicative framework were set. the aim of the third meeting was for the researcher to present the suggested “rules” of the communicative framework to the children, and for the children to agree to those terms in order for them to actively participate in the teaching intervention process (fisher 2007; haynes 2008). these “rules” consisted of: participating in the group discussion in an attentive and polite manner, speaking softly, and paying attention to the story read by the researcher, freely posing their opinion when asked. as mentioned in the bibliography, children participation in active listening is a matter of teaching and learning (coles 1991). the following five meetings were used for the teaching interventions. the paedagogical context for the introduction and investigation of the children’s reasoning process, was formulated by the reading of a different story every day. the stories were chosen by the research group based on their adequacy to serve the teaching goal. story adequacy was established through a pilot study. all storybooks were published in greek either original works in the greek language or works translated into greek. all stories were revised into autonomous brief articulated stories in order (a) to allow narration interruptions and (b) to facilitate the researcher to ignite children discussion. intervention duration varied, according to narration length and children’s correspondence, from 25 to 40 minutes. data were collected through recordings, children’s representations and the researcher’s field notes. data analysis for the purposes of the study, and based on our data, we used specific dialogue analysis typology and classification. our data showed three types of argumentation children used in order to justify their answers: we defined the first type as “non structured argumentation” consisting of the following characteristics: simple sentences without argumentation (“just because”, “i do not know”, “because i believe so”) or idiosyncratic answers without argumentation support, sentences leading to no conclusion and, often, presented as a type of internal monologue, sentences showing that the child had not realized the cause-and-effect relation between situations, analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 95 sentences showing that children could not use logical relations such as “if p, then q” nor could they argue on hypothetical reasoning, sentences showing that children did not realize deductive reasoning as a single logical system, sentences showing that children had not yet familiarized with types of inductive reasoning and did not lead to any generalizations. the second type was identified as “semi-structured” argumentation consisting of the following characteristics: children rationalized their thoughts and tried to justify them in order to convince their fellow speaker, but their arguments were tautological, consisting of unfinished expressions which often did not express a specific meaning, children often used vocabulary linked to justification such as “because”, “why”, children justified their opinions without considering the answers given by their peers, instead of addressing their peers, children addressed the teacher/researcher during argumentation or when they disagreed with the child who had expressed the initial thought, asking for adult consent, the team did not come to a conclusion, since there was no effective verbal interaction nor a commonly accepted problem to solve, children created reasoning based on simple premises without coming to a conclusion, children could justify some of the hypothetical story situations and could step into the shoes of the story figures. the third type was identified as “structured” argumentation consisting of the following characteristics: children justified their opinion and formulated suitable arguments in order to persuade, based on facts, children, created logical structures of reasoning which led to logical conclusions, children perceived cause-and-effect relations in situations and phenomena, children created justifications about hypothetical situations and thought about situations opposed to reality, children could generalize their thoughts following an inductive thinking pattern, children operated in a co-operative and consensual manner. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 96 teaching interventions and data analysis in this section we present selective data deriving from three teaching interventions, emphasizing on parameters of teaching interest and having the possibility of respective teaching intervention development. first teaching intervention paedagogical frame: the teaching intervention was based on a story (dimitriadou 2009), edited by the research team for the needs of the study. the story: “while walking in his garden a king saw a little girl sleeping on the lawn. he was impressed and sat next to her, staring without waking her. the next day he anxiously waited for his daily walk in the garden hoping to see her again. he found her sleeping under a tree. the king sat next to her staring at her and when it was time for him to leave, he put a top next to her. the next day the king had to decide about starting a war, which his consultants believed had to be carried out. when he saw his generals planning the war he interrupted them and said “we are not having this war! no child will be ever happy if we go to war”. and saying this he turned around and left”. justification forms i. cause-and-effect at this point the children were asked to answer the researcher’s questions “why did the king decide not to start the war?” and “is war a good thing?” children’s answers often had the form of structured justification. moreover, children often resorted to the introductory use of justification words such as “because”, “for the reason that”. in the first crosstalk children justified their thoughts and formulated arguments, in order to persuade of its correctness. crosstalk 1. structured justification examples. 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 τ (teacher): why do you think that the king decided not to go ahead with this war? s4 (subject 4): because children do not like war. t: okey. s2: because he is scared the little girl might be killed. […] s2: or with all the noise made by war she might wake up. […] s5: because if there was war the little girl might be killed and if she was killed the king would be sad. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 97 1.9 1.10 1.11 1.12 1.13 1.14 1.15 1.16 1.17 1.18 1.19 1.20 1.21 1.22 1.23 […] t: is war a good thing? students: no! t: why? s3: because people get killed. s12: a bullet might hit the little girl. s4: maybe a grenade. s2: the little girl might not be wakened nor killed because the war will be outside the kingdom. t: outside the kingdom. and what about the little girl? s2: she is inside, she is protected. they will be fighting outside the garden and the little girl will be inside s3: or she might lock so that they cannot come in. t: the enemies are not able to come in? s3: yes, they might have locked. the door that is. . . the garden door and the kingdom door so that they cannot come in. in the above crosstalk there are dialogues showing the children’s ability to formulate justified reasoning about possible reasons for cancelling war. lines 1.3, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7 and 1.8 show the way children formulate their arguments giving reasons for the king to cancel the war. moreover, children justified, from an ethical point of view, the reasons for their belief that war is not a good idea (lines 1.12 και 1.13). lastly, an alternative scenario was given for the cause of war postponement (lines 1.15 and 1.16s2) and forms of structured justification were built on this possibility (lines 1.18, 1.19, 1.22 and 1.23). concerning the forms of verbal interaction (mercer 1995) in crosstalk 1 there was intense of cumulative talk since each child participated in the conversation adding his/her opinion (lines 1.31.8, 1.12-1.15, 1.20) and expressing his/her own arguments (lines 1.15-1.16, 1.18-1.19, 1.20 and 1.22-1.23). of course the talk observed in this crosstalk did not lead to collective meaning construction since every member simply expressed their own argument independently. ii. indirect reasoning development in crosstalk 2 the researcher set the question «why did the king not wake up the little girl?” crosstalk 2. hypothetical situation reasoning development. a child (s13) claimed that the little girl probably fainted; another child (s2) opposed: 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 s2: but if she had fainted how could she have got the top? s13: or she might have been pretending to be asleep. t: but then why did the king not wake her to ask what she was doing there? s13: he could have stayed at the palace for a long time and watched, that the girl that the girl saw the king and then she went and then she went back to sleep again. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 98 on line 2.1 of the above crosstalk, a well structured argument was formulated by the child in order to answer the question. the cause-and-effect relation was highly processed and apparent. there was also a latent indirect reasoning which in the classical two-valued logic is called the “reductio ad absurdum rule” (also called the rule of introduction of negation). this type of indirect reasoning shows that judgment p should be negated (considered false) if a contradiction derives from p (getmanova 1989). in the case of crosstalk 2, s2’s claim that the little girl had fainted was confuted (“but. . . how could she have got the top?”) leading to the denial of the first claim by s2. the justification attempt on lines 2.4 and 2.5 could not be considered sufficient, since its content was unclear and, of course, the cause-and-effect relation was not apparent. concerning verbal interaction at the beginning of the crosstalk, there was an alternation of disputational talk (lines 2.1 and 2.3) and cumulative talk (line 2.2). it seemed that disputational talk gave s13 the chance to formulate a well structured argumentation on the given question (line 2.2). through disputational talk s2 also showed a clear formulation of a cause-and-effect relation on line 2.1. iii. forms of deductive reasoning in the following crosstalk (crosstalk 3) through s4’s justification (lines 3.5 and 3.7) a typical form of deductive reasoning could be detected: a general claim was expressed “all people love children” (first premise), which was specialized for a specific case “the king is a person” (second premise) followed by a conclusion “the king loves children”. crosstalk 3. an example of deductive reasoning. 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 t: after nine months the little girl woke up and told the king it was time for her to go home and that he should not be sad because he might find another child in his garden. s3: but what will happen if he finds another child? s4: he will love it! t: he will love it. why do you say this? s4: because all people love children! t: should the king be sad about the little girl’s leaving? s3: no! because he might see her again or he might find another child. as in crosstalk 2 initial disputational talk (line 3.4) acted as a trigger, giving children (s3 and s4) the chance to express their thoughts formulating structured argumentation, in order to answer the question set by the researcher. the dialogues between researcher and children (s3 and s4) involving both, disputational talk and cumulative talk, gave an answer to the question set initially by s3. second teaching intervention law of excluded middle and inductive reasoning analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 99 the dialogues in crosstalk 4 highlighted children’s ability to develop forms of argumentation based on variations of modus tolens reasoning (table 1). of course, this form of reasoning was incomplete since the second premise was based on incomplete inductive reasoning, where the concept of the “middle term” did not consist of all possible cases. table 1. forms of modus tolens reasoning reasoning structure 1st premise if statement p is true then statements q1, q2, q3, … are also true. 2nd premise but statements q1, q2, q3, … are not true. conclusion then p is also no true. paedagogical frame: the teaching intervention was based on the story “shovel on mars” (translation from greek) (trivizas 2013), edited by the research team for the needs of the study. the story: «once upon a time, three astronauts went to explore mars. when they finished exploring the planet they decided to go back to earth. they collected all their things and left. but they forgot to take their shovel. when the astronauts left, the aliens on mars, called marsians, walked around the strange object they had never seen before and kept asking one another “what is this thing?”. after long talks and hard thought they decided that it was a lamp post” (picture 1). picture 1. the shovel and the lamp post in crosstalk 4 children used modus tolens reasoning (lines 4.1-4.6) while lines 4.8-4.13 showed the formulation of inductive reasoning justifying why the specific objet could be a lamp post. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 100 crosstalk 4. modus tolens reason and inductive reasoning 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.10 4.11 4.12 4.13 t: if this was a lamp post (shows the shovel) would it have something special? s2 and s3: light. t: light. but is this (shows the shovel) a lamp post? students: no! t: why? s4: because it has no light. and it does not look like that. t: how so? can you explain? s4: it has no light, it has nothing to switch off. s13: because it has no wood at the top and no metal at the bottom to dig. […] s11: because it has no lamp. […] s9: because it has no electricity. […] s6: it has no cord. […] s4: it has no switch to turn on. story continuation: “the marsians continue looking at the strange object trying to find out what it is. “might it be a lion?”, said a marsian. “yes, yes it is”, said another marsian. “just a moment! it does not look like a lion to me”, said a third marsian” (picture 2). picture 2. the shovel and the lion. similarly to crosstalk 4, in crosstalk 5 children based their justification on a modus tolens form of reasoning (table 1). crosstalk 5. modus tolens reasoning. 5.1 5.2 5.3 t: if this (shows the shovel) was a lion, would it have something special? s4: it would have a tail. […] s2: it would have a mane and sharp teeth and it would eat them up. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 101 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 […] s13: it would have eyes and sharp nails and a tongue. t: good! so has this (shows the shovel) got sharp teeth to chew? students: no! t: why? s4: because it is not a lion. it is a shovel. story continuation: “the marsians continue to look at the strange object with the same curiosity. “could it be a sponge?”, said a marsian. “yes, yes. it is a sponge”, said another marsian. “it does not look like a sponge to me”, said a third marsian”. once again in the crosstalk following the storytelling, children formulated argumentations based on the properties of a sponge not found in a shovel. in their argumentation there was a modus tolens reasoning based on the law of excluded middle, where an option was accepted through the exclusion of other alternative options. crosstalk 6. shovel and sponge comparison. 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 t: can this (show the shovel) be a sponge? students: no! t: can it not be a sponge? s12: because if you squeeze it you will not get any soap and water. s5: and it is not square with soap and water and soft either. overall, in the second activity, children developed forms of structured and semi-structured argumentation. of course, there were instances of idiosyncratic answers, where children gave answers without justification or relativity to the questions and the subject of negotiation. in crosstalks 4, 5 and 6 cumulative talk was evident. in crosstalk 4, the development of cumulative talk seemed to lead to a more complete determination of the characteristics of a lamp post. interestingly, each child, participating in the discussion, added another characteristic, relevant to the characteristics already reported (lines 4.10-4.13). similarly, in crosstalk 6, the children’s participation in cumulative talk (s5 and s12) allowed them to formulate a more comprehensive reasoning process (lines 6.4-6.5). third teaching intervention. argumentation development i. joint arguments paedagogical frame: the original story was a variation of “snow white and the seven dwarves” (mantouvalou 2005), edited by the research team for the needs of the study. the story: “far in the woods seven dwarves built their home. one day snow white visited and stayed with them. the seven dwarves were very happy to have her. every night after supper they would all play their favorite analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 102 question game. snow white asked the questions and the dwarves answered. tonight, snow white started with a question for wise dwarf: “why are you so self-centered?”, asked snow white. “because i know everything and i can do everything on my own and i am very proud of this! i do not need anyone’s help!”, said wise dwarf proudly. “yes” snow white replied “but you cannot say that you do not need anyone’s help for anything, because there are things you can do only with the help of others”. at this point the researcher asked the children what they thought on one’s bragging about doing everything on his own. the children presented their arguments about the necessity of ethical values such as co-operation, arrogance, and self-centeredness. crosstalk 7 (especially lines 7.5-7.9) showed the way children joined their ideas building an argumentation for the necessity of co-operation and the avoidance of arrogance. crosstalk 7. joint argumentation. 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.9 t: i have a question for you. do we need to brag that we can do everything on our own? s3: no! t: why not? s3: because someone might tell us something very difficult and we may not be able to find the answer, others may have found it! s4: it may be a very difficult question. s5: one may not know something but others may know it and they will have to tell him. ii. the contribution of verbal interaction children’s participation in the dialogues was a basic condition for the development of the teaching interventions. children’s participation was not symmetrical, since each subject participated differently (spoke more or spoke less or did not speak at all during conversations). moreover, dialogue quality differed from child to child, since there were subjects who justified their thoughts with verbal completeness and structured justification, while others used vague verbal wording and idiosyncratic answers, characterized by the absence of justification. for example, in crosstalk 8 (lines 8.1-8.3) s2 used a form of verbal wording characterized by identitarian-cyclic speech. but with the researcher’s intervention the child (s2), started gradually presenting indications of structured justification leading to significant improvement (lines 8.13-8.16). crosstalk 8. the contribution of verbal interaction. for the first time during this intervention, s2 showed its intention to participate in the conversation and answered the questionwhether we are able to do everything on our own without help from others. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 103 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.8 8.9 8.10 8.11 8.12 8.13 8.14 8.15 8.16 s2: and for only him to know, while others know and then if he thinks they do not know anything he will think they are brainless and they might not know anything. […] t: should someone pretend to be wise, pretending to know everything? s2: no! t: why? s2: because he thinks that others are brainless. t: okay. s2: because it is not nice to tease others, it is like. . . us showing that we are wiser than them. t: but what if we know everything, why should we not brag about knowing everything? s2: we can say it in another way, so that our friends get to know what we know. we can say it politely, so that our friends can also learn a few things we know, but one’s friend cannot know what another knows that is why the other should tell him politely so that he too can know. commenting on the children’s general participation in this activity, we could say that: in most cases children’s argumentation could be characterized as unstructured and only in a few cases could it be characterized as semistructured. children’s responses were often single-worded while in other instances they would simply reply “i do not know”. the arguments presented by the children were drawn from their everyday experiences and had limited “strength”; they were constructed jointly without any element of generalisation. moreover, the children did not occupy themselves in the process of confuting ideas different to their claims; each child seemed to have their own opinion. discussions and conclusions this paper is a part of a broader research and teaching orientation, interested in the investigation of children’s critical thinking development and more specifically the development of their ability to follow and use logical reasoning processes. this study dealt with types of argumentation which, within the frame of typical logic, are characterized as reasoning processes. we also looked at (a) types of argumentation which had the form of inductive reasoning and (b) children’s ability to create cause-effect relations. our findings showed compatibility with current concern about the possibility of introducing teaching practices, in order to increase pre-school children’s critical thinking within a paedagogical context guiding the use of logical reasoning (dias and harris 1998; 1990; richards and sanderson 1999; german and nichols 2003; dias et al. 2005). concerning our first research question, investigating pre-school children’s ability to use logical reasoning processes mentioned in this paper, we found participants’ responses to be satisfactory. our findings showed that participants were able to (a) respond to the argumentation forms required in the first activity (crosstalk 1) , (b) use argumentation forms based on the law of excluded middle (crosstalks 2, 4, 5 and 6) and deductive reasoning (crosstalk 2), (c) use the form of inductive reasoning (crosstalk 4). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 104 not only did the children use the given information in order to come to the correct conclusion, but they also seemed to have accepted the commitments required by the activity communication frameworks, referring to situations contradicting their experiences. moreover, they could develop argumentation on hypothetical situations. the above observations were in agreement with other research findings (riggs et al. 1998; leevers and harris 1999; beck et al. 2006) showing children’s ability to cognitively decentralize from their immediate experiences, as well as their ability to build reasoning processes based on imaginary or hypothetical situations. in the third activity children’s argumentation was built on a collective process (crosstalk 7). in the teaching interventions presented here, all forms of argumentation noted by bibliography were present (structured, semi-structured, unstructured). strong structured and semi-structured argumentation was found in the first two teaching interventions and unstructured argumentation was encountered in the third teaching intervention (table 2). this study was not based on a complete teaching proposal it was rather a detection of the possibilities for the development of a teaching intervention programme. taking this into consideration, while attempting to answer the second research question, we could suggest the positive effects of a possibility of teaching such concepts in pre-school. indeed, the communication framework within which such concepts were integrated seemed to stimulate children’s interest and determine their positive emotional attitude towards the specific aims. here, the communication framework’s significant parameters were the verbal interactions between children and adult. as noted by mercer (2004), the use of language is the means for creating meaning between teacher and student. guiding students, through suitable questions, is critical in children’s familiarization with reasoning processes. this statement refers to the interweaving of concepts such as ‘scaffolding’ (bruner 1978) and “the zone of proximal development” (vygotsky 1978), a fact occurring in research which focuses on teaching and learning (fernández et al. 2001). according to bruner (1978) ‘scaffolding’ is described as cognitive support given by teachers to students to help them solve tasks they would not be able to solve working on their own. this statement closely relates the concept of “scaffolding” to vygotsky’s concept of “the zone of proximal development”. based on our data, we could conclude that children basically resorted to cumulative talk, much less to disputational talk and not at all to exploratory talk (table 2). it seemed to be easier for the children to add their ideas to what had already been said, rather than to dispute or explore the ideas of others. this could be contributed to the following reasons: firstly, to the absence of a set of “ground rules” (mercer and sams, 2006, p.513) which would help children to familiarize with the development of a similar type of dialogue. secondly the children had never before been exposed to structured mathematical reasoning activities. none the less, cumulative talk which was detected in certain instances gave (a) some children the opportunity to formulate their opinion more comprehensively and more clearly (crosstalks 2 and 3) and, (b) the possibility for a reasoning process to be completed with the participation of more than one child (crosstalks 4, 5, 6 and 7). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 105 the above ascertainments were evident in all crosstalks presented in this paper, even in the cases where children’s responses, within the dialogue, were not particularly productive (crosstalks 1 and 8). table 2. forms of verbal interaction and forms of argumentation found in the study. forms of argumentation semi-structured √ forms of verbal interaction cumulative talk √ structured √ disputational talk √ unstructured √ exploratory talk (√ ) : forms observed during the study, (-): forms not observed during the study. another dimension of the introduction of logical reasoning through children’s literature is that (a) it leads to children’s familiarization with the transfer process from free natural talk to the standardized language of logic and mathematics; a particularly important skill for the future stages in education (durand-guerrier et al. 2012) and, (b) it contributes to familiarization with forms of proof which are mainly found in mathematics education (arzarello et al. 2009). the fact that this was the first time, within the classroom context, that children had come into contact with such cognitively demanding processes and managed to respond sufficiently, showed the possibility of introducing such concepts in pre-school education. we believe that such teaching interventions can infiltrate across multiple disciplines such as mathematics, science education, linguistic education and philosophy for children. of course succeeding in the implementation of programmes on the systematic introduction of reasoning processes in young ages, requires corresponding teacher preparation and encouragement (gazzard 2012; colom et al. 2014; haynes 2008; lipman et al. 1980). of course it is important to note that according to bruner (1986), there is an important differentiation between a well-formulated logical argument and thought which is created by a narrative frame (such as the frames used in the teaching interactions presented in this paper). although both can be used as means of persuasion, the former demands resourcing in typical or empirical proof processes, while the latter is based on the verisimilitude it offers rather than truth. during the reading or listening of a story, readers or listeners develop rhetoric in order to bring the object of narration to life. this strategy gives their reasoning a more specific form whereas expressions such as “if x then y” are characterized by their universality. concluding the presentation of this study, we need to note its restrictions having to do, mainly, with its small sample and pilot character. the former limitation does not permit us to generalize our findings, while the latter does not permit us to follow the children’s cognitive development through the implementation of a long-term programme. such an implementation would lead us to draw information concerning children’s ability to respond to specific reasoning forms. indeed, we believe that the research project presented in this paper highlights the need for analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 106 systematically studying forms of verbal interaction, especially the systematic recording of questions enabling the accomplishment of our goal: young children’s familiarization with forms of logical reasoning. acknowledgements: the authors would like to thank the reviewers for their helpful and constructive comments. bibliography arzarello, f., paola, d., sabena, c. 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(2001). visualising the emergent structure of childrren’s mathematical argument. cognitive science , 25, 733-773. toulmin, s. e. (1958). the use of arguments. cambridge: university press. trivizas, ε. (2013). a shovel on mars. athens: metaichmio (in greek). van de walle, j. a. (2007). elementary and middle school mathematics. teaching development. boston: pearson. vygotsky, l. s. (1978). mind in society: the development of higher psychological processes. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. zacharos, k., antonopoulos, k., and ravanis, k. (2011). activities in mathematics education and teaching interactions. the construction of the measurement of capacity in preschoolers. european early childhood education research journal, 19(4), 451-468. address correspondences to: 1. vasiliki pournantzi: pre-school teacher, greece, vickypou1@gmail.com 2. konstantinos zacharos: associate professor, department of educational sciences and early childhood education university of patras, greece, zacharos@upatras.gr 3. maria angela shiakalli: phd pre-school teacher, cyprus angelashiakalli@primehome.com analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 69 the history of mathematics as scaffolding for introducing prospective teachers into the philosophy of mathematics dimitris chassapis an introductory note this paper claims that the awareness of crucial philosophical questions and controversies, which have arisen during the historical evolution of fundamental concepts, ideas and processes in mathematics, should be an essential component of the professional knowledge of student teachers who intend to teach children mathematics. the starting point of this claim is the premise that the philosophy of mathematics may provide a unifying framework, which potentially supports an epistemological clarification of mathematical knowledge, as well as critical reflection on the beliefs and values about mathematics, that a teacher holds, which guide the practice of mathematics teaching, as relevant research has shown (thompson, 1984, 1992). based upon the above perspective, a course has been designed and implemented in a greek university. it uses themes from the history of mathematics as scaffolding for the introduction of prospective teachers to the questions and controversies raised by various philosophical approaches to mathematics throughout its historical development. reasons why the philosphy of mathematics for teaching mathematics in the project reported here, mathematics teaching is understood as a practice that intentionally works on students’ learning of mathematics by paying attention to the following: firstly, the representation of mathematical knowledge; secondly, the students’ mental processes of learning; and finally, the instructional media within which teachers and students interact (cohen, 2011). this is exemplified by herbst et.al. (2010), where in practice, the representation of mathematical knowledge includes teaching tasks where examples of mathematical ideas are selected and mathematical statements formulated; thus, providing mathematically persuasive explanations and choosing problems for students which promote the understanding of target mathematical concepts and more. being aware of the students’ mental processes of learning includes teaching techniques, for example, eliciting students’ thinking, interpreting students’ conceptions and identifying errors, etc., while simultaneously dealing with the instructional media and handling a number of diverse teaching skills and techniques associated with interpersonal dynamics and communication. this also includes handling the limitations and constraints of the institution where the teaching and learning activities are taking place. the important question is, to discover the purpose of teaching mathematics in our schools, and the answer to this question, implicitly or explicitly, guides the work of the mathematics teacher. the why stems from the viewpoint of mathematics as a discipline and a subject to be learned, in addition to the perception of its role and purpose in society. such points of view may be spontaneous and somewhat incoherent; however, they do, in fact, exist and affect the activities of mathematics teachers. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 70 with reference to the above, it may be asserted that there is a direct association of a philosophy of mathematics adopted by mathematics teachers which will be combined with fundamental features of their teaching practices. over forty years ago, thom claimed that a philosophy of mathematics has powerful implications for educational practice, pointing out that: “in fact, whether one wishes it or not, all mathematical pedagogy, even if scarcely coherent, rests on a philosophy of mathematics” (thom, 1973, p.204), and following this claim, hersh emphasised that: one’s conception of what mathematics is affects one’s conception of how it should be pre sented. one’s manner of presenting it is an indication of what one believes to be most essential in it. … the issue, then, is not, what is the best way to teach? but, what is mathematics really about? …” (hersh, 1979, p.33). nowadays, it is widely accepted, both on a philosophical level (lerman, 1983, 1990; steiner, 1987; ernest, 1989) and on the basis of empirical evidence, (thompson, 1984, 1992) that teachers’ assumptions about mathematics and its learning and teaching, implicitly reflect, or are related to, a philosophy of mathematics. in their turn, these assumptions play a significant role in shaping characteristic patterns of their teaching practices. firstly, they include the origins of mathematical knowledge and the nature of this knowledge as a discipline. this is followed by the nature of mathematical problems and tasks and the relationships between mathematical knowledge and empirical reality, particularly in terms of the applicability and utility of mathematical knowledge and its nature as a subject taught in schools (törner, 1996). added to this is the notion of the teacher as a learner and user of mathematics and more generally, opinions about the process of learning mathematics (ernest, 1989; pehkonen, 1994). therefore, what teachers believe about mathematics reflects, or is related to, a philosophy of mathematics and, in fact, constitutes a kind of a practical philosophy of mathematics. this, as a complex, practically-oriented set of understandings, regulates and shapes to a great extent the teachers’ thoughts and practices within the classroom; it is however, subject to the constraints and contingencies of the school context. moreover, the teachers’ practical philosophy of mathematics often takes precedence over knowledge, shaping the interpretation of their received knowledge and selectively admitting or rejecting new knowledge. consequently, in assuming a connection between both a philosophy of mathematics and mathematics teaching practices, as well as a philosophy of mathematics and teachers’ philosophical and epistemological view of mathematics, the philosophy of mathematics per se would have to be considered as an essential component of teachers’ preparation in order to introduce children to the culture of mathematics even in early childhood education. the aim is to enable teachers to develop a questioning stance towards dominant canons of mathematics education and lead them to be able to reflect critically on their personal didactical practices. it is believed that this will increase their professional autonomy in teaching mathematics and consequently is a vitally important part of a teachers’ preparation. also of great importance is the necessity to create a teachers’ preparation which aims to support them, so that they can become reflective practitioners. it is equally essential that these teachers play an important role in the definition of the purposes and goals of their work, as well as the means to attain them, that will result in their participation in the production of knowledge about teaching mathematics, the possession of which, would place teachers in a position where they could critically assess the established standards. the subject of the philosophy of mathematics ernest (1991, 1998) described two contrasting philosophical views of mathematics, absolutism and fallibilism, which, although somewhat simplistic, are useful in our discussion of introducing the philosophy of mathanalytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 71 ematics into teachers’ preparation courses. the first is an absolutist view of mathematics, which stems from both platonist and formalist philosophies; these consider mathematics to be a consistent body of knowledge without errors or contradictions and are expressed in a formalized language. these philosophies regard mathematics as infallible, due either to its existence beyond humanity just waiting to be discovered (platonist school), or due to its creation as a logical, closed set of rules and procedures (formalist school). the second view of mathematics originates from a fallibilistic philosophy or a philosophy of humanism, as hersh, (1997) termed it, which regards mathematics as a human construction, consequently fallible and corrigible. it is this philosophical view of mathematics which has moved away from the dogmas of the traditional, foundationalist schools of formalism, logicism and intuitionism, each of which sought to establish the universal and absolute validity of mathematical knowledge, setting its epistemological status above all other forms of knowledge. this perspective has included the history and practice of mathematics in the topics studied by philosophy of mathematics. lakatos, one of the founders of this philosophy of mathematics, stressed the necessity of a close relationship between the history and philosophy of mathematics, claiming that “the history of mathematics, lacking the guidance of philosophy has become blind, while the philosophy of mathematics turning its back on the...history of mathematics, has become empty” (1976, p. 2). following the same direction, ernest (1998) builds on the need to consider the relationships between mathematics and its corporeal agents, i.e. humans, listing the following minimum number of aspects of mathematical knowledge and practices that a modern philosophy of mathematics should account for: 1. mathematical knowledge; its character, genesis and justification, with special attention to the role of proof. 2. mathematical theories, both constructive and structural; their character and development, and issues of appraisal and evaluation. 3. the objects of mathematics; their character, origins and relationship with the language of mathematics. 4. mathematical practice; its character, and the mathematical activities of mathematicians, in the present and past. 5. applications of mathematics; its relationship with science, technology, other areas of knowledge and values. 6. the learning of mathematics: its character and role in the onward transmission of mathematical knowledge, and in the creativity of individual mathematicians. (pp. 56-57) ernest stated that: criteria 1 and 3 include the traditional epistemological and ontological focuses of the philosophy of mathematics but add a concern with the genesis of both mathematical knowledge and the objects of mathematics, as well as with the language in which mathematical knowledge is expressed and mathematical objects named. criterion 2 adds a concern with the form that mathematical knowledge usually takes: that is in mathematical theories. it allows as admissible the notion that theories evolve over time and can be appraised. the discussion of standards and theory analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 72 appraisal is evidently a matter for the philosophy of mathematics, even if theory choice is not the same kind of issue as it is in philosophy of science. this criterion also indicates the dual nature of mathematical theories and concepts, which can be either constructive or structural, and this is a philosophically significant distinction. criteria 4 and 5 go beyond the traditional boundaries of the philosophy of mathematics by admitting the application of mathematics and human mathematical practice as legitimate philosophical concerns, as well as its relations with other areas of human knowledge. they unambiguously admit social aspects of mathematics as legitimate areas of philosophical enquiry. criterion 6 adds a concern with how mathematics is transmitted onward from one generation to the next and, in particular, how it is learnt by individuals and the dialectical relation between individuals and existing knowledge in creativity. (p. 57) aligned with the two contrasting philosophical views of mathematics mentioned above, are ideas about mathematics teaching. in the analysis of threlfall (1996), the absolutist view of mathematics is usually associated with a behaviorist approach, utilizing drills and the practice of discrete skills, individual activities, and an emphasis on procedures, while the fallibilist view of mathematics aligns itself with pedagogy consistent with constructivist theories, utilizing problem-based learning, real world application, and collaborative learning, with the emphasis on the process and not on product. however, although there have been numerous calls to change and adapt the teaching of mathematics through the adoption of a constructivist epistemology, little has been done to challenge teachers’ conceptions of mathematics but as ernest (1989) has underlined, “teaching reforms cannot take place unless teachers’ deeply held beliefs about mathematics and its teaching and learning change” (p. 249). the history vs. the philosphy of mathematics the history and philosophy of mathematics are academic disciplines which have different objectives, conceptual structures, interests and methods and they perceive the world of mathematics from a different point of view. some of their differences are not important when attempting to interweave themes from the one, with questions raised by the other, in a course designed for student teachers who intend to teach mathematics in schools; however, others are crucial (aspray & kitcher, 1988). for example, history deals with the particular and the temporal, while philosophy deals with the universal and a-temporal; the first focuses on selected episodes from the past, while the latter is concerned with universality building upon abstractness. in actual fact, the connection between history and philosophy is a complex, dynamic and purpose-sensitive relationship. history employs a variety of practices, and philosophy is so heterogeneous that it is extremely difficult to draw simple and uniform links between them. at the same time, any connections drawn are dependent on the approach adopted in drawing them. for this reason, the history and philosophy of mathematics may be related in different ways for different purposes. in our project and for our purposes, we have found such a relationship based on the following premises: – the philosophy of mathematics involves a temporal dimension. as exemplified by lakatos, in his proofs and refutations, he stated that mathematical definitions, proofs and theories are not created at the outset in their full format, ready to meet the requirements of mathematical research and development. as a consequence, the concept of truth in mathematics is actually conditional and domain-specific and as such, this approach has significant implications for questions posed and answered by the philosophy of mathematical practice. – the philosophy of mathematics studies, mathematical procedures, representation, and analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 73 ontology in comparison with the history of mathematics which studies changes in mathematical procedures, representation, and ontology. explanations of changes presented by history provide philosophy the grounds for testing its general hypotheses and theories and for interpreting their transformations over time. – mathematical ideas are not developed in isolation from their wider intellectual context or the institutional factors regulating the mathematical practice. mathematical definitions, proofs and theories often develop in response to practical problems and these practicalities condition them for as long as mathematics continues to develop. as a result, many questions related to the epistemology of mathematics may be answered by an inquiry which transcends the boundaries of the strictly mathematical or even intellectual fields. adopting the above mentioned view of the connection between the history and the philosophy of mathematics creates the need for a key question to be answered: which of the two disciplines will provide the template for the syllabus of a course aiming to introduce students to the philosophy of mathematics? a series of in-depth interviews with students, during the planning of the course being reported on here, showed that the history of mathematics was more familiar and a more appealing subject matter to the students than the philosophy of mathematics. the latter was referred to as a field dealing with abstract, incomprehensible theories about mathematical knowledge, focused on the ‘logic’ of mathematics or with the formal logic of mathematical thinking. thus, the history of mathematics was chosen to be used as scaffolding for the introduction of prospective teachers to the questions and controversies raised by various philosophical approaches to mathematics in the course of its development. the course with this background, the introduction of any aspects of the philosophy of mathematics to a course offered to student teachers, has to meet additional prerequisites. firstly, the selected topics from the history and philosophy of mathematics should have a clear relevance to the topics of school mathematics, in order to be a crucial motivating factor for teachers. secondly, these issues of the philosophy of mathematics ought to introduce thought provoking questions related, directly or indirectly, to the mathematics taught in schools, thereby functioning as a catalyst in attracting teachers’ interest and involvement in the philosophy of mathematics. in addition, a preliminary study has produced evidence of student teachers’ poor mathematical background and rather narrow view of mathematics as a discipline, inherited from their own school experience, and this needs to be considered carefully. taking into account the above outlined issues, the course reported here has been developed and implemented on the following rationale. 1. as a first step, themes from the history of mathematics were selected for the syllabus of the course. the criterion for the choice was based, both on the crucial role played in the development of mathematics and its philosophy and on the need to incorporate into these themes the fundamental concepts, processes and application of mathematics, which are included in the curricula of pre-school and primary school mathematics. 2. the second step, selected issues from the philosophy of mathematics and integrated them into each theme which was introduced by challenging and provocative questions aiming to create dissonance within the group of teachers; thus, stimulating them to be actively involved in discussions about learning and reflective thinking about mathematics, e.g., how it is taught and learnt. so for every issue or theme an attempt was made to include questions that would provoke discusanalytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 74 sion which would meet the previously mentioned criteria for a modern philosophy of mathematics. the organising concepts of this rationale are “themes” and “thought provoking questions.” by “themes” here is meant, collections of learning experiences from the history of mathematics, that assist students to relate their learning to questions that are important and meaningful for them, as well as being clearly linked to practice (freeman & sokoloff, 1996). themes are the means with which to organize the philosophy of mathematics content, which is presented and discussed by using questions that are meaningful to the teachers as starting-points, and they are intended to give meaning and direction to the reflection and learning process (perfetti & goldman, 1975). this thematic approach seems to provide an environment where knowledge can be individually and socially constructed, so it may be considered to be associated with constructivist ideas of knowing. “thought provoking questions” are those which create discordant situations for the teachers and thus motivate them to be actively involved in approaching the philosophy of mathematics; they are in fact, questions which create perplexity, challenge beliefs, point out questionable issues and potentially foster a conceptual reconstruction of mathematical knowledge and pedagogy of the teachers. as a result, the following twelve teaching units were developed using historical themes as scaffolding for introducing key questions and crucial controversies from the philosophy of mathematics; challenging and provocative questions were also provided for each theme: 1. numbers and numerals: from the ishango bone to the arithmetic of stevin. are numbers: objects or properties? what differences and similarities can you point out in the following definitions of number (definition of number given by pythagoreans, cantor, peano and frege are offered)? do different number definitions impact on any differences in teaching number concept? why were the various numeration systems invented and used over time and across cultures? 2. discrete and continuous quantities: from zeno’s paradoxes to dedekind’s cuts. how is the difference between classes and sets conceived? what happens when ordering rational numbers? 3. zero and infinity if zero is the representation of nothing, then nothing must mean something because it is being represented, is this correct? is any collection of objects sharing a common characteristic a set? what is the relation between a whole and one of its parts and may it be divided? could you give an example of an infinite set? analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 75 what is the difference between an ordinal number and a cardinal number? have you ever heard about the continuum hypothesis? if not, could you make a guess based on your understanding of the term “continuum.” 4. equality and equation: algebra from diophantus, to cardano and then to dr. noether. may mathematical statements be understood in the same way as ordinary statements? for instance, statements of equality or equation? 5. euclidean geometry and non-euclidean geometries: from the ancient egypt surveyors to lobachevski’s creation. can you see any difference in the statements, “between any two points one can draw a straight line” (euclid) and “between any two points there is a straight line” (hilbert)? why is the golden ratio so prevalent in nature? how many dimensions have a curved plane? are mathematical concepts and truths discovered or invented? 6. existence and construction in mathematics. do mathematical objects (sets, numbers, lines, functions, circles, etc.) actually exist? are there mathematical properties which a mathematical object might have only contingently? does the existence of a mobius strip prove that mathematical objects are true? how can we rationalize the fact that complex numbers exist? 7. geometry, arithmetic and their mutual relationships. newton declared that “geometry is founded on mechanical practice.” what could he have meant? descartes postulated that “geometrical” curves are “those which are amenable to precise and exact measurement.” compare this statement with the euclidean concept of a curve. 8. randomness, probability and finally statistics. is there any difference between “randomness” and “anything can happen”? what does “probable” mean? can every statement be assigned a numerical probability related to the given evidence? analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 76 can we assign probability to a person’s rational act? 9. justification and proof in mathematics what truth is expressed by a mathematical statement? is a truth in mathematics about objects, concepts or neither? from where is the indispensability of a mathematical argument derived? 10. axiomatic systems and the foundations of mathematics: from euclid to the foundational schools of the 19th century. what do mathematical statements mean? what is the organization of mathematics concepts in axiomatic systems? what differences and similarities can you identify in euclid’s axioms for geometry and in peano’s axioms for natural numbers? what do the axiomatic organization of mathematics concepts mean for their relation to real world situations? have you ever heard the terms “logicism,” “formalism” or “intuitionism”? what do you think they mean in mathematics? what are the foundations of mathematics? 11. the story continued: the foundations of mathematics and the strange dr. gödel. is the view that “mathematics is a game with signs” tenable or not? 12 …what shall we do with mathematics now dr. lakatos? do you think that mathematics has any similarities to physics? in the above course of teaching units, there may be the possibility that a fragmented introduction to the philosophy of mathematics could lead students to confusion and misunderstanding of some issues concerning the philosophical views of mathematics. this is actually a risk underlying the implementation of this course. however, it is compensated by the power to raise and to keep alive the interest of the participants through the variety of presented and discussed topics. briefly, this course suffers from the lack of a comprehensive introduction to the philosophy of mathematics but has the advantage of offering an anthology of the philosophy of mathematical issues. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 77 feedback and evaluation of the course the course outlined above has been running for the last four years in the faculty of early childhood education at the university of athens in greece. after the completion of the course the students who have participated are asked to write a short anonymous report evaluating the main aspects of the course. they are requested to describe the most important benefits that they had from following the course, and identify the main obstacles which they encountered during the lectures and in participating in the discussions taking place as part of the course. all the reports were carefully examined by a team, so that the evaluative comments made by the students could be clearly elicited from their writing and the resulting data could be thoroughly analyzed. from the analysis of the evidence collected over the four years of the implementation of this course the following conclusions were drawn, here briefly presented: (a) most of the students pointed out that the main benefit from attending the course was the actual conceptual reconstruction they engaged in, which was vaguely described as a “change of mind about mathematics,” a “change of my view of mathematics” or a “change of my attitudes towards mathematics.” in every case, these “changes” which can be interpreted to mean a re-conceptualization of the nature of mathematics leading them to look at the discipline from a position different to their own previously held perspective. it was shown in their reports that the perspective of mathematics that is “new” for them is that of a critical approach towards the dominant images of mathematics in schools and the teaching practices they have experienced. this critical approach has mostly emanated from the possibilities of questioning what has been taken for granted in school mathematics. therefore this “change” appears to have been brought about by their introduction to and involvement in the philosophy of mathematics. (b) the issues from the philosophy of mathematics that were obviously appreciated by the teachers and which seem to have the greatest effect on their thinking were those which offered explicit opportunities for challenging their conceptions about teaching particular concepts and processes of school mathematics (e.g. numbers or proofs) or elements of their teaching models (e.g. the use of manipulatives as embodiments of mathematical concepts or the employment of diagrams as depictions of mathematical relations). (c) the most serious problems encountered during the implementation of the course were created as a result of the poor mathematical backgrounds of the students, which is mainly attributable to secondary school mathematics. the knowledge deficits about particular mathematical concepts, processes and theorems did not permit them to comprehend specific questions and ideas from the philosophy of mathematics and delimited the extent, depth and quality of relevant discussions. infinity and continuity issues being the most characteristic examples. therefore, the outcome of this course, and i believe any course concerning the philosophy of mathematics, will be highly dependent on students’ mathematical backgrounds. a final, highly relevant issue from the instructor who has been running this course for three years, is that of the demands, in terms of time and effort, placed on the tutor both for the preparation, and even more for the managing, of each session of this course. i suppose that this would also apply to similar courses that attempt to introduce student teachers to the philosophy of mathematics while having to meet other pedagogical goals. concluding comments the growing philosophical investigations of mathematics in the past thirty years (see, e.g., davis & hersh, analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 78 1981; hersh, 1997; restivo, van bendegen, & fischer, 1993; tymoczko, 1986) have not been properly addressed in mathematics education. even at present, rationales and practical proposals in mathematics education are mainly informed by educational and psychological research, disregarding ideas coming from disciplines that study the nature of mathematics, as do philosophy and history of mathematics. in this paper, i have presented an attempt to use themes from the history of mathematics as scaffolding for the introduction of prospective teachers to the questions and controversies arisen by the philosophy of mathematics, claiming that an introduction to the philosophy of mathematics will support student teachers to become more reflective practitioners. on the other hand, it must be recognized that no single course can resolve all the issues associated with reflective thinking and the effectiveness of prospective teachers. however, if nothing else, it seems likely that if student teachers are never asked to reflect on the philosophical basis of their perceptions of mathematics, then they will continue to produce traditional, and mostly ineffective, teaching practices and remain resist to change. references aspray, w. and p. kitcher (1988). history and philosophy of modern mathematics. minneapolis: university of min nesota press. cohen, d. (2011). teaching: practice and its predicaments. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. davis, p. j., & hersh, r. (1981). the mathematical experience. boston: birkhauser. ernest p. (1998). social constructivism as a philosophy of mathematics. albany: state university of new york press. ernest, p. (1991). the philosophy of mathematics education. london: falmer. ernest, p. (1989). the impact of beliefs on the teaching of mathematics. in p. ernest (ed.), mathematics teach ing: the state of the art (pp. 249-254). london: falmer press. freeman, c., & sokoloff, h.j. (1996). toward a theory of theory of thematic curricula: constructing new learning environments for teachers & learners. education policy analysis archives, 3(14), 1-19. herbst, p., bieda, k., chazal d. & gonzález, g. (2010). representations of mathematics teaching and their use in teacher education: what do we need in a pedagogy for the 21st century? retrieved from http://hdl.handle. net/2027.42/78158 (25-04-2013). hersh, r. (1997). what is mathematics, really? new york: oxford university press. hersh, r. (1979). some proposals for revising the philosophy of mathematics. advances in mathematics, 31(1), 31-50. lakatos, imre (1976). proofs and refutations. cambridge: cambridge university press lerman, s. (1983). problem solving or knowledge centred: the influence of philosophy on mathematics teach ing. international journal of mathematics education in science and technology, 14(1), 59–66. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 79 lerman, s. (1990). alternative perspectives of the nature of mathematics and their influence on the teaching of mathematics. british educational research journal 16(1), 53–61. pehkonen, e. (1994). on teachers’ beliefs and changing mathematics teaching. journal für mathematik-didaktik, 15(3/4), 177-209. perfetti, c.a., & goldman, s.r. (1975), discourse functions of thematization and topicalization, journal of psy cholinguistic research, 4(3), 257-271. restivo, s., van bendegen, j. p., & fischer, r. (eds.) (1993). math worlds: philosophical and social studies of math ematics and mathematics education. albany, ny: state university of new york press. steiner, h.-g. (1987). philosophical and epistemological aspects of mathematics and their interaction with theory and practice in mathematics education. for the learning of mathematics 7(1), 7–13. thom, r. (1973). modern mathematics: does it exist? in a.g. howson (ed.), developments in mathematics edu cation: proceedings of the second international congress on mathematics education (pp. 194-209). cambridge: cambridge university press. thompson, a. (1984). the relationship of teachers’ conceptions of mathematics teaching to instructional prac tice. educational studies in mathematics, 15, 105-127. thompson, a. (1992). teachers’ beliefs and conceptions: a synthesis of the research. in d. a. grouws (ed.), handbook of research on mathematics teaching and learning (pp.127-146). new york: macmillan. törner, g. (1996). views of german mathematics teachers on mathematics. in h.-g. weigand, et. al. (eds.), developments in mathematics education in germany. selected papers from the annual conference on didactics of mathematics, regensburg 1996 (pp. 116-129). hildesheim: franzbecker. tymoczko t. (1986). new directions in the philosophy of mathematics. boston: brikhauser. address correspondences to: dimitris chassapis university of athens faculty of early childhood education navarinou 13a, 106 80 athens, greece dchasapis@ecd.uoa.gr shared autonomous reasoning: interpretations of habermasian discourse for the community of philosophical inquiry 46 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 37, issue 1 (2016) shared autonomous reasoning: interpretations of habermasian discourse for the community of philosophical inquiry natalie m. fletcher introduction an autonomous reasoning be shared? according to many philosophical perspectives, from kantian ethics to libertarian theories, this question seems incoherent – the purpose of an individual being able to think rationally for herself, to determine what she finds important and advance her own ends in accordance, seems to lose its appeal if she must engage in this process jointly with others and result in having the same concerns, perspectives, and goals in common. a crucial motivation for many accounts of autonomy is to safeguard the individual’s will from the influence or interference of the other, and enable her to authentically express the identity and life she freely chooses for herself. from this vantage point, what could be gained from having the capacity for autonomous reasoning be shareable? throughout his writings and notably in his theory of communicative action, jürgen habermas examines the potential for shared autonomous reasoning, challenging monological approaches in favour of a discursive understanding that seeks to preserve the emancipatory features of popular notions of self-determination while adding a crucial intersubjective component.1 from his perspective, it appears that autonomous reasoning not only can be shared but indeed must be shared, given his stance that all human meaning is intersubjectively constituted. but what does this particular construal of autonomy involve? as gerald dworkin has noted, autonomy is a term of art—its characterization varies depending on the field and usage, making it a notoriously difficult concept to define without compromising the intricacy of the facets of human reality it denotes.2 this burden of characterization intensifies when considering the breadth of the habermasian corpus. to begin, then, if we define autonomous reasoning simply as the capacity to freely and willingly engage in critical processes of reason generation and justification, the question of whether it can be shared is interpretable in three ways. first, on a descriptive interpretation, we can argue that autonomous reasoning is shared in that it takes place in a context of common understandings and meanings established linguistically that gives us the basis for our reasons and makes interpersonal exchanges possible. second, on a normative interpretation, we can argue that autonomous reasoning c 47 ought to be shared in that we are responsible for ensuring no one lives under norms they do not themselves endorse, and therefore, we must include them in the collaborative process of generating and justifying reasons, and respect their capacity to do so. third, on an epistemic interpretation, we can argue that autonomous reasoning benefits from being shared in that the combining of our efforts in terms of both procedure and content can increase knowledge and advance learning in ways that expand the scope and integrity of our collective communicative agency. through an exploration of these three interpretations, this essay will contend that autonomous reasoning can and must be shared, as habermas would maintain, but that to fully benefit from this “sharedness,” we must understand it as a capacity comprising a range of faculties driven not only by our commitment to establishing justifiable norms but also by a sense of integrity that recognizes others as epistemic agents whose worth stems from both their discursive aptitudes and concrete particularities. the essay will begin with an overview of the context for habermas’s interest in discursive autonomy, then consider the descriptive, normative and epistemic interpretations in turn, and end with a look at how shared autonomous reasoning might be honed through a community of philosophical inquiry (cpi) practice. i. contextualizing habermas’s interest in discursive autonomy beyond the influence of kantian ethics, habermas’s interest in autonomy is largely motivated by what he calls the “unfinished project of modernity.”3 as a philosopher who recognizes the historical situatedness of philosophical concepts and ideologies, habermas has celebrated the significant positive contributions of modern social life, notably the increases in individual freedom and knowledge as well as the plurality of perspectives and orientations resulting from the decline of dominant religious traditions. at the same time, he has denounced the rise of overly scientistic and instrumentalist worldviews that alienate people from moral engagement and threaten social cohesion, claiming that we have yet to live up to the new expanses of knowledge that modernity has afforded us.4 and so, modernity remains a project to be completed, in part through the exercise of discursive autonomy that preserves the communication modes necessary for moral norms to be created and followed in a world no longer ruled by divine codes of conduct. as a critical theorist, habermas has sought to conceive autonomy in ways that protect individuals from exclusion, coercion, groupthink, and political and economic repression, while making them accountable to each other and their social contexts. politically, he has borrowed ideas from liberal democracy and civic republicanism to express the importance of balancing autonomy’s private and public dimensions, which he sees as interdependent: on the one hand autonomy is a kind of self-determination that allows individuals to freely pursue life projects with minimal governmental interference, and on the other hand, it is the collective will of people who self-legislate by recommending their views to their representative governments in the public sphere.5 48 through an interdisciplinary rational “reconstructive” method combining pragmatist theory with empirical sciences,6 habermas proposes a dualistic view of society as comprising two realms of activity in which autonomy can be exercised, albeit in very distinct ways: the “lifeworld” and the “system.” the lifeworld consists of “the culturally transmitted and linguistically organized stock of interpretive patterns”7 that shape our everyday unregimented interactions with others, from our families and communities to our mass media and grassroots political projects: it contains the diversity of shared meanings and understandings—the “vast and incalculable web of presuppositions”8—that make communicative action possible. as a self-sustaining force that enables cultural reproduction, the lifeworld can only undergo gradual change given its deep-rooted complexity. in contrast, the system designates the sphere of society’s material reproduction of goods and services governed by money and power, which in turn are wielded by instrumental and strategic action. when people act instrumentally in the system, they use their reasoning to calculate how best to reach their desired ends through targeted means, including acting strategically to influence others in ways that will support the realization of their chosen ends. unlike marxists and fellow frankfurt school theorists, habermas recognizes the significance of action in both realms; however, he argues that since the system lacks transparency in its aims and imposes external restrictions on agency, if its reach extends too far, it can lead to “systematically distorted communication” that creates social pathologies like alienation, demoralization and instability that upset the lifeworld and result in its colonization. he writes: “such communication pathologies can be conceived of as the result of a confusion between actions oriented to reaching understanding and actions oriented to success.”9 in response to these increasingly complex circumstances, we must protect the lifeworld by exercising our autonomous reasoning to come to mutual understandings and agreements about how best to live and how we ought to treat one another—questions of the good life (ethics) and questions of the right and the just (morality). as subsequent sections will strive to elucidate, this process of communicative action occurs through our everyday exchanges, whereby we coordinate our actions by using validity claims and, when disagreement occurs, by engaging in specific types of discourse that enable us to determine the ethical values and moral norms best suited to guide our actions. for habermas, through the process of modernization, ethics and morality have grown apart: without the overarching grip of religious codes and beliefs, people have had to collaboratively decide for themselves what moral norms ought to universally apply to maintain social order and resolve conflicts, while acknowledging that the broadening array of worldviews and orientations has resulted in vastly different ideas about what makes a life worthwhile for individuals and their respective communities. as habermas explains, at first glance, moral theory and ethics appear to be oriented to the same question: what ought i, or what out we, to do? but the ‘ought’ has a different sense once we are no longer asking about rights and duties that everyone ascribes to one another from an inclusive ‘we’ perspective and ask what is best ‘for me’ or ‘for us’ in the 49 long run and all things considered. such ethical questions regarding our own weal and woe arise in the context of a particular life history or a unique form of life. they are wedded to questions of identity: how we should understand ourselves, who we are and want to be.10 in both the moral and ethical domains, shared autonomous reasoning plays a key role, but questions of the right and the just require that it be exercised in very particular ways toward the crucial objective of establishing reasonable norms to which we can all agree by virtue of our common humanity.11 and so, it would appear that on habermas’s account, autonomy functions differently—albeit always in some sense intersubjectively—depending on the context in which it is employed. here, joe anderson’s analysis of the five senses of autonomy that emerge from habermas’s theory of communicative action is helpful: (i) within the theoretical context of deliberative democracy, political autonomy involves the freedom from “illegitimate domination by others” and appropriate integration into “processes of collective self-determination;” (ii) within the theoretical context of moral philosophy, moral autonomy involves the capacity of allowing “intersubjectively shared reasons to determine one’s will;” (iii) within the theoretical context of free will, accountable agency involves the wherewithal to “act for reasons” rather than “as a result of compelling forces;” (iv) within the theoretical context of social theory, personal autonomy involves the ability to “engage in critical reflection about what do with one’s life” and pursue it without violating moral norms; (v) within the theoretical context of personal identity, accountable identity involves “vouching for oneself and being recognized by others for so doing.”12 for present purposes, we will focus on the tensions and parallels between moral autonomy and personal autonomy—or what habermas calls “ethical-existential” autonomy13—and how these relate to the prospects of shared autonomous reasoning from the descriptive, normative and epistemic interpretations previously outlined. ii. a descriptive interpretation of shared autonomous reasoning a straightforward approach to the “shareability” question at hand could simply be the following: to describe autonomous reasoning as shared is to describe how it actually happens—what is involved when we employ the capacity to freely and willingly engage in critical processes of reason generation and justification. but is this in fact the case? suppose that person x is on her own, thinking about the possibility of becoming a vegan. though this decision has clear moral and ethical implications, let us assume for now that she is thinking only of the feasibility of veganism in her current life circumstances. no one is forcing her to consider this topic: she is not being coerced or pressured; she is doing so freely—generating reasons, critically comparing them and determining which are most justifiable. at this stage, she is alone, not in dialogue with others. in this situation, is autonomous reasoning shared? it would seem, at the very least, that the contents of x’s autonomous reasoning and its worth as an activity are shared: she can articulate reasons because of linguistic and 50 cultural parametres that she has come to adopt through her social embeddedness and her interaction with others, and she can deem the process itself as worthwhile because its value has been considered in the historical context in which she finds herself. it would seem odd of her to claim either of these features as strictly her own or solely the products of her own independent thought. to be reasoning autonomously in this case does not mean to be the originator of the contents and valuation of her activity, even though she has willingly engaged in it for herself. and so, on a descriptive interpretation of habermas, we can argue that autonomous reasoning is shared in that it takes places in a context of common understandings and meanings established linguistically in the lifeworld and expanded through collective language use that gives us the basis for our reasons and makes interpersonal exchanges possible. since the lifeworld resources from which we draw when we engage in autonomous reasoning—or the “stuff” of reasoning (language, connotations, meanings, reasons themselves, etc.)—are intersubjectively constituted, when we use any of them, we are drawing from a pool of already common resources that are co-constructed with others.14 on our own, we cannot make the rules of our own reasoning—we cannot single-handedly decide how to determine what is true, right or meaningful without recourse to others with whom these decisions are made. as pablo gilabert notes, “this is why habermas prefers to talk of ‘communicative reason’ instead of ‘practical reason,’ like kant [since it] requires practices of justification to be dialogic (or discursive) rather than monologic (or introspective).”15 further, the lifeworld resources that were created before us by others through their communicative action form part of the background of assumptions and significances in which we too are embedded so when we reason autonomously, we are necessarily sharing in what has already been established, even if our goal is to challenge and refine it. for example, in the very process of my writing about habermas, i cannot cut myself off from the shared understanding of words and their various connotations, and i am aware that some terms in habermasian philosophy will have very particular meanings in my current context of autonomous reasoning than they will in others, which enjoins me to be clear and cull from these pre-existing and evolving meanings in ways that will make sense of my own thoughts and be reasonable to others. in a more sophisticated sense, this descriptive interpretation of shared autonomous reasoning reflects habermas’s interest in speech acts and pragmatic meaning theory. from his perspective, truth conditions are inadequate at explaining how language enables our various forms of communication and action because we do not speak purely to describe the world as it is, but also and more importantly, to make meaning intersubjectively through the giving and weighing of reasons in order to co-construct justifiable norms.16 as james gordon finlayson writes, habermas argues that the primary function of speech is to coordinate the actions of a plurality of individual agents and to provide the invisible tracks along which interactions can unfold in an orderly and conflict-free manner. language can fulfill this function because of its inherent aim (or telos) of reaching understanding or 51 bringing about consensus. habermas takes it to be a fact that ‘reaching understanding inhabits human speech as its telos.’17 returning to the veganism scenario, if person x wants to really ascertain the reasonableness of her prospective change in diet, she would have to communicate her thoughts on the matter to others, thereby making a commitment to providing sound reasons to justify herself—or what habermas calls “validity claims”18—and to having these claims evaluated by them. if, for instance, she tells her extended family that she prefers that they not serve meat dishes at their reunion dinner and that they object to her expressed wish on the grounds that traditionally they have always eaten meat dishes, this disagreement will create an impasse that cannot be settled with everyday speech-acts. for habermas, when communicative action in the lifeworld is so interrupted, practical discourse is the more refined speech mode through which to share autonomous reasoning in the form of rational exchanges and evaluations of reasons that seek to resolve conflict, re-establish consensus and return to a mode of harmonious action. to function in this way, our discourse—or “form of argumentation” that is “norm-justifying”19—must meet a series of requirements: first, in terms of logic, we must ensure the products of our arguments are cogent, consistent and non-contradictory; in terms of dialectic, we must ensure the procedures of our arguments are guided by the principles of accountability and truthfulness, which helps our speech-acts reach the illocutionary aims of being transparent and understandable; and in terms of rhetoric, we must strive to ensure the process of our arguments meet the presuppositions of inclusion and equality that characterize an “ideal speech situation”—a notion to which we will return in the next section.20 so far, then, we can argue that our autonomous reasoning is shared at least in terms of its contents and worth as an activity since we draw from intersubjectively constructed lifeworld resources to critically generate and justify our reasons, and when these fall short, we use discourse to refine and re-establish the validity claims that will coordinate our actions, until we have cause to consider them afresh. this descriptive interpretation has its advantages: it does away with the illusion of an atomistic, solipsistic ego popularized by the philosophy of consciousness that habermas rejects, and it highlights the powerful ways in which our sense of reasonableness is embedded linguistically, historically and socially.21 but is it enough to say that our autonomous reasoning is shared because of our common language and means of communication? could we share lifeworld resources without necessarily sharing equal participation in discursive autonomy? iii. a normative interpretation of shared autonomous reasoning from a habermasian perspective, it is insufficient to consider only the contents and the valuation of autonomous reasoning as shared—we also have an obligation to the people in the lifeworld with whom we intersubjectively create meaning. given the atrocities he witnessed during the second world war, habermas has been steadfast in his envisioning of a deliberative form of 52 democracy that eschews exclusionary tactics and violations of human dignity. on a normative interpretation, then, we can argue that autonomous reasoning ought to be shared in that we are responsible for ensuring no one lives under norms they do not themselves endorse, and therefore, we must include them in the collaborative process of generating and justifying reasons, and respect their capacity to do so. kenneth baynes calls this the “sociality of reason” since it suggests that “reflective endorsement is not a solitary endeavour but requires social practices of justification that include other reason-givers or ‘co-deliberators.’”22 the recognition of my own capacity for autonomous reasoning and the contributions it enables must be mirrored by my acknowledgement of this capacity and potential in others, thus resulting in the shared accountability of being critically responsive to one another’s validity claims. in habermas’s estimation, this normative dimension of shared autonomous reasoning is especially pertinent in the realm of morality. he argues that moral norms are dynamic, evolving human constructions that are established and refined through moral discourse, and delimit our overall communicative action.23 they do not originate within us, they do not exist independently of us, and they do not come from a higher power—they are the result of our attuned intersubjective exchanges as agents capable of discursive autonomy. in light of their crucial role, it is imperative that moral norms be co-constructed in ways that would be deemed valid by all those affected by them, or else they will control the actions of people who have not contributed to the reasons justifying them nor agreed to their acceptability, and whose capacity as autonomous reasoners thus risks being disregarded. for instance, if person x finds herself living under the moral norm “thou shall kill animals for meat,” because she has been excluded from the critical collaborative process of generating and justifying reasons, we cannot say that the autonomous reasoning behind the norm has been adequately shared nor that real consensus has been reached. in this case, we could say she has been intersubjectively cheated of the opportunity to challenge validity claims to rightness and provide reasons that may change the outcome of a norm’s endorsement—and this lacks both respect for and responsibility to her capacity for shared autonomous reasoning, to say nothing of the possibility of her being coerced into renouncing her position. to guard against such occurrences in discourse, habermas specifies key requirements of “ideal speech situations” that reinforce their collaborative spirit: (i) every subject with competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a discourse. (ii) a. everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever. b. everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into the discourse. c. everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires, and needs. (iii) no speaker may be prevented by internal or external coercion, from exercising rights as laid down in (i) and (ii).24 53 moreover, habermas identifies two principles of discourse that are intended to ensure broad acceptability: first, the discourse principle (d) affirms that “just those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourse”25—if this turns out not to be the case, or even not to be anticipated, then the norm cannot be adopted; the criterion is a very demanding one that applies to moral, ethical and practical claims. second, specific to questions of the right and the just, and more demanding still, the universalization principle (u) affirms that a moral norm is valid if and only if “all affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s interests.”26 together, these presuppositions and principles incorporate mutual respect, solidarity and responsibility into discursive reasoning by requiring that we engage in a “universal exchange of roles” that allows us to see from the perspective of what george herbert mead calls a “generalized other” and thereby recognize that “valid norms must deserve recognition by all concerned.”27 as thomas mccarthy asserts, “habermas’s discourse model, by requiring that perspective-taking be general and reciprocal, builds the moment of empathy into the procedure of coming to a reasoned agreement.”28 so we can argue that beyond its intersubjectively constituted contents and valuation, our autonomous reasoning ought to be shared so that its process of contributing to norms, and by extension to communicative action, is as inclusive and equal as possible—that we embrace our responsibility to take into account the perspectives of all those affected and ensure respect for those who participate in discursive autonomy through argumentation that is open, unrepressed and noncoercive. of course, habermas grants these conditions are idealized; the realities of time constraints, massive populations and everyday obligations might well jeopardize our efforts towards autonomous reasoning that is shared in these ways, though he maintains they are feasible in principle.29 one strength of the normative interpretation, as rainer forst and jeffrey flynn highlight, is that “nobody claims special privileges and everyone grants others all the claims one raises for oneself, without projecting one’s own interests, values, or needs onto others and thereby unilaterally determining what counts as a good reason.”30 yet the shared facet of autonomous reasoning is not meant to obscure the individual’s freedom of thought: as anderson writes, “having one’s will determined by reason does not undermine one’s self-authorship, especially once it is clear that ‘listening to reason’ is a matter of engaging, as a full and equal participant, in the ongoing process of giving and asking for reasons.”31 but can we really co-construct norms to which we all rationally agree? or would some individuals inevitably end up settling, living under norms that they have accepted against their better judgment because of the influence of other overpowering factors, like the longing to belong, to fit in, to not call attention to themselves by destabilizing the status quo? or, more plainly, would some individuals reluctantly acquiesce to certain norms because they are unable to think of better formulations for them, despite intuiting that they are not strong enough to be satisfactory? habermas might respond that these are simply not instances of real discourse; perhaps the agents’ capacity for shared autonomous reasoning is lacking in important ways. if so, however, how might levels or varieties of 54 this capacity lead to exclusion, despite the presuppositions and principles theoretically in place to support equal and broad participation? v. an epistemic interpretation of shared autonomous reasoning according to habermas, we develop the capacity for autonomy through a learning process that combines cognitive, psychological, social and moral development, and only when we reach a certain stage of “post-conventional morality”—a phrase he borrows from psychologist lawrence kohlberg—can we really begin to engage in discourse about norms.32 learning to hone discursive autonomy involves knowing about the procedures and content of discourse—the components of rational communication and the rightness of norms—and results from an ongoing practice that conditions us to be more reflective, critical and responsible agents.33 however, for habermas, no matter how much we learn and come to know, we must remain perpetually open to revising our norms and related actions because we are fallible—our consensus does not entail rightness as we may be mistaken.34 even given our shared autonomous reasoning, “the valid moral norms legislated and internalized by morally autonomous agents thus represent our current best efforts in the ongoing process of learning to solve the moral challenges continually posed by life and raised in discourse.”35 but what else does this process of learning and knowledge acquisition involve? thus far, we have been defining autonomous reasoning as the capacity to freely and willingly engage in critical processes of reason generation and justification, and we have qualified it as shared in that we need co-constructed resources to undertake it as a jointly valued discursive activity, the products of which can only be deemed worthy of delimiting our actions if they meet exacting principles aimed at inclusion and equality, and result from reciprocal consideration of each other’s perspectives. but upon closer inspection, the capacity for shared autonomous reasoning appears to involve faculties that are far more complex than intimated by the descriptive and normative interpretations. these faculties include but are not limited to: first, discerning the most pertinent lifeworld resources from which to draw in a given situation while doing our utmost to be aware of the assumptions that colour our justifications, notably the biases to which we know we can fall prey. second, scrutinizing and honestly appraising whether we are forming judgments in light of our real commitment to listening to others’ reasons rather than our engagement with overpowering systemic factors by which we might unknowingly be diverted and even crippled. third, exercising very acute and wide-ranging evaluative skills that enable us to discriminate between good and bad reasons, detect fallacious thinking and manipulation tactics, and pinpoint what is missing in an argument when we are not convinced by it—and clearly articulating all of this in argument form. and fourth, exhibiting enough resilience and strength of character to employ these aforementioned faculties even in less than conducive circumstances where we might feel ill-equipped or in over our heads. in short, we need to know a lot: about ourselves, about each other, about our individual and collective strengths and weaknesses, about our current and past contexts, about the nature of reasonableness and the 55 myriad demands it makes on us. it seems, as anderson suggests, that “autonomy is not something we can pull off by ourselves.”36 and so, given this daunting endeavour, on an epistemic interpretation, we can argue that autonomous reasoning benefits from being shared in that the combining of our efforts in terms of both procedure and content can increase knowledge and advance learning in ways that expand the scope and integrity of our collective communicative agency. with regard to scope, it seems likely that we will be better at autonomous reasoning and ensure it covers larger ground if we learn from others and grow from their knowledge, divvying up the responsibilities of communicative action and discourse so we complement and make up for each other’s shortcomings. yet these benefits in the form of epistemic gains seem to also entail a particular obligation. the fallibilist nature of our judgments (the reality that we know nothing for certain) and our own fallibility (the reality that we are error-prone) do not imply that we are incorrigible in how we share our autonomous reasoning. indeed, with regard to integrity, our learning from others and access to their knowledge bases should arguably impel us to recognize them as epistemic agents who contribute to our autonomous reasoning not only by virtue of their discursive faculties but also, more controversially for the habermasian agenda, because of their particularities as individuals with their own sense of what is good—or their own ethical-existential autonomy—which is experienced as concretized not generalized. this epistemic interpretation goes further than habermas would probably condone but it is worth exploring. if we return to the example of person x and her issue of veganism, even if her autonomous reasoning is shared in the descriptive and normative senses previously examined, something may still be amiss. the contents and valuation of her reasoning may be intersubjectively coconstructed; she may be competent as an autonomous reasoner and allowed to take part in discourse about the morality of animal consumption in the form of questioning and introducing assertions, and expressing her attitudes, desires, and needs, all in a seemingly non-coercive atmosphere. she may even end up agreeing to a norm different than the one she set out to defend. but could she still somehow be settling or acquiescing prematurely for reasons that have more to do with factors influencing her capacity for autonomous reasoning than with her apparent equal inclusion as a discursive agent? put differently, could there be threats to the “sharedness” of her autonomous reasoning that impair its faculties in ways that increase the risk of her exclusion? conceivably, her fellow interlocutors could be including her in discourse but not fully recognizing her as an epistemic agent and thus not benefitting from her knowledge to the extent outlined above. beyond her discursive faculties, there may be a host of particularities relevant to the norm in question that are being overlooked but could enrich the collective critical processes of reason generation and justification—say, as random examples, her cultural heritage growing up in remote and fragile mountainous ecosystems, her applied research training in zoology, her childhood experience with animal-assisted therapy due to a congenital disability, her avid interest in alternative and sustainable approaches to nutrition, her skills of synthesis and her spirited sense of compassion.37 these distinctive details that have in part formed and in other ways resulted from her ethical56 existential autonomy—or recalling anderson’s definition, her ability to “engage in critical reflection about what do with [her] life”38—surely must be affecting her faculties of autonomous reasoning on some level. to bracket them from consideration would seem to discount a significant part of her learning and knowledge. and yet certain threats to the “sharedness” of autonomous reasoning may do just that, as this section’s examination of unacknowledged conformity and unstated privilege will seek to show, with reference to critiques of habermas from within deliberative political philosophy and feminist theory. a) the threat of unacknowledged conformity the presuppositions of discourse that habermas proposes are in part aimed at guarding against external and internal coercion, but their formulation assumes that we are aware and realize when such coercion is happening. we may, at times obliviously, live under norms that we have accepted not because of their validity but due to the influence of other overpowering systemic factors affecting the way we learn and know—or, in short, due to the threat of unacknowledged conformity. here, knowing about the particularities of people and their circumstances, and how these connect to their exercise of ethical-existential autonomy, may reveal how we can better share autonomous reasoning. for instance, citing the example of stoic slaves, joshua cohen notes how unfavourable, unjust conditions for autonomy can produce “accommodationist preferences” in people who deliberately choose to subordinate themselves because they have no other alternative.39 sharing the task of reflecting on how such preferences are formed and how they may exclude people in ways that go unnoticed may help us to prevent their status as epistemic agents from being undermined. similarly in terms of power relationships, johanna meehan argues that dynamics of domination may be ingrained in how we form our very identities before we even engage in moral discourse, making members of marginalized groups all the more vulnerable to those who have been in a sense “raised” to exclude them: “when the fabric of a child’s relationship to self and to other is woven in threads of domination, the seeds of disrespect and domination are sown, and children may grow to be adults whose very construction of others undercuts the possibility of respect.”40 for those being marginalized, the result may be a tendency to conform to norms rather than accept them, due to a distorted, discrediting sense of their worth as epistemic agents or out of a need to not call attention to themselves by destabilizing the status quo. moreover, habermas has claimed that during discourse, in principle, “nothing coerces anyone except the force of the better argument.”41 but the force of the better argument may come from a very forceful argumentator whose feigned interest in the epistemological vantage points of others is tokenistic at best. according to the universalization principle, if an individual thinks a norm is right, she must anticipate that others will agree—if not, she ought not to be rationally convinced by it herself. but where does this leave the perspectives of disenfranchised people whose specific particularities may yield normative considerations that ruffle the feathers of the more forceful voices 57 and stand no chance of motivating consensus? it seems an overemphasis on commonality may also breed unacknowledged conformity. concerned about the eclipsing of differences, seyla benhabib has recommended that we recognize not only the perspective of “the generalized other” as worthy but also that of the “concrete other,” which “requires us to view each and every rational being as an individual with a concrete history, identity and affective-emotional constitution.”42 in so doing, we will move away from construing shared autonomous reasoning as an abstracted, existentially disconnected process of reason generation and justification that is only successful if it reaches consensus, and instead see it as a practice that trains us to be more reflexive and comprehensive so as to acknowledge our commonality as well as our multiple differences, and promote a more genuine reciprocal recognition. in her words: “the emphasis now is less on rational agreement, but more on sustaining those normative practices and moral relationships within which reasoned agreement as a way of life can flourish and continue.”43 b) the threat of unstated privilege on a related note, habermas’s presuppositions of discourse state that every subject “with competence to speak” can participate, while his take on moral development contends that this competence is defined in no small part by our having reached a “post-conventional” moral consciousness.44 but does this stance exclude people based on their age, their upbringing, their maturity, their education, their faith, their mental acuity, their psychological stability, their moral compass—in short, the host of particularities that have shaped what they have learnt and come to know, and how? if autonomous reasoning is indeed a capacity that we develop, do we need a certain amount of it before we can even be considered as epistemic agents with validity claims worth examining? more troubling still, do we all equally share in the capacity, or is there unstated privilege that exists as a result of some individuals being more predisposed to autonomous reasoning or having more opportunities to enhance it? here, philip pettit’s distinction between virtual and actual capacities is useful. he describes an actual capacity as “a capacity that is ready to be exercised” and a virtual capacity as “a capacity that is yet to be fully developed,” using the example of an individual who does not play the piano but might discover musical gifts if he tried.45 while the would-be pianist’s virtual capacity should not be dismissed, he cannot reasonably be said to be capable of pianoplaying— nor be evaluated for this aspect of his agency—until he can actually play, learn to play or declare himself musically inept. correspondingly, regardless of our virtual potential for faculties of autonomous reasoning, we can really only benefit from sharing it if it is “ready to be exercised.” even supposing we do all have the same virtual capacity for autonomous reasoning—a contentious assumption—do we all actualize it to the same degrees, or do some of us by some privilege get more use out of it and thus more epistemic clout? it seems all too possible that those of us without the actual capacity for autonomous reasoning, by no fault of wanting or trying, risk being ineligible for 58 sharing in critical processes of reason generation and justification, which affects the scope of the collective knowledge that drives discursive autonomy and affects its integrity as an “inclusive” practice. further, even if we do actually possess faculties of autonomous reasoning like those listed earlier in this section, the modes in which we are required to use them might themselves incorporate unstated privilege—we might be presuming that given the same chance and access, we will all communicate in the same ways. iris young has argued that habermasian-type discourse approaches “assume a culturally biased conception of discussion that tends to silence or devalue some people or groups” while elevating others, and affect the “internalized sense of the right one has to speak or not to speak.46 in her view, the kind of discourse habermas envisions tends to be assertive, competitive, combative, dispassionate and disembodied, and use direct, literal language rather than “speech that is tentative, exploratory, or conciliatory.”47 accordingly, those individuals whose culture, gender, socioeconomic status and education favour this mode of argumentative communication are likelier to thrive while the rest have to adapt to alien speech styles or risk having their epistemic vantage point excluded. to prevent these “powerful silencers of speech” that privilege some “strong” voices at the expense of other “weak” ones, young maintains we must expand what counts as valuable communication forms beyond argumentation to include speech characterized by figurative language, emotion, humour and camaraderie, like rhetoric and storytelling. by revealing the meanings of the particularities that characterize people, narrative has the power to expand the scope and integrity of our collective communicative agency by giving us “social knowledge from the point of view of that social position,” helping us “understand why the insiders value what they value” and recognize that “values, unlike norms, often cannot be justified through argument, but neither are they arbitrary.”48 on the epistemic interpretation, then, for autonomous reasoning to really benefit from being shared, it seems we need to not only learn from others and their knowledge so we get epistemic gains that expand the scope of our collective communicative agency; we also need to be concerned with matters of integrity, addressing and correcting threats to the “sharedness” of our autonomous reasoning—like unacknowledged conformity and unstated privilege—that get in the way of our recognizing each other as epistemic agents whose worth as fellow interlocutors stems from both discursive faculties and concrete individual particularities. as cristina lafont stresses, the justice of a norm does not depend on whether we all agree on it since we could be wrong. even if we reach unanimous agreement, “we still need to be vigilant to the (ever-present) possibility of undetected injustices and powerful ideologies that such agreements may contain.”49 v. shared autonomous reasoning in practice through a descriptive, normative and epistemic interpretation of habermasian discourse theory as well as some of its critiques, this essay has claimed that autonomous reasoning is, ought to be and benefits from being shared, and has problematized what faculties it may involve as a capacity and the threats it may face. in closing, it is worth considering how shared autonomous reasoning 59 might be honed through an applied practice, namely the community of philosophical inquiry (cpi) pedagogical model. to cultivate a sense of integrity that expands the scope of the sharedness of our autonomous reasoning and deepens our recognition of others as epistemic agents, we not only need to be able to critically generate and justify reasons, but to do so with epistemic virtues. as baynes has argued, habermas’s principles of moral discourse cannot “be guaranteed by specifying formal features—the rules of argumentation—alone; they depend upon many other cognitive and empathic skills as well.”50 and within the realm of ethical-existential concerns, as anderson observes, “the expansion in possibilities for choice brings with it an expansion in the responsibilities for choosing well,” which must involve joint efforts toward being “maximally open to relevant considerations.”51 a cpi may be the ideal setting for fostering the epistemic virtues that can help make autonomous reasoning truly shared and thereby support communicative action. originally developed by educational philosopher matthew lipman as a philosophical practice for children, this pedagogical model aims to develop responsible, relational autonomy through multidimensional thought (or combined critical, creative and caring thinking), by challenging us to confront the contestable questions we deem central to our lives and seek reasonable judgments through structured group dialogue.52 the cpi model shares many features in common with habermasian discourse, notably its pragmatist roots, its fallibilist view of knowledge, its commitment to intersubjective meaning-making, its use of dialogic argumentation, its emphasis on communicative rather than instrumental rationality, its principles of equality, respect and inclusion, its concern over similar social “pathologies,” and its desire for real-world relevance as a practice that can help people to interpret and understand the complexities of life. as cpi scholar barbara weber has noted, because this model “genuinely aims for understanding and simultaneously makes us aware of our differences as well as of our own prejudices,” it can “provide the missing link to make habermas’s concept of communicative rationality more practicable by cultivating a natural illocutive intention in children”53 and, for that matter, adults. while the cpi model is not immune to threats that affect the “sharedness” of autonomous reasoning like unacknowledged conformity and unstated privilege,54 its method builds in ways to avoid them: inquiry members are invited to consider the philosophical dimensions of a stimulus they experience together (like a story, art work or exploratory project), generalize from these to formulate open-ended questions that address issues of overall concern to humanity, deliberate over what is reasonable to think with respect to these questions, and bring in concrete examples from everyday life that can problematize the positions under consideration to make them more nuanced and applicable. in so doing, the cpi model seems primed to promote the “enlarged mentality” that benhabib extols by cultivating judgment that “involves the capacity to represent to oneself the multiplicity of viewpoints, the variety of perspectives, the layers of meaning which constitute the situation.”55 if the cpi succeeds in its efforts, it is in no small part because of its focus on developing self-correction, which involves crucial epistemic virtues like intellectual humility, attentiveness, discernment, comfort with uncertainty, acceptance of fallibility, resistance to bias and a willingness to freely change 60 positions when reasonableness demands it. by helping us address questions of the right and of the good, and by fuelling both our moral and ethical-existential autonomy, the cpi and its epistemic virtues can contribute to what richard bernstein has called our “democratic ethos.”56 if we understand autonomous reasoning as a capacity comprising a range of faculties driven not only by our commitment to establishing justifiable norms but also by a sense of integrity that recognizes others as epistemic agents whose worth stems from both their discursive aptitudes and concrete particularities, we may bring the “sharedness” of discursive autonomy to new heights. endnotes 1 this article will focus primarily on habermas’s mature positions as developed in the two volumes of his theory of communicative action (1984, 1987) and related mid-career works. 2 dworkin, 1988, 7. 3 habermas, 1997, 38. 4 finlayson, 2005, 66. 5 habermas, 1996, 468. 6 as habermas writes, “the reconstructive sciences explain the presumably universal bases of rational experience and judgment, as well as of action and linguistic communication.” habermas, 1990, 16. 7 habermas, 1984, 70. 8 habermas, 1987, 130. 9 habermas, 1984, 332. 10 habermas, 2004, 32. 11 as such, moral norms have universal validity whereas ethical values have only relative validity. 12 anderson, 2011, 91, 108. 13 habermas, 1993, 11. 14 in this sense, we can say we have a linguistic dependence that translates into an intersubjective dependence: as anderson writes, “when one acts for reasons, a full explanation of what one is doing must make reference to the cultural and linguistic background in virtue of which certain noises count as giving reasons.” anderson, 2011, 93. 15 gilabert, 2005, 408. 16 habermas, 1984, 277. habermas also borrows from richard rorty, who writes: “saying things is not always saying how things are.” habermas, 1990, 10. 17 finlayson, 2005, 34. 18 habermas, 1984, 9. 19 habermas, 1990, 19, 70. 20 referencing aristotle, habermas writes: “rhetoric is concerned with argumentation as a process, dialectic with the pragmatic procedures of argumentation, and logic with its products.” habermas, 1984, 26. he offers logical-semantic rules as the departure for argument (habermas, 1990, 87), ethical rules that promote mutual recognition (88) and rules for communication that avoids coercion (89). 21 as finlayson outlines, habermas is suspicious of many features of what he calls the “philosophy of consciousness,” notably ca rtesian subjectivity and subject-object metaphysics. finlayson, 2005, 28. 22 baynes, 2015, 91. 23 as baynes writes, “moral rightness, according to habermas, is ‘constructed’ not discovered.” ibid, 105. 24 habermas, 1990, 89. 25 habermas, 1996, 107. 26 habermas, 1990, 65. 27 ibid, 65. 28 mccarthy in habermas, 1990, viii. 29 as habermas writes, “the need to act in the lifeworld, in which discourses remain rooted, imposes temporal constraints on what is, from an internal perspective, ‘an infinite conversation.’ hence it requires highly artificial measures to insulate rational discourses against the pressures of the lifeworld and to render them autonomous.” habermas, 2003, 253. 30 forst and flynn, 2002, 66. 31 anderson, 2011, 96. 32 habermas, 1987, 174. 33 habermas distinguishes between the “empirical and analytical knowledge” of purposive-rational action and the “moral-practical knowledge” of value-rational action—the latter being the focus of our analysis. habermas, 1984, 174. 34 habermas writes about the fallibilism of knowledge: “an expression satisfies the precondition for rationality if and insofar as it embodies fallible knowledge and therewith has a relation to the objective world (that is, a relation to the facts) and is open to objective judgment” habermas, 1984, 9. he also writes about the fallibility of agents: “members know that they can err, but even a consensus that subsequently proves to be deceptive rests to start with on uncoerced recognition of criticizable validity claims.” habermas, 1987, 150. 35 anderson, 2011, 98. 61 36 ibid, 104. 37 to be clear, she may also be introverted and slightly agoraphobic, prone to flights of fancy, mistrusting of authority and overly obsessed with koala bears—the point is not that her particularities are positive or negative but that regardless, they somehow affect her autonomous reasoning. 38 anderson, 2011, 91. 39 cohen, 1997, 78. 40 meehan, 1995, 244. 41 habermas, 1990, 198. 42 benhabib, 1992, 159. 43 ibid, 38. 44 habermas seems to have a very specific idea of socialization and identity formation in mind, claiming that “anyone who has grown up in a reasonably functional family, who has formed his identity in relations of mutual recognition, who maintains himself in the network of reciprocal expectations and perspectives built into the pragmatics of the speech situation and communicative action, cannot fail to have acquired more intuitions.” habermas, 1993, 114. 45 pettit, 1996, 580. 46 young, 1996, 120. 47 ibid, 123. 48 ibid, 128, 131. 49 lafont, 2004, 49. 50 baynes, 2015, 121. 51 anderson, 2011, 102. 52 for more on the nature of the cpi as method, please see matthew lipman’s thinking in education (cambridge, ma: cambridge university press, 2003). 53 weber, 2008, 5. 54 if not well facilitated or understood, a cpi can also become exclusionary by overemphasizing commonality and consensus at the expense of difference, and allowing instrumental and strategic action to parade as genuine intersubjective concern. 55 benhabib, 1992, 54. 56 bernstein, 1995, 1134. bernstein argues against habermas’s stark division between morality and ethics because it risks compromising the dispositions required for democracy, which stem from both our moral judgments and our ethical convictions. his description of this ethos very closely resembles the aims and virtues that lipman envisioned for the cpi model: “when dewey speaks about ‘debate, discussion and persuasion,’ he is not simply referring to formal rules of communication, rather his major concern is with the ethos of such debate. for democratic debate, ideally, requires a willingness to listen to and evaluate the opinions of one's opponents, respecting the views of minorities, advancing arguments in good faith to support one’s convictions, and having the courage to change one’s mind when confronted with new evidence or better arguments. there is an ethos involved in the practice of democratic debate. if such an ethos is violated or disregarded, then debate can become hollow and meaningless.” ibid, 1131. bibliography anderson, joel. “autonomy, agency and the self.” in habermas: key concepts, edited by barbara fultner. durham: acumen, 2011. apel, karl otto. “the a priori of the communication community and the foundations of ethics.” in toward a transformation of philosophy. milwaukee: marquette university press, 1998. baynes, kenneth. “public reason and personal autonomy.” in handbook of critical theory, edited by david rasmussen. hoboken, nj: wiley-blackwell, 1999. baynes, kenneth. habermas. london: routledge, 2015. benhabib, seyla. “in the shadow of aristotle and hegel” and “the debate over women and moral theory revisited.” in situating the self: gender, community, and postmodernism in contemporary ethics. new york: routledge, 1992. bernstein, richard. “the retrieval of the democratic ethos.” cardozo law review. 17, 1995, 11271146. cohen, joshua. “deliberation and democratic legitimacy.” deliberative democracy: essays on reason and politics, edited by james in bohman and william rehg. cambridge, ma: mit press, 1997. dworkin, gerald. the theory and practice of autonomy. cambridge: cambridge university press, 1988. 62 finlayson, james gordon. habermas: a very short introduction. oxford: oxford university press, 2005. forst, rainer and jeffrey flynn. “ethics and morality” in the right to justification. new york: columbia university press, 2012. gilabert, pablo. “a substantivist construal of discourse ethics.” international journal of philosophical studies, 13(3), 2005, 405-437. gilabert, pablo. “the substantive dimension of deliberative practical rationality.” philosophy and social criticism, 31(2), 2005, 185-210. habermas, jürgen. the theory of communicative action: volume 1. boston: beacon press, 1984. habermas, jürgen. the theory of communicative action: volume 2. boston: beacon press, 1987. habermas, jürgen. moral consciousness and communicative action. cambridge, ma: mit press, 1990. habermas, jürgen. justification and application. cambridge: mit press, 1993. habermas, jürgen. between facts and norms. cambridge, ma: mit press, 1996. habermas, jürgen. “modernity: an unfinished project.” in habermas and the unfinished project of modernity: critical essays on the philosophical discourse of modernity, edited by seyla benhabib and maurizio passerin d’entrèves. cambridge: mit press, 1997. habermas, jürgen. “a genealogical analysis of the cognitive content of morality,” in the inclusion of the other: studies in political theory. cambridge: mit press, 1998. habermas, jürgen. “rightness versus truth: on the sense of normative validity in moral judgments and norms” in truth and justification. cambridge, ma: mit press, 2003. habermas, jürgen. “the moral and the ethical: a reconsideration of the issue of the priority of the right over the good.” in pragmatism, critique, judgment, edited by seyla benhabib and nancy fraser. cambridge: mit press, 2004. lafont, cristina. “procedural justice? implications of the rawls-habermas debate for discourse ethics.” philosophy and social criticism, 29(2), 2003, 163-181. lafont, cristina. “moral objectivity and reasonable agreement: can realism be reconciled with kantian constructivism?” ratio juris, 17(1), 2004, 27-51. lipman, matthew. thinking in education. cambridge, ma: cambridge university press, 2003. mccarthy, thomas a. the critical theory of jürgen habermas. cambridge: mit press, 1981. mccarthy, thomas a. “legitimacy and diversity: dialectical reflections on analytic distinctions,” cardozo law review. 27, 2005, 1083-1126. meehan, johanna, (ed). feminists read habermas: gendering the subject of discourse. routledge: new york, 1995. pettit, philip. “freedom as antipower.” ethics, 106 (3), 1996. 576-604. weber, barbara. “the practicability of the ideal speech situation,” analytic teaching. 28(1), 2008. young, iris. “communication and the other: beyond deliberative democracy.” in democracy and difference, edited by seyla benhabib. princeton: princeton university press, 1996. address correspondences to: natalie m. fletcher concordia university montréal, canada nataliefletcher@gmail.com analytic teaching and philosophical praxis analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 57 what good is love? lauren ware abstract: the role of emotions in mental life is the subject of longstanding controversy, spanning the history of ethics, moral psychology, and educational theory. this paper defends an account of love’s cognitive power. my starting point is plato’s dialogue, the symposium, in which we find the surprising claim that love aims at engendering moral virtue. i argue that this understanding affords love a crucial place in educational curricula, as engaging the emotions can motivate both cognitive achievement and moral development. i first outline the state of the challenge between dominant rival theories regarding emotions in learning. next, i demonstrate how platonic virtue ethics offers the most tenable prospect for an education of reason and emotion. third, i sketch three practical ways educators might constructively engage emotions in the classroom. i conclude that love’s virtue is its peerless power to motivate the creative and lateral thinking which leads to moral development. introduction ove can get us into all kinds of trouble—love of power, love of ourselves, love of what’s harmful, not to mention unrequited love and limerence. furthermore, the emotions in general are often taken to be at odds with reason, getting in the way of making informed decisions, and love is no exception to such criticism. this paper sets out to discuss whether love can ever fulfil its promise to make life better, by investigating a controversial suggestion of platonic virtue ethics that it is love which really ought to be at the heart of creative thinking and moral decision-making. can the emotions be educated? ought they? the past twenty years has witnessed a groundswell of academic interest in the emotions, with considerable attention being given to arguing and articulating their philosophical, political, and medical import.1 yet the role of emotions in moral education has seen an unfortunately neglectful polarisation, with as-yet unresolved tension pitting educating for rationality against educating for moral development of the total person. this is, of course, not a new debate. accordingly, this interest has sparked something of a minor renaissance of and academic focus on historical treatments of the emotions, particularly aristotelian views on love and friendship, stoic applications to psychological health, and pre-socratic discussion of the emotions in the poetry of, for example, hesiod and empedocles.2 plato is often portrayed as advocating an abandonment of such emotions as love and desire, in order for the philosopher to have access to the true objects of knowledge. yet, in his dialogue, the symposium, he writes that a life without love is not worth living, and that love is the best chance the philosopher has at true knowledge of beauty and virtue. in this paper, i argue that education by attraction to the beautiful motivates moral development through a unique form of self-creation. i will first outline the state of the challenge between a solely cognitive basis for education, and one that allows for affective or emotional considerations. next, i will show how platonic virtue ethics, specifically his theory of love in moral development, holds out the most tenable prospect for an education of reason and emotion, as the power of love carries with it a distinctly creative element: the l analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 58 generation of virtue in the soul. finally, i sketch three practical ways this creative love might be employed in the classroom. i conclude that love’s virtue is its peerless power to impel one to develop and shape herself. beauty incites creation of beauty, and the mechanism for that creation is love. emotions in education the instrumental and utilitarian trends that pervade significant areas of contemporary education are typified by the promotion of the value of school as being primarily or even solely in the service of economic benefit to state or student. in spite of such trends, there remains a sound argument for the view that education ought concern itself with a more comprehensive view of human development. humans are undeniably emotional beings, and thus that personal development must take the emotions into serious consideration. the challenge is traditionally presented as between a strictly cognitive view of education, and one that seeks to shape the character through emotional development. a brief analysis of these two general views will provide insight into where a virtue ethical framework might be able to contribute a degree of reconciliation for moral educational curricula. the former view is made prominent by kohlberg’s cognitivist understanding of moral development, which— stemming from piagetian cognitive theory—takes that development to encompass only emotionally disinterested rational capabilities such as social cognition, problem solving, and perspective-taking without affect.3 on the kolhbergian educational program of study, moral development is seen as largely the province of cognitive development, relegating emotion to the sidelines as impeding the rationality which is its exclusive focus. on the other hand, two influential anti-kolhbergian systems have also arisen in the literature: character education, as best exemplified in the works of lickona and kilpatrick,4 and the ethics of care defended by noddings, gilligan, chodorow, and slote.5 proponents of character education “rally around the belief that the formation of moral dispositions is a vital part of moral education and ascribe to a comprehensive definition of character which views character as comprising dispositions of thought, action, and feeling.”6 the ethics of care take the emotion of caring to be “ontologically basic to human excellence” and that the aims of maintaining and enriching caring relationships must be the anchor of all educational activities and policies.7 both of these theories, especially character education, may be mistaken for a brand of virtue ethics, but they differ in at least one significant respect when it comes to educating for moral development: neither character education nor the ethics of care appear to offer a specific mechanism for incorporating reason into their praxis. as carr laments of care ethics, “it seems in itself to be opposed to any very principled definition of moral association.”8 is there a view of moral educational theory that does not place attentiveness to the emotions over and above the development of rational capacities, nor sacrifice them for a quasi-kantian view of education which all but ignores the emotive aspect of ethical development? in what follows, i want to focus on the emotion of love and its role in educating for virtue. with this as a focus, i hope to show we can find such an educational theory in platonic virtue ethics, which i will set out in section two. virtue ethics can be argued to hold out more over its adversary moral theories since its focus takes into account the human soul as a whole—specifically including emotions such as love, but also fear, shame, and the more contentious feelings of schadenfreude, pride, anger, and maudlin.9 i identify three reasons for virtue ethics to be the primary candidate for a social scientific educational theory of moral development. first, virtue ethics is fundamentally about a particular ordering of the emotions so as to be compatible with reason. plato’s discussion of the properly ordered soul in his dialogue, the phaedrus, depicts reason as a charioteer harnessing the motivational force of an angry but righteous horse on the one hand, and the wily but chaotic and desiderative analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 59 horse on the other. the account is famously set out in an educational context in book iv of his republic, where the virtuous individual is one whose rational, spirited, and erotic capacities are established “in a relation of mastering, and being mastered by, one another that is according to nature.”10 that relation is artfully expressed by lewis in his short treatise on emotion and morality in education, the abolition of man, as the condition in which “the head rules the belly through the chest.”11 rather than deny, ignore, or suppress the emotions, or relegate them to extra-curricular training, virtue ethics fully acknowledges the potential conflicts between reason and emotion and sets out a structure which accounts for their role in the virtuous life. the major benefit of this accommodation is that it allows for movement in the direction of a possible reconciliation with moral educational theories which focus more on training for rationality. second, that virtue ethics is a satisfactorily principled cognitive system ought to go some way in warning off the threat of emotions taking over and destroying the work of reason when faced with a personal moral dilemma. for virtue ethics, especially contemporary virtue ethics as set out in geach and hursthouse, does hold that some actions or activities are absolutely wrong.12 the difference between virtue ethics and consequentialist theories here, however, turns on those situations when an ostensibly morally bad act is required in the face of a more damaging alternative. whereas the consequentialist would see the act as morally neutral or even positive in its achievement of the best outcome, the virtue ethicist would still be committed to the principle that the act itself was, in fact, wrong.13 a third reason virtue ethics is our best candidate for an account of moral education that facilitates the interaction between reason and emotion is that it affords a positive role for reflection in emotive development. aristotle’s “doctrine of the mean”—according to which the virtuous action is the mean between two extremes of character; for example, cowardice and recklessness—requires cognitive reflection in order to locate that mean, or, in the case of his supreme virtue, magnanimity, to be able to identify the particular pitch and balance magnanimous action requires in a given situation.14 that virtue ethics is conducive to emotions in education is perhaps not surprising. the vocation-focussed or economically-impactful curricula referenced at the beginning of this section share a common trajectory with deontological or utilitarian ethical systems in their emphases on satisfying objective lists or calculating consequences and benefits. if the underlying strength of virtue ethics is its ability to account for the entire human complex—messy emotions and all—a virtue ethical pedagogy of moral development would, at least in theory, be primed to avoid those perhaps negative priorities. in the next section, i focus specifically on how one particular virtue ethical system puts love at the heart of not only cognitive motivation, but moral development in tandem. love’s virtue in platonic ethics it was the dinner party that went down in history. decades afterwards, the eager curious desperately gossiped to get a taste of what brought together the beautiful and powerful in one night of intoxicating conversation: love. in the symposium, socrates shocks his interlocutors by proclaiming that erôs, “god of love”, is, in fact, not a god at all. rather, love is a dæmon, intermediary between gods and men. as he describes the activity and purpose of the dæmon class, it begins to become clear the importance that plato attributes to this emotion. he writes: for erôs is in the middle of both gods and men and fills up the interval so that the whole cosmos itself has been bound together by it. for a god does not mingle with a human being; but through erôs occurs the whole connection and conversation of gods with men. 15 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 60 love’s power is to bind together the ethical absolutes of virtue, and what approximates it in the individual person. how can love bind together such different realms, the human and the divine? as i interpret plato, love does this by having as its object the creation of beauty and virtue. love quickens the curiosity we have about the beautiful objects and art forms we encounter in the world, which inspire us and move us to come to know them better, and to learn about what beauty itself really is. 1. love is oriented to knowledge stendhal’s famous maxim that beauty is “the promise of happiness” could well be said to be true of the sort of beauty plato has in mind in the symposium: we can define plato’s love as a belief about the beloved that one’s life would be better if that beloved were a part of it.16 the beauty one experiences in the world constantly beckons her forward to get to know it more intimately. it is sometimes difficult to tell, however, in what way an attachment to the object will impact her. it is for this reason that she is led to study and come to know the object, so as to know whether time spent with it will leave her better or worse. plato here presents a compelling view regarding the interrelation of all beautiful things in the world and their role in the philosophic life. as one becomes attracted to a beautiful particular, and pursues it with natural curiosity to learn more about it—where does it come from? why does it work the way it does? what makes it different to others of its kind?—she will find herself pursuing other beautiful particulars in ever-expanding circles of beauty. as one is beckoned forward by beauty to come to know one work or object, she will find she must learn about another, its context, its language, its history, and other similar beauties. as nehamas asserts, to love something is always in part to try to understand what makes it beautiful, what drew me—and, as long as i love it—continues to draw me toward it. to understand what it is and to see how it will affect me and to see what it will be able to give me. the more i try to understand a particular object, the more i need to learn about the world in general. the deep and the broad are just facets of one another. 17 this is the account of love and beauty we find in the famous “ascent passage” of the symposium (209e-212a). in this passage, the lover is depicted as being led from one beauty by a desire to know more about it, to come to see the beauty in other similar things, and the culture and laws which allow such beauty to flourish, and finally to glimpse that absolute beauty that is the source of all beauty experienced in the world: the beholding of which turns out to be the best life imaginable. yet the lover’s interest in what is beautiful does not stop there—with a solely cognitive achievement. instead, the lover aims to come to behold the beautiful as closely as she can, which leads her to create beauty, both in herself and in the wider world. whilst love leads the lover to come to know and experience greater and wider realms of beauty in the world, the activity of love is further constituted by the creation of beauty. 2. love’s object is moral self-creation the framing characteristic of love, socrates asserts, is that it is “of something”—just as a father is father of a child so too love is of something, and it “desires that something”.18 plato’s focus on the object of love reveals the complex relational quality essential to it. for love to have an object is simply part of its grounding logic, and the identification of this object is thus fundamental to any attempt to define and understand love. in contemporary moral psychology, this object of love serves as the “intentional object” which is said to be “‘about’ objects and analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 61 states of affairs quite external to the agent.”19 my account of love’s object in the symposium, however, locates this object within the individual as her own moral development. it is commonly claimed in the scholarly literature that the object of love, in the symposium dialogue, is beauty.20 however, i argue against this view and assert that love’s object is the creative activity of “bringing to birth in beauty”—to translate precisely the platonic text. for plato writes at line 206e that this object of love is decidedly not beauty, but rather the creative process of generating beauty, both in the individual and in the wider world. what we witness in socrates’ speech is plato challenging the received wisdom of his day. upon seeing beauty in the world, the lover is led to make herself more like that beauty. in so doing, she brings into being further beauty by making herself more beautiful. thus, love is not purely relational, as emotional intentionality is standardly analysed, but teleological—seeking its end. the highest form of love, for plato, is an instrument of creation. he sees in the human soul a self-generation principle: a compass of self-design, externally triggered by beauty. crucially, however, instead of turning to point towards beauty, the compass turns to point to itself, to design and craft itself. time spent in pursuit of beauty provides a way for the lover to become beautiful: shaped by the course of her life. plato thus establishes that the lover will have an inwardly-directed motivation to find ways to achieve this end. is the cognitive nature of love plato has in mind here strong enough to ground such generative activity? i argue that as love regarding the beautiful has led to knowledge, so does knowing about the beautiful lead to assimilation. such a tendency finds comparison in the republic, where training in dialectic leads the young philosopher-kings to becoming morally virtuous and hence to being able to lead well and produce a good city. in the symposium, cognition and contemplation of the beautiful similarly lead to association and assimilation, and hence to being able to produce beauty on earth. in the course of his educational exposition in book vii of the republic, socrates reveals how an understanding of the truth is more than a displacement of ignorance for knowledge, but is intimately tied to bringing about a moral change in the student. the study of dialectic enables one “to attain to each thing itself that is…[to] grasp the reason for the being of each thing”,21 with the result that one will be able to separate decisively the form of absolute goodness from the many particular instances which bear a relation to it. thus grounded in truth, the philosophers will be in the best position to produce good things—in themselves and in the city. socrates asserts, “once they see the good itself, they must be compelled, each in his own turn, to use it as a pattern for ordering the city, private men, and themselves for the rest of their lives.”22 these ruling men are pronounced thoroughly beautiful,23 and can become “authors of the greatest good” by bringing into being the “well-governed city”.24 but is witnessing the forms, in whatever way mortals might be able to do, enough to initiate moral change? i argue it is. the method by which the philosopher-king shapes and creates the beautiful city and beautiful citizens (including herself) is described by socrates as that of the inspired artist: i suppose that in filling out their work they would look away frequently in both directions, towards the just, beautiful, and moderate by nature and everything of the sort, and again, towards what is in human beings; and thus, mixing and blending the practices as ingredients…taking hints from exactly the phenomenon in human beings which homer too called god-like and the image of god…and i suppose they would rub out one thing and draw in another again, until they made human dispositions as dear to the gods as they admit of being. 25 this concept is repeated in plato’s timaeus dialogue as well, where socrates asserts: analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 62 now everything that becomes or is created must of necessity be created by some cause, for without a cause nothing can be created. the work of the creator, whenever he looks to the unchangeable and fashions the form and nature of his work after an unchangeable pattern, must necessarily be made beautiful and virtuous… 26 time spent in contemplation of the forms of beauty and goodness provides a way for the philosopher to become like them, through imitation and assimilation. socrates concludes, “then it is the philosopher, keeping company with the divine and the orderly who himself becomes orderly and divine, in the measure permitted to man.”27 what we have here is an account that considering the form, and comparing it to what is in humans, compels one to change and rub things out in the attempt to make what is only qualifiedly virtuous more like the unqualifiedly virtuous. there is good in the philosopher, because of her knowledge of and assimilation with the form, and as a result of this togetherness, she is the best able to produce good things in the city and in the individual citizen. the object of love is therefore its greatest virtue: impelling the lover to shape herself in the image of virtue, and bringing about new virtue in the soul. beauty in the classroom this idea of creative thinking led by love, i argue, was a key feature of plato’s educational theory and derives from insightful analysis of the human powers of motivation. you cannot navigate with merely a highly polished rudder—you must start with the motor before navigation even begins. once we have engaged the emotions, then we can deliver the directional standards of a particular curriculum. the hypothesis we are presented with in the symposium is that every contact with beauty (from perceptual and sense-based contact, to emotional and cognitive contact) gives rise to erotic desire to generate in beauty. this generation, as i have argued above, manifests in an assimilation with beauty itself. love unites the form with the particular lover, binding them together, thus enabling the production of any and all particular beauty. if plato is right about this, his message to posterity is that teachers should teach by beauty, and by engaging the emotions. philosophy, the love of wisdom, has a responsibility not to sit alone in the study or retreat to the ivory tower— building edifices of purely rational construction—but to connect with the world of art and culture to generate the virtue that those in pursuit of it have come to love and to know. kristjánsson divides moral education of emotion projects into three inter-related areas of inquiry: (1) are emotions appropriate objects of education; (2) ought, and if so, how, can emotions be shaped within education; and (3) what specific activities or techniques can teachers employ in the classroom?28 as the above discussion has emphasised, the debate on educating the emotions tends to focus on the first two questions—understandably, of course, as we are philosophers. precious little, however, is available to educators seeking practical, straight-to-theclassroom application of the results of all this research. indeed, maxwell and reichenbach even go so far as to say that “not a single intervention programme or identifiable body of educational practices or strategies grounded in a major theoretical perspective in contemporary social psychology exists which specifically and explicitly targets moral emotions.”29 in what follows, i would like to outline, briefly, some of the positive ways the virtue of love— being the internal motivation to seek not only knowledge of the attracting object, but the activity of shaping oneself and generating virtue in the soul—may be encouraged in the contemporary classroom. first, educators can engage the emotion of love through bringing beauty into the classroom. the “vast, open sea of beauty”, to appropriate plato’s description of the lover’s vision, is diverse and limitless.30 depending on the level analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 63 of schooling, a range of examples in art and literature (conceived broadly to include as well drama, music, dance, design, and more) can be creatively incorporated into lessons with the specific aim of grabbing the emotions, which in turn compel further investigation (in the classroom, in extra-curricular activities, and in personal free pursuit), and indicate future lines of discussion. there exist in the literature a number of compelling arguments that engaging the emotions of, for example, compassion, sympathy, and empathy—through materials and stories— is the “sine qua non of the ability to formulate moral assessments”.31 educating through love and attraction to the beautiful, however, offers a uniquely powerful capacity to harness the motivational aspects of the emotion. for it is the initial pangs of love, read as the desire to know, which first present as curiosity and develop into a commitment to finding out more, and a passion for the subject. bringing beauty into the classroom—all classrooms, not just the art studio—can launch this motivation in new and exciting ways. the beauty of great literature and compelling art has a further special role to play in developing imagination, particularly in the consideration of multiple perspectives which arouse emotion. such subjects are often exceptionally concerned in depicting or commenting on the complex interplay of human emotions in moral situations. indeed, wordsworth defined poetry as “the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings.”32 by presenting material that prompts an emotional response, students can be inwardly led to appreciate certain aspects of a case they may not otherwise have acknowledged. i should emphasise here that bringing beauty into the classroom ought to go beyond art appreciation courses as one among other (subtly more “serious”, “academic”) subjects. the beauty of art and literature should instead be seen as a powerful impetus to moral development and so afforded a place in any and all subjects. what engaging the emotions can contribute to educational and cognitive development is what schwartz and clore term “affect as information”.33 according to this theory, internal emotional experiences supply individuals with information about their external environment. this information can then be harnessed in creative ways as it influences the individual’s evaluations, decisions, concerns, and further courses of action. educators can consider how facilitating students’ attending to their emotional response to material may enhance the learning experience and understanding of course content. take, for example, the following classroom exercises:  upon the presentation of visual illusions such as adelson’s checkershadow illusion, below, the mind is primed to accept that the squares marked a and b are of different colours. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 64 in fact, they are the same colour, and this can be confirmed by the educator using the proof image: when the illusion is experienced for the first time, students often respond with a range of emotions including bafflement, awe, amusement, and incredulity—the latter of which leads naturally to further questioning and explanation. in my undergraduate philosophy classes, i use this illusion to introduce descartes’ radical doubt: how much can we trust our senses if they can be so wildly taken in by illusion? the emotional response, however, can be harnessed for motivating the intellectual virtues of curiosity and care towards a host of subjects. for example, such virtues can serve to widen appreciation for suspending judgement on controversial figures in a history class until the motivations for actions can be carefully considered; or for precision and caution in a science lab.  literature, poetry, and other story-telling media can also stimulate the emotions to enhance achievement outside of english and literature classes. upton sinclair’s the jungle is often featured in american history class readings lists, but its ability to generate powerful emotions of shock and disgust at the conditions of the meat-packing industry in the early 20th-century can function to initiate discussions and projects across the educational spectrum. despair at the working conditions the novel presents is a unique way to contribute to lessons on trade unions and class poverty in economics; and revulsion at unsanitary factory farming practices can initiate a personal dimension to considerations of vegetarianism and veganism in a physical education or health class, or of animal welfare and organic farming in government and business classes. what is important to focus on in such exercises is that the students attend consciously to their emotions in response to the subject matter of the lesson: drawing out what it is the experienced emotion tracks, and considering that aspect of the content as information which can be explored further in discussions or assignments. second, educators can use gadfly questions to engage the emotions in response to an apparent wrong. in the apology, socrates refers to himself as a gadfly which bites the sluggish horse in order to arouse him to action: he put this into practice by acting the rogue street philosopher, constantly questioning his contemporaries in such a way that they would feel compelled either to defend their premises or realise further thought and refinement of analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 65 those premises was needed.34 plato acknowledges that children possess the ability to love the beautiful, and blame and hate the ugly, even before they are capable of rational speech.35 by pressing intuitively controversial points, challenging assumptions, or playing advocatus diaboli, educators can stir up instinctive defences of what is, or is at least thought to be, true. gadfly questions can be directed towards the course content and students’ answers to questions, in addition to their emotional responses to that course content. facilitators may take cues from socrates’ own method as to what kinds of questioning best get at the heart of the interlocutor’s statements, probing responses to ferret out analytic distinctions as well as to elicit commitment to a view by proposing a radical alternative. the use of the socratic method in education has long been championed for its ability to aid students in clarifying and justifying their thoughts on the topic under question.36 of specific relevance to our topic of engaging the emotions in education, is to direct gadfly questions towards the students’ own emotional responses to material (and perhaps especially towards unexpected emotional responses), which can be indicators of a further question or line of reasoning. examples of such gadfly questions towards emotions may include:  do you think all parties (or characters) involved in the event felt the same way in response? why or why not?  why do you think you like x more than y?  is there a difference between our society and the society under discussion that might make the situation look different to you?  what element of the lesson would you be most (or least) likely to remember?  what element of the lesson makes you the most surprised (or angry, or curious)? why? the task in employing gadfly questions specifically, within the broader teaching style of the socratic method, is to harness the motivational power of the emotions and direct it towards identifying new ways of thinking about course content. by attending to their emotions in this reflective manner, students can link their own affective responses to the subject of a lesson and find in that link a personal reason to defend and articulate their thoughts. a third practical application of plato’s theory of love’s virtue is to use beauty as a tool for cognitive appraisal and reflection. art and literature can present vastly different beauties, which the student can then evaluate in relation to other beauties presented in the course, and in relation to other types of beauties she experiences in her wider world. this is the basis of plato’s metaphysical theory of forms, according to which one learns about, for example, abstract, absolute beauty by reflecting on what each of these particular beauties perceived and experienced have in common. identifying what is essential to each of a beautiful work of art, a beautiful scientific equation, a beautiful soul, and a beautifully accomplished action or performance is at once, then, a cognitive-emotional-aesthetic (not to mention interdisciplinary) exercise. encouraging students to ask, and reflect on, what it is they think that makes each of the different beauties they encounter beautiful can culminate in synthesisation assignments which aim at articulating and defending an account of what the terms beauty, art, or justice actually can mean. methods for employing this concept in the classroom could include the following exercises:  having students each curate an ongoing journal focusing on a key concept of the course (e.g., citizenship, tragedy, respect, or abuses of power). journals can be written in a notebook or—to analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 66 introduce technology where appropriate to the level of the course—created online, as on a tumblr microblog or pinterest board. students add examples of the concept they identify in art, current affairs, or the media and are asked to reflect on each entry asking what it is they think makes the particular example fall under the concept heading: what it is that makes the piece of work beautiful, or the court ruling unjust. the task here is to allow the emotions first to locate the particular examples, which can then become the subject of appraisal and reflection. this reflection aims at developing creative or lateral thinking, which draws connections between disparate instances of a concept.  incorporating music created in a particular culture or era into a world civilisations, history, or foreign language class. this can be done at intervals throughout the term, with students instructed to choose a song or music style they liked best at the end; or as a one-off project for a particular time period. students are to reason about what in the period might have inspired or influenced the artists. rather than making this a research exercise, it can be done as in-class writing, to facilitate lateral thinking between their emotional response to the music and the historical-cultural facts presented in the course content. my aim in highlighting this third kind of exercise is to draw attention to the particularly creative impetus beauty in art can have on the emotions, which—when attended to with cognitive reflection—can draw the mind to identify causal relationships between material previously unnoticed. the development of the ability to draw such relationships is a key feature of the kind of lateral and creative thinking which marks original thought. i may at this point anticipate the objection regarding plato’s infamous “banishment” of the poets from the ideal city in book x of his republic, on the basis that they morally corrupt an audience. to argue that this demonstrates a rejection of art as an educational tool, however, would be to miss the point. a significant part of plato’s critique was that certain works of art present falsehood as truth, with the effect that the student may come to think justice involves what is actually unjust, thereby obscuring what being just “looks like.” however, the fact that plato’s dialogues are positively littered with myths, similes, dramatic characters, and other poetic devices, coupled with the fact that the symposium dialogue itself lists the work of homer and hesiod as highly praised creations of beauty, reveals that plato openly acknowledged the positive benefit of poetry.37 the above exercises may already be carried out in the classroom for a host of other reasons, for example to integrate technology, to make connections to other classes, or to practice writing across the curriculum. what i wish to emphasise here is that they can also be used as starting points to hook students with the aim of facilitating a uniquely powerful and generative connection between student and subject. it may, however, be argued that these three types of classroom exercises take beauty in art for moral purposes in such a way which places the theory squarely in that instrumental view of education lamented above: merely substituting moral or emotional development for economic benefit as an educational aim. i argue against this. the platonic virtue ethics set out in section two holds as a fundamental tenet that it is because the lover values the beautiful for its own sake that she strives to become like it by creating beauty in herself. the lover in the symposium does not perceive beauty and think of all the great benefit she can gain by attaining it, but rather self-creation is an emotive-creative response of the soul to the beauty present to her. love in relation to the beautiful leads to the creation of new beauty. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 67 conclusion curiosity is ultimately driven by desire: the desire to know. accordingly, we can find in plato’s theory of love an understanding of how education in the beautiful—a generative process led by love—results in the lover becoming virtuous through the self-creation of beauty and virtue in the soul. this theory connects plato’s ordering agents of the universe (the conceptual ideas of absolute goodness and beauty) with that which orders individual persons. it is an education by attraction. we can take away from plato’s symposium dialogue the following hypothesis: if education is to be truly transformative—making us into responsible citizens, rational problem-solvers, creative thinkers—it must begin with honing desire, employing those mechanisms which attract and which motivate a commitment to discovering more. what’s exciting, and challenging, is that you never know where such journeys might lead. endnotes 1 bruce maxwell and roland reichenbach, “educating moral emotions: a praxiological analysis,” studies in philosophy and education 26 (2007): 148. 2 see, for example, the following newly-established research centres and projects: les émotions au moyen âge, established in 2006 <http://emma.hypotheses.org/?lang=fr_fr>; berlin’s languages of emotion institute, established in 2007 <http://www.loe.fu-berlin.de/>; the max plank center for the history of emotions, established in 2008 <http://www.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/en/research/history-of-emotions>; the queen mary centre for the history of emotions, established in 2008 <http://www.qmul.ac.uk/emotions/>; oxford’s the social and cultural construction of emotions: the greek paradigm, established in 2009 <http://www.classics.ox.ac.uk/emotions.html>; the australian research council centre of excellence for the history of emotions, established in 2011 <http://www.historyofemotions.org.au>; and project c2learn on emotional reasoning at edinburgh’s eidyn centre for epistemology, mind, and normativity, established in 2012 <http://eidyn.ppls.ed.ac.uk/c2learn>; as well as, to name but two recent examples, elena carrera’s edited volume, emotions and health: 1200-1700 (leiden: brill, 2013); and the forthcoming palgrave macmillan series: palgrave studies in the history of emotions. 3 lawrence kohlberg, essays on moral development, volume i (new york, ny: harper row, 1984). recent advocates of his structural-cognitive framework include jennifer chalmers and michael a.r. townsend, “the effects of training in social perspective taking on socially maladjusted girls,” child development 61 (1990): 178-190; sigrun adalbjarnardóttir, “promoting children’s social growth in schools: an intervention study,” journal of applied developmental psychology 14 (1993): 461-484; wolfgang edelstein and peter fauser, demokratie lernen und leben: materialen zur bildungsplanung und zur forschungsförderung (bonn: bund-länder-kommission für bildungsplanung und zur forschungsförderung, 2001); and john gibbs, moral development and reality: beyond the theories of kohlberg and hoffmann (thousand oaks, ca: sage, 2003). 4 thomas lickona, educating for character: how our schools can teach respect and responsibility (new york, ny: bantam doubleday dell, 1992); william kilpatrick, why johnny can’t tell right from wrong (new york, ny: simon & schuster, 1992). different but related strands of character education can be identified in the work of, e.g., terrence mclaughlin and j. mark halstead, “education in character, virtue,” in education in morality, eds. halstead and mclaughlin, 132-173 (london: routledge, 1999); jan steutal and ben spiecker, “cultivating sentimental dispositions through aristotelian habituation,” journal of philosophy of education 38:4 (2004): 531-549. http://emma.hypotheses.org/?lang=fr_fr http://www.loe.fu-berlin.de/ http://www.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/en/research/history-of-emotions http://www.qmul.ac.uk/emotions/ http://www.classics.ox.ac.uk/emotions.html http://www.historyofemotions.org.au/ http://eidyn.ppls.ed.ac.uk/c2learn analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 68 5 nel noddings, caring: a feminine approach to ethics & moral education (berkeley, ca: university of california press, 1984) and the challenge to care in schools (new york, ny: teachers college press, 1990), esp. 171-202; carol gilligan, in a different voice: psychological theory and women’s development (cambridge, ma: harvard university press, 1982); nancy chodorow, the reproduction of mothering: psychoanalysis and the sociology of gender (berkeley, ca: university of california press, 1978); michael slote, moral sentimentalism (oxford: oxford university press, 2010). within sentimentalism, specific trends emerge championing one or the other of emotional understanding, emotional expression, emotional regulation, and empathy. see, e.g., jonathan cohen, ed., educating minds and hearts: social and emotional learning and the passage into adolescence (new york, ny: teachers college press, 1999) and caring classrooms/intelligent school: the social emotional education of young children (new york, ny: teachers college press, 2001); maurice j. elias, et al., promoting social and emotional learning: guidelines for educators (alexandria, va: association for supervision and curriculum development, 1997); david c. grossman, et al., “effectiveness of a violence prevention curriculum among children in elementary school: a randomized controlled trial,” journal of the american medical association 277 (1997): 1605-1611; susan d. mcmahon, et al., “violence prevention: program effects on urban preschool and kindergarten children,” applied and preventive psychology 9 (2000): 271-281; and carolyn webster-stratton, how to promote children’s social and emotional competence (london: sage, 1999). 6 maxwell and reichenbach, 158. 7 maxwell and reichenbach, 155; noddings, 1992. 8 david carr, “on the contribution of literature and the arts to the educational cultivation of moral virtue, feeling and emotion” [“contribution”], journal of moral education 34:2 (2005): 137-151, esp. 139; and “after kohlberg: some implications of an ethics of virtue for the theory and practice of moral education,” studies in philosophy and education 15 (1996): 353-370. 9 this paper focuses on love, but for an account of “nasty emotions” versus “nice emotions”, see ronald de sousa, “moral emotions,” ethical theory and moral practice 4 (2001): 109-126; aaron ben ze’ev, “are envy, anger, and resentment moral emotions?,” philosophical explorations 5:2 (2001): 148-154; and kristján kristjánsson, “can we teach justified anger?,” journal of philosophy of education 39:4 (2005): 671-689. cf. plato, republic, 440c. 10 plato, phaedrus, 246a-254e; republic, 427e-444e, esp. 444b-e. 11 c.s. lewis, the abolition of man (new york, ny: harpercollins, 2009), 24. 12 peter thomas geach, the virtues (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1977); rosalind hursthouse, on virtue ethics (oxford: oxford university press, 1999). 13 carr [“contribution ”], 140. 14 aristotle, nicomachean ethics, 1106a26-b28, with 1106a36-b7, 1122a18-1125a17. 15 symposium, 202e-203a. 16 “la beauté n’est que la promesse du bonheur.” stendhal, de l'amour (boston, ma: michel levy bros., 1857), 34, n. 1. 17 alexander nehamas, “‘only in the contemplation of beauty is human life worth living’ (plato, symposium, 211d),” (katz lecture in the humanities, university of washington, seattle, washington, 17th november, 2005). 18 symposium, 199c-200a. 19 carr [“contribution”], 141. for an alternative account of the intentional object of love in plato, see gerasimos santas, “plato’s theory of eros in the symposium: abstract,” noûs 13:1 (1979): 67-75, esp. 71-72. 20 see, generally, f.c. white’s survey, “according to many scholars, the central theme…is that the primary or ultimate object of love is the form of beauty. thus among such scholars beauty is variously described as: love’s analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 69 primary object (irwin); its final object (cornford); its final goal (grube); its final ‘why’ (morgan); its ultimate objective (raven); its ultimate object (teloh); its ultimate goal (grube). or it is described more simply as the object of love (hamilton); as the goal of eros (bury)…and so on”, “love and beauty in plato’s symposium,” journal of hellenic studies cix (1989): 151. see also suzanne obdrzalek, “moral transformation and the love of beauty in plato’s symposium,” journal of the history of philosophy 48:4 (2010): 416, 440; nehamas, “beauty of body, nobility of soul: the pursuit of love in plato’s symposium,” in maieusis: essays in ancient philosophy in honour of myles burnyeat, ed. dominic scott, (oxford: oxford university press, 2007), 123; lloyd gerson, “a platonic reading of plato’s symposium,” in plato’s symposium: issues in interpretation and reception, eds. james lesher, debra nails, and frisbee sheffield (washington, d.c.: center for hellenic studies, 2006), 48, 64, 65; radcliffe g. edmonds, “socrates the beautiful: role reversal and midwifery in plato’s symposium,” transactions of the american philological association 130 (2000): 266, 268-269; michael gagarin, “socrates’ hubris and alcibiades’ failure,” phoenix 31 (1997): 33, 27; e.e. pender, “spiritual pregnancy in plato’s symposium,” the classical quarterly, new series 42:1 (1992): 72, 77-78, 82, 86; richard patterson, “the ascent in plato’s symposium,” in proceedings of the boston area colloquium in ancient philosophy, vol. vii, ed. john j. cleary (lanham, md: university press of america, 1993), 198, 207; david m. halperin, “platonic erôs and what men call love,” ancient philosophy 5 (1985): 180; halperin, “plato and the metaphysics of desire,” in proceedings of the boston area colloquium on philosophy, vol. v, ed. john cleary and daniel shartin, (lanham, md: university press of america, 1989), 34. notable exceptions include harry neumann, “diotima’s concept of love,” the american journal of philology 86: 1 (1965): 42-47; christopher rowe, plato: symposium (warminster: aris & phillips, ltd., 1998), 184 ad loc 206e2-3, 5; white, “virtue in plato’s symposium,” the classical quarterly new series 54:2 (2004): 369-375; and gregory vlastos, “the individual as an object of love in plato,” in platonic studies (princeton, nj: princeton university press, 1981), 20-22, who argue that the object of love is not beauty but the possession of the good. while i disagree as well that the good is love’s object, i will not go into any detail here. for an account of how love has as its object the generation of beauty in plato’s symposium, see lauren ware, “plato’s bond of love: erôs as participation in beauty” (phd diss., university of edinburgh, 2014), esp. chapter 3, §iii. 21 republic, 532a, 534b. 22 republic, 540a-b. 23 republic, 540c. 24 republic, 495c; cf. 499b, 520d, 521a. 25 republic, 501b. 26 timaeus, 28a-b. 27 republic, 500c-d. 28 kristjánsson, 671-689. 29 maxwell and reichenbach, 148. 30 symposium, 210d. 31 maxwell and reichenbach, 154; max scheler, the nature of sympathy, trans. peter heath (london: routledge & kegan paul, 1954); lawrence a. blum, friendship, altruism and morality (london: routledge & kegan paul, 1980); arne johan vetlesen, perception, empathy, and judgement: an inquiry into the preconditions of moral performance (university park, pa: pennsylvania state university press, 1994). 32 david nichol smith, wordsworth: poetry and prose (oxford: clarendon press, 1921), 171. 33 norbert schwartz, “feelings as information: informational and motivational functions of affective states,” in handbook of motivation and cognition: foundations of social behavior vol. 2, eds. e. tory higgins and richard m. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 70 sorrentino (new york, ny: guilford press, 1990); norbert schwartz and gerald l. clore, “mood, misattribution, and judgments of well-being: informative and directive functions of affective states,” journal of personality and social psychology 45 (1983). 34 apology, 30e. 35 republic, 401e-402a. 36 pete boghossian, “how socratic pedagogy works,” informal logic 23:2, teaching supplement #8 (2003); richard garlikov, “the socratic method: teaching by asking instead of by telling,” last modified 2001, http://www.garlikov.com/soc_meth.html; james l. golden, “plato revisited: a theory of discourse for all seasons,” in essays on classical rhetoric and modern discourse, eds. robert j. connors, lisa ede, and andrea lunsford (carbondale, il: southern illinois university press, 1984); and robert d. whipple, socratic method and writing instruction (lanham, md: university press of america, 1997). 37 symposium, 209a-e. bibliography adalbjarnardóttir, sigrun. “promoting children’s social growth in schools: an intervention study.” journal of applied developmental psychology 14 (1993): 461-484. adelson, edward h. “checkershadow illusion.” 1995. http://web.mit.edu/persci/ people/adelson/checkershadow_illusion.html. aristotle. nicomachean ethics. translated by j.a.k thomson. london: penguin books ltd., 2004. ben ze’ev, aaron. “are envy, anger, and resentment moral emotions?” philosophical explorations 5:2 (2001): 148154. blum, lawrence a. friendship, altruism and 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connors, lisa ede, and andrea lunsford, 16-36. carbondale, il: southern illinois university press, 1984. grossman, david c., holly j. neckerman, thomas d. koepsell, ping-yu liu, kenneth n. asher, kathy beland, karen frey, and frederick p. rivara. “effectiveness of a violence prevention curriculum among children in elementary school: a randomized controlled trial.” journal of the american medical association 277 (1997): 1605-1611. halperin, david. “plato and the metaphysics of desire.” in proceedings of the boston area colloquium on philosophy v, edited by john j. cleary and daniel shartin, 27-52. lanham, md: university press of america, 1989. _____. “platonic eros and what men call love.” ancient philosophy 5 (1985): 161–204. hursthouse, rosalind. on virtue ethics. oxford: oxford university press, 1999. kilpatrick, william. why johnny can’t tell right from wrong. new york, ny: simon & schuster, 1992. kohlberg, lawrence. essays on moral development, volume i. new york, ny: harper row, 1984. kristjánsson, kristján. “can we teach justified anger?” journal of philosophy of education 39:4 (2005): 671-689. lewis, c.s. the abolition of man. new york, ny: harpercollins, 2009. lickona, thomas. educating for character: how our schools can teach respect and responsibility. new york, ny: bantam doubleday dell, 1992. maxwell, bruce, and roland reichenbach. “educating moral emotions: a praxiological analysis.” studies in philosophy and education 26 (2007): 147-163. mclaughlin, terrence, and j. mark halstead. “education in character, virtue.” in education in morality, edited by halstead and mclaughlin, 132-173. london: routledge, 1999. mcmahon, susan d., jason washburn, erika d. felix, jeanne yakin, and gary childrey. “violence prevention: program effects on urban preschool and kindergarten children.” applied and preventive psychology 9 (2000): 271-281. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 72 nehamas, alexander. “beauty of body, nobility of soul: the pursuit of love in plato’s symposium.” in maieusis: essays in ancient philosophy in honour of myles burnyeat, edited by dominic scott, 97-135. oxford: oxford university press, 2007. _____. “‘only in the contemplation of beauty is human life worth living’ (plato, symposium, 211d).” katz lecture in the humanities, university of washington, seattle, washington, 17th november, 2005. neumann, harry. “diotima’s concept of love.” the american journal of philology 86:1 (1965): 33-59. noddings, nel. caring: a feminine approach to ethics & moral education. berkeley, ca: university of california press, 1984. _____. the challenge to care in schools. new york, ny: teachers college press, 1990. obdrzalek, suzanne. “moral transformation and the love of beauty in plato’s symposium.” journal of the history of philosophy 48:4 (2010): 415-444. patterson, richard. “the ascent in plato’s symposium.” in proceedings of the boston area colloquium in ancient philosophy vii, edited by john j. cleary, 193-214. lanham, md: university press of america, 1993. pender, e.e. “spiritual pregnancy in plato’s symposium.” the classical quarterly 42:1, new series (1992): 72-86. plato. apology. translated by harold north fowler. london: william heinemann, ltd., 1966. _____. phaedrus. translated by alexander nehamas and paul woodruff. cambridge: hackett, 1995. _____. republic. translated by paul shorey. london: heinemann, 1969. _____. symposium. translated by c.j. rowe. warminster: aris & phillips, ltd., 1998. _____. timaeus. translated by w.r.m. lamb. london: william heinemann, ltd., 1925. rowe, christopher. plato: symposium. warminster: aris & phillips, ltd., 1998. santas, gerasimos. plato and freud. oxford: basil blackwell, 1988. _____. “plato’s theory of eros in the symposium: abstract.” noûs 13:1 (mar. 1979): 67-75. scheler, max. the nature of sympathy. translated by peter heath. london: routledge & kegan paul, 1954. schwartz, norbert. “feelings as information: informational and 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vlastos, gregory. “the individual as an object of love.” in platonic studies, 1-34. princeton, nj: princeton university press, 1981. ware, lauren. “plato’s bond of love: erôs as participation in beauty.” phd diss., university of edinburgh, 2014. webster-stratton, carolyn. how to promote children’s social and emotional competence. london: sage, 1999. whipple, robert d. socratic method and writing instruction. lanham, md: university press of america, 1997. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 73 white, f.c. “love and beauty in plato’s symposium.” journal of hellenic studies cix (1989): 149-157. _____. “virtue in plato’s symposium.” the classical quarterly new series 54:2 (2004): 366-378. address correspondences to: lauren ware university of edinburgh l.ware@ed.ac.uk analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 1 reasoning (or not) with the unreasonable susan t. gardner, anastasia anderson, wayne henry introduction thriving democracy requires that citizens, despite different value sets and perspectives (haidt), find ways to communicate across difference so that, together, they can chart a path forward that is potentially flourishing for all. in his article “philosophy, democracy & education: reconstructing dewey,” philip cam quotes dewey as saying that, both for thinking in general and democracy in particular, “we need to “think together in face-to-face relationships by means of direct give-and-take.” (3). this give-and-take, this learning to be open to perspectives different from our own, is a central pedagogical aspiration of “the community of philosophical inquiry” (cpi), the pedagogical cornerstone of “philosophy for children” (p4c). being open to opposing positions is likewise a fundamental presupposition in science, something stressed by peirce, and to whom both lipman (15) and sharp (53), the co-founders of p4c, frequently refer. as well, gardner, in her critical thinking text, thinking your way to freedom, defines good thinking as requiring that one be open to one’s opposition (24-36). these positions seem laudable and within fairly easy reach in a classroom setting in which a facilitator assists in ensuring that vastly different viewpoints find welcome. in real life, however, engaging in the give-and-take of reasoned dialogue in ordinary discourse may sometimes, even often, seem like a bridge too far. immigration, climate change, sexual orientation, transgender issues, indigenous people’s rights, taxation, trade policy, even behavior of political figures, all these are topics about which many people have strong opinions that seem to require of advocates that they stand firm. or, at least, the dialectics of discourse often push people to “their corners.” in such situations, individuals who have embraced the importance of engaging in reasoned dialogue (whom we refer to technically as “reasonable”) both for their own integrity and the health of the community, may be utterly at a loss when confronted with individuals who absolutely refuse to entertain a position other than their own (whom we refer to technically as “unreasonable”). should they become ever more assertive? should they listen silently while carrying on a disparaging inner dialogue about what a jerk this person is? should they just give up and go home? in what follows, we suggest several alternatives. first, we argue that it is important not to “take the bait”: while the position advocated by the other may be infuriating, expressing fury, more often than not, throws the balance of power to the other side and, in any event, ends any further chance of engaging the other. secondly, we suggest that an internal analysis (to be clarified shortly) of the a analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 2 other’s position (as opposed to demanding external justification) might prove enlightening. third, we suggest using a “genetic ad hominem/ad feminem approach;” instead of attempting to focus on the merits of what may be a “meritless” position, or instead of avoiding a discussion of the meritless position altogether, one might attempt to analyze how the person came to cling so firmly to what appears to be an unreasonable position. lastly, we urge that, even when faced with doors closed in one’s face, one hang onto the humanity of the other, as this baseline attitude might be just the sort that will serve as the communicative foundation for future dialogue. clearly, with regard to the above suggestions, context is critical. in advocating communicative alternatives when the give-and-take of reasoned dialogue seems impossible, we are assuming the context of common-garden variety communicative exchanges of the sort that dewy talks about in his book the public and its problems. we are not advocating these as carte blanche alternatives; we are certainly not advocating these in situations of danger, imminent or otherwise. more specifically, then, in what follows, we begin with a discussion of the “default value” of reasoned dialogue, followed by an analysis of why those who hold so tightly to that ideal, do so. this will help shed light on why those who value reasoned dialogue can be so flummoxed when confronted by those who cannot or will not so engage. we then very briefly mention why many do not value reasoned dialogue as an ideal. this will be followed by a discussion of alternative communicative strategies and attitudes that might serve as a guide for those with “open-minds” (sharp 40) when confronted by closed doors. as opposed to increased aggression, developing attitudes of disgust, or simply giving up altogether, such strategies can help maintain a belief in oneself, that even in the face of challenge, one is nonetheless attempting to stay true to one’s ideals (albeit imperfectly), while, at the same time, potentially laying out the groundwork for future more productive dialogue. for those in the field of philosophy for children, who either implicitly or explicitly advocate the ideal of open give-and-take reasoned dialogue, reflecting on alternative strategies, when reasoned dialogue is not within one’s reach, is both necessary and urgent. what “being reasonable” looks like in his treatise on liberty, john stewart mill argued that a top priority of any society must be the protection of freedom of speech not because freedom of speech, in and of itself, is of supreme value, but because without being able to hear opposing viewpoints, one is left with no way by which to test the adequacy of one’s own position. habermas likewise argued in his book the theory of communicative action that, rather than viewing reason as a solitary armchair activity, engaging in dialogue with those who think differently is a precondition of being able to evaluate whether one’s viewpoint is more adequate than another. so being reasonable requires that one be open to opposing viewpoints. this does not mean, however, that one is simply polite enough to listen to the other. this requires, rather, that one is willing and able to seriously evaluate the opposing position both in and of itself, as well as in juxtaposition to one’s own, i.e., that one evaluate the opposing position both for internal consistency, as well as its merits by comparison to other positions. being reasonable then, requires also that one has at least some familiarity with the norms of reasoning. in her article, selling analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 3 the reason game, gardner (2014) describes reasoning, or what we are referring to as being reasonable in the following way: at its best, or perhaps even in its only authentic sense, reasoning is such that all engaged participants must be prepared to follow reasons wherever they lead (gardner, 2009), that they assume that there are norms that govern what each should believe (darwall, 50-56), that “how speakers and hearers make use of their communicative freedom to take yesor no-positions is not a matter of their subjective discretion (habermas, fhn 10)…at its best, then, or, again, perhaps only in its authentic sense, participants who reason together must assume that the conclusion that they come to, or at least ought to come to, is not “up to them,” and, because it is not “up to them,” they all ought to enter the reasoning game prepared, from the outset, to change their minds when confronted with stronger competing arguments (129). it is important to emphasize, at this juncture, perhaps emphatically, that being reasonable is thus not a function of any particular position held; it is, rather, a function of an ability and willingness to engage in a particular process, namely, one in which one is open to all reasoned viewpoints, and that one has the ability and willingness to evaluate the strength of any reason offered, and, ultimately that one is prepared to embrace what turns out to be the strongest contender to truth. motivation for being reasonable it is one thing to characterize what might be described as the ideal of reasoned dialogue, it is quite another to present an argument (even to oneself) as to why one ought to aspire to such an ideal. as gardner points out in the article mentioned above (2014) “it is not at all clear, in situations in which there is an opportunity to enhance one’s status, or avoid ego-damage, or successfully divert blame, why anyone ought to cave to the opposition merely in deference to the abstract goals of reason” (129). and this, it might be argued, is a lethal fault of many critical thinking courses, namely that little effort is invested in actualizing students’ motivation to actually be reasonable. thus, students might excel in the mechanics of deductive and inductive logic, venn diagrams, truth tables, and so on, and yet use these skills only to support their own biased view, rather than in the service of ferreting out the best contender to truth. in response to this problem, gardner, in her critical thinking book thinking your way to freedom (2009), invites students, at the very outset, to engage in analysis of the point of “ferreting out the best contender to truth,” and that point is autonomy. she argues that, since our biases are not our own but rather introjected from the physical and social environments in which we move, it follows that in order to become our own persons, we need to wash out bias by using reason to evaluate the merits of our own positions against the very strongest possible opposition, and, in so doing, move closer to viewing our own positions with at least some degree of impartiality. specifically, she says: analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 4 the values that you adhere to when you decide how to act in the short, medium, and long term will determine the kind of human being you become, the kind of life you live, and the kind of community that you help to create. to the degree—and only to the degree—that you seriously and impartially reflect upon the values that guide your actions in the short, medium and long term, can you describe yourself as the master of your own fate, as the creator of yourself (36). motivation for being unreasonable we all know that the world abounds with people with whom one is unable to reason. kjartan sekkingstad, of norway, who along with three others was kidnapped by islamist militants from a resort in the philippines in 2016, and who later witnessed the beheading of two of his fellow captives, knows that in spades. but we don’t need to cite extreme incidents to support this point. your aunt sally, who is a fundamentalist christian, supports this point, as does your father who knows to the bottom of his toes how life should and should not be lived. there are multiple reasons why someone might be closed to considering a position in opposition to the one they presently hold. among them are: 1. identity protection (including ideological allegiance, tribal membership); 2. emotional fragility (verbal interchange seems like violence); 3. narcissism (can’t imagine that anyone, holding a different view, deserves to be taken seriously); 4. extreme principle-ist (disagreeing with me is immoral); 5. invested monetary interests (e.g., the trickle-down theory); 6. status (facebook); 7. hedonism (tracking truth is too much work); 8. relativism (no way to judge one position as better than another): 9. a misunderstanding of what reasoning is all about (smart people don’t change their minds); 10. a rejection of the value of reasoning (e.g., belief in divine revelation). given these multiple reasons for holding tight to one’s own viewpoint, those who value the open give-and-take of reasoned dialogue ought not to be surprised when confronted with a closed mind. indeed, it is not inconceivable that closed minds are more of a rule, rather than an exception. however, this should not serve to discourage those who have embraced reasoned dialogue as an ideal. rather, it should alert them to the need of having alternative strategies at hand when reasoned dialogue is not within view. there are other alternatives to simply infusing one’s own position with more force, viewing the other as an idiot, or simply giving up altogether. the following are some suggestions. communicative strategies when reasoned dialogue is not possible avoid taking the bait in the 2016 us presidential election, michelle obama’s exhortation that “when they go low, we go high,” was spoken in recognition of the fact that “being unreasonable” can be “catching.” who isn’t tempted to return insult for insult when one is subjected to a flagrantly illegitimate ad hominem/ad feminem attack? indeed, like junk food, unreasonable maneuvers can be positively analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 5 addicting, as they so often catch one’s opponent off-guard and often seem like a guaranteed win in a competitive interchange. it is imperative, therefore, that we remember that, like junk food, being unreasonable is bad for one’s health in the sense that it jeopardizes one’s autonomy, one’s dignity, and one’s self-respect. similarly, just as we arm our youngsters against the seduction of junk food by emphasizing, again and again, the merits of a healthy diet, so too, we must, again and again, emphasize the merits of staying true to the anchor of being reasonable, at least as far as any given situation allows, even if the situation is such that the ideal of reasonable dialogue seems like a distinct long-shot. wendy behary, in her book disarming the narcissist, likewise argues that though we will be mightily tempted to lose our cool when engaged in an interchange with a narcissist, she asks us to keep firmly in mind the difference between “taking a stand for yourself—utilizing an authentic and assertive voice against abuse, control, and oppression—and defending yourself with contempt, criticalness and self-righteousness” (72). in the former case, the possibility of a win-win remains possible, in the latter case a lose-lose is virtually inevitable. and she reminds us, as part of the strategy of keeping one’s cool, that one ought to “angle your awareness toward the other person’s face, hand and physical being, reminding yourself that he is just another member of the fascinating and imperfect human species” (behary 111)—and not allow yourself to be blinded by the glare of his 14-karat ego. internal versus external analysis in his article “the dying art of civil disagreement” (national post, sept. 30, 2017, a16), bret stephens argues that, though disagreement is essential for underpinning our freedom, energizing our progress, and making our democracies real, and though we are getting lots of practice in recent decades more than ever before nonetheless, “the more we do it, the worse we are at it.” good disagreement, according to stephens is the sort that sharpens our thinking; the sort of disagreement that took place over the centuries amongst thinkers such as plato, hobbes, nietzsche and wittgenstein. what is characteristic of this sort of good disagreement is that it is “never based on a misunderstanding. on the contrary, disagreements arise from perfect comprehension; from having chewed over the ideas of your intellectual opponent so thoroughly that you can properly sort them out. in other words, to disagree well you must first understand well. you have to read deeply, listen carefully, watch closely.” this suggests, then, that when faced with a mind closed to alternative views, a productive line of approach would be to thoroughly question the other so that one comes away from the communicative exchange with a deeper understanding of the other’s position, rather than worrying about whether or not one’s own position is being heard. in the process, one might find areas of overlap that can serve as opening for actual dialogue. as well, one might take this opportunity to probe potential contradictions as they come to light. thus, when confronted with someone who adamantly maintains that all gays are eternally damned, one might discuss how, for instance, this coheres to a belief that god is loving. while such an approach might enhance reflection on both analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 6 sides, one must keep in mind that the other might not be bothered in the least by potential contradiction in her position. nonetheless, such an exploration might still be fruitful as it will disclose whether, from any vantage point, the position of the other can be deemed justified. causes, not reasons: revisiting the genetic fallacy though citing dialogue amongst philosophers may be a helpful model in imagining what “good disagreement” looks like as stephens does above, we ought to keep firmly in mind that such careful framing of one’s position, along with anticipating areas of resistance, is not typical of ordinary interaction. when one feels under attack, the capacity to state one’s whole case, indeed the capacity to even know the whole or the why of one’s own case, is often diminished. so, the strategy of internal analysis as suggested above, i.e., the continual probing and re-probing of the stated case in order to understand better, may not lead to enhanced comprehension simply because the adherent of the position is unable to fully articulate it or refuses to respond to questions about its consistency. if such is the case, if understanding the other’s position proves problematic, understanding the other may not be. that is, if examining the reasons that do or do not support the position of the other seems fruitless, focusing on the causes might not be. the question to focus on may be: what is it that prompted this person to hold so tightly to this position? the suggestion that one examine the causes rather than the reasons for another’s position may seem outrageous. after all, this strategy is one that is classified in critical thinking texts as an informal fallacy (either circumstantial ad hominem/ad feminem attack or a genetic fallacy), and hence one to be avoided by good thinkers. and certainly anyone who has been the victim of such a strategy knows well how infuriating it can be. and any man who has suggested to a woman that she is only complaining because “it is that time of the month” can likewise testify to the ferocity of the rage that such a response can engender. nonetheless, we suggest that, if the goal is genuinely a deeper understanding rather than an undermining of the other’s position, such a strategy would be more helpfully termed a “genetic investigation” rather than a “genetic fallacy.” in such an investigation, our attempt would be to create question-rungs that allow us to ladder down into view of the core values of the other. since beliefs are expressive of values, gaining an understanding of how your beliefs are a product of your values is proof positive that i view you as a rational being; all of which is the very antithesis of permitting myself to dismiss your view as an irrational product of various and sundry causes. another way of putting this point would be to say that partaking in a genetic investigation is an attempt to figure out how your position on a particular issue fits within the narrative of your life as you see it (macintyre). or yet another way would be to say that i am trying to see you as a person, rather than just a talking head. the suggestion that i attempt to view you as a person in situations in which your position is utterly opaque, puts an interesting twist on what was initially described as “bias neutralization,” i.e., analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 7 that a reasonable person ought to be open to alternative positions so that s/he might be alert to the possibility that her own position is biased. what the present strategy suggests, by contrast, is that “person perception” helps us to neutralize bias of a different sort: namely, a biased view of “how to be in the world.” that is, in coming to understand the narrative of the other, i may see that it has merit, even if it is not a way of life that i would choose for myself. if that is the case, i may be able to double down on trying to find ways in which our differences can be accommodated that do not, in the process, trample either of our desperate core values. if there is any merit at all to this position, this suggests that, in the long run, diversity requires of us that we speak two languages: the “language of reason” with the goal of genuine meeting (buber) and the “language of understanding” through which we learn to appreciate one another, but from a bit of distance. if there is any merit to this position, this, interestingly, has implications with regard to communal inquiry (as depicted in philosophy for children literature). that is, if “person perception” turns out to be a fundamental strategy when a reasoning impasse is encountered, and if reasoning impasses are not uncommon, then clearly utilizing such questions as “how do you think you came to hold that view,” or “do you know why you hold that view so strongly,” or “have you always held that view,” or “is it possible that you hold that view because …,” would be vital probes for enhancing depth all around, rather than being perceived as illegitimate personal insertions in what is supposed to be a purely reasoned dialogue. hang on to your faith in the other in an august 30, 2017 article in the national post entitled “why reasonable people can still support trump,” clive crook explores the implications of the fact that trump’s supporters seem unaffected by virtually anything he does or says, no matter how apparently outrageous. he articulates two main theories: “one is that a large minority of americans –40% give or take—are racist idiots.” “the other is that a large majority of this large minority are good citizens with intelligible and legitimate opinions who so resent being regarded as racist idiots that they will back trump almost regardless” (a8). and he goes on to say not only that he thinks that the first theory is absurd and the second theory basically correct, but that those who hold the first theory are, in essence, arguing against democracy. they are in essence saying that there is plainly nothing that can change the minds of these people so why even go through the motions of talking and listening to them? in arguing against the tendency to bundle the views of trump’s supporters into packages of “bigotry” and “stupidity,” crook asks rhetorically why this large minority of american people can’t be accorded something other than pity or scorn. crook finishes his article with the following plea: “democracies that work make space for disagreement. you can disagree with somebody in the strongest possible terms, believing your opponents to be profoundly or even dangerously mistaken. but that doesn’t oblige you to ignore them, scorn them, or pity them. refusing to engage –except to mock and condescend– is counterproductive. proof of that last point,” he adds, “is the dispiriting tenacity of trump’s support.” crook is arguing, in other words, that we need to hang onto our faith that, with time and effort, we may, in the long run, be deeply rewarded by understanding what we may deem to analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 8 be an unreasonable position. the difficulty is in finding appropriate modes of engagement when reasonable dialogue is not possible. how does relating to the unreasonable relate to p4c? our goal in philosophy for children–at least so we presume–is to engage youngsters in communities of philosophical inquiry so that they develop the habit of engaging in reasonable dialogue outside of the cpi space. there is a danger here, however, of oversell. that is, if we give the impression (even though that may not be our intent) that interpersonal communication is of little value unless all participants are equally open and reasonable, and if some find that, on many instances outside the cpi space, they encounter closed minds, faith in reasonable dialogue may be lost altogether. memories of cpis may thus coalesce into the assumption that this was a fun, but ultimately, impractical academic experience, and a return to the habit of verbal boxing may thus be reinstated. it is for that reason that we suggest that it behooves all of us, at some point, to comment that what we are doing in a cpi is an ideal to which we all ought to aspire but that, nonetheless, we all ought to be prepared that there will be times when we are stonewalled by those unable to stay open to opposing positions. we need to add that this in no way ought to diminish the personal ideal of being reasonable, as its motivation is grounded in the value of autonomy, not success (see above). as well, it would be helpful to note that, in those instances in which a two-way dialogue fails, there are other ways in which we can connect with others, namely, the one-way street of attempting to thoroughly understand the other’s position and why the other is so firmly entrenched. though it is obviously maddening when the other is closed off to who we are and what we believe, nonetheless we may find that this new understanding is actually enriching, and that our own position may become more nuanced as a result. this new perspective might, in turn, open up the possibility for future dialogue. in other words, if we are prepared to go down a one-way street toward the other, the other, in turn, might be more intrigued by the possibility of reciprocation. all in all, then, what we are offering is just another tool for the p4c toolbox: that though a central p4c goal is to educate for dialogue that is open-minded and in which we learn to respect each other’s views as potential sources of insight (sharp 51), it is important, as well, to offer strategies by which discourse outside the classroom might nonetheless be profitably maintained even when confronted with minds that are closed. conclusion though engaging in reasoned dialogue is the ideal, and adopting alternative communicative strategies when confronted with steel-door biases is a second best, we need to keep in mind that, nonetheless, contact with the other’s position, or the other person, may not be possible. this point is brought into stark relief by the portrayal, by erik larson, in his book in the garden of beasts, of american naiveté in their continuing confidence of the potential efficacy of reasonable dialogue with the nazis in the six years leading up the beginning of wwii. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 9 wendy bahary, in her book disarming the narcissist, warns of the despair that may result when one attempts to dialogue with the common-garden narcissist. she writes: “like the president of a debate club or a judge with a gavel in hand, the narcissist invited you into a conversation that quickly became either a long-drawn-out soliloquy, argumentative or highly competitive. no matter what your response—ignoring him, fighting back, pleading, or even giving in—he is impervious” (behary 97). on the other hand, behary suggests that we can keep despair at bay if we keep the distinction between empathy and compassion clearly focused in our minds. empathy is the capacity to truly understand the experience of another…. it does not mean that you agree with, condone, or support the other person’s feelings and behaviour (behary 137). another way of putting this would be to say that advocating “person perception” when “position perception” is not possible, is not advocating “love thy neighbour.” ultimately the goal for a reasonable person is to find ways to protect and foster her reasonable self and the reasonable selves of others, in the face of what sometimes seems like an unreasonable world. we are suggesting here that a deeper understanding of the other, whether it is the other’s position, or the other as a person, will help to do that. and to the degree that reasonable people are able to maintain that focus in the winds of conflict, to that degree they may serve as models to be emulated and hence ultimately nourish the common good. references behary wendy t. disarming the narcissist. oakland, ca: harbinger, 2013. buber, martin. i and thou. 2nd ed. new york: charles scribner’s sons, 1958. cam, philip. “philosophy, democracy & education: reconstructing dewey.” in-suk cha (ed.), teaching philosophy for democracy. seoul: seoul university press, 2000. 158-181. crook, clive. “why reasonable people can still support trump,” the national post. august 30, 2017. darwall, stephan. the second-person standpoint: morality, respect, and accountability. cambridge, mass.: harvard university press, 2006. print. dewey, john. the public and its problems. new york: holt, 1927. gardner, susan t. thinking your way to freedom. philadelphia: temple university press. 2009. gardner, susan t. “selling the reason game.” teaching ethics. fall, 2014. habermas, j. the theory of communicative action (tca). vol. 1: reason and the rationalization of society. trans. thomas mccarthy. boston: beacon press, 1992. (german text 1981.) haidt, jonathn, the righteous mind: why good people are divided by politics and religion. new york: pantheon books, 2012. kant, immanuel. groundwork of the metaphysic of morals. trans. h.j. paton. new york: harper and row, 1964. lilla, mark. the once and future liberal: after identity politics. new york: harper collins, 2017. lipman, matthew. thinking in education. cambridge: cambridge university press, 1991. macintyre, alasdair. after virtue. notre dame, indiana: notre dame press, 1984. mill, john stewart. on liberty. on liberty. essay on bentham. ed. mary warnock. new american library, 1962. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 10 sharp, ann margaret. “what is a community of inquiry.” in community of inquiry with ann margaret sharp: childhood, philosophy, and education. edited by maughn rollins gregory and megan jane laverty. new york: routledge, 2018. 38-48. sharp, ann margaret. “self transformation in the community of inquiry.” in community of inquiry with ann margaret sharp: childhood, philosophy, and education. edited by maughn rollins gregory and megan jane laverty. new york: routledge, 2018. 49-59. stephens, bret “the dying art of civil disagreement,” the national post, sept. 30, 2017, a16. will, georg f. “yale takes lead in race for silliest thought police,” the national post, friday, sept. 8, 2017, a10. address correspondences to: dr. susan t. gardner professor of philosophy, capilano university 2055 purcell way, north vancouver, bc, canada, v7j 3h5. sgardner@capilanou.ca analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 23 bringing philosophy to gaming, not gaming to philosophy daniel j. anderson i. introduction hilosophy for children (p4c) is a pedagogical intervention designed to cultivate critical, creative, and caring thinking in its participants. unlike other pedagogical interventions, such as the roots of empathy program, which privilege social and emotional learning, philosophy for children places a greater emphasis upon its participants' capacities to think and reason (see, for example, schonert-reichl., et. al., promoting children’s prosocial behavior in school: impact of the ‘roots of empathy’ program on the social and emotional competence of school-aged children). practitioners of this intervention attempt to realize these aims by fostering an environment for rational dialogue among a collection of ideologically-diverse individuals called a community of philosophical inquiry (cpi). ideally, practitioners of this intervention would have participants leave cpi's invested in reasoning after experiencing its power in action. investment here refers to the forming of an internal link between an individual's identity and reason, in the sense that the individual begins to care deeply about objectively justifying significant decisions in their life, and, hence, takes seriously the implications of reason with regard to his or her own behaviour. however, getting individuals to invest in reason is often an uphill battle for cpi practitioners, especially when the cpi experience does not straightforwardly model decision-making outside the classroom. intermittently using roleplaying games (rpg’s) to conduct cpi's may help in this regard, as it provides individuals with the opportunity to practice applying reasoning to their own behaviour. this paper will begin by explaining the history and nature of roleplaying games. afterwards, the paper will explore the various ways in which rpg's have been used as both an educational and philosophical tool to date. the paper will then proceed to outline two game mechanics that can be introduced to rpg's in order to help maximize their philosophical potential: requiring that game characters have names and characteristics similar to the players, and requiring that participants get input from others. it will then be argued that when rpg's are philosophically reengineered to include these mechanics, it may enhance players’ capacity to: (a) apply reasoning to their own behaviour; (b) be open to opinions and viewpoints of others; and (c) reflect prior to decision-making. finally, a practical guide will be laid out for educators interested in using rpg’s as a cpi tool in their own classrooms. p analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 24 ii. the history of roleplaying games. roleplaying games, or rpg's, are a collective story-telling experience in which a group of players take on the roles of characters in a fictional story. in tabletop rpg’s, polyhedral dice are used to help determine how various events unfold in the story. during gameplay, players take turns proposing what their characters will do, and then they roll dice to determine the outcome of those actions. rpg's have been around since the early 1970's, starting with gary gygax's famous game dungeons & dragons. dungeons & dragons is an rpg that takes place in a fictional medieval setting. in dungeons & dragons, players generate fantasy characters, such as a wizard, cleric or warrior, and then proceed to collectively tell a story (which usually revolves around their characters exploring treasurefilled dungeons). in order to play dungeons & dragons, one player takes on the role of the dungeon master (dm) and is responsible for: 1) creating and/or describing the world that the other players explore; 2) making rule judgements; and 3) determining the behavior of npc's (non-player controlled entities), such as monsters or background characters. think of the dm as both the referee and the story-teller. iii. educational benefits of roleplaying games since their inception, roleplaying games such as dungeons & dragons have been successfully utilized by a number of different educational initiatives. for instance, board-certified psychologist megan connell uses dungeons & dragons therapeutically to help autistic individuals acquire social skills (dragon talk, 2018), and to help domestic abuse victims rediscover personal empowerment (geek & sundry, 2017). the central intelligence agency (cia) has used various forms of roleplaying to train their operatives by presenting them with hypothetical situations that they might encounter in the field (larson, 2017). moreover, classroom teachers, such as alexandra carter (2011) have used roleplaying games to maintain student engagement while teaching academics. in one houston school, grade 9 students attending their school’s dungeons & dragons club far outperformed their district on a statewide, standardized test. initially it was thought that this was owing to the fact that the club drew in brighter students; however, after investigating, the school found that many of the students who had joined the club had a history of struggling with academics (kqed, 2018). research on the educational benefits contained within rpg’s by david simkins (2008) echoed many of these findings. throughout his research, simkins discovered that rpg’s were often associated with improved student learning, and tended to increase students’ curiosity (kqed, 2018). simkins and steinkruehler (2008) further discovered that roleplaying games were successfully being used by a number of schools to assist in teaching science, editing skills, literacy, math, and reasoning. iv. the philosophical potential of roleplaying games. the philosophical potential inherent in rpg’s has not gone unnoticed within the p4c analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 25 community. in his book adventures in reasoning (2015), philosopher jason howard makes the argument that roleplaying games are an ideal “vehicle for communal inquiry” that cultivate and enhance students' “critical, creative and caring thinking” (p.1, 44). howard argues that the rpg environment is particularly well-suited for cultivating these qualities in participants because it transports them into hypothetical scenarios, which crucially require collaboration and critical reasoning to traverse (p. 345). he goes on to argue that fantasy roleplaying games hold particular advantages over other philosophical stimuli because they assign players an active and authorial role in philosophical inquiry (p. 35-36). in his book, howard presents detailed rules on how to play the rpg that he has constructed. here i offer yet another alternative, namely a guide on how to reengineer rpg's presently on the market for the purposes of cpi. i also present two mechanics that might enhance participants’ tendency to reason about their own behaviour, rather than the behavior of their rpg character. v. whose behaviour are you reasoning about? at the beginning of this paper it was argued that the central aim of a cpi is to have individuals invest in reason. investment, in turn, was described as an individual’s commitment to applying reasoning to their own behavior. at first glance, it may appear that rpg’s assist in accomplishing this goal, insofar as players are often forced to reason about their in-game behavior while playing an rpg. that is, rpg’s often organically elicit reasoning, because strategizing can help individuals overcome in-game challenges. however, in roleplaying games, players may only be tangentially reasoning about their own behavior. this is the case because roleplaying games require players to create an avatar or character when they play. thus, in most out-of-the-box rpg’s, players are not really inquiring about what they should do, instead, they are inquiring about what their characters should do. the difference here is important. an individual's character might be a bloodthirsty warrior, a pacifist cleric, or a greedy thief; there are a multitude of roles, and accompanying motivations, that a player could represent in an rpg. previous research has demonstrated that children and adolescents have a propensity to create digital avatars that differ greatly from themselves (oulette, 2014, p. 153), such as avatars of a different gender, age, or species. the same heuristic likely applies to the characters youth generate when playing a roleplaying game. the trouble is, under such circumstances, children may be getting more practice at reasoning about their character's behaviour than their own. past research in cyber settings has demonstrated that the appearance of an individual’s gaming character or avatar can drastically effect their in-game behaviour. yee and bailenson (2007) discovered that the appearance of an individual's digital avatar had a profound impact on how they behaved in virtual worlds. they called this the proteus effect: the name makes reference to the shape-changing abilities of the greek god proteus. what they found was that an individual would adjust their avatar's behavior in order to conform with stereotypes that were associated with their avatar's appearance. for analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 26 example, an individual would act more assertively during pay negotiations when controlling a tall avatar, simply because height is stereotypically associated with confidence. avatars' appearances also held implications for individuals’ out-of-game behavior. a separate study by fox and bailenson (2009) demonstrated that if avatars were made to closely resemble the individuals that were controlling them, then they could be used to motivate real-world behavior. for instance, when individuals had look-alike avatars on a nike app shed weight as they exercised, then they exercised eight times longer than individuals without avatar feedback (mcgonigal, 2011, p. 161). a subsequent study found that even watching a short animation of a lookalike avatar running was enough to inspire most individuals to spend (on average) one more hour running over the next twenty-four hours in comparison to a control group. importantly, this powerful effect on real world behaviour disappeared as soon as the avatars no longer resembled the players in question (mcgonigal, 2011, p. 162). like virtual avatars, roleplaying game characters can differ in the degree to which they accurately depict or represent the player controlling them. unlike virtual avatars, which are digitally represented, tabletop rpg characters are typically represented in players' imaginations, or, in some cases by a miniature figurine. facilitators ought to be wary of the “deindividuation” caused by avatars or characters that differ wildly from the players they represent. i. nudging characters closer to actual participants lipman’s original aim was to have youngsters introject philosophical thinking in their own lives. cpi facilitators can raise the likelihood of such introjection by providing their participants with personalized experiences to call upon at a later time. in one study by hershfield and his colleagues (2011), the authors found that temporally-based behavior, such as saving for retirement, was often neglected simply because individuals had difficulty “psychologically connecting to,” or imagining, their future selves. however, when individuals were able to interact with a virtual reality rendering of their older self, the amount of money that they allocated towards retirement dramatically increased. in the same way that a lack of imagination may undermine temporally-based behavior, a similar lack of coherence between an individual and their character may undermine the salience a roleplaying game experience will have for them in the future. however, if educators have individuals play themselves in rpg’s, participants are then able to recall things they have done, and use this as a guide when navigating similar dilemmas in the real world. a simple mechanic to address this problem is to have players play themselves in roleplaying games (see, for example, fantasy flight’s end of the world series, which uses this mechanic). that is, if you are a human, female, named sarah in the real world, that is exactly who you would play in the game. likewise, sarah’s peers would play themselves in this situation. the immediate benefit of this design choice is that it ensures that players perceive their ingame choices as their own, and not as analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 27 their avatars'. educators can implement this game-mechanic by ensuring that players' miniatures resemble the player that they represent, or by ensuring that players are imagining themselves in the roleplaying game context. as an aside, although the individuals playing the game will never encounter an angry ogre, a horde of magical artifacts, or a flame-breathing dragon in their real lives, they will leave the roleplaying experience being able to recall how they responded to the moral dilemmas surrounding these events, and perhaps similar principles will help guide their future behaviours. ii. how rpg’s can nurture authenticity in their paper authenticity: it should and can be nurtured (2015), gardner and anderson argue that despite evidence demonstrating that philosophy for children enhances one's thinking skills and cognitive capacities, the ultimate goal of p4c should be to see these skills practically applied to individuals' identities and actual behaviour –in the service of who they are becoming as persons. in other words, one ought to practice philosophy in order to cultivate authenticity. according to the authors, authenticity requires that individuals learn to take responsibility for their decisions. this, in turn, crucially requires that one is capable of justifying one's actions to other individuals. under this conception, the primary goal of p4c should be for individuals to become adept at making their own choices the object of critical inquiry, so that they gain control of their own behavior and begin to take an authorial role in shaping their identities. becoming authentic and taking responsibility requires that one be exposed to the viewpoints of others. in his book responsibility and moral sentiments, r. j. wallace (1994) fleshes out peter strawson’s original notion that to be morally responsible, one must also be held morally responsible, i.e., open to the intersubjective judgements of others (p. 159, 231). this is the case because to be morally responsible, according to wallace, is to possess something akin to normative competence, which, in turn, crucially depends upon one's ability to “grasp and apply moral reasons” (p. 1). it is important to note, however, that the act of merely exchanging reasons with others is insufficient; one must also be adept at hearing the reasons of others, judging the strength of competing reasons, and following reasons wherever they lead (gardner, 2008, p. 19-20). by having players play themselves in rpg’s, and hence forcing them to justify their behaviour to other players, facilitators can help cultivate authenticity in their participants and ensure that participants feel the weight of personal responsibility when they make in-game decisions. for instance, one could imagine an in-game scenario where a player named sarah decides to abandon her friends into captivity in exchange for a large sum of gold. if it were only sarah’s character making the decision, then it would be unreasonable to hold sarah responsible. after all, perhaps that’s what her character would do. however, when sarah is representing herself in the game, and has to explain to other players why she abandoned them for gold, the situation more closely represents real world instances in which sarah will have to justify the decisions that she makes. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 28 vi. input requirement when using an rpg to conduct a cpi, the facilitator is tasked with deciding when to interject philosophical discussion into gameplay. one approach would be to have players reflect on their ingame decisions after they are made. this might look like holding a cpi once the game is finished, and discussing some of the events that transpired during gameplay. alternatively, it might look like presenting an in-game challenge that requires players to discuss their earlier in-game behaviors. an example of this can be seen in one of howard’s (2015) missions called a quest for justice, in which players encounter a sentient mountain who offers to grant them safe passage inside if they can first correctly answer a question: whether or not the questing party was courageous for previously killing a monster (p. 75). another approach, however, is to intersperse discussion throughout gameplay using a simple input requirement rule, which is as follows: before a player can finalize an action on their turn, they must take advice from a minimum of three other individuals who are playing the game with them. for instance, if a player named james is about to attempt and knockout a guard in order to gain entrance into a facility in the game, then he needs to first consult at least three other players about the decision he is about to make. in practice, this simply ensures that james is discussing the reasons for, or against, his proposed idea with other players. once all the inputs are taken, james is then free to make a final decision, which may or may not be different from what he was originally planning to do. i. input requirement allows for reflection prior to action when participants are only given practice at philosophically evaluating their own or others’ past behaviors, one misses the opportunity to train them to philosophically reflect prior to action (i.e., consider other perspectives during live decision-making). the input requirement rule may teach participants how to pause, consider other perspectives, and then to make an informed decision. as well, in contrast to the ponderous, often time-consuming reflection that takes place in a typical cpi, the “on the fly thinking” characteristic of input is arguably a more accurate representation of individuals’ daily experiences. as such, it may raise the likelihood that these experiences will influence decision making outside of the game/philosophical context. ii. input requirement allows participants to listen to others a second upside of the input requirement mechanic is that it helps model to participants how considering alternative perspectives can elucidate and potentially counteract their own blind spots, biases and impulses. the input requirement rule provides participants with the opportunity to sometimes have their own decisions, values and assumptions questioned and contested within a light and playful environment. in a typical cpi, setting up such an experience might provoke anxiety, and it almost always certainly does in reality. however, within the context of a well-designed game, individuals are often more willing to fail, socialize, and be teased by others (mcgonigal, 2011, p. 64, 85). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 29 iii. input requirement allows for “short and sweet” cpi’s the input requirement rule functionally replaces larger cpi’s with a series of “mini-cpi’s,” i.e., short and compact philosophical discussions. thus, using this strategy often makes academic philosophizing imperceptible to players i.e., they do not realize that they are philosophizing. this provides the facilitator with the opportunity to “take the pulse” of their participants and discover where they disagree with one another, where there is consensus, and what topics could use further problematizing in the future, etc. this is only made possible by the sheer number of issues that get fielded over a short period of time during rpg gameplay. for younger participants, these games may hold an advantage over classic cpi’s insofar as they are not required to sit quietly through a lengthy discussion. on certain occasions, younger children can sometimes have trouble following the thread of a conversation, become confused with the topic, or simply become bored or distracted. by using “input” to break down a cpi into small discussion chunks, facilitators can help ensure that their participants stay engaged during inquiry. iv. input requirement helps idle players stay focused a welcome consequence of the input requirement mechanic is that it helps idle players stay focused and invested while others are taking their turns in the game, thus allowing for the game to engage between fifteen and thirty participants at a given time. this is mostly because idle players have the chance to influence what happens in the game using the input they submit to active players. if their reasons are good enough, they might be able to change what happens in the story! vii. a guide to using roleplaying games for cpi's rpg's have been around since the 1970's, so there is no need to reinvent the wheel. in fact, in many instances, trying to reinvent the wheel simply results in a worse wheel. instead of designing philosophical games, i encourage educators to tinker with games already market-tested and simplified for optimal user experience. for those who are less game-savvy, all you have to do is make some rules adjustments to rpg's currently on the market. these five simple steps below are offered to help with this process: step 1: select a simple and intuitive roleplaying game system to master and tinker with. there are plenty of easy-to-understand rpg systems to choose from: fate core, end of the world, dungeons & dragons 5th ed., index card rpg, hero kids to name but a few. some of these systems even have simplified rules sets for younger participants (see carter, 2011). step 2: choose a story you want to tell. some roleplaying systems, such as fate core, are setting agnostic. this means that they are a simple rules set that can be used to tell practically any story. other systems take place in a particular setting, such as medieval fantasy, or a modern-day analog. step 3: familiarize yourself with the dice system used in the game. dice systems are used to help players and the dm determine how events unfold in the story. some games require that you purchase analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 30 a set of polyhedral dice, which are dice that typically range from four sides to twenty sides, while other games just require you to have some standard six-sided dice. step 4: start reading through the rules of the game that you have chosen. these rules will explain how to resolve possible events or how to handle situations that inevitably arise during gameplay. there are tons of resources online for each system, simply look up “how to play” videos for your chosen system on youtube or browse through the publisher’s website. step 5: in order for a game to have philosophical merit, you will likely need to inject a few rules into the game in order to ensure that it facilitates philosophical discussion during or after gameplay. in the last section, two such rules were suggested: having players play themselves and requiring input before in-game actions are taken. you may need to engineer other, similar adjustments in order to accomplish a specific goal that you have in mind. in summary, by injecting philosophical mechanics into already tried-and-true games, one is provided with a plethora of material that was designed to actively engage individuals, as well as an immersive setting for conducting a cpi within. most importantly however, roleplaying in this manner may help solidify the link between reason and one’s personal behaviour, which is core to practical reasoning. viii. conclusion in conclusion, it has been suggested here that roleplaying games can serve as a new and exciting way to conduct cpi's in the classroom. it has further been suggested that the philosophical impact of rpg’s can be maximized if players are required to play themselves and if the facilitator of the game requires players to seek input prior to making in-game decisions. since most cpi facilitators are experts in pedagogy or philosophy and not in gaming, this paper presents a way by which philosophy can be brought into games rather than the other way around. it should be stressed, at this juncture, that none of this suggests that rpg’s should outright replace traditional cpi's. rather, the model proposed above is meant to provide facilitators with a novel tool that may assist in reaching disengaged participants, or even serve as a welcome change when philosophical discussions become too tedious or reach an impasse. in short, this model can serve as either a classroom staple or as an occasional departure from the classic cpi method, which is likely how it will most frequently be used. philosophy often carries the stigma of being a discipline that is inaccessible, impractical and boringly disconnected from everyday life. this notion can be countered by ensuring that philosophy is positively associated with the spirit of adventure, comradery and play. ultimately the inclusion of roleplaying games in the discipline may not only enhance the impact of p4c, but may also reflect glowingly on its parent discipline. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 31 references carter, alexandra (2011). “using dungeons and dragons to integrate curricula in an elementary classroom.” serious games and edutainment applications. 329-346. fox, jesse and jeremy n. bailenson. (2009). “virtual self-modeling: the effects of vicarious reinforcement and identification on exercise behaviours.” media psychology. gardner, susan t. (2008). thinking your way to freedom. temple university press. gardner, susan t., daniel j. anderson (2015). “authenticity: it should and can be nurtured.” mind, culture, and activity, 22. 392–401. hershfield, hal, daniel goldstein, william sharpe, jesse fox, leo yeykelis, laura carstensen, and jeremy bailenson (2011). “increasing saving behavior through age-progressed renderings of the future self.” jmr, journal of marketing research, 48. howard, jason j (2015). adventures in reasoning: communal inquiry through fantasy role-play. roman & littlefield publishers. kqed (2018). how 'dungeons & dragons' primes students for interdisciplinary learning, including stem. retrieved from: www.kqed.org/mindshift/51790/how-dungeons-dragons-primesstudents for-interdisciplinary-learning-including-stem. larson, selena (2017). why the cia uses board games to train its officers. cnn business. retrieved from: https://money.cnn.com/2017/03/13/technology/cia-board-games-training/index.html. mcgonigal, jane (2011). reality is broken: why games make us better and how they can change the world. penguin press. oulette, jennifer (2014). me, myself, and why. penguin press. schonert-reichl, kimberly a. smith, veronica, zaidman-zait, anat, hertzman, clyde (2012). promoting children's prosocial behaviors in school: impact of the ‘roots of empathy.’ program on the social and emotional competence of school-aged children. school mental health, 4. simkins, david, and constance steinkuehler (2019). “critical ethical reasoning and role-play.” games and culture. sundry, geek & (2017). crossing boundaries & character death: dm tips with satine phoenix. youtube. tito, greg, mazzanoble, shelly (2018). dr. megan connell on d&d helping people. dragon talk. wallace, r. jay (1994). responsibility and moral sentiments. harvard university press. address correspondences to: daniel j. anderson email: danieljohnanderson@hotmail.com mailto:danieljohnanderson@hotmail.com analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 25 can philosophic methods without metaphysical foundations contribute to the teaching of mathematics? john roemischer introduction in the complex teaching paradigm constructed and celebrated in classical greek philosophy, geometry was the gateway to knowledge. historically, mathematics provided the generational basis of education in western civilization. its impact as a disciplining subject was philosophically served by plato’s most influential metaphysical involvement with the dialectical interplay of form and content, ideas and images, and the formal, hierarchic divisions of reality. mathematics became a key--perhaps the key--for the establishment of natural, social and intellectual hierarchies in plato’s work, and mathematical capacities became synonymous with power--the power of abstraction needed to effect and control change (cf. boisvert 153). it was the provenience of the academic demands, levels, and achievements celebrated as culturally western. from ancient athens to medieval europe, it became the principle of interactional/hierarchic selection: similia similibus cognoscuntur--that is, only those things alike (by nature) can interact cognitively; this launched the notion that mathematical ability is the best test for objectively determining who does and who does not qualify for a social, political, and intellectual meritocracy. why mathematics? the capacity to turn interactive experiences with nature into a formal framework, as euclid did, was inspirational. it generated the architectural metaphor of an empowering foundation of knowledge and work, and foundation came to denote a set of fundamentals that were apodictic and irreducible: axioms come to mind, but, more subtly, the highly variegated greek term of logos, the greek foundation stone of thought. the quest for metaphysical foundations simply denoted the promotion of a fundamentalism that promised the ultimate closure of inquiry. john dewey’s “quest for certainty” attempted to soften metaphysics, to avoid epistemic closure. he noted that mathematical propositions “appear to be true everywhere and at all times,” since their meanings are limited to their place in a closed “formal system” in which “transformation(s) within the system are uniform and dependable within that limited scope.” and from the perspective of a pragmatist epistemology, he noted that insofar as “mathematical propositions refer to some existential individual or another, they are not dependably applicable” (hickman, 1998, p.175). notwithstanding dewey’s reconstructionist approach to pedagogical foundations, fundamentalist teaching remained the cornerstone of american schooling. while some metaphysical foundations of mathematics emerged in the 20th century that attempted the further reduction of mathematics to logical foundations, the anti-foundational philosophy of american pragmatism proclaimed that logic was the business of experimental inquiry. critical reaction to foundational theory soon found its way not only into the work of mathematical theorists, but also those who questioned the use of mathematics as a disciplinary model for intellectual/cognitive development. dewey’s democracy and education, and progressive educators generally, proposed that the fundamentalism implicated in the use of mathematics as a model for metaphysical foundations of education was the bane of schooling, as many reflective adults would concur; it was anticipated that it would soon be rejected, especially since the moral component implicated in fundamentalism is obedience to rule--or, as poet shelley proclaimed: “obedience / bane of all genius, virtue, freedom, truth / makes slaves of men.” analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 26 for internal reasons (given the royal status of geometry), the presence of both irrational numbers and a dependence on sense-based illustrations moved plato to think that mathematics by itself could not compete with philosophic inquiry in its quest for the discovery of the fundamental elements of reality; however, he did see it as a high-level stepping stone (logos) to education. plato probably felt, as has reuben hersh (1997), that, given mathematicians who think themselves qualified to produce philosophy, “no worse metaphysics than theirs is to be found” (hersh, 1997, p.199). in his celebration of the appearance of a new humanistic mathematics, hersh finds laudable 20th century pragmatism’s rejection of the myths that have governed mathematical foundations-”unity, universality, certainty”--(ibid. 37). academically, however, peirce and dewey, as well as socrates, lost the fight against platonism, and all have become fond memories: experiential, cooperative and socratic/dialogical inquiry are still mentioned, but plato’s paradigm, his metaphysical a priorism is still celebrated in school-related foundations of mathematics. as hickman notes, dewey argued that “experimental science, as well as everyday experience, is replete with cases in which abstract mathematical propositions are too ‘thin’ to apply to experience in all its robustness. it is important to note that dewey does not think that mathematical propositions, or any other type of propositions, for that matter, are true or false” (hickman, loc. cit.). at best, as products of experiential inquiries, propositions are either “warranted” or “unwarranted assertions.” but there are philosophic methods of thought that appear to be independent of metaphysical foundations-methods that shy away from the exclusive concentration on textbook subject-matters. the french mathematician/cognitive neuropsychologist, stanislas dehaene, suggests that mathematics instruction turn in this different direction: thus bombarding the juvenile brain with abstract axioms is probably useless. a more reasonable strategy for teaching mathematics would appear to go through a progressive enrichment of children’s intuitions, leaning heavily on their precocious understanding of quantitative manipulations and of counting. . .eventually, formal axiomatic systems may be introduced. even then, they should never be imposed on the child, but rather they should always be justified by a demand for greater simplicity and effectiveness. ideally, each pupil should mentally, in condensed form, retrace the history of mathematics and its motivations. (dehaene, 1997, p.242) how odd that more than a century after the reign of herbartianism in schools, we should be reintroduced to a softer version of the old principle that, in teaching, “ontogeny should recapitulate phylogeny.” this paper selectively explores the applicability of two non-foundational philosophic methods of thought to the teaching of mathematical concepts. philosophical foundations of mathematics for those contemporary writers on the philosophy of mathematics who have been critical of the enterprise that has been identified as foundations of mathematics, the gripe has been that the metaphysical bias has been to reductively formulate the enduring, essential components that form the framework of what is actually an evolving and variegated area of knowledge. the ostensible purpose of this framework is to provide a portrait of the real nature of this subject matter, though, paradoxically, its tendency toward reductionism has historically invited not only competing, but also mutually exclusive frameworks. in foundations of mathematics, platonic formalism has strongly competed against constructivism, intuitionism, et al., while, on the academic side, school teaching has, for generations, settled on plato’s prioritizing of form over content and the production of reductive definitions. plato’s purpose in his dialogue, meno, as we shall see below, was to dramatize how the use of formally guided problem-solving algorithms in teaching geometry demonstrates the dependence of mathematics on a specific metaphysical foundation--namely, on the essential a priority of subliminal ideal forms. notwithstanding this so-called embedded awareness, math phobia, as experienced by many children, has been an effect of the abstractionist, cognitive distance between their schooling and their initial and growanalytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 27 ing involvement with content-laden areas of experience--for example, with games of increasing complexity. as dehaene has further noted, “playing snakes and ladders may be all children need to get a head start in arithmetic.” this ostensibly more “humanizing” approach to mathematics is elaborated in dehaene’s the number sense: his section on education begins with an excoriation of platonic foundations and ends with a casual reminder: “in fact, most children are only too pleased to learn mathematics if only one shows them the playful aspects before the abstract symbolism” (p.143). in several places, dehaene notes that what is generally lost in the teaching of mathematics is its meaning--”our schools are often content with inculcating meaningless and mechanical arithmetical recipes into children” (139); and he demonstrates how the practice of teaching arithmetic through standardized textbooks leads to algorithms that are “not correct” (p.133). “bugs” are introduced which “only a refined understanding of the algorithm’s design and purpose can help. yet the very occurrence of such absurd errors suggests that the child’s brain registers and executes most calculation algorithms without caring much about their meaning” (p.133, italics added). dehaene’s example of a “classical error” pertains to the mysterious notion of “carryover”: a classical error consists in a leftward shift of all carry-overs that apply to the digit 0. in 307 9, some children correctly compute17 9 = 8, but then fail to subtract the carryover from 0. instead, they wrongly simplify the task by carrying over the one into the hundreds column; “therefore”, 307 9 = 208. errors of, this kind are so reproducible that brown and his colleagues [carnegie-mellon university study] have described them in computer science terms: children’s subtraction algorithms are riddled with “bugs.” (dehaene, 1997, p.133) dehaene then examines three philosophic foundations of mathematics: platonist, formalist, and intuitionist, and finds platonism most questionable. in effect, all the “myths” that reuben hersh (loc. cit.) finds in foundational thinking (platonic especially) seem summed up in dehaene’s version, one that finds him more in agreement with intuitionist foundations than any other. ironically, mathematics seems to have an unreasonable effectiveness precisely because “mathematical models rarely agree exactly with physical reality.” it is the human brain that “translates” physical reality “into mathematics” (ibid. 251f). if, in essence, plato’s a priori abstract forms are not the product of an evolving induction based on “the regularities of the universe,” then teaching them as if they were creates the stresses of textbook-driven mathematics. the irony is that “the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics” seems to be its availability to conflicting foundational positions, and this is possibly the least of those reasons that mathematician, hilary putnam, hopes will lead to the deliquescence of [metaphysical] foundations of mathematics. efforts to humanize mathematics have inspired our question: “can philosophic methods without metaphysical foundations contribute to the teaching of mathematical concepts?” here, gadamer’s (1982) recognition of the danger of “dogmatic metaphysics,” a danger that consists in the historic development of exclusionist methods of thought that are tied to absolutist metaphysical designs, calls for the propagation of what husserl called a “free imaginative variation.” the search for a system that is reducible to a set of fundamental (a priori) elements is thereby resisted. a contemporary pedagogic attempt to rejuvenate the socratic protreptic (open-ended) method (cf. copeland’s “socratic circles”) might work once plato’s metaphysical design is sidetracked. given this direction, references to actual mathematical experiences can serve to evaluate questionable, but celebrated, reductionist approaches to foundations. as de millo, lipton, and perlis have noted, the formalist attempt, in russell’s the principia mathematica, to reduce mathematics to a few and fixed rules of transformation, was “the deathblow for the formalist view.” “if the mathematical process were really one of strict, logical progression, we would still be counting on our fingers” (de millo, et al., 1998, p.269, italics added). these comments mark a crisis now fully evident in competitive philosophical foundations of mathematics, as well as a spillover into the field of teaching mathematics; one such effect was the mid-twentieth century pedagogic preoccupation with set-theory. the crises in the field of teaching appear in the strong curriculum discontinuities generated and supported, historically, by platonic “form/content” hierarchic dualism. the practical results are often paradoxical. for example, given the metaphysical hierarchizing of platonic (and also analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 28 the more naturalized aristotelian) forms, some contemporary specialized middle schools have institutionalized cognitive discontinuities prematurely in the lives of 11 year-old children. notwithstanding a. n. whitehead’s warning against premature and persistent methodological specialization, offering a single math and science middle school to a limited population in a large city, but then making math and science the general gateway for all higher education, illustrates one toxic effect of gadamer’s repudiated “dogmatic metaphysics.” the use of traditional selective testing processes, supported by dogmatic form/content dualisms, dualisms opposed by progressive educators, has generated a strong distaste for schooling; dewey had to reconstitute the domain of content as the experiential basis of all learning. so-called “subject matter” had to be tailored to meet the criterion of accessibility, while the platonic denigration of sensory content was a disservice to the pluralism evident in the variegated learning experiences of children. with john dewey as his topic, james garrison (1998) has concisely formulated the progressive rejection of the metaphysics of hierarchic content: “educational value is not intrinsic to the subject matter. the value of any given subject matter depends on its contribution to the growth of the learner. educators and the public at large must learn that there is no one best method of education. there is no one best way to grow” (garrison, 1998, p. 69, italics added). though dewey departed from plato by arguing that method is never “outside of the material,” he nevertheless pointed out that there is a logical sense of method that distinguishes the structure of the subject matter as it appears to the expert or specialist (ibid.). the objective of progressive pragmatism was to bypass the finality of the traditional truth criterion by rejecting the notion of non-reconstructible fundamentals. as raymond boisvert notes, for pragmatists, “there is no foundational data that simply offers itself up to the inquirer as absolutely fundamental.” at best, even those “logical” structures that come with expertise are largely “maps” that must serve some purpose (boisvert p. 150). hence, in the history of mathematics, progress has required a reconstruction of fundamentals. in time, the 10finger model has begun to yield to a binary base. hilary putnam’s viewpoint in “models and reality,” originally presented in 1977, is preceded by a more radical statement presented ten years earlier--his essay: “mathematics without foundations.” in the 1930’s (especially, and perhaps ironically, in the work of kurt gödel), platonism became a dominant force in foundations of mathematics, one that paul bernays succinctly identified as abstractionism: platonism (especially in mathematics) views the object “as cut off from all links with the reflecting subject” (bernays, 1983, p. 258). putnam (1967) does “not think mathematics is unclear; [he doesn’t] believe mathematics has or needs ‘foundations’. the much touted problems in the philosophy of mathematics seem to me, without exception, to be problems internal to the thought of various system builders. . .[t]he various systems of mathematical philosophy, without exception, need not be taken seriously” (putnam p. 295). keep putnam in mind while noting collingwood’s view that plato failed “to drive deep enough the distinction established by himself between philosophy and mathematics.” perhaps plato could not comply with collingwood’s desire, for without mathematics, socrates could not have provided the evidence plato sought for his major premise, vis-à-vis, the congruence of a priori knowledge and mathematics. philosophic method: disciplinary process or subject-matter? the question under review here is whether philosophic methods, as methods of “theoretical thought,” can have a productive impact on the practice of teaching mathematical concepts. it should be noted that the term “philosophic method” has a controversial history, one briefly summarized in gadamer’s (1982) truth and method. by placing philosophy in the hands of two of its famous teachers, kant and hegel, gadamer noted that method emerges when “dogmatic metaphysics” gives way to philosophy as a process of conceptual clarification--in effect, a disciplinary process of thought rather than a subject-matter. of the highest historical importance is gadamer’s claim that “prekantian dogmatic metaphysics” is still characteristic of “the modern ages of non-philosophy” (gadamer, 1982, p. 424, italics added). gadamer’s critical reaction to dogmatic metaphysics has to include approaches to methodology, since method is a term with built-in fallibilities--it is never “free of all prejudices.” even “the certainty imparted by analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 29 the use of scientific methods does not suffice to guarantee truth.” since, “in the knowing involved in [the human sciences], the knower’s own being is involved, [this certainly marks] the limitation of ‘method’, but not that of science.” however, gadamer does not abandon truth: “what the tool of method does not achieve must-and effectively can--be achieved by a discipline of questioning and research, a discipline that guarantees truth” (ibid. p. 446, italics added). in j. m. bochenski’s (1965) the methods of contemporary thought, philosophic methods are designed precisely as “disciplines of questioning and research.” though bochenski does not specify it, his distinction between “practical thought” and “theoretical thought” might best be understood in terms of a distinction in the logic of types of questions, as we shall see below, as well as the important distinction between “algorithmic” and “dialectical mathematics,” also forthcoming. bochenski attempted to direct attention to those methods that were not generated from metaphysical foundational philosophies, methods that might serve theoretical thought without the paradox generated in the crises of foundational systems. to the extent that teaching practice involves more than management and strategy, and since it could be a process for promoting theoretical thought, the paradox is that those philosophic foundational conflicts that supposedly govern teaching from above or outside the practice cannot therefore be resolved in and through the foundation-governed practices themselves. this defines the general crisis in foundations, a condition concerning which socrates’ ironic claim of “ignorance” was a forewarning. the philosophic point is that teaching could be the arena in which different non-foundational philosophic methods can all be critically employed as disciplinary methods--that is, in gadamer’s sense of a “discipline of questioning and research.” if these philosophic methods can all work independently of foundational metaphysics, and interdependently as methods of teaching, then, arguably, the so-called crisis in foundations of mathematics can be avoided, at least from a pedagogical perspective. these disciplines, then, become the application of philosophical methodology to the teaching of mathematical concepts. examples of traditional dogmatic metaphysical approaches, some that move deductively from metaphysical positions to teaching theory, can be found in nelson henry’s (editor) (1955) modern philosophies and education. here, the content is radically different from the non-foundational methods that bochenski identifies. bochenski’s “contemporary methods of thought” do not bear the labels that identify those metaphysical systems identified by henry: realism, thomism, christian idealism, marxism, et al. in mid-20th century, as american schools faced school challenges from abroad, foundational metaphysics was hidden under a cloak consisting of a mechanized psychology of learning that was presumed given, and a homogenized, pseudo-scientific lesson planning process utilizing behavioral objectives. bochenski’s “methods of contemporary thought,” which are not theories about teaching, but are philosophic methods that can only do service when practiced as diverse methods in teaching, failed to penetrate the politicized teacher-training colleges. notwithstanding the efforts of pragmatists to neutralize dualist distinctions--theory vs. practice, form vs. content, truth vs. meaning, among others, metaphysical dualisms have been enshrined in american education. while schools and teachers have seesawed between so-called methods of practice, philosophic foundations of education have futilely moved from dogma to dogma. students tend to see no relationships, no language continuities, in the thought processes used in their atomized curriculum; they tend to confuse teaching with presentation, re-presentation, and repetition--in effect, students tend to stagnate in a mimetic learning modality rather than move to conceptual thinking. the challenge to bochenski’s distinction between “methods of practical thought” and “theoretical thought” consists of a rather odd observation, vis-à-vis, that his “methods of contemporary thought” (four in all) are, from a pedagogical point-of-view, both practices and theories. here, philosophic methods of thought are teaching processes. non-foundational teaching: a discipline of questioning and research once an area of research lends itself to the closure provided by a metaphysical foundation, it tends to analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 30 restrict the most relied-on instrument available to both philosophy and teaching, vis-à-vis, questioning as a process. and when the area of research becomes a subject-matter, the use of questioning becomes less a process of conceptual exploration and more a device for reinforcing learning of what is given. work in the logic of questions offers this distinction: “whether questions” (pertaining to a yes/no, right/wrong approach to facts and definitions in subject matters) are different from “which questions” (pertaining to conceptual exploration of meanings). most teachers, governed by the restrictive framework of a metaphysical foundation (most likely platonism), will tend to barrage children with rows of yes/no or true/false “whether questions.” the pedagogic instrument called questioning simply serves to ascertain the extent to which the child can conform to a closed system of identifications and mechanized solutions to problems; more often than not, routine exercises are honorifically called problems. space permits just two examples of bochenski’s philosophic methods: they are precisely “disciplines of questioning and research.” if we take bochenski’s discussion of the philosophic semiotic methods, and then proceed to john wilson’s (1963) section on “general justification of linguistic analysis,” we can find a comparable “justification” in his thinking with concepts. this pedagogic/philosophic work actually introduces a “method of practical thought”--one that puts theoretical thought to work in the advancement of concepts. wilson begins with a distinction that clarifies bochenski’s--the distinction of teaching thinking as a disciplinary process rather than a subject-matter. his philosophic method, the analysis of concepts, as a practical method of semantic discovery, can be distinguished from such typical school methodized subjects as latin prose, varieties of mathematics, german, et al. wilson notes, “often we can look up the right answers to questions in these subjects, by referring to a dictionary, or a grammar, or an authoritative textbook. but none of this applies to the techniques outlined [in this analysis of concepts].” wilson’s questions of concepts are not “whether-or-not” questions of such text-based facts; they are “which” questions, questions that open a variety of pathways to conceptualization. hence, it might help to preface wilson’s work with a brief reference to the logic of questions. belnap and steel (1976), in their the logic of questions and answers, state that there are questions, for example, “what is a number?”, that “give little indication as of what would count as an answer” (belnap & steel, 1976, p.12). it might appear, then, from the belnap and steel discussion, that conceptual questions and the classroom infatuation with definitional questions are different in kind. is the instructional pursuit of definitions, so commonplace in teaching mathematics, more caught up with answers than with an understanding of the questions themselves? “elementary questions can be classified into two sorts, depending on how many alternatives they present”: “whether” questions allow for a few or finite number of alternative answers, and these are often “explicitly listed in the question”--e.g., “does brass contain more tin than copper?” on the other hand, “which” questions contain a potentially large number of cases--and these are not in the question but are presented as part of some condition or matrix--e.g., questions in ethics as to which principles are ethical and why, and questions in mathematics as to which symbol is a number and why. the point is that while “which” questions also apply to mathematical reasoning (e.g., “which numbers are imaginary?”), in plato’s aporetic (inconclusive) dialogues, choices were inconclusive precisely because limited from the standpoint of the logic of questions: as colin mclarty (2005) notes, socrates was essentially concerned with the destruction of hypotheses; the ostensive direction was not to dictate secure definitions, but to filter unexamined or sensory-based opinions. plato’s denigration of mathematics, when viewed from the standpoint of philosophic methods of thought, involved its inability to dispense with sensible diagrams. this, unhappily, gave “whether” questions a dominant place in mathematical inquiry. in essence, notwithstanding plato’s attempt to give mathematics a central place in his educational curriculum, he felt that mathematics was “irremediably defective” (gonzalez, 1998, p. 377). nevertheless, and ironically, plato’s metaphysical realism led socrates’ dialectical struggle to get “which” questions fully developed through dialogical/dialectical processing to resort to more restricted “whether” questions. the fault was not in his determination. “ordinary yes-no questions are whether-questions, for from the question we can analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 31 easily directly recover the statements presented as alternatives. . . .any finite set of formulas is called an abstract whether-subject” (belnap & steel, 1976, 19f, italics added). in plato’s dialogue, meno, socrates’ sensory approach to teaching geometry by a presentation of two similar, yet different, geometric figures--two squares, one superimposed on the diagonal of the other--resulted in a geometric problem in which the two objects appeared to be related and yet unrelated (different) at one and the same time. the solution to the problem involved the formulation of a hypothesis to determine whether these objects were related or unrelated in such a way as to account for their appearance. in effect, the geometric problem that had to be solved was related to “the set of alternatives it present[ed]” which “is defined as identical with its subject.” plato’s denigration of mathematics, gonzalez opines, was that its involvement with sensible diagrams raised the suspicion that it could never “cease to be ‘hypothetical’” (loc. cit.). the puzzling issue is why socrates’ questioning process in his mathematics lesson in meno was not different in design when he turned to his dialogical/dialectical inquiries into meaning generally; that is, why did he settle for mathematically-styled definitions rather than concepts? but here lies buried the final socratic irony. as collingwood noted: notwithstanding the fact that plato and socrates at least attempted to distinguish philosophy and mathematics, socrates used mathematics as a “model for dialectical reasoning.” it moved socrates, in his dialogical quest for the meaning of concepts, in the direction of definitional knowledge that could be offered as hypotheses. “whether” questions prevailed, that is, as collingwood notes, when socrates “asked himself or his pupils to define a concept, the model which he held up for imitation was definition as it exists in mathematics. this no doubt accounts for his [repeated philosophic] failure; and it also accounts for the tendency which exists at the present time to deny that philosophical concepts admit of definition” (collingwood, 1933, 92ff, italics added). however, while lacking the tools of modern philosophic methods and proclaiming ignorance, at least socrates’ use of mathematics as a model for dialectical reasoning allowed his students the opportunity to contribute to the dialogue. hence, philosophy’s quest for concepts seemed to profit from the mathematical production of definitional possibilities, without which plato’s dialogues would have faltered. what could be gained from a classroom discussion of philosophical method and mathematical thinking is a comparison and contrast of the logic of concepts and the logic of definitions, and a comparison and contrast of forms of questioning. in “a mathematical concept,” collingwood notes, “some one attribute is essential and the others flow from it” (ibid., 99). this conceptual quest for the essences of the meanings of things has haunted western philosophy--a quest that phenomenology had to re-open by its methodological insistence on free imaginative variations. hence, notwithstanding plato’s reservations, mathematical concepts might now be more open to exploration than he thought. while plato, in time, made an effort to account for complexity by distinguishing between things in terms of a scale of forms, that effort was better developed and elaborated by aristotle. as collingwood notes, instead of examining the range of a concept, plato’s socrates kept asking for “a unitary definition” of a term like “virtue” (cf. socrates’ encounter with glaucon in plato’s dialogue, republic); for aristotle, such concepts ranged from lowest to highest manifestations--for example the form of “virtue” found in a slave to higher and higher forms (ibid. 10). free imaginative variations in didactical philosophy evidence to the effect that platonism is still in the ring fighting for dominance in philosophical foundations of mathematics is stressed in stanislas dehaene’s aforementioned study. by grounding mathematics in history, dehaene does precisely what mary warnock (1994) prescribed in her imagination and time. he states that “the history of number notations is hard to reconcile with the platonist conception of numbers as ideal concepts that transcend humankind and give us access to mathematical truths independent of the human mind.” and, contrary to the “platonist mathematician alain connes,” dehaene argues that mathematical objects are not “untainted by cultural associations.” if an “abstract concept of number” had been the driving force of the “evolution of numeration systems. . .as generations of mathematicians have noted,” then, dehaene points out, “binary notation would have been a much more rational choice than our good old base 10. . .[a analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 32 base] due to the contingent fact that we have ten fingers.” and citing karl popper, dehaene writes, “the natural numbers are the work of men, the product of human language and of human thought” (dehaene, 1997, p. 117). a .e. taylor’s (1936) masterful work on plato’s philosophy provides a condensed version of socrates’ geometry lesson to meno’s slave-boy: “the point insisted on is that the lad starts with a false proposition, is led to replace it by one less erroneous, and finally by one which, so far as it goes, is true” (taylor, 1936, p. 137). socrates’ series of bi-value “whether” questions led the slave-boy to a correct conclusion; however, it was a demonstration and not the type of dialogical/dialectical interaction that required questions conducive to more open-ended conceptual inquiries. from a radical empiricist’s standpoint, d. w. hamlyn (1978) rejects plato’s concept that all learning is recollection--that is, is built on a priori foundations. it might be argued that a priori truths can be found in geometry, however not in cases “where what has to be learnt is an empirical truth.” all that the slave-boy has to do “is to work out the logical consequences of what he already knows, even if he has to be jogged along in the process. the ‘demonstration’ is therefore something of a fraud and it cannot be taken as showing that all learning is recollection” (hamlyn, 1978, p. 6). however, since hamlyn accepts aristotle’s notion that “socrates was the first to use induction, . . .to have used instances or examples to give point to a general principle rather than abstracting a principle in the instances,” the implication is that socrates was much more at home in the domain of empirical reality than was plato. plato’s theory of a priori knowledge might find comfort in the domain of geometry, and this might account for its popularity in platonic mathematical foundations, but it might also account for the essential irrelevance of such foundational thinking to socrates’ inductive approach to teaching mathematics in meno. thus, following k. r. popper’s work, perkinson notes that “the notion of making the slave boy aware of his ignorance i take to be socratic; but the notion of recollection of ideas (the theory of innate ideas), i take to be platonic” (perkinson 10n). but the more noteworthy method of socratic thought was not a process of direct induction from examples; rather, it was his interest in dialectical thought, a process that has surfaced as broad-based dialectical mathematics, and this would appear to come close to a concept-driven humanistic approach to mathematics. this reflects socrates’ original, more open protreptic (extended, “turning-toward”...) procedure: the distinction between dialectical mathematics and algorithmic mathematics seems as close an example of how one might distinguish socrates’ dialectical method of thought from his mathematics lesson in meno. from peter henrici’s work in applied mathematics comes the following elaboration of this distinction: “algorithmic mathematics is a tool for solving problems. here we are concerned not only with the existence of a mathematical object, but also with the credentials of its existence. . . dialectic mathematics invites contemplation. algorithmic mathematics invites action. dialectic mathematics generates insight, algorithmic mathematics generates results” (cited in davis & hersh, 1998, p. 183, italics added). (space prohibits an elaborate review of examples provided by these authors). returning to bochenski’s discussion of semiotic methods, wilson’s thinking with concepts explores this dialectical method in the philosophical analysis of concepts: “which” questions are embedded in the steps students can use to explore and clarify meanings--an exploration that might take them across a variety of subject fields. a brief and somewhat limited example of the procedure, imaginatively applied to mathematical concept development, is as follows: conceptual questions and language analysis: a) model cases: provide a clear-cut case of a mathematical ‘number’.. . (a set of cumulative symbols with predecessors and successors). b) contrary cases: provide a negative case.. . .(non-cumulative symbols with no predecessors or successors . . .) c) related cases: provide a comparable case. .(a symbol with no natural predecessor and merely finite conventional successors-analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 33 a,b,c...) d) borderline cases: provide an analogous case. . .(a finite set of successive but non-cumulative symbols--a musical scale.) e) invented cases: provide an invented case . . . ? (a set of non cumulative symbols that can be differentiated and yet overlapped: for example, enharmonic musical tonal notations: b and c flat...) another example: “provide a clear case of a number that can be expressed as a comparative distinction.” (2-dual). a related case: (3 or more--plural). invented case: (?). question: why not past 2 or 3? (dehaene, 1997, p. 93.). turning to the phenomenological method, some of the most productive work on teaching mathematical concepts phenomenologically can be found in the oxford journal, philosophia mathematica (cf. mary leng, vol. 10, 2002: “phenomenology and mathematical practices”). the purpose of phenomenology, as edmund husserl defined it, was to free the imagination--through teaching, we might add here. in richard schmitt’s (1967) outline, husserl’s philosophic method is formulated as follows: husserl talked about a procedure that he called “free imaginative variation,” comparable to what anglo-american philosophers call the method of “counter-examples” [cf. wilson above). here we describe an example and then transform the description by adding or deleting one of the predicates contained in the description. with each addition or deletion we ask whether the amended description can still be said to describe an example of the same kind of object as that which the example originally described was said to exemplify. sometimes we shall have to say that if we add this predicate to the description or take that one away, what is then described is an example of a different kind of object from that exemplified by the original example. at other times the additions or deletions will not affect the essential features of the kind of object exemplified by the different examples. (schmitt, 1967, p. 141) in order to free the imagination, phenomenological method moves in three steps: “(1) [the recognition that] phenomena are essences. (2) phenomena are intuited, (3) phenomena are revealed by ‘bracketing’ their existences” (ibid.). as a bare outline, this already suggests a remedy for the narrow, inductively abbreviated, answer-driven approach to turning concepts into definitions. a great variety of directions are open to inquiry, since the method does not merely settle on a single definition as the product of an inductive abstraction. what is the essence of number that allows it to expand beyond the limits of ordinary language? one soon discovers that the restrictive borders of those subject matters that constitute traditional curriculum do not govern the work of phenomenological method. some of the most productive work for phenomenological teaching has come under the title, “didactical phenomenology,” and here perhaps one of the most commendable and possibly revolutionary works is hans freudenthal’s (1983) didactical phenomenology of mathematical structures. in his first chapter, freudenthal approaches mathematics through the phenomenology of extension by moving directly into the concept of length. in ten pages, he shows how the concept evolves, first through phenomenological analysis of length’s variety of manifestations, and then, through mathematical symbolization and didactic phenomenology, into an object to be taught. his range is wide: from his treatment of the concept length, he moves to sets, natural numbers, fractions. . ., and finally to algebraic language and functions. freudenthal’s critique of contemporary mathematics instruction is that it lacks a phenomenological base, and is therefore dependent on psychology: all the psychological investigations. . .which i know about suffer from one fundamental deficiency: investigations on mathematical acquisitions (at certain ages) have involved the related mathematical structures in a naive way--that is they lack any preceding phenomenological analysis--and as a consequence, are full of superficial and even wrong interpretations. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 34 the lack of a preceding didactical phenomenology, on the other hand, is the reason why such investigations are designed in almost all cases as isolated snapshots rather than as stages in a developmental process. (freudenthal, 1983, p. 10) conclusion: the socratic/platonic chasm in his an essay on philosophical method, collingwood notes: “when aristotle asked himself what contribution socrates had made to philosophy, he answered in terms implying that, in his opinion, socrates was essentially the inventor of method--not, we might add, the inventor of metaphysics (collingwood, 1933, p. 10, italics added). if platonic metaphysical foundations traditionally supported mind-based, social-class hierarchic divisions, then one might reasonably argue that platonic foundations was not what socratic teaching method had in mind. socrates’ purpose was an unlocking teaching method--a protreptic (indefinitely extended) philosophic method using an elenctic, that is, a destructive/constructive dialogic/dialectic question-and-answer process to explore meanings and clarify concepts. the point was not to teach truths that were meaningless, but to realize that if a concept isn’t meaningful, its truth is immaterial. in socrates’ attempt to teach mathematics (meno dialogue), socrates seemed to move away from the destructive/analytic side of the elenchus, but as gonzalez argues, plato, from a methodological standpoint, never abandoned this fundamentally oppositional response to the constructivism embedded in mathematics (gonzalez, 1998, p. 330). in a contemporary attempt to bring socratic philosophy into the lives of young people, matthew lipman attempted to demonstrate that the problem of closure in contemporary schooling was, ironically, largely due to a loss of interest in the contribution that philosophy made to methods of thought. his discussion, in “the role of philosophy in education for thinking” (1988), supports collingwood’s critical analysis of the abstractionism and closure embedded in typical schooling. lipman identifies this drive toward closure as “the rationalistic disposition of the non-philosophic disciplines...” he points to the effects of what happens when academic disciplines actually shed their commitments to socratic teaching--that is, ironically, shed the authentic disciplinary process from their disciplines. from a socratic standpoint, what’s left is a static, closed system of abstractions-literally, a subject matter merely designed for study: in effect, the classroom becomes a non-socratic, platonistic portrait of the world. and here, too, is mary warnock’s prophecy that teaching--perhaps especially teaching mathematics--could come alive through history. “for a discipline to stay alive, it must re-animate the thinking that went into it at its inception and subsequent formation” (lipman, 1988, p. 33). if we generalize lipman’s claim and apply it to contemporary fields of foundations of mathematics (formalism, logicism, et al.), it might account for the fact that contemporary foundations--except for one, platonism-have had little if any impact on classroom mathematics. it should come as no surprise that platonism has been the dominant, but troublesome, foundational voice as well as the non-problematic basis of those academic disciplines lipman derides. despite the views that teachers convey to their students, collingwood would agree that, by definition, a discipline can never be ultimately non-problematic. the foundational notion of ultimate closure produces the crises in foundations. while philosophy has served as a source of foundations of mathematics, philosophy cannot serve as a foundation of itself. “in a philosophical inquiry what we are trying to do is not to discover something of which until now we have been ignorant, but to know it better in the sense of coming to know it in a different and better way” (collingwood, 1933, p. 11). arguably, a corollary proposition should be that no prior philosophic foundation is required for socratic teaching to occur, since needing one would contradict the purpose of socratic inquiry. furthermore, if the subject-matter being taught is still evolving, as most are, then no philosophic foundation should be applied to it that creates closure. in effect, socrates ironically proclaimed his “ignorance” of “models and reality,” since he sensed that philosophy was a method of inquiry to be mastered through practice rather than a subject matter merely to be learned. this socratic insight might be the most productive way to connect philosophic method to mathematics education; though in itself limited, it has opened the door to the possible use of socratic philosophy in all teaching domains. and here, also, is the reason that underlies our earlier suggestion, vis-à-vis, that philosophic methods that might support analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 35 the teaching of mathematics should be sought in non-foundational/non-metaphysical philosophic methods of thought. contemporary teaching, peter senge (2000) points out, is governed by a foundational fiction: the use of a fictional device to terminate imaginative thought. schools create the world of “as if...” schools “teach as if they are communicating truth. kids learn ‘what happened’ in history, not an accepted story about what happened. kids learn scientific truths, not models of reality that have proven useful. they learn the one right way to solve a particular problem, not the complexities of different perspectives. as a consequence, students’ tolerance for ambiguity and conflict is diminished, and their critical thinking skills fail to develop” (senge, 2000, p. 46). this helps us outline the components of socrates’ attempt to discover meaning through a foundations-free teaching method. in each instance, what is sidelined is the typical quest for systemic closure. first, a defining characteristic of socratic protreptic method is its attention to on-going, open criticism--or critique. second, as perkinson notes, criticism can be further defined as an acknowledgement of that most fearsome epistemic challenge, vis-à-vis, the possibility of error. (perkinson, p. 5, et passim.) third, given the strong possibility of error, a constant attention to the avoidance of authoritarianism is called for. fourth, the authoritarian approach to teaching method consists of the troublesome premise that teachers both know and are communicating truth. paradoxically, avoiding infallibility is the primary mark of a good teacher. whatever his failings, socrates did bring methodological insight into the world of education. for good philosophical reason, it was john dewey who celebrated his effort. from the standpoint of the humanization of the mathematics classroom, john dewey went beyond collingwood to distinguish socrates’ pedagogical contribution from plato’s metaphysical approach to the problem that collingwood addresses. in hickman’s (1998) attempt to place dewey’s concept of abstraction into the context of his theory of experimental inquiry, dewey was at least cognizant of socrates’ noble effort: “socrates’ attempt to get his fellow athenians to engage in hypothetical reasoning constituted a great step forward in the history of inquiry. but plato made the opposite mistake: when he began to treat abstractions as metaphysical entities, he set an unfortunate course for twenty-five hundred years of western philosophy” (hickman, 1998, p. 174, italics added). in dewey’s own philosophic critiques of metaphysical foundations--his critiques of abstractionism, of the a priori, of value and truth antecedence, of discontinuity--he attempted to restore the experiential/historic interconnections of mathematics; these critiques might now serve mathematics education from the standpoint of methods of inquiry. bringing socratic dialogical/dialectical and 20th century non-foundational philosophic methods in to support humanistic mathematical teaching processes might finally put an end to school-related mathephobia. this paper concludes, in the spirit of its beginning, with stanislas dehaene’s prescient attempt to bring the socratic search for meaning back to life: “the flame of mathematical intuition is only flickering in the child’s mind; it needs to be fortified and sustained before it can illuminate all arithmetic activities. but our schools are often content with inculcating meaningless and mechanical arithmetical recipes into children” (dehaene, 1997, p. 139, italics added). references belnap, n. d., jr. & steel, t.b. jr. (1976). the logic of questions and answers. new haven: yale university press. bernays, p. (1983). on platonism in mathematics. in p. benacerraf and h. putnam (eds.), philosophy of math ematics, selected readings. cambridge: cambridge university press. bochenski, j. m. (1965). the methods of contemporary thought. dordrecht, holland: d. reidel publishing co. collingwood. r.g. (1933). an essay on philosophical method. oxford: at the clarendon press. davis, p.j. & hersh, r. (1998). the mathematical experience. boston: houghton mifflin co. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 34 issue 1 36 dehaene, s. (1997). the number sense: how the mind creates numbers. oxford: oxford university press. de millo, r.a., lipton, r. j., & perlis, a.j. (1998). social processes and proofs of theorems and pro grams. in thomas tymoczko (ed.). new directions in the philosophy of mathematics. princeton: princeton university press. freudenthal, h. (1983). didactical phenomenology and mathematical structures. dordrecht, holland: d. reidel publishing co. gadamer, h. (1982). truth and method. new york: the crossroad publishing co. garrison, j.w. (1998). john dewey’s philosophy as education. in larry a. hickman, reading dewey: interpreta tions for a postmodern generation. bloomington, indiana: indiana univeristy press. gonzalez, f.j. (1998). dialectic and dialogue: plato’s practice of philosophical inquiry. evanston, illinois: northwest ern university press. hamlyn, d.w. (1978). experience and the growth of understanding. london: routledge & kegan paul. henry, n.b. (ed.). (1955). modern philosophies and education (the fifty-fourth yearbook of the national society for the study of education). chicago: the university of chicago press. hersh, r. (1997). what is mathematics, really? oxford: oxford university press. hickman, l. (1998). dewey’s theory of inquiry. in larry hickman (ed.) reading dewey: interpretations for a post modern generation. bloomington: indiana university press. lipman, m. (1988). philosophy goes to school. philadelphia: temple university press. mclarty, c. (2005). ‘mathematical platonism’ versus gathering the dead: what socrates teaches glaucon.” philosophia mathematica 13(2): 115-134. perkinson, h.j. (1971). the possibilities of error: an approach to education. new york: david mckay, inc. perkinson, h.j. (1980). since socrates: studies in the history of educational thought. new york and london: long man. putnam, h. (1983a). mathematics without foundations. in p. benacerraf and h. putnam (eds.). philosophy of mathematics, selected readings. cambridge: cambridge university press. putnam, h. (1983b). models and reality. philosophy of mathematics, selected readings. cambridge: cambridge university press. schmitt, r. (1967). phenomenology. in paul edwards (ed.), the encyclopedia of philosophy, vol. 6 (pp. 135-151). new york: macmillan publishing co., inc. & the free press. senge, p. (2000). schools that learn: a fifth discipline resource. new york: doubleday. taylor, a.e. (1936). plato: the man and his work. new york: the dial press inc. warnock, m. (1994). imagination and time. oxford: blackwell publishers ltd. wilson, j. (1963). thinking with concepts. cambridge: at the university press. address corresspondences to: john roemischer, emeritus suny plattsburgh johnroemischer@gmail.com the classroom as a work of art 1 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 37, issue 2 (2017) the classroom as a work of art1 félix garcía moriyón abstract: the “philosophy for children” program has different goals, one of them being to foster creative thinking among students. the educational approach of the program is designed to transform the classroom into an innovative and philosophical environment that encourages students to develop creative thinking. at the beginning of this article, i discuss a concept of art as a creative activity that requires strong active involvement by the person who creates the work of art as well as the person who perceives, observes or enjoys that work. moreover, we also consider art not to be an activity exclusive of those we call artists, but rather we contend that all of us have the capacity to make works of art. in this light, one of the most important goals of our educational practice is to transform the class itself into a work of art in which all participants bring to bear the best of themselves, thereby making a valuable educational experience that demands from them and from the teacher the practice of complex and high-level thinking: a critical, creative, and caring way of thinking. key words: art, work of art, performance, creativity, community of philosophical inquiry introduction he educational proposal of doing philosophy with children in the classroom, from kindergarten through primary school and high school, started in the early 1970s, in the usa, with the seminal work of matthew lipman and anne sharp in montclair state college (currently montclair state university). since then, this endeavor has been successfully developed worldwide. at first, lipman focused on the development of thinking skills, close to the critical-thinking movement. however, he later offered a richer concept: first, high-order thinking included critical and creative thinking, and a few years later, caring thinking; finally, in 2003 he moved to multidimensional thinking. together with ann sharp, and in the mood of dewey’s philosophy of education, they established a strong relationship between high-order thinking and the building of democratic societies. to foster these cognitive and affective dimensions, they deemed it necessary to introduce profound changes in compulsory schools and in education in general. their priority was the practice of philosophical dialogue in school, transforming the classroom into a community of philosophical inquiry. in the western philosophical tradition, disciplining the individual’s thinking process by the commitment to good reasoning is an essential way to achieve rigorous and critical thinking. t 2 the heart of this innovative proposal was clear from the beginning; we do hope our current societies become truly democratic, for which we need persons able to think critically. for this, we need to bring about significant changes in our compulsory school system, making it a priority to introduce philosophical dialogue from childhood onward, because western philosophy through the ages has developed processes to master rigorous and critical thinking. starting with this initial pedagogical and philosophical core (a clear idea in the papers lipman wrote at the end of the 1960s), the proposal grew in many ways. first, he started the practice of philosophy in kindergarten, when children three years old begin to have a fuller use of language. next, the iapc curriculum moved upward, to the high-school level. some teachers implemented the community of philosophical inquiry in different educational environments, in non-formal and informal education. then, lipman and sharp broadened the scope of critical thinking and included creative and caring thinking. last, but not least, the program was translated into different languages and was disseminated all over the world, inspiring the emergence of different styles of doing philosophy in diverse educational settings. thus, the aim of this paper is to evaluate the traits of this program, and, more precisely, to assess the need to foster creative thinking. however, i am not focusing on creativity; my main interest is the “work of art”. the reason for this choice is that creativity is a basic and necessary characteristic of art, both in the process of creating the work as well as the aesthetic perception of the observer. thus, the work of art is the joint creation of the artist and the observer, and both participate in the final aesthetic experience. creativity can be a characteristic of any human activity, but only in the work of art does it become a necessary condition. furthermore, each time anything is done or made with creativity, in any field, it can, and often is, considered a work of art. teaching, as interpreted in p4c, and more clearly philosophical dialogue, requires teachers to transform the classroom into a true work of art, which involves engendering creative activity. teachers, of course, need to master didactic methods, well known by experts in the field and discovered during their own teaching experience. however, they should go further and transform their classes into a meaningful and relevant experience for their students and for teachers themselves. to gain a clear understanding of this proposal, we first need to clarify what we mean by a work of art, a problematic concept in current society. conceptual clarifications: art one difficulty to overcome is that the current definition of art has become restricted. usually, we think of art as a term we can use only for activities or objects of outstanding value, the kinds of things we find in special environments or moments. museums are filled with works of art – according to experts of course – in the same way that we use the term “works of art” for certain emblematic buildings or civil-engineering works that are built with dazzling skill. a list of art works may include any number of the classical disciplines: painting, sculpture, architecture, music, literature, and the performing arts (theatre and dance). also, we can add modern fine arts such as film, photography, video, or graphic design. when we go to a concert, or we watch a play or a film, we recognize them as works of art, whether or not there is a broad social consensus on this point. 3 few people will dispute that guernica, by picasso, is a work of art, as almost everybody would admit that the beatles were consummate artists of pop music. designers such as balenciaga or armani, among other masters of haute couture, and chefs like ferran adria are also considered artists and their work deserves to be displayed in art museums and they can organize a performance in art biennale. these are clear examples of my thesis: on the one hand, the capacity of a museum as an institution of social prestige, to convert something into a work of art by the mere fact of exhibiting it. in fact, any object, even if it is far from being considered part of the classical fine arts, might be perceived as a work of art if it gains recognition from art experts. explaining this restricted use of the term “art” involves different disciplines, with a specific mention of the sociology of art, because it helps provide a better understanding of the complex web of interests and social struggles underlying the definition of any object as a work of art or as an artistic object. at this juncture, i do not explore this topic as i prefer to call our attention to the artificial distinction between works of art and the rest of human endeavors lacking those characteristics. in some respects, we establish a class difference with rigid criteria for including and excluding a certain object or activity as art. however, it would be more appropriate to mark only a difference in degree — that is, every human product has some artistic dimension, however small. an analogous artificiality appears in the distinction between art and craft, or between higher and lesser arts. of course, all such distinctions are rooted in classical struggles for power, status, and social prestige. this classical approach to art has a particularly negative consequence: it blinds us from perceiving the artistic dimension of ordinary human activity in everyday life. faced with the monopoly on art claimed by certain sectors of the society, we fail to discover the artistic dimension in what each of us does. as a consequence, we also might accept that our daily actions need not be guided by artistic criteria. from this perspective, what we do every day loses intensity, crushed by perceived tedium, boredom, mediocrity, and inexpressiveness. this has a double implication. first, the mundane rules our lives and, second, we no longer aspire to anything but the mundane. we allow works of art to become the exclusive field for artists and only at very few moments of our life, and usually as merely passive spectators, do we approach the world of artistic creativity. getting dressed every morning becomes a mechanical and repetitive activity in the same way as cooking. we stop being demanding of ourselves and refuse to face the challenge of choosing and combining clothing items to offer a personal look that becomes satisfying and meaningful. we dress without manners (i will discuss below about the importance of “manners” and “forms”) or, with no special care, we eat any food put on the table. we go about all these activities as if they were devoid of value, mere necessities. some movements in modern art have struggled to overcome the above-mentioned rigid criteria, and they have made liberating contributions. for example, surrealist art, in the early decades of the 20th century drew the attention of the audience to the fatuity of elitist criteria of art. also, the bauhaus movement in germany considered fundamental to infuse art into the everyday life of the populace. the aim was to take art inside normal homes, and to give aesthetic appeal to the manufactured products that began to proliferate in all facets of everyday life. later on, pop art provocatively strove to vindicate the artistic value of banal objects from daily life. for example, in america, the famous 32 campbell’s soup cans produced by andy warhol in 1968 had a huge, liberating impact by elevating industrial mass production to an aesthetic statement of the times. the films of the spanish director almodóvar had a similar effect by breaking social mores by using styles, objects, and situations that had never before been accorded artistic value. our understanding of art 4 has also been broadened by exhibitions dedicated to fashion (e.g. clothes, jewelry, and accoutrements) and vehicles (e.g. automobiles, motorcycles, boats), as well as industrial design (e.g. furniture, appliances, tools). advertising is a world in expansion (e.g. television, internet, cell phones) that is pushing back the boundaries of the artistic. another example of blending art and life was the participation of ferran adriá in the 2007 documenta 12 in kassel, germany, by leaving a table for two open at el bulli every night for exhibition visitors. therefore, the crucial point to apprehend from the outset of our discussion is that art is present in everything done or made by human beings and that we should only concern ourselves with differences in degree of that artistic quality. human life has an intrinsic artistic and creative dimension, and we should not accept less than that. another aspect that we should underline is the double dimension of art. we often apply the term “art” to the work of art as an end product, endowed with a set of characteristics that convert it into an artistic object. alternatively, we see it as an activity such as a formal performance: a violinist playing beethoven or a rhythmic gymnast or a figure skater. this view clearly distinguishes actors from spectators, with the former producing art and the latter contemplating it. this is not an arbitrary distinction, as the performer makes money while the spectator pays for attending the concert or exhibition. in addition, the efforts of the artists are usually greater in creating the work than that of the spectator in viewing it. as usual, this distinction between the artist and the viewer would be useful if it pointed to nothing more than two different ways of exploring or analyzing facts that never happen separately, but this is not the case. it is more usual to make a real distinction between active and passive behavior: an agent who actively makes something and a spectator who passively watches. this dichotomy carries negative implications, which i would like to highlight. what really happens is a different process. any person who embarks on creating something seeking to produce a work of art needs not only to act according to creative guidelines, which i explore below in more detail, but from time to time should stop, stand back, and examine the outcome to assess its artistic value. difficult as this personal split may be, it is indispensable so that when it is almost impossible, as in a music performance, the dancer must rehearse over the days prior to the public concert to adopt this duality of roles. then, in each new recital, the artist pays attention to the reaction of the audience to check the perceived artistic value of the performance. the work of art has a separate existence, independent even of its creator, and only the attentive and active perception of the spectator can find in the work, or performance, the traits that convert it into something with specific artistic value. the painter moves away from the painting to look at it from different angles and draws pertinent conclusions to resume the task. it is the same for the writer, who reads the text and changes words here and there, perhaps a sentence, to improve the text, to intensify its expressivity. this process continues until the creator considers the work of art finished—that is, that no new modification would improve it. the same is true of spectators. they are not simply passive receptors whose empty minds are filled with the creative activity of the artist. first, any perception is the result of a complex perception and interpretation in the observer’s brain. perception is something more than to register in the brain and mind a sensation coming from the outside world or from a person’s inside; it involves the organization, identification, and interpretation of sensory input. this process is, on the one hand, automatic for the brain, but on the other it is a more conscious activity by which we integrate what we perceive into a network of personal concepts and expectations. in the hermeneutic tradition, we 5 perceive the world from our specific situation, which at the same time enables but limits our understanding of what we perceive. we are not completely passive receivers. we focus on events or objects that catch our attention in a selective approach that depends on our personal background, our interests, and our expectations at a given time. we concentrate more clearly on specific details that we consider relevant, and we maintain our attention as long as the object retains our interest and contributes meaning to our life. we bring into play our entire background, first including history, culture, social class, gender, and language, and then our personal system of attitudes, beliefs, and ways of thinking. this “reservoir” of personal ideas and beliefs makes it possible for our present experiences to be meaningful as a coherent unity, endowed with rhythm and harmony. this activity is guided by a sense of purpose that is fundamental to live a complete and meaningful life. this progression is valid even when we pay attention to objects that at a first sight look trivial, such as a stone or the bark of a tree. reality around us is complex enough to open a process of limitless interpretation. similarly, our personal life is so rich in variation and nuances that at any moment an ordinary event can draw our interest and become part of our personal experience. again, some trends and movements of contemporary art might clarify what i want to say. in the 1920s, the bauhaus in germany, broke the frontiers between craft and art and approached the mass-production of consumer goods as the process of making high-quality functional objects with artistic merit. some years later, art povera recovered simple objects and unconventional materials, and converted them into meaningful works of art. many contemporary artists have used materials collected from scrap yards and landfills to make their works and have endowed them with new life. similarly, photographs by chema madoz show the expressivity that a staircase, a piano key or a clamp can have for the attentive eye of the photographer. we perceive that same depth in the gaze in the documentary photos of sebastian salgado when he becomes a witness to human exoduses. as might be expected, the exigency of involving the spectator is even greater for a work of art. only a superficial and inappropriate analysis leads to the conclusion that the impact of the perception of a work of art or an artistic performance has nothing to do with our active attitude. we can say that in very special circumstances, while attending a performance or looking at a painting, we might become so overwhelmed by its quality that we may even feel suspended for a long time. this deep connection with the artwork is the result of its expressive power, which requires our total involvement, bringing all our skills to bear and raising our level of consciousness. by contrast, a tedious or poor-quality television show triggers a very different mood: a situation almost without brain activity. in this situation of psychic atony, we can lose the limits of our identity, reaching a degree of pleasurable self-annihilation closer to the mineralization of existence. by sharp contrast, our identity blurs during a high-level aesthetic experience and we melt into the reality around us. we are transported to levels of meaning and fulfillment that demand a degree of energy that we can hardly sustain for a long period. we do not get tired of gazing at a painting we intensely like, in the same way that we hardly perceive time passing when we read a good novel. in spanish, it is said that we re-create ourselves when observing an object that we like very much. rather than idle inactivity, we engage in just the opposite: we re-create ourselves by appropriating what we perceive while recreating in our mind the object that we contemplate. the recreational break is not time for inactivity, but time for total activity, although a selfless and playful one. these are the reasons why observers’ activity and involvement is so important in art, and thus we can state that any work becomes a work of art if, and only if, it is actively appropriated as such by an observer. 6 works of art clearly, art is an activity with different degrees of intensity, and any human activity has an artistic ingredient. i would like to emphasize this point. it suffices to observe two of the most basic activities of human beings, sex and food. when humans learned to cook and left behind eating raw materials, a process started by which cooking evolved into a sophisticated activity and meals became a social, creative, and artistic performance. for its part, sex is much more than plain reproduction or pleasure; it leads to refined and delicate human relationships. similarly, art requires two stages —one of preparation, execution, and recreation of the work and the second of mindful and enjoyable observation— and both stages involve a high-order activity. therefore, the process of learning art is not reduced to becoming masters in the use of the techniques to render a perfect performance or to create an impeccable and beautiful painting. learning art also means to develop a perceptual capacity, i.e. learning to watch, hear, perceive with all senses, because, if the education of the perception is neglected, people will fail to develop the faculty of grasping the relevance and meaning of art works. having said this, i should describe certain characteristics that enable us to make an aesthetic assessment. this may be fuzzy territory, but we should not give up the search for criteria that, arguable as they are, have a certain level of general acceptance. although we can agree on some universal criteria, disagreement grows when spectators or critics of art apply those criteria to specific works or performances. frequently, for example, after a painting exhibition or musical performance that some people consider masterful, others reject outright and negate its aesthetic value. despite resembling an oxymoron, the first criterion is the absence of criteria. artists must follow some rules and procedures in their specific artistic domain. classical greek sculptors used a canon of proportions to carve the perfect human body. poetry has historically been governed by rules on rhyme and rhythm, with its accompanying technical vocabulary. we are familiar with the persistence of the golden ratio in the visual arts, and we know that many plastic surgeons use aesthetic canons to operate on those who wish to improve their “beauty”. some of these canons might also be rules for the perception of beauty and for the education of aesthetic taste, because most of the people tend to perceive works as beautiful when they follow such rules. nevertheless, in other domains it may not be so important to break the rules as in art and in creation in general. this is not a consequence of the urgent and pressing need to be an original and innovative artist, but something deeply related to the specific traits of any work of art. a work of art is always a singular and unique work, even in times when the mechanical reproduction and the growth of industrial design has provoked, according to benjamin’s analysis, the loss of that aura that was a fundamental trait of the original work of art. the democratization of design in furniture (ikea, for example) or dress fashion (zara, for example) diminishes the singularity of art, but the specific use that any person can make of those commodities opens the door to further creative possibilities. each individual, group or family need to decide how to combine clothes or arrange furnishings to transform those objects, which have been reproduced and sold by the thousands, into personal and unique interpretations. the users’ manual for the furniture that you buy for your home, offers you basic instructions only to assemble the kit. the result of the aesthetic value of that furniture depends on your own decision about how and where to position table or sofa. the same is true in the fine arts, such as music, poetry or painting. the poetic value of a poem is more the result of a strict implementation of 7 the technical rules you have learned. this idea would be useless even in the case of a musician as bach, who allegedly stated that music consisted of playing the right note at the right moment and that his musical harmony followed a mathematic understanding of music, based on symmetry. when the artist sticks too much to the rules, the work often conveys cold academicism, i.e. perfect in the execution but lacking expressivity. considering my claim that art is part of our everyday life, we might think about family photos, as all of us have experience as photographers and as subjects of a photographer, usually an amateur. we can buy a good camera and carefully read the owner’s manual to gain a working knowledge of how the camera works. however, this knowledge that goes further than just to shoot in auto mode, offering other options of aperture settings or shutter speeds. you may also read a manual to find out the 10 best tips, hints, warnings, etc., to become a good photographer and you learn basic concepts such as depth of field, light temperature, contrast, and backlight compensation. moreover, you assimilate some helpful norms about photocomposition and framing, and you become familiar with photographs by great photographers by visiting, for example, photo exhibitions. all those rules, tips, and warnings will almost surely improve the technical quality of your photos, raising the artistic level. nevertheless, if this is all we do, our snapshots might lack the strength and vigor that characterize photos that, taken with or without rules, capture the specific subject at a precise moment. improvement of our capacity to make photos that give life to the final product requires cumulative experience based upon many examples that transcend the rules and norms of the manuals. this lack of rules can also characterize the reception of a work of art; this is almost the only rule that professor keating shares with his students in order to become members of the dead poets society and to discover the personal joy of reading poetry. thus, works of art fit fully within a context and it is the situation that imposes its demands, requiring of us a precise action at every moment. works of art have a life of their own that demands their particular process of development and fullness, a process that is rarely decided in advance by the artist. when we start something with the intention of creating a product of some artistic value, we know how to start and have a more or less definite idea about our goal. only if we are open to follow what the work requires at every moment of the process, will the result exhibit some artistic value. what i am writing right now can serve as an example; that is, even if it is not my intention to create a work of art but an expository text, the product should nonetheless have originality to deserve to be published in a philosophical journal. yet, in fact, when i started to write this piece, i had in mind a definite project, but gradually, as my writing flowed, it found its own paths that i had not anticipated. the spanish philosopher miguel de unamuno and some years later the italian writer luigi pirandello called attention to the autonomy of the characters of a novel or a drama, characters who, as the plot of the story progresses, impose their own personality on the author who created them. the title of one of the major plays by pirandello, six characters in search of an author, is revealing: according to the plot, those are characters, who existed only in the fantasy of the writer, and they search for an author who brings them to life. once creation begins, it imposes restrictions on our freedom as authors and requires us to follow certain rules. automatic writing and aleatory music go hardly beyond being experimental proposals, which as experiments open new creative approaches. a second trait of art is selflessness, which we can express in a positive way as the intrinsic value of the work of art. many, if not all, activities are aimed at a result that has only an extrinsic relationship with the activity. we eat, for example, to feed ourselves, just as we dress so we do not get 8 cold or we make ceramic containers to store food or drinks. we thus follow a constant and uninterrupted chain of means and ends, in which everything can be an end of some action, but later becomes the means to achieve some other end. this is not true of works of art. they have intrinsic value, regardless of other concerns. it is important to emphasize that this is not a dualistic opposition, all-or-nothing, because the relation between the ends and means admits different degrees: rarely are ends or means pure. in the 16th century, the italian sculptor cellini created an elaborated saltcellar for king francis i of france. the work involves sculpture, part in gold hammered by hand into delicate shapes, with a small vessel to hold salt. the result was a piece of art that was valuable in itself, regardless of its utility as a saltcellar. like many other objects whose design and shape have been carefully worked, cellini’s piece of sculpture was originally no more than a thing to dispense salt, but it took on great intrinsic value. people can use any work of art as a tool for purposes vastly different from those that guided its creation. the main aim of a gothic cathedral was not to inspire an aesthetic experience, but a religious one. patronage is a longstanding practice that professes interest in art among powerful people, who exploit the possibilities of art to exalt their power, often manifested in munificence and magnificence. patrons can be helpful for artists and art, but as a patron’s interest domineers, art disintegrates, its intrinsic value of fades, and vulgarity grows. stalinist and fascist art offer good examples of that degeneration, while nazi leaders labeled modern art as “degenerate art”. nowadays, the powerful art market threatens art with billionaire auctions and massive competition between private and public clients, many guided not by artistic criteria, but by the desire of flaunting merchandise or by the need of money laundering. works of art become simply one more commodity in a marketplace where exchange value overpowers the use value, depreciating the aesthetic value. something similar happens when three tenors get carried away by their media fame and give priority to the spectacle in which economic benefits are prioritized. putting aside mercantile degradations, we can consider the so-called decorative arts. at some moments, the decorative component predominates at the expense of the artistic dimension, so that what begins as an integral part of a particular work becomes a superficial element that distracts us and invites us to turn our attention elsewhere. we can also contemplate the current abuse of aesthetic surgery; people surrender to the demands of imposed aesthetic canons or are deluded by a commercial strategy. when i emphasize the selfless dimension of art, i do not mean that a work of art has no use at all. our everyday life is enriched any time we add some aesthetic touch to what we do; this idea is a leitmotif of this commentary. however, the artistic dimension of any work or activity does not come from the outside, but from the inside. this awakens our interest and captures us full attention. when doing something artistic, we fully engage in the task, attending every detail to achieve the desired execution. we become aware of what the activity and its product impose as the creative process advances. the process demands such dedication that we remain absorbed and concentrated, forming a bond with what we are making without losing consciousness, since it is not a cathartic ritual but an activity where cognitive and emotional skills establish a productive link. this unselfishness in the work of art can be related to play. this also applies in competitive games, whose aesthetic quality is linked to fair play and an artistic expression in mastering the technique of the game. a better understanding of the above is possible when we focus on another characteristic of the work of art, i.e., its noteworthy expressivity that imbues the work with intensity and fullness. we put the whole strength of our being into what we are making. this generates a tension in the creative process which keeps us striving to perfect our work or performance. in any work of art the formal 9 aspects are fundamental, making what we execute as important as how we execute it. the american philosopher john dewey described art as “perfection in execution”. in any case, form cannot be separated from substance. that is, each specific substance demands an appropriate form. this close link between the two dimensions of the work of art becomes clear in the difficulties involved when a work made in a particular artistic domain is remade in a different one. for example, it is difficult to adapt a novel to the screen and it is almost impossible to express with words what the sculptor tried to express with three-dimensional materials. at best, form exhibits harmony, balance, and rhythm, which are classical fundamentals of artistic expression. that intensity, translated as the expressive force that artworks must transmit does not imply any lack of serenity, equilibrium or calm inherent in the mastery of the technique. rather, the aesthetic experience, both in execution and in perception, demand from the artist and the spectator an effort so that the complete creative process suffuses a unity that extends from its initial inception to its fulfillment. art requires effort, often remarkable effort, but the whole process fosters a feeling of fullness, restfulness, and joy, which restores the energy spent and reinforces the aesthetic endeavor. moreover, striking among those who excel in the execution of art is the apparent ease of their action. this results from a long process of learning, transforming technical skill into a habit that favors the execution and perception of the artistic work with ease and spontaneity. finally, a work of art is always open, according to the italian author umberto eco. it is possible to make different interpretations of any work of art, without betraying it, although not all interpretations are equal. this reflects a deep feature of reality, its inexhaustibility. in a sense, this is its polysemy (different meanings) and polyphony (different voices) embodying the notion that reality has different facets to take into account if we wish to appreciate its intrinsic richness. art is an event that opens space and time to the emergence of novelty, which is possible because the artist reaches to the bottom of reality, to its deepest and most radical dimensions, and from these depths draws attention to the basic issues of human existence, opening fields of exploration, raising new questions without offering closed solutions. this, as i have already pointed out, prompts an active response by the spectators, who contribute their personal effort to complete the implicit or explicit meaning in the work of art, but each does so from personal experience, a biographical past pointing to future personal expectations. conclusion: the class as a work of art the above tenets can and should be applied to every class. the world of education is filled with different approaches to teaching. many of the most promising and fruitful current styles of teaching insist on the active role of students, on the need for fostering critical thinking and creativity, on proposing collaborative and cooperative learning projects, on promoting a dialogical attitude that emphasizes airing students’ ideas and thoughts, etc. all these educational approaches have a long history, even recalling socratic dialogues or philosophical teaching in medieval universities or movements in the contemporary world such as “progressive pedagogy” with locke and rousseau as forerunners of ideas later developed by dewey, montessori, and many others. the educational project, philosophy for children, launched by matthew lipman and ann sharp in the 1970s, and disseminated worldwide since then, is one of the current paramount programs in tune with progressive pedagogy. transforming the classroom into a community of 10 philosophical inquiry, as the best way of fostering multidimensional thinking, is the core of the program, promoting high-order thinking, which includes three basic dimensions: critical, creative, and caring thought. this is the central thesis of this discussion: a community of philosophical inquiry amounts to a creative and artistic class, a setting whose most important traits are those we have just considered while exploring the concept of art and works of art. it is critical thinking based on sound reasoning and uses criteria to assess the argumentation process. it is creative because it is sensitive to the specific context, open to novelty, and guided by criteria, not confined to them. it is caring because it fosters consciousness of the social and aesthetic dimension of inquiry and creates true care for the process and its outcomes. a philosophy teacher or any other teacher who wishes to implement the p4c project needs to be familiar with certain pedagogic techniques that help to transform the class into a community of inquiry. all those techniques are, at first sight, rules to be followed, a set of criteria teachers use in order to assess their own teaching and the process of every class. most of these rules are similar to those used by teachers following the progressive movement, and they learn such pedagogy in teachers’ colleges. nevertheless, philosophy for children involves a profound change of professional attitude, and therefore the project has developed a specific model of teacher training, where teachers discover what it means to become a facilitator guiding a community of inquiry. those attending this workshop have the opportunity to become members of a community of philosophical inquiry and the conductor of the workshop models, in front and with the active cooperation of the attendants, the meaning of this deeply different style of teaching. as in art, rules and norms for better teaching are only guides, not rigid norms that shut down children’s and teachers’ minds. at most, they are a set of do’s and don’ts that guide teachers’ practices. therefore, the first rule is not to be entirely dominated by the rules, but rather to enter the class with an open mind, attentive to the nuances of each situation and context. you have some goals for which you prepare a work plan, with specific exercises, dialogue plans or activities. but first you observe the actual attitude of students, making sure that they are ready for cooperative inquiry and, once the dialogue starts, you can adapt your previous plan, first to the needs and wants of students, and then to the needs of the dialogue itself. this all requires metacognitive activity: as a facilitator of the dialogue, you have to stand back and observe how the class is proceeding in order to make the changes needed by each unique situation. eventually, you reach the end of the class and, together with your students, you assess whether it was a meaningful experience. sometimes, all of you – teacher and students – will agree that it was a powerful and meaningful experience. the above effort is a particular work of art. rather, it is not a “work” but an event, such as mounier, deleuze or derrida have defined the event. it is a period of your life where you have the opportunity to experience novelty full of meaning, where you move away from the burden of past closure to make room for the hope to make possible what is impossible. according to basic ideas of modern art, art permeates everyday life, including the boring ruins of school life, and offers the opportunity for an artistic experience. the class becomes a performance, an ephemeral and genuine experience for performer and audience in an event that cannot be repeated, seized or purchased. it is at the same time a participative performance in which the teacher is not the only performing artist in the room, because the students themselves become more than an active audience; they become coartists in the performance. it is a vivid example of participatory art in that it transcends its own limits and becomes a happening in which an open narrative and the active participation of the audience 11 makes a difference: the classroom as a work of art effaces the boundaries between the artist, the artwork, and the viewers. aiming to transform the class into an artistic performance constitutes a search for excellence in education. it transforms banal and empty ideas into working ideals. it is the opportunity for teachers and students to experience plenitude and meaning that will encourage them to gaze at the confucian moon rather than gawk at the finger pointing heavenward. the following quote by dewey conveys the essence of the above discussion: “by making the present activity the expression of the full meaning of the case, that activity is, indeed, an end in itself not a mere means to something beyond itself; but, in being a totality, it is also the condition of all future integral action. if forms the habit of requiring that every act be an outlet of the whole self, and it provides the instruments of such complete functioning.” no more, no less: just make of your life a work of art. endnotes 1 in october 2010, i gave a lecture at the iii seminario internacional de filosofía para niños: pensamiento creativo y sociedad, corporación universitaria minuto de dios, bogota. after the conference i wrote a paper that was published as a book chapter, “la clase como una obra de arte”, in rojas, v.a.: filosofía para niños. práctica educativa y contexto social. bogotá: magisterio/uniminuto, 2013. pp. 71-88. this new version has been updated and translated into english. i have written again the last section of the article. david nesbitt edited the text, improving my english with some comments that helped me to be more precise and clarify my ideas. i appreciate his contribution. references in order to write this article, i have relayed mainly in dewey and lipman’s books, and in other philosophers. the article is also based on my own experience as philosophy teacher in high school level for 35 years. álvarez, luis (1992): la estética del rey midas. arte, sociedad y poder. barcelona: península benjamin, w. (2008): the work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction. london, penguin eco, u. (1989): the open work. cambridge, ma, harvard univ. press danto, a. (2007): el abuso de la belleza. barcelona: paidós derrida, j., soussana, g. et nouss, a. (2001) : dire l’événement, est-ce possible? paris, l’harmattan dewey, john (1980): art as experience. new york: perigee books gadamer, h.g. (1991): la actualidad de lo bello. barcelona: paidos/u.a.b. 12 garcia moriyon, felix (1997): “belleza” in moreno villa, m. (dir.): diccionario de pensamiento contemporáneo. madrid: san pablo —, garcia gonzalez, m. y pedrero sancho, i. (2002): luces y sombras. el sueño de la razón en occidente. madrid: ediciones de la torre, 2ª ed — (2012) «la belleza como esplendor del ser» en murillo, i. (ed.): la filosofía primera colmenar viejo: diálogo filosófico. pp.. 225-238 lipman, matthew (1995) caring as thinking inquiry: critical thinking across the disciplines, autumn, 1995, vol. 15, no. 1 — (2003). thinking in education. 2nd ed. new york: cambridge university press. marcuse, h. (1976): eros y civilización. barcelona: seix barral. read, h. (1996): educación por el arte. barcelona: paidós sharp, ann m. & splitter, lawrance, (1995). teaching for better thinking: the classroom community of inquiry. melbourne: acer. tolstoi, l. (1992): ¿qué es el arte? barcelona: península. address correspondence to: félix garcía moriyón dpto. didácticas específicas. uam felix.garciamoriyon@gmail.com your feelings are wrong analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 37, issue 1 (2016) 39 your feelings are wrong stephen miller abstract: we live at a time when many aspects of our educational culture are declared to be in crisis. increasingly, the stem movement dominates initiatives at the same time that there is less agreement about what constitutes a humanities or liberal arts education. relatively broad consensus indicates that it should make students somehow “better”. within the field of pre-college normative ethics surveys, a survey of textbooks shows that most agree on what a course like this should look like. in evaluating the effects of an ethics curriculum, however, most show diffidence to claim moral transformation in their students. at least part of this problem seems to stem from mainstream philosophy’s longtime bias against and misunderstanding of emotions. a closer look at emotions and how they might be educated offers a very different picture how a successful ethics curriculum could look. a typical ethics curriculum of any level presumes that a course neutral in regards to which, if any, of the normative ethical theories covered is true. however, any such course begins with a host of implied values that might not necessarily be shared with the students. if it’s the case, as contemporary moral psychology suggests that at the very least, our rational minds inform our behavior and moral judgments far less than we might have thought, then a course in normative ethics needs to engage emotions far more effectively. martha nussbaum’s recent work political emotions suggests some important ways that desirable emotions like civic love and undesirable emotions like disgust might relate to a curriculum. with the right approach, perhaps we can begin to claim that a moral philosophy course might make someone more moral. your feelings are wrong1 e live at a time when many aspects of our educational culture are declared to be in crisis. increasingly, the stem movement dominates initiatives at the same time that there is less agreement about what constitutes a humanities or liberal arts education. relatively broad consensus indicates that it should make students somehow “better”. one of my own employers, with a past tradition linked to the marist brothers, demands every graduate take an ethics course. within the field of introductory normative ethics surveys, scanning textbooks shows that most agree on what a course like this should look like. in evaluating the effects of an ethics curriculum, however, most show diffidence to claim moral transformation in their students. at least part of this problem seems to stem from mainstream philosophy’s long time bias against and misunderstanding of emotions. a closer look at emotions and how they might be educated offers a very different picture of how a successful pre-college ethics curriculum might look. much to the delight of many popular news sources, and to the chagrin of teachers of ethics, eric schwitzgebel and joshua rust have shown through a series of experiments that teachers in this field are indistinguishable from their peers in their moral behavior. perhaps even worse, 1 an earlier version of this paper was presented at the 25th annual conference for the association for practical and professional ethics (appe), february 19, 2016 and received the best formal paper on pre-college ethics award. w 40 however, they are strongly distinguishable in their moral judgments. schwitzgebel describes in one survey, like this: “although u.s.-based ethicists are much more likely than other professors to say it's bad to regularly eat the meat of mammals (60% say it is bad, vs. 45% of non-ethicist philosophers and only 19% of professors outside of philosophy), they are no less likely to report having eaten the meat of a mammal at their previous evening meal.” (“the moral behavior of ethics professors”) randy cohen, formerly the author of the “ethicist” column in the new york times magazine describes a similar phenomenon in his farewell column. he says that, “writing the column has not made me even slightly more virtuous… what spending my workday thinking about ethics did do was make me acutely conscious of my own transgressions, of the times i fell short. it is deeply demoralizing.” (“goodbye”) these two examples suggest that thinking about, studying and teaching ethics may help us become more judgmental, but may not make us conventionally “better” at all. a typical ethics curriculum presumes a course neutral in regards to which, if any, of the normative ethical theories covered is true. given that these courses will also traditionally use applied ethics cases to illustrate and ground the theories, this seems the only fair way to proceed: if an abortion case is being discussed, students will come to the course with deeply-held beliefs. an ethics survey would aim not to convince them of a particular view but to be able to articulate arguments for contrary positions. all this goes without saying. the narrator of matthew lipman’s influential natasha: vygotskian dialogues puts it this way: "the curriculum has to be representative of the entire tradition of academic philosophy, just as an encyclopedia of philosophy has to represent every philosopher, every movement, and every school fairly and dispassionately. as the editor of the curriculum, i try to be impartial, so that every point of view gets a hearing…” (p.92). and in response to why this is the case, he succinctly puts it, “for the good of the children” (91) implying both that it would help them learn to reason well and that it would actually benefit them as people. however, the unspoken and unacknowledged system of values underlying not only these courses, but schooling from the start is worth overtly investigating. one key area to look at involves how an ethics course fits into the community as a whole. i currently work at a formerly catholic college and a quaker high school. the former requires a survey course in ethics yet doesn’t address it in any ways outside of the classroom. as a result, in this setting, the students tend to see the material as alien and divorced from their concerns. in contrast, the quaker high school uses valueladen language in many areas of the school. as a result, students generally see theoretical ethics as intrinsically linked to themselves since their community is one where moral competence is expected. john dewey made this idea a centerpiece of his work: “the only true education comes through the stimulation of the child's powers by the demands of the social situations in which he finds himself. through these demands he is stimulated to act as a member of a unity, to emerge from his original narrowness of action and feeling and to conceive of himself from the standpoint of the welfare of the group to which he belongs.” (dewey, p. 443) when ethics curriculum is presented as abstract knowledge, it will be received as impersonal and purely cognitive rather than emotive. what is the effect of seeing morality purely abstractly? it fails to affect behavior. jonathan haidt has made a career from the simple but powerful insights built into his influential paper, “the emotional dog and its rational tail.” in this paper, he suggests that philosophical ethics “stress the power of a priori reason to grasp substantial truths about the world" (p. 814). this position as a result has a hard time accounting for why the fact that almost everyone taking the surveys haidt carefully designed to inspire feelings of moral revulsion at stories that feel wrong but have had the rational reasons to support these feelings proactively removed actually do feel this moral disgust. the paper opens with this infamous story: 41 julie and mark are brother and sister. they are traveling together in france on summer vacation from college. one night they are staying alone in a cabin near the beach. they decide that it would be interesting and fun if they tried making love. at the very least it would be a new experience for each of them. julie was already taking birth control pills, but mark uses a condom too, just to be safe. they both enjoy making love, but they decide not to do it again. they keep that night as a special secret, which makes them feel even closer to each other. what do you think about that? was it ok for them to make love? (p. 814) most people morally condemn mark and julie; however they usually can’t explain why. haidt suggests that most moral reasoning follows similar patterns, that it is in effect, an ex post facto process. he goes on to explain it this way, “the central claim of the social intuitionist model is that moral judgment is caused by quick moral intuitions and is followed (when needed) by slow, ex post facto moral reasoning” (p. 816). if haidt is correct, moral reasoning is quick, emotional and seemingly unconscious. this fits with oft-shared ethics classroom stories where students ardently resist kant’s inquiring murderer example without really trying at all to refute it: it just seems obviously wrong. the overwhelming amount of literature on trolley problems follows the same trajectory: for most people it’s clear you should throw the switch but not push the man off the bridge even if the two stories suggest the same underlying moral perspective. numerous other fields have been examining ways that cognitive biases, priming, unconscious context cues, smells or found dimes can affect how we act. what should we make of all of this? it’s not necessary to accept all of the often shrill claims in the press about the consequences of this and other studies showing that we’re far less rationally oriented than we may have hoped, that rational moral reasoning is illusory and ineffective. it is worth taking seriously however. this branch of scholarship suggests we would do well to not only think about the content of ethics curricula (which surveys of introductory textbooks show to be remarkably consistent) but to think about the idea of educating the emotions. how can we make students feel better, more effectively? thirty-five years ago, alasdair macintyre famously claimed that the enlightenment had interrupted a long-established culture of the cultivation of virtue. in trying to find a secular, universal ground for moral judgment, he suggests, earlier answers from wisdom traditions developed over hundreds of years of experience were thrown out. with the failure of the enlightenment project, macintyre tells us, the old answers are gone, but no new system of value has replaced it; on his narrative, ever since then, we’ve been trying, but failing to decide a new way to help us decide how to live. according to macintyre, modern attempts to show some form of value have taken the form of the therapist, the manager and the rich aesthete. simply, macintyre sees the post-enlightenment world offering us a value system that can be measured using pleasure, success or if these two fail to offer a thriving life, ways of reducing pain. (after virtue, p. 88) macintyre describes them like this: “the central characters of modern society thus embody emotivist modes of manipulative behavior: the aesthete specializes in seeing through illusory and fictitious claims; the therapist is most likely to be deceived into believing his own claims to power, despite the fact that devastating hostile critiques of the standard therapeutic theories of our culture are easily available; and the manager is the figure interested in effectiveness, the contrivance of means ... to the manipulation of human beings into compliant patterns of behavior" (73,74). given that these seem to be the reigning systems of value in most schooling systems, macintyre claims this leads ultimately to the “confrontation of one contingent arbitrariness against another,” (p. 33), which he calls the emotivism that leads to nihilism. in practice, this would suggest that a school system would prime students to be quite effective in method and ability with 42 no sense of what to orient their skills towards other than the obvious lucrative professional careers or the advice of bland graduation speakers exhorting them to pursue their passions without explaining how passion is formed and what it should be directed towards. emotions are left to the extracurricular. the past thirty years have produced a lot of interesting answers to the concerns macintyre and a number of other critics raised at that time. much moral philosophy in virtue ethics lately has combined with empirical psychological studies coming from across academic disciplines, the united nations and many national governments. while for many, current trends of scientific incursion into traditionally humanities areas is cause for alarm, it has the potential to inform how we evaluate wisdom traditions. this approach also fits into the aristotelian notion of endoxa – of looking for the full range of what has been said on a subject to find something of value in even opposite claims. aristotle’s value here is twofold: the need for any useful moral system to engage the emotions and the need for it to be socially embedded. despite the general loss of virtue education arising from enlightenment rationalism, we can find both recent and older accounts that engage this idea. while lipman suggests that “thinking and emotions are not necessarily opposed to one another,” (natasha, p. 115) the answer lies even beyond this: they may be not just connected but dependent on one another. if we can for the moment connect emotions with intuitions as unconscious starting-points, haidt then claims, “even if moral intuitions are partially innate, children somehow end up with a morality that is unique to their culture or group. there are at least three related processes by which cultures modify, enhance, or suppress the emergence of moral intuitions to create a specific morality: by selective loss, by immersion in custom complexes, and by peer socialization.” (p. 827) we can’t correct innate qualities, but the more one understands the social and emotional world of students, the more one can guide these. the questions in need of answering are what emotions should we try to give our students and how we train them. this process has just begun. martha nussbaum has long been one of the most intriguing thinkers about emotions. her recent book political emotions directly takes on the uncomfortable idea of designing a curriculum aiming to inculcate certain emotions, describing the goal as “to engender sympathy without undue control” (p. 75). the idea that a planned curriculum would aim to guide students’ unconscious thoughts seems inherently politically fraught, a walden two filtered through clockwork orange. it’s likely though that as dewey continually suggested, schools already do this; they just inculcate wrongful emotions such as despair, anger, shame and frustration. nussbaum focuses on love, in particular the type of love states need in their citizens: patriotism and civic sympathy. elsewhere, she suggests that an “open society needs patriotism” (for love of country, p. 118) and that a mutual commitment needs to precede any policy of redistribution. (for love of country, p. 118) in the absence of a universal religion, nussbaum suggests, we need the institutions (she suggests the states and schools) to serve this purpose: to train citizens into loving each other. in political emotions, nussbaum discusses the term aristotle employed against plato’s kallipolis, “water-emotions” (p.219) to suggest that most moral philosophy offers paltry understanding of the strong motivations needed to actually behave morally. the suggestion is that being rationally convinced of an idea will be insufficient to move us to act without robust accompanying emotions. even those in the tradition who addressed this issue (notably mill in his “rector’s address” about the role of a liberal education in inculcating compassion) do so by referring to the need without addressing specifically how. to simplify a complex issue, how can one both instill compassion and prevent the kind of disgust that leads to discriminatory behavior? 43 here nussbaum continues themes she has covered for years now -the effect of stories on the imagination. she suggests that, “if the other has been dehumanized in the imagination, only the imagination can accomplish the requisite shift” (p. 211). following mill’s language, she describes the method here as “aesthetic education” (p. 80). the idea would be that poetry, literature, opera and the like would broaden one’s feelings of compassion by expanding the circle of what one unconsciously and emotionally considers “like me” and resisting the category of otherness for those who might otherwise fall into this. to illustrate this point, nussbaum analyzes a number of works closely. her discussion of mozart’s marriage of figaro and tagore’s gora illuminate how stories of this sort could be used to expand civic love. her discussion of mozart is too extended and complex to go into detail here, but it suggests how the emotive qualities of music combined with the plot elements of the story combine to move us to feelings surprising for the 18th century – not just sympathy for the female characters but genuine compassion…a feeling “with” that demands full subjectivity and a respect for emotionally-based understandings of human behavior. in short, nussbaum claims this opera inspires love, the kind of love that perhaps needs to preface actually enacting kantian respect for persons or a utilitarian principle of equality. nussbaum’s discussion of gora is likewise helpful. in this story, a tension arrives when a character raised by a lower caste maid suddenly comes to see her through the lens of disgust after years of feeling only sympathy for her. in this case, political passions stirred up at a nationalist rally prompt the protagonist to feel first shame at living with a low caste servant and then disgust. while disgust can be inspired by rational arguments tied to emotions, nussbaum reminds us that “given the late arrival of disgust in the developmental process, however – it is not in evidence before the time of toilet training – societies have more than the usual opportunity to mold its content and to extend it to other objects” (p. 183). in this case, disgust is educated for and has terrible consequences. the psychologist paul bloom also links this idea to the development of racism. children who attend racially diverse elementary schools seem to resist categorizing racial others as disgusting, while those who attend racially segregated schools fall more easily into this way of thinking. the idea is that emotions like disgust are not innate and that they are tied to both education and imagination. nussbaum stresses the way in which literature, in particular, allows us to avoid degust in areas we don't want it – towards racial, religious and sexual others. of course, moral disgust is an essential category. steven pinker, among others, has suggested certain categories of moral thinking are innate (“moral instinct”). he describes what he calls the law of conservation of moralization. this concept suggests that the innate aspect of our moralization is that we do think in terms of moral purity/ disgust, but that the content of what we are disgusted by is not innate. thus emotions are trainable. the task for an ethics curriculum and for schools in general would next be to honestly assess which emotions ought to be expanded and which ought to be defended. should the goal of a moral philosophy class be to steer disgust and to broaden civic love? walt whitman in democratic vistas described the job of poets as “in his works, shaping, for individual or aggregate democracy, a great passionate body, in and along with which goes a great masterful spirit” (p. 33). perhaps pre-college ethics classes should also aim to not be merely history surveys of great ideas, exercises to improve reasoning or great battles of ideas over time, but should really look to improve students. in expanding the imagination, this may well become possible. 44 works cited: aristotle, ross, david (trans), nicomachean ethics. oxford university press. 1998 bloom, paul. just babies. broadway books. november 11, 2014. cohen, randy. ‘goodbye”, new york times magazine, february 25, 2011. dewey, john. the philosophy of john dewey, university of chicago press, 1973. haidt, jonathan. “the emotional dog and its rational tail,” psychological review. 2001. vol. 108. no. 4, 814-834. hume, david. an enquiry concerning the principles of morals. oxford university press lipman, matthew. natasha: vygotskian dialogues. teachers college press (february 16, 1996). lipman, matthew. philosophy in the classroom. temple university press; 2nd edition, 1980. lipman, matthew. thinking in education. cambridge university press; 2 edition, 2003. macintyre, alasdair. after virtue, university of notre dame press; 2nd edition. august nussbaum, martha. for love of country . beacon press; 1996. nussbaum, martha. hiding from humanity: disgust, shame and love . princeton university press, 2006. nussbaum, martha. political emotions: why love matters for justice. belknap press; reprint edition (may 4, 2015). nussbaum, martha. upheavals of thought: the intelligence of emotions. cambridge university press; new ed edition (april 14, 2003) pinker, steven, “the moral instinct.” new york times. january 13, 2008. rorty, richard, “the unpatriotic academy”, new york times. february 13, 1994. said, edward, beginnings. columbia university press. 1975. solomon, robert ed. thinking about feeling: contemporary philosophers on emotions. oxford university press; 1 edition (march 4, 2004) schwitzgebel, eric and rust,joshua. “the moral behavior of ethics professors: relationships among self-reported behavior, expressed normative attitude, and directly observed behavior.“ in philosophical psychology. volume 27, issue 3, smith, adam. the theory of moral sentiments. economic classics. october 1, 2013. whitman, walt. democratic vistas. university of iowa press; 1 edition, april 10, 2009. williams, bernard. ethics and the limits of philosophy. routledge; 1st edition, october 2006. williams, bernard. moral luck. cambridge university press; 1 edition (july 24, 2013). 45 address correspondences to: stephen miller oakwood friends school and marist college 22 spackenkill road, poughkeepsie, ny 12603 stephen.miller@marist.edu consumer capitalism meets inquiry analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 55 consumer capitalism meets inquiry wayne henry introduction e, in the educational community, would be remiss if we did not arm our students with the reflective tools to handle pervasive influences in our society that are detrimental to their long-term well-being. such a determining yet invisible force is consumer capitalism (cc). that it is invisible and hence particularly pernicious, is a function of the fact that it is so pervasive. if we lived in an all-blue world, we would not recognize that we were surrounded and hence influenced by the colour blue. in this paper, then, it will be assumed that any serious inquiry requires an alternative from which to examine the issue in question; that if we want to analyze whether or not it is a good thing to live in an all-blue world, we would have to be able to at least imagine what it would be like to live in, say, a yellow world. thus, in what is to follow, i will briefly describe the basic dynamics of capitalism and some of its most pernicious dangers and then go on to describe a potential alternative to cc, known as natural capitalism (nc). it is important to keep in mind that i am not, here, making a case for nc per se, any more than i would be making a case for yellow if i wanted to encourage an examination of the potential dangers of living in an allblue world. what i am arguing is that in order to examine the forces of capitalism, and in order to avoid a straw person argument, it is imperative that we not only outline the perils of consumerist forces, but also that we construct an alternative that is at least not implausible so that we can examine from without what it is like to live within. after briefly outlining these two positions, i will then go on to sketch how one might construct a community of philosophical inquiry (cpi) with regard to these two positions, with the goal being that students will begin to acquire the tools to be more reflective of the consumer forces that impinge upon them and which potentially rob them of their capacity for self-legislation. so let us begin: the individual amdist consumer capitalist forces a consumer capitalist system is, by necessity, compelled to stimulate consumption to achieve desired growth outcomes. capitalism generally is committed to the premise that there must be continual growth of the economy; in contrast to, for instance, a steady-state economy of the sort envisaged by john stuart mill. cc, though, differs from the industrial capitalism that characterized pre-war western economies. in a capitalist state that is investing its capital to build its productive capacity, growth is achieved by the resulting productive efficiencies and the consequent trade advantages. but once a mature state of industrial development has been reached, the extraction of further efficiencies becomes increasingly expensive, insufficient to deliver the required economic growth.1 at this point, further growth requires the stimulation of domestic consumption and this is w analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 56 the transition to cc. the important point to emphasize is that capitalism is an historical artefact, a human invention of relatively recent origin, ostensibly designed to benefit us all. 2 it has been continually adapted as circumstances have changed, but thus far all adaptation has been in the service of enhancing profit exclusively. thus, if we, as citizens, decide that cc is no longer maximally beneficial, it can be altered again under motives other than mere profit maximization, if we can find the will to do so. now, consider how cc seeks to meet its growth objectives. clearly, advertising plays a crucial role. the official narrative is that advertising merely informs brand choice for individuals who have already made the decision to buy. in no way does it compel or even encourage consumption. but everyone knows this is facetious, and at least two models have emerged that purport to explain the real role of advertising in a consumer society. one model holds that advertising, as a discipline, is in the business of finding the hidden psychological levers that compel consumption. the other narrative argues that we willingly submit to the lure of the pretty baubles dangled before us to fill a void in our otherwise meaningless lives. according to the former view, the “madmen” of wall street have succeeded at transcending our conscious awareness of the tactics they employ: our consumption is both compulsive and subconscious. however, upon reflection, this seems absurd: if compulsion were that easy to achieve, free will would be meaningless. the latter suggests we are willing participants in a system that is transparently obvious, but this fails to comport with our experience. the feeling of living meaningless lives is hardly universal. in fact, the truth is far subtler than either of these models would suggest. what the mandarins of wall street have discovered is the power of ideology – an ideology that defines one’s identity and self-worth in terms of one’s possessions.3 thus, the crucial claim is that cc plays a significant role in shaping our identities, how we conceive of ourselves and of our relation to others. moreover, the narrative about identity and selfworth in cc is fundamentally at odds with personal autonomy and democratic citizenship, particularly in a multicultural society. to the best of my knowledge, c. b. macpherson was the first to explore this conception of the self in 1962 in a book titled, possessive individualism. my own focus here is on an ideology that combines locke’s theory of private property with smith’s theory of the laissez faire market, and utilitarian moral theory.4 a central plank of the laissez faire market is that, under appropriate conditions (i.e., there is no coercion, no fraud, and no relevant information is withheld) individuals are left maximally free to pursue their preferences. this is all that personal autonomy is conceived to consist of on this view. it is impossible under this ideology to categorize preferences as immoral, or perverse, or otherwise. where there is an unmet demand, the self-interest of market participants will motivate someone to exploit that niche. under these conditions of market freedom, every deal that is concluded must reflect the preferences of the participants and that is all that matters. it is a kind of preference utilitarianism: the best situation is the one that maximizes preferences for as many individuals as possible. any attempts to limit this are, prima facie, limits on personal freedom. and happily we needn’t concern ourselves with the naked self-interest of market transactions, for we are assured that under conditions of maximal freedom, perfect competition will have the effect, as though guided by an invisible hand, of maximizing social welfare. so under this conception, we are conceived as bare repositories of wants, and autonomy consists of nothing more than pursuing these wants self-interestedly in the market. now as such bare analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 57 repositories of wants, we are, metaphorically, one-dimensional beings. thus, the possessions we surround ourselves with become the physical manifestations of our character. in this sense, they define who we are by becoming, quite literally, the outward projection of our character (i.e., they provide the depth our characters otherwise lack). moreover, they are also the outward manifestation of success. for on this view, the only measure there can be of success is one’s ability to satisfy as many of one’s preferences as possible in the market place. in this way, i would argue, the satisfaction of our wants becomes the measure of our self-worth and our self-esteem. in fact, there is a tri-partite conflation here: on the one hand, one’s self-identity is conflated with self-worth, and the latter is, in turn, conflated with self-esteem. thus, the more stuff one has, the more successful one is, and one is encouraged to see this as the true measure of one’s self-worth and of one’s self-esteem. notice the implicit assumption that the conditions of a free market society are simultaneously the conditions of a meritocracy. thus, where one ends up in society reflects what you deserve. selfishness is a virtue and one’s position in society is a reflection of one’s willingness to work hard and bargain hard, it is a measure of your ambition and drive. in these ways, cc undermines empathy and the notion of identity through dialogue and self-discovery. in addition to being in conflict with genuine autonomy, this conception of the self is in tension with diversity and plurality, principally in virtue of the imperative to seek the economies of scale that maximize profit. consider, for instance, the role of globalization and multi national corporations (mnc’s) in the context of cc. mass production of mnc’s has a powerful homogenizing effect on markets. call it the mcdonald’s effect: everywhere you go, a big mac is the same. in fact, mnc’s expend great efforts to shape our expectations such that this has become, for many, how we prefer things. we take great comfort in knowing that the big mac we order in moscow, istanbul, wherever, will be the same as the one we order when we’re home. and due to their economic might, these same mnc’s are able to push smaller, local players out of the market, thus reducing diversity. and remember, this applies as much to the commodification of the arts and culture as it does to cuisine. now one might object that mcdonalds (and every other successful mnc) tailors its products to individual markets. so, in moscow you can also go to mcdonalds and get, say, borscht or perogies. while this is true, it is traditional cuisines filtered through the profit-driven imperatives of a western mnc. even setting aside the difficult question of authenticity, there will be the same effect locally of reducing the once diverse offerings of borscht from the local eateries to the standard set by the fast food market. there is the same re-education of the local palettes; in time, locals have their expectations re-set and come to regard ‘this’ as borscht.5 natural capitalism natural capitalism is the name given to a particular model of capitalism as presented in the book, natural capitalism, published in 1999 by amory lovins, hunter lovins, and paul hawken. there is a cluster of related ideas in the field usually referred to as the dematerialization of capitalist society.6 the principle idea unifying the various discussions is to significantly reduce the consumption of resources (and, thus, the correlated production of wastes) relative to a fixed level of services provided. the system is properly called capitalism because it is still based on free market exchange and private ownership, but, for the broadest range of goods possible, we seek to replace the sale of durable goods to consumers as end users with the sale of services. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 58 the value of the book by hawkens, et al, is the richness of the detail.7 in their discussion, the model is based on four principle ideas. first, is to maximize resource productivity (i.e., the quantity of useable product per quantity of inputs). the authors present evidence for the claim that technologies and methods of production are already available that could achieve 70 to 80% enhancements of resource productivity in most sectors. there are two aspects to achieving this desideratum. one is the fullest implementation possible of best existing practices and technologies, and the other is full system design. on this last point, most mass production facilities are presently designed to maximize worker efficiency (i.e., fordism). this from a time when worker inputs were the most expensive limit to production costs. but with modern production techniques (including robot technologies) this is no longer the case. full system designs must now seek to minimize material and energy inputs. put the other way around, the goal is to maximize resource efficiency. the second idea is biomimicry, otherwise known as “closing the loops,” which further enhances resource productivity by focusing on the elimination of waste. the idea is that in nature there is no such thing as waste, certainly no such thing as toxic waste. everything that is produced as “waste” by one organism becomes the food or input to another organism or the support of some ecological niche. so, this desideratum requires us to model our production systems on the operating principles of biological systems, such that, at every stage of production, what would formerly have been treated as an unintentional by-product, hence waste, becomes the input to some later stage of the process or is rendered inert/harmless (e.g.: by the use of specially designed bacteria). the third idea is the notion of a “service and flow” economy. this is the fulcrum notion that will require the active participation of consumers, as it will require them to accept giving up ownership of durable goods in exchange for the purchase of services. the perfect example to keep in mind is the photocopier leasing model as it applies to educational institutes, law firms, and such. these devices are complex and finicky, but essential to many businesses. xerox was the first to realize that their customers didn’t want to own a bunch of expensive devices, difficult to maintain and often constituting a bottleneck to their operations. what they wanted was “document copying services” and xerox moved to a leasing business model now emulated by all players in this industry. the service provider leases the machines as part of a package that includes a needs analysis, maintenance and upgrade as required. the benefits for the consumer include hassle-free delivery of the needed service and on-going access to state of the art technology (as a result of competition between service providers). significantly for the service provider there is the benefit of regular cash flow; the elimination of the normal ups and downs of the business cycle that results in significant market volatility. this business model, together with facilitating cradle-to-cradle legislation incentivizes producers to abandon planned obsolescence in favour of goods built to last, thus resulting in significantly less resource consumption and waste production for delivery of equivalent services. it is also localizes exactly where consumers, by their conscious choices, can have a decisive impact on actual outcomes. and the fourth idea is the restoration of natural capital, e.g., our forests, water, meadows, etc., which we will have the luxury to indulge once the other elements of nc are in place. consider, for example, the devastation wrought on new orleans by hurricane katrina in 1995. the standard narrative of this event fails to mention the role played by the loss of natural wetlands along the coast analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 59 of louisiana, destroyed by decades of agricultural effluents flowing down the mississippi. no human constructed dikes can, on their own, protect against future events of this sort. the idea here is that, in the fullness of time, as the other three desiderata of nc have the effect of lowering the draw on natural resources and the output of wastes into the environment, we will have the “space” needed to do the hard work required to assist the processes of natural restoration. consumer capitalism meets inquiry having made the case that cc can have a destructive impact on self-identity, autonomy, selfworth, and diversity (to say nothing of its deleterious impact on the environment), and having presented a plausible alternative to cc that acts as a stimulus to the imagination, participants of a cpi are positioned to recognize that they are not victims of inevitable forces, and are ready to genuinely reflect on how they ought to live. whereas heretofore their lives were shaped in large part by what may very well have been invisible forces, they can now reflect on, for example, the degree to which they believe that it is true that their identities are constructed by what they own; whether it ought to be the case that their identities are constructed by what they own, and, if not, what is the alternative; the pros and cons of homogeneity; and in general to examine alternatives life styles that might be more conducive to human well-being that is within their own purview. ultimately, discussion of the detrimental impact of cc is, at best, a waste of time if such an inquiry does not lead to participant empowerment. inquiry questions while, students themselves can be encouraged to come up with inquiry questions in light of the above presentation, i personally have found the following questions helpful in jump-starting the discussion. in fact, i give out printed copies of the questions below before even beginning the discussion, in an attempt to short-circuit politically correct responses to cc descriptions, e.g., “i don’t construct my identity by what i own.” we then return to these questions following the presentation. the following is a sample of the sorts of questions that might be helpful in this regard. 1. are there any material objects in your life that you would be very unhappy to do without? 2. if so, why? 3. would you still be unhappy if those objects were replaced by low budget but equally serviceable substitutes? 4. if so, why? if not, why not? give an example. 5. if you found out that you had been hypnotized by a group of local dealers to buy what you have bought, e.g., the red sneakers, would you be annoyed? would you value what you bought any less? 6. would the world be better if we all wore exactly the same clothes, read exactly the same books, watched exactly the same movies? if so, why? if not, why not? 7. if we all looked pretty much the same, how would you show to others that you are special? is it important to have ways to show others that we are special? do the ways that we use to show that we are special matter? analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 60 concluding remarks the foregoing is the scaffolding on which i stand to conduct a cpi with participants on the topic of consumer capitalism. exactly what information i include in any instance is largely a matter of circumstance and the particular dynamics of the group before me. however, in all cases, the strategy is the same. i characterize this strategy in terms of four stages. i always begin, by some sort of mechanism that will eventually show that the participants themselves are indeed being sucked in by the persuasive forces of cc (e.g., handing out questions of the sort listed above before giving the presentation). i then proceed to make explicit the presuppositions of cc and trace out some of the consequences of those presuppositions. then, in the third stage, my goal is to stimulate their imaginations with an alternative model, another way of seeing how the world might be. in the final stage, the cpi begins in earnest by returning the original set of questions that tend to demonstrate the degree to which their own identities are a function of what they own, and then proceed to prodding inquiry as to how they might construct their respective identities if they were not a function of conspicuous consumption. this, interestingly, often leads to chicken-egg discussions of whether altering how we construct identities needs to first take place before we can mitigate the forces of cc, or whether we need to first nudge cc to some alternative (such as natural capitalism) so that changes in the process of identity formation will emerge more organically. one way or another, though, i think it is safe to say that participants in such discussions are unlikely to be as blind to the potential deleterious personal impact of consumer forces. as well, with an alternative glued in by the discussion, they will have less of a tendency to feel victimized by forces that hitherto may very well have been seen as immutable. endnotes 1 this explains, in large part, the sudden and dramatic economic collapse of the soviet union. after competing with the west for decades as it ramped up its industrial capacity, it had no way to stimulate domestic consumption consistently with the premises of a centrally planned economy, and economic stagnation resulted. 2 this is the only official justification there can be for capitalism. even if one cynically supposes that the system is really designed and/or manipulated to enrich the propertied class at the expense of the rest of us, this could never be the official justification. the political legitimacy of capitalism requires that it be intended to benefit all of us, and that it does so better than any alternative arrangement of the economy. the tension arises from the discrepancy between the official justification and the capacity of the system to deliver the goods. 3 this also explains the remarkable resilience of capitalism, a resilience that marxists failed to predict. marx predicted that the proletariat would grow tired of their exploitation and would rise in rebellion to reject capitalism, but you don’t (can’t) reject what is central to your self-identity. thus, citizens of capitalist nations will perceive threats to their lifestyle as existential in nature. it is significant, in this regard, that george w. bush, while addressing america from the rubble of ground zero said, “my job is to keep you safe. you just keep doing what you ordinarily do. go shopping.” and this with a complete absence of irony, it must be noted. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 61 4 utilitarianism as filtered through the economic theory of vilfredo pareto, which i will not pursue here. 5 not wanting to sound overly cynical, one must take notice of the enormous effort exerted by mcdonald’s in particular to cater to children. shaping the untutored palette is far easier than reeducating mature palettes. 6 see, e.g., meadows, et al., limits to growth. 7 a very helpful précis, by the same authors, has been published in the harvard business review, july-august 2007. works cited galbraith, john kenneth (1998) the affluent society (4oth anniversary updated edition). new york: houghton mifflin company. hawken, paul, amory lovins & l. hunter lovins (1999) natural capitalism: creating the next industrial revolution. new york: little, brown and company. hill, christopher “understanding possessive individualism,” http://understandingsociety.blogspot.ca/2011/08/possessive-individualism.html. lovins, amory b., l. hunter lovins & paul hawken (2007) “a road map for natural capitalism” in, harvard business review, july-august, pp.172-183. macpherson, c.b. (1962) the political theory of possessive individualism: hobbes to locke. oxford: clarendon press. meadows, donna, jorgen randers & dennis meadows (2004) limits to growth: the 30-year update. vermont: chelsea green publishing company. address correspondences to: wayne henry department of philosophy, university of the fraser valley 33844 king road, abbotsford, b.c. canada v2s 7m8 wayne.henry@ufy.ca analytic teaching and philosophical praxis analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) guest editor’s welcome from susan gardner it is with joy that i shepherd these wise words from our esteemed veterans for the second veterans’ edition of analytic teaching and philosophical praxis. in the first article, entitled “freire and sharp on liberating education,” maria teresa de la garza reminds us of the power of the community of philosophical inquiry as a liberating pedagogy that finds its roots in both freire and sharp, both of whom focused on liberating silent voices. she notes that in promoting communities of philosophical inquiry, we nourish a deep faith in democracy in the face of recent challenges. and gil burgh similarly focuses on democracy in his article, “the narrow-sense and widesense community of inquiry: what it means for teachers,” in which he suggests that the narrowsense of community of inquiry must be underpinned by a wide-sense that is supportive of a democratic way of life. for those of us who are concerned about the proliferating cracks in the foundation of contemporary democracy, this is an important read. in his paper “a model of philosophical discussion in the classroom,” phil cam lays out in breath-taking clarity what makes a philosophical discussion “philosophical,” and he notes that, since partaking in philosophical inquiry enhances reasoning skills across the curriculum, it is an educational scandal that its value has not been commensurate with that of promoting numeracy. in his article entitled “an ecological approach to thinking,” felix garcia-moryion calls wondering, reasoning, moral growth, and good judgment “ecological thinking,” and offers us descartes’ tree as metaphor to understand the improvement of thinking that the philosophy for children program proposes. what matters is the whole, without neglecting the parts. in his lovely dialogue between lipman and socrates, antonio cosentino eulogizes the founder of p4wc and also interestingly reminds us that a facilitator in a cpi has far less control than socrates, who often seemed to drag his interlocutors toward the truth he had in mind. the loveliness of the community dialogue, though, is that the self-criticism that rises from “polyphonic interaction” is more transformative than simply having it spotlighted by another. marie france daniel in her article “dialogue among peers and critical thinking,” presents fascinating results from two empirical research studies. in one, it became evident that in p4c sessions, it took time for critical dialogue to emerge and was very much a function of skilled intervention by facilitators. in the second study, it became evident that epistemological sophistication occurred “through processes of decentering and abstraction” in a non-linear way. in her paper “philosophy for children, the uncrc and children’s voice in the context of the climate and biodiversity crisis,” sue lyle presents results from an impressive research project that showed that p4c was instrumental in shifting teacher attitudes so that they came to value children’s voices. as humanity faces climate and biodiversity breakdown, this amplification of the voices who have most to lose from the impact of the planetary crisis is critical. in their article, “teaching philosophy with picture books,” wendy turgeon and tom wartenberg provide for us an extensive review of the scholarship devoted to examining the pros and cons of using philosophical novels in contrast to using pictures books. their presentation is intriguingly balanced and, in that sense, mirrors the best of what we hope for in a community of inquiry. in support of those who choose to use picture books, they also offer a wealth of valuable information. this is a feast: sharp and freire, the importance of democracy as a reference, a model philosophical dialogue, education for the whole person, a dialogue between lipman and socrates, empirical research demonstrating the emergence of critical dialogue in p4c, empirical research demonstrating the change of teacher attitudes toward young people, and a cpi in writing about the pros and cons of using picture books in p4c. bon appétit. susan gardner chief editor jason j. howard viterbo university web page master jason skoog viterbo university copy editor jason j. howard viterbo university editorial board sara cook viterbo university susan gardner capilano university susan hughes viterbo university david kennedy montclair state university nadia s. kennedy stony brook university, suny richard morehouse, emeritus viterbo university félix garcía moriyón center for philosophy for children, madrid, spain joe oyler maynooth university, kildare, ireland barbara weber university of british columbia publisher viterbo university, la crosse, wi 45601 established in 1981 as analytic teaching at texas wesleyan college and transferred to viterbo in 1993. online copyright 2005. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis is a peer-reviewed, online, open access journal published annually and sometimes biannually. issn 2374-8257 mailto:cosentino.ntn@gmail.com deconstructing the artistic impulse through an examination of david wiesner’s art and max 36 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 37, issue 2 (2017) deconstructing the artistic impulse through an examination of david wiesner’s art and max wendy c. turgeon n art and max1 david wiesner explores the tools and processes of artistic creation. this book does so in an unusually self-referential way as the very illustrations themselves are the subject focus for deconstructing and reconstructing the meaning of art. while this is a picture book with simple text and most likely aimed at very young children, we can find here a rich mine of ideas for “children of all ages,” any of us who are puzzled by the meaning of art. this text can be a wonderful guide for reflecting on the nature of art, the requirements for artistry, and problematizing of how art relates to the world. overview of the story this picture book tells the tale of two desert creatures, an iguana and a lizard, and their somewhat fractious relationship through art. the title brings with it a delightful ambiguity: is the reference to art and max or arthur and max, or indeed are both implied? the story line has arthur, the artist, completing a portrait of another lizard while max bursts into the scene enthusiastic about art and wanting to join in the painting experience. arthur first dismisses him as unable to paint but then offers him a canvas and cautions him “just don’t get in the way.” when max has stared at the blank canvas for a while he interrupts arthur with the question, “what should i paint?” arthur, with a self-congratulatory look on his iguana face, replies, “well you can paint me.” and then it starts. max takes the advice literally and begins to splash colors all over arthur, resulting in a technicolor version of his mentor. “maxxxxx, screams arthur, and the colors burst away in a twopage spread of color fragments flying everywhere. the result is a rainbow-saturated arthur who is thunderstruck while max is delighted. no worries! maxes solution is to push a large fan over towards arthur, and when turned on, it blows all the colors off. when arthur demands a glass of water, the n i 37 colors melt away and leave…a penciled outline of our iguana artist. max loves it but when arthur tries to leave, max grabs hold and the lines that make up arthur begin to unravel, like wires. we have a picture of max, surrounded by a heap of tangled wires or threads asking with a worried look on his face, “arthur?” where did arthur go? he must be reassembled and so max sets out to recreate arthur by shaping the wire into an arthur shape. hmm… his first attempt is a strange creature who looks nothing like arthur. “more detail, i think” muses max. max continues to reshape the wire-like lines and arthur begins to emerge, even to the point where he can offer advice, “acceptable, i suppose, but don’t forget my foot.” at this point, max takes off, returns with a vacuum cleaner and sprays paint colors all over our liner version of arthur. the result? a pointillist version of arthur but one that he can apparently live with. the new arthur has been transformed in more ways than simply how he looks as he and max now team up to paint the desert world with colors. what does this picture book suggest about creativity and the artistic impulse? how can we introduce this delightful book into a philosophical inquiry about art? i would suggest the following philosophical prompts to help explore ideas embedded within the pictorial text: 1. what are the rules of art? is there a right way to do it? 2. in creating art are we showing a world or showing our view of it? creating a world or recreating it? 3. how does color and line define objects in art? in the world? 4. does creativity emerge in thought and planning or in action? who is the artist? what are the rules? in many classrooms and indeed in all art education, there are techniques to be learned and mastered through practice. draughtsmanship may be seen as an essential first step. picasso was a master draughtsman but then choose to break the rules of representational art in seeking to get closer to the “truth” of his subject. but first, he learned to draw, and draw quite well. for centuries art making was seen as a teachable skill and thereby a craft accessible only to those who had gone through the arduous and long training overseen by experts, masters. the artist was separated from the “average person” or non-artist by the gulf of time spent in that training process. arthur’s first response is to dismiss max’s desire to paint because he is not an official artist, not one of the guild, so to speak. he would not have either the knowledge or skill to make art. can one be an artist if one has neither gone through the process of training nor been accepted by the community of artists? the answer is often yes; but especially revelatory is that in many cases we dismiss the art of children based on these same working assumptions. however, all the training in the world will not yield artistic talent or genius; that seems to emerge from the ideational font of the person making the art. in western art history we see this tension arise in the 19th and 20th century with respect to naïve art or non-representational art. if the artist is not a member of the academy, the art community, and has not paid her “dues,”2 so to speak, can we consider her work as art? when we consider art by children, the question becomes even more acute. given the child’s age and immaturity, how can what they produce really be considered ‘art?” what is the status of the child [max] artist? 38 in an essay entitled “portrait of the artist as a young child”3 i wrote about the question of whether children could be considered artists. philosopher gareth matthews in his text the philosophy of childhood4 speaks precisely to this issue. he references a work that his own young daughter had created and how he had hung it up in their home. while every parent can probably relate to such a valuing of their child’s work, could we expect the work to be taken seriously as, well, art? a movie from several years ago my kid could paint that5 explores just this question through a documentary of a four year old gifted artist, marla olmstead, who lives in binghamton, ny. this movie begins as a story about a young artist who creates gorgeous huge canvases with color block abstract images that a local gallery owner offers to exhibit, perhaps as a lark, but which begin to fetch upwards of five figures in the art world. the media hears about the artistic phenomenon and she is featured in the new york times6 and around the world as a new picasso. the documentary story takes a dark turn when it covers a sixty minutes7 episode on the artistic phenomenon and the interviewee was the psychologist ellen winner, co-founder of harvard’s project zero which studies creativity. she suggests that the art was simply typical pre-school art, thereby offering the expert view that marla’s work was ‘nothing special.’ where a piece seemed to be truly outstanding, she hints that she was unsure whether the girl had done this work herself. a scandal ensues. the documentary film maker stays with the story, interviewing the distraught parents who insisted the pieces were all done by their daughter, the jealous and jaded gallery owner (a painter himself of tromp d’oeil art) who questioned whether this revealed the hoax of all abstract art, and the offhand comments of marla herself which deepened the suspicion that there was something inauthentic about the entire situation. in the end we are left with questions about whether marla did the works entirely by herself, whether abstract art is a sham, and most importantly whether the adult world used a four year old girl for self-aggrandizement. but all of these doubts are generated by the initial suspicion that a child cannot be making real art—just as max’s claim that “i can paint too!” is met with arthur’s response, “you, max? don’t be ridiculous.” and while he gives in and offers a blank canvas to max he mostly enjoins him not to get in the way— that is, not in the way of the real artist and the making of genuine art. art and creating a world wiesner’s story challenges us to think about this possibly artificial partitioning of artist from non-artist. max stands in for the child who enthusiastically embraces the chance to paint the world around him—in this case, painting his friend arthur is the work of art itself. but, is he creating arthur or recreating him? there is a nice metaphysical twist here as arthur fades away into a linear outline, only to have that crumble and leave… nothing? it is up to max to rebuild his friend and bring him back “into the picture.” the author takes us into the act of making an image, deconstructing it into color blocks, and then into a simple linear sketch. the initial splatter paint version of arthur (arthur-as-art-object for max) explodes into a color block representation. arthur is still arthur in that he speaks and challenges max, “what have you done [to me]?” arthur has been transformed into a color field created by max. arthur is no longer an iguana as found in nature but one which has been imagined by the artist—a technicolored iguana. however, the next step in the process has the fan blowing all the colors off of arthur and he begins to fade away. without the artistic rendering, he begins to disappear and drinking the water further washes out any remaining color-substance. we are left with a sketched linear version. 39 how has the artistic renderings of arthur by max changed how he appears to the viewer? who/where is arthur? one is reminded of the famous portrait of gertrude stein by picasso. when told that it did not look like her, picasso replied, “don’t worry. it will.” the linear sketch of arthur is still clearly arthur, until he tries to leave and max grabs hold of a line which then leads to the unraveling of the entire image. the artist max has disassembled his work and in doing this has lost arthur. rich imagery indeed! consider these question threads:  do artists create their representations and in doing so, re-create, reassemble the reality that inspired the art making activity?  does the world only exist as the artist presents it to us?  we speak of the artist as a creator; in this story we see max as both a destroyer and creator. but which is he and when? as max struggles to reassemble arthur, we see him going through the process of learning how to draw, how to construct an image. ah, so perhaps we see here a subtle plea for skill acquisition. his first attempt resembles one of those ugly dolls8, a crude outlined figure that fails to capture pretty much anything of arthur. but as he persists we see him improving on his bending and shaping of the wire lines until they begin to bring back arthur—but still as a linear image. but as the image takes shape so does arthur emerge and his voice returns as he begins to advise his pupil, “don’t forget my foot.” he has been reassembled, recreated by the power of the apprentice max. but we still are missing the threedimensional arthur and max’s solution is to add the density and dimensionality of color. in a glorious act of pollockian randomness, max blows a wind of colors upon the linear arthur. the result is not arthur as we met him but as re-envisioned in a pointillist version of arthur. the painter has become the painted but in a transformational way which even he can accept. but let us back up for a moment: was arthur ever really absent or simply present through a different imaging? is realism the goal of art? even in wiesner this cannot be said to be fully the case as arthur in the end of the story is not the same presentation of arthur at the beginning. art has transformed him into an artistic rendering by max. locating creativity this story invites to consider the nature of creativity. does max have an idea of what he wants to do or does he simply let the material guide him? confusing arthur’s suggestion to “paint me” with the act of putting paint on arthur rather than an image of arthur on the canvas, max gleefully splashes paint all over his mentor. but has he really misunderstood or is he taking art out of the rectangular canvas into the world, perhaps much the way artists in the 20th century have responded with found art, performance art, pop art? creativity can be the act of creation within rules, but outside of them as well. max takes the challenge to paint and responds with a dedication to color and form in the shape of his friend. he colors ‘outside of the lines’ and in doing so breaks the rules but the result is a newly fashioned image of arthur. where in the process was max in control, if at all? so, is creativity a matter of letting go and following what surprises result? or does it still need order and rigor? one reading of the title directs us towards the development of max into an artist through his creative renderings of his work. but we can also read the title as signaling the relational nexus that is max and his friend/mentor, arthur—who himself becomes max’s artwork. 40 using art and max as mentioned in the beginning of this essay, this book is written with young children in mind but it fully respects their ability to tease out the problems as they develop. it does not sell them short. and clearly the ideas therein are richly problematic and can be used to generate much thinking and dialogue over art, artists, and creativity among any age group, including teens and adults. return to our initial guiding questions here: 1. what are the rules of art? is there a right way to do it? 2. in creating art are we showing a world or showing our view of it? creating a world or recreating it? 3. how does color and line define objects in art? in the world? 4. does creativity emerge in thought and planning or in action? let’s build upon them by asking our children or young people to comment on the characters, the assumptions behind the comments of arthur and the ingenious responses of max. what have the odd characters taught us about how art seduces us to re-examine our ways of looking at the world, demands a response from us that challenges us to create new visions and new solutions. finally, i invite readers of art and max to speculate on the role of the silent lizard witnesses to the entire process between max and arthur. who is the art public and what role do they play in this story and in the art world? endnotes 1 daivd wiesner, art and max, new york: clarion books, 2010. 2 there was an apocryphal story that i heard about all the artists in paris inviting henri rousseau to a dinner allegedly in his honor but really as a mockery of his naïve works. rousseau had a marvelous time and supposedly completely missed the mockery intended. 3 contained in conflicts in childhood, edited by miriam damrow and helen hearn, oxford: interdisciplinary press, 2014. 4 gareth matthews, the philosophy of childhood, chapter 10, harvard university press, 1994. 5 see http://www.sonyclassics.com/mykidcouldpaintthat/ 6 http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/28/nyregion/28artist.html?_r=0 7 sixty minutes is a weekly news/magazine television program that features stories of general interest for viewers. 8 see https://www.pinterest.com/pin/203858320606454148/ address correspondences to: wendy c. turgeon st. joseph’s college, new york turgeon@optonline.net http://www.sonyclassics.com/mykidcouldpaintthat/ http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/28/nyregion/28artist.html?_r=0 https://www.pinterest.com/pin/203858320606454148/ analytic teaching and philosophical praxis analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 93 book review philosophical adventures with fairy tales: new ways to explore familiar tales with kids of all ages. wendy. c. turgeon rowman & littlefield 168 pages 2010 hardcover $75, paper, $35, kindle $33 (us dollars) review by richard morehouse s i began reading wendy turgeon’s fascinating book, i found myself in the middle of a long-ago memory about a training course for teaching junior great books. a group of teachers reads silently, jack and the beanstalk. we generated some questions within the rubric of the great book training approach, which is exploring possible meanings of the story, or what was the author’s intended meaning for this specific part of the story. the question that we chose to answer was: why did jack climb the beanstalk the third time? as the trainer indicated, the discussion will end when we have exhausted all of the possible supportable meaning of our question. in our case, this was about 1 hour. going back to my opening remembrance, wendy turgeon’s book is not about junior great books, what the book is about is getting young people and adults doing philosophy and using fairy tales as one of the ways of accomplishing that goal. with that end in mind, she presents two sections in this readable and practical guide: section 1, philosophy, dialogue, and fairy tales, and section 2, fairy tales. section 1 – philosophy, dialogue, and fairy tales in her chapter one, “philosophy is for kids!”, wendy turgeon provides an overview in support of the chapter tile by looking at prominent educators and philosophers who have advocated for children as philosophers: gareth matthews, matthew lipman, and kieran egan. using the ideas and strategies of these philosophers and educators, turgeon prepares the reader for helping young people explore open-ended and sometimes controversial issues. she provides a beginning answer to this issue here. a analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 94 adults and teens worry that such open questions will confuse or upset children looking for answers in certainty. and true, there are some questions that really do seek confirmation and reassurance that adults are in control and that it's alright. but as we shall see some of these most fundamental and significant human questions in our search for meaning lack that clarity and recognizable pass to the answer that is not automatically hopeless or a bad thing (6). her answer to how to approach these questions is explored throughout the book. chapter two, “planning a philosophical conversation” provides an answer to the question “what does pre-college philosophy look like?” guideline two is to invite “a child or a group of children to have fun with philosophy! tell them philosophy is about asking questions, exploring different answers and looking for puzzles1” (12). i was struck by the value of finding a puzzle. such prompts hint at ways of thinking with young people, especially with children between preschool and elementary school. it struck me that looking for puzzles, as well as solving them, is what many children do much of the time, with or without adult hints or supervision. to engage with a puzzle is to do adult work while still being playful. within these guidelines, we get a sense of the poetry in turgeon’s work when she writes that it is not always important to stick fastidiously to the topic and advocates for following the discussion where children lead it. “ideas can be like beautiful birds that start off in a bush but fly up in the sky and we follow them, forgetting about the bush. don't worry about staying with the storyline”, turgeon tells us. she goes on to say, “this willingness to follow ideas outside the story differentiates philosophical discussions from other reading lessons” (12). these lines are among the ways that turgeon’s own adventure with fairy tales differs from discussion guides in the philosophy for children's corpus as well as junior great book discussion guides. middle school and high school guidelines begin with a statement of purpose that differs only in detail from ways of leading discussion in childhood and elementary school. what i saw as the most helpful bit of advice was that the students own the discussion, that it is their choice of questions and their pursuit of understanding that is most valuable. the facilitator should not be too concerned about how long the discussion should last or when it should end (14). some things that may help make for a richer discussion includes asking for examples and definitions, distinguishing between descriptions and prescriptions. as students learn to use deductive and inductive logic any disputed outcome may be resolved or set aside for later discussion. “what ifs” and counterarguments may also open new avenues for fruitful discussion. as facilitators, we must be open to all responses. we simultaneously should be aware that all assertions are not equally acceptable or well supported. evidence and reasons matter (15). turgeon includes in this chapter questions for debriefing. these questions are (1) what did we discover? (2) what questions remain for us to continue to ponder? (3) did we listen to one another 1 my emphasis analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 95 with respect? (4) did we offer reasons for what we said? (5) did we explore facts and values? (6) did everyone get a chance to offer his or her view? taken together they provide both a summary of progress and a potential sense of confidence for the work completed. chapter three provides a breezy but informative overview of the history and uses of fairy tales. an informative and insightful bit of new information for me was that “mother goose” was a way that some german families referred to their children’s nany. turgeon provides a helpful overview of the history of fairy tales with “getting into the weeds” of academic disputes. this chapter sets the table for the delicious meal of using fairy tales as discussion starters, the main course meal as well as dessert. section 2 – fairy tales twelve fairy tales are presented in separate chapters (6 -17). this is the largest part of the book and makes up 127 pages of a 169 paged book, that is, 75 % of the book is the how-to guide. wendy turgeon’s choice to allot such a large portion of the book to examples that can be implemented in the classroom seems appropriate especially for readers who are actively involved in philosophy for children (p4c). all of these chapters are organized in the same format. they begin with plot and move forward with targeting age level2, reading plan, and themes. under each theme, there are a different set of discussion questions, and activities or projects. the number of themes varies between as few as three to as many as seven. my original thought was to choose several stories and present the readers with an overview of those chapters. as i began writing about the first fairy tales lesson plan, i realized that the best i could accomplish was a poorly done re-doing in a shorter version of what turgeon had already done well in a somewhat longer lesson plan. this approach would have also deprived the reader of the joy of discovering for her or himself the rich experience of a first encounter with turgeon’s insightful approach to fairy tales. readers who are not familiar with the p4c literature might benefit from looking at appendix a provided by turgeon, ‘more information about philosophy and children’. some things the reader might overlook but are important include the second page of the introduction where turgeon invites the reader to look at the appendixes. each appendix provides helpful material for using the lesson plans or enriching our understanding of methods and content. perhaps most valuable is the list of books she cites regarding the philosophical underpinning that turgeon draws on explicitly and implicitly as she constructed the lessons for this work. unfortunately, in this reviewer’s opinion, she neglects to include one of the works of kieran egan. while there are many of egan’s works that could enhance understanding for conducting a philosophically oriented approach to fairy tales, i would recommend his an imaginative approach to teaching (2005). the reader should not overlook the illustration which begins chapters in section 2. the illustrations are by alice gerhardstein and might provide a unique opportunity for discussion. 2 sometimes targeting and reading level is integrated into reading plan and sometimes each heading has its own paragraph. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 96 the reader will be much aided by looking at “some notes on sources.” these last pages (167168) of the book were of great value to this reviewer as they provide a place to find the original stories. while many of us grew up reading the brothers grim and hans christian andersen, we may not have read maria ratar’s version of beauty and the beast or cinderella and are even less likely to have read her versions of maria tatar's fisher’s bird, white snake or the seven ravens. turgeon’s philosophical adventures is an exciting invitation and a practical tool for discovering and re-discovering twelve fairy tales and provides a roadmap for teachers and parents in ways to engage students. wendy turgeon’s book is readable and comprehensive yet not overwhelming. it is a welcome addition to the literature on teaching kids as they engage ideas in a new and deeper way. i found myself occasionally wishing that she would go deeper or provide more specific connections to philosophy, but on contemplation, i realized that turgeon was not writing for me, but for the many teachers and parents who could enrich themselves and the children who will be exposed to fairy tales and philosophy in new ways. i am glad she wrote philosophical adventures for them. address correspondences to: richard morehouse emeritus professor of psychology, viterbo university email: remorehouse@viterbo.edu mailto:remorehouse@viterbo.edu editor's notes analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 37, issue 1 (2016) editor’s notes the six articles that make up the current issue of volume 37 survey a range of issues, both practical and applied, germane to philosophy for children and the community of inquiry in particular. thematically, the six articles fall into two broad categories. the first three focus more on issues of application and outcomes, while the last three turn more to the conceptual underpinnings of communal inquiry. the first article by youssef, campbell and tangen takes a largely critical look at the results of pfc on 6th graders at an australian elementary school. the contribution by macdonald and bowen “sharing space with other animals,” along with that of baker’s “philosophy, pedagogy and personal identity,” provide a largely positive assessment of the impact of communal inquiry on specific groups. the submissions by miller, fletcher and morehouse unpack the different resources that communal inquiry brings to the difficult problem of generating constructive agreement and disagreement, whether as a result of emotions, subtle inequalities, or the demanding character of civic life in a democracy. together, the six articles raise not only serious concerns over some of the claims raised by advocates of pfc, but also probe the deeper implications of communal inquiry as a practice on our students, teachers, and civic institutions. i hope the current volume finds you all doing well and engaged in a project you love… pax et bonum jason howard chief editor jason j. howard viterbo university web page master jason skoog viterbo university layout design assistant jan wellik viterbo university editorial board susan gardner capilano university david kennedy montclair state university nadia s. kennedy stony brook university, suny richard morehouse, emeritus viterbo university félix garcía moriyón center for philosophy for children, madrid, spain joe oyler institute for the advancement of philosophy for children montclair state university john simpson university of alberta barbara weber university of british columbia publisher viterbo university, la crosse, wisconsin 45601 established in 1981 as analytic teaching at texas wesleyan college and transferred to viterbo in 1993. online copyright 2005. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis is a peer-reviewed, online, open access journal published annually and sometimes biannually. issn 2374-8257 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 48 doing philosophical psychology: helping adolescents discover their place in history richard (mort) morehouse his paper explores one of the elements of doing philosophy with young people. as readers of this journal will know, people of all ages, including young children, can do philosophy as the work of matthew lipman demonstrated. here i argue that there is something unique about the ways that some adolescents and young adults struggle with a set of philosophical issues. to explore philosophy with adolescents and young adults is to recognize and to build on some of the questions that are at the surface of, or latent within, their struggle as they enter adulthood. to do philosophy with emerging adults is to recognize and address these questions. one of the important questions is: “what does it mean to be an inheritor of a culture that one did not create?” this question and the closely related question, “what does it mean to be an adult?” has been explored for millennia, but is experienced uniquely for each individual. many young people have little awareness that they are embarking on a potentially dangerous adventure during which they will come face-to-face with issues that will challenge who they are, as they address ways of engaging the culture. this encounter will nudge them to explore philosophical ideas, whether this exploration happens in formal environments such as classrooms, or informal settings like coffee houses and late-night "bull sessions" in dorm rooms, or other hangouts. this question is sometimes introduced as a lighthearted and even cynical question "what do you want to be when you grow up?" but often migrates into a more serious discussion with a focus on the “to be” part of the question. as the discussion deepens beyond the issues of employment or career, the importance of being comes more into the foreground. these questions on a more serious vein can be stated as “what are my moral and social responsibilities to myself and others?” “how do i integrate what i have been as a young person growing up with the goals that i see for myself as an adult?” these interconnected questions and an exploration of ways to think about them have been explored in philosophy for millennia and more recently in psychology. connecting psychology and philosophy in psychology, until recently, struggling with the question of identity had been thought to be engaged primarily during adolescence (see, for example, erikson, 1958). erik homberg erikson, was one of the first psychotherapists to give prominence to the issues of identity, though others have written about it often writing about the self. this discussion began at least as early as william james when he wrote in 1890 about the self (1890; 1892). many psychologists have continued to explore the issue of identity. carol gilligan explored the issues of identity and morality in girls and young women (gilligan, 1982; gilligan, lyons, & hanmer, 1990). dan j. mcadams' stories we live by: personal t analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 49 myths and the making of the self (1993) also contributes to an exploration of what it means to encounter a world and a life story that the person, while being the central character, is not the author. more recently, jeffery arnett has labeled and extended this period of uncertainty as emerging adulthood. he characterized this period of development as the age of instability, the self-focused age, the age of feeling in-between, and the age of possibilities (arnett, 2000; arnett & tanner, 2006). this essay will focus almost exclusively on hannah arendt's the human condition (1956) as a source for the exploration of identity or self. hannah arendt looks to the idea of identity by focusing on what she calls appearance. arendt's chapter in the human condition (1958) entitled “action” provides a window into gilligan's understanding of the crisis for girls and young women, as well as a bridge to understand young adults more generally. arendt begins the chapter by setting up what is necessary to understand the meaning of appearance by exploring human plurality. human plurality, the basic condition of both action and speech, has the two-fold character of equality and distinction. if men were not equal, they could neither understand each other and those who came before them nor plan for the future and foresee the needs of those who will come after them. if men were not distinct, each human being distinguished from any other who is, was, or will ever be, they would need neither speech nor action to make themselves understood (p.175). arendt goes on to argue that humans reveal their uniqueness, their distinctness, through speech and action, both as individuals and in group efforts.1 it is by speaking and acting that we distinguish ourselves as more than human beings, but as distinguished as persons with standing in the world. she states that it is by words and deeds that we insert ourselves into the world "and this insertion is like a second birth, in which we confirm and take upon ourselves the naked fact of our physical appearance" (pp. 176-7). the human sense of reality demands this (p.208). carol gilligan writes about identity and appearance in her work with girls and young women in a private preparatory school in her book making connections: the relational world of adolescent girls at the emma willard school (gilligan, lyons, and hanmer, 1990). gilligan takes arendt’s idea of appearance and sees it reflected specifically in the lives of girls and women as they enter and disrupt a male worldview. to take on the problem of appearance, which is the problem of her development, and to connect her life with history in a cultural scale, she must enter – and by entering disrupt – a tradition in which "human" has, for the most part, meant male (p. 4). though the work of gilligan and her colleagues examines adolescent girls specifically, i think much of it applies to boys and young men and young women as well. adolescence, gilligan argues, poses a problem that is not easily solved. the problem, stated as a question is: “what is my role in the dominant civilization in which i am living.” or stated differently, “how does one articulate and call into full existence what has been an experience that one has suffered passively until now?” “how am i to participate, how do i distinguish myself, in a world that i have inherited, a world that i have not created?” as a young person moves toward admission into their culture, there is tension as to one's acceptance into, and potential contribution, to the larger culture and/or rejection of some or most of analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 50 that culture. this tension may have external or internal manifestations. implicit in this paraphrase of gilligan is the idea of appearance as stated in the above citation (p. 4). reading gilligan’s passage on appearance led me to re-read hannah arendt more closely; appearance seemed a strange word as i initially took it to mean one's looks, that is, if one were perceived as attractive. appearance as hannah arendt describes it, and as gilligan uses it in this passage, is the way we distinguish ourselves by our words and actions. "this appearance, as distinguished from mere bodily existence, rests on initiative, but it is an initiative from which no human being can refrain and still be human" (arendt, 1958, p.176). importantly, this initiative is more salient during our young adult life. adolescence is a period during which there is a keen and sometimes surprising recognition of the self. william james wrote to his son in the early twentieth century, referring to the moment when one recognizes who he is becoming. "at such moments there is a voice inside which speaks and says, 'this is the real me'" (cited in erikson, 1968, p. 19). arendt in a similar manner writes about "inserting one's self into the world as a second birth, a moment of recognition by others. with word and deed, we insert ourselves into the human world, and this insertion is like a second birth, in which we confirm and take upon ourselves the naked fact of our original physical appearance. this insertion is not forced upon us by necessity, like labor, and it is not prompted by utility, like work. it may be stimulated by the presence of others whose company we may wish to join, but it is never conditioned by them; its impulse springs from the beginning which came into the world when we were born and to which we respond by beginning something new on our own initiative … [this beginning] is not the beginning of something but of somebody, who is a beginning himself [or herself] (pp. 176-7). to insert oneself "into the human world is like a second birth". psychologists, such as erikson, have given special prominence to the time of this second birth; they have suggested that it happens during a persons' teens and early twenties. this insertion arendt calls appearance. it is a part of what makes us human, as we struggle to make ourselves distinguished.2 to be distinguished is to be a particular person within a specific time and place, as we insert ourselves into the world, or as gilligan writes rather poetically, as the river of a girl's life flows into the sea of western culture, she is in danger of drowning or disappearing. …. thus a struggle often breaks out in girls' lives at the edge of adolescence, and the fate of this struggle becomes key to girls' development and western civilization (p. 4). arendt's argument regarding appearance is that speech and action are the way we appear in the world and is echoed in the above passage. to the extent that they are not allowed to speak and act in their voices and as their own person, girls and young women are in danger of drowning, gilligan argues. i think that it may also be true for some, perhaps many, boys and young men.3 erik erikson writes about the transition of young people from adolescence to adulthood. implicit in this transition is the personal history of the individual intertwined with the history of the civilization they inherit. he characterizes identity formation as employing the processes of reflection and observation, both personal and cultural. this process is how an individual judges the self in the analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 51 light of how she is perceived by others, and by which others judge her in comparison to themselves (erikson, 1968, p. 22). he does not use the same language as arendt about inserting oneself into the world, but perhaps the idea is implicit when erikson cites george bernard shaw as shaw comments on this early life "the truth is that all men are in a false position in society until they realize their possibilities and impose them on their neighbors, they are tormented by a continual shortcoming in themselves, yet they irritate others by a continual overweening. … everyone is ill at ease until he has found his natural place, whether it be above or below his birthplace" (erikson, 1968, p. 143). in a phrase perhaps in line with gilligan and arendt, erikson captures some sense of what it means to enter and disrupt when he cites william james in a letter to oliver wendell holmes as writing "about 'rebaptizing' himself in their friendship, and this one word says much about what is involved in the radical direction of social awareness and social needs of youth" (p. 246). carol gilligan, in a reflection on her work with lawrence kohlberg, writes about what she learned when working with erikson. in "me and larry" (1997), she writes that erikson encouraged her to think about what it would mean if she took her work in psychology seriously. erik exemplified for me the possibility of being in psychology and meaning it –the possibility of speaking in a first-person voice. he showed that you cannot take a life out of history, that life history can only be understood in history, and that statement stayed with me for a long time. in many ways, it was the inspiration for my work, and when subsequently i connected my life history with history, i discovered that as a woman this connection had very different implications, both psychologically and politically (1997, p.2). the development of identity or appearance is similar in gilligan, erikson, and arendt, that is, how do adolescence come to terms with their place in the world; whether that world is the school, or community or culture writ large. these questions begin for many as they enter adolescence, and last more or less intensely until about 30 years of age. arnett labels this group of young people as emerging adults (arnett, 2004). his research says that emerging adults include such characteristics as having a goal or purpose and being self-directed. a study of which i was apart (morehouse, visse, singer-towns, & vitek, 2019) shows that self-realization, a part of identity formation, is a dynamic and moral process. “meaning and purposefulness appeared to be defined, in part, by the way, they saw themselves and the way they wanted to the seen by others" (2019, p. 6). attending university was a part of the environment and context in which identity formation occurs (erikson, 1968). the similarity between identity formation and appearance, while hinted at in the discussion so far, is more clearly stated in this passage from arendt: the realm of human affairs, strictly speaking, consists of the web of human relationships which exists wherever men live together. the disclosure of the "who" through speech, and the setting of a new beginning to action always falls into an already existing web where their immediate consequences can be felt. together they start a new process which eventually emerges as the unique life story of the newcomer, affecting uniquely the life stories of all those with whom [she or] he comes into contact (p. 184). the possibility of speaking in the first person, which sometimes goes underground during adolescence,4 is closely related to the idea of appearance as arendt writes about it. one's life story is revealed as one speaks and acts. it is who i am, both as i tell it to myself and others; it is also by acting analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 52 it in the world that i tell my story (mcadams, 1993: ludwig, 1997). other people also tell my story to me and others. they observe me as i listen, as i speak and observe, as i act. our stories come to be through our speech and action, but this speech and action are inserted into an ongoing history into which we are born. although everybody starts his [or her] life by inserting himself [or herself] into the human world, nobody is the author of their own life story. that even though we initiate our story, we are not the writers of our story (arendt, p.184). stated somewhat different, susi ferrarello and nicolle zapien (2018) state that "the meanings that define our lives are often meaningless, and even evasive, for us. although these meanings represent who we factually are, usually we are not aware of the determining power they have on our lives" (p. .96). what makes an event meaningful to the person's life is seeing one's experience (words and actions) in a new and often broader context (2018). though we have a unique life story, we are not the authors of our life story. this apparent paradox is resolved as follows: a life story cannot be written until a person has died because one's speech initiates other speech and one's actions always affect other actions, so our story will be incomplete during our lifetime. this fact does not prevent persons from telling their life story as they understand it. telling our story in the first person may aid in forming an identity and contribute to the making of the self (mcadams, 1993: ferrarello & zapien, 2018; morehouse et al, 2019). to add to this paradox, it is nonetheless also true that others may know me better than i know myself (ludwig, 1997; ferrarello & zapien, 2018). the reasons for connecting arendt with gilligan, erikson, and mcadams leads to my experiences with a lipman inspired university class in theories of personality and its implications for teaching philosophy to undergraduates, as well as providing a framework for the penultimate part of this article: offering a forum wherein adolescents can begin to discover their place in history. creating a class for self-discovery my long-standing practice in teaching theories of personality had been to use essays on personality from a selection of writings by pioneers in the field such as sigmund freud, anna, freud, carl jung, gordon allport, karen horney, g.h. mead, and carl rogers as a sample of the variety of theories we read. using primary sources was an alternative approach chosen over the traditional personality textbook. however, recently, i chose to use a textbook entitled personality theory (engler, 1999). at about the same time, i read a new book, how do we know who we are? a biography of the self (ludwig, 1997). that book is a personal reflection by a therapist, arnold m. ludwig, pondering questions about his own life, as well as the lives of others, and working to construct a biography, that is, a biography of the self, not a theory of self. he uses biographies to ask whether it is possible to know anyone at all, whether psychological truth is really true, and whether we have the power to control our lives (1997, p. 8). these are among the issues ludwig reflects on by drawing on his personal experiences and those of his patients, as well as a lifetime of observations to gain some insights into the self. during the first two weeks of the course, the textbook personality theory was read and discussed. after completing the textbook, we began reading how do we ever know who we are: a biography of the self (ludwig, 1999). we read and discussed one chapter per week. i used a laptop computer and a projection devise to make the student questions visual and to save the screen content, which also included some of the key discussion points. this approach was an approach loosely adapted from the pedagogy of philosophy for children. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 53 analysis of what happened in the class discussion the student questions on each chapter were discussed in a consensus determined order, following one of the often-used discussion methods employed by practitioners of the lipman and sharp approach. ludwig's first chapter after an introduction, is entitled "the 'real' marilyn". to understand marilyn monroe, he read over 50 biographies of the star, including her autobiography, "marilyn monroe: my story" and asks wryly, "she isn't "marilyn monroe, her stage names, or is she?" (p. 21). this statement begins a series of explorations, variously entitled: “the spoken word,” “seeing through other eyes,” “do actions speak louder than words?” and “composing a composite.” at the end of the chapter, ludwig writes "this raises the question whether a person's self can exist independent of others' perceptions, or whether it needs others' perceptions to give it dimension and form" (p. 32). this question is also central in philosophy as well. in chapter six, "the philosopher's stone", a subheading is entitled, “the master or mistress of our fate” begins with "one of the most appealing myths we embrace is the notion that we have control over our own lives and can construct our own future" (p. 126). a later section presents a counter-narrative, "since consciousness can exist without our believing in a personal self, why do we need to be able to believe in a self or for that matter any of our self-enhancing myths at all" (p. 140); ludwig answers that our brain is a problem-solving organ, oriented toward survival. that's where belief, myth, and faith come in; they help to eliminate the knowledge gap. … myth and metaphor offer substitutes for reality. belief gives ignorance and mystery form, neither of which has survival value, and lets us act without continually having to wrestle futilely with the unknown (p.140). this statement may not be reassuring to emerging adults, but it does "stimulate the grey matter." as the vignettes of the selected chapters indicated, ludwig does not work to reassure but to challenge. what follows is a look at some of the student questions with a little commentary. following my practice when i taught philosophy for children classes, i asked students: what questions or issues stood out for them? what sparked their interest? what issues would they like to pursue? here are their responses: 1. don't we figure out who we are by what we reveal about ourselves to others? 2. what comprises the self –what's included, what's excluded? 3. how can one part of us protect us from another part of us? 4. how do we know a self exists? 5. does the search for the self, prevent us from finding it? 6. is there such a thing as a true self/as opposed to a false self? 7. are we all multiple personalities? 8. how can something be useful and not true? (id, ego, superego) 9. what role does society play in our view of our self? 10. why does he (ludwig) go around in circles so much? 11. how close does ludwig come to defining the self? 12. are we defined by our experiences? if so, do we limit who we can become by our past? 13. without memory would we have a personality, or would we just be about survival? analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 54 14. can we completely disregard our experiences as they relate to who we are? 15. are we one "self" or are we multiple selves? 16. memory is always changing (reconstructed) so how can it be an important part of the self? (a question constructed by the whole class) 17. the self has no constant definition between selves, nor is there a constant definition within me? (a statement or prompt constructed by the whole class) number ten (10) is the question we chose to discuss by a vote of the students. “why does he go around in circles so much?” was likely chosen as, in an earlier discussion, we talked about what we learn by asking a question of the author by looking only at the text before us and because the question, in some ways, incorporates some of the points of several other questions. this was a fruitful discussion as it allowed us to get a better understanding of how the narrative was constructed and how there is a certain circularity to many elements of our own life story. we summarized our tentative conclusion on this chapter as: (1) narrative is an important part of personality; (2) there is something constant in us and memory plays a role in that constancy; (3) we are trying to find out what counts as evidence that contributions to the construction and understanding of a self. each of these tentative conclusions was raised and their meanings and implications were sorted out in a lively discussion. an understanding of the role of stories or narratives in our life, in our personality, was a not unimportant contribution to self-understanding, as well as to theories of personality. likewise, the role of memory in personality is not self-evident or, if it is self-evident, it is understood on a deeper level when discovered during a discussion. the last statement or tentative conclusion, the value of and meaning of the nature of evidence, i would argue is essential to understanding the world, as well as the self and one's theory of personality (the goal of the class). “the philosopher's stone” (chapter 6) was the next chapter selected for this presentation. in the introduction to chapter 6, ludwig presents a long list of the problems that humans endure, ranging in intensity and source of the problem from torture and imprisonment and sexual abuse to failing health and brain damage. he then comments on how remarkable it is that a "substantial number manage to find meaning in their ordeal and also claim to be better for it" (p. 123). under the heading of "an alchemist view," he argues that it is a mix of values, aspirations, and needs packaged in cultural myths and often in religious beliefs, that shape our basic assumptions and generate meaning in our lives. in "master or mistress of our fate," he argues that one of the most prevailing myths that allow us to overcome problems is the belief that we are the masters of our destiny and have control over our life outcomes. one statement stands out in this part of the chapter, "because our thoughts usually precede or accompany our actions and we often accomplish what we set out to do, we assume that we're causing our behavior, not bothering to wonder what biological or environmental forces may have influenced our thoughts" (p. 127). in a sub-section entitled "the purpose of purpose," ludwig's point can the summarized in this sentence: "to retain a sense of purpose, we must believe in our specialness" (p. 128). he moves on to explore "loving the bond" in a more expansive section of the chapter, building on the idea of the specialness of the individual, to the value of loving others as well as being loved by them. "by loving others, we deny the potential meaninglessness of existence and add meaning to our lives" (p. 113). in a sectional called "forever and ever," ludwig states "while the preservation of life is basic, sometimes even more important is the desire to identify with something transcendent or to participate in an ongoing and lasting cultural drama, which offers the prospect of some form of existence beyond death or everlasting life” (p. 139). the last section of the chapter "why believe?" is succinctly captured in this sentence "by believing in our personal control, the analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 55 meaningfulness of our life, and the enduring nature of our self, we diminish our sense of insignificance and the threat of our eventual extinction" (p. 141) the students raised the following questions and issues which were placed into three categories. i. purpose: a. it depends on which section of the chapter you read. b. intro – to make our struggle to find meaning look silly? c. *to explore our reason(s) for living – what is the carrot that keeps us going? d. *our minds are like our bodies – they both have internal mechanisms for survival. e. *even if our mind responds like the body, the defense mechanism is dependent on our reasons to live, for example, richard pryor's reason for going on – "we may have to shape what's given us.” ii. an alchemist brew: a. religion and other myths give us meaning by mediating between society and ourselves. b. master or mistress of fate – all think that we have control over our lives, and gain some satisfaction from that feeling. iii. the purpose of purpose: a. purpose can be seen as the "spin doctor" for your lives – dealing with illness is an example. b. we all need to have faith in something to deal with the unknown, whatever you chose to have faith in becomes your purpose. question c, and statements d, and e were combined for this class discussion as indicated by the asterisk. this class discussion moved back and forth between personal, historical and fictional examples and their implications with considerable references to viktor frankl's man's search for meaning (2006), which most of the students had previously read (though not connected to this course). the previous reading by these students was a helpful anchor for some students, especially as few if any students noticed that ludwig while citing nietzsche "he who has a why to live for can bear with almost any how" reports in a footnote that he pulled the quote from man's search for meaning (p. 129). this discussion was an intense, thoughtful, and searching one. the reference to richard pryor, a stand-up comedian, for those who may not remember, was to a statement he made in an interview about his multiple sclerosis that affected his ability to consistently control his arms which he used as a part of his act, and was a reason for his successful career. with regard to the overall structure of the course, a comment on evaluation is probably necessary. as one might guess a multiple-choice test or even an essay test on this material would be a challenge for an instructor to construct, as well as for the student to write. term projects were my solution. the students were required to write two essays of 4 to 6 pages in length examining a short section of the ludwig book due a week after the class discussion on the chapter previously discussed. there were also several term projects based on the ludwig book.5 teaching emerging adults remembering our own struggles when we are in the middle of teaching is not easy. after years of teaching, thinking, and reading, some things appear obvious. we recognize that students might analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 56 have to struggle to understand a complex topic such as “who am i?” or “what does it mean to have a self?” but we think that these questions are intrinsically interesting to any student. and they are for many. but the issue for instructors is to find ways to engage students in a topic by coming vicariously in contact with their selves and their world. ludwig’s none-fiction book is one example. these topics may expose elements of the students' beliefs and values that they do not wish to expose.6 at the opposite end of that dilemma is the danger that discussions of these topics do not get below the surface and therefore remains inert knowledge, as alfred north whitehead would call it. this inert knowledge has no life, no usefulness, is not alive. that is among the reasons that narrative is important to teaching. how do we help students "actualize the sheer passive givenness of their being, not in order to change it, but in order to make it articulate and call into full existence what otherwise they would have suffered passively anyhow" (arendt, 1958, p. 208)? this is a dilemma, as on one hand, this actualization (making articulate and calling into full existence) is one of the key concerns of their lives, but to understand that calling out, they must have or develop a sense of a world that they are on the verge of inheriting and their place in it. so, they must reconcile what they were with what they wish to become (to paraphrase erikson, 1968). works like how do we know who we are? a biography of self (ludwig, 1997) is, as much of the discussion of this article says, one way to help confront our “appearing” (arendt, 1968; gilligan et al., 1990) in the world. other non-fiction works that i have used as a means of aiding emerging adult in addressing the inheritance of their culture and their response to it are unflattening (sousanis, 2015), which is a visual and verbal meditation in a graphic comic format, and marshall mcluhan’s the medium is the message: an inventory of effects (1967) – which might be among the first graphic comic formatted non-fiction books. philosophy in the flesh: the embodied mind and its challenges to western thought (lakoff and johnson, 1999) is a book in which a linguist and a philosopher challenge and use cognitive science to rethink some basic understanding of the unconscious, and embodied mind, and the role of metaphor that provides a menu from engaging themselves in the lived-world. short stories such as margaret attwood’s “hair jewelry,” albert camus’ “jonas or the artist at work”, shirley jackson’s” a pair of silk stockings” have also been used by me as works that confront the self as inserted into current and personal history. pulling it together in a nutshell, the challenge in understanding young adults requires knowing some psychology and some philosophy regardless of which subjects we teach. helping young adults fully encounter the world is possible if we can help them see their reflection, their voices in works of fiction and nonfiction. a related issue is how to encourage curiosity? i have struggled with that issue separately elsewhere (morehouse, 2012). the case made here is that hannah arendt, as well as erik erikson and carol gilligan, all suggest that adolescents and young adults struggle to be heard in their voices, as they become aware and confront a civilization that they are inheriting. this is a two-fold process: 1) understanding their inherited culture, and 2) coming to grips with their role in assimilating and correcting it. our additional role is to recognize that this is a gradual and daunting undertaking. in this task, we can nudge, support, and encourage their efforts. the example of teaching a challenging text that raises self/world engagement such as how do we know who we are? a biography of the self (ludwig, 199) is one of many examples that hopefully add light to our mutual analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 57 endeavor. endnotes 1 … their ability to affect and attain something, to have an impact in the world. it is precisely in this sense that hannah arendt sees world first emerge in collective action and the accompanying experience of being able to shape something, so that she considers subjects who lack this experience to be world-poor if not world-less (rosa, 2016, p. 161) 2 while it is true, as those involved in p4c know, all children can do philosophy and by doing philosophy they are active participants in the world, the argument here is that there is something about adolescence that allows many at that age to see themselves and their relationship to the world in a new way, to appear in a new way. 3 this is an interesting paradox, for while gilligan’s argument is one that is important to be addressed from the perspective of girls and women, the metaphor of drowning as one enters and challenges the dominant culture resonates, as well, especially for males who do not have a place of privilege in that culture. 4 the “taking one’s voice underground” orientation can be seen in young women taking the “little girl voice” and young boys taking an “i don’t know” attitude on things that affect them directly. 5unfortunately, my note on student comments are no longer available and i did not record the session. 6 i am not making a case for safe spaces or trigger warnings, but rather a comment on ways to draw students out so these issues can be explored more in depth. references arnett, j. j. (2000). emerging adulthood: a theory of development from the late teens through the twenties. american psychologist, 55(5), 469. arnett, j. j., & tanner, j. l. (eds.). (2006). emerging adults in america: coming of age in the 21st century (p. 3). washington, dc: american psychological association. arendt, h. (1958) the human condition. chicago: university of chicago press atwood, m. (1994). hair jewelry. dancing girls and other stories, 117. belenky, m.f., clinchy, b.m., goldberger, n.r. and tarule, j.m., 1986. women's ways of knowing: the development of self, voice, and mind (vol. 15). new york: basic books. camus, a. (2007). jonas, or the artist at work. exile and the kingdom: stories, 87-124. chopin, k. (2012). a pair of silk stockings. courier corporation. james, w. (1890) the principles of psychology, 2 vols., dover publications 1950, vol. 1 james, w. (1892) psychology (briefer course), university of notre dame press. jackson, s. (2005). the lottery and other stories. macmillan. ferrarello, s. & zapien, n. (2018) ethical experience: a phenomenology. london: bloomsbury academic. frankl, v (2006) man's search for meaning. an introduction to logotherapy, beacon press, boston, ma, 2006. isbn 978-0-8070-1427-1 (originally published in 1946) gilligan, c. (1982). in a different voice: psychological theory and women’s development: cambridge, ma: harvard university press. gilligan, c., lyons, n. p., & hanmer, t. j., (1990) making connections: the relational worlds of adolescent girls at the emma willard school. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. lakoff g. & johnson, (1999). philosophy in the flesh: the embodies mind and its challenges to western thought. new york. basic books ludwig, a. m. (1997) how do we know how we are? a biography of the self, new york: oxford university press. morehouse, r. (2001). philosophical inquiry in a university classroom: a case study with broader implications. 174 –179. in t. curnow, (ed.), thinking through dialogue: essays on philosophy in practice. surrey, uk: practical philosophy press. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 58 morehouse, r. (2012). addressing the problems of “underprepared” university students: one person’s perspective. education today, 62, 3, pp. 22 – 27  morehouse, r., visse, m., singer-towns, b., & vitek, j. (2019) juggling the many voices inside: what it means to be an emerging adult. international journal of psychological research and review, 2019, 2:13 https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/juggling-the-many-voices-inside%3a-what-itmeans-to-morehouse-visse/5939edc03e46e4b8b588bf029ec6fe7a02d89b1a oldenburg, ray (1989). the great good place: cafes, coffee shops, community centers, beauty parlors, general stores, bars, hangouts, and how they get you through the day. new york: paragon house. rosa, h. (2016). resonance: a sociology of relationship to the world. medford, ma; polity press. taylor, c. (2018). the authentic self. cambridge: harvard university press. address correspondences to: richard (mort) morehouse, ph. d. professor emeritus, viterbo university 1706 n salem road la crosse, wi 54603 remorehouse@viterbo.edu mailto:remorehouse@viterbo.edu analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 27 the deweyan background in p4c maura striano introduction n a 1992 interview, matthew lipman affirmed that p4c was “a deweyan way to go beyond dewey” thereby explicitly acknowledging the deweyan inspiration of his project but also asserting his own original contribution to the creation and development of a new educational approach. this achievement was the outcome of his effort to overcome what he later described as “the apparent inconsistency in dewey’s formulation of the relationship between philosophy and education” (lipman, 2008, p. 147). this inconsistency had been, indeed, the leading motivation for lipman’s educational inquiry to the point that finding the solution to this problem would be his “life’s work” (p. ivi). starting from this acknowledgment, i will try to highlight the deweyan background of the p4c pedagogy, showing how dewey’s ideas constitute a strong educational framework, which grounds and organizes both the curriculum and the device of the community of philosophical inquiry (copi). however, i will also identify the original contributions offered by lipman in the development of a new pedagogical framework, which successfully operationalizes a “practical” understanding of the educational role of philosophy. in my analysis i will focus in particular on three elements within the p4c pedagogy, that represent lipman’s original contribution to the development of the deweyan legacy in accordance with a new pedagogical framework: the idea of teaching for thinking; the pattern of the process of inquiry in a p4c session; and the “reconstruction” of a new understanding of philosophy and its educational value, which constitutes the effective overcoming of the inconsistency that lipman had found in dewey’s educational thought. 1. the idea of teaching for thinking in a 2005 interview, lipman states that “philosophy for children didn’t just emerge out of nowhere. it built upon the recommendations of john dewey and the russian educator, lev vygotsky, who emphasized the necessity to teach for thinking, not just for memorizing” (naji, 2005, p. 23). here lipman points out that one of the main points of contact of p4c and dewey’s educational ideas is the focus on thinking and, in particular, on the peculiar relationship that dewey identifies between thinking and education. as andrea english points out, the common association of dewey’s educational theory with the idea of “doing” has caused educational scholars to overlook his understanding that “thinking is both the aim and the condition for the possibility of education” and has, therefore, limited their exploration in depth of the deweyan vision of the nature and function of thinking within a pedagogical framework (english, 2016). i analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 28 this is not the case with lipman, who refers to dewey focusing explicitly on the relationship between thinking and education, and identifies thinking as a peculiar form of agency, overcoming the false dichotomy between thinking and doing, theory and praxis, that has often misled educational scholars in their understanding of dewey’s pedagogy. lipman refers to dewey’s vision of thinking as a reflective process strictly interconnected with his understanding of the life associated with it, according to a democratic perspective. however, he also focuses on the social elements embedded within individual thinking processes from a psychological and pedagogical point of view. in so doing, he makes explicit the latent influence of george herbert mead on dewey’s thought and defines a clear pedagogical framework for his educational project. choosing as a scientific reference the russian psychologist lev vygotsky, who explores the development of individual thinking capacities according to a socio-cultural approach, lipman successfully highlights the intersubjective matrix of individual thinking, which would lead him to identify the “community of philosophical inquiry” as a “social matrix” that generates a variety of social relationships, building up the framework of the cognitive matrices which, in turn, generate fresh cognitive relationships (lipman, 1991, 2003). the reference to vygotsky is essential for lipman as his main pedagogical focus is not only on the structure of thinking and on its functioning, but also on the educational context within which it would be possible to teach for thinking, a process which involves multiple actors, interactions and moves. lipman refers to dewey’s idea of thinking with a strong pedagogical focus, and this leads him both to explore the conditions that promote it but also to look for the educational contexts, tools and methodologies that are most suitable for education for thinking, thereby operationalizing what he identifies as the pedagogical “criteria” implicit in dewey’s writings and work (lipman, 2008). in fact, the title of lipman’s masterpiece, thinking in education, is an intentional quotation of the title of chapter twelve of dewey’s “democracy and education,” highlighting how the relationship between thinking and education should be understood, focusing on the cultural, political and social conditions useful for the improvement of educational models and practices in order to make them more respondent to the needs of a democratic society. in the above-mentioned chapter, dewey clearly states that “the sole direct path to enduring improvement in the methods of instruction and learning consists in centering upon the conditions which exact, promote, and test thinking.” moreover, he is also very explicit in the definition and description of what should be understood as thinking, stating that: “thinking is method, the method of intelligent experience in the course which it takes” (dewey,1916, mw, p. 9). indeed, in democracy in education, dewey is contextualizing and finalizing the ideas developed in how we think (1910, 1933), where he highlighted the necessity to achieve, through education, a discipline of cognitive processes according to a reflective pattern, within which reflection can be seen as a process aimed at sustaining the development of conceptual understanding. as megan laverty notes, this procedure is at the basis of the formation of concepts, a factor which is of paramount importance as these concepts have the function of “introduc(ing) permanency into an otherwise impermanent world,” working as “established meanings, or intellectual deposits” useful for the founding of a better understanding of individual and collective experiences. the capacity to form and transform concepts can be achieved only if people are in the condition of being reflectively engaged in a sustained communication with others (laverty, 2016). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 29 here it is necessary to point out that we should consider dewey’s understanding of thinking in connection with his understanding of education, intended as a practice which can direct and facilitate activities leading to an organized and reflective use of inner forces and potentialities. accordingly, in a deweyan perspective, the main objective of education is to sustain and enhance the “power of the mind,” which emerges from a continuous mental discipline, through activity and reflection. the “discipline of the mind” is, first of all, a discipline of thinking, understood as a reflective process which develops through different stages, and can be educated according to socially acknowledged criteria and values. therefore, dewey develops what we could define as an “educational theory of reflective thinking,” within which thinking is explored in its emergence and unfolding within different fields of human experience. within this framework, the emergence of thinking derives from a condition of uncertainty and perplexity, which is at the core of individual and collective experience. indeed, from a pedagogical point of view, the most interesting aspect of dewey’s idea of thinking, a feature which has significant educational consequences, is, as vasco d’agnese points out, the disclosure of an “inescapable uncertainty” at the core of human thinking. this realization is particularly challenging given “dewey's firm faith in the power of intelligent action, and in education as the means by which human beings grow and create meaningful existence.” in this perspective education must be conceived not so much as the attempt to master and control experience but as the means to create new, unpredictable experience, introducing new forms of transaction with the environment in which individuals live (d’agnese, 2017). this understanding of education is particularly interesting since it focuses on the necessity to design educational contexts within which individuals can be exposed to uncertainty in order to acquire the ability to cope with new experiences through multiple thinking paths in accordance with a reflective approach. for his part, lipman acknowledges the necessity to disarticulate reflective thinking (understood as “complex thinking”), identifying the different threads and cognitive postures embedded within reflective processes. what he defines as “complex thinking,” is a kind of thinking that is “aware of its assumptions and implications as well as [....] of the reasons and evidence that support this or that conclusion.” this articulated thought structure takes into account the various angles and points of view assumed in different contexts and situations and is “prepared to recognize the factors that make for bias, prejudice, and self-deception” by including within itself recursive, metacognitive and self-correcting dimensions (lipman, 1991; 2003). as peter paul elicor points out, lipman’s idea of thinking contrasts with a linear and unidimensional vision of human thinking, which has frequently dominated the whole practice of education; instead, he proposes a multidimensional understanding, within which critical, creative and caring dimensions are strictly interwoven (elicor, 2016). it is the interplay or the “transaction” between these three dimensions that allows thinking to explore in depth, through a reflective process of inquiry, the various aspects of human experience, taking into account different epistemic positions and contrasting different perspectives. lipman acknowledges the educational value of pluralism and looks for an educational context within which complex thinking can sustain a multi-perspectival exploration of individual and collective experience, within which different cognitive patterns and epistemic positions can emerge and be appreciated and compared. accordingly, he understands educational practice as a facilitating device useful to promote the emergence and development of reflective processes sustained by multiple reasoning threads. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 30 2. the pattern of the process of inquiry in a pfc session the emergence of reflective thinking occurs when thinking encounters a particular kind of situation, which dewey defines as “indeterminate” and describes as “disturbed, troubled, ambiguous, confused, full of conflicting tendencies, obscure (lw12: p. 109). explicitly disavowing categorical divisions between emotion and reason (a distinction which is also rejected by lipman, who understands emotions as a form of thinking) in “logic, the theory of inquiry,” dewey describes the genealogy of reflective processes and identifies the different phases of their unfolding within the field of individual and collective experience, pointing out that, wherever he uses the term “inquiry,” he could just as well have used the term “reflective thinking.” according to dewey, the process of inquiry unfolds in five phases. the initial phase of inquiry begins with a feeling of something amiss, which endures as a pervasive quality within the whole process. this feeling grows out of the encounter with an “indeterminate” situation, which is explored by elaborating a number of “suggestions” in order to devise and formulate, through a process of “intellectualization,” a specific “problem” which will become the focus of the inquiry. in order to address the problem, a hypothesis is constructed, utilizing both theoretical ideas and perceptual facts. next, this is tested through imaginative actions and forms of “reasoning,” which explore the reasons sustaining the hypothesis and the meanings involved, sizing up the implications or possible contradictions, and thereby reformulating the hypothesis or even the problem, if this is necessary. finally, the process of inquiry comes to a close with an evaluation and testing of the effectiveness and validity of the hypothesis. in this final phase, it is revealed whether or not the process of inquiry has converted an “indeterminate situation” into a “determinate one” and has transformed the experience into a meaningful one. donald allan schön wrote that the most important legacy bequeathed by dewey to education is his “theory of inquiry” (schön, 1992) since it grounds the development of a reflective approach to educational processes and practices and gives birth to what cam identifies as the “tradition of reflective education” (cam, 2008). dewey’s “theory of inquiry” focuses on the context, on the conditions and on the process of the emergence and development of thinking in terms of its frames of reference, its norms, and its rules. moreover, it also concentrates on the best conditions for its development within human experience, shedding light both on the relationship between thinking and experience within human formation processes, as well as on the educational conditions necessary to promote the development of reflective processes. inquiry is explored by dewey both in its cognitive and logical structure, also considering its cultural and social implications, and is understood both as an educational device and as an educational model. thus, it supports an educational process of growth and understanding, both at an individual and at a social level. indeed, as lipman points out in philosophy goes to school: just as scientists apply the scientific method to the exploration of problematic situations, so students should do the same if they are ever to think for themselves. instead, we ask them to study the end results of what the scientists have discovered. we neglect the process and fixate on the product. when problems are not explored analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 31 at first hand, no interest or motivation is aroused and what we continue to call education is a charade or a mockery. dewey had no doubt that […] the educational process in the classroom should take as its model the process of scientific inquiry. (lipman, 2003, p. 20). the outcome of this process is the acquisition of a specific method which is the epistemic grounding of the different disciplines interwoven in the educational curricula. as zongyi deng points out, in dewey’s pedagogy subject matter has a central role in teaching thinking. it is a very important intellectual resource for conceptual understanding, an assertion which is also consistent with current advances in cognitive psychology (deng, 2001). according to this framework, as lipman puts it, “it is not enough to learn the events of history, we must be able to see and think historically" (lipman, 2003, p. 24). this happens progressively through the acquisition, mastery and dissemination of the method of inquiry with the support of educational practices aimed at promoting the acquisition and development of attitudes and competences which favour inquiry. these attitudes and competences can be achieved through the engagement with inquiry experiences, which are the only contexts within which they can be developed and fostered. nonetheless, while the experience of inquiry is always an on-going experience which stems from “indetermination and uncertainty,” normal educational situations are very often predetermined and oriented, and therefore do not offer the possibility to think reflectively and to be engaged with meaningful processes of inquiry; as a consequence, it is necessary to design dedicated educational situations which reframe what happens in the average classroom. as lipman points out in thinking in education, “dewey had no doubt that what should be happening in the classroom is thinking—and independent, imaginative, resourceful thinking” which unfolds and develops within a context aimed at enhancing and promoting inquiry (lipman, 2003, p. 20). however, he did not explore the educational conditions which could orient and sustain the emergence and development of reflective inquiry processes. accordingly, a session of philosophical inquiry starts with the reading of a short story describing an indeterminate situation from which different kinds of “suggestions” stem in the form of inquiry questions collected within an “agenda.” the questions and suggestions are analyzed according to a process of “intellectualization,” which helps in the identification of one or more specific “problems” and dedicated inquiry paths aimed at exploring these questions in depth, organized into a “discussion plan.” the following step is the construction and comparison of several hypotheses through a process of conversational “reasoning” within which the reasons sustaining each hypothesis and the meanings involved are explored in depth. the culmination of the process of inquiry consists in a close testing of the effectiveness and validity of each hypothesis. the effectiveness of the process of inquiry itself is represented by the transformation of the “indeterminate situation” into a “determinate one.” moreover, lipman refers to dewey's understanding of reflective thinking as a form of inquiry and acknowledges the organization of the inquiry process in different steps. however, his operational model is not, as it is for dewey, scientific inquiry. he refers, instead, to philosophical inquiry, which aims to address particular kinds of questions and is focused on logical, aesthetic and ethical dimensions of human experience. therefore, lipman reproduces the pattern of the process of deweyan inquiry, but organizes it in the form of a “philosophical inquiry,” and embeds it within a analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 32 social dimension, which facilitates the emergence of, and encounter between, different epistemic positions and inquiry threads. the interplay of the pattern of scientific inquiry with philosophical questions and issues is the first epistemological move which contributes to the overcoming of the apparent dichotomies and inconsistencies which lipman had identified in dewey’s thought. the second epistemological move is the acknowledgment of the educational value of philosophy, introduced within educational contexts in the form of philosophical inquiry, in accordance with dewey’s legacy. this move is based on an in-depth analysis of the cultural and educational scenarios within which philosophy could have a significant role, if it is understood not as a discipline, but as a process of individual or collective inquiry into different dimensions of human experience. the development of a new understanding of philosophy and its educational value dewey was particularly interested in reframing curricular subject matter in the form of scientific inquiry and focused essentially on the subject matter available within primary or junior high school curricula. therefore, he did not refer to philosophy as a curricular subject matter. moreover, as lipman pointed out in getting our thoughts together (lipman, 2003), dewey did not consider that philosophy could be used as a transdisciplinary tool to ground the school curriculum and make it more meaningful. lipman addressed this issue more clearly in the essay philosophy for children’s debt to dewey where he writes: [s]o, what of philosophy? what could dewey tell us about how it was to be employed? dewey minced no words, when he said that philosophy would be ‘the general theory of education.’ he meant that it was to be the exception to the rule. in every other discipline, there had to be an interpenetration of theory and practice, but in the case of philosophy, not so. philosophy, like victorian womanhood, was to be put upon a pedestal, where it could receive 360 degrees of respect, but where it would be fully set apart from educational practice. nowhere in his writings does he refer to the practical use of philosophy in education. it was for him, i believe, unthinkable (lipman, 2008, 148). stefano oliverio (2012) argues that what prevents dewey from “mobilizing philosophy in education” is what dewey himself defined as the “permanent hegelian deposit” in his own thought, which leads him to understand the task of philosophy as cultural rather than educational. in his life experience and in his writing, dewey did have the opportunity to investigate also the educational value of philosophy and to discuss the reasons why philosophy should be studied, but he did not consider philosophy as a part of the primary school curriculum and did not explore in depth its educational potential. dewey’s experience as a teacher of philosophy both at high school and at university level led him to strengthen and clarify the cultural and social necessity to study philosophy. we can see this analysis in his early essay “why study philosophy” (dewey, ew, p. 4) where he describes the study of philosophy as a “deliberate and reflective overhauling” of ideas that need to be extracted from the cultural tissue grounding human experience and explored in their meaning. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 33 however, he did not explain according to which educational approach and within which educational context this could be properly done. hints and suggestions regarding the educational potential of philosophy are disseminated throughout dewey’s works, but they are not organized within a clearly defined pedagogical framework. in “the child and the curriculum,” dewey explained how no form of knowledge can be inserted into human life “from without” since “learning involves reaching out of the mind” and “involves organic assimilation starting from within” (dewey, mw, 2, p. 277). for this reason, any kind of study should have its starting point “from within” one of the different fields of human experience. according to dewey, we should take into account the fact that individual and collective experience “already contains within itself elements —facts and truths— of just the same sort as those entering into the formulated study; and, what is of more importance, of how it contains within itself the attitudes, the motives, and the interests which have operated in developing and organizing the subject-matter to the plane which it now occupies” (dewey, mw, 2, p. 278). this requires an exploration of the complexity of human experience and the discovery within this of the ideas, issues and problems that have generated the construction of a specific form of knowledge, considered as the by-product of a process of inquiry, deeply embedded in these fields. within this framework, according to a deweyan approach, the study of philosophy also should be conducted through the identification of philosophical motivations and interests emerging within individual and collective life, and through the recovery and reconstruction of ideas, problems and themes from the past, which can be actualized within current experiences in order to make them more meaningful. as dewey will later point out in “the study of philosophy” (mw, p. 6), philosophical studies are extremely powerful since they “acquaint the student with the forces that create ideas and make them potent” and endow her/ him with “some increase of expertness in the use of the tools by which the leading ideas of humanity are worked out and tested” (dewey, mw, 6, p. 138). in this perspective, the study of philosophy provides individuals with cultural, intellectual and linguistic tools which enable them to become part of a process of creation, implementation and validation of ideas which are not abstract entities, but concrete realities that can be operationalized into actions and practices aimed at promoting individual and collective growth. the emphasis here is upon philosophy as an activity rather than upon the products of such an activity: those distinctions, canons, theories, and systems which have advanced to become the content of philosophy as an academic discipline and a historical tradition. lipman’s merit is to have developed dewey’s intuitions within a consistent and clear educational framework, thereby operationalizing the educational potential of philosophy, focusing on its epistemic structure and functioning. in thinking in education he points out that “it should not be forgotten that dewey makes a strong case in experience and nature for a conception of philosophy as criticism” (lipman, 2003, p. 37). moreover, he explains that dewey locates philosophy as “a special non-scientific form of cognition that is concerned with the judgment of value as a unique form of inquiry: a judgment of judgment” (lipman, 2003, p. 38). we can say, then, that lipman shares with dewey the understanding of philosophy as a particular form of inquiry but goes further, trying to identify the educational context and the pedagogical guidelines according to which it would be possible to promote and sustain individual and collective engagement with multiple forms of philosophical inquiry. on this basis he elaborates the analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 34 idea of a “philosophical community of inquiry” whose logic, is, as kennedy points out, “deweyan and pragmatic,” since “it is based on problematization in the interest of the improvement of a lived situation”(kennedy, 2012, p. 41) which is explored through a process of inquiry that, as we have seen, follows the deweyan pattern of inquiry. “inquiry” within a community of philosophical inquiry (copi) begins, as kennedy states, “when the relationship between a concept and the lived experience and narratives to which that concept relates shows enough dissonance,” and when “the automatic steering and control mechanisms of the vehicle of communicative culture no longer assure a stable meaning to the social values and qualities” that “saturate” our experience” (kennedy, 2012, p. 41). according to lipman, the process of inquiry experienced in a copi is of a particular kind, as its focus is on the philosophical, conceptual and linguistic tools used in its performance. it refers to the diverse dimensions of philosophical thinking, which, as we have seen before, allow us to develop inquiry paths useful to explore the logical, aesthetic and ethical dimensions of human experience. this is consistent with dewey’s description of the different types of philosophical thought that can be cultivated within an academic context. in the “syllabus: types of philosophical thought” that he prepared for his students at columbia university (dewey, mw, 13, pp. 349-395), dewey identified logic, aesthetics and ethics as the three features of philosophical thought, thereby introducing philosophy as a multidimensional and multi-logical method of inquiry. lipman agrees with dewey in acknowledging the different dimensions of philosophical inquiry, but adds to this vision the idea, grounded in the socratic and platonic tradition, that philosophical inquiry is essentially dialogic. in the essay “the educational role of philosophy,” he writes: philosophy may begin in wonder and eventuate in understanding, or even, in a few instances, in wisdom, but along the way it involves a good deal of strenuous activity. this activity generally takes the form of dialogue. when one engages in such dialogue about traditionally philosophical matters — abstract or generic concepts such as truth and justice and friendship and personhood; methods and procedures of inquiry; criteria as the opinions of criticism or justification, and so on — it could reasonably be said that one is doing philosophy” (lipman, 2014, p. 7). this focus on the dialogic structure of philosophical inquiry is consistent with lipman’s own experience as a professor of philosophy. he was teaching logic at columbia university when he had the intuition to introduce philosophy into the primary school curriculum, and made the first move toward the design of the p4c curriculum, aimed at engaging junior high school students with a process of inquiry into logical and linguistic structures. p4c involves students in the exploration of ideas and problems emerging from individual and collective experiences and is strictly connected with agency and practice, through a process of shared inquiry that highlights multiple dimensions and unfolds through multiple logical paths. as we have seen, for dewey the study of philosophy involved the exploration, but also the deconstruction and reconstruction, of the leading ideas to which individuals and communities refer. accordingly, lipman develops the p4c curriculum around “leading ideas,” which become the focus of the processes of philosophical inquiry. in the p4c curriculum, the “leading ideas” are approached and explored within various contexts and are embedded within a narrative framework. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 35 as lipman pointed out in getting our thought together, the manual accompanying the novel “elfie” dedicated to primary education, the p4c curriculum unfolds at different levels of complexity. at the elementary and junior high school level the “leading ideas” around which the narratives can be identified are defined, simple, and directly connected to lived fields of experience. at the high school level, they become increasingly organized and interconnected with the cultural texture from which they have been extracted. in fact, at high school and university level, “philosophical inquiry” offers the possibility of engaging students both with philosophical problems emerging from their areas of experience, but also with philosophical ideas and problems culturally embedded in the philosophical tradition. within the context of the copi it is possible to explore the ideas “from within”, reproducing and recovering the process of inquiry that has generated them, by making it explicit and visible. the students are therefore accompanied in acquiring a growing expertise in the use of conceptual tools, thinking skills and language skills, that sustain the working out and testing of leading ideas at multiple levels. the teachers, who act as facilitators of the process of inquiry, progressively introduce further ideas, questions and problems in the context of what is being explored by the students, who in turn are actively engaged and learning within this process of inquiry. finally, the pattern of inquiry is slowly interiorized by the participants and becomes what dewey would define as a “habit,” a frame of mind that accompanies and sustains individuals in the engagement with their own life experiences. individuals learn to explore philosophically their own experiences, to make meaning of them and to reconstruct them according to new and different frames of reference. this long-lasting outcome can be considered, according to a deweyan perspective, the most effective educational achievement that p4c can produce over time in different contexts. it should therefore be explicitly identified as an educational objective and be constantly pursued as what dewey would define an “end in view,” collectively shared and transferred from one educational context to another, in order to create the conditions that favor the development of critical, creative and caring individuals and communities. references cam p. (2008), dewey, lipman and the tradition of reflective education in pragmatism, in taylor m., schrerer h., ghiraldellip.jr. (eds), pragmatism, education and children: international philosophical perspectives, leiden: brill rodopi, pp. 163-184. d’agnese v. (2017) the essential uncertainty of thinking: education and subject in john dewey. journal of philosophy of eucation. volume 51, issue 1, february, pp. 73-88, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9752.12187 deng, z. (2001). the centrality of subject matter in teaching thinking: john dewey's idea of psychologizing the subject matter revisited. educational research journal. 16(2), pp. 193-212. dewey, j. (1972) [ew] the early works of john dewey, 1882-1898. 5 vols. carbondale and edwardsville: southern illinois university press. _____. (1978) [mw] the middle works of john dewey, 1899-1924. 15 vols. carbondale and edwardsville: southern illinois university press. _____. (1985) [lw] the later works of john dewey, 1925-1953. 17 vols. carbondale and edwardsville: southern illinois university press. _____. (2008) the collected works of john dewey, 1882-1953. supplementary volume 1: 1884-1951. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9752.12187 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 36 carbondale and edwardsville: southern illinois university press. elicor p.p. (2016) rethinkingeducation: matthew lipman’s pedagogical model. tambara 33, n°1 pp. 1-24. english a.r. (2016) dewey on thinking in education. in: peters m. (eds) encyclopedia of educational philosophy and theory. singapore: springer. kennedy d. (2012) lipman, dewey and the community of philosophical inquiry, in education& culture 28 (2). pp. 36-53 laverty megan j. (2016) thinking my way back to you: john dewey on the communication and formation of concepts. educational philosophy and theory,48:10. pp. 1029-1045, doi: 10.1080/00131857.2016.1185001 lipman, m. (1988) philosophygoes to school. philadelphia: temple university press. lipman, m &bynum, t.w. (eds) (1976) philosophyfor children. oxford: basil blackwell. lipman, m & sharp, am (eds) (1978) growingup with philosophy. philadelphia:temple university press. lipman, m, sharp, am & oscanyan, f.s.(1980) philosophyin the classroom. 2nd ed. philadelphia: temple university press. lipman m., (1988) philosophy goes to school. philadelphia: temple university press. lipman m. (2003a) thinking in education. cambridge: cambridge university press. lipman m., (2003 b) getting our thoughts together. montclair: iapc. lipman m. (2008) philosophy for children’s debt to dewey, in taylor m. (2008), schrerer h., ghiraldellip.jr. (eds), pragmatism, education and children: international philosophical perspectives, leiden: brill rodopi, pp. 143-152. lipman m. (2014), the educational role of philosophy. journal ofphilosophy in schools. 1(1), pp. 5-14. najis. (2005), an interview with matthew lipman. thinking. volume 17, issue 4,pp. 23-29. schön, d. (1992). the theory of inquiry: dewey's legacy to education. curriculum inquiry,22(2), pp. 119-139. doi:10.2307/118002 oliverio s. (2012), accomplishing modernity: dewey's inquiry, childhood and philosophy, education and culture. john dewey and the child. vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 54-69. striano, m. (2002). “la filosofia come educazione del pensiero. una conversazione pedagogica con matthew lipman.” in a. cosentino, filosofia e formazione. 10 anni di philosophy for children in italia (1991-2001). napoli: liguori. taylor m., schrerer h., ghiraldellip.jr. (eds) (2008) pragmatism, education and children: international philosophicalperspectives. leiden: brill rodopi. address correspondences to: maura striano university of naples, federico ii maura.striano@unina.it https://doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2016.1185001 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 1 education for sustainable development and global citizenship through philosophical enquiry: principles and practices sue lyle abstract: in this paper i argue that at this time of ecological crisis, ethics should infuse all teaching and learning, and education for sustainable development and global citizenship (esdgc) should be an overarching planning tool. i make the case for philosophy for children (p4c) to be integrated into the whole curriculum rather than be a stand-alone lesson. i show how a thematic approach that connects esdgc to real life issues and incorporates all school subjects can connect the different areas of study to each other and support critical thinking by introducing controversial issues. the study is located in wales in the uk to show how national curriculum requirements can be satisfied through careful planning. in this paper i discuss a teaching pack for the 8-13 age range, ‘arctic stories’ (lyle, 2010) to illustrate how the four c’s of thinking: critical, creative, collaborative and caring can be integrated into the curriculum. introduction ur children are growing up at a time of major species extinction, major pollution, catastrophic resource depletion and an inexorable rise in levels of c02. if these young people are going to undo the damage done by industrialization, they need rather more than the current obsession with rising scores on very narrow tests, as if there were no planetary emergency (orr, 2004). we need a paradigm shift in our thinking. such a shift can start with education policy. in wales (uk), where the work reported on here took place, the curriculum includes education for sustainable development and global citizenship: education for sustainable development and global citizenship (esdgc) seeks to give learners, at all stages of education, an understanding of the impact of their choices on other people, the economy and the environment (dcells, 2008a). known as esdgc, it is not an additional subject, but should permeate the whole curriculum: it is more than a body of knowledge as it is about values and attitudes, understanding and skills. it is an ethos that can be embedded throughout schools, an attitude to be adopted, a value system and a way of life (ibid). in addition, wales has a skills framework as a cross-curricular requirement (dclls, 2008b). the framework emphasizes critical and creative thinking and puts metacognition at its heart. a range of thinking principles have been identified including: o analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 2 …activating prior skills, knowledge and understanding; thinking about cause and effect and making inferences; thinking logically and seeking patterns; considering evidence, information and ideas; forming opinions and making decisions; linking and lateral thinking (dclls, 2008b). working in this context, this paper examines principles and practices developed over the past 25 years working mainly with the 8-13 age range to support esdgc and in the context of the skills framework to integrate philosophy for children into the curriculum. however, this way of working poses a challenge for schools that have a duty to implement the national curriculum with its focus on mathematics, english, science and digital literacy. to be effective, esdgc needs to connect specialist knowledge across the subject areas of the curriculum to real-world problems. philosophy for children (p4c) has been introduced to many welsh schools as part of the skills framework and is commonly seen as a ‘stand-alone’, separate to the given curriculum; it is rarely integrated into curriculum planning from the start. my aim was to devise curriculum that embedded esdgc and p4c into the statutory curriculum. since the introduction of the skills framework, there has been a call for schools to focus on critical thinking, which is widely regarded as essential if children and young people (cyp) are to navigate a world in crisis. noddings (2006) goes further and argues that critical thinking is “nonexistent, or, at best, weak” without controversial issues and laments the fact that topics that call forth critical and reflective thinking are largely absent from the given curriculum. in sum, the curriculum development i carried out was designed to meet the welsh government demands for esdgc and thinking skills and to incorporate p4c as an integral part of the curriculum planning. in this paper i draw on one of the teaching packs i prepared for the 8-13 age range. ‘arctic stories’ (lyle, 2010) is carefully mapped to national curriculum requirements with a cross-curricular focus that incorporates aspects of the science curriculum, in particular the development of ecological literacy; the geography of the arctic and the history of victorian britain. literacy, numeracy and it skills are central. to promote creative thinking drama and role-play are key pedagogic tools. an aspect of esdgc that is particularly relevant is its requirement for schools to engage in moral education and to prepare future citizens to be morally acceptable people. again, in our current system, moral education tends to be seen as something separate from the mainstream curriculum. i argue that ethics should infuse all teaching, especially when combining esdgc and p4c. if this is to happen we need teachers who can lead enquiry on moral reasoning, the sources of ethical principles and the role of relations and community. following noddings (2013), i argue that connecting esdgc to real life issues and locating this in all school subjects can connect the different areas of study to each other and encourage critical thinking by introducing controversial issues. curriculum development: arctic stories for the purpose of this paper, i focus on one aspect of ‘arctic stories’, a case-study of whaling in the 19thc. whaling is a good choice because it illustrates how so much of the activity of analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 3 europeans at this time broke the intimate relationship between cultures and ecosystems that had coevolved over centuries. the highly localized adaptations needed for ecologically healthy ecosystems in the arctic came into conflict with the requirements of rapidly industrializing nations and an expanding international economy. the case-study introduces cyp to the sustainable, social, philosophical, political and ecological context of whaling communities. the consequences of whaling for complex biological and cultural systems are also considered. i go on now to discuss the planning tool i developed and applied to the development of the topic. the tool is generic and can be applied to planning any topic in the curriculum. esdgc: a planning tool i have incorporated two key concepts into curriculum planning for esdgc: 1) ecological understanding (how the natural and made world works and interacts); 2) aesthetic appreciation (developing awe and wonder for the natural world and human creativity to promote empathy). three key questions are used to shape the content of a topic infused with esdgc: 1) what is happening? 2) why is it happening? 3) what can we do about it? let’s start with the last question first. this question has an implicit moral component. it asks us to help children and young people think not only about what we can do, but what we should do in order to live the best lives possible. the esdgc curriculum is concerned for the well-being of sentient beings that depend on the integrity of the physical environment. in our current context the physical universe is changing at a rate not predicted 50 years ago and this raises specific moral questions that our children and young people need time to talk about. the questions that are raised in relation to esdgc are therefore always going to be moral questions. as discussed earlier, critical thinking is now widely regarded as essential if we are to prepare children for their lives. inspired by noddings (2006), i identified some key principles to guide the successful development of critical thinking in the context of esdgc and p4c. i begin by listing these principles and go on to show how i use them when planning classroom activities. 1. critical thinking is best achieved when learners have knowledge and understanding of a topic. 2. critical thinking is best developed in relation with others – it is a collaborative process. 3. critical thinking is motivated when there is a strong affective response to the content of the curriculum. emotions should be carefully examined using reason. 4. critical thinking skills are promoted through collaborative exploration of controversial and contestable issues. 5. reasoning is best developed through consideration of matters of moral and social importance so learners can apply critical thinking to real-life issues. 6. critical thinking should help learners develop self-understanding. this means students must be asked to consider what they believe and explore why they believe it. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 4 7. critical thinking is developed in relation with others through hearing, thinking, and talking about issues that are critical to our lives or the lives of other human beings. 8. the best critical thinking comes from the things children are interested in, or even better, passionate about. putting principles into practice i applied the above principles when writing the case study of 19th century british whaling taken from ‘arctic stories’ (lyle, 2010). an important consideration when planning teaching to promote critical thinking is principle 1: 1. critical thinking is best achieved when learners have knowledge and understanding of a topic. the case study of arctic whaling is the second case study the students encounter when following arctic stories. the first case study depicts the lives of the ihalmuit people of canada whose way of life was shaped by the migratory patterns of reindeer. as they study these people, the students acquire a lot of information about the climatic conditions of the arctic in the 19thc and the flora and fauna that had evolved in this context shaping the way of life of the people. the whaling case study builds on this ecological literacy and begins by introducing an inuit family whose lifestyle also depended on hunting animals. the substantial concepts of interdependence and self-sufficiency are explored, as children find out about the way of life and the relationship of the people to whales and other arctic creatures. in parallel to this they are introduced to a 19th century scottish sailor who worked on a whaling ship. the two narratives are designed to help the children see the world both through the eyes of the inuit and the whaler and provide knowledge and understanding of the topic. the design of the teaching materials is influenced by sociocultural theory (mercer & littleton, 2007) and the claim that narrative understanding is the primary meaning-making tool (lyle, 2000). following this, extensive use is made of narratives to stimulate the children’s imaginations and engage their interest. the importance of experiential learning is emphasized as role-play and drama is a key pedagogic tool (lyle, 2002) that can promote creative thinking. this links to principle 2: 2. critical thinking is best developed in relation with others – it is a collaborative process. initial activities are designed to help the children develop a principled understanding of the lives of the 19th century inuit people who depended on the whale for their very existence. working in small groups, children are asked to examine a set of illustrations depicting scenes from the lives of the people; they are invited to work out what they can about their way of life from the illustrations. in addition, they generate questions they would like to ask to develop their knowledge and understanding. in this way, their prior knowledge is activated and gaps in their understanding identified as areas for investigation. following this, the teacher shares a story with the children. this provides information that can be linked to the illustrations and may also answer some of the questions the children have raised. they are encouraged to research their unanswered questions. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 5 in order to make the knowledge their own, the children work with the illustrations and the story to create a storybook about the inuit whaling people for younger children. this process is designed to support the development of higher order literacy skills as an integral part of the learning process. the next activity is designed to give the children an understanding of why men in victorian times joined the whaling ships, and to find out what life was like aboard. through listening to a cd of the oral diary of a victorian seaman, the children learn of the circumstances that drove him to take this job – to save his wife and children from the workhouse. the diary tells the dramatic story of the voyage to the arctic and documents a whale hunt to give the cyp a graphic understanding of what life was like for the sailors on board the whaling ships. this focus on developing knowledge of the inuit and the whaling ships through dramatic narrative is designed to fulfill principle 3: 3. critical thinking is motivated when there is a strong affective response to the content of the curriculum. emotions should be carefully examined by reason. narratives about an arctic family and a scottish whaler was chosen to generate feelings of compassion and empathy for the protagonists on both sides as the students engage with their stories. work in psychology suggests that empathy is felt more intuitively if we focus on a single, identifiable human life (small & lowenstein, 2003). this understanding is drawn on by charities working in areas of need today. the implication is that advertising campaigns will be more effective in raising money if they focus on a single child’s suffering rather than the reality of a whole group. we apparently give more generously and feel the greatest empathy for a single child. known as the ‘identifiable victim effect’ it describes how we put more weight on a single story than on large-sample statistics (ibid). the decision to prepare stories about individuals also links to philosopher kieran egan’s (1988) conceptualization of teaching as storytelling. the age group targeted for this work is 8-13 years; egan (1990) argues that story-telling and narrative understanding is still the overarching pedagogic tool for engaging this age group. by the age of 8, most children become hungry for knowledge, they want to understand how humans across the ages and in different places have made sense of the world. they are ready for thinking rationally and imaginatively and both need to be drawn on. they are fascinated by what it means to be human and want to explore the best a human can be as well as the worst. egan (1990) calls this romantic understanding and he tells us this age are interested in heroes and heroines, villains and tyrants and wish to explore human characteristics such as love and hate, bravery and cowardice, cruelty and compassion, loyalty and betrayal – they want to measure themselves up against the heroes and villains, and consider what their own potential is for goodness or evil. examination of such concepts are also grist to the p4c mill. in the romantic stage we help children explore the real world and consider the extremes of experience and limits of reality. this understanding of the age group informed the planning of arctic stories. having set the scene by establishing the perspectives of the two main protagonists in the coming conflict, the children are asked to imagine the whaling ship has been stranded in the arctic over the winter (this often happened) and that the sailor and inuit meet. together the cyp develop role-plays of the conversations they think the two men would have had. they are invited to consider what they analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 6 would do if they had been a victorian man facing the prospect of separation from his wife and family, and was forced to choose between whaling and the workhouse. children role-playing the inuit try to use reason to make him change his mind and see that commercial whaling is destroying their way of life and threatening the whales. role-play allows the learners to listen and respond to the different voices that express contrasting attitudes and values towards whaling. knowledge and understanding of the arctic way of life and the lives of the poor in victorian britain is thus developed through story and imaginative pedagogy. thus whaling is established as a controversial and a moral issue (principle 4). 4. critical thinking skills are promoted through collaborative exploration of controversial and contestable issues. the story of british engagement with the original peoples of the arctic is one that exemplifies the less attractive traits of human nature – territorial violence, avarice, deceit, cheating, cruelty to animals and fellow humans. the long-term outcomes of european expansion into the arctic brought misery for the indigenous people and other sentient beings. children see this as bad and learning about the actions of our forebears often provoke negative emotions including guilt and indignation. the topic raises questions about what our forebears did and what we should do now. this is complicated because they also feel compassion for the scottish whaler who was facing poverty and the workhouse at home and only wanted to help his family. reflection on their role-play activities allows them to consider the following questions:  what arguments did the victorian whalers advance for whaling?  what arguments did the inuit people put forward against whaling?  whose arguments were the most convincing? the creation of a strong argument is a fundamental purpose of critical thinking. what seemed to motivate and engage the children to do the hard work involved in critical thinking were the emotions engendered by the stories they had heard. like all human beings, they respond not to strong arguments with evidence to back them up, but the discursive process of examining the stories. the cyp recognize the power of rage and indignation expressed in the protagonists’ stories and also understand the need for stories of hope. following the first role-play between the inuit and the sailor, the students are invited to generate questions for enquiry. the questions often reflect their interest in moral aspects of the situation, for example, ‘was it wrong for the whaler to care more about his wife and children that the wives and children of the inuit people?’ they quickly recognize that such questions are difficult or impossible to answer. they see that both the whaler and the inuit are more concerned with their own immediate families than that of the other and they understand how human a response that is. through enquiry, the cyp tried to make sense of who should take moral blame in these circumstances – following egan one group of cyp generated the following question for enquiry: who is the hero and who is the villain? the sailor had joined the whaling ship because the industrial analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 7 revolution in scotland had left him without work, which was no fault of his own. he had a wife and five children and they all faced the workhouse unless he could earn some money. cyp were of the opinion that he had no intention to cause harm to the inuit and that fact provides mitigating circumstances. they recognized that circumstances matter when passing judgment. however, once the sailor had met the inuit he could no longer claim ignorance about the impact of his behavior. the teacher in the enquiry asked the children if he should be held accountable if he decided to return for another whale hunting expedition. in responding, the children demonstrated understanding that what he does subsequent to conscious reflection will reflect on what sort of person he is. nevertheless, he still has his own family to look after. this raises the question of which he should prioritize – his own family or that of the inuit. the cyp recognized that the sailor isn’t the instigator of the whaling voyage and raised questions about the economic system that sent him to the arctic. what about the ship owners? does it matter that they made inordinate amounts of money? should either or both of them be punished for what they did? the case study and role-play activities thus generated a lot of opportunity for ethical speculation. having established some of the sources of conflict in the 19th century, a new voice is introduced in the form of a time traveler. the ‘time traveler’s story’ brings a 21st century voice to the discussion. this voice provides historical information about the trade in whales and the impact this had on the people and animals from the 19th century to the present day, and gives further information about the relationship between the whalers and the inuit. the children undertake further role-play to simulate the conversations they believed would have taken place between the victorian whalers, the inuit peoples and the time traveler. in this role-play the cyp try to decide what pathway would have maximized the well-being of all – including the future generations. the concepts of harm and fairness are discussed as they attempt to examine the moral codes of both sides and the impact of their behaviour. group loyalty is usually seen as important, but in comparing behavior and outcomes they notice that the inuit who hunt whales engage in self-serving actions that do not affect others, whilst the whaler engages in self-serving actions that negatively affect others. the time traveler calls for actions that would be beneficial to future generations with no direct personal benefits and no expected reciprocation. the arguments of the time traveler correspond to a consequentialist view of moral argument. she asks the inuit and the whaler why they did not foresee the cause and effect impact of whaling on the future population of whales and on the people. this second role-play therefore involves the polyphonic voices (bakhtin, 1984) of the characters holding conflicting views and the cyp try to make sense of who should take moral blame for the 21st century outcomes. they know that the whaler couldn’t have known what the consequences of his actions would be. such discussion can cause the students to question the validity of consequentialism as a moral theory and consider alternative approaches. this role play and subsequent enquiry illustrates principle 5: 5. reasoning is best developed through consideration of matters of moral and social importance so learners can apply critical thinking to real-life issues. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 8 the real-life stories provide the affective connection for the children, which in turn promote the emotional engagement necessary if strong arguments are to emerge. this is essential, as the skills of reasoning require the affective as well as the cognitive (egan, 1990). reflection on the arguments developed by the children ‘in role’ are then extended as children are asked to consider their own position and that of those who might disagree with them. questions suggested for them to consider include:  are the arguments of the time traveler strong enough to change current attitudes and behavior towards whales?  should we boycott products that contain ingredients from whales?  should we support a ban on whaling?  what arguments could be put forward in favour of whaling? as they explore such questions, children’s self-understanding through critical thinking and selfreflection are enhanced. these questions help children examine their own beliefs and that of others, both now and in the past, as a precursor for forming their own principled opinions. in this way, our learners can increase self-understanding, an important aspect of education and essential to moral development (sharp, 2007). this meets principle 6: 6. critical thinking should help our students develop self-understanding. this means our pupils must be asked to consider what they believe and explore why they believe it. to culminate this case study of whaling in the arctic, the teacher facilitates a community of philosophical enquiry with the children. the enquiry is informed by the earlier role-plays where the children were guided by their imagined conversations between the inuit, whaler and time traveler. these conversations helped them appreciate that the protagonists could not have known what the consequences of their actions would be. in the enquiry they show that the consideration of possible consequences of our actions is worth spending time on as they make links between the dilemmas of the past and those we face today. their understanding that both the whaler and the inuit are naturally more concerned with their own immediate families than that of the other is as true for us today as we wrestle with the huge inequalities that exist in the world, and in this respect the world we live in is very much like the world of the whaler and the inuit. we all share a natural bias towards our own children and families which can lead to injustice. the time-traveler helps the cyp understand why government may be needed to make sure the system is fair. these ideas are extended in the final case study in arctic stories when the cyp consider the up-to-date story of the polar bear and the impact of global warming. following this, the last activity in the pack asks the cyp to reflect on what principles and practices might maximize the well-being of polar bears and by extrapolation all the world’s species. in ‘let the planet speak’ the children draw up a charter of planetary rights for the world. this activity entails reflection on what moral theories would best guide our actions. they consider how designing a society for the future might be assisted or not by considering different analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 9 moral theories. this is essential if the children are to fulfill principle 7: 7. critical thinking is developed in relation with others through hearing, thinking, and talking about issues that are critical to our lives or the lives of other human beings. when planning all the activities for this case study, i had in mind the final enquiry that will bring the work to a conclusion. careful planning as discussed above, can ensure that all the principles i have identified as important to critical thinking have been properly taken account of. in my experience the final enquiry produces high quality critical thinking from the children. i suggest that this is because the subject matter chosen for the topic is controversial and the manner of its presentation through the stories of the key protagonists has stimulated the children’s interest and emotional engagement. we can therefore meet our final principle: 8. the best critical thinking comes from the things children are interested in, or even better, passionate about. in the process of their enquiries the cyp have the chance to gain insight into what it might mean to live wisely and ethically. they usually notice that the decision made by the whaler was made on the basis of emotion and see how powerful emotion is in our day-to-day decision-making. this provides support for haidt’s (2001) social intuitionist model as an alternative to rationalist models for making moral judgments. haidt argues that reasoning rarely produces moral judgments; that human beings tend to make moral decisions on the basis of emotion, justifying their decisions with post hoc reasoning. by experiencing enquiry where they can learn to reason using critical thinking and pay greater attention to evidence, the cyp have the possibility of becoming mindful of the ever-present possibility of error in our ethical decision-making, and learn to be more self-reflective. this supports sharp’s argument that classrooms that become communities of enquiry can bring about better thinking on the part of students and a growth in emotional maturity (sharp, 2007). summary my research suggests that planning, framing and teaching curriculum for esdgc around controversial issues is an exciting way to promote critical thinking skills. too often critical thinking consists of decontextualized exercises that claim to develop skills, and are presented as yet another lesson to be added to an overcrowded curriculum. for me, critical thinking cannot be taught directly as a set of exercises, for we can’t think critically about something we know little about. we have to carefully plan for critical thinking across all curriculum areas, not consider it as a ‘bolt on’ extra, not a condiment to the main curriculum meal, but the driver of planning. my research supports noddings’ (2006) argument that critical thinking is the skillful use of reason that can be developed through a consideration of controversial issues. in fact, it can provide much more than this. when curriculum encourages passionate, personal engagement (sharp, 2007), it can lead children to bring reason to bear on matters of moral importance that affect their own beliefs and decision making, and in the process they learn how to develop and assess arguments – the heart of critical thinking. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 10 this approach, which taps into egan’s (1990) romantic understanding framework also helps children to learn and remember the content of the curriculum. a curriculum designed using the principles of critical thinking outlined above, can generate genuine interest on the part of students and when they are interested they will learn and remember. it is well documented that much of what our children currently learn in school is promptly forgotten. i have gone back to schools 1-4 years after they have followed arctic stories and found strong memories remaining, not just for facts and information, but deep understanding of the controversies and issues considered. the learners have made connections to things that interest them –in this case the fundamental human condition of conflict over access to and use of the planet’s resources, and consideration of how to resolve such conflict and the probable impact on the people and animals of the planet if such differences are not resolved. i have also learned that experiential learning through dramatic role-play and enquiry can aid memory. the research supports the argument that dialogue should be at the centre of effective classroom practice (mercer & hodgkinson (2008). furthermore, structuring understanding by planning meaningful literacy tasks linked to real-life issues is an effective way to improve literacy and develop literate thinking (lyle & jenkins, 2010). and most of all, remembering is improved when there is a strong affective response to the material being studied. conclusion we should not ask cyp to think critically on issues they know little or nothing about. they will not be able to reason well without adequate information. we should therefore build critical thinking into the content of our curriculum. to do this, we need to find or create powerful narratives to harness the affective to the cognitive, and create the conflict between opposing positions on issues that are of interest to us all. we need to ensure the tasks we give our students are based around collaborative learning and enquiry to give them the chance to explore their own beliefs, and subject those beliefs to scrutiny and interrogation. following lipman (2003), any teacher using these activities should be aware that critical thinking is just one type of thinking being developed. the key pedagogical tool used is collaborative learning designed to promote collaborative thinking (lyle, 2008). all the activities in ‘arctic stories’ are collaborative; they depend on students working together to complete them. the activities they engage in and the artefacts they produce require creative thinking. from the production of a story for younger children and imaginative engagement in listening to story and carrying out role-play, through to the dialogue that takes place during communities of enquiry, the children are engaged in creative thinking. finally, and underpinning all the other types of thinking, is caring thinking as discussed by ann-margaret sharp (2014): the good life comes from what we care about, what we value, what we think truly important, as distinguished from what we think merely trivial. through this case study, students are engaged in the process of thinking through what the protagonists in the story care about, examining the justifications they employ, and considering what was important to them as individuals and as a community. through the role-play, they rehearsed their analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 11 ideas and in the process gained confidence in presenting the ideas of others and of themselves. sharp (2014) identifies different elements of caring thinking that includes thinking ethically, appreciating values, being sensitive to the feelings of others, being moved to act to attain one’s chosen values and imagining how things might be different from the norm. all of these elements are present in the children’s consideration of the lives of people and whales. such considerations can promote their moral development. however, caring thinking is more than this; children are also encouraged to care about the quality of their thinking, to explore their own thoughts and listen to the thoughts of others, to be prepared to change their minds when hearing what others think, and to justify their own ideas with reasons. when we are the recipients of caring thinking, when others listen carefully to our ideas and respond to them, whether they agree or disagree, we grow as individuals (noddings, 2003). from this perspective, moral life is thoroughly relational. our selves are constructed through encounters with others, it is a relational process; caring thinking is therefore a moral approach to the classroom and, by extension, to life. i began this article by outlining a set of principles to guide curriculum planning to incorporate and develop critical thinking. i end by arguing that critical thinking is not enough; we also need to promote collaborative, creative and caring thinking –the 4cs necessary to the holistic development of the learners in our care. all four types of thinking have been incorporated in the planning process and are essential to the development of critical thinking. learning and teaching in this way is a moral challenge and demands a long-term perspective. the best of us want to live ethical lives. we want our children to behave morally, to take their obligations seriously to strive for a just world. education should have an empathic, ethical heart if it is to tackle the environmental crisis. orr (2004) asks us what could be more important today than climate stability, the maintenance of the natural world and biological diversity. actions to achieve this involve asking moral questions about justice and fairness. it requires an understanding of cultural and biological diversity and above all the cultivation of a moral imagination. it requires curriculum infused with esdgc in a way that promotes critical thinking through the community of enquiry and moral education. references bakhtin, m.m. (1984), problems of dostoevsky’s poetics. ed. and trans. caryl emerson. minneapolis: university of minnesota press. department for children, education, lifelong learning and skills (2008a) education for sustainable development and global citizenship. cardiff: welsh assembly government. http://learning.gov.wales/docs/learningwales/publications/081204commonunderstschoolsen .pdf department for children, education, lifelong learning and skills (2008b) skills framework for 3-19 year olds in wales. cardiff: welsh assembly government. http://learning.gov.wales/docs/learningwales/publications/140626-skills-framework-for-3-19year-olds-en.pdf egan, k. (1988) teaching as storytelling: an alternative approach to teaching and the curriculum. london: routledge. egan, k. (1990) romantic understanding: the development of rationality and imagination. london: analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 12 routledge. haidt, j. (2001) the emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. psychological review. vol.108:4, pp. 814-834. harris, s. (2011) (kindle edition) the moral landscape. transworld digital. lipman, m. (2003) thinking in education (3rd edition). cambridge: cambridge university press. lyle, s. (2000) narrative understanding: developing a theoretical context for understanding how children make meaning in classroom studies. journal of curriculum studies. vol. 32:1, pp. 45 63. lyle, s. (2002) talking to learn: the voices of children aged 9-11, engaged in role play. language and education. vol. 16:4, pp. 303-317. lyle, s. (2008) learners’ collaborative talk. in: hornberger, nancy, h. (ed) encylopedia of language and learning. volume 3: discourse and education, section 4: discourse and the construction of knowledge. pp. 279-290. springer: reference. lyle, s. (2010) arctic stories: a thematic approach to the key stage 2/3 curriculum. birmingham: imaginative minds lyle, s. & jenkins, p. (2010) enacting dialogue: the impact of promoting philosophy for children on the literate thinking of identified poor readers, aged 10. language and education, vol. 24:6, pp. 459-472. mercer, n. & littleton, k. (2007) dialogue and the development of children’s thinking: a dialogic approach. london: routledge. mercer, n. & hodgkinson, s. (2008) (eds) exploring talk in school. london: sage. noddings, n. (2003) happiness and education. cambridge: cambridge university press. noddings, n. (2006) critical lessons. cambridge: cambridge university press. noddings, n. (2013) education and democracy in the 21st century. new york: teachers college press. orr, d.w. (2004) earth in mind: on education, environment and the human prospect. washington: island press. sharp, a.m. (2007) education of the emotions in the classroom community of inquiry. gifted education international. vol. 22:2-3, pp. 248-257. sharp, a.m. (2014) the other dimension of caring thinking (with a new commentary by phillip cam) journal of philosophy in schools. vol. 1: 1, pp.15-21. small, d.a. & lowenstein, g. (2003) helping a victim or helping the victim: altruism and identifiabilty. journal of risk and uncertainty, vol.26:1, pp.5-16. address correspondences to: dr. sue lyle university of wales, trinity st david’s swansea, wales sue.marilyn.lyle@gmail.com analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 73 an education for “practical” conceptual analysis in the practice of “philosophy for children” arthur wolf and susan t. gardner introduction hinking about and inventing concepts is the hallmark of the philosophical endeavor. concepts like fairness, beauty, friendship and knowledge are some of those with a long philosophical lineage that start with questions like ‘what is …?’, ‘why?’, ‘how is it different from …?’ and ‘does it then follow that…?’ these questions are crucial, as they set up a relationship between concepts and conceptualizers such that practical concept-utilization can be done in better or worse ways. in daily life we are constantly confronted with situations that call for inquiries into these big topics. thus, for instance, if i wonder if i should tell him that his new hair-style looks great, while i actually think it doesn't, that requires that i work through the concepts of friendship and beauty, as well as the concepts of truth and lying. "should i tell her i think her marriage has taken a wrong turn?" "should i tell him that his breath smells?" several concepts play a role here even though we may not be sure which ones take precedence. practical engagement with concepts through questions, in other words, matters. in what is to follow, we will suggest that practical conceptual analysis, despite its sophisticated philosophical vibe, is, in fact, the responsibility of all of us as we go about our everyday lives. if this so, then it follows that those who are interested in practical educational strategies, such as those in the field of philosophy for children (p4c), need to have a “working view” of concepts, not only so that they can pass on that view to others, but also so as to empower the facilitator and, as a consequence, the community of philosophical inquiry (cpi)—the pedagogical cornerstone of p4c. we will undertake such an exploration here, while attempting to skirt the particular ins and outs of the philosophical landscape with regard to what precisely concepts are, such as: are they mental representations or images, can they be defined by necessary and sufficient conditions, or are they prototypicals. we will, in other words, rather than exploring the heavens of academic philosophical discourse with regard to concepts, explore how the practical application of value concepts, that is, those that underwrite individual behavior, can go well or poorly. in so doing, we presume that we will make the case that quality education for such concept application is imperative. t analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 74 along the way, it will become evident that the sort of dialogue that is undertaken in a cpi can be precisely the sort that serves as practice for real-world value-concept application. as well, we will suggest that there are certain kinds of questions, namely those that both establish a precise context, while simultaneously “laddering-up” into target concepts, that are optimal for giving practice in real world value-concept application. we will further argue that, precisely because competent valueconcept application is so essential for both individual and collective well-being, that a deeper more flexible view of a target concept can be used as a measure of the degree to which a cpi can be judged as fruitful. with regard to the set-up of what is to follow, we will begin with an outline of the basic distinction between concepts that emerge as a result of physical world interaction (baseline concepts) and those that emerge as a result of social interaction (value concepts); we will then analyze how the application of value concepts can go well or poorly; and finally, we briefly offer ways in which a cpi (with some tweaking) can be particularly valuable in nudging participants into being more competent in this life-altering practice of value-concept application. so let us begin. two kinds of concepts corresponding to two kinds of selves in what is to follow, we suggest that much traction can be gained in understanding the human conceptual framework, as well as the degree to which individuals can be considered responsible for its use, if we categorize human concepts as a function of our two kinds of selves: our physical selves, which we will call 'inter-world' selves and our social selves, which we will call 'inter-personal' selves. that is, we will argue that qualitatively different kinds of concepts emerge as a function of our different kinds of selves. we will deal with these in turn. inter-world selves: base-line concepts let us start our exploration at what might be conceived as the developmental dimension of the physical self or inter-world self. that is, we will presume that the capacity to conceptualize in the sense of organizing perceptions, emerges in a trajectory that is virtually simultaneous with the capacity to sense stimuli1. indeed, it could be argued that the very notion of stimuli makes little sense unless it is presumed to be undergirded by conceptualization, which can be characterized as the capacity to organize stimuli in such a way that “similar ways of responding are elicited by similar stimuli” (i.e., classical conditioning)—a notion not dissimilar from an abilities view of concepts (dummett; kenny). in other words, the foundation of this exploration rests on kant’s precept that: “percepts without concepts are empty, concepts without percepts are blind.”2 the implications with regard to understanding the emergence of conceptualization this way are many. to begin with, it follows that the capacity for conceptualization is not a function of linguistic ability. that is, since non-linguistic animals can clearly perceive food, fire, trees, predators, and so forth, if we apply kant’s dictum, it follows that they clearly have the ability to view their environment analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 75 through a conceptual grid. though this reference to non-linguistic animals is somewhat tangential to the exploration here, it is nonetheless important as it reminds us to be alert to the fact that many human concepts arise in a manner not dissimilar to that of our non-linguistic animal friends, namely, as a result of our embodied encounter with the environment (a thesis congruent with what shapiro refers to as an embodied mind thesis). as with other animals, our concept of a tree as a solid entity, for example, emerged as a function of the fact that we cannot walk through it. as a result of this embodied mind thesis, we can also presume that conceptualizing entities who have similar bodies and who inhabit similar environments, will use fairly similar conceptual grids to organize their base-line experience of the world, with base-line referring to concepts that inevitably arise given bodilyenvironmental interaction. it is on this basis that we can presume that, with regard to base-line concepts, all humans have similar concepts: all humans will form a concept of fire that will be informative of the fact that a close encounter can result in burns. importantly, it must be kept in mind, following damasio, that all these concepts are “somatically marked” (175), meaning that they are perceived as having more or less positive or negative importance for the animal. gardner (thinking your way to freedom) describes how this somatic marking can impact animal behavior in the following way: this value/behavior dialectic can be illuminated through an analogy with color. let us suppose that all animals are pre-programmed so that red is appetitive (i.e., red elicits an approach response) and blue is aversive (i.e., blue elicits an avoidance response). with association, red and blue rub off on various objects and situations so that, with extensive experience, an animal’s environment becomes a riot of color with many shades and variations of red, blue, and purple. were we to have the appropriate metaphysical glasses, we would be able to predict an animal’s behavior merely by seeing the colors of its world. we would know, for instance, that a vibrant red would be extremely appetitive, a pale blue mildly aversive, while we would predict that a deep purple would elicit a highly ambivalent response. (13) finally, following kant’s reasoning in the transcendental deduction, we can presume that any entity who perceives objects as a function of the capacity to conceptualize, must, thereby, also have a sense of self—at least in the sense of being aware of the self as an embodied agent, such as a self whose body is such that it cannot walk through trees; a self that we are referring to here as an inter-world self. inter-personal selves: interpersonal-value (practical) concepts humans are not merely conscious animals. unlike most of our other animal friends, we are also self-conscious. to understand the degree to which different kinds of concepts emerge as a result of the emergence of self-consciousness, let us turn to the account of the emergence of selfconsciousness, or what might be referred to as the emergence of the social or inter-personal self, according to george herbert mead, as depicted by susan gardner in her article “taking selves seriously” (2011). according to mead, self-consciousness emerges as function of an analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 76 …emerging awareness that there is a correlation between the changing affect (or response) of the other and particular units of one’s own behavior. a young child, in other words, becomes aware of her actions through the fact that a change in the behavior, verbal response, and/or attitude of the other sends the message that her actions are positively or negatively valued by that other. thus, according to mead, self-consciousness, rather than being some mysterious metaphysical exudate of the brain, is rather an awareness of one’s behavior through the fact that it is valued either positively or negatively by others. (emphasis added, 81) what mead is saying, then, is that self-consciousness as such quite literally develops because of, and only because of, social interaction. without interaction, in other words, there would be no selfconsciousness—a theory, by the way, that is empirically supported by experiment carried out by gallup who showed that the self-consciousness evident in chimps as measured by mirror-related activities is absent in chimps that are raised in isolation. (emphasis added, gardner, “taking selves seriously” 81) entities who are self-conscious, in other words, can be described as entities who organize their behavior with respect to interpersonal values—in contrast to and in addition to inter-world values— that are borrowed from prominent others in their social milieu; for example, that such-and-such behavior is considered rude, or courageous, or fair, and so on. it is in this sense, then, that selfconscious entities can be described as having a qualitatively different layer of concepts that impacts their organizational responses. let us refer to these concepts that emerge as a result of social interaction as interpersonal value concepts, or pace kant, simply as practical concepts, in contrast to the base-line concepts that emerge as a result of base-line interactions between the body and its physical environment. what is important to note with regard to these different-in-kind concepts is that, with regard to base-line concepts, there is no choice in the matter: the concept of fire will inevitably contain the notion of potential harm. with regard to interpersonal values, however, here are several degrees of latitude for variance. to begin with such variance might be a function of the strength or weakness of the justificatory apparatus that supports concept application. that is, you and i can disagree as to whether a particular act of behavior is or is not cowardly by offering reasons in support of our views. we can think here of garcin, the protagonist in sartre’s no exit. he tried desperately to convince his “hell-mate” that, even though he ran from war, he had a good reason for doing so, since he was, after all, a pacifist. secondly, even if we agree on the concept application, we might nonetheless disagree with regard to its degree of blameor praiseworthiness, or its “depth of color”: what you consider inexcusably rude (a deep blue), i might view as simply an innocent “faux pas” (closer to a pale purple) (see reference to color in gardner above). thirdly, how a practical concept is appropriately applied also depends very much on context, which, of course, can be infinitely variable. thus, while “a rose is a rose is a rose”3 regardless of context, the application of value concepts is essentially contextdependent. such context-dependency ought not to be considered a defect but instead, following habermas, is a necessary condition for the normal use of language: “in everyday communication an analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 77 utterance never stands alone; a semantic context accrues to it from the context the speaker presupposes that the hearer understands” (125). this fact, that the analysis and application of value concepts can vary widely, is the source of the call to account. that is, to the degree that practical concepts can have a considerable impact on the actions of the conceptualizer, and to the degree that a conceptualizer can have at least some degree of “reasonable” control over the design of her conceptual lens, to that degree it can be argued that we conceptualizers have a responsibility, both collectively and individually, to ensure that the manner in which we apply concepts can indeed by justified. practical conceptual analysis the unmooring it is important to emphasize that this claim that conceptual analysis and application is the responsibility of all agents refers only to a given set: there are only some concepts over which any conceptualizer has any control. as has already been mentioned, concepts that arise as a result of mind-physical world interactions are concepts over which an embodied conceptualizer has little or no control. what is interesting about this sort of rigid mind-world conceptual grid is that it may very well inform a person’s “concept of concepts,” that is, a conceptualizer may assume that concepts are categorizations over which a conceptualizer has little control. thus, for instance, a conceptualizer might assume, as is quite typical of children, that something is or is not fair, or that something is or is not just, as a result of some sort of conceptual fiat, in the same way that a thing is or is not a tree. this is where the imperative that one gain control over the analysis and application of one’s practical concepts first finds breath. conceptualizers, not just philosophers, need to understand that there are some concepts that are up for grabs, and that the interpersonal value concepts that guide their own behavior are precisely the sort that fall into this category.4 and conceptualizers need to understand how relevant this is to their own lives. they need to understand, in other words, that to the degree that they can be held responsible for their own behavior, and to the degree that practical concepts guide that behavior, and to the degree that practical concepts are indeed up for grabs, it follows that, to that degree, conceptualizers can be held responsible for how they construe such concepts. the first step to enhancing conceptual agency, in other words, is to unmoor practical concepts from their heretofore tyrannical grip. objectivity’s anchor the mirror image of viewing interpersonal value concepts as authoritatively rigid is to view them as up for grabs in an anarchical sense. that is, so the reasoning goes, if the meaning of such analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 78 concepts is not locked in, then surely it is entirely up to individual whim as to how such concepts should be applied. this movement from “all to nothing” may indeed be the source of what appears to be wide-spread contemporary subjectivism, or what matthew crawford calls, in his book, the world beyond your head: on becoming an individual in an age of distraction, rampant “moral autism” (184). in supporting his view, crawford cites a 2008 study done by notre dame sociologist christian smith that investigated the moral views of 230 young american adults. smith’s findings were summarized as follows: many were quick to talk about their moral feelings but hesitant to link these feelings to any broader thinking about a shared moral framework. . . as one put it, “i mean i guess what makes something right is how i feel about it. but different people feel different ways, so i couldn’t speak on behalf of anyone else as to what’s right and wrong”. (183) this “fixed to anarchical” swing with regard to conceptual application, interestingly, mirrors a not uncommon philosophical assumption with regard to fact and value: that value concepts are somehow basically meaningless since an evaluative conclusion cannot be inferred from factual premises. what we want to argue here, by contrast, is that the degree of legitimacy of practical concept application is a function of the objectivity of the process.5 that is, just as the legitimacy of the application of many factual concepts, in science for instance, is very much a function of the objectivity with which the evidence is evaluated, so, we argue, the application of value concepts is very much a function of the objectivity of the reasoning process. in order to elaborate on this notion of “objectivity in reasoning,” we will turn first to jürgen habermas and then to stephen darwell, both of whom argue that objectivity in reasoning is a function of a very particular kind of interpersonal dialogue. objectivity and interpersonal dialogue habermas takes issue with the notion that objectivity (what he refers to as rationality) can be approximated by any kind of solitary intrapersonal purely logical thought (pace kant)—a view famously concretized by rodin’s thinker. habermas argues, by contrast, that rationality (or objectivity) can only be achieved through interpersonal dialogue of a certain sort, namely one in which a valuer is prepared to expose her “reasoned” value claim to the critique of opposing viewpoints. thus, in his book, the theory of communicative action, habermas says: anyone participating in argumentation shows his rationality or lack of it by the manner in which he handles and responds to the offering of reasons for or against claims. if he is “open to argument,” he will either acknowledge the force of those reasons or seek to reply to them, either way he will deal with them in a “rational” manner. if he is “deaf to argument,” by contrast, he analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 79 may either ignore contrary reasons or reply to them with dogmatic assertions, and either way he fails to deal with the issues rationally. (18) habermas is arguing, in other words, that “we must be willing to test with reasons and only with reasons whether the claims defended by the proponent (including ourselves) rightfully stand” (25). the most prominent implication of habermas’ view is that the estimation of the legitimacy of practical concept application requires that we dialogue with one another in a fairly intimate manner. if we take habermas’ reference to “meaning” as similar to what we are here referring to as interpersonal value concepts, then the following quote is particularly germane to the argument presented here. he says that “understanding meaning differs from perceiving physical objects: it requires taking up an intersubjective relation with the subject who brought forth the expression” (111). he goes on to say that “[t]o understand, one must become a potential member of that individual’s lifeworld”; and that “objectively, i can hear noises, but once i genuinely understand, then what is said is something that can be true of false. i am then challenged to react with a ‘yes’ or ‘no.’ it becomes a comment on our common world” (112). habermas, thus, suggests that a necessary condition of legitimate value concept application is a willingness to engage in a kind of interpersonal reasoning that requires that we listen to views that may be different from our own. darwell fleshes out this notion by arguing that such an interpersonal reasoning process requires that we presuppose an objective standard that adjudicates as to what does and does not count as a good reason in any given situation—an attitude which he calls taking “a second-person stance.” thus, in his book the second-person standpoint: morality, respect, and accountability darwell argues that “to enter into the second-person stance and make claims and demands of one another at all, you and i must presuppose that we share a common second-personal authority, competence, and responsibility simply as free and rational agents” (5). this “exchange thus involves reciprocal acknowledgment of norms that govern both parties and presupposes that both parties are mutually accountable, having an equal authority to complain, resist coercion, and so on” (48). and he goes to say, quoting petit and smith (1996) that “in taking up the conversational stance, both must assume (1) that there are norms that govern what each should believe, (2) that each can recognize these norms, that each is capable of guiding their beliefs by them” (433). darwell argues, as well, that to engage in such an interchange is to accord that other what he refers to as “recognition respect,” which he distinguished from “appraisal respect,” with the latter being characterized by a form of esteem. recognition respect, by contrast is not about appraisal but how our relations are to be regulated (123). recognition respect, in other words, allows me to vehemently disagree with your position, even to find it abhorrent, and yet to nonetheless engage with you in reasoned dialogue; which emphasizes again the degree of intimacy and commitment necessary for genuine dialogue. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 80 in contrast to relationships of power, genuine interpersonal reasoning, or what darwell calls second-personal interaction, requires the assumption on the part of all participants that the win is a function of the relative strength of reason-offerings and not a function of the desired outcome on the part of any one participant. and in that vein, darwell argues, quoting fichte, that we need to be alert to the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate forms of address with the former being characterized “summoning” the other’s will, as opposed to “impermissible ways of simply causing wanted behavior” (darwell 21), i.e., that second-personal address is reason-giving in its nature. it differs fundamentally from coercion in that it seeks to direct a person through her own free choice, and in a way that recognizes her status as a free and rational agent. it is, as it were, an attempt to guide rather than goad (darwell 49). contextualization and de-contextualization though habermas and darwell have much to give us in terms of understanding how objectivity is possible with regard to value concept application, we need to be aware that we are not, as a result, seduced by a scientific or “universal” aura to such an extent that we fail to take account of the importance of being sensitive to context, to differing interpersonal perspectives, and to the “lives of concepts.” concepts do not operate in a vacuum but instead interact with other concepts, with the context, and as well, change as a result of interpersonal interaction. with regard to context, lipman (thinking in education) puts it this way: “[a]dvocates of better thinking have usually pointed out that [critical] thinking would generally involve an intense sensitivity to contextual individuality” (208) and that “readers must master the contextuality of meaning” (146; see also 224-225). we must always keep in mind, in other words, that contexts, even those that seem remarkably similar, virtually always have aspects or nuances that differentiate it from others. it is for that reason that, when we engage in thinking about concepts, we need to undertake a kind of dance that alternates between the context and concept, or between one contextualization or another. moving first to contextualization, one might ask, “was garcin a coward because he refused to fight in his particular situation?” and then to a de-contextualization, “what is a coward?” and vice versa. this dance enriches both the context and the concept which, in turn, is also enriched by the interchange between conceptualizers. thus, while estelle buys garcin’s argument about pacifism: “no one could blame a man for that” (81), inez puts that view into question when she says, “no doubt you argued it out with yourself, you weighed the pros and cons, you found good reasons for what you did. but fear and hatred and all the dirty little instincts one keeps dark—they're motives too” (81). thinking about concepts, then, requires a dance between interlocutors and between contexts and concepts. it requires an inquisitive attitude, a willingness to interrupt expectations, experimentation. it requires a certainty that, despite the importance of concept application in guiding behavior, and despite the possibility of objectivity through reasoned exchange in a public forum, one will never quite be certain, inquiry will always be necessary, and ultimately the dance will never end. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 81 summary thus far in summary, then, it has been argued that, while the opposite of a rigid application of value concepts (in a manner similar to the application of base-line concepts) would appear to be anarchic subjectivism, there is a third alternative, namely objective anchoring via second-personal dialogue—an anchoring which nonetheless ought not to constrain the contextual/de-contextual dance necessary to gain an adequate view of practical concept application in any particular situation. this combination of objectivity and conceptual dance ensures that, despite the dance, the concept doesn’t become “unhinged” with every differing opinion. this objectivity of process also has a fundamental impact on those conceptualizers who are willing to so engage. more specifically, from a habermasian point of view, such individuals are worthy of considering themselves as genuinely “rational,” and from a darwellian point of view, such individuals are worthy of genuine respect, not only in the sense that they are willing to grant such respect to others, but as well, because they are willing to take responsibility for how they apply value concepts, as well as holding others to account. they are, as it were, willing to take responsibility for how they see the world. matthew crawford puts it this way: “arguably, what it takes to be an individual is to develop a considered evaluative take on the world, and stand behind it” (184)—though, of course, not in the sense of having a static view but rather in the sense of being prepared to make a commitment to a view while nonetheless remaining open to the possibility of “dancing further.” education for practical conceptual analysis if it is true that consistently engaging in practical conceptual analysis and application is the responsibility of all agents, and if it is true that engaging in second-personal dialogue is a necessary condition for doing this well, then it follows that, if we are to educate for competent practical concept application, then educators need to have a vision of the sort of mind that needs to be cultivated so that agents may become competent practical conceptualizers. we suggest this vision be informed by the following: (a) a fundamental inclination, or motivation, to get the application of value concepts right, particularly with respect to context, in the sense of recognizing that such application underwrites behavior, and hence the identity of all concerned; (b) a fundamental understanding of concept application in the sense of recognizing both that the application of contextualized value concepts requires reasoned negotiation in public space, along with contextualization and de-contextualization, and that the outcome of such a negotiation is a function of reason, not the reasoners involved; (c) a fundamental attitude toward the process of concept application in the sense of being open to reasoned alternatives to one’s own and showing an intense sensitivity to context; (d) a fundamental skill in the sense of acquiring an understanding of the basic moves of contexualization/de-contextualization, as well as the sorts of logical essentials that are necessary to distinguish between good and poor reasons that support the various perspectives. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 82 all of the above can be enhanced through education. here we will argue that the worldwide educational initiative of philosophy for children (p4c), because of its process and format, is particularly well placed to excel in enhancing the fundamental motivation, understanding, attitude and skills that are necessary for individuals to become competent and responsible value conceptualizer. this framework also, intriguingly, offers an interesting way to measure the degree to which a philosophical inquiry is a success. the cpi process with regard to process, the modus operandi of philosophy for children is the community of philosophical inquiry (cpi). within a cpi, participants engage in a facilitated inquiry with regard to the issue at hand. it is because of this facilitation—one that is (or ought to be) rigorous and often deeply involved with regard to the process rather than content, that a cpi can be said to provide the garden in which the sort of optimal dialogue, of which habermas and darwell speak, can flourish. ann margaret sharp, one of the founders of the p4c movement, describes the community of philosophical inquiry in the following way: “this education is an education in procedural principles (as contrasted with substantive principles) that can help young persons move towards objectivity, …when i use the term 'objectivity', i mean an inter-subjective truth arrived at by human beings through inquiry, experimentation, consideration of the evidence and dialogue” (39-40). much has been written about the importance of facilitator transactions in this regard, (gardner 1995; kennedy 2004; gregory 2007), so we will not labor this point here except to say that, with regard to the fundamentals that are needed for engaging in “second personal dialogue” in the interests of competent practical concept application, a competently run cpi underwrites both “c” (attitude of openness) and “d” (reasoning skills) above. that is, in a cpi, since participants must inevitably listen to opposing points of view, and since such a cpi can be enormously invigorating to all concerned, this experience serves as a positively reinforcing practice of being open to alternatives other than their own (“c” above). as well, to the degree that a facilitator is keenly attuned to the logic that underpins various claims, such as hidden assumptions, counter-examples, etc., and to the degree that problematic logical issues are made evident, to that degree participants learn that some reasons can be judged as better or worse than others, not on the basis of who made the claim, but on the basis of the degree to which they can withstand logical challenge (“d” above) (though, of course, a case can be made that, aside from participating in cpi’s, participants could benefit enormously from receiving direct instruction with regard to learning logical essentials that help to distinguish good from poor reasoning) (gardner 2015). the cpi setup but what about “a” and “b,” the motivation to get the application of value concepts right, as well as the understanding that legitimate concept application is a function of reasoned negotiation in public space? here the set-up of the cpi matters. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 83 the typical set-up for a cpi is one which begins with a stimulus of some kind, such as a story, which is then used to elicit questions about which participants wish to inquire (gregory; weber & wolf). though this format seems simple, it can be the source of much difficulty for facilitators, as it may be that relatively few of the suggested questions are appropriate for inquiry. in an effort to help facilitators in avoiding the pitfall of attempting to anchor an inquiry with a non-inquiry question, a number of authors have offered characterizations of the sort of question that should be avoided, e.g., questions whose answers can be found in the text, questions whose answers need expertise, questions whose answers is up to anyone’s imagination (cam), questions that already have definitive answers, empirical questions, religious/mystical questions (gregory), google questions, silly questions, “it doesn’t much matter” questions (dumas). here, we would like to add to the latter a positive suggestion that emerges from the present focus on practical conceptual application. that is, while certainly avoiding non-inquiry questions, we would like to suggest that facilitators ought to be particularly alert to context specific questions that have the potential to ladder into target value concepts. examples of such questions might be the following: was it unfair for johnny not to share his homework with sally? (targeting the concept of fairness), or, after reading anansi and the moss covered rock, a question as to whether it was alright for little bush deer to deceive anansi, since anansi had deceived others (targeting the concept of deception (wartenberg). we suggest this for the following reasons. though we have argued that becoming competent in value concept analysis and application is a responsibility of all agents, clearly learning about concept analysis and application in and of itself, such as what is it to be fair or what counts as being a coward, is virtually unintelligible. as mentioned above, the potential for concept application varies widely, potentially infinitely, as a function of context, justificatory support, and purported “colour.” referring again to lipman (philosophy goes to school) with regard to context, he says that: students should be able to recognize how assertions change their meanings—and possibly their truth values—when applied to a variety of contexts. thus in asserting that something is true, one should be prepared to say under what circumstances it might be false and vice versa (214). it is because of this essential variability that no rule book will do with regard to the analysis and application of value concepts; these are not knowledge factums. and it is precisely for this reason that it is being argued here that agents need to become competent in the reasoning process through which any given practical concept might be applied in any given specific situation. thus, we suggest that if a cpi begins with a context specific question that targets a specific value concept, the resulting inquiry will indeed be the sort through which participants gain practice in the process of practical concept application. to elaborate further by way of example, let us suppose that from a class of elementary school youngsters, after reading together “dragons and giants” from frog and toad together, the following analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 84 sorts of questions (suggested by wartenberg) become the focus of inquiry: are frog and toad brave even though they jumped away? or was it wrong for frog and toad to run away? or was toad brave even though he was shaking with fear? thereafter, in the ensuing cpi, youngsters can reflect together on whether there was a time when any of them ran away when maybe they shouldn’t have, or whether there was a time when they were shaking with fear but nonetheless stood their ground. it is thus precisely through such communal inquiry into the fluid nature of concept application that youngsters (a) actually get practice in negotiating such application, (b) experience the exhilaration of recognizing that there are better and worse ways to describe such situations, and (c) begin to understand that getting a more accurate take on how such concepts are applied actually matters. it is in this sense, then, that a cpi that is set up in this way can nurture “a” and “b” above, i.e., (a) that motivation for getting the application of value concepts right will be enhanced and (b) a fundamental understanding of the process of concept application in the sense of recognizing that the application of value concepts requires reasoned negotiation in public space that is highly sensitive to context. it is important to keep in mind with regard to the suggestion of anchoring a cpi based on a context specific question that targets a specific value concept that the value of the original question and the value of the resulting conceptual analysis are interdependent. on the one hand, the original question of whether or not frog and toad are brave is fruitful precisely because it ladders easily into the concept of bravery and thereby gives participants an opportunity to play with concept application not only in various alternative potentially personal scenarios, but with altering minutia (e.g., were they in mortal danger, did they think they were in mortal danger, should they have established whether or not they were in mortal danger, etc.) and in so doing, it alerts participants as to how complex valueconcept application really is. on the other hand, however, the original question, precisely because of its precision, serves as a magnet to “corral in” the discussion so it doesn’t wing off into infinite ruminations that would, in real life, paralyze practical reasoning. the above, then, serves as a suggested guide to facilitators for picking and/or formulating “good questions” by which to anchor a cpi, namely those that are precise enough to keep the inquiry within an intelligible range, but that nonetheless ladder up into target concepts; it is the tension between these two that will afford participants an exhilarating practice in the vagaries of competent concept application. the measure of success measuring the degree to which a cpi is successful has been an on-going challenge for philosophy for children. valiant attempts have been made by many with regard to measuring specific moves that are undertaken in communities of inquiry; attempts to measure whether, for example, there are consecutive peer-to-peer exchanges uninterrupted by the teacher, or whether the teacher does not miss opportunities to ask students to explain and support their positions with reasons, examples, and evidence, etc. (reznitskaya). though such attempts are admirable and inspiring, they are beyond the scope of most individual facilitators. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 85 by contrast, this focus on conceptual analysis, along with its companion notion of laddering questions, will help the facilitator informally measure the degree to which a cpi has been fruitful. that is, facilitators might first ask themselves if the inquiry was anchored in a precise or “situated,” laddering question, and then, whether the ensuing inquiry did indeed result in a more complex, nuanced, riveting understanding of the concept in question. if the answer is yes on both counts, then it seems to us that the facilitator can give herself credit for nudging her co-inquirers toward becoming more competent responsible conceptualizers. conclusion what does it mean to be brave? are mothers brave for having children? is a fireman brave for going into a burning building? are lions brave when they take down an antelope? is anyone who speaks their mind, regardless on what’s on their mind, and regardless of the situation, brave? or is it wrong to deceive? is it wrong to lie to a murderer about the location of his intended innocent victim? is it wrong to tell granny that she looks lovely when you think she doesn’t? is it wrong for parents to lie to their children about santa claus? is it wrong for corporations to lie about the benefits of their products? the above demonstrates, incontestably we believe, that attempting to answer questions like “what does it means to be brave?” or “is it wrong to deceive?” in and of themselves, regardless of context is, quite literally, a meaningless activity. and, it is for that reason that it is evident that becoming “conceptually competent” cannot be a matter of simply learning what such-and-such concept means as a system of rules or, even, following kant, how they might apply universally.6 we have argued here that becoming “conceptually competent” (rather than acquiring knowledge or learning a simple application formula) requires (a) that one is motivated to get the application of essentially variable value concepts right, particularly with respect to context; (b) that one understands that the application of contextualized value concepts requires reasoned negotiation in public space; (c) that, for that reason, one is open to reasoned alternatives to one’s own and one shows an intense sensitivity to context; and (d) that one is able to utilize basic logical skills so as to distinguish between good and poor reasons in support of alternative viewpoints, all the while, being highly sensitive to context. we have further argued that philosophy for children is well placed to enhance conceptual competence, particularly if the questions that anchor the community of philosophical inquiry are context specific and are such that they can ladder-up into target value concepts. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 86 what is particularly important to remember about all the above is that it demonstrates that conceptual analysis is not the sole prevue of arcane academic philosophy, but is, rather, the responsibility of all agents. if we can keep this in mind, it will go a long way to spur those of us involved in the practice of p4c to try to ensure that that practice is relevant to its core; and, to that degree, we as educators, will, at least in some measure, have fulfilled our responsibility for enhancing the agency of those in our charge. references bell, jeffrey a. deleuze and guattari's what is philosophy?: a critical introduction and guide. edinburgh, edinburgh university press, 2016. brooks, david. “if it feels right.” the new york times, september 12, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/13/opinion/if-it-feels-right.html.accessed 28 september 2018. cam, philip. thinking tools. camberwell, australia, acer press, 2006. crawford, matthew. the world beyond your head: on becoming an individual in an age of distraction. toronto, penguin, 2015. damasio, antonio. self comes to mind: constructing the conscious brain. new york, pantheon books, 2010. davidson, donald. “thought and talk.” inquiries into truth and interpretation, oxford, oxford university press, 1975. darwell, stephan. the second-person standpoint: morality, respect, and accountability. cambridge, massachusetts, harvard university press, 2006. dumas, cody. “question categories.” the thinking playground meeting, january, 2017, canada, www.thinkingplayground.org. accessed 28 september, 2018. dummett, michael. seas of language, oxford, oxford university press, 1993. gallup, gordon g. “self-recognition in primates: a comparative approach to the bidirectional properties of consciousness.” american psychologist, may 1977, vol. 32, pp. 329-338. gardner, susan t. “inquiry is no mere conversation: it is hard work.” the australian journal for critical and creative thinking, vol. 3, no. 2, october, 1995, pp. 38-49 (as well as, analytic teaching, april 1996, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 41 – 50). gardner, susan t. thinking your way to freedom: a guide to owning your own practical reasoning. philadelphia, temple university press, 2009. gardner, susan t. “taking selves seriously.” cultural politics and identity, edited by b. weber, h. karfriedrich, e. marsal, t. dobashi, p schweitzer, berlin, lit verlag, 2011, pp. 79-89. gardner, susan t. selling the reason game. teaching ethics, vol. 15, issue 1, spring, 2015, pp. 129136. gregory, maughn r. “a framework for facilitating classroom dialogue.” teaching philosophy, vol. 30, no. 1, march 2007, pp. 59-84. habermas, jürgen. the theory of communicative action. vol. 1. translated by thomas mccarthy, boston, beacon press, 1992. https://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/13/opinion/if-it-feels-right.html http://www.thinkingplayground.org/ analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 87 kennedy, david. “the role of a facilitator in a community of philosophical inquiry.” metaphilosophy, vol. 35, no. 5, october 2004. kenny, anthony. “concepts, brains, and behavior, grazer philosophische studien.” vol. 81, no. 1, 2010, pp. 105–113. linsenbard, gail. “sartre's criticisms of kant's moral philosophy.” sartre studies international, vol. 13, no. 2, 2007, pp. 65-85. lipman, matthew. philosophy goes to school. philadelphia, temple university press, 1988. lipman, matthew. thinking in education, 2nd edition, cambridge, cambridge university press. 2003. mead, george h. george herbert mead: on social psychology-selected papers. edited by a. strauss, chicago, chicago university press, 1965. pettit, philip & smith, michael. “freedom in belief and desire.” journal of philosophy, 93, 1996 pp. 429– 449. reznitskaya, alina, oyler, joe, wilkinson, ian a. g., & glina, monica. argumentation rating tool: assessing the quality of discussions in elementary school classrooms. paper presented at the xvii conference of the international council for philosophical inquiry with children, vancouver, canada, june 2015. sartre, jean-paul. no exit and three other plays. new york, vintage, 1989. shapiro, lawrence. the mind incarnate. oxford, oxford university press, 2004. sharp, ann m. “what is a ‘community of inquiry'?” journal of moral education, vol. 16, no. 1, january 1987, pp. 37-44. weber, barbara & wolf, arthur. “questioning the question: a hermeneutical perspective on the ‘art of questioning’ in a community of philosophical inquiry.” the routledge international handbook of philosophy for children, edited by m.r. gregory, j. haynes & k. murris, london & new york, routledge, 2017, pp. 74-82. wartenberg, thomas. teaching children philosophy. the squire family foundation, http://www.teachingchildrenphilosophy.org/bookmodule/bookmodule. accessed 28 september 2018. endnotes 1 to sense and to organize means to establish differences. we can also see this in the philosophical notion of critique (kritein in greek), which means making a distinction. 2 critique of pure reason (a51, b75). 3 see gertrude stein’s geography and plays (1922). this sentence is from the poem ‘sacred family’. 4 though there are other concepts, other than value concepts, that are also up for grabs, e.g., typical philosophical concepts like “mind.” the analysis of these sorts of concepts, however, cannot so easily be described as critical for ordinary agency. http://www.teachingchildrenphilosophy.org/bookmodule/bookmodule analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 88 5 thus, in discussing deleuze and guattari, bell writes “the objectivity of our claim, in other words, will be simultaneous to the subjective conditions of the grasp of this objectivity rather than it being understood, as it was traditionally, as the recognition of a truth that pre-existed our grasp of it. instead of the independent objectivity of truth, it is consequently the certainty of our subjective grasp that becomes the benchmark of objectivity (50). 6 it is of note what a difference it would have made had kant suggested that we attempt to universalize a “situated concept,” rather than a concept per se, e.g., asking yourself if you can universalize the maxim of lying to a murderer about the location of his intended innocent victim, versus asking yourself if you can universalize lying. this, interestingly, echoes “sartre’s critique of kant’s claim that moral conduct consists in obeying abstractly knowable maxims valid independently of situation, that is, independent of the historical, social, and political time and place” (linesbard 65). address correspondence to: dr. susan t. gardner professor of philosophy, capilano university 2055 purcell way north vancouver, bc canada, v7j 3h5 sgardner@capilanou.ca mailto:sgardner@capilanou.ca analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 13 meta-analysis of the effectiveness of philosophy for children programs on students’ cognitive outcomes sijin yan, lynne masel walters, zhuoying wang, and chia-chiang wang abstract: philosophy for children (p4c) is an educational program that aims at introducing philosophy into k-12 education. this meta-analysis examines the research on p4c, published from 2002 to 2016, regarding how it affects pre-collegiate students’ cognitive outcomes. ten studies (including two follow-up studies) with the total sample size of 1,509 students from second to twelfth grade are included in this meta-analysis. results suggest that the extant empirical studies on p4c show an overall moderate positive effect (d=0.58) on students’ cognitive learning outcomes and a significant positive effect on reasoning skill (d=1.06). specifically, those studies conducted in non-western countries have higher effect sizes than the western ones. moreover, studies with smaller sample sizes have higher effects sizes than those with larger sample sizes. this may be because p4c produces better outcomes in reasoning skills than general cognitive abilities and reading comprehension, and p4c could be more effective when practiced in small scales. keywords: meta-analysis; philosophy for children; cognitive outcomes; reasoning skills hilosophy for children (often abbreviated as p4c) is an educational program that provides students in k-12 settings opportunities to engage in communities of philosophical inquiry with the long-term aim of improving their cognitive abilities (lam, 2012; trickey & topping, 2004). an increasing number of studies have documented the implementation of p4c and its impacts on students’ cognitive outcomes (abbasi & ajam, 2016; lam, 2012; nia, 2014). this meta-analysis aims to examine what the cumulative research evidence suggests about how p4c affects students’ cognitive abilities and whether characteristics of interventions, students, or outcome types influence the magnitudes of the effectiveness of the program. introduction of philosophy for children philosophy for children is an educational program initiated by matthew lipman, ann sharp and their colleagues in the institute for the advancement of philosophy for children (iapc) in the early 1970s (brandt, 1988; lam, 2012; marashi, 2008; van der straten waillet, roskam, & possoz, 2015). witnessing the weaknesses of college students’ argumentative performance in public discourses and the tumultuous political environment during the contentious years of vietnam war in the 1970s (vansieleghem & kennedy, 2012), lipman argued that philosophy should no longer be confined to college and academic research. children, he said, even in elementary grades, can begin a quest in philosophy to learn how to think and reason (brandt, 1988). p analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 14 currently, with the help of numerous philosophers, educators and researchers, philosophy for children has become a global movement that has spread across 50 countries, and its material has been translated into 20 languages (daniel & auriac, 2011). it is now a fertile ground for educators to creatively practice different educational ideas (meskin & cook, 2012; murris, 1992) to critically modify it for different students living in specific cultural, social and educational contexts in the world (di masi & santi, 2016; ghazinejad & ruitenberg, 2014; ndofirepi & cross, 2015; ndofirepi & shanyanana, 2016), and most recently, to introduce it to very young children who are below the age of 6 (giménez-dasí, quintanilla, & daniel, 2013; säre, luik, & tulviste, 2016). as a whole, philosophy for children believes in engaging pre-collegiate students in doing philosophy by 1) removing the formidable terminologies and 2) using children’s literature, pictures, films or other forms of stimuli to bring the philosophical discussion into class. the central pedagogy of philosophy for children is community of inquiry. its philosophical roots can be traced back to the american philosopher charles sanders peirce. in his article some consequences of four incapacities (1868), he claimed that it is pernicious to make single individuals absolute judges of truth and what we need is a community of inquiry to ‘grind off the arbitrary and the individualistic character of thought’ (peirce & houser, 1998). dewey fleshed out the peircean theory of inquiry and incorporated it into his philosophy of education (lipman, 2004), contending that a genuine community life in the classroom could let students cultivate the habit to meaningfully engage in a democratic life. ann sharp reconstructed and put forward the notion of community of inquiry as the guiding educational model for the philosophy for children movement (gregory & laverty, 2017). here is an illustration of a classic example of a mendham p4c session (noting that there are many other important forms of p4c and the ways of doing community of inquiry are always amendable): in a classroom of philosophy for children, students with diverse backgrounds and lived experiences gather together in a circle to read a selected text aloud. normally each student reads a part of the text and everyone has a turn, so that they could share meaning with each other, read aloud with expression and emotions, and learn to carefully listen to others. then, teachers collect students’ questions about issues they find puzzling, and write them down on the chalkboard/whiteboard for further discussion. after students choose a question as the target of discussion, they inquire with each other, which often involves making assertions that are supported with reasons, clarifying one’s position, and providing (counter) examples. the goal of such inquiry is to “form a judgement about the matter that is reasonable, meaningful and practicable as they can manage (gregory & laverty, 2017).” however, given the divided political and racial climates in the current era of globalization, a community may not always be a birthplace of respect, diversity and mutual learning; it can also generate conflicts, discontent, feeling of divergences, bullying and exclusion. thus, the idea of analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 15 building ‘an intellectually safe community’ where all participants can be challenged in their worldviews but at the same time feel supported and safe is a timely response to such concerns in p4c (butnor, 2012). literature review the radical nature of p4c in transforming our vision of the function of philosophy from a sphere for intellectual elites to a place for human beings with diverse age and life experiences generates skepticism and debate. the first question is whether children are intellectually mature enough for philosophy (daniel & auriac, 2011). this debate can be traced back to plato and aristotle’s views on the nature of children and their negative opinions on children’s intellectual ability and appropriateness to philosophize (kennedy, 2006). in modern educational theories, according to piaget, children are not equipped with the ability to do abstract thinking (piaget, 1931). however, vygotsky’s emphasis on the role of social interactions in cultivating children’s intelligence potential provides strong support for the idea that age is not the determining factor of children’s cognitive abilities (roberts, 2016). recently, cognitive scientists have shown that children have much higher level of cognitive abilities than piaget estimated (gopnik, 2009). furthermore, philosopher gareth matthews stressed the freshness of children’s ideas that he discovered through his philosophical discussion with young people, and thus rejected deep-rooted condescending attitudes behind this ‘children are not capable of doing philosophy’ argument (matthews, 1980, 1994). the second question concerns the evaluation of p4c, which is related to questions such as whether p4c is effective according to different metrics and if there are various ways this program can be implemented to benefit more students, especially those who are challenged and disadvantaged, at an affordable cost (gorard, siddiqui, & huat see, 2015). since the 1970s, the outcomes measured in p4c research can be divided into two categories: (1) cognitive outcomes (2) socio-psychological outcomes related to attitudes toward academics, prosocial attitudes and behavior. even though there are emerging studies that appraise the effectiveness of p4c in the socio-psychological field (abbasi & ajam, 2016; dasí, quintanilla, & daniel, 2013; scholes et al., 2016), the extant literature is still limited. most studies focus on the goal of the philosophy for children program to provide a more formal training to develop students’ cognitive outcomes. this includes direct assessment of students' reasoning skills and abilities, comprehensive skills, and academic performance (garcía-moriyón, rebollo, & colom, 2005; gorard et al., 2015; gregory, 2011; säre et al., 2016; trickey & topping, 2004) as indicators to students' learning progresses. previous review of the evaluation of p4c p4c may have a positive effect on students’ cognitive abilities. in 2004 and 2005, two systematic reviews (garcía-moriyón et al., 2005; trickey & topping, 2004) were conducted to analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 16 synthesize research on the effectiveness of p4c. first, the quantitative systematic analysis by trickey and topping (2004) investigated the influence of p4c on students in general, with the conclusion that p4c has a moderate positive effect on students’ abilities with low variance. it collected eight controlled experiments regarding philosophy for children from 1970s to 2002. even though the relationship between the two has not been yet been accepted by researchers (hidi, renninger, & krapp, 2004), they combined the cognitive outcomes and affective abilities without a theoretical foundation for doing so. the second study is a meta-analysis conducted by garcía-moriyón, rebollo, and colom (2005), in which they examined the relationship between p4c and reasoning skills as outlined in 18 studies published from 1976 to 2002, with the finding that p4c has a positive moderate influence on students’ reasoning abilities. this meta-analysis included 18 experiments. the results showed significant differences among post-test experiments, single group studies with pre and post-test, and controlled experiments, in which the more rigorous controlled experiments tended to show lower effect sizes. these two reviews (garcía-moriyón et al., 2005; trickey & topping, 2004) provided significant contributions in understanding the impacts of implementing philosophy for children in k-12 education. however, a new meta-analysis is needed to address the following issues in the contemporary situation: first, after the publication of the two earlier meta-analyses, a larger collection of literature on the effects of p4c on cognitive outcomes has been generated with an increasing rigor of study designs, a larger number of participants, and follow-up studies (fair et al., 2015a; fair et al., 2015b; topping & trickey, 2007a, 2007b). thus, researchers now have the opportunity to improve the rigor of a systematic analysis by only including studies with random controlled experiments or quasi-experiments and analyze these findings in detail through moderator analyses to find if the relationship between cognitive outcomes and p4c intervention is depended upon other variables such as duration of the program, sample size, et cetera. second, since the p4c movement has spread worldwide and research was conducted on different continents (lam, 2012; marashi, 2008; nia, 2014; youssef, 2014), a meta-analysis at this stage can involve an exhaustive search globally in english and capture the multiplicity of p4c practices worldwide. thus, the present study aims at conducting a more recent and detailed analysis of the literature to help educators acquire a clearer understanding of the effectiveness of philosophy for children movement as a globalized phenomenon. the present study the purpose of the current meta-analysis is to examine the reported effectiveness of p4c from 2002 to 2016, immediately following the publication of the two articles that analyzed studies from 1970s to 2002. in addition, this meta-analysis examines which variables –participant age, socioeconomic status, study location, assessment measure, duration– of the intervention might moderate the magnitude of the aggregated effect sizes. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 17 through this meta-analysis, the researchers hope to find answers for the following question: 1. what does the cumulative research suggest regarding the overall effectiveness of p4c on students’ cognitive abilities? 2. do study design, students' backgrounds (grade level and socio-economic status), location and duration of intervention, and characteristics of cognitive outcome measurements influence the magnitude of the effect size of included studies? methodology in this study, the effectiveness of p4c was tested through a meta-analysis, which is a method that merges the results of many independent researchers, conducted on a particular topic and performs statistical analysis (çoğaltay & karadağ, 2016). study search and retrieval this study included the online databases british education index, eric, education full text (h.w. willson), education source, academic search complete, psycinfo database from 2002 to 2016. the keyword used was philosophy n2 children, which means it specified 2 maximum intervening words between philosophy and children, in any order. the researchers included both referred published journals and doctoral dissertations. second, the researchers conducted a non-electronic journal search. the index of the journal thinking: philosophy for children was consulted for articles. then, potential relevant articles were retrieved from a library. the third was a google scholar search engine, journal of philosophy in schools, as well as references listed in collected studies. through the initial searches, 1180 articles were potentially relevant. inclusion criteria in order to be included in this meta-analysis, studies had to meet the following criteria: 1. participants: the population of interest was pre-collegiate students enrolled in a philosophy for children program and their control-group counterparts. college studies and teacher education research were excluded from the study. 2. intervention: philosophy for children has various names and diverse ways of practicing in the world. in this meta-analysis, we included studies that are under the names of p4c, philosophy for children, philosophy with children, and pwc. all the included studies must have explicit pedagogical markers of "community of (philosophical) inquiry" that shares the common practices of providing stimulus (stories, questions, pictures, or other media), students' questioning, and building on each other’s ideas. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 18 3. publication: the retrieved study should be published between 2002 and 2016 in a refereed journal or as a thesis/dissertation. 4. research design: 1) the study must be either random controlled experiments or quasiexperiments. 2) a quantitative measure of outcomes was used in the study to calculate the effect sizes of the intervention. 3) the outcome variables contained a measurement of cognitive outcomes, such as reasoning ability, comprehension ability, general cognitive ability, and academic development. 4) this meta-analysis focused on comparing the cognitive outcomes of p4c as the experimental group with other control groups where participants did not receive any thinking skill intervention. thus, studies that did not contain a control group were excluded. to ensure all studies included were well-designed and able to provide enough data for the computation of effect sizes, researchers left out studies that failed to conform to any of those criteria. thus, a considerable number of studies were excluded in this stage particularly because many of them adopted qualitative methodology, which could not provide enough effect size for meta-analysis. this is because of the nature and limitation of meta-analysis itself as it applies only to research studies that produce quantitative findings. that is, studies using quantitative measurement of variables and reporting descriptive or inferential statistics to summarize the resulting data (lipsey & wilson, 2001). this process ruled out qualitative forms of research such as case studies, ethnography, and ‘naturalistic’ inquiry (lipsey & wilson, 2001). because of the large amount of literature, there were two steps of screening during the selection of included studies. first, one of the authors screened the titles and abstract of each of the 1,180 studies. 44 articles which met all the criteria of inclusion remained from the initial screening. then, the full text of each of the 44 studies was retrieved and scrutinized. during this second screening of 44 full texts, 28 more studies failed to meet the requirements of the inclusion criteria. finally, the remaining 16 studies were subject to the coding process. coding procedure the coding process is a data extraction process, picking clear and appropriate data from the pile of complex information (çoğaltay & karadağ, 2016). the manual for coding studies was developed by the researchers before proceeding to the coding. content validity for the coding sheet and coding manual was determined originally by submitting to scholars/researchers for feedback on the appropriateness of variables and categories created in this study. the first scholar works primarily on culture and curriculum, and the second professor is in educational psychology. there were two coders in this study. the first coder is the first author of this meta-analysis; the second coder is a doctoral student and the 3rd co-author. both of the two coders have received statistical education for quantitative research. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 19 after the coding manual was created, two coders initially met to go over the coding manual until everything was clear. the coders scrutinized each of the articles and extracted the variables and outcomes from the studies and input them into an excel document. to determine interrater reliability, the two researchers independently coded five studies (31.25% of the 16 articles) to ensure that the inclusion/exclusion criteria were met. the researchers achieved an interrater reliability of 90.0% across those studies. analysis of coder disagreements resulted in the refinement of some definitions and decision rules for some codes. then, each coder individually coded the remainder of the studies. during the coding process, the first coder contacted the original authors from two different references for standard deviations and means to calculate the effect sizes. one set of data was obtained and another contact for data was not successful. data analysis effect size computation, test of homogeneity and moderator analysis were conducted in the stage of data analysis. the effect size acquired in the meta-analysis study is a standard measure value used to determine the strength and direction (çoğaltay & karadağ, 2016) of the effectiveness of philosophy for children program on students’ cognitive outcomes. cohen’s d was used to adjust and determine the effect sizes of each study. all the effect sizes in each study were aggregated to one effect size as the cognitive outcome. in meta-analysis, the unit of analysis is the individual research study, and any two or more effect sizes that come from the same study are statistically dependent (lipsey & wilson, 2001). furthermore, all data analyses involving effect sizes were weighted analysis. two main models, namely fixed effects model and random effects model, were utilized in the analysis of heterogeneous distribution of effect sizes. under a fixed effects model, an effect size observed in a study is assumed to estimate the corresponding population effect with random error that stems only from the chance factors associated with subject-level sampling errors in that study (lipsey and wilson (2001). if it is believed that the research is not equal in terms of functionality, and if generalizations through the estimated effect size are to be made for greater populations, then the model that should be used is the random effects model (çoğaltay & karadağ, 2016). last, the authors evaluated the data generated by the analysis and determined 1) whether p4c had a positive impact on students' cognitive abilities to address the first research question and 2) if characteristics of study design, students' background location and duration of intervention, characteristics of cognitive outcome measurements could be the moderator(s) of p4c on the effect size of cognitive abilities to answer the second research question. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 20 results six studies were excluded from the 16 research papers during the last stage of this analysis. one study was excluded because participants were younger than first grade (säre et al., 2016) and this study only focuses on k-12 students. the study conducted by othman and hashim (2006) was excluded because the experiment’s control group was still participating in another thinking skills intervention. this study compared p4c to another thinking program (the reader response program). thus, the control group is not neutral. the control groups in all the included studies were not under any thinking skills intervention. two studies were not included due to the lack of means and standard deviations to calculate the effect sizes (colom, moriyon, magro, & morilla, 2014; walker, wartenberg, & winner, 2013). another one (gorard et al., 2015) was not from a peer-reviewed journal and thus excluded from the study. one study was excluded because its outcome measure was spiritual development, which is not considered to be within the realm of cognitive outcomes (abaspour, nowrozi, & latifi, 2015). studies included a total of 10 controlled experiments were included in this analysis, which together report the findings of eight independent studies and two follow-up studies. among the ten studies, nine were articles from peer-reviewed journals, and one is a dissertation (youssef, 2014). table 1 provides an overview of the characteristics of each citation included in the synthesis. the sample sizes in these studies ranged from 28 to 540, representing 1,509 students from second grade in elementary to 9th graders in high schools. the sample sizes of studies were adjusted in following way: first, if the sample size of one study in post-test was smaller than the pre-test due to the loss of participants, then the whole sample size of this study was coded according to the number of participants of the post-test. second, in the case of one study with a follow-up study (fair et al., 2015a; fair et al., 2015b), the sample sizes of the independent studies were adjusted to the corresponding student groups with the follow-up studies. thus, the overall sample sizes in this meta-analysis are smaller than those in the original literature. regarding outcomes measures, four studies (fair et al., 2015a; fair et al., 2015b; topping & trickey, 2007a; topping & trickey, 2007b) used the cognitive ability test, a standardized test called cat in america and cogat in united kingdom. it measures students' verbal, quantitative and nonverbal reasoning abilities (lohman et al., 2001). two studies (lam, 2012; marashi, 2008) chose the the new jersey test of reasoning skills (njtrs), which was specifically designed to measure reasoning skills. one study (naderi, 2014) selected abedi's test of creativity which was formulated to measure rate of creativity based on torrance tests of creative thinking (ttct). another study (youssef, 2014) utilized a standardized test called the test of reading comprehension (torch) to measure reading comprehension ability of the students. one study (abbasi & ajam, 2016) developed a questionnaire to test the educational progress of science lessons. to verify the validity of the analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 21 measurement, the researchers included 20 in-service teachers of second grade to review the instrument. in the study by tok & mazı (2015), both the reading comprehension test and listening comprehension test were designed by the researchers. they were developed through the framework of predicted objectives for the reading and listening comprehension learning field in the elementary fifth grade turkish course curriculum. overall effectiveness of p4c the overall effect size aggregated from the ten studies was 0.43 with a 95% confidence interval, ranging from 0.33 to 0.53. according to cohen’s rule of thumb (vanvoorhis & morgan, 2007), the mean effect size represents that p4c has a moderate, positive overall cognitive effect for students who are in 2nd to 10th grade. in this study, the homogeneity test was found to be statistically significant (q = 26.59, p < 0.01), which means that there is more variability in effect sizes than would be expected from sampling error around the mean. table 2 provides the overall results and omnibus test of this meta-analysis. results of moderator analysis since the homogeneity test was found to be statistically significant, a moderator analysis was used to find out the potential explanations for variance among effect sizes. in this meta-analysis, subgroup analysis was employed to detect moderating effects. seven moderator variables were tested: grade level, socioeconomic status of students, location of studies, study design (random or quasiexperiments), total time of intervention, outcome measures, and type of outcomes. table 3 provides a detailed statistical description of the result of moderator analysis. in this study, two of the seven moderators revealed statistically significant effects. they were research location (two subgroups: asia and western countries) and type of outcomes (three subgroups: general cognitive ability, reasoning skills and academic achievement). the tests of homogeneity indicated no statistical differences by grade levels, socio-economic status of participants, methods of group assignments, duration of the intervention, and outcome measures. the following is the detailed description of each subgroup analysis. grade level. the included studies were divided into two categories in terms of the grade levels: 2 to 5 (k=4) and 6 to 10 (k=6). as seen in table 3, the aggregated effect size (cohen’s d) of studies which recruited grade 2 to 5 students was 0.51, and the average effect size of studies with grade 6 to 10 students was 0.42. qb was 0.75 (p > .75). from the results of this moderator analysis, no significant difference was found between effect sizes of studies according to the grade levels of the samples. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 22 table 1 characteristics of included studies reference study type location sample size grade/age level outcome measure effect size variance (abbasi & ajam, 2016) intervention iran 50 second questionnaire of educational progress* 0.870 0.080 (fair et al., 2015b) intervention united states 177 seventh cogat 0.590 0.020 (fair et al., 2015a) follow-up united states 115 seventh grade two years after cogat 0.570 0.030 (lam, 2012) intervention china 28 secondary school first grade njtrs 0.590 0.190 (marashi, 2008) intervention iran 60 eighth njtrs 1.100 0.070 (naderi, 2014) intervention iran 60 high school first grade abedi's test of creativity 1.190 0.070 (tok & mazı, 2015) intervention turkey 74 fifth grade reading comprehension test* and listening comprehension test* 0.162 0.035 (topping & trickey, 2007a) intervention united kingdom 540 ten-year-old students cat 0.25 0.01 (topping & trickey, 2007b) follow-up united kingdom 183 ten-year-old students (two years after) cat 0.400 0.020 (youssef, 2014) intervention australia 222 sixth grade reading comprehension test 0.340 0.020 note: cogat: cognitive ability test (american version); cat: cognitive ability test (united kingdom version); njtrs: new jersey test of reasoning skills; *: tests developed by researchers analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 23 table 2 overall results and omnibus test of p4c studies k n median es (d) fixed effect random effect q es (d) 95% ci es (d) 95% ci p4c 10 1,509 .58 .43 [.33, .53] .50 [.33, .66] 26.59** note: k = study size; n = total number of participants; ci = confidence interval; q = omnibus test of homogeneity. ** p ＜ .01 socio-economic status of students. in this sample of studies, we used two categories for the socio-economic status (ses) of the participants. the first group consisted of students who received free lunch, or were classified as ‘economically disadvantaged’ by the local districts. the second group of students are not identified as part of the free-lunch program, or was classified as from middle (or upper) class families. however, no significant heterogeneity in effect sizes was found between the two groups of students. research location. this meta-analysis covers 5 studies conducted in the western world and 5 in asian countries. five of the examined studies conducted in asian countries: iran, turkey, and china. the other five studies come from western countries: united kingdom, australia and the united states. the first reason for doing this moderator analysis is because p4c as an educational movement has its roots in the western philosophical traditions, which bring about the authors’ uncertainty of the viability of its globalization. for example, p4c’s exclusive emphasis on dialogue (gregory, 2011), which is different from some non-western philosophical practices such as contemplation, may negatively impact its implementation and effectiveness. another impetus for this analysis is that of the socio-political environments in these nonwestern countries. for example, countries such as iran and china might be more resistant to western rhetoric and democratic schooling as a whole. in is respecting children’s rationality in their best interest in an authoritarian context?, the authors (ghazinejad & ruitenberg, 2014) argued that p4c implementation in iran must balance the teaching of critical thinking and the protection of children’s safety in their communities. giving the consideration that p4c and its democratic educational ideals not only have conflicts with the extant educational systems but also may bring clashes between individual students and their communities, the authors wonder if the effectiveness of p4c will be influenced by these factors at all. through moderator analysis, a significant difference between the two groups was found (q = 5.16, p < .05). the studies in asian countries had higher effect sizes (d=0.69) than those studies analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 24 conducted in western countries (d=0.39). yet, the five studies in asian countries had significantly lower sample size (n=272) than the five studies in non-asian countries (n=1237). study design. to warrant the rigor of this meta-analysis, the authors set up stringent criteria for the inclusion of studies in which only random controlled trials and quasi-experiments were brought in the synthesis. from the moderator analysis, no significant difference was found between effect sizes of random controlled experiments and quasi-experiments which were included in this meta-analysis. duration. the authors of this study divided the literature into three subgroups based on the duration of interventions: 5 to 20 hours (k=4), 21 to 40 hours (k=3), and more than 40 hours (k=3). the result showed that none of the duration levels statistically varied from one another. thus, there was no noteworthy difference between different levels of duration of intervention in the effectiveness of p4c on students’ cognitive outcomes. outcome measure: cat or non-cat. studies included were examined according to their outcome measures. four studies using cognitive ability tests were accepted as cat subgroup; six studies applying other types of outcome measures were accepted as non-cat subgroup. no significant heterogeneity was found between these two subgroups. types of outcomes. a significant difference among different types of outcomes was found (qb = 15.44, p < .001). the studies (lam, 2012; marashi, 2008) which tested the improvement of reasoning skills through p4c yielded the largest estimations (d=1.06), which is a large effect size. p4c used in improving general cognitive abilities (d=0.40), which is a moderate effect size. reading comprehension ability (d=0.28) is a small effect size. this suggests that p4c has significant, positive influence on students’ reasoning skills, and moderate effects on general cognitive ability and comprehension ability. summary the first research question in this meta-analysis concerned the direction and magnitude of the effectiveness of p4c on students’ cognitive ability. the studies analyzed here showed an overall positive medium effect size on cognitive outcomes in general. the second question was whether and how the effectiveness of p4c differed significantly depending on the moderator variables. the moderator analysis found statistically significant results in regard to the study location and outcome types of these studies. no significant differences were found as to different grade levels, socio-economic statuses of participants, methods of group assignment, duration times of intervention, and cognitive measures. the results suggest that philosophy for children has a positive moderate influence on students’ cognitive outcomes. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 25 discussion ten studies were included in this meta-analysis to determine the effects of philosophy for children program on students’ cognitive abilities, and what characteristics of the intervention, students and outcomes measures could influence the magnitude of such effect. the overall effectiveness of p4c according to the findings of this meta-analysis, the philosophy for children program has shown a moderate, positive influence on students’ cognitive outcomes. this result corroborates the previous literature on the program that states that p4c has a positive impact on students’ various types of cognitive abilities (fair et al., 2015a; fair et al., 2015b; garcía-moriyón et al., 2005; topping & trickey, 2007a, 2007b; trickey & topping, 2004). the cognitive outcomes comprise general cognitive ability, reasoning skills, creative thinking abilities, educational progress in science, reading and listening comprehension abilities. among all of these types of cognitive outcomes, the philosophy for children program has large aggregated positive effect on students’ reasoning skills, while moderate influences on other cognitive domains. the previous p4c meta-analysis that focused on reasoning abilities (garcía-moriyón et al., 2005) also indicated the positive impact of p4c on students’ reasoning skills. however, as the number of studies selected in this meta-analytic review was limited, the interpretation of those aggregated results needs to be cautious. discussions about findings between p4c and students’ grade levels as stated in the results section, there was no statistically significant cognitive outcome in the effectiveness of p4c based on the grade levels of students. this result sheds lights on the question regarding p4c and students’ age. philosophy education is traditionally assumed to be appropriate for students no younger than secondary school age (lipman & sharp, 1978). but this moderator analysis indicates that both the studies with grade 2 to 5 students and the studies with grade 6 to 10 students benefited from p4c program (grade 2-5: d=0.51; grade 6-10: d=0.42). there was no statistically meaningful difference between the aggregated effect sizes of the two subgroups. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 26 table 3 moderator testing of study variable k n d 95% ci qb anova research location asia 5 272 .69 [.46, .91] >n-a non-asian countries 5 1,237 .39 [.27, .51] 5.16* grade at intervention 2-5 4 416 .51 [.34, .69] 6-10 6 1,093 .42 [.29, .55] 0.75 ses of participants disadvantaged 4 1,015 .40 [.27, .53] others 6 494 .55 [.37, .72] 1.74 methods of group assignment random 4 811 .44 [.33, .54] quasi experiment 6 698 .52 [.38, .66] 0.83 total time of intervention 5-20 hours 4 445 .34 [.18, .51] 21-30 hours 3 579 .28 [.13, .43] more than 40 hours 3 427 .47 [.28, .66] 2.41 outcome measure cat or cogat 4 1,015 .40 [.27, .53] others 6 494 .55 [.37, .72] 1.74 type of outcomes general cognitive outcomes 4 1,015 .40 [.27, .53] reasoning skills 2 148 1.06 [.72, 1.40] > c & r reading comprehension 2 296 .28 [.06, .50] 15.44*** note: k = study size; n = number of participants; ci = confidence interval; qb = between-groups test of homogeneity; anova = significant result. * p ＜ .05, *** p ＜ .0 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 27 discussions about findings between p4c and locations another significant finding of this study is where the research was conducted could determine its effect sizes. a statistically significant difference was found between the effect sizes of studies in western (d = 0.39) and non-western (d=0.59) countries. from this result, it seems that the globalizing philosophy for children program has generated more positive influences on students’ cognitive outcomes in non-western countries than western countries. this is not expected by the authors in that considering p4c’s western philosophical heritage, this program might not be suitable to the socio-political and philosophical contexts of non-western educational settings and thus has less positive outcomes. there are several possible accounts for this phenomenon. first, the studies in asia have smaller sample sizes. because p4c is still new to educators and researchers in those countries (lam, 2012; marashi, 2008), including iran, china and turkey, these studies are often pilot studies with small sample sizes. moreover, since p4c was initiated in the united states in the 1970s (brandt, 1988), it is more relatively well-known to the educators in the united states, united kingdom, australia and other western countries. thus, studies conducted in these areas tended to evaluate p4c in large school districts (fair et al., 2015b; toppings & trickey, 2007a; youssef, 2014). in this meta-analysis, the mean sample size of western studies is three times higher than the mean sample size of non-western studies. smaller sample sizes may contribute to the quality of teacher education and p4c implementation. pedagogically speaking, all the studies have utilized community of inquiry as the core pedagogy. though it might be the case that there are more experienced practitioners in countries where p4c is more well-known or in studies with larger scale, it is also possible that the reverse is true. this is because the practitioners in pilot studies may have received more focused teacher education while in studies with large sample size teacher education and motivation for practicing p4c are not easy to control. another possible explanation is that several studies in non-western countries tested the improvement of reasoning skills among students (lam, 2012; marashi, 2008; othman & hashim, 2006), while no western research included here specifically examined the reasoning abilities of students. according to the moderator analysis regarding the effect sizes of studies with different types of outcomes, there is a statistically significant difference between reasoning skills and other types of outcomes. if p4c is more effective to the improvement of reasoning skills, then the discrepancy between the effect sizes in western and non-western studies is understandable. although none of the studies from non-western countries in this meta-analysis seemed to utilize or create p4c philosophical texts that catered to their specific philosophical, socio-political, and educational environments, it is worthwhile to consider the complex and nuanced cultural and political consequences of introducing p4c to non-western countries from the lens of de-colonial theories and democratic education (ghazinejad & ruitenberg, 2014; ndofirepi & cross, 2015), and also the possibility of p4c being transformed by its globalization (gregory, 2011). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 28 discussions about findings between p4c and duration of interventions the moderator analysis showed that the p4c’s influence was not moderated by the duration of the intervention. this was not expected since several studies (fair et al., 2015a; fair et al., 2015b; garcía-moriyón et al., 2005; topping & trickey, 2007a) have proposed that p4c should be implemented for a significant period of time before the program shows results. that being said, our result resonates with one p4c study (fair et al., 2015b). in this project, the authors replicated a previous experiment conducted by topping and trickey (topping & trickey, 2007a), in which they shortened the duration of the p4c intervention to less than half of the former one: from 58 weeks to 22 to 26 weeks. the result showed that p4c still had a moderate effect on students’ general cognitive ability. this suggests that a short time of exposure to p4c may also have a meaningful impact on students’ cognitive outcomes. discussions about the excluded literature a large number of studies were excluded in the process of the analysis. the first reason is because the majority of studies in the field of p4c are qualitative and theoretical, whereas the methodology employed in this study is a quantitative meta-analysis that needs to extract the data from many independent studies conducted on a particular topic and perform statistical analysis (çoğaltay & karadağ, 2016). for example, numerous insightful articles regarding p4c have been published in africa (di masi & santi, 2016; ndofirepi & cross, 2015), but none of them was quantitative and could be used in this study. the second reason is that even if some studies utilized a quantitative methodology, they often lacked sufficient information especially for the means and standard deviations for the researcher to compute effect sizes. third, the result of exhaustive literature search and process of study inclusion/exclusion showed that more rigorous quantitative studies regarding p4c program are still needed. the researchers gathered over 1180 studies at first, after coding procedure, there were only 16 studies remained. throughout the data analysis process, six more articles were excluded from the study. the main reason of this phenomenon is that the majority of the literature regarding p4c is qualitative and theoretical. due to the nature of meta-analysis, which is a quantitative synthesis study, it cannot process and analyze qualitative and non-empirical literature (lipsey & wilson, 2001). in addition, there is not only few quantitative experiments in p4c, but the data produced by the studies are not sufficient enough for computing an effect size. thus, this suggests that this field needs more studies to form a larger cluster of rigorous research. moreover, some studies gave a novel practice and detailed observation of children who are below the age of five. to narrow down the age to grade 1-12 students, one study about p4c’s effectiveness on reasoning skills was excluded, but it definitely shows the potential of teaching and analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 29 introducing philosophy to very young children. for example, the study conducted by dasi et al. (2013) showed a clear significant improvement in socio-psychological abilities among the 5-year-old children and a partial improvement in the 4-year-old children after participating in a few sessions of the p4c program. also, one study (säre et al., 2016) showed that p4c positively influenced preschoolers’ verbal reasoning skills. these studies provide information for educators and researchers to understand the unfamiliar area in which young children are involved in rather than exclude them from this philosophy. future research can consider examining how p4c affects the cognitive outcome of children in kindergarten or preschool. types of p4c study outcomes can be expanded from cognitive outcomes to psychological or social outcomes. conclusion and suggestions for future research p4c was found to have a moderate, positive overall effect on students’ cognitive outcomes. the authors suggest that p4c may be considered as an effective thinking program for teachers in grade 2-10 education. based on the findings of this meta-analysis, several recommendations and suggestions for future research are advanced: first, in addition to long-term implementation of p4c in classroom, a short time of exposure to p4c may also have a meaningful impact on students’ cognitive outcomes. the practice of p4c should not only be limited to the realm of long-term applications. second, this study suggests that grade level is not a moderator of the effectiveness of p4c in improving students’ cognitive abilities. moreover, a small number of studies (dasí et al., 2013; säre et al., 2016) have practiced p4c with very young children who are below the age of five. thus, age should not be the sole reason for excluding students from philosophy education, and more studies are needed in terms of the impacts of p4c on very young children. as lone and burroughs have said (2016), at one time or another we all ask philosophical questions of some kind, consider our values and reflect on the rightness and wrongness of our actions. it is possible that all children, regardless of age and grade level, have the capacity and interest to engage in philosophical activities (lipman, 2009). lipman and sharp (1978) once questioned a presupposition of p4c which assumes philosophy education should be assigned to students who are either from gifted programs or from particular advantageous backgrounds. the results of this study also indicate that there is no statistically significant difference in the impact of p4c based on social-economic backgrounds. it is suggested that educators in p4c program should strive to build a community of inquiry that encourages students to share not only divergent social backgrounds and life experiences (lipman, 2009) but also different styles of thinking (lipman & sharp, 1978) so as to involve them in the classroom discussion. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 30 different from previous meta-analyses, this study emphasized the exhaustive search for p4c studies around the world. the results show that during recent years, a considerable amount of practices have been taken in various continents. this study calls for more research and analyses that consider the nuances and details of p4c practices in different cultural, social, educational, linguistic, and philosophical contexts. last, while p4c as a famous thinking skill program has been relatively examined (daniel & auriac, 2011; fair et al., 2015a; fair et al., 2015b; garcía-moriyón et al., 2005; säre et al., 2016; topping & trickey, 2007a, 2007b), limited research on socio-psychological outcomes have been generated in this field. more studies that explore the connection between community of inquiry, philosophical thinking and the socio-psychological development of children are strongly recommended. references abaspour, n., nowrozi, r. a., & latifi, z. 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(2007). understanding power and rules of thumb for determining sample sizes. tutorials in quantitative methods for psychology, 3(2), 43-50. walker, c. m., wartenberg, t. e., & winner, e. (2013). engagement in philosophical dialogue facilitates children’s reasoning about subjectivity. developmental psychology, 49(7), 1338. youssef, c. (2014). a multilevel investigation into the effects of the philosophical community of inquiry on 6th grade students' reading comprehension, interest in maths, self-esteem, prosocial behaviours and emotional well-being (doctoral dissertation). queensland university of technology, australia. address correspondences to: sijin yan (correspondence author), texas a&m university, teaching, learning & culture department, philosophy department. 321 ymca building, college station, tx 77843-4237. email: yansj101@tamu.edu. tel: 979-676-7911 lynne masel walters, texas a&m university, teaching, learning & culture department, 362 harrington office building, college station, tx 77843 email: lynne-walters@tamu.edu tel: 979-845-8384 zhuoying wang, texas a&m university, texas a&m university, teaching, learning & culture department, 111d harrington office building, college station, tx, 77843 email: ustop2013wzy@tamu.edu tel: 979-587-4603 chia-chiang wang, department of counseling, school, and educational psychology, university at buffalo, 413 baldy hall, buffalo, ny, 14260-1020 email: chiachia@buffalo.edu tel: 716645-1119 mailto:yansj101@tamu.edu mailto:lynne-walters@tamu.edu mailto:ustop2013wzy@tamu.edu mailto:chiachia@buffalo.edu sharing space with other animals: early childhood education, engaged philosophical inquiry, and sustainability analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 37, issue 1 (2016) 20 sharing space with other animals: early childhood education, engaged philosophical inquiry, and sustainability margaret macdonald and warren bowen introduction ollaborative research between univercity child care at simon fraser university and a philosopher in residence has yielded promising research in an understudied interdisciplinary undertaking: early childhood education, engaged philosophical inquiry, and sustainability. the goal of our work has been to better understand how engaged philosophical inquiry (epi) can be used with young children (age 4 and 5) on topics related to our local forest environment as part our centre's foundation curriculum on sustainability (macdonald, 2015). our guiding research questions include: what are children’s beliefs, ideas and concepts related to sustainability? and, how can we contribute to children (and adults) deeper understandings of sustainability by challenging our human centric thinking? pedagogical methods engaged philosophical inquiry is an approach that honours children’s natural curiosity and our quest to understand and make connections in the world around us. different from philosophical discussions with the goal of developing logic and argumentation (gardner, 2009), epi stresses development of the capacity to listen and take into account the perspectives of others within a democratic participatory community of learners (lipman, 2003, 2009; cam, 1998, 2000; dewey, 1954; dahlberg & moss, 2005). this pedagogical method employs principles and practices of philosophy for children (p4c) in order to facilitate critical discussions among children and adults related to our curriculum on sustainability (macdonald, 2015). our epi sessions were conducted once per week over a six-month period. during this time the content was negotiated and developed by the children and our philosopher in residence, warren bowen, using a conversational approach in a group setting with 8 children. during this project, one of the main discussion threads was human management of nonhuman populations. questions discussed in depth included: are dangerous animals real? what should we do with dangerous animals? how should we share space with other animals? are humans animals? do humans need to be managed? is it acceptable to trap and kill frightening or dangerous animals? we endeavour to live by an ethos of joy and wonder in our pedagogical encounters with children, believing in working from a strong image of children’s capabilities as a starting place for our pedagogical practices and epi sessions (malaguzzi, 1994). our embodied holistic view of learning sets out to optimize both experience and thought by gently introducing critical cognitive challenges to children’s thinking and ideas. for this approach to be successful we try to link the discussion to the learning context by introducing activities, experiences and naturally occurring events while the children are visiting the forest. later we are able to draw on and refer to these events in the discussions that follow. we tried to create a flow in our epi sessions and found that in the forest we could engage with the children optimally by having the sensory benefit of the natural environment c 21 at a time when we were discussing nature and our environment (macdonald & bowen, 2015). in this way the questions were meaningful to the children after having just played a related game or having participated in a related activity (i.e. building a house for dragons and then discussing whether or not dragons are dangerous, or asking about the value of trapping animals after a child has caught a mosquito). during the discussions, when statements were presented by members of the epi circle (i.e. warren, the teachers or the children) warren would often ask the children if they held the same view or a contrary view. this created rich opportunities to deepen thinking and the opportunity to gain the advantage of multiple opinions and perspectives on a topic of interest. from our transcripts of the discussion and reflections on the epi circles propositions were identified that led to our understanding of the children’s arguments and, importantly, also formed the basis of our next lesson. in this way, as we reviewed and debriefed we could build on the children’s current understandings as well as any emerging ideas that they may have had. each week was connected to the last by a re-current game or activity that was familiar. warren also built on the children’s memories of the previous week’s discussion by reminding the children of conversations or statements made or bringing in objects related to the prior discussion (i.e. pictures of animals in the zoo when the previous week’s discussion had been about capturing wild animals). methodology methodologically we used ethnographic techniques (charmaz, 2006) to systematically collect and analyse our weekly epi sessions. in this study, our collection includes digital video, photographic and audio recordings of the children’s forest play sessions, and the children’s group time discussions with our philosopher in residence. these digital traces were collected, transcribed and reviewed for content related to the questions posed and as discussed above the children’s thinking and propositions around being in the world. to do this, all audio recordings were transcribed verbatim and initially reviewed using in vivo coding (charmaz, 2006; corbin & strauss, 2008) to identify key words reflecting the children’s references to topics of interest and emotions. we also reviewed the transcripts for ‘cognitive knots’ in the children’s thinking, where emerging ideas were contradictory or in the process of being developed (edwards, gandini & forman, 2012). to optimize and deepen thinking we introduced ‘gentle critical cognitive challenges’. this was done to challenge the children to think in different ways. for example, when the theme of human management over non-human populations emerged from the transcripts we further reviewed the transcripts and video recordings during the play sessions to determine the way the children saw themselves in relation to pretence in play, the forest, animals and their own being and becoming during play and questioned them during the epi sessions (for example to determine if the children’s statements were believed to be true across different circumstances or conditions i.e. ‘what if it was a baby animal? would it be alright to put a baby animal in a cage?’) findings: the threats of wild animals the major contention discussed during our epi session was whether or not we can live peaceably with wild animals given they can scratch, bite, and eat us, or whether we ought to cage, kill, or otherwise train and punish them for posing perceived threats that were frightening to the children. in the following, section excerpts from the transcripts are shared to demonstrate the children’s thinking in relation to this area of sustainability. often the children would recall and reference being hurt by or frightened by animals such as bees, bears and other wild animals. for most of the discussion this fear lead to a desire to cage or trap wild animals as well as pets. 22 as the session with the children went on, their reasoning about what to do with animals perceived to be dangerous changed. originally we focused on building a dragon nest for dragons that might be living in the forest. later the children became increasingly concerned with threats posed by dragons to bodily integrity, safe space, and their lives. as their intent and concerns shifted so did their beliefs about what kind of structure to build for an animal as dangerous as a dragon. the children’s ideas changed from building a nest, to a tower (that could shoot them), to a cage to contain them. their reasons for caging other animals also changed and become more refined as the months passed. in the earlier months, caging was seen as a convenience for interaction, and even as homes for animals: “he can go in the cage and we can pet him whenever we want,” (i) “but that's [the cage] her home,” (a). cages could mean that cats could be pet at any time and that they would have their own home. eventually, however, with the introduction of plastic toy props (animals and cages), the children were asked whether we ought to trap animals like lions, wolves, elephants, and bears. in part influenced by their reasoning about the dangers of dragons, the children began to advocate for caging as pre-emptive measures against the perceived potential for violence. so when asked why we ought to trap various animals, the children responded: a: we have to trap him [the mosquito] so he won't suck our blood. i: because they bite each other! a: wolves are bad because they will eat people. i saw a snake eat a bad guy. j: because they [elephants] can smash people in the face with their nose. s: because they [elephants] can spray you in your face and then you will get soaking wet. i: they might push you to the ground. and eat you. g: i'm a little bit nervous, i am scared, because lions are not actually in cages. they can jump over. a: a lion will just bite you with its big mouth and then so bad and then your head and they you're going to have no bones, you'll have no bones and then your skeleton is going to be there and then you to have your red, red, red body. a: and he's going to throw our bones in the air. every regular participant advocated for the caging of animals during our sessions, using strikingly similar reasons. the children for the most part expressed here and elsewhere concern for their own safety and worry about violence against them. they often imaged these possibilities in graphic detail. for the children, the fear and possibility of being bitten, pushed, hit, and even eaten was real. being small animals themselves, the threat of even domesticated cats proved real enough to justify caging. it became apparent early in our discussions that alongside concerns about safety and bodily integrity were also concerns about power: a: nooo! we can bring kitty and then we can bite them- warren: you want to bite them?! a: yeah! g: yeah, so that i can kill it! 23 caged animals soon became recipients of the children's expression of power and domination. importantly, almost all of the children voiced the desire to bite the tail of one animal or another (a wolf, a lion, a cat, a snake). this might be seen as a display of humannonhuman power relations and the children’s emerging understandings of their limits against others of superior strength and agility. some children also expressed amusement at the thought of caged animals. in a vignette offered by one of the teachers about seeing caged bears the children were asked how they felt. warren: [d]o you think it's sad, or how do you feel? a: i think it's sad. a: funny. warren: ok, so why do you think it's funny, a? a: because they eat us. j: i think it's funny, too. warren: why do you think it's funny, j? j: because we can catch them so they don't run away. gentle critical cognitive challenges as we reasoned together, important terms were introduced by the children to refine their position and better explain their beliefs. wildness was one such term. as j explained, “wild kitties are bad... because wild kitties have no food to eat and then they get grumpy and they bite people.” wildness was a term adopted by the children to describe the kind of animal that will bite, scratch, and devour. j introduced it for the first time during a discussion about caging domesticated cats in order to draw a distinction between cats that are not violent, and those that behave the same way as wolves, lions, and bears. ‘wildness’ became especially important in our discussion of what to do with a baby lion (represented by a plastic figurine). while the children offered many reasons to trap the adult lion, they were less sure about what to do with the baby. as a succinctly put the matter, trapping an adult is okay but trapping a baby is not “[b]ecause big animals are not cute for us.” further complicating the argument and building on j's distinction of wildness, a added, “[b]ecause if one goes wild, then the other goes wild and follows it.” that is, wildness begets wildness; if an adult is permitted freedom with her baby, the baby will turn wild and pose the same kind of threat as the adult. some children did offer reasoned dissent against caging. another child suggested that, “[b]ecause some will get angry at you, and try to get to you, eat you,” [if we attempt to cage wild animals]. as mentioned above, cuteness was a consideration against trapping an animal. s also felt concern for the separation of parent and child “[b]ecause the lion wants his baby.” in the final two sessions with the children, warren introduced a flying squirrel hand puppet, named peanut, in order to confront the children about some of their beliefs about trapping, caging, and killing wild animals. we felt this offered something to both the children and facilitator: the children were able to take responsibility for their beliefs about the other in the presence of the other, and the facilitator was able to be more forceful in objecting to the positions of the children without feeling neutrality was compromised, since objections came from peanut. peanut: well hold on. i have something to say to j and to a: are you guys just joking [about what you want to do with wild animals]? 24 a and j: no. peanut: see? they're serious. they really do want to trap. so you want to trap me? a: we want to trap you! j: i want to bite you! peanut: a, why do you want to trap me a? a: because you want to scratch us and [inaudible] spray you with water. j: and i put you in my washer, and put you in the toilet. a: i want to put it in the jail. g: i want to trap you in a cage. j: i'll eat every friend of yours. we came to learn that the motivating force behind the desire for extreme punitive measures against not only peanut, but, as we have already seen, all potentially dangerous wild animals, was the fear of being eaten, bitten, or scratched: “because [they] scratch us. because [they] scratch all of us,” (a). some children were uncomfortable with these measures, calling them “sad,” and subsequently changed their minds about their own positions regarding the treatment of other wild animals. however, at least one child also recognized that the intentions of a and j seemed reasonable, “i guess j and a think he'll do bad stuff to us, so they [a & j] want to save us,” (s). this line of inquiry lead to peanut asking whether it is was acceptable to trap children who bite and scratch. two separate discussions followed. the first was that because children are not animals, it was unacceptable to trap them: m: because there won't be any more humans. a: or kids! i: no, then i'll never get to eat again. j: i'll give you food and water though. peanut: a, do you want to put i in a cage? a: no, i want to put small animals. when peanut responded that i is a small animal, and so meets a's criterion for caging eligibility, some children objected that humans are not animals. while reasons were not offered for this position, some children contended that humans are animals because “some of us really hurt people,” because the “one song said people are animals,” and because of quasievolutionary reasons: peanut: a long, long time, humans were monkeys? what does that mean? a: my dad tell me. peanut: ohhh. did you guys hear what a said? he said a long, long time ago humans were monkeys. j: yeah, you're right, and then they turned into people. peanut: so does that mean that humans are animals? 25 j: no, not anymore. i: i'm still a monkey because i'm just born. interestingly, there did not seem to be a correspondence in thinking between those who believed humans were animals and what ought to be done about animals, as j and m and s believed humans and animals were different, and a and a, ar, and i believed humans are a type of animal. the second discussion that followed related to the acceptability of caging children who scratch or bite explored asymmetrical punishments for humans and nonhumans. when asked what should happen to children who bite or scratch, the children suggested to “throw them out of daycare,” or “just give them a timeout.” but when peanut asked what should happen to her if she bit or scratched the children they suggested to “throw you out and kill you!” (j) “[p]ut you in the fire,” (a) or “kill you and [your] friends!” (i). objecting to this disparity, peanut sought to explain the rationale behind wild animals attacking humans: fear of being hurt. to this m and a replied, m: yeah. i don't think you should go in the garbage or [be] lit on fire. a: yeah, you just want to defend yourself to be safe. the children were left, then, having expressed different beliefs on the subject of how to treat a potentially dangerous wild animal. a and j were strong defenders of extreme punitive measures, including shooting, igniting, caging, and biting the offender, and devouring the offender's friends. a, a, s, i, and m objected to these measures, instead opting for a more empathetic approach to wild animal behaviour and critical self-reflection of their own “wildness”, and eventually repudiating their own positions about caging animals. s noted, however, that the motivations of a and j were for the sake of protecting the children, and all seemed reluctant to criticize the two directly. analysis adopting an ‘ethic of resistance’ (lenz taguchi, 2010; 2011) toward assumptions and taken for granted notions in early childhood education discourses, in this analysis we turn our attention to promising explanations of the children’s statements based on their own experience of feeling the need for protection against cruel aspects of the world. rather than focusing on the children’s inability to take the perspective of the animals (for discussions on perspective taking see piaget & inhelder, 1969). we can view their stance as a natural extension of their current knowing and sensibility around safety and security and perhaps what could be considered a realistic view of vulnerability within the world. in their short tenure (4 years) as humans on earth, these children have learned a great deal about their own power (or lack of power) and fears within the world. their sympathies for the baby animals and their consideration that caging the animals could assist them in getting to know them potentially without being hurt by them reveals promising notions of attending to others with care and adopting a gaze or understanding based on the mutual need for protection. rather than looking at these children’s power fantasies as naïve or cruel, it might be fruitful to examine the potential that their comments hold for extending their understanding, and nudging their thinking toward other complex ideas including species interdependence and alternative perspectives on freedom, safety, contact and cohabitation. so many of the messages children receive are confusing and contradict species interdependence. for example, we often encourage children to clean up after themselves and perhaps have even begun to work on habits of recycling and reducing or critically considering our consumption of resources in our attempt to move children toward stewardship and green 26 actions and thinking. however, at the same time children are bombarded with other messages promoting material consumption. this creates confusing and contradictory images of ways of being and becoming within the world. for adults to understand and work through these ideas with children we ourselves must identify and critically deconstruct the contradictory and confusing ways that the world is or may appear to be with respect to human consumption, place and power. for example, we tend to valorise high density urban habitation as a solution to global population growth knowing that this creates economies of scale in urban areas and the potential to preserve and protect natural habitat. however, we rarely discuss human encroachment on bear, wolf, coyote and/or the habitat of other species that are displaced or are marginally co-existing within city or suburban limits. we are also remiss in our focus and discussion of care and release of unwanted “pets” like fish and rabbits and the role that we (human’s) play in the stewardship of the ‘unwanted’. release of non-domestic species has created ecosystem imbalances in urban areas along with countless other pollutants that effect insect and microbial populations in the remaining wooded and riparian zones. to adequately support children’s actions and thinking adults have to also begin to act and reflect on these topics. considering again the children’s experience of being cared for and protected, the idea of caging and confining s’s cat so that they could encounter it safely can be seen as an extension of their curious and inquiring gaze rather than a position of superiority. in this way we can examine these exchanges from the perspective of species interdependence or what donna haraway (2008) terms ‘worlding’, where species meet, respond and learn to pay attention to ‘other’ (kindle edition, location 399). as haraway notes, i love the fact that human genomes can be found in only about 10 percent of all the cells that occupy the mundane space i call my body; the other 90 percent of the cells are filled with the genomes of bacteria, fungi, protists, and such, some of which play in a symphony necessary to my being alive at all, and some of which are hitching a ride and doing the rest of me, of us, no harm. i am vastly outnumbered by my tiny companions; better put, i become an adult human being in company with these tiny messmates. to be one is always to become with many. (kindle edition location 157) conclusion during the epi sessions it was necessary for warren to unpack the children’s ideas, and he did so by drawing out the children’s thinking and challenging them using a variety of analytic techniques such as: 1) asking who, when, where, what, how much, and why questions, 2) making comparisons to look for similarities and differences, and 3) using what strauss and corbin (1990) call a ‘flip flop technique’ where the concept is wrestled with cognitively and turned inside out or upside down, imagining the very opposite, comparing extremes to bring out qualities and properties under different conditions (example, does it hold true if…when…), and 4) drawing on personal experiences. we also found it necessary to deepen the children’s perspectives by gently nudging their thinking forward. analysing the transcripts for children’s understandings and assertions we found was a valuable way to further their thinking. by bringing ideas forward week to week from the children’s previous discussions we were able to introduce alternative perspectives, including (through peanut) the perspective of the animals the children wanted to cage. we also found that the discussion was assisted by the forest context. in this environment we were able to create a flow in the dialogue and a confluence between the games and activities taking place in the forest, the children, warren and the topic of discussion. this coming together of elements reminds us of deleuze and parnet’s (2007) 27 writing on conversation, lines of flight, flow and how timing creates a phenomenon. as stated: movement does not go from one point to another-rather it happens between two levels as in a difference of potential. a difference of intensity produces a phenomenon, releases or ejects it, sends it into space. (p. 31) the moments we experienced in conversation with the children in a sense represent such lines of flight and movement as our conversations created an awareness and deepened our experience of the children’s understanding. barad (2007) refers to as an ‘agentic realist encounter’ where a bounded reality comes into existence and becomes agentic through an entanglement of human and non-human agencies in the moment of the encounter. our encounter during the epi sessions with the children created an agency that was the product of all elements of the encounter within that moment of conversational flow. using technology (digital video, audio, photographs) to capture aspects of that agentic moment and bringing them forward to our next session with the children, or to our joint awareness in a research dialogue between the teachers and researchers, added another dimension to the phenomenon by creating a record of it in time and for the purposes of analysis. taken together we found that epi with the children in the forest on the topic of animals helped to deepen our understandings of children’s perspectives on sustainability and in particular their reaction to and treatment of animals they felt threatened by. as we analysed the work we took into consideration the contradictory messages received by children around cohabitation and environmental stewardship. to make these discussions meaningful and sufficiently complex we must ourselves consider the various environmental contradictions we live by and with and the way we might present these to children to gently nudge both their and our own thinking forward in favourable ways. we believe that the educational importance of this research lies in its previously understudied method of engaging critical inquiry with young children around topics of sustainability. while this method need not be limited to sustainability, the collaboration between the philosopher in residence and the childcare centre, whose foundational curriculum is based on sustainable practice, proved a fruitful line of interdisciplinary early childhood educational research. we hope our work here will provide a useful starting point for other educators interested in critical inquiry with young children in the hopes of interrogating beliefs, fostering participation, and promoting democratic and sustainable lines of inquiry. references barad, k. (2007) meeting the universe halfway: quantum physics and the entanglement of matter and meaning, durham, nc: duke university press. cam, p. (1998). thinking together. sidney: hale& iremonger, pty. ltd. cam, p. (2000). philosophy, democracy, education: reconstructing dewey. in: in-suk cha (ed.), teaching philosophy for democracy. seoul: seoul university press, pp. 158-181. charmaz, k. (2006). constructing grounded theory: a practical guide through qualitative analysis. los angeles, ca: sage 28 corbin, j., & strauss, a. (2008). basics of qualitative research (3rd ed.). los angeles, ca: sage. dewey, j. (1954). the public and its problems. ohio: swallow press. dahlberg, g. & moss, p. (2005). ethics and politics in early childhood education. london: routledgefalmer. deleuze, g. & parnet, c. (2007). dialogues ii (revised edition). new york: columbia university press. edwards, c. p., gandini, l., forman, g. e. (2012). the hundred languages of children (3rd ed.). santa barbara, ca.: praeger. gardner, s. (2009). thinking your way to freedom: a guide to owning your own practical reasoning. philadelphia: temple university press. haraway, d. (2008). when species meet (posthumanities). minneapolis, mi: university of minnesota press. lipman, m. (2003). thinking in education. cambridge: cambridge university press, part two: communities of inquiry, pp. 81-105. lipman, m. (2009). philosophy for children. some assumptions and implications. in marsal, e., dobashi, t. u. (eds.), children philosophize worldwide, frankfurt and main: lang publisher, pp. 10-27. lenz taguchi, h. (2010) doing collaborative deconstruction as an ‘exorbitant’ strategy in qualitative research. reconceptualising educational research methodology, 1(1), 41-52. lenz taguchi, h. (2011) investigating learning, participation and becoming in early childhood practices with a relational materialist approach. global studies of childhood, 1(1), 36-50. author 1. (2015). early childhood education and sustainability: a living curriculum childhood education, 91, 5, pp. 332-341. author 1 & author 2 (in press). foundations of democracy and sustainability: power, reality and dragons, children and philosophy malaguzzi, l. (1994). your image of the child: where teaching begins. early childhood educational exchange, no. 96, 52-61. piaget, j. & inhelder, b. (1969). the psychology of the child. new york: basic books. strauss, a., & corbin, j. (1990). basics of qualitative research: grounded theory procedures and techniques. thousand oaks, ca: sage. 29 address correspondences to: dr. margaret macdonald associate professor faculty of education simon fraser university burnaby, bc v5a 1s6 warren bowen philosopher in residence univercity childcare centre simon fraser university burnaby, bc v5a 1s6 community of inquiry and underserved youth engagement: a reflective account of philosophy and method 13 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 37, issue 2 (2017) community of inquiry and underserved youth engagement: a reflective account of philosophy and method darren garside & karen j. myskiw introduction: arts education and inquiry braidotti, when considering her early career, poses the following questions: how do we do justice to experiences that have no recognition in the language and practice of conventional wisdom, common sense and reasonableness? what is the appropriate way to express silences and missing voices? (butler & braidotti, 2010, p. 315) n this paper we expand on the short answer “art”, including visual arts, spoken word, and poetry, dancing and tableau, by elaborating upon one aspect processes of inquiry that at their heart value recognition and voice. we begin our account by providing a dialogic narrative case study that explores an artist’s educational inquiry practice with underserved youth in british columbia. braided into the account are analytical reflections from a philosopher of education working in a uk teaching university. as we explore the phenomenon of giving expression to underserved youth voice, we go on to outline how lin & bruce (2013) address the matter. their line is to wed critical theory and philosophical pragmatism in order to theorize inquiry with underserved youth. however, there are aspects that we find unconvincing because of unresolved tensions in ontology; tensions deriving directly from using dewey without understanding contemporary developments in pragmatist scholarship. our approach is to present an aspect of the work of the contemporary pragmatist, colin koopman, who sets out to emphasize transition, inquiry and transformation without necessarily locating agency solely in the individual. for koopman sources of power and agency must be liberated from within contexts rather than imposed from outside as a form of utopian or dystopian scheme. this form of philosophy emphasizes action and a fluidity in the conception of ‘who’ is acting and is guided by an emphasis on meliorism, i.e. a justified hopefulness intending improvement in the situation at hand (koopman, 2009; garside, 2014). such a reading has affinities with the new materialist stance of hickey-moody et al. (2016, p. 217), who argues that “young people’s individual and group subjectivities becom[e] through [artistic] practices”1. philosophical-artistic inquiry in a canadian context: working with the underserved to combat epistemic and hermeneutic injustice i 14 in our case study we interpret the notion of voice and injustice through fricker's (2007) work on epistemic injustice. fricker systematically conceptualizes how voice is not heard, recognized, or responded to by all parties in configurations of power2. injustices can take the form of testimonial injustice where the testimony of a specific individual or group is ignored or not heard. here the wrong is done to the giver of knowledge as they are simply unable to make themselves heard or have their concerns acted upon. the second type of injustice, and is central to understanding our dialogue, is hermeneutical injustice. here speakers’ claims about their experiences are almost insurmountably difficult to express as the linguistic and conceptual resources are not available within the discourses available to these subjects of injustice. we may say there are gaps or lacunae that deny voice so deeply that persons and groups, according to fricker, are ‘prevented from becoming who they are.’ we also aver that cultural and artistic excellence is central to any good notion of human flourishing. in the classical sense of flourishing as eudaimonia we know that life as the practical art of living well requires both an understanding and expression of the good. a post-humanist sense of flourishing is necessarily non-teleological and must emphasize and cultivate the capacity to articulate and then navigate fractured and discontinuous experience. in order to construct narratives of engagement with our future selves and a sustainable life on our future planet then those generating meaning in othered or underserved communities, who are alienated from self--replicating and perpetuating habits of powerful domination, must be able to start from their own situation and find resource and capability within those spaces and places. the following narrative case study is formed from the words of one of the authors of this paper and concerns her work with indigenous youth in british columbia. aboriginal education in canada, and in particular british columbia, works with a variety of living theory concepts such as ‘two­-eyed seeing’, ‘wayfinding’, ‘and elegant sufficiency of ourselves’ to revitalize indigenous peoples through processes of healing and emphasizing holistic wellbeing (kelly, 2014; kelly, 2015). central to this are arts practices leading to a radical re-imagining of the self and the more--than--human, a notion that expands beyond the perniciousness of a colonial western individualistic mindset. as etherington states, narrative analysis treats stories as knowledge per se which constitutes ‘the social reality of the narrator’ (etherington, 2004, p. 81; 2009). woven into this account is an analytical structure that the other author has read into the account as a dialogic response to themes that will be elaborated upon in the next section of the paper. presenting the case study in this way is a cartographic act (braidotti 2010) and one that maps the co-construction of meaning and knowledge between the authors, without over-generalizing, in ways that are meant to be interesting and reflection-provoking for a wider audience. we begin with a descriptive outline of the darearts process. kjm: the darearts3 programme in vancouver is a week-long, non-traditional, arts-based studio & leadership activities intervention. preparation for the students begins with in-class introductions to the artist facilitators, exploring the themes for the arts-based week, and a highlighting of the darearts vocabulary. additional pre-teaching is allocated to develop storylines in advance of the intensive week and this helps students perform when time is precious in the week itself. the students are introduced to some of the facilitators, who are visual / multimedia artists and dancers, as well as the core darearts values and principles. these values, an acronym for discipline, action, responsibility, respect and reflection for excellence are core in all subsequent endeavors 15 undertaken. the values are modelled and repeated throughout the week-long program. in the week itself, the immersion of the whole class has immediate benefits for the individuals who participate as well as the class, which engenders class cohesiveness. “when i consider transitionalism, i am reminded of a line of poetry valued by my co-author, ‘time present and time past\\are both perhaps present in time future’ (eliot, xxxx). this echoes for me how my students (from a b.c. elementary school) move into and reflect on the darearts intensive studio process, whose purposes are to provide long lasting transformation and growth.” dg: for me this resonates with a performative metaphor of the educator as cartographer. you describe a setting forth or journeying into a landscape and this requires commitment to hopeful connection. i also note the importance of the invitation and your respectful stance as you enter into relating with these children. you bring values with you, unavoidably, but own these values so that children have a chance to respond authentically and choose how they respond to the invitation. the approaches in this paper are concerned with initiating inquiry in a way that is purposeful without being instrumental and the former requires a fundamental commitment to openness. it echoes one of the underlying assumptions of new materialism, barad’s (2003: 815) insight that relating precede relata, and in the process of intra-relating there can be ‘agential cuts’ that recognize or deny agency as a materialist interaction of matter and discourse. i read your practice as affirming and acknowledging the children’s heritage as an essential part of their agency. denying this heritage is to deny part of themselves by denying a whole apparatus of expression. your approach to the classroom is more tentative and respectful since children’s voices are heard and made space for from the outset. kjm: with inquiry-based programs, such as darearts, the artists model and teach the leadership process that values discipline, action, reflections, responsibility, and a respect for excellence. excellence is achieved through students doing their personal best; respect is integrally developed and recognized as students support the efforts of the group, as well, acts of responsibility ensure artist endeavors each day contribute towards the final performance. the product itself is not the main focus; the workshops are about the process and celebrating how far the participants have come by sharing their efforts at the end of the week with a wider community. each day the circle opens and closes as students are encouraged to reflect on their learning, and to note these thoughts on sticky-notes to be gathered up each day as status updates. action and the decisive ability to choose the expression of one’s agency offers a profound gift for empowering the students. the ability for students to take ownership of the studio environment and its outcomes arises from encouraging their mindful commitment to the creative process. dg: i read into these words an elaboration on themes of transitional becoming that requires a wrenching free by the students’ from being positioned. i note how the circle is a practice central to indigenous cultural practice. i hear that their trajectory and velocity of possibility is committed to and connected with by the artists in a melioristic and open-ended way. for me it is also worthwhile to imagine how artists create value by an embodied valuing of those with whom they work. drawing again on barad (2003), one aspect of valuing performing one’s voice over having it merely represented is that phenomena are made through the intra-action of matter (material processes) and instruments (the language and structures of recognition at play; the process of inquiring as community) rather than be 16 recognized by a sovereign self. hence, intra-subjective space emerges from, rather than being prior to, bodies in motion aligning their trajectories. kjm: yes, this intra-subjective space becomes further elaborated upon by our elder, in the talking circle. the talking circle creates a cohesive space with rituals that reinforce safety and celebrate the efforts over the course of the 4 days. throughout the week, different artists and students take the lead and facilitate this process. all participants, including students, teachers, artists and volunteers sit in a unifying circle whose space allows for equality, where individual voices can be heard in a respectful environment and performative space. the circle creates a kindred experience that is both transformative for individuals and the group. “our class came together as a team” a grade seven girl commented in closing circle of day four, bearing witness to the profound change she underwent compared to her group’s habitually destructive/negative behaviors. as she changed, her clique changed too. dg: for me this relates to temporal form and historicist practices that we shall see to be at the heart of koopman’s work. a transitionalist situation has form and material circumstance, and what you describe is the centrality of a safe yet transformative space. i read in your words that there are three aspects to the space: the affective, the conceptual and the technical. the affective aspect concerns the emotional space where it is made possible to feel and to express what is often excluded and marginalized from common classroom work. the conceptual safe space is made possible by the comfort of artists in playing with ideas and possibilities that transmits the idea of permission to the students. two aspects that come also from your words and that relate to the conceptual is that of elaboration and communication. the final necessary condition of the safe space is the importance of technique since (melioristic) intention is not sufficient in itself. there are strong parallels for me with the community of inquiry experienced as philosophy for children (p4c) practice. the emphasis on different types of thinking caring, critical, collaborative and creative reflect the safe spaces made through your artistic practices. but there are limits to thinking. pietzner’s recent doctoral work reminds us of the emphasis that lipman laid upon the product of inquiry (pietzner, 2014), but in this paper it is our position that disembodied judgements are dissociative and alienating; it is this that gives rise to what dewey criticized as the spectator theory of knowledge (coulter and weins, 2004) where our knowledge is good for nothing (or know-thing perhaps). this troubling passivity of knowledge is challenged by third-wave pragmatism. kjm: yes, there is strong resonance between darearts and p4c pedagogical practice. the darearts program carefully constructs a program that builds collaboration over the course of the week where the sharing of responsibility for self-efficacy is given over to the students. over the course of the week, this co-constructed practice deeply engages the student participants to call upon the leadership techniques they are exposed to that will over time be part of the transitionalist place koopman speaks of, where future relationships to future selves and future worlds illustrate the impacts of a hands-on program. co-construction leads to claiming our voices: within the workshop a salish performer and artist recounts his poignant experiences as a youth, his choice of not speaking, to not have his voice heard, his need to be electively mute until he was 18 and how then the arts provided the means for his liberation. through dance and drumming the gift of his becoming was fully actualized and 17 epitomized by the eagle dance, an autobiographical event that presented points of affinity for the youth and inspired the artists in attendance. other mentors who have graduated from the darearts program also shared their personal accounts, building solidarity. over the course of the morning the young students became eaglets, preparing to sing, dance and fly. the eagle is closest to the creator, in salish culture, and epitomizes wisdom, loyalty and strength. the youth soar forth into a landscape charted mutually. dg: for me the theme of transformational experience is particularly strong. at the beginning, no one could have specified this as a learning outcome nor could this be planned for. instead, a trust is required that the resources required for transformation are inherent in the situation and can be accessed through meaningful encounters with one another, in a safe space. there is a trust in one another and confidence that what one has at-hand is sufficient to find the way. becoming eaglets is not just a metaphor but a genuine transformational experience that is accessible to young children but gets denied to us as we become older. the gift of the salish dancer is to free us to become children again and that allows us to move forward with our growth once we are wrenched loose from our positions. kjm: the practices are an embodied inquiry with individuals immersed in the fullest practice of becoming. as part of engaging holistically, we encourage active minds and bodies each day through rigorous exercises in movement, dance, drama and creative thinking. through these exercises, the students get hands-on experience building animation sets, writing scripts, drawing and painting, playing instruments, shooting video and photography, creating lyrics and performing movement and dance. the students have control over the creative process and are encouraged to take ownership of their cooperative learning in the studio at all times. then, they create artworks and their own performance pieces that are a direct product of their self-exploration and artistic interpretation of what it is to be an eagle and the dare values. they are expected to communicate their ideas and collaborate with their peers as they complete their artworks. students reflect, communicate their point of view and insights as they progress through the darearts program on a status update board where students can ‘post it’ note how they are feeling about their progress and what they are learning about themselves and their peers. through social media, the comments are tweeted to say listen to the voices of youth. dg: this is another affirmation of the space which is fluid and matter-full. the recurrent themes of the physical, conceptual, affective and technically saturated practice are here in abundance and resonate with the intensity and commitment of a p4c inquiry by an established community of inquirers. ci and art engagement are not the same thing since they differ in their emphasis on reasoning and artistic practice. however, common to both are in interest in expression for broader purposes concerning identity and transformational change as well as a need for technique and execution. in my response to your words, spoken and written, i read into them what is of value in koopman’s transitionalist pragmatism, the anti-essentialism of new materialism, and what is common to both of them a commitment to challenging the systematic marginalization of underserved youth through recognizing their voice and making spaces for its performance. 18 kjm: the artists and educators that work for darearts play an integral role in guiding the students through free thought and free expression. they teach them, in a very distinct way, how tapping into their creative side can make them stronger and more confident and can reveal who they truly are and what they truly want in life. darearts educators and artists help students spark that fire inside that will help them move through life no matter what comes their way. vancouver's darearts leadership models is inquiry based learning in that there are multiple outcomes possible, purposeful play where attention is focused on painting, dancing, acting, creating musical compositions and poetic verse, giving artistic license to the youth to have an authentic and inter-subjective experience. the darearts pedagogical philosophy that underpins the whole week is fundamentally studentcentered and empowering. by students teaching their peers what they have learned, they are empowered to become leaders, not followers, and ignite change — in their own lives and in their communities. during the final performance, one student stood alone, spot-lit, reciting the phrases created through the spoken word workshop. a powerful message that both embraces and claims ownership of the experiences which have metamorphically valued the other. it is the duality of intent that allows deep transformation. witness each member’s words: feelings are wild animals. when sorrow is like a purple mountain you feel you cannot climb. when life feels like an ice cream cone, melting around you. if i were an eagle i could be soaring down to the horizon line, always watching on the way, not worrying about depression day after day. i wish i was the mighty eagle, flying with god, careless about my appearance, tuning out the embarrassments, conquering all isolation, laughing at suicidal thoughts, not overreacting at my loss. the community of inquiry as transitionalist phenomenon two common ways for arts education to be conceptualized is as either inquiry or research (sullivan, 2010) but little is written about it as a community of inquiry (ci) or emancipatory education. visual culture arts education (hernandez, 2000, 2007) is increasingly being used to promote inclusive education practices, such as challenging deficit narratives around immigrant populations (hernandez, 2015). karpati et al. (2015) also argue that `visual culture groups act as powerful student communities for auto-didactic and peer initiated learning'. sclater and lally (2013) identify the ‘significance of creative practices ... to support a range of wider educational aims, including those relating to social justice and the development of young people’s own authentic voices.’ they also recognize how garber (2004) notes the importance of visual culture, and arts & design education in social justice education. this manifests as ‘helping students to develop their `voice' [but this] actually requires educators to develop a deeper understanding of the array of contexts that young people find significant’. an interesting example is in the context of working with “underserved youth” and lin & bruce (2013) see art education instrumentally as a means to ‘foster engaged citizens by encouraging youth to see how social, cultural and political forces shape their experiences’ (p. 337). art does this by fostering learning through art as an alternative site of counterhegemonic struggle against reductive accounts of human experience; the authors term this perspective 19 ‘community inquiry’ and to conceptualize the approach draw upon dewey's philosophy of art and sociopolitical theory and his ‘inquiry methodology’. what is interesting and novel about this approach is marrying together two distinct philosophical traditions critical theory and pragmatism. as part of the work in drawing on both traditions, first, lin & bruce (2013) analyze and then make a distinction between a community and the state of consensus, coherency or unified social entity and in their work attempt to find a balance between the individual and the social. furthermore, they challenge the idea that art interventions are a sufficient condition to enable underserved youth to productively respond to their struggles. they do grant that art can and should play a vital role in fostering engagement as a form of democratic practice. it is the concern of the authors to value a move away from an individualistic focus on learning to a community inquiry approach that fosters growth from real-life issues. they draw upon the model of inquiry established in dewey’s logic: theory of inquiry (1938) and make reference to the broader figures in the pragmatist tradition to justify a dialogic space and collaborative activities. hence, community becomes not just a containing or hosting space but an enactive or performative space. we note that these considerations of teleology and purpose, where neither individual nor collective can claim to be ontologically a priori, are at the heart of debates about subjects and their knowledges in philosophy for children and philosophical community of inquiry (splitter & sharp, 1995; lipman, 2003; mccall, 2006; kennedy & vanseigelheim, 2010; biesta, 2011; murris, 2016). moving on to consider the role of the arts (p. 339-340), the authors take the position of dewey in art as experience (1980) where art, or rather the communicative capacity for relating to art, ‘offers an avenue for participation in the public sphere’, which emphasizes the collective relationship over individual authorship (p. 339). it is in the relationship to collective meaning-making that the individual, as an artist, integrates both difference and commonality in their experience and the experiences of others. paradoxically it is by facilitating the individual voices of underserved youth that the collective voice can also be articulated; art in this instance catalyzes productive power and social action. after considering a number of their own projects, lin & bruce (2013) conclude that artist and audience need to reconsider their relationship, as it is evermore crucial to consider relationships to reality rather than objects (conceptual or discrete). second, they argue that serving the underserved requires emphasizing strengths rather than needs. this approach builds on noddings’ (1989) relational attitude that sees the relation as more basic than the individual (lin & bruce, 2013, p. 343). third-wave pragmatist critique of lin & bruce we agree with the value position in the paper that places arts inquiry in a critical social context but we part from their approach in two ways. first, in our understanding of the account of agency underpinning critical social engagement. despite dewey's intention to move away from a selfworld philosophical dualism, his account of subjectivity, like those that precede him, remains a figurative one. second, we note that contemporary developments in pragmatist philosophy raise considerable doubts over what sellars termed 'the myth of the given', i.e. the role of the aesthetic as 'given' directly to consciousness without mediation by normatively-laden language (koopman, 2009). we begin by examining in more depth dewey’s understanding of inquiry that underpins the pragmatist elements of lin & bruce’s commitment to democratic modes of intersubjective relating. 20 for dewey, the subject is in a non-dualistic and naturalistic relationship with its environment. since there is a continuous flow of information between organisms from the environment then transition, best articulated in the logic is fundamentally a move from the indeterminate to the determinate. dewey's (1938) thinking on judgement in the logic is highly significant; part of the 'later works' series, this volume devoted to the one topic is indicative of dewey's mature and settled thoughts on the subject. according to nagel's introduction, at the heart of dewey's theory of inquiry is an innovation in the theory of judgement. for dewey, judgement is the settlement of an issue that has been subject to inquiry arising from a break in previously untroubled behavior. it is a problem-solving mechanism and dewey intended to show that to speak of logic and logical forms as a distinct way of understanding is severely limited and does not warrant the full use of the term 'judgement'. instead propositional understanding and unwarranted positions should be treated only as proposals, hypotheses, assertions and appraisals and are only a part of the judging process (1938, p. xvi; ch.1). full judgement is constructed through inquiry and is arrived at when logical forms (ideational matter) accrue to subject-matter (that brought to attention) when the latter is subjected to controlled inquiry (p. 105). as dewey describes it, inquiry is a directed or controlled transformation of an indeterminate situation into a determinedly fixed one. to do this there must be two operations acting in a functional correspondence the ideational/conceptual subject-matter, and techniques and organs of observation (p. 121). there is thus a unity where neither ideas nor empirical data is privileged over one another as proving fundamental to the generation of meaning. dewey is clear that in this view of the construction of judgement, 'construction' refers both to the act of construction and the structure that results from the act. only the subject-matter of judgement is existential and its substantial character is logically not ontologically determined. in other words the world is not found but made. and for it to be an existential subject the conditions of inquiry must be satisfied (pp. 129-30). the following quote exemplifies dewey's anti-essentialism: it is a form that accrues to original existence when the latter operates in a specified functional way as a consequence of operations of inquiry. it is not postulated that certain qualities always cohere in existence. it is postulated that they cohere as dependable evidential signs. the conjoined properties that mark off and identify a chair, a piece of granite, a meteor, are not sets of qualities given existentially as such and such. they are certain qualities which constitute in their ordered conjunction with one another valid signs of what will ensue when certain operations are performed. an object, in other words, is a set of qualities treated as potentialities for specified existential consequences. powder is what will explode under certain conditions; water as a substantial object is that group of connected qualities which will quench thirst, and so on (p. 132). judgement has a direct existential importance, over and above representational importance, since its concluding objects emerge from the process of inquiry, or put another way the process of inquiry produces conclusions. nor is this the end of the matter. the finality of judgement means that it is an individual situation but one that may always be open to further inquiry since each situation is part of a wider field or domain of understanding that can move from being untroubled to troubled given other information. 21 it is koopman’s (2009; 2016) argument that this latter direction, the move from resolved to unresolved is undeveloped in dewey’s work but it is precisely this aspect which needs greater emphasis when engaging with critical practices and situations what lin & bruce termed counterhegemonic practice. when we consider the ci as in transition from determinate to indeterminate then this creates an interesting set of issues for analysis. koopman terms his third-wave perspective on pragmatism as transitionalist pragmatism or conduct pragmatism. transitionalism is described as a philosophical temperament that focuses on ideas, concepts and things as part of and constitutive of transitional processes (p. 11). this working from old to new, from past to future, treats truth as a dynamic process with temporal duration rather than a static quality holding either momentarily or eternally. extending this idea to ethics changes our focus onto the process of improving living rather than evaluating the correctness of isolable acts (p. 11). hence, it is more meaningful to speak in terms of truer/better rather than true or good. what koopman is trying to get us to accept is that pragmatism in general, and transitionalism in particular, is concerned with processes of justification and inquiry; he is concerned not for 'epistemic or moral rightness but melioration, improvement, development and growth' (p. 12, my italics). in order to make his argument koopman states firstly that transitionalism is a figure or lens for drawing together a range of complex concepts such as temporality, historicity, evolution, development, process and event. here i follow koopman and present his sketched clarifications of the relationship between some of these key terms. first, transitionality is not mere change (p. 13). the former is temporally mediated development whilst the latter is temporally mediated difference. temporally mediated development is a purposive activity whilst difference implies only undirected change. the former is central to pragmatism and indeed inherits a kantian legacy where thought is regarded as thoroughly purposive and directive of activity. for example, a rolling boulder does not develop, it does not transition between states according to purposes unlike humans and humming birds who might 'strive towards the glory of the sun' (p. 13). koopman is making a fundamental distinction here between purposive, developmental activity that develops for better or worse, that is activity that is fundamentally normative or evaluable. at its crux all human endeavor depends on whether purposive transitions result in definite improvements or definite degenerations (melioration or decline) (p. 13)4. on the other hand, there are situations which are comparatively continuous, ongoing processes of activity. this consideration ought to be borne in mind when we consider that for this form of pragmatism it is not necessary to specify in advance the shape of success in its transitions. koopman, i think, is not too concerned to over-specify in the manner of dewey’s logic since a key issue for koopman is that the emergence of new futures is not fully determined by the structures of old pasts. in other words, the future is radically underdetermined by the past in that the future develops out of the past without merely rehearsing the old and that purposiveness can be strictly delimited in advance. koopman states (p. 14) that purposive activity sets up a field of possibility where both progress and decay are possible. moving on from purposiveness, koopman then examines the inter-relationship between temporality and historicity. it is an inter-relationship since both concepts imply one another and are both aspects of purposive change. temporality is (p. 15) the form of transitionality itself, whilst historicity is the determinate contents through which transitions occur. koopman then goes on to indicate how there is a growing interest in pragmatic meliorism but that it still remains to be spelled out how, precisely, meliorism contributes to pragmatism. the keyword for koopman is hopefulness 22 and he claims that the philosophically robust conception of hopefulness is meliorism. furthermore, he identifies hopefulness as consisting of a combination of pluralism and humanism. by pluralism he means that the realities we inhabit are many and contingent, what he calls the pluriverse, and by humanism he means the idea that humans make definitive contributions to this pluriverse. in another description of meliorism he states it as the capability of creating better worlds and selves. koopman then goes on to draw on james (pp. 19-22) to delineate meliorism from mere optimism/pessimism which he regards as the conventional positions in mainstream philosophy. definitions of these terms are made through the common relationship to 'salvation' and truth where optimism is a belief in the necessity of salvation, pessimism the belief in the impossibility of salvation but meliorism focuses on the possibility of our creating the world's salvation whilst being willing to live without assurances or guarantees. meliorism therefore stands in contrast to mainstream optimistic/pessimistic attitudes since it no longer regards truth, as external authority, as having any emancipatory power. koopman discerns the constant theme of transitionalism as latent in all of the early pragmatist writers as well as rorty. in james he see the first account of pragmatist philosophy setting out as a practice to reconstruct the situation in which it finds itself rather than timeless contemplation of eternal verities. instead of truth standing in objective relation to humanity that then needs to be found, revealed and of which the consequences are necessarily emancipatory, james sees truth as something happening to an idea. if we consider, as koopman (p. 20) does, the verb forms 'becomes true' and 'is made true' we get this sense of truth as a species of improvement rather than inert state. not only is the adverbial and processual aspect of truth emphasized but the fact-value distinction that is arguably core to the western philosophical tradition collapses; truth as improvement is both epistemological and axiological. on this account, truth does not stand removed from human plurality, it is not a power extrinsic to human action, rather truth is how we free ourselves actively, not how we are made free passively (p. 21). koopman claims that not even interpreters sympathetic to pragmatism have quite grasped this point or in other words 'truth is not powerful in itself but the name for our being powerful' (p. 22). in this paper what we wish to establish is a critique of lin & bruce’s use of pragmatist thought. they are right to emphasize a performative reading of the community of inquiry but firstgeneration pragmatism does not contain the conceptual resources to warrant this claim. dewey’s work on inquiry focuses on the production of individual judgements. a ci may be a valuable form that facilitates the production of such judgements but the ci in itself does not produce knowledge at the level of intersubjective let alone intra-subjective understanding. whereas the ontological openness to form, matter and purpose that is the feature of third-wave pragmatism provides a much firmer set of justifications for the type of practices that lin & bruce envisage. this ontological openness has strong affinities with new materialism but a discussion of this is beyond the scope of this paper. we would also add that it is our understanding that the problem of how to use arts practice educationally, in ways that do not replicate existing modes of domination and repression, is also relevant to critical theorists’: 'discourse ethics' (allen, 2010). for example, a distinctive feature of 3rd generation critical theorists is a concern to move beyond the rationalism (and the rationalist subjectivity) of habermas (and by extension over-rationalistic conceptions of ci) in order to stress “the contextual, the ethical, the particular, and the concrete as crucial aspects of 23 moral-political deliberation (allen, 2010, p. 132)”. additionally, medina (2010, p. 303) considers what was referred to earlier as the 'enactive and performative' and argues that: the issues we are confronted with as speakers are whether a legacy of use is worth maintaining and in what way the received use should be modified and how. in any performative chain in which we participate, we should ask ourselves: what are the transformations that are needed in this chain, if any? and how can they be produced? we end by agreeing with the implied position in lin & bruce (2013) that holds the site of educational-artistic engagement is a location of moral-political deliberation, but we add also a place of performative disruption. so far we have shown how we disagree with the implied unity of selves and the possibility of dialogic engagement as presented by lin & bruce. our position is that the figurative account of subjectivity should be criticized for ascribing too much credence to the notion of the sovereign, uniform and constitutive subject who judges. we agree with the premise of braidotti (2010) that ‘the nonunitary subject is ubiquitous’ and the implications that has for our practice are posed as a question: ‘how might [a] nomadic subjectivity as artistic practice allow us to consider political and ethical mattering in indigenous arts education contexts?’ references allen, amy. 2010. “3rd generation critical theory: benhabib, fraser and honneth.” in after poststructuralism: transitions and transformations, edited by rosi braidotti, 129–48. durham, england: acumen publishing. biesta, gert. 2011. “philosophy, exposure, and children: how to resist the instrumentalisation of philosophy in education.” journal of philosophy of education 45 (2). doi:10.1111/j.14679752.2011.00792.x. braidotti, rosi, ed. 2010. “introduction.” in after poststructuralism: transitions and transformations. durham, england: acumen publishing. butler, judith, and rosi braidotti. 2010. “out of bounds: philosophy in an age of transition.” in after poststructuralism: transitions and transformations, edited by rosi braidotti, 307–35. durham, england: acumen publishing. coulter, d., and j. r. wiens. 2002. “educational judgment: linking the actor and the spectator.” educational researcher 31 (4): 15–25. doi:10.3102/0013189x031004015. etherington, kim. 2009. “life story research: a relevant methodology for counsellors and psychotherapists.” counselling and psychotherapy research 9 (4): 225–33. doi:10.1080/14733140902975282. etherington, r k. 2004. becoming a reflexive researcher: using our selves in research. jessica kingsley. fendler, r. & hernandez, f. 2015 visual culture as living inquiry: looking at how young people reflect on, share and narrate their learning practices in and outside school, pamplona: pamiela-edarte (upna) fricker, m. 2007. epistemic injustice: power and the ethics of knowing. oxford, oxford university press. garber, e. 2004 social justice and art education, visual arts research, 30(2), 4-22 24 garside, d. 2014. edifying judgement : using rorty to redescribe judgement in the context of 'philosophy for children'. phd thesis, university of bath hernandez, f. 2000 educación y cultura visual. barcelona: octaedro hickey-moody, anna, helen palmer, and esther sayers. 2016. “diffractive pedagogies: dancing across new materialist imaginaries.” gender and education 28 (2). taylor & francis: 213–29. doi:10.1080/09540253.2016.1140723. kárpáti, a., gaul, emil eds. 2013. from child art to visual language of youth. new models and tools for assessment of learning and creation in art education. bristol: intellect publishers kelly, v. 2014. to see, to know, to shape, to show: the path of an indigenous artist. in s. walsh, b. bickel & c. leggo (eds.), arts -based and contemplative approaches to research and teaching: honoring presence. new york, ny: routledge books. kelly, v.2015. finding our way home: an ecological sense of self and honouring the places we are from. eco thinking, vol. 1, no. 1 koopman, colin. 2009. pragmatism as transition: historicity and hope in james, dewey, and rorty. new york: columbia university press. koopman, c. 2016 "pragmatism, transitionalism and conduct." paper presented at philosophy of education seminar of great britain seminar: towards a transitionalist critique of education, university of roehampton, london. march 16 2016 lin, ching-chiu, and bertram c. bruce. 2013. “engaging youth in underserved communities through digital-mediated arts learning experiences for community inquiry.” studies in art education 54 (4): 335–348. lipman, m., 2003. thinking in education 2nd ed., cambridge: cambridge university press. mccall, c.c., 2009. transforming thinking: philosophical inquiry in the primary and secondary classroom, london: routledge. medina, jose. 2010. “the performative turn and the emergence of post-analytic philosophy.” in after poststructuralism: transitions and transformations, edited by rosi braidotti, 275–305. durham, england: acumen publishing. murris, karin. 2016. the posthuman child : educational transformation through philosophy with picturebooks. abingdon: routledge. pietzner, jason john. 2014. “expanding their horizons : hermeneutic practices and philosophising with children.”, phd thesis, university of melbourne sclater, m. & lally, v. 2013. virtual voices: exploring creative practices to support life skills development among young people working in a virtual world community. international journal of art and design education, vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 331-344 splitter, l.j. & sharp, a.m., 1995. teaching for better thinking : the classroom community of inquiry, melbourne, victoria, australia: australian council for educational research. sullivan, g. 2010. art practice as research: inquiry in visual arts. los angeles, ca: sage. vansieleghem, n. & kennedy, d., 2011. what is philosophy for children, what is philosophy with children after matthew lipman? journal of philosophy of education, 45(2). endnotes 1 a more developed treatment of the relationships between koopman’s conduct pragmatism, braidotti’s figurations of the nomadic subject and cartography, and new materialist writing inspired by barad will be 25 found in articles in production for educational theory and two forthcoming special sections of the journal of philosophy of education (2018/19). 2 in p4wc research, murris (2016) has pioneered the reception of fricker, barad and braidotti through murris’ treatment on the posthuman child. 3 darearts is a toronto-based charitable arts and youth ngo with reach across canada. http://www.darearts.com/index.shtml 4 i pause here to note that koopman does not to my mind adequately differentiate the situations and contexts where on the one hand we might consider matters discreetly, as part of momentary evaluations or episodes. address correspondences to: darren garside and institute for education, bath spa university, england +44 1225 876579 d.garside@bathspa.ac.uk karen j. myskiw vancouver, b.c., canada, jardinsdesigns@gmail.com http://www.darearts.com/index.shtml mailto:d.garside@bathspa.ac.uk analytic teaching and philosophical praxis analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 13 love or tolerance? a virtue response to religious violence and plurality william r. jarrett abstract: violence is a threat to human flourishing and religious violence is of particular concern. despite the united nations issuance of several documents addressing religious freedom, and declaring 1995 “the united nations year for tolerance,” religious violence continues rising worldwide in a global culture increasingly committed to promoting religious tolerance. although promoted as a virtue in modern liberalism, i argue that the tolerance encouraged in society presently does not function as virtue and propose that caritas, the theological virtue of love, functions in a way that tolerance cannot. i contend that tolerance is an ideology, and then contrast that ideology with caritas. next, i suggest that hospitality, the moral virtue associated with caritas, can function in the broader culture, achieving what tolerance alone cannot, a positive resolution of conflict arising from the presence of others. finally, i conclude with a brief critique of my position and offer suggestions for further discussions. introduction ll of humanity is alienated when too much trust is placed in merely human projects, ideologies, and false utopias. today humanity appears much more interactive than in the past: this shared sense of being close to one another must be transformed into true communion. the development of peoples depends, above all, on a recognition that the human race is a single family working together in true communion, not simply a group of subjects who happen to live side by side.” 1 violence in any form establishes itself as a threat to human flourishing and religious violence is of particular concern. in the second chapter of caritas in veritate, pope emeritus benedict xvi addresses the issue of religious violence, “violence puts the brakes on authentic development and impedes the evolution of people towards greater socioeconomic and spiritual well-being.”2 responding to rising incidences of religious violence, in the 20th century the united nations issued several documents addressing religious freedom, along with declaring 1995 “the united nations year for tolerance.” 3 nonetheless, holland and indonesia, two countries historically known for tolerance have struggled with religious violence in recent years.4 in the post 9/11 united states strong anti-muslim sentiment is having negative psychological effects on muslims.5 tragically, religious violence continues rising worldwide in a global culture increasingly committed to promoting religious tolerance. what contributes to rising instances of religious violence amidst increasing emphasis of religious tolerance? defiance, insensitivity, and being faithful to one’s own tradition all seem plausible explanations. however an apparently unsuspected, but significant, reason is the emergence of tolerance as an ideology which communicates a message that all beliefs systems must be acknowledged and accepted. “a analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 14 opposition to such a message yields violent reactions as people believe their beliefs must be diminished in order to accept the presence of other belief systems. in efforts to “defend the faith” some religious followers resort to violent means, although such people may sincerely believe they are responding faithfully to a perceived attack on their beliefs. thus, such responses to tolerance yield outcomes diametrically opposed to the aims of tolerance, and inconsistent with the beliefs being defended. the problem, simply, is that tolerance lacks the theological impetus required to prompt religious believers to exhibit internally consistent responses to the growing plurality of religious beliefs and practices, thereby avoiding violent behavior. so, is there a better response than tolerance to addressing religious violence? i believe so, and suggest that caritas is that response. although tolerance is promoted as a virtue in modern liberalism, i argue that the tolerance encouraged in society presently does not function as a virtue. therefore, i aim to show that caritas, the theological virtue of love, functions in a way that tolerance does not. to do so i will argue that tolerance is an ideology, and then contrast that ideology with caritas. next, i offer that hospitality, the moral virtue associated with caritas, can function in the broader culture, achieving what tolerance alone cannot, a faithful response to the presence of others. finally, i conclude with a brief critique of my position and offer suggestions for further discussions. definitions of religious violence and tolerance religious violence: religious violence includes not only overt acts of terrorist bombings and warfare attributed to religious extremism but also covert acts of coercion and threats to religious expression.6 as defined, religious violence occurs in either overt physical attacks or in covert ways such as harassment, psychological issues and prejudicial treatment resulting when people are viewed as inferior because of their religious beliefs and practices. tolerance: the united nations declared 1995 to be “the united nations year for tolerance” and developed the declaration of the principles of tolerance (principles of tolerance). article one of principles of tolerance offers a detailed definition of tolerance. consisting of four sub points the article defines what tolerance is and is not. tolerance includes: respect, acceptance and appreciation of the rich diversity of our world’s cultures” while not being a “concession, condescension, or indulgence” and involves the “rejection of dogmatism and absolutism and affirms the standards set out in international human rights instruments,” and “means that one is free to adhere to one’s own convictions and accepts that others adhere to theirs. 7 thus, to offer a definition based upon the principles of tolerance, tolerance is the state of being respectful and appreciative of all types of diversity which resists dogmatic absolute standards so that all persons may express beliefs and convictions of their own choosing. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 15 tolerance: virtue or ideology? the emergence of tolerance as a virtue to violence attributed to religious plurality developed over several centuries with the rise of democracy in western europe.8 in positing tolerance as a political response, john locke clearly believes individual restraint, laws and government protection are needed. locke argues civil magistrates bear responsibility to protect against the infringement of human rights, including infringements caused by religious intolerance. he states, “men have but two ways of working out conflicts: one is by law, the other by violence; and in the nature of the case the latter begins where the former ends.”9 thus, locke defines tolerance as the removing of force to convert people to any religion.10 locke views the use of force against people holding differing religious beliefs as antithetical to the nature of religion itself, and sees tolerance as a political means to shaping religious behavior. championed by locke, erected in the disestablishment clause of the united states constitution, and endorsed further by john stuart mill, tolerance has taken root in the western world, prompting a movement to extend tolerance globally. however, over time a favored response risks becoming an ideology. robert paul wolff identifies two problems with ideology. first, ideology often overlooks “unpleasant facts” related to policies, and, secondly, ideology dismisses the presence of revolutionary forces under the guise that believing a situation to be stable actually makes the situation stable.11 religious tolerance suffers from the problems wolff identifies. proponents of religious tolerance often refuse to acknowledge the “unpleasant fact” that while major religions share many similarities, distinct differences exist which cannot be dismissed or reconciled. as an ideology, tolerance actually promotes religious indifference, an impediment to authentic development noted by benedict.12 masking such differences and promoting indifference, religious tolerance presents a narrative of stability in hopes that stability becomes reality. the current narrative of tolerance fails to acknowledge that plurality exposes religious groups to the potential instantiation of the hegelian master-slave dialectic. upon encountering another’s presence, persons “become aware of [themselves] as factually and objectively self-existent…”13 each knows existence as the object of another’s consciousness; to be recognized as subject and not merely an object is the struggle. the irony of the master-slave dialectic rests in the master’s dependency upon the slave in order to exist as master, revealing an interdependent but unequal relationship, which always comes with the price of subjugation for the one treated as object. the same dynamic can be applied to groups. as key differences exist in major religious systems, in some sense, one religious group achieves identity through the presence of those with alternative viewpoints.14 resolving the master-slave dialectic negatively, one religious group sees other groups as objects to be mastered, rather than subjects to be respected, minimally ensuring instability while potentially fostering overt and covert religious violence. ideologies, then, pose problems rather than providing complete solutions. according to slavoj žižek, as an ideology tolerance recognizes real problems, but “mystifies them precisely by perceiving them as problems of tolerance” of which sexism, racism, and religious intolerance are examples.15 intolerant belief and behavior directed at others appear to indicate a lack of tolerance, and thus emphasizing tolerance overcomes the intolerance. however, the ideology simply masks the problems: different beliefs about reality, truth, the human condition, and which belief system best offers the most comprehensive, yet internally consistent worldview. by advocating forced acceptance of other beliefs, tolerance minimizes beliefs of any one system. religious adherents analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 16 view tolerance then as a threat to belief. since threats are a form of violence often producing violence in return, tolerance actually encourages believers to react negatively towards those holding other viewpoints. borrowing terminology from edward tenner,16 i suggest that, as an ideology, religious tolerance yields its own “revenge effect” of intolerance and ignorance, outcomes diametrically opposed to the aims of religious tolerance in two distinct, but interrelated, processes. first, because tolerance promotes a passive acceptance of other religious beliefs as legitimate, no understanding of another’s beliefs is required. believers simply acknowledge the diversity of religious belief, but are not required to seek understanding of differing belief systems. secondly, believers need not understand their own set of beliefs because passive acceptance of alternative views does not necessarily foster dialogue between people holding differing views.17 if, as i have argued, tolerance actually promotes a lack of understanding of others’ religious viewpoints, and the lack of understanding contributes to intolerance of divergent beliefs, then we should not be surprised to see the revenge effect of increased intolerance and violence in the midst of more tolerant cultures. in spite of the significant shortcomings which tolerance as an ideology experiences, nonetheless tolerance enjoys widespread acceptance as a virtue.18 the principles of tolerance states “tolerance, the virtue that makes peace possible, contributes to the replacement of the culture of war by a culture of peace.”19 i suggest that tolerance settles for coexistence, not communion, and thus does not and indeed cannot, achieve the excellence associated with virtue. virtue important to virtue ethicists is not just the outcome of an act and guiding principles used in determining actions, but the inner dispositions which contribute to the observed behavior. by stressing the metaphysical state of character, virtue ethics not only addresses behavior, but also affective and cognitive dimensions and therefore, addresses the whole person. although virtue ethicists present different approaches, generally virtue refers to the concept defined by the greek word arête, which is sometimes translated as excellence.20 the problem with classifying tolerance as a virtue then, is determining to what extent, if any, that tolerance yields the excellence necessary for authentic virtue. recent efforts targeting prejudicial behavior have yielded various enactments of “hate crime” legislation. such laws impose punishment for persons charged and convicted of violent behavior directed towards persons based on racial, gender, religious, or other reasons. suppose i find myself involved in some type of conflict with another person. legislation and business policies provide external restraints and may be sufficient to ensure that i do not direct a racial or gender related epithet towards the other person for fear of reprisal. to any persons who may happen to observe the altercation, my actions may be deemed tolerant if the actions of my antagonist were of the kind that typically produces violent verbal or physical responses. my behavior may seem virtuous, but what about my dispositions? external restraints do nothing to address my attitude towards or thinking about the other person which influence behavior. caritas thus, we may now examine why the theological virtue of love is vastly superior to tolerance. in the introduction to caritas in veritate benedict xvi states analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 17 love—caritas—is an extraordinary force which leads people to opt for courageous and generous engagement in the field of justice and peace. it is a force that has its origins in god, eternal love, and truth…charity is at the heart of the church’s social doctrine. every responsibility and every commitment spelled out by that doctrine is derived from charity which, according to the teaching of jesus is the synthesis of the entire law (cf. mt. 22:36-40). it gives real substance to the personal relationship with god and with neighbor; it is the principle not only of micro relationships (with friends, with family members, or within small groups) but also of macro-relationships (social, economic, and political ones). 21 originating in god the father, embodied in jesus christ, and gifted to humans through the holy spirit, love is a virtue which makes possible human flourishing both of self and of others, most fully expressed in love of god and neighbor. in discussing the theological virtues, rachel amiri and mary keys note such virtues are “performative, transforming for the better personal and social life… in an important way faith in god’s love rests on a person’s willingness to love and to serve others for their own sakes, as persons and in communities.”22 so, in returning to my earlier example, suppose i find myself in conflict with another person. clearly, if i exhibit tolerance and refrain from exhibiting an oppressive or hostile act, i have acted justly to the extent that i have not outwardly violated the other’s individual rights or liberties, nor broken any civil laws or policies. but inwardly, have i honored the other as person qua person? the question remains, “does love function in a way that hate crime laws or policies of tolerance do not?” benedict supplies the answer, “charity always manifests god’s love in human relationships as well, it gives theological and salvific value to all commitment for justice in the world.”23 love goes beyond the notion of justice as defined by external restraint and forces one to wrestle with the question “is there justification to treat the other as an object to be manipulated rather than a subject to be respected?” by now, the difference between tolerance and love should be sharpening. while tolerance undergirds laws and policies aimed at protecting individuals from infringements of rights and liberties because of different, conflicting, or alternative beliefs, obedience to such laws and policies are more for the sake of the one obeying, than for ones protected by such constraints. the telos of obeying such laws and policies is not valuing the other who is different. the telos of tolerance is avoiding punishment or reprisal, thus entrenching the value of self over others. at best, the end for tolerance, it seems, is coexistence. in contrast, caritas, and not a selfish imitation, affects not only the subject, the one loving, but also the object, the one being loved despite the existence of significant differences. thus caritas has communion as its end. while coexistence is better than strife and conflict, the absence of conflict dispelled by communion makes caritas superior to tolerance. theological love and hospitality in a secular society encouraging to me is the critical re-examination that tolerance is receiving. c.w. von bergen et al. address the current understanding of tolerance as forced acceptance within the broader u.s. culture.24 within my immediate area of concern, gustav niebuhr advocates moving beyond the concept of religious tolerance.25 since von bergen analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 18 et al. address the broader social context we perhaps would be surprised to find any discussion of love. however, insofar as i can determine, in niebuhr’s work discussion of love is noticeably absent in his exposition of interfaith relationships in the post-9/11 united states. so then, given the shortcomings of tolerance as currently practiced, how might caritas function in pluralistic secular societies such as the united states, or cross-culturally in an increasingly global society? obviously, the theological nature of caritas makes proposing caritas as a solution to religious conflict in secular societies problematic as opponents could argue that in doing so, religion receives privileged support. instead, i propose that hospitality offers a way to overcome religious conflict while moving persons and groups holding differing and competing worldview towards genuine communion and hence, towards caritas, without imposing a theological paradigm on society.26 etymologically, the concept of “stranger” or “guest” lie at the root of the modern english word “hospitality”27, defined as “the cordial and generous reception and entertainment of guests socially or commercially.”28 such openness is requisite to the building of genuine relationships that avoid elements of dominion. hospitality, then, requires an active response to the presence of others, the initial step in the process of establishing and building relationships that move from alienation to communion. further, although hospitality may lead to communion and the experiencing of caritas, hospitality can be practiced by all of society as an end in itself, rather than as a means to the end of mandating caritas. historically hospitality enjoys recognition as a virtue in the abrahamic traditions. within the scriptures of the three abrahamic religions, judaism, christianity, and islam, we find attention given to the just treatment of strangers. abraham’s entertainment of three strangers in genesis 18 results in the lord’s promise to give abraham and sarah a child. the story becomes the rationale for extending hospitality to all nations.29 although more prominent within the catholic than within protestant christianity, and overshadowed by jewish-christianmuslim tensions, nonetheless, the abrahamic traditions expect hospitality to be an important behavior exhibited by followers. similarly, hospitality within secular cultures has a long history, although that history is now overshadowed by economic interests. while kevin o’gorman acknowledges the development of hospitality had a religious foundation within ancient greece, rome and judeo-christian cultures, he also traces the emergence of hospitality as an economic venture. whether grounded in ancient religious practices or modern commercial enterprises, gorman concludes, “it [hospitality] is an essential part of human existence, especially as it deals with basic human needs (food, drink, shelter, and security).”30 honored within religious and secular worldviews, hospitality provides common ground on which to address the presence of other beliefs systems within a pluralistic culture. theoretically, meeting together to celebrate similarities while exploring differences may foster genuine respect towards those holding other beliefs. thus hospitality also offers the possibility that one’s own practice of hospitality may be formed further by interaction with other cultures and customs.31 hospitality promotes relationships with strangers and enemies, and provides a standard of excellence in treating others as relationships transform from that of others and strangers to neighbors and friends. the renewed interest in hospitality is due in large part to the influence of jacques derrida.32 in typical fashion, derrida exposes incoherence in conditional hospitality introduced by plato and magnified by kant33: the presence of political structure. hospitality to the stranger is extended as an act of honor to zeus, the patron of strangers, yet analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 19 in establishing conditions on both hosts and guests, plato inserts power into the relationship when hosts place preconceived expectations on the guest or stranger. in contrast, the guest or stranger may abuse power by refusing to reciprocate appropriately. hospitality then becomes an obligation to extend and reciprocate. in order to curb the abuse when one uses another merely as a means to an end, kant restricts hospitality to nothing more than protection of life unless a stronger relationship exists. however, the restrictive hospitality likely impedes development of relationships that might resist corruption caused by the political structure within the host-stranger relationship. thus, derrida challenges the platonic and kantian politicization of hospitality. particularly influential is derrida’s call for unconditional hospitality expressed in the work of hospitality in which derrida is in conversation with anne dufourmantelle. in meeting the conditions required for receiving hospitality, the stranger is not completely foreign to the host; those not meeting the conditions are considered barbarians and are not afforded hospitality.34 thus conditional hospitality imposes a power structure that limits hospitality to those persons meeting the conditions determined by the host. in contrast, derrida proposes unconditional or absolute hospitality. to put it in different terms, absolute hospitality requires that i open up my house to the foreigner (provided with a family name, with the social status of being a foreigner, etc.), but to the absolute, unknown, anonymous other, and that i give place to them, that i let them come, that i let them arrive, and take place in the place i offer them, without asking of them either reciprocity (entering into a pact) or even their names. the law of absolute hospitality commands a break with hospitality by right, with law or injustice by right… 35 absolute hospitality fully embraces the other without regard to preconditions, thus extending a place to the foreigner. the absoluteness of this unconditional hospitality challenges power structures which conditions place upon those disadvantaged by being guests in strange places. yet, derrida recognizes a potential problem in the practice of unconditional hospitality. he ends his discussion in on hospitality by mentioning the problem encountered by the biblical character lot told in genesis 19. lot is hosting some guests and the townspeople come to lot’s house expecting to engage in sexual relations with the guests. to protect his guests, lot instead offers his daughters to the townspeople. derrida recognizes that the practice of hospitality raises ethical questions. how do people practice hospitality that fully embraces the presence of others? how should hospitality function in the midst of conflict? the questions bring into discussion the tension between the limited contractual conceptions of platonic and kantian hospitality and the derridean emphasis of absolute, or unconditional, hospitality. thus, while tolerance has inherent problems, so does hospitality. a common criticism is that virtue theory is more descriptive than prescriptive.36 how might emphasizing the virtue of hospitality as a response to religious plurality address concerns of religious intolerance and violence lead to the type of love expressed by caritas? i propose that the virtue of hospitality is the mean between the deficiency of resistance and the excessiveness of openness, the excellence of which contributes to the telos of the mutual wellbeing of host and other. the virtue of hospitality requires rejecting a resistant disposition to the presence of others that inhibits the development of relationship while refusing absolute openness that might expose self or others to harm. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 20 in offering the proposal, i want build on the distinction between negative peace and positive peace, first discussed by johan galtung. for galtung, negative peace connotes the absence of personal violence while positive peace refers to the absence of structural or institutional violence.37 other philosophers such as ronald glossop and william gay have expanded on the distinction with gay defining the terms as the absence of violence and the presence of justice.38 in the present context, i suggest negative peace describes coexistence, accomplished by toleration of the other while positive peace is communion with the other. the path to positive peace requires dialogue and relationship with the other with whom conflict exists. genuine exploration of different beliefs requires discussion and examination for the sake of understanding and cannot take place unless the parties involved actively pursue relationships with the other. the virtue of hospitality promotes active pursuit of relationships with others. what, then, can be done to foster relationship with persons of other faiths that might result in genuine expressions of hospitality leading to potential resolution of conflict resulting in positive peace? to answer that question, i now offer the following examples of ways in which people might move from coexistence to communion through practicing the virtue of hospitality. first, i draw on my experience as a humanities instructor at a community college, teaching among other subjects, introduction to world religions. most of the students, if they hold religious beliefs, are followers of one of the three abrahamic religions. while the majority of participants are christian, one or two muslims along with one or two jewish students may be present. thus, in the classroom we have an interesting dynamic. present in one class are members of three of the major world religions, which at various times throughout history have been engaged in conflict and war against each other. not surprisingly, current tension between judaism, christianity, and islam inevitably surfaces during class discussions. although the course examines the subject of religion from an academic perspective, students invariably express their own beliefs while occasionally asking me to present my personal beliefs. what am i to do? as hunter brimi observes, “teacher nonparticipation is understandable in an era when we are careful not to impose unwanted beliefs on others.”39 rather than redirecting the discussion back towards easily quantifiable and measurable bits of information, i ask students to name core teachings each religion holds in common with the others. typically, i find that students who are often very vocal struggle to articulate answers to such questions. next, i share verses of scripture related to love and patience.40 typically, jewish and christian students are surprised to learn that the qur’an contains verses such as “indeed, allah is with those who are patient”41 and “and verily, whosoever shows patience and forgives, that would truly be from the things recommended by allah,”42 or, “it may be that god will grant love (and friendship) between you and those whom ye (now) hold as enemies. for god has power (over all things), and god is oft-forgiving, most merciful. god does not forbid you, with regard to those who fight you not for (your) faith nor drive you out of your homes, from dealing kindly and justly with them: for god loves those who are just."43 still, the image of islam as a violent, warring religious system that mandates world-wide conquest often overshadows discussions of love and patience. to counter the negative stereotypes associated with islam, i introduce students to alfarabi, the tenth century muslim philosopher who argued for religious plurality due to the concept of monotheism and the limits of human knowledge.44 thus, the inaccurate perception of islam as a completely intolerant religion focused on forced conversion of all people can be countered by active engagement with islamic sources, an engagement which nurtures patient reflection and conversation about differences. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 21 further, while one approach to providing students with direct contact with other religious practices requires students to attend religious services outside of class, i prefer inviting religious leaders and scholars to speak to the class for several reasons. first, requiring students to attend worship services may blur the distinction between an academic study of religion and implicit promotion of religion. secondly, requiring students to attend worship services outside of their traditions teaches students to regard others as objects to observe rather than subjects to respect.45 thirdly, and more pertinent to my concern to foster genuine community, inviting a members of other religious traditions to speak to the class exemplifies the practice of hospitality associated within an academic setting, while allowing students to see genuine dialogue that promotes understanding. so, to demonstrate the practice of hospitality, i now invite a local muslim imam to speak to the class. in the environment of the classroom, as guest the imam is subject, not the object of students’ off-site assignment. further, the classroom setting allows students to act as host to the stranger. thus i aim to guide students towards this discovery: if students are interested in being faithful to their respective traditions, then that faithfulness expects them to be willing to love, patient with, and indeed, hospitable towards people of other religious beliefs, as well as with those who hold no religious beliefs. using the legitimate content of the course, students may well discover the virtues of love, patience, and hospitality, which contribute towards them flourishing as human beings and, if they regard themselves religious, as followers. further, if they are open to such learning students have their own faith and practice informed by other traditions, all the while avoiding elevating one religion at the expense of others, and demonstrating to students without religious beliefs that people of different beliefs systems can have dialogue in relationship with one another. a more vexing problem is practicing hospitality outside the classroom in situations in which followers of the abrahamic traditions often view the other as stranger, if not enemy. can followers of abrahamic religions move towards communion with one another? increasingly, the answer is yes. for example, mark mccormack addresses interfaith relations in the united states from a psychological perspective. he suggests a three-tier level of interfaith engagement. the microsystemic level focuses on interpersonal relationships, the mesosystemic level addresses intergroup relationships, while the macrosystemic level pertains to communities and societies.46 mccormack then addresses the interfaith mission service of huntsville, al that includes christian, jewish, and muslim congregations. the service provides opportunity for encounters at a personal, congregational, and community level that foster interfaith relationships and dialogue aimed at addressing common concerns “from medical transportation for the homeless to litter pick-up for various community neighborhoods and centers” with the goal of “problematizing widely held perceptions of homogeneity and strangeness in the religion of the other, in addition to challenging individuals and organizations to rethink how they live in a community comprised of diverse religious traditions.47 secondly, jonathan haidt points to the concept of youth charter movements promoted by william damon as a means of inculcating virtues in persons with the goal of promoting happiness.48 summer youth camps promoting peace and justice issues among arabs and jews attempt to overcome barriers of division.49 similar in concept, intentional interfaith community ministries and youth charter movements are provide opportunities for building relationships that remove barriers which inhibit communion with others. i suggest that such approaches ranging from classroom introduction to the presence of the religious other, to informal youth charters, to the more intentional interfaith movements aimed at addressing common social concerns offer opportunities to practice the virtues of hospitality and caritas that lead to positive peace, the absence of conflict. drawing from the nonviolent, communitarian examples of gandhi and king, beginning at the personal and community levels can yield significant changes at the societal and political levels. as followers of analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 22 different faiths express hospitality towards the other in their midst, people recognize the other as subjects worthy of respect rather than objects to manipulate. with momentum such movements may impact political structures similar to the way in which gandhi and king challenged the structures and institutions supportive of colonialism and racism at national and international levels. such a context will likely foster the development of humanity that benedict xvi suggests rests “…on a recognition that the human race is a single family working together in true communion, not simply a group of subjects who happen to live side by side.” evaluation the theological virtue of love and the moral virtue of hospitality offer advantages over merely emphasizing toleration of conflicting religious beliefs. john esposito, a leading scholar on islam, notes emphasizing family connection between judaism and christianity has resulted in decreased tension among christians and jews as those groups learned to live and interact with each other in mutual cooperation, yet very little emphasis has been given to the connection islam shares with judaism and christianity.50 given the hostility christianity once held towards judaism, we may hope a similar approach between judaism, christianity, and islam will promote better appreciation while lessening fear of muslims. further, while i have focused on the broader issue of violence between religions, practicing love and hospitality encourages patience when confronting dissenting beliefs among groups within the same religion. religious conflict and violence occurs within groups when believers clash over controversial issues such as abortion, homosexuality, or causes of and responses to poverty. practicing patience and hospitality fosters conversation as doctrinal issues are debated and clarified, potentially leading to more peaceful resolutions. thus, emphasizing love, patience, and hospitality encourages religious followers of the abrahamic traditions to be faithful to the tenets of their respective faiths. although advocating caritas and hospitality as a fuller response to religious violence, i concede the following shortcomings, though readers may recognize others which i have failed to consider. first, religious adherents must recognize love of others as an appropriate and faithful response to religious plurality. thus, the extent to which love and hospitality as virtues become an accepted and practiced response to religious plurality and violence depends upon religious leaders and followers willing to confront the status quo and exhibit love to persons outside the religious community and through non-violent responses to religious conflicts. secondly, developing love as the proper and faithful response to religious conflict and violence offers no quick solution. virtue develops over time. however non-violent methods advocated and practiced by gandhi and king provide credible evidence that over time simple and faithful responses yield considerable influence and change. thirdly, even emphasizing hospitality as a virtuous act towards strangers is not without challenge. the degree to which modern society has downplayed the significance of hospitality as a personal response to the presence of others is evidenced by several factors including the commercialization of hospitality as a sector within the global economy, the immigration debate, and even by the fact that xenophobia, fear of strangers, may be found in the dictionary while philoxenos, love of strangers enjoys no such presence.51 the commercialization of hospitality encourages shifting the location of housing and feeding guests from individual homes to neutral sites of lodging for hire and public restaurants, potentially limiting the amount of personal interaction between hosts and guests. perhaps xenophobia is more common due to confusion that hospitality requires unbounded, optimistic openness analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 23 towards any stranger or guest. to the contrary, authentic hospitality does not require one to overlook behavior detrimental to the well-being of self and others. conclusion while intolerance certainly qualifies as a vice, tolerance fails to achieve the excellence required to be a virtue. the perceived threat of acknowledging the equality of all religious expressions, which tolerance implies, often yields hostility towards out groups rather than increased civility. dismissing the religious beliefs of other persons is often a prelude towards dismissing, or at least diminishing, the value of persons holding different religious beliefs, and is a leap often made without an adequate understanding of how large the leap is. once the value of the other is dismissed or diminished, the potential towards violence, whether overt or covert, increases. even when practiced, tolerance settles for coexistence—groups of subjects living side by side—not communion. while promoted as a virtue, tolerance does not achieve the flourishing required to be a virtue and thus, tolerance is an incomplete response to the problem of religious violence. in contrast, caritas sees others as subjects in conversation and prompts active engagement with others resulting in better understanding of other religious traditions while increasing clarification of one’s own tradition. the theological virtue of love and the moral virtue of hospitality, combined with patience, supplement civil laws encouraging tolerance while addressing the shortcomings of tolerance as an ideology, presenting a positive resolution to the master-slave dialectic and a more promising solution to the social injustice of religious violence caused by the presence of other beliefs. abrahamic traditions present love, patience, and hospitality as virtues which promote faithfulness within believers while fostering a humanitarian regard for others who do not share such beliefs. thus, the moral virtues of hospitality and patience allow secular people to participate in just treatment of others, while enabling believers to respect others as an authentic response to god. the virtues of love and hospitality, i argue, directly address issues concerning proper relationships with people holding different beliefs and offer the theological motivation needed to address religious violence and plurality. ultimately, love, not tolerance, is “the virtue that makes peace possible” and spurs us on towards authentic human development – communion with one another—a single family working together. endnotes 1 benedict xvi. caritas in veritate. encyclical letter on integral human development n charity and truth. june 29, 2009." all references are to the digital edition, october 2011. 2 ibid. par. 29. 3 see derek h. davis. “the evolution of religious freedom as a universal human right: examining the role of the 1981 united nations declaration on the elimination of all forms of intolerance and of discrimination based on religion or belief.” brigham young law review (2002): 217-236. 4 see, ian taylor in uden, “holland mourns loss of tolerance as religious violence spirals.” irish times, 13 november 2004, and lucien van liere, “gestures of the evil mind: interpreting religion-related violence in indonesia after 9/11.” exchange 38 no 3 (2009): 244-70. 5 marilyn elias. “usa’s muslims under a cloud.” usa today. 10 august 2011. <http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-08-09-muslim-american-cover_x.htm.>. accessed 10 november 2011. http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-08-09-muslim-american-cover_x.htm analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 24 6 see newton garver. "what violence is," the nation. 209 (june 24, 1968): 821. in defining religious violence, i draw from the work of newton garver who argues the term “violence” can apply to situations in which overt physical force is absent. force can be psychological and, therefore, often covert. 7 declaration of principles on tolerance, 1995. <http://www.unesco.org/webworld/peace_library/unesco/hrights/124-129.htm> accessed 5 march 2013 8 for a detailed historiography, see perez zagorin how the idea of religious toleration came to the west. (princeton: princeton university press, 2003). 9 ibid. 34. locke’s assertion that violence begins where the law ends reflects a paradigm influenced by his christian heritage and an emphasis on natural law. arguably violence both precedes laws designed to curb its expression, and continues in covert ways once such laws are enacted. for example, beliefs about and attitudes towards people identified in some way as different exist prior to, and continue after, enactment of legislation criminalizing violent behavior towards people because of real and/or perceived differences. 10 ibid. 68. 11 robert paul wolff. “beyond tolerance.” a critique of pure tolerance.” robert paul wolff, barrington moore, jr. and herbert marcuse. (boston: beacon press, 1969): 39-40. 12 caritas in veritate. par. 32. 13 g.w.f. hegel. the phenomenology of mind. trans. j.b. baillie (new york: harper and row, torchbooks, 1967): par. 196. 14 see james k. wellman, jr. and kyoko tokuno. “is religious violence inevitable?” journal for the scientific study of religion 43:3 (2004): 292. 15 zizek, slavoj. “ecology.” in examined life: excursions with contemporary thinkers. ed. astra taylor (new york: the new press, 2009): 156-57. 16 edward l. tenner. why things bite back: technology and the revenge of unintended consequences (new york: vintage books, 1997), 6. in writing about technology, edward tenner discusses “revenge effects,” or unintended consequences of technology. for example, improved word processing and printing technologies facilitate multiple edits of documents, such as this paper, thereby increasing paper consumption. 17 for an excellent article describing the benefit of dialogue and debate in increasing understanding of one’s own beliefs see, constant j. mews “peter abelard and the enigma of dialogue,” beyond the persecuting society: religious toleration before the enlightenment. eds. john christian laursen and cary j. nederman. (philadelphia: university of pennsylvania press, 1998). 18 see barry barnes, “tolerance as a primary virtue.” res publica 7 (2001): 231-45, and david heyd, ed. toleration: an elusive virtue, pp. 23-43, princeton: princeton university press, 1996. the debate as to whether tolerance is a virtue is far more complex, and issues of values and normativity are beyond the scope of this paper. my concern at present is to challenge the extent to which tolerance is capable of achieving the flourishing associated with virtue theory. 19 principles of tolerance. a point for future development would be to examine the type of peace that tolerance makes possible: negative peace identified as the absence of violent activities, or positive peace defined as the resolution of conflict. 20 richard parry, "ancient ethical theory", the stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (fall 2009 edition), edward n. zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/ethics-ancient/ retrieved may 6, 2010. http://www.unesco.org/webworld/peace_library/unesco/hrights/124-129.htm http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/ethics-ancient/ analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 25 21 caritas in veritate, pars 1 & 2. 22 rachel a. amiri, and mary m. keys. “benedict xvi on liberal modernity’s need for the ‘theological virtues’ of faith, hope, and love.” perspectives on political science 41 no.1 (2012): 15. see also meghan j. clark, “love of god and neighbor: living charity in aquinas’ ethics.” new blackfriars, (2011): 415-30, and hans urs von balthasar, love alone is credible. (san francisco: ignatius press, 2004), for further discussion of the way in which love compels one to serve other persons. 23 caritas in veritate, par. 6. 24 c.w. von bergen, et.al. “authentic tolerance: between forbearance and acceptance.” journal of cultural diversity (2012) 19 (4): 111-17. 25 gustav niebuhr. beyond tolerance: searching for interfaith understanding in america. (new york: penguin group, 2008). 26 i am indebted to the comments of richard kyte who suggested hospitality as a possible avenue towards the development of caritas in cultures not open to discussion of theological virtues following presentation of an earlier draft of this paper at the viterbo conference on the theological virtues, march 15, 2013. 27 kevin d. o’gorman. “modern hospitality: lessons from the past.” journal of hospitality and tourism management. vol. 12, no. 2, (aug 2005), 142. 28 merriam-webster unabridged dictionary. s.v. “hospitality,” accessed 30 sept 2013; available from http://unabridged.merriam-webster.com/unabridged/hospitality. 29 amos yong. hospitality and the other: pentecost, christian practices, and the neighbor. (new york: orbis books, 2008), 112-17. see also carolyn m. jones, “hospes: the wabash center as a site for transformative hospitality.” teaching theology and religion, 10 no. 3 (2007): 157. 30 o’gorman, 148. 31 see alasdair macintyre, after virtue: a study in moral theory, 3rd ed. (notre dame: university of notre dame, 2007), 222-23, for discussion of how practices of one culture may inform and be shaped by practices of other cultures. 32 see ciro augusto floriani and fermin roland schramm, “how might levinas’ concept of the other’s priority and derrida’s unconditional hospitality contribute to the philosophy of the modern hospice movement.” palatative and supportive care 8 (2010): 215-20, and carolyn m. jones, “hospes: the wabash center as a site of transformative hospitality.” teaching theology and religion 10 no. 3 (2007): 150-55 for articles drawing insight from derrida’s work. 33 see plato. laws. trans. by benjamin jowett., p. 155. kindle edition, and immanuel kant. perpetual peace: a philosophical essay (with active table of contents). 2011. kindle edition. (kindle locations 492-500) for the development of a contractual understanding of hospitality. 34 dufourmantelle, anne. of hospitality: anne dufourmantelle invites jacques derrida to respond. trans. rachel bowlby. stanford: stanford university press, 2002, 25. 35 ibid. 36 see robert b. louden. “on some vices of virtue ethics.” american philosophical quarterly, 21 no. 3 (july 1984): 227-36 and john m. doris. lack of character: personality and moral behavior. new york: cambridge university press, 2002, for discussions of virtue theory’s limitations in prescribing behavior. 37 johan galtung. “violence, peace, and peace research.” journal of peace research, 6, no. 3, (1969): 183. 38 see ronald j. glossop, confronting war: an examination of humanity’s most pressing problem. 3rd edition. jefferson, nc: mcfarland and company, 1994, 12-14, and william c. gay “language of war and peace,” in http://unabridged.merriam-webster.com/unabridged/hospitality analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 26 encyclopedia of violence, peace, and conflict, oxford: elsevier science & technology, 2008. http://search.credoreference.com/content/etnry/estpeace/language_of_war_and_peace_the/0 (accesed april 9, 2014) for other applications of negative and positive peace. 39hunter brimi. “academic instructors or moral guides? moral education in america and the teacher’s dilemma,” clearing house 82 no3 (jan/feb 2009): 129. 40 i have found that “patience” does not carry the negative connotations associated with tolerance. since patience is listed in several bible verses, the openness to “patience,” as opposed to tolerance, may be due to students raised in an area heavily influenced by conservative protestant christianity. in response to comments offered in response to the presentation of an earlier draft of this paper, i now follow discussions of love and patience with the practice of hospitality. 41 surah al-anfaal: 46. 42 surah ash-shura: 43. 43 surah al-mumtahanah 60:7-8. 44 joshua parens. an islamic philosophy of virtuous religions. introducing alfarabi. (albany: state university of new york press), 121. . for alfarabi, the truth associated with a monotheistic god is too great to be understood by humans, and a great injustice occurs when that truth is limited to just one religious system. see mohamed eltahir el-mesawi and tesnim khriji. “islam and terrorism: beyond the wisdom of the secular paradigm.” intellectual discourse 14, no. 1 (2006): 49. “islam has laid down at a very essential level the basis for sustainable plurality and multiplicity in human socio-cultural life both within and without the abode of islam.” 45 see naomi southard and richard payne, “teaching introductions to world religions: religious pluralism in a post-colonial world,” teaching theology and religion vol.1:1 (1998): 55 for a discussion of the ethical implications associated with required site visits. 46 mark mccormack. “interfaith relations in the united states: toward a multilevel community psychology approach,” journal of community and applied social psychology. 23: (2013), pp. 177-80. doi: 10.1002/casp.2107. 47 ibid. 180-82. 48 jonathan haidt. the happiness hypothesis: finding modern truth in ancient wisdom. new york: basic books, 2006, 180. 49 see < http://www.middleeastpeacecamp.org/index.html> for one example of summer youth camps aimed at building relationships among arab and jewish youth. 50 john l. esposito. unholy war: terror in the name of islam (new york: oxford university press, 2003, 119. 51 merriam-webster unabridged dictionary. s.v. “xenophobia,” accessed 30 sept 2013; available from http://unabridged.merriam-webster.com/unabridged/xenophobia. the search for philoxenos yielded no entry. bibliography amiri, rachel a., and mary m. keys. “benedict xvi on liberal modernity’s need for the ‘theological virtues’ of faith, hope, and love.” perspectives on political science 41 no:1 (2012): 11-18. balthasar, hans urs von. love alone is credible. san francisco: ignatius press, 2004. barnes, barry. “tolerance as a primary virtue.” res publica 7: 2001, 231-45, and david heyd, ed. toleration: an elusive virtue, pp. 23-43, princeton: princeton university press, 1996. http://search.credoreference.com/content/etnry/estpeace/language_of_war_and_peace_the/0 http://www.middleeastpeacecamp.org/index.html http://unabridged.merriam-webster.com/unabridged/xenophobia analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 27 benedict xvi., pope emeritus. caritas in veritate. encyclical letter on integral human development in charity and truth. june 29, 2009." all references are to the digital edition, october 2011. bergen, c.w. von. et.al. “authentic tolerance: between forbearance and acceptance.” journal of cultural diversity 19 no.4 (2012): 111-17. brimi, hunter. “academic instructors or moral guides? moral education in america and the teacher’s dilemma.” clearing house 82 no3 jan/feb 2009, p. 125-30. clark, meghan j. “love of god and neighbor: living charity in aquinas’ ethics.” new blackfriars (2011): 415-30. davis, derek h. “the evolution of religious freedom as a universal human right: examining the role of the 1981 united nations declaration on the elimination of all forms of intolerance and of discrimination based on religion or belief.” brigham young law review (2002): 217-236. doris, john m. lack of character: personality and moral behavior. new york: cambridge university press, 2002. dufourmantelle, anne. of hospitality: anne dufourmantelle invites jacques derrida to respond. trans. rachel bowlby. stanford: stanford university press, 2002. el-mesawi, mohamed el-tahir and tesnim khriji. “islam and terrorism: beyond the wisdom of the secular paradigm.” intellectual discourse 14, no. 1 (2006): 47-70. elias, marilyn. “usa’s muslims under a cloud.” usa today. 10 august 2011. <http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-08-09-muslim-american-cover_x.htm.>. accessed 10 november 2011. esposito, john l. unholy war: terror in the name of islam (new york: oxford university press, 2003. floriani, ciro augusto, and fermin roland schramm. “how might levinas’ concept of the other’s priority and derrida’s unconditional hospitality contribute to the philosophy of the modern hospice movement?” palliative and supportive care. 8 (2010): 215-20. garver, newton. "what violence is," the nation. 209 (june 24, 1968): 817-22. gay, william c. “the language of war and peace.” in encyclopedia of violence, peace, and conflict. oxford: elsevier science & technology, 2008. http://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/estpeace/language_of_war_and_peace_the/0 (accessed april 9, 2014.) galtung., johan. “violence, peace, and peace research.” journal of peace research. 6 no. 3 (1969): 197-191. glossup, ronald j. confronting war: an examination of humanity’s most pressing problem. 3rd ed. jefferson, nc and london: mcfarland and company, 1994. haidt, jonathan. the happiness hypothesis: finding modern truth in ancient wisdom. new york: basic books, 2006 hegel , g.w.f.. the phenomenology of mind. trans. j.b. baillie. new york: harper and row, torchbooks, 1967. jones, carolyn. “hospes: the wabash center as a site of transformative hospitality.” teaching theology and religion. 10 no. 2 (2007): 150-55. kyte, richard. comments at the d.b. reinhart institute for ethics in leadership at viterbo http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-08-09-muslim-american-cover_x.htm http://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/estpeace/language_of_war_and_peace_the/0 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 28 university, conference on the theological virtues, la crosse, wi., 15 march 2013. macintyre, alasdair. after virtue: a study in moral theory, 3rd ed. notre dame: university of notre dame, 2007. -----. dependent rational animals: why human beings need the virtues. chicago: open court press, 1999. mews, constant j. “peter abelard and the enigma of dialogue,” beyond the persecuting society: religious toleration before the enlightenment, edited by john christian laursen and cary j. nederman. (philadelphia: university of pennsylvania press, 1998). kant, immanuel. perpetual peace: a philosophical essay (with active table contents). 2011. kindle edition. louden, robert b. “on some vices of virtue ethics,” american philosophical quarterly 21 no. 3 (july 1984): 227-36. liere, lucien van. “gestures of the evil mind: interpreting religion-related violence in indonesia after 9/11.” exchange 38 no 3 (2009): 244-70. locke, john. “a letter concerning toleration.” in locke on toleration. richard vernon editor. new york: cambridge university press, 2010. niebuhr , gustav. beyond tolerance: searching for interfaith understanding in america. new york: penguin group, 2008. o’gorman, kevin d. “modern hospitality: lessons from the past.” journal of hospitality and tourism management 12 no. 2 (august 2005): 141-151. parens joshua. an islamic philosophy of virtuous religions. introducing alfarabi. albany: state university of new york press, 2006. parry, richard. "ancient ethical theory", the stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (fall 2009 edition), edward n. zalta (ed.), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/ethics-ancient/ >. plato. laws. trans. by benjamin jowett, kindle edition. tenner, edward l. why things bite back: technology and the revenge of unintended consequences. new york: vintage books, 1997. uden, ian traynor in. “holland mourns loss of tolerance as religious violence spirals.” irish times, 13 november 2004. united nations educational, scientific, and cultural organization. declaration of principles of tolerance, 1995. <http://www.unesco.org/webworld/peace_library/unesco/hrights/124-129.htm> wellman, james k., jr. and kyoko tokuno. “is religious violence inevitable.” journal for the scientific study of religion 43 no. 3 (2004), 291-96. wolff , robert paul. “beyond tolerance.” a critique of pure tolerance, edited by robert paul wolff, barrington moore, jr. and herbert marcuse, 3-52. (boston: beacon press, 1969). yong, amos. hospitality and the other: pentecost, christian practice, and the neighbor. new york: orbis books, 2008. zagorin, perez. how the idea of religious toleration came to the west. (princeton: princeton university press), 2003. zizek, slavoj. “ecology.” in examined life: excursions with contemporary thinkers, edited by http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/ethics-ancient/ http://www.unesco.org/webworld/peace_library/unesco/hrights/124-129.htm analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 34, issue 2 (2014) 29 astra taylor, 155-83. (new york: the new press, 2009. address correspondences to: william r. jarrett university of north carolina at charlotte wjarret3@uncc.edu philosophical inquiry in the malaysian educational systemreality or fantasy? analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 3 5 issue 1 (2 0 1 4 ) 26 philosophical inquiry in the malaysian educational system – reality or fantasy? abstract: thinking skills are a popular topic of conversation nowadays among malaysian educationists. these experts lament that malaysian students are ill-equipped to face the challenges of life in the 21st century. as a solution to this and other problems, a reform document was proposed by the malaysian ministry of education (moe) in 2012. the 'malaysian educational blueprint' as it is called, has at last recognized the importance of critical thinking skills and seeks ways to include these into the national curriculum. philosophy for children (p4c) is a teaching method that develops critical thinking and analytical reasoning in children. the paper therefore recommends the use of p4c to achieve the goals of the malaysian educational blueprint vis-à-vis critical thinking, since it has proven its effectiveness in various studies around the world. the main purpose of this paper, therefore, is to raise the following pertinent questions: how suitable is p4c for the malaysian education system? secondly, how will p4c be implemented, bearing in mind the challenges within the unique malaysian context? these questions and others, need to be explored if p4c is to be implemented successfully, and malaysia is to be transformed into a more 'thinking nation' through education. introduction: p4c in malaysia hilosophy for children (p4c) was first introduced into the malaysian educational scene in 2002 by rosnani hashim, a professor at the institute of education at the international islamic university malaysia, receiving a first-hand, formal training from its founder, matthew lipman. rosnani hashim went on to remodel lipman’s approach incorporating discussion about common, central and contestable concepts by including religious ethics and values relevant to muslim society. she then rebranded it with a new name, the hikmah1 programme. the reason for renaming p4c was because she noticed that the malaysian teachers seemed to have an ‘allergy’ towards philosophy i.e., they had no background in philosophical inquiry and so she felt the name hikmah had a more positive ring since it comes from a traditional malay word (rosnani hashim, 2009c, p. 660). in january 2006, the centre for philosophical inquiry in education (cpie) was established under the institute of education, with the aim of promoting philosophical inquiry in the malaysian education system via the hikmah programme. rosnani hashim was made its first associate director and the centre, through its members, conducted studies in the practice of p4c at different levels of education —primary, secondary and tertiary. as a result of these studies, hikmah has been found to be an effective and stimulating pedagogy. books containing thinking stories and issues relating to muslim children have been published under the centre. for example, 'sarah' (rosnani hashim, p abdul shakour preece and adila juperi analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 3 5 issue 1 (2 0 1 4 ) 27 2012b) for secondary school students and the 'mira series' (rosnani hashim & abdullah, 2009; rosnani hashim & banging, 2009; rosnani hashim, 2009a, 2009b) for the primary level. the following studies have been conducted by members of the centre and relate to p4c in the malaysian context. the first attempt to study the suitability and effectiveness of p4c for malaysian children was conducted by rosnani hashim herself, in 2003, using an experimental methodology that involved a class of 30 'average' ability, 5th grade students. the class was treated to the novel 'siti', which is a translated version of lipman’s 'pixie'. p4c was conducted twice a week for sixteen weeks. using the new jersey test of reasoning skills (njtrs) for the preand post-tests, it was found that the students showed a statistically significant improvement in their critical thinking skills. also, the results of a survey administered to the students revealed very positive feedback showing that the students liked the classes very much and wanted the programme to be continued (rosnani hashim, 2003). research by moomala othman (2005) compared p4c and a teaching method known as 'reader's response' (rr). the effects on critical thinking and english reading skills among secondary school students was measured for these two methods and the results revealed a statistically significant difference for both thinking and reading for p4c but not for rr. this suggests that there is adequate evidence that p4c enhances thinking and reading skills. juperi (2010) conducted a study about philosophical inquiry in islamic education and its effects on the development of questioning skills among secondary school students. a qualitative observation, based on bloom’s taxonomy, showed that throughout the eight sessions of philosophical inquiry, students displayed significant improvements in their ability to create and pose questions, demonstrating bloom's 'higher order thinking skills' of analysing, synthesizing and evaluating. a more recent study conducted by preece (2012) explored ways of making english language teaching materials more engaging for muslim learners, using philosophical inquiry, discussion and critical thinking. preece found that the combination of philosophical discussions related to learners' culture and worldview enhanced their motivation to study english. it also gave them opportunities to practise the four language skills of reading, writing, listening and speaking, as well as enhancing their critical thinking skills. it is worth noting that the above mentioned studies were conducted in the malaysian context by members of the centre (rosnani hashim, 2003; juperi, 2010; othman, 2005; preece, 2012) and although results and findings were positive, the studies were exploratory in nature and only conducted on a small scale. consequently, their results have little impact on the malaysian education scene. additionally, the length of p4c in these studies was limited to short periods, with no follow-up studies. moreover, the studies only showed one or two facets of p4c, i.e., its contribution to the development of cognitive skills or english language. it is the authors' opinion analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 3 5 issue 1 (2 0 1 4 ) 28 that 'doing philosophy' with malaysian children should have more far-reaching implications and benefits, such as character development and behavioural change. thus, research in the malaysian context is needed to strengthen the argument for introducing p4c into the malaysian national curriculum. in spite of the fact that empirical research has been carried out on the implementation of p4c in the malaysian context, there is still a need to take a step back and re-examine some of the basic foundational aspects of p4c and how it might be beneficial to the malaysian educational system, given the distinctive characteristics of malaysia. thus, the over-arching question to be answered in this paper is: how would philosophy for children be beneficial in the malaysian educational context? this question comes in the light of the numerous success stories around the world about the implementation of p4c. since its inception in the early 1970s, many studies have shown how successful and effective p4c is in promoting good thinking practices among children, i.e., critical, creative and caring thinking. the influence of p4c continues to spread throughout the globe. p4c has proven its effectiveness for enriching students' educational experience and cultivating critical, ethical and caring thinking in countries such as australia, iran, mexico, south korea and the united kingdom. it would therefore be a great loss if the children of malaysia were deprived from experiencing such an innovative and revolutionary pedagogy. however, it is important to understand what are the distinctive benefits and challenges faced in the malaysian education setting, if p4c is to be implemented here. being able to think philosophically is a substantial advantage for children, but would that be beneficial in the malaysian context where teachers favour a didactic approach and where teachers and parents are very exam-oriented? to answer these questions, we divide our discussion into three parts; 'the uniqueness of the malaysian socio-cultural landscape', 'the current educational reform process' and 'reviving the interest in philosophy in the malaysian public.’ distinctive malaysian socio-cultural atmosphere malaysia is a comparatively small but unique country, blessed with a diverse demography. it is home to various ethnic groups, professing different religious beliefs and speaking different languages and dialects. according to the most recent world bank data, the total population of malaysia, in the year 2011, was 28.86 million2.the report from the official malaysian census in july 2011 showed that 91.8 per cent of the population were malaysian citizens, while 8.2 per cent were non-citizens. malaysian citizens consist of four main ethnic groups: bumiputera (67.4%), chinese (24.6%), indians (7.3%) and others races (0.7%). the predominant religion is islam (61.3%), followed by buddhism (19.8%), christianity (9.2%), hinduism (6.3%) and others (2.1%). the official language is malay or bahasa melayu, but english is also widely spoken and each race has its own language and sub-race dialect. historically speaking, peninsular malaysia was originally populated by the malays and indigenous tribes (collectively identified as the bumiputeras3). in the eighteenth century, it was the british, under analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 3 5 issue 1 (2 0 1 4 ) 29 their colonial rule, who brought the chinese and indian immigrants to the country to work in the tin-mining industry and rubber plantations respectively. this, and subsequent economic migration “forms the basis of malaysia’s multi-ethnic and multi-religious society” (rosnani hashim, 2004). given this unique historical background, watson (1980, p. 150), describes malaysia as, “undoubtedly the most complex and difficult country of the region to examine” when it comes to discussion about education and culture. one of the purposes of this paper is to examine how p4c can help children living in a multicultural society to understand and assimilate the concepts of tolerance and respect towards people of different backgrounds and cultures, by thinking and discussing in a 'community of philosophical inquiry' (copi). the proponents of p4c strongly believe that, copi enables children to deal with issues that are sensitive to their social and cultural backgrounds (brighouse, 2009; de la garza, 2009; echeverria, 2009; hannam, 2009; turgeon, 2004). therefore, copi under the auspices of p4c is an ideal space for intercultural growth, something invaluable for promoting national unity and social integration in a country as diverse as malaysia. in the malaysian educational scene, the government attempted to address the issue of national unity through several programmes, such as the commencement of the 'student integration plan for unity'4 in 1986, the introduction of civics and citizenship education as a subject in the national curriculum and the establishment of vision schools5 in 1995. despite all these efforts, a perennial social gap and racial polarization among malaysian students remain unresolved. in a study conducted by malakolunthu (2009, p. 130) about 'vision schools,' an initiative established by the malaysian ministry of education (moe), it was observed that there was “no special pedagogical intervention to help students understand the concepts of race, religion and culture, and how they varied from people to people.” the absence of such intervention eventually resulted in the failure of the whole vision school project. thus, the introduction of copi would be timely because it would offer malaysian school children, as described by turgeon, (2004, p. 105) “a safe haven for diversity that is both encouraged and nurtured and also caringly examined.” through philosophy, we can nurture more respectful, tolerant, cooperative children and in the long run, better citizens, in such a way as to effect social change (kohan, 2009, p. 119). put another way, the inquiry process in p4c presents children with the opportunity to share their own views on challenging and controversial issues, in a safe space, enabling them to become aware of the assumptions and stereotypes present in society in order to challenge them. this process will not only contribute towards children’s self-development, but it could also be a factor for constructive social change towards a more democratic society. in summary, schools should become places where children can learn how to make judgments without being judgmental, to differentiate but not to discriminate. school should act as a giant filter where all negative influences passing through its gates are neutralized. ideally, this is how school should be, but in reality schools seem ill-equipped to counteract the torrent of bigotry, racism and hate that surge from every corner of society, and sometimes from within school. thus, if the analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 3 5 issue 1 (2 0 1 4 ) 30 malaysian government is serious about national unity and racial integration, then the very first place to start would be the national schools, where the majority of malaysians are educated. educational reform in malaysia the education system in malaysia has undergone several reforms and transformation, since independence in 1957. these changes happened due to several factors, such as a shift in the educational philosophy of the country or changes in the aims and objectives of the system itself. changes in curriculum have happened mainly as a result of the changing needs of society, e.g., to develop the country in terms of science and technology, yet national unity has always been the overriding priority (ahmad, 1998, p. 463). the most recent government initiative to improve the education system is the national educational blueprint 2013-2025 (moe, 2012b). on september 11, 2012, the malaysian prime minister, najib abdul razak, launched the blueprint, and at last, higher order thinking skills and the 'spirit of inquiry' were given emphasis for malaysian students, alongside the 3r's. it became evident to the malaysian public in 2009 that malaysian students’ achievement was at a discomforting level as malaysia was ranked 55 out of 74 countries by pisa (the programme for international students assessment). this put the country in the final third cohort well below the international and oecd average for all three areas of mathematics, reading and science (walker, 2011). almost 60% of malaysian 15-year-olds who participated in pisa in 2009 failed to meet the minimum proficiency level in mathematics, while 44% and 43% failed to meet the minimum proficiency levels for reading and science respectively. a discrepancy of 38 points on the pisa scale is equivalent to one year of schooling. a comparison of the scores shows that 15-year-olds in singapore, south korea, hong kong, and shanghai were performing as though they have had three or more years of schooling than malaysian 15-year-olds (moe, 2012b). this poor performance in the pisa rankings was one of the factors that moved the ministry of education to draft the new blueprint, after conducting a rigorous nationwide survey on the strengths and weaknesses of the national education system. the dismal performance of malaysian students against this international benchmark has become a matter of concern when discussing malaysian educational standards. such concerns have increased when we consider the amount of money spent by the government on education in the annual budget. based on data produced by the world bank in 2010, malaysia’s performance lagged behind other countries with a similar or even lower expenditure per student, per annum, for example, thailand, armenia and chile (moe, 2012b). furthermore, the average teacher to student ratio in malaysia is 1:13 which is high compared to other countries. given these advantageous conditions, it is perplexing to think that malaysian students performed so poorly on international assessment. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 3 5 issue 1 (2 0 1 4 ) 31 it is interesting to note that the assessment in pisa focuses on questions that test for higher order thinking skills, such as analysing, evaluating and synthesizing. in other words, it does not test for mere application of knowledge. this suggests that the malaysian educational system is still behind other countries in equipping students with such skills (rosnani hashim, 2012a, p. 1). there is therefore a crucial need for educational reform to introduce higher order thinking skills into the malaysian national curriculum. in 2012, the ministry of education distributed a booklet6 on thinking skills for all state-school teachers. the purpose of the 13-page booklet was to act as a guide for teachers to understand the basics of thinking skills in the hope that they would implement it into their classroom teaching. the booklet also aimed to help students acquire the basics of thinking skills as outlined in the new educational blueprint (moe, 2012b). some brief descriptions and examples of how thinking skills can be assimilated into learning were included in the booklet. however, it is not known how helpful the booklet was and whether it was successful in enabling teachers to realise the government’s aspiration of teaching students to think critically, creatively and innovatively. judging by the size and simplicity of the booklet we should not expect too much. the ministry would do better to make a concerted effort to reform the curriculum, rather than adopting this quick-fix approach. rosnani hashim (2012a, p. 9) suggests a reform in curriculum as well as in pre-service teachertraining programmes, so that trainee-teachers are exposed to the use of thinking skills as well as the techniques of teaching thinking. if they themselves are sufficiently equipped with thinking skills then they will be better placed to introduce these into their future classrooms. rosnani hashim further submits that the hikmah philosophy programme is the most suitable thinking skills programme to achieve this objective. indeed, the existing literature shows that p4c has the edge in helping children to cultivate their critical and creative thinking. thus, p4c or the hikmah programme should be considered as one of the ways to make the educational blueprint a reality. reviving interest in philosophy it is interesting yet disturbing to know that there is, at present, no faculty or department of philosophy in existence in any of the malaysian institutions of higher learning, public or private. a glance through the e-handbook of public university admissions applications for 2013 intake (“epanduan kemasukan ke ipta 2013”) issued by the ministry of higher learning7, shows that there is not a single undergraduate course related to philosophy on offer for prospective students, in all 21 public universities across the country. as one would expect, there are numerous courses relating to science, technology, business and economics, and the like. one might counter that even though there is no specific undergraduate course in philosophy, students will still be exposed to philosophy in their respective disciplines e.g., philosophy of law or philosophy of science. yet this should not be taken as an excuse to exclude philosophy as discipline in its own right. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 3 5 issue 1 (2 0 1 4 ) 32 the reason for this omission can be attributed to several factors. according to a. murad merican, a professor at the petronas university of technology (utp), (abdul rahman, 2010), the dearth of philosophy is the result of the country’s development policy over the last forty years. as a relatively young nation that attained its independence in 1957, malaysia needed to develop quickly requiring a strong foundation in economics, science and technology. more emphasis and funds were consequently awarded to these areas of knowledge. conversely, funds and financial support for the social sciences and humanities were significantly reduced in public universities, with adverse effects on facilities, resources, opportunities and teaching expertise in these fields. similarly, scholarships to study science, technology, economics or law were greater in number than the humanities and social sciences. as a consequence, university departments of philosophy had to be closed down due to a shortage of students. students, parents and the general public perceived these fields to be useless, having no practical value, or marketability. after all, studying philosophy, sociology or literature did not appear to contribute anything towards the development of the country. thus philosophy lost its importance and was abandoned. rosnani hashim (2009c, p. 658) also discusses this 'death' of philosophy in malaysian society holding that in many predominantly muslim societies including malaysia, philosophy has been abandoned because it is seen to challenge islamic theology. muslims believe islam to be a complete way of life, and so they see no place for philosophy in it. philosophy is not viewed as something within religion but rather something alien to it. however, this was not always the case. historically, philosophy had a place in the islamic religion, but this tradition was lost centuries ago. in fact, muslim philosophy came out of a rich culture of intellectual exchange that involved syrian arabs, persians, turks, berbers and others (rosnani hashim, 2009c, p. 656). muslim scholars engaged in philosophical arguments and discussion in the fields of jurisprudence (‘fiqh’), the nature of law, analogy ('qiyas') and meaning ('mantiq'). but it was the arrival of greek philosophy that challenged traditional islamic sciences and it was this that was considered a threat according to the traditional scholars. it also gave rise to the emergence of the mu’tazilites8, a group of muslim scholars who relied purely on logic, reasoning and rationality, as well as their rivals, the ash’arites, who argued that mere reason alone was not enough to establish the basic tenets and beliefs of islam (rosnani hashim, 2009c, p. 658). this division went on for centuries and in the end, resulted in the alienation of philosophy from islamic fields of knowledge. for this reason, it is a common trait of typical muslim societies nowadays that too much questioning or inquisitiveness on the part of students is seen as inappropriate. in fact, excessive questioning is discouraged because it is seen as a threat that could cause muslims to doubt their faith. whilst there does seem to be ambiguity about the demarcation between acceptable and unacceptable questions in islamic tradition, this should not be an obstacle for students who ask questions in the sincere pursuit of knowledge. the need for philosophy in the malaysian schools has been further discussed by syed alwi shahab (2013, pp. 36–38). shahab suggests that by modifying the current curriculum to offer philosophy, or by infusing philosophy into the existing curriculum, students will find their studies more meaningful and interesting. he claims it is the task of philosophers to design lessons and materials with workable strategies that can help teachers develop philosophical thinking skills in their students. however, given the actual complexities of the educational system in malaysia, analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 3 5 issue 1 (2 0 1 4 ) 33 shahab’s arguments are rather simplistic. it is easy to talk about ideals, but we have to face the realities of life. even if the ministry of education were to go so far as to modify the curriculum and include philosophy, such an attempt would be fruitless if teachers are not adequately prepared in the basics of philosophy, or trained to use philosophy in their teaching. currently, the only philosophy that teacher-trainees are exposed to in malaysian teacher-training colleges is the national educational philosophy, which is nothing more than idealistic statements about how education in malaysia should be. the national educational philosophy reads: education in malaysia is an on-going effort towards further development of the potential of individuals in a holistic and integrated manner so as to produce individuals who are intellectually, spiritually, emotionally and physically balanced and harmonious based on a firm belief in god. such an effort is destined to produce malaysian citizen who are capable of achieving a high level of personal well-being as well as able to contribute to the harmony and betterment of the nation at large. (moe, 1993) this policy statement is as far as philosophy goes in the malaysian education system. teachertrainees receive no fundamental courses in philosophy such as logic, ethics or epistemology. without knowing the basics of philosophy, how can teachers convey knowledge in a philosophical way or encourage their students to practise philosophical thinking? like any other skill, philosophical thinking requires constant practice in order for it to flourish. another challenge faced by the re-introduction of philosophy into the school curriculum is resistance from stakeholders. as stated earlier, philosophy has become something foreign within malaysian society. thus, getting support for such a programme from parents, teachers and members of the public will be difficult. similarly, finding teachers who are interested to participate in such a programme is also challenging. teachers are already overburdened with so many tasks and school work that we cannot simply expect them to undergo more training courses in p4c and then expect them to implement ‘philosophical thinking ’ into their classrooms; it is not so simple. rosnani hashim (2012a) submits that the most viable way to bring philosophy back into malaysian classrooms is to train pre-service teachers. from the above discussion it can be seen that bringing philosophy back into the malaysian school curriculum is a very complicated and overwhelming task. to date, the ministry of education is still unconvinced about the potential of philosophy to develop students’ thinking skills. hence, the future of philosophy may seem bleak in malaysia. yet as we speak, there are efforts being made by parties who are aware of the gravity of the situation. among them is the centre of philosophical inquiry in education (cpie) which has expended considerable effort to revive the malaysian public's interest in philosophy. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 3 5 issue 1 (2 0 1 4 ) 34 it is therefore hoped that using p4c as a means to bring philosophy back into the school curriculum, will cause the malaysian public to appreciate the significant impact that philosophy has on children's cognitive development and behaviour. if this happens, then enthusiasm for this lost field of knowledge will slowly begin to increase, and this in the long run could lead to a demand to re-open philosophy departments in local universities so that philosophy can come to life once again in malaysia. conclusion there has been much hype about thinking skills in the malaysian educational scene of late, so the call to introduce a philosophy programme into malaysian primary schools could come at no better time. sadly, however, malaysian schools are still fixated on what paulo freire describes as the ‘banking’ concept of education, where students are seen as ‘depositories’ and teachers are ‘depositors’ (freire, 1996, p. 53). classroom dialogue is almost non-existent and the learning process is still very much a one-way process. if education remains this way, then children will have little chance to improve their thinking skills. this paper therefore examines the viability and suitability of implementing the philosophy for children programme within the malaysian context, and how this can be beneficial for malaysian school children in their unique, cultural environment. several arguments have been established in support of the idea of returning philosophy to the malaysian school curriculum. these arguments are grounded on three main bases; i) the distinctive social atmosphere in malaysia, ii) the plan for educational reform, and iii) the need to revive interest in philosophy among the malaysian public and stakeholders. of all three grounds, the third seems to be the most difficult, yet it is the most crucial aspect that will determine the success of any philosophy-based programme in the country. malaysia has lost interest in philosophy, which is evident from the absence of philosophy departments in all of the public universities. thus, it is essential that enthusiasm for philosophy be rekindled among the public if programmes like p4c are to take root and grow. the public should be made aware that philosophy is not something to be fearful of, but rather something that is innate in all of us, which has been lost along the way when we become adults, due to a lack of exposure and experience in it. this is not to say that children are born as philosophers; but rather that questioning, inquisitiveness and wonder are innate to them. young children certainly do ask thought-provoking questions, but they need adults to develop these questions so that their questioning does not diminish. unfortunately, more often than not, children’s sense of wonderment and curiosity are stifled by adults in the name of education, making them uncritical and an easy target for indoctrination. children's natural curiosity should be continuously nurtured and refined, not only for their benefit, but for the benefit of society as well, into which they will grow up as future 'thinking citizens'. there are several suggestions to be made pursuant to this discussion: analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 3 5 issue 1 (2 0 1 4 ) 35 1. a tailor-made p4c programme based on existing models should be adapted to suit the distinctive characteristics of malaysian students. rosnani hashim’s hikmah programme (rosnani hashim, 2003, 2009c, 2012a) is a good start, but it needs to be expanded to include students from other multicultural backgrounds i.e., not just muslims. such a programme should be tested across the country to see whether it is viable to have a model suited to the different types of school in malaysia (urban, rural, religious, chinese and tamil schools). 2. a module for conducting a community of philosophical inquiry, based on p4c or hikmah, should be devised for teacher-training institutions and included as part of training for preservice teachers. skills acquired from this module should then be integrated into the teachers' respective subjects that they teach in school, or alternatively, a stand-alone, p4c-based programme should be implemented. 3. training should be provided for in-service teachers who are interested in using philosophy in their classrooms. 4. a study should be conducted for educational materials that include thinking stories, exercises and modules etc., to be used in appropriate subjects that are already in existence in the national curriculum e.g., civics and citizenship studies, moral studies, islamic education, history and languages, etc. it is hoped that this method of teaching and learning will catch on and be accepted by the malaysian ministry of education, since it affords a bridge between 'academic philosophy' and 'doing philosophy' i.e., philosophy for everyday people in everyday life. philosophy need not be treated as an esoteric subject that is only accessible to the academic elite. in fact, philosophy is the right of everyone, and so, by nurturing philosophy in our children, we give greater depth and meaning to their lives, helping them develop a critical consciousness about the way things are; teaching them not to just accept things at first glance but to question them. through philosophy, children, as well as adults, can experience multiple ways of seeing and of understanding the world. philosophy teaches us to evaluate others' claims, to analyse and use our reasoning, rather than just accepting assumptions and prejudices. in contemporary life and especially in malaysia, philosophy is very relevant and should be re-introduced to society, starting with our school children. endnotes 1. a malay word of arabic origin which literally means ‘wisdom’ 2. http://data.worldbank.org/country/malaysia 3. literally translated as ‘the son of the soil’ 4. this programme was intended to create greater and more meaningful integration among students of different ethnic backgrounds through positive relationships and understanding, by having students become aware of and appreciative of others’ cultural and religious belief and values through special outdoor projects like camping, sports, excursions etc. (moe, 2007) analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 3 5 issue 1 (2 0 1 4 ) 36 5. in 1995, the government introduced a new redesigned model of school called the “vision schools” by which the schools of three major media of instructions (malay, mandarin and tamil) are located on the same compound, share the same facilities and organise certain shared programmes and events. by virtue of the proximity and open environment thus created, it was believed that the vision school would help to foster racial integration, harmony, and unity among the children of the different ethnic groups by creating opportunities for them to mingle, interact, and play with each other (malakolunthu, 2009, p. 124) 6. buku panduan kemahiran mena’akul (thinking skills guidebook) (moe, 2012a) 7. https://online.mohe.gov.my/upu/emas/index_epanduan.php 8. the ethical theory of the mu’tazilites is properly called ‘rationalism’ because it held the values of human and divine actions are knowable in principle by natural human reason (hourani, 1976, p. 59). references abdul rahman, i. (2010, november 1). semua universiti terbaik dunia ada jabatan falsafah prof. murad. mstar online. kuala lumpur. retrieved from http://mstar.com.my/mingguan/cerita.asp?file=%2f2010%2f11%2f1%2fmstar_minggu an%2f20101101123750&sec=mstar_mingguan. ahmad, r. h. (1998). educational development and reformation in malaysia: past, present and future. journal of educational administration, 36(5), 462–475. brighouse, h. (2009). the role of philosophical thinking in teaching controversial issues. in m. hand & c. winstanley (eds.), philosophy in schools (pp. 61 – 77). london: continuum. de la garza, m. t. (2009). identity and education in an intercultural setting. in e. marsal, t. dobashi, & b. weber (eds.), children philosophize worldwide: theoretical and practical concepts (pp. 645 – 653). frankfurt am main: peter lang. echeverria, e. (2009). philosophy for children with indigeneous children. in e. marsal, t. dobashi, & b. weber (eds.), children philosophize worldwide: theoretical and practical concepts. frankfurt am main: peter lang. freire, p. (1996). pedagogy of the oppressed. london: penguin books. hannam, p. (2009). from inter-cultural to inter-relational understanding: philosophy for children and the acceptance of difference. in e. marsal, t. dobashi, & b. weber (eds.), children philosophize worldwide: theoretical and practical concepts (pp. 141–152). frankfurt am main: peter lang. rosnani hashim (2003). the teaching of thinking through the philosophy for children approach in malaysia. (unpublished research report). gombak: international islamic university malaysia. rosnani hashim (2004). educational dualism in malaysia: implications for theory and practice (2nd ed.). kuala lumpur: the other press. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 3 5 issue 1 (2 0 1 4 ) 37 rosnani hashim (2009a). mira’s new school. kuala lumpur: saba islamic media. rosnani hashim (2009b). mira’s trip to the zoo. kuala lumpur: saba islamic media. rosnani hashim (2009c). philosophy in the islamic tradition: implications for the philosophy for children (p4c) program. in e. marsal, t. dobashi, & b. weber (eds.), children philosophize worldwide: theoretical and practical concepts (pp. 655–662). frankfurt am main; new york: peter lang. rosnani hashim (2012a). memenuhi aspirasi kemahiran berfikir dalam pelan pembangunan pendidikan malaysia 2013-2025 menerusi inkuiri dan pedagogi filosofiyyah dalam kalangan guru. in institutional paperworks. johor bahru: malaysian education deans’ council (medc).retrieved from http://www.medc.com.my/medc/seminar_medc/fromcd/pdf/iium.pdf rosnani hashim (2012b). sarahthe budding thinker. kuala lumpur: centre for philosophical inquiry in education, iium. rosnani hashim, & abdullah, n. (2009). mira and helping the poor. kuala lumpur: saba islamic media. rosnani hashim, & banging, b. m. r. (2009). mira’s thinking about god. kuala lumpur: saba islamic media. hourani, g. f. (1976). islamic and non-islamic origins of mu’tazilite ethical rationalism. international journal of middle east studies, 7(1), 86. juperi, j. a. (2010). philosophical inquiry in islamic education and its effect in the development of questioning skills among secondary school students (master’s dissertation). international islamic university malaysia, gombak. kohan, w. o. (2009). some reasons for doing philosophy with children. in e. marsal, t. dobashi, & b. weber (eds.), children philosophize worldwide: theoretical and practical concepts (pp. 117 – 126). frankfurt am main: peter lang. madrid, m. e. (2008). multiculturalism, extreme poverty, and teaching p4c in juchitán: a short report on research. childhood & philosophy, 4(8), 125–135. malakolunthu, s. (2009). educational reform and policy dynamics: a case of the malaysian “vision school” for racial integration. educational research for policy and practice, 8(2), 123–134. moe. (1993). education in malaysia. educational planning and research division. moe. (2007). kertas kerja aktiviti rancangan integrasi murid untuk perpaduan. ministry of education. moe. (2012a). buku panduan kemahiran mena’akul. curriculum development division, ministry of education. moe. (2012b). preliminary report malaysian education blueprint 2013-2025 (preliminary report). kuala lumpur: ministry of education. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol um e 3 5 issue 1 (2 0 1 4 ) 38 othman, m. (2005). critical thinking and reading skills: a comparative study of the reader response and philosophy for children program approaches (phd dissertation). international islamic university malaysia, gombak. preece, a. s. (2012). benefitting muslim learner’s using philosophical inquiry. presented at the 21st melta international conference, kuala lumpur. shahab, s. a. (2013). philosophy for adolescents: teaching philosophy in malaysian high schools. international journal of humanities and management sciences, 1(1), 36 – 38. turgeon, w. (2004). multiculturalism: politics of difference, education and philosophy for children. analytic teaching, 24(2), 96–109. walker, m. (2011). pisa 2009 plus results: performance of 15-year-olds in reading, mathematics and science for 10 additional participants. australian council for educational research. watson, j. k. p. (1980). education and cultural pluralism in south east asia, with special reference to peninsular malaysia. comparative education, 16(2), 139–158. doi:10.1080/0305006800160206 address correspondences to: abdul shakour preece faculty of education, international islamic university malaysia shakour@iium.edu.my adila juperi faculty of education, international islamic university malaysia adila_j@yahoo.com analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 46 between crisis-philia and crisis-phobia: reflections on the community of inquiry1 aaron j. yarmel abstract: conflict is a ubiquitous feature of community life, and communities based on inquiry are no exception. sometimes, conflict escalates into crisis. a crisis may help a community by providing opportunities for its members to recognize and ameliorate their shortcomings, but it may also destroy a community or limit its ability to sustain productive projects. in this discussion, i articulate two orientations towards crisis: crisis-philia (loving crises and seeking them out) and crisis-phobia (fearing crises and seeking to avoid them). i argue, drawing heavily from my experience as a participant in the summer seminar of the institute for the advancement of philosophy for children, that neither orientation is satisfactory. instead of crisis-philia or crisis-phobia, we ought to get into the habit of inquiring, as a community, about whether our current obstacles to accomplishing our work derive from being constrained by too much (imperfect) structure or from too little stability. when we find it is the former, we ought to seek crises; when we find it is the latter, we ought to avoid crises. after making my case, i offer an example of what it looks look like to implement this conclusion in practice. i. introduction n august 4, 2018, ariel sykes2 picked me up from the train station in morristown, nj and drove me to st. marguerite’s retreat house in the nearby township of mendham: the site of the summer seminar of the institute for the advancement of philosophy for children.3 when i entered her car, i assumed that she was taking me to an intensive workshop where i would add new teaching techniques to my repertoire without having to change much, if anything, about myself. and while i was looking forward to meeting new people, my expectation was that they would be merely colleagues: professional educators and philosophers with whom i would collaborate, and yet from whom i would remain comfortably alienated. what actually happened at mendham was that 24 people formed a community inside of a convent for 8 days. we would have breakfast every morning together at 8:00 am, after which, with the exception of a communal lunch and dinner and a three-hour afternoon study break, we would attend presentations and participate in community of inquiry (coi) sessions4 until the conclusion of the final session at 9:00 pm. after that, we would gradually wander into the solarium and continue to inquire, reflect, and play together until deep into the night (my longest night ended at approximately 5:30 am). my experience of mendham was the experience of being in an intentional community that is caring enough to allow for both authentic creativity and for the growth that results from subjecting o analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 47 the products of that creativity —especially the community itself — to critical scrutiny. one aspect of our community that we frequently scrutinized was the possibility of a crisis that could, at any second, puncture our collective, harmonious bubble and show us that our community had opportunities to grow. to be clear, it wasn’t that we were aware of problems that we simply chose to overlook. instead, we were aware that a crisis is the sort of thing that can make you become aware of aspects of reality that you had previously been protected from perceiving, though they were under your nose the whole time. while the prospect of a crisis was terrifying to us, there always was, at the same time, a hint of excitement in the voices of the more experienced mendham participants when they recounted their experiences of past crises: crises complete with impassioned screaming matches, premature exits, tears, and poignant resolutions. the question i pursue below is as follows: should we seek crises in a coi or avoid them? i begin (§ii) by presenting david kennedy’s (1994) framework for understanding how conflict is escalated and de-escalated within the context of a coi. i then (§iii) use this framework to articulate the relationship between conflict and crisis. next (§iv) i motivate two extreme positions that one can take towards crisis, which i call ‘crisis-phobia’ and ‘crisis-philia,’ and argue that, while neither position is itself plausible, we should search for intermediate positions in order to include the benefits of both and the problems of neither.5 i conclude that, instead of deciding always to seek or avoid crisis, we ought to get into the habit of inquiring, as a community, about whether our current obstacles to accomplishing our work derive from being constrained by too much (imperfect) structure or from too little stability. when we find it is the former, we ought to seek crises and when we find it is the latter we ought to avoid it. i conclude (§v) by showing an example of what it would look like to implement this conclusion in practice. ii. conflict in the coi why is there conflict in the coi? according to kennedy (1994), the answer is that “all persons experience themselves as parts of a greater whole, but we also experience a fundamental, irreducible dimension of discontinuity, because each of us occupies a horizon which both connects and separates us from others” (13). this is to say, there are two ways that we experience ourselves. on the one hand, we see ourselves as part of our whole community. on the other hand, we see ourselves as unique individuals who will always be discontinuous from our community. sometimes our desire to be part of a community is frustrated by our realization that, in order to be ourselves, we need to act in ways that are in conflict with the role we occupy within the community, and other times our desire to be ourselves is frustrated by an overwhelming need to participate in communal life. moreover, there are times when someone else’s pursuit of being themselves gets in the way of the projects that we have chosen to pursue as individuals or as a community. there are many different ways that this conflict between the two ways of seeing ourselves can be manifested, and kennedy identifies five parts of a coi where these conflicts take place. he refers analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 48 to these as the “five structural dimensions of the coi,” each of which “is the expression of a communicative, interpretive process, converging on a common body of signs” (3). these five dimensions6 are as follows: our gestures, the language we use, the contents of our minds, the various kinds of love we feel, and our individual interests. for each of the five dimensions, there are dimension-specific ways that conflict is manifested: your hug may bring us closer together or result in my feeling uncomfortable; a convention that we all speak english may help me participate better while making communication more difficult for someone else whose first language is french; she may take comfort in the feeling of solidarity that comes from knowing that we all hold the same view about an important issue and feel frustrated when such a view must be justified to a skeptical audience; the love shared by members of a group for each other may be liberating or stifling; and our interests can be such that our pursuit of them at the same time is mutually inclusive or exclusive. i discuss each dimension in greater depth below (ii.1-ii.5). at each of the five dimensions, then, we can ask whether what one person is doing is fostering, hindering, being fostered by, or being hindered by what others in the community or the community itself is doing. i use the word ‘conflict,’ to refer to such hindrances and the word ‘coordination’ to refer to such fostering. this is to say, a community with hindrances that are greater in number and severity is, by definition, a community with more conflict and less coordination, and a community with fosterings that are greater in number and severity is, again by definition, a community with more coordination and less conflict. additionally, conflict and coordination can happen with respect to a single structural dimension, some set of structural dimensions, or all five structural dimensions considered holistically. when i do not specify a particular dimension or set of structural dimensions, i am referring to all five considered holistically. such holistic assessments are rough, and i am not committed to any particular formula for how to aggregate levels of conflict or coordination across dimensions (e.g., how to balance greater coordination at one dimension against greater conflict at another). ii.1 the dimension of gesture a place like mendham provides opportunities to examine aspects of communal life that would otherwise go unexamined. an occasion for such reflection happened one day when i was having lunch with my friend léa c. brillant and i noticed that she was touching my arm from time to time while we were talking. normally this isn’t the sort of thing i would take note of—it’s a fairly common thing that happens during conversations after all—but, primed by having been reading kennedy, i had already been thinking consciously about gestures and how we use them in conversations. it occurred to me that she and i had different gestures in our repertoires for making physical contact with friends: for the most part, i limit myself to hugs and handshakes and only use them when saying hello or goodbye. after i mentioned this to léa, we spent a few minutes attempting, and yet never quite succeeding, to figure out how to get me to move in a way that didn’t seem like a parody of her natural execution of the gesture of touching someone’s arm during a conversation. this process changed our analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 49 friendship in two ways. first, it highlighted particular differences between my approach to interacting with people and hers. in this way, it showed us one way that we were less than perfectly coordinated in the dimension of gestures. second, it initiated a path towards better, though never full, coordination. as i tried, but never fully succeeded, to execute her natural gesture in ways that were progressively less awkward, we simultaneously experienced both movements towards greater coordination and the realization that there would always be a limit to how coordinated our gestures would, in the end, be. while we are generally not as aware of our gestures as léa and i were in the lunchtime conversation that i just described, as kennedy notes, every time we are around other people, the ways that we arrange the various parts of our bodies — whether through activity or inactivity, tension or relaxation, movement towards or movement away — affect everyone else in our vicinity (3-4). we can feel when our gestures are producing tension or relaxation in our community when we attend to the ways that our bodies respond to the gestures of others (e.g., how do we reposition ourselves and feel in response to gestures like the one that person over there just made?), to the ways that our own gestures make us feel (e.g., if our shoulders are raised, how does it feel?), to the ways that others respond to our gestures (e.g., does that person come closer when we move towards them or shrink away?), and to the ways that our gestures fit into the interactive system of gestures responding to other gestures (e.g., how well does someone’s level of movement fit into the rhythm of gestures around them?) (5-6). when we attend to these gestures, we become aware of the ways that we can achieve greater coordination with those of others and of our community as a whole and of the limits to such coordination. ii.2 the dimension of language on the final day of mendham, ariel revealed to me that she had taken an immediate disliking to me when picking me up from the train station because, as a result of the way i used language, i reminded her of other analytic philosophers whom she had seen fail to embrace the pragmatist spirit of mendham in the past. at the beginning of the week, i was in the habit of using philosophical terms, such as realism and relativism, and making references to famous philosophers, such as martha nussbaum, that i wrongly assumed everyone else would understand. joe oyler, the mendham workshop coordinator, made it clear to me, with both his words and his gestures, that he wanted me to stop what i was doing and use language that was common to everyone present during inquiry sessions. in the end, i successfully redeemed myself to ariel (at the time that i am writing this article, she and i are co-organizing a winter writing retreat, planning a multi-city facilitation tour, and coauthoring a paper that has already been accepted for a presentation in february of 2019), but coordination of language is never guaranteed. mendham attracts inquirers from a variety of countries each year, and many of my favorite conversations were with people whose first language is french. while people were generally happy to accommodate my inability to speak french, there were analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 50 situations where a french-speaker felt compelled to express a number of nuanced ideas too quickly for them to use english. in such cases, i would wait for the conversation to subside and then request a distillation of what had just happened. as kennedy notes, while speakers of different languages must work hard to find a common language for communication, members of different communities and disciplines (in this case analytic and pragmatist philosophers) who speak the same language often have distinct enough ways of talking that they must translate from the methods of engagement specific to their communities and disciplines to a common way of communicating with one another (e.g., by using frameworks that they have studied together and drawing from their individual and shared lived experiences) (6). as is the case with gestures, our attempts to coordinate language reveal both possibilities of coordination and the inevitable discontinuities that render complete coordination impossible. even in the case of ariel, differences in the stylistic habits that we bring with us to our co-authored works remind us that we are distinct individuals. before moving on, i want to discuss one further difficulty for coordinating language. i remember trying to have a conversation with someone sitting all the way across the dining room table from me on the final morning of mendham and, due to a combination of her english accent, the ambient noise of the room, the size of the table, and the fact that i was operating on less than 2 hours of sleep, i did not understand anything that she was saying. this amounted to a failure to coordinate language, in the sense that the sounds we were producing were literally not at the right amplitude for communication to occur. in a dialogue, we need to make sure that we do not talk at the same time as others or jar or confuse each other with the pitch, volume, or speed of the sounds we make. when our sounds are well-coordinated, it seems like we’re working together to sing a single song with roles for different voices, and the increases and decreases in pitch, volume, and speed are anticipated and welcomed by all participants. kennedy refers to this as the “musical element in speech” (7).7 ii.3 the dimension of mind one night in the solarium, the difference between two fundamentally different orientations towards approaching mysteries was thrown into sharp relief. the conversation went almost exactly like this (i have identified myself, but the other identities have been disguised and person 2 is an amalgamation of at least two people): person 1: all you do is complicate things; you use flowery language to make stuff more obscure. person 2: when you dissect things into their parts you don’t actually learn about them. there’s mystery in the world, and you can’t learn about it by dissecting it because when you dissect it you kill it. person 1: what does that even mean? you’re not actually solving problems or learning anything—you’re just writing poetry. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 51 person 2: go to bed. me: i think that both of you are doing something valuable and i want to see if our conversation gets better once we’re all on the same page about what that is. on your approach [gesturing towards person 1], we use philosophical tools to clarify what all of the parts of seemingly mysterious things are and figure out how they work. this approach makes sense if you want to make sure that the mysteries you’re studying are really mysterious rather than simply things that we haven’t yet devoted enough time to figuring out. on your approach [gesturing towards person 2], we try to experience a mysterious thing as a whole without dissecting it. this makes sense if you’re worried that there are some things in the world that don’t survive being dismembered, and so the only way to actually experience them—as opposed to the lifeless components that remain after dissection—is to use interpretive tools that allow us to observe them as wholes. ultimately, though, i think we need different people doing both approaches because i think that we learn different things from each one. person 2: i want to hug that comment. person 1: [nodding] okay. me: we all think that there are real mysteries in the world that we should explore, but we’re just disagreeing about how to do that. and, again, i think a variety of approaches within our community is best. person 1: that’s right. the conversation continued, but i want to end the dialogue there and discuss what had happened so far. we began with a clash between two very different perspectives about how to approach mysteries. i then made the moves of beginning to distill these perspectives and suggesting that they were both important for a single community based on inquiry. to be clear, these moves alone are insufficient to transform a conflicted community into a harmonious one. within the context of a particular inquiry session, showing care for the inquiry—precisely identifying one question and then pursuing that question, and only that question—may mean having to collectively choose between pursuing the inquiry in a way that makes either person 1 or person 2 unhappy. and since, in the dialogue excerpt, the work of clarifying what the positions of persons 1 & 2 actually amounted to had just begun, it was not yet clear which inquiry questions would be satisfying to whom. however, moves like these can help us begin to explore the degree to which our perspectives can be coordinated with each other (e.g., we’re all aimed towards the goal of exploring mysteries), the extent to which our different perspectives can be coordinated with our collective project of organizing a coi, and the limits to both kinds of coordination given the ineliminable discontinuities between us. speaking more generally, our thoughts, feelings, and perspectives are complex and personal, but when we exchange sounds and gestures with others, we learn some things, but not all things, about their internal worlds. when we are open to this process of exchange and learning, we have the opportunity to progress towards, as kennedy puts it, “a coordination of perspectives” (7). in a analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 52 community coordinated at this dimension—the dimension of mind—we state when we are confused, check in to make sure that we understand the arguments others are making, and offer examples to support or critique each other’s conclusions after adequately describing them. in a community conflicted at this dimension, we talk over each other and persist in misunderstanding each other’s positions because we do not devote sufficient effort to offering or receiving explanations of perspectives. ii.4 the dimension of love in one of the most helpful coi sessions i participated in at mendham, i learned two things about the variety of erotic love that people can feel for one another: it is fairly obvious when we are experiencing a process of falling in love with someone, but it is less clear whether we are ever in a position to determine, in the moment, that we are certain that we are in the state of being in love with them; and processes of falling in love with someone happen when we have the poignant feelings associated with strongly believing that we understand them (we get them) and that we’re understood by them (we’re gotten by them). given that mendham is a community that fosters deep understanding between participants, there is always a danger that people will begin to fall in love with each other. when processes of erotic love between people are well-coordinated, the results can be profoundly beautiful and satisfying. when i asked whether people had fallen in love at mendham in the past, ariel shared stories where this had happened; in one case, two mendham participants even went on to get married afterwards. love at mendham isn’t always well-coordinated, however, and, although, as far as i know, this did not occur at mendham during my time there, when love is unrequited it can feel devastating. moreover, there are obvious cases where any romantic pursuit can be destructive. according to kennedy, there is always a risk of “sexual and/or emotional exploitation, and emotions of jealousy, unrequited love, excessive diffidence, etc.” (8). erotic love between people is not the only kind of love found in mendham. one night in the solarium, around 3:15 am, someone asked how we were supposed to be awake for a very long day that was set to begin with breakfast at 8:00 am the next morning. one of the participants responded with (and here i am paraphrasing), you literally eat the inquiry; that’s where you get your energy from; that’s your food. over the next few days, i found that she was entirely correct. the love for the inquiry is a powerful force that, when coordinated towards a common goal as opposed to directed by different individuals towards disparate ends, can propel us forward even through exhaustion. kennedy describes this drive to push forward in the inquiry as a “hunger” (8). for a mendham community to flourish, a third kind of love is important as well: agape love, which is the desire to merge with and lose ourselves in the larger collective entity of our whole community (8). on the final night of mendham, all of the participants performed plays they had written inspired by matthew lipman’s philosophical children’s novel, pixie. the play i participated in was a collaboration between myself and a close-knit group of colleagues from the brila organization in analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 53 montréal. in general, they brought to mendham a unique blend of kookiness and unbridled creativity that became one of the defining features of our community. for example, our play includes a scene where five of us dressed as lobsters are on top of a table eating spinach out of a doll-version of david kennedy; one of the lobsters, after pretending to be choking on ideology, coughs up her spinach onto my face. the agape love shared among the lobsters that evening was palpable. however, there is always the danger that a cohesive group of people who love each other very deeply will turn into a clique that will disrupt whole-group processes of agape love. on david’s birthday, i joined the brila group in offering what must have been one of the most disruptive and whimsical birthday gift offerings that he has ever received. the five of us marched up to david in the solarium; i carried a cupcake while they sang loudly in french. once we reached him, the others stopped singing, opened their mouths, and dumped sprinkles all over the cupcake i was still holding (it isn’t clear to me how or when they filled their mouths with sprinkles). the spectacle disrupted the comparatively calm and reflective atmosphere of a room full of people drinking wine and reflecting on a week of inquiry. although situations like this made the discontinuities between the relations of agape love between the members of the group and the relations of agape love shared by the community as a whole clearly visible, the presence of the brila group still, in my opinion, made an entirely positive contribution to the mendham community; in addition to their years of experience inquiring and the insightful ideas that each of them brought with them, they created opportunities for eccentric and even absurd activities that enriched our community and which others were invited to help shape. ii.5 the dimension of interest participants come to mendham to satisfy different interests, and, as kennedy notes, the process of coordinating these interests is a constant negotiation for each person “with the group as a whole, within various subgroups, and with each individual within the group” (9). at times, this coordination requires people to refine their goals when such goals are incompatible with the flourishing of the community. when i asked ariel, i was told that, in past mendhams, some participants — who happened to be analytic philosophers (it often seemed as though i were doing free pr for analytic philosophy) — were frustrated and disappointed because they were not allowed to simply lecture others into giving up what they took to be elementary philosophical errors resulting from not being up to speed on the literature in the relevant subdisciplines. i understand their frustration; on one or two occasions early on in the week, it occurred to me that i was wasting my time listening to mistakes that would have been quickly corrected during the course of a good undergraduate philosophy class. in my case, my frustration disappeared as the days went on and i found that, regardless of the topic, participating in a coi helped me learn new things that i would not have learned on my own (my deepest goal in coming to mendham was to learn as much as i could from the experience). in past years, there were cases where coordination never happened and the frustrated individuals either left or stayed and made everyone else miserable. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 54 in some cases, a community is able to adapt to provide new opportunities for individuals to flourish in ways that, in turn, benefit the community. in my own mendham experience, i was fortunate enough to be given time to facilitate a coi where the object of inquiry was a live performance i gave of a composition i had written for solo violin (at the suggestion of a mendham participant, i later decided to name the piece, mendham). but this opportunity for me came with a cost. i learned, during the process of writing this article, that another participant had been hoping to give a presentation about one of his areas of research during the time that was given to me for my session. in a community, a decision that allows one person to pursue their interests can also result in someone else’s not being able to do so. unfortunately, such conflicts are inevitable when two people want the same resource and it can only be used by one of them. iii. on conflict and crisis kennedy describes the role of crisis in the coi as follows: “doubt and belief—a complex web of instinctive beliefs and assumptions, mostly vague, many of them at any given point in time altogether unconscious—crisis in constant state of dynamic tension. it is when these belief-habits come into crisis, are thrown by experience into a state of perplexity, that the act of search, of investigation begins” (10). on this usage, the term ‘crisis’ refers to a state of perplexity where, following a disruption of our activities, we do not know how to go on. in a good inquiry, crises of this sort are ubiquitous. they happen whenever we offer a position that is then met with a challenging example or counterargument, prompting us to have to decide whether to defend or abandon our position. i articulated above (§ii) five different structural dimensions of a coi where conflict can take place, and, on this general conception of ‘crisis,’ each of the conflicts i described can produce a crisis. when, for example, a rolls her eyes and crosses her arms while responding to a point b has just made, she is engaging in what natalie fletcher (2014) refers to as body taunting: “the combined “vocabulary” of flesh—gestural, postural, physiognomic, kinetic expression—with which inquirers both deliberately and inadvertently provoke, dismiss, intimidate or alienate one another as they attempt to co-construct meaning” (14). as a result of a’s body taunt, b may become perplexed about whether she has anything of value to offer to the community, “resulting in missing perspectives and an imbalance of contributions, which in turn damages the community’s dynamic” (16). if others around b become frustrated at her for not contributing, they may become unsure about whether to continue to allow her in their community, leading to conflict at the dimension of agape love, which, in turn, could lead to questions about whether they ought to accommodate b’s use of language, coordinate their perspectives with her, and be sympathetic to her interests. there are many different kinds of crisis, and i want to draw four distinctions8 between them. first and second, we can distinguish between different kinds of crisis by looking at the actions that are disrupted and the thing that disrupts the action. your action of walking to work is disrupted if, along the way, a road is closed, an emergency forces you to attend to something else, or you receive a phone call analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 55 from a publisher who is excited about your manuscript and would like you to catch the next plane to new york so that you can begin your new life as an author. while on one level of analysis, these three interruptions interrupt the same action (i.e., the action of walking to work), they differ along a third dimension: severity. the first disruption interferes with your particular path to work without interrupting your continuing to travel to work (e.g., by another path); the second interferes with your currently taking steps to go to work without necessarily affecting your future decisions with respect to traveling to work (e.g., you may resume your action once the emergency has passed); the third interferes with your current and future steps towards work (e.g., you may decide to go immediately to new york, quit your job, and never return to your old home again). in this way, the third disruption is the most severe of the three crises. fourth, crises vary with respect to whether they contribute to or detract from individual or group flourishing. for example, i believe i am better off because a chance encounter with academic philosophy led me to question whether a career as a professional orchestral violinist was really for me (i determined that it wasn’t). on the other hand, i have met other musicians who regret ending their musical careers and believe that their decision to do so detracted from their flourishing in the long run.9 moreover, a crisis that eventually helps me flourish may, in the long run, detract from your flourishing or the flourishing of our group (or vice versa). in addition to the general term ‘crisis,’ i am going to introduce the term, ‘existential crisis,’ to refer to a crisis where someone, or some group, is perplexed about whether or not to continue existing, either per se or as the bearer of a particular socially-constructed identity. sometimes life events like retirement can lead someone to abandon one socially-constructed identity, become perplexed about who they are, and then eventually take on a new one. for example, i once spent several weeks getting to know an ex-physicist who had become extremely wealthy by designing weapons for the us military during the cold war. when i met him, he had already gone through the process of retiring from physics, being perplexed about what social role he now occupied, and eventually becoming a renowned and beloved patron of the arts. in other cases, a combination of life events can produce an existential crisis that will leave someone perplexed about whether to continue to exist per se: to ponder what albert camus (1955) described as the “only one serious philosophical question… suicide” (3). philanthropist, businessman, and inventor george eastman responded to such a crisis on march 14, 1932, when he famously shot himself in the heart after writing the following note: “to my friends, my work is done—why wait? g.e.” iv. between crisis-philia and crisis-phobia it is uncontroversial that some crises, in the broad sense of crisis, are valuable. if we never subject premises to counterarguments, then we should not have much faith in them, for the crucible of testing throws the actual or apparent deficiencies in a premise into sharp relief, leading us to reject it, refine it, or gain a more nuanced understanding of it and what it can do. in the same vein, a coi community that is never challenged also suffers from having not been properly tested.10 a crisis analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 56 provides us with the opportunity to reject, refine, or gain a new appreciation for the strength of our community: our proposed solution to the question, how should we coordinate a specific kind of communal life based on inquiry? what is controversial, however, is how to answer the following question: should we seek all crises, including existential crises? when answering this question, it is important to keep in mind that the power individuals have to cause or prevent existential crises in their groups varies depending on how much of an impact one individual’s action will have on the group as a whole. in the case of revolutions faced by states, a particularly dramatic sort of existential crisis, theda skocpol (1988) and e. j. hobsbawm (1989) have argued that individuals have so little power that their intentions are explanatorily irrelevant. in the case of a group of friends, each individual has considerably more, though never complete, power to cause existential crises at will. individuals in a coi are more similar in power to individuals in a friendship than to citizens in a pre-revolutionary state. although they are still constrained, they are always in the position of being able to ask, “should i increase the probability of an existential crisis by contributing to greater levels of conflict or decrease this probability by contributing to greater levels of coordination?” in the context of a coi, this question can be asked with respect to each of the five structural dimensions. one answer to this question is that we ought never to seek existential crises. call this position, crisis-phobia. although the real edmund burke did not endorse crisis-phobia across the board (e.g., he supported the american revolution), someone who does could find support for their position in the reasons he offered in his critique of the french revolution in his (2003 [1790]) reflections on the revolution in france. according to burke, if we allow people to change “the state as often, and as much, and in as many ways as there are floating fancies or fashions, the whole chain and continuity of the commonwealth would be broken” (81). the danger of breaking this continuity is that progress in art, science, manufacturing and every other area of life will be impossible because there will be no stable mechanisms to preserve the fruits of yesterday’s advances today so that they can be enjoyed and built upon tomorrow. as a result of this instability, “the commonwealth itself would, in a few generations, crumble away, be disconnected into the dust and powder of individuality, and at length dispersed to all the winds of heaven,” and this harm is “ten thousand times worse than those of obstinacy and the blindest prejudice” (82). there is a clear disanalogy between the french revolution and a crisis in a coi: no matter how all-encompassing a coi feels when we are in the midst of it, no serious harms are likely to result from its premature conclusion. the cataclysmic dangers that concerned burke with respect to the former simply do not apply to the latter. however, we have a reason to preserve a coi to the extent that it is doing important work that depends on continuity. crisis-phobia will be endorsed by someone who thinks that this reason always defeats, even if just in practice, the countervailing considerations that motivate escalating conflict. such a person will think that we ought always to discipline ourselves in such a way so as to avoid threatening the continuation of the coi. to do otherwise is to risk losing out on discovering the most reasonable answer to an important question. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 57 crisis-phobia is one extreme position that we can take towards existential crises; the opposite extreme is the position that we ought always to seek out existential crises. call this crisis-philia. while it would be false to characterize paulo freire as someone who endorses crisis-philia across the board, we can, as was the case with burke and crisis-phobia, motivate a crisis-philia position by starting from his position and then adding a few additional assumptions. in his (2018 [1968]) pedagogy of the oppressed, freire describes a binary world populated by two sorts of people: the oppressors and the oppressed. his goal is to articulate a pedagogical approach with which the oppressed will eliminate both the oppressed and the oppressors by transforming them both into new sorts of people who are “no longer oppressor nor longer oppressed, but human in the process of achieving liberation” (49). freire’s call is not simply for internal change at the levels of people’s attitudes and beliefs, but for the transformation of “the world of oppression” (54), which may even involve violent actions on the part of the oppressed (56). one path to crisis-philia begins with the choice to see all social life in terms of freire’s oppressor/oppressed binary. when we are limited to seeing all social life in these terms, then all of the moves made by people within a coi will be seen as moves either of the oppressed or the oppressors. the second step is to assume that all of the social roles they adopt while making these moves are roles that help maintain this binary. once we see the coi in this way, we have a reason to continually seek out existential crises; becoming perplexed about whether or not to continue along in our activities and socially-constructed identities (i.e., the activities and identities of oppressors and oppressed) gives us the opportunity to examine and reject the binary world of oppressor/oppressed in order to construct a new world of humans seeking liberation. neither crisis-phobia nor crisis-philia is a reasonable perspective to take. on the one hand, a proponent of the former will ignore the important kinds of growth and progress that can result from becoming perplexed about, and eventually abandoning or modifying, ways of organizing individual or social life that are suboptimal. at mendham, one participant explained to me that he was frustrated because he believed that the cois he was participating in were too focused on ethics and not focused enough on aesthetics. he chose to avoid raising this issue because he did not want to interfere with the norms for selecting questions that were already in existence. while his decision had the benefit of allowing a question-selection process to persist that was working fairly well, it had the disadvantage of leaving the biases our community had towards ethics and against aesthetics unexamined and unchallenged. while the person i am referring to is not a proponent of crisis-phobia all the time, it is possible to imagine someone who always, and in all circumstances, shies away from conflict in the coi, with the result that important opportunities for progress are missed. on the other hand, a proponent of crisis-philia has a limited number of moves when it comes to reacting to social phenomena in an imperfect status quo. while such a person is adept at escalating conflict in the hope of dismantling social practices to which they object, they are without tools for identifying the aspects of our current institutions that we would be better off preserving and improving rather than burning to the ground. on one occasion at mendham, a participant boldly analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 58 exclaimed that the training they were receiving was inadequate for learning how to facilitate cois with children. i responded, as did several others, by empathizing with the person’s frustration and suggesting ways that they could still get value from mendham and reach out to experienced facilitators for help. while the person i am thinking of is not always a proponent of crisis-philia, it is possible to imagine an inquirer who is. such a person will always escalate conflict in inquiries in an attempt to disrupt the inquiry whenever they have an objection to some aspect of how it has proceeded. such a pattern of behavior would severely hinder the community’s pursuit of the inquiry. i have referred to crisis-phobia and crisis-philia as positions that one can take towards crisis, but it is also important to think about these concepts in terms of virtues and vices of character. in his discussion of aristotle’s nicomachean ethics, aryeh kosman (1980) describes virtues and vices of character as, “dispositions toward feeling as well as acting” (104). in the context of this discussion, a crisis-phobe is someone who has a disposition to fear crises and to act in such a way so as to prevent them, and a crisis-phile is someone who has a disposition to desire crises and to act in such a way so as to cause them. as we have seen, crisis-phobia is a vicious disposition that will produce a deficient amount of change, while crisis-philia is a vicious disposition that will produce an excessive amount of change. aristotle argues that we should develop virtues of character that are intermediate between the states of vicious deficiency and vicious excess: virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by reason, and by that reason by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it. now it is a mean between two vices, that which depends on excess and that which depends on defect; and again it is a mean because the vices respectively fall short of or exceed what is right in both passions and actions, while virtue both finds and chooses that which is intermediate. (1107a1-a5) the plausible positions, about what dispositions we ought to have with respect to crisis, are discovered through attempts to recover the benefits of crisis-philia and crisis-phobia without their excesses or deficiencies.11 one such attempt is found in maughn gregory’s (2006) discussion of douglas walton’s “eristic” dialogue type, which is characterized “as a quarrel that serves the purposes of airing participants’ complaints and thereby facilitating mutual understanding” (170). while gregory acknowledges the value of eristic dialogue in bringing unconscious conflicts to the attention of the community and sometimes being “the only mechanism available to participants who have become disempowered within the community,” he sees eristic dialogue as a deviation from the proper forms of dialogue in an inquiry; when eristic dialogue occurs, he thinks it should be managed by “maneuvers of affective and cognitive discipline” that redirect the community back to other forms of dialogue (171). in arguing that such disruptions ought to be avoided and managed, he takes a position that is closer to crisis-phobia than crisis-philia, but he departs from the extreme crisis-phobic position by recognizing that such disruptions, though we should avoid them, can still have value. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 59 other attempts are closer to crisis-philia than to crisis-phobia. pavel lushyn and david kennedy (2004) argue that the coi environment is one “in which there is continual struggle—at its best a happy struggle” (109). the struggle happens because any time there are two different individuals interacting in an environment, they are “in an impositional relation,” but such that “complete imposition by any one element is impossible” (109). in what lushyn and kennedy refer to as a “monological classroom” environment, a teacher is presumed to have all of the knowledge about the subject and any discrepancies between what the students do and what the teacher wants them to do are understood as situations where the teacher should impose on the student: to correct a mistake (108). in a dialogic classroom environment, such as a coi, mistakes are understood differently; they are discrepancies between the teacher’s model for how students ought to think, behave, and be evaluated and the students’ own models for how they ought to think, behave, and be evaluated, and these discrepancies can create a crisis that leaves both teachers and students perplexed about whether and how to modify their respective models. a mistake is valuable because it “brings the model into the crisis through which it transforms towards greater adequacy” (109). in this way, there is constant conflict between teachers and students, and, furthermore, it would be counterproductive for a teacher to attempt to fully eliminate this conflict. while lushyn and kennedy stop short of a full endorsement of crisis-philia, they describe the coi as an environment in which crises are both ubiquitous and productive. moreover, by constantly pushing facilitators to be perplexed about how to impose substantively without imposing fully, these crises are existential crises for facilitators who see themselves as occupying any of the usual sociallyconstructed identities associated with norms of leadership and collaboration. this is to say, if a facilitator enters a classroom while seeing herself as a leader, she will become (productively) perplexed about whether to continue existing as a leader once she grapples with the requirement that she not impose fully (e.g., she may refine her conception of ‘leadership’ or abandon the social identity). additionally, if another facilitator thinks of himself as a teammate, on equal terms with everyone else, he may become perplexed about whether to continue along in that role once he is confronted with the community’s need for him to impose in such a way so as to foster the caring, creative, and critical thinking of others. as we have seen, some conflict in a coi is inevitable and it can lead to productive crises. but when we have too much crisis –when we only look for objects to critique and tear down– we miss out on opportunities to benefit from our past projects and successes by preserving and building upon them. for this reason, it would be a mistake to conclude that, in all situations, we ought only either to escalate or de-escalate conflict. instead, we sometimes need tools for escalation and we sometimes need tools for de-escalation. according to aristotle, we use reasoning to find the intermediate virtue between the vices of excess and deficiency (1138b20), and also that the “virtue of a thing is relative to its proper work” (1139a16-20). what this means, in the context of the coi, is that we have to figure out what the proper work of the coi is and then use reasoning to figure out whether the greatest barriers currently analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 60 to our carrying out that work are caused by the chaos of instability or the constraints of imperfect conventions and institutions. in the case of the coi, the proper work is to find the most reasonable answer to some important question. when the barrier to accomplishing this task is too much chaos, we need to use tools for de-escalating conflict so that we can begin and sustain productive projects of inquiry. when the barrier is the latter, we need to use tools for escalating conflict and seeking a crisis. this task is easier said than done. one complication is that we do not always agree about which danger is more severe. such disagreements may be prompted by differences in access to particular facts (e.g., people with different amounts of experience, expertise, or social standing will notice different things about the coi) or differences in interests (e.g., someone who is unhappy with the inquiry question will have a reason to emphasize the negative aspects of the inquiry, while someone who is happy with the inquiry question will have a reason to emphasize the positive aspects of it). in addition, research in moral psychology suggests that differences in our approaches to crisis may also track psychological differences between different groups of people.12 in the righteous mind, psychologist jonathan haidt (2012) argues that, in the context of the united states, political liberals score higher on neophilia (their orientation is to be open to new experiences) while political conservatives are neophobia (their orientation is to be cautious of new experiences) (172). it would be irresponsible to conclude that liberals are crisis-philes and conservatives are crisis-phobes, but, since crisis-philia and existential crisis-phobia are orientations towards a specific kind of change, it seems plausible that, as a result of these documented differences in psychological orientation to new experiences in general, there could be differences between groups of people with respect to crisisphilia and crisis-phobia as well.13 another difficulty is that we sometimes disagree about what the proper work of our coi should be. if one person thinks that all of the most important questions are ethical questions, then she will think that the proper work of the coi is being carried out by a mendham community where only ethical questions are selected. but someone who takes a more expansive view of which questions are important will think that the important work of the coi is not being carried out. instead of embracing a general attitude of loving or fearing crisis, inquirers in a coi should search collectively for the most reasonable answers about (a) what the proper work of our community should be and (b) whether our pursuit of that work suffers from a dearth or an abundance of chaos so that we can then escalate or deescalate conflict accordingly. in the pursuit of such answers, we should remember that we all differ with respect to our perspectives and orientations towards crisis and also that an authentic encounter within the coi can produce productive crises that will lead to our being productively perplexed about what our own perspectives and orientations towards crisis and the work of the coi should be. in the end, there is no overarching answer to the question of whether we ought to seek or avoid crises because the answer to this question depends on the unique obstacles and opportunities faced by our community in the pursuit of the ends set by our community.14 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 61 v. implementation according to the philosophy for children facilitation handbook of the iapc (2008), the final step in an inquiry is to implement the warranted hypotheses arrived at through the earlier stages of the inquiry. specifically, this implementation takes the form of adopting a new habit that will solve some problem: “the ultimate end of an inquiry is a reconstructed habit that ameliorates a problematic situation” (34). in light of this tradition, i am going to conclude this article by discussing what it would mean to implement the judgment i defended above. in the past, i have made the mistake, as have virtually all of us, of falling into the trap of crisisphobia or crisis-philia. when we fall into the trap of crisis-phobia, we are so unreasonably terrified of the potential consequences of being without a particular relationship, project, or organization that we fail to subject these things to the sorts of disruptions that could produce a productive crisis. when we fall into the trap of crisis-philia, we are so quick to disrupt what appears to be unsalvageable or suboptimal that we destroy it, to our peril, without first taking the time to understand the important work it was doing. going forward, i want to navigate in the space between crisis-philia and crisisphobia by inquiring about whether our current barriers to flourishing derive from too much or too little chaos. but what does implementation look like in practice? i want to close by offering an illustrative example from my own teaching practice. i direct madison public philosophy (mpp), an organization that shares philosophy with the madison, wi community through p4c programs and public performances. in one of our p4c workshops for a local community partner, our plan was to write an adaptation of plato’s allegory of the cave, share it with a group of 4th and 5th grade students, help the students come up with questions about the story suitable for inquiry, and then facilitate their inquiry about one of their questions.15 when i asked the students to sit down in a circle in the middle of the room so that we would all be sitting at the same level as everyone else, all but two boys, who insisted on remaining in chairs, did. if we refer back to lushyn and kennedy (1994), we can describe their refusal as a clash between my model, as a facilitator, for how the students should behave and their own models for how they should behave. while we did not engage in a formal coi about where the boys should sit, the community made its position clear: the other students in the room showed, with their body language, that they were annoyed at the behavior of the two boys, one of the community partner’s regular staff members repeated my request, and the two boys got out of their chairs and sat on the floor. in this case, the community solved its problem of how inquirers ought to arrange their bodies by moving towards greater order, which was manifested as a uniform seating arrangement. since we did not know the students we were working with and we only had a small amount of time to spend with them, the other mpp volunteers and i had previously decided that we would read the text aloud to the students (i.e., instead of having them read it). however, the students communicated to us, first through their body language and then with their words, that they wanted to read the text too. this was another clash between the model of the facilitators and the model of the analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 62 students, but this time it seemed that the structure we had tried to impose was creating an obstacle to the community’s accomplishing its work of engaging in a truly collaborative process. we changed course and the students read the remainder of the story. however, the need for more structure became evident when one boy wanted multiple opportunities to read; we established an order of readers. through the remainder of the reading process, the question-selection process, and the inquiry into the question, our community oscillated between requiring more structure and requiring the dismantling of suboptimal structures. rather than being a manifestation of crisis-philia or crisisphobia, our decision to build or dismantle structures varied and depended upon the changing situations that presented themselves in the community. and the processes of figuring out what problems there were in our community and how whether or not our solutions to these problems were successful were collaborative processes in which the agency of everyone in our community –the students, the community partner staff, and the mpp facilitators– was respected. references aristotle. (2009). the nicomachean ethics (w. d. ross, trans.; l. brown, ed.). oxford, england: oxford university press. burke, e. (2003). reflections on the revolution in france (f. m. turner, ed.). new haven: yale university press. camus, a. (1955). the myth of sisyphus and other essays. new york, ny: alfred a. knopf. fletcher, n. (2014). body talk, body taunt-corporeal dialogue within a community of philosophical inquiry. analytical teaching and philosophical praxis, 35(1): 10-25. freire, p. (2018). pedagogy of the oppressed. new york, ny: bloomsbury publishing, inc. gregory, m. r. (2008). philosophy for children practitioner handbook. montclair, nj: institute for the advancement of philosophy for children. gregory, m. r. (2007). normative dialogue types in philosophy for children. gifted education international, 22(2-3), 160-171. haidt, j. (2012). the righteous mind: why good people are divided by politics and religion. new york, ny: random house books. hobsbawm, e. j. (1989). the making of a “bourgeois revolution.” social research, 71(3):455-480. kennedy, d. (1994). the five communities. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis, 15(1): 3-16. kosman, l. a. (1980), being properly affected: virtues and feelings in aristotle’s ethics. in a. o. rorty (ed.) essays on aristotle’s ethics (pp.103-116). berkeley, ca: university of california press. lushyn, p, and kennedy, d. (2004). power, manipulation, and control in a community of inquiry, analytic teaching, 23(2): 103-110. nancy, j. (2009). listening. new york, ny: fordham university press. nikulin, d. (2010). dialectic and dialogue. stanford, ca: stanford university press. plato. (2009). complete works (j. m. cooper, trans.). indianapolis, in: hackett. skocpol, t. (1988). states and social revolutions. new york, ny: cambridge university press. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 63 endnotes 1 this article would not have existed without help and encouragement from my mentors, friends, and colleagues. in particular, i am grateful to megan laverty for encouraging me to write this article and for her guidance during the writing process, to ariel sykes for helping me navigate mendham and for her helpful critiques of an earlier draft, to abram de bruyn for his insights and suggestions, to léa c. brillant for helping me stay continually and productively perplexed, to emily fletcher, harry brighouse, and the anonymous reviewer for analytic teaching and philosophical praxis for their helpful comments, to the volunteers in madison public philosophy, and, crucially, to the summer 2018 mendham participants who contributed to one of the most meaningful eight-day periods of my life. 2 in this article, i refer to both the authors of published works and to people whom i met at mendham. for published authors, i follow the convention of using their full name when mentioning them the first time and their last time for subsequent mentions. for people whom i met at mendham, i follow the convention of using their full name when mentioning them the first time and their first names for subsequent mentions. when someone falls into both categories, i use their first name when referring to statements they made at mendham and their last name when referring to their published works. 3 to quote megan laverty, “the iapc summer seminar at mendham has a long tradition. beginning in 1983 the iapc began holding p4c residential workshops at st. marguerite's retreat house at the episcopal community of st. john baptist in mendham, new jersey. in the 1980s and 1990s, they were held multiple times a year. today they are held annually” (megan laverty, personal communication, october 12, 2018). 4 a coi is a dialogue practice where a group of people experience a stimulus, such as a story, a work of art, or a musical performance, collectively decide upon a question inspired by the stimulus, and then work together to find the most reasonable answer to that question. a facilitator helps the participants along in the inquiry by gently guiding them to show care for each other, care for the inquiry (i.e., by not deviating from the question), creative thinking, and critical thinking. for a full explanation, see the (2008) philosophy for children practitioner handbook of the institute for the advancement of philosophy for children. 5 as i discuss below (§iv), my account is broadly aristotelian. 6 in his original text, kennedy also uses the word ‘communities’ to refer to these five dimensions. 7 much more could be said about the musical element of speech. a more indepth treatment could incorporate dmitri nikulin’s (2010) work on dialogue (dialectic and dialogue) and jean-luc nancy’s (2009) work on listening (listening). 8 these distinctions are meant to be illustrative rather than comprehensive. they are useful for showing that there are many different dimensions along which crises can differ, but i do not take myself to be articulating a complete theory of crisis. 9 it is possible for someone to wrongly think that a crisis has contributed to, or detracted from, their flourishing, but i set that complication aside here. 10 in the context of mendham, ariel sykes put this point as follows: a mendham without a crisis is not a good mendham. 11 one thing that crisis-phobes and crisis-philes have in common is that they are both participants in the coi, but in different ways (i.e., the former group wants to preserve it, warts and all, while the latter group wants to escalate crises within it). there is, as plato scholar emily fletcher pointed out to me, an option that departs from both crisis-philia and crisis-phobia: the individuals who simply are not invested in the project of the coi analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 64 and do not take any stance on conflict or crisis (emily fletcher, personal communication, october 18, 2018). such individuals are analogous to the ones socrates refers to as ‘misologues’’ in the phaedo (88c-89e), except that, in the case at hand, their hatred is for inquiry rather than for argumentation or logic. 12 aristotle writes that we are not born with virtues, but instead we “are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit” (1103a23-25). it seems plausible that haidt’s empirical research can be made consistent with aristotle’s claim by noting that different people are naturally disposed to be closer to the vices of excess or deficiency than others with respect to particular virtues, but that they still can be trained to move towards the mean. 13 since i am not presenting a metric for measuring degrees of crisis-phobia and crisis-philia, more work would need to be done before this claim could be evaluated. 14 i do not give a name to the virtue between the vices of crisis-philia and crisis-phobia because i am not sure whether we have a pre-existing concept that refers to it. while a full discussion would go beyond the scope of this article, there is aristotelian precedent for this move. in his discussion of ambition and unambitiousness, aristotle argues that the virtue in between is “without a name…. but where there is excess and defect, there is also an intermediate; now men desire honour both more than they should and less; therefore it is possible also to do as one should; at all events this is the state of character that is praised, being an unnamed mean in respect of honor” (1125b15-25). the basic idea is that we can infer the existence of an intermediate virtue by reflecting on the relevant vices of excess and deficiency, but there is no pre-existing concept that refers to the virtue in this case. 15 an undergraduate volunteer named grace gecewicz and i came up with a detailed storyline about a group of young people who leave a movie theater where they have been living for as long as they remember. i then wrote a short story based on this storyline. philosophy graduate student dani clevenger and undergraduate student joe venuta helped me facilitate the inquiry into this text with the students. address correspondence to: aaron yarmel phd candidate uw-madison ayarmel@gmail.com the epistemology of imagination and play in the community of inquiry analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 76 the epistemology of imagination and play in the community of inquiry karen mizell i. he “community of inquiry” (coi) as it is used in the context of doing philosophy with children, is a phrase that refers to a pedagogical method in which groups of children and adults come together to discuss a targeted philosophical issue.1 generally, a philosophical topic is decided upon and initial questions or ideas may be proposed, which are used to generate a discussion among participants. one of the most important features of such a discussion, when well organized, is that all participants are provided with an opportunity to express their opinions and positions, with an express objective of doing away with an adult/child or teacher/student power differential. a model coi provides a place for many philosophical perspectives and opinions. coi reflects the dawning recognition among many educators who worry that standard lecturebased approaches to teaching and learning fail to generate genuine thinking in students. recognizing the limitations of such pedagogies, educators have cast about for “active-learning” pedagogies that generate thoughtful, meaningful learning for students, a simplified description of the transformation of educational pedagogies, with roots in the works of such diverse thinkers as jean jacques rousseau, maria montessori, lev vygotsky, paulo freire, and others. as educators strive to help students develop empathy, expand their minds, view concerns from different perspectives, think critically, and become citizens of an evolving global community, it is clear that one thing students most need to learn is to transcend their own perspectives and to learn to view the world from others’ points of view. martha nussbaum observes that “[students] see only what their own minds have created, never the reality of the person who stands before them.”2 implicit in this passage, is her view that students must develop a cognitive apparatus that allows such altered viewpoints, a facility that rests upon imagination. coi plays upon this use of imagination and allows students to avoid knowledge transmittal that is “pre-packaged” and finished. instead, coi is a collaborative, inquiry-driven dialogue that invites young people to jointly interrogate a philosophical topic. ideally, it represents a dialectic between several parties that involves careful thinking and listening, as well as speaking.3 as david kennedy notes, coi is applied philosophy, “…the actual doing of philosophy rather than reading it or reading about it.”4 coi is designed to integrate children into a discursive, intersubjective intellectual community. most importantly, it allows participating children to develop a respect for their own and others’ intellectual individuality. michael pritchard describes his own excitement at “seeing a community of inquiry in action [with its] give and take of…discussion.”5 the dynamic interaction in a well-structured coi encourages a philosophical dialogue that enhances children’s abilities to frame philosophical issues posed by themselves and others, and to t analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 77 reflect on those issues while developing creative, individual approaches to thinking. in pedagogical terms, children become active thinkers and respected arbiters in the discussion, using imagination to cast and interrogate philosophical dilemmas in an, often, organic discussion. in practice, coi is an antidote for what maxine greene calls “the legacy of positivism” in which “children are perceived as human resources rather than persons.”6 in traditional educational models, children are often regarded as crude materials to be shaped according to external demands which are defined by others. in its best exemplification as an effective educational method, coi is based upon an enduring respect for the personhood of its student participants and constructs a “democratic community that is accessible to the young….[based upon] shared meanings, common interests and [participatory] endeavours.”7 greene speaks to a common concern shared by some educators and philosophers associated with the philosophy for children movement; that is, children’s philosophical abilities are often overlooked and children are often marginalized and excluded from important human conversations. the most caring and well-intentioned adults often overlook the childish propensity for philosophical reflection. coi, on the other hand, represents a recognition that children do engage in philosophical reflections, often unidentified and overlooked. coi is a venue that cultivates and encourages children’s natural philosophizing. matthews speculates that: so much emphasis has been placed on the development of children’s abilities, especially their cognitive abilities that we automatically assume their thinking is primitive and in need of being developed toward an adult norm. what we take to be primitive, however, may actually be more openly reflective than the adult norm we set as the goal of education. by filtering the child’s remarks through our developmental assumptions we avoid having to take seriously the philosophy in those remarks; in that way we also avoid taking the child and the child’s point of view with either the seriousness or the playfulness they deserve.8 it is the imaginative, philosophical playfulness that inheres in coi that i wish to examine in this paper. conceptual play demonstrates an isomorphism between belief and imagining that informs the process by which children develop a grasp of philosophical puzzles. in particular, how does an epistemology of conceptual imagination and play figure into the community of inquiry when doing philosophy with children? ii. as an elemental aspect of childhood, play is acknowledged as a fundamental right supported in the convention on the rights of the child.9 theorists increasingly note the close correlation between learning and play in child development. sara smilansky, who studied child development in the 1980s, discovered that imaginative play is an essential tool for cognitive development.10 another researcher in early childhood education, vivian paley, observes that important play behaviors are taught by children to one another. she discovered that “…the brightest kids make the most out of fantasy play. they set up a level of creativity that others follow.”11 she identified strong cognitive connections between imaginary play and progress in analytical thinking. both paley and maxine greene, recognize the erroneous assumption on the part of educators who fail to recognize imaginative play as an important component of intellectual growth in children.12 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 78 other thinkers note the tendency to sideline the importance of the imagination in education.13 greene appeals to john passmore’s description of imagination as a process of learning that includes original and inventive cognitive strategies the student may not have been directly taught.14 student innovation goes beyond direct instruction, a creative capacity based upon student imagination.15 maxine greene’s research affirms the importance of imaginative activity in rational development in children and makes sense of diverse experiences that may oppose or supplant their own interpretations of reality.16 it is through imagination that children understand the limitations of their own experiences and the possibilities that outrun experience. children who attempt to make sense of their own experiences, who learn to be in the world in certain ways, depend upon imagination, and by extension, the construction of imagined worlds. imagination opens up a plurality of experiences as children learn to access the “great community.”17 lev vygotsky’s important work in the area of children’s cognitive development is predicated upon the capacity of children to imaginatively innovate in ways that go beyond direct instruction in what he calls the “zone of proximal development.”18 brian sutton-smith, an important play theorist, agrees that imagination, as it contributes to day-dreaming, pretense, and fantasy, is an activity of the playing mind and that children develop curiosity, as well as other cognitive faculties, through play.19 sutton-smith’s research reveals other important insights concerning the place of play in the intellectual, social, and moral growth in children. directed imaginative play is a vehicle children use to solve problems and make contextual sense of their lives.20 clearly, children’s play is often a reflection of their social situations, their relative disempowerment in the adult world and enables them to balance their appreciation of general life conditions. much of children’s play is directed at addressing issues of hegemony and hierarchy21 and is an instrument that contributes to a child’s emerging autonomy. many philosophers have acknowledged the life-long interdependence between education and play. indeed, joseph dunne notes that the greek words for play (paidia) and education (paideia) have the same etymological root, which is the word for child (pais).22 while some educators dismiss children’s play and stories as just so much aimless imagining, they often belittle and correct imaginative children in order to direct the child to more productive, reality-based learning activities to counteract what is perceived as fruitless imagining. piaget, for example, discourages childish imaginings as a trivialized “romancing.”23 gareth matthews observes that the stance employed by developmental psychology shapes presumptions about children’s abilities and influences subsequent interpretations of child behavior. if developmental psychologists assume certain limitations of child cognition when compared to adult capacities, the natural supposition is that it is a mark of ignorance, conceptual limitation, and incompleteness. as matthews observes, an “unfortunate result of this is that it predisposes one to ignore, or misunderstand, the really imaginative and inventive thinking of young children. if one is predisposed to rack up “oddball” questions and unpalatable conclusions to cognitive incompetence, one will miss much that is interesting in what children have to say to us.”24 progressive educators increasingly recognize the deep connection between learning and play, and even more importantly, that children like to play. consequently, educators introduce educational analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 79 games into the curricula. the unfortunate result is that such teaching often becomes contrived and trivialized, and ultimately suppresses native creativity in children. an associated peril in this approach is that it preserves adult domination and control of childish learning which amounts to a patronizing and condescending view of play in the curriculum, and by extension, children’s directed activities. among exceptions to such trends are maria montessori’s approach and kieran egan’s approach to incorporating imagination in education.25 as dunne notes, educational models, such as montessori’s [and egan’s,] combine work and play in an effective and unified approach to children’s learning. he also adds that while philosophy with children is different from learning activities in montessori [and egan], they are alike in viewing learning and play as conjoined activities.26 montessori and egan regard children as essentially imaginative creatures who make epistemic sense of experience through the inventive constituents of cognition. on their views, imagination is a component of the rational understanding, foundational to children’s ability to make sense of the world. in addition, studies of the psychology of imagination in children recognize the social advantage of imagination that allows children to envision alternate states of affairs that might model better worlds and more inviting social environments. imagination is fundamental to understanding and acknowledging other cultures and the development of empathy, a moral emotion critical to grasping what it is like to be another person. the philosopher, rosalind ladd, observes that a child’s trajectory from dependence to moral autonomy depends upon her cognitive facility with moral reasoning. she calls this a kind of moral apprenticeship, but clearly, such cognitive acts depend upon imagination to establish modalities in moral understanding.27 imaginary play returns significant cognitive and social results in classrooms where it is encouraged.28 says a kindergarten teacher who took such play seriously and extended the time allotted for play in her classroom, “there is more time to be kind, to solve problems by imagining in different ways, to include more kids and let them have a say.”29 the result in this classroom was that children became nicer to each other, shared more, became more cooperative, and more empathetic to other children who might otherwise have been marginalized. paley notes that although we might expect fantasy play to interfere with purposeful educational activities, her research indicates that it helps children to become more open-minded about alternate states of affairs.30 epistemologically significant in understanding the machinations of philosophical inquiry, imagination figures into the comprehension of fiction, empathy, possibility and necessity, hypothetical reasoning, creativity and a range of other philosophical operations. in this respect, the cognitive capacity to conceptualize alternate states of affairs is crucial. the importance of imaginative activity in cognitive development allows children to make sense of diverse experiences that may oppose or even displace their common-place interpretations of reality.31 it is through imagination that children recognize the epistemic and metaphysical limitations of real-world experiences that are challenged by modal possibilities that outrun experience. children who attempt to make sense of their experiences depend upon imagination and, by extension, the construction of counterfactual worlds. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 80 imaginative, playful conversations may, at first glance, seem like so much spoken nonsense, yet targeted, philosophical conversations with children amount to a special kind of play: conceptual play. children, who are engaged in philosophical discussions, offer playful treatments of semantic expectations, “reversal and inversion, exaggeration, paradox, playing with semantic boundaries, playing with space, and playing with time.”32 the creative use of language is often evidence of such imaginings. philosophical play exhibited by children in well-designed coi dialogues, represents a classic form of dialectic. the play theorist, sutton-smith notes that: …the center of play’s dynamism is a dialectical relationship between its enactments and their everyday references. pretense and imagination are predicated upon the creative use of language and the child may use words beyond their conventional usage. words used in makebelieve and pretense may be used in a secondary, rather than a primary sense in such a way that the conceptual force of the latter derives from the former. play may be a paradox in communication terms (it is and it is not what it says it is) but play also involves maintaining the referential paradoxes throughout.33 other theorists note that children are capable of such imaginings and rarely confuse actual semantic relations. michael pritchard records a delightful conversation between grade school children who consider similarities and differences between humans and computers. they use various imaginative devices such as analogies and counterfactual conditionals (“if it could think….”). the upshot is they puzzle over thinking and meaning and consider various possibilities about human and computer thinking, as well as words and referents.34 likewise, the children in michael pritchard’s coi groups illustrate such sophisticated use of language in imaginary cognitive play. pritchard’s reflections support david suits’ observation that: “language itself gives us experiences, not so much by manipulating our sensory environment, but by focusing our attention….we are being presented with what, at the moment, are taken to be truths. that is to say, language has authority, so that what we read and hear has some tendency to direct our desires, beliefs and emotions.”35 what is it that children do when imaginatively engaging in philosophical play? very often, they construct thought experiments, expressed as imaginable states of affairs. maxine greene alludes to thought experiments as the architectural base of critical communities which should ground our teaching and learning.36 such communities, according to greene, open student imagination to alternate views, values, and perceptions. in the context of such communities, thought experiments are an important instrument for children as they learn. gareth mathews, when considering “thought experiments” as a fundamental philosophical tool in philosophical conversation (coi) with children, writes: “[they] invite us to consider situations different from our everyday experience, even worlds unlike the familiar one about us….thought experiments are often a good way to trace conceptual connections and ruminate on philosophical puzzles.”37 intellectual adventure that stimulates children to imaginatively develop thought experiments allows them to consider philosophical issues from alternate perspectives. the classic analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 81 thought experiment is a kind of philosophical make-believe that turns on conceptual possibility.38 despite a dearth of research on the place of childish imagination in the curriculum, educational theorist, kieran egan, recognizes the educational efficacy of thought experiments when he asks children to imagine some state of affairs and draw out relevant inferences.39 indeed, a profound and creative imagination, couched in powerful thought experiments, is important to learning. within such imaginative and linguistic contexts, children are well able to detect coherent sets of propositions and, conversely, to identify incoherent sets of propositions, the stuff of philosophical thought experiments. as we see, children are quintessentially inventive creatures, who often make sense of experience by resorting to imaginative capacities. david hume observed that imagination is a cognitive state that brings into cognition the ability to transpose and change ideas that open alternate courses of experience and advance human understanding.40 just so, children often construct imaginary states of affairs using sophisticated logics41 and frame them in classic thought experiments. human learning, in general, is advanced as epistemic agency imaginatively offers alternate perspectives of experience by resorting to imaginative capacities and cognitive states that turn on the ability to transpose and change ideas.42 thought experiments in coi reveal childish facility with complex belief structures. philosophical thought experiments depend upon imagination, which are subject to rules of inference. timothy williamson notes, “although empirical knowledge constrains the attribution of essential [metaphysical] properties, results are more often reached through a subtle interplay of logic and the imagination. the crucial experiments [that figure into philosophical understanding] are thought experiments.”43 iii. useful thought experiments turn on contrary-to-fact conditionals, imaginative use of propositional content, conceptual possibility, and doxastic inferences.44 children who are doing philosophy in the setting of coi are doing just that. they engage in a kind of conceptual play driven by thought experiments as epistemic vehicles. such thought experiments illustrate their conceptual competence with moral, scientific, epistemological, and metaphysical concerns. conceptual play of this kind amounts to a tool for acquiring knowledge that circumvents empirical entanglements. that children are able to effectively engage in philosophical thought experiments as they exercise complex epistemic abilities indicates their ability to appropriately use relevant concepts and counterfactual conditions they may never experience in the real world. in curiously mature ways, even very young children correctly work through thought experiments to illuminate comprehension about realistic and non-realistic situations. just as real world knowledge supports children’s pretend physical play, it supports conceptual play. the child’s ability to playfully imagine the world one way while recognizing that it is another functions as a skillful symbolic pretense. it is noteworthy that empirical data derived from studies with small children make it clear that children rarely resort to “representational abuse”45, which is a matter of confusing imaginary states of affairs with actual states of affairs. for instance, child subjects, some as young as fifteen months old, who imagined a particular state of affairs, such as pretending analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 82 an overturned cup represented a “spill,” did not think the table would be wet in the real world.46 children recognized that such propositions make perfect conceptual sense, but did not feel bound to imagine metaphysical falsehoods.47 play among children often involves some measure of pretense about the existence of certain counterfactual states of affairs. rational comprehension is enhanced as children develop competence with relevant fictions, especially as they recognize justifiable inferences and coherent imaginary states of affairs. experimental and theoretical evidence supports the observation that imaginative inferences bear structural similarities to belief inferences and represent an important subcomponent in the epistemology of counterfactuals.48 the isomorphism between such inferences situates inferred rules that allow us to configure imaginative scenarios in ways that make sense. to explain this capacity, shaun nichols and stephen stich postulate a kind of “belief” box in which the knower commits to the truth of belief x. opposed to this is a “pretense” box which includes beliefs about imaginable states of affairs.49 a counterfactual conditional takes the form: if x had been the case, then z would have been the case.50 they use their “belief box” to offer an explanation of the cognitive mechanism that explains the connection between representational belief and pretense mechanisms (imagining) that can be applied to epistemic processes employed by young children. nichols and stich hypothesize a “single-code” that explains parallels between the mechanisms that process information from both imagination and belief and assert that “pretense representations are in the same code as belief representations.”51 says nichols “…if a mechanism takes pretense representations as input, the single-code hypothesis maintains that if that mechanism is activated by the occurrent belief that p, it will also be activated by the occurrent pretense representation that p. more generally, for any mechanism that takes input from both the pretense box and the belief box, the pretense representation p will be processed much the same way as the belief representation.”52 the “pretense box” accounts for inference mechanisms that parallel real belief-forming mechanisms; “…to draw these inferences the child must be able to use real-world knowledge about the effect of gravity and so forth.[and] the inferences the child makes during pretense can somehow draw on the child’s beliefs.”53 this means that beliefs and imaginings used by children in thought experiments have similar content and follow a standard epistemic order. ichikawa concurs: “imaginative propositional attitudes are interestingly and importantly belief-like, but nevertheless comprise a distinct cognitive attitude from belief.”54 he also observes that when deploying epistemic concepts in actual cases, cognitive subjects likewise correctly apply the concept in counterfactual instances. both williamson and ichikawa support thought-experiments as convenient vehicles for imagination, and serves children’s emerging cognitive abilities.55 empirical studies support the contention that imaginative content is, to some extent, anchored in the actual world. an observation nichols offers about alan leslie’s research is that nearly all of the children, in his now famous experiment could point to the appropriate cup when asked to indicate the empty one (a metaphysically appropriate claim) in the midst of a pretend tea party in which, under the pretense of the play scenario, some cups are “full” and some are “empty.” this further supports the contention that even in the presence of “bizarre and creative elements” that are analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 83 present in pretend play, certain mechanisms are in place, which allow children to make epistemically predictable inferences comparable to those made in real-life situations.56 the epistemic toolkit children use in thought experiments is a feature of modal epistemology. modal epistemology figures into nuanced understanding of knowledge about fictions, possibility, and necessity, and ultimately reflects coherent imaginations that suggest everyday belief formation. an important focus of modal epistemology is the manner in which an epistemic subject can know non-actual propositions to be possible.57 so, for example, it may be metaphysically impossible that x, but it is, nevertheless, coherently imaginable and conceptually possible.58 we often fail to notice that children routinely formulate time sequential and causal expectations when they “project the trajectories of nearby moving bodies into the immediate future.”59 in other words, they can play “catch” with balls and other toys. in the same vein, when danielle imagines that robert struck the match, she is justified in inferring that the match lit. a similar cognitive phenomenon occurs when children make hypothetical inferences on the basis of a counterfactual state of affairs to a counterfactual consequence. making such an inference reveals a complex judgment about counterfactual states of affairs. children are well capable of making such hypothetical inferences based on the assessment of counterfactual propositions.60 such hypothetical inferences are not necessarily a consequence of instruction, but reveal the child’s natural capacity for counterfactual reasoning. children exhibit a capacity for rational inference-making early in childhood.61 indeed, patterns of reasoning in which children engage while in the context of pretense, mirrors their reasoning in non-imaginative contexts.”62 these observations are borne out by gareth matthews’ accounts of coi conversations he participated in with children at an art school in scotland.63 the conversations reveal the concentrated epistemic skill grounded on the correspondence between possibility and imagination. the children who were part of his coi group exhibited sophisticated cognitive coherence between imagination and belief. a close examination of the conversations reveals a kind of epistemic frolicking based on imaginative inferences and counterfactual states of affairs. elsewhere, matthews recorded an account of a three-year-old boy’s conversation with his father. the little boy, named steve, addressed his dislike of bananas, saying: “if you were me, you wouldn’t like bananas either.” steve correctly used the subjunctive form of the verb, to be. after a moment’s reflection about this imagined scenario, steve then asked: “who would be the daddy?”64 gareth matthews queried steve’s father about this account because steve correctly used a complex semantic construction that revealed his capacity to imaginatively take up the standpoint of another person. although steve might not be able to express the tacit propositions and argument structure of his expression, his simple wondering is an example of a counterfactual conditional –at three years of age. only recently have logicians begun to puzzle through a sub-discipline of philosophy known as “possible-world semantics” which is captured in steve’s three-year-old musings about an even more arcane enigma, that of a “counterfactual identity,” expressed in his “if you were me…”65 the point we may take from this example, and others from accounts of coi, is that children, even very young ones such as steve, are puzzling through modal possibilities, counterfactual states of affairs, and analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 84 hypothetical inferences, usually quite capably, and employing sophisticated semantic and epistemic structures to do so. what we may ultimately learn from such conversations is an insight into hitherto overlooked rational capacities on the part of children that reflects an unsuspected semantic and philosophical sophistication. philosophers and educators have important work to do as children are included in thoughtful and respectful philosophical discussions. especially in the context of coi, we find a philosophically productive opportunity to really listen to children. burgeoning accounts indicate philosophers are uniquely situated to recognize the epistemological capacities and metaphysical musings of children and to encourage their capacity for philosophical thinking. the benefits of such encounters are manifestly important in pedagogical and, even, moral theory. what may be even more important is the recognition that children, traditionally excluded from, and dismissed by the philosophical community, may have recognizable philosophical abilities and a legitimate place at the philosophical table. endnotes 1 the p4c movement assumes that children are able to engage in productive philosophical discussions and often do philosophy well and do it productively. i skate past a debate about the efficacy of such dialogues which has been admirably argued by gareth matthews, matthew lipman, matthew pritchard, ann margaret sharp, maughn gregory, jen glaser, and jana mohr lone. 2 martha nussbaum, cultivating humanity: a classical defense of reform in liberal education (cambridge: harvard university press, 1997), 87. 3 timothy williamson, the philosophy of philosophy (oxford: blackwell publishing, 2007), 1. 4 david kennedy terms this activity a community of philosophical inquiry (cpi), kennedy, philosophical dialogues with children: essays on theory and practice (lewiston: the edwin mellon press, 2010), 97. 5 michael s. pritchard, philosophical adventures with children (lanham: university press of american, 1985), 96. 6 maxine greene, releasing the imagination: essays on education, the arts, and social change (san francisco, jossey-bass publishers, 1995) 32. 7 ibid., 33. 8 gareth matthews, philosophy and the young child (cambridge: harvard university press, 1980), 52-53. 9 united nations convention on the rights of the child (unicef, 1989) retrieved from http://www.unicef.org/crc on july, 2014. www,ohchr.org/documents/professional interest, article 31. 10 sara smilansky and edgar klugman, chldren’s play and learning: perspectives and policy implications (new york” teacher’s college press, 1990. 11 vivian gussin paley, a child’s work: the importance of fantasy play (chicago: university of chicago press, 2004). 12 ibid., 49; greene, 54. 13 kieran egan, “the other half of the child,” in thinking children and education, ed. matthew lipman, (dubuque, iowa: kendall hunt publisher, 1993) 301; gregory heath, “exploring the imagination to establish frameworks for learning,” studies in philosophy and education 27 (2008): 115-123. 14 greene, 14. 15 lev vygotsky remarks upon the trajectory of student ability in thought and language, translator,alex kozulin (cambridge: mit press, 1999), 187. 16 greene, 54. 17 john dewey, the public and its problems (new york: holt publishing, 1927), 142. 18 vygotsky, 189. 19 brian sutton-smith, the ambiguity of play (cambridge: harvard university press, 1997), 37. 20 ibid., 36. 21 ibid., 114. http://www.unicef.org/crc analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 85 22 joseph dunne, “to begin in wonder: children and philosophy,” thinking: the journal of philosophy for children 14 (2), 17. 23 jean piaget, the child’s conception of the world, 10; matthews, philosophy and the young child, 38-39. 24 gareth matthews, dialogues with children (cambridge: harvard university press, 1984), 32. 25 kieran egan, imagination and education (new york: teachers college press, 1988). 26 dunne, 17. 27 rosalind ladd’s observation about moral development can reasonably apply to intellectual development in general. “paternalism and the rationality of the child, ” in thinking children and education, ed. matthew lipman, (dubuque, iowa: kendall/hunt publishing, 1993), 59-64 28 swedish “play schools” capitalize upon this observation. the curriculum is entirely driven by children’s play and found to be as, or more, successful for later learning as academically oriented pre-schools. 29 paley, 54. 30 ibid., 26. 31 greene, 54. 32 sutton-smith, 148. 33 ibid., 196. 34 pritchard, chapter 8. 35 david b. suits, “really believing in fiction,” pacific philosophical quarterly 87 (2006): 382. 36 greene, 198. 37 matthews, philosophy and the young child, 74. 38 jonathan ichikawa, imagination and epistemology (phd diss., rutgers university, 2011), 88. 39 kieran egan, getting it wrong from the beginning: our progressive inheritance from herbert spencer, john dewey, and jean piaget (new haven: yale university press, 2002), 93-94. 40 david hume, a treatise of human nature, l.a. selby bigge editor (oxford: clarendon press, 1978), 148. 41 timothy williamson, the philosophy of philosophy (oxford: oxford publishing ltd, 2007), chapter 6. 42 hume, 52. 43 williamson, 19. 44 propositional imagination depends upon a representational theory of mind, which views beliefs as internal representations. on this view, “to believe that p is to have a prepresentation token with content p, stored in some functionally appropriate way in the mind.” (shaun nichols, editor, the architecture of the imagination: new essays on pretense, possibility, and fiction (oxford: clarendon press, 2006), 5) such learning is composed on the back of conceptual possibility grounded on coherent states of affairs that employ contrary-to-fact conditionals. 45 tamar szabo gendler,”on the relation between pretense and belief” imagination philosophy, and the arts, eds. matthew kieran and dominic mciver lopes (london: routledge, 2003),130. 46 ibid. 47 this is an insight we gain from saul kripke who is skeptical about the notion that what may be conceptually possible is an indicator of metaphysical possibility. saul kripke, naming and necessity (oxford: basil blackwell, 1980), 142. 48 kendall walton discusses certain rule-governed conventions that involve make-believe, which he calls “principles of generation.” in mimesis as make-believe: on the foundations of the representational arts (cambridge: harvard university press, 1990), 38. 49 shaun nichols and stephen stich, “a cognitive theory of pretense,” cognition 74 (2000): 12. 50 as ichikawa notes, it is also possible to have a true antecedent and a counterfactual consequent. an indicative condition takes the following form: if x is the case, then z is the case. the truth value of a counterfactual is not fixed the by the truth value of its consequents and antecedents. ichikawa, 144-145. 51 shaun nichols, “imagining and believing: the promise of a single code,” journal of aesthetics and art criticism (spring 2004): 131. 52 ibid. 53 ibid., 130. 54 ichikawa, 155. 55 ibid., 72. 56 nichols, 130. 57 ichikawa, 79; kripke, 144. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 86 58 ichikawa, 89. 59 ibid., 128. 60 ibid., 154. 61 ibid.,155; alan m. leslie, pretending and believing: issues in the theory of tomm” in cognition 50 (1994): 211238. 62 nichols, 180; jonathan m. weinberg and aaron mesking, “puzzling over the imagination: philosophical problems, architectural solutions,” the architecture of the imagination: new essays on pretense, possibility, and fiction, ed. shaun nichols (oxford: clarendon press, 2006) 178. 63 matthews, dialogues with children. 64 ibid., 113. 65 ibid., 114-115. works cited dewey, john. the public and its problems. new york: holt, 1927. dunne, joseph. “to begin in wonder: children and philosophy.” thinking: the journal of philosophy for children 14 (2): 9-17. egan, kieran. “the other half of the child.” in thinking children and education, ed. matthew lipman, 301-305. dubuque, iowa: kendall/hunt publishers, 1993. egan, kieran. getting it wrong from the beginning: our progressive inheritance from herbert spencer, john dewey, and jean piaget. new haven: yale university press, 2002. gendler, tamar szabo. “on the relation between pretense and belief.” imagination, philosophy, and the arts, ed. matthew kieran and dominic mciver lopes, 125-141. london: routledge, 2003. greene maxine. releasing the imagination: essays on education, the arts, and social change. san francisco: jossey bass publishers, 1995. heath, gregory. “exploring the imagination to establish frameworks for learning.” studies in philosophy and education 27 (2008): 115-123. hume, david. a treatise of human nature, ed. l.a. selby bigge. oxford: clarendon press, 1978. ichikawa, jonathan. imagination and epistemology. ph.d. diss., rutgers university, 2008. kennedy, david. philosophical dialogues with children: essays on theory and practice. lewiston: the edwin mellon press, 2010. kripke, saul. naming and necessity. oxford: basil blackwell, 1980. ladd, rosalind ekman. “paternalism and the rationality of the child.” in thinking children and education, ed. matthew lipman, 59-64. dubuque, iowa: kendall/hunt publishing, 1993. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 87 leslie, alan m. “pretending and believing: issues in the tomm.” cognition 50 (1994): 211-238. matthews, gareth. philosophy and the young child. cambridge: harvard u. press, 1980. matthews, gareth. dialogues with children. cambridge: harvard u. press, 1984. nichols, shaun and stephen stich. “a cognitive theory of pretense.” cognition 74 (2000): 115147. nichols, shaun. “imagining and believing: the promise of a single code.” journal of aesthetics and art criticism 62(2) (spring, 2004): 129-139. nussbaum, martha. cultivating humanity: a classical defense of reform in liberal education. cambridge: harvard university press, 1997. paley, vivian gussin. a child’s work: the importance of fantasy play. chicago: university of chicago press, 2004. piaget, jean. the child’s conception of the world, new york: routledge, 1929. pritchard, michael s. philosophical adventures with children. lanham: university press of america, 1985. smilansky, sara and edgar kregman. children’s play and learning: perspectives and policy implications. new york: teacher’s college press, 1990. suits, david. “really believing in fiction.” pacific philosophical quarterly 87 (2006): 369-386. sutton-smith, brian. the ambiguity of play. cambridge: harvard university press, 1997. united nations convention on the rights of the child. unicef, 1989. http:/www.unicef.org/crc. retrieved july 2014. vygotsky, lev. thought and language, translated by alex kuzulin. cambridge, mit press, 1999. address correspondences to: karen mizell professor of philosophy utah valley university 800 w., university pkwy, mc 173 orem, utah 84058 karen.mizell@uvu.edu mailto:karen.mizell@uvu.edu analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 41 ann margaret sharp, a view from the classroom: reviewing gregory and laverty’s (eds.) in community of inquiry with ann margaret sharp bonnie zuidland “the educator must consciously take it upon himself to liberate, rather than indoctrinate.” –sharp, (ici, 80)1 n community of inquiry with ann margaret sharp, is an anthology of essays collated under a variety of themes. each section starts with an essay on the theme by another academic in the field of community of inquiry (coi) or philosophy for children (p4c)2, most of whom either knew and/or worked with ann margaret sharp and themselves have made significant contributions to the theory and practice of coi/p4c. inspired by the title of the book, this article is going to attempt to be ‘in communal inquiry’3 with sharp and the other authors. i intend to present a case for how sharp’s work has influenced the philosophy of education through the lens of my own practice and experience with the coi methodology, and explain why it is still relevant today. i first read sharp while doing my undergraduate degree, majoring in philosophy, at latrobe university, melbourne. i took a subject called philosophy with children. there were a number of factors that drew me to the subject, however, the most significant reason was because it was being taught by ross phillips, who i had come to adore as an educator. i took all of his subjects. phillips had prescribed teaching for better thinking, by sharp and splitter,4 as the core reading for the subject. at the time, the book did not resonate with me; the theory of education, how it was actually applied in the classroom context, and the theories of childhood were not on my radar. but it was fun all the same reading picture story books and looking for philosophically interesting problems. it wasn’t until a number of years later and with hindsight now that i can see its influence on me, not so much from having read it at university but rather returning to it again as an educator. and i say ‘not so much’ because the fact that i came to love and embody (as much as possible) philosophy (both p-hilosophy and p-hilosophy5) i can safely accredit to phillips. his style and method of teaching, his ability to interact with students, to help us grow, to not look down upon us and to enter into genuine dialogue, emboldened me and helped me to forge my own philosophical path and desire to do p-hilosophy the way he did, with openness and integrity. now knowing sharp’s philosophy, method and practice of coi i can see its direct influence on phillips and i understand why he selected teaching for better thinking as the core text. what follows are thoughts on this book and sharp’s influence, not from the perspective of a trained academic (perhaps a p-hilosopher), but rather a keen practitioner of coi. i’m a secondary i analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 42 school teacher who has worked hard to promote philosophy within my school and schools throughout victoria. i have at most written a few papers, presented at a few conferences, developed resources and played a few key roles in the victorian association for philosophy in schools (vaps). i have trained in coi to the level of teacher educator. i have also had the pleasure of getting to know several of the authors in this book, many of whom have deeply influenced my practice and whom i consider friends, especially one of the editors, maughn gregory. i had the pleasure of meeting maughn at the 2014 naaci6 conference in quebec. it was the first international coi conference that i had attended, and presented at, and it is one that i will never forget precisely because of maughn’s contributions. maughn, like phillips, represents the key dispositions that coi inspires in me and that i aspire to generate in society. he is a gentle and warm human being, a critical thinker who wants and works for social justice, whose own facilitation skills and personal interactions embody the theory and practice of coi. the experience of naaci, the collective embodiment of coi, combined with my previous practice of coi changed my life and indeed, like gregory and phillips, i feel as if i am a testament to the work of sharp.7 coi radically changed my teaching practice. i never would have called myself an authoritarian teacher but schools are toxic warehouses of authoritarianism and patriarchy, that suck you into their culture and it is hard to resist. sharp’s work gave me a framework, the power, the confidence, the pedagogy and importantly the pedagogical justification to confront the authoritarian elements in my practice, to move away from chalk and talk, to consider and relate to young people in a more authentic student centred approach, and to push against the neoliberal agenda to commodify education. this is still very challenging and i’m still having to wade upstream against a culture and system that pushes back; even the students are acculturated and push back. i knew that sharp was a significant person in the coi community, but it wasn’t until i read the brief biography of her at the start of this book that i began to understand why her work and practice resonates with me, and came to understand her legacy to current educators. sharp was a bit of a rebel. she challenged injustices when she saw them and she carved a way of being in the world that was consistent with her beliefs. i can only say that i aspire to be this kind of person. she also faced challenges as a fellow female in a male dominated space. i was the only female student in my honours year and it took perseverance to maintain a space and have a voice. sometimes, to my shame, i had to resort to what i have discussed in a paper i presented recently, as features and practices of debate culture, which i argue reinforce dominant forms of patriarchal masculinity. 8 for the purposes of being ‘in communal inquiry’ within this article i’m going to tell a story of one of the most significant lessons that i’ve learned. my hope is to be ‘in communal inquiry’ with sharp and the authors through the lens of this lesson and reflect upon how each of the different sections of the book can help me understand this lesson along with aspects of the theory and practice of coi. a few years ago my principal sent an email around asking if any teachers would like their students to attend a presentation by a group of indigenous men of the arlwpe community, from ali curang, in the northern territory. the local mayor had arranged for their visit to the area and was offering to bring them to the school for the day. having been an ally to many indigenous projects in melbourne i jumped at the opportunity. in the week prior to their visit i asked my junior philosophy analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 43 class (year 7-9 students) if they had any questions that we could consider before the presentation. wow! what had i just done? while many of the questions were philosophical in nature (it was still early days in our coi journey) many were social and political questions that contained racist assumptions i.e., “why do they burn the cars?” “why do they destroy the houses that the government gives them?” “why are they given special treatment?” i was shocked and stunned into paralysis. i dropped it. i wasn’t prepared to deal with the questions without preparation. the next week we attended the presentation. the men presented stories from their dreamtime, showed artefacts, talked about projects they were involved in and in general talked about life in an indigenous community. one project they mentioned was a youth project that had young people from the community writing and performing hip hop songs. they showed a video clip of one of the songs which dealt with alcoholism in their community. there was a q&a session at the end and, in general, the students asked interesting questions, although one did ask if they lived in houses. the following week when the class reunited, i had decided to use the same clip as the stimulus for our lesson. i was more mentally prepared to deal with the questions that may arise this time. we generated our list of questions, did some sorting of the questions, eliminating mostly empirical questions, and leaving a variety of philosophical, social, political and psychological questions that were sufficiently open for discussion. we then voted on the question they wanted to discuss. the question they chose was “why do indigenous people resort to alcoholism?” i wasn’t happy about the choice but i respected it and we started to tackle it. we started our suggestion bomb recording possible answers to the question. then we started to evaluate each suggestion.9 as we progressed through the list one of the students noted, “i know white people who are alcoholics and they are probably alcoholic for reason x”. it was then requested that we test this idea against each of the other suggestions. and as it turned out every single other reason, except for dispossession from their land, was a reason why people of any culture or ethnic group may ‘resort to alcoholism’. i then asked “so what does this tell us about our own thinking?” and to my surprise a few students identified the racist assumption in their chosen question. that alcoholism is a uniquely indigenous problem. the key discovery for me was that i could trust the coi process to enable students to discover their own assumptions and resist the impulse to do the work for them. the anthology in community of inquiry with ann margaret sharp is organised around seven themes. each theme is introduced by an academic from the coi/p4c world who has selected and curated a selection of sharp’s writing that connect to that theme. each section therefore has one or two pieces of sharp’s work. i was asked to partly critique this book, alongside a discussion of sharp’s general influence on education.10 however, as a school practitioner, not an academic, i will leave some of the more heavy philosophical criticism to those with this experience (see reviews already written – kohan,11 daniel,12 and gardner13). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 44 part 1’s introduction, by phil cam, provides an overview of the links between sharp’s work on coi, her life and the pragmatist tradition of dewey, mead and peirce. he shows how sharp’s work has advanced and greatly contributed to our knowledge and understanding of the philosophy of education, and what she did in her life to make it a reality in classroom practice around the world. two of the most powerful aspects of sharp’s interpretation and use of dewey’s notions are that 1) “the educational process has no end beyond itself; it is its own end” (ici, 31) and 2) “that philosophy itself is best understood as a theory of education” (ici, 9). furthermore, sharp embodied her theory and practice; she was an example of praxis. the construction of ‘self’ and personhood through praxis were just as important, especially if we want autonomous citizens able to transform society. and she demanded this of those she worked with and those of her readers. in this section both cam and sharp also define the coi. sharp also makes the distinction between being ‘in’ the coi and not, or what susan gardner called ‘mere conversation’14. gardner’s article “inquiry is no mere conversation (or discussion or dialogue)facilitation of inquiry is hard work!” was a foundational text for me when i started my journey. sharp’s project and the project of coi is hard work. it is one of the hardest things that i have ever faced in my life. however, i haven’t found anywhere in the book where sharp acknowledges this, perhaps for her the work was easy and an obvious way forward. coi is a multi-layered practice that requires deep critical thinking, personal engagement in understanding yourself and others; it requires deep personal reflection on your own practice and selfhood, being prepared to give up old, bad habits, and acknowledge your faults and weaknesses as a practitioner. it is not for the faint of heart, nor for someone merely seeking employment as a teacher. it is a challenge to who i am not just as a teacher, but as a person who sees the need to embody this practice in everyday life. these difficulties are exacerbated in the ‘post-truth’ era with the move towards more subjective, emotional responses to events rather than critical, evidence based responses that are also self-reflective. this is encapsulated in section 1 through its focus on the process of self-transformation of the child. here lies the first criticism. sharp talks of students in the classroom coi and uses examples of children to illustrate self-transformation, however, when she describes the process of self-transformation she uses the plural “we”. if there is a criticism here, it is that because of the examples she uses, children, she can be interpreted as not actually talking directly to all of us. but i take it that when she says “we” she means all of humanity, children and adults. since sharp’s passing, this idea has been taken up. there has been much work done in the area of coi with adults. i have done some, running workshops using the coi model, when vaps runs professional development for teachers. we want teachers to be ‘in’ the coi, which was key to sharp’s practice, improving teacher practice. however, many of my colleagues around the world are doing coi with adults for the purpose of better thinking (as opposed to teaching) – walter kohan, michael burroughs, peter worley, and jennifer glaser to name but a few.15 if we are to model the embodiment, the praxis, of coi then adults too need to be ‘in’ the coi – an even harder proposition than educating teachers. you might wonder how does this connect to my personal example above? i hope that the discussion i outlined was not “mere conversation,” but that my students were ‘in’ a coi, and i hope that the example demonstrates why coi is “hard work”. there was also a degree of selftransformation when students identified racist assumptions in their own thinking. however, to be true to the pragmatist tradition what was lacking was action. on reflection, i should have followed analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 45 through with some kind of action, or encouraged the students to make a commitment that would reflect true self-transformation, to activate them as citizens. today in ‘eduspeak’ we talk of teaching and learning16, something sharp acknowledged and practiced well and truly before its time, that education was not just about what the teacher did and how they did it but also how the student learns. in part two, stefano oliverio, (ici, 63-73) explores the ways in which sharp challenges us to reconceptualize both teaching and learning, and the relationship between the teacher and student. she questions the nature of authority within the relationship. she sees the teacher as liberator. it is a radical position that in theory i ascribe to but in practice can only aspire but never achieve given the limitations of the system within which i work. for example, i am directed (by school administrators) to think of my relationship with students as friendly but not friends, already creating a barrier. this section of the book draws largely upon sharp’s use and interpretation of nietzsche to explore this idea of teacher as liberator. sharp’s radical position requires a complete reimagining of schooling along freirean17 lines, and other radical pedagogies. i struggle greatly with the possibility, in practical terms,18 of such a project, though i know of numerous attempts, some still surviving today, such as the free school, paideia, founded in 1978 in mérida, spain. i also don’t feel like sharp’s concept of teacher as liberator totally dismantles the authoritarian role of the teacher. the idea of shaking a “student out of his complacency” (ici, 67) still privileges the teacher’s viewpoint over that of the student. and i have also witnessed the opposite; teachers being shaken out of their own complacency when students at my school went on strike for action on climate change. teachers, and the school, were forced to respond to student initiatives –thankfully in a generally positive and supportive manner. also, from personal experience i have worked with students who consciously and stubbornly choose complacency. sharp does not offer us, at least not in this text, any practical ideas on how to address this (except the need to improve thinking); rather we are given only a theoretical possibility, and one firmly placed with the responsibility of the individual. sharp’s work lacks an institutional analysis, although perhaps this is because it is very much a personal project. also, the teacher as ‘shaker’ still implies some authoritative role, but in today’s technological age i’m increasingly informed by my students about things happening in the world that i would not otherwise come across if it wasn’t for them. the relationship is changing whether i want it to or not. it is not surprising that sharp selected nietzsche as a means to her vision of teacher as liberator. nietzsche’s self-overcoming is key to sharp’s concept of self-transformation. i can appreciate the idea that philosophy and its practice in the coi is a kind of suffering; again, it is “hard work”. how often have i heard students say “philosophy makes my brain hurt”, or the suffering that comes from unsettlement “why can’t there be just one correct answer?” but this hard work is ultimately creative, students are empowered to be their own creators. i can also appreciate nietzsche’s view of educational institutions as places that deprive children of freedom and creativity; in most ways and in most places around the world things have not changed, and it could be argued that we are going backwards with the increased neo-liberalisation of schooling. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 46 further to this, as a classroom teacher, and perhaps more as a secondary school teacher, there are a few tensions and problems with regards to the practical application of sharp’s theory of education, and the practice of coi. one is the conflict between what sharp means by education and the capacity for teachers to meet the curriculum demands set out by their individual governments. curriculums are crowded. there are competing demands and while i like to think that most of these can be approached in a philosophical manner i struggle, as a practitioner, to find the space for the practice of coi in the everyday classroom and across the school. part 3 explores sharp’s views on ethics and the importance of relationships in education. i have done a lot of work in the area of ethics and coi with regard to the practical aspects of implementing ethics and ethical capabilities curriculum in the classroom. for me this means that any discussion of ethics and coi is relevant and important, especially given some of the attitudes from teachers that i have witnessed with regards to its implementation. i was confronted on numerous occasions by teachers who said it was not their role to teach ethics and values, it was the role of families. if only such teachers had been exposed to sharp’s thinking on ethics; that ethics and ethical thinking is about a commitment to care, not indoctrination towards a particular ‘ethic’. ethics in the context of coi is not indoctrination, which is sometimes how the ethical capabilities curriculum19 in victoria has been interpreted.20 in one of sharp’s essays in this section she seems convinced that narrative (in the form of novels with deliberate ethical dialogue) is the best stimulus for developing ethical thinking in children,21 and this has strongly shaped the coi community as there is a litany of resources and novels to support the teaching of coi. however, this made me wonder what she would think about how other parts of the world have revised what counts as stimulus for ethical thinking, for example, in the australian context almost anything can count as a stimulus for thinking. for example, the film clip of the indigenous youth rapping about alcoholism i mentioned earlier.22 while the steps that the students made in our coi were important for ethical thinking, perhaps sharp was right about the use of selective novels that exemplify people engaging in ethical thinking in a deliberate manner. do such novels prepare students for better thinking? the essay “looking at others’ faces” was refreshing and personal. it reminded me of a number of experiences that confirmed sharp’s ideas, namely, that looking at faces helps us to “discover ethical responsibility” (ici, 122) and confronts us with the “needs, desires and vulnerabilities” (ici, 122) of others. i feel given my current situation23 that this sense of ethical responsibility is imminent. i have also witnessed how children are more open to looking at faces than adults, having used an activity (participants in pairs staring at each other for a period of time and recording their feelings as a stimulus) with both adults and children. the children were far more open and comfortable with the exercise than the adults, which tells me that children are the best starting place for coi as they are more open than adults, although not in all cultures.24 part 4, the section on feminism and children, has made me reflect on many of my own experiences as a woman. i started this chapter with great enthusiasm. i had wanted to skip ahead to it because i felt certain i would find even greater affinity here with sharp. this only partly came to fruition. i found this section too abstract, perhaps because i lack an understanding of simone weil’s analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 47 work,25 and sharp’s writing not being stridently feminist enough for me. it did not encapsulate what i felt as a woman in the world of p-hilosophy, and sometimes p-hilosophy, nor did i find her feminist philosophy helpful in confronting the challenges that we face. here is but one example of one of those challenges. sharp was a reader and admirer of the anarchist activist and writer emma goldman (ici, 10). goldman had argued that there were two spheres, a masculine and feminine (or a public and private sexuality26). in a recent paper i gave at the naaci conference in puebla, mexico, i made a similar distinction about the spheres of discourse, between debate culture and dialogue culture, arguing that one, debate, was predominantly masculine and the other, dialogue, feminine27 (to crudely summarise the paper). in sharp’s analysis of the two characters in pixie, pixie (representing speech) and brian (representing silence), this distinction can be seen, though the roles are reversed (ici, 174-185) and not explicitly described in terms of gender. the one aspect from sharp’s incorporation of weil’s philosophy that did resonate with me was the idea of creative labour as meaningful, since this is the work of the coi, that through our creative labour we create meaning and spaces for others to create their own meaning. but does this translate to a world where male assumptions still scaffold how we see dialogue? and again, not to essentialise gender, though i feel sharp’s work forces me here,28 this “meaningful work”, this “creative labour” is often done by the women (at least in the groups that i have been involved, with the exception of men whom have embodied the philosophical practice that sharp describes). however, on the pedagogical contributions of the idea of creative, meaningful work, sharp is right that when the coi is engaged in meaningful work (that feels like play) we escape time “the interruption of the bell – of chronos – is a rude awakening” (ici, 156). i, and my classes, as i am sure is also true of others who practice coi, experience this “interruption” on numerous occasions. in part 5 peter shea breaks down sharp’s spiritual contribution to the coi. he is one of the few contributors that offers criticism of sharp’s work. i struggled to engage with this theme coming from a non-religious background and lacking religious experience,29 and also perhaps because of the highly abstract philosophical treatment of ideas. i’m open to, but yet to be convinced, that the coi is a form of religious activity, as argued by sharp. that it, the coi, is somehow sacred. why is this gathering, this activity, sacred? for me the coi is a special place, but i wouldn’t say sacred. however, i can recognise the need for an alignment between the two, especially if we want to promote better thinking across all aspects of society. and given that many educational institutions around the world are religious it makes sense to draw connections. and of course many classes will include religious students,30 (and ideas). however, if we are to accept sharp’s proposition, that we should imbue students with a sense of spirituality it must be a critical form of spirituality, and i’m yet to see what that looks like, and how it can be done ‘safely’31. perhaps a conception of coi as the embodiment of a daily practice is one version of spirituality. alternately, perhaps the on-going project of cultivating student curiosity should be seen as the “essence” of education (ici, 186) and therefore sacred. one of sharp’s greatest contributions to coi was her philosophy around the theory and practice of caring thinking. this is outlined in part 6. it was not enough to be a critical and creative thinker; one also had to embody a philosophy of care. caring thinking is one of the most challenging aspects of the coi; i certainly need to reflect more on why caring thinking is the hardest, at least for analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 48 me. it is certainly the hardest to assess, and perhaps hardest in the secondary context given the selfabsorbed nature of teens. this section of the book also highlights another area that i find challenging: race and dealing with racism. i was at a presentation by darren chetty (ici, 206-207) on racism within the coi and it was certainly an eye-opening challenge to my own self-awareness (or lack of) and eurocentric viewpoint. sharp’s desire to incorporate care into her pedagogical practice, and worldly practice, makes her approach significantly stand out from others, though i don’t think that to date it has satisfied the likes of chetty and suissa (ici, 206-207) in terms of dealing with the community’s ‘whiteness’.32 for me, there is a real tension that exists between sharp’s ethics of care and the project of coi that connects to issues like race (as well as other things like sex, and disability). the example i provided earlier of the student question about indigenous australians is just one example where this tension arises, and so far none of my experiences within the coi community have been able to resolve this tension. i did a presentation to a group of radical educators in melbourne on the practice and theory of coi. in that presentation i told the above story to illustrate the power of coi. however, it was pointed out to me that it was possibly insensitive to allow such a question and discussion to occur. why? because what if there had have been an indigenous identifying person in the class33. if we do what sharp and the coi community suggests then we must “follow the inquiry where it leads”. but this is dangerous and risky! it may be re-traumatizing (it may also be that the group do not have the necessary skills to deal with such questions). i find this is especially the case in the secondary school context when students have more life experiences. it is likely that i have students in my class who have experienced rape, drug abuse, or have even had an abortion, and sometimes inquiries naturally lead to such topics. in such cases these inquiries must be followed with a sensitivity and care that i’m still not sure coi has really provided me with the tools to do, nor do sharp’s writings appear to elucidate much on this in practical terms. however, to be fair, what sharp means by caring thinking is not just the emotional well-being of the participants, but that each participant also care about the quality of thinking. if quality thinking is achieved, then perhaps the resilience of students to deal with sensitive issues is also achieved. jennifer glaser, in part 7, explores sharp’s interpretation and use of hannah arendt’s views on democracy and public life. glaser connects this to the ever globalised world and sharp’s desire for a more just and peaceful world. sharp insists that the coi be open ended, what we might call unsettled, or as she states it, having a “commitment to fallibilism and self-correction” (ici, 237), because we are open to inquiry as an ongoing conversation rather than settled on “hard’ truths”. for me, sharp’s social-political work makes her even more important and relevant in the face of challenging the so-called ‘post-truth’ era. glaser also argues that sharp successfully constructs the idea and practice of the coi as philosophically, socially and politically normative through her incorporation of dewey and arendt (ici, 224). however, she notes that this doesn’t automatically translate into action (glaser, ici, 225). the theory and practice of coi, and hence sharp’s work, faces many other challenges in today’s crowded pedagogical eco-system. however, i argue that it is more the practice and practical aspects than the theoretical that creates barriers to its wider utilization. the market is flooded with ‘pedagogies’ and different ‘practices’ connected to different gurus (many schools have seen them come analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 49 and go). however, sharp’s work stands out from the others because of its historical foundation, the research (evidence based, but predominantly theoretical) and its years of successful practice. i’d also add what dewey argued “that philosophy itself is best understood as a theory of education” (ici, 9); hence, that the philosophical approach, in this case coi, to education is education and therefore should be the predominant pedagogy. if we strip sharp’s pedagogical work back to some of its key origins, outlined throughout the book, in the likes of dewey, peirce, mead, vygotsky, and her philosophical engagement with other key philosophers like arendt, nietzsche, weil, putnam, rorty, and habermas, we find a wealth of foundational support for coi. we can also see how it supports so many areas of curriculum and teaching practice (if implemented well). when i am presented with other pedagogical approaches i always see fragments of coi practice, but often they are deficit in aspects that i find in coi –be it critical thinking, or caring thinking, or they are insufficiently philosophical. for example, one practice my school has engaged with is the curiosity and powerful learning program.34 it uses what it calls theories of action. many of these theories of action are simple tools that you can find in any coi teaching book. one instructional model connected to these theories of action is called concept attainment. it is basically the coi concept game model35 minus what i and others would call concept exploration. yet the concept attainment model lacks any discussion of grey areas or borderline examples, and it only talks of exemplar examples and non-exemplar examples. this is just one reason why sharp’s work and the work of the coi community is superior; it moves us from the scientific to the philosophical and brings a greater richness to learning. it is this aspect of coi that is missing from many so-called ‘new’ pedagogies. and in the light of neoliberal challenges to education, coi is exactly what we need if we are to confront this challenge and bring about sharp’s vision. the use of data is another face of the neoliberal agenda to control education. i can’t speak for the rest of the world but in the australian context john hattie’s book visible learning,36 a metaanalysis of data from across the world, is greatly shaping government policy with regard to education and teacher practice. hattie’s effect size is quoted ad nauseam. the effect size – i.e. the influence on learning – for “inquiry based learning” models is found to be very low. while hattie’s work does not specifically measure coi, and i would argue it cannot do so, the result has been that the word “inquiry” has become a dirty word and schools are turning away from it. i believe that this is a direct result of hattie’s data analysis and use of effect size, although to be fair to hattie i don’t believe that this was his intention. he does place some caveats on when inquiry can be successful, he just argues that currently, with how it is done, there is no evidence to show that it is successful.37 this is therefore a challenge to those who subscribe to sharp’s work, the authors, contributors to this book, and the larger coi community, including myself. how can we build a bridge between sharp’s work and the work already done in education to confront these challenges to improve the quality of thinking and the quality of inquiry, and thus developing autonomous, active citizens. before concluding, i will offer a few more basic thoughts on the overall tone of the book. the book as a whole feels more like a tasting plate than a set menu. i’m not sure that each section is always coherently connected, partly due to the different voices. however, i’m not sure that this is necessarily a problem given that i feel this is reflective of the interconnected and multidimensional analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 50 nature of everything p4c, especially coi, and sharp’s thinking. she engaged in all aspects of theory and practice to produce a political, ethical, spiritual, aesthetic approach and method and applied it to the practice of philosophy, the philosophy of education, and her life. there is also a lack of critical reflection within the book. very few criticisms are mentioned, and of those that are, they rarely deal with the theory itself but rather improper practice (ici, 126127). for example, peter shea offers several criticisms, one being that while coi is a good practice it is not supernatural. he challenges sharp’s idea that the coi is safe (ici, 161-173), although again his example appeals to improper practice. this lack of criticism is perhaps also connected to the fact that the contributors all come from within this community, they see each other regularly at conferences, work on projects together, and are in dialogue with each other in other areas of coi. while this is a good thing for the community – and this book further inspires my own practice– i can’t help but wonder whether it reaches to where i ultimately believe it should –the larger world of teacher practitioners and the children they teach; i would argue that it does not. for one, it is too inaccessible for the majority of everyday practitioners in the p4c/coi world. the challenge, then, is to the editors and contributors, as well as for myself as a passionate practitioner, to find ways to embed sharp’s work in schools, communities, and in everyday life. what’s more, i’m not so sure that the book strikes the right balance between theory and practice to make it widely accessible. it is somewhat accessible to teachers, but only in parts, and even less so to teachers with no philosophical training. it is accessible to teacher educators who are interested in pedagogy, but again, less for those educators with little to no philosophical training beyond your standard theories of education. most books on education often focus either too heavily on teacher tactics or on the theory behind classroom practice and student learning, and so don’t achieve the depth of worldly analysis and application that takes us beyond the classroom, to the sociopolitical, ethical, and spiritual dimensions that sharp’s work offers. yet, it is precisely thanks to such depth that sharp’s work may not be accessible to all. she was a prolific reader and her work engaged with such a broad scope of philosophical and spiritual writings, from dewey, to heidegger, to religious buddhist texts. this broadness should not be a deterrent as there was plenty to learn along the way, but for those thinkers that readers may be unfamiliar with, it will likely be a struggle. who should read this book? my bias and love for many of the contributors would have me say that everyone should read this book; however, that would not really be an accurate assessment. whether you should read this book depends on what kind of person you are and what you are engaged in. if you just want to know more about ann margaret sharp and her life then only some aspects are relevant, although highly insightful and inspirational. if you want to learn about coi, then you will learn a great deal about the theory and justification but not so much about the actual practice. if you are already a member of the p4c/coi community then it will greatly deepen your knowledge and understanding of the historical and theoretical contexts of your practice. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 51 educators, especially those interested in radical critiques of education and looking for ideas to support their own thinking and practice in relation to what is wrong with our current state of education,38 will find the book to be of great value. this is especially true for those who want to challenge the industrial and neoliberal models of education that permeate our societies. ultimately, however, i believe those who are likely to get the most from engaging with this text will need to first have practiced coi to truly appreciate much of what sharp writes. as stated above, i first read sharp as an undergraduate philosophy student, not as a teacher. it is only after much practice that it has become relevant. if you are reading this article then perhaps you are already a member of the p4c/coi world. but if you are not i feel you will get much more from encountering the work if you were first to seek out your local p4c/coi community, like vaps, and engage with their training programs. there are many groups that provide such training across the world, and many of them have been directly inspired by the work of sharp, and lipman.39 “only when a woman reads her daily experience in terms of a self responding to the world does she discover both her power and the limits of her power” (ici, 157). this is certainly a true reflection of my experience of reading this book. through reading this text, i have further explored and reflected on my strengths and weaknesses, as a practitioner and as a person. perhaps this experience, alongside the strong sense of womanhood i have had while reading it, has enhanced my experience of self responding. i can only hope that i have expressed this in a way that means you, the reader, will further engage in the theory and practice of coi. sharp’s legacy is huge. philosophy for children is in 45 nations around the world (ici, 130). the coi community is largely volunteer run, which makes it “hard work” but again reflects the embodiment of sharp’s work. i’m not aware of the circumstances of sharp’s passing but walter kohan finishes his review40 of in community with ann margaret sharp implying that sharp’s care for others meant she often did not care as extensively for herself. sharp cared for others and was herself a caring thinker, and perhaps this care was to the detriment of her health. i’m very cognisant of this as i’m writing this review at 38-9 weeks pregnant, experiencing practice contractions and a kicking baby! last week i also spent several hours (even though i’m on maternity leave) with my year 12 students reviewing locke and hume’s theories of personal identity, over hot chocolates and nachos. but to me, and to how i have interpreted sharp, this is living educationally and philosophically, imbuing my students with a love of philosophy through friendship. coi continues to inspire others, as it continues to inspire me, because it is such a powerful, and admittedly dangerous, approach to education and life. this book is a great tribute to a person i never had the pleasure of meeting, someone whose work has greatly influenced my life, and the lives of many others. i hope to repay her wisdom and commitment, to do justice to her memory, by continuing to live educationally and philosophically. *i would like to acknowledge and thank the work of janette poulton, my professional mentor, for her support to write this article, and my partner, jonathan rutherford for his editing and support. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 52 endnotes 1 in community of inquiry with ann margaret sharp will be cited as ici in the text. see, maughn rollins gregory and megan jane laverty, eds., (2018) in community of inquiry with ann margaret sharp: childhood, philosophy and education, new york, ny, routledge. 2 community of inquiry (coi) and philosophy for children (p4c) are different ideas, but often considered interchangeable. coi is the theory and practice, it is a pedagogical approach. p4c encompasses any program that involves the teaching of philosophy to children – it varies from programs to pedagogies. the two professional communities largely cross over but are also made up of distinct individuals and groups. for the purposes of this article i will be referring to coi as i feel sharp’s alliances were more with this community. 3 being ‘in communal inquiry’ is a very distinct concept and practice for sharp, it is not just to be ‘talking or discussing’ but a set of dispositions, both individual and collective, that define being ‘in’ (ici, 38-48). these dispositions are elaborated throughout the book. 4 splitter, l.j. and sharp, a.m. (1995) teaching for better thinking: the classroom of community of inquiry. melbourne: acer press. 5 i’m a lowercase-p philosopher, not a capital-p philosopher. this means i have limited capacity to review the other philosophers mentioned, because i’m more engaged with trying to make sense of the world than with the academic texts of philosophers. this was a distinction made by rorty, but akin to sharp’s theory of philosophy for children. you can read about the distinction in phil cam’s introduction (ici, 30). 6 naaci, north american association for the community of inquiry 7 there are many others worthy of mentioning, such as susan gardner, maria teresa de la garza (both contributors in the book) and janette poulton, who has been a personal and professional mentor. 8 zuidland, b. (2018). debate compared to dialogue: a (moral) justification for the community of inquiry. naaci, puebla. 9 this is one pattern of inquiry, sometimes referred to as plain vanilla. and a suggestion bomb is where students generate as many suggestions (possible answers) to the question as possible, regardless of their own views. 10 i have tried to show throughout this article how sharp’s work has connected with my own (both my practice and implementation of theory) as a means of modelling how i hope it can support others to make their own connections to their practice. 11 kohan, walter. (2019). "in community of inquiry with ann margaret sharp". educational theory 68(4-5): 555-560. 12 hypatia reviews online. daniel, marie-france. (2019). hypatia: a journal of feminist philosophy! "in community of inquiry with ann margaret sharp". accessed: 19/04/2019. <https://www.hypatiareviews.org/reviews/>. 13 gardner, susan t. (2019). "in community of inquiry with ann margaret sharp". teaching philosophy! 42 (1); 61-64. 14 gardner, susan t. (1995). ‘inquiry is no mere conversation (or discussion or dialogue). facilitation of inquiry is hard work!’ analytic teaching 16(2): 102-111. 15 for example, michael burroughs has been doing philosophy in prisons with inmates, through the kegley institute of ethics, kegley institute of ethics. (2019). accessed: 19/04/2019. <https://www.cs.csubak.edu/~kie/>. 16 i have italicized and learning because once upon a time education was concerned only with teaching, not so much the learning. 17 freire, paulo. (1970). pedagogy of the oppressed. new york: herder and herder. 18 any free school movement in the australian context would still be required to follow government requirements and curriculums to be registered as an educational institute. other practical complications also arise when considering the wages of teachers working such as school, to resolve this would to be create a ‘class divide’ given that parents would be required to pay, rather than the state. 19 department of education. (2019). the victorian curriculum. ethical capabilities curriculum. accessed: 19/04/2019. <http://victoriancurriculum.vcaa.vic.edu.au/ethical-capability/introduction/rationale-and-aims>. 20 this is a gross misinterpretation. many of the contributors to this curriculum come out of the p4c and coi community in australia and, as any careful reading of the curriculum will reveal, it is not indoctrination but the development of dispositions, hopefully ethical ones. 21 it was also the best method for normalising philosophical issues, placing them in everyday contexts. https://www.hypatiareviews.org/reviews/ https://www.cs.csubak.edu/~kie/ http://victoriancurriculum.vcaa.vic.edu.au/ethical-capability/introduction/rationale-and-aims analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 53 22 youtube. (2015). ali curang community. ‘where you going?’. barkley desert community. accessed: 19/04/2019. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d1vcn-3hd94>. 23 being 39 weeks pregnant and yet to put a face to my ethical responsibilities as a parent. 24 indigenous children in australia do not make eye contact with adults as it is a sign of respect. 25 sharp’s feminist philosophy draws upon the work of simone weil. 26 goldman, emma. (1911). anarchism and other essays. mother earth publishing association. 27 though i do not want to essentialise this gender distinction, i recognise these as stereotypical features only. and it was only one point of distinction that i made between debate and dialogue culture. 28 sharp’s (and gregory’s) use of weil’s five criteria for a feminist philosophy do essentialise the feminine when they attempt to redefine ‘women’s personhood’ (ici, 145-158). 29 i would also say that recent historical events have pushed me, and many around me even further away from religion and religious practices, especially in the australian context of the church’s role in the gay marriage debate, and the george pell affairs. 30 i teach in a public school in a community that has access to a number of religious private schools that are not financially inaccessible, though they still cost more than attending the local public school. 31 see my further discussion regarding indigenous identity, since indigenous spirituality and connection to land plays a role in australian society it is hard to envisage what a shared spirituality would look like in the classroom. 32 i can’t be certain of this point given that i haven’t read their work, but given that i saw chetty’s presentation only a few years ago it is safe to say the coi community has not yet sufficiently dealt with its own ‘whiteness’. 33 in the australian context it is not always obvious who is indigenous, nor are individuals expected to identify themselves as indigenous, except for bureaucratic purposes. in the educational setting this is optional. and given our historical and cultural context i completely empathise with those that decide not to openly identify as indigenous given the on-going stigma and racism that permeates australian society. 34 australian council for educational leaders. (2017). curiosity and powerful learning program. accessed: 19/04/2019. <http://www.acel.org.au/acel/acelweb/programs/2018/curiosity_and_powerful_learning/about.aspx>. 35 if you are unaware of the coi concept game model a starting place may be clinton golding’s book connecting concepts or thinking with rich concepts. 36 hattie, john a. (2008). visible learning: a synthesis of over 800 meta-analyses relating to achievement. routledge, abingdon. 37 visible learning. (2019). 10 questions for professor john hattie, asked by teachers and school leaders. accessed: 19/04/2019. <https://visible-learning.org/2016/07/ask-professor-john-hattie-a-question/>. 38 i speak here only for australia and usa, having experiences in both, although i feel that many of my education colleagues from around the world may feel similarly to me. 39 it is sometimes said that matthew lipman was the main instigator of p4c but because i was introduced to it through sharp this was never my impression. it is also my understanding that sharp’s work was less academic than lipman’s because she valued the practical aspects of coi more, which also resonates with me. 40 kohan, walter. (2019). "in community of inquiry with ann margaret sharp". educational theory 68(4-5): 555-560. references australian council for educational leaders. (2017). curiosity and powerful learning program. accessed: 19/04/2019. <http://www.acel.org.au/acel/acelweb/programs/2018/curiosity_and_powerful_lear ning/about.aspx>. department of education. (2019). the victorian curriculum. ethical capabilities curriculum. accessed: 19/04/2019. <http://victoriancurriculum.vcaa.vic.edu.au/ethicalcapability/introduction/rationale-and-aims>. freire, paulo. (1970). pedagogy of the oppressed. new york: herder and herder. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d1vcn-3hd94 http://www.acel.org.au/acel/acelweb/programs/2018/curiosity_and_powerful_learning/about.aspx https://visible-learning.org/2016/07/ask-professor-john-hattie-a-question/ http://www.acel.org.au/acel/acelweb/programs/2018/curiosity_and_powerful_learning/about.aspx http://www.acel.org.au/acel/acelweb/programs/2018/curiosity_and_powerful_learning/about.aspx http://victoriancurriculum.vcaa.vic.edu.au/ethical-capability/introduction/rationale-and-aims http://victoriancurriculum.vcaa.vic.edu.au/ethical-capability/introduction/rationale-and-aims analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 54 gardner, susan t. (1995). ‘inquiry is no mere conversation (or discussion or dialogue). facilitation of inquiry is hard work!’ analytic teaching 16(2): 102-111. gardner, susan t. (2019). "in community of inquiry with ann margaret sharp". teaching philosophy! 42 (1); 61-64. goldman, emma. (1911). anarchism and other essays. mother earth publishing association. gregory, maughn and laverty, megan, editors. (2018) in community of inquiry with ann margaret sharp: childhood, philosophy and education. new york, ny: routledge. hattie, john a. (2008). visible learning: a synthesis of over 800 meta-analyses relating to achievement. routledge, abingdon. hypatia reviews online. daniel, marie-france. (2019). hypatia: a journal of feminist philosophy! "in community of inquiry with ann margaret sharp". accessed: 19/04/2019. <https://www.hypatiareviews.org/reviews/>. kegley institute of ethics. (2019). accessed: 19/04/2019. <https://www.cs.csubak.edu/~kie/>. kohan, walter. (2019). "in community of inquiry with ann margaret sharp". educational theory 68(4-5): 555-560. splitter, l.j. and sharp, a.m. (1995) teaching for better thinking: the classroom of community of inquiry. melbourne: acer press. youtube. (2015). ali curang community. ‘where you going?’. barkley desert community. accessed: 19/04/2019. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d1vcn-3hd94>. visible learning. (2019). 10 questions for professor john hattie, asked by teachers and school leaders. accessed: 19/04/2019. <https://visible-learning.org/2016/07/ask-professor-john-hattie-aquestion/>. zuidland, b. (2018). debate compared to dialogue: a (moral) justification for the community of inquiry. naaci, puebla. address correspondences to: bonnie zuidland philosophy and humanities teacher upwey high school, melbourne, australia bonnie.zuidland@upweyhs.vic.edu.au https://www.hypatiareviews.org/reviews/ https://www.cs.csubak.edu/~kie/ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d1vcn-3hd94 https://visible-learning.org/2016/07/ask-professor-john-hattie-a-question/ https://visible-learning.org/2016/07/ask-professor-john-hattie-a-question/ analytic teaching and philosophical praxis analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 74 the perpetual crisis: early and modern ideas on education “no one will doubt that the legislator should direct his attention above all to the education of the youth” —aristotle, politics, viii guillermo farfan n underlying belief on the positive relationship between educating the young, on the one hand, and the economic, political, and cultural survival of a nation-state, on the other, seems present in virtually all modern and modernizing societies in the world (chabbott & ramirez, 2000). in the united states, this belief takes on many forms, but chief among them is the idea that education in science, technology, engineering, and math (stem) plays a vital role in the health and preservation of the country as a whole (holdren & lander, 2012). this belief can be justified, to some extent, by how reliant we all have become on the products of stem disciplines. a democratic society in which large numbers of people are dependent on using these products but are otherwise unfamiliar or uncomfortable with the scientific and technological principles behind them is arguably setting itself up for failure. nonetheless, contemporary arguments in favor of stem education often employ narratives that are not novel but instead resemble certain philosophical antecedents. hence, my interest here is not whether justification for the belief in the fundamental role of stem education is necessary or sufficient for how we function as a society. rather, what i wish to call attention to in this essay is how, in advocating for more mathematics and science education, national leaders often make use of a trope not unfamiliar to the western philosophical tradition: education as the solution to a societal crisis. i will use three short historical readings to illustrate my point. first, i will show how plato’s the republic and rousseau’s emile, or on education could be read, inter alia, as elaborated responses to a critical societal problem or threat the author wished to resolve. i will then sketch out how stem education developed in the united states, paying attention to how it has been officially defended. finally, i will contrast and critique the similarities and differences between these narratives and give some reasons for being critical of them at the end. the crisis in plato’s the republic in ancient greece, the paideia was an early curriculum for elite young males which included military training, horse riding, athletics, singing, playing an instrument, and reciting homer (griffith, a analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 75 2015). completing the paideia was the mark of a ‘civilized’ man and ensured entrance into the political and economic activities of a small, greek polis (city-state). by the 5th century bce, the rise of participatory governments and other aftermath effects of the greco-persian wars significantly changed the face of greek education (raaflaub, 2015). the needs of growing city-states could no longer be met by the traditional curriculum, and soon many cities were flooded with iterant teachers—called sophists—offering every kind of education to those who could afford it (wolfsdorf, 2015). although the work of the sophists was of great significance to the democratization and internationalization of education in classical antiquity, it also contributed to a leadership dilemma since anyone with a modicum of education could now sway the assemblies and courts that made up the body politic of big democratic cities such as athens (hatzis, 2017). there was also no agreement as to what sort of education democratic leaders should aspire to, whether in rhetoric, law, or military history; consequently, collective decision-making was inconsistent and occasionally disastrous: ostracism and even death of prominent generals, failed and expensive campaigns in sicily and egypt, and the massacre at melos are a few of the instances where the crisis of athenian leadership was severely felt. the republic, one of plato’s main works, is set against this socio-political background. one of its major themes is the establishment of a strong and balanced society that will nurture the right kind of happy and just individuals according to reason (lane, 2006). to do this, plato suggests a curriculum where all men and women—remarkably, for the time—are educated in music and gymnastics. mathematics, literature, and dialectic were reserved exclusively for those chosen to be guardians and rulers of the city. as such, the education that plato had in mind for the city’s leaders would not only instill courage but also nurture reason (collins, 2000). as noted earlier, the crisis for plato was that education in his native athens was nothing of that sort. the city that had condemned his master socrates to death was also the city which had allowed various political and economic interests to compete and outdo each other, producing programs of education that were not concerned with truth, but with the appearance of truth, and where men saw the advancement of their careers in political influence and honor as their ultimate goal. in plato’s eyes, the sophists were major culprits in this, and he thus positioned himself (and socrates) squarely as their enemy: socrates claims that he knows nothing and refuses to be paid for his advice—in direct opposition to how sophists operated. and again, unlike the sophists, plato’s socrates does not believe that truth is relative to whatever the circumstance needed it to be; instead, truth resides in the unchangeable, immutable world of forms (lane, 2006). similarly, plato presents the education of the city’s leaders in books ii-vii of the republic chiefly as an alternative to the errors in leadership among greek poleis of his time. through the cultivation of reason, the philosopher-king and her guardians will be equipped to lead their subjects in a manner that is above all rational: they will know how to avoid unnecessary wars (375c), they will know what is true from what is false (376d), they will put the needs of the city first before their own (412b ff), they will have no need for material accumulation or gain (415e ff), etc. (bloom, 2016). only when men analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 76 and women in leadership are able to live their lives according to reason, free from worldly bondage, will the city and its inhabitants experience true happiness and justice (natali, 2000). although it is not entirely clear to what extent plato’s fears of a crisis of leadership were justified, nonetheless, it provided the perfect backdrop to contrast his solution of a universal and socially stratified education against what was in offer at the time (wolfsdorf, 2015). his views on education fit very well his larger philosophical agenda of seeing the city as a reflection of the soul, moving it away from temporal and ordinary matters and towards the ideal and perfect forms. the crisis in rousseau’s emile, or on education in the 18th century, the nation of france was at a crossroads. many frenchmen at the time welcomed the reign of louis xv as a return to peace and prosperity that has all but disappeared during two long and debilitating wars of the preceding century. many others, however, grew disenchanted with what they saw as excesses of the monarchy and the church, principal institutions of the ancien régime (old order). when the genevan philosopher and composer jean-jacques rousseau moved to paris to try his fortunes in 1742, he encountered an educational system that was divided between various religious orders, whose core business were producing clergy, and the state, which encouraged the training of bureaucrats, merchants, and doctors that populated the ranks of the bourgeoisie, or middle-class (bloch, 1995; riley, 2001). there was no shortage of criticism for the old educational system in the years prior to the french revolution, though it was less clear what should take its place. a popular view among philosophically minded people was that education should be used to subdue personal interest in the service of national regeneration (gill, 2010). rousseau, however, believed that such a solution would produce nothing but unjust men. for even if a reasonably stable social order could be established, with toleration, fine manners, sophisticated works of art, and high-minded laws, in the end it would be all a charade, because underneath all of that men will still manipulate, exploit, oppress, and eat one another (melzer, 1980). the crisis rousseau was responding to in emile, then, was not the necessity of taming human nature but the need to replace an educational system that corrupted the nature of man. nothing was more symptomatic of this system than those individuals (which rousseau identified with the bourgeoisie) whose only concern with education was to protect and perpetuate their own way of life. for rousseau, these people were weak-willed conformists who were directed by the whims of their desires and the whims of their culture’s desires (jonas, 2010). not surprisingly, much of what happens in emile takes place far away from the influences of the ancien régime and the people who lived in it. as a result, a major premise of the book is establishing a system or environment that is conducive to self-motivated learning: a child should have as much freedom to explore as possible (p. 43ff), should seek to learn from first-hand knowledge rather than books (p. 109ff), should be introduced to subjects only when he is ready to take an interest in them (p. 169), should be allow to analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 77 use his intuition when solving geometric problems (pp. 145-146), etc. (bloom, 1979). in rousseau’s eyes, children in the traditional educational system were taught too many things before they were ready to absorb them, and they ended up learning nothing that was useful. rather than producing a student capable to repeat the ideas of others, education should produce a person who can think on his own and judge accordingly (melachrinou, 2012). it must be noted in passing that this applies to male students only; the education of women was an entirely different matter (israel, 2012). for these reasons, and unlike many of his contemporaries, rousseau was wary of public education: emile’s education is individual education, entirely customized and overseen by his allknowing tutor (rosenow, 1980). the traditional education offered by the state and the church, where students were grouped in classes and told what they needed to know, is written-off by rousseau for its failure in balancing personal interest with mutual dependence (its greatest achievement, the bourgeoisie, rousseau clearly despised). in its place, he proposes a radical new pedagogy that will make not only free-thinking men but men capable of giving back to their community. the rise and fall of stem education in the united states from the time of colonial america to the early 1800s, most children and servants were taught rudimentary arithmetic and other basic facts about the world at home; only in new england could a handful of public schools be found. at the higher level, college education was focused on learning classical languages and matters of religion: of the nine colonial colleges, only harvard required proficiency in arithmetic in 1726 (willoughby, 1967). as the pace of innovation and economic expansion brought by the industrial revolution of the midto late 19th century continued to accelerate, the value of a scientific and mathematical education increased (franceschetti, 2000). some progressive ideas, such as attending to how children think mathematically, also started to catch on (sinclair, 2008). elsewhere, the use of statistics and the scientific method to persuade policymakers and the public about the virtues of free, universal education became more and more commonplace (klein, 2003). importantly, these developments often went hand-in-hand with a sense of national opportunity, the natural outcome of the united states becoming a world superpower (engel, lawrence, & preston, 2014). although such enthusiasm was dampened somewhat during the 1930s, the aftermath of world war ii brought new attention to the american educational system from both federal and state governments. a major impetus for this came from outside the united states: the launching of sputnik in october 1957 created both paranoia and concern that the soviets had beaten america into space (vinovskis, 1998). the next year, congress approved one billion dollars—worth roughly 9 billion today—for the national defense education act, or ndea, to help american students compete with their soviets counterparts. it was the first of a series of policy initiatives (many of them spearheaded by scientists, not educators) that directly involved the federal government in all levels of american education for the first time. the changes brought by the ndea could be seen at local schools in the form of lab kits, overhead projectors, and educational films; gifted students were handpicked for upper-level courses, analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 78 and matching funds for mathematics, science and even foreign languages abound (abramson, 2007). incidentally, it was also during this period that the idea of a national, standardized assessment of students led to the creation of the national assessment of educational progress (neap) and the many aptitude tests that followed. by the early 1970s, however, interest in mathematics and science began to wane. there was a sense among some politicians and academics that the united states had entered a period of decline, and even a longing for another sputnik to boost education and innovation again (abramson, 2007). the rise of japan in the 1980s provided such an opportunity to develop stem education around the idea of national security (thorsten, 2012). the most famous and influential document from this period was the widely circulated report, a nation at risk, which in 1983 challenged americans to return to the basics in education and to focus attention on student academic achievements (vinovskis, 1998). written by the national commission on excellence in education at the behest of then secretary of education, terrel bell, the report asserted: “…the educational foundations of our society are presently being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future as a nation and a people [...] if an unfriendly foreign power had attempted to impose on america the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war.” (p. 9) although not the first such national report (that honor goes to the higher education for american democracy in 1947), it was significant in its demand for increasing mathematics and science education. in its wake, the leading organization of mathematics education in the united states, the national council of teachers of mathematics (nctm), published curriculum and evaluation standards for school mathematics in 1989. the american association for the advancement of science (aaas) likewise produced the science for all americans (1985) and benchmarks for science literacy (1989) in an effort to standardized science education. without diminishing the importance of having a consistent and informed stem policy and curriculum, the narrative structure found in a nation at risk set a template for many reports that followed: an ominous threat is identified (pp. 9-10), past failures and warnings are named (pp. 11-13), proposals to remedy the situation are put forward (pp. 15-16), evidence is marshaled to defend the viability of said proposals (pp. 17ff; national commission on excellence in education, 1983). even the titles of some of these reports are derivative: before it’s too late (2000), rising above the gathering storm (2007), etc. public figures, likewise, are not strangers in using dire language when defending stem education efforts. former president barack obama, for instance, occasionally made references to sputnik and to the idea that rival nations (e.g., china) are outpacing children in the united states in both mathematics and science (e.g., “for we know that the nation that out-educates us today, will outcompete us tomorrow;” nagesh, 2011). john holdren, then director of the president’s council of advisors on science and technology (pcast), made similar remarks when advocating for 1 million more college graduates in stem fields (holdren & lander, 2012). more recently, the trump analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 79 administration has singled out the lack of high-quality stem education as a critical problem facing the nation (united states department of education, 2019). secretary of education elisabeth devos, in fact, has stated that mathematics and science education in the united states has stagnated, though she blamed the previous administrations’ policies rather than efforts by foreign nations for the situation (stahl, 2018). early and modern education: contrast and critique what do these narratives have in common? on the surface, the characterization of education appears distinct in these three historical accounts. for plato, education (including mathematics education) is a state-run affair that is subordinate to the search for first-principles, or forms, which alone guarantee a just and contented society (knorr, 1981). in contrast, rousseau puts his faith in the rational and moral education of the individual, rather than on the state or any other institution, to sustain society (rosenow, 1980). lastly, american education is concerned, at least in principle, with extending the same learning opportunities to all communities and age groups (noddings, 2018). yet, even though the issues plato, rousseau, and the united states government were responding to differ, there is also a sense in which education is seen as a remedy against some societal ill (melachrinou, 2012). in the case of plato, it was the sophists’ free-market approach to education that posed a threat to the principled, elite culture embodied in the paideia (curren, 2000). rousseau, on the other hand, was afraid that the noble virtues of the past—such as charity, courage, and selfreliance—would disappear under the pressure of the ancien régime and bourgeoisie values (melzer, 1980). modern american anxieties are attached to the idea of the nation slipping into global irrelevance (herman, 2019). these threats are as much part of the narrative as are matters of strict pedagogy. but is this emphasis on threats and crises completely unwarranted? in hindsight, the mistakes made by the athenian leadership cost them their hegemony over much of greece. rousseau was certainly not the only one dissatisfied with the french old system in the years leading to the french revolution. and almost by any metric, the united states is lagging behind other nations like singapore or china in stem education. if there is any truth in the old maxim that it is better to be feared than to be loved, then perhaps framing things in terms of crises in order to mobilize people into action is not such a bad idea. however, in my view, there is a danger in relying too much on fear or a ‘crisis’ to rally support and get things done, particularly in education (cf. herman, 2019). the urgency of solving a crisis might inadvertently favor quick solutions over deliberating on long-term ones, inclining people to overlook possible consequences in an effort to get results. let me illustrate this point with one final example. after years of sounding the alarm about america’s failing in education, in december of 2000 then-upcoming president george w. bush called for a bipartisan summit to overhaul the elementary and secondary education act (esea). a legacy of the johnson’s administration, the esea was signed into law in 1965 and revised several times after. but bush’s vision for the law was far more ambitious, analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 80 calling for an expansion of the federal role in education not seen since the sputnik era (klein, 2015). the proposal was spearheaded by rep. john boehner and the late sen. ted kennedy who, alongside members of the house, the senate, and the white house, met regularly to work out the details. however, in the aftermath of the september 11th terrorist attacks, the pressure to get the proposal over the finish line suddenly doubled (in the words of former secretary of education margaret spellings, “we had to strike while the iron was hot;” samuelsohn & vinik, 2015). the final proposal was presented to then-president bush on january 4th, 2002—just over a year from its conception—and signed into law four days later. it became known as the no child left behind (nclb) act. the most salient feature of the nclb was the idea of withholding federal title i money to any school that did not demonstrate yearly progress in mathematics and reading. states were required to test students grades 3 to 8 every year, and at least once in high school. consequently, many teachers began to “teach to the test,” spending less time to cover other subjects like social studies or the arts in order to increase standardized test scores (hanley, roehrig, & canto, 2012). by 2010, however, it was clear the law had become so unpopular and controversial that the obama administration had to waive most of its provisions (klein, 2015). now, there were certain things in the nclb (and its successor, the every student succeeds act or essa) that are commendable: it sought to help historically disadvantaged students, it instilled a sense of accountability from states and schools, and it gave credibility to having national educational standards (turner, 2015). but the nclb failed to achieve its larger objectives, and it is clear in retrospect that part of the reason why is that it was rushed. this case, i hope, elucidates why i see acting out of fear or in crisis mode as risky in practice. it makes it easy to overlook an important philosophical question: assuming the government is a major player in spreading educational equity, what forms of discourse are acceptable for the state to use in achieving its educational goals? in the republic and emile, plato and rousseau were free to shape the narrative as they saw fit—it is clear that their “solutions” were meant to be considered as philosophy and not as workable and sensible educational programs (bloom, 2016). the education of children in the united states, on the other hand, does not afford one such luxury. conclusion this paper aimed to call attention to the idea that the portrayal of education (in particular stem education) as a solution to a social dilemma or crisis has precedents in the western philosophical tradition. it showed, briefly, how a historical reading of plato’s the republic and rousseau’s emile highlights the ways their authors used education as a response to societal threats they saw as critical. similarly, in attempting to promote stem education, american officials oftentimes frame its importance in terms of national security. on this reading, the fear of an imminent crisis is used to mobilize support. finally, i offered a few reasons why i think it may be a bad idea to lean on such a strategy. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 81 to be sure, there is more to plato’s the republic and rousseau’s emile than fears of society collapsing under the sophists or the bourgeoisie, and for that reason, both these works deserve the attention and critical consideration they have enjoyed to this day. i believe the same could be done to reports like a nation at risk, or the history behind the nclb, which may contain lessons of philosophical interest. given that education is always caught in a moment of transition—between the culture it wants to preserve and the culture it wants to become—there is much to be gained by putting old and new ideas about education in critical dialogue. references abramson, l. 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(2015). sophistic method and practice. in m. bloomer (ed.), a companion to ancient education (pp. 63-76). west sussex, uk: john wiley & sons. address correspondences to: guillermo farfan doctoral candidate in learning and cognition dept. of educational psychology and learning systems fsu college of education email: gjf14@my.fus.edu mailto:gjf14@my.fus.edu analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 1 reflecting and looking forward: inquiring into inquiry, philosophy and community1 laurance j. splitter introduction trace the beginnings of my journey in both p4c and p4c2 to my first encounter with matthew lipman, in his “office” which was, in fact, a caravan parked on the campus of montclair state college. that was in august 1982, just prior to my oral examination at oxford, in which i managed to persuade the examiners that my thesis in the philosophy of biology warranted the award of a doctorate degree. over the next few years – and i admit, with mixed feelings – my intellectual (and physical) energy took me out of theoretical philosophy and into philosophical practice, i.e., philosophy for children, although my work in the philosophy of biology had already convinced me that philosophers could make important contributions beyond their own field. as someone long interested in exploring the connection between philosophy and education, p4c “hit the nail on the head”: it was precisely what i had been looking for. i hasten to add, however, that i never lost my interest in, or love for, philosophy itself. indeed, notwithstanding the historical features of p4c that linked it to a specific “curriculum” and pedagogic structure, i have always seen p4c (lower case intended here) as a way of bringing philosophy and young people together, rather than a selfcontained discipline in its own right. after all, we don’t refer to “maths for children” or “science for children”, because we want to preserve the idea that what we are doing in schools really is maths and science. this is somewhat ironic, given that the practice of teaching these subjects in schools often bears little resemblance to what actually goes on in their parent disciplines. to what extent is that also true for philosophy, it might be asked? by way of moving toward an answer to this question, i make two contextual points. first, while i do think that we need a clear sense of what “philosophy” means in the context of p4c, i don’t find it helpful to insist that it refers to pragmatist philosophy alone just because (i) lipman, sharp and subsequent generations of scholars identify with this particular tradition, and (ii) the same tradition has emphasized key aspects of the practice of p4c, including those connected with the pedagogical environment called “the community of inquiry.” speaking from experience, i have found children of all ages happily and productively drawing on and applying (if inadvertently) aspects of the angloamerican analytic tradition, even if this does happen to match my own philosophical predilections. indeed, and this is my second point, i am prepared to assert that philosophy, generally, exemplifies certain elements that lie at the heart of education itself, including a commitment to “getting to the bottom of things” while realizing that the bottom is rarely, if ever, reached and, accordingly, there is always more work to do. this commitment is neatly captured by the term “inquiry” (see gardner, 1995). in this essay, i am engaging in a meta-level inquiry into the nature of inquiry. it is tempting to cite stereotypes of teaching and learning where the chief dynamic is the transmission of “stuff”, along the lines of freire’s (1970) “banking” model of education, in which case i analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 2 philosophy may seem to offer an attractive alternative on the grounds that there is no “stuff” – in the form of accepted content – to be transmitted. however, as appealing as this may be as a marketing ploy for p4c, it misrepresents teaching and learning both generally and in the specific case of philosophy in schools. on the one hand, good teachers in any subject area understand the importance of focusing more on inquiry – as characterized above – (even if their efforts are undermined by rigid models of assessment and accountability); and on the other hand, the practice of teaching and learning in philosophy does not always qualify as inquiry-based. think, for example, of philosophy courses offered at senior secondary level in australia, where the sheer amount of textual content (“stuff”) leaves little room for genuine inquiry; or of philosophy classrooms at any level where – perhaps due to lack of experience or philosophical expertise on the part of the teacher – questioning, discussion and other activities remain superficial at best. these two examples represent a tempting but false dichotomy that needs to be exposed: that between (objective) “fact” and (subjective) “opinion”. both have their place but, taken together, they squeeze out the crucial domain of inquiry which lacks the finality of facts, on the one hand, and the flimsiness of opinions, on the other. i have long supported the idea that classrooms and other learning environments should be transformed into communities of inquiry, regardless of the subject or discipline being taught. while the origins of this concept predate p4c (it being one of lipman’s and ann sharp’s greatest insights to infuse the latter with the former), 3 i believe, nevertheless, that we can learn a great deal about what such a transformation involves by taking as paradigm the model of the community of philosophical inquiry. freed from the accountability requirements associated with finding the “correct” answers, philosophy teachers use “open questioning”, among other strategies, to encourage inquiry – what i term “powerful thinking” – in their students.4 more precisely, these strategies encourage “powerful talking”, i.e., dialogue (i shall have more to say about this below). however, it does not follow that the absence of correct answers is a necessary condition of either open questioning or powerful thinking/dialogue. it does not follow unless we are prepared to rule out the possibility of inquiry in domains like science where, for all intents and purposes, there are well-established answers or, at least, well-understood empirical procedures for arriving at them. indeed, neither the presence nor the absence of “answers” (pre-determined or otherwise) is necessary for inquiry. whether implicitly or explicitly, inquiry is preceded and driven by questions, whereby the process of inquiry may be construed as a search for solutions or answers to these questions. generally, we ask questions when there is something which (i) we do not know or understand and (ii) we wish/seek to know or understand. wishing and seeking, like asking, reflect a motivation driven by curiosity, puzzlement or wonder. but while questions – whether asked explicitly or lying in the background – are essential to any inquiry, their presence does not, by itself, signal that some kind of inquiry is occurring, or is about to occur. i may ask you whether or not it is raining outside, or to account for your whereabouts at the time of the burglary or, in more pedagogically familiar terms, to prove a mathematical theorem (i.e., to ask you for the solution in the expectation that it will require you to produce a proof), or generate a hypothesis about the results of mixing sodium and chloride (i.e., to ask you what happens when you mix them). in all such situations, my questions reflect curiosity on my part although they may not produce much by way of inquiry. notice that this curiosity might be “first-order” or “second-order”: the former when someone is genuinely curious as to the answers to the questions being asked; the latter – characteristic of the “question-response-evaluation” scenarios commonly employed in classrooms – when that curiosity is focused on whether or not those being asked know, or can work out, the answer. my contention is that the potential for genuine inquiry is inversely proportional to the expectation, on the part of those being asked (students, typically), that analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 3 those asking (teachers) already know the answers on account of their expertise, reputation or status. this expectation, in turn, feeds the desire to satisfy the questioner by providing the correct answer. what emerges so far, then, is that (i) many questions, whether first or second-order, are not aimed at provoking inquiry; (ii) inquiry is not ruled out by asking questions that have determinate answers [in any discipline], nor is it guaranteed by asking questions that have no determinate answers (as in philosophy); and (iii) over and above the desire to know or understand something new, the potential for genuine inquiry depends upon the absence of the expectation that someone else – the teacher, the text-book, the computer – already knows the answer. to what extent does this summary capture both the nature of inquiry and what actually drives inquiry? not greatly, it must be said, but it does, at least, point us in the right direction, namely, away from a narrow focus on subject matter and content, toward specific dispositional characteristics of those who engage in inquiry (splitter, 2010a). regarding the latter, we should not ignore the connection between what may be termed “professional inquiry” – i.e., inquiry engaged in by (adult) inquirers such as scientists, historians, mathematicians, philosophers, etc. – and “student inquiry” – i.e., inquiry engaged in by students who may be novices with respect to the subjects in question. i have already stated that inquiry is a process aimed at answering questions or solving problems which precede and drive it. the detailed nature of this process depends upon the subject matter, discipline or field of inquiry, be it philosophy, science, history, social studies, literature, mathematics, etc. i am assuming that each of these disciplines can indeed be associated with a certain discipline of thought and activity, i.e., a body of rules and procedures which guide its followers and practitioners to make certain kinds of moves and avoid other kinds. further, those who hold that the community of inquiry provides an appropriate framework for effective teaching and learning are proposing that students acquire and enact collaboratively the same disciplines of inquiry as those modelled by their more expert counterparts, albeit at a suitable level of complexity in relation to their age, maturity, knowledge level, etc. in short, at the heart of student learning in science, philosophy and history lies their own reflective and self-correcting practice in and of these disciplines. this idea, aimed at reducing the gap between learning x and doing x is hardly new; it serves as a reminder that a community of inquiry is, at least ideally, an authentic environment in which novices, as well as experts – with teachers placed somewhere between these extremes – regard themselves as thinking scientifically, mathematically, philosophically, and so on (splitter, 2009; taylor, 1991).5 the idea of settlement 6 irrespective of one’s commitment to something called “the truth,” i share the pragmatist view that the process of inquiry involves moving from a state of “unsettlement” to one of (relative) “settlement” (judgment), while realizing that the latter is, itself, a “resting place” from which, in due course, further inquiry may be launched (just as a plateau represents a resting place on the way to the mountain peak) (dewey, 1938, 1956).7 i also agree with the central place that open questioning plays, both in initiating and in furthering the inquiry. but what precisely is open questioning? i have rejected the view that open questions are questions with no settled answers, on the grounds that it sets too high a standard for inquiry as an activity that can realistically be pursued by students. there ought to be room for (open) inquiry irrespective of the state of settlement, at least if the latter refers to what is known or understood by relevant experts (notably, scientists and other scholars). and, indeed, there is room, if we shift the focus of what counts as settled from the experts to the students, who may or may not be on their way to becoming experts. in so doing, we also focus on both the type and the level of analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 4 motivation that moves them to search for answers (or explanations). i hold that: the feeling or belief that matters are unsettled, in so far as it determines the dispositional states of those inquiring, is the crucial ingredient needed for sparking an inquiry, irrespective of the state of settlement among relevant experts in the field. in referring to feeling and belief here, i have in mind two aspects of unsettlement which are mutually reinforcing. when we are genuinely puzzled or intrigued by something (a question, problem, scenario), we both feel a sense of unsettlement that yearns to be resolved (psychological or subjective unsettlement) and, within the context and boundaries of our current state of knowledge, believe that the answer really is unknown or unresolved (epistemological unsettlement). of course, when those inquiring happen to be, or include, relevant experts, then their sense that things are not settled may be taken as definitive of the state of knowledge in the field itself. but since my concern here is with the conditions underlying student-based inquiry, we do need to distinguish between questions that students find unsettling and those that relevant experts find unsettling. the following is a list of dispositions or attitudes that are involved in the inquiry process which, taken together, elucidate the role played by the transition from “unsettlement” to “settlement”: 1. an awareness – including self-awareness – that we (i.e. the group or community which is asking or responding to the initial question or confronting a puzzling scenario) either don’t know the answer to the question or do not understand something which is needed for its solution (epistemological unsettlement); 2. first-order curiosity or puzzlement (psychological unsettlement) which motivates us to look for answers, understanding, explanations…8 3. a belief or expectation that we can find a satisfactory – and satisfying – answer/response/ explanation [settlement] or, at least, make some progress toward one (relative settlement); 4. more general dispositions such as patience, persistence, confidence, thoroughness, respecting the procedures appropriate to the mode of inquiry (e.g. scientific or historical method, reasoning, conceptual thinking…), and a commitment to self-corrective thinking. these dispositions are known as “intellectual virtues”. the rationale for adding 3 (the belief or expectation that settlement is possible) is that it motivates us to proceed, and reinforces the general dispositions described under 4. conversely, in the absence of such a belief or expectation – which can also be described in terms of hope – any attempt to move forward may well be viewed as pointless. still, it is worth pointing out that in the right circumstances – an inspiring teacher who invokes trust, a supportive community of fellow inquirers – we might be moved to proceed in the absence of such a belief or hope. the “illusion of unsettlement” in practice, the dispositional sequence i have outlined does not always run smoothly. earlier i proposed that the potential for genuine inquiry is inversely proportional to the expectation, on the part of those being asked (students, typically), that those asking (the teacher) already know the answer on account of their expertise, reputation or status. this expectation, in turn, motivates students to satisfy the teacher by providing the correct answer (or, at least, the answer she is looking for). it also motivates the teacher to provide an appropriate evaluation or confirmation in response (“right!”; “not quite!”, “anyone else?”…). such expectations and motivations distract from, if not subvert, the analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 5 inquiry process; after all, there is a difference between getting to the bottom of things and arriving, expeditiously, at solutions which have been pre-determined. in these situations, which are all-too familiar to students and teachers alike, the first-order curiosity about the original question or puzzle, outlined in 2 above, is replaced by the motivation to get the right answer and “move on”. fortunately, this scenario is not inevitable, even when teachers are confident that they do know the answers to, and understand the issues behind, the questions that are asked. good teachers know how to keep the spark of curiosity alive in their students, to fuel their desire to find the answers for themselves (albeit collaboratively and under her guidance), and to persuade them that solutions are, indeed, within their reach. they do this by distracting students from playing the familiar “can you tell me the answer that i am looking for?” game by acting as co-inquirers and facilitators rather than experts with respect to the subject matter involved. this, in turn, requires teachers to engineer a different kind of game which may be termed “entertaining the illusion of unsettlement”; that is, simulating in the classroom the same kind of environment as might be found among scientists or other experts (including philosophers) working at the epistemological boundaries of their disciplines. assuming that the questions at issue do arouse the curiosity of students so that they experience a sense of intellectual unsettlement and a corresponding desire to find a solution (1 and 2 above), teachers can demonstrate, by their own practice and attitudes, that there will be no inevitable “shortcuts” to resolution and that the only way for students to relieve their sense of unsettlement is to think about the issues for themselves. the following comment nicely captures what i have in mind here: “good teachers…know the set curriculum outcomes, but suspend desire for these… allowing them to be rediscovered through [genuine] inquiry…” (metcalfe and game, cited in scholl 2010, 6). i take it that suspending desire for predetermined curriculum outcomes is akin to both suspending desire (on the part of students) to gain the teacher’s approval by obtaining the “right” answer, and suspending desire (on the part of the teacher) to push students toward a known outcome. how, in practice, do teachers suspend such desire (their own and their students’)? not by insisting that there is no outcome to be obtained; such insistence is likely to drain the potential inquiry of much of its interest. nor again by requiring teachers to pretend that they do not know the likely outcome; this threatens to make the whole activity even less authentic than it may seem already. teachers suspend the desire for predetermined outcomes by embedding questions and problems into contexts which students find intrinsically enticing, intriguing, puzzling, etc. the expectation here is that such intrinsically motivating factors are sufficiently powerful as to subdue or divert the extrinsic desires described above. this is why teachers in a community of inquiry, instead of introducing a topic with specific questions that are likely to provide only extrinsic motivation (whereby students will ask themselves “what answer is she looking for?”), usually begin by sharing a scenario or context (story, video, activity, media article, etc.) which both has a strong likelihood of puzzling, intriguing or otherwise capturing the interest of students and is linked, in appropriate ways, to the subject matter that they intend to cover. the case of philosophy and the “illusion of settlement” many children, like many adult philosophers, are content to discuss philosophical questions indefinitely, without the expectation that at the end of the day, they will have arrived at – and, presumably, agreed upon – any solutions. others, however, may not relish the prospect of an inquiry which never ends, preferring either to give up in frustration (“this is going around in circles”; “there are no answers so what’s the point?”…) or not to begin in the first place. again, pointing out to students that the questions about which they are deliberating have been around for thousands of years analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 6 and never satisfactorily answered is likely to appeal to some (“wow! we are really having a dialogue with plato (etc.) here”) but not others. it is easy to dismiss the negative side by pointing out that this is what happens when students are spoon-fed solutions or spend their school lives answering questions and solving problems that, as they well know, have been answered and solved by thousands before them. however, such a response is not altogether convincing because, irrespective of the epistemological status of questions that really do not have settled answers, there is a separate expectation – and corresponding belief – on the part of those engaged in an inquiry that if we just keep trying, we will, indeed, find a solution and, thereby, conclude the inquiry. why bother asking questions in the first place if we are already convinced that there are no answers? i had long thought that the only decent response to the conundrum posed by this last question was to advise inquirers to adjust their cognitive expectations and beliefs away from the unrealistic prospect of the right or final truth of the matter, toward more modest objectives. two such objectives come to mind; one substantive, the other procedural. on the one hand, student inquirers should celebrate those occasional “light bulb” or “aha!” moments that signify both a breakthrough in their understanding, and a resting point or plateau on their journey toward finding a solution (“so there are at least three types of reality,” “i can see now how the mind can exist without being an actual object,” “so both intention and outcome are important elements to consider when making ethical judgments”, …). on the other hand, they can celebrate mastering a new procedure (argument by analogy, identifying hidden assumptions, even asking a philosophical question…) that will likely assist them in future inquiries. needless to say, such objectives tend to be complementary: mastering a new procedure leads to a new and important substantive realization, etc. while i stand by these ways of modifying our original expectations when faced with philosophical questions, i now think that something further may also be needed – or, at least, helpful. it brings us back to the idea, expressed in condition 3 above, that a key aim of any inquiry is to arrive at some kind of settlement which, as i have explained, has both psychological and epistemic aspects. for, surely, the settlement aimed for refers to the original question itself, i.e., as a whole, not just in part, and not just some procedural gains along the way. in this respect, philosophical inquiry with students is not so different from that which engages professional philosophers (and, needless to say, teachers of philosophy). when embarking on a philosophical inquiry, we may need to play a different game which can be called “entertaining an illusion of settlement”; that is, we proceed with the same kind of dispositional state of mind as we would in an area such as science, where there is a clear assumption that if only we had sufficient time, energy, patience, etc., we would indeed come up with a solution. that we do not, in fact, find it does not dent our commitment to ongoing inquiry, as long as we continue to entertain the same illusion. moreover, we deem the inquiry to be justified and worthwhile because, when we look back and see what we have achieved, we realize we have made real progress on procedural and/or substantive grounds, as discussed above. upon further reflection, i do not think that characterizing the philosophical questions as questions with no settled answers is particularly helpful. i am thinking here not just of the need for an illusion of settlement to make the inquiry seem worthwhile, but also because it is simply not clear that no philosophical questions have settled answers. if we think of such familiar philosophical puzzles as those concerning the concept of identity (the ship of theseus and heraclitus’ claim that “you cannot step into the same river twice”), it does seem that once we become clear about the meanings of the key concepts involved, the puzzles can be resolved. in my terms, conceptual clarification and analysis can, at least sometimes, relieve the sense of unsettlement, both psychologically and epistemologically. in this respect such analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 7 philosophical problems are akin to those in science and other disciplines, yet warrant being described as “philosophical” because of the manner in which we seek to solve them. follow-up, probing or socratic questions thus far i have aligned my discussion of the dispositions conducive to inquiry with the kinds of questions that initiate or spark inquiry. but there is another type of question which is highly relevant to the structure of inquiry, namely, those questions we often term “procedural” or “followup” questions (as noted in the above heading, i also associate the terms “probing” and “socratic” with this type, because these are the questions characteristically employed by socrates in his dialogues with scholars and students in ancient athens). in our 1995 book, ann sharp and i constructed a graph consisting of two axes: “procedural-substantive” and “closed-open” (splitter and sharp 1995, 58). examples of procedural questions include “are you implying that…?”, “what assumption is being made here?”, “do you agree with her reasoning?”, “if you are right about that, what would follow?”, “can you find a counter-example to this rule?” and so on. what role do such questions play in inquiry and how well do they qualify according to the dispositional aspects i have been considering?9 it is no accident that procedural questions of this type are invariably context-dependent (or indexical), as indicated by the open-ended “…” and use of the terms “here”, “this”, “that”, “her”, etc., whose actual references can be suppled only by tracing them back to specific items (statements, persons, etc.) previously referred to. whatever substantive content they have is drawn from those items and contexts. in presenting them in an abbreviated or schematic form as shown, we focus attention on their primary purpose, which is to explore or probe the logic, direction and shape of the inquiry as it unfolds. but the inquiry itself derives its content from more substantive questions and responses. likewise, for the dispositional conditions i have been discussing. we do not need to be overly concerned with whether or not inquirers are aware that they don’t know the answer to specific procedural questions or if they induce a sense of unsettlement, etc., so long as the substantive elements of the inquiry meet these conditions. of course – and this is an important qualification – if it should turn out that students do not understand a particular procedural move (looking for a counter-example, identifying the argument structure used, etc.), then the procedure may become the subject of a separate inquiry. indeed, it is a merit of philosophical inquiry that in the course of asking about the meaning of substantive terms like “truth,” “real” or “mind,” we may find it necessary to digress (as it were) in order to consider what such procedural terms as “counter-example” or “valid argument” mean. all concepts (and associated questions) are potential topics for philosophical inquiry. by contrast, teachers of science, history or literature who discover that students do not grasp the meaning or significance of certain procedural elements may find it more difficult to devote time to clarifying the latter because to do so would take them beyond the substantive boundaries of their own discipline or subject matter, and so may exceed either their own capabilities (basic logic is not a regular subject in teacher education) or the time allocated for the subjects in question. of course, such boundary problems would be less troublesome if (i) teacher professional development were more inclusive of the philosophical dimensions of teaching and curriculum, and (ii) school curricula and timetables were more fluid and integrated, reflecting the epistemological reality that human inquiry and experience are not neatly carved up according to subject area. inquiry as self-corrective thinking matthew lipman wrote that inquiry can be characterized as “self-correcting practice in which a subject matter is investigated with the aim of discovering or inventing ways of dealing with what is analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 8 problematic” (lipman 2003, 184). good inquirers are willing to temper their passion and enthusiasm for their subject matter by exhibiting those attitudes or dispositions – intellectual humility, persistence, self-effacement, sense of fallibility, etc. – which make it relatively easy for them to selfcorrect, that is, to acknowledge the power of a counter-argument or objection made by a co-inquirer (or perhaps themselves) and rethink their point of view – perhaps even their entire line of inquiry. in the absence of such dispositions, the inquiry may not even get off the ground because those involved will be reluctant to admit that there is something of concern which they do not know or about which they are less than certain. to the extent that certainty excludes the possibility of being mistaken, it, as much as indifference, is the enemy of all genuine thought and inquiry. conversely, as can be corroborated by studying the history of scientific inquiry, the path of progress toward greater understanding and knowledge allows for – and, arguably, necessitates – making, acknowledging and repairing mistakes. in the terms of the present discussion, dogmatic and authoritarian thinking lacks the crucial sense of unsettlement which drives inquiry. dogmatism – including all forms of fundamentalism and extremism – is not the only obstacle to inquiry. to be unsettled by a question, in my sense, presupposes that we care about it – and, in turn, we care about finding an answer or solution or, at least, making some progress toward one. accordingly, one avoids the sense of unsettlement simply by failing to care, a condition often manifested by disillusioned or alienated students who feel that regular schooling has nothing to offer them. needless to say, we cannot compel others to care but here we find one important merit of the classroom when it functions as a community of inquiry: its members develop a multi-dimensional sense of care which embraces caring for one another as persons, caring for the procedures of inquiry (i.e., for the quality of those skills and strategies in which they engage and which they seek to master as powerful thinkers), and caring for the questions, topics, concepts and other elements which make up the content of their inquiry. it is this pervasive sense of care which, in turn, underlies the key dispositions of inquiry that i have been discussing. needless to say, students also care about other aspects of their school experience, including gaining appropriate recognition from teachers and peer group, and progressing through the various grade levels that lead to “success.” it is unrealistic to imagine them not caring about these things; still, the prospects for genuinely powerful thinking and inquiry depend upon cultivating in them the more intrinsic sense of care to which i have been alluding (splitter, 2010b; also, noddings, 2002). philosophical inquiry so far, i have defended several claims, including: that inquiry, as a practice which involves and cultivates powerful thinking, is not restricted to philosophy; and that philosophical inquiry is not adequately characterized in terms of having no (settled) solutions. these claims lead naturally to the question: “what constitutes philosophical inquiry?” i wrote earlier that “in this respect [namely, in being resolvable] such philosophical problems are akin to those in science and other disciplines, yet warrant being described as ‘philosophical’ because of the manner in which we seek to solve them.” the underlying point here is that the procedures which characterize philosophical inquiry are not (i.e. not solely) empirical or narrowly logical (e.g. deductive), or linguistic (e.g. textual analysis). they are conceptual, given that the questions and problems which move us to do philosophy are, primarily, conceptual in nature, where these concepts form the fundamental building blocks of our understanding of the world and ourselves. concepts are not merely classifiers; they are vehicles for meaning-making (or sense-making). the capacity to form and apply concepts of varying degrees of abstractness is part of what it means to be a person. as persons we are each aware of ourselves as one among others who are, jointly, aware of a common world. we use concepts to make sense of the world to analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 9 ourselves and one another. in this collaborative process of making sense, we also find ourselves needing continually to construct and reconstruct these concepts. we see this process at work in a community of philosophical inquiry even with young children, when they attempt to make sense of terms such as “friend,” “fair,” “right,” “mind” – terms which may well be familiar to them, but whose accepted meanings require rethinking in light of new experiences (whether real or imagined) on which they reflect together. in practice, it is a hallmark of philosophical inquiry that its participants can readily identify one or more concepts whose meanings are the subject matter of their deliberations. it bears reiterating that conceptual agreements and resolutions should be regarded as temporary resting places rather than final solutions and, accordingly, further inquiry always beckons to us. granted, this is a feature of all forms of inquiry, but where students in subject areas such as science and mathematics must, ultimately, defer to the expertise currently available, students in philosophy are free to transcend the limits of what they, or anyone, claims to know or understand. finally on this point, notwithstanding my preference for a more integrated syllabus which leaves room both for improving the tools of powerful thinking, and for deliberating on the meanings of key concepts – including those which lie at the heart of the disciplines (number and function in mathematics; mass, force, energy, causality, in science; change and agency in history;…) – i am skeptical of the view that in such a syllabus, there would be no need or place for philosophy itself. its venerability among disciplines should be respected; but its importance to young people who have an opportunity to engage in and with it, is even more salient. philosophy matters to children, and they have a right to do it. remembering the community in “community of inquiry” inquiry, like thinking itself, is internalized as a social practice in which forms of linguistic expression and communication – notably, dialogue – are essential ingredients. elsewhere, i have cited both empirical and conceptual factors in defense of this thesis (in line with the thinking of a broad range of scholars, including peirce, mead, vygotsky, bakhtin, dewey, habermas, gadamer, macintyre, ricoeur, appiah, taylor, lipman, and davidson10). these social and inter-personal dimensions of thinking and inquiry are needed to make sense of the psychological, affective and epistemological elements of questioning, including the sense of settlement/unsettlement, selfawareness and self-correction to which i have given attention. while scholars from many disciplines (including various schools of philosophy) have articulated and defended various elements of this thesis, i will not resist the temptation to cite davidson who, among those mentioned, stands out as an analytic philosopher par excellence. while never – to my knowledge – writing about education specifically, his celebrated theory of mind makes clear reference to the social origins of thought and knowledge: “a community of minds is the basis of knowledge; it provides the measure of all things”. (2001, 218). again, “writing may portray, but cannot constitute, the intersubjective exchanges in which meanings are created and firmed. socrates was right: reading is not enough. if we want to approach the harder wisdom we must talk and, of course, listen” (1994, 432). how does the kind of community, qua environment for powerful thinking and talking, referred to in the previous paragraph, bear on the more common-place sense of community as used in the social sciences and media? at one extreme, the term “community” serves as an innocuous placeholder for just about any group of people who are connected by a common attribute or quality: the australian community, the lgbtqi community, the community of christians and jews, the lefthanded community, the world community… , i.e., virtually any group at all! at another extreme, it connotes the kind of collective or institution which generates a strong sense of belonging and moral analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 10 purpose for its members. examples include the nation/state, religion, ethnic group, tribe, culture, and so on. elsewhere i have criticized this view, largely on the grounds that it is based on a confused notion of identity, and has given rise to populist modes of thinking by which individuals seek to identify with others who are “like them,” at the exclusion of those who are not. i shall not attempt to revisit this issue here, although, given the political realities currently confronting us around the world, resolving it remains a matter of great significance. my point in mentioning these uses of the term “community” is to contrast them with the sense intended when we speak about the community of inquiry. a clue to this intended sense is found in the inter-dependence of thinking and talking, more specifically, of powerful thinking – i.e., inquiry – and powerful talking – i.e., dialogue. while i hold that both inquiry and dialogue – which are really two sides of a coin – have specific features beyond those of everyday thinking and conversation (including the sense of unsettlement and commitment to selfcorrection discussed above), what i wish to emphasize here is that those engaged in inquiry and dialogue are persons and, conversely, that persons are those entities who engage – or, at least, who strive to engage – in inquiry and dialogue. to be a person in the world is to regard (in the sense of awareness) oneself as one among others, where “others” refers both to other persons (i.e., those who also regard themselves …) and to those objects in the world of which we have common experience. according to this conceptual thesis of triangulation, as articulated and defended by davidson among others, these forms of awareness are mutually irreducible and interdependent. my own self-awareness is inextricably linked to my awareness of others, as my awareness of the world is inextricably linked to theirs. but the links in question are not made in some mysterious mental realm (“mind-melding”); they are made in the ordinary material world in which we co-exist and of which we have shared experience (for davidson, there is no other world). these links are “the intersubjective exchanges in which meanings are created and firmed” (davidson, above) and, while these exchanges can take many forms, they are, in their most full-blooded and richest sense, linguistic. there need not be – indeed, there must not be – any constraints, boundaries or limitations placed on those eligible to participate in such exchanges (differences of language, culture and tribe notwithstanding), other than those that constitute what we mean by being a person. indeed, and to complete the circle, to be a person just is to be eligible to participate. the sense of community which captures this conception of personhood is, somewhat paradoxically, both crucial and ultimately redundant. crucial, because as a dialogical environment, it brings us together inter-subjectively. redundant, because unlike those groups and associations which all too often impose extrinsic conditions of existence and morality on their members, the community of inquiry (or of dialogue) is nothing other than a relational network of its own members, bound by whatever existential and moral commitments they bring to it. as such it is a means to an end (we might describe the latter as becoming a person) and is, inevitably, left behind as its members move on. concluding comments: what does a philosophy curriculum for young people look like? to what extent does a focus on concepts, together with reflective practice in the tools that make for powerful thinking, provide the structure for a curriculum in philosophy, i.e., a sequence of lessons/activities that form a coherent whole for children and adolescents over a specified period of time (a semester, a year, several years, etc.), while corresponding, if loosely, to different philosophical styles and subdisciplines? i recently addressed this question in the context of p4c in australia, which moved away from the original iapc curriculum model during the 1990s (splitter 2019), a move analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 11 echoed in other english-speaking countries. i noted there that while every generation faces new benefits and challenges brought about by increased knowledge (and information) and technological expertise, “our stock of concepts, by which we seek to classify, organize and make sense of our knowledge and experience is relatively enduring and resilient.” (76). we may not yet fully understand the ethical and epistemological implications of globalization, social media and the growth of ai (with driverless vehicles just around the corner, so to speak), to take some familiar examples, but the underlying concepts that are involved will “continue to be reflected in questions about what is the right thing to do, how we should treat others, [whether] our claims to knowledge [can] be justified, and so on.” (76). inquiries in the history of ideas reveal that these very concepts and questions have been around for thousands of years, kept alive, in part, by their application to changing circumstances and new experiences, but also by their intrinsic contestability. in light of the recursive and cyclical nature of the concepts and questions which form the building-blocks of philosophical inquiry, how realistic is it to believe, as lipman and sharp did, that a “core curriculum” in philosophy could be constructed for children and adolescents? in addressing this question, we need to acknowledge that philosophical inquiry, even – perhaps especially! – in the hands and minds of children, quickly takes on a life of its own, as new circumstances and challenges to old solutions (points of settlement) arise; accordingly, any attempt to limit or constrain a philosophy curriculum in terms of content (“stuff”) to be learned is doomed to failure. concepts, as the bearers of meaning, cannot be defined by any specific set of examples or instances. we understand or grasp concepts such as right by linking them, both to instances or exemplars (e.g. right or wrong actions…), and to other concepts whose meanings may be related or contrasted (right seems related to just and fair, but quite different from wrong and power…). such links cannot be limited or predetermined by teachers or other “experts”. but teachers can guide students as they seek to forge these links for themselves, based on their own experiences and dialogical exchanges. guidance in this sense has several dimensions, including modelling and assisting with the procedures of inquiry (notably, thinking procedures), and experience with forging such links themselves, based on their experiences and dialogical exchanges. there are clear implications here for the kinds of teacher professional development required for teachers of philosophy. but there are also implications for a well-structured curriculum which provides a framework or model for students as they gain mastery of the appropriate conceptual links and procedures. the iapc curriculum stands as exemplary for several reasons: its novels and teacher manuals correspond roughly to different age groups and class levels; they provide models of inquiry, via fictional characters who grapple – both dialogically and by themselves – with a broad range of familiar but contestable concepts – notably, those which have featured throughout the history of philosophy in their attempts to make sense of their experiences;11 this process of grappling is not resolved by the imposition of an adult or “expert” viewpoint – indeed, it is often not resolved at all; it involves the reflective use of thinking or inquiry procedures (critical, creative and “caring”) to construct and evaluate chains of reasoning and the conceptual links by which the characters expand and deepen their understandings of familiar yet puzzling scenarios and problems. while these exemplary features may be open to challenge or modification, they support the claim that teachers of philosophy – and even more specifically, those who train these teachers – benefit from understanding and appreciating what the iapc attempted to do (by spending time doing p4c as p4c!). they will, then, be in a stronger position to create or utilize alternative approaches and curriculum materials. the above considerations suggest, to me at least, that the very idea of a core curriculum in p4c is, if not misguided or unrealistic, then not the primary area of concern for those of us who are analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 12 committed to bringing philosophy and children together. what matters more – apart from finding room in a crowded timetable – is ensuring that schools, teacher educators, teachers and, in due course, students themselves, are committed to the integrity of philosophy as an age-old tradition of conceptual thought, inquiry and, as appropriate, action. in simpler terms, what matters is that they are actually doing philosophy as opposed, say, to merely bouncing opinions around or resting content with what others have come up with. earlier, i suggested that our grasp of concepts depends on our capacity to link them, in appropriate ways, to other concepts that matter to us, and to exemplars (including those we encounter in our lives). but as i have noted elsewhere, we need also to attend “to the links and threads that bind philosophical issues of contemporary concern with those that have generated philosophy inquiry and dialogue for thousands of years. p4c invites children of all ages, abilities and backgrounds to join this dialogue…” (2019, 84). in response to the question “to whom does ‘we’ refer here?”, i repeat my insistence that while it includes young people and teachers, it is not their responsibility alone: on the one hand, children are moved more by what is philosophically present to them than by what, or who, has gone before; and on the other hand, most teachers do not have the kind of background that would give them mastery over the links and threads to which i have referred. this responsibility must also be embraced by the academy, and shared by members of the academic philosophical community. forging and sustaining links among young people, teachers, teacher educators and professional philosophers remains, perhaps, our greatest challenge.* endnotes 1 i use this terminology to distinguish between the specific curriculum created by the institute for the advancement of philosophy for children (“p4c”), and the broad range of alternatives developed and used in many parts of the world (“p4c”). 2 for an excellent discussion of the origins of “community of inquiry” and its role in historical inquiry, see seixas, 1993. also, sharp, 1987, 1996. 3 “powerful thinking,” in my terminology, includes what has become known in p4c as “critical, creative and caring thinking”. see, for example, lipman, 2003, thayer-bacon, 1993, noddings, 2002. 4 there is an extensive body of research on the ideas of authenticity and inquiry in the mathematics classroom. see, for example, lampert, 1990; cobb, stephan, mcclain & gravemeijer, 2001; yackel & cobb, 1996. 5 some of the material in this and subsequent sections is taken from splitter 2016. 6 a useful discussion of how both early and later pragmatist philosophers (e.g. peirce, james and dewey; and putnam and rorty, respectively) dealt with issues of truth and inquiry is in capps, 2019. 7 these two aspects of unsettlement do not always go together. i/we may agree that we do not know the answer or understand the problem, but be uninterested in finding a solution. 8 the importance of “socratic” questioning in promoting critical thinking is a key theme in richard paul’s work. see paul, 1993, paul & elder, 2006. 9 splitter 2015 chapter 7 includes a detailed discussion of this issue, together with references to the writers named in the text. 10 it will surprise many to learn that the iapc constructed detailed bibliographies linking the novels and teacher manuals to parts of the philosophical tradition. (*) i am grateful to the anonymous reviewers assigned by the editor for their very helpful comments and suggestions. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 13 references capps, j. (2019). the pragmatic theory of truth. in e. zalta (ed.). the stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. retrieved from: url = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/truth-pragmatic/>. cobb, p., stephan, m., mcclain, k., & gravemeijer, k. (2001). participating in classroom mathematical practices. the journal of the learning sciences, 10, 113-163. davidson, d. (2001). three varieties of knowledge. in d. davidson (ed.). subjective, intersubjective, objective (pp. 205-220). oxford: clarendon press. davidson, d. (1994). dialectic and dialogue. in g. preyer, f. siebelt & a. ulfig (eds.). language, mind and epistemology (pp. 429-437). dordrecht: kluwer academic publishers. dewey, j. (1938). experience and education. new york: the macmillan company. dewey, j. (1956). the child and the curriculum. chicago: university of chicago press. gardner, s. (1995). inquiry is no mere conversation. critical and creative thinking: the australasian journal of philosophy for children, 3(2), 38-49. freire, p. (1970). pedagogy of the oppressed, m. macedo (trans.), new york: bloomsbury academic, 2000. lampert, m. (1990). when the problem is not the question and the solution is not the answer: mathematical knowing and teaching. american educational research journal, 27(1), 29-63. lipman, m. (2003). thinking in education. second edition. cambridge uk: cambridge university press. noddings, n. (2002) educating moral people: a caring alternative to character education. new york: teachers college press. paul, r. (1993). critical thinking: what every person needs to survive in a rapidly changing world. (rev. 3rd. edition). santa rosa, ca: foundation for critical thinking. paul, r. and elder, l. (2006). the miniature guide to critical chinking: concepts and tools. (4th. edition). dillon beach, ca: foundation for critical thinking. scholl, r. (2010). the question quadrant: a stimulus for a negotiated curriculum. primary & middle years educator, 8(2), 3-16. seixas, p. (1993). the community of inquiry as a basis for knowledge and learning: the case of history. american educational research journal, 30(2), 305-24. sharp, a. (1987). what is a community of inquiry? journal of moral education, 16(1), 22-30. sharp, a. (1996). self-transformation in the community of inquiry. inquiry: critical thinking across the disciplines, 16(1), 36-47. splitter, l. (2019). memo to harry stottlemeier and friends: you are not wanted here. reflections on the idea of a philosophy curriculum in australia. in g. burgh & s. thornton (eds.) philosophical inquiry with children: the development of an inquiring society in australia (pp. 73-86). london and ny: routledge. splitter, l. j. (2016) the dispositional ingredients at the heart of questioning and inquiry. journal of philosophy in schools, 3(2), 18-39. splitter, l. (2015). identity and personhood: confusions and clarifications across disciplines. singapore: springer. splitter, l. (2010a). dispositions in education: nonentities worth talking about. educational theory, 60(2), 203-230. splitter, l. (2010b). caring for “the self as one-among-others”. thinking: the journal of philosophy for children, 19(4), 33-39. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 14 splitter, l. (2009). authenticity and constructivism in education. studies in philosophy and education 28(2), 135-151 splitter, l. & sharp a. (1995). teaching for better thinking: the classroom community of inquiry. melbourne: the australian council for educational research. taylor, c. (1991) the ethics of authenticity. cambridge, mass: harvard university press. thayer-bacon, b. (1993). caring and its relationship to critical thinking. educational theory, 43(3), 323-40. yackel, e., & cobb. p. (1996). sociomathematical norms, argumentation, and autonomy in mathematics. journal for research in mathematics education, 27(4), 458-477.(*) address correspondences to: dr. laurance j. splitter honorary professor at the education university of hong kong, and honorary associate at the university of melbourne email: laurance.splitter@unimelb.edu.au about:blank analytic teaching and philosophical praxis analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 39, issue 2 (2019) editor’s welcome the five articles that make up the second issue of volume 39 focus largely on either suggesting helpful ways of implementing philosophy for children (p4c), or identifying challenges with the community of inquiry (coi), with one article that looks at the larger educational value of a philosophical education in cultivating a more responsible sense of tolerance. the first article by gardner, anderson and henry explores the difficult problem of how one reasons with people who simply refuse to be reasonable or even listen to what others have to say on a subject. the second piece by davenza tillmanns provides some helpful examples of how to use picture books to stimulate philosophical thinking, while the third article by anderson looks at the value of roleplaying games in enhancing p4c. the fourth article by tiedemann transitions away from the p4c/coi community to look at larger challenges involving the cultivation of tolerance in schools, especially from the standpoint of the european school system. the final article by zuidland is a personal testament to the power of ann sharp to inspire us, as she offers an overview and reflection on gregory and laverty’s recent anthology, in community of inquiry with ann margaret sharp. together, the five articles take up a variety of issues that either provide advice on how to meet the challenges of facilitating communal inquiries, or engage some of the fundamental assumptions that underscore the purpose of coi and the integration of philosophy in education. i hope the current volume finds you all doing well and engaged in a project you love. pax et bonum jason j. howard chief editor jason j. howard viterbo university web page master jason skoog viterbo university copy editor jason j. howard viterbo university editorial board sara cook viterbo university susan gardner capilano university susan hughes viterbo university david kennedy montclair state university nadia s. kennedy stony brook university, suny richard morehouse, emeritus viterbo university félix garcía moriyón center for philosophy for children, madrid, spain joe oyler maynooth university, kildare, ireland barbara weber university of british columbia publisher viterbo university, la crosse, wisconsin 45601 established in 1981 as analytic teaching at texas wesleyan college and transferred to viterbo in 1993. online copyright 2005. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis is a peer-reviewed, online, open access journal published annually and sometimes biannually. issn 2374-8257 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 97 book review why we are in need of tails maria davenza tillmanns with illustrations by blair thornley iguana books (toronto) 35 pages 2019 hardcover: $12.49, paper: $9.99, kindle: $8.49 (us dollars) review by sergey borisov wonderful philosophical book with a mysterious title "why we are in need tails" lies before me. the book is a short story by the philosopher maria davenza tillmanns, accompanied by illustrations by the artist blair thornley. maria teaches philosophy with children in a program developed in collaboration with the university of california at san diego. in 1980, she enrolled in a teacher trainer workshop in philosophy for children conducted by matthew lipman. in 1998 she received her phd in philosophical counseling and teaching under the guidance of maurice friedman (a world-renowned martin buber scholar). thus, the author of the book i am introducing is an accomplished professional philosopher with her own distinctive and unique style. for maria, philosophy is an art form and she likes to "paint with ideas" (p. 35). a talented artist blair thornley embodied these ideas in her illustrations. blair is an award-winning illustrator with publications in the new york times, boston globe, washington post, and others. she has also illustrated the books of writers peter de vries and james thurber. so, what's this book about? how did its author manage to put big philosophy into one small story? to understand this requires basic philosophical training, but even without it, it greatly appeals to the imagination. the characters of this amazing book—huk and tuk—are used to expressing their friendship through their tails. friendship is a strong ties-tails that binds people together. these ties, though strong, enhance freedom. besides, these ties should be organic; they should be natural, not artificial. it is a pity that we rarely have that magical "tail" that connects us to one another’s presence in our lives, even as we are busy with our daily activities. over time, many artificial devices for the convenience of our lives made the tails unnecessary, and they gradually disappeared. and only then the scale of the catastrophe became clear, which was a analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 98 that people lost direct tail-contact with each other. communication lost its intense subtlety and precision. people began to compensate for the lack of communication with the help of language. but if previously only the tail was enough to communicate, now it takes hundreds of words to convey or express something. however, we still cannot always achieve our goal. we can be heard, but we are not understood. without tails, we cannot pass on to the other the full depth of our feelings and thoughts. we can be there for each other, but there's something missing; we feel disconnected, distant from the other somehow. but the author of the book knows the cure for this awkwardness. we are helped by metaphors, images, i.e., everything that is contained in wonderful fairy tales. and understanding becomes possible. an allegory, a metaphor, a figurative vision, connects us with our invisible tails and our invisible roots. through this subtle subconscious connection we feel unity with each other, because through these tails-tales we are all rooted in culture. on the other hand, invisible connections are everywhere. for example, as the author of this beautiful story claims, string theory is a kind of tail-theory. invisible strings permeate the universe, forming space-time gravitational fields. everything is connected with everything through this intertwining of tails-traces left by our physical interactions and the course of events. it's all about keeping the world in balance. everything is intertwined and present to each other in different ways, much like yin and yang. therefore, in everything there is its opposite—a condition of transition and change creating a dynamic and pulsating whole. by losing our tails and thus losing a direct connection with the world and with another person, we lose a connection with ourselves. the magic is that to feel connected to myself, i must be connected with the other. connecting means that i feel the other as myself and i feel like the other. if i don’t feel the other in me, i may not see, let alone think about how my desires will affect others and the world at large. i end up living “in the void,” wishing for something that cannot be. this becomes the root of my forever-unfulfilled dissatisfaction. according to protagoras, “man is the measure of all things.” maybe we should include the other in our “measure” of all things. the lack of connection to the other makes me assertive and arrogant. without feeling a real connection, i can consider my thoughts to be the thoughts of another, and project my desires onto the desires of another. reality becomes vague and distorted, and the uncertainty this creates, makes me more assertive and arrogant. my knowledge of the world without my deeper connection to the world makes this knowledge not only arrogant, but foolish and essentially completely unnecessary. the only way to keep in touch is to be able to listen to the other so that it is always on, as the author of the book writes, stereo listening mode. unlike the mono mode, which implies only our agreement or disagreement with the speaker, stereo mode implies understanding the thoughts of others as the thoughts of the unique other, in all their dissimilarity and identity. when several voices are present in our consciousness at the same time, this creates a more complete and richer sound of reality. listening to these voices clearly means being able, through understanding, to transform the cacophony of individual sounds into a symphony of unified reality that resonates in people’s hearts and souls and becomes part of our individual and shared consciousness. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 99 we need to be able to properly connect the sounds you hear. if you don't have this skill, you will only know music, but not be able to perform it. it's knowledge without understanding. it becomes technical knowledge without reaching the soul. what does our lovely book say about that? for example, we may know a tree as a source of wood (building material) or as an object that creates a shady spot in a park. but understanding wood is a different thing. a tree can give us an understanding of the many connections that make everything around us "from small to great,” an understanding of the visible and invisible, the essential and the secondary, the living and the inanimate. to understand a tree is to understand many things that make it possible to be a tree itself, which makes it unique, firmly rooted in reality; its branched root system with its tails-roots provides a connection to the earth, and its crown with its tails-branches, connecting it with the atmosphere. “and so it is with everything else that was once connected and now so often lies fragmented and forlorn, not able to be part of the warp and woof of life” (p. 17). polyphonic listening provides an opportunity to penetrate deep into things that are inaccessible to superficial knowledge, which provides little understanding of reality. often we know that there is something, but we don't understand how or why it is. we may know phenomena, but we don't understand how they are interconnected. we may know the patterns, but we don't understand where they are and where they are not. we may know something about the world or about people, but we don't understand what that knowledge is for. only understanding makes us wise and receptive, able to be perceptive, i.e., to see the essence of things. understanding makes me rich in what i will never lose. it is a wealth of meaning that is immense and inexhaustible. and most importantly, the acquisition of this wealth depends only on us and no vicissitudes of fate can take it away from us. understanding is an opportunity to reach out to everything with your tailreason, and to establish a connection. the vast body of the earth is entwined with numerous roads and paths. all these winding paths, from wide highways to narrow footpaths in the forest, are like the tails that people have left trying to meet each other. these people are no longer there, and their tails are left behind. on the scale of the earth (or maybe the universe), all paths, wandering and crossing, will lead you sooner or later to the same place—back home, home in this universe. so on a cosmic scale, it is not so important what road to take. another beautiful philosophical discovery that awaits the readers of the book are the tails which create the possibility of meeting in the "in-between". since, according to martin buber, being is a relationship, tails are a wonderful way to establish and maintain that relationship. thus, it is not language, as heidegger thought, but the tail that is the "home of being". huk and tuk don't have to explain this; they always knew. you have to enter into a dialogue with reality and through a tailrelationship the true nature of things is revealed. the tail-relationship brings the “i” and “you” to life in all things. according to buber, as the author of the book claims, it is possible to establish a relationship "in-between" only in your whole being. again, the metaphor of the tail makes it clear, because the tail is inseparable from us. of course, the loss of the tail will not endanger life, just as the loss of memory does not take away a person's consciousness. but there is an acute sense of disconnection from the world, of lack of reliance, of separation. this feeling cannot be compensated for by artificial means. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 100 the thirst for a new, modern, advanced way of being in this world has led us to lose our tails. but did the age of "post-tail" make us happier? have people become kinder? has society become fairer? have people gained the desired freedom? i'm afraid that each of these proposals is followed by a question mark's tail. “we become just beings to be used for the sake of another being’s utility. we have to imagine we have tails in order to become whole again.” (p. 29) huk and tuk give us good advice on how to reestablish the lost connection in today's world. huk and tuk point to a love of the miracle of life, a love so deep it transforms into a deep trust, knowing that you belong to this world and that you are already home! (р. 34) what else can i say here ... after this tail-multipoint it remains only to thank the author of the book for an unusual and exciting journey into the world of big philosophy. address correspondences to: dr. sergey borisov, doctor of philosophy head of department of philosophy and cultural studies of the south ural state humanitarian pedagogical university (chelyabinsk) director of the scientific and educational center for practical and applied philosophy of the south ural state university (national research university) (chelyabinsk) email: borisovsv69@mail.ru mailto:borisovsv69@mail.ru analytic teaching and philosophical praxis analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 40, issue 1 (2020) guest editor’s welcome as my fellow veterans will attest to, there are escalating challenges that come with the piling on of years. so, it is with genuine exuberance when i say that working with this lovely group of international veterans has been genuine pleasure. the first article by laurance splitter (australia) entitled “reflecting and looking forward: inquiring into inquiry, philosophy and community” engages the reader in “a meta-level inquiry into the nature of inquiry” in which, (amongst other intriguing moves) the dichotomy between teaching to instill “stuff” (as opposed to not) is repudiated, the necessary conditions of inquiry are explored (e.g., is it important for the teacher not to know the answer?), as are the dispositions that are critical for genuine inquiry, the danger of certainty, and the role that professional philosophy plays or ought to play in this entire endeavor. the second article by claire cassidy (england) and jana mohr lone (us) entitled “thinking about childhood: being and becoming in the world” focuses on the focus of p4/wc, namely the child, or more particularly, the potentially problematic perception of the child from the perspective of the adult or, indeed, from the perspective of the child. it is argued here that, if we hope to help children maximize their potential, we must keep in mind how this potentially problematic view of childhood may limit children’s confidence, their imagination, their thinking, and their ability to genuinely participate in philosophical dialogue. the third article by maura striano (italy) entitled “the deweyan background in p4c,” will reinvigorate the reader’s detailed understanding of the deweyan theoretical underpinnings of the community of philosophical inquiry (copi), as well as remind us of what a herculean move the founder of p4/wc, matthew lipman made when he insisted that we do our youngsters an unforgivable disservice if we over-focus on knowledge transmission and, in the process, fail to educate them for thinking. the forth article by larisa retyunskikh (russia) entitled “teaching philosophy and doing philosophy in the space of play” makes the case that “doing philosophy” ought always to be part of “teaching philosophy,” and that this most certainly can be done in a way that is playful. the case is also made for using classical philosophical texts as the stimuli for such philosophizing, as opposed to, say, the original iapc novels that hide the message of classical texts in fictional narratives. the fifth article by richard (mort) morehouse (us) entitled “doing philosophical psychology: helping adolescents discover their place in history,” presents an intriguing, almost heart-wrenching, case for the importance of adopting educational strategies (which morehouse demonstrates as happening in a university-level psychology class using an adapted form of the cpi) that will assist adolescents not only to learn how to answer the question “who am i,” but to recognize the importance of reflecting upon what kinds of actions, attitudes, and judgments are necessary so that there is an entity to whom they can address that question. the sixth article entitled “what kind of magnet is freedom?” (mine, canada) argues that, since an increase in the freedom of individual choice inevitably decreases freedom somewhere else in the social net (thus requiring unending judicial balancing), autonomy, in the sense of the freedom to pull away from the force of extrinsic-freedom magnets, ought to be a pivotal educational goal. chief editor jason j. howard viterbo university web page master jason skoog viterbo university copy editor jason j. howard viterbo university editorial board sara cook viterbo university susan gardner capilano university susan hughes viterbo university david kennedy montclair state university nadia s. kennedy stony brook university, suny richard morehouse, emeritus viterbo university félix garcía moriyón center for philosophy for children, madrid, spain joe oyler maynooth university, kildare, ireland barbara weber university of british columbia publisher viterbo university, la crosse, wisconsin 45601 established in 1981 as analytic teaching at texas wesleyan college and transferred to viterbo in 1993. online copyright 2005. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis is a peer-reviewed, online, open access journal published annually and sometimes biannually. issn 2374-8257 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 32 philosophical education and transcendental tolerance markus tiedemann n this article i would like to address a challenge that is intensively discussed in europe, namely the so-called dilemma of teaching values. how to win children, pupils, students or even citizens for values like tolerance, human rights or democracy without dogmatism – without ignoring the free use of reason? very principal positions are involved in this discussion. you need to be a universalist to insist that there are global values for all reasonable creatures. communitarists deny this possibility. from their point of view, even the “sapare aude” is a cultural construction, and normative universalism has a tendency to become neocolonialism. one might perceive this attitude to be informed by tolerance, but we should also be aware that it belongs to the main line of the argument in samuel p. huntington’s clash of civilisations. huntington is a ‘cultural relativist’. according to this conviction, people cluster around the values and the symbols of their incidentally accrued cultures. one of the ‘key’ formulations of huntington’s claims is that values like human rights are perhaps ‘unique’ but not ‘universal’ (comp. huntington, 1996, the clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order, p. 513). in 1995, two years after the publication of huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’, the unesco proclaimed its explanation of tolerance. it reads as follows: article 1: meaning of tolerance 1.1 tolerance is respect, acceptance and appreciation of the rich diversity of our world's cultures, our forms of expression and ways of being human. it is fostered by knowledge, openness, communication and freedom of thought, conscience and belief. tolerance is harmony in difference. it is not only a moral duty, it is also a political and legal requirement. tolerance, the virtue that makes peace possible, contributes to the replacement of the culture of war by a culture of peace. (comp. unesco, 1995, declaration of principles on tolerance). in this context, the unesco puts high hopes in school education in general, and philosophical teaching in particular. this is why the program ‘philosophy, a school of freedom’ (comp. unesco, 2007, teaching philosophy and learning to philosophize) was started. in some parts of the world, philosophical education and the support of tolerance via this subject are already common. barbara bruening proved in 1998 that the subject and its pedagogic goals are established all over europe (bruening, 1998, ethikunterricht in europa. ideengeschichtliche traditionen, curriculare konzepte und didaktische perspektiven in der sekundarstufe i). in many of the romanic nations, ‘philosophy’ is an obligatory school subject. other nations offer comparable efforts under the umbrella of ‘critical i analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 33 thinking’. in the federal republic of germany, paragraph 7, 2 of the constitution confirms that religion is to be a regular subject at school. consequently, ‘philosophy’ and ‘ethics’ have mostly been offered as mere alternatives to the religion courses. in recent years, however, the availability of philosophical education has massively increased. the german federal state of berlin has, for example, introduced obligatory ethics in the schools’ curriculums for all, by public referendum. the integration of refugees as well as citizens from muslim cultures has pushed this development as well. in 2015, klaus goergen has convincingly pointed out the potential of bringing together young people of various cultures and origins in a normative discourse (goergen, 2015, ethik für alle? plädoyer für ein pflichtfach philosophie/ethik, in: zdpe 2/2015, pgs. 91-98). moreover, there is empirical evidence that philosophical education has a beneficial impact on critical thinking skills and increases the appreciation of controversial arguments. the proof began with lawrence kohlberg and was confirmed by the research of georg lind in europe and latin america (comp. kohlberg, 1984, essays on moral development: vol. 2. the psychology of moral development; lind, 2016, how to teach morality: promoting deliberation and discussion, reducing violence and deceit). but, what exactly can philosophical education contribute to the cultivation of tolerance? essentially, two models of tolerance education can be differentiated: the first model represents contentual tolerance education. what is communicated here is a ‘canon’ of behaviour and ways of life to be tolerated and accepted. the second model can be designated as transcendental tolerance education. it provides no obligatory content, but attempts to promote the condition of possibility for discernment and tolerance. at its core, this approach revolves around a ‘reorientation’ in attitudes and ways of thinking, understood as the clarification and explanation of terminology and categories, as well as dealing with open-ended questions and cultural conflicts. a presentation of explicit norms may be indispensable still. this applies to instructions in legal affairs as well as to the integration into already existing social and cultural circumstances. if you wish to play soccer with us, you have to accept the offside rule. whether this rule is good in itself, is not up to debate. philosophical reflection is, however, a priori untied to specific results. this is what the dilemma of teaching values is all about (comp. martens, 1996; tiedemann, 2015, ethische orientierung in der moderne – was kann philosophische bildung leisten, in: handbuch philosophie und ethik. bd. 1: didaktik und methodik). matthew lipman’s community of inquiry as well as gareth matthew’s discourse communities are committed to the principle of rationality. content beliefs are not the goal of the process. (lipman, 1980, harry stottlemeier’s discovery; matthews, 1984, dialogues with children). ‘we love young people who say straight out what they mean, as long as they think on lines like us’. this remark by mark twain shows that it requires courage to establish real philosophical education. philosophy is not the administrator of a carefully selected set of ideas, it is the call to thinking for ourselves and the cultivation of that very habit. the radicalism of the philosophical ‘sapere aude’ analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 34 manifests itself in its principle of incompatibility with normative requirements. whoever postulates that philosophical reflection necessarily leads to a primacy of democracy, human rights and humanism, is wrong. philosophical argumentation struggles for consistency. sympathy or political correctness are no criteria for quality. of course, antidemocratic drafts can be supported by substantial arguments. just look at the history of philosophy! not many of the great figures have been convinced democrats. is plato’s idea of the philosopher king inacceptable for school education because it is antidemocratic? should a pupil who, after intelligent reconstruction and critical reflection, aligns him or herself with plato, receive a ‘bad’ grade? certainly not. a dogmatic canon of values and the essence of philosophical education are incompatible. a philosophical accomplishment can be measured by the quality of its argumentation and not by its adherence to ‘political correctness’. but what effect does transcendental tolerance education produce? i do see five benefits. the first benefit is the explanation of categories, terminology, and differentiations. kant’s differentiation between knowledge, opinion, and faith might be a good example (kant, 1781, kritik der reinen vernunft, pg. 532 ff.). whoever understands the nature of these levels of episteme develops a robust immunity to dogmatism. i can entertain a position without being convinced of it myself, and any statements of faith are only justified for the believer. only knowledge is based on arguments that everyone must accept. to understand how little knowledge we have and how limited our reason is, is one of the most important foundations of tolerance. in any truth that gets not possession of our minds by the irresistible light of self-evidence, or by the force of demonstration, the arguments that gain it assent are the vouchers and gage of its probability to us; and we can receive it for no other, than such as they deliver it to our understandings. (locke, 1689, an essay concerning human understanding) a second benefit is to counteract the inflationary and thus worthless application of the term ‘tolerance’. even the latin root ‘tolerare’ shows the necessity of having to bear or suffer an unlovely issue. according to rainer forst, tolerance always requires rejection as well as higher-order arguments that demand acceptance (forst, 2012, toleranz im konflikt: geschichte, gehalt und gegenwart eines umstrittenen begriffs). forst identifies and establishes three components which are indispensable for the very definition of tolerance. the first, he designates as the ‘rejection component’. in order to be able to tolerate anything at all, the practices involved have first to be seen as false or disruptive. anything else would be approval or indifference, and would therefore render any debate superfluous. intuitive rejection does not get in the way of tolerance but is rather the base requirement for the possibility of its existence. the second component, according to forst, is the ‘acceptance component’. this includes the reasons why certain practices are personally considered improper or bad, but still have their justification. rejection remains, but there is an understanding of opposing arguments and the limitation of one's own evidence. the third component is the ‘refusal component’, which always analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 35 intervenes when higher-order arguments justify or demand a refusal. this applies to reciprocal and intersubjective justification. it is the same for both: those who claim tolerance, and those who reject tolerance. both are obligated to explain their reasons in discussions. only those arguments will be acknowledged which can be communicated reciprocally or intersubjectively. ‘we always did it like that’ or ‘i do not want that’ are, in fact, no arguments at all. any school pupil mastering the basics of syllogisms will understand that normative conclusions can normally not be drawn from one premise alone. provided the arguments are sufficiently convincing, the dispute is settled. in the case of ‘tolerance’, a tendency to a rejection of the disputed issue remains. the argument by itself is accepted, but that which was argued to be accepted remains rejected. a third benefit lies within the discussion of concrete cases and cultural conflicts. may a hijacked aircraft be shot down? is the circumcision of boys inacceptable without medical necessity? are burkas a sign of cultural diversity or an attack on liberal society? should ‘continuing embryonic research’ be permitted? should a liberal-democratic nation be allowed to impose obligatory healthcare insurance upon its citizens? how voluntary may marriages be? are honour and respect benefits that need to be earned, or is everyone entitled to them? when and where can public religious ceremonies be tolerated? how much tolerance should the organisation of public schools exercise when it comes to foreign traditions. may an individual be a citizen of a democratic and an undemocratic nation at the same time? in philosophical classes queries like these can be discussed without being tied to cultural or religious traditions. an example: if a teacher were to display a burka-attired woman on the blackboard of a classroom in berlin, germany, and asks the pupils to give an opinion, a rapid division would very soon occur. one half of the class would probably say that they see a religiously devout woman living her pursuit of happiness. the other half of the class might argue that this woman is the victim of oppression and needs help. it is not the job of philosophical education to settle this question, but to train exact description and the use of categories. for example, none of the class sees a woman. regarding someone in a burka, at most you can see a human figure. moreover, categories like ‘personal freedom’, ‘citizen obligations’, ‘structural violence’, or ‘shame’ can help to find and justify one’s opinion, or at least to understand the reasons for disagreement. identifying reasons opens a door for reciprocal respect despite controversial positions. ideally, discussions like these help to increase the acceptance of difference, and to question prejudices. the next benefit is to understand that tolerance needs to be limited. otherwise it turns into nihilism. there is a lot of struggle surrounding terms like ‘multiculturalism’, a ‘multicultural society’ or ‘cultural pluralism’ and so on. from my point of view, these debates are quite boring. at the end of the day, the interesting question is whether cultural diversity should be limited or not. to equate such limitation with intolerance is a gross simplification. it is also a question of priority between individual and collective rights. is cultural tradition a value in and of itself? who is going to protect the individual from its own community? pascal bruckner calls the representatives of analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 36 an unlimited multiculturalism “anti-racist racists”. bruckner speaks of a ‘paradox of multiculturalism’. all the various communities are granted the same treatment, but not their members, because they lose the right to break away from their own traditions (comp. bruckner, 2007, enlightenment fundamentalism or racism of the anti-racists?, pg. 58). it is a sad example of negative dialectic. the heart of racism is to reduce the individual to its affiliation with an ethnic or cultural group. moreover, there is also a differentiation between ‘persecution racism’ and ‘neglect racism’, or between active and passive racism. recent german history produced the cruelest persecution racism – the ‘holocaust’. the human rights of millions were violated, regardless of individuality, only because they belonged to a certain demographic. the rule of persecution racism says: ‘we violate your human rights, because you belong to a certain group of people.’ in order to prevent such barbarism from ever rising up again, tremendous efforts were made, especially in europe, not to discriminate on racial or cultural grounds. this is of course a desirable development. the problem is that unlimited tolerance for cultural groups can undermine the individual rights of their members. again, individuals are reduced to their group affiliation. the rule of the neglect racism says: ‘we will not protect your human rights, because you belong to a certain group of people.’ the struggle for higher-order arguments as the basis of tolerance leads to the fifth benefit of philosophical education: the debate around ethical cosmopolitanism and rules like human rights. even the unesco argues for limited cultural tolerance on the basis of human rights: 1.2 tolerance is not concession, condescension or indulgence. tolerance is, above all, an active attitude prompted by recognition of the universal human rights and fundamental freedoms of others. in no circumstance can it be used to justify infringements of these fundamental values. tolerance is to be exercised by individuals, groups and states (comp. unesco, 1995, declaration of principles on tolerance). nevertheless, such a proclamation is far from being a legitimisation. the fact that the majority of nations signed the declaration of human rights is a proper contractual argument. nevertheless, it loses its binding quality with every generation that did not actively ratify the contract. the idea of cultural relativism radically challenges universal ethical values. since it is impossible to imagine values to be independent of social contexts, alasdair macintyre (macintyre, 1981, after virtue) argues that they have no universal claim. huntington expresses this point of view much more radically. values such as democracy, human rights, and freedom of speech are unique, but represent no ‘universal’ culture (comp. huntington, 1996, pg. 513). any such consensus could at best be achievable within an already disappearing small group of academic elites, which huntington calls the ‘davos culture’ in reference to the world economic forum held annually in davos, switzerland (comp. huntington, 1996, pg. 78). the hope, however, that sooner or later identical universal cultural values will be generated in all cultural spheres, is decidedly denied. huntington sends a clear denial to the cosmopolitans of the ‘enlightenment’. progression in the cultural spheres is primarily of a demographic, technical, and military, but not of an ethical nature. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/alasdair_macintyre analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 37 a philosophical community of inquiry must not ignore these positions. moreover, it is to be accepted that they might be right and need to be heard and analyzed. nevertheless, this does not mean that the defense of universal values like human rights has failed. "we hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.” unfortunately, it is not that easy. the binding effect of human rights may be quite natural for most of us, but it is not self-evident. ludwig wittgenstein argued that to doubt makes sense only if certain things are not to be doubted (wittgenstein, 1969, on certainty). but even if this remark is to be accepted, it does not nullify the lack of proof. reasonable people must use the unconstrained constraint of the better argument (habermas, 1987, theory of communicative action). philosophical education makes students understand that there is no ultimate justification, which does not mean, that ‘anything goes’ (feyerabend, 1978, science in a free society). we still have to be ‘conscientiously endeavoured to think about our beliefs coolly, rationally, impartially, with conceptual clarity and with as much relevant information as we can reasonably acquire.” (regan, 2004, the case of animal rights, pg. 134). and there are good reasons to regard the justification of human rights to be unmatched. concepts like those of martha nussbaum, susan neiman, ottfried hoeffe, john rawls or juergen habermas are not final but very well founded. martha nussbaum talks of a vague but strong and resilient concept of ‘good’ (comp. nussbaum, 1993, the therapy of desire. theory and practice in hellenistic ethics, pgs. 323-363). john rawls uses the term of the ‘overlapping consensus’ (comp. rawls, 1971, a theory of justice, pg. 340) this has nothing to do with the ‘imperialism’ of an ‘american way of life’, but with the condition of possibility of diversity and binding rules. ottfried hoeffe mentions a ‘transcendental exchange’, which, similar to rawls’ ‘veil of ignorance’, constructs an intelligible decision-making situation. he argues on the basis of a minimalistic anthropology. how independent and divergent our cultural ‘imprint’ may be, we can certainly agree that we are bodily, purely rational, social, and political beings. any intervention into such necessities will restrict our ‘freedom of action’, and will thus prevent us from realising our understanding of a successfully led life. any realization of cultural or individual difference presupposes the capacity to act. as ‘human rights’ seek to protect such a ‘capacity to act’ they do not endanger but guarantee diversity and disparity. “transcendentality is that which one implicitly affirms, provided that one always seeks what one wills; transcendental means the circumstances, that one can have and pursue normal interests.” (comp. hoeffe, 1996, vernunft und recht. bausteine zu einem interkulturellen rechtsdiskurs, pg. 77; translation by tiedemann). the benefits of philosophical education are not to indoctrinate students with specific values. it's about the ability to argue, the insistence on reason, and the distinction of categories. these competencies are not only indispensable for any democracy; they are also the core foundation of the virtue of tolerance. ekkehard martens understands philosophical education as an elementary cultural technique of a human way of life (comp. martens, 2003, methodik des ethikund philosophieunterrichts. philosophieren als elementare kulturtechnik). julian nida-ruemelin talks of an ‘renewed humanism’ with rationalism, freedom and responsibility. the capability of educating reasonable, well justified https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/self-evident https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/all_men_are_created_equal https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/creator_deity https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/inalienable_rights https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/life,_liberty_and_the_pursuit_of_happiness https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/paul_feyerabend analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 38 convictions (rationalism), and the capability of leading an autonomous and free way of life (freedom), and, as a result, the capability of becoming aware of and adopting responsibility (responsibility). the teaching of philosophy and ethics is a training for giving and taking arguments. their aims are not to indoctrinate values, but to negotiate them on the basis of reciprocal argumentation. in this regard, ethics are more important –so the dalai lama– than religion (comp. dalai lama, 2016, an appeal by the dalai lama to the world: ethics are more important than religion). almost two decades ago, long before debates on integration and religious fanaticism arose, hartmuth von hentig formulated the following thoughts: “people are right who say: values are always at play in teaching; value concepts should be allowed to form anywhere; value judgments and decisions should always be made. but, there has to be one subject in the school curriculum in which the foundation of moral judgment/decision-making is clarified and its tenets brought to awareness. i call this subject ‘philosophy’” (comp. von hentig, 1999, ach die werte! ein öffentliches bewusstsein von zwiespältigen aufgaben. über eine erziehung für das 21. jahrhundert, pg. 164). for the representatives of a conservative teaching of values, all of this may not suffice. from the position of didactical theory, transcendental tolerance education remains without an alternative. an imposition of ‘moral truths’ and philosophical education are not compatible with one another. with a little good fortune, an attitude is formed which jules lemaître (1853 1914) called “the philanthropy of intelligence”. federico mayor zaragoza, vice director of the unesco argues: philosophy and democracy urge each of us to exercise our capacity for judgement, to choose for ourselves the best form of political and social organisation, to find our own values, in short, to become fully what each of us is, a free being. among so many dangers, we have no other hope. (zaragoza, 1995, memory of the future, pg.12). i call this the goal of philosophical education of transcendental tolerance. references bruckner, p. (2007) enlightenment fundamentalism or racism of the antiracists?. www.signandsight.com/features/1146.html. bruening, b. (1998) ethikunterricht in europa. ideengeschichtliche traditionen, curriculare konzepte und didaktische perspektiven in der sekundarstufe i. leipzig: militzke verlag dalai lama (2016) an appeal by the dalai lama to the world: ethics are more important than religion. elsbethen: benevento. feyerabend, p. (1978) science in a free society. london: nlb fisch, j. (1992) zivilisation und kultur. geschichtliche grundbegriffe bd.7. stuttgart: klett-cotta https://www.aphorismen.de/autoren/person/4361/jules+lema%c3%aetre https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/paul_feyerabend analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 39 forst, r. (2007) das recht auf rechtfertigung. elemente einer konstruktivistischen theorie der gerechtigkeit. frankfurt am main: suhrkamp. forst, r. (2009) toleranz, glaube und vernunft. bayle und kant im vergleich. kant und die zukunft der europäischen aufklärung. berlin: de gruyter. forst, r. (2012) toleranz im konflikt : geschichte, gehalt und gegenwart eines umstrittenen begriffs. frankfurt am main: suhrkamp. goergen, k. (2015) ethik für alle? plädoyer für ein pflichtfach philosophie/ethik. zdpe. 2/2015. pp. 91-98. habermas, j. (1983) die philosophie als platzhalter und interpret. moralbewußtsein und kommunikatives handeln. frankfurt am main: suhrkamp. habermas, j. (1987) theory of communicative action. boston: beacon press. hentig, h.v. (1999) ach die werte! ein öffentliches bewusstsein von zwiespältigen aufgaben. über eine erziehung für das 21. jahrhundert. münchen: hanser. hoeffe, o. (1996) vernunft und recht. bausteine zu einem interkulturellen rechtsdiskurs. frankfurt am main: suhrkamp. huntington, s. p. (1996) the clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. new york: simon & schuster. kant, i. (1911) kritik der reinen vernunft. kant‘s gesammelte schriften bd. 3 b 850/851. berlin: de gruyter. kant, i. (1800) logik: handbuch zur vorlesung. königsberg: bey f. nicolovius. kohlberg, l. (1984) essays on moral development: vol. 2. the psychology of moral development. new york: harper & row. lipman, m. (1980) harry stottlemeier’s discovery. upper montclair: iapc. georg lind (2016) how to teach morality: promoting deliberation and discussion, reducing violence and deceit. berlin: logos verlag. locke, j. (1824) an essay concerning human understanding. the works of john locke in nine volumes vol. 2. london: rivington. macintyre, a. (1981) after virtue. notre dame: university of notre dame press. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/alasdair_macintyre analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 40 martens, e., schnaedelbach, h. (1991) zur gegenwärtigen lage der philosophie. philosophie. ein grundkurs. bd. 1. reinbek: rowohlt. martens, e. (2003) methodik des ethikund philosophieunterrichts. philosophieren als elementare kulturtechnik. hannover: siebert verlag. matthews, g. (1984) dialogues with children. cambridge: harvard university press. mayor, f. (1995) philosophy and democracy in the world. a unesco survey. new york: unesco publishing. neiman, s. (2011) kant hat mein leben gerettet. die zeit. 20/2011. p. 57. nussbaum, m. c. (2011) creating capabilities. the human development approach. cambridge: harvard university press/belknap press. nussbaum, m. c. (1994) the therapy of desire. theory and practice in hellenistic ethics. princeton: princeton university press. nussbaum, m. c. (1993) menschliches tun und soziale gerechtigkeit. zur verteidigung des aristotelischen essentialismus. gemeinschaft und gerechtigkeit. frankfurt am main: fischer verlag. regan, t. (2004) the case of animal rights. los angeles: university of california press. rawls, john. (1971) a theory of justice. cambridge: harvard university press/belknap press. tiedemann, m. (2015) ethische orientierung in der moderne – was kann philosophische bildung leisten. handbuch philosophie und ethik. bd. 1: didaktik und methodik. paderborn: utb tugendhat, e. (1993) vorlesungen über ethik. frankfurt am main: suhrkamp. unesco (2007) philosophy, a school of freedom. teaching philosophy and learning to philosophize. status and prospects. paris: unesco publishing. wittgenstein, l. (1969) on certainty. oxford: oxford university press. zaragoza, f. m. (1995) memory of the future. paris: unesco publishing. address correspondences to: prof. dr. markus tiedemann professur für philosophiedidaktik und für ethik technische universität dresden, institut für philosophie d-01062 dresden analytic teaching and philosophical praxis analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 17 p4c and voice: does the community of philosophical inquiry provide space for children’s free expression? “the best part of camp is being able to talk and no one judges us.” –thinking playground camper, age 10 anastasia anderson “during summer camp one year, a group of six to eight year olds are discussing the book, the gift of nothing. their facilitator asks them: is a gift of nothing a good present? during the dialogue, the children explore fertile philosophical ground such as the concepts of “nothing” and “everything,” the importance of friendship, and what makes a gift valuable. they do a good job of giving reasons, building on each other’s ideas using phrases such as “i agree with…” and “i disagree with…” and noting when they change their minds. when asked how they would feel if they got an empty box as a birthday present, one camper, nina, notes that she would not mind getting such a gift because being with a friend on your birthday is more important than getting a present. at lunchtime immediately after the cpi, as the campers line up at the door with their lunch kits, the counsellor continues the dialogue with the children near her. she asks again how they would feel about getting a box of nothing as a birthday present. nina immediately says, “oh, it would be horrible. i would hate it!” the camp counsellor expresses surprise and reminds her of what she said during the cpi. the child replies, pointing to the circle of chairs in the center of the room where the cpi took place, ‘that is just what i said in there. that isn’t what things are like really.’”1 here are several ways to interpret nina’s explanation of the difference between what she said during the cpi (community of philosophical inquiry) and what she said later. she might have been pointing out the distinction between how one should feel and how one actually feels. she might have simply been explaining that she changed her mind. however, there is one interpretation of what nina said that merits particularly careful consideration and illustrates the central concern of this chapter: nina may have been telling the counsellor that she was not free to express her real beliefs and feelings during the cpi. in other words, there was something about being “in there” that stopped her from expressing what she really thought or led her to believe that she was not supposed to say what she really thought. if this is what nina meant then her words raise troubling questions. p4c (philosophy for children) is founded on a respect for children’s rational abilities and their expressive capacities. it is a pedagogical approach that is designed to provide children with the opportunity to freely express themselves and practice the skills necessary for making well-reasoned 1 anastasia anderson, “categories of goals in philosophy for children”, studies in philosophy and education, vol. 39, no. 6, (2020): 608-609. t analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 18 choices. indeed, in the unesco report, philosophy: a school of freedom, the importance of p4c is supported with reference to the three articles of the united nations convention on the rights of the child that set out children’s rights to freedom of expression and thought (i.e., 12,13,14).2 an individual child may feel unable to express her genuine thoughts during a cpi for many reasons that relate to her particular circumstances. these reasons should be considered and addressed, as far as possible, by p4c facilitators. however, if children are restricted from freely expressing their beliefs during a cpi due to their shared status as children, this would be a foundation-shaking problem for p4c. it would mean that there is a serious inconsistency between what p4c does in theory and what “things are really like.” nina’s comment may represent a fundamental challenge to the p4c ideal. does a cpi really give children a space in which to be heard? does p4c provide children with genuine opportunities for free expression? the goal of this article is to establish that p4c can and should provide children with an opportunity to freely express themselves and have their voices heard. however, much of it will be dedicated to considering how children’s expression might be restricted during cpis due to adult attitudes and control. the first section sets out young-bruehl’s definition and analysis of prejudice against children. young-bruehl’s controversial position challenges complacency about social attitudes towards children and will be used as a touchstone when addressing the question of whether p4c gives space for children’s free expression. her analysis of the beliefs that ground prejudice against children will be a starting point for reflections about p4c and how it may be affected by adult beliefs about children and childhood. in the second section, different ways in which children are constrained when doing p4c will be discussed in order to shed light on how adults may, unknowingly, be limiting children’s ability to express themselves freely. the third section explores critiques of the instrumentalist view of p4c that the function of a cpi is not primarily to give children a space to freely express themselves, but to teach them the skills they need to express themselves fully and rationally in the future. the fourth section concludes that despite the constraints that children experience during p4c programs, the structure does give children the opportunity to freely express their views and have their voices heard as long as facilitators understand the importance of reflecting on their assumptions about childhood and allow children to pose the inquiry questions. the challenge of childism a thoughtful response to the question of whether adult facilitated cpis provide a space for children to freely express themselves must involve reflection on adult attitudes and beliefs about children. p4c theorist and philosopher of childhood david kennedy has claimed that an adult’s capacity to listen to children is impacted by the beliefs and assumptions the adult has about children and childhood.3 it can be added that these beliefs and attitudes also impact whether the structure and implementation of p4c activities give children the opportunity to speak in their own voice. youngbruehl has recently claimed that in some countries (her example is the united states) there exists a systemic prejudice against children that is based in distorted and mistaken beliefs about children and 2 philosophy: a school of freedom. ( unesco publishing, 2007), 3. 3 david kennedy, “practicing philosophy of childhood: teaching in the (r)evolutionary mode,” journal of philosophy of schools, 2, no.1, (2015): 6. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 19 childhood. in this section, her analysis of that prejudice will be outlined and presented as a starting point for an examination of children’s free expression in p4c. in the book, childism: confronting prejudice against children, young-bruehl attempts to persuade the reader that prejudice against children exists and must be eliminated.4 she offers the following examples of this prejudice. america incarcerates more of its children than any country in the world...some of the ‘delinquents’ are there because they were arrested for a crime and are awaiting trial. they will be tried in courts that are permitted to sentence children convicted of a homicide to life without parole in adult prisons...others were incarcerated without arrest: they were simply found on the streets, sometimes homeless, sometimes mentally ill and judged to be out of control and dangerous “to themselves and others.” no one knew what else to do with them.5 she quotes a 2009 children’s defense fund report that states, “14.1 million children in america, or 1 in 5 are poor...almost 900,000 children each year in america are abused or neglected, one every 36 seconds...each year, more than 800,000 children spend time in foster care...”6 in light of statistics of this kind, she maintains that children must be recognized as a target group for prejudice. youngbruehl calls prejudice against children, “childism’” and provides an analysis of this prejudice. one of her stated goals is to enable clearer thinking about the vast range of “anti-child social policies and individual behaviors directed against all children daily...”7 she emphasizes that childism is not confined to particular abusive individuals, but is a prejudice that has been institutionalized in the united states and is found not only in the country’s practices of child imprisonment, but also in poor schooling and laws that privilege a family’s right to determine children’s lives. she uses the united states’ refusal to ratify the un convention on the rights of the child as one particularly clear example of american prejudice against children. recognizing and analyzing childism is essential because it allows the root causes of childism to be addressed. her claim is not that all adults are childist, but she warns that even those adults who work to make children’s lives better may not recognize the existence of prejudice against children or the forms that it takes because it is so socially pervasive. young-bruehl argues that in order to fully understand individual acts of child abuse and neglect, as well as the policies that harm children, one must not focus on the acts or policies alone. one must consider the attitudes and beliefs that ground the acts and justify them in the minds of individual agents and policy makers. the prejudiced beliefs and attitudes that abusers rely on to try to legitimate their acts are not the only reason for child abuse, but are a necessary condition for such abuse. young-bruehl identifies the basis of the beliefs that undergird prejudice against children as involving stereotyping children and childhood. what makes any group a target of prejudice, according to young-bruehl, is that the members of the target group share common features that those who are 4 elisabeth young-bruehl, childism: confronting prejudice against children. (new haven: yale university press, 2012.) 5 ibid., 2. 6 ibid., 14. 7 ibid., 4. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 20 prejudiced focus on and distort for their own purposes. children form a target group for prejudice because children share the features of being born dependent and relatively helpless. children also share the characteristic that they are affected by any social, cultural, and political construction, evaluation, and distortion of the very concept of “child” and “childhood.” as in all prejudices, according to young-bruehl, there are sets of beliefs about the target group that ground prejudiced acts. she maintains that it is not sufficiently illuminating simply to claim that children are the targets of prejudice. a full analysis of childism must identify the beliefs that underlie the prejudice. childist adults believe that adults should be privileged over children, but the question she tries to answer is why they believe they should enjoy this privilege. young bruehl’s psychoanalytic answer is that childism is “a belief system that constructs its target group ‘the child,’ as an immature being produced and owned by adults who use it to serve their own needs and fantasies.”8 like other prejudices, as analysed by young-bruehl, childism involves projection of certain fantasies onto the target group. and, as with other prejudices, because people are projecting their fantasies onto the target group, they find the target group to exhibit what they believe about them and this serves to reinforce the prejudice. childism is a prejudice against children on the grounds of the beliefs that they are property that should be controlled, enslaved, or removed to serve adult needs. the three fantasies she sees as grounding childism have versions that are either wildly negative or unrealistically positive. she describes one fantasy as being of self-reproduction and ownership of offspring: for example, children need to be controlled and indoctrinated so that they assume a certain religious or cultural identity and are stopped from overthrowing or threatening their parents’ rights; or, children are required to conform to an ideal of the perfect child that reflects the parent’s idealized vision of accomplishment and character. a second fantasy is one of having slaves and often involves projections about sexuality: for example, children are dangerously sexual and must be repressed or given pseudo-adult roles; children can be used, enslaved, or prostituted to serve adult needs. the third fantasy is the fantasy of elimination: for example, children are a burden, an infiltrator group that is depleting resources and must be put away, segregated, or removed. youngbruehl describes target groups of prejudice as phobic objects. people with phobias project unwanted aspects of themselves onto others and then come to fear those people or objects. so, the deep root of childism is that childists project their fears and self-contempt onto children, turning them into things to be feared, hated or owned. childism is, in many ways, more complex than other prejudices. according to young-bruehl, childists project immaturity and stereotypes associated with immaturity onto a population that actually is immature. moreover, even childist adults were once children and their own experiences can appear to add credence to their attitudes and beliefs. these complicating factors make prejudice against children particularly difficult to recognize and overcome. young-bruehl holds that to combat childism, we must advocate for children’s rights as formulated in what has come to be known as the un convention on the rights of the child’s 3 ps: provision, protection, and participation. children must be provided for and protected, but the key to ending prejudice against children is finding ways to ensure more child participation. she believes that only by hearing children’s voices can we start to understand the different ways that childism infiltrates our beliefs and behavior towards children. in 8 ibid., 36. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 21 the same way that the struggle against sexism has involved listening to women’s voices, children must be heard in order to eliminate childism. if young-bruehl is correct about the existence of childism and how to eliminate it, p4c could play a pivotal role in fighting childism because in a cpi setting, children are encouraged to express themselves, listen to each other, and build on each other’s ideas and experiences. p4c asks children to take their own ideas and other children’s thoughts seriously, and to strive for answers together. conceived both as an education for democracy and an education for autonomy, p4c provides children with a safe haven in which to express themselves on matters of fundamental importance to human existence such as the nature of moral action, personal identity, and knowledge. engagement in cpis during which children are invited to offer and test answers to philosophical questions allows them to speak their minds, develop thinking skills, create their own positions, values, and the sense of self that comes with this development. these opportunities to speak are valuable in and of themselves, and are also fruitful in that they support children’s readiness to participate in other arenas. in the countries around the world that have ratified the un convention on the rights of the child, including canada, children have the right to express their views on matters that affect them. in british columbia, for example, children who are affected by foster care arrangements, custody suits, and health care are to be consulted before final decisions on these matters are reached.9 p4c can support and help develop children’s capacity to express themselves effectively on these sorts of topics which are of the greatest importance to their personal lives. p4c can also support children’s participation as citizens of democracies through the improvement of their critical, cooperative and caring thinking. furthermore, the cpi’s dialogic approach to education might even untie the gordian knot created by the fact that democratic governments control children’s education and yet must avoid their indoctrination because democracy relies on the rational decision-making powers of free-thinking, autonomous citizens. the child's right to freedom of expression is not unlimited. in article 13 of the uncrc, this right is subject to restrictions necessary to respect the rights and reputation of others and to public safety. the freedom of expression that can be offered to children during a cpi is also not a wholly unrestricted freedom. the cpi requires children to show respect for each other. for example, a child is not free to speak so much that other children are not heard, and children are not free to threaten each other with harm. in other words, the freedom of expression within a cpi is limited by certain responsibilities to the cpi community. furthermore, the cpi primarily offers a space for verbal expression. in article 13, freedom of expression includes the "freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of the child's choice." while p4c practitioners provide children with opportunities to express themselves on philosophical topics through various media including art, movement, and poetry, the cpi is primarily a space for philosophical dialogue. as participants in a philosophical dialogue, children are engaged in an inquiry and will be asked to relate their expressions to that inquiry and give reasons to support their views. a child may choose to express ideas without providing supporting reasons, but those thoughts might be tested by the group to determine whether or not they should agree. despite these restrictions, p4c can provide an 9 bc family law act 37, 2b; bc infants act, 17; bc child, family, and social services act, 70. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 22 important area of liberty. laura lundy, professor of education law and children's rights at queen's university, belfast, conceptualizes the participation rights of children as set out in the uncrc, article 12 into four elements: space, voice, audience, influence. while the four elements together constitute participation, the elements of space and voice are understood as primarily related to freedom of expression. her influential model suggests that to meet their participation rights, children must be given opportunities to express themselves (space), must be facilitated to express their views (voice), the view must be listened to (audience), and the view must be acted upon, as appropriate (influence).10 the cpi can satisfy all four requirements. the space and voice available to children in the cpi provides children with the opportunities to say, with frankness, what they think about the topic at hand, freedom from the power of adult authority on the topic, freedom to agree or disagree with each other's ideas and arguments, freedom to change their minds, and freedom that comes from the opportunity to voluntarily engage in inquiry that is meaningful and of interest to them. the facilitator's role is not to dictate what is said in the dialogue, but to help the children reason together. the audience for and influence of children's views are also evident in p4c. the adult facilitator and the entire community listen to one another with respect. the metacognitive dialogue at the end of a cpi and the activities testing hypotheses outside of the cpi allow children's views to be influential. the metacognitive dialogues in particular, when facilitated effectively, can give children influence over the ways in which future cpis are conducted and helps them to create the conditions necessary for their voices to be heard. p4c has much to offer in support of children’s participation rights. it is for this very reason that p4c practitioners should, as young-bruehl might recommend, look closely at how the sorts of social or personal beliefs that ground childism and, more generally, how adult conceptions about childhood might be affecting children’s liberty to express themselves and to have their voices heard during cpis. after all, although young-bruehl’s analysis of prejudice against children focuses on horrendous forms of child abuse by individuals and large scale abuse such as perpetrated by the american criminal justice system, she also notes that a history of childist assumptions has been at play in work meant to address and eliminate child abuse, and that these assumptions can even be found in the work of socalled “child liberationists.” the perniciousness of systemic prejudice is that it often goes unnoticed. even if one completely rejects the claim that prejudice against children exists or doubts youngbruehl’s analysis of it, if one conceives of p4c as child-centered and as supporting children’s right to freedom of expression, it is worthwhile doing a thorough and sincere check for implicit beliefs, attitudes, and practices that suggest children must be controlled, enslaved, or removed. to do this, we must consider the context in which the offer to speak freely is being made. adult imposed limits on children’s freedom the summer after nina made her comments about a gift of nothing, a ten-year-old child named anna comes to camp after recently being moved to a new foster family. she loves camp, but voices her suspicions about one inquiry in no uncertain terms. through a game of bigger and better, the 10 laura lundy, "'voice' is not enough: conceptualising article 12 of the united nations convention on the rights of the child," british educational research journal, vol. 33, no. 6 (2007): 927-942. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 23 children have amassed 32 large donuts from a local coffee shop.11 the inquiry question the facilitator supplies to the 15 children is: should we share the donuts with the children in the group next door? the facilitator allows the children to eat one donut each while they engage in dialogue since they agree that at least each person in their group should have one. the question of how to divvy up the rest remains. one child claims that the donuts should not be shared with the other group because their group worked to get the donuts by trading up during the game. another child disagrees and claims they should be shared because sharing is good for everyone. after a few more children speak, anna addresses the other children in frustration, "don't you see that no matter what we say, she is going to make us share! we shouldn't even bother talking about it. even talking is just doing what she wants." anna is keenly aware of the control adults have over children's lives and her comment raises questions about how that control may extend into the cpi. adults might believe that they are providing children with opportunities to speak freely, but the difference in power between adults and children is so great and the context within which p4c is done is controlled by adults in so many ways that she is right to question whether children's freedom within the context of a cpi is an illusion. to explore this question, we will consider the different ways in which adults determine what happens during p4c programs and whether children are free enough from this influence that we can say they have the space to voice their own views. similar observations about adult control over children can be found in several works on children’s liberation,12 but listed together they highlight the extent of adult power in the contexts in which most adults do p4c. this section’s observations are about a specific summer camp program because of the key differences between camp and school that make camp a more democratic environment for children than most canadian schools. nevertheless, even in summer camps dedicated to children’s enjoyment, constraints on children’s freedom are not difficult to find. the thinking playground13 summer camps provide fun games and activities for children with a variety of different philosophical themes. throughout the day, the camps implement the p4c approach of providing stimulus material, determining an inquiry question, and engaging in cpi dialogues. while the summer day camps are organized with a focus on fun, they have the educational goals of p4c programs run in schools. the camps, however, are not supposed to feel like school and children should be (and are generally reported to be) eager to get up and go to camp. a key difference between camp and school is that some children are asked by parents which summer camp they would like to attend and some are asked if they would like to attend any at all. however, just like school, there are camp rules and structures that might suggest an acceptance of the belief that children must be controlled or segregated. once children arrive at camp, they are not free to leave without permission from a parent or guardian. during the camp, children are not free to leave the camp 11 in the game bigger and better, children are given a paper clip and then approach people on campus to try to make a series of trades to end up with something 'bigger and better'. 12 for general discussions of the children’s liberation movement see david archard, children: rights and childhood (second edition). (new york: routledge, 2004), 30-84. for a general discussion of freedom in education and experimental schools see joanna haynes, “freedom, inclusion and education,” in perspectives on participation and inclusion: engaging education, edited by s. gibson and j. haynes. (london: continuum, 2009), 76-90. 13 the thinking playground summer camps take place at the university of the fraser valley in abbotsford, bc, canada. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 24 grounds, and they are not free to leave the supervision of adults whenever they wish. they are not free to make contact with people outside of camp without adult permission. children are grouped by age and mostly segregated from children of other ages and from adults who are not in charge of their care. children do not choose the adults who supervise them or the details of the curriculum which is generally developed before the camps start. food can only be eaten at times determined by adults. there are rules about when children can go to the bathroom.14 the timing of activities is generally chosen by adults and activities are directed and facilitated by adults. children are allowed to sit out or find something else to do, however, this requires isolating oneself from the others who are engaged in the activity and singling oneself out as different which may inhibit the freedom to opt out. these are the basic structures of control and segregation in most environments children in canada find themselves in when not in family situations. the effect of these structures on children’s own understanding of themselves and their understanding of their own capacities should not be underestimated. at summer camp, rules of conduct are created in a group composed of adult camp counsellors and children on the first day of camp. however, there is likely a certain amount of theatre in this. the rules are discussed; the reasons for the rules are discussed; children suggest rules, but do children really have or believe they have the power to make the rules? for example, if children decided as a group that they should do nothing but play videogames for the week, that would not get on the list of rules. if they decided that taking turns in cpi dialogues meant only one person would be allowed to speak per day, that would most likely not be acceptable to the counsellors.15 the adult and child co-creation of rules allows for a discussion of the reasons behind rules, but the rules are ones that both adults and children are probably quite sure will make it onto the list. in fact, it is a testament to the socialization of children that in the reported experience of the camp counsellors, the only rule that adults have needed to suggest modifying has been the consequence for breaking rules because the children chose consequences that are unreasonably harsh. for example, as a consequence for breaking a rule, one child suggested sitting in a corner for the whole day and another child suggested sitting in a box in a corner for the whole day. children can occasionally be quite willing to take the opportunity to control each other in imitation of the ways in which they have been controlled. children, themselves, can have quite set ideas of how childhood should be understood, and these ideas can be derived from their own experiences of social expectations. for example, during an activity that took place in an empty art studio space in which there was an undressed mannequin of the type you would find in a clothing store, a young girl commented with seriousness that “this is not appropriate for children.” on a different occasion, during a cpi on the question of whether children should run the world, the dialogue began with one child saying that adults should run the world because they are smarter and when that answer was challenged, a second child claimed that adults should run the world because "children are crazy and they would make the world go crazy." 14 some of these rules may sound harsher than they actually are. food is eaten during lunch time and snack times. due to the nature of the physical space, children must walk to the washrooms with an adult. the curriculum is largely determined by adults before camp begins, but the counsellors often take pains to modify or change activities in response to children's ideas and interests. 15 there are some situations in which a p4c facilitator might allow children to experiment with different protocols for cpis, but the camps are so short that there is little time available for this kind of experimentation. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 25 the effect of adult-imposed restrictions on children must be considered when trying to determine whether children are free to express themselves because these restrictions and the power imbalances implied by them may serve as constraints on such freedom, and they also imply a particular conception of childhood that suggests children, unlike adults, need restrictions. however, it is doubtful that young-bruehl would identify the rules and structures that have been noted above as stemming from prejudiced fantasies of control and elimination. the constraints on children described thus far can be understood as necessary for their protection, one of the 3 ps that must be respected in order for childism to be addressed, according to young-bruehl. one can reasonably argue that children need rules to keep them safe. yet if systemic childism exists, we should undertake a thorough investigation into what sorts of controls are needed for child protection. firestone, for example, argues that just as oppression of women involved a “myth of femininity” that was used to justify the restrictions that were put on them, so the “myth of childhood” reinforces the idea that children need to be rigidly supervised, disciplined, and segregated by age for the sake of their own protection and developmental needs.16 if the understanding of children’s needs is colored by social constructions of the concept of childhood then that understanding should also be analyzed for signs of prejudice. however, such a difficult and wide-ranging investigation is far too ambitious for this article. therefore, we will provisionally assume that children require the commonly employed supervision and rules for the sake of their protection. the question then becomes whether or not within that area of control, children are given genuine opportunities to express themselves. what counts as freedom of expression in this context? to really fulfil the purpose of combating childism and to meet the goal of hearing what children have to say without the distortion of adult projections about childhood, the space for a child's expression during a cpi must be as free as possible from the obstacles of adult control and adult censure. in order to determine whether cpis provide children with the opportunity to exercise free speech within a system with rules aimed at protecting them, we will turn to p4c curriculum development and facilitation. the goal of the facilitator at summer camp is to provide fun activities that stimulate philosophical questions and generate opportunities for successful cpi dialogues. but curriculum development is largely dependent on adult beliefs about children. the curriculum is determined by a wide variety of assumptions such as those about children’s interests, about what children find fun, about children’s knowledge, about what children have and have not experienced, about children’s capacities, about what is emotionally “safe” for them, and about what is, as the camper said, “appropriate.” children's feedback on activities and the designers' past experiences with children help determine curriculum choices. furthermore, the counsellors frequently adapt the curriculum in response to the campers input during the camp itself. however, the final decision on curricular matters rests with the adults. another task adults set for themselves is the management of children’s behavior during a cpi. strategies and goals of behavior management depend on assumptions about dangers that children face, acceptable use of language, noise levels, and what constitute signs of interest and disinterest. as previously noted, the freedom of expression possible in a cpi is limited by the children's responsibility to be respectful of each other. however, the interpretation of whether that responsibility is being met is mainly in the hands of the adult facilitator. adult assumptions color how they interpret or “listen” to children in many different ways. does the adult assume that the 16 shulamith firestone, the dialectic of sex: the case for feminist revolution. (new york: bantam books, 1971), 86-104. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 26 children feel safe and comfortable in the setting they find themselves? does the adult recognize the pressures of social expectations and how a child’s own assumptions about childhood may be affecting them? in the context of doing p4c, the curriculum revolves around efforts to provide engaging stimulus material. however, this material is almost exclusively adult generated: the picture books, games, museums, and philosophical novels used in p4c are written and created by adults. lipman’s philosophical novels contain an adult’s ideal images of the child philosopher for children to use as a model.17 in all of the curriculum development, games, stories, books and activities of various sorts that have been designed, written and created by adults with specific purposes, we might reasonably ask where there is room for a child’s self-expression. where is the opportunity for adults and other children to listen to what children genuinely think without the constraints of the various assumptions that adults and society make about childhood and what children should be and become? we might reply that the child is given the opportunity to freely express his or her ideas in response to the adult generated stimulus material. however, adults need to consider this response carefully. there is a danger lurking here that the response is tantamount to the adult saying to the child, “well, enough about me. what do you think about me?” p4c practitioners should question the extent to which children can express their own concerns, ideas and beliefs in response to material provided by adults and within the structures enforced by adults who rely on their own ideas and expectations of childhood. preparing children to be free in response to the challenge of explaining how p4c supports children’s free speech despite the imposition of adult rules and adult curriculum material, we might argue that adult constructed curriculum materials are necessary because children are still apprentices when it comes to philosophical reasoning and the ability to express themselves. in cpis they are learning the philosophical skills—the critical thinking skills—necessary to becoming capable of breaking free from various socially constituted roles and have a truly open future. in a cpi setting, children are given a chance to express themselves as apprentices, as part of developing the capacities necessary to express themselves freely as adults. so, the cpi is not primarily meant to be a space for hearing children’s voices. rather, it satisfies children’s right to express themselves in the sense that it is a pedagogy designed to help children develop their capacities to freely express themselves in the future. this viewpoint suggests that p4c is related to the political goal of honoring children's freedom of expression by providing a pedagogical method that develops the skills needed for free expression even if that method itself does not provide opportunities for the child's voice to be heard. there are at least two main lines of argument against the position that because p4c has the pedagogical goal of developing children's reasoning skills, providing space for children's voices in cpis is of secondary importance. first, even if we understand p4c merely as a tool for developing children's critical, caring, cooperative, and creative thinking skills, it is difficult to see how this tool could be a pedagogically effective without allowing children to express themselves freely. if p4c does not allow children the space necessary to test what they are genuinely thinking and pursue inquiries that reflect their concerns and interests, it is unlikely that the skills they learn will become internalized 17 matthew lipman, thinking in education, second edition. (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2003), 96. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 27 and form part of who they are as agents and citizens. lipman's goal was not simply to teach children to be able to identify premises and recognize fallacies within a classroom setting. he claimed that the goal of p4c is to help children develop into reasonable people.18 in order to meet that goal, thinking skills need to be developed in dialogues in which children practice thinking about what they actually think and that means providing space for their voices to be heard. the second line of argument is found in the work of a number of writers who are critical of conceiving of p4c merely as an instrument for improving children’s reasoning skills. often, these criticisms relate to the point this conception closes us off from hearing the newness of the child's voice. for example, vansieleghem writes: philosophy for children, with its emphasis on critical thinking and autonomy is nothing more than the reproduction of an existing discourse. the autonomy that the child gains is nothing more than the freedom to occupy a pre-constituted place in that discourse.19 in young-bruehl’s language, vansieleghem is showing concern about the projection of adult aims and goals onto children in p4c. in other words, there may be the fantasy of self-reproduction and ownership at play if cpi facilitators do not recognize the importance of children’s freedom of thought and speech. vansieleghem maintains that there needs to be a space for children’s thinking that is not an exercise in problem-solving, but instead arises out of genuine experience and doubt. this experience is part of the search for meaning that should be available to children. children need a space that accepts the importance of their “newness.” biesta, too, argues that in order to avoid basing p4c solely on a particular conception of humanity and to allow the possibility that the newcomer (child) can change how we understand “humanity,” we must not limit ourselves to education that focuses on production of such an ideal (or re-production of what currently exists).20 karin murris writes that prejudices we have about children and childhood lead us to miss knowledge that is offered by the child.21 relying on fricker’s understanding of epistemic injustice as an injustice that occurs due to someone being wronged in their capacity as a knower, murris urges adults to adopt a position of epistemic modesty. conceiving of p4c as an opportunity to listen to and learn from children not only opens adults up to newness, but also honors children’s right to freedom of expression in a way that a purely instrumentalist understanding of p4c cannot. kennedy, who has written so eloquently on the philosophy of childhood, suggests that facilitators should be involved in their own philosophy of childhood in order to develop the capacity to actively listen to children.22 the recognition, deconstruction and reconstruction of pre-conscious beliefs that we as adult facilitators have about childhood will help us to recognize where we are projecting onto children and also be able to 18 matthew lipman, ann margaret sharp, frederick s. oscanyan, philosophy in the classroom. (philadelphia: temple university press, 1980), 15. 19 nancy vansieleghem, “philosophy for children as the wind of thinking,” journal of philosophy of education,39,1, (2005):295. 20gert biesta, “philosophy, exposure, and children: how to resist the instrumentalisation of philosophy in education” in philosophy for children in transition: problems and prospects , edited by n. vansieleghem and d. kennedy. (hoboken: wileyblackwell, 2012), 144. 21 karin murris, “the epistemic challenge of hearing child’s voice,” studies in philosophy of education, 32,(2013): 245-259. 22 kennedy, practicing philosophy of childhood. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 28 distinguish between moments when children are saying what an adult would say and when children are saying something new. even if alternative or additional goals for p4c are accepted such that it is not conceived of merely as an instrument to teach children critical, creative, caring and cooperative reasoning skills, and even if facilitators consistently work on their philosophy of childhood as part of a professional practice that makes them better able to hear what children are saying, proving that p4c programs as they currently exist have structures that allow for a child’s genuine freedom of expression remains problematic. given that adults control so many aspects of children’s experience of philosophy, the challenge is to show that the cpi can nevertheless allow the “newness” of children’s voices to be heard. do the adult-imposed rules and choice of curriculum act as insurmountable constraints, distorting the child’s voice through the adult’s agenda even if part of the adult’s agenda is to hear the child’s voice? it is possible that the various types of control adults exert over children mean that, in young-bruehl’s terms, adults are inevitably projecting ideal images onto children and requiring them to play roles to satisfy adult preconceptions rather than allowing children the freedom to express their own thoughts. however, the next section is dedicated to showing that the p4c method, as created by lipman, is structured in such a way that the child’s autonomy of thought and freedom of expression are respected. the role of children’s questions careful attention to one’s assumptions about childhood and the different ways in which adults control children through rules, curriculum, and the interpretation of children’s actions is essential to respecting children and to being able to hear the child’s voice. p4c practitioners should continue to be responsive to the interests, needs, and input of children when creating activities and facilitating cpis if they want to set up a context as sensitive as possible to children's own perspectives and concerns. however, the structural element in p4c that is central to providing children with the opportunity to freely express themselves is the child-chosen inquiry question. adult control over environment, curriculum, and stimulus material can be consistent with giving children the opportunity to express themselves freely in a robust sense as long as children are allowed to create their own questions in response to stimulus material and to choose the inquiry question. the importance of the child-created inquiry question can be understood with reference to shiffrin’s position that the right to free speech is best understood as grounded in an agent’s interest in the protection of the “free development and operation of her mind.”23 shiffrin holds that the fundamental value of the autonomy of the individual mind is what undergirds the value of free speech. moreover, she takes this to be true not just of adults, but also of children. shiffrin maintains that included in the autonomy interests of thinkers is their interest in responding authentically, by which she means “that rational agents have an interest in forming thoughts, beliefs, practical judgments, intentions and other mental contents on the basis of reasons, perceptions, and reactions through processes that, in the main and over the long term, are independent of distortive influences...so too agents have an interest in revealing and sharing these mental contents at their 23 sean valentine shiffrin, “a thinker-based approach to freedom of speech,” constitutional commentary, 27, no. 2, (2011): 287. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 29 discretion...”24 when children create and choose an inquiry question, even when it is in response to adult chosen and created stimulus material, they are invited to respond authentically to it, to reveal their thoughts and reactions to that material and create the terms of the inquiry itself. the creation of the inquiry question is the starting point of free expression during the cpi. the thinking and speaking that children do in attempting to respond to a question they have chosen have their origin in the children rather than being externally imposed. the question is the initiation of a new beginning. the children have determined the goal of the discussion and the aspect of the adult created material that they wish to bring into question.25 they have taken charge of the agenda. jana mohr lone has argued that allowing children to choose the inquiry question helps facilitators to maintain an appropriate level of epistemic modesty and is part of setting the conditions for authentic dialogue.26 but, even beyond this, it allows us to truly claim that cpi dialogues are opportunities for children to exercise their right to freedom of expression.27 the ownership of the inquiry that arises from children choosing the inquiry question is buttressed by the metacognitive activity that traditionally concludes a cpi. during this stage of the cpi, children are asked to reflect and comment on the dialogue and community. these metacognitive reflections are designed to influence future dialogues and may even affect protocols such as turn taking and more generally how respect for others is understood and honored by the group. however, the metacognitive stage of the cpi only supports freedom of expression and counts as influence if the voices of the children are heard during the dialogue. if the children have no voice in the dialogue then the metacognitive stage reflects on and affects an inquiry that is the adult's rather than the children's. the voices of the children can only be fully present in the cpi when they are given control over the inquiry question. it is no coincidence that in p4c as it was established by lipman, children choose the inquiry questions. lipman describes the purpose of allowing children to develop their own inquiry questions as being anti-authoritarian and sees it as allowing children to put the world in question.28 however, not all p4c practitioners ask children to choose inquiry questions. and, while choosing their own inquiry questions is an essential element in allowing children’s free expression in a cpi, there can be some good, pedagogical reasons to begin doing p4c with questions that have not been raised by the children. the problem is that children often do not initially understand what dialogue in a cpi is like when it involves meaningful, creative, and cooperative thinking. it may take some experience for children to recognize what kinds of questions they are being invited to ask and the kind of freedom they have in their answers. once children have the experience of being caught by a philosophical problem—the ”aha!” moment when a connection is made or the moment of hesitation or disequilibrium when they start to think of a concept in a different way—then children start to understand what a cpi sounds and feels like, and, more importantly, recognize the extent of their 24 ibid., 290. 25 in many cpis, the children ask questions and then vote on which one they wish to discuss. so, it is not always the case that children get to discuss their own question. nevertheless, the question is one that has been posed by a child as opposed to an adult. moreover, some practitioners who work with the same children over several weeks, may run cpis on every question children pose. 26jana mohr lone, “questions and the community of inquiry,” childhood and philosophy, 7,13, (2011):78-89. 27 joanna haynes, freedom, 86-87, describes children’s reflections on their experiences of philosophy with children and notes that they claim that while doing philosophy they enjoy both negative freedom (freedom from teacher’s authority and lesson plans) and positive freedom (freedom to play with ideas, listen to others and change their minds). 28 lipman, thinking, 98. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 30 freedom to raise questions. wonder cannot be externally imposed and, as kohan has written, “...thinking is passion-immanent, spontaneous, self-caused and not the result of some external will.”29 however, children often do need to learn that wonder, thought, and freedom to question are what they are being given the space to do. children do spontaneously raise philosophical questions and are capable of engaging in philosophical dialogues, but they do not always do this on cue. we can lead children to philosophically rich stimulus material and they will not engage, often because the opportunity to freely raise philosophical questions among groups of children and adults—particularly ones who are not family members—is unfamiliar to them. as a result, it is pedagogically sound for p4c to include dialogue on pre-determined questions, philosophical games, exercises, and other activities that are planned and initiated by adults as part of alerting children to the opportunity to express their views during a cpi.30 perhaps the childism in north american society is such that children do not generally expect to be listened to in any extended or meaningful way during organized activities. during one cpi at camp, an adult was writing notes on the board and another was facilitating a dialogue on art. one of the children had not noticed the notes on the board until the dialogue was over. when he realized that they represented the discussion, he exclaimed in amazement, “look! she wrote what we were saying and it takes up the whole board!” children need to have some experience of feeling as though their ideas are worth listening to as part of learning that their questions will be heard and are worth thinking about carefully. children as the alpha and omega of the dialogue the idea that children might need time to recognize the opportunity for free expression that is available to them during a cpi provides one explanation of nina’s comment described at the beginning of the chapter. nina’s distinction between what is said “in there” and what is “real” may be attributable to a lack of familiarity with the freedom she was given to respond authentically. children are so often expected to agree with the adults in authority, to repeat the lessons that they have been taught, and to guess at what answers adults will approve of that the invitation to express their genuine beliefs and ask independent questions may be greeted with the sort of skepticism anna exhibited. one advantage of the summer camp setting is that there are many opportunities to have informal cpis between small numbers of campers and counsellors. these are cpis that can arise spontaneously and do not occur in anything like a classroom setting. in nina's case, the counsellor took the opportunity to create a brief and informal continuation of the cpi while standing in line for lunch. it was in this less formal setting that nina appeared to feel more comfortable expressing her real views. taking advantage of the opportunity to speak freely during a casual, miniature version of a cpi can help children believe that the adults around them are trying to hear them by offering them a space to think and express themselves with as few ‘distorting influences’ as possible. although there are some practical reasons to begin doing p4c with inquiry questions that have not been created by the children, this must be considered an early or transitional step intended to 29 walter omar kohan, “childhood, education and philosophy: notes on deterritorialisation” in philosophy for children in transition: problems and prospects , edited by n. vansieleghem and d. kennedy. (hoboken: wiley-blackwell, 2012), 178. 30 in lipman, thinking, 100-103, he lists using exercises and lesson plans as a stage in creating a community of philosophical inquiry. activities and lesson plans can be found in the instructor manuals accompanying lipman's philosophical novels. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 31 support free expression during a cpi. it is by choosing the question that children initiate the inquiry and make it their own. if there are ways to give children choices in inquiry questions during this transitional stage, this is preferable because at least the children are playing some role in determining the focus of the dialogue. for example, children can be given a list of facilitator created questions to choose from or children can be given a list of questions that other children have asked in response to the stimulus in the past, or children can engage in exercises that do not involve cpis that are related only to generating questions and encouraging authentic questions. however, what should be uppermost in the minds of adults is that ultimately, inquiry questions must be created and chosen by children so that the thinking that occurs in the cpi has its origin in children’s interests, children’s wonder, and ultimately, children’s own conception of what should be questioned and how it should be questioned. when we couple an inquiry that begins from a child's question with a metacognitive stage at the end of the dialogue, we have facilitated not only voice, but influence over how future opportunities for free expression will be formed. it is by allowing children to start and end an inquiry that we can truly say that p4c allows children to express themselves freely and have their voices heard in ways that can help all of us to thoughtfully consider our assumptions about children and childhood.31 address correspondences to: anastasia anderson department of philosophy university of the fraser valley 33844 king road abbotsford, bc canada, v2s 7m8 email: anastasia.anderson@ufv.ca 31 this paper was presented at the 2015, icpic conference and was modified in light of very helpful comments from natalie fletcher. mailto:anastasia.anderson@ufv.ca analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 11 aporia and picture books maria davenza tillmanns “the intuitive mind is a sacred gift and the rational mind is a faithful servant. we have created a society that honors the servant and has forgotten the gift.” – albert einstein hen rationality fails us we are puzzled and left with a sense of “aporia” ( meaning puzzlement or wonderment. we are “at a loss,” perplexed. many of plato’s dialogues leave us with this sense of aporia. in philosophy, aporia refers to a philosophical puzzle or a seemingly insoluble impasse in an inquiry. what we thought we knew, we have to admit we do not know – rationally. on the other hand, we may have developed a deeper sense of love (in plato’s symposium), or courage (in plato’s laches), in the process. aporia with children in my philosophical discussions with elementary school children, i use questions not just to uncover hidden assumptions the children may have, but to lead them to a place of aporia – puzzlement, a place of “not-knowing.” if some children assume that to be brave is to be fearless, i not only ask why they assume this, but go on to ask how it is that we can be called brave, if we’re not even afraid? what’s there to be brave about? with this question, i try to bring the children to a place of “aporia,” a place of puzzlement. so how do you think your way out of a puzzling question? this sparks curiosity. philosophy is the pursuit of truth through clear thinking; it is also the pursuit of wisdom, a deeper truth (the intuitive mind, which einstein also called a sacred gift – see the einstein quote above). philosophy is about learning about the world, developing an understanding of the world, and being able to navigate the world. philosophy with children pursues all three goals. limits of rational thought eastern philosophy tries to give us a deeper sense of understanding reality through showing the limits of rational thought as well. the zen koan of the sound of one hand clapping is to guide students to enlightenment. where the mind hits a wall, a deeper understanding can emerge. oftentimes, we try to replace deeper thinking with knowledge. the more i know, the less i have to think. i have the answers, so i do not have to live in a world of uncertainty, ambiguity, feeling perplexed or “at a loss.’ however, this is precisely the place true thinking can begin: now what? w analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 12 when we are “at a loss,” we tend to seek advice from an “expert.” our own thinking seems to have failed us; but in philosophical discussions with children, aporia empowers them to think. wonderment empowers thinking. in journey of the universe, by brian thomas swimme and mary evelyn tucker, they state that, “this sense of wonder is one of our most valuable guides on this ongoing journey into our future as full human beings. they continue with how “wonder is a gateway through which the universe floods in and takes up residence within us.” (p.113) (emphasis added). it was out of a sense of wonder that philosophy was born and out of philosophy the disciplines emerged. wonder captivates us and connects us to the world around us. in “doing” philosophy with children, this sense of wonder is expanded upon. and as swimme and tucker surmise, “what if, after a hundred million years of mammalian existence, there appeared a species that could remain spontaneous, curious, astonished, compelled to try everything? what would happen then?” (p. 86) (emphasis added). for a young mammal, behavior is open-ended in a way that is rarer in adults…certainly some of their playful activity can be understood as preparation and practice for their later lives. but much of it is without any direct relationship to adult behavior. in a word, what often occupies their consciousness is play…. they enter into many kinds of relationships out of sheer curiosity. with their play they are discovering the exuberance of being alive.” (p. 85) (emphasis added). in doing philosophy with children, we play with ideas; we are curious. shobhan lyons states in her article, “what makes a philosopher?”, in philosophy now (oct./nov. 2018, issue 128): “linking philosophy and truth is a common approach; but i believe that philosophy is less a search for truth and more an engagement with possibilities; those that exist and those that are yet to exist…a philosopher is therefore one who does not profess to know anything.” (p.23) (emphasis added). and as mentioned in the quote above, “…they enter into many kinds of relationships out of sheer curiosity.” aporia is about being puzzled and curious and about engaging with many possibilities, enhancing deep thinking. icebergs it is as though our ability to explain the world we live in resembles the tip of the iceberg above the surface. similarly, what we understand but cannot explain the same way, exists below the surface. what is below is certainly as real as what exists above the surface. to explain what exists below the surface we use metaphors, analogies, poetry, music or scientific explanations such as space-time or the higgs boson. nevertheless, we can come to know love reading solomon’s love in the song of songs (new american standard bible); we can come to know courage when we read about hector’s bravery in homer’s iliad. with children, i use picture books. the stories and the pictures lend themselves perfectly for developing a deeper understanding of what lies beneath the puzzlement. i will give some examples later in the article. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 13 the compass this deeper understanding helps us to set up a kind of internal compass, guided by which we can learn to recognize the value of something (not all that glitters is gold), the potential danger of something (recognizing red flags in life), and to navigate the world. educating our compass this compass guides us in our decision-making to survive a complex and dangerous world. the compass needs to be educated much in the way socrates tried to educate his interlocutors in the agora, or zen buddhists try to educate their students. the compass we use to navigate life needs to be cultivated from an early age. it does not tell us rationally what is good or what is bad. it is not that simple. remember, the stars we sail by, are not fixed, either. so we need to develop a sense for what may be right or not in any particular situation. we may have a general sense, but need to learn how to apply this general sense to specific situations, which are unique. in every new situation we have to figure out what is the right thing to do (not the correct thing, for that seems to imply there is only one correct way). navigating our ship to navigate our ship in this world, we need concrete skills, of course. what use is it knowing how to sail by the stars when we do not know how to handle a ship on the high seas. but with all the technical skills of sailing, lacking the knowledge of how to orient our ship, we are lost at sea. my sense is that we put too much weight on acquiring concrete knowledge and too little –now a days anyway– on our ability to sail by the stars (remember einstein’s quote). in our philosophical discussions, we try to focus on the compass. the compass has the cardinal directions, but it also has all the degrees in between. and every degree can make a huge difference in how to steer your ship. for example: whereas fear may be a good thing in some instances, it may not be in others. lying may be necessary in some instances and a good thing (although, this does not imply that lying in itself is a good thing), and in other cases it may be harmful and hurtful. so how do you decide? this is where navigational skills come into play. what may work in some instances may in fact be the entirely wrong thing to do in other cases. so how can you tell? this is where you need to learn how to respond to complex situations, and not reduce all situations to a one fits all solution. stella’s paper after i told my professor in a plato seminar during my undergrad studies that i would like to re-write some of plato’s dialogues for children, he suggested i write my final paper on a topic in analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 14 philosophy that could be understood by children. that’s how stella (12 years old at the time), my landlady’s niece and i ended up writing in dialogue format, how come the opposite of what i think is true is usually really true? the paper focuses on how fear often interferes with our thinking. we often do things we might not do otherwise, if it weren’t for the fact that fear had us thinking differently, often leaving us with a feeling of regret: what was i thinking? we need to understand fear intuitively, using real-world cases, rather than rationally—for fear cannot be explained rationally. how do i know when my thinking is motivated by fear rather than fairness, for example? it’s rational to justify retaliation, hitting back against others as being “fair.” but is it? so where does intuitive knowledge originate? children are born with an intuitive grasp of the world, the “a priori of relation,” according to existentialist philosopher and scholar martin buber. from early on, they have to “figure out” how to survive. they may quickly sense if being in the arms of a particular adult feels safe or not and may start crying if they do not. in i and thou (1923), martin buber wrote, “it is simply not the case that the child first perceives an object, then, as it were, puts himself in relation to it. but the effort to establish relation comes first… in the beginning is relation – as category of being, readiness, grasping form, mould for the soul; it is the a priori of relation, the inborn thou. the inborn thou is realized in the lived relations with that which meets it” (my emphasis, p.27). this a priori relation to the world forms the basis for the intuitive knowledge we have of the world. intuitive thought then emerges from one’s total engagement, one’s “lived relations” with the world. in other words, we are born with an intuitive inborn compass. vacuum-disassociation while we always have the capacity to retain some form of an intuitive understanding of the world, often it is replaced by the cognitive skills we develop in school. as a result, our cognitive skills are often developed, as it were, in a vacuum, disassociated from our being. this disassociation creates a dependency on others with authority, or influence (financial or emotional) or with a certain social status, or on following trends and fads. if we cannot self-regulate our thinking using our own compass, we depend on others. this dependency robs us of our ability to enter into interdependent relationships with each other, with our inborn relationship with the world and ourselves intact. the art of not knowing/aporia what expertise do philosophers have and what can they bring to philosophical discussions with children? philosophers are experts in not knowing, experts in aporia. in practicing the art of philosophy, analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 15 we engage each other to think together to explore concepts we only vaguely understand. thinking together not only binds us, but also allows us to explore unknown and perhaps unknowable territory with joy, curiosity and confidence. and in my experience with children, they thoroughly enjoy these discussions and are eager to participate. aporia and picture books in the following, i will present some examples of leading group discussions to a place of aporia. the stories i will use are: “dragons and giants,” and “cookies,” in frog and toad together, by arnold lobel, “the club,” and “the voyage,” and “the new house,” in grasshopper on the road, also by arnold lobel, it’s mine, by leo leonni, fish is fish, by leo leonni, and the giving tree, by shel silverstein. dragons and giants in frog and toad together: frog and toad want to find out if they are brave and looking in the mirror doesn’t really tell them if they are brave. they decide to climb a mountain to find out if they are. while doing so, they come across a snake that wants to eat them for lunch, they are suddenly in the path of an avalanche of rolling stones, and at the top of the mountain a hawk sweeps over them. all these encounters terrify them. finally, having reached the top of mountain, they run back down as fast as they can, back to toad’s house, where toad crawls under his blanket in bed, and frog hides in the closet. they stay there for a long time feeling very brave together. the question is, are frog and toad brave? many children say that to be brave you cannot be afraid. since frog and toad are afraid, they cannot be brave. the aporia question is, whether you can be brave without being afraid? if you are not in the least afraid, what makes you brave? if you are not afraid of dogs, are you brave when you see them in the street? children are puzzled by this question and often don’t find a way out of the dilemma until they come up with the idea that an element of danger plays a role in being brave and in being afraid. the snake presented an element of danger, as did the avalanche, and the hawk. one child commented that if you are not afraid, you don’t know the danger you are in. another aporia question is, whether frog and toad are brave when they decide to jump out of the way of the snake, the avalanche or the hawk? it seems to make frog and toad not brave. this raises the question of frog and toad being foolish rather than brave if they were not to jump out of the way. a third aporia question has to do with the question how we know we are foolish or brave when dealing with that which is dangerous. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 16 this question can truly only be answered by an individual in a real life situation by the way s/he decides to act in a dangerous situation. and is the act truly a brave act or simply foolish? what makes these questions aporia questions is that they seem counter intuitive and contradictory. on the face of it, these questions don’t seem to make sense. children are puzzled and “at a loss,” until they figure that what lurks below the apparent paradox, is an understanding of what it means to be brave in real life. reason alone tells you that you cannot be brave and afraid at the same time. but real life tells you that without being aware of the danger involved and the fear that comes with knowing the danger involved, you cannot be brave. cookies, in frog and toad together: toad baked some cookies and brought them over to frog’s house. it’s a big bowl with lots and lots of cookies in it, and they can’t stop eating them. soon they decide they better stop eating them or they will get sick. but they cannot seem to stop; let’s have one last cookie, one very last cookie. what to do? frog decides that what they really need is will power. toad is not sure what that is, and frog explains that will power is trying hard not to do something you really want to do, like eating all the cookies. so, they come up with different tactics to keep from eating all the cookies, such as putting the remaining cookies in a box, tying a string around the box and putting the box on a high shelf. but that won’t really work, because they can take it down from the shelf, untie the string, open the box and eat the cookies. so they finally decide to dump the cookies outside for the birds to eat. the question is, do frog and toad have will power? many children will say that they do, because they got rid of the cookies and will no longer be tempted to eat them. the aporia question is, whether it is really will power if you get rid of something, because then you don’t have to “try hard” not to do something you really want to do. of course, it took will power to get rid of the cookies, but now you have eliminated the problem. some children thought throwing the cookies out was really “fake will power,” as they called it. surely, frog and toad are making attempts, which should be acknowledged. the children responded, however, that real will power is when you can stay away from the cookies when the bowl of cookies is still in front of you on the table, or when you decided to leave some cookies for tomorrow. another aporia question has to do with when we know we have will power – again a question, which can only be answered by an individual person in a real life situation by the way s/he decides to act, such as of having to exert will power with regards to stopping a bad habit, for example. the club, in grasshopper on the road: grasshopper is going down the road when he sees a bunch of beetles carrying signs that say that they love morning. the beetles are morning lovers and celebrate morning every morning. when they see grasshopper, they ask him whether he likes morning and he says he does. the beetles are thrilled analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 17 and make him part of their “we love morning club.” they give him a wreath and a sign to carry, but things go terribly wrong when grasshopper announces that he also likes afternoon and night is very nice too. the beetles are shocked and rip the wreath from him and take away his sign: nobody, nobody who loves afternoon and night can be in our club. and grasshopper continues on down the road. it’s morning and he sees the dew sparkle in the sunlight. the question is, whether it’s ok for the beetles to throw grasshopper out of the club. the children have different ideas about this, some say ‘yes,’ because it’s the beetles’ club and they make up the rules. others believe that the beetles should leave grasshopper in the club, because he does love morning, after all. the aporia question is whether it is fair to throw grasshopper out? because even if the beetles have the right to throw grasshopper out of the club, should they? the children decide it’s not fair, if the beetles didn’t tell him about the rules to begin with. they made him a member of the club, because he loved morning and threw him out when he said he also loved afternoon and night. grasshopper didn’t have a say in any of this. then again, grasshopper could have figured out that the beetles only loved morning, because their signs said they loved morning. although, they might have carried “ we love afternoon” signs in the afternoon…who knows. they also figured that it was not fair to throw him out since this is so rude and unkind to grasshopper. being rude is not fair. another aporia question is about what would be fair? one child proposed that one beetle might take grasshopper aside and explain the rules of the club to him and then makes sure grasshopper is treated with respect, whether he stays or leaves. a third aporia question is about how do we know something is fair? that can only be answered by an individual in a real life situation by the way s/he decides to act according to what s/he thinks is fair. for some, retaliation is fair. the voyage in grasshopper on the road: grasshopper comes to a puddle in the road and suddenly he hears a tiny voice saying that it’s a rule that grasshopper must use his ferry boat if he wants to get cross the lake. mosquito has been sailing back and forth across the lake for many years. grasshopper tries to explain that he is way too big to fit into the tiny boat, but mosquito will have nothing of it and keeps telling grasshopper that “rules are rules,” and he must get into the boat. grasshopper doesn’t want to offend mosquito and gently picks the boat up and carries it across the puddle. mosquito is very happy and tells grasshopper about all his adventures of storms and waves sailing across the lake. grasshopper puts the boat down at the other end, tells mosquito “thank you” for taking him across the lake safely and goes on walking down the road. the question is, whether rules should always be followed? the children agree that rules should always be followed. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 18 the aporia question is how can grasshopper obey the “rules are rules” rule, when he cannot fit in the boat? when should rules be followed and when not, because it seems that the nature of rules is that they should always be followed, as mosquito insists. but rules are made for a certain purpose, like when the teacher establishes rules on how to behave in the classroom, such as not being allowed to run in the classroom. but then there are other rules outside on the playground, where you are allowed to run around. the children certainly agree that in certain cases, rules simply don’t apply. if the rule is that i should not eat candy, but i don’t even like candy, the rule does not apply to me. the following aporia question is how to determine when i should follow the rules. if grasshopper is too big to fit in the boat, he cannot be expected to follow the rules. that’s easy, but not for mosquito. how do you convince mosquito that the rules do not apply to you, when mosquito is convinced they do? grasshopper tries to respect mosquito’s rules by picking up the boat and carrying it across. mosquito doesn’t seem to notice – another interesting aspect. another aporia question would be, why doesn’t mosquito notice the obvious – that grasshopper cannot fit into his tiny boat? what causes us to sometimes not see the obvious? yet another aporia question has to do with following the rules blindly, just because they are the rules, or do i have to decide which rules to follow and when? we know of many examples, when military personnel while required to follow the rules, are also held accountable if they follow orders/rules that go against a higher principle of proper conduct. a new house, in grasshopper on the road: grasshopper sees an apple on top of a hill and decides, yum! lunch, as he takes a big bite out of the apple. this, however, causes the apple to start rolling down the hill. grasshopper hears a voice inside the apple, telling him to keep his house from being destroyed as it is rolling down the hill. my bathtub is in the living room; my bed is in the kitchen. grasshopper is trying to catch the apple, as it is rolling faster and faster down the hill. in the end, it crashes into a tree at the bottom of the hill and is smashed into a hundred pieces. luckily, it is an apple tree, and worm has decided to find a new house to live in, one without a big bite in it, either. the question is, should worm be angry at grasshopper? the children often agree that he shouldn’t be angry. grasshopper didn’t mean to hurt worm and destroy his home. the aporia question is, isn’t worm justified in being angry at grasshopper for destroying his home, even though it was an accident? in other words, should i be angry with someone who hurt me, even if it is not done on purpose? i am hurt; so can’t i be angry because i have been hurt? the children often feel that when it was not done on purpose, you can’t really be angry. and grasshopper not only didn’t make the apple roll down the hill on purpose, he also tried to catch the apple. he was trying to save worm’s home, but it still crashed and was destroyed. another aporia question is, can you punish someone when what they have done wasn’t done on purpose? is it ok for your parents to punish you when you have done something wrong, even though analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 19 you didn’t do it on purpose? or your teacher tells you didn’t do a good enough job even when you really tried your best, but it didn’t come out right? at this point, the children often feel that the punishment is to make you more careful not to break the glass or the toy, etc. and maybe grasshopper will knock on the apple next time, to see if someone is living in it, before he takes a big bite out of it. one more aporia question is then whether we are justified in punishing the innocent? does it make sense to punish your baby brother for breaking your toy? or are the police justified to shoot an unarmed black man, because they feel their life is threatened? it’s mine, by leo leonni: on a small island in the middle of rainbow pond, there lived three quarrelsome frogs, milton, rupert and lydia. they fought all day long, about what they thought was theirs and theirs alone. the water belonged to milton, the earth belonged to rupert, and the air belonged to lydia. a toad on the other side of the island was fed up with all the quarrelling and told the frogs to stop. but they didn’t. they kept on fighting. then the rain began to fall and their small island grew smaller and smaller. at last they could only cling to one rock that was left. they huddled together, trembling from cold and fright, but they felt better that they were at least together sharing fears and hopes. when the rain stopped and the water receded, they saw that the rock was not a rock; it was the toad, who had saved them. they were so very happy and the next morning they all jumped into the water together, they leaped after butterflies in the air together and finally rested in the weeds together. the island, the water and the air could now be shared in peace. the question is, can we say that the earth, the air and water belongs to me only? no, the children agree; if only you get to breathe the air, there won’t be any left for me and i’ll die. the aporia question is, how can i tell something is truly mine or not? one child responds that her smile is hers. but what if i make you smile? is it also partly mine? one child said that even your home is not strictly yours, because it belongs to the earth. fish is fish, by leo leonni a tadpole and a minnow are best friends. they live in a pond at the edge of the woods. one day, the tadpole notices that it is growing two little legs. very excited, he tells his friend, “look, i am a frog.” “nonsense,” says the minnow, “last night you were a little fish like me.” they argue and argue until finally the tadpole concluded, “frogs are frogs and fish is fish, and that’s that.” gradually the little frog becomes a real frog and climbs out of the water and onto the bank. the minnow is also a fullfledged fish by now and is wondering where his friend has gone. one day, frog returns to the pond. he shares with his friend, the fish, all the things he has seen, birds, and cows and people. fish, only familiar with his watery world, imagines all these fascinating creatures with fins. one day, fish decides to go see this world for himself and with a whack of the tail throws himself onto the bank. but he cannot breathe on the bank and out of breath, calls out, “help.” frog happens to be nearby, hears him and comes to the rescue. he pushes fish back into the pond. fish is relieved, can breathe again and moves gently though the water, exclaiming, “you were right, frog, fish is fish.” analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 20 the question is, why does fish see all the creatures frog describes as having fins? the children agree that since fish only knows the world of fish, he sees other creatures the same way. the aporia question is, if he has never seen these types of creatures in his watery world, why does he still assume they look like other fish? how do you give up an assumption about something? how do you give up knowing what you know? another aporia question is, how do you explain something to someone who knows nothing about what you are trying to explain to them? can someone make me “see,” something i cannot “see”? here frog may be of help to fish, by saying something like, these creatures that live on land, do not look anything like fish. we can think of translators who are familiar with two languages and are able to translate one language into the other. many of the children i work with are from immigrant families and know two languages. this is a fun question for them to ponder. the giving tree, by shel silverstein. there is a boy and there is a tree – a giving tree. the two are friends and the boy comes every day to play with the tree, gather her leaves, climb up her trunk, swing from branches, and eat her apples. the boy loves the tree and the tree is happy. but as the boy grows older, his friendship with the tree changes too. he doesn’t come as often and the tree is often sad and alone. and when he does come to see her, he wants things from her, such as money. but she wants him to stay and swing from her branches the way he used to. but he isn’t interested anymore. he is too old for that now. so the tree tells him to take her apples and sell them in town. he stays away for a long time and when he comes back, he wants a house and the tree tells him to take her branches to build a house. when he comes back again after having stayed away for a very long time, he wants a boat and she tells him to cut down her trunk, so he can make a boat and sail away. finally, when the boy, now a very old man, comes again, the tree has nothing left to give and tells him to sit on her stump if all he needs now is a place to sit down and rest. the question is, did the tree give the boy too much? most children will agree that giving her life for the boy is giving too much. and the boy never seemed happy. in the illustrations his face was always unhappy. he just wants more and more; and people who want more and more, are never happy. the aporia question has to do with is there such a thing as giving too much? does unconditional giving imply giving all, even at your own expense? because when it’s at your expense, you stop being there to do the giving? some children feel the tree gave too much, because in the end she died. many children responded that the boy should have gone out to get a job in order to get the things he wanted and not ask the tree for all these things. another child came up with the observation that since apples have seeds, he could have planted the seeds, and then he could have sold the apples from all those new trees and get the money he needs for building a house, and a boat. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 21 another aporia question is why the boy never gave the tree what she wanted and needed? can a friendship be one-sided and still be a friendship? the children feel that overall the tree was happy when she could make the boy happy. they compared it to the giving a mother does. but that is not the same as a friendship. in a friendship the relationship works both ways, and the boy could have visited the tree more often and not just when he needed something. some kids said that he should “grow up.” he could have brought his family to meet the tree, his friend from when he was a boy. conclusion i have tried to give some examples of using picture books to get children thinking on their own and to figure out how they would have responded in these situations. bringing children to a place of not-knowing (the answer), triggers their curiosity and engages them in the questioning process. they are now personally involved and this makes the questioning come alive. they are in charge of their own answers and can freely change their minds; for example, hey, george said something that made me change my mind. aporia opens a place of wonder and curiosity and allows them to play with ideas without the pressure of coming up with the right answer. they are developing their “sacred gift” (einstein quote), which is a deeper understanding of what is discussed and the complexity involved. there are no simple answers – maybe temporary answers; answers that make sense, for now. this enhances flexibility in thinking and collaborative thinking. it also allows for independent thinking; we don’t all have to agree and believe the same thing. it’s okay to have very different views on things. that makes things exciting and interesting. if wondering about things enhances children’s interest in learning, we know that it will motivate them for a lifetime. references hamilton, edith and huntington cairns. the collected dialogues of plato, “symposium,” trans. michael joyce. princeton: princeton university press, 1973 ---. the collected dialogues of plato, “laches,” trans. benjamin jowett. princeton: princeton university press, 1973 swimme, brian thomas and mary evelyn tucker. journey of the universe. new haven: yale university press, 2011 lyons, shobhan. “what makes a philosopher?” philosophy now. oct./nov. (issue 128), 2018 buber, martin, i and thou. ronald gregor smith (trans). new york: charles scribner’s sons, 1937 lobel, arnold. “dragons and giants,” frog and toad together. new york: harper & row, publishers. 1972 ---. “cookies,” frog and toad together. new york: harper & row, publishers. 1972 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 2 (2019) 22 ---. “the club,” grasshopper on the road. new york: harper & row, publishers, 1978 ---. “the voyage,” grasshopper on the road. new york: harper & row, publishers, 1978 ---. “the new house,” grasshopper on the road. new york: harper & row, publishers, 1978 lionni, leo. it’s mine. new york: dragonfly books – alfred a. knopf, 1985 ---. fish is fish. new york: dragonfly books – alfred a. knopf, 1970 silverstein, shel. the giving tree. harper collins publishers, 1964 address correspondences to: maria davenza tillmanns davenza academy of philosophy san diego, ca davenza@sbcglobal.net editor's welcome analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) editor’s welcome let me welcome you to the first issue of volume 42. the five articles and one book review published here come from authors with a wealth of experience in philosophy for/with children (p4wc). collectively, their contributions explore a variety of challenges that beset the integration of p4c in k-12 education and also identify confusions that run through some of the pedagogical assumptions of philosophy for children practitioners. the first article by maughn gregory takes a detailed look at how lipman and sharp integrated the notion of a “community of inquiry” into philosophy for children, noting that although the phrase is commonly attributed to peirce it is never actually used in his writings, and is first employed by lipman and sharp. gregory’s article provides a comprehensive analysis of the ways in which lipman and sharp develop peirce’s original notion of inquiry into a robust pedagogical methodology. the second article by sutcliffe argues that p4c should have had a more substantial impact on education than is actually the case. he argues that we need to consider presenting p4c as a general pedagogical orientation applicable to all teachers regardless of subject matter—an approach he calls ‘philosophical-teaching-and-learning’—rather than an educational specialization. this more holistic strategy promises to disseminate the pedagogical benefits of pfc to a wider audience and better ensure its core contributions to moral education are readily accessible to all. lena green’s article reflects on her own journey with p4c and uses her wealth of experience to broach the notion of boundaries. as someone whose primary training is not in the practice of philosophy, green articulates why pfc would benefit from a clearer sense of what falls within its pedagogical practice and what does not, as well as being more interested (receptive) to research from the fields of education and psychology. although such close attention to boundaries may not be as necessary in the actual practice of p4wc in the classroom, it is important when it comes to training other teachers. pieter mostert’s contribution looks at the continuing challenge of assessing pfcs many different pedagogical effects on students. as mostert points out, not only are there multiple levels involved in the successful implementation of a pfc programme in schools, but many different classroom activities fall under the purview of pfc interventions. mostert concludes his analysis with a number perceptive suggestions on how to improve the effectiveness of our assessment of philosophy for children pedagogies. the final article is a collaborative effort by darren chetty, maughn gregory and megan laverty who use the lens of picture books to explore the timely challenge of diversity within the pedagogy of pfc and its practitioners. using the recent review of picture books coauthored by turgeon and wartenberg, chetty, gregory and laverty argue there are a variety of complicated challenges that arise with picture books that need more nuanced and sensitive treatment, not least of which relates to the lack of racialized diversity within the pfc community. wendy turgeon anchors our issue with her thoughtful review of gregory’s and laverty’s edited anthology, gareth matthews: the child’s philosopher. skilfully highlighting what each author sees as matthews’s contribution, turgeon’s review provides an informative summary of an important book. pax et bonum, jason howard chief editor jason j. howard viterbo university web page master jason skoog viterbo university student assistants heather greenberg faith hemmersbach olivia meyers viterbo university editorial board sara cook viterbo university natalie m. fletcher brila institute, quebec susan gardner capilano university david kennedy montclair state university nadia s. kennedy stony brook university, suny richard morehouse, emeritus viterbo university félix garcía moriyón center for philosophy for children, madrid, spain joe oyler maynooth university, ireland barbara weber university of british columbia publisher viterbo university, la crosse, wi 45601 established in 1981 as analytic teaching at texas wesleyan college and transferred to viterbo in 1993. online copyright 2005. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis is a peer-reviewed, online, open access journal published annually and sometimes biannually. issn 2374-8257 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 122 book review intentional disruption: expanding access to philosophy edited by stephen kekoa miller vernon press, 2021 173 pages price: hardback $64.00, ebook (via vernon press) $75.00 review by susan t. gardner s you read this book, which you should, you will be tempted to stand up and clap in celebration of the energy, dedication, and passion that these extraordinary people—the authors in this edited collection—infuse into their determination to bring the potential lifetransforming influence of philosophy to the general public. while all signal an awareness of philosophy for children as it was first envisioned by matthew lipman, the route that these authors take is different. though they all incorporate the “dialogical mode of learning” that is central to the community of philosophical inquiry (cpi), the facilitators that most of these programs use are undergraduate and graduate philosophy students rather than school teachers. in so doing, they short circuit the worry of “inquiry failure” due to the lack of philosophical sensitivity on the part of nonphilosophically trained teachers, and they reinvigorate the discipline itself, as these university students witness firsthand the benefits that accrue to those with whom they have the opportunity to philosophically engage. the generosity exhibited by these authors is also quite breath-taking. though each article only gives a rough outline of the program that each inspired, many also give url addresses to websites that give readers access to the material that they have road-tested in their various programs. for those of us who believe, like these authors, that dialogical philosophical interchange can be a life-transforming experience, for those who are convinced that humanity has taken a detour in the wrong direction by focusing our educational energies too exclusively toward the neoliberal “productivist” vision, for those who would like to see philosophy students brimming with pride over the service-learning that their department offers the community, buying this book as a celebratory gift for anyone who might think likewise would be a way to “pass it forward.” the collection begins with stephen miller, the editor of the collection, who offers invaluable advice for answering frequently asked questions from those considering starting a pre-college philosophy program. to begin with, he implicitly suggests flexibility in implementation by noting that a analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 123 one might decide to employ the socratic method which is more teacher-centered than the more traditional community of philosophical inquiry, but that in either case, an unknown destination is optimal (p. 4). following socrates, miller suggests that the biggest virtues of this approach “lies in disabusing us of false belief” and learning that “learning is social” (p. 4). among the aims that might be adopted by any practitioner are helping participants recognize the difference between an empirical claim and a moral claim, nurturing conceptual clarity (p. 5), and cultivating the habit of questioning one’s own presuppositions (p. 9). miller thus reiterates the importance of “unlearning” (p. 10). he emphasizes that all of us believe things that are untrue and argues that socrates has shown us how believing something false might cause us to live diminished lives (p. 11). he interestingly warns us, though, that if delivered badly, a program that enhanced thinking skills “can make students become more biased, selfish and confirmed in their previous understanding” (p. 8). he warns us too that, since philosophy is messy and inefficient, if a school’s mission is about information delivery, philosophy classes may well be seen as threatening (p. 11). with regard to the question of whether or not philosophy can teach students how to live a good life, he reminds us, quoting laverty, that philosophy is not about imparting wisdom, but rather about promoting the kind of philosophical selfreflection that prompts individuals to reflect on how their actions give expression to the kind of individual that they are becoming. as a final note he says that, though philosophy’s reputation as being a troublemaker is well-founded, “if inquisitive, thoughtful and engaged students are what a school is seeking, pre-college philosophy may be just the right thing (p. 14). chapter 2 focuses on the iowa lyceum which is a week-long philosophy summer camp hosted at the university of iowa, organized and run entirely by philosophy graduate students for campers aged thirteen to eighteen. lectures are given by graduate students and professors, but the primary format is doing philosophy in the form of dialogue and interactive activities (p. 28). participants themselves have the opportunity to create their own presentations that they give to the group at the end of the week. the authors (danielle colburn, cassie finley, and joe glover) stress that the overall aim is for participants to develop what they refer to as the intellectual virtues of being curious, open-minded, intellectually courageous, interested in truth for its own sake and being eager to engage in effective inquiry (p. 30) so that ultimately participants “develop a new approach to life” (p. 30). the authors also stress that a major benefit that accrues from the camp being run by graduate students is the personal and professional development of the graduate students themselves. they not only learn to express complicated philosophical ideas in a way that is accessible to non-philosophers (p. 25), they also often discover a passion for teaching pre-college philosophy. they note, as well, that it is no small benefit that this experience can set a graduate student apart from their peers when moving through a highly competitive field going forward (p. 26). in chapter 3, erik kenyon describes a p4c program that he developed for rollins college, a small liberal arts college near orlando florida using tom wartenberg’s big ideas for little kids. initially, the program was designed to send undergraduate philosophy students to teach p4c to a gifted class in a nearby elementary school. the program then morphed into teaching 3and 4-year-olds in lab school at the college. for the younger ones, the format was altered so that each lesson opened with a game, which was followed by mini-discussions throughout the reading of a picture book, and at the end, children were invited to translate some of their thoughts into art (p. 39). so, a lesson on bravery might open with a blind-fold game, followed by discussions about frog and toad in dragons analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 124 and giants, and end with children being invited to draw an image of when they thought they were brave. speaking of bravery, keyon provides a number of helpful references for those brave enough to explore doing philosophy at the pre-k level. keyon also describes a completely different program, one in which he tweaked his first-year course to help the office of career and life planning to create an internship that was genuinely exciting for interested graduates. since internships are becoming increasingly necessary for graduation in the us (p. 41), this was a particularly innovative undertaking. as well, since studies have found that undergraduates tend to be “unengaged,” or “dabblers,” or “unrealistic dreamers” or “motivated but directionless” (p. 43), engaging undergraduates in this sort of service learning so that they can do their part in rectifying the decline of civic discourse (p. 37, p. 46) would seem to be the prefect medicine for reinvigorating university education. in chapter 4, marisa diaz-waian describes her passion for doing public philosophy through her institute called “merlin,” in her native montana. merlin’s many atypical forms include street philosophy (51), field philosophy, popular philosophy, activist philosophy (64), philosophy walks (p. 73), hayride-philosophy (p. 77), philosophy night school (80) and think and drinks (80). all of these varying formats are anchored in philosophical dialogue which diaz-waian likens to a horticultural tool: it is “central to the cultivation and development of ideas, ourselves, and others” (p. 60). she warns us, though, that “what is often disguised as dialogue may actually be a monologue that excludes and dehumanizes others, blocks knowledge production, promotes self-interests, and normalizes inaction” (p 60). she argues that philosophical dialogue that is worthy of the name requires humility, openness, courage and a certain kind of relinquishment wherein all parties experience the “deconstructive and transformative power of the question itself” (p. 60). in underscoring the importance of public philosophy, diaz-waian speaks to the relevance of this entire collection, by quoting jules evans who writes that: “without street philosophy, academic philosophy becomes irrelevant. without academic philosophy, street philosophy becomes incoherent” (pp.6-3). she emphasizes, however, that though academic philosophy is critical for public philosophy, unlike academic philosophy, public philosophy is not about expanding the knowledge of the history of philosophy. it is rather about “finding your way with philosophy” in the sense that we each are required to figure out how to be in this messy world of ours (p. 83). in a lovely complex analogy, she writes that philosophy can be considered “a trusty steed, a light house in the storm, and a thing which can inspire, and ‘lead out’ what is beautiful in all of us” (p. 84). memphis, tennessee is the blackest city in the us with a p4wc program. since this is the location of christian kronsted and jonathon wurtz’ program called philosophy horizons (ph), these authors speak with authority when they suggest (in chapter 5) that we may err if we try to socratize as usual when inquiring with students who come face to face with racism on a daily basis. they argue, nonetheless, that this kind of dialogical pedagogy is particularly important for these students in order to help mitigate the pedagogical deficits of the public school system (p. 93) since such programs help develop critical thinking and analytic skills that allow them to formulate positions with clarity, precision, and depth and to critically and respectfully evaluate the positions offered by others (pp. 934). as well, these sorts of programs can help underrepresented youth enroll in college by offering philosophy classes for college credits. it is of note that, in three years after instituting their program, the graduation rate of the high school they serve jumped from 55% to 82% (p. 94). with regard to the specific topic of racism, some comments are contentious, e.g., that the racist views of kant, hegel, and analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 125 heidegger ought to be taken into account when considering the merits of their philosophy (p. 97). as well, some may find that they are too quick to jump on the bandwagon of accusing western philosophy in general, and lipman in particular, of “white-washing” philosophy. they criticize, for instance, the “color-blind” impartiality approach of a cpi since it can quickly “lead to the most precarious of our students having to put their life experiences on display for all to scrutinize” (p. 98). while few would doubt the truth of this claim, it is not clear that this, in and of itself, is a fault. in my own practice of running cpis in university philosophy classes, i have found that there are very few topics that don’t ultimately lead to the most precarious of the participants (with respect to the topic at hand) “having to put their life experiences on display for all to scrutinize.” take the topic of rape, for instance—some students have been raped; or the topic of immigration—some students are first generation immigrants; or a topic that focuses on attitudes towards china—some students come from mainland china; or the topic of abortion—some students have had abortions; or even the topic of death—some students have recently lost loved ones. while cpis around these topics usually begin with an exchange of impersonal abstract reasoning, e.g., kant would view rape as wrong because it is an assault on a person’s right to autonomy, as the dialogue moves to, say, comparisons to other forms of assault, e.g., one man punching another, it is rare for an inquiry not to circulate to deeper levels when individuals recount (often with tears) their own personal experiences of sexual assault “for all to scrutinize” in defence of the claim that rape is worse than non-sexual assault. yes, these topics are intricately tricky, but, more often than not, a genuine sense of solidarity emerges as participants bring themselves and their personal experiences to the table. and speaking of solidarity, here too kronsted and wurtz, in trying to see the “whitewashed” emperor’s clothes in p4c, fault lipman whom they claim assumes that all cpis are characterized by solidarity (p. 96, p. 98), something they say that is clearly missing if participants are of diverse races. it seems to me, though, that a more generous and realistic interpretation of lipman’s work is that with luck, sensitivity and skill, a cpi may result in a sense of solidarity, which is precisely what kronsted and wurtz themselves seek (p. 99). nonetheless kronsted and wurtz bring up an important point when they suggest that, with regard to difference, the gap may be so wide amongst participants, that one ought to at least pause before attempting to engage in a cpi. as an example, they relate an instance in which a young black woman asked: “why do black people believe in christianity when christianity was used to enslave black people?” (p. 104). the resulting dialogue was productive for this all-black group, but one can only imagine that it would have been anything but productive had the participants been of diverse races. in chapter 6, sarah vitale describes a philosophy outreach project (founded in 2015) in which university students engage in philosophical dialogue with high school students across indiana. vitale’s particular concern is that the educational system in general follows what she refers to as a “productivist logic” which “values practices that increase productivity and profits and devalues practices that fail to do so. it converts all practices to economic ones and prioritizes market exchange over all other human interactions” (p. 114). she notes that while school passes itself off as neutral, nonetheless “it works to support the capitalist economy, preparing students for their respective roles in the economy and then ‘ejecting’ them into the workforce at the appropriate level of preparation” (p. 120). it is not surprising then that the space to do philosophy is crowded out when every moment must be accounted for and when every activity is subjected to a cost/benefit analysis (pp. 114-5). to emphasize the dire situation, she notes that the number of academic positions in philosophy is decreasing, and not only are whole philosophy departments shuttering but entire humanities analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 126 departments are closing down (p. 115). vitale is fighting back against this productivist tsunami by supporting her university, ball state university in muncie, indiana, in their effort to provide grants to support students engaged in community-based philosophy projects, which they call immersive learning or high-impact experiences (p. 123). one particularly innovative event that outreach puts on is a conference for pre-college philosophy engagement (cppe), a one-day interactive conference for high school students held at the end of the spring semester that has numerous breakout sessions including “speed philosophy.” in “speed philosophy,” 5 or 6 high school students are given 5 minutes to discuss a question pertaining to a presentation later in the day. since 5 minutes is never enough to address the question, students become energized for future discussions. all in all, vitale urges us to find ways in which university philosophy students can philosophically engage with high school students since it is a win-win that will help in the struggle against the impact of productivism on the greater public (p. 128). philosophy for the young (p4y), a program that was initiated by the university of pennsylvania, is the focus of chapter 7. in it the authors (dustin webster, stephen esser and karen detlefsen) describe the many formats that their project has embodied. in one format, high school students are invited to come to campus on saturdays to engage in philosophical dialogue with undergraduate philosophy students. aside from igniting an interest in philosophy, this has had the added benefit of familiarizing high school students with college life (p. 132). in another format, philosophy classes and clubs were initiated in schools in philadelphia (p. 135). yet another format was the initiation of lunchtime, after school and early morning philosophy clubs call think and talk clubs. running middle school film and philosophy clubs is yet another format. an intriguing and unusual format was p4y’s collaboration with mighty writers which offered students practice in philosophical writing which, as it turned out, offered those who might have more trouble with dialogue a chance to shine (p. 137). a more formal format was an 8-week course offered to high school students entitled “the philosophy and ethics of science” (p. 137) with the view to nurturing literate consumers of scientific information. one important point that they stress is that it is essential for everyone to understand the difference between empirical and non-empirical claims along with the different kinds of reasoning that supports each (pp. 137-8). p4y is also heavily involved in the ethics bowls, an event that, importantly, differs from debating in that, rather than being adversarial, the teams are assessed on the degree to which they can learn from one another (p. 139). with regard to this format, not only are undergraduates trained to be ethics bowl coaches, but several weekend workshops are also offered at the university campus for any teams or students who want extra preparation and coaching (p. 140). this has the added advantage of building strong connections between area high schools and the university. p4y is even in the early stages of creating an ethics bowl coaching manual. and finally, yet another intriguing initiative is the establishment of a graduate certificate in public philosophy that creates a formal path for students to develop their capabilities as they engage members of the community (p. 143). this certificate reflects p4y’s belief that philosophical tools and knowledge can contribute to improving civic dialogue about contentious issues. indeed, it reflects the belief that all of us who have philosophical training have a moral obligation to help cultivate the knowledge and skills needed to effectively engage the public in doing philosophy (p. 143). in the final chapter, joseph murphy describes a full year course in an independent high school in new jersey in which the history of philosophy is taken in spanish by those who are philosophically analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 127 and linguistically fluent. “how odd,” was my first thought as i began to read. and then, to my surprise, i learn that there is such a thing as the international philosophy olympiad (ipo), for which students must write a philosophy essay in one of four languages, but not in their native tongue. so, for us students, the essays must be written in german, french, or spanish, hence the motivation for combining spanish and philosophy in one course (p. 163). and since murphy has a degree in philosophy from montclair state university and worked with mathew lipman, it is hardly surprising that his mode of teaching is dialogical and hence is the perfect format for students to enhance their spanish proficiency while diving into the intricacies of philosophy (murphy also has a degree in hispanic studies from a university in spain). though preparing students for the ipo has genuine power to motivate school administrators to include philosophy in the general curriculum, it is evident, when reading this chapter, that murphy’s prime motivation is not to prepare students for the contest— amazing though it is, given the opportunities to travel to, among other countries, norway, estonia, and italy. his prime motivation seems to be to push back against the rampant idiocy that has infected society all the way up to the highest reaches, e.g., alternative facts (p. 157). how is it possible, one wonders, that relatively intelligent students believe that everyone has a right to their own opinion and that if you believe something, that is equivalent to it being true (159)? how is it possible, one wonders, that most schools include critical thinking as one of their most important goals and yet, in terms of actualizing that objective, do little except for sending out the implicit message that critical thinking is nothing more than deep reading and careful listening to the teacher to make sure that what the teacher is saying is well understood (p. 156)? how is it possible, one wonders, that we live in a world in which there are serious issues such as racism and sexism that “scream out for the kind of clarification that philosophical and ethical analysis can provide” (pp. 156-7), and yet stand-alone philosophy and ethical classes are close to non-existent in high school? how is it possible, one wonders, that educators consistently tell our young people that they are the future leaders and yet, at the same time, consistently deny them the sort of education that would equip them with the skills necessary to make the sort of sound ethical decisions that are integral to any leadership position (p. 157)? all in all, then, this chapter is about subterfuge: how to get philosophy to young people without too much notice. murphy even suggests that, if getting philosophy into schools continues to be such a hard sell, young philosophy graduates ought to consider getting certified in a subject that offers them a surreptitious route, e.g., english, history or one of the ipo languages, so that they can remain true to their passion for bringing philosophy and critical thinking to school age youngsters (p. 165). it is fitting that this remarkable collection that focuses on expanding access to philosophy should end with this explosion of passion, something that clearly drives all these practitioners. and each, in their own way, have offered a roadmap. this extraordinary collection might just be the catalyst to popularize doing philosophy with those outside the academy—a movement that would surely make this world a significantly better place. address correspondences to: dr. susan t. gardner professor of philosophy, capilano university, north vancouver, bc, canada, v7j 3h5. email: sgardner@capilanou.ca mailto:sgardner@capilanou.ca analytic teaching and philosophical praxis analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 44 expanding the facilitator’s toolbox: vygotskian mediation in philosophy for children jacob b. castleberry and kevin m. clark abstract philosophy for children (p4c) is an educational program founded by matthew lipman and ann sharp in the 1970s to improve judgment in children by sharpening their critical, creative, and caring thinking skills. as children’s engagement in philosophical dialogue is an essential component of the program, the teacher has a facilitative, rather than an instructive, role. the goal of this paper is to provide new and experienced facilitators with conceptual tools for critically reflecting on and improving their facilitative practice. the paper first develops a vygotskian interpretation of p4c facilitation, applying vygotsky’s theory to p4c’s community of philosophical inquiry structure and david kennedy’s “toolbox of philosophical moves.” we contend that vygotsky’s sociocultural theory provides a useful lens through which to view facilitation as assisted or mediated learning. the concept of facilitation as mediational assistance is then extended by drawing on gallimore and tharp’s neo-vygotskian framework and their six means of assistance. finally, we further extend these ideas by turning to lakoff and johnson’s theory of conceptual metaphor. metaphors expand the “facilitator’s toolbox” by providing additional conceptual tools for facilitation as well as varied ways to conceptualize the facilitation process through a vygotskian lens. keywords: philosophy for children, facilitation, community of philosophical inquiry, philosophical moves, vygotsky, scaffolding, conceptual metaphor, cognitive structuring. hilosophy for children is an educational program founded by matthew lipman and ann sharp in the 1970s to improve judgment in children by sharpening their critical, creative, and caring thinking skills (lipman, 1998, 2003; lipman, sharp, & oscanyan, 1980; splitter & sharp, 1995). these skills are sharpened by engaging students in philosophical dialogues, during what the program calls a community of philosophical inquiry (cpi), or in other philosophical activities and discussion plans (gregory, 2008; lipman, 1996b; oyler, 2016). lipman and sharp theorized that dialogic philosophical engagement would encourage children (as young as kindergarteners) to think for themselves, think with others, and think well (gregory, 2011; kennedy, 2000). as dialogue is an essential component of the cpi, the teacher has a facilitative rather than an instructive role (lipman et al., 1980). the program has emphasized the importance of the teacher’s modeling of good critical reasoning for students. the teacher’s role has also been conceptualized as a socratic questioner (splitter & sharp, 1995) and “co-inquirer” (gregory, 2008). more recently, kennedy (2013) has further explicated the facilitator’s role and introduced what he calls a “toolbox of philosophical moves.” these moves are a set of critical reasoning tools to be modeled by facilitators and identified as they occur in students’ on-going conversations. ideally, as students internalize and p analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 45 master the use of these moves, the facilitative role will be dispersed across the community and the students will eventually become capable of managing the dialogue on their own (gregory, 2007; kennedy, 2004; oyler, 2016). in this paper, we provide a vygotskian perspective of facilitation within a lipman-sharp approach to philosophy for children (p4c). as a developmental psychologist, lev vygotsky studied the social and cultural origins of higher mental processes. in vygotsky’s theory, cognitive development occurs as individuals learn the use of cultural tools, with the help of more skilled cultural members. in other words, for vygotsky, development occurs through assisted or facilitated learning. as a result of this emphasis, vygotsky’s theory can provide a valuable lens through which to view facilitation in p4c. lipman (1996a), in his book, natasha: vygotskian dialogues, addressed some connections between vygotsky and p4c. however, lipman did not focus specifically on vygotsky’s relevance to facilitators. the goal of this paper is to provide a vygotskian interpretation of p4c facilitation that expands and deepens our understanding of the facilitator’s role. we aim to provide p4c facilitators with conceptual tools for critical reflection as they strive to improve their facilitative practice. this may be especially helpful for new facilitators. the paper is organized in two main sections. in the first section, we develop a vygotskian interpretation of p4c facilitation. after an overview of vygotsky’s sociocultural theory, we apply his key concepts to the community of philosophical inquiry (cpi) and kennedy’s philosophical moves. the concept of facilitation as mediational assistance is then extended by drawing on gallimore and tharp’s neo-vygotskian framework and their six means of assistance. in the second section, we further extend these ideas by turning to lakoff and johnson’s theory of conceptual metaphor. our purpose for including this work on metaphor is twofold. first, metaphors provide facilitators additional conceptual tools for assisting student learning from a vygotskian perspective. second, several metaphors for facilitation or assistance have emerged within neo-vygotskian sociocultural theories that offer varied ways of understanding the process of facilitation itself. in both cases, metaphors can further expand the “facilitator’s toolbox.” vygotsky’s sociocultural theory and p4c vygotsky’s sociocultural theory provides a useful lens through which to view and deepen our understanding of p4c facilitation. in this section, we focus on three vygotskian concepts: mediation, internalization, and the zone of proximal development. the idea of facilitation as mediational assistance is then extended through the neo-vygotskian framework of gallimore and tharp (1990), who outlined six specific means of assistance. when applied to p4c, these theories can help facilitators better critically reflect on their practice and assist student learning within the community of philosophical inquiry. vygotsky’s sociocultural theory of development lev vygotsky, a russian developmental psychologist from the early twentieth century, sought to understand human psychological processes in terms of their origins. specifically, he studied how elementary mental processes (those we share with other animals) are transformed into more complex analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 46 higher mental functions (e.g., voluntary attention and memory, thinking and reasoning, selfregulation). according to vygotsky (1978), this occurs through mediation involving the use of signs or psychological tools (e.g., language, number systems) produced within a culture. whereas in a reflex, a stimulus directly triggers a response, with mediation a third entity (e.g., a tool or sign) transforms this relation and expands our capabilities. for example, counting on one’s fingers was an important cultural tool for extending quantitative perception. signs mediate perception and action as physical tools mediate labor. however, rather than being directed outward (toward the world), signs are directed inward (toward ourselves). other examples of cultural tools include memory strategies, diagrams, maps, and algebraic systems (vygotsky, 1978; wertsch, 1985). vygotsky (1978) argued signs allow for the voluntary control of behavior and mental processes. internalization involves the internal production of a sign to mediate perception or action. in vygotsky’s view, all higher mental functions begin as social processes. in his law of cultural development, the individual (internal) plane emerges from the social (external) plane: “every function in the child’s cultural development appears twice: first, on the social level, and later, on the individual level” (vygotsky, 1978, p. 57). for example, first we point things out to others, then later we are able to point things out to ourselves (the basis of voluntary attention). according to vygotsky, thinking is transformed as language, thinking strategies, and other cultural tools are internalized—that is, they become internal and private, directed toward oneself, incorporated into existing mental processes, and regulated by the individual. for vygotsky (1978, 1986), speech played an essential role in the development of children’s thinking. speech is first used to communicate with others—to express desires, make requests, and describe situations. it gradually comes to organize the individual’s perception and action. for young children, the primary function of speech is labeling, allowing them to focus on a specific object or aspect of their perceptual field. as vygotsky (1978) described, through this “verbalized perception” they learn to perceive the world as objects with meaning: “the child begins to perceive the world not only through his eyes but also through his speech” (p. 32). gradually speech becomes more planful. children tend to speak as well as act when trying to reach a goal. at first, speech tends to follow or accompany action, but it eventually moves earlier in the process to precede action (in the form of a plan). speech also shifts from being external to internal. children first talk to others, then to themselves out loud, and finally to themselves internally (as inner thought or “private speech”). whereas other developmental psychologists at the time viewed kids talking out loud to themselves negatively (for piaget, this “egocentric speech” was a sign of immaturity), vygotsky considered this an important step in the internalization process through which children develop the capacity to engage in dialogue with themselves. this emerging planning function of speech enables children to first master their environments and eventually regulate their own behavior (vygotsky, 1978). for vygotsky, cognitive development is social in two ways: (a) it is mediated by sociocultural tools and (b) it occurs through social assistance (wertsch, 1985). vygotsky (1978) introduced the zone of proximal development (zpd) to describe the relationship between assisted learning and development. he defined the zpd as “the distance between the actual developmental level as determined by independent problem solving and the level of potential development as determined through problem solving under adult guidance or in collaboration with more capable peers” analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 47 (vygotsky, 1978, p. 86). with regard to instruction, the zpd represents competencies not yet mastered but which the individual is able to perform effectively with assistance. in other words, it defines what an individual cannot do alone but can do with help. this is where instruction or assistance should be targeted, as it is where learning can lead development forward. for example, if students already know multiplication, exponents can be explained as the same number multiplied by itself x number of times. eventually, children will be able to use this strategy themselves. development occurs as children participate in cultural activities just beyond their level of competence and learn how to use cultural tools with the assistance of more skilled adults or peers. applying vygotsky: p4c “moves” and the cpi structure a vygotskian framework can be used to conceptualize effective facilitation within philosophy for children. here we focus on interpreting kennedy’s “philosophical moves” and the cpi through a vygotskian lens. kennedy (2013) has provided p4c facilitators and participants a set of tools for inquiry he calls “philosophical moves.” these moves are strategies for engaging in critical reasoning and philosophical dialogue. specifically, kennedy has identified the following philosophical moves: “asking a question”; “agreeing or disagreeing”; “giving a reason”; “offering a proposition, hypothesis or explanation”; “offering an example or counterexample”; “classifying/categorizing”; “making a comparison” (i.e., a connection, distinction, or analogy); “offering a definition”; “identifying an assumption”; “making an inference”; “making a conditional statement (‘if/then’)”; “reasoning syllogistically”; “self-correcting”; “restating”; and “entertaining different perspectives” (see kennedy, 2013, for a description of each). according to kennedy, these moves should be modeled by facilitators and identified as they occur naturally in conversation. as students learn to identify and use these moves, the facilitator’s role is reduced (ideally, for kennedy, it disappears) and control is distributed across the group (kennedy, 2004, 2013). through a vygotskian lens, these moves serve as mediational tools that can be used first as category labels and then for planning and regulating social and internal processes. by identifying critical reasoning moves already spontaneously produced in students’ conversations, facilitators make them a focus of conscious attention. as facilitators model the use of these moves to guide discussion, they mediate inquiry on the “social plane.” note that what is being facilitated here is the critical reasoning and dialogue processes, not their content; the p4c facilitator does not lead students toward any particular discussion topic, belief, or conclusion. as students begin (with the help of the facilitator and later their peers) to see the conversation in terms of the categorical framework provided by the moves, the facilitator can more easily direct students’ attention to aspects of group conversation and help them develop a greater understanding of the moves. eventually, the moves will be more planned, as students call for various moves from others and, when internalized, from themselves. in order to best support this process, facilitators should target students’ zones of proximal development. at first, assistance will be more explicit, as students need to have the moves identified or modeled and the facilitator may need to call for specific moves. with practice, students should be able to provide more help to each other and eventually themselves, so that the facilitator only needs to intervene when conversation “gets stuck” or when alternative moves could push the conversation to a deeper level. as students internalize the moves and increasingly regulate their own critical reasoning analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 48 and dialogue processes, they will need facilitation less and less, and control of the conversation will be increasingly distributed across the group. when this occurs, teachers should be ready to make two adjustments: (a) facilitation should be aimed at higher levels of skill and (b) the teacher’s role should shift from facilitator to co-inquirer. according to oyler’s (2016) analysis of the lipman-sharp approach to p4c, the cpi has the following parts: engaging with a stimulus, student-generated question, inquiry dialogue, and metacognitive reflection (we will not focus here on post-cpi activities). the stimulus is any philosophically charged experience from which students can develop questions. lipman and sharp wrote several novels designed for this role (e.g., lipman, 1981), but alternative stimuli include picture books, short video clips, or even the classroom itself. the questions developed from the stimulus need to be philosophical in order to be useful for inquiry; they should be communal (appropriate for group discussion), central (meaningful to the group), and contestable (with more than one possible answer; gregory, 2008). examples of good inquiry questions include “is it wrong to lie to your friend if you are trying to protect them?” and “would it ever be just to kill someone?” as students engage in inquiry, the result is typically not a finished or correct answer. rather, through inquiry, students aim to identify a “most reasonable thing to believe” or a hypothesis that must be tested or considered further (lipman et al., 1980; reznitskaya & wilkinson, 2017). in the final metacognitive reflection, students assess their own thinking and group process: “are we doing a good job listening to other participants? how can we improve our thinking in the future? are we examining multiple perspectives?” (lipman, 2003; oyler, 2016). these questions are designed to encourage students’ mindfulness about their thinking and inquiry processes and hopefully also promote a self-corrective attitude (gregory, 2008; lipman, 2003). for example, if students indicate they are not doing a good job examining multiple perspectives, the facilitator can ask them how they could address this issue moving forward. importantly, this leaves the responsibility with students to identify problems and implement solutions. in vygotskian terms, the cpi framework provides a cultural tool that mediates the social process of initiating and engaging in philosophical conversations. this structure allows participants to know how to ask and answer philosophical questions within a group. if later internalized, individuals have a framework for asking and answering questions on their own. for example, while at home watching a television show with a philosophically charged scene, they may develop their own questions, engage in internal inquiry (using the moves), and determine an answer that works for them. this aligns with the program’s goal of helping students think for themselves and think well. the cpi also attempts to help students internalize metacognition as a mediation tool. originally done as a group at the end of inquiry, the hope is that students will apply this metacognitive reflection to other experiences. for example, after writing a paper or taking a test, students could ask themselves, “did i choose good strategies in writing that paper?” or “did i prepare well for that test?” followed by “how could i improve in the future?” this can help students better plan, monitor, and control their thinking and learning processes (see flavell, 1979; nelson, 1996). in all these examples, facilitators provide conceptual tools, aimed at the zpd, that assist students’ social interactions and eventually (when internalized) their internal “conversations” with themselves. to further develop a vygotskian understanding of facilitation as mediational assistance, in the next section we turn to a neoanalytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 49 vygotskian framework developed by ronald gallimore and roland tharp. extending vygotsky: gallimore and tharp’s means of assisting performance gallimore and tharp (1990; tharp & gallimore, 1988) introduced an approach to teaching literacy, based on vygotsky’s ideas, in which teaching is viewed as assisting performance and literacy is developed through “instructional conversations.” they have challenged traditional conceptions of teaching as lecture and recitation, where teachers control the topics of discussion as well as the form and timing of student responses. in their instructional conversations, they weave together experiences and concepts, engaging learners in meaningful discourse that provides a context for assisting performance. in this paper, gallimore and tharp’s work is important for its further development of methods for providing assistance. of most relevance here, they outline six means (or forms) of assistance that integrate ideas from several psychological perspectives (e.g., behavioral, cognitive, social cognitive) within a broader neo-vygotskian framework. these six means of assistance are modeling, contingency management, feedback, instructing, questioning, and cognitive structuring. in this educational model, learning is facilitated as assistance occurs within a student’s zpd. as students eventually internalize these means of assistance, there is a shift from assisted (or other-regulated) to self-regulated performance. in what follows, each means of assistance is described and examples are offered that connect it to effective facilitation in p4c. modeling is the act of performing a behavior or task for the purpose of imitation. this can occur intentionally or unintentionally (gallimore & tharp, 1990). in p4c, lipman’s novels model critical, creative, and caring thinking (de marzio, 2017). the facilitator is also constantly modeling in the cpi. for example, during the question forming stage, if participants do not understand what kinds of questions are appropriate for philosophical conversation, the facilitator can provide examples. when a facilitator identifies or calls for a specific move, this models the use of that move. metacognition can also be modeled by facilitators, as they lead discussions that evaluate the session and consider improvements. facilitators should be careful not to model undesired behaviors (e.g., being upset or defensive when someone disagrees with your idea). as students develop their p4c moves, they can also serve as models for each other. contingency management is often described in terms of reinforcement and punishment. teachers should align contingencies (i.e., consequences of behaviors) with their goals, such that desired behaviors are reinforced and undesired behaviors are not reinforced. in school, grades serve as important contingencies. other potential reinforcers include praise, recognition, preferred activities, and opportunities for desired choice or participation. in the cpi, the most common reinforcers used in on-going conversations are praise and recognition. the p4c facilitator can praise or recognize students for appropriately identifying and using moves, asking good questions, or making good arguments. although punishment (e.g., criticism) may occur, reinforcement is preferred in both the psychological and p4c literatures. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 50 feedback provides information on performance in relation to a standard or goal (gallimore & tharp, 1990). common forms of feedback in school are grades, test corrections, rubrics, teacher comments, and peer evaluations. within p4c, the cpi creates a context where students receive a constant stream of feedback, as they offer ideas or employ moves and observe the responses of others (e.g., do others understand what i said? did it move the conversation forward? do others agree?). as students learn the characteristics of good critical reasoning and dialogue, along with the appropriate use of the p4c moves, these provide standards relative to which individuals can compare their performance and make improvements. for example, questions can be evaluated as to whether they are communal, central, and contestable (gregory, 2008). all cpi participants can contribute group feedback during the metacognition stage. in gallimore and tharp’s framework, instructing has the specific meaning of telling an individual what to do (i.e., how to think or behave). in the cpi, there is not a lot of direct instructing. the first few sessions may include instruction as to the kinds of questions that are useful for inquiry and, depending on the age range of the group, certain etiquette guidelines may be necessary and students’ attention may occasionally need to be directed back to the appropriate task. however, in part, p4c distinguishes itself from traditional teaching in its emphasis on other forms of assistance. when instruction is used, it should be selected because it is determined to be the best form of assistance, not as a means for the facilitator (as expert or authority) to take control of the conversation or direct the group toward certain topics or conclusions. questioning has a distinct role as a means of assistance, in that it “provokes creations by the pupil” (gallimore & tharp, 1990, p. 181). this enables teachers and facilitators to assist learning in several important ways. first, it stimulates students’ thinking. second, as students offer a linguistic response, it provides access to their thoughts, allowing facilitators to assess and further assist their thinking and understanding. third, it models questioning, which can support its eventual internalization as self-questioning. questioning has a central role in p4c. the cpi is based on complex questions like “what is a democracy?” or “what makes someone a good friend?” that stimulate critical, creative, and caring thinking. as conversations develop, there are further opportunities for the facilitator and students to ask questions to gain access to other participants’ thoughts. this provides a context for clarifying statements, generating alternative ideas, evaluating arguments, and promoting metacognitive reflection. finally, cognitive structuring involves providing a mental structure for understanding perceptions and experiences or structuring thoughts and actions (gallimore & tharp, 1990). cognitive structures can include concepts, examples, unifying principles, conceptual frameworks, theories, philosophies, evaluative standards, procedures, and strategies. in p4c, students gain useful concepts from shared readings and conversations with each other. at select times, the facilitator may offer an example, concept, or strategy to advance the conversation. venn diagrams can be introduced to help students understand relations between categories (kennedy, 2013). the p4c moves and cpi structure also provide examples of cognitive structuring that can assist facilitators and students in planning and evaluating their critical reasoning and dialogue. the next section will further extend this idea of cognitive structuring via lakoff and johnson’s theory of conceptual metaphor. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 51 thus, gallimore and tharp’s six means of assistance offer facilitators a range of options to select from when assisting students. this “meta-framework” itself provides cognitive structuring for facilitators, as they engage in and metacognitively reflect on how they can improve their practice. modeling is central to p4c, and many p4c contributors have stressed the modeling and identification of various moves in the cpi (de marzio, 2017; gregory, 2007, 2008; kennedy, 2013; lipman et al., 1980; splitter & sharp, 1995). gallimore and tharp’s framework can assist facilitators when considering how to combine modeling with other forms of assistance. if combined with questioning (i.e., asking the group what move was just used), this may help students later identify moves on their own (i.e., asking themselves, “what move was that?”). a facilitator could also provide or ask for feedback on the group’s use of the moves (e.g., “did we disagree with any positions today? did we ask for clarification when needed?”). as students use and identify moves, facilitators can manage contingencies by providing some encouraging praise or recognition (e.g., “good example”; “thank you for clarifying that point”). moreover, when a group is struggling with part of the program, a little instruction (e.g., directing students to try a specific move) or cognitive structuring (e.g., offering an example) may help move the conversation forward without negatively impacting the overall collaborative nature of the group. by using varied means of assistance, the facilitator is also modeling their use, which means that the group may begin using them. although none of these specific strategies may be new to p4c, this meta-framework can hopefully assist facilitators by cognitively structuring their thinking about their own performance, thus helping them better assist student learning. metaphors for cognitive structuring in p4c to further develop a neo-vygotskian approach to p4c facilitation, and extend the idea of assistance via cognitive structuring discussed above, this section draws on george lakoff and mark johnson’s theory of conceptual metaphor. although lakoff and johnson do not directly connect their ideas to vygotsky’s work, we argue that metaphors can provide a further source of mediation within a vygotskian conceptualization of facilitation that has relevance for p4c. below, we first introduce key concepts from lakoff and johnson’s theory relating to the role of metaphor in human thought. then, we illustrate the potential value of metaphors for cognitive structuring by offering examples of metaphors that could facilitate p4c inquiry, followed by examples of metaphors from neo-vygotskian theories that are useful for conceptualizing the facilitation process itself. this combines ideas from the first author’s training and experiences as a p4c facilitator and the second author’s prior analysis of metaphors underlying sociocultural theories (clark, 2005). our goal is to provide facilitators additional conceptual tools to expand their “toolbox” and increase their capacity for critical reflection on the facilitation process. lakoff and johnson’s conceptual metaphor theory lakoff and johnson (1999, 2003) have extensively studied the role of metaphor in human cognition. in traditional views, metaphor has been considered a linguistic device, a form of figurative language, useful for poetry and rhetoric but not central to everyday cognition and to be avoided by philosophers and scientists in search of precise definitions and literal truths. in contrast, lakoff and johnson have argued metaphor is common, ordinary, and fundamentally conceptual; metaphorical analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 52 language is often derivative of (and provides evidence for) this pervasive role of metaphor in human thought and understanding. conceptual metaphor theory is a central part of a broader embodied view of mind. lakoff and johnson (1999, 2003) have explored how many of our concepts and forms of reasoning have arisen, often through metaphor, from our sensorimotor experiences and ways of interacting in the world (e.g., object manipulation, orientation and motion in space). as defined by lakoff and johnson (2003), metaphor is the structuring of one experiential or conceptual domain in terms of another. this typically involves using a well-structured (often sensorimotor) source domain to understand and reason about a less-structured (often abstract) target domain. we are usually unaware of the metaphors that enable and constrain our conceptualization and reasoning processes. lakoff and johnson (2003) have referred to our most basic metaphors, those that structure our conventional ways of thinking, as “metaphors we live by.” as an example, consider how discussions of arguments often reflect the language of war. we strive to defend our position, plan lines of attack, shoot down opposing ideas, and gain ground. according to lakoff and johnson (2003), this “argument is war” metaphor is more than a linguistic matter; we use not just the words but also the conceptual structure of war to think about arguments. an alternative (but also conventional) metaphor is “arguments are buildings” that can be well constructed, have strong support, or lack a firm foundation. each metaphor partially structures the concept, highlighting some aspects of arguments but not others. which metaphor we use influences how we think and act. whereas the war metaphor draws attention to oppositional aspects, the building metaphor emphasizes the importance of foundational premises and evidentiary support. those engaged in argument as war are likely aiming to win. in contrast, for those viewing arguments as buildings, the goal is likely to strengthen their support (e.g., to prevent a shaky argument’s collapse). when faced with objections, the former may defend their position, even deploying strategies that seem irrational (e.g., refusing to accommodate reasonable objections, constructing a fake “reality” in an attempt to remain “correct”), whereas the latter may welcome feedback on any structural defects in the argument. another common metaphor in western cultures is “time is a resource” and the more specific variation “time is money.” we use resources and money (as source domains) to structure our thinking about time (the target domain). we talk of saving, wasting, and running out of time (reflecting resources generally) and spending, budgeting, and investing time (reflecting money more specifically). to use vygotskian terms, the resource and money domains mediate our understanding of time by helping to structure this more abstract concept. we also conceptualize time in terms of motion in space. events such as deadlines can approach or pass us by (if time is moving relative to us) or we can look ahead to upcoming events we are fast approaching (if we are moving relative to a time landscape). as with the argument metaphors, each metaphor partially structures time. time as a resource or money highlights its value and limited status, whereas time as motion in space emphasizes our changing temporal relations to events. there is no “true” or “right” metaphor that “captures” all of the concept’s available meaning. to fully understand a domain, we must rely on multiple metaphors, each emphasizing different aspects (lakoff & johnson, 1999, 2003). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 53 conventional metaphors are typically used automatically without effort, and we are usually unaware of their role in our thought processes. however, if we become aware of the metaphors we use (i.e., if we develop reflexivity), we can assess their strengths and limitations and use them more intentionally and self-critically. in addition, new metaphors (or new extensions of existing metaphors) can create new understanding (lakoff & johnson, 1999, 2003). for metaphors, the relevant question is not whether they are true or false but if they are appropriate or inappropriate for use in a given situation. moreover, considering multiple metaphors should be encouraged. even if one metaphor fits our experiences or the evidence well, an alternative perspective could still be valuable in highlighting different aspects of the situation. facilitating with metaphors integrating lakoff and johnson’s ideas into the neo-vygotskian framework of facilitation as assistance developed in the previous section, conceptual metaphor provides another tool for facilitating learning through cognitive structuring. this section outlines two metaphors implemented in the first author’s experiences with p4c. for each, we explicate the metaphor and describe how it could help facilitators see aspects of the cpi they might otherwise have missed. these metaphors are merely offered as examples of possible ways to conceptualize aspects of the program. the list is far from exhaustive and identifying additional useful metaphors could be one potential avenue for future projects. our goal here is to illustrate the potential role of metaphor within a neo-vygotskian interpretation of facilitation. the first metaphor, arguments are houses, assumes that arguments have parts: the claim or hypothesis, the premises or reasons, and the assumptions or grounding on which those premises rely. the claim represents the roof of the house, which needs to be supported by walls (i.e., premises or reasons). a typical reason will assume something, which means it is grounded in prior beliefs or knowledge claims. this grounding is the house’s foundation. just as a house’s weak foundation or walls could threaten the roof, weaknesses in (or objections to) the underlying assumptions or supporting reasons, if not addressed, could cause a shaky argument to collapse. this “arguments are houses” metaphor can be useful in helping facilitators and participants construct and critique arguments. if a student presents a hypothesis (i.e., a roof) without providing reasons (i.e., walls) to support it, then the facilitator can call for those reasons. eventually, this way of seeing arguments, as well as this move, will be internalized by the participants and the facilitator will no longer need to call for other features of the house/argument. objections are easier to understand through the house metaphor as well. for example, if an objection is presented, students may assume a claim is indefensible. however, if the facilitator can help them identify and amend the weak feature, they may see that the claim is still defensible. this metaphor highlights that knowledge construction is an active process and there is often value in collaborative efforts. variations on this metaphor are found in reznitskaya and wilkinson (2017). note that it is also consistent with the “arguments are buildings” metaphor identified by lakoff and johnson (2003). a second metaphor, communities are organisms, highlights that a classroom community such as the cpi takes time to develop, just as an organism takes time to grow. also, like an organism, a analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 54 community is comprised of interrelated parts that must work together for the successful functioning of the whole. kennedy’s (1994, 2004) ideas align with this metaphor, when he has argued good participants notice where and when they are most needed in the group conversation. contributions that distract from the current discussion thread might need to be withheld, a personal sacrifice for the benefit of the larger community. a community also has certain needs for the parts to function well, and, just as different organisms have similar needs (e.g., nutrients, shelter), many of the community members’ needs (e.g., being listened to and respected) are shared across communities. the “communities are organisms” metaphor emphasizes that all parts make an important contribution to and must work together for the effective functioning of the whole. thus, this metaphor implies the community must care for and value the contributions of each individual. this can help facilitators emphasize the importance of caring thinking. when a participant who rarely contributes attempts to do so, the facilitator may intervene to ensure this participant gets an opportunity to be heard. in addition to other common caring behaviors, such as using the participants’ names or preventing interruptions, a facilitator cares for the group by keeping them focused on their goals. this includes the goal of finding the most reasonable answer, as well as other goals set by the group such as improved participation or better listening. in sum, thinking of communities as organisms, or arguments as houses, may enable facilitators and participants to think in new ways about critical reasoning and dialogue in the cpi. metaphors of facilitation vygotsky and other sociocultural theories align well with p4c because of the central importance they place on processes of facilitation or assistance. in this section, we briefly describe three metaphors of facilitation consistent with a vygotskian perspective, emphasizing what aspects of assistance each metaphor highlights. as discussed above, multiple metaphors expand our understanding of a conceptual domain. these metaphors provide different ways for p4c facilitators to understand their practice, enabling greater critical reflection on how they can best support and guide their students in developing philosophical competencies. scaffolding. one of the most common metaphors used in sociocultural (neo-vygotskian) approaches, especially in the educational and developmental literatures, is assistance as scaffolding. vygotsky did not actually introduce the concept of scaffolding; its first use is typically credited to wood, bruner, and ross (1976). nevertheless, this metaphor has become closely associated with a sociocultural approach due to its fit with vygotsky’s ideas. in this scaffolding metaphor, competencies are viewed as constructed objects and learning and development as processes of construction. in the source domain of building construction, scaffolding provides assistance. it is erected as needed for construction but then is removed when no longer needed. more specifically, greenfield (1984) identified five features of scaffolding drawn from construction: “it provides a support; it functions as a tool; it extends the range of the worker; it allows the worker to accomplish a task not otherwise possible; and it is used selectively to aid the worker where needed” (p. 118). with scaffolding, builders can build, and learners can learn, what would otherwise not be possible without the temporary assistance. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 55 the strength of the scaffolding metaphor is specifically this focus on the role of assistance in learning and development. rather than taking a teacher-centered perspective, this metaphor focuses on facilitated learning. it can help p4c facilitators focus their attention on the zpd and the what, when, and how of assistance. what should facilitators assist? assist students with aspects of philosophical conversations and thinking (process, not content) they cannot yet do alone but can do with help. when should facilitators assist? assist students until help is no longer needed, or adjust help to match a student’s expanding zpd (the facilitator’s role should fade or even disappear as students internalize these processes). finally, how should facilitators assist? assist students in specific ways (matched to their individual needs) that help them advance toward greater mastery (as they internalize these forms of assistance). gallimore and tharp’s means of assistance and the p4c moves provide many scaffolding options to consider. guided participation. a second facilitation metaphor comes from the work of barbara rogoff (1990, 2003), who extended vygotsky’s approach based on her own cross-cultural developmental research (e.g., in mayan communities of guatemala). rogoff has conceptualized assistance as guided participation, where skilled cultural members guide children’s participation in culturally valued practices. this concept is based on viewing activities and development metaphorically as paths, with action as movement, goals (i.e., culturally-defined competencies) as destinations, and paths as ways of achieving them. however, rogoff adds social elements to this path schema, in that the goals and paths are culturally defined and there are others with us on the path to guide us. guidance involves providing direction (i.e., pointing individuals toward certain goals and away from others) and support (i.e., helping individuals move along the path). it can also involve “building bridges” to help individuals overcome obstacles as they move toward more advanced states (as locations), from incompetence to competence, from personal to shared meaning, and from other-assisted to selfassisted action. as individuals develop, those guiding should transfer responsibility, so that the individuals being guided have increasing control over their actions (this is equivalent to removing the scaffolding when no longer needed). guided participation, like scaffolding, highlights assistance (now framed as guidance). in p4c, facilitators can guide (direct and support) student participation in philosophical thinking and dialogue using the means of assistance and the p4c moves. however, this metaphor also directs attention to a couple additional elements. one criticism of the scaffolding metaphor is that it emphasizes the role of the adult (or more skilled other); the child (or one being assisted) is viewed passively (rogoff, 1990). the guided participation metaphor gives the child a more active role in moving along developmental paths and in eliciting guidance. applied to p4c, students and facilitators are active agents who interact with and influence each other. facilitators should consider what interests and ideas students bring to the group and respond to how students engage with materials and others in the classroom. this requires flexibility in selecting means of assistance that respond to students’ proposed ideas in on-going activity. as students get sidetracked or encounter obstacles (e.g., “get stuck” over a definition), facilitators can help students move forward (e.g., identify the problem, consider alternative options). students can also be encouraged to elicit guidance (e.g., modeling, feedback, cognitive structuring) from facilitators and peers. finally, guided participation makes goals and students’ progress toward them more salient. in p4c, the goal state is not a particular conclusion but good critical reasoning. facilitators can help the group clarify its goals (e.g., finding “the most reasonable analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 56 answer”), track its progress, and understand why certain thinking and conversation practices are valued in p4c “culture.” apprenticeship. a final metaphor for facilitation is apprenticeship. using apprenticeship as a metaphor for cognitive development, rogoff (1990) described children as “apprentices in thinking, active in their efforts to learn from observing and participating with peers and more skilled members of their society, developing skills to handle culturally defined problems with available tools, and building from these givens to construct new solutions within the context of sociocultural activity” (p. 7). rogoff (1991) offered four reasons why apprenticeship is an attractive metaphor: (a) apprentices and children actively observe, gather information about, and participate in activities around them; (b) their learning is structured by practices developed by older generations that involve the use of cultural tools to meet socially valued goals; (c) they are assisted through communication and involvement with more skilled partners (i.e., guided participation); and (d) they typically learn with others, both skilled practitioners and peers. apprentices often develop considerable skills without traditional forms of instruction or examination. learning is usually not defined in terms of teaching; the “curriculum” is not a detailed instructional plan but a set of opportunities for observation and participation in ongoing practice. presented with the activity as a meaningful whole (rather than as decomposed parts), apprentices are usually motivated to develop competence in and contribute to valued practices (lave & wenger, 1991; rogoff, 1990, 1991). we believe these characteristics fit p4c well and highlight the importance of both facilitation and collaboration. apprenticeships provide contexts for scaffolding and guided participation. in p4c, this highlights the importance of creating contexts (e.g., choosing stories and topics) that will engage students in meaningful conversations, where they can observe and participate with more skilled others who can provide scaffolding or guidance. apprenticeship also emphasizes learning to use tools. in p4c, this involves developing competency in using the cpi structure and p4c moves. in vygotsky’s terms, students first observe tool use in others, then use tools in conversations with others, and finally internalize this tool use to structure their own philosophical thinking (as internal philosophical conversations). as a final parallel between apprenticeships and p4c, apprentices often learn with peers, who can provide another source of guidance. in p4c, peers can assist each other as they engage in collaborative activity. conclusion the central aim of this paper was to present a set of conceptual tools that could facilitate facilitation, that could provide scaffolding for the development of a broader and deeper understanding of the facilitation process. we pay tribute to the impactful work of matthew lipman, ann sharp, and david kennedy in p4c. through interpreting their key ideas, especially the community of philosophical inquiry structure and kennedy’s philosophical moves, through the lens of vygotskian theory (supplemented by ideas from gallimore and tharp, lakoff and johnson, and rogoff), our intent has been to provide useful conceptual tools for supporting philosophical conversations and students’ development of critical, creative, and caring thinking. as authors, although we have brought different academic backgrounds and experiences to this project, we share interests in philosophy, education, cognitive development, and effective thinking. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 57 we also share a concern with the lack of critical reasoning, deep understanding, and respectful dialogue we see in our society today and a belief in the importance of helping others (and ourselves) think collaboratively, think independently, and think well. although we have discussed facilitation in the context of philosophy for children, we believe these theories and concepts are useful wherever effective thinking, dialogue, and collaboration can be guided and supported. as teachers, parents, neighbors, and citizens, we can use these same tools in promoting critical, creative, and caring thinking—in the classroom, at home, and in our communities. today, more than ever, we are in need of thoughtful citizens who are able to join together with others in dialogue to explore deeply the challenges we face within our communities and broader society. in fact, our democracy may depend on it. references clark, k. m. (2005). an embodied cognitive analysis of social situativity (unpublished doctoral dissertation). indiana university, bloomington, in. de marzio, d. (2017). matthew lipman’s model theory of the community of inquiry. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis, 38(1), 37-46. flavell, j. h. (1979). metacognition and cognitive monitoring: a new area of cognitive-developmental inquiry. american psychologist, 34, 906-911. gallimore, r., & tharp, r. (1990). teaching mind in society: teaching, schooling, and literate discourse. in l. c. moll (ed.), vygotsky and education (pp. 175-205). new york: cambridge university press. greenfield, p. m. (1984). a theory of the teacher in the learning activities of everyday life. in b. rogoff & j. lave (eds.), everyday cognition: development in social context (pp. 117-138). cambridge, ma: harvard university press. gregory, m. (2007). a framework for facilitating classroom dialogue. teaching philosophy, 30(1), 59-84. gregory, m. (ed.). 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(1980). philosophy in the classroom. philadelphia: temple university press. nelson, t. o. (1996). consciousness and metacognition. american psychologist, 51, 102-116. oyler, j. (2016). philosophy with children: the lipman-sharp approach to philosophy for children. in m. a. peters (ed.), the encyclopedia of educational philosophy and theory (pp. 1-7). singapore: springer science. reznitskaya, a., & wilkinson, i. (2017). the most reasonable answer: helping students build better arguments together. cambridge, ma: harvard education press. rogoff, b. (1990). apprenticeship in thinking: cognitive development in social context. new york: oxford university press. rogoff, b. (1991). social interaction as apprenticeship in thinking: guidance and participation in spatial planning. in l. b. resnick, j. m. levine, & s. d. teasley (eds.), perspectives on socially shared cognition (pp. 349-364). washington, dc: american psychological association. rogoff, b. (2003). the cultural nature of human development. new york: oxford university press. splitter, l., & sharp, a. (1995). teaching for better thinking. melbourne: australian council for educational research. tharp, r. g., & gallimore, r. (1988). rousing minds to life: teaching, learning, and schooling in social context. new york: cambridge university press. vygotsky, l. s. (1978). mind in society: the development of higher psychological processes (m. cole, v. johnsteiner, s. scribner, & e. souberman, eds. & trans.). cambridge, ma: harvard university press. vygotsky, l. s. (1986). thought and language (a. kozulin, ed. & tran.). cambridge, ma: harvard university press. wertsch, j. v. (1985). vygotsky and the social formation of mind. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. wood, d. j., bruner, j. s., & ross, g. (1976). the role of tutoring in problem solving. journal of child psychology and psychiatry, 17(2), 89-100. address correspondences to: jacob b. castleberry department of philosophy, western michigan university 1903 w. michigan ave, kalamazoo, mi 49008 email: jacob.castleberry@wmich.edu mailto:jacob.castleberry@wmich.edu from learning outcomes to educational possibilities—what happens when philosophical community inquiry "works wonders" with university students in taiwan analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 26 from learning outcomes to educational possibilities—what happens when philosophical community inquiry “works wonders” with university students in taiwan jessica ching-sze wang introduction here have been concerns in higher education circles in taiwan regarding students’ reluctance to participate in class discussion and their lack of ability to think independently about major societal issues. a government-funded study found that the main cause is students’ fear of “losing face,” and suggests a number of practical, culturally appropriate strategies for tackling this deep-seated problem, such as making student opinions anonymous and having students present group ideas instead of individual claims (lee, 2013). addressing the problem from a different vantage point, i turned to a radical shift in pedagogy. this paper describes how i adopted the pedagogy of a community of inquiry and applied it to transforming the classroom into an “intellectually safe” community, where there is “no fear of ridicule, putdowns, or belittlement” (jackson, 2001). when feeling intellectually safe, students have the courage to express their “raw thoughts” and work together with others to refine them. to borrow from biesta (2014), they learn how to take a “beautiful risk” and to “come into the world.” this open encounter of self and other enables students to take ownership of their ideas and to exist as unique beings in the world. this pedagogy was inspired by mathew lipman’s (2003) formulation of philosophy for children (p4c). i also owe a huge debt to thomas jackson for his emancipatory vision of philosophy and education in developing philosophy for children hawaii (p4chi).1 embracing the core p4chi feature of “doing little p philosophy,” ensuring “intellectual safety,” and “not being in a rush” (jackson, 2001, 2004, 2012, 2013; lukey, 2013), my taiwanese version of the “philosopher’s pedagogy” (maikaiau & chad, 2012) has “worked wonders” with my university students in taiwan.2 the class under study was a university-wide general education course titled education for thinking and democracy. the participants were 25 juniors in various departments of the colleges of teacher education and the humanities. the materials used to stimulate inquiry were a selection of ted talks broadly related to education. the course was designed to help students experience thinking and democracy for themselves. the experiential focus allowed me “free teaching from learning,” as gert biesta (2015) suggests. t analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 27 describing the class as “working wonders,” i do not mean that it was flawless or that it was representative of other p4chi classes i have taught in taiwan. in fact, each class was different and unique in its own way. my intention is to document and comment on the transformational journey of this class, because it expanded the horizons of my vision for educational possibilities, which are emancipating in nature. the p4chi community of inquiry pedagogy emancipates us from the bondage of regimented, predictable learning outcomes and allows us to engage in education worthy of the name. i take such education to be “wonder-full” because it is full of students’ questions, wonder, and bewilderment; it is full of the wonder of adventuring into the twists and turns of inquiry; and it is full of students’ wonderfully genuine reflections and transformations. such education is also wonderful because it is not simply cognitive or affective, moral or aesthetic, but “all in one,” with all of these elements mutually interpenetrating. the “wonder” of this all is that everyone is on board in the journey to learn “from all the contacts of life,” which is the “essential moral interest” (dewey, 1916, p. 371). as unique individuals, we depart from different places, and head in different directions, but somehow end up being in a more humbled and humane place than where we set out from. on our p4chi journey, we practice philosophy not as “combat,” but as “aesthetic experience,” stressing understanding and appreciation (mattice, 2013). although there is the perennial controversy concerning the legitimate contours of philosophy in philosophically-guided educational practice (biesta, 2011), the aesthetic model of philosophy, as described in sarah mattice’s metaphor and metaphilosophy (2013), is more congenial to chinese cultural sensibilities and philosophical outlooks, and thus holds more promise for grounding p4c in our own cultural soil. in this paper, i share my journey of teaching and explore its implications for education. i draw extensively from the students’ own reflections in their weekly assignments (wa) and their final questionnaires (fq). this rich data has enabled me to explore from their perspectives what it means and how it feels to be “educated” in the community circle. in elaborating on their experience, i draw from john dewey’s educational theory, david bohm’s theory of dialogue, and the more recent ideas of contemporary philosopher of education gert biesta. in conclusion, i reflect upon my role as a co-inquirer and facilitator of inquiry and its implications for university teaching. awakening on the first day of class let me begin with the first day of class. we were all sitting in a circle so that the students could see each other’ faces, rather than the back of someone’s head. we analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 28 introduced ourselves using the “community ball” to facilitate: whoever gets the ball is the one who talks and who gets to invite the next speaker. in this process, i also asked every speaker to summarize the gist of what the previous speaker said. this created a social need to listen attentively as well as a social responsibility to articulate oneself. this is also a way of breaking the students’ habit of mind wandering and helping them re-orient themselves in this new inquiry setting. this procedure arose from the realization that if we really want to encourage students to talk in class, we must also create a classroom atmosphere where everyone is listening and being listened to, and where everyone's contribution, however tiny, is acknowledged for making a difference. the goal is to create an environment where listening, speaking, and thinking are mutually reinforcing. toward the end of the first class, i asked everyone to share what they experienced in class that day. one student said that it was interesting to watch who was throwing the ball to whom. he noticed that people tended to pass the ball to someone they already knew, and he hoped that this would change. i was glad to find that right from the beginning, the creation of a non-exclusive, integrated community was a shared vision. i also clearly remember how one student said to the class, “i sense so much soul in everyone’s gaze.” there is, indeed, something very special about the looks on people's faces when they are listening, thinking, and being mindful. no longer drifting, students were awakened to a new mode of being. as i reflected upon these comments, i knew why this class was a success. it had to do with who the students were before they walked into the class. they came in with an interest in community, communication, and reflection; and by living through these experiences, they left with a firmer grasp of their meanings. maintaining an intricate interplay between listening and speaking as i started to analyze the data, i found an intricate interplay between listening and speaking. on the one hand, students who were vocal in the beginning became more conscious of the importance of listening, and deliberately chose to listen to others first before they themselves spoke. “i found that simply by listening, my thoughts have become much clearer” (wa, s21, 2015/4/7). on the other hand, the more taciturn students gradually began to talk more freely and frequently. as one student noticed, “some of the quiet students are beginning to share their thoughts in class. i think they are very brave” (wa, s19, 2015/4/7). such transformation of conduct in opposite directions is clearly shown in this pair of reflections. i have always been the one who listened more and talked less. i worry that my own views may be too shallow. and sometimes i am not sure how to express my thoughts. but our class is an intellectually safe environment, so i should not limit myself to analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 29 my comfort zone. i should speak up and step out of my little circle. (wa, s6, 2015/3/24) in the past, when it comes to discussion, i thought that i should freely express whatever i thought of. now in our community of inquiry, i learned to listen more and i found that listening to others and integrating what they say into my own thoughts can make my thinking more complete. (fq, s24) this nuanced shift in the students’ attitudes toward speaking and listening led to a neat balance, which created “the nice feeling of having everyone all here together in the end” (fq, s20). the overall positive impression of the students is summed up in the comment: “i hope we can have more classes like this to allow more people to experience what it means to really listen and to really speak” (fq, s16). coming to know the true meaning of listening and speaking what does it mean to listen and speak in our community of inquiry? what is listening? do students not “listen” enough? as one student commented, we are so used to listening; we listen when we sit in class, we listen at home, and we listen when we sit in front of the tv, but that kind of listening is perfunctory, not really encountering the thing itself, not taking it seriously. it was like having a wall that blocked the sound signals from passing through, making it difficult to hear. to really listen, then think, and then respond is what i learned the most. (fq, s16) dewey makes a similar distinction between the “one-way or straight-line listening” associated with much of schooling, and “transactional listening in conversation” (waks, 2011, p. 194). in one-way listening, a student can live exclusively in her own head protected by “a wall”; in the transactional model, she throws herself into the world in her responding to the other. the purpose of transactional listening in inquiry is not merely to comprehend some information, but to understand and respond to the other. as one student wrote, [listening to others], i found myself wanting to say to the speaker: is this what you are trying to say? if i guessed it right, i would feel delighted. i don't know how the person feels, but for myself, i was somehow feeling closer to that person. i also found that effectively speaking for another requires wholehearted listening and empathy. you almost need to stand where she is standing, and you need to watch the view she is watching. only then can you truly express what she is thinking. (fq, s19) analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 30 embedded in the thinking in a community of inquiry is a special way of thinking, understanding, and relating to the other. relating to the other in inquiry can also become a means of understanding oneself. i used to think that listening to the opinions of others can help me understand them better. but i gradually realized that this process can in fact help me understand what i am thinking. regardless of whether other people think the same or differently, i can, from their sharing and explanation, come to know what it is i agree or disagree with. understanding others can help me see more clearly what i want. (fq, s10) the community circle provides a space in which the self is inextricably connected to the other, where interaction of self-understanding and understanding of the other are mutually reinforcing. the theme of self-understanding recurs throughout the students’ comments about speaking. “today the biggest breakthrough for me is to express my thoughts. perhaps not everyone agrees. but at least, i said what i wanted to say” (wa, s24, 2015/4/7). this student learned to stand up for what she believed, rather than “hide behind the crowd” (fq, s16). through speaking, one student came to understand something new about herself and her role in the community. in the past, i didn’t think that i had any position to say anything. as long as there is someone in the community who is really vocal, the community will move along. however, after experiencing a community of inquiry a few times, i realized that no matter who was speaking, as long as a person’s idea got voiced, it would have some kind of effect on the community. it may open up a completely new direction in the inquiry, or it may make the person visible to the community. so even if what i want to say may not be correct, or may even be refuted, i should still try to express myself. otherwise, i might gradually lose sight of who i am. (fq, s19) these comments demonstrate the students’ need to be heard, to be seen, to relate to the other, and to connect with themselves. in my view, this need is not an egocentric desire to assert oneself at the expense of the other, but a genuine desire to “come into the world” (biesta, 2014) and to exist for who one is. embracing the power of genuine questions one of the pedagogical emphases in p4ch is to have every student ask her own questions and have the community vote on the questions. the purpose is to nurture a analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 31 sense of wonder and to create a sense of connectedness in the community. in this process, students will also be more likely to ask genuine questions that truly puzzle them and hence be more likely to feel the impact of inquiry on their lives. what is a “genuine” question? why is it important for philosophical inquiry to engage students with their genuine questions? in teaching, we all want students to ask questions. we assume that being able to ask questions indicates some progress in learning, particularly when students ask thoughtful, inviting questions germane to the course content. but is there a gap between the good questions teachers love to hear and the genuine questions students have? in democracy and education, dewey (1916/1980) prioritizes a “genuine” problem over a “simulated or mock” problem and offers two sets of criteria to judge the difference. (a) is there anything but a problem? does the question naturally suggest itself within some situation of personal experience? or is it an aloof thing, a problem only for the purposes of conveying instruction in some school topic? is it the sort of trying that would arouse observation and engage experimentation outside of school? (b) is it the pupil's own problem, or is it the teacher's or textbook’s problem, made a problem for the pupil only because he cannot get the required mark or be promoted or win the teacher's approval, unless he deals with it? is the experience a personal thing of such a nature as inherently to stimulate and direct observation of the connections involved, and to lead to inference and its testing? or is it imposed from without, and is the pupil's problem simply to meet the external requirement? (p. 162) the first criterion emphasizes the connection of the question to personal experience and the second criterion suggests that the question come from the student as a human person per se, rather than as a role. a genuine question also has to do with the need of an embodied human being (not an abstract mind) to make sense of her concrete, living world, and to navigate her way around. in our community of inquiry, when we open up a space for students to ask their own questions, we are, in a sense, engaging them to ask questions arising from their contacts with real people and events in the experiential world. we allow our students to turn away from the motionless, eventless, “objective” world of textbook facts, and take a deep look at the world of their everyday lives—where they are bound to confront its complexities, multiplicities, and perplexities, and where they would encounter genuine questions “coming” naturally to them. when genuine questions do arise in inquiry, they surprise, they resonate, and they appeal to everyone. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 32 let me give two memorable examples from my first “p4ch experiment” in taiwan. it was the first class of an introductory course on the philosophy of education. i asked everyone to ask a question broadly related to their k-12 schooling experience or their university education. one of the questions was, "does university teaching have no problems?" the other students resonated with this controversial question, and it indeed got the most votes. remarkably, on that day, the students were not complaining about the bad teachers they had had; they were thinking together about what was lacking in their university classroom experience, whether class evaluations were at all helpful in improving university teaching, and what was good teaching anyway. as i look back, i realize the great significance of this first day of class. in fact, it was a monumental opening up of a space of trust in the community. as facilitator, i trusted that the students would discuss such controversial questions in a thoughtful way; and for their part the students trusted that i would respect their thoughts and feelings. once trust was established, our community was ready to grapple with genuine questions from the students. for example, when the assigned reading was about the purposes of philosophy—pursuing truth and establishing values—our community chose to discuss the question: “if one could live happily with a lie, is pursuing the truth important?” interestingly, the traditional epistemological problems of what is true and how we can know and verify what is true took on a new rendering in the students’ questioning. they were puzzled by the value of truth in relation to real human life. for me, these genuine questions are invitations to enter into unchartered territory where our own assumptions are held in abeyance—so as to look at the world anew. genuine questions coming from the students resonate with the community and spur high interest in inquiry. this is also what happened in the class described in this paper. we inquired about “whether it was the purpose of education to fill an existing gap or to cultivate unknown potentialities,” and “how to differentiate between wasting time and meaningful exploration when trying to find out what to do with one’s life?” one student was genuinely unsure about how to distinguish between thinking and zuan niu jiao jian, a chinese idiom implying wasting time thinking about an insoluble or insignificant problem. this expression is typically used to ridicule people who seem to think too much, too sedulously, or pointlessly. students have inherited this term from the culture at large without ever considering what it actually means, assumes, and implies. how is it related to thinking? and, what is thinking, anyway? can we really think too much or too little? our inquiry may not yield “final” answers, but students may “have gained something more valuable than the answer,” that is, “the meaning of the question itself, its multiple dimensions, and the connections between people’s ideas” (wa, s19, 2015/3/24). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 33 what do students think about the overall meaning of question generating, sharing, and voting? sharing everyone’ questions at the beginning of the class is like “seeing how people, as different individuals, draw from their own life experiences to add a little footnote to the theme under discussion” (fq, s19). the voting itself created “a shared consensus in the community” and a “sense of honor” for the student contributing the question (fq, s24). as one student wrote, “learning to ask my own questions helps me get in better touch with myself, to discover some areas in my thinking that i did not realize before, and to find out why i have these thoughts. these two processes actually helped us better understand ourselves and others” (fq, s19). the philosophical journey of “knowing thyself” begins by having students ask powerfully genuine questions of their own. dancing with the natural rhythms in the life of a community of inquiry we think of the four seasons as nature's rhythms. from nature’s standpoint, a hot summer day is as good as a cold winter snow. how about the “natural rhythms” in a community of inquiry when it takes on a life of its own? the natural lifecycle of a community can be said to consist of the stages of beginning, emerging, and maturity. in my own experience, a beginning community is one where people tend to act the way they are (shy or vocal) and show what is socially expected. there may be an initial atmosphere of peace due to a certain relational distance. an emerging community occurs when people venture to take their own positions and voice conflicting viewpoints. some tensions may rise and some feelings may be hurt. although it is important to maintain an intellectually safe community where people respect each other, it is also important to embrace tension as a natural part of its rhythms. in his vision of using dialogue to create “a common consciousness,” david bohm (1996) indicates a way to work with tensions. as he puts it, “if people can share the frustration, and share their different contradictory assumptions and share their mutual anger and stay with it—if everybody is angry together, and looking at it together—then you have a common consciousness” (p. 33). bohm adds, “if people could stay with power, violence, hate or whatever it is, all the way to the end, then it would sort of collapse . . . they would become open and trusting of each other. they have already gone through the thing that they are afraid of, so the intelligence can then work” (p. 33). embracing tensions as natural rhythms can lead to new births and new hopes for the life of a community of inquiry. usually around mid-semester, we see a beginning community changing into an emerging community. the strategy i use to scaffold this change is to conduct a metaanalytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 34 inquiry that gives students a chance to reflect upon their experience in the community, sharing their excitement, frustrations, and hopes for change. such meta-discussions, if conducted successfully, help the community evolve into a more mature one, where people can truly speak their minds, embrace differences, work with tensions, and stay connected. then diversity is not merely tolerated, but truly appreciated as conducing to deeper understanding and stimulating moral growth. several students in my class expressed appreciation for the openness of our community to work with tensions. as one student described it, we could talk things out without “having to pretend to be all that rational.” another wrote, “even if we did argue over certain values, what i got out of it is a certain kind of engrossing earnestness and excitement” (fq, s2). another student took the meaning of respect to include the acceptance of emotions. respect has always been the most important thing for me, both in casual talks and in debate. when people do show some emotions in a heated exchange or argument, i take that to be a positive sign, a manifestation of seriousness in attitude toward the matter at hand, though i might not always know how to respond on the spot. as long as there is not deliberate attack, criticism, or ridicule, i am willing to include heated debate in my range of what counts as respect. in a community, such respect is very important because it entails safety, trust, sincerity, and acceptance. (fq, s20) in my view, a heated dialogue that is emotionally charged is like a sudden thunderstorm on a hot summer afternoon. as bohm’s statement indicates, if we allow it to happen and run its course, we may be rewarded with a beautiful rainbow if the community is being reflective and mindful about the process. apart from the community, the inquiry itself also has its natural rhythms. sometimes the inquiry will be quite smooth and fulfilling, but other times it may be caught in a stalemate or fall into chaos. in inquiry, there is always the risk that it will not be as perfect as we would like it to be. however, the “thinking together” in an inquiry can still be valuable even if it is far from being perfect. one student reflected on the difference between thinking alone and thinking in a community. thinking alone can help a person to think more deeply about the issue and understand oneself, but one can easily get caught up in one's own prejudice without knowing it or get caught up at a certain level without moving forward. thinking in a community allows one to hear diverse perspectives and learn from the differences between oneself and others, but sometimes it can be very chaotic, either having no point or having too many points, which almost makes one unable to think. (fq, s4) analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 35 this student had been struggling to make sense of the “occasional chaos” in inquiry, but on the last day of class she wrote: “up until two week ago i felt frustrated or guilty over my own sense of confusion in inquiry. but now i realize that i am not here to judge other people. i am here to learn from them” (fq, s4). while i am sympathetic to her struggles, i have found that this is part of the process of learning to think together, and that it nurtures “faith in the capacities of human nature, faith in human intelligence, and in the power of pooled and cooperative experience,” which is “the foundation of democracy” (dewey, 1937/1987, p. 219). indeed, her struggles are only to be expected. how can it be otherwise in taiwan, where few students really had the chance to learn to think together with their peers and teachers? not knowing how to think collaboratively with others is the natural starting point for a community of inquiry. we have to begin with where the students are, and then patiently guide them towards transformation and development. sometimes a facilitator may have a very good reason for rushing in and rescuing a student drowning in chaos, but undue or untimely intervention may kill the spirit of the inquiry. to be sure, knowing the right timing challenges the practical wisdom of every facilitator of a community of inquiry. however, if we truly embrace inquiry, we must also embrace uncertainty and chaos as natural rhythms. dewey’s description of “actual thinking” in inquiry, though a bit convoluted, attests to this point. in the thinking by which a conclusion is actually reached, observations are made that turn out to be aside from the point; false clues are followed; fruitless suggestions are entertained; superfluous moves are made. just because you do not know the solution of your problem, you have to grope toward it and grope in the dark or at least in an obscure light; you start on lines of inquiry that in the end you give up. when you are only seeking the truth and of necessity seeking somewhat blindly, you are in a radically different position from the one you are in when you are already in possession of truth. (dewey, 1933/1986, p. 184) in a community of inquiry, no one is in possession of the truth and knows exactly where it will go and how it should end. to use dewey’s terminology, we may have an “end-inview,” but no fixed, predetermined ends. as long as we have an end-in-view, going astray in the middle of an inquiry is as natural as coming to see an answer. if we overemphasize progress and certitude, we will miss out on what it means to genuinely think—to grope in the dark and finally find the way. to respect the natural rhythms in inquiry, one must manifest a certain kind of openness and trust— in “letting happen,” not “making happen”—which is the true spirit analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 36 of “not being in a rush” (jackson, 2004). dewey’s notion of open-mindedness serves to elaborate on this point. in open-mindedness, there is a kind of passivity, willingness to let experiences accumulate and sink in and ripen, which is essential to development. results (external answers or solutions) may be hurried, processes may not be forced. they take their own time to mature. were all instructors to realize that the quality of mental process, not the production of correct answers, is the measure of educative growth, something hardly less than a revolution in teaching would be worked. (dewey, 1916/1980, p. 183) if we want to breathe “natural life” into inquiry, we need to refrain from any predetermined goals that might smother the spirit of inquiry. we need to trust that the life of the inquiry will create its own existential surprises and educational possibilities. two of the students used the image of walking in a maze to describe the collaborative adventure of thinking in our community of inquiry. one stated that it was like “walking in a maze. if you walk by yourself, you can quickly decide to turn right or left, but if you walk with a lot of people, you will perhaps find different exits” (fq, s9). the other found that “a community of inquiry is risky but creative; you run the risk of having your own ideas questioned, but it may work out for the best in the end because you will get to enjoy some views you have never seen before” (fq, s19). seeing oneself in the mirror of the other—learning from each other sitting in a circle—one of the defining features of a community of inquiry—is replete with symbolic meanings and moral underpinnings. a circle makes everyone equally related to the center and hence to each other. a circle also makes everyone see each other. such seeing makes utterly transparent a certain quality of the person-to-person relationship. such seeing also makes the “relating to the other” essential. it creates a natural effect of seeing oneself through the mirror of the other. apart from the circular sitting arrangement, another important classroom element of a p4ch community is the use of a “community ball” to involve everyone in the process (jackson, 2001). the function of the ball is to monitor turn taking and to empower every member in the community with the same right to speak, to invite, and to pass. the community ball is made of yarn of different colors, symbolizing the integration of people with different backgrounds and the weaving together of their ideas. one of my students said that the circular shape of the ball also reminds people in the community to improve their relationships with each other by rounding their own sharp edges. the symbolism of the circle also runs at a deeper level, serving as a reminder to “search for one's center” analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 37 as thomas jackson has long envisioned in his practice of p4chi.3 finding one's center and speaking from it is the most joyous moment of a philosophical journey—it is where the true, the good, and the beautiful meet. in my own adaption of p4ch, i created a set of hand signals (see endnote 2) to assist the flow of inquiry and to consolidate our community. therefore, in our highly interactive community, people can readily connect with each other using eye contact, attentive listening, the ball, or hand signals. the circle, the community ball, and the hand signals—all of these classroom rituals help students experience and perceive how their own words, facial expressions, postures, and emotions impact other people in the community, and vice versa. these conventions can increase what bohm (1996) calls “awakened attentiveness,” which enables students to fully perceive the impact of their thought processes and mutual exchanges in inquiry. in my class, i have found that this “awakened attentiveness” leads to a heightened sense of moral reflection on the part of my students. as one student wrote, “basically, i try to respect other people by suspending my own disagreement, but sometimes i wasn't so proud of the way i spoke. i must have looked unpleasantly upset to other people” (fq, s23). although this student did not intend to reveal her anger, the mirror of the others revealed to her something about herself that she may not have wanted to see. another student wrote, what strikes me the most about this class is that i realized that my ideas and others’ ideas differ so much. in the beginning i felt that mine were better, but i gradually realized that i was too conceited. i wasn't really understanding what other people were trying to say. (fq, s4) another student had a cogent analysis of herself in different stages of her overall experience and transformation. at first, i forced myself to accept others’ opinions, but i became deeply troubled by an internal conflict. then i gradually learned to see that i can have different viewpoints from others, and that i can raise my own doubts and ideas, which is indeed my biggest breakthrough. on the other hand, i also realize that those who seemed to hold strong opinions are not really all that dogmatic or unsympathetic. they were just frankly persisting with what they think is the right thing to do. (fq, s25) another student wrote, analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 38 in the past, i would take a different opinion to be a threat because i thought mine was better, so listening to them implied that i should compromise and accept something which seemed wrong to me; and this would be a blow to my self-esteem. but over this semester i realized for myself the importance of listening to diverse opinions. these opinions actually helped to enrich my thinking. (fq, s1) indeed, the biggest challenge for everyone in the class may have been to “truly put self and other in an equal position and be willing to learn from others” (fq, s4), as one student reflected. many students in this class expressed appreciation for the journey of mutual learning. as one noted, “everyone in the class was like an expert on life . . . rather than either teaching others or being taught by others, this mutual learning from each other makes one more humble” (fq, s25). an effective community of inquiry does reduce the participants’ egocentricity in the face of a larger world where everyone makes a unique contribution. as one student commented, “my deepest and fondest memory about the class is the sharing and interacting among people. you can see that some people are really sharper thinkers; some are such good listeners and give so much warmth; and some people share special stories from their personal experience” (fq, s8). in our community of inquiry, the many different ways “people are” and “come to be” have enriched and enlarged everyone’s experience. such enriching and enlarging of experience through inquiry and dialogue is at the heart of dewey's theory of communication as educative experience. dewey wrote, “to be a recipient of a communication is to have an enlarged and changed experience.” since communication leads to a transformation of experience, “all communication is educative” (dewey, 1916/1980, p. 8). such educative experiences are the surest foundation of democracy. as dewey wrote, “democracy will have its consummation when free social inquiry is indissolubly wedded to the art of full and moving communication” (dewey, 1925, p. 350). this statement captures the meaning of the title of my course, education for thinking and democracy. although i did not explicitly teach about democracy in class, the students all recognized the close connection between education for thinking and the ideal of democracy. before i conclude this paper, i would like to add some caveats. much of the data i analyzed came from the students’ own self-reports and reflections in their required assignments. although triangulation was established by checking and comparing different sources, including classroom observations and mid-term reflections, it is still possible that some of the students may have exaggerated their positive comments and analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 39 downplayed negative ones out of concern for their grades. i also make no attempt to claim that their transformations are lasting and easily transferred to other settings. nor do i wish to claim that there is a direct causal relationship between my pedagogy and student change. in fact, this paper is not so much about how the students themselves changed because of the class, but more about what change of experience they had in the class. my major contention is that the students had a very different experience of education; and i tried to show what this experience may have meant for them, for me, and for education in general. conclusion: opening up educational possibilities as worthwhile learning outcomes having shared my journey of teaching, i realize i had a larger purpose in mind—to urge us to rethink “what education is” and “what education can be.” let me start with a scenario of a hypothesized dialogue. suppose someone approaches me with these questions, “what did you teach in your class?” and “what did your students learn?” you are likely to see me painfully scratching my head but eventually come to admit, with a frank shrug of my shoulders, “i didn’t teach anything specifically, but we learned to think together.” this answer may be quite unthinkable for those who regard education as transmission, which amounts to nothing more than selecting teaching materials and ensuring learning outcomes. to these people, i venture to suggest a shift in their trajectory of thinking—from “what did students learn?” to “how did they come to be?” surely, there are definite things “to learn” about the world, but there are infinite possibilities of “coming to be” in the world and with the world. “to be or not to be”—that is perhaps the more crucial question to ask, if we are willing to consider what biesta (2010) calls “subjectification” as a worthwhile educational pursuit, along with what he calls “qualification” and “socialization.” according to biesta (2015), the “learnification” phenomenon in educational discourse and practice is “seriously limiting our existential possibilities, that is, our possibilities for being in the world and with the world” (p. 237). my teaching experiment described in this paper aims to open up such existential educational possibilities. admittedly, it is not the only way, but i am convinced that it is an effective and worthwhile pursuit. to conclude, i would like to pose and answer a question. what is my role as a teacher in our philosophical journey of learning to think together? my students’ views about the criteria for a good facilitator may help shed some light on this question. a good facilitator “has to be very attentive so that she can capture what everyone is thinking and feeling. she also has to renounce her own subjective consciousness and prejudice” (fq, analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 40 s11). she “cannot be partial and only listen to what she wants to hear” (fq, s20). she needs “to have good verbal abilities and a good-tempered nature, but also a strong will and lot of perseverance in order to earn the true respect of the students” (fq, s2). she needs to demonstrate tolerance and sensibility. when all voices are coming out in the community, we need someone who can simultaneously take in all these accounts without making it seem as though anyone is absolutely right or absolutely wrong. when the community falls into chaos, we need someone who can step outside and make everyone see what is going on and guide us to take the next step. (fq, s19) in my view, a good facilitator models an ideal participant. a good community of inquiry requires everyone to learn to be an ideal participant. it is everyone—not just the facilitator—that made this learning together possible. however, as the students themselves suggest, this learning takes some “letting go” on the part of the teacher, so as to “allow the students to try for themselves” (fq, s6). it also requires “seeing the shinning spots” in students’ unpolished articulations (fq, s4). if a teacher can really learn to move in these directions, she is bound to discover, like myself, a wealth of treasures that lie hidden and buried in the students’ hearts and minds; she is bound to feel, like myself, a sense of agony over the waste of human resources and experiences that could enrich the meaning of our lives; and she is bound to be moved to action, like myself, to bring more existential educational possibilities to schools so as to encourage all to live a flourishing and examined life. acknowledgements i would like to express appreciation to taiwan’s ministry of science and technology for supporting and funding this research (103-2410-h-415-033). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 41 endnotes 1 philosophy for children hawaii (p4chi) is one among the many developments of p4c inspired by the work of mathew lipman. under the guidance of dr. thomas jackson and because of several p4c teachers winning national and regional teaching excellence awards, p4ch has transformed itself into a general teaching movement with three model schools where philosophers in residence, local school teachers, and school principals work collaboratively to bring about educational change. philosophy for children hawaii now has its own center of teaching and research, the uehiro academy for philosophy and ethics in education, at the university of hawaii at manao. 2 to adapt p4chi to the linguistic and cultural contexts in taiwan, i created a set of hand signals combining important features from the “good thinker’s toolkit” and “magic words” developed by jackson (2004). with these hands-on signals, students can practice and internalize the cognitive and affective skills for building the community and deepening the inquiry. these signals include: idus (i don’t understand), thumbs up (well said), reason, example, counter-example, assumptions, going off subject, true?, speak louder, and no side talk. to see these signals, please visit http://p4chawaii.org/gallery/#prettyphoto. 3 influenced by his encounter with non-western philosophical traditions, such as the madhyamika school of buddhism, the advaita vedanta school of hinduism, and j. krishnamurti, dr. jackson has revealed during our private conversations his concern for the loss of a sense of center endemic to the human condition. therefore, he sees that when p4ch is embedded in school culture, it provides a powerful way for people to reconnect with the center, which is the essential part of their humanness. references biesta, g. (2015). freeing teaching from learning: opening up existential possibilities in educational relationships. studies in philosophy of education, 34, 229–43. biesta, g. (2014). the beautiful risk of education. boulder, co: paradigm publishers. biesta, g. (2011). philosophy, exposure and children: how to resist the instrumentalization of philosophy in education. journal of philosophy of education, 45 (2), 305-319. biesta, g. (2010). good education in an age of measurement: ethics, politics, democracy. boulder: paradigm publishers. bohm, d. (1996). on dialogue. london: routledge. dewey, j. (1916/1980). democracy and education. in j. a. boydston (ed.), john dewey: the middle works, vol. 9. carbondale, il: university of southern illinois press. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 42 dewey, j. (1927/1984). the public and its problems. in j. a. boydston (ed.), john dewey: the later works, vol. 2. carbondale, il: university of southern illinois press. dewey, j. (1937/1987). democracy and educational administration. in j. a. boydston (ed.), john dewey: the later works, vol. 11. carbondale, il: university of southern illinois press. dewey, j. (1933/1986). how we think. in j. boydston (ed.), john dewey: the later works, vol. 7. carbondale, il: university of southern illinois press. lee, z. y. (2013) afraid of asking stupid questions, 88% of students remain silent in class. (2013, april 25). chinatimes. retrieved from https://tw.news.yahoo.com/%e6%80%95%e5%95%8f%e7%ac%a8%e5%95%8f% e9%a1%8c-88%e5%a4%a7%e5%ad%b8%e7%94%9f%e9%9d%9c%e6%82%84%e6%82%84213000391.html. jackson, t. e. (2001). the art and craft of “gently socratic” inquiry. in a. l. costa (ed.), developing minds: a resource book for teaching thinking (pp. 459–465). alexandria, va: association for supervision and curriculum development. jackson, t. e. (2004). philosophy for children hawaiian style—“on not being in a rush.” thinking: the journal of philosophy for children, 17(1 & 2), 4–8. jackson, t. e. (2012). home grown. perspectives, 44(1 & 2), 3–7. jackson, t. e. (2013). on philosophical rules of engagement. in s. goering, n. shundak, and t. wartenberg (eds), philosophy in schools: an introduction for philosophers and teachers (pp. 99-109). new york: routledge. makaiau, a., & miller, c. (2012). the philosopher’s pedagogy. educational perspectives, 44(1 & 2), 8–19. mattice, s. (2014). metaphor and metaphilosophy: philosophy as combat, play and aesthetic experience. lanham: lexington books. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 36 (2015-16) 43 lipman, m. (2003). thinking in education (2nd ed.). new york, ny: cambridge university press. waks, l. (2011). john dewey on listening and friendship in school and society. educational theory, 61(2), 191–205. address correspondences to: jessica ching-sze wang national chiayi university chingsze@mail.ncyu.edu.tw analytic teaching and philosophical praxis analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 1 freire critical pedagogy. ann sharp, liberating education maría teresa de la garza camino fter work war ii when people were astonished at the violence that had devastated europe, several intellectuals founded the frankfurt school that proposed the critical theory of society that aimed at the diagnosis of maladies of reason with the purpose of saving it. enlightenment, understood in its widest sense as the advance of thought, has always aimed at liberating human beings from fear and installing them as masters. yet the wholly enlightened earth is radiant with triumphant calamity.1 this maladie or sickness of reason comes from the human desire to dominate nature, including human beings. this modern rationality operates under the identity principle: it rejects the different and relates to everything only by manipulation and dominion. “enlightenment stands in the same relationship to things as the dictator to human beings. he knows them to the extent that he can manipulate them.”2 horkheimer raised the need of a negative dialect emancipatory project that can diagnose the failure of the enlightenment and, as a solution, he proposes a new rationality, a new praxis for the construction of a more humane society. j. habermas represents the second generation of critical theory. he continues the work of the first critical theory and adds to the oblivion of nature, the oblivion of communication. he poses a change of paradigm: from modern subjectivity to intersubjectivity by means of “communicative reason.” he acknowledges the emancipatory self-reflection of critical theory, but also the socratic idea of dialogue. dialogical communication becomes an imperative for the transformation and reconstruction of social institution and practices. habermas recognizes the importance of educational institutions for the transformation of society. the ideal of a democratic and rational society requires educational institutions that prepare citizens in communicative rationality through dialogue. his interest is mainly in universities; he thinks universities should go back to the universal formation, 1 m. horkheimer and t. adorno, dialectic of enlightenment. philosophical fragments (stanford university press, 2002), p.1 2 op cit. p. 3 a analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 2 that is, not only empirical sciences, but humanities, to prepare cultivated men and women capable to be oriented to praxis, ethical and political. education should stress the critical consciousness of students enabling them to participate critically in social and political life. critical discussion of practical social questions is promoted by the formation of a critical community of students and professors in a democratic university. this community is ruled by decision making in the context of a dialogue, free of domination, and could be a paradigm for a democratic society. critical pedagogy is influenced by these ideas. it can be defined as an educational proposal that aims to help students to question the dominant practices and beliefs by the development of critical thinking. its aim is to generate liberating proposals both at an individual and a collective level. it is based in dialogue and aims at the development of a democratic society. henry giroux defines critical pedagogy as a theory that prepares students through practice so they can reach a critical conscience in their societies. critical pedagogy is an alternative to stop the reproduction of injustice in societies by means of education that promotes the humanization and integral development of students fostering the possibility of a progressive democratization of society and the commitment with those less favored in search of equity and justice. the context of latin america in the second half of the 20th century was one of inequality, a high rate of illiteracy, and political unrest. this is the context in which new pedagogical tendencies arose, generally known as “pedagogies of liberation” or “critical pedagogies.” they maintain the political character of education, denounce the alienating factors of the economic and political contexts, and propose a critical intervention upon reality. freire is the most distinguished representant of this movement that is linked with critical pedagogy. paulo freire was born in recife, the capital of brazil’s northeast province, one of the most impoverished parts of brazil. he was raised in a middle-class family and had educational opportunities that most brazilians did not. at the university, freire had contact with the catholic lay movement, the catholic students’ club (juc) that was one of the most radical organizations at the time. he also began to read increasingly the authors of the catholic left, like jacques maritain, thomas cardone, emmanuel mounier, and their radical brazilian interpreters, such as lace de amoroso lima, henrique lima val, herbert josé de souza and others. he always acknowledged being an eclectic, drawing ideas from many philosophical currents such as phenomenology, existentialism, christian personalism, humanist marxism and hegelianism. nevertheless, his central interest was the education of the poor people in his region and so he wanted to develop educational strategies for the poor. because of his revolutionary ideas, he was considered a menace for those in power and therefore was analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 3 imprisoned twice in his own country while becoming famous in other parts of the world. his ideas and educational praxis brought about his exile in 1964, following some time in prison accused of being a revolutionary. he lived for four years in chile and then one year in the united states. he then moved to geneva. in 1980, he returned to brazil and in 1989, he became secretary of education in são paulo, the most populous state in his country. he then made a great effort to implement his ideas, to review the curriculum, and to increase the salaries of brazilian educators, and he implemented a literacy campaign, crucial for his country. today, paulo freire must be considered one of the most famous educators of our time and one of the most influential thinkers, representative of critical pedagogy in latin america. he believed that all education was part of a project of freedom and eminently political because it offered students the conditions for self-reflection, a self-managed life, and particular notions of critical agency. freire worked to increase literacy in people, not as means to prepare them for the world of subordinated labor or ‘careers’, but a preparation for a self-managed life. a literacy campaign implies that the subject achieves critical consciousness liberating himself of the oppression of an imposed culture. literacy situates the individual in the world and so it must be linked to praxis; it cannot be separated from the political and social reality. it is a way to learn and to change the world, orienting the pedagogical action towards democratization and social justice. more than of a literacy “method,” he spoke of “conscientização”, conscientization or the redeeming of the oppressed’s own voice. his critical pedagogy tries to help the learner become aware of the forces that rule their lives and shaped their consciousness and, in this way, to set the conditions for producing a new way of life where power has been, at least partly, transferred to those who literally make the social world by their work. in pedagogy of the oppressed, his most influential work, he makes clear that pedagogy at its best is about neither training, teaching methods, nor political indoctrination. for freire, pedagogy is not a method or an a priori technique to be imposed on all students but a political and moral practice that provides the knowledge, skills, and social relations that enable students to explore the possibilities of what it means to be critical citizens while expanding and deepening their participation in the promise of a substantive democracy. freire’s idea of democracy is that of “radical democracy”, seeking the participation of the greatest number of citizens as it is possible. that is why he wanted to improve literacy in all parts of brazil. his ideal is democratic socialism that implies the participation of citizens in all aspects of social life: economy, politics, education, etc. practice and reflection led him to affirm that the powerful impose their educational models as elements to stabilize a social system convenient for them, so they will not change voluntarily; thus, education has an ideological character. for this reason, education for the marginalized needs to be analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 4 oriented not only by didactical needs, but also and fundamentally for a commitment to liberation. h. giroux cites aronwitz, pointing out that freire has highlighted the three goals of education: thus, for freire literacy was not a means to prepare students for the world of subordinated labor or ‘careers’, but a preparation for a self-managed life. and self-management could only occur when people have fulfilled three goals of education: self-reflection, that is, realizing the famous poetic phrase, ‘know thyself’, which is an understanding of the world in which they live, in its economic, political and, equally important, its psychological dimensions. specifically, ‘critical’ pedagogy helps the learner become aware of the forces that have hitherto ruled their lives and especially shaped their consciousness. the third goal is to help set the conditions for producing a new life, a new set of arrangements where power has been, at least in tendency, transferred to those who literally make the social world by transforming nature and themselves.3 (aronowitz, 2009, p. ix) freire is against a way of educating that is organized around the demands of the market, instrumentalized knowledge and the priority of “training” over the pursuit of imagination, critical thinking and the teaching of freedom and social responsibility. pedagogy of the question versus banking education pedagogy must be based in the reflection of those oppressed about the causes of oppression. it must be elaborated by the oppressed and not for the oppressed. for freire, traditional education treats the student as if he were a bank which knowledge is deposited, banking education. this kind of education has a subject, the teacher and some passive objects, the students where the teacher deposits knowledge and values. in this relationship there is one that “knows” and the others that are ignorant, but keep the deposits using memory. this kind of education according to freire cancels the creative power of students as well as their critical thinking. banking education does not allow action, inquiry, creativity, and, in consequence, leads to the “domestication” of the students, adapting them to reality without the possibility to question and transforming it. he proposes democratic relationships between teacher and students, undermining the power dynamics that hold the teacher above the students as the one who knows. such a teacher is not aware of his own fallibilism and ignorance. this kind of education negates the process of inquiry and coming to know. the democratic teacher is willing to admit that his experience is different from that 3 h. giroux, “rethinking education as a practice of freedom: paulo freire and the promise of critical pedagogy,” policy futures in education, vol. 8 num. 6 (2010) www.wwwords.co.uk/pfie 715 http://dx.doi.org/10.2304/pfie.2010. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 5 of the student, and by sharing they both can benefit by learning, and grow as human beings. liberating education is centered in dialogue and the existential conditions of those who engage in a dialogue with reality. problematizing reality breaks all the traditional models of education that separate the teacher and the student; both educate and are educated, and the dichotomy subject-object in the educational process is eliminated: “no one educates anyone else, nor do we educate ourselves. we educate one another in communion in the context of living in this world.”4 dialogue is at the core of his thought: dialogue is an existential requirement and, being the solidary encounter in reflection and action of subjects oriented to the world that must be transformed and humanized, cannot be reduced to a simple action of depositing ideas from a subject in another subject.5 it is love and respect that allow us to engage in dialogue and to discover ourselves in the process. the answers and the truth are not at the beginning, they will emerge as we listen and speak to one another. the conditions of dialogue are love, faith, hope, and critical thinking. love because it implies the recognition of the other as a free and creative being capable of naming and transforming the world. this cannot be the privilege of a few, but a right and obligation of all. hope is not to be confused with a passive waiting; it is dynamic, incessant, communitarian and brave search. it is an ontological need and a historical and existential imperative. it can be an instrument to advance towards the unprecedented: the construction of our future world and our own existence in a free, critical, and amorous way and, finally, critical thinking a commitment with the search for truth and meaning that is generated in dialogue: “only dialogue that implies critical thinking is capable of generating it. without dialogue there is no communication and without it there is not true education.”6 such an education will not come from those in political power who seek to maintain things as they are. it must come from the base with the oppressed through collaborative efforts and with a dialogical methodology; only so will it be possible to respect people’s wisdom, achieve liberation and get rid of the domesticating education of the oppressors. a culture of silence arises when society is not listened to by the dominators. one’s voice is not authentic. it is just the echo of the voice of the oppressors. this dependence is maintained by the international economic system and ideologically reinforced by religious schemes, the cultural industry, 4 freire, pedagogía del oprimido ed. siglo xxi, méxico, 1985, 107. the translation is mine. 5 op. cit, p. 101. the translation is mine. 6 op. cit, p. 107. the translation is mine. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 6 militarism, individualism, and consumerism, which impose a symbolic oppressive system on the people. paulo freire and ann sharp much has been said about the relationship between freire and lipman7. most of those who write about this relationship focus on dialogue. it is a fact that dialogue is at the core of both educational proposals and, in both, critical thinking is also a central concept. in 1988 catherine young-silva, then director of the brazilian center for philosophy for children, organized an encounter between matthew lipman, ann sharp, and paulo freire to which i was invited. to be present there and to listen to that dialogue has been one of the most significant experiences i have ever had. listening to the dialogue showed how following different paths and with truly diverse experiences and theoretical influences, these three educators had found similar problems and proposals. the need to develop critical thinking in students and the role of language in this development was discussed at length. dialogue as the heart of educational projects, and how they described it, was another important topic. freire said that the conditions of dialogue are love, hope and critical thinking. lipman mentioned respect for others, caring thinking, and critical and creative thinking. when hope was discussed, ann agreed in considering it an essential component of dialogue. it is, she said, a part of caring thinking. she shared how she was impressed by freire’s idea of the “culture of silence” and how she could relate it to the voices of women and children. for her, the community of inquiry tries to listen to the voices of all, so it could be a way to fight against the culture of silence in education. then there was a discussion about democracy, and in this topic, there were differences. freire’s idea of democracy is that of “radical democracy”, seeking the participation of the greatest number of citizens as it is possible through improving literacy in all parts of brazil. his ideal is democratic socialism that implies the participation of citizens in all aspects of social life: economy, politics, education, etc. for lipman and sharp, as we know, the ideal is deliberative democracy fostered by education inspired in the work of john dewey. but they agreed in the idea that a democratic education implies that the teacher must renounce the tendency to impose their own reading of the world on their students, and embrace the obligation to show students that there are different possible readings of the world. there have been also some scholars that compare freire’s “cultural circles” with philosophy for children’s “communities of inquiry”. cultural circles were for adult illiterate persons, and communities of inquiry have been thought of as for children and adolescents, but that does not mean 7 walter kohan, cfr., paulo freire mais do que nunca: uma biografía filosófica. (belo horizonte, vestigio, 2019). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 7 that adults cannot benefit from the participation in such a community, as we all know. beyond such considerations, here i would like to focus on the ideas of ann margaret sharp that i think are close to the liberating education proposed by freire. from early on, sharp’s academic activities and relationships were characterized by a sensitivity to injustice. she became adept at reading “the face of the other” for signs of suffering. she noted that women and children typically belong to what paulo freire describes as a “culture of silence”8 such individuals view themselves as impotent. they keep their eyes down when the powerful walk by. they don’t look you straight in the eye. they know they are outside the real conversation, the conversation that matters. cut off from the flow of ideas, hopes, dreams of those in power, the oppressed are powerless to question the assumptions or have a role in defining the concepts that affect their daily lives.9 listening to freire in the encounter in 1988 and reading the pedagogy of the oppressed, she found coincidences with her own concerns about education. according to ann, the task of education becomes one of political ethics: it is defined by the need to do justice to the oppressed, by bringing to the surface their perspective. the perspective of those who suffer injustice is the critical perspective and, therefore, the perspective of hope. this silence must be interrupted by the questions of the oppressed, who must, in turn, learn how to break from the culture of silence imposed on them. similarly, for freire, education must help the oppressed to use their own voice, to conquer people’s right to pronounce the world and to assume the direction of their own destiny. for him, as for ann, education is an act of love, therefore it is an act of courage. language is in both, freire and sharp, an indispensable tool for a critical, reflective process of conscientization that leads to liberation. and language in the form of dialogue as a critical and caring encounter of consciences searching for truth, meaning and hope for the future is also essential for both. they also shared the importance of hope in education. sharp’s political hope was also inspired by simone weil,10 who promoted education to free women, workers, and peasants from oppression. weil joined the international brigade in support of the spanish republic, fought the structures of patriarchy, rejected gender roles, and worked tirelessly to put her ideal of education for social justice into practice. 8 ann m. sharp carefully read the pedagogy of the oppressed and was inspired by it as shown in the next quotation. 9 a.m. sharp, “women and children and the evolution of philosophy,” analytic teaching 10 (1989): 46-51. 10 a.m, sharp, “simone weil on friendship,” philosophy today, winter (1978) 266-275; “work and education in the thought of simone weil,” pedagogica historica 24 (2) (1984): 493-515 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 8 democracy and the construction of a democratic society was a shared ideal for freire and sharp, despite some differences of approach. freire says: “…the point of departure must always be with men and women in the ‘here and now,’ which constitutes the situation within which they are submerged, from which they emerge, and in which they intervene.”11 a democratic quality may be characterized by openness, equality, and a willingness to share, learn, and create together, which needs the practice of virtues such as open-mindedness, listening, empathy, courage, humility, trust, receptivity to others’ experiences, and a willingness to be transformed by the experience. as other proponents of radical democracy, paulo freire thinks that it is through our relationships and within the immediate experience that we have of each other that our ideals have the capacity to become actualized experiences. democracy must be more than merely a procedure to elect a few individuals to represent the community’s political interests. radical democracy criticizes liberal theories for equating democracy with legal guarantees, or with the procedure of periodic voting, as well as for the belief that it is through private property that individual liberty is achieved. even when critical democracy is informed by liberal democracy, it is also critical of it. it is developed in colonized experiences of dehumanization, oppression, corruption, and abuse of power. paulo freire says that democracy is based on faith in humanity, in the belief that all are capable to discuss together and to find new ways to recreate the world. he acknowledges some of dewey’s ideas, proposed in democracy and education, for example, the idea that originality is not the fantastic, but rather the new use of known things. there is a social interest in dewey´s theory of democracy that could relate to sharp´s idea of it, especially the idea of the participation of all for the creation of a more just and freer world, as we can see in this quote from dewey: democracy as compared with other ways of life is the sole way of living which believes wholeheartedly in the process of experience as end and as means; as that which is capable of generating the science which is the sole dependable authority for the direction of further experience and which releases emotions, needs and desires so as to call into being the things that have not existed in the past. for every way of life that fails in its democracy limits the contacts, the exchanges, the communications, the interactions by which experience is steadied while it is also enlarged and enriched. the task of this release and enrichment is one that has to be carried on day by day. since it is one that can have no end till experience itself comes to an end, the task of democracy is forever that of creation of a freer and more humane experience in which all share and to which all contribute.12 11 freire, paulo. pedagogía del oprimido. ed. siglo xxi 2nd. edition, méxico, 2005, p. 98. the translation is mine. 12 j. dewey, creative democracy. the task before us. in m. fish, “classic american philosophers” (new york appletoncentury-crofts, 1951), p. 394 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 9 for sharp, the use of philosophy for children for the empowerment of women and children became a dominant theme in her scholarship. as she wrote, “[f]or feminism and philosophy for children, the doing of philosophy within a community is a critical and creative enterprise aimed at criticizing and changing the beliefs and practices of the dominant culture that sustain the unjust conditions that characterize the oppressed.”13 she was also thinking of a democratic way of life and liberation through thinking together critically: philosophy for children is an attempt to take the discipline of philosophy and reconstruct it so that children … can learn to master its tools and concepts and appropriate its content for themselves in such a way as to bring about their own liberation.14 sharp argued that: “participation in such a community [of inquiry] is a democratic approach to moral education, preparing youngsters to speak their voice in shaping the institutions of their society. a strong democracy must rely to a great extent on the critical, creative and ethical intelligence of each generation.”15 this is to be expected if ethics and politics are understood as dimensions of everyday experience—including the experience of children—and if philosophy is construed as inquiry into these dimensions. the community of inquiry prepares children to participate in a democratic society, and to rebuild it, thus giving rise to what sharp called “the child as critic,” in two senses. as critics of society, children move from personal claims of injustice to theories about the conditions of structural injustice. as critics of one another’s ideas, children’s perspectives become broader and more complex. both involve self-correction and the construction of new political, moral, and aesthetic ideals. sharp was aware of the radicalness of her idea but she thought that: “with time and practice in communal inquiry they come to realize that their teachers and classmates really do care about them as persons. they believe in their potential ability to make a difference. in turn, this realization makes it possible for children to care about a variety of things and motivates their acting with courage and hope in the world.”16 paulo freire thinks that one of the characteristics of an education for liberation is love. in a similar way, sharp focuses on the practice of care: sharp claims that learning is more than an accumulation of knowledge. it involves education of the feelings and emotions so as to promote growth of the capacity to care. 13 a.m. sharp, “and the children shall lead them,” international journal of applied philosophy, 18 (2) (2004): 177-187. 14 op. cit. 177 15 sharp, ann, “the role of intelligent sympathy in educating for global ethical consciousness.” in in community of inquiry with ann margaret sharp. childhood, philosophy and education. maughn rollins gregory and megan jane laverty, editors. (routledge international studies in the philosophy of education, 2018), p.230 16 ann m. sharp, “the other dimension of caring thinking,” journal of philosophy in schools 1(1) university of new south wales 1997. p. 16 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 10 without such growth we cannot develop as persons. the capacity to judge, value and be motivated to act are all of necessity tied to care.17 critical, creative, and caring thinking are all developed through the participation in a community of inquiry and can contribute to the creation of a new social ideal. the community of inquiry, at its best, offers an immersion into a democratic and aesthetic experience that can serve as funded experience of the group in envisioning new possibilities and making judgments. the sensitivity, the appreciative discerning of parts and wholes, the imaginative manipulation of elements to construct something of harmony and vision, will be dependent on the consciousness and quality of this immersion. as we become more conscious of the social and aesthetic dimension of the inquiry process, we find that it takes on more and more meaning and we truly care about its process and its outcomes.18 to foster caring thinking, we need more than logic, and in the environment of the community of inquiry, children become aware of the richness of their relationship with each other and with the world, and they view themselves as capable to create together a new way of life. in a real sense what we care about is manifest in how we perform, participate, build, contribute and how we relate to others. it is thinking that reveals our ideals as well as what we think is valuable, what we are willing to fight and suffer for.19 despite coming from different countries, contexts, and different philosophical influences these two thinkers, freire and sharp, shared the dream of a liberating, critical education that could lead to a true democratic society. references aronowitz, stanley (2009). foreword, in sheila l. macrine (ed.) critical pedagogy in uncertain times: hope and possibilities. new york: palgrave macmillan. cam, philip. commentary on ann margaret sharp’s ‘the other dimension of caring thinking.’ journal of philosophy in schools. university of new south wales, 1997. de la garza m.t. política de la memoria: una mirada sobre occidente desde el margen. anthropos/ universidad iberoamericana, barcelona, 2002. -----educación y democracia: aplicación de la teoría de la comunicación a la construcción del conocimiento en el aula. 17 philip cam, “commentary on ann margaret sharp’s ‘the other dimension of caring thinking,’” journal of philosophy in schools 1(1) (university of new south wales, 1997), p. 15 18 ann m. sharp. “the other dimension of caring thinking,” journal of philosophy in schools 1(1) (university of new south wales, 1997): 16-21, p. 17 19 philip cam, “commentary on ann margaret sharp’s ‘the other dimension of caring thinking’,” journal of philosophy in schools 1(1) university of new south wales, p. 15 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 11 dewey, j. democracy and education. macmillan, new york, 1944. ------creative democracy. the task before us. in m. fish, “classic american philosophers”, new york appleton-century-crofts, 1951, p. 394. freire, paulo. pedagogía del oprimido ed. siglo xxi, méxico, 1985. -----educación como práctica de la libertad. ed. siglo xxi, méxico, 2011. -----pedagogía de la esperanza, ed. siglo xxi, méxico, 2018. giroux, h. rethinking education as a practice of freedom: paulo freire and the promise of critical pedagogy (2010) www.wwwords.co.uk/pfie 715 http://dx.doi.org/10.2304/pfie.2010 habermas, j. teoría de la acción comunicativa: complementos y estudios previos. cátedra, madrid, 1989. -----toward a rational society. beacon press, 1970. horkheimer, m. and t. adorno. dialectic of enlightenment. philosophical fragments. stanford university press, 2002. kohan, walter. “paulo freire mais do que nunca: uma biografía filosófica. belo horizonte, vestigio, 2019. maughn rollins gregory and megan jane laverty, editors. in community of inquiry with ann margaret sharp. childhood, philosophy and education. routledge international studies in the philosophy of education, 2018. sharp, a.m. women and children and the evolution of philosophy. analytic teaching 10 (1989): 46-51. ----“simone weil on friendship.” philosophy today, winter (1978): 266-275. ----“work and education in the thought of simone weil.” pedagogica historica 24 (2) (1984): 493 -515. ----“the child as a critic.” in e. marsal, t. dobashi and b. weber (eds). children philosophize worldwide. new york: peter lang, 2009: 201-208. ----“and the children shall lead them.” international journal of applied philosophy. 18 (2) (2004): 177 187. ----“the other dimension of caring thinking.” journal of philosophy in schools 1(1) university of new south wales, 1997: 16-21. address correspondences to: maría teresa de la garza camino universidad nacional autónoma de méxico universidad iberoamericana campus sante fe email: garzacamino@gmail.com about:blank analytic teaching and philosophical praxis analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 43 an ecological approach to thinking1 félix garcía moriyón the tree of philosophy n the history of western thought there are various approaches to the classification of science or human knowledge. the current classification is highly conditioned by the fact that knowledge (more or less scientific) is grouped from within the field of academia, which introduces a certain bias (goodson, 2014). it is also true that the current classifications tend to seek more interdisciplinary approaches and, when dealing with complex problems, research groups are also interdisciplinary. i leave this topic, which would take us very far off point, and focus on a metaphor by descartes. descartes compared philosophy to a tree: «thus, all philosophy is like a tree, of which metaphysics is the root, physics the trunk, and all the other sciences the branches that grow out of this trunk, which are reduced to three principal, namely, medicine, mechanics, and ethics. by the science of morals, i understand the highest and most perfect which, presupposing an entire knowledge of the other sciences, is the last degree of wisdom” (descartes, n.d.). it is a metaphor that has been interpreted in different ways, but that interests me here insofar as it offers an integrated and interrelated conception of knowledge and at the same time proposes that the highest level is occupied by “perfect morality”, while metaphysics (first philosophy) constitutes the roots that sustain and feed the tree. the usefulness of philosophy, its most important contribution, are the fruits of those branches, especially the science of morals. it can serve us as a thread for what follows about the program of philosophy for children as it was designed and elaborated by matthew lipman and ann sharp (lipman & kennedy, 2010), mainly, with a few allusions to the varied programs that have followed. critical thinking philosophy for children was born in the sixties in the united states—more specifically in the new york area—during years of profound and significant social, cultural and political transformation. education was among those areas of great concern, with many people believing that important changes were needed. in this context, several educational proposals emerged, one of the most important being aimed at improving thinking, with a focus on teaching people to think—on what was 1 this paper is an updated and extended version of the book chapter: un approccio ecologico al pensiero. to be published propositi di filosofia n°1, collana passaggi, edizioni mimesis, milano. i analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 44 then called critical thinking. this was the generic name that referred to a number of theoretical teaching resources, accompanied by evaluation instruments, all of which were aimed at teaching students to think critically for themselves. undoubtedly, this movement had deep roots, which can be traced back to classical greece, as well as more recent roots such as the new school movement and, in the united states, john dewey’s educational philosophy, which had practical application in chicago, at that university's laboratory schools (hitchcock, 2018). what we now understand by critical thinking was first introduced into the educational field through bloom’s taxonomies (bloom et al., 1956), which included six objectives characteristic of the cognitive domain. this was followed by the work of r.h. ennis, who identified 13 critical thinking dispositions and 12 abilities (ennis, 1962). matthew lipman’s program, which emerged in the late 1960s (he was joined by ann sharp in 1970) (lipman and kennedy, 2010) certainly belongs to that movement (garcía moriyón and lipman, 2002). lipman’s first work, written in 1969, was harry stottlemier’s discovery, which was expressly aimed at teaching students aged 11 to 12 to think critically on their own (iapc, 2002). this was the starting point of a project that would grow into a consolidated curriculum covering from 4 to 18 years (eight novels and eight manuals for teachers). this curriculum included a teacher training aspect, which was accompanied by educational research on the impact of the implementation of the program, and eventually an international network (the icpic) of people involved in implementing the program. at present, the original approach to philosophy for children is widespread throughout the world, with a wide variety of alternative implementations, a large amount of theoretical research and many studies on the impact of the program on the cognitive and affective development of students during childhood and adolescence. in this paper, i will focus exclusively on how those working in philosophy for children understand thinking—at first critical thinking, then quickly expanding to creative and caring thinking. more than an extension, what has taken place during the almost four decades of intense work (19692010) is a deepening of something that was already clearly present at the very beginning—the two creators of the program always had this holistic approach to critical thinking in mind. more than critical thinking: a holistic philosophical thinking all those who have developed critical thinking-based educational approaches, including lipman himself (1987), have shown a decided interest in specifying competences or abilities—preferably cognitive—that can be clearly defined, applicable to education and evaluable with a certain rigor (garcía et alia, 2002). however, although these approaches coincide in many important ways, there are also discrepancies that, without undermining the vitality of this broad educational trend, prevent reaching a shared understanding of them. in other words, there is no clear agreement as to what the fundamental competencies or dimensions of critical thinking should be or as to the instrumental bias of any educational approach to critical thinking (biesta, 2011). more generally, there is little agreement on what we should understand by thinking. this should come as no surprise, given the complexity and extension of the concept—a concept with somewhat diffuse semantic and pragmatic contours. such disagreement, however, is also present in the field of the psychology of intelligence and personality. yet in both fields, important agreements have been reached, for example, around the analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 45 concept of intelligence or personality, with standardized tests that allow for its evaluation and development (colom marañón, 2018). this agreement does not prevent the existence of a variety of proposals in the areas of psychology of personality and intelligence—some of which have little empirical evidence in their favor, but are widely accepted—as is the case of the multiple intelligences proposal in the field of cognitive dimensions, or psychoanalysis, in the field of personality in general. these two proposals, for example, are suggestive, but not rigorous from the perspective of psychological research. in lipman and sharp’s specific contribution, the basic nucleus of their understanding of critical thinking and education was very clear from the beginning of the curricular development. in 1969, lipman published his first novel, harry stottlemeier's discovery. over the next ten years, lipman, together with ann sharp and frederick s. oscanyan, published the seminal books: four novels (harry, lisa, suki and mark), two instructional manuals for teachers (philosophical inquiry and ethical inquiry) and two theoretical books, philosophy in the classroom and growing up with philosophy (iapc, 2002). they presented the theoretical underpinnings of the program, as well as guides for teachers to implement the program in their schools, along with research on the results of its implementation in schools (lipman, sharp & oscanyan, 1980, pp, 217-224). these seminal books—from which the rest of the curriculum was articulated—did not contain a systematic or orderly exposition of the cognitive and affective competencies or dimensions that the program intends to develop, but they do contain four central ideas that offer a good description of the program. the first of these posits that wondering (as a starting point) and the search for meaning (as a goal to be achieved) are central features of human learning, and that we must recover and reinforce them through the use of philosophical inquiry in the classroom (ibid., pp. 11, 32). secondly, those works present a series of competencies linked to the central objective of becoming more reasonable and reflective in our deliberation and decision-making processes (although said competencies may not be completely coherent) (ibid., 51-129). thirdly, they stress that all cognitive development must be accompanied by moral growth, that they cannot be dissociated—in the same way that the enhancement of cognitive and affective competencies can only be achieved when they become habits and behaviors (ibid., pp. 153-188). finally, the authors consider that philosophy is the most appropriate discipline for achieving these ends both for its specific argumentative competences (philosophizing, or philosophy as an activity) and for its contents (philosophy as subject matter). it’s very important to remember that all the novels of the iapc curriculum were written by taking into account the philosophical topics that should provoke philosophical inquiry in the classroom, although cognitive competences (good reasoning) also play a certain dominant role. although cognitive (good reasons) and affective (good feelings) competencies have a certain predominance, content or themes that have been dealt with in the western tradition, as well as “philosophical” topics from other cultural areas are no less frequent. the manuals explain to teachers—who are assumed to have very little philosophical training—what those issues are, along with their most commonly discussed and debatable aspects. this is even clearer in the teachers’ guides, which offer an exhaustive enumeration of the philosophical themes that are present in each chapter and section of the novels. a look at lipman’s work on the sources and references used in harry analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 46 stottlemeir’s discovery (lipman, 1992) and those used in pixie (reed and sharp, 1996) provides good examples of this. in a way, the most innovative aspect of the program is not its objective to teach critical thinking, nor is it to transform classrooms into communities of inquiry—something that was already being done in other pedagogical currents. these are, indeed, central objectives that occupy and guide the entire educational proposal of philosophy for children. neither is it to resort to philosophy, since in countries of the “latin” cultural sphere (italy, france, portugal, spain, mexico, argentina, etc.) philosophy was already an important discipline, partly focusing on good thinking. the true innovation is to link everything (critical thinking, community of inquiry and philosophy) in a coherent way and to propose that it is possible to do philosophy from as early as three or four years old. it is an approach that shatters the piagetian paradigm of cognitive development, which considered children’s intelligence as pre-operational and concrete, thus postponing the emergence of abstract and formal thinking to the beginning of adolescence. it also breaks with a long european philosophical tradition, dating back to plato himself, for which philosophy could not be practiced until the end of adolescence. higher-order and complex thinking the effort to expand upon and to further detail this particular educational proposal continued over the following years. the manuals for the following novels are a good reflection of this deepening, especially those written for earlier ages, from 4 to 11 years old: pixie (1981) and looking for meaning (1982); kio and guss (1982) and wondering at the world (1986); elfie (1987) and getting our thoughts together (1987); nous (1996) and deciding what to do (1996). in the book thinking in education (lipman, 1991), lipman points out that an educational approach aimed at developing reason and critical thinking should be based on understanding rationality (being rational) as reasonableness (being reasonable), that is, a kind of reasoning that performs the cognitive movements that lead to the formulation of good judgments, to making the right decisions and putting them into practice. that is what lipman calls complex, or high-level thinking, formed by the combination of critical thinking and creative thinking, a type of thinking that takes into account the procedures—the method (formal and informal logic)—and the contents, the philosophical issues on which one argues. he summarizes it in a very clear table in which he points out the characteristics of complex thinking or higher order thinking (ibid., p. 35) critical thinking creative thinking complex thinking governed by criteria sensitive to criteria (particularly binary) concerned with both procedural and substantive considerations aims at judgment aims at judgments aims at resolution of problematic situations self corrective self-transcendent metacognitive (inquiry into inquiry) sensitive to context governed by context sensitive to context analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 47 in the same book, he groups cognitive skills into four major groups (ibid., pp.40-45) 1. inquiry: a self-corrective practice with the aim of discovering or inventing ways of dealing with problematic situations. the products are judgments. 2. reasoning: orders and coordinates what has been found or invented through the inquiry, and finds ways of extending and organizing it. it is interested in truth. 3. concept formation: organizes information into clusters and analyzes and clarifies it so as to get a better understanding and basis for judgment. it focuses on forming principles, criteria, arguments and so on. 4. translation: carries out the meanings from one language to another in different languages and contexts, retaining their sense and meaning, sometimes through interpretation. it is primarily concerned with the preservation of meaning. it is a debatable classification of cognitive competencies, but it is evidently a well-oriented effort for its application in the classroom. very importantly, it makes clear (ibid. ch. 14, pp. 229-241) that all this formation of complex thinking takes place in the setting of a classroom transformed into a community of inquiry (never forgetting that, even if he does not explicitly say so, he is always talking about philosophical inquiry), a central concept in which ann sharp’s contributions are also fundamental (sharp & splitter, 1995, ch. 5; gregory & laverty, 2018). the community of inquiry is the environment in which acts and mental states become epistemic moves, i.e., behavioral habits that manifest robust learning in critical, creative and caring thinking. this theme is further developed in the second edition of the book (lipman, 2003). in this further development, he clearly lays out the idea of a third level of thinking—caring thinking (ibid., ch. 12, pp. 261-272)—an idea that he had previously presented in a paper (lipman, 1995). it is interesting because in this approach he directly takes up what they, lipman and sharp, had already stressed in 1973-1977: the importance of meaning and of the ethical dimension of reasoning. yet this time he gives it a new treatment by speaking of caring thinking. as we can see in the table prepared by lipman, it is a triadic approach to philosophical thinking that has been present in the western philosophical tradition, including medieval scholasticism. lipman greek philosophy aristotle kant critical search for truth truth theory pure reason creative build meaning beauty poiesis judgment caring value-oriented good practice practical reason analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 48 there are two articles from sharp that offer a good insight into the community of philosophical inquiry. in one of them, she attributes an aesthetic dimension to the philosophical research community (sharp, 1997a), which leads us to consider that each class is a work of art, a performance. in the other, she talks about each session being a religious experience, following dewey’s ideas (sharp, 1997b), a topic she addressed in two other articles focused on spirituality that remained unfinished when she passed away. peter shea (2018) exposes these ideas of sharp very well and includes a quote from his article (sharp, 1997b) that correctly expresses this integral sense of education that is proposed in the philosophy program for children: john dewey made a very suggestive comment in his book a common faith that each time a community gets together to engage in deliberation, active inquiry into matters of importance, they are engaging in a ritual, a ritual that celebrates the ideals of goodness, truth and beauty. these ideals do not exist somewhere in another world, but are human projections that regulate our inquiry and motivate us to move the actual (that which is) to what we think it ‘ought to be’, a world in which the ideals are incarnated. this movement toward the ideal is god or, even better, what mary daly calls “godding” (shea, o.c, p. 165). social identity and bibliographical identity the above approach, which pays attention to the dimensions, or modes of thinking that we can differentiate, should not make us forget that the philosophy for children (p4c) approach pays attention to each individual person who is part of the community of inquiry. thus, we must emphasize that the program states, from the beginning, that the personal growth of the students must be treated in a global and integral sense. from an analytical or even methodological approach, it is good to clearly distinguish the cognitive and affective dimensions of the personality, and also to point out that cognitive improvement cannot be separated from moral improvement. it is also important to differentiate between specific first and second-order dimensions in which both cognition and affectivity are manifested, something that may have some parallels with factorial studies of personality (garcia et alia, 2002). however, what should be clear is that every human being is a complete entity, and the educational approach should always be oriented to the person as a whole. this idea is well illustrated by the metaphor of the chain and the cable that lipman himself uses in the novel lisa: the important thing is that we form with all our personal dimensions a well-braided and solid cable, because a chain will always be as weak as the weakest of its links. all our personal effort to achieve a full life is animated by the search for meaning (garcía moriyón, 1992), which is also deeply rooted in the western philosophical tradition and in other non-western traditions. this holistic understanding of human beings also takes into account g.h. mead’s contribution. according to mead, “the self is a social process,” meaning that there are a number of actions that take place in the mind to help formulate one’s complete self. mead presented the self and the mind in terms of a social process. as gestures are taken in by the individual organism, the individual organism also takes in the collective attitudes of others, in the form of gestures, and reacts accordingly with other organized attitudes. (mead, 1967) this process is characterized by mead as the i and the me. the ‘me’ is the social self and the ‘i’ is the response to the ‘me’. in other words, the ‘i’ is the response analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 49 of an individual to the attitudes of others, while the ‘me’ is the organized set of attitudes of others which an individual assumes. mead develops william james’ distinction between the ‘i’ and the ‘me’. the ‘me’ is the accumulated understanding of “the generalized other,” i.e. how one thinks one’s group perceives oneself, etc. the ‘i’ is the individual’s impulses. the ‘i’ is self as subject; the ‘me’ is self as object. lipman expressly takes up this vision of the self as part of a network in the novel mark, and there are several activities and discussion plans in which he and ann sharp emphasize this relational sense of identity that implies a global vision of the subject. in these relations, lipman also includes relations with things (lipman & sharp, 1980, ch. iii, id. 15). we are therefore faced with a program that encourages us to see the person as a whole, not as his or her specific competencies or dimensions: sometimes one can't see the wood for the trees. this is a synchronic approach to personal integrity, one that focuses on every moment of human life. there is another holistic or integral approach—the diachronic. personal identity is also an unfolding of the identity along a life cycle: it is a biography, a story that we write day by day. to a large extent we are what we do; it is our actions that define our identity (garcía-moriyón, 1992). we can look at the building of our personal identity as telling a story, the story of our own life. following ricoeur’s ideas about time and story, and his suggestions about the conflict of interpretations, it would be possible to describe personal identity as the result of intertwining both sides of the self, idem and ipsum (ricoeur, 1988). idem is something that you cannot change and you are not accountable for; ipsum, points to the area in which it is up to you to decide the kind of person you would like to be— the one that you are constructing, and how you construct it is a personal decision...no one can decide for you. the ipsum is the area of interpretation, where many interpretations are possible. the idem is the background and the limit for those interpretations: many of them are possible, but not all of them. as a matter of fact, you can, and ought to, make a work of art out of your personal identity, but you can also fail, you can deceive yourself. the hermeneutical circle is a good analogy for understanding how we must go from the idem to the ipsum, and then back to the idem. thus, nothing is decided from the very beginning; you have to tell your story, to put together all the pieces in order to have your own biography. and you never can give up on the search for truth and for meaning. comprehensive and ecological thinking philosophy for children is not the only program that talks about integral education, or that focuses on an integral vision of knowledge, one that is linked to an integral conception of the person. there are several well-founded and articulated proposals, such as that of sternberg, who, beyond his triadic theory of intelligence, proposes a close relationship between creativity, intelligence and wisdom (sternberg et alia, 2019), defending a balanced theory of wisdom (sternberg, 1998). there are other programs such as that of complex thinking developed by edgard morin, which gives coherence to an education structured in seven knowledge areas (morin, 2000). we also have gardner's theory of multiple intelligences, which suggests teachers to accept multiple intelligences, up to 8 or 9, and teachers should pluralize their teaching attending to the specific strengths of each singular student. jacques delors, as president of unesco, led an important report produced by the unesco analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 50 commission on education for the twenty-first century (unesco, 1996). this report identifies four pillars of lifelong learning: "learning to know", "learning to do", "learning to live together" and "learning to be". since that time, this report has continued to be an important influence on the discourse of lifelong learning and can be found in almost all official reports and education legislation worldwide. philosophy for children brings a specific approach in line with the previous educational projects. in this more general framework, i think we can give another name to the holistic thinking promoted by p4c—ecological thinking. this connects with sternberg's concept of wisdom "defined as the application of tacit knowledge as mediated by values toward the achievement of a common good through a balance among multiple (a) intrapersonal, (b) interpersonal, and (c) extra personal interests in order to achieve a balance among (a) adaptation to existing environments, (b) shaping of existing environments, and (c) selection of new environments" (sternberg et alia, 2019). it is clear that the term ecological has become highly relevant today due to the serious environmental crisis that threatens all of us. picking up the greek meaning of the word, oikos (οἶκος) —the house in which we live—ecological thinking would be that which is in charge of its own house and also is responsible for looking after and caring for that house, in order to ensure that our life becomes a full life. but care of the environment is not only centered on nature as the fundamental environment, but also starts from oneself, in the sense that both my physical body and mind constitute my own house in the strictest sense, abandoning any dualistic conception of human beings. this house of one's own is not a closed sphere, impermeable to the exterior, but is closely related to everything that surrounds it. the limits of this house expand in successive concentric circles or in a network of relations similar to that which harry spoke of (lipman, 1980, ch. 3)—thinking that our identity is constituted precisely thanks to this network of relations without which we could not speak of a personal self. the first circle is constituted by our individual being, our body and mind, our affective and cognitive dimensions. hence the importance of metacognition, that is, reflecting on one's own thinking. caring for our thinking implies thinking well in the double sense: thinking according to the rules of good reasons, without biases, fallacies or prejudices; thinking with good information and avoiding bad and harmful thoughts. the main guiding question for this area of ecological thinking is: what kind of person do i want to become? in this sense, the program's priorities are for people to think for themselves and make well-argued and well-founded autonomous decisions. and to become good people, people who seek a fulfilling and meaningful life (garcía moriyón, 2018). the second circle of this wide network of relationships is the family and, what is fundamental in an educational approach, the classroom and the school as a space for educating and learning together. clearly aware of the importance of this context, the program aims to transform the classroom into a community of inquiry and the entire school into a democratic school. it is in this environment that the development of behavioral habits should be encouraged, both cognitive and affective, to generate a relationship in which problems are faced cooperatively, trying to reconcile different proposals, based analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 51 on different convictions. thus begins the step towards the second fundamental question—what kind of world do we want to live in, as we become aware that what we want to become is closely linked to the world in which we live. this requires us to take care not only of our own individual person but also of the community, starting with the two immediate ones—the school and the family—then moving on to more and more extensive areas that end up encompassing the whole world. as both lipman and sharp and practically all the people involved in the program insist, it is a strong and radical commitment to democracy (daniels, 2003, c. iii; sharp, 1993). conclusion: the metaphor of the tree of philosophy i return to descartes’ tree. if we had to present an image that could serve as a metaphor for the way to understand the improvement of thinking that the philosophy for children program proposes, descartes’ tree of philosophy would be a good one. what matters is the whole, without neglecting the parts. if we look at the aims of the curriculum, fostering higher order thinking, the whole is ecological thinking: an attentive philosophical reflection on oneself, one's community, and the entire world, in a continuous and fallible search for truth, beauty and goodness. in the face of the cognitive dispersion that can result from an education fragmented into diverse disciplines, it is fundamental to defend some roots, along with the sap that gives sustenance and coherence to all the branches that will grow later on. that is indeed the contribution of philosophy to the curriculum—the development of high-level complex thinking. it requires its own space and time, but it must also vivify all the disciplines that are being learned, disciplines which must also include philosophical reflection in its own domain. a living tree, properly nurtured, ends up bearing its highest fruit, descartes said, in morality, that is to say, contributing to the growth of fulfilled people in a world worth living in. the tree becomes a metaphor for the program in a double sense: it represents the unity of human reflective activity that encompasses all the dimensions of knowledge and personal identity. at the same time, we can compare the pedagogical proposal to gardening, so that the classroom as a philosophical community becomes a garden, in which each plant must receive from its always attentive, careful and patient gardeners all that is necessary for it to grow according to its specific and unique personal configuration (hannam, 2017; biesta, 2015, ch. 1). there is yet a third way of interpreting the comparison between descartes' tree and philosophy for children. a good article by sharp in 1995 (and carefully edited by gregory and laverty) captures very well that integral sense of the education of higher-level thinking in the title: the role of intelligent sympathy in the education of a global ethical consciousness (sharp, 1995). the tree of philosophy for children, which sinks its roots into rigorous philosophical activity, points towards its most valuable fruit: a global ethical conscience that takes its place within oneself, then the immediate community (the neighbor), those that are near (the polis) and those that are distant (the whole planet earth). from this point of view, once again following sharp (1997 a and b), philosophy for children is linked analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 52 to a global consciousness that is similar to another classic philosophical current, the so-called philosophia perennis—in search of a universal and universalizable wisdom, which is open to the influence of other cultures (leibniz and huxley). interesting as it is, this last step takes the risk of going beyond philosophy to a different level, more mystical than philosophical. references biesta, g. (2011). philosophy, exposure, and children: how to resist the instrumentalisation of philosophy in education. journal of philosophy of education. vol. 45, no. 2, pp. 305-319 — (2015). the beautiful risk of education. boulder: routledge. bloom, b. s., m. d engelhart, e. j.furst, w. h. hill, and d. r. krathwohl. (1956). taxonomy of educational objectives. handbook i: cognitive domain, new york: david mckay. colom marañón, r. (2018). manual de psicología diferencial. métodos, modelos y aplicaciones. madrid. pirámide descartes, r. (n.d.). selection of the principles of philosophy, translated by john veitch, ll. d. daniels, m.f. (1992). la philosophie et les enfants. montreal. editions logique ennis, r. (1962). “a concept of critical thinking: a proposed basis for research on the teaching and evaluation of critical thinking ability.” harvard educational review, 32(1). 81–111. garcía moriyón, f. (1992). en busca del sentido. aprender a pensar, nº 5, págs. 29-39 — (1996). personal identity story and interpretation. in reed, r.f. & sharp, a.n. (ed.). studies in philosophy for children. madrid: de la torre, 1996. chapter: 15, pp. 209-220 — (2018). de los pensamientos al destino en garcía, f; duthie, e. y robles, r. (ed.). parecidos de familia. propuestas actuales en filosofía para niños / family ressemblances.current proposals in philosophy for children. madrid. anaya. 423-434 — y colom marañón, r.; lora cerdá, s.; rivas vidal, m.; traver centaño, v. (2002). la estimulación de la inteligencia racional y la inteligencia emocional. madrid: de la torre, 2002 garcía moriyón, f. y lipman, m. (2002). matthew lipman: una biografía intelectual. en garcía moriyón, f. (ed.). matthew lipman: filosofía y educación, ediciones de la torre, madrid. págs. 1746 goodson, i. (2014). context, curriculum and professional knowledge. history of education: journal of the history of education society, 43:6, 768-776, doi: 10.1080/0046760x.2014.943813 hannam, p. (2017). teachers as gardeners: thinking, attentiveness and the child in the community of philosophical inquiry. childhood & philosophy, rio de janeiro, vol. 13, no. 28, set.-dez. 2017, pp. 605-614. doi. 10.12957/childphilo.2017.29987 huxley, a. (1945). the perennial philosophy. new york. harper. iapc (2002) iapc timeline. upper montclair, nj. iapc. accessed 2020 01 10 on https://www.montclair.edu/iapc/iapc-timeline/ analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 53 gregory, m.r. and laverty, m.j. (eds) (2018). in community of inquiry with ann margaret sharp: childhood, philosophy, and education. routledge. pp. 264. lipman, m. (1980). mark. montclair, new jersey. iapc — (1987). critical thinking: what can it be. analytic teaching, vol 8, no. 1, pp. 5-12 — (1991). thinking in education. cambridge. cambridge univ. press. — (1992). sources and references for harry stottlemeir’s discovery. en sharp, a.m. and reed, r. (eds.). (1992) studies in philosophy for children: harry stottlemeier’s discovery. philadelphia: temple university press. pp.189—266. — (1995). caring as thinking. inquiry: critical thinking across the disciplines, autumn, vol. 15, no. 1, pp, 1-13. — (1996.) sources and references. in reed, r.f. & sharp, a.m. (ed.). studies in philosophy for children. pixie. madrid: de la torre. chapter: 15, pp. 209-220. — (2003). thinking in education. cambridge. cambridge univ. press 2nd. ed. lipman, m. and kennedy, d. (2010). ann sharp’s contribution. a conversation with mattew lipman. childhood and philosophy, 6 (11). 11-19. lipman, m. and sharp, m. (1980). social inquiry: instructional manual to accompany mark. montclair, nj. iapc lipman, m., a. m. sharp & oscanyan, f.s. (1980). philosophy in the classroom (philadelphia: temple university press, 1980. 2nd ed.) hitchcock, david, “critical thinking”, the stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (fall 2018 edition), edward n. zalta (ed.), url = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/criticalthinking/ . iapc (n.d.). iapc timeline. consultado el 10/09/2019 en https://www.montclair.edu/iapc/iapctimeline/ mead, g.h. (1967) [1934]. mind, self, and society, edited by c. w. morris. chicago: university of chicago. morin, e. (2000) éduquer pour l’ère planétaire, la pensée complexe comme méthode d’apprentissage dans l’erreur et l’incertitude humaine, paris, balland. ricoeur, p. (1988). l’identité narrative. in esprit, no. 140-141 (paris, juillet-août 1988) pp. 295-304. sharp, a. m. [1993]. the community of inquiry: education for democracy. in (gregory and laverty, 2018, app. 241-250). — [1995]. the role of intelligent sympathy in educating for global ethical consciousness. in gregory and laverty, 2018, pp. 230-240). — (1997a). the aesthetic dimension of the community of inquiry. inquiry. critical thinking across the disciplines. 17,1. pp. 67-77. about:blank about:blank about:blank about:blank analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 54 — (1997b). the sacred as relationship in the community of inquiry. in h. pálsson; b. sigurodardóttir & b. nelson (eds.). philosophy for children on top of the world. proceedings of the eight international conference on philosophy with children. university of akureyri, iceland. sharp, a.m. and reed, r. (eds.) (1992). studies in philosophy for children: harry stottlemeier’s discovery. philadelphia: temple university press. sharp, a.m. and splitter (1995). teacher for better thinking. melbourne. acer. shea, p. (2018). do we put what is precious at risk through philosophical conversation? en (gregory and laverty, 2018, pp. 161-173). sternberg, r.j. (1998). a balance theory of wisdom. review of general psychology vol. 2, no. 4, 347365. sternberg, r. j., kaufman, j. c., & roberts, a. m. (2019). the relation of creativity to intelligence and wisdom. in j.c. kaufman & r. j. sternberg (eds.), cambridge handbook of creativity (2nd ed) (pp. 237-353). new york: cambridge university press. unesco (1996). learning: the treasure within; report to unesco of the international commission on education for the twenty-first century. parís. unesco. address correspondences to: félix garcía moriyón, profesor honorario. dpt. didácticas específicas, universidad autónoma de madrid. email: felix.garciamoriyon@gmail.com more than critical thinking: a holistic philosophical thinking references biesta, g. (2011). philosophy, exposure, and children: how to resist the instrumentalisation of philosophy in education. journal of philosophy of education. vol. 45, no. 2, pp. 305-319 — (2015). the beautiful risk of education. boulder: routledge. bloom, b. s., m. d engelhart, e. j.furst, w. h. hill, and d. r. krathwohl. (1956). taxonomy of educational objectives. handbook i: cognitive domain, new york: david mckay. colom marañón, r. (2018). manual de psicología diferencial. métodos, modelos y aplicaciones. madrid. pirámide descartes, r. (n.d.). selection of the principles of philosophy, translated by john veitch, ll. d. daniels, m.f. (1992). la philosophie et les enfants. montreal. editions logique ennis, r. (1962). “a concept of critical thinking: a proposed basis for research on the teaching and evaluation of critical thinking ability.” harvard educational review, 32(1). 81–111. garcía moriyón, f. (1992). en busca del sentido. aprender a pensar, nº 5, págs. 29-39 — (1996). personal identity story and interpretation. in reed, r.f. & sharp, a.n. (ed.). studies in philosophy for children. madrid: de la torre, 1996. chapter: 15, pp. 209-220 — (2018). de los pensamientos al destino en garcía, f; duthie, e. y robles, r. (ed.). parecidos de familia. propuestas actuales en filosofía para niños / family ressemblances.current proposals in philosophy for children. madrid. anaya. 423-434 — y colom marañón, r.; lora cerdá, s.; rivas vidal, m.; traver centaño, v. (2002). la estimulación de la inteligencia racional y la inteligencia emocional. madrid: de la torre, 2002 garcía moriyón, f. y lipman, m. (2002). matthew lipman: una biografía intelectual. en garcía moriyón, f. (ed.). matthew lipman: filosofía y educación, ediciones de la torre, madrid. págs. 17-46 goodson, i. (2014). context, curriculum and professional knowledge. history of education: journal of the history of education society, 43:6, 768-776, doi: 10.1080/0046760x.2014.943813 hannam, p. (2017). teachers as gardeners: thinking, attentiveness and the child in the community of philosophical inquiry. childhood & philosophy, rio de janeiro, vol. 13, no. 28, set.-dez. 2017, pp. 605-614. doi. 10.12957/childphilo.2017.29987 huxley, a. (1945). the perennial philosophy. new york. harper. iapc (2002) iapc timeline. upper montclair, nj. iapc. accessed 2020 01 10 on https://www.montclair.edu/iapc/iapc-timeline/ gregory, m.r. and laverty, m.j. (eds) (2018). in community of inquiry with ann margaret sharp: childhood, philosophy, and education. routledge. pp. 264. lipman, m. (1980). mark. montclair, new jersey. iapc — (1987). critical thinking: what can it be. analytic teaching, vol 8, no. 1, pp. 5-12 — (1991). thinking in education. cambridge. cambridge univ. press. — (1992). sources and references for harry stottlemeir’s discovery. en sharp, a.m. and reed, r. (eds.). (1992) studies in philosophy for children: harry stottlemeier’s discovery. philadelphia: temple university press. pp.189—266. — (1995). caring as thinking. inquiry: critical thinking across the disciplines, autumn, vol. 15, no. 1, pp, 1-13. — (1996.) sources and references. in reed, r.f. & sharp, a.m. (ed.). studies in philosophy for children. pixie. madrid: de la torre. chapter: 15, pp. 209-220. — (2003). thinking in education. cambridge. cambridge univ. press 2nd. ed. lipman, m. and kennedy, d. (2010). ann sharp’s contribution. a conversation with mattew lipman. childhood and philosophy, 6 (11). 11-19. lipman, m. and sharp, m. (1980). social inquiry: instructional manual to accompany mark. montclair, nj. iapc lipman, m., a. m. sharp & oscanyan, f.s. (1980). philosophy in the classroom (philadelphia: temple university press, 1980. 2nd ed.) hitchcock, david, “critical thinking”, the stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (fall 2018 edition), edward n. zalta (ed.), url = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/critical-thinking/ . iapc (n.d.). iapc timeline. consultado el 10/09/2019 en https://www.montclair.edu/iapc/iapc-timeline/ mead, g.h. (1967) [1934]. mind, self, and society, edited by c. w. morris. chicago: university of chicago. morin, e. (2000) éduquer pour l’ère planétaire, la pensée complexe comme méthode d’apprentissage dans l’erreur et l’incertitude humaine, paris, balland. ricoeur, p. (1988). l’identité narrative. in esprit, no. 140-141 (paris, juillet-août 1988) pp. 295-304. sharp, a. m. [1993]. the community of inquiry: education for democracy. in (gregory and laverty, 2018, app. 241-250). — [1995]. the role of intelligent sympathy in educating for global ethical consciousness. in gregory and laverty, 2018, pp. 230-240). — (1997a). the aesthetic dimension of the community of inquiry. inquiry. critical thinking across the disciplines. 17,1. pp. 67-77. — (1997b). the sacred as relationship in the community of inquiry. in h. pálsson; b. sigurodardóttir & b. nelson (eds.). philosophy for children on top of the world. proceedings of the eight international conference on philosophy with children. univer... sharp, a.m. and reed, r. (eds.) (1992). studies in philosophy for children: harry stottlemeier’s discovery. philadelphia: temple university press. sharp, a.m. and splitter (1995). teacher for better thinking. melbourne. acer. shea, p. (2018). do we put what is precious at risk through philosophical conversation? en (gregory and laverty, 2018, pp. 161-173). sternberg, r.j. (1998). a balance theory of wisdom. review of general psychology vol. 2, no. 4, 347-365. sternberg, r. j., kaufman, j. c., & roberts, a. m. (2019). the relation of creativity to intelligence and wisdom. in j.c. kaufman & r. j. sternberg (eds.), cambridge handbook of creativity (2nd ed) (pp. 237-353). new york: cambridge university press. unesco (1996). learning: the treasure within; report to unesco of the international commission on education for the twenty-first century. parís. unesco. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 12 the narrow-sense and wide-sense community of inquiry: what it means for teachers gilbert burgh introduction1 y approach in this paper on the community of inquiry is to think of it in the context of democracy as primarily a process; as a way of being, a way of thinking and communicating on important life-matters, and as an associated from of living that is inherently inclusive but requiring the cooperation of others. in doing so, i am not expressly ignoring the political dimensions of governance, systems, and organizations, as such matters are important, but i consider them to be subsidiary to the social dimension of democracy—at least where education is concerned. nevertheless, what binds both the political and social dimensions is that democracy is a form of inquiry. our task as educators in a democracy is to develop the skills, capacities, and dispositions to facilitate the kinds of relationships that support democratic ways of life. because learning to think is at the core of educational aims and practices, the kind of support that education can offer is to facilitate the development of these skills, capacities, and dispositions necessary to both living in and thinking about democracy. noteworthy, is the potential of philosophical inquiry as an effective educational strategy for enhancing democratic ways of life (burgh, 2003, 2010, 2014; burgh, field & freakley, 2006; lefrançois & ethier, 2010; saint, 2019; unesco, 2007; venter & higgs, 2014). because democracy is a certain kind of community, or at least it is a way of life practiced in communities, that necessitates thinking as a form of inquiry, i will focus my attention on inquiry-based learning which has become a major part of educational discourse. specifically, i will explore the idea of school-based communities of inquiry as a specific teaching method for fostering philosophical discussion and its relationship to scholarly communities of inquiry. the term ‘community of inquiry’ has a long history that dates back to charles sanders peirce, whose original formulation is grounded in the notion of communities of disciplinary-based inquiry 1 a shorter version of this paper was presented at 36th annual conference of the philosophy of education society of australasia, held at the queensland university of technology, brisbane, australia, 4–7 december 2008. the original conference presentation was a response to seixas (1993), sprod (2001) and gregory (2002), and some of the ideas appear scattered elsewhere in an attempt to develop my ideas, which eventually resulted in this article. it has also been substantially re-written as part of a broader discussion in chapter 4: educational philosophy of burgh & thornton (2021, forthcoming). m analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 13 engaged in the construction of knowledge. however, its current usage as a productive pedagogy owes much to matthew lipman and ann margaret sharp (1978) who ‘extensively developed the community of inquiry as an approach to teaching that transforms the structure of the classroom in fundamental ways’ (burgh & thornton, 2016, p. 165). as a teaching method, the community of inquiry is a purposive activity of inquiry, experimentation and collaboration motivated by intelligent curiosity that arises from a ‘sense of genuine doubt that signals a rupture in consciousness’ (gregory & granger, 2012, p. 6); an approach to education in the tradition of reflective education in which good thinking and its improvement is central. alongside the educational rhetoric of ‘learning to think’ as the core of educational aims and practices and the emphasis on constructivist pedagogy, the community of inquiry has gained attention from both scholars and classroom teachers alike. however, teaching philosophically presupposes an ability to think philosophically; being able to make use of thinking tools at the right time, as well as the application of methods, approaches and other devices used by philosophers. this challenge is compounded when we consider that the notion of a ‘community of inquiry’ functions in two different kinds of ways—as a specific method for fostering philosophical discussion in the classroom and as an education ideal for the reconstruction of education guided by the pragmatist principles of scholarly inquiry (gregory, 2002; pardales & girod, 2006; seixas, 2003; sprod, 2001). in this paper, i introduce the narrow-sense and wide-sense conceptions of the community of inquiry (sprod, 2001) as a way of understanding what is meant by the phrase ‘converting the classroom into a community of inquiry.’ the wide-sense conception is the organising or regulative principle of scholarly communities of inquiry and a classroom-wide ideal for the reconstruction of education. i argue that converting the classroom into a community of inquiry requires more than following a specific procedural method, and, therefore, that the wide-sense conception must inform the narrow-sense community of inquiry, as it provides the pedagogical guidelines for classroom practice. this is followed by a discussion on the dual role of the teacher as facilitator and co-inquirer in mediating between the two conceptions of the community of inquiry. finally, i look at three different interpretations of john dewey’s educational theory and practice that underpins philosophy for children. i conclude that without an understanding of the relationship between the two conceptions of the community of inquiry to guide the larger aims of an education that supports democratic ways of life, the teacher’s role remains unclear. two communities of inquiry the phrase ‘converting the classroom into a community of inquiry’ is commonly understood as a teaching method with a philosophical focus to guide classroom discussion. however, it has a broader application, namely, to transform or convert the entire classroom, or schooling, into a community of inquiry. when lipman uses this phrase he is, on the one hand, talking about a method of teaching which he articulated as five stages: the offering of the text, the construction of the agenda, solidifying the community, using exercises and discussion plans, and encouraging further responses (lipman, 1991, pp. 241–243). the method has been described variously by different authors (burgh, field & freakley, 2006; cam, 2006; gregory, 2008) and has been embellished in practice, but mostly it follows the method of practice set out in lipman’s educational theory and practice and implicit in the analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 14 philosophy for children curriculum materials. briefly, it commences with the students sitting in a circle reading a text, a story, or other stimulus, which is effectively an introduction of a problematic situation to stimulate students to think about what might be puzzling or disagreeable. as a group, the students identify problems through the generation of questions based on what each of the students find problematic. following on, they offer suggestions in response to a central question by expressing their opinions, exploring ideas, stating conjectures, and generating hypotheses in order to find possible answers, solutions, or explanations. this leads to the analysis of concepts and use of reasoning to develop arguments, in order to gain deeper understanding of the problems, issues or topics into which students are inquiring. the teacher’s role is to facilitate the substantive discussion through the use of open-ended questioning and the introduction of exercises, discussion plans and other classroom activities that compel students to inquire further and to connect their questions with the philosophical questions of the tradition. only after such a thorough investigation is the community of students ready to evaluate their thinking and to bring their deliberations to closure (freakley, burgh & tilt macsporran, 2008, pp. 6–7). this method of practice is intended to develop the students’ capacities for reasoning and deliberation, as well as their social dispositions, through adult mediation between the culture and the child. this brings us back to the broader implications of the community of inquiry as a method of teaching to guide classroom practice. underpinning lipman’s method is his pedagogy; that is, the how and why that guides teaching practice. the two aims of ‘converting the classroom into a community of inquiry’ are quite distinct in the role they play in lipman’s framework of educational philosophy, which he developed by extrapolating the pedagogical guidelines implied in dewey’s writing (lipman, 2004). the pedagogy informs the method of classroom practice which is the practice of philosophy. the pedagogy is reflective education, in which thinking is understood as a process of inquiry, and where learning to think is at the core of educational aims and practices. this is why the community of inquiry is best described as educational philosophy rather than as philosophy of education; that is, teaching methods and classroom practice are informed by certain pedagogical criteria whereby the practice of philosophy is the methodology of education (lipman, 2003, pp. 6–8). as we have seen, the term community of inquiry when understood as a method for classroom practice that follows lipman’s basic procedure functions to distinguish it from other approaches to teaching and learning. however, the following passage by lipman (1991) clearly suggests that as pedagogy his aims for the community of inquiry are far-reaching. thus we can now speak of converting the classroom into a community of inquiry in which students listen to one another with respect, build on one another’s ideas, challenge one another to supply reasons for otherwise unsupported opinions, assist each other in drawing inferences from what has been said, and seek to identify one another’s assumptions. a community of inquiry attempts to follow the inquiry where it leads rather than being penned in by the boundary lines of existing disciplines. a dialogue that rises to conform to logic, it moves forward like a boat tacking into the wind, but in the process its progress comes to resemble that of thinking itself. consequently, when this process is internalised or introjected by the participants, they come to think as the process thinks. (p. 16) analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 15 this frequently quoted passage has the role of the teacher and the curriculum conspicuously absent (sprod, 2001, pp. 152–153). likewise, a passage by splitter and sharp (1995) on the idea that every classroom can be transformed into a community of inquiry gives a similar impression. we believe that all subjects can be taught as forms of inquiry, although we do not pretend to understand how this transformation might take place for each individual discipline and domain. adult researchers, academics and practitioners move in and out of the communities of scientific, religious, historical, literary and artistic inquiry that are associated with their work. what we are proposing is that by redefining teaching and learning as inquiry-based activities, children and teachers can participate in this process. this redefinition is the key to improving thinking in all students. (p. 24) the role of the teacher as facilitator is implied in this passage by splitter and sharp and mirrors what lipman says elsewhere, dispersed throughout his writing. that is, the teachers and the students, like their professional counterparts, can move in and out of various communities of inquiry that are articulated by the key learning areas or curriculum subjects, but whose knowledge base is informed by the knowledge of each accompanying discipline. but, as lipman points out, it is more than this, because moving in and out of various communities of inquiry is also to gain an understanding of how those disciplines are practiced. the community of inquiry articulated as a teaching method and as pedagogy offers pedagogical guidelines for classroom practice, but when understood together they serve for a better understanding of lipman’s educational philosophy; that is, as both reconstructing education and how it translates into schooling practices. to distinguish between what i will refer to from here on as the community of inquiry as a teaching method and the community of inquiry as pedagogy, i will examine a distinction made by tim sprod (2001, pp. 152–156) who refers to the ‘narrow-sense’ and ‘wide-sense’ community of inquiry. i have already described the narrow-sense community of inquiry as basically that pattern of inquiry recommended by lipman for classroom practice, which, generally speaking, is identified as having five stages. it is a teaching method that can be augmented by other classroom strategies, including cooperative learning techniques such as paired discussion and small group work, and research and writing. the more difficult task is to explain what is meant by the wide-sense community of inquiry. it would be impractical, and even ineffective, for classrooms or whole schools to be converted into communities of inquiry if this is taken to mean an approach to education in which communal dialogue is the only teaching and learning technique. to interpret what is meant by the phrase converting the classroom into a community of inquiry in the wise-sense, i will need to go back to the origins of community of inquiry. the community of inquiry, as originally formulated by peirce, is grounded in the notion of communities of disciplinary-based inquiry engaged in the construction of knowledge. it is a selfcorrective process where the exploration of ideas and reasoning are publicly displayed and scrutinized, and it is the site for critical discourse in which new hypothesis are generated and subjected to the most rigorous tests the community can devise. when the community comes together in agreement, we can speak of knowledge, truth, and reality as concepts grounded in the community of inquirers not in the individual consciousness (murphy, 1990, p. 12). peirce (1955) rejected the philosophical position that we can be clear and distinct about our own thinking and hence that reliable knowledge could be analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 16 gained from introspection. the test for truth or certainty is not an individual endeavor ‘but requires us to stand upon a very different platform than this’ (p. 228). in the following passage, pierce more than hints at the necessity of community as that ‘different platform’ from which we can achieve any significant insight or reliable knowledge. in science in which men come to agreement, when a theory has been broached, it is considered to be on probation until this agreement is reached. after it is reached, the question of certainty becomes an idle one, because there is no one left who doubts it. we individually cannot reasonably hope to attain the ultimate philosophy which we pursue; we can only seek it, therefore, for the community of philosophers. hence, if disciplined and candid minds carefully examine a theory and refuse to accept it, this ought to create doubts in the mind of the author of the theory himself. (p. 229) for pierce, reliable knowledge results from inquiry, which is a rational, scientific process. by scientific inquiry peirce included all disciplinary-based inquiry (e.g., science, history, mathematics, philosophy). a community of inquiry, by virtue of its logic and method of investigation, sets the standards and the justification for the construction of reliable knowledge. it is the actual community whose members accept the logic and method of investigation that acts as a deliberative jury between doubt and belief about ideas or hypotheses. the narrow-sense community of inquiry is restricted to classroom practice, and differs to the wide-sense, scholarly communities of inquiry referred to by peirce, as they are conducted over global sites through a combination of many activities which do not always involve communication between members of the community and in some cases require work to be done in isolation before consulting again with the community. these inquiries are conducted by international communities of experts whose tasks include keeping abreast with research, e.g., working in small research teams engaging in solitary experimentation, attending conference, and consulting with other experts in the field as well as allied fields. yet, it cannot be ignored that the social aspect is also vital to such an inquiry. sprod (2001) highlights this in his description of scientific inquiry. what we call ‘scientific objectivity’ is not a product of the individual scientist’s impartiality, but a product of the social or public character of scientific method; and the individual scientist’s impartiality is, so far as it exists, not the source but rather the result of this socially or institutionally organized objectivity of science. (p. 154) other products also result from such a community of inquiry, e.g., methodologies, conventional standards, conceptual schema, and interpretations of mathematical formalisms. these products are the results of communications in which other experts in the profession are able to potentially participate, which include raising questions, suggesting and exploring alternatives, exploring flaws in data, methods and analysis, giving reasons, identifying assumptions, and other procedural aspects of inquiry, which all happen informally in the form of conferring with colleagues, and formally at conferences or in journal publications. nevertheless, both conceptions of the community of inquiry share the communal and deliberative aspects that are vital to the inquiry process. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 17 in both cases, the community of inquiry sets the standards and justification for the construction of reliable knowledge. taking these similarities into consideration, splitter and sharp could be interpreted as alluding to a wide-sense conception of the community of inquiry described as students moving between the classroom community of inquiry and scholarly inquiries of adult researchers, academics and practitioners, and, thus, converting the classroom into a community of inquiry by redefining teaching and learning as inquiry. we could describe it this way. the wide-sense conception is a statement about education as reconstruction, which has its foundations in lipman’s educational theory and practice, founded on peirce and dewey, and, therefore, contains preconditions which act as pedagogical guidelines for teaching methods and classroom practice. these educational preconditions are grounded in an epistemology of community as reflective equilibrium. this equilibrium is suitably described as fallibilistic because the community is constantly open to new ideas, to revision, to improvement, and most of all to self-correction (hildebrand, 1996; burgh & thornton, 2016). rejected in practice is the search for foundational knowledge and absolute truth, replaced by the interplay between equilibrium and disequilibrium that is necessary to dialogue. in terms of usefulness as a description of what teachers should be striving for in classroom practice it serves the purpose of giving us a broader understanding of dialogue as a collaborative, reflective process, with reconstruction as its outcome. similarities notwithstanding, the significant differences between the two communities of inquiry cannot be ignored. peter seixas (1993) points to the limits of the analogy between scholarly communities of inquiry and school-based communities of inquiry (p. 306). to conflate the two, he says, ‘would be woefully mistaken and dangerous’ (p. 313). whereas scholarly inquirers are engaged in the construction of disciplinary knowledge arising out of their own set of problems embedded within specific contexts and history, students are not able to do what scholarly inquirers do and, thus, the flow of knowledge can only be unidirectional. in order to achieve the necessary abilities to engage in scholarly inquiry, students must ‘learn, value and begin to practice a common set of procedures and activities that are typical of a community of inquiry’ (pardales & girod, 2006, p. 308). thus, schoolbased inquiry has a different focus than that of scholarly inquiry. unlike scholarly inquirers, students are not engaged in inquiry voluntarily, they are not necessarily practiced inquirers before they enter school, and they do not, at the outset, represent the shared values of scholarship and participation. in virtue of its function as an educative activity, school-based community of inquiry emphasizes teacherfacilitated inquiry where mutual respect and concern for all participants are paramount, and progressively ‘as the community becomes more skilled and begins to gain confidence, the teacher takes a less active role in the inquiry’ (pardales & girod, 2006, p. 304). in other words, student-based inquiry is a precondition for engaging in scholarly communities of inquiry. we can now link our discussion back to the use of the phrase ‘converting the classroom into a community of inquiry.’ we have seen that students cannot really engage in the kind of community peirce spoke of until they learn, value, and begin to practice a common set of procedures and activities that are typical of a community of inquiry. it would be reasonable, therefore, to favor an interpretation of the narrow-sense community of inquiry as a place to build the skills of inquiry which act as a foundation for disciplinary inquiry whereby content is ‘enlivened and enriched by the ongoing process of inquiry’ (splitter & sharp, 1995, p. 24). it is a place to initiate students into the knowledge, skills and dispositions, which are predetermined by the practitioners of the disciplinary areas, that get analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 18 transformed into the school curriculum so that they come to appreciate that these disciplines are themselves forms of inquiry and ‘interconnected in various ways, not entirely unconnected—as the traditional school timetable would lead them to believe’ (splitter & sharp, 1995, p. 25). this is closer in approximation to the wide-sense, scholarly community of inquiry outlined by peirce. one last word before we move onto the next part of our discussion on the dual role of the teacher in inquiry. sprod (2001) also cautions against conflating the narrow-sense and wide-sense conceptions of the community of inquiry. the conflation of the meaning of the term converting the classroom into a community of inquiry to mean, on the one hand, ‘a specific method for fostering philosophical discussion and critical discourse’, and, on the other hand, the ‘ideal for the transformation of education’, he says, ‘is a confusing and unnecessary one’ (p. 156). his caution deserves consideration in terms of retaining the meaning of the narrow-sense community of inquiry as a teaching method for fostering philosophical discussion. however, whatever term we substitute for the wide-sense conception, teachers need to understand the relationship between the two meanings. in the absence of another term, the two meanings can be separated by their function, which allows teachers to understand why, how, and when to move between the two communities. whilst we, perhaps, should not conflate them conceptually, for the community of inquiry to achieve what dewey and lipman intended, teachers need to be active in both by mediating between them (gregory, 2002; seixas, 1993). the dual role of the teacher as inquirer the wide-sense conception of the community of inquiry could be viewed as both an organizing or regulative principle of scholarly inquiries and a classroom-wide ideal for the reconstruction of education. the two are, of course, connected as they share the same constructivist epistemology and methodology and, thus, teachers need to know how they function as they are ‘responsible for structuring the learning experiences of the classroom members’ (seixas, 1993, p. 312). the community of inquiry is a reflective pedagogy that has as its core authentic learning as self-correction. the classroom community of inquiry is an example of constructivist pedagogy, which makes the empirical claim that these kinds of educational objectives, as well as traditional, counter-oriented objectives, are better achieved by engaging students in processes of inquiry in which they construct their understanding of a topic by means of investigation, application, experimentation, and most importantly, through dialogue with teachers, experts, and other students. (gregory, 2002, p. 400) it is a constructivist pedagogy that rests on immersing students in problematic aspects of their experience as a basis for guiding students to construct knowledge, skills and dispositions that enable them to engage more meaningfully with these experiences. put another way, by activating students’ interest in learning through their own active intelligence in developing and testing their own ideas and hypothesis as a group, and engaging in self-correction, their experiences, including their habits of thought, feelings and actions, are reconstructed as more meaningful. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 19 the community of inquiry requires a skilled philosophical facilitator who is procedurally rigorous and prepared to appreciate the philosophical implications of students’ philosophical discourse (gregory, 2008, p. 9). the overall task of the teacher is that of philosophical facilitator who is sensitive to the immediate concerns of classroom practice, but also aware of the interplay between classroom practice and the methodologies and other practices of the professional disciplines. such thinking requires a redefinition of teaching and learning. for an effective model of inquiry, we need look no further than to dewey’s educational theory and practice. in fact, given that dewey was heavily influenced by peirce’s notion of the community of inquiry, particularly its emphasis on pragmatic considerations of fallibilism and self-correction, and that the pedagogical guidelines contained within his educational theory and practice were influential on lipman’s own theories and curriculum, it is a necessary starting point. according to dewey, democracy is a mode of associated living. he viewed the school as a cooperative society on a small scale; an agency to restore community by being the center of community life. in order to experience the social value of education and its interdependence with society, schooling should engage students in real-life problems to solve in order to connect with home and social life. this means that the teacher takes on a dual role as classroom practitioner and as a professional engaged in the problems, both epistemological and methodological, of the scholarly community in which they belong, and as facilitator to construct through a process of dialogue and intellectual self-correction the experience and knowledge of students into a form that is meaningful so that they become experts. to these ends, the teacher needs to engage students in rich tasks that involve discussion, investigation, and experimentation (depending on the disciplines), as well as placebased education that involves an exchange between proponents of new beliefs and the rest of the community most directly affected by the social problem in a caring, communal inquiry so as to actually reconstruct the problem (bleazby, 2004, 2013). such thinking requires a reconceptualization of the teacher’s role. gregory (2002) meets this challenge by calling ‘for teachers to mediate between communities of students and communities of experts, by being active participants in both’ (p. 403). if we consider seixas’ (1993) claim that teacher’s subject knowledge entails a bridge between communities’ that extends outward to scholars in the disciplines (experts) ‘in one direction and to students in another’ (p. 316), then teachers can appreciate how both communities function. nevertheless, gregory (2002), acknowledges the asymmetry in the positions of the participants in each of the inquiries, specifically the pedagogic role of the classroom community of inquiry absent in its professional counterpart. however, he argues that the solution is to call ‘for teachers to mediate between communities of students and communities of experts, but being active participants in both’ (p. 403). he begins with pointing to the similarities: (1) the teacher’s role like the expert is to construct the experience and knowledge of others into a meaningful experience, (2) there is a dialogue between the participants over new ideas, (3) both the teacher and the experts listen to and are open to the ideas of others, (4) the participants must follow the argument to where it leads, (5) the inquiry is a form of meta-level inquiry or meta-dialogue, and (6) summative evaluation is used to preserve the standards of the norms that remain intelligible and valuable (pp. 403–407). these similarities are crucial to reconciling the problem of the teacher’s role in in a community of inquiry with education toward analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 20 disciplinary-based standards, ‘so long as learning is understood as an appropriation of predetermined standards that involves student self-correction and self-verification’ (p. 407). this, first and foremost, requires that constructivist pedagogy in the form of the community of inquiry is seen ‘as an apprenticeship in self-correction, in which the students’ capacity to construct and verify new knowledge for themselves within a discipline becomes increasingly informed by the norms of that discipline’ (p. 407). the upshot of reconceptualizing the teacher’s role in a community or inquiry is that the teacher takes on a dual role of (1) co-inquirer, who engages in the problems, both epistemological and methodological, of the scholarly community of inquiry, and (2) facilitator to reconstruct, through a process of dialogue and intellectual self-correction, the experience and knowledge of students into a form that is meaningful to their lives. to these ends, the teacher needs to ensure there is ‘dialogue between proponents of new ideas (including methods and values)’ that include ‘a complex process of inquiry that might involve discussion, investigation, and experimentation, depending on the discipline and the nature of the new ideas’ (p. 403). to fulfil these roles, teachers not only need to be skilled philosophical facilitators, but also active participants in disciplinary communities of inquiry, to ensure that the standards of the disciplinary community are met, and that the classroom inquiry proceeds in the same manner as scholarly or disciplinary inquiry. teachers need to appreciate that the wide-sense community of inquiry as practiced by scholars in discipline-based inquiries, not only produces knowledge that finds its way into curricula but provides the epistemological and methodological framework for the reconstruction of education. to convert the classroom into the community of inquiry, the narrow-sense, school-based community of inquiry—a specific teaching method for facilitation philosophical dialogue—must be driven by the pedagogical principles lipman and sharp adapted to education that were derived from the scholarly, disciplinebased communities of inquiry. this requires teachers to not only have a procedural understanding of how to facilitate philosophical inquiry, but to also understand their dual role as co-inquirers to mediate between the two communities of inquiry. whilst teachers are not fully-fledged members of the scholarly communities, insofar as they are not engaged in the methodologically diverse inquiries of scientists, historians, mathematicians and other knowledge producing disciplines, they are accredited members of the teaching profession and have familiarity with the knowledge and methodologies currently warranted by the disciplines that inform curriculum content and textbooks—typically through teacher preparation programs, in-service and professional development, journal subscriptions, and membership to teaching associations that represent their subject specific domain. together with their pedagogical ability, this makes them unique in moving between both communities and to facilitate student learning through self-correcting open inquiry to ‘close the gap’ between the two communities. in this way, they are converting the classroom into a community of inquiry as the boundary between classroom and the greater community is more fluid. as scholarly communities of inquiry also inform and are informed by professional, social and political institutions that make up the greater community, converting the classroom into a community of inquiry as the reconstruction of education is also the impetus for social reconstruction—it is, as lipman says, an exemplar of democratic education. of course, this is not to say that we do not need to re-think teacher in-service and professional development and pre-service teacher education programs. however, this is beyond our scope here (see bleazby & slade, 2019; poulton, 2019). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 21 progressivism, reconstructionism and pragmatism an understanding of the wide-sense conception of the community of inquiry as both an organizing or regulative principle for disciplinary inquiry and an educational ideal aimed at reconstructing schooling relies on a certain interpretation of dewey’s general theory of education. his theory, laid out in democracy and education, has been variously interpreted as progressivism, reconstructionism, and neo-pragmatism (englund, 2005). in what follows, i will briefly outline the three interpretations, in order to develop my argument for the idea that converting a classroom into a community of inquiry makes sense only if dewey’s general theory of education that informs the pedagogy of the community of inquiry is taken to have elements of reconstructionism and neopragmatism. progressivism is underpinned by the belief that the aim of education is to change school practice. while the seeds of progressivism can be traced to such notables as the french philosopher jean-jacques rousseau, the swiss educational reformer johann pestalozzi, and the german educator friedrich froebel, the most influential was dewey. although he was an early proponent of progressive education, he never aligned himself to the movement, and, indeed, distanced himself from it. but it was his principles that schools should reflect the life of the society and that the process of upbringing and teaching is an end in itself that shaped the progressive movement. this is expressed in his dictum: ‘since growth is the characteristic of life, education is all and one with growing; it has no end beyond itself’ (dewey, 1916, p. 58). in practice, progressivism advocates a curriculum that follows the interests of students and emphasizes active learning and deep understanding. while it can be loosely said that dewey advocated some sort of progressivism, its theoretical underpinnings, especially the relationship between education and democracy are too vague to make any judgment. so, how can progressivism inform our understanding of the phrase converting the classroom into a community of inquiry? if we trace back to the understanding of the wide-sense conception of the community of inquiry as both a regulative principle for disciplinary inquiry and an educational ideal aimed at reconstructing schooling, we are given some indication. this could be interpreted simply as pedagogy for changing school practice. but this is hardly informative, except that if one of the specific criteria for such change rests on dewey’s dictum that education has no end beyond itself, we land ourselves in the difficult position of having to offer a justification without recourse to other criteria underscored by alternative interpretations of dewey. for this reason, i now turn to reconstructionism. both progressivism and reconstructionism share a concern for education as change. whereas progressivism is directly aimed at schooling practices and curriculum to develop individual capacities, reconstructionism uses democracy as the reference point for schools to develop the participatory capacities and dispositions in students as a way to ensure on-going development of society. seen in this way reconstructionism views schooling as making a contribution ‘to the development of pupils’ interest in societal questions by focusing on possibilities for everyone understanding the kind of issues involved in such questions and opportunities for discussion of controversial questions offering’ (englund, 2005, p. 137). it advocates education as an instrument for change; a view that can be traced back to dewey’s fundamental concern that schooling and civil society needed attention to strengthen analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 22 democracy. democracy in its fully fledged form as a way of life could only be obtained through a civil society comprised of citizens with the capacity for fully formed opinion. dewey (1916) highlights this in the following quotation: ‘since education is a social process, and there are many kinds of societies, a criterion for educational criticism and construction implies a particular social ideal’ (p. 105). in other words, reconstructionism is concerned with the reconstruction of civil society as the root of democracy, which has its beginning point the transformation of student thinking. if we revisit the notion of converting the classroom into a community of inquiry, we get a better indication if we apply the criteria of reconstructionism. to convert the classroom into a community of inquiry is to foster in students the capacity to form opinions about democratic ways of life; to encourage experimental intelligence and plurality as a way of transforming or reconstructing society. the method to bring this about is the narrow-sense community of inquiry, but the pedagogy that underscores this method is one of reconstruction. reconstructionism, therefore, brings the two kinds of community of inquiry closer together insofar as they share in the aim of transforming society, albeit one emphasizes the educational role of developing the appropriate capacities and dispositions. however, to fully appreciate what it means to convert the classroom into a community of inquiry we need also to incorporate a pragmatist interpretation. following from his own words in the quotation cited earlier dewey says: ‘the two points selected by which to measure the worth of a form of social life are the extent to which the interests of a group are shared by all its members, and the fullness and freedom with which it interacts with other groups’ (p. 105). according to thomas englund (2005), from a neo-pragmatist perspective, these words emphasize the importance of communication (p. 137). i will take the liberty to embellish on englund’s claim, and emphasize collective communication, to stress the importance that dewey placed on communication as communal dialogue. democracy is just one side of the deweyan education coin; the other is to be accomplished through effective communication, not just among its citizens but also among experts and political representatives. this is achieved through education as communication because social life is communicative, or as dewey (1916) put it: ‘not only is social life identical with communication, but all communication (and hence all genuine social life) is educative’ (p. 8). neo-pragmatism is best understood as emphasizing dewey’s attention to reconstructing dualisms, of which an important one is the private-public distinction, to the relationship between language and a sense of community, and to his epistemological justification for democracy as a form of communal deliberation. the neo-pragmatic dewey arose from an analysis of his close historical connections to peirce and william james, the focus on communication and interaction in the work of the pragmatist george herbert mead, and the accentuation by richard rorty of the linguistic turn as a background for an analysis of how language for dewey aims as a sense of community, as well as richard bernstein’s emphasis on dewey’s attempts to dissolve the dualisms linked to the publicprivate in order to create a public philosophy (englund, 2005, p. 138). i will not elaborate on the arguments here, other than to say that the revival of pragmatism or what is generally referred to the pragmatic renaissance has placed emphasis back on the pragmatism of dewey and highlighted the importance of his predecessors, especially peirce. but my argument does not rely on the details of neopragmatism, especially the emphasis on postmodern linguistic analysis. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 23 my emphasis is on dewey’s notion of communion, which is present it his educative ideal of communal dialogue as being identical with social life. if we account for both the reconstructionist and the pragmatist interpretations of dewey’s theory of education, then the phrase converting the classroom into a community of inquiry becomes more informative. i reiterate my previous claim. to convert the classroom into a community of inquiry is to foster in students the capacity to form opinions about democratic ways of life; to encourage experimental intelligence and plurality as a way of transforming or reconstructing society. but it is also accomplished through education as effective communication which is exemplary in communal dialogue. the method to bring this about is the narrow-sense community of inquiry, but the pedagogy that underscores this method is a combination of reconstruction and pragmatism. it is an educative ideal that moves between the classroom and civil society. this perspective explains social integration as a ‘communicative and argumentative consensual process’ (englund, 2005, p. 139) that is an on-going educative process. it also explains the pedagogical directive of the wide-sense community of inquiry in relation to the narrow-sense community of inquiry, insofar as they share in the aim of transforming society through communicative action. both senses of the community of inquiry have as their requirement an educative role, albeit the role of the facilitator in the narrow-sense conception of the community of inquiry rests with the teacher to cultivate the dispositions of the students, whereas in civil society the task is distributed among all citizens. this also applies to the professional and expert communities of inquiry where the community also has an educative role to play, including scientific and other scholarly communities in which dialogue itself allows open communication among professionals and between professions, as well as with the greater community. accordingly, for this account of the community of inquiry to be effective, it must integrate placebased education, i.e., practical, experiential learning, with communal inquiry in order to facilitate learning outcomes which may lead to social reconstruction. place-based approaches to education vary, and might involve scientific experiments, productive labor, or some kind of service learning, usually work experience or community service activities. but these must also fully facilitate the meaningful practice that they intend and must, therefore, include the identification of problems in order to develop and implement real solutions to them (bleazby, 2013). such an account of place-based education is congruent with a pragmatist conception of the community of inquiry, which emphasizes communicative and deliberative capabilities, and is consistent with dewey’s conception of communal inquiry as a process of constructing and applying ideas that aim at real social change. whereas dewey argued that common and productive activity through school occupation work (which was an integral educational component of this laboratory school), properly used, would connect students to the school curriculum and engage them in communal activities via firsthand experience, place-based education with an emphasis on social reconstruction has the potential to incorporate student participation in community development projects, as well as social and political activities to facilitate an understanding of the process of self-governance,2 and, therefore, it has the potential to bring about social change (thornton, graham & burgh, 2021). 2 self-governance, as the term is used here in relation to social reconstruction, is not to be confused with schoolgovernance. rather, it is engagement with the design and implementation of solutions to social problems that affect not only the members of the class, but also members of the greater community. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 24 by applying their inquiry skills to actual ‘real-world’ situations, students purposefully reconstruct their socio-cultural environment (bleazby, 2004, 2006). in this sense, education has the potential to extend beyond the classroom and the school. it requires members of the school community to understand the connection between themselves as active members of the community, the school of which they are a part, the greater community, and responsible decision-making. the school and the community to which it belongs becomes a microcosm of a greater deliberative democratic community. conclusion i have argued that the narrow-sense community of inquiry, which is the methodology of education, must be driven by the pedagogy that underscores the wide-sense community of inquiry, i.e., the pedagogical guidelines that drive the community or inquiry as a teaching method. without these to guide the larger ambitions of reconstructing education toward an education that supports democratic ways of life, whereby education as communication is seen as identical with social life, the role of the teacher as mediating between communities of students and scholarly (discipline-based) communities, but also being active participants in both, remains unclear. references bleazby, j. (2004). practicality and philosophy for children. critical & creative thinking: the australasian journal of philosophy in education, 12(2), 33–42. bleazby, j. (2006). autonomy, democratic community, and citizenship in philosophy for children: dewey and philosophy for children’s rejection of the community/individual dualism. analytic teaching, 26(1), 30–52. bleazby, j. (2013). social reconstruction learning: dualism, dewey and philosophy in schools. london: routledge. bleazby, j., & slade, c. (2019). philosophy for children goes to university. in g. burgh & s. thornton (eds.), philosophical inquiry with children: the development of an inquiring society in australia (pp. 215‒232). london & new york: routledge. burgh, g. (2003). democratic education: aligning curriculum, pedagogy, assessment and school governance. in p. cam (ed.), philosophy, democracy and education (pp. 102–120–102). seoul: korean national commission for unesco. burgh, g. (2010). citizenship as a learning process: democratic education without foundationalism (revised). reprinted in d.r.j. macer & s. saad-zoy (eds.), asian-arab philosophical dialogues on globalization, democracy and human rights (pp. 59–69). bangkok: unesco, regional unit for social and human sciences in asia and the pacific. burgh, g. (2014). democratic pedagogy. journal of philosophy in schools, 1(1), 22–44. burgh, g., & thornton, s. (2021, forthcoming). teaching democracy in an age of uncertainty: pedagogy of deliberation. london & new york: routledge. burgh, g., field, t., & freakley. (2006). ethics and the community of inquiry: education for deliberative democracy. south. melbourne: thomson social science press. burgh, g., & thornton, s. (2016). lucid education: resisting resistance to inquiry. oxford review of education, 42(2), 165–177. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 25 cam, p. (2006). twenty thinking tools. camberwell: australian council for educational research. dewey, j. (1916). democracy and education. new york: free press. englund, t. (2000). rethinking democracy and education: towards and education of deliberative citizens. in w. carr (ed.), philosophy of education (pp. 305–313). new york: routledge. freakley, m., burgh, g., & tilt macsporran, l. (2008). values education in schools: a resource book for student inquiry. camberwell: australian council for educational research. gregory, m.r. (2002). constructivism, standards, and the classroom community of inquiry. educational theory, 52(4), 397–408. gregory, m.r. (2008). philosophy in schools: ideals, challenges and opportunities. critical & creative thinking: the australasian journal of philosophy in education, 16(1), 5–22. gregory, m., & granger, d. (2012). introduction: john dewey on philosophy and childhood. education and culture, 28, 1–25. hildebrand, d. l. (1996). genuine doubt and the community in peirce’s theory of inquiry. southwest philosophy review, 12, 33–43. lefrançois, d., & ethier, m.a. (2010). translating the ideal of deliberative democracy into democratic education: pure utopia? educational philosophy and theory, 42(3), 271–292. lipman, m. (1991). thinking in education. cambridge: cambridge university press. lipman, m. (2003). thinking in education, 2nd edition. cambridge: cambridge university press. lipman, m. (2004). philosophy for children’s debt to john dewey. critical & creative thinking: the australasian journal of philosophy in education, 12, 1–8. lipman, m., & sharp, a.m. (1978). some educational presuppositions of philosophy for children. oxford review of education, 4, 85–90. murphy, j.p. (1990). pragmatism: from peirce to davidson. boulder: westview press. pardales, m.j., & girod, m. (2006). community of inquiry: its past and present future. educational philosophy and theory, 38(3), 299–309. peirce, c.s. (1955). the philosophical writings of peirce, j. buchler (ed.). new york: dover. poulton, j. (2019). teacher education and professional development. in g. burgh & s. thornton (eds.), philosophical inquiry with children: the development of an inquiring society in australia (pp. 145‒155). london & new york: routledge. saint, e. (2019). democratic education: a theoretical review (2006–2017). review of educational research, 89(5), 655–696. seixas, p. (1993). the community of inquiry as a basis for knowledge and learning: the case of history. american educational research journal, 30(2), 305–324. splitter, l.j., & sharp, a.m. (1995). teaching for better thinking: the classroom community of inquiry. melbourne: australian council for educational research. sprod, t. (2001). philosophical discussion in moral education: the community of ethical inquiry. london; new york: routledge. thornton, s., graham, m., & burgh, g. (2021, forthcoming). place-based philosophical education: reconstructing ‘place’, reconstructing ethics. childhood & philosophy, 17(1). unesco (2007). philosophy, a school of freedom: teaching philosophy and learning to philosophize: status and prospects. paris: unesco. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 26 venter, w., & higgs, l.g. (2014). philosophy for children in a democratic classroom. journal of social sciences, 41(1), 11–16. address correspondences to: gilbert burgh, the university of queensland, australia email: g.burgh@uq.edu.au teaching philosophy with picture books analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 96 teaching philosophy with picture books wendy turgeon and thomas e. wartenberg introduction rom its inception, the philosophy for children movement has questioned the use of picture books to begin philosophical discussions among young children. this trend has its roots in the work of the movement’s founder, matthew lipman. lipman believed that philosophical novels written with the express purpose of engaging children in philosophical discussions were better suited than picture books to the task of introducing philosophy into elementary school classrooms because only they could actually teach children how to think, the goal of the philosophy for children movement. and while there have always been advocates for the use of picture books in the p4c community, the relationship between the lipman p4c curriculum and picture books has been an uneasy one. as practitioners who have, for many years, used picture books in our philosophical interactions with children, the two of us believe the use of picture books in philosophical inquiries is fundamentally sound and an excellent path to encourage children to engage in philosophical enquiry. in this paper, we will consider objections to this use of picture books in order to show that they have limited or no validity. on the other hand, we will canvas a range of objections against the use of expressly designed philosophical novels to engage children in philosophical discussions. our position is not that one method for engaging children in philosophical inquiry is better than the other, but that each has important virtues as well as drawbacks. our goal is to defend picture books from unjustified criticisms made against their use in philosophical dialogues; but we do not categorically reject the use of specifically designed philosophical novels either. we hope this balanced account will get practitioners to give picture books their due. 1. the critique of picture books in p4c we begin by canvassing some of the central arguments cautioning against the use of picture books to teach philosophy to young children. the first “lipmanian” argument against using these sources notes the danger of ruining an imaginative story by treating it in too utilitarian a manner, say, by mining it for philosophical ideas. literature should not be used for philosophy discussions, the argument goes, because that is not its “job.” the function and beauty of literature will be lost if it is used simply as a jumping off tool for philosophical discussion. in response, karin murris claims that lipman creates a divide between literature which is intended for imaginative play and entertainment, f analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 97 and that which is directly constructed to provoke and encourage philosophical thinking.1 in his seminal works on philosophy with children, philosophy in the classroom and growing up with philosophy, lipman argues that what is needed is a carefully crafted and integrated curriculum to both guarantee genuine philosophical growth in the children and to support teachers unequipped with a background in philosophy.2 lipman also suggests another problem with the use of picture books. he claims that, if we wish children to be thoughtful, we need to employ stories in which children are shown to be thoughtful.3 to do this, we must have a new form of literature, “philosophical stories.” lipman himself has created this literary form, beginning with harry stottlemeyer’s discovery (1971), in which he attempted to realize this narrative structure. subsequently, lipman wrote a series of novels in which children are presented as engaged in the types of philosophical discussions lipman wanted the students in his class to engage in. he was open about them not being great works of literature, but that was not his goal. he believed that the stories help children take part in philosophical discussion because the characters in the story did just that. it certainly is true that the philosophical novels that lipman wrote are not great works of literature. they portray children learning important philosophical lessons, such as the validity of basic forms of inference4, the meaning of words and classification schema5, and concepts of fairness as equity vs equality.6 however, lipman’s assertion about the advantage of using expressly written philosophical novels is not entirely justified. it is not at all self-evident that the most appropriate way to teach young children to philosophize is to have them read novels in which the characters are shown engaging in philosophical discussions. can’t children learn to be thoughtful from their interactions with each other in philosophy discussions even if the stories they read do not provide a model of such thoughtfulness? we see no reason to deny this possibility and we join our voices with others who have advocated for the introduction of picture books to promote robust philosophical inquiry. and, indeed, we have found that the children we have worked with using picture books do become more thoughtful as a result of their interactions with their peers under the guidance of a facilitator. it is also true that the characters in certain picture books are depicted as engaged in philosophical discussions, so that there is less of a difference than lipman believed. 1 as summarized by khosronejad and shokrollahzadeh, “from silencing children’s literature to attempting to learn from it: changing views towards picturebooks in p4c movement”, childhood & philosophy, may 2020, p. 12. they reference haynes’ and murris’ picturebook, pedagogy and philosophy (new york and london, routledge, 2012). 2 see lipman, sharp, oscanyan, philosophy in the classroom, temple university press, 1980: chapter 5 and lipman, philosophy goes to school, temple university press, 1988: chapter 11 and pp. 182-185 where lipman argues for the necessity of specifically designed philosophical literature to support teachers untrained in philosophy and to promote development in the philosophical skills of the students. 3 matthew lipman, philosophy goes to school (philadelphia, temple university press: 1988), pp. 186-87. 4 harry stottlemeier’s discovery (montclair, nj: institute for the advancement of philosophy for children, 1971). all of the novels written by lipman and his sometime collaborator ann margaret sharp can be found via the iapc. 5 pixie (montclair, nj: institute for the advancement of philosophy for children, 1981). 6 lisa (montclair, nj: institute for the advancement of philosophy for children, 1976). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 98 in their 2020 article charting the evolution of children’s literature’s relationship to philosophical inquiry, morteza khosronejad and soudabeh shokrollahzadeh develop such criticisms of lipman’s view. 7 they argue that lipman’s position implicitly limits philosophy to logical/rational discourse and misses the rich depths of the role of imagination in making meaning.8 not only does this do a disservice to literature, they say, but it also involves too narrow a concept of philosophical inquiry. this criticism echoes one made by karin murris. she criticizes lipman for positing what she calls “the ideal ‘abnormal’ child, the thinking child.”9 her claim is that the children depicted in lipman’s novels are not ordinary children who are acting the way children normally do, but rather idealized children who fit lipman’s own norm of how philosophically sophisticated children will behave. from her point of view, lipman prioritizes a very specific notion of philosophy, academic analytic philosophy,10 thereby failing to do justice to his own goal of creating genuinely reflective children. while we would not want to equate philosophy with the analytic or even pragmatic traditions, we do not believe murris’ own posthuman approach is necessarily superior or even more respectful towards children than others. exploring how language works and what concepts are is a primary activity of the young child and lipman’s approach does focus on this. that said, we also recognize a tendency within education to ignore the real child as a person and substitute some model from psychology or educational theory and murris argues persuasively why that fails to honor the very real capabilities of children to reflect on their experiences. additionally, there are recent examples of specifically written “philosophical novels” which are linked to alternative models of philosophy, such as phenomenology and continental philosophical in general. one example is david kennedy’s novel, dreamers.11 a different argument against the use of picture books in philosophical discussions is offered by laurence splitter and ann margaret sharp.12 they claim that the pictures and illustrations in children’s books foreclose the cognitive options of the children engaged with them. the idea is that the illustrations in picture books do “work” that is properly left to the children themselves by filling in the text with images that the author and illustrator deem appropriate. adults tend to assume that children need pictures in their books. many children’s books are as well-known for the illustrations as for the actual story and in some cases the images overpower the 7 morteza khosronejad and soudabeh shokrollahzadeh, “from silencing children’s literature to attempting to learn from it: changing views towards picturebooks in p4c movement”, childhood & philosophy, may 2020, pp. 1-30. 8 ibid., p. 13. 9 karin murris, “the philosophy for children curriculum: resisting ‘teacher proof’ texts and the formation of the ideal philosopher child,” studies in the philosophy of education (2016), 35: p. 63. 10 it is more likely that matthew lipman adopted a deeply pragmatic view of philosophy based on his use of dewey and pierce in his theoretical works and in the many taped interviews with him. 11 the book can be downloaded at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/336312912_dreamers_a_philosophical_novel_for_children. another recent set of contributions can be found in the site for the p.e.a.c.e. project in europe: https://peace.kinderphilosophie.at/index.html 12 see sharp and splitter’s text, teaching for better thinking (melbourne, au: australian council for education, 1995). about:blank about:blank analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 99 story itself and create a parallel magic allure. since alice in alice’s adventures in wonderland is depicted as blond and blue-eyed girl, it might be difficult for someone who does not share those properties to imagine herself as the questioning alice.13 lipman was worried philosophy lessons using such imagery might appeal to only a small subset of the students he was interested in reaching. this was one reason he eschewed illustrations for his own novels and often used names that did not clearly signal a character’s gender. lipman wanted all children, whatever their race, gender, etc., to envision themselves in the story or picture the characters in the story as sharing their “look.” this is important. in some of the lipman novels you are not even sure whether the protagonists are girls or boys, although there are clues that can help you sort that out. or can you? likewise, the characters ethnic background are vague and open to interpretation. however, the characters, unlike a vast number of stories for children, are human (for the most part—the giraffe in nous is the only exception). this facilitates, according to the classic p4c approach, a more porous and open identification between readers and the characters in the novels.14 the omission of pictures on the lipman/sharp novels has drawn criticism on the grounds that children expect and want pictures; otherwise they will find the books boring or not engaging. to give them credit, in our experience children are astonishingly tolerant of the lack of pictures in the lipman novels and relish seeing the children in these stories through their own ethnic and cultural lens. although there is a history of picture books failing to include human characters other than white and middle-class ones, recently there have been many attempts to be more inclusive. one prominent example is matt de la peña’s last stop on market street, in which the main characters are both african american. such books invite their readers to identify with these characters and to explore cultures that may not be familiar to them. another wonderful example is julian is a mermaid (2018) by jessica love that features a young latino boy who likes to dress up in beautiful clothes and his understanding grandmother supports his choices. these recent picture books point to a trend that will defang any criticism of picture books based on the absence of non-caucasian characters. in response to these criticisms from the lipmanians, we suggest that these philosophers betray an inability to come to terms with the wonderful illustrations that grace the pages of picture books. it seems inconceivable that anyone who has read books by dr. seuss (theodore geisel) and looked at his wildly imaginative drawings could think that a child’s imagination would be stunted by seeing the image of a star bellied sneetch or the cat in a hat.15 the same holds good for the delightful images that grace where the wild things are by maurice sendak. it makes more sense to see such images as stimulating children’s imaginations rather than hindering them. 13 toni morrison’s the bluest eye (new york: vintage, 1970) captures the alienation experienced by a young african american girl who longs to be like the dolls she desires: blue-eyed and blond. that is offered to her as ideal beauty and ideal personhood and excludes her from that experience of being valued and being loved. 14 there are many contemporary picture books that feature non-white protagonists, so the force of this objection has been blunted by developments within picture books themselves. we discuss some of them in a moment. 15 the fact that some of dr. seuss’ books have racist pictures does not affect our claims about his work in general. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 100 recently, darren chetty has offered a new criticism of the use of some picture books.16 while he does not attempt to undermine the use of picture books tout court, he is concerned that certain picture books don’t provide children with an adequate understanding of important and complex issues such as the nature of race and racism. he expresses concern that they might trivialize or dismiss such important and nuanced issues. among his targets are murris and haynes’ use of david mckee’s tusk tusk in their classic text, picture books, pedagogy, and philosophy.17 murris and haynes think the abstract and decontextualized nature of this book allows children to develop an understanding of racism. the black and white elephants in the story fight one another and eventually kill each other off. their grey offspring return from the forest to which they have fled, only to find themselves hostile to the other elephants who do not have the same size ears as they do. because this story avoids providing any specific historical or social context, haynes and murris think it allows for a good philosophical discussion of the nature of racism. chetty disagrees. he thinks that the abstract nature of the story presents a skewed understanding of racism according to which racism is an inherent feature of human beings (and, we suppose, elephants). but this view is clearly false. chetty argues that we need to use books with more culturally specific and nuanced content if we hope to have adequate discussions of racism with children. murris responds by reasserting the validity of using books that do not have clear social and cultural contexts. i argue…that it is indeed the abstractness (independence of history) of the concepts embedded in such picture books that connect with children’s own ideas and interests and therefore challenges adult-centered ontology and epistemology. enquiries with children about the meaning of abstract concepts make it possible for adults to hear young children’s metaphorical, imaginative, and philosophical contributions to the pool of knowledge.18 murris is critical of chetty for assuming that he knows what the appropriate theory of racism is and attempting to get children to come to accept it. a discussion shaped by an adult’s conception of what the outcome should be for children fails to grant children the autonomy that is the proper goal of philosophical discussions. in an article entitled “philosophical dialogues with children about complex social issues: a debate about texts and practices,”19 steve williams recounts chetty’s critique of haynes and murris use of the picturebook tusk tusk that we have just discussed. chetty claims that this is a good example of a complex topic reduced to simplicity and that using such a story to teach racial peace is both 16 cheety, d. “the elephant in the room: picturebooks, philosophy for children and racism” childhood & philosophy, v. 10, 2014, number 19, pps. 11-31. 17 haynes, joanna and murris, karin, picturebooks, pedagogy, and philosophy, pp. 115-16. 18 karin murris, “posthumanism, philosophy for children, and anthony browne’s little beauty,” bookbird (2015) 53.2, p. 60. 19 childhood & philosophy, july 2020, pp. 3-28. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 101 inappropriate and falsifies the complexity of these societal issues.20 chetty argues that, to the contrary, one must “read against” the text. as williams parses this criticism:21 chetty’s argument seems to be that it is not likely that children’s picture books alone, particularly in the form of fables, can present this level of complexity and “blending.” i take him to imply that other kinds of picture books and alternative materials-or combination of materials-might be more suitable for exploring complex social issues with historical dimensions. williams goes on to critique murris’ recent position on picture books. as he describes it, murris maintains that picture books are the ideal and perhaps only way for introducing children to philosophizing. she seems to want to avoid contextualizing stories in time, culture, and place, and make the locus of philosophical activity the matrix of “text, educator, and learners.”22 williams builds an argument which acknowledges the concerns raised by chetty about either simplifying complex phenomena and ideas or de-historicizing them but stops short of rejecting the use of such books in philosophical discussions. he suggests that books such as tusk tusk can be used so long as they are supplemented with other materials from non-fiction as well as fictionalized accounts set in specific historical and social contexts. he offers a book by jaqueline woodson, the other side, as an example of a book that is located in a very specific social context, namely the deep south during segregation. the two girls in the story overcome the “rules” set by their mothers in a way that suggests that children are not bound by the same racist norms that affect their parents. williams continues by offering concrete suggestions on how a facilitator might “read against the text.” this would involve inviting evaluative judgements, questioning implied and imbedded concepts (for example, sharing is good in the rainbow fish and hatred is natural in tusk tusk), and using carefully constructed reflective dialogues, both within and without the group setting. implicit throughout williams’ article is the critical point that philosophical dialogue and exploration of problematic concepts does not automatically happen. without guidance, for facilitators and from facilitators to participants, these tools of philosophical dialogue can fail or perhaps even become tools of indoctrination. this speaks to one of our central concerns about using children’s literature and picture books for philosophical dialogue. will the teacher/facilitator be able to envision the ways in which the text and image can be used to engage in a genuine philosophical exploration but also be able to allow the children to raise unexpected questions and issues? if the facilitator has the tools to approach children’s literature in ways which create a philosophical community of inquiry, then there is no reason, and perhaps every reason, to include picture books and familiar works of children’s literature in the p4c canon. 20 ibid., p. 6. 21 ibid., p. 7. 22 ibid., p. 11. however, based on her recent writings, we would expect she would be careful to not in any way imply that the educator has any privileged position in the dialogue. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 102 2. a survey of the use of picture books for philosophical discussion despite the admonition of lipman and his followers not to use picture books in elementary school philosophy discussions, many practitioners—the two of us included—have ignored this warning and found picture books to be an excellent way to introduce young students to the practice of philosophy. in their recent article, khosronejad and shokrollahzadeh trace the changing relationship between the picture book and philosophy for children, practitioners, and theorists. they offer a helpful tour of how children’s literature has been incorporated into philosophy classes with children in a variety of different ways; but they also critique what they see as missed opportunities. early on gareth matthew used familiar children’s stories like the frog and toad readers to explore rich philosophical topics like friendship, loyalty, and self-image.23 david kennedy has used the beatrix potter stories about peter rabbit to likewise engage children into thoughtful and extensive conversations.24 the two authors also discuss how thomas wartenberg developed an entire approach to doing p4c using only examples from children’s literature. their main interest, however, is to investigate the extent to which the images in picture books are themselves taken to be objects suitable for philosophical inquiry. they label matthews and wartenberg as instrumentalist since they see them as focusing solely on the storyline itself, paying insufficient attention to the images and the story they might tell on a parallel or even conflicting track. they do acknowledge that kennedy encourages the viewing of the pictures as a catalyst for discussion but stops short, they argue, in actually exploring the holistic relationship between word and image in the picture book genre. they wish to suggest that the nature of a picture book is multivalent and needs an articulated and systematic exploration of how the text and images work together to offer opportunities for philosophical reflection. it is not clear what the charge of instrumentalism amounts to. the philosophers who are criticized as instrumentalists were not seeking to develop a philosophical account of picture books—a philosophy of the picture book, if you will—but only to use the books to get children involved in philosophical discussions. in practice both of us have included the visual images as part of the philosophical project. khosronejad and shokrollahzadeh appear to conflate their own interest in developing an account of the nature of picture books that focuses on the interplay of text and image with the use of such books to teach children philosophy. murris and hayes are two practitioners who have been using picture books successfully for many years and their own account of how these imaged texts “work” in a philosophical dialogue has grown and evolved over the decades. khosronejak and shokrollahzadeh are particularly complimentary of their approach as well as their criticism of lipman’s disavowal of these stories: the reasons why murris and haynes have found contemporary picturebooks rich materials for philosophizing are that they bend, stretch or break the rules (39); open up space 23 see, for example, matthews, the philosophy of childhood (cambridge, ma: harvard university press, 1994), pp. 104-05. 24 david kennedy, “using ‘peter rabbit’ as a philosophical text with young children,” analytic teaching, 13 (1992), pp. 53-58 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 103 between the “real” world and other possible worlds which encourages a free exploration of philosophical ideas; employ postmodern devices that disturb the reader’s expectations; and hold up a mirror for the adult, encouraging a self-critical stance.25 in recent writings, murris has adopted a posthuman stance which seeks to disrupt binaries at all levels. particularly troubling to her are those binaries associated with developmental theory about children and any distinction between adult/child that might be seen as privileging the adult and his/her perspective. her critical focus is on the over-rationalization of the lipman approach as well as what she sees as an imposition of adult ideas onto children, thereby disenfranchising them from owning their own ideas, as we discussed earlier. other approaches to the use of picture books were developed in england by robert fisher, roger sutcliff, steve williams, and peter worley. these thinkers share an embracing of the picture book genre along with children’s literature in general but with a more “analytical” bent. in their review of fisher’s work, khosronejak and shokrollahzadeh put him in the camp with murris and haynes but we would suggest he, and the others mentioned here, are not in the postmodern tradition (an oxymoron?) of decentering all dialogue. khosronejak and shokrollahzadeh do note that fisher’s attention to literary theory opens up a door for cross-fertilization from literary studies and they welcome this as a way to plumb the depths of the image/text relationship. they ultimately argue for an alternative way of considering children’s literature as offering opportunities for philosophical reflection that have moved way beyond the limits of the lipman novels. one point on which they are quite insistent is the recentering of the image in picture books to explore precisely how illustrations (from cover to title page to the end cover) function as narratives in their own right. we offer an example of what this might mean. in boodil, my dog (1992), a delightful picture book by pija lindenbaum, the young girl who narrates the story of her amazing bull terrier sings his praises and touts all of his virtues: courage, steadfastness, curiosity, and joy. however, the illustrations raise serious doubts as to the stellar and brilliant nature of boodil and the humor they involve is not lost on child or adult. the reader sees the real boodil while the child narrator sees her dog through the lens of love. this contradiction between the content of the written text and the meaning of the illustrations can be used by the facilitator to get children to see how the images and the text can function in tandem in a variety of ways.26 many stories include a whimsical use of pictures to suggest such a second narrative as a supportive and enhancing account of the verbal story or perhaps even a sub/contra-text. as a result, you can use the images themselves as a parallel track for philosophical inquiry. khosronejak and shokrollahzadeh champion this multifaceted way to engage with pictures/text. among the questions that would result from such a focus are: why did the illustrator choose just that event or depiction to include? how does a picture take us beyond the written text to suggest questions, ideas, humor? we suggest that many of the advocates of picture books reviewed by khosronejak and shokrollahzadeh in 25 op cit., pp. 14-15. 26 for another example, see turgeon’s article, “deconstructing the artistic impulse through an examination of david wiesner’s art and max,” analytical teaching and philosophical praxis, vol. 37, no. 2, july 2017, p.36-40. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 104 practice do include discussion of the images in the books as seeds for philosophical inquiry with the children. 3. difficulties involved in using picture books having given a quick survey of the inclusion of picture books to initiate philosophy discussions, we now turn to a range of criticisms that have been put forward about using picture books in this way, specifically by parents and teachers. their concerns may connect to some of lipman’s original ones. most teachers at the pre-college levels are not themselves well versed in philosophy, its concepts, and tools of analysis. using children’s literature may be difficult without a lot of support, either in terms of guiding documents that highlight potential philosophical avenues for discussion or the presence of an experienced p4c practitioner who can help shape the dialogue, along with the teacher.27 the stories while rich in potential, may lack the sequencing of ideas and the building of schema whereas stories written specifically for philosophical dialogue are created to do this. ann gazzard has criticized wartenberg on precisely this point.28 the difficulty that teachers may experience using picture books may result in their reverting to the more familiar use of the stories in a typical language arts manner: as reading exercises, vocabulary builders, and yes, pleasurable entertainment, rather than as springboards for philosophical discussions that can legitimately take the group beyond the story altogether. the great books program is structured in a way that any comment or analysis of the text by the participants must be grounded in the text itself and is highly controlled by the facilitator. philosophy for children, on the other hand, seeks to develop discussions that move away from the text in order to explore where the ideas themselves lead. another challenge for teachers is letting go of the control they are used to having in their classrooms. one of the basic tenets of philosophy for children is to let the children determine the direction the discussion is to take. the idea is to encourage the children to explore their own ideas through interactions with their peers. in order to do this, the teacher needs to be self-effacing, that is, they must refrain from putting their own ideas into the mix or shutting down an avenue of inquiry because it was not what they had planned. there remains a strong role for them as the discussion’s facilitator, but the idea that the children can generate “the lesson” may rest uneasy on them in these times of accountability. this is a departure from the standard way in which teachers normally interact with their students. in addition, since many teachers lack philosophical background, they are put in a position of teaching a subject about which they lack specialized knowledge. this can be difficult and represents a real challenge and perhaps frustration to teachers. one of the advantages of the traditional lipman curricular materials is that it provides a clear path for teachers to recognize the philosophical potential 27 see wendy c. turgeon, “the place of ‘philosophy’ in preparing teachers to teach pre-college philosophy—notes for a conversation”, analytic teaching and philosophical praxis, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 68-74. 28 ann gazzard, “do you need to know philosophy to teach philosophy to children? a comparison of two approaches,” analytic philosophy and philosophical praxis, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 45-53. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 105 in the novels, provides examples of ways that can engage their students, and a solid method of the community of inquiry. another potential problem raised by using classic children’s stories is that such stories are often didactically constructed to teach lessons. many of the grimms brothers’ fairy tales end with a cautionary admonition to follow the rules. the dangers little red riding hood faces are caused by her talking with a stranger—the wolf—against her parents’ warning and charles perrault ends his version with a very pointed warning to young ladies to beware of those wolves who often resemble nice young men. as a result, teachers using such works may see their role as getting their students to all agree on a moral, such as that “honestly is the best policy” or “sharing is always the right thing to do.” or consider a picture book, the rainbow fish, that is hugely popular both because of the beautiful images and the inclusion of holographic scales on the fish. the real interest teachers have in this book is its ability to teach children that sharing is always desirable. but there are many problematic aspects to this particular story. should the fish be asked to share part of himself? when we are all the same, is that so desirable? is this the communist manifesto in disguise? unless the teacher is well prepared to problematize a story, they might quite normally revert to seeing stories as teaching moral lessons. although that might be useful in some contexts, it is not the open inquiry philosophy for children wants children to participate in. of course, this is precisely where the notion of reading against the text (or “grain”) gains traction. a skilled teacher can ask the children if they agree with what the book says about sharing, initiating a discussion of the virtues and limitations of sharing.29 the problems we have just canvased make us aware that using picture books for elementary school philosophy discussions is not without its problems. but we still join the advocates for picture books as a useful means for getting young children excited about and conversant with philosophical topics. we turn now to some suggestions for minimizing the problems we have just see in the use of picture books. 4. picture book philosophy: a positive account we believe that teachers who want to use picture books to introduce philosophy to their students do not face insurmountable challenges. since teachers are required to use some picture books in their classroom, this method of teaching philosophy relies on materials that the teachers are familiar with, even if they are not used to teaching those texts in the way that we are recommending. the use of such stories might render the activity of philosophical dialogue as more readily integrated into the existing curriculum. there are no reasons why teachers need to feel that picture books are not appropriate to use to teach philosophy. 29 see claudia mills, “slave morality in the rainbow fish,” in philosophy in children's literature, edited by peter costello, (lanham, md: lexington books, 2012), pp. 21-40. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 106 one important fact to remain aware of is that a teacher’s knowledge of philosophy is not something that is set in stone forever. although a teacher may be able to begin teaching philosophy without having a great deal of previous knowledge, they will generally acquire a better understanding of philosophy through facilitating discussions in their classrooms. philosophical knowledge is therefore not a possession that a teacher has that is set once and for all; we need to treat philosophical knowledge as something that is acquired through a dynamic process. there are a wide range of materials that teachers can use to acquire greater knowledge of philosophy in general and of the more specific issues raised by a particular book. in the book that he wrote to help teachers use picture books, big ideas for little kids: teaching philosophy through children’s literature, wartenberg includes discussions of the philosophy contained in eight picture books that are suitable for use with young children. the idea is to provide teachers with enough philosophical background that they will be comfortable facilitating discussions of abstract concepts. in addition, his website—teachingchildrenphilosophy.org—presents both a short discussion of the philosophy contained in the more than 150 picture books featured as well as questions to use to initiate a philosophy discussion in their classrooms. in a relatively old article,30 turgeon outlines ways that teachers and professional philosophers can craft manuals to accompany works of children’s literature. and with the expansion of new materials for doing philosophy with children, one can find a wealth of support material and new ideas from scholars around the world. in her recent book, philosophical adventures with fairy tales,31 she provides support both in terms of suggestions for philosophical themes and techniques to use to promote philosophical enquiry. there are also websites, such as that of the international council for philosophical inquiry with children, that can offer information about theory and practice.32 and the plato site can likewise provide valuable support for teachers and parents. 33 teachers are not limited to materials expressly designed for philosophy for children sessions. there are many books that are available to introduce philosophy to the general public. the “for beginners” and the oxford short guide series, for example, attempt to make philosophy accessible to a wide range of people, not just college students. teachers may find these helpful in providing them with the background they feel they need in order to facilitate philosophy discussions in their classrooms. the world wide web has also made it very easy to access useful information. in addition to wartenberg’s website,34 there are many sites dedicated to introducing people to philosophy. in addition, many college and university philosophy home pages provide links to websites that introduce philosophy to non-philosophers. 30 turgeon, wendy. “developing philosophical manuals for children’s literature,” philosophy for children on top of the world: proceedings of the eight international conference on philosophy with children, hreinn palsson, brynhildur sigurdardottir, and barbara b. nelson (editors,) 1997. 31 turgeon, wendy c. philosophical adventures with fairy tales, lanham, md, rowman & littlefield: 2020. 32 see https://www.icpic.org/our-research/ for links to materials and new publications. 33 see https://www.plato-philosophy.org/ 34 see the updated version: https://www.prindleinstitute.org/teaching-children-philosophy/ about:blank about:blank analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 107 all of this suggests that a teacher interested in using picture books to teach philosophy has many resources available to them that can make their job easier. while they can easily begin to teach philosophy with only a minimum amount of preexisting knowledge, they have many options for developing their philosophical understanding. although getting some training in how to teach philosophy might be ideal, teachers who don’t have access to such courses can nonetheless acquire the knowledge they need by using the materials we have just outlined. indeed, plato might be able to put them in touch with an experienced mentor who can guide them in their own mastering of both philosophy and philosophical dialogue. the main points we wish to emphasize are: 1. a teacher’s store of philosophical knowledge is constantly developing as they use picture books with their students. even if they begin with only a passing acquaintance with philosophy, they stand to develop more knowledge through their classroom activities. they will experience the excitement and pleasure of thinking along with their students about the big ideas. 2. there are many resources teachers can avail themselves of to gain greater acquaintance with philosophical theories and ideas. while these may not be necessary for a teacher as she begins to introduce philosophy into her classroom, they are there for them to use as they feel the need and can be invaluable to make them more confident in noting philosophy when it appears in the comments of their students. 3. there is likewise lots of support for teachers on methods for forming a philosophical community of inquiry and tools to use to engage students in active philosophical explorations. as a result, we do not believe that the problems that teachers face as they introduce philosophy into their classrooms are insurmountable. they can use picture books without feeling that they lack the appropriate background for guiding a philosophical discussion. we have not yet discussed some of the advantages of using picture books for philosophy discussions. a primary one is the delight that children have in being read aloud to. many adults find abstract discussion of philosophy topics dull and uninteresting. when a topic is introduced through a picture book, however, the children have already been prepared to find the discussion interesting. consider the following: essentialism is the doctrine that every object has a set of properties that it cannot lose and still be the same thing that it is. in order for something to be a knife, for example, it has to be able to cut, for that’s what knives do. but you could paint the handle of a knife, changing it from black to red, say, without affecting the object being a knife. while the ability to cut might be an essential property of a knife, having a black handle is not. asking children to say whether they believe that objects have essential properties is not likely to peak their interest. but asking the same question after reading margaret wise brown’s the important book is likely to have a different result. that’s because the list of “important things” (a.k.a. essential properties) of things like the sky and rain presented in the book are so obviously flawed that students are excited to criticize the book. using a picture book like this gives the children entrance into a analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 108 genuine philosophical topic by presenting problematic examples for them to discuss through the engaging lens of a narrative. the fact that you can begin a philosophical discussion by asking a question about a picture book’s narrative means that children are slowly introduced to the abstract level of discussion necessary for philosophy.35 when discussing the frog and toad story “dragons and giants,” for example, you might begin by asking the children whether they thought frog and toad were brave despite the fact that they are trembling from their adventures climbing a mountain. this is a question that employs a philosophical “big idea,” i.e. bravery, but only in the specific context of the story. instead of starting out by asking an abstract question—can someone be brave and scared at the same time?—a philosophical discussion of a picture book starts much more concretely, thereby enabling students to see how the abstract questions that preoccupy philosophers are rooted in experiences that they themselves have encountered. of course, you might discover that the children want to go in a completely different direction from the one you suggest. but this only reveals the power of encouraging children to question and explore ideas that interest them. conclusion in this paper, we have considered a range of objections to using picture books to teach elementary-school children philosophy. we have seen that these objections are not fully justified, that there is no reason for educators to avoid picture books in their philosophy lessons. at the same time, we have explored an alternative method for teaching philosophy to young children, namely using novels specifically designed for this purpose. once again, a range of objections has been canvassed. while we do not think that these objections are completely convincing, we see no reason to prefer philosophical novels to published children’s literature as a means of introducing the young to philosophy. children as well as most adults find picture books imaginative and intriguing. for this reason, they are a good resource to use to introduce them to philosophy. despite a history of questioning the inclusion of such books from some philosophy for children practitioners, we hope to have shown that these wonderful books can be an exciting resource in the elementary-school philosophy classroom. address correspondences to: wendy turgeon professor and chair of philosophy, st. joseph college, long island, ny. email: turgeon@optonline.net thomas wartenberg professor of philosophy emeritus, mount holyoke college, south hadley, ma. email: twartenb@mtholyoke.edu 35 if we are honest, are adults any different? the power of movies and stories in general is that they invite us to reflect on the big ideas through a concrete situation. but adults quickly come to a realization that fiction like shakespeare’s king lear, the movie a few good men, and virginia woofe’s the waves are about far more than a myopic king, soldiers following orders, and a group of people aging. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 38 teaching philosophy and doing philosophy in the space of play larisa retyunskikh introduction ear friends, i am a professor of philosophy and have been teaching philosophy more than 30 years. in 1992, i started to do philosophy with children using my own methods. i had known nothing about lipman’s curriculum. i based my method only on my university experience and philosophical education, trying to do something unofficial and useful for children. that’s how “philosophical games for children and adults” appeared. it was my first program in philosophy with children. when i discovered lipman’s work and the world practice in p4c, i was surprised by the very similar points of our programs despite some differences. i started to use lipman’s term, “doing philosophy” as opposed to “teaching philosophy.” the differences and similarities between both of these pedagogical practices became clear to me as i worked with university students and with children. what’s the basic platform of deference between doing philosophy and teaching philosophy? i believe that it is the difference between the philosophical styles of socrates and plato. i will try to make that argument in what is to follow. it is traditional “to do philosophy” in p4c and other forms of practical philosophy, and “to teach philosophy” at university and high school. there are many cross-points between doing and teaching philosophy, but the main cross-point is “philosophizing.” if we present philosophical concepts to our students, we give them the result of great philosophers’ philosophizing. if we involve our student in philosophizing, we make them “philosophers.” who is a philosopher? in my mind he or she is a person who looks for wisdom (motivation); who could be surprised (the pushing); who thinks reflexively (the way). in other words, philosophizing is a process of thinking, and philosophical concepts are a result of philosophizing. i understand philosophizing as a certain way of thinking. i do not take the age differences into account. if philosophizing is a way of thinking it could be used by grown-up as well as by children. from this perspective, any person who starts philosophizing becomes a “philosopher”, one who is interested in the essence of things. another point is that philosophizing is a kind of play, like “language games,” which was suggested by wittgenstein. we will explore play and language games in what is to follow. d analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 39 1. doing philosophy and teaching philosophy 1.1. philosophy and philosophizing the epistemological status of philosophizing can be defined by comparing it to the term “philosophy,” which could be understood widely. for example: • all learning exclusive of the technical • pursuit of wisdom • search for general understanding of values and reality by chiefly speculative means, an analysis of the grounds and concepts expressing fundamental beliefs • a system of philosophical concepts • a theory underlying or regarding a sphere of activity or thought • the most general beliefs, concepts and attitudes of an individual or group • knowledge of things and their causes, whether theoretical or practical • the system which a person forms for the conduct of life • research into mysteries • art of questioning this is a very short list of existing definitions of philosophy. the term “philosophy” is often used in a synonymic way with the term “metaphysics,” coming from aristotelian philosophy. so, the main topic of kant’s “critique of pure reason” is the possibility of metaphysics, understood in a specific way. kant defines metaphysics in terms of “the cognitions after which reason might strive independently of all experience,” and his goal in the book is to reach a “decision about the possibility or impossibility of a metaphysics in general, and the determination of its sources, as well as its extent and boundaries, all, however, from principles” (kant 1998, p. 101). kant’s position is based on the certainty that philosophy could only be looking for the truth, but it will never reach the truth. that is why there are many philosophies, and none of them is correct. so, how can we teach philosophy? if every philosophy gives us an original world view and we will never recognize any of them as a true theory, it seems to follow that we should never ask students what they know as the correct answer, but, rather, we can ask them what they think. this could be characterized as turning from teaching philosophy to doing philosophy. kant adds that the philosophical writer, or teacher of philosophy is not to be regarded as the paradigm of judgement but he/she “should be taken as the occasion for forming the student’s own judgement. what the pupil is really looking for is proficiency in the method of reflecting and drawing inferences for himself” (kant 2015, p. 107). so, the nature of philosophy is different from other types of knowledge; in philosophy there is no common standard for following ideas one by one. that is why kant supposed that we could not teach philosophy, but that we could teach philosophizing. he made a distinction between philosophy and philosophizing. philosophy is opinion, and philosophizing is a way of founding it. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 40 let us compare. teaching philosophy doing philosophy 1. translate information about philosophy and philosophers 1. thinking together 2 the way of development is evolution and increase of knowledge 2. the way of development is evolution of cognitive skills: questioning, conceptualizing, interpreting, analyzing 3. the result of development is knowledge 3. the result of development is “good thinking” 4.the way of evaluation: student have correct information about the subject (objective criteria) 4.the way of evaluation: (subjective criteria) certainly, the above is a very simplified outline of differences, but it allows us to see the problem in the sphere of philosophical education. what do you want to do as a new philosophy teacher? if you want your students to know the names of philosophers and learn by memory some aphorisms and to remember the main texts, then you are closer to “teaching philosophy.” if you want them to think philosophically, then you need to help them to “do philosophy.” doing philosophy has a background in our mind. if we believe kant, we should recognize the existence of “metaphysical addiction” which pushes us to find answers to eternal questions, such as: what is freedom? what is knowledge? what is god? if all of us have a metaphysical addiction, it seems to follow that everyone can be a philosopher, that everyone has the possibility to philosophize. karl popper makes a similar claim when he says “all men and all women are philosophers” (2012, p. 17). if people are not conscious of having philosophical problems, they have, at any rate, philosophical prejudices. most of these are theories which they take for granted: they have absorbed them from their intellectual environment or from tradition. since few of these theories are consciously held, they are prejudices in the sense that they are held without critical examination, even though they may be of great importance for the practical actions of people, and for their whole life (popper 2012, p. 17). so, according to popper there are two criteria to being a philosopher, which allow everybody to be one: philosophical prejudices, and thoughts about life and death. let us think of the difference between having a philosophy and doing philosophy. virtually everyone "has a philosophy" in the sense that we have many basic beliefs about the world and ourselves and use certain key concepts to articulate those beliefs. many of us initially come to thus "have a philosophy" (or elements of several philosophies) often only unconsciously, or by following analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 41 "what's obvious" or "what everybody knows", or by adopting a view because it sounds exciting or is intellectually fashionable. "doing philosophy," on the other hand, is a self-conscious unearthing and rigorous examination of these basic beliefs and key concepts. in doing so, we try to clarify the meanings of those beliefs and concepts and to evaluate critically their rational grounds or justification. thus, rather than having their heads in the clouds, philosophers are really more under the surface of their thinking, examining the structures that support – or fail to support – that thinking. 1.2. philosophizing as a kind of thinking philosophizing is always thinking, but thinking is not always philosophizing. what kind of thinking is philosophical thinking? based on kant’s and popper’s ideas we may say that it is thinking (a) “about” and thinking (b) “by”: (a) about life and death, love and hate, happiness and unhappiness, justice and injustice, and so on. in other words, it is about traditional philosophical concepts. for example, if i think about my morning exercises trying to choose the best ones, i stay in an everyday life thinking space. if i start to think of why i need them? for health. what is it? why it is important to be healthy? what does it mean to be healthy? – i jump into philosophizing, because the object of my thinking is a common thing. (b) by philosophical skills: argumentation, interpretation, conceptualization, questioning and others. for example, it is not enough to say that all people want to be happy, i need to give rational arguments, based on knowledge, understanding, and vision returning to kant let us remember his famous essay “what is enlightenment?” enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-imposed nonage. nonage is the inability to use one's own understanding without another's guidance. this nonage is self-imposed if its cause lies not in lack of understanding but in indecision and lack of courage to use one's own mind without another's guidance. dare to know! (sapere aude.) "‘have the courage to use your own understanding,’ is therefore the motto of the enlightenment” (kant (1999). p. 11). so, the aim of philosophizing is to make a person capable of having a philosophy, to be free in choosing his or her own position. “teaching philosophy” could be defined as understanding, with another's guidance. only “doing philosophy” gives a human the possibility of using one's own mind without another's guidance. 1.3. what about truth? philosophizing is always existing in the space of language, like all other human intellectual activity. the classical tradition of thinking requires strong compliance between terms and concepts. this compliance establishes relations of identity between terms and concepts when it comes to definitions and finding analogies. however, the practice of human reasoning and cognition is far from the ideal image created by classical science and philosophy. in my mind, it is consistent with the transformation of the concepts of truth through the ages. for philosophers from ancient times to the present day the truth either exists or does not exist, but it does deal with objective reality. descartes, for example, deeply believed in the truth. kant supposed it was limited by knowledge but quite real analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 42 too. even those philosophers who declared the impossibility of reaching the truth (berkeley and others) perceive the truth like a reality. modern philosophy tends to discuss the problem of the truth in the context of thinking and language. for wittgenstein, for example, the truth is only a language construction which could be called a game. close to the position about the truth we find in postmodern philosophy (jacques derrida, michel foucault, jean-françois lyotard, richard rorty and others). in this way of understanding the truth, we put it into the language and claim the position of relativity of the truth, which means the full freedom of opinions about every concept. this kind of mental orientation gives us the wild space of philosophizing, using philosophy not for finding the truth but for making ourselves. in my opinion, this position is closer to the everyday practice of thinking. we do not use strict analogies to understand and explain something. language creates many forms of understanding and explaining the processes and phenomena around and inside us. philosophizing is aimed at understanding reality by language. doing philosophy, we try to make the meaning of words clearer. when teaching philosophy, we interpret the words of philosophical texts and try to make a philosopher’s thinking clearer. philosophical thinking, as i said before, is immersed in language and all our definitions and philosophical issues are founded in language with language games as wittgenstein called them (wittgenstein, 1958a, p.32). language games are the way of creating language as it is, according to wittgenstein. why is it a game? in my opinion, it is a game because there is no one single way of speaking, understanding and thinking, there are no strong rules of interpretation because language creates the reality of meaning, which often does not correlate with physical reality and always includes an element of imagination. language games are skills of understanding in the context of philosophizing. “and this is true. – instead of producing something common to all that we call language, i am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all, – but that they are related to one another in many different ways. and it is because of this relationship, or these relationships, that we call them all ‘language’” (wittgenstein. 1958, p. 31). 1.4. philosophy for children when talking about philosophizing as a type of thinking it is important to remember lipman’s term “good thinking”. it is very close to the term philosophizing with a focus on the quality of thinking. philosophy for children (p4c) is one of the philosophical practices aimed at the development of good thinking. in lipman’s opinion, good thinking is the aim of education and critical and creative thinking are indispensable parts of good thinking (lipman 2003). he wrote: “as we urge to ‘teach for thinking’ we cannot lose sight of the fact that what we have in mind is good thinking. but how do we identify good thinking?” (lipman1995, pp. 37-41). he further suggests that criteria of good thinking involve judgment, reasoning, being strong, relevant and reliable. another marker of good thinking is the ability to question. by asking questions, the child learns to design the concrete concepts connected with the development of the subject world by means of the language of concepts, senses and abstraction. a very important marker of good thinking is reflexivity. as we see it is quite difficult (if not impossible) to define accurately the concept of good thinking. we could only describe it by some of its characteristics (e.g., logical, creative, open, etc.), making specific semantic space of good thinking as lipman did. good thinking could be described as philosophizing, which has not only rational but irrational components. about:blank#jacques_derrida about:blank#jacques_derrida about:blank#michel_foucault about:blank#jean-fran%c3%a7ois_lyotard about:blank#richard_rorty about:blank analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 43 the rational background of critical thinking is critical philosophy, as defined by kant. the critical way of thinking is not the way of negotiation, but the way of analyzing, and philosophy is the art of thinking but not the possibility of getting the truth. that is why he claims in the critique of pure reason that it is impossible to teach philosophy, as we said before. if it is only possible to teach philosophy in terms of “philosophizing,” – as a kind of training of our rationality – then teaching philosophy should be doing philosophy at the same time. 1.5. bringing “doing” into “teaching philosophy” if we have university or high school philosophy courses, then, we should combine them with information about philosophers and doing philosophy. every philosophical theory is a result of thinking of a philosopher. if we cannot involve students in this process of thinking together with studying a philosopher, we cannot help them to understand the main ideas and therefore to know them. for example, i can ask a student to describe building or creating a tree from the position of democritus’ atomistic theory. it is also interesting to introduce philosophical debates from the middle ages to inform students about traditional philosophical problems from the standpoint of nominalists or realists, using not only the arguments employed by these traditions but also inviting students to create new ones. or one could divide the class in two teams and start a debate focused on a topic, like: how many angels will fit on the tip of the needle? debates like this can be a good exercise for the training of argumentation. one should have strong guidelines for these types of activity, like in every game. this kind of activity can be useful, informative and fun. the next example. this exercise could be used in a university course as well as p4c. it is possible to present the topic of socrates to every age and discuss the problem of justice. one can introduce the problem as follows: how can you identify – what is just and what is not? for example, a man has stolen a loaf of bread and was imprisoned – is it just? what if he has stolen the bread because he could not buy bread to feed a hungry child? can one and the same thing be just and unjust simultaneously? if we take war – is it just? does what is “just” and what is “right” define the same thing? two students can read plato’s text about justice, each playing a different role: socrates. tell me, please, what do you feel is just: to tell the truth or to lie? a friend. of course, to tell the truth. socrates. then what is just: to mislead or to avoid it? a friend. for sure, to avoid misleading is just. socrates. later on, what is just – to do harm or to be helpful. a friend. to be helpful. socrates. consequently, to tell the truth, to avoid misleading and to be helpful is just, but to lie, to do harm and to mislead is unjust? a friend. undoubtedly! may zeus be with us! socrates. does the same apply to the enemies? the question becomes the first step of discussion. we ask students to give the answer (yes or no) and provide an argument. we write every argument on a piece of paper. after that, we ask somebody to make a classification of arguments. we work together to group the arguments into different types. then we organize a team for each group of arguments. every team is assigned the task analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 44 of continuing the dialogue and presenting it as a “new film about justice.” each participant could be an actor, producer, writer, etc. each group has a limited amount of time to complete the assignment. the lesson ends with the performance (dramatization) of the film. as you can see, this example connects cognitive, creative and moral aspects of philosophizing with the background of philosophical knowledge (plato’s dialogue on justice). the first step (questioning) is aimed at stimulating moral thinking. the second step (reading plato’s text) is aimed at demonstrating socrates’ method and stating the problem of justice. the third and fourth steps (argumentation and classification) are the elements of traditional logical work. the fifth step (creating), involves students forming their own concept of justice by making moral choices. all these kinds of thinking use the principle of family resemblances: we find out something in common in different scenes or aspects of the argument. we have no correct answer, but we nevertheless want to reason about our position. we can choose a different logic of thinking and defend what is common, so that we will have different families (perspectives) of the same things. thus, philosophizing can exist in many forms – in rational texts, essays, art, poems etc. we philosophize by looking for answers to our questions and testing the opinions of different people – philosophers, poets, children, just as socrates did. that is why, it seems to me that doing philosophy implies a socratic style of philosophy. let us remember that socrates never wrote anything and declared his lack of knowledge (i know that i know nothing). this is very different from plato. the latter wrote more than 30 books in which he presented his own philosophy with the certainty that it was a correct worldview. so, the platonic type of philosophy is based on knowledge, which could be transmitted to other people (teaching philosophy). but the socratic type is based on lack of knowledge – questioning (doing philosophy). but the irony of the situation is that plato wrote almost all his papers in dialogue form, with socrates as the main character, and almost all that we know about socrates we know from plato. it demonstrates the unity of teaching and doing philosophy one more time. it is a pity that there are people involved in philosophical practice or teaching philosophy who ignore one of these two sides. i have met p4c followers who have assumed the idea that i know that i know nothing belongs to lipman (rather than socrates) and that it had been initially presented by the character of elfie. at the same time, there are a lot of boring philosophy teachers at schools and universities who know about socrates but have never tried to use his methods. 2. philosophizing as a form of play philosophizing is a play with meanings or a game about concepts. take the classic example of a game: chess, football, poker, etc. what is a game? how do we decide if this is or is not a game? why is this a game but that is not? and so on. if these are all games, do we want to say that they must have something in common? is there anything in common between football and philosophy? but what would it be? if we try to make a definition or find out the background of our understanding, we will start to philosophize. that is what we do in the community of inquiry, we play with the meaning of words, and we exist in the “house of being” (as heidegger puts it) by way of language. 2.1. how can children philosophize analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 45 being in play is outside of daily, mundane being. philosophy has its root in everyday being, but raises our mind above it like play. the kinship of play and philosophy makes philosophy not a stranger in the world of childhood, where play is a total activity. every child is a player. all children create their own world in their minds with language. in this sense, every child is a creator, much like the classical demiurge of ancient philosophy who constructs the world by playing. so, children’s philosophizing is an organic process of the development of thinking. a child starts to live in language as a player. he or she asks many questions starting with “what does it mean?” they play with words like a footballer with a ball. if they find out a good meaning, they will try to save it as one might save the rules of a game. they create concepts. conceptcreating, according to gilles deleuze, is a philosophy. children are philosophers because they can recognize and feel meaning that could be called an “a priori way of understanding.” for instance, if we want to make something clear for ourselves and other people, we often say a magic word “like”. (“the sun is like an apple”; “the boy is like an angel”, etc.). we try to find resemblances in different things. the ability to see that correlation, even if the things are very different (e.g. computers and stones) is a marker of philosophical thinking. children do it easily because they do it while playing. play allows them to exceed the bounds of everyday life and explore reality. all children are creators. they construct their own world in their minds and imagination. children’s philosophizing is always a creative process. young children come into the world free of cultural and social stereotypes. in this sense, they are freer than most adults. that is why children’s philosophizing tends to be fresh, original, and imaginative. let us read some children’s statements. anastasia (9 years old): “freedom is when a man can live his own life, express his own thoughts” ksenia (11 years): “freedom is a feeling of absolute control over yourself”. serguei (14 years): “mind is the ability of a man not to repeat his mistake more than two times. the first time man understands he made a mistake, the second time he understands not to repeat it again”. what do we mean by the word “creativity”? creativity is the human ability to make something new, something that has not existed before. creativity is the condition of human rationality. in existentialism, creativity is understood as a display of human freedom. the famous russian philosopher nicolai berdyaev wrote in his book the sense of creativity, that human beings could exist in greatness and strength, as well as in nothingness and weakness only due to creativity. creativity is the basis of human freedom. creativity is not only an action, but also a feeling. a child feels him or herself as a creator, a demiurge philosophizing. he or she originates new senses of things via playing. so, children’s philosophizing can be more successful and creative when it comes in the form of playing. vygotsky’s idea of a high-level form of thinking, which develops together with language, allows us to realize the evaluation of thinking; it makes a person able to give an original, her or his own, solution for any problem. 2.2. how to connect doing philosophy and teaching philosophy in the space of play philosophizing is a unique form of thinking having rational and emotional foundations. that is why it can be realized in many ways, paradigms, and logical forms. if we teach students to think, we analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 46 need to understand why. philosophizing should not be transformed like in “the glass bead game” (hesse, 2002). it is needed for making choices and decisions. the most difficult choice of our life is a moral choice. thinking can help us to do it in harmonic unity with reason and feeling. so, to teach philosophy is not only to teach thinking but teach morality and choice. when talking of teaching morality, i do not mean giving strong rules of behavior. i mean only helping our students in making his/her own decision between good and evil. i suggest that my students read philosophical texts or quotes that deal with problems. it is not the presentation of a correct answer that is the focus but making a possibility for thinking. usually i give opposing ideas and ask students to compare them. this is the main difference between my approach and lipman’s principles of doing philosophy. i present the ideas of philosophers with their own names. i do not substitute the names of fictitious girls and boys. if, for example, we talk about an idea –i know that i know not nothing– i talk about socrates. in the process of doing philosophy i often include elements of teaching philosophy (information), and in process of teaching philosophy i usually use the skills of doing philosophy. example. this exercise could be done by teams of 5-6-persons, individually or in pairs, with a preparation time of between 5-10 minutes. the students are assigned the following task: 1) to choose a known literary work which illustrates a given thought (sometimes i can ask students to play a mute scene from it in such a way that others could understand the represented work, using the positive potential of role play). 2) to explain why that piece was selected and what it means. for example, what is kant trying to illustrate or explain when he claims: “the consciousness of an internal tribunal in a man (before which his thoughts accuse or excuse one another) is conscience. every man has a conscience, and finds himself observed by an inward judge which threatens and keeps him in awe…it follows him like his shadow, when he thinks to escape.” conclusion in summary, we should see philosophizing in general as a thought-provoking way of understanding the world, making personal choices and seeking meaning in life, all of which result from the stimulation of the mind. doing philosophy requires different skills. teaching philosophy allows us to be involved in the space of real culture and history. principles of doing and teaching philosophy are not in conflict but complement each other. it is for that reason that i believe that all p4c educators ought to have a sound philosophical background. references beck, a.t. (1975). cognitive therapy and the emotional disorders. madison, ct: international universities press, berdyaev, n. (2015) the philosophy of freedom. the meaning of the creative act. moscow: “akademichesky project, delovaya kniga.” hesse herman (2002) the glass bead game. picador (first published 1943). kant, i. (1998) critique of pure reason (eds. & trans. paul guyer and allen w. wood) cambridge: cambridge university press., kant i. (2015): critique of practical reason. 2nd edition. part of cambridge texts in the history of philosophy. kant immanuel (1999) "an answer to the question: what is enlightenment?". in mary j. gregor (ed.). practical philosophy. the cambridge edition of the works of immanuel kant. cambridge about:blank about:blank analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 47 university press. lipman m. (1995) good thinking. inquiry: an interdisciplinary journal of philosophy 1995 15 (2):37-41. lipman, m. (2003) thinking in education. cambridge: cambridge university press. popper k. (2012) in search of a better world: lectures and essays from thirty years. new york: routledge. wittgenstein, l. (1958) philosophical investigations (trans. g.e.m ascombe). oxford: basil blackwell. address correspondences to: professor larisa retyunskikh, faculty of philosophy moscow state university (named after lomonosov) retunlar@gmail.com about:blank about:blank contextualizing community of inquiry as a democratic educational environment within a wider view of other progressive educational approaches 63 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol.37, issue 1 (2016) contextualizing community of inquiry as a democratic educational environment within a wider view of other progressive educational approaches richard morehouse abstract: this paper takes a three-pronged approach to answering the question regarding the relationship between democracy and community of inquiry and other progressive pedagogies. first, a definition of a democratic educational environment will be provided within the larger context of democracy in general. next, i will explore a number of democratic educational environments within a community of inquiry framework. then, community of inquiry and dewey’s theory of democracy are examined together. this background leads to an overview of what a democratic community of inquiry looks like. i end by replaying the major themes of this paper. in its perfect sense, democracy “is not a fact and never will be.” nonetheless, without a guiding idea we would never engage in the work to eliminate the “restrictive and disturbing elements” which prevent a fuller flowering of democratic life. [citing john dewey in the public and its problems, 1927 (boisvert, 1998, p. 57)]. democracy as seen through dewey’s definition of freedom and equality his paper addresses three questions regarding democracy and community of inquiry: (1) what is democracy, (2) what constitutes a democratic educational environment, and (3) how are democracy and community of inquiry integrated. the discussion of democracy looks in some detail at liberty and equality. the last issue we will explore here examines other examples of democratic education and provides a closer examination of community of inquiry in theory and practice. perhaps the hardest of the three questions to answer relates to defining a democratic educational environment. within the definition of democratic educational environment, the term “democratic” is the one that is the most problematic. the reason for the difficulty is the complex and differing views of democracy itself. a way of beginning to address the joint problem of democracy and democratic education is by stipulating that democracy is defined as a process and not as a product, and maybe even more so as an ideal, something implied by dewey’s caveat regarding the definition of democracy, seen in the above quote. seeing democracy as a process serves two purposes. first, it narrows the definition of democracy making it an activity and therefore a more useful concept for understanding individuals and groups engaged within communities: local, regional, and national. second, democracy as a process and an ideal, as we will see later, is consistent with lipman’s (1980) understanding of a community of inquiry as an educational practice. thus, we can at least get at what is supposed to occur in a community of inquiry, even if not all individual elements actually do occur in all inquiries. t 64 democracy dewey sees democracy as primarily a mode of associated living (boisvert, 1998). this definition is essential to understanding the importance of both freedom and equality within a democratic society. briefly, democracy, according to dewey, is a way of living together that is characterized by a mutually created communication experience. “this means that the primary responsibility of democratic citizens is concern with the development of shared interests that lead to sensitivity about repercussions of actions on others” (boisvert, 1998, p. 57). dewey’s process definition is in contrast with the commonplace definition of democracy as a form of government, or legislative processes. dewey is not primarily concerned with democracy as a form of government. dewey is concerned with the way individuals live their daily lives in the company of others. it is from this deweyan perspective that we will examine democracy and community of inquiry. democracy as a process involving conjoint communication experiences is built on two pillars that support democracy as a process: freedom and equality. again, these concepts demand specific definitions. freedom and equality, from dewey’s perspective, are also defined as processes. these processes are not defined, however, in the typical way one would associate with discussions of democracy. freedom understanding john dewey’s key concepts of freedom and equality is essential to understanding what it means to act democratically and what the role of education is within a democracy. dewey examines freedom by re-visiting john locke. dewey argues that locke and other enlightenment writers, in arguing against the monarchy, saw the rest of the world as consisting of well-educated and privileged individuals much like themselves, rather than as the immigrant workers of the newly industrialized 19th century. what this meant in practice is that locke defined freedom as the lifting of constraints. from his perspective, as a well-educated, middle class professional, all one needs to be free was to lift the constraints of oppressive laws or oppressive rulers. however, this definition of freedom is limited to those who have certain abilities and who attain a certain status. dewey gives an example that i will paraphrase: if i speak english and french, all i need to be free to speak french is that there be no law that prevents me from using my language skills. however, if i speak only english, it is an empty statement to say that i am “free” to speak french. therefore, in addition to seeing freedom as the lifting of constraints, dewey also taught that freedom was related to growth. this conception of freedom as an ability that may be in need of development is essential to understanding dewey’s democracy (that is, a mode of associated living), and eventually to understanding democracy within a community of inquiry. freedom as a lack of constraints, according to dewey, was a simplistic concept that not only leads to a misunderstanding of democracy, but also, more importantly, to a misrepresentation of the human condition. dewey suggests that there is no such thing as a completed self who only requires the elimination of extraneous conditions to reveal a full and complete human being. rather, we are open-ended creatures, shaped and influenced by the cultures we inhabit, the languages we speak, and the relationships into which we enter. classic liberals, beginning with locke, were wrong to conceive of freedom as something that exists antecedently and can be made manifest by the simple removal of restrictions. rather, freedom is a capacity that may be developed through time and in conjunction with the aid of others. freedom as the growth in power of effective action cannot emerge in a context where 65 one is merely free from interference. indeed, increasing “effective” freedom often requires others (mentors, teachers, and colleagues) and, paradoxically, constraints in the form of discipline, effort, and practice (boisvert, 1998, p. 620). freedom is practiced where one has the skills needed to be free, to make choices, to act effectively on the world. to act on the world is not to act in isolation from others but in concert with others. freedom also requires sensitivity to the way our actions have repercussions on others. the reason we need to be sensitive to the way our actions affect others is because our actions also reflect back on ourselves. we are, after all, creatures who shape the culture we inhabit, the languages we speak, and the relationships we enter into. the shaping of the self is a process that takes place within a community; a community that is also shaped by many selves. dewey believed that the realization of a democratic life is a challenge requiring constant effort and attention. it cannot be reduced to the slogan “leave me alone.” instead of demanding a mere loosening of constraints, freedom requires self-scrutiny of our actions, especially the potential impact of what we do on fellow citizens. equality dewey has a unique understanding of equality, one that at first blush seems counterintuitive. dewey sees equality as a form of individuality. he points out that even casual observers will notice that we are not equal, either by birth or by position in society. further, if equality in its traditional meaning were to be achieved, it is not what most of us on reflection would wish for. a short story by kurt vonnegut, jr. called harrison bergeron provides an interesting case study for what that type of equality would mean in practice. vonnegut’s trop is to set his story around the rebellion of a ballet dancer required to wear heavy weights, in his case, very heavy weights, because he is extremely physically talented. these weights are intended to make him equal to all the other ballet dancers who are less talented. this fictional example points to why dewey does not advocate equality in the traditional sense of the word. dewey celebrated difference, uniqueness, a sort of inequality. what dewey criticized is a single standard to judge all individuals. in an open society that values equality we must, according to dewey, have a variety of measures for excellence, not one measure that we are all judged by. the idea of using only one standard of evaluation also works against our contemporary sense of identity as individuals and as groups or communities within the larger society. charles taylor in his essay called the “politics of recognition” (1992) argues that one of the main themes of western societies is the recognition of the “self’ as unique or equal in dewey’s sense of the word.1 consistent with dewey’s perspective, taylor argues that identity is formed in communication communities or in dialogue. “the genesis of the human mind is in this sense not monological, not something each person accomplishes on his or her own, but dialogical” (taylor, 1992, 32). the self is a creation of the community and not an individual act of volition. even though the self, the individual human mind, is created in dialogue, humans still strive for a sense of recognition as individuals and as members of unique groups. the demand for recognition ... is given urgency by the supposed links between recognition and identity, where this latter term designates something like a person’s understanding of who they are, of their fundamental defining characteristics as a human being. this thesis of identity is party shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them 66 a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves (taylor, 1992, p. 25). this desire for recognition (for individuals as well as for groups) is achieved by creating a system that values uniqueness. dewey calls this type of uniqueness “equality,” while taylor writes about dignity as his expression of recognition based on uniqueness and equality. to re-emphasize the point, equality correlates with difference. dewey’s perspective on equality is based on all individuals being members of communities. a community can only prosper if each member contributes to the community from her unique perspective with her unique abilities. to somewhat overstate the case, if we were all equal with regard to our talents and abilities, we would all make the same contribution to the community, severely limiting and weakening it. equality is a manner of regarding others, which refuses any absolute scale by which to judge them. people are equal in the sense that life offers multiple contexts within which to evaluate others. democratic equality is postulated on the denial of any single, a-temporal universal context for judgment (boisvert, 1998, p. 68). equality, like freedom, is a creation of community. it denotes effective regard for whatever is distinctive and unique in each, irrespective of physical and psychological inequality. equality is not a natural possession. rather it is a byproduct, that is, a fruit of the community that comes about through action directed by the character and quality of the community (boisvert, 1998, p. 68). neither freedom nor equality are given at birth, or even guaranteed by a legal system or a constitution except within large political bodies (e.g., national or provincial institutions). while constitutional and legal guarantees are essential for the workings of democratic governments, dewey is more concerned with democracy as practiced in communal settings from neighborhoods to community groups to individual classrooms. without democracy at these levels, democracy within a national context is empty; it is a sham. democratic educational environments given the above discussion of freedom and equality as essential elements of democracy, it follows that a democratic educational environment is one that promotes growth in freedom and equality. the key elements of a democratic classroom, then, is to encourage the training of students in freedom and equality. pupils may not need to learn explicitly the uses of these two key terms, but it may help teachers if they understand in their practice that pupils cannot be given freedom or equality directly; they must be prepared to assume them. a brief exploration of preparing for freedom might be in order. it is not too far out of line to think of freedom as an art. an art is “a skill at doing a specified thing, typically one acquired through practice” (apple dictionary, version 2.1.3 [80.4]). dewey views freedom in this light. is it possible to teach freedom in the classroom? to answer this question, we need to go back to our definition of freedom as the ability to act in one’s own interest while being aware of one’s actual and potential influence on others. in theory and practice this means that pupils need to learn metacognitive skills. they need to learn to think about the potential impact of their actions on others. this is a learnable and developmental skill. robert selman calls this the skill of perspective taking (2007). selman’s skill of perspective taking provides teachers with some guidance on how to aid students in seeing things from the point of view of another. as a student moves from a perspective of seeing only his or her point of view to a reciprocal selfreflective point of view, and then ultimately to an in-depth societal perspective, the awareness of the 67 consequences of one’s behavior on others increases (2007). engaging students in discussions in which they present arguments and counterarguments helps them see more than their own perspective. being able to see things from another’s point of view is also one of the centerpieces of dewey pragmatism. specifically, the examination of consequences is implicit in seeing how one’s point of view includes the consequences of one’s own behavior. we will see later how the community of inquiry is a good place to take roles and examine consequences. the important point here is that this metacognitive skill of role taking is one teachable element of the art of freedom. freedom, as the ability to take effective action, implies some other learnable skills. argument, i suggest, is one of the key skills of effective action within groups or communities. deanna kuhn’s the skills of argument (1989) and education for thinking (2005) are good sources for understanding how we can learn and teach this skill. kuhn shows the similarities and differences between rhetorical and dialogical arguments, claiming that the similarities far outweigh the differences. both types of arguments have the same structure: premise, support for premise, counter arguments, and rebuttal. the difference between the types of arguments is that in the case of dialogical arguments, the counter argument comes from the opponent, while in the rhetorical argument the counter argument is supplied by the writer of the argument. in a rhetorical argument, the writer must have an implied opponent with a stated counter argument, or the writer’s presentation is not an argument. this is but one skill that develops freedom for a pupil. a closely related skill tied up with the freedom “to do,” or the freedom to act within a community, is the skill of inference making with regard to consequences of your actions or the actions of others. the ability to make good inferences is a skill that can be learned. with regard to inferring the consequences of an action, this skill is best learned in discussion within a classroom setting where one’s fellow students’ perspectives can be brought to bear on individual inferences. if we think about speech as action, many skills can be learned in a classroom discussion. this concern for understanding through discussion would be an academic and moot point if the things learned in discussion were not usable in other situations. this leads to the question of transferability. transferability is the application of skills and knowledge in new settings and to new information. two elements of transfer will be explored. first, the traditional area of transfer, namely, what skills are learned and then transferred to a new setting. david n. perkins and gavriel salomon (1988) explore the traditional understanding of transfer. the second area to be explored relates to the hidden curriculum, that is, what is the unintentional message students learn from the method of instruction. it will be argued that one learns that knowledge is tentative and learning is on-going from discussion oriented classes and that lecture classes teach a static version of knowledge and present learning as an accomplishment rather than as a process. perkins and salomon outline two types of transfer: low-road transfer and high-road transfer. low-road transfer is the type of transfer that occurs when i use the skills learned in driving a car to drive a truck. this type of transfer occurs in skills that are “over-learned” and in situations that have many surface similarities. low-road transfer happens automatically. highroad transfer occurs in situations that do not have surface similarity (applying problem solving skills learned in math class to a new problem in social studies) and occur intentionally (morehouse, 1992). to what extent is high-road and low-road transfer likely to happen in a discussion approach to teaching knowledge acquisition and knowledge production skills? to understand what is learned and transferred in a discussion, the work of marzano and colleagues (1989) will be used. these researchers list three skills that are used to acquire knowledge and four skills that are used to apply knowledge in a discussion. oral discourse is the 68 conceptual space where knowledge acquisition and knowledge application overlap. the three skills that are involved in knowledge acquisition are: concept formation, comprehension, and principle formation. the four skills used in applying what has been learned are: composing, problem solving, decision-making, and research. let’s look at each of these skills in turn after briefly orienting ourselves to marzano and his colleagues’ understanding of oral discourse. marzano and colleagues look to the inventive and creative nature of oral discourse to explore its central role in building and applying thinking skills. the individual, in speaking, puts non-linguistic thought “into words in an act of invention” that brings into existence for the individual, and perhaps for the listeners, new distinctions that did not exist before verbalization (marzano, 1989, p. 62). marzano’s understanding of conversation or discussion2 includes the elements of informing, persuading, regulation, generating or expressing emotions, acquiring information, and stimulating divergence. the first of the knowledge acquisition components is concept formation. in discussing concept formation, marzano points out the difficulties of helping students learn concepts: some highly abstract concepts resist direct instruction. in other words, these concepts cannot be learned by pointing, identifying another instance of the concept, finding concepts in a new context, etc. (p. 36). enter the classroom conversation or discussion. the concept of democracy is an example of a concept that cannot be taught directly. if some abstract experiences cannot be directly taught, then experiments, hands-on activities, life experiences, and discussions are the ways to indirectly teach and/or learn abstract concepts (morehouse, 1992). in a discussion, students can generate examples, counter-examples, and model cases. they can explore and question assumptions, and then follow-up on the consequences of ideas (what follows from this?). these questions and probes can be taught by example and illustrated during discussions and during follow-up sessions and then applied to learning about abstract concepts. principle formation follows from and builds on concept formation. principles are relationships between and among concepts in a discipline. as principles connect concepts, it follows that conversation, that is, a connection between two or more people, is a reasonable way to acquire an understanding of relationships. four kinds of principles are discussed: cause and effect principles, correlational principles, probability principles, and axiomatic principles. the philosophy for children materials present many examples of ways to develop these principles in classroom conversations. 69 comprehension, the last of the components in the knowledge acquisition side of the circle, is meaning making. comprehension is making sense of the world around us by observing it in its various forms. whether the information comes from books, films, observing an experiment or listening to music, comprehension encompasses the pulling out of new information and the placing of it with what we already know to produce new meaning(s). making connections creates meaning by exploring what lipman and colleagues call whole/part and means-ends relationships. it is also closely related to arendt’s idea of “inter-est.” that which is between persons in a conversation, that which is interesting, is what connects people. many strategies are currently being researched that aid students in comprehension or meaning making. these strategies include summarizing, predicting, and generating questions. all the strategies begin with the idea of building on what the student already knows and applying that knowledge to the new situation. as marzano and colleagues point out many, if not most, of the strategies for developing comprehension are found in oral discourse or conversation. these three processes are likely to be transferred to other situations if they are learned in the give-and-take of discussion. this chance of high-road transfer is greater if the cases are varied, that is, if concept formation, principle formation and comprehensive discussions have occurred in science classes, social studies classes, and language arts classes. additionally, if these thinking processes are taught in a discussion format (and some research has indicated that they cannot be taught in a lecture format), this would seem to encourage students to be tentative in their conclusions, and to see learning as on going. the four knowledge production or application processes taught in a conversational or discussion format are presented next. these processes are even more likely to encourage and instill the characteristics of tentativeness and life-long learning. problem solving, broadly considered, should include the ability to figure out restricted, narrow puzzles and enigmas, as well as fuzzy, undefined, open-ended issues and mysteries. problem solving usually involves a general set of procedures, such as, defining the problem, breaking it into parts, exploring causes, and using metaphors and analogies. while these points can be presented in a lecture or a book, to be understood they must be examined, attempted, and reapplied ideally in a group setting. the conversation of a group of students will, under the watchful eye of the instructor, present solutions in a series of successively more helpful steps. competing alternatives, whether conscious or unconscious, are what distinguish problem solving from decision making. alternatives imply action to be taken after the choice is made. decisions have consequences, whereas problems have solutions. if groups make decisions together, they also share the consequences of the decision. therefore, it is important that decision-making discussions are conducted only after the group has had some time to use discussion to form concepts, to form principles and to develop comprehension. in the process of these activities, the group becomes a community aware of the distinctive qualities of each member. they are thus in a better position to share responsibility for decisions. research done along these lines can be defined as scientific inquiry. the process has the following steps: describing phenomena, formulating hypotheses, and testing hypotheses. how can research be developed in classroom conversation? the answer is found in what comes before observation. observation depends on having a theoretical construct in place in order that we have some context from which to observe. karl popper argues that it is absurd to say that we can start with a pure observation (1962). therefore, i argue that while an observation may be done individually, the construct—the theory—on which and through which we observe can and perhaps should be developed in classroom conversation. composing, the last of the knowledge production or application processes, is the development of a product—most often in schools, a written product. writing, and other product 70 forming, has three steps: planning, translating, and reviewing. surprisingly, many experts see discussion as an essential requirement for writing. process writing3 may be understood to include conversations with at least several other students at each step of the re-writing process. each of these four thinking processes is dependent on classroom conversation. additionally, classroom conversations teach students about the tentativeness of knowledge and the on-going nature of learning. as conversations are always between distinct and equal persons, they are always open-ended. as they are always brought forth in tentative, incomplete statements, they encourage further exploration. an implicit commitment to partial solutions and to continued exploration is perhaps the most important aspect of classroom conversation. tentative solutions and continued exploration are built into the nature of conversation between equals. built into the human condition is the need to make what is distinct about ourselves known to others. the advantage of a lecture is its efficient delivery of information. research and experience have indicated that classroom discussion—under whatever name—is one of the ways to teach thinking skills that will be useful in new situations. when the value of community building is added to the teaching of thinking skills it becomes even clearer that conversation needs to be an essential part of any classroom. if we follow dewey’s definition of equality as the recognition of the uniqueness of each individual, then equality too may be seen as an art. for dewey, it is not just that we are unique— it is the recognition of that uniqueness that is of greatest importance to understanding how equality is developed. freedom and equality reference abilities that allow us to contribute to the larger whole, and so should be seen skills to be practiced. to learn to listen to each person’s perspective is to practice equality. to recognize the contribution made by each individual to defining a problem or contributing to a solution is to practice equality. to paraphrase raymond boisvert (1998) in his chapter on democracy: a democratic classroom should be judged by the way that all of the pupils are able to develop their capacities and thus grow in effective freedom and genuine equality. a democratic classroom should be judged by the way that it encourages individuality, that is, the unique distinctive contributions its pupils are actually capable of making. freedom and equality will then be a concrete present reality not a hollow echo from a mythical state of nature (p. 71–72). how are democracy and community of inquiry integrated? this part of the paper scrutinizes the theory and practice of ci within the context of a democratic educational environment and also provides a closer look at classroom practice. community of inquiry and democracy in theory a working definition of community of inquiry is now in order. lipman (1995) provides a good definition of a philosophical community of inquiry4. he states that a community of inquiry is a classroom “in which students can generate and exchange ideas, clarify concepts, develop hypotheses, weigh possible consequences, and in general deliberate reasonably together while learning to enjoy their intellectual interdependence” (p. 121). i begin with “learning to the enjoyment of intellectual interdependence” as it places all the other elements in perspective and stipulates the role of the teacher in a community of inquiry5. the seemingly innocuous phrase “learning to” is important, as communities of inquiry are not a given; they are built, that is, we learn to make communities of inquiry together. this point is consistent with dewey’s idea about communities in general. dewey states in the public and its problems (1927) that community requires acting together toward an agreed upon good that 71 is consciously recognized and appreciated as a good by the group. community also demands an effort by the group to sustain a recognized good. in a community of inquiry, we learn to recognize and appreciate common goods through the process of generating and exchanging ideas, developing hypotheses, weighing possible consequences, and deliberating reasonably together. (lipman, 1995) intellectual interdependence can also be learned. it is about people and ideas. while ideas are (in some sense) independent from the people who state them, in a community of inquiry we must pay attention to both the person and the idea in order to give full weight to equality, that is, the unique contribution of each person. our exploration of interdependence begins with what hannah arendt calls interest. she defines interest as literally “inter–est” that is, “the space between” us. interest comes about because we share a common framework as humans: the “web” of meaning. arendt’s idea of interest is important to intellectual interdependence, to democracy, and to community of inquiry. a few words from arendt will set the stage for the development of these points. ... the subjective in-between is not tangible, since there are no objects into which it could solidify; the process of acting and speaking can leave behind no such results and end products. but for all its intangibility, this in-between is no less real than the world of things we visibly have in common. we call this reality the “web” of human relationships, indicating by the metaphor its somewhat intangible quality” (arendt, 1958, p. 183). arendt goes on to write that it is within these webs of meaning that we reveal who we are, that is, we tell our story through our actions in the world. a community of inquiry is also a “web” of meaning, a place where pupils’ stories are told; it is a community that remains intangible even as it is occurring. stories shape and inform the community. these stories are not necessarily or primarily told as a narrative, but rather told as pupils speak their beliefs, their opinions, their critiques. these statements by students reveal not only what a person thinks, but also who that person is. “sheer human togetherness” is what a community of inquiry strives to achieve. the community of inquiry also reveals the “who” of a person as it unfolds. “this revelatory quality of speech and action comes to the fore where people are with others and neither for nor against them—that is, in sheer human togetherness” (arendt, 1958, p. 180). dewey’s idea of a community and arendt’s idea of webs of meaning created by human togetherness are related in spirit and function. both writers define humanness in terms of the way we come together. for both dewey and arendt, it is the way we come together that defines our humanness, each makes a similar case for defining humanness but from different perspectives. dewey sees us functioning in community, while arendt views webs of meaning as the way humans function as social beings. both include an intangible sense of the good that is agreed on and committed to as key elements in defining this human coming together. dewey argues that we learn to be human. this learning occurs through the give-andtake of communication between the individual and distinctive members of a community. we understand and appreciate the beliefs, desires and methods of the community, and contribute to the use of our human resources and values (1927). in like manner, arendt writes that action and speech are essential to our humanness. she argues that we cannot act in isolation—“to be isolated is be deprived of the capacity to act” (1958, p. 188). dewey’s emphasis is on learning, and arendt focuses on the human condition. human plurality is an essential part of the human condition. she defines the human condition as having the twofold character of equality (the ability to understand each other) and distinctiveness (the uniqueness of each person). this definition of humanness implies learning from each other. being with others and neither for 72 nor against others (arendt’s phrase) is consistent with dewey’s definition of democracy as the manifestation of community life regarded as an idea, democracy is not an alternative to other principles of associated life. it is the idea of community itself. as dewey put it, it refers to “…the tendency and movement of something that exists carried to its final limit, viewed as complete, perfected.” (1927, p. 148). since things do not attain such fulfillment but are in actuality distracted and interfered with, democracy in this sense is not a fact and never will be. but neither, by the same logic, is there or has there ever been anything that is a completed community, a community unalloyed by alien elements. i hope that this short exploration of community of inquiry within dewey’s understanding of democracy and arendt’s work on action and speech make a case for community of inquiry as based on a theory of democracy. the case to be made now is whether or not a community on inquiry can achieve in practice what it purports to in theory. community of inquiry and democracy: what might it look like? rather than ask the rhetorical question “is community of inquiry a democratic practice?” we will instead provide a model of what one might see in a community of inquiry classroom. it seems counterproductive and somewhat dishonest to ask a question that is inauthentic. to state my position clearly, i believe that community of inquiry, like democracy, is an ideal that can be approached but never fully achieved. i am using ideal as dewey does when he writes that democracy “is an ideal in the only intelligible sense of an ideal: namely, the tendency and movement of something which exists carried to its final limit, viewed as completed, perfected.” (1927, p 148) so what might a community of inquiry classroom look like? to paint that picture, we will look to typical individual and group behaviors as well as the dispositions and orientations of individuals and the class as a whole. the physical organization of the classroom is likely to be the first thing that one notices. the desks will be in a circle and up to 20 pupils, along with the teacher, will sit around a large table. while this physical arrangement may seem to be a small and insignificant part of a community of inquiry, it is in fact quite important. if pupils see each other face-to-face, and the teacher becomes a part of the circle and does not stand apart, a sense of reciprocity and mutuality follows. david kennedy writes about the discursive space within a community of inquiry that he says is “symbolized by the space of the circle which we make as we’re seated on the classroom floor or around a table” (1999). he sees the space created by the circle as allowing dialogue to occur with regard to posture, gestures, visual and phenomenological information as well as the actual words that are spoken. i like to visualize the center of the circle as the conceptual space (arendt’s in-between that constitutes interest) as the place where the ideas being discussed reside. to appreciate this perspective, ask yourself where is the focus of a discussion when we are all sitting in rows facing the teacher? one possible answer is that the focus lies somewhere between the front row of desks and the teacher. while other perspectives are possible, at a minimum, the message of the “rows” arrangement is that of one to many (teacher to student) rather than one among many. in “rows” the exchanges of ideas is likely to be limited to teacher/idea/student/idea/teacher exchanges. if my metaphor of the “idea on the table” is a partial description of the place of an idea in a community of inquiry, then the dynamic of the classroom is altered in the direction student / idea / student / idea / teacher / idea, etc. while the classroom circle does not guarantee this dynamic, the “rows” arrangement clearly works against it. 73 some of the behaviors likely to be seen in a community of inquiry classroom include “building on, shaping and modifying one another’s ideas” (splitter & sharp, 1995, p. 18). it is of vital importance that the topic for discussion is seen as a problem by the participants. if it is the teacher’s problem alone, a community of inquiry is hard to establish. while occasionally the teacher poses a problem, however, if this problem is to be engaged, it must become the classes’ problem. this is why, in the lipman approach, the class generates leading ideas, rather than stipulates which ideas are to be discussed. “ownership” of the ideas is essential in a community of inquiry. the students and the teacher will ask questions, pose hypotheses, and offer explanations that are directed toward a tentative solution to the agreed upon problem. a community of inquiry is shaped by the problem(s) it poses. while this problem may be redefined, expanded, or narrowed by the discussion, it remains in the “center of the table,” at the center of the discussion. it is the central location of the problem at the metaphoric center of the table more than anything else that frames a community of inquiry. for example, if a community of inquiry is “self-correcting,” it is the problem that mediates the self-correction. an example might help. one possible place where a self-correction might need to take place is with regard to what counts as evidence. but the question of what counts for evidence is different depending on what type of problem one is addressing. if the problem relates to how people think about a problem (say, their opinion on a parliamentary decision), information from a pole is a legitimate source of information. however, if the problem relates to how a parliamentary decision ought to be made, then an opinion poll may not count as evidence—a different set of criteria are required depending on whether the problem is defined as moral, or as procedural. to further illustrate the “idea on the table” perspective, david leat of the university of newcastle-upon-tyne presented a paper at the 8th international thinking conference called “brains on the table: diagnostic and formative assessment through observation6.” his paper focuses on how students can see a verbal problem in terms of its parts, asking students to create a story taking different slips of paper that would allow them to solve the problem. the small groups were observed by teachers to gain insight into how students think about geography concepts. this assessment activity nonetheless illustrates the metaphor of keeping ideas on the table. in leat’s activity students literally move pieces of paper on a table to construct a story, sorting relevant from irrelevant information and organizing the information to find the problem and to solve it narratively. imagine a group of four or five students moving slips of paper around the table as they make a case for placing the paper in one area rather than in another area. as students manipulate the pieces of paper and argue for each placement, they engage in a very observable community of inquiry. by making a method of assessment observable, elements previously invisible may become visible. the “brains on the table” activity is important to a community of inquiry as it makes tangible what a community thinking aloud might look like. this activity also illustrates selfcorrecting as we observe students making tentative choices that are later revised, which helps the problem solving to proceed. we cannot correct what we cannot see. lipman (lipman, sharp, & oscanyan, 1984) make a simple but brilliant observation: thinking becomes visible when we talk (or write). it is by making thought visible that improvement in our thinking abilities can be improved. “brains on table” is another way to make thinking visible. to further aid in making a community of inquiry discussion visible we should also pay attention to processes by asking questions such as: • who speaks when and to whom? • what discussion moves are made and by whom? 74 • what activities foreshorten discussion and which enliven it? • who helps move a “stuck” discussion forward and what techniques are used? in natasha, lipman (1996) presents an outline called “forming a philosophical community of inquiry.” a few of lipman’s points will be highlighted to underscore the democratic elements of a community of inquiry: (1) the class discovers that the text is meaningful and relevant, and appropriate for their consideration; (2) students initiate questions and the teacher recognizes the specific contribution of each student; (3) students and teacher make a decision regarding where to begin the discussion and the joint discovery of the problematic through discussion; and (4) the articulation of disagreements and the quest for understanding may be made by students or the teacher. these points were highlighted to show that there exists at least a theoretical consistency between dewey’s ideas of democracy, freedom, and equality and lipman’s understanding of community of inquiry as a form of democratic education. da capo what i have tried to do in this article is to connect some of the key ideas of john dewey and hannah arendt, and to a lesser extent charles taylor, to matthew lipman’s understanding of democracy, freedom, and equality as exemplified in a community of inquiry, and thus, to a wider understanding of a democratic educational environment. implicit in all the works on community of inquiry is the goal of meaning making. lipman (lipman, oscanyan, & sharp, 1980; lipman, 1996) sees meaning making as the heart of the community of inquiry. the product of meaning making is an outcome of communal attempts at understanding each other and the world and therefore creating a conceptual space for democratic participation in a community. meaning making can only happen in a mutually created communication experience, that is, in a community of inquiry. lipman’s community of inquiry as an ideal is consistent with dewey’s idea of democracy. taylor’s concept of recognition and dignity and arendt’s “inter-est” point to a beginning for elaborating an educational perspective on freedom and equality that incorporate the importance of human rights. human equality, that is to say, the recognition of uniqueness and identity along with the development of the capacity for engagement in the world (freedom as defined by dewey), are essential in a multipolar world of heightened individualism and, along with this, an unprecedented splintering of perceptions. more than ever before, we need to look for the acknowledgement, or rather the emergence, of a common substratum of values that would make economically, socially and culturally viable coexistence possible on a worldwide scale (kim, 1998, p. 18). i would submit that this common stratum of values may come from a deweyan sense of freedom (growth in a conversational community) and equality (valuing of our uniqueness within communities). while democracy has many meanings, if it has a moral meaning this is to be found in the ability to resolve that supreme test of all political institutions and industrial arrangements, namely, the contribution these institutions can make to the all-around growth of every member of society (dewey, 1938, p. 186). dewey’s statement about democracy as a moral concept should inspire us to continue our work as educators, seeing democracy in education as the starting point for building a human rights consensus and a more democratic world. although a democratic educational environment is an ideal to aim for, we would do well to recognize that such a goal is never accomplished once and for all. 75 endnotes 1 charles taylor writes about authentic or individual identity in much the same way that dewey writes about equality. 2 i will use conversation and discussion interchangeable throughout this paper. 3 process writing is an approach to aid students in improving their writing skills by presenting their essays to fellow students for feedback. 4 lipman, sharp, splitter, kennedy, sasseville and others have recently included the word philosophic with community of inquiry. this paper will use the same working definition of community of inquiry but without the word philosophical both for easy of presentation and also to support the use of this approach in a wide variety of disciplines and classrooms. 5 intellectual interdependence is the hallmark of the theory of community of inquiry as well as its goal. 6 this presentation was later published as “brains on the table: diagnostic and formative assessment through observation” in assessment in education: principles, policy and practice with adam nichols, june 2010. references arendt, h. (1958). the human condition. chicago, il, usa: university of chicago press. boisvert, r. d. (1998). john dewey: rethinking our times. albany, new york: the state university of new york press. dewey, j. (1927). the public and its problems. new york: henry holt and company. gardner, h. (1999). the disciplined mind: what all students need to know. new york, new york: simon and schuster. gutmann, a. (1992). the politics of recognition. in c. taylor, multiculturalism and the politics of recognition: essays by charles taylor with commentary. princeton, new jersey, usa: princeton university press. kennedy, d. (2006). the well of being: childhood, subjectivity, and education. albany, new york, usa: state university of new york press. kennedy, d. (1999). thinking for oneself and with others. analytic teaching, 2. kim, y. (1998). prospects for a universal ethics. new york: unesco. kuhn, d. (2005). education for thinking. cambridge, ma, ussa: harvard university press. kuhn, d. (1991). the skill of argument. new york, new york, usa: cambridge university press. leat, d. (1999). brains on the table: diagnostic and formative assessment through observation. eight international conference of critical and creative thinking. alberta, ca. lipman, m. a. (1980). philosophy on the classroom. philadelphia, pa, usa: temple university press. lipman, m. (1995). education for violence reduction and peace development. in j. portelli & r. reed, children, philosophy and democracy. calgary, alberta, canada: detsellig enterprises. lipman, m. (1996). natasha: vygotskian dialogues. new york, new york: teachers college press. marzano, r. b. (1988). dimensions of thinking: a framework for curriculum and instruction. alexandria, virginia, usa: association for supervision and curriculum development. morehouse, r. (1992). conversation and cognition. in r. f. reed, when we talk: essays on classroom conversations. fort worth, tx: analytic press. perkins, d. n. & salomon, g. (1988). teaching for transfer. educational leadership, 46, 22-32. selman, r. l. (2003). the promotion of social awareness: powerful lessons from the partnership of 76 developmental theory and classroom practice. new york: russell sage foundation. silver, p. (1978). ortega as phenomenologist: the genesis of the meditations of quixote. new york, new york usa: columbia university press. vonnegut, k. (1965). harrison bergeron. in k. vonnegut, welcome to the monkey house. new york, new york, usa: delacorte/seymour lawrence. address correspondences to: dr. richard morehouse, professor emeritus, praxis consulting 115 5th avenue south, suite 409 la crosse, wi 54601 remorehouse@viterbo.edu analytic teaching and philosophical praxis analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 1 combatting epistemic violence against young activists sarah vitale, ph.d, and owen miller introduction oung people are advocating for social and political change. in response to the worsening climate crisis, young people have organized several movements, including the sunrise movement and the school strike for climate movement. following the mass shooting at marjory stoneman douglas high school in parkland, florida, students led a nationwide movement for gun control. young people led the charge for justice following the death of trayvon martin and have played significant roles in the black lives matter movement. members of the climate, gun control, and anti-racism movements are well-educated on their respective issues and have articulated clear political and economic aims.1 young people have rallied around concerns for their shared futures, using knowledge of climate science, gun dangers, and white supremacy and their correspondingly rational interests in a safe and ecologically healthy world, to create sound platforms for reform. even though their positions are sound, many adults believe they could not possibly understand the scope of the issues or have the tools to respond to the crises. their beliefs are often dismissed as childish because adults assume that children are too naïve to understand the full extent of issues like the climate crisis and what it would take to address them. the result is that their position as young persons who must endure the effects of current policies and practices is discounted and they are subject to epistemic injustice, a concept introduced by miranda fricker, and epistemic oppression, a concept introduced by kristie dotson. in this paper, we seek to establish the way in which young people are subject to two forms of epistemic oppression in testimony, what dotson calls testimonial quieting and testimonial smothering. testimonial quieting happens when a hearer fails to identify a speaker as a person who knows about whatever subject about which the speaker is offering testimony (dotson, “tracking epistemic violence” 242), and testimonial smothering occurs when a speaker stifles their own testimony to avoid being the object of prejudice or ridicule on the part of hearers (244). we also consider how young people are subject to what fricker calls hermeneutical injustice, which occurs when a group is less able to make sense of their experiences due to an imbalance of social power. we 1 see the principles articulated by the sunrise movement (“sunrise principles”). also, see the speech given by activist greta thunberg to the british house of parliament (thunberg). for an account of the position held by the never again msd activists, see hogg and gonzález. for a list of the demands by one offshoot of the larger black lives matter movement, see “about.” see also an op-ed by thandiwe abdullah, 15, co-founder of the black lives matter la youth vanguard, on the parkland shooting and the response to the never again msd activists (abdullah). y analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 2 examine three different scenarios of quieting: quieting of parkland activists following a shooting at their school; quieting of dream defenders and black lives matter activists following the shooting death of trayvon martin; and quieting of climate activists. because of the different ways these groups were quieted, we consider the importance of analyses attentive to how race and other identity factors intersect with age to compound the epistemic oppression faced by young people. we then argue that philosophy for children (p4c) can help remedy epistemic oppression by helping young people who might otherwise stifle their testimony develop their voices, helping adult facilitators better listen to young people as equal interlocutors, and helping young people become adults who are less likely to quiet the testimony of any specific group in public discourse or elsewhere. epistemic injustice and epistemic oppression while many philosophers have examined the damage done to individuals and social groups by social and political injustices, few had explicitly considered what it meant to harm someone as a knower before miranda fricker’s groundbreaking work epistemic injustice. fricker examines how a special wrong, which she calls an epistemic injustice, is inflicted upon someone when they are damaged in their capacity as a knower (20). in testimonial injustice, the first type of epistemic justice, the audience fails to take the speaker seriously as a knower (4). the audience does not give the speaker what they need, namely an audience that is open to hearing them and able to hear them without prejudice, and a successful linguistic exchange fails to take place. the other type, hermeneutical injustice, occurs when “a gap in collective interpretive resources puts someone at an unfair advantage when it comes to making sense of their social experiences” (fricker 1). hermeneutical injustices exist when a group is unable to explain, describe, and assign meaning to a common set of experiences, often because the dominant social group fails to recognize these experiences as worth understanding or even as real. as social power dictates the creation of concepts, the group with relatively less power is left with fewer concepts at hand to explain everyday encounters. kristie dotson has also developed an important account of epistemic harm, which, while overlapping with fricker’s account, differs in a few key ways. dotson examines what she calls epistemic violence in testimony and claims that it relies in large part on pernicious ignorance, or reliable and ongoing ignorance about a group that causes harm (“tracking epistemic violence” 238). pernicious ignorance often manifests itself in negative stereotypes (243). dotson defines epistemic violence in testimony or epistemic oppression as “a refusal, intentional or unintentional, of an audience to communicatively reciprocate a linguistic exchange owing to pernicious ignorance” (238). dotson characterizes fricker’s notion of epistemic injustice as a “species of epistemic oppression” (238). dotson argues, however, that fricker misses a type of epistemic injustice, which dotson calls contributory injustice. contributory injustice is “caused by an epistemic agent’s situated ignorance, in the form of willful hermeneutical ignorance, in maintaining and utilizing structurally prejudiced hermeneutical resources that result in epistemic harm to the epistemic agency of a knower” (dotson, “a cautionary tale” 31). while fricker claims that hermeneutical injustice occurs because social power dictates the creation of concepts, dotson emphasizes that there is rarely only one set of hermeneutical resources at any given time. contributory injustice occurs when someone fails to use available hermeneutical resources created by a marginalized group and only uses the prejudiced analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 3 hermeneutical resources of the oppressor. both fricker and dotson’s contributions are essential to our project, but their differences, while significant, bear less on our argument. instead we borrow fricker and dotson’s arguments on the epistemic oppression of women and people of color to apply to children, which is something few thinkers have done to date. those thinkers who have begun the conversation about epistemic injustice and children have opened the door to an important field of inquiry. karin murris, for instance, has applied fricker’s concepts to epistemic injustice against black children in educational settings. murris holds that the mistaken and influential views of developmental psychology disadvantage children by positioning them as partial humans and do not allow for the fact that adults may learn from children (254). michael d. burroughs and deborah tollefsen consider epistemic injustice against children in forensic contexts and argue that pervasive prejudices determine whether children are considered credible in courtroom scenarios (369). we engage in a similar project, focusing on testimonial quieting and smothering of young activists. testimonial quieting and smothering of youth activists dotson explains that testimonial quieting and smothering result from pernicious ignorance, and we contend that ignorance regarding children’s and young people’s intellectual and rational capacities are types of pernicious ignorance. in the traditional educational setting and in public spaces, the interpretative tools employed by children are often dismissed as undeveloped or simply incorrect. children are often seen as ignorant and incapable of forming rational beliefs without first being taught how, when, and with what facts to do so. ignorance regarding young people’s ability to know shows up in terms adults use to describe children’s interpretations of the world, like “childish,” “naive,” and “uneducated.” these terms do not necessarily assail the content of children’s understandings (in the way “irrational” or “misinformed” might), but rather the thinkers themselves. to call a child’s wishful thinking “childish” does not dismiss the value or accuracy of the belief’s content, but dismisses the child’s position as a knower. in what follows, we consider testimonial quieting of young activists in the public sphere, looking at three examples of recent youth activism: the youth-led climate movement, never again msd, and black lives matter. 1. testimonial quieting we can see a clear example of testimonial quieting in the response to the student leaders of the climate movement, specifically in an encounter between representatives from the sunrise movement and senator dianne feinstein. around fifteen young people, from age ten to eighteen, visited feinstein’s office to present her a letter and request that she support the green new deal, a proposed economic stimulus package that addresses the climate crisis and economic inequality. feinstein responded that she was not in support of the proposed measure, as she thought it was not feasible and instead had co-authored an alternative bill (sunrise movement bay area). when the children responded that she should listen to their reasons, she asked their age and dismissed them with the statement, “you didn’t vote for me.” she also told the crowd, “i know what i’m doing.” this is an example of quieting because feinstein dismissed these children’s ability to offer testimony about the analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 4 climate crisis by virtue of a social prejudice about the naiveté of children’s understanding of political (and scientific and economic) concepts. despite her claim, feinstein cannot properly “know what [she’s] doing.” if to know something means to know the truth, she becomes further from the truth as she excludes significant viewpoints from her evaluation of the climate crisis. she is acting in a way that has obfuscated the actual consequences of her actions by quieting the sunrise protesters, who have a relevant standpoint regarding the need to act as young people who will endure the consequences of today’s climate policy. in refusing to engage with the students as rational agents, she has excluded the experiences and needs of children from her evaluation of the climate crisis due to children’s lack of social power. in the case of the climate crisis discourse and this example in particular, the testimony of children is especially relevant to the production of climate policy, as children are the ones who will have to deal with the most significant consequences of present decisions. as such, we should afford special attention to the standpoint of children regarding the climate crisis. feinstein’s perspective toward these young people is in keeping with many educators, politicians, and other adults: you don’t know what you’re talking about; let the adults handle it. but the adults often do not handle things, as the parkland students know too well. they formed never again msd in the aftermath of a mass shooting at their school in february 2018 (seelinger). the movement began as a twitter hashtag—#neveragain—and transformed into one of the largest nationwide protests on march 24, 2018 (lopez). the goal of the group was to prevent future shootings by advocating for universal background checks and influencing elections. the students were adept organizers and public speakers, effectively using social media and mobilizing groups around the country to act quickly. several influential people publicly attempted to silence the leaders of the movement. a republican candidate for the maine house called emma gonzález, one of the youth leaders who survived the shooting, a “skinhead lesbian,” and david hogg, another movement leader, a “bald-faced liar” (stevens). gonzalez also appeared in a doctored video tearing up the constitution (mezzofiore). in the original video, which was posted online by teen vogue, she and friends tore up a gun-target poster. while it is unclear who doctored the video, the altered one was shared on the right-wing forum 4chan and then on twitter, by verified users including actor adam baldwin (wanshel). david hogg, another movement leader, has also received criticism from the conservative media. redstate, an influential right-wing blog with 206,400 twitter followers, for instance, posted doubts as to whether hogg was even at school on the day of the attack (bromwich). the vitriol against the young activists came from gun supporters, who wanted to discredit the movement. however, there was significant blowback against the young activists’ detractors, even from those who were against the movement’s aims. after an aide to republican florida legislator shawn harrison called gonzalez and hogg crisis actors on twitter, senator marco rubio (r-florida) defended the students (astor). he tweeted that “[c]laiming some of the students on tv after #parkland are actors is the work of a disgusting group of idiots with no sense of decency” (rubio). the blowback from figures like rubio demanded response, and harrison apologized and fired his aide https://twitter.com/hashtag/parkland?src=hash https://twitter.com/hashtag/parkland?src=hash analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 5 (@shawnharrisonfl). the maine candidate who criticized hogg and gonzalez received criticism from other republicans, and in response he ended his candidacy (stevens). similar blowback has not occurred, however, against those who have tried to silence youth leaders and participants of the black lives matter movement and its predecessors. young black people in florida began the fight against gun violence after the death of trayvon martin in 2012, six years before the shooting in parkland. the shooting death of martin resulted in the formation of youth-led movements such as the dream defenders and the million hoodies movement, groups that were formed before the blm movement began in 2013. in 2012, high school and college-aged dream defenders occupied the capitol building in tallahassee for 31 days, demanding an end to the standyour-ground law which was invoked during george zimmerman’s trial (alvarez). the young people were silenced when the lawmakers refused to speak with them. scott eventually met with them during their occupation, but still refused to hold a special session of the legislature. the blm activists have received many criticisms, but republican lawmakers have never publicly come to their defense. for the most part, republicans had nothing to say to the teen activists in the early years of the movement. they did not take young black people seriously at all, not even enough to criticize them. also, when young people engage in direct action—through actions such as interrupting bernie sanders or martin o’malley during the 2016 presidential primary to foreground racial justice concerns or holding “die-ins” at restaurants in major cities during brunch—they are criticized by their ostensible supporters, white progressives, who question their methods and targets (lind). the blm activists are often told that they should be more peaceful like the civil rights activists before them, and even civil rights activists like barbara reynolds, john lewis, and andrew young have criticized the movement (reynolds; theoharis). oprah winfrey also criticized blm for its leaderless structure and what she saw as its lack of concrete demands (“oprah winfrey’s comments”).2 then, while she did not offer support to the dream defenders, she offered $500,000 to the msd movement (@oprah). the dream defenders and subsequent young blm activists have encountered opponents on all sides. black students at marjory stoneman douglas high as well as other young people involved in the blm movement have noted the divergent responses to their protests and the never again msd protests. in a press conference in the days after the march for our lives protest in washington, which she attended, marjory stoneman junior tyah-amoy roberts stated, “the black lives matter movement has been addressing this topic since the murder of trayvon martin, since 2012. yet we’ve never seen this kind of support for our cause. and we surely do not feel that the lives or voices of minorities are as valued as our white counterparts” (green). a clear example of testimonial quieting of young blm activists occurred at marjory stoneman douglas high, in fact, a week before the shooting. a student published a critique of the blm movement in the school newspaper, calling it “ridiculous” and saying its participants “seem to be good for nothing but creating mistrust between civilians and police” (green). in a black history month presentation, several black students responded to the letter and defended the movement. a teacher cut off their mic, literally silencing them, and ushered them 2 in august 2016, over sixty organizations associated with the blm movement released a policy platform with six central demands (alcindor). https://www.dreamdefenders.org/ https://www.millionhoodies.net/ https://policy.m4bl.org/ https://policy.m4bl.org/ analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 6 off the stage. the administration defended the teacher’s actions, saying that they prevented the students from finishing their address because the speech was not rehearsed or a planned part of the show. an article on the event indicates that it was a “last-minute decision by some of the black student organizers” to read their response letter aloud at the event (green). the students were silenced, unable to communicate their message to their classmates, teachers, and community members. it is clear that the type of epistemic silencing experienced by each group is different. in the first example offered above, the climate activists are dismissed by someone who is, ostensibly, on their side. feinstein says she understands the dangers of the climate crisis, but she does not support the green new deal because she does not believe it is feasible. her dismissal of the young people stems in large part from the fact that they are not a constituency that matters to her—they are not of the age of majority. however, they recognize that it is not feasible to ignore the exigencies of the climate crisis and fail to act swiftly. the never again msd activists are dismissed, on the other hand, by rightwing figures with a clear pro-gun agenda, who often focus on the young people’s age to discredit them. however, not all of those who were ideologically opposed to the students spoke out against them, as it became less than politically expedient to do so. the students appeared sympathetic to the public because of the tragedy they faced, so they gained a perhaps politically privileged position for a moment from which to act. we cannot assume, therefore, that because a person is young, they will face epistemic injustice in the precise way the climate activists have. the epistemic violence faced by the dream defenders and the young blm activists is very different from both the above examples. the young black activists are often ignored outright or dismissed with hostility, not only by those who would appear ideologically opposed to their aims, but also by those who agree with their goals but question their methods. one factor that makes sense of the treatment of the black blm activists and dream defenders and the white msd activists is the racial frames around how we see youth and childhood. following the killing of trayvon martin, many images shared by the media depicted him as adult-like and thus more dangerous (adler; pareene). though he was a 17-year-old with skittles in his hand, the images shared by conservative news outlets depicted him as a formidable presence on the street, perhaps a dangerous adult, justifying the attack on him (adler). holding a pellet gun in his hand, tamir rice, who was 12 years old when he was shot and killed, appeared threatening and perhaps adult-like to the officer, even though the 911 caller indicated that the gun was “probably fake” and the person holding it “probably” a child (never and lowery). these young people did not appear young and innocent to the people who killed them, and subsequently the media does not portray them as such. studies have confirmed that young black people suffer from an adultification bias. in a series of studies, black boys appeared more like adults than their white peers (goff et. al.). researchers have also found that adults consider black girls as young as 5 as needing less protection and more independent than their white peers (epstein, black, and gonzález). it is plausible, then, that the public has been more sympathetic toward the msd activists because they see them as youthful and innocent, and they sympathize less with young black people who suffer. the way that epistemic injustice works towards young black activists and white activists is therefore very different, especially when their activism is a result of trauma and gun violence. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 7 2. testimonial smothering when young people routinely face testimonial quieting and become accustomed to being dismissed, they may also begin to experience smothering, the second type of epistemic violence dotson identifies. testimonial smothering occurs when a speaker stifles their own testimony to avoid being the object of prejudice or ridicule on the part of hearers (dotson, 244). also, and although dotson does not offer this as a reason, testimonial smothering may occur when people do not want to waste their time offering an account that they know will not be heard. while tangible examples of smothering are harder pin down—as it is the non-sharing of testimony that constitutes smothering—it is fruitful to at least illustrate a couple plausible descriptions of how it might occur among children in educational settings. black students, for example, often have a different experience in schools than white children. for instance, black children receive a disproportionate level of discipline from their teachers. they are much more likely to receive out-of-school suspensions than their white peers (“k-12 education”). and federal investigations show that these punishments occur even if the students of color are not causing more problems (staples). as we have seen, the adultification bias impacts black children as young as 5 years old, and research shows that even very young black children—preschoolers—are punished more than their white classmates (“data snapshot: school discipline”). when the classroom appears to be a place where they are not wanted, black students may be more likely to smother their own testimony when in that classroom or outside. another example might involve the smothering of testimony in light of a hegemonic discourse. consider, for example, a native american child learning about christopher columbus in public school. the native american child has some ideas about columbus, having heard her parents discuss columbus’s catalytic role in native genocides and mass slavery. the textbook the native american child is reading in school, however, focuses on columbus’s “heroic discovery” of the americas more than the tragedies enacted thereafter. furthermore, the child may have learned that her understandings are untrustworthy and childish and may have had experiences in the past where her testimony was rejected. or she may trust her family’s account and not want to waste her time correcting an educator she knows will not believe her. if this child has been the victim of epistemic injustices, it is plausible that she will not offer her testimony about columbus as received from her parents. wanting to avoid the anxiety or embarrassment of offering a “false” understanding, or simply wanting to pass the tests and earn good grades, this child may smother herself, and it is further plausible that the child will abandon her own understanding of columbus in favor of the school’s. the consequences of this smothering involve not only preventing other students (and potentially the teacher) from developing a more nuanced view of columbus, but also significant cognitive dissonance for the native child. 3. hermeneutical and contributory injustice another reason that the voices of young people may not be heard is that they are often deprived of the hermeneutical resources to make sense of their own experiences and suffer from what fricker analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 8 calls hermeneutical injustice. in this case, it is not that they actively smother their own testimony, but that “their social situation is such that a collective hermeneutical gap prevents them...from making sense of an experience which it is strongly in their interests to render intelligible” (fricker 7). fricker offers as an example of hermeneutical injustice women who were victims of sexual harassment at work before the term sexual harassment was created (1). fricker explains that the “powerful tend to have appropriate understandings of their experiences ready to draw on as they make sense of their social experiences, whereas the powerless are more likely to find themselves having some social experiences through a glass darkly, with at best ill-fitting meanings to draw on in the effort to render them intelligible” (149). in contributory injustice, dotson explains, the oppressed have their own set of hermeneutical resources, but the oppressor fails to use them to understand relevant experiences (“a cautionary tale” 31). the oppressor instead uses the concepts they have created, which are often prejudiced against the oppressed group. in the first case, young people, therefore, may not have the hermeneutical resources to understand their experiences because they have not been afforded the opportunity to contribute to the creation of concepts (fricker 6). there are fewer concepts adequate to accounting for their particular experiences. they may therefore not participate in activist struggles because they do not have concepts to name their disenfranchisement. in the case of contributory injustice, they have the appropriate resources, but since the dominant group fails to recognize these resources, young people may smother themselves and consider the activist venture a lost cause. 4. promoting epistemic justice through philosophy for children (p4c) epistemic injustice against young people is pervasive. while we have examined epistemic injustice largely in the public sphere, one place to combat it is in schools. we contend that many epistemic problems are cultivated in traditional educational settings because the pedagogy assumes a mistaken account of the knower and follows what paolo freire calls the “banking model” of education. the banking model relies on an account of the knowing subject as an atomistic, independent, even disembodied knower, who encounters phenomena as discrete things to know through mastery or acquisition. the subject appears to approach these phenomena from a bird’s eye perspective or a “view from nowhere” (nagel 67-70). the material this knower encounters in textbooks and on standardized exams passes itself off as universal knowledge. there are multiple problems with this model. first, it in fact privileges a particular type of knowledge, that of middle-class and wealthy, white, able-bodied, native english-speaking americans. the textbooks and exams take the particular experience of one group of people and raise it to the level of the universal. insofar as it raises the experiences of a particular group of people to the level of the universal, it covers over the knowledges and experiences of marginalized people. second, insofar as it frames certain knowledge as universal, it ignores the way knowledge is situated and context-specific. freire explains that implicit “in the banking concept is the assumption of a dichotomy between human beings and the world: a person is merely in the world, not with the world or with others; the individual is spectator, not re-creator” (85). the person is not portrayed to be a situated knower, who in fact creates a world. she is rather a disembodied knower. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 9 in the banking model, however, the student is not yet a powerful, atomistic knower, though that may be a goal. during her education, that knower is her teacher, and the student is a passive learner. the learner is not understood to be a richly thoughtful, question-forming and answer-seeking agent. rather, the learner is treated as a kind of epistemic tabula rasa or empty vessel.3 the learner is not seen as having a particular context or as able to contribute her own experiences to the learning process. in the perceived absence of young people’s meaningful “starting point” in the learning process, educators use the banking model to fill these empty vessels with textbook and lecture content. the epistemic and testimonial capacities of young people, and thereby their ability to answer meaningful questions, are neglected as educators assume that learners are not yet knowers. in this process each learning agent is considered interchangeable—all learners, some exceptions granted, read the same textbooks and hear the same lectures—reflecting a disembodied, decontextualized model of the knower. this phenomenon occurs both in education and in the public sphere: young people are thought to have nothing to contribute to the production of knowledge and discourse and can only endure the consequences of political and educational discourses.4 p4c is a methodology that gives children, those on the downside of epistemic oppression, the license to fight back. p4c shifts the dynamic from a top-down flow of information to a bottom-up or non-hierarchical exchange. while many young people already have little trouble offering testimony, as we can see in the examples above, still others suffer from testimonial smothering, and p4c is a way to address this by helping young people gain confidence. in addition, p4c may help the adults who participate as facilitators become less likely to smother young people’s testimony, both in the p4c context and outside of it. finally, p4c may help the young people who participate grow into adults who are less likely to quiet young people. in this section, we aim to demonstrate key ways the structure of p4c helps remedy the epistemic injustices committed against young people. p4c is a movement that emphasizes the ability young people have to critically analyze the world and themselves and the importance of open-ended inquiry. a key method p4c employs to help young people critically engage with their world and promote epistemic equality is by establishing “communities of philosophical inquiry.” communities of philosophical inquiry (cpi) share much in common with paolo freire’s “problem-posing” method, which he designed to work with peasant workers in brazil. freire argues that the most liberatory mode of education is one determined and driven by the oppressed themselves (freire 126). both methods are effective at working with epistemically and otherwise disadvantaged groups, such that those groups can find ways to articulate their own problems and needs. cpis often, but need not, take place within the k-12 setting; they can take place at refugee resettlement centers, youth groups, in student-led movements, in border communities, and elsewhere. while many student-led movements are already democratic and challenge established hierarchies, the p4c movement is a way for adults and educators to act as allies and combat prejudices against young people. a cpi is a collective endeavor where young people and a 3 philosophers and developmental psychologists have considered the young person to be a blank slate. see, for example, locke 33 and piaget 38. 4 young people are not only denied the vote, as in most countries the voting age is 18, but they are also denied any type of involvement in the political process approximating the vote. (we are indebted to redacted for helping us strengthen this line of our argument.) analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 10 facilitator do philosophy together. participants are able to take an active role in the development of understanding, restructuring the learning process so that the participants exercise power collectively. we do not mean to suggest that a cpi is merely a formless friendship circle where rationality is abandoned. rather, a cpi is a situation in which critical thinking and rational dialogue are part and parcel of young people’s flourishing. contrary to many prejudices against young people’s ability to produce valuable discourse, a cpi does not produce understandings about monsters under the bed except perhaps to provide rational interpretations of what purpose narratives about monsters serve in the lives of children. by directly building rationality and dialogical learning into the discussion, a cpi makes the imaginative curiosity of children into a tool for gaining genuine understanding about the world. elements of the community of philosophical inquiry a cpi usually develops over multiple meeting periods. lone and burroughs explain that a cpi is typically comprised of five stages: prompt, reflect, form questions, discuss, and close (57). the members first reflect upon a prompt (a picture, video, short story, philosophical passage, etc.) and then create questions about it, which shape the direction of the subsequent discussion. what is key here is that participants create the questions; the line of inquiry is not imposed from without. in creating questions, young people develop the ability to learn what they don’t know: they are able to identify areas of confusion or curiosity elicited by a prompt and develop the ability to respond accordingly. these initial steps echo freire's method, which also relies on the oppressed to generate worthwhile questions about problems identified in their own social reality. by generating a critical consciousness of reality that starts from the interests of the oppressed, the oppressed develop a praxis that can lead to liberatory action (freire 66). a cpi typically has four key elements in addition to its five stages, according to lone and burroughs. first, the members seek to build meaning in a collective fashion (lone and burroughs 5455). in a cpi, the teacher or club leader acts as a facilitator rather than one who solely delivers content. while participants decide the course of dialogue, facilitators play an important role, especially in the discussion phase, according to lone and burroughs. for the discussion to be a philosophical one, the facilitator has to listen carefully, noting the connections and contradictions between what the participants say and making those relationships explicit. the facilitator has to point out when students are giving reasons for their positions or when someone offers a counter-argument. the facilitator also has to recognize if the discussion is progressing (lone and burroughs 60). therefore, the facilitator has to have developed what lone and burroughs call philosophical sensitivity: familiarity with fundamental philosophical questions and debates and ability to see philosophical elements and patterns in the students’ discussions (60). they can then allow students to drive the discussion, while they help them develop it into a philosophical dialogue. a cpi is not primarily about learning a particular body of information, though that is frequently learned along the way, but rather about discovery and logical development. because of this first requirement, a cpi reinforces a different model of the knower. unlike “view from nowhere” account, a cpi recognizes participants as situated knowers. the understanding analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 11 produced by a cpi is intricately linked to all participants, their particular experiences, and their current setting. the p4c model is intersubjective and situated. the way dialogue is pursued in a cpi highlights how each of us comes to know through and alongside one another. since dialogue is at the heart of a cpi, participants come to learn vis-à-vis the learning of others. the nature of dialogue requires participants to recognize the fact that they learn about the world and their selves through the experiences of other people. by forging understanding with the experiences and perspectives of other people alongside a student’s own, participants come to understand the world from an intersubjective point of view. insofar as a cpi focuses on learning as a collective pursuit, it promotes a sense of community and collaboration. a cpi demonstrates to the participants that one person learns less when the others fail to learn because the wider discourse is truncated. this occurs because the person who has failed to learn is less able to invigorate the discussion with their own perspective on the new knowledge. each member’s learning is contingent on every other member’s. knowledge becomes less about mastery of a subject than about engagement in a shared project. as p4c does not promote a competitive view of knowledge, it relies on an egalitarian and a radically democratic orientation to its participants. advocates of p4c do not believe that young people have less access to truth or reason than adults do. adults and children are equal interlocutors and meaning makers in a p4c cpi. all children are also equal to one another.5 p4c is also radically democratic insofar as it rejects age limits for reason.6 while the groups radical democrats discuss are usually the poor, women, black people, and other minority groups, they can definitely be children. in fact, samuel chambers examines the antidemocratic function of age restrictions on voting or holding national office. he explains that while u.s. citizens are said to exercise “full democratic rights” at 18, the constitution prohibits them from holding national office until they are older. chambers believes that from the perspective of democratic politics, we cannot defend age restrictions (13). in the same way, p4c challenges the idea of age limits for reason or rational discourse.7 a second requirement of a cpi that lone and burroughs offer, which corresponds with the commitment to radical democracy, is that there is no requirement and in fact an aversion to the use of technical terms and jargon in a cpi. this requirement ensures that the cpi remains as open as possible to everyone. it is also based on the premise that all people have equal intelligences and can engage in philosophical engagement and dialogue. they do not need the language of a specialist to do so. 5 radical democrat jacques rancière emphasizes the importance of starting with equality as a presupposition, not arriving at it as a destination (16). he explains that we in fact already do this when we communicate. we presume the equality of intelligences when we presume that the other can understand what we say. those engaged in p4c explicitly begin with the assumption of the equality of the intelligences of the young people in the community. 6 radical democracy challenges exclusionary consensus-based governments. according to rancière, the true scandal of democracy is that the demos —the people— means everyone and anyone (16). no one has a preordained title to rule. 7 while according to liberal tenets we could make good arguments for and against age limits, there are no democratic grounds for the age limits. there have been historic efforts to curtail political participation of and deny the vote of those people considered less intelligent, uneducated, or undisciplined. these have taken the form of literacy tests, which have been outlawed, largely because we recognize that even non-literate adults should be able to have a voice in how they are governed. just as non-literate adults should have a voice in policies that will impact them, so too should people under 18, even if they are considered by many to be less intelligent, uneducated, or undisciplined. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 12 the final requirements involve epistemic virtues, those virtues conducive to “knowing well.” first, those in the cpi must exercise “epistemological modesty” and recognize that they can make mistakes (lone and burroughs 56). lone and burroughs also hold that a cpi must be an intellectually safe environment where ideas are met with acceptance and charity (56), which calls for its members to exercise benevolence and open-mindedness. participants must be willing to adjust their own ideas when presented with good reasons to do so. these virtues promote a knower’s capacity to know because they cultivate a collaborative, non-competitive view of understanding by encouraging all participants to engage in dialogue with care. freire also emphasizes the importance of developing epistemic virtues in the problem-posing method. first, he emphasizes the importance of epistemological modesty. he asks, “how can i dialogue if i always project ignorance onto others and never perceive my own... if i regard myself as a case apart from others--mere ‘its’ in whom i cannot recognize other ‘i’s’?” (freire 90). the explicit call for modesty and humility applies to both participants and facilitators as freire implores dialoguers to “learn more than they now know” (90). the problem-posing method also calls members to be charitable, recognizing that ideas come from other situated subjects, who are working toward a shared goal. the banking model, on the other hand, relies on a “mechanistic view of reality” and thus a mechanistic view of consciousness (freire 130). if members assume the other consciousnesses with whom they are engaging are like machines, they are less likely to be charitable and supportive, such that epistemic failures are attributed to poor programming or hardware (i.e., education or intelligence) rather than seen as an opportunity for fruitful dialogue. conclusion: testimonial justice for young people since dialogue is the fabric of p4c, testimonial injustices are much less likely to occur in p4c settings than in traditional educational settings and in the environments they condition, including current public spheres. dialogue can only happen via the sharing of testimony, and p4c puts great emphasis on the dialogues that can take place between young people. insofar as young people learn in an environment in which others’ testimony is central to developing understanding, testimonial injustices are not systemically sustained under p4c. unlike traditional educational settings which impose self-doubt on students, p4c encourages students to form and answer their own questions (without thinking that they are infallible), thus developing the epistemic skills necessary for critically engaging with the world. p4c’s facilitation of discourse among young people and cultivation of epistemic virtues are critical for healthy public discourse. on the one hand, by promoting epistemic virtues in young people, we help ensure that these young people, when they are adults, exercise the epistemic virtues with the young people with whom they interact, leading to less testimonial quieting and better dialogue. a future senator who recognizes young people as valuable interlocutors may not silence the young sunrise activists and may instead trust their ability to engage in honest dialogue. more importantly, however, if young people today experience less testimonial quieting in their schooling, where they spend a great deal of their time, they are less likely to smother themselves. young people analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 13 who cultivate epistemic virtues in educational spaces that encourage them to employ their own experiences and interests to produce meaningful discourses become more resilient to epistemic injustices that pervade the public's treatment of their testimony. they become more confident to speak truth to power. p4c, rather than cultivating epistemic self-doubt, promotes and develops epistemic confidence as a virtue demanded by discourse in a cpi. young people, especially marginalized young people including young people of color, develop the license to speak their mind and gain the ability to demand that those words are heard. testimonial smothering regarding political and public discourse among young people should therefore become much rarer when education focuses on dialogue and cpis. this is critically important for the vitality of discourse because it opens the door for meaningful public debate, such as that provided by blm, the sunrise movement, and never again msd, to include many more young people. as these groups and others grow in size and importance, it will become more difficult for adults with public power to ignore these meaningful voices and perspectives. references abdullah, thandiwe. “what this black lives matter teen activist thinks never again msd misses about the gun debate.” bustle, 25 march 2018, https://www.bustle.com/p/what-this-blacklives-matter-teen-activist-thinks-never-again-msd-misses-about-the-gun-debate-8587893. “about.” black lives matter at school, 7 august 2018, https://blacklivesmatteratschool.com/about/. adler, ben. “conservative media smears trayvon martin.” the nation (blog), 27 march 2012, https://www.thenation.com/article/conservative-media-smears-trayvon-martin/. alcindor, yamiche. “black lives matter coalition makes demands as campaign heats up.” the new york times, 1 august 2016, sec. u.s. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/02/us/politics/black-lives-matter-campaign.html. alvarez, lizette. “florida sit-in against ‘stand your ground.’” the new york times, 11 august 2013, sec. u.s. https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/12/us/dream-defenders-arent-walking-out-on-theirflorida-protest.html. astor, maggie. “florida legislator’s aide is fired after he calls parkland students ‘actors.’” the new york times, 20 february 2018, sec. u.s. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/20/us/florida-shooting-benjamin-kelly-actors.html. bromwich, jonah engel. “parkland students find themselves targets of lies and personal attacks.” the new york times, 27 march 2018, sec. u.s. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/27/us/parkland-students-hogg-gonzalez.html. burroughs, michael d., and deborah tollefsen. “learning to listen: epistemic injustice and the child.” episteme vol. 13, no. 3, 2016, 359–77. chambers, samuel. the lessons of rancière. oxford, oxford university press, 2013. “data snapshot: school discipline.” civil rights data collection, u.s. department of education office for civil rights, march 2014. https://ocrdata.ed.gov/downloads/crdc-schooldiscipline-snapshot.pdf. dotson, kristie. “a cautionary tale: on limiting epistemic oppression.” frontiers: a journal of women's studies vol. 33, no. 1, 2012, 24-47. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5250/fronjwomestud.33.1.0024. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/20/us/florida-shooting-benjamin-kelly-actors.html analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 14 dotson, kristie. “tracking epistemic violence, tracking practices of silencing.” hypatia vol. 26, no. 2, 2011, 236-57. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2011.01177.x. epstein, rebecca, jamilia j. black, and thalia gonzález. “girlhood interrupted: the erasure of black girls’ childhood.” center on poverty and inequality: georgetown law, 27 june 2017. https://www.law.georgetown.edu/poverty-inequality-center/wpcontent/uploads/sites/14/2017/08/girlhood-interrupted.pdf. freire, paulo. pedagogy of the oppressed. 30th anniversary ed., new york, continuum, 2000. fricker, miranda. epistemic injustice: power and the ethics of knowing. oxford, oxford university press, 2007. goff, phillip atiba, matthew christian jackson, brooke allison lewis di leone, carmen marie culotta, and natalie ann ditomasso. “the essence of innocence: consequences of dehumanizing black children.” journal of personality and social psychology vol. 106, no. 4, 2014, 526–45. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0035663. green, nadege. “in parkland, shutting down a black lives matter statement days before shooting.” wjct public media, 6 april 2018. https://news.wjct.org/post/parkland-shutting-down-blacklives-matter-statement-days-shooting. hogg, david, and emma gonzález. “since parkland, we’ve been demanding action. now it’s time to join us.” washington post, 5 november 018, sec. perspective. https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2018/11/05/since-parkland-weve-been-d manding-action-now-its-time-join-us/. “k-12 education: discipline disparities for black students, boys, and students with disabilities.” report to congressional requesters. united states government accountability office, march 2018. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-18-258. lind, dara. “black lives matter vs. bernie sanders, explained.” vox, 11 august 2015, https://www.vox.com/2015/8/11/9127653/bernie-sanders-black-lives-matter. lipman, matthew. “philosophy for children: some assumptions and implications.” children philosophize worldwide: theoretical and practical concepts, edited by eva marsal, takara dobashi, and barbara weber, frankfurt am maim, peter lang, 2009, 23–43. locke, john. an essay concerning human understanding. hackett publishing, 1996. lone, jana mohr, and michael d. burroughs. philosophy in education: questioning and dialogue in schools. rowman & littlefield, 2016. lopez, german. "it’s official: march for our lives was one of the biggest youth protests since the vietnam war." vox, 26 march 2018, https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2018/3/26/17160646/march-for-our-lives-crowd-size-count. @marcorubio. “claiming some of the students on tv after #parkland are actors is the work of a disgusting group of idiots with no sense of decency.” twitter, 20 february 2018, 6:04 p.m., https://twitter.com/marcorubio/status/966071116447010821. mezzofiore, gianluca. “no, emma gonzalez did not tear up a photo of the constitution.” cnn, 26 march 2018. https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/26/us/emma-gonzalez-photo-doctored-trnd/index.html. murris, karin. “the epistemic challenge of hearing child’s voice.” studies in philosophy and education vol. 32, no. 3, 2013, 245–59. nagel, thomas. the view from nowhere. oxford, oxford university press, 1989. @oprah. “george and amal, i couldn’t agree with you more. i am joining https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2018/11/05/since-parkland-weve-been-d https://twitter.com/hashtag/parkland?src=hash analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 15 forces with you and will match your $500,000 donation to ‘march for our lives.’ these inspiring young people remind me of the freedom riders of the 60s who also said we’ve had enough and our voices will be heard. twitter, 20 february 20, 2018, 5:36 p.m., https://twitter.com/oprah/status/966079086379507712. “oprah winfrey’s comments about recent protests and ferguson spark controversy.” people.com, 1 january 2015. https://people.com/celebrity/oprah-on-recent-protests-andferguson/. pareene, alex. “why rush limbaugh and the right turned on trayvon martin.” salon, 2 april 2012. https://www.salon.com/2012/04/02/why_rush_limbaugh_and_the_right_turned_on_trayvo n_martin/. piaget, jean. the child’s conception of the world. rowman & littlefield, 2007. rancière, jacques. disagreement: politics and philosophy. translated by julie rose. 1st ed., university of minnesota press, 2004. reynolds, barbara. “i was a civil rights activist in the 1960s. but it’s hard for me to get behind black lives matter.” washington post, 24 august 2015, sec. posteverything. https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/08/24/i-was-a-civil-rights-act vist-in-the-1960s-but-its-hard-for-me-to-get-behind-black-lives-matter/. schmidt, samantha. “rep. steve king’s campaign ties parkland’s emma gonzález to ‘communist’ cuba.” washington post, 26 march 2018, sec. morning mix. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/03/26/rep-steve-kingscampaign-ties-parklands-emma-gonzalez-to-communist-cuba/. seelinger, lani. “parkland survivors have formed a new group & you need to know what they stand for.” bustle, 19 february 2018, https://www.bustle.com/p/what-is-never-again-msdparkland-survivors-are-standing-up-to-politicians-the-nra-8262680. @shawnharrisonfl. “tonight mr. kelly was terminated from his position as my district secretary. i am appalled at and strongly denounce his comments about the parkland students. i am again sorry for any pain this has caused the grieving families of this tragedy.” twitter, 20 february 2018, 8:09 p.m., https://twitter.com/shawnharrisonfl/status/966102446425739264 staples, brent. “at school, it matters if you’re black or white.” ny times taking note (blog), 28 march 2014. https://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/03/28/at-school-it-matters-ifyoure-black-or-white/. stevens, matt. “‘skinhead lesbian’ tweet about parkland student ends maine republican’s candidacy.” the new york times, 18 march 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/18/us/politics/maine-republican-leslie-gibson.html. sunrise movement bay area. live video inside senator dianne feinstein's san francisco office. facebook, 22 february 2019 https://www.facebook.com/bayareasunrise/videos/2101109139978731/. “sunrise principles.” sunrise movement. accessed 13 june 13 2019, https://www.sunrisemovement.org/principles. theoharis, jeanne. “the civil rights movement, distorted: weaponizing history against black lives matter.” salon, 31 january 2018. https://www.salon.com/2018/01/30/the-civil-rightsmovement-distorted-weaponizing-history-against-black-lives-matter/. thunberg, greta. “‘you did not act in time’: greta thunberg’s full speech to mps.” the https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/08/24/i-was-a-civil-rights-act analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 16 guardian, 23 april 2019, sec. environment. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/apr/23/greta-thunberg-full-speech-to-mpsyou-did-not-act-in-time. wanshel, elyse. “those images of emma gonzález ripping up the constitution are fake,” huffington post, 26 march 2018, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/parkland-student-emmagonzalez-ripping-up-the-constitution-fake_n_5ab934efe4b054d118e5aeb8. address correspondences to: sarah vitale, phd department of philosophy nq 211 ball state university 2000 w university avenue muncie, in 47306 sevitale@bsu.edu owen miller ball state university, class of 2020 department of philosophy ball state university 2000 w university avenue muncie, in 47306 otmiller@bsu.edu mailto:sevitale@bsu.edu mailto:sevitale@bsu.edu analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 65 unintended lessons: what typically developing students learn from the inclusion and exclusion of students who receive special education services carol hines introduction ne of the hallmarks of the public education system in the united states is its diversity. while in other countries, students are segregated in academic and vocational tracks, in the us students commonly attend the schools in their neighborhood with other students from the neighborhood. in 1954, the supreme court struck down the idea of separate but equal in brown v. the board of education and mandated that schools be desegregated. in 1975, public law 92-142 mandated the free appropriate public education (fape) to students with disabilities. subsequent legislation (idea-1997, idea-2004) has specified that students with disabilities are to be educated in the least restrictive environment (lre). lre means that, to the maximum extent appropriate, school districts must educate students with disabilities in the regular classroom with appropriate aids and supports, along with their nondisabled peers in the school they would attend if they were not disabled. the first placement that must be considered is the general education classroom alongside typically developing peers. it is only if this placement is deemed to be ineffective that segregation is to be considered. demographic studies suggest that most students with disabilities are receiving at least 80% of their education in general education classrooms. however, there are still many districts that interpret lre in a broader sense, and routinely segregate students with disabilities. disability activists such as gallagher (2006), naraian (2017), valle & connor (2010), danforth & gabel (2006), kliewer (2014), and gabel & connor (2014) have argued for broadening the policy of including students with special education needs in the same classroom as their typically developing peers: a philosophy known as inclusion. while these scholars agree that inclusion is a good idea, the term inclusion can be defined in many different ways. when pl 94-142 was first enacted, having students with disabilities in their neighborhood school was considered inclusion, even if they were segregated into a separate class. currently, students with disabilities can be placed in general education classrooms, but may spend their day working with an instructional assistant on a separate curriculum and have little interaction with their peers. for example, while the general education students work on multiplying fractions, the student with o analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 66 disabilities works in the back of the room with an assistant placing four plastic counting bears on a large numeral 4. other students may be placed in general education classrooms, but receive a majority of their services in a pull out model, meaning that they are absent from the classrooms for a part of the day. finally, some schools define inclusion as having students with disabilities attend assemblies and non-academic subjects with their typically developing peers. debates continue to rage about whether students who receive special education services are better placed in full inclusion or in a separate placement. many also question whether having special education students in the general education classroom helps or harms the progress of the typically developing students (cosier, 2014: brantlinger, 2006; gallagher, 2006; rice, 2006). my purpose in this paper is not to recount or weigh in on those debates, but rather to pose the question of how typically developing students’ views on society may differ depending upon their experience with inclusive or segregated special education placements. i borrow the concept of unintended consequences from the study of social policies that indicate that solving one problem can cause unanticipated other problems. in his seminal work, robert merton (1936) refers to “purposive social action” (p. 894). as it relates to this topic, the purposive social action is the mandating of public education for students with disabilities in the least restrictive environment. i propose that the purpose of this social action was to move us toward a society that is more inclusive of people with disabilities. i question whether, in our move toward inclusion, we are actually teaching some of our typically developing students that people with disability are not includable? i will begin by describing two different educational settings with which i am familiar. in the first setting, students with disabilities received their special education services in a separate classroom called a special day class (sdc). in the second scenario, students with disabilities receive their special education services in a classroom with their typically developing peers. i will go on to describe the theoretical foundations for each of these placement models, and finally examine the unintended lessons that could emerge in these two settings. finally, i explore the ways these unintended lessons might change the students’ view of society outside of the school setting. two scenarios allow me to begin by explaining my connection to the following two settings. i was a teacher at jefferson elementary school for six years. the classroom i describe is my own. i became familiar with crafton elementary in multiple visits in my role as a university clinical practice supervisor for a student teacher. the notable difference in approach in these two settings prompted my questions on this topic. the first setting described is jefferson elementary school, which is in a residential neighborhood in a mid-sized city in the southwestern united states. it serves 850 students in kindergarten through 6th grade. built on the site of what was originally a walnut grove, it serves a low income community. 83% of its student qualify for free or reduced lunch. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 67 in addition to the general education classes offered at jefferson, the school also has four special day classes (sdcs). these special education classes are located in the elementary school, but much of the oversight for these classes comes from the district program specialist. these classes contain only students who have disabilities. two of these special day classes serve students with moderate to severe disabilities. it is the primary classroom for grades kindergarten through third grade that is the setting for this scenario. students in this classroom may require significant support in the areas of mobility, communication, skills for daily living, and academics. their education is usually focused on helping them to function in the most independent way possible given the extent of their disabilities. the expectations are that these students will not receive a high school diploma, but a certificate of completion. there is also the expectation that these students will continue to need significant support in their adult years. in a special day class, the reading curriculum teaches letter sound associations as is common in other primary classrooms, but this classroom curriculum also focuses on sight words. the aim is to have students learn 500 functional words that will help them to live more independent lives in adulthood. the curriculum is modified according to each student’s capacity. some may be working on tracing the first letter in their first name, and others might be constructing sentences or paragraphs. math may be placing four counting bears on an enlarged number four as mentioned above, or it may involve double digit addition or subtraction with regrouping. the whole class lessons are built around literature, seasonal topics, and general literacy and math skills. the small group work is ability based, and each group does activities that are specific to their level of performance. some students in the class may attend to personal needs independently, but others may require more assistance with activities of daily living such as eating and toileting. the setting of the classroom is on the edge of the campus, and the classroom has its own restroom that contains adaptive toilets and a lift table for students who require diapering. this restroom is kept locked so that the adaptive equipment will not be tampered with by unsupervised students. interaction between the special day class students and the general education students happens during a joint recess time. the students in the special day class have an extra layer of supervision with the instructional assistants shadowing the students for protection and redirection. the students who use wheelchairs and walkers are generally accompanied by instructional assistants. during the breakfast and lunch meal, the students eat in the cafeteria, but at a separate table with support as needed from the instructional assistants. the sdc students participate in most assemblies, usually sitting at the edge of the rows of children so that the wheelchairs can be readily moved in and out of the multi-purpose room. at the beginning and end of the day, most of the sdc students arrive by bus. they are the only students at the school who receive bussing. the bus drops off and picks up at the door to the analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 68 cafeteria, which is about 100 feet from the front gate of the school through which all other student enter and exit. the two students who live close enough to walk to school also enter through the cafeteria doors. in the second elementary setting observed, a different approach is used. crafton elementary school is located in a small farming community in rural midwestern united states. it serves 282 students in pre-kindergarten through 5th grade. 33% of the student qualify for free or reduced lunch and 91% of the student population is caucasian. over the last decade or so, the crafton school district has become more intentional in implementing its goal of full inclusion for students with disabilities. oversight for these students happens at the site level with the elementary principal overseeing the program. at crafton elementary school, there are three special educators; one serves kindergarten and first grade, one serves second and third grade, and one serves third, fourth, and fifth grade. there are no separate settings for students with disabilities, and each student receives services in a general education classroom. many of the lessons in these general education classrooms are co-taught with a general education and special education teacher. the teachers at each grade level are provided one hour of coplanning time per week during the school day. during this time, the co-teachers determine learning targets and plan lessons. for observers in the crafton classrooms, it is not always evident which students are receiving special education services. the students are intermingled with their typically developing peers in various groups. as is true at jefferson elementary, differentiation of instruction is evident in many of the lessons, but this differentiation happens across the entire classroom population, not only for the students who qualify for special education services. the differentiation may be leveled assignments, different levels of scaffolding, extra time to complete tasks, small group reviews, and additional practice. because of the rural nature of the community and the resulting lack of specialized personnel, the approach to special education is quite different at crafton as compared to jefferson. in a large district with a variety of specialized settings, the task is to find the correct setting for students who qualify for special education services. in crafton, each student is assessed to determine his/her educational needs, and then decisions are made about how best to provide for those needs in a general education classroom. in one crafton kindergarten classroom, six of the fifteen students qualify for special education services, with an additional student receiving speech and language services. for the majority of the day, all of the students are in the classroom, although any of the students may be occasionally removed from the classroom for individual assessments. some lessons are presented on the carpet in a whole group setting, and these lessons are commonly followed by small group instruction at three separate tables. each of the groups is of mixed ability, and the teacher or assistant assigned to each analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 69 table helps all of the students at that table. because of common planning time, each of the adults in the room is aware of students’ current levels and academic goals. another structural note is the opportunity for student choice time built into the daily schedule. following a whole group lesson, students are allowed to pick from a menu of five options that include read to self, read with a friend, writing, and computer games. students who require additional practice or re-teaching often have their needs met in short one-to-one sessions. theoretical frameworks these two scenarios grow out of different theoretical frameworks. the scene at jefferson elementary can best be understood when viewed through the medical model as a theoretical lens. before 1974, when pl 94-142 guaranteed education for students with disabilities, the professionals assisting children with disabilities were located within medical and therapeutic settings. early special education was a natural extension of this history. valle and connor (2011) describe the ways in which the medical model aligns with traditional public special education. for the sake of clarity, the following description includes the medical terminology in parentheses after each component. the student (patient) presents with education issues (symptoms). the school psychologist (scientific expert) performs an assessment (examination) in order to determine a possible disability (diagnosis). an education plan is written (prescription) and the individualized instruction in special education (course of treatment) is begun in order to remediate (cure) the student (patient). annual iep meetings (follow-up appointment) determine whether the placement (treatment) is working. operating in a medical model leads naturally to the segregated placement at jefferson. the assumption is that the students with disabilities need different services than students without disabilities. the professionals who educate (treat) them have a different set of skills than those who educate the typically developing students. there is also a built-in assumption that the students in special education should stay in that placement until they are cured and can operate at the same level as their typically developing peers. some of the isolation may even come from the practice of keeping sick individuals away from the healthy to prevent contamination. in contrast, the scene at crafton elementary grows from a social model of disability. in this model, the disability is not located in the individual with the impairment, but is located in the social construction of disability (valle & connor, 2010; ferri, 2006). the argument is that impairment is a natural and universal component of diversity, and it is only the social construction of disability that causes problems for the individuals with disabilities. when the teachers at crafton are meeting the student with a disability, the question is not about how to fix the child, but how to fix the classroom or school to make it accessible to the child. because the disability isn’t located within the child, there is no question about whether (s)he belongs in a different or segregated placement. let me clearly state that the severity of the disabilities of the students in these two classrooms are different. the students at jefferson with the most severe disabilities may or may not have their analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 70 educational needs met in a general education setting. however, there are several students at jefferson who are at a similar developmental level as the students at crafton. for these students, it is their respective districts’ theoretical framework that places students in either inclusive or segregated settings. unintended lessons having described the two settings and given their theoretical foundations, i move now to what i fear are the unintended lessons we teach to typically developing students through our practices of in(ex)clusion. who gets to belong? the first lesson i fear we teach is that only students who measure up to the norm get to belong. students in elementary classrooms are capable of making their own observations about what is normal based on what they see around them. in the days before racial integration of schools, students, and other denizens of schools, had strong opinions about who got to belong in white schools. when brown v. board of education changed the federal policies about racial integration, schools struggled with the paradigms they had created about who belonged and who didn’t belong in schools. if students are taught that individuals with disabilities don’t get to belong in schools, they are likely to carry this lesson into their adult lives. the assumptions from childhood will carry over to who gets to belong in the workplace, in the club, in the community of faith, and even in the neighborhood. danger/protection another lesson i contend we are teaching our students in segregated classrooms is that people with disabilities either pose a threat to, or need to be protected from, society. separate placement for students with disabilities can send the message that they are dangerous and may cause harm or injury to students without disabilities. students who learn this message are likely to be frightened or intimidated by the unknown. conversely, typically developing students could assume that the reason for the separation is to protect the individuals with disabilities. the segregated students may be seen as fragile and vulnerable. they could be in danger from being with their typically developing peers. the separation may send the message that the disability is contagious, and that the separation is designed to prevent exposure and contamination. these messages will affect the way individuals engage with individuals with disabilities into adulthood. students who have learned these unintended lessons are likely to stay away from people with disabilities because they fear they are dangerous, contagious, or because they fear they are fragile and likely to be injured. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 71 ableism the last unintended lesson we teach segregated students is that of ableism. ableism is described as discrimination in favor of able-bodied people. if students grow up in segregated settings, they may learn the message that people who are able-bodied are more valuable than people who are disabled. in fact, students may carry this generalization one step further and hide any difficulties or areas where they need extra support so that no one will suspect them of being disabled. if students fear losing their status as typically developing, they will mask areas of difficulty and misunderstanding. this could limit their access to needed supports in learning. if they are not catching on to concepts as quickly as their peers, students may hide their needs because of the risk of being removed from the favored group. conclusion to review, the literature is full of examples of the advantages and drawbacks of the inclusion of students with disabilities in general education classrooms. my purpose in this article is to explore the unintended lessons we may be teaching typically developing students about people with disabilities. the purposive goal of federal legislation was that people with disabilities would have equal access to educational opportunities and in turn, be more integrated into society in their adult life. but because the federal legislation has been interpreted along a wide continuum of inclusion, students with similar disabilities are placed differently depending upon the preconceptions of individual districts. my fear is that, in districts where students with disabilities are segregated, we are unintentionally strengthening and perpetuating biases. the damage happens in actual time, but the greater fear is that the patterns that we establish in childhood are carried into adulthood and affect the way our students view society. when we segregate in schools, we structure schemas of which people are unaware. these structures must be purposefully dismantled in order for the rights of people with disabilities to be realized. what if these schemas were never constructed to begin with? what if students with disabilities were and are expected to be part of all classroom communities? what if elementary school students learned that people with disabilities are not so very different, or dangerous, or vulnerable? what if learning diversity came to be valued, and the contributions of those with disabilities could be realized in a familiar and inclusive environment? imagine how differently students who experienced inclusion would view who gets to belong, who is dangerous, who needs protection, and their own able-bodied privilege. the benefits are clear for the students with and without disabilities, and for society as a whole. even though inclusion legislation is in place, districts are still needlessly segregating students. we must come to understand the unintended lessons such policies of segregation perpetuate. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 72 references brantlinger, e. a. (2006). who benefits from special education? mahwah, nj: lawrence erlbaum associates. cosier, m. (2014). using numbers and narrative to support inclusive schooling. in danforth (ed.), becoming a great inclusive educator (195-208). new york, ny: peter lang. ferri, b. a. (2006). teaching to trouble. in danforth & gabel (eds.), vital questions facing disability studies in education (pp. 289-306). new york, ny: peter lang. gallagher, d. j. (2006). the natural hierarchy undone: disability studies’ contributions to contemporary debates in education. in danforth & gabel (eds.), vital questions facing disability studies in education (63-76). new york, ny: peter lang. kliewer, c. (2006). disability studies and young children: finding relevance. in danforth & gabel (eds.), vital questions facing disability studies in education (pp. 91-102). new york, ny: peter lang. merton, r. (1936). the unanticipated consequences of purposive social action. american sociological review, 1(6), 894-904. retrieved from retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2084615.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3a1ae857ffc998186287a bdc6af6c1e76f naraian, s. (2017). teaching for inclusion. new york: teachers college press. rice, n. (2006). teacher education as a site of resistance. in danforth & gabel (eds.), vital questions facing disability studies in education (pp. 17-31). new york, ny: peter lang. valle, j. w. & connor, d. j. (2010). rethinking disability: a disability studies approach to inclusive practices. new york, ny: mcgraw-hill. address correspondence to: carol hines ph.d. viterbo university, la crosse, wi assistant professor | college of education, engineering, letters, and sciences cross-categorical special education program specialist cnhines@viterbo.edu analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 34 using communal inquiry as a way of increasing group cohesion in soccer teams alex newby, susan t. gardner, arthur wolf introduction uch has been written about the importance of creating cohesive units in such settings as the military (dvir et al.), the work environment (purvanova et al.), as well as in sports (callow et al.), on the assumption that an increase in the sense of cohesiveness enhances the unit’s performance. what was particularly intriguing to the authors (one of whom is also a soccer coach) is that callow et al. argue that “intellectual stimulation” can enhance group cohesiveness in sports teams. by intellectual stimulation they mean the sort of thinking that emerges when individuals, in “constructive conflict,” are able to view situations from different perspectives, and so are prompted to reexamine their assumptions and to rethink how to go forward (396). this sort of intellectual stimulation, therefore, is not the solitary kind that one might experience in, for instance, doing math problems; it is, rather, the sort that emerges when in communication with others. this kind of “communitive thinking” that emerges when confronted with the challenging perspectives of others is precisely the sort of experience offered to individuals who engage in communities of philosophical inquiry (cpi’s), the pedagogical cornerstone of philosophy for children (p4c). since both authors are deeply involved in the practice of p4c, it seemed like a worthwhile endeavor to test out whether frequent participation in cpis might result in an increased sense of cohesiveness in the soccer team which one of the authors coached. to test out this hypothesis, the authors undertook the following research project. we engaged a team of soccer players (aged 13) in 10 biweekly hour-long cpis on topics we hoped would be of relevance to the players. we asked players to bring questions from which they could choose, and we also provided questions. we attempted to quantitatively measure group cohesion using the group environment questionnaire (geq) (steca et al.) which consists of 18 self-rating items which measures cohesion in the sense of whether individuals perceive their respective goals as meshing, and whether they sense that the team is united in pursuing its goals. we chose to use this measurement tool because of its widespread use in measuring group cohesion in sports teams, but also due to its validity (see below for more detail). our goal was to try to measure whether engagement in cpi’s did, in fact, enhance team cohesion (goal 1). m analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 35 we also included questions from the budner ambiguity questionnaire for the following reason. since the number of cpis was necessarily limited, we needed a measure as to whether there was sufficient exposure to communal inquiry to provide the sort of intellectual stimulation that results in an increase in “communicative thinking.” in other words, if the results showed no increase in team cohesion, we needed to be able to estimate whether this was due to the fact that there wasn’t sufficient cpi exposure (either quantitatively or qualitatively) to have a significant impact to enhance “communicative thinking,” or whether the sort of intellectual stimulation offered in cpi’s does not in fact increase group cohesion. we chose the budner ambiguity questionnaire, as gardner found that an increase in tolerance of ambiguity correlated strongly with an increase in perspective taking. thus, we presumed that an increase in a tolerance of ambiguity would suggest that the group had indeed been exposed to the kind of intellectual stimulation of which callow et al. speak. this, then, was the second goal of this study: to estimate whether the cpi exposure was sufficient (either quantitatively or qualitatively) to have a significant impact on “communicative thinking” (goal 2). as an aside, we were also eager to use the ambiguity questionnaire as a way of trying to disguise the main intent of the larger questionnaire, which was to measure group cohesion. the third goal was experiential: we wanted to experience how easy or difficult it would be to transplant engagement in communities of philosophical inquiry—a relatively academic pursuit, into a group of athletes who came together primarily for the purpose of engaging in physical activity. we viewed this study as a test run so that we might estimate the sort of alterations in the usual cpi format that might be necessary for genuinely engaging sports teams (goal 3) the study description of cpis in a typical cpi, participants sit in a circle and, with the help of a facilitator, inquire about a question that has either been provided by the facilitator or which participants themselves have formulated as a result of being exposed to some kind of stimulus. the present study differed in several ways. for one, in all the cpis, there were always two facilitators together (newby and gardner)—one starting and the other jumping in to ask questions when it seemed appropriate. generating questions also varied. initially, participants were asked to put questions that interested them into a suggestion box that was brought to practices. the questions were then put on the board from which the participants picked. though the participants did indeed put questions in the box, it turned out that they did so primarily to fulfill the request, rather than coming up with questions of genuine interest. thus, though the question “at what age should parents allow their offspring to date?” was put in the suggestion box and was picked by the group, it was evident, after some discussion, that no one was in the least interested in the question because no one was interested analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 36 in dating (note: they were all 13-year-old girls). the same problem arose with the question as to whether parents should allow youngsters to get a tattoo. a new strategy was then adopted, with the facilitators providing the questions. an example of such a question was one taken from alina reznitskaya’s the most reasonable answer on whether, when in competition with another, one should stay silent if the opponent is unfairly penalized in some way. though this question in reznitskaya’s book was about art, it slid easily into the game of soccer and so elicited enthusiastic participation. all the questions that were explored can be found in appendix 1. the sample these questionnaires were given to the fraser valley selects 04 girls’ soccer team: a team of 18 female players aged 13-14. (the experimental group). the questionnaires were also given to the abbotsford soccer division 1 04 girls team (the control group): a local soccer team of the same age but at a slightly lower skill level than the experimental group. measurement tools we chose to measure the group cohesion by using the group environment questionnaire as it had already been shown to be a valid measure of group cohesion. for example, whitton and fletcher write that “a review by carron et al. found substantial support for the validity of the geq.” (70) further, carron et al.’s review of the geq “also found empirical support for geq predictions of variables such as group size, leadership, team building, role involvement, and collective efficacy.” (71) as well, whitton and fletcher note that their study “provides evidence for the multilevel factorial validity of the geq.” (1) the 18 questions of the geq are designed to measure 4 distinct variables: attraction to group-social (ags) (a measure of whether an individual enjoys spending social time with the group); attraction to group-task (agt) (a measure of whether an individual’s goals align with the group’s); group integration-social (gis) (a measure of whether the group actually socializes with others in the group); group integration-task (git) (a measure of whether the group seems united in terms of attempting to reach its goals). see grouped questions in appendix 2. we also chose to intersperse the geq questions with questions about ambiguity from budner’s tolerance of ambiguity scale as a measure of the adequacy of cpi exposure: that is, whether or not there was sufficient exposure to alter thinking (see explanation above). see grouped questions in appendix 2. we gave both the control and the experimental group the questionnaire before the soccer season began (and hence before the exposure to cpi’s) and after the cpi’s at the end of the soccer season. see questionnaire with interspersed questions in appendix 3. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 37 method of analysis we used a t-test to compare (1) the means of each of the 5 variables (ambiguity and the 4 geq cohesion variables) before and after the cpi exposure in the experimental group in order to estimate if the cpi’s had an impact on group cohesion. we used a t-test to compare (2) the mean of each of the five variables before and after the cpi’s of the control group in order to estimate whether simply playing together for a season might have an impact on group cohesion. we then used a t-test to compare (3) the means of each of the five variables between the experimental and the control groups before the cpi’s, as there was a concern that initial cohesion levels might have an impact on the results. we used a t-test to compare (4) the means of each of the 5 variables between the experimental and control groups after the cpi’s as the final estimate of whether there was an increase in group cohesion in the experimental group that was absent in the control group. results variables are as follows: i. ambiguity questions (aq) ii. attraction to group-social (ags) a measure of whether an individual enjoys spending social time with the group iii. attraction to group-task (agt) a measure of whether an individual’s goals align with the group’s. iv. group integration-social (gis) a measure of whether the group actually socializes with other v. group integration-task (git) a measure of whether the group seems united in terms of attempting to reach its goals. (1) means of variables before and after in the experimental group question i (aq) ii (ags) iii (agt) iv (gis) v (git) mean before cpi 5.09 7.71 8.34 6.83 7.08 mean after cpi 5.13 7.99 8.21 6.48 7.10 significance .981 .280 .576 .256 .967 (2) means of variables before and after in the control group question i (aq) ii (ags) iii (agt) iv (gis) v (git) mean before cpi 5.18 6.86 6.57 5.65 5.41 mean after cpi 5.43 6.78 4.86 5.32 5.21 significance .341 .811 .001 .452 .839 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 38 (3) the means of variables between the experimental and control group before the cpi question i (ags) ii (agi) iii (agt) iv (gis) v (git) mean before cpi (exp) 5.09 7.71 8.34 6.83 7.08 mean before cpi (con) 5.18 6.86 6.57 5.65 5.41 significance .808 .017 .000 .001 .000 (4) the means of the variables between the experimental and control groups after the cpi question i (aq) ii (ags) iii (agt) iv (gis) v (git) mean after cpi (exp) 5.13 7.99 8.21 6.48 7.10 mean after cpi (con) 5.43 6.78 4.86 5.32 5.21 significance .239 .001 .000 .009 .000 discussion the first thing of note with regard to goal 1 (measuring the impact of engagement in cpi’s on cohesion) is that there was no significant difference in team geq scores before engaging in cpi’s at the beginning of the season, and at the end of the season (table 1). however, interestingly, there was a significant difference in geq’s scores for the control group, in particular variable iii, but the difference was a decrease in team cohesion after a season of playing together (table 2). by contrast, there was no decrease in team cohesion over the course of the season in the experimental group (table 1). it is difficult to interpret this finding. it may have been that engaging in the cpi’s was sufficient (though not measurable—see below) to prevent a decrease in team cohesion that may happen as a result of the trials and tribulations of disparate individuals trying to work as a unit. on the other hand, since the experimental group had higher scores on the geq to begin with (table 3), it may be that once a team reaches a certain level of cohesion, it can more easily withstand the dissipating forces of what might turn out to be a tiring season. further study would be needed to tease out the answer. with regard to goal 2 (attempting to measure whether this limited exposure to cpi’s was sufficient to enhance the sort of communicative thinking that emerges with perspective taking), the results suggested that this was not the case, at least in the sense that engagement in the 10 biweekly cpi’s within this setting had no significant impact on ambiguity scores (table 1, column 1). on the other hand, we had anecdotal evidence that the experience was fruitful. the following are examples of some of the comments received. "the team is playing much more connected and together." (father after week 4 of the cpi's) "she (dr.sue) helped my grade in socials go up 10 percent"! (player) analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 39 "we are often having these conversations around the dinner table after training" (mother) "we often have fantastic discussions on the ride home after these sessions" (mother) with regard to goal 3 (trying to estimate how easy or difficult it would be to transplant engagement in communities of philosophical inquiry —a relatively academic pursuit— within a group of athletes who came together for the purpose of engaging in physical sport) our conclusion is that running the cpi’s with this group was substantially harder than anticipated. for one, it took a lot of effort (even having a seasoned cpi practitioner as a co-facilitator) to get participants to let down their guard sufficiently so that they would talk openly in front of the group. this may have been because of the nature of the group —namely that it was a sports team who has never experienced this kind of activity during what is usually physical practice. as well, it may have been because of the context in which the cpi’s took place, namely in a classroom right before having practice in the adjacent gym. as well, while we explained to the players that the purpose of these sessions was to enhance critical thinking both on and off the field, more often than not, there was a sense of wonder as to why on earth we were doing this. as well, the process of finding relevant questions by which to inspire genuine inquiry turned out to be agonizing. as mentioned above, though participants were diligent in providing questions for inquiry, as requested, they did so in an utterly perfunctory way. the questions submitted turned out to be questions that were utterly uninteresting to virtually everyone in the group. the situation improved significantly when we read short snippets of stories from alina reznitskaya’s the most reasonable answer, and then asked an explicit question, such as whether, in competition with another, one should stay silent if the opponent is unfairly penalized in some way. interestingly, the most successful cpi was the last, and the topic in question was one of politics, namely whether the so-called “dreamers” in the us should be allowed to stay despite the potential of opening up the flood gates to massive legal and illegal immigration. participants were told that they should consider themselves members of congress and that, at the end of the cpi, there would be a secret ballot as to whether or not the dreamers could stay. (fyi: the majority decided to let the dreamers stay.) the lesson that this on-again off-again participation suggests to us is that genuine engagement in a cpi requires that participants believe that “moving toward truth” on this issue really matters—that the topic is of significant import. indeed, were we to do this study over again, we would restrict topics to those of contemporary social and political importance—as these had the added benefit that participants seemed genuinely pleased to be learning about something of which they were ignorant but which had genuine contemporary importance. finally, we learned from this experience that having two facilitators run a cpi, rather more than one, increases the ease and potential effectiveness of the inquiry. anyone who has experienced stunted participation in a cpi will appreciate what a blessing it would be to have someone beside you who managed, at just the time when the inquiry seems to have come to a dead halt, to come up with a question or analogy that breathes life back into the interaction. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 40 conclusion in summary, then, this study found no evident increase in team cohesion in the experimental group as a result of partaking in cpi’s. however, there was at least no parallel decrease in team cohesion over the season that was evident in the control group. this study was unable to determine if this discrepancy between the control and experimental groups was due, in part, to participation in cpi’s by the latter, or whether it was due to the initial high level of cohesion in the experimental group to begin with. using the tolerance for ambiguity as a measure, the study suggested that 10 biweekly cpi’s carried out in this setting made no measureable impact on the kind of communicative thinking that emerges with perspective taking. we did learn, however, that running cpi’s within a setting that is utterly foreign to academic work, such as a soccer practice, was difficult in the extreme due to reluctance to speak openly of one’s personal opinions in a situation in which one rarely does so, and because of the difficulty finding questions that genuinely grabbed participants’ interest. were a study such as this to be done again, we would recommend more frequent cpi’s, as well as restricting cpi questions to those that are obviously pertinent to contemporary issues. we also highly recommend to all facilitators of cpi’s that they work in pairs. appendix 1—list of cpi questions 1) is it ok to listen to lyrics like this – “i take your bitch right from you, bitch i’m a dog, woof, beat the ho walls loose, hop in the frog, woah, i tell that bitch to come for me”. 2) are your parents justified in deciding whether you can have a tattoo or piercings? * 3) why are dress codes sexist – which evolved into are schools justified in having a dress code? * 4) should parents put an age limit on when their teens should date? * 5) are you justified in taking your cell phone into your room after dinner? * 6) are religious people justified in looking down on atheists? * 7) multiple questions were explored based on a pre-made scenario about thomas and adam who played on the same hockey team but on different teams in football. adam was mad at thomas because he cheated and their team won and adam’s team was eliminated from the tournament. was adam justified in feeling this way? could adam have controlled this emotion, even if he wanted to? if adam doesn’t somehow get rid of this feeling will it effect the way they play hockey? might this conflict between adam and thomas actually be a good thing for the team? 8) the question “what should kelly do” was asked after explaining the scenario between kelly and evelyn. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 41 9) a scenario in which there was a grizzly bear that had to be put down in the yellowstone national park due to it killing two people. the question was “was gunther (park ranger) justified in putting down the bear (based on the scenario)? 10) cpi about daca – the question was posed to the group would you vote as a republican or a democrat with respect to daca (dreamers act). in the above, the questioned marked by an * indicate that they were suggested by members of the group. these sessions lasted for 1 hour and were held approximately every two weeks from november until may. appendix 2 note: starred questions * are those whose answers were transposed so that a higher number on all questions measured an increase in what variable was attempting to measure. ambiguity questions *1 – an expert who doesn’t come up with a definite answer probably doesn’t know too much. *2 – a good job is one where what is to be done and how it is to be done are always clear. 6 – it is more fun to tackle a complicated problem than to solve a simple one. *8 – what we are used to is always preferable to what is familiar. *12 – a person who leads an even, regular life in which few surprises or unexpected happenings arise really has a lot to be grateful for. 14 – many of our most important decisions are based upon insufficient information. *17 – the sooner we all acquire similar values and ideals the better. 19 – a good teacher is one who makes you wonder about your way of looking at things. individual attraction to group-social. *3 – i do not enjoy being a part of the social activities of this team. *5 – i am not going to miss the members of this team when the season ends. 7 – some of my best friends are on this team. *11 – i enjoy other parties rather than team parties. 15 for me, this team is one of the most important social groups to which i belong. individual attraction to group-task. *4 – i am not happy with the amount of playing time i get. *9 – i’m unhappy with my team’s level of desire to win. *10 – this team does not give me enough opportunities to improve my personal performance. *13 – i do not like the style of play on this team. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 42 group integration-social. *18 – members of our team would rather go out on their own than get together as a team. *22 – our team members rarely party together. 24 – our team would like to spend time together in the off-season. *26 – members of our team do not stick together outside of practice and games. group integration-task. 16 – our team is united in trying to reach its goals for performance. 20 – we all take responsibility for any loss or poor performance by our team. *23 – our team members have conflicting aspirations for the team’s performance. 25 – if members of our team have problems in practice, everyone wants to help them so we can get back together again. *21 – our team members do not communicate freely about each athlete’s responsibilities during competition or practice. appendix 3 soccer questionnaire used in this study. 1. an expert who doesn’t come up with a definite answer probably doesn’t know too much. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 strongly disagree strongly agree 2. a good job is one where what is to be done and how it is to be done are always clear. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 strongly disagree strongly agree 3. i do not enjoy being a part of the social activities of this team. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 strongly disagree strongly agree 4. i’m not happy with the amount of playing time i get. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 strongly disagree strongly agree 5. i am not going to miss the members of this team when the season ends. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 strongly disagree strongly agree 6. it is more fun to tackle a complicated problem than to solve a simple one. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 43 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 strongly disagree strongly agree 7. some of my best friends are on this team. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 strongly disagree strongly agree 8. what we are used to is always preferable to what is unfamiliar. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 strongly disagree strongly agree 9. i’m unhappy with my team’s level of desire to win. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 strongly disagree strongly agree 10. this team does not give me enough opportunities to improve my personal performance. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 strongly disagree strongly agree 11. i enjoy other parties rather than team parties. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 strongly disagree strongly agree 12. a person who leads an even, regular life in which few surprises or unexpected happenings arise really has a lot to be grateful for. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 strongly disagree strongly agree 13. i do not like the style of play on this team. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 strongly disagree strongly agree 14. many of our most important decisions are based upon insufficient information. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 strongly disagree strongly agree 15. for me, this team is one of the most important social groups to which i belong. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 strongly disagree strongly agree 16. our team is united in trying to reach its goals for performance. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 44 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 strongly disagree strongly agree 17. the sooner we all acquire similar values and ideals the better. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 strongly disagree strongly agree 18. members of this team would rather go out on their own than get together as a team. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 strongly disagree strongly agree 19. a good teacher is one who makes you wonder about your way of looking at things. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 strongly disagree strongly agree 20. we all take responsibility for any loss or poor performance by our team. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 strongly disagree strongly agree 21. our team members do not communicate freely about each athlete’s responsibilities during competition or practice. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 strongly disagree strongly agree 22. our team members rarely party together. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 strongly disagree strongly agree 23. our team members have conflicting aspirations for the team’s performance. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 strongly disagree strongly agree 24. our team would like to spend time together in the off-season. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 strongly disagree strongly agree 25. if members of our team have problems in practice, everyone wants to help them so we can get back together again. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 strongly disagree strongly agree 26. members of our team do not stick together outside of practice and games. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 39, issue 1 (2018) 45 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 strongly disagree strongly agree references budner, s. (1962). intolerance of ambiguity as a personality variable. journal of personality, 30, 29-50. callow, n., smith, m.j., hardy, l., arthur, c.a., and hardy, j. (2009). measurement of transformational leadership and its relationship with team cohesion and performance level. journal off applied sport psychology, 21: 395–412. dvir, t., eden, d., avolio, b. j., bass, b.m., & shamir, b. (2002). impact of transformational leadership on follower development and performance: a field experiment. academy of management, 45, 735–744. eysenck, h. (1954). the psychology of politics. london: routledge. gardner, susan t. “philosophy for children really works! a repost on a two year empirical study.” critical and creative thinking. march, 1998. purvanova, r. k., bono, j. e., & dzieweczynski, j. (2006). transformational leadership, job characteristics, and organisational citizenship performance. human performance, 19, 1–22. reznitskaya, alina and ian a.g. wilkinson. the most reasonable answer. cambridge: harvard university press, 2017. siegel, daniel. (2012) the developing mind: how relationships and the brain interact to shape who we are. 2nd ed. new york: the guilford press. steca, p, norcini pala, a. and greco a. (2013) “a psychometric evaluation of the group environment questionnaire in a sample of professional basketball and soccer players.” perceptual & motor skills: motor skills & ergonomics, 116, 1, 262-271. sullivan, p. j., & feltz, d. l. (2001). the relationship between intrateam conflict and cohesion within hockey teams. small group research, 32, 342–355. whitton, s.m., & fletcher, r.b. (2013). the group environment questionnaire: a multilevel confirmatory factor analysis. small group research, 45, 68-88. silva, p., garganta, j., araujo, d., davids, k., & aguiar, p. (2013). shared knowledge or shared affordances? insights from an ecological dynamics approach to team coordination in sports. sports med, 765-772. address correspondence to: dr. susan t. gardner professor of philosophy, capilano university, 2055 purcell way, north vancouver, bc, canada, v7j 3h5. sgardner@capilanou.ca mailto:sgardner@capilanou.ca analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 60 what kind of magnet is freedom? susan t. gardner introduction reedom is a magnet. ask any teen chomping at the bit under adult rules. ask any entrepreneur entangled in endless government regulation. ask any child in a war zone who longs for freedom from fear. this “will to freedom” is an appetitive stimulus for us all; a stimulus more foundational than the “will to power” (nietzsche 1895/1992), which is merely instrumentally valuable for the pursuit of freedom. freedom, however, is not a one-stop shop. one individual’s freedom magnet might be freedom of action, another’s freedom from judgement, another’s freedom to participate, another’s freedom from want, another’s freedom from oppression, and another’s freedom of sexual expression. given that, on the surface, this looks like a mass love affair with freedom, it is critical to see that this magnet can also do great harm. the pull of such a magnet might render a person cynically impotent in the face of what seems to be an ever-receding target. as well, the power of a freedom magnet can blind those in its capture to the havoc created by, on the one hand, too much of one kind of freedom (the proverbial kid in the candy shop) and on the other, the harm created within the social system of which the individual is a part. popper refers to this ripple effect of personal freedom to other parts of the social net as the “paradox of freedom” (1945, p. 330); an increase in freedom in one part of a social system can seriously decrease freedom in another part. this paradox of freedom becomes more obviously evident by returning to our original examples. a freedom-seeking rebellious teen can massively decrease the freedom from worry of her parents; unfettered entrepreneurial freedom can decrease the freedom from concern over environmental health for the wider population; a war that ends too soon can establish a tyrant, and so decrease the freedom of future generations, despite allaying the present fear of local children. given freedom’s radiating net, an argument can be made that for a claim for some kind of freedom to be legitimate, it ought always to be accompanied by a corresponding recognition and willingness to shoulder the responsibility of the decrease in freedom that potentially accompanies it. this will be the focus of what is to follow. ultimately, the message that will emerge is that, under the spell of any one kind of freedom, we ought always to look at its potential harm, and try to create a reasoned path through these bewitching sirens. the corollary of that message will be that this is inevitably an unending endeavor; that we ought never to expect a utopian stopping point, or hope that, one day, freedom will have been secured, and so we can all relax from a job well done. precisely because increasing freedom in any part of the system implies decreasing freedom in another, we will always have to work for a fine balance. f analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 61 one exception to this balancing act is the freedom to control one’s attraction to freedom. this self-focused freedom, or what kant referred to as autonomy, carries with it the possibility of promoting both the welfare of the individual and the social system within which the agent functions. that is, unlike the call of the freedom magnets outside the self, this self-freedom does not create a zero-sum situation. it is for that reason that it will be argued that promoting this self-focused freedom ought to be the ultimate goal of any educational initiative, as indeed it is for most practitioners of philosophy for/with children (see e.g., https://www.montclair.edu/iapc/ or http://icpic.org/ and many others). looking more closely at self-focused freedom will be the second major focus of this paper. freedom within a social system in his article entitled “marx’s theory of the state” (1945/1985), popper endorses the marxian assumption that formal freedom (in the sense of the rule of law) does not necessarily translate into material or economic freedom. thus, popper says i believe that the injustice and inhumanity of the unrestrained ‘capitalist system’ described by marx cannot be questioned: but it can be interpreted by what we called the paradox of freedom. freedom, we have seen, defeats itself if it is unlimited. unlimited freedom means a strong man is free to bully a weak man if he is weak and to rob him of his freedom (p. 330). popper goes on to say that just as the state protects its citizens from physical violence, it is the responsibility of the state to protect its citizens from the misuse of economic power. “the state must see to it that nobody need enter into an inequitable arrangement out of fear of starvation, or economic ruin” (p. 331). but why, then, should we not endorse a marxist solution, the end point of which is a classless society and the withering away of the state? the answer is that the freedom/power magnet inherent in all of us ensures that there is little possibility of humans living together in an end-state of frozen equilibrium (an imaginary kingdom of ends). the tug to acquire more freedom, which translates into the will to acquire more power, will inevitably result in disequilibrium, so that some have more freedom than others. and once the tipping starts, there will be nothing to stop it from continuing to tip, unless a countervailing force nudges it in the other direction. what is particularly interesting about looking honestly at the inevitable demise of utopian end-states is that it reminds us of a tendency of which we are all guilty. those of us who are liberals wish fervently for liberals to be forever in power, and we become mightily annoyed when we are forced to deal with those damn right-wing self-serving capitalists. on the other hand, those of us who are conservatives wish fervently for conservatives to be forever in power, and we become mightily annoyed when we have to deal with those demented unrealistic commies. both sides are guilty of misguided wishes. unfettered capitalism will, for sure, institute economic servitude on masses of people. on the other hand, legislation that allows for state intervention to mitigate this consequence will also inevitably increase state power —something always to be wary of in juxtaposition to the pintsized liberty of individuals. so either magnet, on either side, functioning at full velocity, will ultimate destroy freedom. the take-home message of all of this is that we all need to get comfortable with valuing the tension between the countervailing magnets of freedom, and we all of us need to find a https://www.montclair.edu/iapc/ http://icpic.org/ analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 62 reasoned path within this inter-magnetic space so that we may maximize freedom within the entire system in light of forever changing circumstances. reasoning toward freedom versus mere compromise it is important to note at this juncture, though, that finding a path between two opposing forces should not be understood as forever seeking compromise —something joshua greene (2014) demonstrates by asking us to imagine the following: suppose two children are fighting over cake. one wants to split it down the middle. the other wants it all for himself. then along comes the “pragmatist,” ever the catalyst of compromise. “there, there, children. let’s be reasonable now. you get three quarters and you get one quarter” (p. 292). and moving to the adult arena, greene asks …should grown-up liberals, in the spirit of compromise, favor more civil rights for gay couples, but not full civil rights? should open-minded liberals fight for environmental regulations that are strong but not quite strong enough to stave all global warming? (p. 336) since some simple mathematical computation, or what in critical thinking circles is called resorting to the “fallacy of the golden mean” (gardner 2009, pp. 98-99) is a non-starter, what ought to be our strategy when faced with inter-magnetic conflict? according to greene, who presents extensive evidence that evolutionary biology ensures that we all inevitably find ourselves within competing tribes that are anchored in different value sets, our goal ought to be the utilitarian one; that we use our reasoning capacity to maximize happiness. given the tangles that utilitarianism has gotten itself into since its inception, this suggestion doesn’t seem particularly helpful. and greene provides little additional guidance except to say that the ultimate goal ought to be the use of reasoning to help persuade ourselves and others to be less tribalistic (p. 340). he says that this capacity to reason our way above selfish and tribal claims is a meta-moral ideal that “is a distinctly human invention, a product of abstract reasoning. were we limited to our selfish and tribal instincts, we would be stuck” (p. 345). since the kind of reasoning that would keep our selfish and tribal claims at bay requires the onerous, ponderous, time-consuming task of slow thinking (kahneman 2013), this suggestion may be viewed by some as exhausting and disheartening. and the fact utilitarianism has been around for over 200 years and yet we still haven’t been able to “get it right,” is the source of much cynicism and disengagement in many of our youth. it is for that reason that we must spread the good news: not getting it statically right is the whole point! as long as we maintain the formal freedom to toss “the bums out” so as to short-circuit a potential cascade into tyranny (popper, p. 333), our job is to get stuck in there and keep this forever flopping freedom-circle afloat by engaging in slow, non-tribalistic, i.e., unbiased, reasoning as best we can. in so doing, we do our part in helping to maximize the potential freedom of all. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 63 adam gopnick (2019), in defending what he refers to as darwinian liberalism (p. 57), makes a similar claim when he says that “one of the things that distinguishes liberalism is the readiness to accept that social reform is always going to be essential. each time we alter a society, new inequalities and injustices appear and are in need to remedy (p. 45); no sane society reaches a secure balance point” (p. 47). freedom within the self self-focused freedom has been referred to by many names: authenticity, self-legislation, agency, and autonomy are the most common. the philosopher most obviously associated with the notion of autonomy is immanuel kant, the same philosopher also associated with promoting reason as the highest good. we should all be like data, the android on star trek, and then we would be autonomous —completely cut off from the pull of our annoying freedom-destroying appetites— or so a not-uncommon interpretation of kant goes. but surely, goes the answering critique, kant must be wrong by suggesting that reason is the pinnacle to which humans ought to strive. according to hume, reason can only ever have instrumental value; it is inevitably the slave of the passions. and according to findings in contemporary neuroscience (damasio 2010, p. 175), animate action is always and only instigated by “somatic marking,” or what might otherwise be called the pings of emotion. but if this is true, if reason has no intrinsic value, then the question arises as to why any of us ought ever to attempt to be reasonable? this was a question that kant took seriously and his answer can be articulated as follows: we ought to be reasonable so that we can maneuver around the forces of the various freedom magnets to which we are subject, and thereby gain the freedom to be in charge of our own freedom. this is valuable because, for self-conscious symbol-using entities, there are two kinds of survival: biological survival, and the survival of the identity of self-conscious self to whom various predicates may or may not stick. in other words, survival energizes qualitatively different kinds of freedom magnets: the freedom to do what your body (emotions) tells you to do, and the freedom to be whom you want to become. from the point of view of these two kinds of magnets, it can be suggested that the difference between hume and kant is not so much centered on the role of reason, but rather with regard to the freedom magnet on which they focus. in reading hume, one assumes (at least on first reading) that the passions to which he refers are those of the body; in reading kant, one assumes that the passion that creates a sense of duty is in service of ensuring the survival of the self as a self-legislator. the difference between these two kinds of freedom magnets is also interestingly in line with contemporary psychological studies done on the difference between seeking happiness versus seeking meaning1 (baumeister 2018). baumeister notes that while meaning and happiness often overlap, they are not the same, and indeed, often compete (p. 21). baumeister says of happiness that presumably it “began in evolution when organisms felt pleasure in connection with having their needs satisfied” (p. 21). meaningfulness, however, has to do with judgements about the self; it is tied to earning the respect of one’s peers or even from imagined posterity (p. 21). studies have shown that the higher importance people assigned to identity issues, the more meaningful they considered their lives (p. 29). other differences included the fact that people who judge themselves as “takers” tend to score high on happiness, while people who judge themselves as “givers” tend to score high on meaning (p. 26); people who had high scores on happiness tended to live in “the now,” while people who had high analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 64 scores on meaning tended to view their lives from a more temporal spread (pp. 24-26); and people who focused on happiness were less focused on self-control (with some even viewing self-control as self-harming (p. 31)), while self-control was absolutely critical for enhancing meaning. in summarizing these findings, baumeister concludes that “the happy life is one of ease and enjoyment, focused on taking pleasures in the present. the meaningful life is oriented toward the future, concerned with constructing and expressing the self, and heavily involved in sociocultural activities” (p. 32). he adds that we should assume that a meaningful life will include stress and struggle, failures and disappointments; but that these unhappy phases ought to be seen as part of parcel of a highly meaningful life. what is particularly interesting about this body/happiness versus self/meaning distinction is that it beckons us to have another look at utilitarianism: in particular, mill’s attempt to differentiate between what he refers to as lower and higher pleasures which suggests that he would concur with baumeister’s happiness/meaning distinction (though he would refer to both as happiness). thus, mill (1962) says that human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites, and when once made conscious of them, do not regard anything as happiness which does not include their gratification (p. 258). and that there is no known epicurean theory of life which does not assign to the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of moral sentiments, a much higher value as pleasures than to those of mere sensation (p. 258). and we may attribute this to a sense of dignity which all human beings possess in proportion to their higher faculties (p. 260). and, most famously, that surely “it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be a socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. and if the fool or the pig are of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. the other party to the comparison knows both sides” (p. 260). it is of note that mill’s use of the term “dignity” above is very much an echo of kant. in explaining why we should obey our own reasoning that tells us, for example, that fairness requires that i do the housework this weekend in opposition to the pleasure-pull of going out with my pals, kant (1964) says we should do so “not because of any further motive of future advantage, but from the idea of the dignity of a rational being who obeys no law other than that which he at the same time enacts himself” (p. 102). and he goes on to say reason must look upon itself as the author of its own principles independently of any alien influences. therefore, as practical reason or as the will of a rational being, it must be regarded by itself as free; that is, the will of a rational being can be a will of his own only under the idea of freedom, … (p. 116). in more contemporary terms, the above can be translated as follows: even if i am free to go out with my pals, i would know full well that it is my various bodily appetites that are in the driver’s seat. by contrast, if i reason that i should not go out because it would be “unfair,” since i am the one doing the reasoning, i am the one in the driver’s seat. it is in this sense that self-legislation, or selffocused freedom, according to kant, is the ultimate of all freedom magnets; it is the source of dignity.2 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 65 nurturing the magnet of self-creation if we suppose that self-legislation, or autonomy, or the seeking of meaning, or the seeking of higher pleasures, is the ultimate of all freedom magnets, then the question arises as to why is it not more pervasive? an answer can be found in mill’s assertion that “if the fool or the pig are of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. the other party to the comparison knows both sides” (p. 260). what this quote suggests is that, while all animate beings are inevitably subject to bodily appetites and hence know that side of the equation, they either cannot or may not be aware of the possibility and importance of the other side of the equation, i.e., selfcreation. this would be in line with charles taylor’s view (2003) that, in earlier times, self-creation was never on the menu, as identity was predetermined and fixed by social structures such as class, gender, ethnicity, etc. since the possibility of self-creation in more contemporary times is the new kid on the block, it is usually ignored, and so results in what taylor calls “malaise of modernity”; a pervasive sense of alienation and a lack of orientation as to who one is and how to become who one wants to be. this, then, according to taylor, is the challenge of our age (p. 72); we all must get involved in formulating a far more precise and hence demanding notion of what the ideal of authentic selfcreation requires of us. taylor’s challenge is a daunting one in light of the fact that our young people are subject, as never before, to enormous pig-pressures; they are endlessly bombarded with marketing forces, the goal of which is to ramp up the chatter of their appetites to buy, buy, buy so that they can have fun, fun, fun; as well as being non-stop exposed to social media that ramps up the envy of all the pleasures that other folks are enjoying. in mill’s terms, this is all one-sided experience. making visible the possibility and existential importance of self-creation is thus an educational imperative. how do we do that? how do we nurture the magnet of self-creation? it would seem that there are at least two necessary components (both of which are central to the practice of philosophy for/with children): (1) that aside from the topics that are the traditional fare in academia, students should also be required to seriously focus on topics that are relevant to the students’ lives and day-to-day decision-making, and (2) that students learn how to think impartially when considering the potential answers to these highly contentious issues. let us deal with these in turn. relevant topics with regard to relevant topics, it is imperative that we first understand that if we want to get students to see that it matters what and how much they buy, what they ingest, who they sleep with, how they interact with social media, what they say and don’t say, what they do and don’t do, etc., then education clearly must focus on precisely the sorts of situations that students, in fact, find themselves in, and in which they will, in fact, have to make self-defining decisions. gardner (2017) refers to this as nurturing a “gathering glance” (p. 209). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 66 this notion of “a gathering glance”—of gathering up the fragments of one’s daily life and having a good hard look —is in step with pierre hadot (2002) who recognizes that wisdom, i.e., how an individual acts in the world, must be engendered by the individual herself focusing on her own value judgments (p. 102). hadot goes on to say that discourse is only truly philosophical if it transforms into a way of life (p. 173), and that risk of the philosopher is that s/he will turn love of wisdom into love of words. despairing of the present state of philosophical education, hadot says: it must be admitted that there is a radical opposition between the ancient philosophical school, which address individuals in order to transform their entire personality, and the university, whose mission is to give out a diploma which corresponds to a certain level of objective knowledge. (p. 260). he goes on to say that the goal of philosophy should be to train people for careers as human beings (p, 260); that the practice of philosophy should be essentially “an effort to become aware of ourselves, our being-in-the world, and our being-with-others” (p. 276). learning to think impartially impartiality requires, referring again to hadot (2002), that one seek to attain a universal vision by putting ourselves in the place of others and transcending our own partiality (p. 276) —a state that pre-exists egotism and egocentricity (p. 279). with regard to agency in the sense of being in charge of the definition of who one is, clearly impartial reasoning (gardner 2017) or what darwell calls “second personal” dialogue, is critical because it is the strongest kind of glue to keep what gardner and anderson (2015) refer to as “self-descriptives” in place. this is so because biased self-definitions are inherently unstable: if one is constantly having to defend whether or not, for example, one is courageous by focusing solely on one’s biased definition, as garcin did in sartre’s play no exit (1989), one’s view of oneself will be worryingly precarious, as it was for garcin, particularly when challenged by an opposing viewpoint. freedom within the self and (not versus) the social system if the above is true, if impartial thinking on relevant topics is a necessary condition of selfcreation, then the startling implication that we come to is that this sort of objective (non-tribalistic) second-personal, impartial reasoning with regard to every day ordinary issues is exactly the same sort of reasoning that is necessary to keep the forever flopping circle of interpersonal freedom afloat. that is, this sort of reasoning not only secures one’s self descriptives, it is also the foundation for creating a reasoned path between one’s own freedom-claims and their inevitable accompanying decrease in freedom elsewhere in the social system. as it turns out, then, focusing on one’s own welfare and focusing on the welfare of society of which one is a part are not antagonistic concerns: they are one and the same. maximizing the freedom of the self maximizes the freedom of the social system of which one is apart. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 67 happiness versus autonomy we are not brains in a vat —though some readings of kant might hint that that is his ideal. but that cannot be his ideal, because if we were brains in a vat, we would have no identifiable self. identity is a product of impartially working through our passions in such a way that we know that that configuration, that is always in flux, is, as far as possible, justified from the point of view of an impartial spectator. our passions are what make up the original marble out of which reason can continuously sculpt an ever-evolving identity. so we should celebrate the passions: the love we have for our significant others, the glass of wine with a friend, the exhilaration of visiting new places, the joy of playing with a puppy. autonomy does not demand misanthropy, nor an austere unhappy life, nor that we pull away from all the ups and downs of life’s roller coaster. quite the contrary. we can create who it is that we want to become only out of the material we have, and that, importantly, includes all the varying magnet-contexts in which we find ourselves. in his book man’s search for meaning (1984), victor frankl emphasizes this very point when he says that it is worse than useless to think that we can construct an identity though armchair philosophizing about what kind of person we want to become. one should not search for an abstract meaning in life —it is like asking what is the best chess move in the world. each person is questioned by his life. he can only answer to life by answering for his own life. to life, he can only respond by being responsible (p. 131). life ultimately means taking responsibility to find the right answer to its problems and to fulfill the tasks which it constantly sets for each individual (p. 98). but, then, one might ask, what happens when the context is barren? how can one create a self when the context is such that one looks upon it with distain, even horror? even then, frankl argues (and as a prisoner in a nazi concentration camp he should know), one nonetheless is responsible for choosing one’s attitude (p. 86) toward the circumstances over which one has no control. all our appetitive freedom magnets can be crushed, yet the freedom to be who it is that we choose to be in the circumstances that we find ourselves in —even if the only choice is how to bare our own suffering (p. 87)— is always ours. of course, a rich environment is often preferable, as it activates all kinds of appetites, which, in turn, will provide the raw material for the creation of a solid self. on the other hand, one must beware that a rich environment can also throw the hedonist drive into full throttle —a tactic that frankl says is inevitably self-defeating (p. 162). this fact, that pursuing happiness can actually decrease happiness is supported by the findings of a recent study (fritz and lyubomirsky 2018) that notes that overvaluing happiness (i.e., strongly agreeing with statements like, ‘how happy i am in any given moment says a lot about how worthwhile my life is’) may be linked with lower well-being. in clinical populations, overvaluing happiness is associated with both self-reported and clinical-related depressive symptoms (p. 106). fritz and lyubomirsky conclude that, in combination with other studies, these findings suggest that “individuals who are too highly motivated to become happier —those who are analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 68 preoccupied with being happy and who seek happiness too often and too directly— may find themselves counterintuitively thwarting their own happiness” (pp. 106-7). thus, instead of chasing after all the goodies that life might have to offer, frankl suggests instead that we pursue a course that we think will make us worthy of being happy (p. 162), a comment that interestingly echoes kant, who says that “a good will seems to constitute the indispensable condition of our very worthiness to be happy” (p. 61). conclusion freedom is a magnet. those of us in the field of education ought to be acutely aware that not only are young people driven to be free to do what they want to do, they are also subject to enormous corporate and social media pressures that ramp up those magnetic forces. despite our worries, we need to assiduously askew the tendency to engage in puritanical finger-wagging in an effort to get in the way of this pursuit of narcissistic hedonism. as frankl has pointed out, no one can tell another what their purpose in life ought to be (p. 11). each of us lives a unique life in unique circumstances, so each of us must take responsibility for carving out ourselves, given the raw material of our talents, our history, our opportunities, and challenges. our job as educators, then, is to introduce our students to the possibility of experiencing what mill referred to as higher pleasures, what kant referred to as autonomy, what frankl refers to as meaning and what is here referred to as the freedom to get in control of one’s own freedom magnets. this kind of education, at least initially, can appear to students in search of happiness as the antithesis of what they seek. this is so because this kind of education can be extremely disquieting, in that it necessitates an exposure to the tension between who it is that they are and who they ought to become, even from their own standpoint (frankl, p. 127). still, frankl says, we should not be hesitant about challenging others with a potential meaning for them to fulfil (p. 127). we need to be courageous in avoiding the not uncommon dangerous misconception of mental hygiene; that what humans need is equilibrium or, as it is called in biology, “homeostasis”; the tensionless state of a happy pig. what humans really need is the striving and struggling for a worthwhile goal, a freely chosen task (frankl, p. 127). what humans need is to be prepared for a fall, and then another fall, as these are inevitably part and parcel of the never-ending road to autonomy and meaning. so, ultimately, kant was right. being free to be in charge of our freedom magnets is the highest good, and the only road to that goal is to be prepared to engage in impartial reasoning with regard to all the every-day mundane decisions that forever challenge us —to try to imagine what a kingdom of ends would decide in the various situations one finds oneself in. and to the degree that kant was also right that this sort reasoning is the source of moral judgment, and to the degree that moral reasoning, in turn, enhances societal wellbeing (as greene suggests), it seems to follow that the best way to promote ethical interaction, or societal wellbeing, is, paradoxically, to encourage our youth to pursue their own highest good. and to the degree that analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 69 educational initiatives such as philosophy for/with children engage participants in dialogical impartial reasoning that focuses on issues that are relevant to self-creation (such as what counts as courage in situation x), to that degree such initiatives are doing double duty with regard to freedom: by promoting freedom within the self, they are also promoting freedom within the social system of which the agent is a part. with this insight in mind, it may be that [w]e can go forward with renewed enthusiasm, and perhaps succeed where dewey failed a hundred years ago, convincing those mired in educational bureaucracy that the payoff of embracing a process with a clear vision for educating thought that guides behavior is one that can no longer be responsibly ignored. whether we like it or not, our kids are in charge of their own actions; for god’s sake let us give them the tools to do so wisely (gardner, 2011, p.80). endnotes 1 in terms of measurement, the 3 happiness items were “in general, i consider myself happy,” “taking all things together, i feel i am happy,” and “compared to most of my peers, i consider myself happy.” the 3 meaning items were “in general, i consider my life to be meaningful,” “taking all things together, i feel my life is meaningful,” and “compared to most of my peers, my life is meaningful.” 2 in contrast to the potential for self-contempt and inward abhorrence if the demands of objective reason are ignored (p. 93). references baumeister, roy f. (2018) “happiness and meaningfulness as two different and not entirely compatible versions of the good life.” the social psychology of living well. eds. joseph p. forgas and roy f. baumeister. new york: routledge. darwell, stephan. (2006) the second-person standpoint: morality, respect, and accountability. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. damasio, antonia. (2010) self comes to mind: constructing the conscious brain. new york: pantheon books. frankl, viktor, e. (1984) man’s search for meaning. new york: pocket book, 1984. fritz, megan and sonja lyubomirsky. (2018) “whether happiness? when, how, and why might positive activities undermine well-being. the social psychology of living well. eds. joseph p. forgas and roy f. baumeister. new york: routledge. gardner, susan t. (2009). thinking your way to freedom: a guide to owning your own practical reasoning. philadelphia: temple university press. gardner, susan t. (2011) teaching children to think ethically. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis, vol. 32, nov. pp. 75-81. gardner, susan t. and daniel j. anderson. (2015) “authenticity: it should and can be nurtured.” mind, culture, and activity. 22 (4) (oct.). pp. 392-401. gardner, susan t. (2017). human agency: its pedagogical implications. international journal of applied philosophy. (jan): pp 207-216. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 70 green, joshua. (2014) moral tribes: emotion, reason, and the gap between us and them. new york: penguin. gopnik, adam. (2019) a thousand small sanities: the moral adventure of liberalism. new york: basic books. kahneman, daniel. (2013) thinking fast and slow. toronto: anchor. kant, immanuel. (1964) groundwork of the metaphysic of morals. trans. h.j. paton. new york: harper. mill, john stuart. (1962) utilitarianism, on liberty, essay on bentham. ed. mary warnock. new york: new american library. nietzsche, friedrich. (1895/1992) “the will to power and the overman.” existential philosophy: an introduction. 2nd ed. ed. l. oaklander. upper saddle river, nj: prentice-hall. popper, karl (1945/1985). “marx’s theory of the state.” ed. david miller. popper selections. princeton: princeton university press. sartre, jean-paul. (1989) no exit and three other plays. new york, vintage. taylor, c. (2003). the ethics of authenticity (11th ed). cambridge, ma.: harvard university press. address correspondences to: dr. susan t. gardner, professor of philosophy, capilano university 2055 purcell way, north vancouver, bc, canada, v7j 3h5. sgardner@capilanou.ca analytic teaching and philosophical praxis analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) editor’s welcome welcome to another issue of at&pp. this first issue of volume 43 consists of four articles and one book review. each of the articles examines a different aspect of philosophy for and with children (p4wc) while the book review explores another innovative way to cultivate ethical reasoning, that of an ethics bowl. the first article by philip cam (“thinking as method”) explores the important work of john dewey and how dewey’s understanding of thinking as a process provides the core pedagogical aims and practices for “intelligent learning.” cam then shows the influence and overlap of dewey’s ideas on matthew lipman’s notion of a community of inquiry. demonstrating the deep conceptual connections between dewey and lipman, cam’s article is reminder of the indispensable contribution these two thinkers make to learning. the second article by erick rosas (“from neutrality to intentionality”) explores important connections between the movement of liberation philosophy in latin america and the pedagogy and aims of philosophy for/with children. rosas both summarizes some of the key assumptions of p4wc and engages the most serious criticisms levelled against it. rosas’s article makes a strong case for the importance of p4wc to unmask the privilege and bias that informs the beliefs of teachers as well as its value to empower young people to see how power and knowledge constrain and restrict their potential. the third article (“the impact of p4c on middle school student’s empathy, perspective-taking and autonomy”) is the collaborative effort of four authors: asgari, whitehead, schonert-reichl, and weber. these authors report their findings from a pilot randomized controlled trial with 6th to 8th graders designed to look at the effectiveness of p4c for cultivating social and emotional competencies (secs) like empathy and perspectivetaking. noting the limited empirical research done in this area of p4c, the authors provide a nuanced analysis of their findings, observing that although no significant differences were noted in the students’ secs a number of other interesting trends were revealed. the final article is by wendy turgeon (“adult picture books as liminal spaces”) and provides a thoughtful overview of a range of picture books. while discussing the various themes of these books turgeon raises a number of important questions about what distinguishes children’s books from those for adults, and why the dividing line between them is more porous than many assume. turgeon’s article identifies a number of distinct themes from each picture book that would serve as ideal topics for philosophical inquiry, and provides some helpful suggestions on how one might lead a philosophical discussion on these various themes. mort morehouse concludes our issue with his review of the ethics bowl way (2022) edited by robert israeloff and karen mizell. morehouse’s review clearly shows that this anthology is not simply about how to hold an ethics bowl competition, but discusses the many ways that preparing and integrating an ethics bowl into one’s classroom curriculum is to embrace an entire pedagogical framework and philosophy. moreover, that ethics bowls are something that various communities can embrace and that extend well beyond the traditional classroom. pax et bonum, jason howard chief editor jason j. howard viterbo university web page master jason skoog viterbo university student assistants faith hemmersbach olivia meyers viterbo university editorial board natalie m. fletcher brila institute, quebec nadia s. kennedy stony brook university, suny megan j. laverty teachers college, columbia university maria miraglia, university of naples federico ii richard morehouse, emeritus viterbo university félix garcía moriyón center for philosophy for children, madrid, spain stefano oliverio university of naples federico ii joe oyler maynooth university, ireland barbara weber university of british columbia aaron yarmel center for ethics and human values, ohio state university publisher viterbo university, la crosse, wi 45601 established in 1981 as analytic teaching at texas wesleyan college and transferred to viterbo in 1993. online copyright 2005. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis is a peer-reviewed, online, open access journal published annually and sometimes biannually. issn 2374-8257 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 92 towards education for 21st century democratic citizenry — philosophical enquiry advancing cosmopolitan engagement (p.e.a.c.e.) curriculum: an intentional critique desireé e. moodley abstract doing philosophy for/with children and exposing students to multiple perspectives, exemplified within the austrian centre of philosophy with children’s implementation project of the philosophical enquiry advancing cosmopolitan engagement (peace) curriculum in schooling, may offer a valuable written, taught, and tested curriculum for democratic citizenry. this paper provides an analysis that seeks to present, describe, critique, and make recommendations on the peace curriculum. the paper asks the question: in what ways does the philosophical enquiry advancing cosmopolitan engagement as a 21st century curriculum address education for democratic citizenry? in this evaluation the ways in which issues of culture and identity, human rights and democracy are perceived and addressed, along with issues of critical thinking and reasoning in verbal and nonverbal language are attended. concepts of collaboration, cooperation, teacher support and development are also critiqued. this critique is based on a ten-day austrian center of philosophy with children conference and training course on the peace curriculum, and consists of open-ended interviews, personal observations, and published reports on preand post-test results of the peace curriculum. exploring the integration of the austrian center of philosophy with children peace curriculum and the philosophy for/with children methodology, this paper utilizes hansen’s (1995) five principles for guiding curriculum development practice as a framework for analysis. it is hoped that findings and recommendations from this study may stir further exploration and contribute to the work of philosophy for/with children in democratic education for 21st century citizenry worldwide. keywords: democratic education, philosophy for/with children, philosophical enquiry advancing cosmopolitan engagement (p.e.a.c.e.) curriculum, curriculum development, 21st century citizenry, critical thinking. ducation for healthy citizenry is essential if children / youth are to be enabled and equipped for 21st century global living. paying attention to both verbal and non-verbal language of students around issues of culture and identity, human rights, and democracy, in a way that is collaborative and cooperative, involves critical thinking and reasoning. explicitly incorporating critical thinking and reasoning for citizenship education into today’s classroom activities requires that educators be fully involved and professionally supported throughout written, taught, learnt, and tested curricular processes. however, the complexity of 21st century classrooms characterised by diversity, multiculturalism, multilingualism, and pluralism make today’s education a challenging proposition. the call for appropriate curricular responses should be a fundamental endeavour of both curriculum designers and their critics alike. it is therefore of local and global importance to pay attention to appropriate curricular models that competently deal with this complexity. the european union e analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 93 unesco supported philosophical enquiry advancing cosmopolitan engagement (the peace project) curriculum, framed around matthew lipman’s (1980) philosophy for / with children pedagogy is one such curricula that offers successful democratic education for local and global application towards education for 21st century democratic citizenry. employing matthew lipman’s (1980), philosophy for children (p4c) approach and pedagogy, the peace project curriculum and practice was co-designed by the austrian center of philosophy with children (acpc) specifically to address the issues and goals of democratic citizenry for social justice in europe. lipman’s (1980) philosophical dialogical approach employs critical, creative, and caring thinking and dialogue through building communities of inquiry (barrow, 2009; farahini, 2013; gregory, 2015; hendricks, 2015; kizel, 2015; lipman, 1998; lipman, sharp, & oscanyan, 1980; murris, 2015; topping & trickey, 2013; vansieleghem, 2014) and thus provides a means of meeting transformative education imperatives across cultural and linguistic divides that addresses issues confronting 21st century europe. this paper provides an analysis that seeks to present, describe, critique, and make recommendations on the peace project curriculum. it seeks to answer the question: in what ways does the philosophical enquiry advancing cosmopolitan engagement (the peace project) as a 21st century curriculum address education for democratic citizenry? the following three sub-questions guide this analysis: 1. in what ways are issues of culture and identity, human rights and democracy perceived and addressed? 2. how are issues of critical thinking and reasoning, both verbal and non-verbal, attended? 3. how are issues of collaboration and cooperation, teacher support, and development met? research from personal participation, open ended interviews, observations, and documents gathered during a ten-day acpc conference and training course of the peace curriculum using p4c methodology, held in graz, austria, provides the framework for this curriculum analysis. utilising published reports of preand post-test results, this paper employs hansen’s (1995) five principles for guiding curriculum development practice as a lens for critique. doing philosophy for/with children — the practice of questioning what is truth— and exposing students to multiple perspectives (westheimer, 2017), as exemplified by the austrian centre of philosophy with children’s peace curriculum in schooling for democratic citizenry, offers valuable written, taught, and tested curriculum. institutional background the austrian center of philosophy with children (the center) was founded in 1985 to advance research, theory, and practice in philosophy with children. responding to a time that saw children in austrian schools around the early 1980s encouraged to rethink their own thinking, the center was set up to help exchange experiences, organize symposiums, and conduct projects. including curricular and staff training, the center was founded to promote education and training for children, youth, and adults, in doing philosophy. philosophy as a subject within school curriculum, as well as an approach across disciplines, was seen as an appropriate vehicle because it is not confined to any one issue or invested in any one body of factual knowledge; this resonated well with the way children sought analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 94 “entirety, perfection and understanding” (acpc, 2017). philosophy for children, the brainchild of american philosopher and pedagogist matthew lipman (1923–2010) was introduced to primary schools in austria by the mid-1980s. the center was founded on lipman’s work on philosophy for children (p4c). a significant proponent of lipman’s work, the center in austria is a founding member of the european foundation for the advancement of doing philosophy with children (sophia) and is an active member of the international council for philosophical inquiry with children (icpic), established by lipman. the center links practitioners and researchers in over 50 countries, and consults with pedagogical institutions, creates projects, writes documentation, and conducts conferences and workshops especially within europe and eastern europe. the center has been in important cooperation with the austrian commission for unesco for the last 15 years. philosophical enquiry advancing cosmopolitan engagement (the peace project), a european union unesco project funded for three years (2013 -2015), involves five countries: austria, germany, italy, spain, and israel. it was a significant macro curriculum project of the center, employing lipman’s approach and pedagogy for citizenship building, a curriculum project in which this author was a doctoral participant trainee. the following section is based on interviews with two of the seminal curriculum designers, three of the original peace project facilitators, and one external quantitative evaluator of the program, as well as ten co-participants of the program —both student candidates and schoolteachers representing six countries (austria, england, germany, israel, slovenia, and south africa). the research is compiled from a ten-day acpc conference, seminar, and training course on the peace curriculum, using p4c as methodology, held in graz, austria in august of 2017. collection and data analysis in keeping with hansen’s (1995) five principles for guiding curriculum development practice and recognizing that curriculum and curriculum change are “complex concepts that lend itself awkwardly, with equal challenge and passion, to theory and practice” (hansen, 1995, p. 31), the following section briefly presents, firstly principle 1, the conceptual framework of the peace curriculum design within cosmopolitanism. secondly, principle 2, a brief exposition of the attitudes and beliefs about learning as exemplified in the thinking of cosmopolitan principles. thirdly, principle 3, a rationale on the practice of adopting p4c methodology. fourthly, principle 4, a brief background to the curriculum planning process, especially the aims and goals of the peace curriculum. and lastly, principle 5, the political realities of the peace curriculum and its implications for citizenship education and democracy within philosophy for / with children. the section concludes with a summary of the key philosophical findings from the data. hansen’s principle 1. the conceptual framework of the peace curriculum design within cosmopolitanism according to two of the seminal designers and theorists of the peace project, the complexity of globalization, along with issues of migration facing the european union (eu), was a pivotal stimulus and challenge that saw the need to develop a responsive curriculum. the construction of a cosmopolitan analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 95 framework of thinking, as expressed by one of the designers, necessitated the development of, “…specific educational strategies aimed at fostering intercultural dialogue and construction of new identities for engagement with the self and the other.”1 educational strategies within a p4c conception offered cognitive, affective, and social tools through which prejudices and stereotypes could be addressed, helping prepare students for active citizenship in a diverse and complex eu society. furthermore, according to one of the austrian facilitators, the issue of intercultural integration needed, “…specific strategies to address prejudice, challenge stereotypes, overcome cultural obstacles, and foster intercultural dialogue.”2 further elaborating on the issue of migrants, and the support required for the integration of migrant populations within the eu, the austrian facilitator also articulated that a p4c approach was the best and most appropriate means to, “…promote complex thinking from primary school age through alternative child learning approaches.”3 the idea of adopting such an approach to support integration of migrant populations was reiterated by one of the curriculum designers and writers of the curriculum who confirmed that p4/ with c was, … a highly validated method to involve marginalised and disadvantaged children in a highquality learning environment, that offered especially children who belonged to different cultures an excellent opportunity for their social development and intercultural integration and recognition.4 a student teacher participant explained during her presentation that cosmopolitanism had a long history with the word “cosmopolitan” coming from the greek kosmopolites, meaning a “citizen of the cosmos”. associated with two aspects: a demand for freedom both cultural and political, and the acceptance of a world beyond the local environment, the stoic sense of the word was described drawing on nussbaum (2001). the participant advocated that the cosmopolitan principle of reconstruction —to rebuild community on moral virtues, and love for humanity that all had in common— “was a moral obligation of education”.5 historically, this moral aspect of cosmopolitanism flourished during the enlightenment of the 18th century, which included the declaration of human rights of 1789. thus, theoretically framed on cosmopolitanism, the peace curriculum is designed on human rights. hansen’s principle 2. a brief exposition of the attitudes and beliefs about learning as exemplified in the thinking of cosmopolitan principles cosmopolitanism, according to the above framework, saw humanity’s obligation to each other as sharers of the planet which stretched beyond local loyalties. all human lives were seen intertwined through beliefs that gave humanity common meaning and experience. cosmopolitan principles, as asserted by another participant, believed that people were different and there was much to learn from these differences. the recognition of human difference was a moral obligation to the other as differences offered a recognition of diversity and situatedness. however, new conceptions of 1 response by one of the peace project organizers to an interview question. 2 response by one of the austrian peace project organizers to an interview question. 3 response by one of the austrian peace project organizers to an interview question 4 response by one of the peace project organizers to an interview question. 5 personal communication with a fellow teacher participant. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 96 cosmopolitanism that have emerged focus more on how a social environment could be built that fully recognized the distinctive and situated character of a person both in a local and globally sensitive manner. it is here that cosmopolitanism was seen as going beyond multiculturalism, cultivating attitudes and beliefs about culture and identity whose implications for learning help demystify diversity. thus, the attitudes and beliefs implicit within the peace curriculum stemming from cosmopolitanism were distinctively inclusive in its recognition of diversity. hansen’s principle 3. a rationale on praxis as seen in the adoption of p4c methodology as explained by one of the program’s designers, and founders of the austrian center of philosophy with children, the conception of cosmopolitanism was best defined as “hermeneutic receptivity towards the other”.6 this conception of cosmopolitanism emphasized dialogue between cultures, empathic understanding of the other, and the recognition of a human condition common to different cultures, in which the self is transformed through the encounter with the other. it was in this conception that lipman’s philosophy and methodology for encountering the self and the other intersected with the principles and thinking of cosmopolitanism. the peace curriculum design embedded the p4c rationale as praxis, recognizing a moral obligation to accept human difference for the enrichment that it brought to understanding of the self. it was here that p4c and cosmopolitanism intertwined with the idea that it was a moral obligation to embark on reflexive critique of the self, made possible through encountering the other. this encounter was explored through specific thinking stories generated as part of the written curriculum. these stories engendered critical thinking and dialogical engagement within a democratic participatory environment. this participation was in practice conceptualised as cosmopolitan critical thought. the elements of selfjudgment, transformation, and transcendence were essential principles in p4c that the peace curriculum employed as praxis for social change. the peace project aimed to develop a cosmopolitan understanding through philosophical investigation in the context of a research community. it aimed to contribute to the kind of cosmopolitan orientation to promote community interaction with the other whilst recognizing the moral obligation to interact in a critical, creative, and comprehensive manner. the possibilities to create democratic principles and moral values, and the need to re-evaluate the self in encounter with the other, according to another of the program designers interviewed, saw possibilities that, …raised the need for criticism and questioning about our commitments and understanding, as we seek (search) the truth and engage in the task of building identity in relationship to the other as individuals and as a community.7 the idea of self-correction was one of the basic concepts of p4c and a necessary condition for praxis in cosmopolitanism employed in the peace project. 6 personal communication with one of the peace project organizers. 7 response by one of the peace project organizers to an interview question. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 97 hansen’s principle 4. the curriculum planning process of the peace curriculum from discussions with one of the facilitators who was involved with the peace project over the full three-year period, each participating country was given specific aspects of the written curriculum to focus on based on the following educational objectives: • improve the development of language and thinking, • develop creativity, • advance personal and social development, and, • encourage tolerance. the emphasis in these educational objectives lay on promotion of autonomous thinking through such philosophical tools as giving, making, and testing assumptions and claims, using examples, giving reasons, planning, discovering assumptions, referring to consequences, use of analogies, promotion of selfand social skills, use of illustrations, and deep listening, among several other thinking strategies and tools. using thinking stories intended to stimulate the raising of student-led questions, philosophical dialogue in communities of inquiry were set in motion toward cosmopolitan community-building and democratic citizenry. each country then explored these objectives at a local level through teacher professional development courses and seminars conducted by trained facilitators over a 6-day period held over consecutive weekends. teachers thereafter implemented the program directly at school level among primary and secondary school learners. a preand post-test quantitative process of evaluation was conducted in all five countries. externally moderated, results of findings showed an over 0.5 (≥p) statistical significance in gains in reading and comprehension as well as increase in levels of student confidence in all five countries (https://peace.kinderphilosophie.at/index.html). the evaluation process of the peace program included focus group reflection and feedback from teachers in dialogue which assisted in the review and revision process before final adoption of the explicit curriculum was made public. the process from design to delivery was a cyclical one. fully informed and interacted upon by all stakeholders, including parents and the community, from whom permissions were sought to implement in schools. the development and implementation of the curriculum was informed and revised at each stage of the process through ongoing feedback and evaluation of effect on both teacher participants and learners at school. democratically, empirically and statistically grounded, data on the peace curriculum’s planning process reveals and confirms the presence of hansen’s 4th principle of sound and scientific curriculum planning. hansen’s principle 5. the political realities of the peace curriculum and its implications for citizenship education and democracy according to both the designers and facilitators of the project, the aim of the peace program as documented was to, …disseminate to the widest possible section of society the idea that it was possible to contribute to the development of a cosmopolitan orientation and engagement amongst future citizens through dedicated educational tools and practices as p4c. (https://peace.kinderphilosophie.at/index.html) https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3a%2f%2fpeace.kinderphilosophie.at%2findex.html&data=04%7c01%7cjjhoward%40viterbo.edu%7c623c87ad4ece4457984b08d9be458e98%7c6b9fc982e8d74958976cb08441cc9b0b%7c0%7c0%7c637750028218343343%7cunknown%7ctwfpbgzsb3d8eyjwijoimc4wljawmdailcjqijoiv2lumziilcjbtii6ik1hawwilcjxvci6mn0%3d%7c3000&sdata=nfzftkeok0xa%2f%2bor5bn7r1ithv7vy0mvowvpy%2fcfu10%3d&reserved=0 https://peace.kinderphilosophie.at/index.html analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 98 as an effective educational approach to developing cosmopolitan engagement, the promotion and enabling of critical, creative, and caring ways of reasoning and understanding was central. using the methodology of p4c in which complex thinking was developed through the construction of communities of philosophical inquiry, the project sought to create a cosmopolitan environment in which children from diverse cultures were able to open themselves to one another as they constructed their own identities. by affirming individual identities, the potential of building a just society offered through p4c was most appreciated. through participation in the project and in communities of inquiry, children, youth, and adults from different spectrums of culture and society were able to engage with one another on equal terms as they sought to construct meaning, develop a worldview, and engage in their own responses to the question: how ought we to live? the political emphasis of the peace project was rooted from its design, through its implementation, testing, and validating of a new p4c curriculum, to focus on cosmopolitan engagement and intercultural dialogue. it was firmly believed that the peace project had a significant impact for educational practices in giving educators specialized professional development, new teaching strategies, and materials. by improving the reasoning and rationalising skills of children, and through creatively making new pedagogical strategies, curriculum, and educational resources sensitive to diverse contexts and countries, the scope of the peace project has been widened. thus, cosmopolitan awareness promoted through the peace curriculum and p4c may serve as a resource beyond the political confines of the european continent. summary of key findings of the peace project as a crucial part of the peace project process, the external testing process and evaluation based on preand post-test scores that began and concluded the three-year project, set into motion the widespread use of a validated curriculum endorsed by unesco. according to the research compiled from testing data, the following are key findings: • the peace educational objectives and emphasis is on the promotion of autonomous thinking of children which in turn enables self-development and the development of social skills. • embedded in raising existential and critical questions examined and explored through critical texts and dialogue, p4c has the potential to be a rich and powerful pedagogical model for education reform as exemplified in the peace curriculum. • philosophy’s central practice of questioning and critical thinking is an obvious choice for teaching thinking skills. possessing the tools of logic and argument necessary for critical thinking, p4c promotes questioning, open mindedness, clarity in language, and precision in thinking, thus offering a means for coherence and meaning that can be explored and employed in all subjects. • the design of p4c aimed at enabling critical thinking through relationships between facts and values, means and ends, and among diverse social groups in the context of holistic, experiential, and contextual learning, raises critical questions central to human concerns about fairness, justice, truth, freedom, responsibility, and right and wrong, which bear significant real-world application. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 99 • the thinking stories interwoven with philosophical, reflective, and critical thinking strategies and tools, specifically written as a pedagogical method, approach, and model for the practice of communities of inquiry, are essential for sharpening awareness, thinking, and social skills, drawing on diverse perspectives in making individual thinking accountable to building a democratic community of peers. • the principles of philosophical inquiry with children include searching and finding meaning, which is seen as a fundamental drive of human beings and of education, and something children are especially preoccupied with. • philosophical argument and the mechanics of the community of inquiry as a pedagogical tool is an essential tool of the quest for meaning making, for oneself and others. • a conceptualization of responsibility, a result of meaning making, is affirmed as fulfilling one’s unique potential operative at all age levels, and is a principle emphasized in the dialogical activity of philosophical communities of inquiry. • ethical relations that involve mutual interpersonal understanding and relationships between oneself and others (both theoretical and practical) that build the social and cognitive understanding human beings seek and thrive on. while the implications of these issues are immense in respect of transformative education that seeks solutions for a free and fair society —equity and equality for all, peace, love and acceptance in coexistence— the peace project highlighted several issues that are both complex and intricate for application universally. these issues and a possible plan of action /recommendations to address them are briefly discussed in the following section. plan of action, theoretical foundation, and recommendations the following issues have been selected based on research from interviews, observations, and participation in the peace project seminar held at the austrian center for philosophical inquiry with children in august of 2017. the application of specific theories to general themes presents a framework for recommendation and action that may help address these issues. these reflections build off the strength of the center’s work over a 30-year period and offer a model of best practices for leading curriculum change and support in europe. the recommendations are offered in the interest of theorising and developing the peace program’s model, in the main for application in other contexts and countries in the interest of democratic citizenry and social justice. issues identified with culture and identity, human rights and democracy • help participants develop a cosmopolitan spirit that combines openness to what is different and what is new, with loyalty to one's own culture and identity. • promote the cognitive and affective abilities of children that are necessary to face the challenge of living in multicultural societies. • promote awareness of the importance of cultural and linguistic diversity in europe, as well as the need to combat racism, prejudice, and xenophobia. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 100 • develop a sense of european citizenship based on the understanding and respect of human rights and democracy. • promote equality and contribute to the fight against any form of discrimination based on gender, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation. recommendation an action plan that addresses the issues of understanding and promoting cultural identity, human rights, and democracy may be underpinned in katz’s (1999) four basic principles. katz (1999) asks the question, “whose story is not being told” (p. 32). in making a recommendation to address this complex endeavour, which recognizes the risks involved in developing openness to differences while fostering cultural loyalty and identity, katz’s four basic principles may assist by “validating the history, culture, and psychology of individuals within a community that…cannot be separated from” the practice of encouraging each member of the community to accept, include, and empathise with others (p. 32). these principles may serve to strengthen the process of building a community of inquiry while philosophizing around issues of culture, identity, rights, and democracy. additionally, fisher and frey (2017), in confirming the challenge of teaching to and for democracy, state that “knowledge of rights and responsibilities of citizens is not passed down through the gene pool. it must be taught” (p. 83). in addressing the challenges of democratic education, fay and levinson (2017), also claim that keeping the balance between ethical and political values should be borne in mind as students are encouraged “to discuss current events or talk with one another about basic civic norms” (pp. 63-64). while the challenge of exposing students to alternative perspectives persists, questioning what really counts for truth / status quo in a political and social climate that often sees these as blurred or biased, offers educators a reason to begin to dialogue and treat issues of beliefs, attitudes, and action as something other than normal (fay & levinson, p. 64). the practice of doing philosophy through the p4c approach offers an educative opportunity for implementation and application of the peace curriculum to other contexts outside of the european union. such investigation may be worth planning for more global action in addressing the issues of understanding and promoting cultural identity, human rights, and democracy. issues identified with critical thinking and reasoning, verbal and non-verbal language • philosophy with children is not a reproduction of factual knowledge but an activity. children should be made aware of their ability for reasoning and encouraged to use it. it resists a onedimensional approach to conceptual reasoning and categorical thinking. • critical thinking helps children to come to decisions and recognize different perspectives and alternatives. children should be enabled to take responsibility in a complex society. it is necessary to encourage children to be independent thinkers to promote their own judgment. this will help them to be tolerant and open to new ideas and solutions. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 101 • interacting with people and experiencing diversity influences a child’s use of language and sharpens his or her perception. training the conscious use of one’s language, listening and observing attentively, forms a critical and open mind that easily resists any attempt at imposing a dogmatic worldview. • philosophy with children helps to realize nonverbal communication standards and to practice and develop one’s own terms and thinking in early years. the main duty of philosophy with children is not only to make children aware of nonverbal communication standards but also to help them practice their own terms and to develop their intellectual power. recommendation in a study of english second language migrant salvadorian students “eager to learn english and adopt new cultural norms in the us”, costello – herrera (2010, p. 88), found that teachers needed to be more “adamant in their support for multicultural education in pursuit of social justice” (p. 88). drawing on peterson’s (1994, in costello – herrera, 2010), five fundamental characteristics of social justice classrooms that value multiculturalism and students’ cultural and linguistic histories, costello – herrera (2010, p. 89), asserted that curriculum needed to be grounded in the lives of students. characterized as “dialogue, a questioning / problem solving approach” (89), with an emphasis on “critiquing bias” and stereotypical “attitudes,” language should be used for “the teaching of activism for social justice” (p. 89). these characteristics, explicitly embedded in curriculum, are recommended to help learners of other languages “fit in and succeed” (p. 89). moreover, the need to shape society in school through language, listening, and speaking was raised in westheimer (2017). in raising the question of what kind of citizens do we need, westheimer (2017, p. 15), recommended that teachers need to “explicitly ‘teach’ lessons in citizenship wherein students learn community organisation, distribution of power and resources and injustice". this taught curriculum should further make explicit the hidden curriculum of “how classrooms are set up, who gets to talk when, how adults conduct themselves, how decisions are made, how lessons are enacted and more” (p. 15). explicitly teaching critical thinking and reasoning, to create classroom spaces that encourage verbal and non-verbal communication within diverse language environments, is offered in the peace curriculum. the aims, goals, and approach of the peace curriculum and p4c within the taught curriculum of schools have the potential to effect change and respect for language, both verbal and nonverbal communication, that can help schools tailor programs in light of societal justice. issues identified with collaboration and co-operation, teacher support and development • philosophy with children is characterized by dialogue that is fashioned in collaboration out of the reasoned contributions of all participants. children learn to give reasons for their own thinking and behavior. • children learn together how to cope with different situations and how to form good judgments. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 102 • the quality of teacher training in europe needs improvement if the full potential of the peace project curriculum is to be realized. we need to support the improvement of pedagogical approaches to global, cosmopolitan, and social issues. recommendations whilst p4c prides itself in its collaborative thinking and narrative pedagogy, it might be worth exploring other strategies for stimulating and engaging philosophical inquiry and dialogue. this action requires teacher support and training. the role of professional in-service development has become a relevant part of education today. in recommending sustained ongoing success through support for adult professional learning communities, fogarty and pete (2010) offered seven protocols as a checklist for those leading curriculum and pedagogical change. among these the sixth protocol suggests an integrative professional learning environment which includes diverse and varied methods. however, research shows that when there is no buy-in among all stakeholders, such initiatives often fail (bryk, 2010). ownership and input from all involved, although cumbersome and time-consuming, has proven to be indispensable in raising awareness, involvement, and effectiveness. teachers are at the heart of the taught and tested curriculum and continue to dominate classroom spaces. the ‘space’ between curriculum design and desired student outcome is dependent on teacher training success in appropriately meeting this gap. however, as glatthorn, baschee, whitehead, & boschee (2016) have indicated, teacher orientation is a crucial factor in addressing school change. raising the concept of mutual adaptation, wherein teachers on receiving professional development training “adapt strategies to fit within their own or the school´s orientation”, weinbaum and supovitz (2010, p. 68), maintain that fidelity of implementation may be accurately evidenced through an iterative process when all levels of the education system implement and achieve change according to “decisions about [the] different components of reform over time” (p. 68). programs designed with specific instruction may work for or against successful implementation. student outcomes with school leadership and teachers being influential on how “reforms are understood and enacted” (weinbaum & supovitz, 2010, p. 68; 70) are to be further considered. in declaring that there is “no-one-best-way” to address school improvement, glatthorn et al., (2016, p. 254), described two basic imperatives, that of teacher input and mastery. among varied development strategies for action that might support teacher orientation and buy-in, the following are recommended: eliciting from members of staff what is needed, providing time and adjusting schedules for planning, sending pairs of individuals to workshops, rotation of substitutes, use of consultants, undertaking online college or university pre-service programs, starting partnerships, engaging community resources, and management planning with the use of matrices (pp. 271-273). the need for real-world relevancy, culturally and socially responsive in supporting teacher professional development for improving curriculum, is especially timely given the demands of 21st century society. sternberg (2011) offered eight ways in which ethics might play a role in the development of curriculum for improving a field of study: authenticity, relevance, active student involvement, concrete principles, responsibility, critical conversations, risk taking, and ethical solutions. here daily life situations are explored through guided questioning for relevance and importance in response to analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 103 living in a globally connected 21st century world (glatthorn, et al., 2016, p. 274). in recommending an action plan using the peace curriculum, which has much to offer in teaching students how to reason, employing sternberg’s suggestions (2011) may be of considerable value. teaching students how to reason “about ethical situations and then following their reasoning with action” (sternberg, 2011, p. 34) needs to be overtly incorporated into professional teacher training if we are to equip children collaboratively with ways to cope with living in a diverse, 21st century global world. conclusion that schools are places where children learn about the society in which they grow up is a given. the complexity of 21st century classrooms, characterised by diversity, multicultural, multilingual, and pluralistic dynamics, make this a challenging environment. yet education for healthy citizenry must be striven for if children are to be well enabled and equipped for 21st century global living. the call for appropriate curricular responses is dire. explicitly incorporating citizenship education around issues of culture and identity, human rights, and democracy that involve critical thinking and reasoning, while paying attention to the verbal and non-verbal language of students —collaboratively and cooperatively— requires that teachers be fully involved and professionally supported throughout written, taught, learnt, and tested curricular processes. the european union unesco supported peace curriculum framed around matthew lipman’s (1980), philosophy for / with children pedagogy may be considered best practice and is recommended to serve as critical global platform and model 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(pdf file) education leadership, september, 38-43.retrieved from http://www.ascd.org/ascd/pdf/journals/ed_lead/el_198809_lipman.pdf lipman, m. (1992). studies in philosophy for children: harry stottlemeier’s discovery. philadelphia: temple university press. lipman, m. (1998). teaching students to think reasonably: some findings of the philosophy for children program. the clearing house, 71, 277-280. retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/30189373 lipman, m. (2003). thinking in education (2nd ed.). cambridge, uk: cambridge university press. lipman, m., & sharp, a. m. (1992). growing up with philosophy. dubuque, iowa: kendall hunt lipman, m., sharp, a.m., & oscanyan, f. s. (1980). philosophy in the classroom. philadelphia: temple university press. lipman, m., weinstein, m., matkowski, j., esformes, r. m. , & kennedy, d. (1997). inquiry: critical thinking across the disciplines. montclair state university: new jersey. lipman. m. (1996). natasha: vygotskian dialogues. new york, new york: teachers’ college press. lipman, m. (2003). thinking in education (2nd ed.). cambridge, united kingdom: cambridge university press. murris, k. (2015). posthumanism, philosophy for children, and anthony browne’s little beauty. bookbird: a journal of international children's literature, 53, 59-65. philosophy with children in austrian schools. http://www-gewi.uni-graz.at/acpc/english/phil_aut.html. retrieved, 25 august, 2017. sternberg, r. j. (2011). ethics from thought to action: teaching students the steps of ethical reasoning and action is just as important as teaching them how to pass tests. education leadership, 34-39. http://www.ascd.org/ascd/pdf/journals/ed_lead/el_198809_lipman.pdf http://www.jstor.org/stable/30189373 http://www-gewi.uni-graz.at/acpc/english/phil_aut.html analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 105 sutcliffe, r. (2011). orbituary: matthew lipman (1923-2010). thinking skills and creativity, 6, 143-145. doi: 10.1016/j.tsc.2011.08.001 topping, k. j., & trickey, s. (2014). the role of dialog in philosophy for children. international journal of educational research, 63, 69-78. retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijer.2013.01.002 välitalo, r., juuso, h., & sutinen, a. (2016). philosophy for children as an educational practice. studies in philosophy and education, 35, 79-92. doi: http://dx.doi.org.molloy.idm.oclc.org/10.1007/s11217-015-9471-6 vansieleghem, n. (2014). what is philosophy for children? from an educational experiment to experimental education, educational philosophy and theory, 46, 1300-1310, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2013.771442 vansieleghem, n. , & kennedy, d. (2011). what is philosophy for children, what is philosophy with children-after matthew lipman? journal of philosophy of education, 45, 171-182. weinbaum, e. h., & supovitz, j. a. (2010) planning ahead: make program implementation more predictable. kappan, pdkintl.org, 91(7), 68-71. westheimer, j. (2017). what kind of citizens do we need? educational leadership, 12 – 18. ascd / www.ascd.org zuniga, x. (2013). bridging differences through dialogue. in adams, m. , blumenfeld, w. j . , castaneda, c. , hackman, h. w. , peters, m. l. , & zuniga, x. (eds.). (2013). reading for diversity and social justice (3rd ed). (635-638). new york and london: routledge. address correspondences to: desireé e. moodley university of cape town, south africa molloy college, new york email: dmoodley@lions.molloy.edu; mdldes019@myuct.ac.za http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijer.2013.01.002 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2013.771442 http://www.ascd.org/ mailto:dmoodley@lions.molloy.edu/ mailto:mdldes019@myuct.ac.za analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 19 can philosophy aid the adjustment of newcomer children? parmis aslanimehr he proportion of foreign-born population in canada is at the highest it has been in 70 years. such an increase in immigration is projected to account for 100 percent of the population growth by 2026.1 the children of families arriving from different parts of the world into canada’s multicultural mosaic are commonly believed to have an easier time adjusting to their new conditions than adolescents and adults. this assumption further adds to an abandonment of inquiry into their experiences in adapting to their unique and, at times, complicated surroundings.2 such a view likens the child of a newcomer immigrant family to the accompanying luggage, for they rarely have any say in the decision to migrate. as a result of this change to a new country, the stability in childhood can be lost: the domains of conflict common in newcomer households can involve levels of aggression, the importance of education, the preference for speaking english at home and sexual openness in youth.3 notably, one in five children of newcomers, specifically visible minorities, tend to encounter discrimination and prejudice during their resettlement years in canada.4,5,6 hence, their sudden encounter with the challenges that accompany settlement calls for special attention, notably because specific inner negotiations may be at play. understandably, many educators of newcomer children may express apprehension due to the lack of communication through a common language and of knowledge of diverse cultures. educators may feel conflicted if they are working under pedagogical frameworks that rely heavily on high-stakes testing, pushing them to encourage the use of english at all times to prepare linguistically diverse learners for such a system.7 other educators may be misled by the slow and gradual comprehension of the second language in students. it takes an average of four to seven years of english language instruction for newcomer students to reach classroom norms. current social movements such as black 1 “canadian multiculturalism act,” justice laws website, 2015, http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-18.7/page-1.html 2 marjorie f. orellana, barrie thorne, anna chee, and wan s. e. lam, “transnational childhoods: the participation of children in processes of family migration,” social problems 48 no.4 (2001): 572-591, doi:10.1525/sp.2001.48.4.572 3 min zhou, "growing up american: the challenge confronting immigrant children and children of immigrants," annual review of sociology 23 (1997): 63-95. 4 samuel n. m. beiser, violet kaspar, feng hou, and joanna rummens, “perceived racial discrimination, depression and coping: a study of southeast asian refugees in canada,” j health soc behav 40 no. 3 (1999):193-207. 5 housing, family and social statistics, “ethnic diversity survey: portrait of a multicultural society,” statistics canada, cata. no. 89593-xie (2003). http://www.statcan.gc.ca 6 morton beiser, samuel noh, feng hou, violet kaspar, joanna rummens, “southeast asian refugees’ perceptions of racial discrimination in canada,” canadian ethnic studies journal 33 no.1 (2001): 46-70. 7 reynaldo reyes, "cheating as good pedagogy: bilingual teachers defying english-only to foster student achievement,” multicultural perspectives 10 no.4 (2008): 209-13, doi: 10.1080/15210960802526136 t analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 20 lives matter, stop asian hate, and every child matters, to name but a few, further prove the misguided notion that adopting a colour-blind approach is appropriate as it bypasses the historicity of belonging to certain groups. the differences that lie between the teachers as well as between the students extend beyond culture: this can make teaching newcomer students incredibly challenging, given obstacles such as english language limitations, low immigrant achievement and low parent involvement.8,9 another problem lies in the lack of literature available to educators. in an examination of 579 articles published by the journal of teacher education between 1980 and 2001, only a handful of articles included immigrant children and the importance of responding to their educational needs.10 what seems to be missing is a platform that can address their present and their (at times) alienated subjectivity as they reconcile their old life with their new one. as mentioned, children tend to struggle with the wide gap between home and school. the programs proposed by educators, if not implemented successfully, can be an added disparate element in children’s two incompatible worlds, thus marginalizing them further.11 moreover, many pedagogically sensitive recommendations in multicultural educational guidelines tend to lack the voices of such children, though they do encourage tolerance of diversity. however, merely enduring the presence of the other risks creating a comfortable climate of relativism that bypasses the vulnerability of having to engage with the other in a critical dialogue.12 philosophy for children theorist barbara weber expands on this sentiment that “[…] wishing to cultivate ‘tolerance ’as a permanent virtuous attitude in a multicultural society seems to ultimately lead to the cultivation of indifference and prevent the sincere recognition of ‘other’ in their personhood. this, in turn, leads to the suggestion that cultivating intercultural recognition is important” (2014, 80).13 this article will orient towards such recognition by building upon research that suggests educators benefit instead from competence as a social venture. the word competence has latin roots in com-petere, meaning “to seek together.” in other words, perhaps educators can communally venture with newcomer students to meet them where they are.14 to suspend anticipation of adjustment, educators can better attune to students as a source of knowledge in the aftermath of settlement if engaged in a critical dialogue that may invite reformulation and refinement of beliefs. by depicting the social and emotional triggers facing newcomer immigrant children in the domains of educational policy, the canadian classroom, and ongoing research and lenses, i hope to inspire paths upon which practitioners of philosophical inquiry may meaningfully tread. perhaps the trajectory of integration for 8 martha j. strickland, jane b. keat, and barbara a. marinak, “connecting worlds: using photo narrations to connect immigrant children, preschool teachers, and immigrant families,” school community journal 20 (2010): 81-102. 9 nicole heusch and cécile rousseau, “the trip: a creative expression project for refugee and immigrant children,” art therapy 17 (2000): 31-40, doi: 10.1080/07421656.2000.10129434 10 a. lin goodwin, “teacher preparation and the education of immigrant children,” education and urban society 34, no. 2 (2002): 156-172, doi:10.1177/0013124502034002003 11 nicole heusch and cécile rousseau, “the trip: a creative expression project for refugee and immigrant children,” art therapy 17 (2000): 31-40, doi: 10.1080/07421656.2000.10129434 12 barbara weber, “to tolerate means to insult’ (j. w. v. goethe): towards a social practice of recognition,” in towards recognition of minority groups: legal and communication strategies, eds. m. zirk-sadowski, b. wojciechowski, & k. m. cern (surrey, uk: ashgate publisher, 2014), 245-256. 13 ibid., 14 see ted t. aoki, curriculum in a new key: the collected works of ted t. aoki, eds. william f. pinar and rita l. irwin (routledge, 2004), 130. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 21 newcomer children has been pre-planned and lacks their voices; thus, a community of philosophical inquiry may serve the undertones of an accompanying exilic subjectivity in such children. multiculturalism in canada in 1971, canada was the first country to implement multiculturalism as an official policy, implying that identifying with a heritage culture and adopting its values and practices should hold no barrier to developing a shared canadian identity.15 in 1985, the equality rights article of the charter, section 15, came into effect, detailing that every individual had the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, or religion.16 however, is multiculturalism attainable for all—including those whose cultural values posit the most significant contradictions with the generalized canadian culture? consider the seemingly harmless political recognition of a minority group as a collective identity: as cultural theorist kwame anthony appiah warns, such celebrations of identity may work to create certain aspects, like skin colour, as a script outside the reach of one’s particularities.17 hence, to be recognized politically through policies like multiculturalism, one may be tied to scripts with very little control. similarly, education systems that operate under the hegemony of multiculturalism bear the intent to welcome newcomers, though the practices and programs used to educate may whisper elements of an assimilation agenda.18 in other words, reducing the multidimensionality of the reality for immigrant children to a mere celebration of culture can mark the school as a place of oppression that may inadvertently suffocate particularities of identity. furthermore, canadian philosopher charles taylor depicts the school as a public arena where identity becomes very malleable and even multiple. taylor describes identity as partly shaped by recognition or its absence, known as the misrecognition of others. as multiple cultures come into fruition between people, neglecting the struggles embedded in the reconciliation of contradictory elements present in both cultures can misrecognize newcomer immigrants. such misrecognition by a host society can have damaging effects on newcomers, for it confines them to a reduced mode of being.19 given that many countries have lowered their barriers to immigration, thereby allowing more back and forth travel across borders, migration is not always a unidirectional journey for many families.20 often the school serves as an intersection where newcomers reunite their past with the (at times) scripted present. additionally, a sense of exclusion can linger both in the classroom and on the 15 “canadian multiculturalism act,” justice laws website, 2015, http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-18.7/page-1.html 16 “annual report on the operation of the canadian multiculturalism act,” canadian heritage multiculturalism site, 2006, http://www.publications.gc.ca/collections/collection/ch31-1-2005e.pdf 17 charles taylor and amy gutmann, multiculturalism: examining the politics of recognition (new jersey: princeton universitry press, 1994). 18aimee v. garza and lindy crawford, “hegemonic multiculturalism: english immersion, ideology, and subtractive schooling," bilingual research journal 29, no. 3 (2005): 599-619, doi: 10.1080/15235882.2005.10162854 19 charles taylor and amy gutmann, multiculturalism: examining the politics of recognition (new jersey: princeton universitry press, 1994). 20 robert crosnoe and andrew j. fuligni, “children from immigrant families: introduction to the special section,” child development 83 no.5 (2012): 1471-6, doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2012.01785.x analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 22 playground. irrespective of racial, ethnic, or linguistic backgrounds, immigrant children commonly experience loneliness and social isolation, described as the distance between them and others.21,22 at times, there can be an accompanying fear of never recovering from the losses left behind.23 such a public space often serves as the first reminder of differences in skin color, religion, and ethnicity between children.24 in the private sphere, newcomer children may grapple with a sense of loss: this can be regarding objects, people, places, and in some cases, identity. the first change in a newcomer child’s life is losing a home, which encompasses losing attachments to familiar objects taken for granted. in a new environment, they may even experience differently those treasured toys brought from their home country.25 differences between the norms of the home country and the dominant host culture may trap them into standing out and being overlooked by society at the same time.26 considering some of these adversities in the home and school, is adjusting to canadian life equally attainable for all children? additionally, the longer newcomer children remain away from home, the less tangible their experience of it, and the associations with history, language and tradition. thus, as edward said has expressed, they may only be acting to be at home. still, with time, it may become difficult to associate with cultural identity, and one becomes the other, or a “flaw in the geometry of resettlement.”27 it is up to families to culturally construct their living conditions when faced with various challenges such as mastering a second language, a weak sense of belonging, dealing with discrimination, and overcoming barriers to find employment.28,29 thus, studying acculturation in children can be incredibly challenging because integration and development are operating simultaneously. both of these processes are interacting as well, making their adjustments a highly time-sensitive issue.30 the 21 anna kirova, “loneliness in immigrant children: implications for classroom practice,” childhood education 77 no.5 (2001): 260-267, doi: 10.1080/00094056.2001.10521648 22 michael j. emme, anna kirova, oliver kamau, and susan kosanovich, "ensemble research: a means for immigrant children to explore peer relationships through fotonovela," alberta journal of educational research 52, no. 3 (2006): 160181. 23 koplow, lesley, and eli messinger. 1990. developmental dilemmas of young children of immigrant parents. child & adolescent social work journal 7 (2): 121-34, doi: 10.1007/bf00757649 24 susan s. chuang and uwe p. gielen, "understanding immigrant families from around the world: introduction to the special issue," journal of family psychology 23 no. 3 (2009): 275-278, doi: 10.1037/a0016016; zheng wu, christoph m. schimmele, and feng hou, "self-perceived integration of immigrants and their children," canadian journal of sociology 37 no. 4 (2012): 381-408. 25 jacqueline oxman‐martinez, anneke j. rummens, jacques moreau, ye r. choi, morton beiser, linda ogilvie, and robert armstrong, "perceived ethnic discrimination and social exclusion: newcomer immigrant children in canada," american journal of orthopsychiatry 82, no. 3 (2012): 376-388. 26 a. lin goodwin, “teacher preparation and the education of immigrant children,” education and urban society 34 no.2 (2002): 156-172, doi:10.1177/0013124502034002003; barbara weber, e-mail message to author, february 2015. 27 edward w. said, reflections on exile and other essays (cambridge, mass: harvard university press, 2000), 184. 28 joseph h. puyat, “is the influence of social support on mental health the same for immigrants and non-immigrants?” journal of immigrant and minority health 15 no.3 (2013): 598-605, doi:10.1007/s10903-012-9658-7; a. lin goodwin, “teacher preparation and the education of immigrant children,” education and urban society 34, no. 2 (2002): 156-172, doi:10.1177/0013124502034002003 29 margie k. shields and richard e. behrman, “children of immigrant families: analysis and recommendations,” the future of children 14 no.2 (2004): 4-15. 30 john w. berry, "immigration, acculturation, and adaptation," applied psychology 46 no.1 (1997): 5-34, doi: 10.1111/j.1464-0597.1997.tb01087.x analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 23 struggles that newcomer children feel at school intertwine with their relationships with their families. such clashing of two cultures—known as dissonant acculturation—may, in turn, result in lower parentchild closeness.31 under such circumstances, connections to domains beyond the immediate family, such as the education system, carry responsibility in mitigating the post-migration experiences of a child. before continuing further, it is worth considering whether labels of status can create limited boundaries in a newcomer child’s experiences that may not exist for other children. defining the path for newcomer children one of the dominant approaches to studying adjustment to life in a host culture is the acculturative framework created by john berry. this theory outlines four acculturation strategies, depending on how ethnic group members identify with their home and host culture. the immigrant is classified as “integrated” when maintaining the cultural identity of the home country and fully associating with the new society. another classification may be “assimilated” if an individual absorbs the cultural values of the mainstream society but denies their cultural identity. the immigrant is deemed to be “separated” when the focus is on maintaining the home culture while rejecting the host society; or those who reject both their home culture and resist the host culture are categorized as “marginalized.”32 however, achieving integration has been criticized for various reasons. for instance, one cannot be both a christian and a muslim within religion since its practices clash.33 meaning, some cultural practices do not permit individuals the freedom to switch between cultural codes. furthermore, the ‘integrated’ individual implies that the immigrant has undergone a free choice of independently weaving the values of the dominant mainstream culture and those of the ethnic group. but such an act of reconciliation of two cultures is dictated by a more extensive set of political and historical practices linked to and shaped by race, gender, sexuality and power.34 another acculturative state, defined as “marginalization,” suggests that individuals are distant from the host culture to which they prefer to belong. yet often, the problem is that individuals rarely prefer to distance themselves from the reference community; instead, marginalization is often the by-product of a failure to belong to the preferred reference group.35 perhaps the most blatant criticism stems from the fluidity of acculturation, where one may carry a myriad of such “states” upon settlement. many newcomers have described their state as constantly undergoing half-involvement and half-detachments, including feeling nostalgic while feeling like a secret outcast.36 thus, one can be successfully immersed in a host country yet also distanced from home. as described by said, in a metaphysical sense, one is in movement, unsettled while unsettling others.37 viewing such individuals free of any categories or 31 robert crosnoe and andrew j. fuligni, “children from immigrant families: introduction to the special section,” child development 83 no.5 (2012): 1471-6, doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2012.01785.x 32 john w. berry, “immigration, acculturation, and adaptation,” applied psychology 46 (1997): 5-34. 33 floyd w. rudmin and vali ahmadzadeh, “psychometric critique of acculturation psychology: the case of iranian migrants in norway,” scandinavian journal of psychology 42 (2001): 41-56. 34 sunil bhatia and anjali ram, “rethinking 'acculturation' in relation to diasporic cultures and postcolonial identities,” human development 44 (2001): 1-18. 35 floyd w. rudmin and vali ahmadzadeh, “psychometric critique of acculturation psychology: the case of iranian migrants in norway,” scandinavian journal of psychology 42 (2001): 41-56. 36 veronica r. martini, “education on the transnational stage: a shared spotlight, a pocket of hope,” global trends in educational policy 6 (2005): 173-196, doi:10.1016/s1479-3679(04)06007-4 37 edward w. said, representations of the intellectual: the 1993 reith lectures (london: vintage books, 1993). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 24 cultural frames of reference allows the development of new ideas and new approaches to various life tasks to take shape. with immigration comes the accompaniment of unique past experiences, which supply a double-vision of what has been left behind and what is actual here and now, where one “never sees things in isolation.”38 although each province has its regulations for accompanying the needs of firstgeneration immigrant students, the guidelines established by the british columbia ministry of education serve as an example of how acculturation for newcomer immigrant children has been encapsulated. as a resource to educators, the bc ministry of education depicted four stages that most newcomers will pass through until adjustment is reached: the “honeymoon stage,” characterized by feelings of happiness for the novel experiences; the “hostility stage,” which are feelings of hate and frustration generated towards north america; the “humour stage,” described as an acceptance of the new ways of living; and finally the “home stage,” where the immigrant student feels ‘native’ and as part of canadian society.39 however, reaching a ‘native’ canadian identity may not be feasible for many children due to external and internal factors. further, a policy that anticipates an arrival is illuminating a model that intrinsically needs protection by recognizing specific individuals as “others”—those students who may never feel at home. hence, we encounter a version of our guiding question once again: is it justified to assume adjustment as an endpoint for all newcomer immigrants? these stages influencing teaching practice are especially problematic considering that adults have depicted them while the child’s voice in the stages of adjustment is lacking. perhaps instead of preplanned destinations, what might better serve such students is to linger on the bridge of inbetweenness as they may be in no hurry to cross over.40 thus, the challenge for educators lies in facilitating the in-betweenness of such children instead of anticipating their arrival at a pre-determined state. given the abundance of longitudinal research dedicated to the educational and occupational roles such students fulfill, children of immigrant families are involuntarily swept into the lens of being viewed as one day becoming economically self-sufficient adults. in line with the tradition of promoting economic growth, most studies devoted to immigrant children have instead opted to measure the value in who they have become as adults to validate an adjusted status. therefore, most research regarding newcomer children evaluates the mastery of the english language as a measurement of adjustment to life in the host country. english comprehension is a valuable skill in making one functional and integrated into society but does not reflect the mental and emotional complexities of migration. for example, english proficiency can have negative repercussions that can bleed into the family: when a child learns a new language faster than their parents, role reversals may occur whereby parents become incapable of assisting children in school-related affairs, paving distance between parents and children. 38 edward w. said, “intellectual exile: expatriates and marginals,” grand street 47 (1993): 124, doi:10.2307/25007703 39 british columbia ministry of education, “english as a second language learners: a guide for esl specialists,” ministry of education special programs branch, (1999): 1-62. 40 see ted t. aoki, curriculum in a new key: the collected works of ted t. aoki, eds. william f. pinar and rita l. irwin (routledge, 2004). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 25 moreover, learning english can influence changes in nonverbal behavior as well. with a diverse range of students in canadian classrooms, the expectation is that non-english speaking and englishspeaking students can interact harmoniously and work collaboratively. even when fluency in english has been achieved, some reported feelings of helplessness and depression, for they assume being negatively evaluated by members of the host culture.41 additionally, high grades may appear as an indicator of adjustment, but may also be stemming from the guilt students bear after witnessing the sacrifices made by their families to provide better opportunities. consequently, such children can uphold high educational aspirations as a way of ridding their feelings of indebtedness to their parents.42 to escape the labels of acculturation theories and stages in policies, perhaps the focus can be diverted to how each student can create a culture congruent to their sense of self.43 the following section will heed the call of creativity lingering in the unheard struggles of newcomer children. philosophical inquiry with newcomer children by conceptualizing newcomers’ adjustment as a series of stages, as english proficiency or through research focused on the outcome, the risk is that we forego the present of the newcomer in exchange for who they have yet to become. without addressing the varied experiences of each person, conformity may be enforced at the expense of individual particularity. for example, those who identify with belonging to the outside may be dismissed as unqualified to comment. philosophical inquiry may provide an opening where the struggles of these children can not only be acknowledged but also incorporated into strategies to navigate the complicated experiences they may be encountering. how can facilitators recognize such students’ alienation without resorting to common misconceptions which impose sameness on them and, in turn, eliminate their particularity? to imagine that a community of philosophical inquiry (cpi) can address this sense of alienation unveils further intricacies, since these challenges tend to thrive as a monologue within the self. thus, the presence of newcomer children in the classroom calls upon facilitators to practice in “tensionality.” this tensionality in a pedagogical situation is a mode of being marked by mis-relations between teacher and students and mis-relations between teacher and instructional pressures to succumb to dated expectations regarding newcomers. instead, facilitators may incorporate philosophical inquiry to engage in the tension between the present and the future that enables a critical process of selfbecoming.44 attending to lived experiences in response to the forces of recognition requires an inquiry 41 krystyna nowak-fabrykowski and miroslav shkandrij, “the symbolic world of the bilingual child: digressions on language acquisition, culture and the process of thinking,” journal of instructional psychology 31 no.4 (2004): 284-292. 42 cynthia feliciano, “beyond the family: the influence of premigration group status on the educational expectations of immigrant children,” sociology of education 79 no.4 (2006): 281-303; peter burton and shelley phipps, "the well-being of immigrant children and parents in canada," (2010): in 31st general conference of the international association for research in income and wealth, st. gallen, switzerland. 43 mary jalongo, “a position paper of the association for childhood education international: the child's right to creative thought and expression,” childhood education 79 no.4 (2003): 218-228, doi: 10.1080/00094056.2003.10521196; angela leung, william w. maddux, adam d. galinsky, and chi-yue chiu, “multicultural experience enhances creativity: the when and how,” american psychologist 63 no.3 (2008): 169-81. 44 see douglas mcknight, d, “critical pedagogy and despair: a move toward kierkegaard’s passionate inwardness,” in curriculum studies handbook: the next moment, ed. e. malewski (new york: routledge, 2010), 500-507. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 26 into the labor of the solitary self in collaboration with social practices. thus, this article invites a pause from pedagogical recommendations in order to not startle the unsettled moments at work in the present—that no universal rule should dictate the conduct aimed at newcomer children. many creative workshops have been used with immigrant children in order to help them construct meaning, structure their identity and work through their losses.45 an experimental study found creative workshops in a 12-week program with 138 immigrant children aged 7 to 13 years to boost their self-esteem.46 such activities increase the understanding of teachers about newcomer students and enable them to reconstruct a meaningful personal world while also linking them to the larger classroom group.47 art therapy is another form of creative expression that has proved promising in assisting immigrant children in better understanding themselves as individuals and as part of a group.48 perhaps such positive outcomes occur because art is an activity where evaluation is subjective, thereby less stigmatizing.49 myths and storytelling are forms of creative expression that allow the child to voice their inner reality and explore the tensions associated with belonging to two cultures.50 providing different avenues of expression for immigrant children, such as verbal and nonverbal activities, can ease the existing language barrier.51 therefore, cpi dialogues can achieve this because their communal structure promotes responsibility to evaluate differing viewpoints, and in turn, members can think creatively in searching for alternative meanings.52 matthew lipman saw the creative process as one that includes originality, transcends the present situation, and expresses itself in an individual's selfdefinition, with imagination lying at its base.53 facilitators who have effectively engaged children in philosophical inquiry have noticed creative thinking at play when members formulate questions, articulate problems, define concepts, construct solutions and search for counter-examples while reconstructing philosophical issues.54 45 ditty dokter, arts therapists, refugees and migrants: reaching across borders (london: jessica kingsley, 1998); kenneth e. miller and deborah l. billings, “playing to grow: a primary mental health intervention with guatemalan refugee children,” american journal of orthopsychiatry 64 no.3 (1994): 346-56. 46 cécile rousseau, aline drapeau, louise lacroix, déogratias bagilishya, and nicole heusch, “evaluation of a classroom program of creative expression workshops for refugee and immigrant children,” journal of child psychology and psychiatry 46 no.2 (2005): 180-5, doi: 10.1111/j.1469-7610.2004.00344.x 47 ibid. 48 hilda wengrower, "arts therapies in educational settings: an intercultural encounter," the arts in psychotherapy 28 no. 2 (2001): 109-115. 49 ibid. 50 nicole heusch, deogratia bagilishya, louise lacroix, and cécile rousseau, “working with myths: creative expression workshops for immigrant and refugee children in a school setting,” art therapy 20 (2003): 3-10, doi:10.1080/07421656.2003.10129630 51 cécile rousseau, louise lacroix, abha singh, marie-france gauthier, and maryse benoit, “creative expression workshops in school: prevention programs for immigrant and refugee children,” the canadian child and adolescent psychiatry review 14 no.3(2005): 77-80. 52 jennifer b. bleazby, “dewey's notion of imagination in philosophy for children,” education and culture 28 no.2 (2012): 95-111. 53 metin demir, hasan bacanlı, sinem tarhan, and mehmet ali dombaycı, “quadruple thinking: critical thinking,” procedia social and behavioral sciences 12 (2011): 545-51, doi: 10.1016/j.sbspro.2011.02.066 54 jennifer b. bleazby, “dewey's notion of imagination in philosophy for children,” education and culture 28 no.2 (2012): 95-111. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 27 my personal experience as a graduate research assistant in a study in british columbia which aimed to measure empathy in relation to cpi practices provides an exemplar of how such social practices can guide individual understanding. the study investigated the impact of the cpi on fostering children’s experiences of empathy and perspective-taking in grades five to eight across four different schools in vancouver, british columbia.55 one of the participants, sia,56 had recently moved from iran and spoke very little english in front of the class at large. as co-facilitators, we tried to make sense of the concerns over sia as expressed by his teacher and we did not know whether sia heard only bits and pieces of artificial-sounding language in the research sessions. to our surprise, his engagement in various topics throughout the program—from questions such as “what is the meaning of life?” and “why do we do what we do?”—reflected in his journals near the conclusion of each philosophical inquiry session. his drawings and concise words conveyed to us where he stood in his imaginative responses and as a part of the classroom. instances of autonomy in his answers to metacognitive questions were apparent where he stated that he had shared ideas with the class. although he rarely contributed verbally, his journal allowed for his inner voice to be made audible. the five finger model by ekkehard martens in philosophical inquiry, as described by eva marsal, can also serve the aims of multiculturalism by making a newcomer child understandable while understanding the other. this can unfold through step-by-step reflective practices by facilitators as they cover its tenets: phenomenology, hermeneutics, analysis, dialectics and speculation.57 in this context, “phenomenology” pertains to describing one’s lived experiences. this resonates with newcomers flooded by memories of their past that become veiled and trapped in their present. to address such memories phenomenologically, one can confront the body as a site of memory. john dewey insisted that successful education connects what happens in the classroom with real-life experiences outside of the school.58 stimuli integrating historical accounts or the stories of children about familial experiences can welcome the family identity into the public sphere of each child. such inquiry can reinforce the dialogue between children and their parents about positive aspects of their past, helping them bridge the gap between home and school. in other words, descriptions that are integral to the child's home culture can symbolically introduce the family into the classroom. next, “hermeneutics” allows for understanding, more specifically, how each person understands something. this involves not only dialogue following the reading of texts but also interpreting messages outside of the context. to delve into these inner workings, facilitators of inquiry can explore how identities have been fragmented due to public recognition in school. for example, writing letters to friends or valued individuals from their home culture or journaling can support metacognitive thinking and assist expression from those members who may be quiet in group settings.59 these writing practices are a suitable mode of expression for those who may be more comfortable writing in english than speaking it. these varied expressions can support newcomer children to cope with the past, find a balance between their two worlds in the present, and help them imagine a future in their 55 mahboubeh asgari, barbara weber, kimberley schonert-reichl, and jenna whitehead, “engaged inquiry with children: fostering empathy and perspective-taking,” (in progress). 56 name of participant has been changed. 57 eva marsal, “socratic philosophizing with the five finger model: the theoretical approach of ekkehard martens,” analytic teaching and philosophical praxis 35 no. 1 (2014): 39-49. 58 john dewey, how we think (new york: dover publications, 1910). 59 melissa freeman and sandra mathison, researching children's experiences (new york: guilford press, 2009). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 28 control. although such activities are suitable for all students, they recognize each newcomer for their particular identity rather than what may be deemed cultural tourism, where a child’s home culture is reduced to a time-frame of celebrating diversity, national foods, and festivals—which risks reinforcing stereotypes. the “analytical” aspect involves a conceptual verification of the arguments made. this process can lead to an exploration of particularities that are potentially shared with others. before i experienced the philosophical inquiry sessions within classrooms over two months, i anticipated students ready to engage with the materials that the principal investigator carefully prepared. this was much like the language created by the curriculum planners: i saw hidden voices like sia’s on the verge of disappearing into the shadow due to policies that were planned for faceless students, shedding them of their uniqueness. i could not help but also sympathize with educators who were also narrowly defined in their performance roles. the paradox of philosophical inquiry when it comes to newcomers is that the anecdotal traces in journals or other forms of expression are telling of something particular while addressing the universal.60 next, the “dialectical” step involves a reciprocal dialogue of arguing about the issues raised in order to arrive at further clarification. personal conceptions are considered and even altered. according to taylor, the particularities of individuals stem from how they reflect and modify their cultural heritage and that of others they encounter.61 this is a dialogical formation of identity that includes how one responds to relations, including their dialogue with others. finally, the last step involves “speculation,” which invites imagining into how to understand something as completely different. this can come through if one remains creatively open and can fantasize about specific questions through philosophizing. the creative process generates an intermediate space that belongs neither to the internal psychological reality nor the external reality of the individual.62 creativity requires skill, knowledge, and control.63 although creative thinking relies on imagination, it is not imaginative thinking; creative thinking involves evaluating the solution or idea. therefore, the creative thinking in a cpi is not just a cathartic expression but undergoes evaluation through critical thinking by the individual and the cpi members as a group, including conflict resolution skills and improved manifestation of emotions, as well as consideration of the thoughts of other children.64,65 for children of immigrant families, especially, such a transitional space welcomes play in external realities until coherence and security are achieved in their inner worlds. in the case of sia, no matter how loudly or silently in solitude philosophical inquiry was conducted, he reminded me that i am a facilitator to 60 william f. pinar, william m. reynolds, patrick slattery, and peter m. taubman, understanding curriculum: an introduction to the study of historical and contemporary curriculum discourses (peter lang, 2006), 42. 61 charles taylor and amy gutmann, multiculturalism: examining the politics of recognition (new jersey: princeton university press, 1994). 62 nicole heusch and cécile rousseau, “the trip: a creative expression project for refugee and immigrant children,” art therapy 17 (2000): 31-40, doi: 10.1080/07421656.2000.10129434 63 ken robinson, interview by amy m. azzam, why creativity now?: a conversation with sir ken robinson, alexandria: association for supervision and curriculum development, september, 2009. 64 metin demir, hasan bacanlı, sinem tarhan, and mehmet ali dombaycı, “quadruple thinking: critical thinking,” procedia social and behavioral sciences 12 (2011): 545-51, doi: 10.1016/j.sbspro.2011.02.066 65 deirdre grogan and joan martlew, “exploring creative environments through the child's lens,” creative education 5 no.16 (2014): 1528-1544. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 29 myself, then to others—although it is not always sequenced linearly. as long as the question for inquiry could resonate with sia, then the intended multicultural educational theory could be contextualized and communicated to students. creating spaces in classrooms where children can access these ideas can facilitate meaningful experiences.66 paulo freire believed interactions must start with the people’s positions in order to be emotionally engaging.67 john dewey suggested that reflective thinking could reconstruct unsettling experiences into coherent and meaningful situations.68 to go beyond the problematic experience in actuality, the imagination enables the individual to understand and transform reality.69 imagination calls upon the individual to draw upon an experience in an inventive way and formulate rich and varied mental images by using past experiences to construct alternative possibilities in problematic situations.70,71 as immigrant children experience exclusion in school, the cpi can serve as a “playground of thought” where children can recreate their interpretations of their experiences and, in turn, achieve ownership of their understandings.72,73 through deliberation with others and reconstruction of their experiences with the world, philosophical inquiry can transform their identities in this process of achieving self-realization.74 perhaps, newcomer children and youth can acknowledge how their history suffuses with the present and accompanies their self-consciousness. by giving space to newcomer children to explore their questions, the practice of philosophical inquiry can encourage comfort in uncertainty. this is especially helpful for newcomer immigrant children because new and often conflicting experiences characterize their world. to inquire into their struggles promotes an understanding that issues in life may not be so fixed. children can perhaps understand that their journey is in their control by gaining comfort with the uncertainties in life in a group setting. in practice, the cpi addresses belongingness by encouraging eye contact during the inquiry and having its members situated in a circle that secures interconnectedness on a nonverbal level.75 such may not only be appreciated for newcomers who often get separated from their classroom for english instruction but also discourages pre-recognizing 66 jennifer b. bleazby, “dewey's notion of imagination in philosophy for children,” education and culture 28 no.2 (2012): 95-111. 67 paulo freire, pedagogy of the oppressed (new york: continuum, 1989). 68 jennifer b. bleazby, “dewey's notion of imagination in philosophy for children,” education and culture 28 no.2 (2012): 95-111. 69 ibid. 70 mary jalongo, “a position paper of the association for childhood education international: the child's right to creative thought and expression,” childhood education 79 no.4 (2003): 218-228, doi: 10.1080/00094056.2003.10521196 71 jennifer b. bleazby, “dewey's notion of imagination in philosophy for children,” education and culture 28 no.2 (2012): 95-111. 72 barbara weber, “childhood, philosophy and play: friedrich schiller and the interface between reason, passion and sensation,” journal of philosophy of education 45 no.2(2011): 235-50, doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9752.2011.00804.x 73 damian spiteri, “the community of philosophical inquiry and the enhancement of intercultural sensitivity,” childhood & philosophy 11 (2010): 86-111. 74 barbara weber, “childhood, philosophy and play: friedrich schiller and the interface between reason, passion and sensation,” journal of philosophy of education 45 no.2(2011): 235-50, doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9752.2011.00804.x 75 michael j. emme, anna kirova, oliver kamau, and susan kosanovich, "ensemble research: a means for immigrant children to explore peer relationships through fotonovela," alberta journal of educational research 52, no. 3 (2006): 160181. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 30 the other by concluding the facial expressions of others.76 miscommunication can occur since given messages are decoded per one’s cultural upbringing. thus, nonverbal translation is a vital asset in adjustment to a new culture, though its importance receives very little attention in classrooms. in philosophical inquiry, the alternating opportunities for personal expression and small group discussions facilitate the emotional understanding and expression of children’s experiences while allowing them the distance they need from it. therefore, when newcomer children engage in creative play of sharing their experiences, the cpi connects them to others in a space with no cultural borders that could bind or limit their self-definition while assuring their voices are heard in the group or journals.77 the recognition it requires for newcomers does not entirely develop from intersubjective understanding but from the realization that one will never fully understand the other and can only listen and bear witness to the monologue of the other. educational opportunities that embrace this diversity can become broader, more tolerant and more stimulating learning environments. the practice of philosophical inquiry has been linked to self-correction and open-mindedness—qualities that depend on the capacity for imagination. perhaps, with greater practice, the more likely newcomer children can think creatively about new experiences rather than surrendering to the dominant culture or succumbing to peer pressure. i have shared adversities facing newcomer children from various aspects to break from a proper way of being alienated, one in which all alienated individuals must partake to achieve adjustment. such work runs a danger of replacing one form of estrangement with another. alienation needs to be explored as a lingering in-betweenness between the public and the private and the tensions it holds in the complexities of in-betweenness. this can be a different approach to designing philosophical inquiry; as an indispensable means for thinking through issues of recognition and difference and understanding relations to others while questioning identity as a point of departure. many contextual factors influence their experiences in canada, and to say that all will fall under a category, is to pave over the inequities faced by many newcomer children. viewing adjustment as a series of stages or labels allows for ease in conceptualization and formulation of outcomes. to assign labels and designate phases to each newcomer dictates how the adult should behave around that specific child. david kennedy suggested that the problem with any stage theory is that the adult has already pre-planned the child’s journey and destination.78 at the community level, a combination of a lack of culturally inclusive programs and limited awareness of community resources and services has resulted in low participation of immigrant children and youth in such services.79 although educational guidelines, research and theoretical frameworks contribute to understanding the newcomer population in canada, such domains have not facilitated their present subjectivity and 76 anna kirova, “loneliness in immigrant children: implications for classroom practice,” childhood education 77 no.5 (2001): 260-267, doi: 10.1080/00094056.2001.10521648 77 barbara weber, “childhood, philosophy and play: friedrich schiller and the interface between reason, passion and sensation,” journal of philosophy of education 45 no.2(2011): 235-50, doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9752.2011.00804.x ;wendy turgeon, "multiculturalism: politics of difference, education and philosophy for children," analytic teaching 24 no. 2 (2005): 96-109. 78 david kennedy, the well of being: childhood, subjectivity, and education (albany: state university of new york press, 2006). 79 barbara schleifer and hieu ngo, “immigrant children and youth in focus,” canadian issues 29 (2005): 29-33. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 31 their voices. if we listen to their voices, instead of imposing an external interpretation of their complex struggles, we can understand the meaning of lived experience within the community. to locate oneself on the margins or between the ridges of two cultures, one's lived experiences are marked by tension. the practice of philosophical inquiry may prepare students for living life worthy as outsiders, where the gap between the self and cultural identity can be a valuable human condition. philosophical inquiry can expose the overcasting, lingering qualities of settlement, which should not be mistaken with cultural differences. this practice of “tensionality” can bring comfort with discomfort, for it promises a deeper understanding of oneself and others, resonant with a more human way of recognition than one based on criterion. perhaps the presence of individuals like sia in the cpi can encourage a redraft of the curriculum—one that invites voices from newcomer students, where they can project themselves into the past, scrutinize its felt structures and weave their unique through-line in their present. address correspondences to: parmis aslanimehr, doctoral candidate, faculty of education, university of british columbia, email: parmisa23@gmail.com mailto:parmisa23@gmail.com analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 52 book review the ethics bowl way: answering questions, questioning answers, and creating ethical communities edited: robert israeloff and karen mizell date: 2022 publisher: rowman & littlefield price: $ 20.00 paper; $ 28.50 kindle; $ 58.49 hardcover review by richard morehouse his edited volume is chocked full of insights that increase as each chapter leads the reader to a richer understanding of what an ethics bowl is, how it works, and what has been learned and applied to thinking and learning skills as well as what organizers of critical thinking programs can learn from the ethics bowl program. this book has three sections: part i: ethics bowl basics, part ii: the best practices, and part ii: expanding the research of ethics bowl. as i started reading this compact book of a mere 141 pages, i thought the ethic bowl was about a thing, but to my great pleasure, it is about ways of teaching and learning and a way of thinking. beginning in the first chapter, i had already radically changed my mind. with that mind shift, the review begins in the middle of the book in part ii. way. a hint as to why this unusual starting point is found in the title – the ethics bowl way: answering questions, questioning answers, and creating ethical communities. i draw your attention to the word “way.” reading the ethics bowl way, my thoughts were directed toward the buddha’s middle way and aristotle’s phronesis. the buddha thought was between extreme asceticism on one hand and sensual indulgence, while aristotle taught about phronesis. phronesis implies both good judgment and excellence of character. the buddha's and aristotle’s teachings were about a way of being and doing. the ethics bowl way is about disposition and methods. before exploring the book as it unfolds, allow me to begin with chapter eight, ‘beyond argument: learning life skills through ethics bowl.’ early in this chapter andrew collision, the director of the cincinnati ethic center at the university of cincinnati, presents some of the skill sets that are in harmony with other communities of inquiry. t analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 53 • ethical awareness – the process of identifying an issue is itself an ethical issue. • ethical reasons – the ability to identify all the different positions that reasonable people may take with respect to an ethical issue and identify all the reasons and arguments they might have for that decision. • ethical decision-making – the ability to weigh those reasons in a thoughtful manner to decide what to think about or do about an ethical issue. • ethical dialogue – the ability to engage in thoughtful, deliberative conversations with other people about an ethical issue [particularly people with different backgrounds and perspectives] (p. 66). these skill sets are not only life skills but, with reference to the book’s title, indicate a “way,” that is, a disposition and a method in which the ethics bowl program may be understood. in conversation, within each student team and within the competitive arena of an ethics bowl, ethical awareness, ethical reasoning, and ethical decision-making occur while engaged in ethical dialogue. the ethics bowl way appears to be about both attribution and method. part i: the ethics bowl basics there are three chapters in part i; chapter one: the idea of an ethical community, building democracy; chapter two: debating democracy: building argument programs for good citizenship; chapter three: optional but suggested: the role of ethics theory and research in ethicd bowl preparation. this brings us back to a brief chapter-by-chapter look at the ethics bowl way (ebw). the goal of the ethics bowl program, operating within a complex community with differing political views and mindsets, is to teach students how to think through ethical issues together (pp. 3-4). as presented in this chapter, there are three main elements to the ethics bowl way: (1) format, (2) procedures and (3) rules. the three elements of the ethics bowl way may begin with a community conversation about ethics constructed around the four principles presented in the paragraph above [format]. the conversations happen in small teams facilitated by a coach. this team practice is identified. defining and articulating the multiple meaning of an ethics issue [procedure]. eventually, this preparation stage ends in local, regional and potentially national competitions, which are scored by judges [rules]. debating democracy is a somewhat misleading title. citing w.v.o. quine, kyle roberson, a lecturer in philosophy at uc santa cruz, cautions that debate teaches compelling thought and persuasion at the expense of the pursuit of truth. robertson’s point is that ethics bowl way is a better approach to debate as a method for teaching persuasion and critical thinking. debate is undemocratic in roberson’s view if persuasion is valued over thinking together to resolve the ethical issue. in the ethics bowl format, all debate forms “inculcate norms of argumentation that influence our everyday notions of what a good democratic deliberation looks like” (p. 12). specifically, a dialogical debate is collaborative, 2) it is truth-seeking, and 3) it encourages open-mindedness (p. 14). “optional but suggested: the role of ethical theory and research in ethics bowl preparation,” the title of chapter three, is emblematic of the open-ended form, procedures, and rules of ebw. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 54 richard greene, assistant professor at weber state university, makes two points in this chapter. first, while it may be helpful for coaches and judges to have some knowledge of theories of justice, that knowledge is not required. if theories of justice are used poorly, they may detract from the struggle of coaches and students to orient the presentations toward an argument about ethics theory rather than sorting through and supporting or criticizing ethical choices. using or ignoring ethical theory in preparation for the ethics bowl is closely connected to the research in preparation for the bowl. the answer to the question of whether there should be extensive research before debates, on the surface, seems intuitive. however, as the reviewer is beginning to learn, the point of ebw is to engage students and coaches in “homegrown” thinking about what is ethical and how to evaluate and make a case for good ethical choices. it is thinking for oneself with peers that are the hallmark of ebw; thus, knowing ethical theory and doing extensive research may or may not help reach the goal of the ebw, that is, teaching students how to think through ethical issues together. part ii: best practices jeanie delay’s “values of ethics bowl design” opens the book's second part. “using the values at play design framework, we focus on describing for ethics bowl, game elements, and their company, values, (1) venue and equipment, (2) narratives, (3) reward, structure, and (4) goals” (p. 30). there is open access to participation in the ethics bowl competition, and the only equipment required is a pen and paper. case study narratives are readable and accessible. the reward structure is both intrinsic and extrinsic, that is, one gains self-gratification by learning to speak better, listen more carefully, and think more clearly within a supportive group structure, and there is a public award at the end of the competition with an award in several categories. “coaching: winning isn’t everything” begins by explaining that the main task of an ethics bowl coach is to teach within an atmosphere that encourages teamwork while imparting knowledge and encouraging independent critical thinking. in the process, students also gain confidence in researching, speaking, and writing. marcia a. mckelligan, a professor of philosophy at depauw university, has coached ethics bowls at the college level for over twenty years. she states that the tasks of a coach are to recruit a team and prepare a team for competition. as a part of the preparation, she writes, is a syllabus that someone else prepares, “the case study drives the course content, and their cases are primary texts. research provides secondary source material” (p. 52). case analysis is one of the pivotal elements of preparing students and takes time to acquire, but close reading and clear, careful thinking are essential (p. 52). mckelligan describes the event, the bowl, and the celebration and debriefing after the bowl. the last section of the chapter addresses the subtitle of this chapter “winning isn’t everything.” regular readers of analytic teaching and philosophical praxis will recognize the person writing chapter seven, wendy c turgeon. dr. turgeon teaches at saint joseph’s college in new york, where she is a philosophy professor and the department chair. dr. turgeon’s chapter points out that the ethics bowls began in colleges and have moved to high school and recently to middle schools. her introductory paragraph points to the hours of work required by students, coaches, and judges. the workload’ for participants has become evident to me, but this reader welcomes a specific analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 55 recognition of what is required to field such an enterprise. the work of the judges is presented in her chapter, beginning with a section entitled “who can be a judge?” the qualifications are not based on position or credentials but instead on skills and disposition: • an interest in preparing for the presentations and in ethical reflection, • a willingness to be objective, fair, supportive, • an ability to listen carefully to arguments presented, • the skill of formulating helpful questions (p. 58). each of these skills and dispositions is addressed, followed by a primer on ethical theory, a presentation on what the day of judging is like, the nature of scoring the teams, and the purpose, role, and value of feedback. the final section addresses the rewards of judging. “i think that ethics bowl is one of the best educational experiences a student can undergo,” (p. 66) states the author of chapter seven, “beyond argument: learning life skills through ethics bowl.” andrew cullison is now founding executive director of the cincinnati ethics center at the university of cincinnati, a former student at depauw university, and a former participant in the ethics bowl, at depauw university in 1999. he compares ebw metaphorically to crossfit, which simultaneously tones the mighty mind and soul together. collison’s focus is on ethical reasoning skills which he lists and defines. these skills are more or less sequentially developed. the first is ethical awareness, followed by ethical reasoning. then comes ethical decision-making, which ends in ethical dialogue. ethical awareness is the ability to identify an ethical issue. ethical reasoning identifies all the different positions that reasonable people might take. ethical decision-making weighs those reasons in a thoughtful manner. ethical dialogue engages one in a community of people of different backgrounds and thoughtful, deliberative conversations. he continues by discussing the life skills involved in public speaking and how the ethics bowl way encourages one to approach dialogue in a non-competitive manner. this move is a step toward gaining self-confidence and becoming resilient. these cognitive, emotional, and communal efforts result in the encouragement of ethical leadership. chapter 9: “room for all: inclusivity and the high school ethic bowl” written by jana mohr lone, director of plato (philosophical learning and teaching organization and an affiliate professor of philosophy at the university of washington). some readers of at & pp might recognize her for her contributions to this journal and her work with the washington center for philosophy for children. from best practices to innovation is a good way to characterize this chapter. best practices include high school students involved with assessing and evaluating the program, teacher/coach suggestions for improvement, adjusting to covid-19 pandemic, and modification of team membership numbers, all in the service of increasing student and school involvement and the number of multiracial teams. the format, procedure, and rules approach discussed in chapter one is flexible, as the “open dialogue” section of dr. lone’s chapter indicated. her team added an open dialogue element to the final round of the bowl by adding an open dialogue element. in 2019, dr. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 56 lone writes that we instituted an open dialogue section in each round. after the presentation, commentary, and response and before the judges' questions, “the team had five minutes for a selfmoderated open dialogue” (p. 77). dr. lone’s “open dialogue” innovation expands the edw within the overarching orientation of format, procedure, and rules. part ii might have been called “how the rewards for all of those involved in ebw are manifested.” the students, coaches, and judges are intrinsically rewarded for making an ethic bowl successful and contributing to participatory democracy. part iii: expanding the reach of ethics bowl in chapter ten: “the turn to reason: ethics bowl in the classroom” is informed by the setting of the staff and the students in ebw. stanford online high school is a private independent school located at stanford university for academically talented students worldwide. the three authors who teach philosophy at stanford online high school, william m. beals, christina drogalis, and morgan e. wallhagen, are all ph.ds. in philosophy. the authors write, “our school is unusual in a few ways: we are an online institution with an international student body and require that full-time students take a sequence of year-long philosophy courses called core classes” (p. 83). the connections between the views of the authors and their perspectives on this class are stated by the authors as important for two reasons, (1) their students in the ethic bowl program have been taking philosophy classes for a number of years, and (2) they have found that their students apply what they are learning in ethics bowl support to the general curriculum of stanford online high school and vice-versa. the authors divide their comments into three sections: (1) the turn to reason, (2) how what we teach in class supports ethics bowl, and (3) what we practice in ethics bowl impacts students in class. in an attempt to summarize the three sections of their chapter, it appears to this reviewer that a key may be the attention paid not only to thinking clearly for oneself but also listening and hearing another’s point of view within the context of the “others” clear alternative thoughts. for example, the habits of critical reading learned in the students’ philosophy classes help students listen and criticize more fluently and attentively, and listening to presentations during ethic bowl sessions improves students’ critical and careful reading. chapter 11: “deliberating across the lifespan” is by michael vazquez. dr. vazquez is an assistant professor and director of outreach in the department of philosophy and the parr center of ethics at the university of north carolina chapel hill; he writes about “flipping the script.” the same attitude that the twentieth century pioneers of philosophy for children movement led to dismantle educational prejudice toward children should animate our efforts to collaborate with folks beyond the schooling years (p. 91). education might be a beginning place for implementing the ebw approach into adult venues, vazquez senior ethics bowl with local communities, ethics bowls for education professionals, ethic bowl in the workplace and for public servants. he also argues that intergeneration ethics bowls offer unique opportunities for modeling lifelong learning. chapter 12: “ethics bowl at san quentin” is an example of the reach of the ethics board way. the ethics bowl program is sponsored by mount tamalpais college, a recently formed college whose analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 57 only campus is inside san quentin state prison. a debate program had been started by kathy richard at the request of the students for extracurricular activities to develop their critical thinking skills (p. 102). after introducing the program authors, connie krosney and kathy j. richards discuss one of the unexpected strengths of the ethics bowl program at san quentin. the authors make a case for the value of a lack of internet and library resources. perhaps this absence of voluminous resources pushed san quentin's team members toward deeper reflection, encouraging them to use their own minds and those of their peers as resources (p. 103). dr. alex m. richardson’s chapter invites the reader to explore what is on the horizon for the ethics bowl way. chapter 13: “meeting the challenges: the future of ethics bowl,” creates a space for students and others at a time when the bonds of social and civic community are strained. a pandemic, the social and cultural questions of race, identity, and belonging and a coercive political climate have highlighted the need for critical and creative thinking around the ethical issues raised in our current milieu. the growth of the ebw has moved up and down the age ladder: moving down to middle school and potentially to elementary school and up past adulthood to include the elderly population. it now serves around four thousand students with a program in at least six countries. this growth has also been toward being more inclusive. “from ethics bowler to coach: lifelong learning through ethic bowl” is the next chapter. racheal robertson-green, now an assistant professor of philosophy at utah state university, shows how coaching ethics bowl was part of her lifelong learning. her introduction to ethics bowl is perhaps emblematic of the diversity of the participants in an ethics bowl, which is best said in her own words, in the fall of 2002, i sat around a table with four friends, talking about dance safe – a program that provided free drug testing at raves. the program was designed to prevent people from seriously hurting themselves or dying by taking drugs cut with harmful chemicals. yet perhaps because the five of us were on an ethics bowl team, we were tasked to decide whether the dance safe mission was ethically feasible (p. 119). this encounter with a diverse group of students led to her reading philosophers who theorized about ethics within social contexts. rachael greene now coaches an ethics bowl team. she illustrates the intersection of ethics bowl and ethical issues that were part of her lived-experience as manifested in regional and national social and political events. those experiences led her to instruct her students that they should recognize the ethics bowl as a call for further reflection and that ethic bowl could help them sharpen their skills in checking out beliefs for coherence. the ethics bowl experiences ignited and maintained her commitment to lifelong learning. this book ends with an appendix, a sample of high school ethics bowl cases and study questions, notes, references and sources, and a short biography of the editors and contributors. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 58 lifelong learning is one of the undercurrent themes of this book; whether intentionally or coincidentally, all the authors appear to commit to passing on their core belief in lifelong learning and are working to pass that love for learning to all engaged in ethics bowl. address correspondences to: dr. richard morehouse, emeritus professor, viterbo university email: remorehouse@viterbo.edu analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 47 does philosophical dialogue cause children to reject adult authority? olivier michaud and mathieu gagnon annie’s classroom was a special environment, it was full of animals during what she called the “animal project.” that week, a crayfish was killed by other crayfish as it was put into the tank. the children saw that and annie started the philosophy session with this event. to start a philosophy session, as annie always did, she used two puppets to make a little theatrical dialogue on why the crayfish may have killed the other one: they don’t have enough space, they don’t have enough food, but they also happened to fight for a girlfriend… annie’s story evolved to explore why people fight, which then became the question picked up by children. they first gave answers to address why people fight, but quickly moved toward exploring if there are good reasons to fight. (field notes) —kindergartner in annie’s classroom1 he fact that the topic of fighting was raised in a school is not in itself surprising, since schools are likely to plan interventions to reduce violence, intimidation and bullying within their walls. yet, it may appear odd that children engage in dialogue about the meaning of violence and of its positive use in the classroom. the major difference between this philosophical context and an educational program that aims to purposefully teach values to children is significant: the community of philosophical inquiry (cpi) aims to open a space for children to reflect about values, not to tell them what to think about these values. as such, children discussing the reasons for fighting and, even more radically, whether there can be good reasons to fight, is quite a different perspective from the likelier, simpler and more absolute school commandment: “don’t fight!” these instances underline a problematic dimension of bringing philosophy into schools, especially given fighting is often forbidden and non-negotiable—a sacred law not to be broken. one possible critique of philosophy for/with children (p4wc) is that it teaches children to question school rules and the adults who issue them, and thus should not be included in the school curriculum—or elsewhere for that matter. for those who hold this view, a prerequisite of good education appears to be strong authority of adults over children. the excerpt above would thus serve as evidence of how problematic it may be to introduce philosophy into schools as it may lead children to question the moral order that structures their schooling and is required for its good functioning. accordingly, the concepts of moral order and authority in school become intimately related; they both must be transmitted to children—not discussed, questioned or negotiated. on this view, imposition is not wrong or miseducative, but the normal way to structure the educational relationship between adults and children. perhaps some reasons could be presented to explain why fighting is forbidden, but in the end, its proscription must be accepted. 1 all names in this text are pseudonyms. t analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 48 this article aims to reject the assumption that philosophy causes children to reject authority. there are different ways to respond to that assumption. one way would be to engage with it theoretically, challenging it by offering a different view of what it means to educate, of how individuals learn, of the relationship between adult and children, and of the place and nature of authority in education.2 in this article, we will take a different perspective on the issues of authority and moral order with regard to p4c in schools, presenting how the tension appeared in a specific classroom through data collected by the first author using qualitative research methodologies. the claim we will propose in this article is a nuanced one: on the one hand, it is true that p4c can create a radical space for children to question authority and moral order at school, yet on the other hand, this space itself is not void of any form of authority. paradoxically, p4c may teach a certain form authority by inviting children to be critical of authority, as our research findings suggest, which we think is particularly favorable to the education of future democratic citizens. the first part of the article will present the major lines of debate between the traditional view of authority in education and the one found in p4c. the rest of the article will illustrate how the collected classroom data confirmed but at the same time nuanced the theoretical claim we will have presented. it is our hope that this article will not only offer a response not usually presented in p4c literature to the critique that incorporating philosophy in schools will lead children to reject adult authority, but that it will, by the same token, clarify the relationship between p4c and authority in general for practitioners. a traditional view of authority in education we may miss the significance of p4c if we do not situate it in the specific historical, social and philosophical context from which it emerged. p4c is part of a larger pedagogical movement attached to the development of modernity, at the center of which is the notion of authority and how it should be understood in education. we could summarize modernity as the long process of calling into question the authorities that used to structure the old world: tradition, religion and aristocracy. individuals are now able to criticize everything or are recognized in principle to do so: they are expected to be autonomous beings.3 this movement has also affected education and led to questioning the nature of the authority that teachers hold over their students. such a discussion is fundamentally about the reasons why we think one form of power is more appropriate than another in an educational relationship and, by extension, about the moral beliefs that might justify such a position. 2 for a theoretical presentation of the issue of authority in p4c, see michaud, o. and välitalo, r. (2017). authority, democracy and philosophy. in m. gregory, j. haynes & k. murris (dir.), the routledge international handbook of philosophy for children (p. 27-33). london: routledge, taylor & francis group. 3 alexis de tocqueville, de la démocratie en amérique, ed. andré jardin, vol. ii, bibliothèque de la pléiade (paris: éditions gallimard, 1840/2004). arendt, h. (1961). what is authority? in h. arendt (ed.), between past and future (pp. 91-141). new york: penguin books. robert legros, l'avènement de la démocratie. (paris: grasset, 1999). charles taylor et amy gutmann. multiculturalisme : différence et démocratie. (paris: aubier, 1994). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 49 here is a clear and precise definition of authority by mary haywood metz: authority is distinguished from other relationships of command and obedience by the superior’s right to command and the subordinate’s duty to obey. this right and duty stem from the crucial fact that the interacting persons share a relationship which exists for the service of a moral order to which both owe allegiance. this moral order may be as diffuse as the way of life of a traditional society or as specific as the pragmatic goals of a manufacturing organization.4 (p. 26, italics original) in the traditional model of authority in education, the educator is deemed to have an authority role in the classroom because she has knowledge judged as valuable that she must transmit to her students. the educator is definitely not equal to the children because she possesses something of extreme value: knowledge. this value gives sense to the moral order that situates her in a superior position over the children. the main philosophical reference for this educational perspective dates back to plato and, more specifically, to the republic.5 in the allegory of the cave, a man finds a way to escape and reach the external world to contemplate the ideas: pure, eternal and absolute truths. the man who has reached true knowledge then has the obligation to go back in the cave to educate others. we can use this allegory to think of the model of the teacher: she has escaped the cave and accessed real knowledge, and thus has the duty to pass it on to those who are still stuck in the cave—the children. her role is to help the children escape the cave themselves. though this plato reference can be criticized, we can see why his allegory may be used to justify such a position. over time, plato’s notion of a “world of ideas” has transformed into the notion of a body of knowledge that should be possessed by future citizens, workers and human beings generally—one that is settled on by experts and through social consensus. the teacher is the representative of the culture in which children must be educated to become autonomous beings. the traditional model is usually attached to a certain idea of the classroom, caricatural to a certain extent: an educator at the front, giving children information or exercises to do, as they sit in rows facing her, silent and listening carefully, taking notes and trying to assimilate the information she imparts. they may be seen as having a passive role in the sense that they are not creating knowledge or interacting with the educator, but they are working hard and obediently on the given task. this view of education is very close to what dewey calls traditional education, in which “the subject matter of education consists of bodies of information and of skills that have been worked out in the past; therefore, the business of school is to transmit them to the new generation.”6 it should be noted that this view is also very similar to what freire identifies as the banking model of education: “education thus becomes an act of depositing, in which the students are the depositaries and the teacher is the depositor. instead of communicating, the teacher issues communiqués and make deposits which the students patiently receive, memorize and repeat. this is the banking of model of education.”7 4 mary haywood metz, classrooms and corridors: the crisis of authority in desegregated secondary schools. (berkeley: university of california press, 1978) 5 platon, la république, 2e ed. (paris: gf-flammarion, 2004); eliyahu rosenow, "plato, dewey, and the problem of teacher's authority," journal of philosophy of education 27, no. 2 (1993); nigel tubbs, "chapter 3: the master," ibid.39 (2005). 6 john dewey, experience & education (new york: touchstone, 1938), p. 17. 7 paolo freire, pedagogy of the oppressed. (new york: continuum, 1970), p. 73. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 50 the rejection of the traditional model is rooted in the larger social movement of progressively minded democratic societies, which involves at its most fundamental level the development of the principle of equality in all domains of social life.8 whereas the inequality between educator and children may not be put into question in a more traditional system as previously described, in societies built on equality, it becomes problematic. in such contexts, all forms of inequality between individuals must be questioned, notably the belief that some people are fundamentally inferior to others on the grounds of their age, gender, ethnicity or economic status.9 the traditional model of authority has been challenged by different educational movements. of course, a first reference may be found in jean-jacques rousseau’s émile, which portrays the education of a fictional student who will not have to face the authority of an adult until his adolescence.10 dewey also proposes an alternative perspective on authority in experience and education, where he argues that the authority of the teacher should not be imposed on the group, but should emerge from the activity of the group itself, an activity in which the students are the most autonomous possible and interacting with their environment.11 alongside progressive education, we can see that different teaching methods inspired by constructivism and socioconstructivism have led to placing children in the center of their learning, through educational projects or experiential learning. in such pedagogies, the teacher’s role is to guide students rather than direct and control their learning experience.12 relatedly, critical pedagogy sees traditional education as having as its function to make students adapt to the world instead of leading them to change unjust and oppressive situations. on this view, transforming the authoritative structure of schooling is vital to transforming society.13 although rooted in a different political trend, anarchist thinkers have also seen the transformation of authority in schools as a necessary means to transforming a society structured on inequality, domination and oppression.14 finally, by investigating deviant forms of authority in contemporary society, critical theorists of the frankfurt school have led to rethink authority in schools in order to counter perverse tendencies, such as those leading to fascism.15 8 alexis de tocqueville, de la démocratie en amérique, ed. andré jardin, vol. ii, bibliothèque de la pléiade (paris: éditions gallimard, 1840/2004). 9 albert jacquard, pierre manent, and alain renaut, une éducation sans autorité ni sanction, nouveau collège de philosophie (paris: bernard grasset, 2003); myriam revault d'allonnes, "ouverture," le télémaque, no. 39 (2009). 10 jean-jacques rousseau, émile ou de l'éducation (paris: éditions gallimard 1762/1995). 11 john dewey (1938). experience & education. new york: touchstone. 12 carole raby and sylvie viola. (2016). modèles d'enseignement et théories d'apprentissage: pour diversifier son enseignement. (2nd ed.). anjou (québec) canada: les éditions cec; raymond vienneau. (2017). apprentissage et enseignement : théories et pratiques. (3rd edition). montréal (québec) canada: gaëtan morin éditeur, chenelière éducation 13 freire, ibid. laurence de cock and irène pereira. les pédagogies critiques. marseille, paris: agone; fondation copernic. (2019) 14 for an excellent presentation of anarchist education, see judith suissa: anarchist education. in c. levy & m. adams (eds.), the palgrave handbook of anarchism (pp. 511-529). cham, switzerland palgrave macmillan, 2019. following the detailed account of suissa, we can see that there is not a unifying vision in the anarchist schools on how authority should be enacted in them, but they all agree that rethinking authority is necessary to create a new form of society. 15 it is worth noting that critical theorists of the frankfurt school have written little on the subject of education and on the issue of authority in them. one of the rare texts on that matter is the one by theodor adorno: education after auschwitz. in t. e. lewis, j. g. a. grinberg, & m. laverty (eds.), playing with ideas: modern and contemporary philosophies of education (pp. 222-231). dubuque: kendall/hunt publishing company, 2007. for an overview of the concept of authority in the frankfurt school, see jessica benjamin, authority and the family revisited: or, a world without fathers? new german analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 51 the traditional model of authority, and debates surrounding it, should not be seen as a thing of the past, as they remain a controversial and central theme of contemporary education. how should we envision an educator’s authority? hannah arendt, marie-claude blais, dominique ottavi, marcel gauchet and normand baillargeon have all defended the perspective of traditional authority.16 they affirm that education has to be conservative, in the sense that children, as newcomers to society, can only become adult citizens by integrating its culture. education is not about teaching children to question or transform the world, but rather making them acquire the knowledge, beliefs and values socially judged as worthwhile. only then will they become able to be critical of their society and transform it. the movement toward more equality and democracy is completely justified in the realm of adult citizens, but it goes too far when it attempts to restructure education and the adult-child relationship. this traditional view of education and the kind of authority attached to it present a critical lens on p4c, including the view that the cpi should be rejected as an educational approach because it leads children to question adult authority. some advocates of the traditional perspective might even see the integration of p4c into classrooms as the ultimate corruption of the schooling mission, since the cpi model can lead children not only to question authority, but also the most fundamental ideas and beliefs that give sense to the structure of schooling and of their social lives. such interrogation can extend to a questioning of the school authorities and the institution in general. in the hands of children, philosophy can therefore be seen as a dangerous tool that should be left to adults, or at least to adolescents who are near graduation, as is the case in most educational systems that have integrated it into their curriculum.17 on this view, the only time philosophy is allowed, even required, is when young adults graduate from school and become full members of a community of equal citizens.18 p4c and authority: a theoretical overview part of this critique of p4c is descriptively sound in that p4c is indeed part of a larger movement aimed at replacing the traditional model of authority in education—or what has been labelled a teacher-centered classroom—with a child-driven approach.19 as ann margaret sharp (1993) put it, critique, (35-57) winter, (13) 1978, and stéphane habe, pathologies de l'autorité. cités, (pp. 49-66). 2(6), 2001. for a reflection on the issue of authority from a thinker of the frankfurt school, see eric j. weiner (2003). paths from erich fromm: thinking authority pedagogically. journal of educational thought, (p. 59-75) 37(1), 2003. 16 hannah arendt, "crisis in education," in between past and future (new york: penguin books, 1961); marie-claude blais, marcel gauchet, and dominique ottavi, conditions de l'éducation (paris: éditions stock, 2008); normand baillargeon, liliane est au lycée : est-il indispensable d'être cultivé? (paris: flammarion, 2011). 17 we can think here to the province of quebec, where philosophy is mandatory subject matter, but only for the students who reach college. 18 and even then, philosophy may be taught in a traditional manner: the teacher presents the mains ideas of the important figures of the history of western philosophy that students have to memorize. 19 matthew lipman, thinking in education (new york: cambridge university press, 2003); nigel tubbs, "chapter 4: the servant," journal of philosophy of education 39, no. 289-285 (2005). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 52 if we assume that the purpose of education is not only to transmit a body of knowledge but also to equip children with the skills and disposition they need to create new knowledge and make better practical judgment, than the traditional classroom of ‘telling’ is not appropriate (p. 572). this is first realized in p4c through the symbolic transformation of the classroom itself: for a cpi, the set-up changes from its regular rectangular organization to a circle.20 the circle is pedagogically significant and symbolic since all children occupy an equal position in front of each other and stop facing solely the educator. further, the educator herself is not above the circle but rather within it— not in front but among her students. finally, the first role of the teacher is not one of transmitting knowledge, but rather of creating a space for children to engage in philosophical inquiry. the whole cpi is then constructed on the idea that it is not up to the adult in the room to transmit knowledge that has been sanctioned by traditions: she is not there to lecture on important concepts or thinkers in the philosophical tradition, but rather to create a space for children to think for themselves with one another.21 to this end, a cpi begins with a subject of interest to the children: after sharing a stimulus, like a story or art work, they are invited to formulate questions and vote on the one they would most like to discuss. the process is constructed from children’s interests and reflections rather than through the imposition of what adults think they should learn. during the dialogue—the most important and longest phase of a cpi session—the educator refrains from telling children what to think on the chosen subject. though she does not have authority over the dialogue content, she should however have authority over the process: she will invite children to develop their reasons, to link their comments to those of others, or to ask them to consider an issue from another perspective. this transformation of the educator’s role in p4c has led to a change in title: she is no longer a teacher but a facilitator—someone who facilitates the dialogue. she then becomes the guardian of the procedure rather than the guardian of the content to transmit. sharp has argued that the teacher should work toward her own disappearance: as the community becomes more mature, the facilitator should become a co-participant with the other members of the community, who can take charge of the dialogue’s direction.22 in progressive education, authority should not be imposed by the educator but rather arise from the activity in which the children are involved. it is the children’s engagement with topics that matter to them that gives meaning to the cpi experience as well as to the facilitator’s function. this may explain why the problematic dimensions of adult authority in a cpi are rarely noticed as there appears to be nothing wrong with it: it naturally emerges from the classroom activity. while advocates of traditional education are right to point out that p4c rejects the traditional authority model, as previously intimated, it is incorrect to claim that p4c rejects all kinds of authority. in fact, it does 20 maughn gregory, philosophy for children: practitioner handbook (upper montclair: institute for the advancement of philosophy for children, 2008); topping, k. j., trickey, s. and cleghorn, p. 2019). a teacher's guide to philosophy for children. new york: routledge, taylor & francis group; michaud, o., & sasseville, m. (2017). introduction à la philosophie pour enfants : l'approche lipman. diotime(71). http://www.educ-revues.fr/diotime/ affichagedocument. aspx?iddoc=108616&pos=1 21 michel sasseville, la pratique de la philosophie avec les enfants, 3e ed. (québec: presses de l'université laval, 2009). 22 ann margaret sharp, "the community of inquiry: education for democracy," in thinking, children and education, ed. matthew lipman (dubuque: kendall/hunt publishing company, 1993). http://www.educ-revues.fr/diotime/ analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 53 promote a certain form of authority, although often implicitly. yet this debate centers on two distinct visions of the child, of the adult-child relationship, of good education and, interrelated with these concepts, of what educational authority ought to be. as mentioned, one way of resolving the clash between these two views is to analyze their central concepts from a theoretical perspective, but this article proposes an alternative route: thinking about that matter through a case study in which issues of authority appeared and unfolded naturally in a classroom setting. inside a democratic classroom the data presented in this article comes from a larger study on issues of authority, democracy and philosophical practice in a kindergarten classroom over several months in the spring of 2012.23 situated in the suburb of a major city in the northeast of the united states, the classroom was chosen because the educator had a master’s degree in p4c and had been integrating the cpi model in her classroom for many years.24 the point of qualitative studies is not to produce generalizable conclusions that can be applied to different populations but rather to push theoretical understandings of certain subjects through empirical data collected by a researcher immersed in a natural setting.25 the collection of data from this study therefore aims to contribute to a better understanding of authority issues in p4c, which may arise in any country or context where the cpi model is practiced. this section will first examine the classroom in which the data was collected and, more specifically, the educator’s various efforts to offer children a democratic educational experience. these details will permit us to see how p4c can be part of a democratic classroom culture, while giving us a vantage point from which to observe the specificity of p4c in its relationship to authority in other classroom activities. in this particular classroom, p4c was representative of a larger perspective on education: the educator annie wanted to offer an experience of democratic education to her students with the objective of making them good future citizens. her pedagogical approach did not start with the idea that she should be the “boss” in the classroom: throughout the research period, she constantly questioned her own authority and tried to make sense of it.26 annie’s conception of authority was linked to another one of her educational principles: she believed that her students should have “ownership” over their education.27 it is possible to see a certain link between these two ideas: if an educator questions her authority, she may be led to think that children should have power inside their 23 olivier michaud, "a qualitative study on educational authority, shared authority and the practice of philosophy in a kindergarten classroom: a study of the multiple dimensions and complexities of a democratic classroom" (montclair state university, 2013). 24 if the location where data were collected was outside of canada, it has to be note that the researcher who collected them—the first author of this text— is canadian and, as the researcher subjectivity is the first tool of data collection in qualitative methodology, he brought his canadian perspective in the data collection. 25 see merriam, s. b., & tisdell, e. j. (2016). qualitative research : a guide to design and implementation (4th edition). jossey-bass; creswell, j. w., & poth, c. n. (2018). qualitative inquiry & research design : choosing among five approaches (4th ed.). sage. 26 interview may 7. 27 interview april 11. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 54 classroom and, if she thinks they should be involved in their education’s direction, she may be led to reflect on how her authority is or is not creating that democratic space for them. taken together, these two elements create a certain view of education that is directly opposed to the traditional authority model. annie’s philosophy of education—including her conception of authority—led her to structure her classroom in certain ways. first, she asked the children what they wanted to learn at the beginning of the year. this is a significant move since it involved them in the creation of the moral order that gave sense to their schooling experience—one not imposed on them but emerging from them. further, she structured the year’s lessons from their chosen themes—what she called “projects”—rather than cover the activities according to the mandated curriculum. through this intentional involvement, she was striving to make the children’s education most attractive to them and as close as possible to their experiences. to this end, she also moved the classroom outside the school walls whenever possible through field trips related to the year’s larger educational projects. in addition, annie included in the daily life of the classroom other elements that aimed to create a space for students to “own” their education. she encouraged children to take various decisions in connection with the classroom functioning and listened to them when they had something to propose. there was “center time,” during which students were free to engage in the activity of their choice. finally, she included at least two sharing activities per day that students directed, during which they could say something about their personal life, allowing them to bring their lived experiences into classroom life. all these daily elements taken together created a particular classroom culture with regard to authority—a culture that opposed the traditional model previously described. how p4c sessions took place for annie, p4c was a kind of “mindset,” in that she infused it into her whole pedagogy, not just her weekly cpi sessions. well, we do philosophy in the philosophy session, but when you have that mind-set, philosophy is all the time. really. it’s all the time, there is the thursday sessions but then these things come up all the time. and usually, if we have done it all year, (…) they know when it’s philosophy session. they know even if it wasn’t thursday at 10 o’clock. they know we are talking about something. like, one thing that, i’m mean as pretty frustrated as i’m, one thing that always sees to come through by the end of the year in a philosophical classroom is that they love to have a talk about what is right and wrong. they usually recognize that, that is dialogue for the sake of dialogue. that they don’t have necessarily to get to a conclusion that is definitive at the end. you know what i mean. like, okay, now you are right, you are wrong at the end. but they get really good at that by the end. just like, no i think this and i think that. they are really good at that. [interview. may 7]28 however, philosophy was also noticeably present beyond the p4c sessions: there were many moments of collective engagement in reflecting on open and fundamental subject matter and using cpi-related 28 interview, may 7. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 55 skills. however, since these other moments could not often be observed by the researcher, this section is based mostly on the thursday morning sessions. during the cpi sessions, students were first invited to sit on a large circular rug situated in the middle of the classroom, which annie had bought especially for p4c. she would then take out a pair of dolls that she only used for these dialogues, which got the children very excited. annie would playfully talk about the dolls—commenting on what they did during the last week—then put on a little play with them to share the story stimulus, drawing on her strong skills as a storyteller and performer. annie told the story twice: in her words, once for listening and once for thinking. however, before the second telling, students would ask annie to make the story longer, indicating how much they liked these moments. the stories were connected to classroom life, as annie wrote them based on what had happened the previous week. most of the time they were about events that contained a philosophical dimension that had not yet been explored. through these creative choices, she adapted the traditional cpi structure—which usually starts with the p4c curriculum of novels written by lipman—and, most interestingly, connected the cpi to the children’s recent lived experiences. for example, that spring, a guest came to share an artistic performance. after the performance, students were visibly interested in what parts of the story were real and which were invented. annie took note of that interest and used it to write the story for the skit between the dolls on the following thursday morning. the discussion then focused on how to know what is real and not real. some remarks included: if the story is about something that really happened, then it is not a lie; there are fake stories which are not lies, like the ninjagos; it was a story because the author invented everything; you can make real stories or fake stories. the discussion then moved on to consider how to know whether something seen on tv is real or not. we can see how annie adapted the p4c method for her classroom. p4c was part of annie’s larger intention to have her students experience democracy, notably by organizing the group in a circle, by starting discussions from the children’s interests, and by asking them to think together and give reasons for their assertions. and yet, although annie’s p4c sessions seemed congruent with her overall classroom culture informed by democratic principles, they also appeared qualitatively different from her other activities. p4c, authority and morality in comparison to the other activities that annie put in place to offer children a democratic educational experience, issues of authority were most clear during cpi sessions regarding moral matters. there was already an established character education program in annie’s school structured around a set of values that had to be transmitted to students.29 for example, the value of “caring,” a certain way of being with others, had to be overtly taught for a certain period of time. educators had to explain what caring meant and students were expected to integrate it at school, earning rewards when they behaved in ways that reflected the value. 29 joel westheimer, what kind of citizen? : educating our children for the common good. (new york: teachers college press, 2015). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 56 this character education program is built on a specific vision of morality, moral education and authority in schools. it is not open to dialogue but rather imposed by an authority—more specifically, a chain of authorities within the school system, from the principal to the teachers. students are not part of the chain of command, they are the ones expected to be transformed by integrating the program’s values into their lives. this kind of authority, clearly functioning within a top-down structure, is attached to a certain moral order: such character education offers a clear and definite vision of what is good and what is wrong, of what is expected and what is forbidden. doubt is nonexistent—the world of values is depicted as being settled, defined, and illustrated. children have to act in accordance with that moral order. interestingly, these two elements are linked together: a precise and official moral order imposed by a hierarchical form of authority. p4c as a pedagogy challenge these two elements. on the one hand, p4c is built on the idea that no authority can establish in advance the topics or answers to be discussed in a cpi—to be possible, it requires a suspension of authority regarding the subject matter. on the other hand, a structured moral order is likely to be undermined by a cpi dialogue, as its defining elements may be discussed, questioned, nuanced, and even rejected. defending a specific moral order cannot be the goal of a cpi, since such an objective would prevent children from inquiring freely—a core principle of cpi—while enabling adults to lead the dialogue where they want it to go. the example presented at the beginning of the article is an illustration of how p4c may allow for inquiry into subjects that are not usually open to discussion. annie started the session with her dolls commenting on the fact that a crayfish was killed by another when it was put in the classroom tank the previous week. as mentioned, annie wanted her educational activities—including p4c—to stem from the children’s interests and experiences rather than from the mandated curriculum and disciplines. animals were therefore an integral part of her classroom, particularly during what she called the “animal project,” one of the year’s biggest projects. the death of the crayfish was not planned but nonetheless triggered the children’s curiosity. as the dolls recalled that event, they wondered if it was possible to make sense of it. they started to mention the different reasons that could explain why animals fight: animals fight when they do not have enough food or enough space… or when they are competing for a girlfriend. this exchange inspired a cpi question on a similar theme that focused on humans, that is: why do people fight? thus, the dialogue invited inquiry into one of the school’s most sacred rules—we should not fight—and did not result in the only allowable conclusion within school: do not fight! the value of nonviolence was sacred at the school not only because of the belief that children’s physical integrity should never be compromised, but also because of the possible reactions that could occur if children’s safety was put into question. if there were nuances to the do-not-fight commandment, they were obscured by the pressure to obey the rule. this cpi dialogue first revealed the nuances of the rule—like the different reasons why someone could be morally justified in engaging in what is forbidden at school—and then opened the possibility of asking whether there were indeed good reasons to fight. some of the reasons that were given included: we can fight in order to get back something that someone stole from us; we can fight because someone has been unfair to us; and we can fight because we do not have enough food, referring specifically to what had to be done in the “old days.” some students claimed there was no good reason to fight and it should always be avoided, because you could get into trouble or be analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 57 hurt. however, in each instance, the group was not sure whether there was a good reason to fight. as the dialogue was drawing to an end and the children were growing restless, one student said: “i fight with my cousins, because i like them and they are my best friends—i just fight with them for no reason and it is just really fun.” the group considered this as a good reason to fight. yet what matters is not whether a good reason to fight was offered, but that the very topic was opened within a school where fighting was strictly forbidden. here, philosophy was definitely creating a breach in the solid, certain and nonnegotiable moral order of the school. the hidden authority and moral order the data collected in this study confirms the possibility that p4c is likely to undermine the adult authority and the moral order in schools—as advocates of traditional education have cautioned— because it can call into question what is usually assumed as given. p4c does make such questioning possible by opening a space for children to inquire into their school’s most fundamental values in ways educators may not want. however, it remains unclear whether participation in cpi dialogues actually leads children to be more disobedient toward their educators and reject the school’s moral order. however, the p4c practice in annie’s classroom did also lead to the construction of a specific kind of authority. though the content of the cpi dialogues was open, the dialogical form itself was more traditionally authoritative. children were expected to stay seated and quiet, and to listen to each other speak. they were expected to say certain things in a certain way, raising their hands before they spoke and backing up their statements with reasons. they were not allowed to physically hit each other during the dialogues nor hurt each other’s feelings. thus, though they could discuss the possibility and legitimacy of fighting at the conceptual level, all literal forms of fighting were forbidden in the dialogical process itself. some of these rules were clearly enunciated—like procedures for taking turns speaking—while others were generally understood without being stated, like the prohibition against fighting during the sessions. and so, it could be argued that the philosophical content—the open-ended inquiry on virtually any fundamental subject—required an authoritative order. further, there was a notable difference between the cpi sessions and the other democratically run classroom activities, namely: the special kind of authority underlying them. philosophy time was not like any other kind of sharing session during the week, only because there was an authority—the educator—requiring children to enter the philosophical dimension of their personal and social lives. such order was attached to a certain timeframe during which they had to sit with an issue. though the researcher could observe some cpi elements in other moments, they were clearly more visible during the thursday morning sessions. and so, if the content of the philosophy sessions could undermine the school’s authorities and moral order, this was only possible because another authority was enacted to enable the activity itself. we can therefore say that the cpi sessions not only caused children to question authority, but also constructed a specific kind of authority through its practice. aspects of this authority could be called into question during the metacognitive assessment that followed the dialogue—for example, exploring what rules should be respected during p4c—but even this inquiry would require that children follow analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 58 certain procedures or else the session would end. this is not to say that other democratic classroom activities did not have certain forms of authority built into them, as well as certain non-negotiable elements. but our claim is that such authority was enacted differently in p4c sessions. first, these sessions permitted the children to engage with the most central concepts of their social life—for example, why do they go to school. but inquiry into these concepts was made possible because an authority was structuring the process. how p4c teaches us to both live with and question authority this article began with the critique that p4c may cause children to question authority in dangerous ways. according to this critique, the educator’s authority over her classroom is required to educate children as newcomers to society and should thus not be undermined. on this view, the purpose of education is to pass a certain moral order down to children so they can integrate it into their lives before having the possibility of questioning it as adults. this article has aimed to debunk this critique. if it is true that p4c may lead children to call into question concepts and assumptions that may not otherwise be challenged, it is untrue that p4c causes children to become critical of any and all forms of authority since, as observed in the case study, p4c works toward the construction of a specific kind of authority—namely, the cpi rules and procedures. still, this research suggests that p4c can bring something to the democratic classroom that other activities cannot. p4c did lead annie’s children to question authority and the school’s moral order in a way that would not have otherwise been possible, as illustrated by the example of fighting. unlike the character education program, the cpi experience made it possible for children to question what appeared to be beyond question: instead of teaching students why they should not fight, it opened a radical space for children to dialogue about good reasons to fight. yet there was an authority in the classroom’s p4c practice, without which the cpi sessions would not have been possible. annie obliged her students to engage in a certain form of rational dialogue and kept them engaged for a certain amount of time. it was this obligation that made p4c such a unique space of and for authority in her classroom: the children could question anything but they still had to do engage in the cpi procedures. this point has several implications. first, according to the data collected, it is false and simplistic to say that p4c teaches children to reject authority because there is a form of authority embedded in the cpi model. second, if this authority has sometimes been noticed and criticized by scholars in p4c—such as, nancy vansieleghem, gert biesta, pavel lushyn and david kennedy30—unlike them, we do not think it is possible to bypass it because we believe it is a fundamental part of cpi, at least according to the data collected for this study. we therefore think that p4c practitioners should be made aware of these issues of authority to make sense of their own practice. lastly, it is plausible to suggest that p4c is intimately linked to children’s democratic education in a very peculiar way. if we look at ourselves in contemporary societies, we often live in a constant tension between being critical 30 nancy vansieleghem, "philosophy for children as the wind of thinking," journal of philosophy of education 39, no. 1 (2005); gert biesta, "education and the democratic person: toward a political conception of democratic education," teacher college record 109, no. 3 (2007); pavel lushyn & david kennedy, “power, manipulation and control in a community of inquiry,” analytic teaching, 23 no. 2 (2003). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 59 of every authority around us and of knowing—however unconsciously—how or when to submit to it. p4c seems to represent an ideal space to experience and grapple with such tensions toward a more nuanced understanding of our democratic identity. references 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(2018). qualitative inquiry & research design : choosing among five approaches (4th ed.). sage. dewey, john. democracy and education. mineola: dover publications, inc., 1916. 1916. ———. experience & education. new york: touchstone, 1938. freire, paolo. pedagogy of the oppressed. new york: continuum, 1970. gregory, maughn. philosophy for children: practitioner handbook. upper montclair: institute for the advancement of philosophy for children, 2008. jacquard, albert, pierre manent, and alain renaut. une éducation sans autorité ni sanction. nouveau collège de philosophie. paris: bernard grasset, 2003. legros, robert. l'avènement de la démocratie. paris: grasset, 1999. lipman, matthew. thinking in education. new york: cambridge university press, 2003. lushyn, pavel, and david kennedy. “power, manipulation and control in a community of inquiry.” analytic teaching, 23 no. 2 (2003): 103-110. merriam, s. b., & tisdell, e. j. (2016). qualitative research : a guide to design and implementation (4th edition). jossey-bass.metz, mary haywood. (1978). classrooms and corridors : the crisis of authority in desegregated secondary schools. berkeley: university of california press. michaud, olivier. "a qualitative study on educational authority, shared authority and the practice of philosophy in a kindergarten classroom: a study of the multiple dimensions and complexities of a democratic classroom." montclair state university, 2013. michaud, o., & sasseville, m. (2017). introduction à la philosophie pour enfants : l'approche lipman. diotime(71). http://www.educrevues.fr/diotime/affichagedocument.aspx?iddoc=108616&pos=1 michaud, o. et välitalo, r. (2017). authority, democracy and philosophy. in m. gregory, j. haynes & k. murris (dir.), the routledge international handbook of philosophy for children (p. 2733). london: routledge, taylor & francis group. pace, judith l., and annette hemmings. 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"the community of inquiry: education for democracy." in thinking, children and education, edited by matthew lipman, 337-43. dubuque: kendall/hunt publishing company, 1993. tocqueville, alexis de. de la démocratie en amérique. bibliothèque de la pléiade. edited by andré jardin vol. ii, paris: éditions gallimard, 1840/2004. topping, k. j., trickey, s. et cleghorn, p. (2019). a teacher's guide to philosophy for children. new york: routledge, taylor & francis group. tubbs, nigel. "chapter 3: the master." journal of philosophy of education 39, no. 2 (2005): 240-57. ———. "chapter 4: the servant." journal of philosophy of education 39, no. 289-285 (2005). vansieleghem, nancy. "philosophy for children as the wind of thinking." journal of philosophy of education 39, no. 1 (2005): 19-35. vienneau, r. (2017). apprentissage et enseignement : théories et pratiques. (3rd ed.). montréal (québec) canada: gaëtan morin éditeur, chenelière éducation. westheimer, j. (2015). what kind of citizen? : educating our children for the common good. new york: teachers college press. address correspondences to: olivier michaud, associate professor, department of educational sciences, université du québec à rimouski (lévis), email: olivier_michaud@uqar.ca mathieu gagnon: professor, faculty of education, université de sherbrooke, email: mathieu.gagnon3@usherbrooke.ca mailto:olivier_michaud@uqar.ca mailto:mathieu.gagnon3@usherbrooke.ca analytic teaching and philosophical praxis analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 62 in the footsteps of matthew lipman: dialogue among peers and dialogical thinking marie-france daniel introduction atthew lipman was a great philosopher and a great man; a man deeply committed to the philosophy of education and to the worldwide advancement of the philosophy for children (p4c) approach he developed. his philosophical approach adapted to children sparked tremendous changes in the way philosophers engaged in philosophy and educators regarded child education. based on lipman’s work, my innovation was to adapt p4c first to mathematics (daniel et al., 1996), and then to violence prevention among children (daniel, 2002). however, the legacy i would like to focus on in this paper concerns my years of research on the concepts of philosophical dialogue and critical thinking. in the mid 1980s, when i was facilitating p4c sessions together with teachers from quebec and elsewhere, i noticed the teachers would sometimes confuse conversation with dialogue, and simple thinking with philosophical or critical thinking. on my side, i was able to observe that pupils were discussing during the p4c sessions, but i was not able to ensure that they were dialoguing in the lipmanian sense of the term; and even though i was able to observe that the pupils were thinking, i was questioning whether their thoughts were spontaneous or reflective. my questioning was justified since the concepts of dialogue and critical thinking are the essence of lipman’s approach. if dialogue and critical thinking are not actualized in classroom discussions, then the approach loses its specificity, its meaning, its purpose. during the 1980s and 90s, many educators and philosophers ignored and even rejected p4c; they claimed it was a “waste of time” both for pupils and teachers, or an “insult” to “real” philosophy. that is why, during that period, i undertook empirical studies on the impacts of p4c on the discursive and cognitive development of children, in quebec and in other countries. the first section of this paper relates to discursive development in children; it centers on the concept of dialogue. i present five types of exchanges that emerged from the analysis of children’s discussions when they are engaging in philosophical praxis, illustrating each type of exchange with examples. m analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 63 the second section of the paper focuses on the cognitive development of children, seeking to provide some answers to two research questions: are pupils in kindergarten and primary school capable of mobilizing critical thinking when they philosophize? further, are age and schooling sufficient for the development of critical thinking in adolescents? the results are presented in three parts: a) a theoretical description of a new concept, named dialogical critical thinking, that emerged from analysis of discussion transcripts (its components and its scaffolding movement through philosophical praxis), b) empirical findings concerning philosophizing children, c) current empirical findings concerning non-philosophizing adolescents. the final section of the paper is a general discussion of the research results and the p4c approach. 1. philosophical dialogue from the philosophers of antiquity, we know that philo-sophia is either an internal deliberation or an external dialectic. its praxis can be either self-reflective or dialogical. lipman and sharp consider that, if left unshared, whatever one constructs in isolation remains latent. they wrote that dialogue within a community of peers is the reflective method that best represents the path of philosophical inquiry. philosophical dialogue is an active and a critical method of communication. it differs from conversation in that it calls upon complex cognitive and social skills, and in that speaking and listening include reciprocity, tolerance, respect, and surpassing of oneself in a quest for meaning and valid justifications. dialogue presupposes a horizontal relationship (versus hierarchical) between two or more people who are united in a community of inquiry (lipman, sharp, oscanyan, 1980). philosophical dialogue: a typology of exchanges do pupils spontaneously engage in dialogue when they participate in a p4c session, or is dialogue a competency that requires apprenticeship? and if apprenticeship is required, how does it develop in the classroom? thanks to a social sciences and humanities research council (sshrc) research grants, and to a team from quebec (professors louise lafortune and richard pallascio), i qualitatively studied transcripts of exchanges within groups of philosophizing pupils aged 9 to 12 years and, subsequently, within groups of pupils aged 4 and 5 years. to ensure the objectivity of our analyses, data was collected in different cultural, pedagogical and linguistic contexts (quebec, australia, mexico and france). results indicated that during p4c sessions, philosophical dialogue did not manifest itself as soon as pupils began exchanging with peers. rather, it manifested itself after months, even years, of philosophical praxis. whether pupils were 9 to 12 years old (daniel et al., 2005) or 4 to 5 years old (daniel & delsol, 2005), philosophical dialogue unfolded according to a similar typology of exchanges. in the following paragraphs, i discuss the five components of this learning process: anecdotal, monological, non-critical dialogical, quasi-critical dialogical, and critical dialogical exchanges. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 64 what we refer to as an anecdotal exchange was observed in most groups of pupils just beginning p4c praxis; in other words, when pupils “talk” without co-constructing their ideas or allowing themselves to be influenced by the interventions of their peers. they speak in an “i” / “my” voice and specifically address the teacher rather than their peers. they do not attempt to understand the concept that is the agenda for the day, nor do they try to identify a common goal; instead, they relate anecdotes and personal experiences linked to the question’s subject. example from an exchange between 5 year-old children at the beginning of the school year: teacher: what difference is there between a doll and a person? pupil 1: the other day, my friend had a doll. it walked. it even had a little fork and it could eat. pupil 2: my doll talks. pupil 3: i’ve seen a doll that could pee. example from an exchange between pupils aged 9 to 10 years old at the beginning of the school year: teacher: in the story, why doesn’t ramon like math exams? pupil 1: i become nervous during exams. pupil 2: because sometimes, i, because i worry. pupil 3: because i am nervous. to help pupils move beyond an anecdotal exchange, teachers can ask them questions that try to evoke a generalization from their statements. for example: “can what you’re saying about yourself be applied to all children? can it be applied to everyone?” or “can what you say about your dog be applied to all dogs? to all animals? to all living beings?” what we call a monological exchange was the type of exchange most often observed in p4c sessions. in this type of exchange, interventions are more generalized (“they” / “their” voice). pupils reflect on the question they are asked; however, their thinking is oriented toward the search for a “correct” answer, one that satisfies them at the moment, or one that is likely to satisfy the teacher. when constructing their ideas, the pupils do not take their peers’ points of view into consideration; instead, they aim to add their own. example from an exchange between 5 year-olds after several months of philosophical praxis: teacher: why do children get diseases? pupil 1: because sometimes they don’t get vaccinated. pupil 2: because sometimes they go outside without a scarf. pupil 3: i know why you catch diseases in hospitals, it’s because people are sick, and they drop germs around. to help pupils move past a monological exchange and attain one that is dialogical, teachers can remind pupils that, in an exchange, one must first listen and try to understand the points of view of peers before expressing oneself: “could you rephrase what x just said? how could you tie in your point of view with what was just said?” or “who wants to help complete his or her idea? who could add something to expand on x’s idea? who can provide an example to clarify x’s point of view?” it was also observed that pupils exchanged dialogically after a few months of p4c praxis. an exchange is called dialogical when pupils begin to form a community of inquiry that is, when they analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 65 actively listen to each other, question each other and build on their peers’ interventions to construct their own. nevertheless, when analyzing transcripts, it became apparent that a dialogical exchange was not inherently philosophical or critical; it could be non-critical, quasi-critical or critical. non-critical dialogue presupposes a process of reflection and co-construction of points of view, but in a manner that is predominantly convergent. in other words, non-critical dialogue builds on and enriches peers’ points of view—but without analyzing or evaluating them. this type of dialogue is greatly praised by today’s schools since it is non-conflictual and characterized by socially desirable values such as respect, open-mindedness and acceptance of differences. example from an exchange between 5 year-old children: teacher:( …) we will write actions that help your body heal. pupil 1: wearing gloves (… helps your body heal). pupil 2 to pupil 1: why gloves? pupil 1 to pupil 2: gloves so you don’t catch a disease in the hospital. pupil 2: and gloves are also useful to keep you from hurting your hands with splinters when you work. example from an exchange between pupils aged 9 to 10 years: teacher: why do you say geometry is an interesting subject? pupil 1: because it is part of our daily lives. pupil 2: that’s true because at school, for example, we learn to measure figures and when we’re older and we will want to buy some land, we will know how much land we have. pupil 3: i agree with pupil 2. and also because with geometry, for example, architects can build schools, buildings and all, stores and all that we need in our lives like pupil 1 said. despite its dialogical nature, and notwithstanding the reflective thinking inherent in pupils’ points of view, a non-critical dialogical exchange does not contribute to an examination of peers’ points of view and is not enough to help young people initiate critical reflection about ideas, values, behaviours, traditions. because of non-critical dialogue’s convergence, in some cases it may even reinforce negative biases, undesirable values, discrimination, and so forth. therefore, teachers should encourage pupils to dialogue critically by asking questions such as: “who can provide a counter-example? who can bring some nuance to…? what are the advantages and disadvantages of x (action, tradition, value)? among the reasons we have just mentioned, which one seems most appropriate, most useful to …? what would happen if everyone did this? is this x (point of view, behaviour, rule, value, etc.) acceptable in every context? what could be the consequences of x (point of view, decision, behaviour, etc.) on you? on others? on society? these questions encourage pupils to transcend their initial thinking; they aim to create doubts and uncertainties in their minds; and when posed regularly, they are likely to motivate pupils to engage in a critical thinking process—one that should assist them in making enlightened choices. the critical dialogue learning process is complex; it takes time before it is established in a group. this is probably why we observed an intermediate dialogical exchange in classrooms, which we named quasi-critical dialogue. in a context of interdependence, some pupils are sufficiently critical to question peer statements, but others are not critical enough to hear their peers’ criticisms, or to be influenced by them. example from an exchange between pupils aged 9 to 10 years: teacher: can we speak of a perfect cube? analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 66 pupil 2: i say maybe it’s possible to have a perfect cube, because if you take 4 squares and if you look at them, then with a blade, you take a little bit away…you keep on taking away little bits until they become equal… pupil 3: at the end, you’re going to need instruments that are too small to do something. pupil 4: you’d have to be lucky […]. pupil 3: no. i don’t think that if you measure the centimeters… after, you have to come to millimeters, then you come to hundredths of mm, then to thousandths of mm, you keep going like that. you’ll never be able to make a perfect cube if you measure […] pupil 2: you could take geometry blocks. pupil 5: yes, but geometry blocks aren’t all equal. [… the makers] make them as equal as possible, the most perfect possible, but that doesn’t mean they’re perfect, perfect, perfect. they may seem perfect to us, but… pupil 2: i say it might be possible to have a perfect cube. questions such as: “how can x’s point of view be linked to yours? would you like to modify or develop your point of view based on the points of view your peers have just shared?” encourage pupils to actively listen to peers, to self-correct, and help them understand that changing their point of view is an integral part of philosophical thinking (rather than demonstrating an error, as many pupils believe). it is also essential for a pupil to realize that a criticism is a “gift” given by one’s peers; it indicates that the pupil’s idea is sufficiently meaningful for others to set aside their own ideas and focus on that pupil’s idea in order to better understand the concept they are discussing. finally, critical dialogue underlies a quest for inter-comprehension, which presupposes that pupils ensure they understand their peers’ ideas in order to co-construct common meanings and representations. when analyzing transcripts, the following characteristics of critical dialogue, which may be manifested to different degrees according to the pupils’ ages, came to light: explicit interdependence between pupil interventions, an inquiry process, research focused on construction of meanings (rather than on truth), calling into question the initial point of view (by way of criticism, questions, nuances), a search for alternatives, justifications of viewpoints, ethical concerns, and selfcorrection. after a critical dialogical exchange, a transformation is observed in the group’s perspectives. example from an exchange between 5 year-old children at the end of one year of philosophical praxis: teacher: here is the situation: jojo doesn’t like the candy her aunt gave her, but she eats it anyway because she doesn’t want to disappoint her aunt. according to you, is this a good solution? pupil 1: i think it’s a good idea (…) because she won’t be sad. teacher: does anyone agree or disagree with pupil 1’s idea? pupil 2: i don’t agree (…) i would take the candy and drop it in the garbage and say i finished the candy (…)because i don’t want to eat mints i don’t like (…) this way, she won’t know i didn’t eat them. teacher: do you agree with the ideas that were just expressed? pupil 3: i don’t agree with pupil 2 because if my aunt gave me some candy i don’t like and i threw it away, when she throws something away, (then) she will look in the garbage and see the candy and she would be angry with me. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 67 pupil 2: if we put them way, way, way down in the bottom and put some stuff over them and then close the lid ? pupil 4: well, i would eat them even if i don’t like them. if i really, really, don’t like them, (then) i’ll give them back to my aunt without telling her i don’t like them. pupil 5: i have another idea. all you have to do is tell your aunt, “could you change the candies?” example from an exchange between pupils aged 10 to 12 years after a few years of p4c: teacher: last week, we looked at the order of animals and the order of maths, which ones you thought were higher. can one of you (…) take up the discussion where we left off? pupil 2: i would place humans in fourth or third place or maybe second because i don’t think we deserve to go at the top for what we’ve done to all those animals and how we’ve had wars. and like animals don’t care, i mean they have wars sometimes but it’s when they need to be in the higher group to be respected more. (…) so i think that animals are a higher level than humans but they respect other people and we tend to be selfish. pupil 4: i think that humans are the only ones that can do math, because it’s like english: humans invented english. and math is just like another language that we invented. we use it to understand things, to do the things we have to do well, to understand the reasons behind things. like why the sky is blue and why we can’t float or fly. so we invented maths to explain these things. (…) but the animals they just think sky and they don’t really think about it, because they’ve got one main instinct which is eat and reproduce. teacher: and how does that affect the order of things? pupil 4: oh, well if it’s the order of how smart they are, i think humans would have to be at the top. teacher: humans would have to be. why? what criteria are you using? pupil 4: on how complex they are. and that we’ve got other intelligences, like i said yesterday, empathy and sympathy and stuff like that. pupil 5: i agree because if i had to rank any of the animals in a higher order or whatever, i think i’d put humans on the top as well because (…) we do things for our own pleasure and usually we do them of our own accord. we usually do whatever we want because we’ve got better resources for it and we’ve created more things. it’s just our brain power is larger. i don’t know if it is but i think that our brain power is larger. pupil 6: i disagree with pupil 5 when he said they don’t build things. they build nests, they build burrows, they have got to work out how to build them, that’s not really easy. and they only kill what they need. pupil 5: […] i think i sort of changed my mind. i sort of agree with pupil 6 (…). then there are like two different paradigms. pupil 6: yes, there is the intelligence to think how to make things and the intelligence of how to use these things. we are both the most stupid and the most intelligent. if society strives for responsible education (in the deweyan sense of the term), it follows that critical dialogue must be further stimulated in schools and during p4c sessions. indeed, this type of exchange implies a quest for equality and community empowerment; it underlies and encourages values such as cooperation and mutual support. in sum, critical dialogical exchange, practiced on a regular basis and from the earliest age, is likely to lead to a habit of dialogical critical thinking in children, without which democracy is likely to erode. the praxis of critical dialogue can be considered a form of protection against minority oppression, racial discrimination, sexism and other types of exclusion; it represents a means to transcend individualism and foster social commitment. in sum, while the typology of exchanges that emerged from our analyses was in line with lipman’s and sharp’s ideas, it focuses on the philosophical dialogue learning process in preschool and analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 68 elementary school pupils. empirical research has shown that dialogue is not spontaneous; that p4c is not a magical approach that simply requires providing pupils with a space-time in which to express their points of view in order to engage in dialogue. we maintain that teachers not only have the responsibility to help pupils acquire knowledge in language, arts, mathematics, history, and so forth, but they also have a responsibility to help them learn to engage in dialogue in a critical manner. in that sense, teachers must be vigilant during the facilitation of p4c sessions. to allow children to speak spontaneously about personal anecdotes and to unconditionally accept their ideas does not necessarily lead them to engage in a philosophical dialogue with their peers. teachers must ask children challenging questions to nurture their active involvement in the dialogical critical process. 2. critical thinking and dialogical critical thinking in children given that speech is the manifestation of thought, it is when exchanges among pupils are of a dialogical critical nature that critical thinking is mobilized. in the following paragraphs, i address the concepts of critical thinking before discussing dialogical critical thinking (dct). 2.1. critical thinking: a recognized tool influenced by dewey and vygotsky, lipman considers that critical thinking occurs within and because of peer interactions. according to lipman, individuals need critical reflection to help them differentiate, among all the information they receive, that which is most relevant according to their goals. his definition of critical thinking is based on three fundamental characteristics: the use of specific criteria; sensitivity to context; and self-correction. according to lipman, critical thinking presupposes reasoning skills and creative craft (lipman, 1988). in his later writings, lipman focused on the concept of higher-order-thinking or complex thinking, which includes caring and metacognitive thinking (lipman, 2003). there is an urgent need to foster critical thinking in pupils. over the past decades, educational systems of industrialized western societies have been increasingly influenced by neo-liberal tendencies. school is no longer the focus for stimulating ideas. school is slowly becoming an instrument subjected to economic values such as efficiency, performance and individualism (among others, lenoir, 2016; martin, 2016). when individualism becomes radical, the concerns of individuals focus on “i”, “me,”, “my” and they focus on individual rights (taylor, 1992) rather than on “we” or “our”, which value social responsibility (rorty, 1989, 1991). unesco (2015) maintains that education, as a tool for social transformation, must surpass its current utilitarian and productionist purpose, which is essentially oriented toward learning to know and learning to do, and must focus on the development of learning-to-be and learning-to-live-together. the convention on the rights of the child, ratified in 1990 by a majority of member countries, recommends the stimulation and development of children’s thinking to allow them to become citizens in their own right, that is, rational actors, which is central to the notion of human dignity. with this in mind, it is important that schools teach young people to question knowledge provided by society and data gathered from social media; teach them to oppose negative values and analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 69 ideas and to argue dialogically with a view toward a common good; teach them to actively participate in the transformation of the common culture. in other words, in addition to transmitting cultural heritage, schools must teach youngsters to think in a responsible and critical manner about the information they are being taught, about their life experiences, and about the society in which they live. in sum, critical thinking is a competency that could and should be encouraged in schools. yet most empirical studies on critical thinking are conducted among young adults attending college and university. data are usually collected using quantitative methodologies, through individual interviews or written tests aimed at evaluating thinking skills (winstanley, 2008) related to the rules of formal logic (kwak, 2007). unlike the current tendency to favour a type of critical thinking centered on the development of formal logic (among others, kpazaï, 2018; lenoir, 2016), dialogical critical thinking1 (dct) values social constructivist orientations, where critical thinking is considered an evaluative praxis that aims to develop critical consciousness. according to freire (1970), critical consciousness is stimulated through a quest for plural meanings rather than a quest for a single truth, and optimally, it occurs within a context of dialogical interactions among peers. 2.2. dialogical critical thinking: description of an emergent concept—its components and movement in order to assess to what extent preschool and elementary school children are able to engage in a dct process, i conducted empirical research, thanks to two subsidies from the social sciences and humanities research council of canada, together with experts from various countries (professors louise lafortune, richard pallascio and mathieu gagnon in quebec; laurance splitter and christina slade in australia; teresa de la garza in mexico; and emmanuèle auriac-slusarczyk in france), within groups of philosophizing pupils aged 4 to 12 years who came from different cultures (quebec, ontario, mexico, france, and australia) and who expressed themselves in different languages (french, english, and spanish). analysis of the groups of pupils’ exchanges concerned the “form” of their discourse (e.g.: is this statement a counter-example? does it include a justification?) that is, the manner in which pupils’ meanings and representations were constructed and expressed. the analysis did not focus on the “content” or the matter of their discourse (for methodological details, see: daniel, 2018; daniel et al., 2005; daniel & gagnon, 2012). firstly, in analyzing transcripts of pupils’ exchanges, we observed that dct involved more than just logical reasoning and creative thinking; it manifested itself through four thinking modes: logical, creative, responsible and metacognitive; each of these modes reflects a different facet of pupils’ 1 we named it “dialogical” critical thinking (dct) because, within the context of p4c, critical thinking develops through pupils’ dialogical exchanges. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 70 thinking. logical thinking reflects coherence of ideas and arguments. creative thinking questions certainties and leads to cognitive disequilibrium, the first step toward critical thinking. responsible thinking demonstrates a balance between the right to express oneself and the responsibility to do so with empathy; it reflects the fact that pupils root their argumentation in a negotiation process with a view toward a common good. metacognitive thinking illustrates a reassessment of one’s own opinions, beliefs and biases (and those of the community of inquiry) in order to improve them. subsequently, we noted that each of the four thinking modes could be mobilized by pupils in a simple or a complex manner. for example, giving one’s own opinion is simpler than producing a negotiated argument (logical); providing a specific example is simpler than co-constructing divergent relationships with peers (creative); talking about a personal behaviour is simpler than assessing social values (responsible); and narrating a particular task one has just accomplished is simpler than making an evaluative judgement that leads to self-correction (metacognitive). as the following description of epistemological perspectives will indicate, epistemological sophistication occurs through processes of decentering and abstraction. in other words, epistemological sophistication occurs progressively as pupils learn, through dialogical praxis, to transcend their own individual experiences and begin to generalize these experiences in order to think about situations that relate to their peers and to the world that surrounds them. the process of increasing sophistication in dct was made operational via six epistemological perspectives2—from the simplest to the most complex—which refer to the groups’ representations of themselves and of the world they live in. following is a summary of these six epistemological perspectives. egocentricity is characterized by the expression of concrete units (vs. relationships) tied to personal and specific experiences (e.g.: me, my…). post-egocentricity is expressed through specific and concrete units tied to close relatives (e.g.: my brother…). pre-relativism is manifested through units situated in a familiar environment; it shows the beginnings of generalizations (e.g.: friends…); points of view are not justified. relativism implies simple and convergent relationships (not mere units) with peer statements; these relationships are grounded in a somewhat generalized experience of known others and it also presupposes simple reasoning or an attempt at justification (e.g.: i agree with … because children…). post-relativism is manifested through divergent relationships that are anchored in the generalized experience of distant others and relationships imply more accomplished reasoning and are justified by “good” reasons (e.g.: i don’t agree with… because people… nevertheless…). intersubjectivity is manifested in conceptual and evaluative relationships related to a common good; in intersubjectivity, pupils participate in negotiated argumentation and in the transformation of perspectives; they categorize behaviours into values and engage in correction in pursuit of the community’s better understanding (e.g.: i am questioning our criteria… i wonder if… maybe… humans/societies… if/then… because on one hand/on the other hand… i changed my mind…). 2 in our work, the analysis of “groups’ epistemological perspectives” differs from that of “individuals’ epistemological postures” (as used in cognitive psychology). epistemological perspectives rather refer to “relational epistemologies” (thayerbacon, 2003) since our analysis are situated within the p4c context, which is essentially a social approach. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 71 finally, our analyses showed that epistemological sophistication in pupils’ dct does not occur linearly or sequentially as maintained by traditional models of critical thinking. instead, it progresses as a “scaffold”; it is marked by a recursive process (see vygotsky’s zone of proximal development, 1985). recursiveness means that continuous interactions occur between epistemological perspectives. during these interactions, the thinking extends and draws back; it attempts a leap into the unknown and regains a foothold in what is known; it gradually integrates the representation of the generalized “we/they” without permanently leaving the comfort of the possessive “i” and the well-known “you”. integration follows verbal interactions with peers and is linked to a transformation of comprehension. taking into account dct’s recursive process is of great importance in research and in pedagogy. it reflects (and allows recording of) not only the group’ predominant epistemological perspective (i.e.: the group’s actual competency), but also the group’ competencies that are about to be left behind and those that are about to emerge (if stimulated by the teacher). dialogical critical thinking: empirical results concerning philosophizing children the developmental model that emerged from the analysis of exchanges was subsequently used as a grid to analyze pupils’ exchanges (see daniel, gagnon, auriac-slusarczyk, 2017). concerning the four thinking modes inherent in dct, our main findings were as follows (for details, see daniel & gagnon, 2012): i) pupils were able to engage to different degrees in all four modes of thinking, and their age did not affect the percentage in which these modes were mobilized. ii) logical thinking was predominant in most groups, whether pupils were 5 or 12 years old. iii) the creative thinking mode was the second most-used by pupils. analyses showed that creative thinking was often a complement to the logical thinking mode. when pupils were unable to justify their point of view by giving a “good reason”, they provided an example. iv) responsible thinking was much less mobilized in p4c sessions. responsible thinking required teacher stimulation. pupils, whether they attended preschool or the end of elementary school, were not inclined to analyze the consequences of their words or actions on their own; they did not tend to evaluate the values and principles that guide our actions. v) metacognitive thinking was scarcely mobilized in the groups. this mode of thinking also required teacher motivation. pupils were not inclined to notice peer mistakes or to self-correct for selfimprovement purposes. regarding progress on epistemological levels (without differentiating among thinking modes), our main findings were as follows (for details, see daniel & gagnon, 2011): i) even groups of preschool children were able to engage in the dct process when they experimented with p4c. the epistemology of these 4 and 5 year-old children was not confined to egocentricity, but was able to reach pre-relativism, a more complex epistemology, in 62% of pupil interventions (see table 1). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 72 ii) the epistemology of groups of pupils in preschool and elementary school progressed with age and schooling (although these factors did not influence mobilization of thinking modes). in groups of preschoolers, the predominant epistemology was situated in pre-relativism (62% of pupil interventions); in groups of first graders, the predominant epistemology was also situated in prerelativism, but by a stronger percentage (68% of interventions); in groups of fifth graders, the predominant epistemology was more complex as it was situated in relativism (41% of pupil interventions). percentage results revealed by the scaffolding or recursive process also illustrated the influence of age and schooling on pupils’ epistemological progression: in preschoolers, 20% of pupil interventions were situated in post-egocentricity; in first graders, 20% of pupil interventions were situated in relativism; in fifth graders, 27% of pupil interventions were situated in post-relativism (see table 1). table 1. predominant perspectives within the scaffolding process group/ epistemology preschool 1st grade 5th grade egocentricity 13% 6% 0% post-egocentricity 20% 6% 7% pre-relativism 62% 68% 25% relativism 5% 20% 41% post-relativism 0% 0% 27% intersubjectivity 0% 0% 0% iii) pupils who experimented with p4c for two years mobilized complex epistemologies (related to relativism, post-relativism, and intersubjectivity)3 in 68% of pupil interventions while those who had no experience with philosophical praxis manifested complex epistemologies in 18% of interventions. without any p4c praxis, pupil epistemologies remained simple (related to egocentricity, post-egocentricity and pre-relativism) in 82% of interventions (see table 2). table 2. grouping of perspectives in fifth graders with and without p4c epistemological perspective fifth grade (2 yrs. p4c) fifth grade (without p4c) simple 32% 82% complex 68% 18% as shown in our findings, age and schooling were important factors in influencing pupils’ epistemological progression. were these two factors sufficient to stimulate the development of dct in adolescents, or was a dialogical approach like p4c necessary? to answer these questions, we 3 epistemologies are considered complex when they underly complex thinking skills and are considered simple when they underly simple thinking skills. based on bloom’s taxonomy, there is a consensus in the literature on associating enunciation, identification, memorization, etc. with simple thinking skills, and analysis, reasoning, divergent relationships, argumentation, synthesis, evaluation, etc. with complex thinking skills (among others: smith & szymanski, 2013). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 73 analyzed manifestations of dct in non-philosophizing adolescents. the following results have not been previously published. current empirical findings: epistemological perspectives in non-philosophizing adolescents through a quite recent subsidy from the social sciences and humanities research council of canada, we initiated a research project in 25 classrooms situated in france, morocco, and quebec. participants were aged 10 to 19 years and attended classes from the fifth grade in elementary school to the end of college4. prior to data collection, these young people had received no explicit training associated with critical thinking or with p4c5. we used the model of the developmental process of dct to analyze their exchanges relating to the topic “what does it mean to be free?”. the one-hour exchange was facilitated in the p4c manner. to illustrate the analysis results, we use the example of the groups of pupils in quebec6: i) the epistemology of these young people did not progress significantly during nine years of schooling, despite increasing age and growth in knowledge acquisition (see table 3). ii) the predominant perspective in 7 of the 9 groups was situated in pre-relativism. relativism, which is more complex, was predominant in only two groups, appearing in 35% of pupil interventions in the first year of secondary school, and in 50% of interventions in the fifth year of secondary school (see table 3). as a reminder, and as illustrated in table 1, relativism was the predominant perspective of philosophizing fifth graders (manifested in 41% of interventions). table 3. predominant epistemologies in non-philosophizing children and adolescents grade/ epistemology gr. 5 gr. 6 sec. 1 sec. 2 sec. 3 sec. 4 sec. 5 coll. 1 coll. 2 egocentricity 1% 6% 6% 6% 7% 2% 1% 5% 4% postegocentricity 28% 14% 25% 23% 11% 22% 4% 14% 15% pre-relativism 53% 54% 34% 44% 42% 40% 35% 34% 45% relativism 17% 25% 35% 27% 36% 33% 50% 33% 33% post-relativism 1% 2% 1% 0% 3% 3% 10% 13% 5% 4 in quebec, children from fifth and sixth grades in elementary school are 10 to 12 years of age; pupils from secondary 1 to 5 are aged 13 to 17 years; and students from college 1 and 2 (pre-university) are aged 17 to 19 years. 5 although students from “college” in quebec (and its equivalent “lycée” in france and morocco) were attending traditional philosophy classes during data collection, we considered the groups to be non-philosophizing pupils, since these classes were delivered as lectures (rather than through dialogical praxis), and because their content as well as the teaching strategies used were not explicitly oriented toward the development of philosophical/critical reflection. 6 results from data collected in france showed a quite similar profile (daniel & fiema, 2017). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 74 intersubjectivity 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% iii) the clustering of all manifested epistemological perspectives (to take into account the recursive process of dct) from every group of non-philosophizing pupils indicated that, in 8 of the 9 groups, epistemologies were simple (see table 4). of note is that with two years of p4c, 68% of philosophizing elementary school pupils’ epistemologies were situated in the complex epistemological perspectives (see table 2). table 4. grouping of perspectives in non-philosophizing children and adolescents grade/ epistemology gr. 5 gr. 6 sec. 1 sec 2 sec. 3 sec. 4 sec. 5 coll. 1 coll. 2 simple 82% 74% 65% 73% 60% 64% 40% 53% 64% complex 18% 27% 36% 27% 39% 36% 60% 46% 38% concerning these last results, it might be useful to add that, in the dct model, simple epistemological perspectives are not a-critical. they are part of the thinking process itself, in adults and children alike. according to dewey (1960), it is not possible for a person to have precise representation of a new concept right from the start. individuals clarify and refine their representation when their thinking goes back-and-forth between their specific experience and the new concept they are attempting to grasp, or when, from time to time, they go back to the safety of acquired beliefs, rather than remaining in the discomfort of critical thinking. yet this deweyan consideration does not mean that simple epistemological perspectives should be accepted as the outcome of the thinking process of adolescents during their pre-university schooling. a philosophical education, using an approach such as p4c, is strongly recommended since it proved to enable pupils aged 10 to 11 years to reach complex epistemological perspectives. discussion according to lipman, sharp and oscanyan (1980), a dialogue is considered philosophical when the pupils, rather than merely relating personal anecdotes, inquire with their peers about the meanings of concepts, listen carefully to each other, give their opinions and justify them with good reasons, identify similarities and distinctions, give counter-examples, discover relationships between means and ends, share constructive criticisms, self-correct, and so on. thus, the objective of the dialogue within a community of philosophical inquiry is not situated in intra-subjectivity, but rather in inter-subjectivity. it aims to stimulate pupils to reflect critically with their peers on concepts, principles, and situations related to their experiences and their world. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 75 the values implicitly contained within p4c dialogue are, among others, respect for oneself and others, genuine communication, human rights, critical reflection, personal and social responsibility, and engagement within one’s community. these values converge toward those advocated in the convention on the rights of the child (american bar association center on children and the law, 1990). articles 3 to 5 and 12 to 15 of the convention state that pupils should not be taught what they should do in a given situation, but rather they should learn to deliberate together, within a democratic and respectful context, in order to determine adequate behaviors to adopt and to assume their respective consequences. furthermore, articles 12 to 15 and article 17 of the convention explicitly advocate children’s right to autonomous, critical and responsible exchanges with their peers. in these articles, the convention recognizes that children have information to convey, experiences to share and ideas to communicate. in other words, it recognizes that children are not mere citizens-to-be, but full citizens; they are rational agents and they have rights. the convention on the rights of the child asserts that society and its institutions must provide autonomy and freedom to children in order to assist them in fulfilling their social role as children, pupils and citizens, and in order to be capable of facing the challenges of daily life. in agreement with the convention on the rights of the child and with the p4c approach, our research results show that even young children have the capacity to express themselves in a respectful and critical way, and that this capacity develops through the praxis of dialogue within a community of inquiry. this is why i argue for the need to provide preschool children with the opportunity to dialogue critically with their peers on situations and concepts related to their world—rather than waiting for children to acquire a higher level of maturity before beginning this praxis. children four and five years old take lessons in music, dance, language arts and more, and the appropriateness of such apprenticeships is never questioned. why then should children not exercise their ability to dialogue critically within a community of inquiry as early as preschool? the second section in this paper shows the need to introduce p4c in the classroom in order to stimulate the development of dct in young pupils. according to lipman, (1988, 1991) it is essential to stimulate critical thinking in pupils, as it protects individuals from being brainwashed into believing what others want them to believe without having the opportunity to inquire for themselves. although lipman considers that there is continuity between critical and creative thinking, as they permeate each other in the formation of judgments, in his earliest works he points out the discontinuity between these two forms of cognitive processing. critical thinking, he writes, involves reasoning and critical judgment and it seeks truth, while creative thinking involves artistry, craft, and creative judgment and seeks meaning (lipman, 1988, 1991). in his later works, lipman emphasizes the concept of higher-order thinking, which presupposes complex thinking—that is, more complex than critical thinking alone, as it involves both critical and creative thinking. and lipman adds caring thinking (which means valuing, appreciating, and focusing on what is respectful, valuable and meaningful), as well as metacognitive thinking (which means being aware of one’s assumptions, analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 76 methodology, procedures and perspectives, as well as being conscious of the implications—the reasons and evidence that support the conclusions) (lipman, 2003). the dct model that emerged from analysis of pupils’ exchanges consists of four thinking modes (logical, creative, responsible and metacognitive) and it reveals an increasing sophistication in the manner in which the pupils’ representations and meanings are co-constructed during exchanges within a community of inquiry. in this sense, the dct model is more than a concept, it is a developmental process that clearly illustrates the pupils’ progression within the philosophical praxis. this progression in thinking can be observed through six epistemological perspectives that operate according to a scaffolding movement (vs. a linear progression, as in piaget’s and kohlberg’s models). this means that, during philosophical dialogue, pupils’ thinking moves back and forth between simple and complex epistemological perspectives. an explanation of this recursive process can be found in the works of pragmatist philosophers such as bayles (1966), dewey (1960) and rorty (1989, 1991) who maintain that our actions and judgments are determined by our interactions with others, and, reciprocally, as persons, we are the starting point of judgments, initiatives, and representations which will influence others and society. regular praxis with the attitudes and cognitive skills related to dct becomes a tool to defeat the indifference of individuals regarding situations and principles, and to favour involvement in one’s society. social involvement implies that individuals show an interest in what others think, say or do; that they dare to dialogue critically, that is, to question, oppose, argue and negotiate in order to improve the common good. thus, mobilizing dct becomes an individual social responsibility, and social responsibility represents a part of the requirement for human dignity as promoted by unesco and the convention on the rights of the child. it is essential that kindergartens and primary schools value and promote critical dialogue and dct in children. as shown by our current findings, if adolescents have not already integrated the habit of critical dialogue or thinking critically at a young age, when they are confronted with the need to analyze a situation, fact or principle, they have a tendency to take refuge in passivity or, in other words, to choose recognition, description or explanation, rather than evaluation. indeed, dct not only calls on complex thinking skills, but also on intellectual attitudes such as courage, humility, openmildness. if these attitudes are not exercised early on, chances are that, when eventually needed, their mobilization might be blocked by other elements of an emotional dimension such as risk aversion, fear of the unknown or of confrontation, aversion to effort, and a desire to self-protect and hold onto one’s beliefs. conclusion in conclusion, walking in lipman’s footsteps led us to conduct empirical research that revealed a typology of exchanges inherent in the apprenticeship of philosophical-critical dialogue. also, walking in lipman’s footsteps led us to expanded on the concept of critical thinking to make the components and the recursive movement of the dct process operational. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 77 the research results demonstrate that critical dialogue and dct are not innate, nor do they develop spontaneously with age and schooling. they rather are fundamental competencies that should be stimulated in children as early as kindergarten. a comparison between the manifestations of dct in pupils who benefited from p4c praxis and those who had not benefited from such praxis showed that p4c is a meaningful tool for mobilizing and developing critical competencies in pupils. references american bar association center on children and the law. (1990). un convention on the rights of the child. usa. bayles, e. (1966). pragmatism in education. new-york: harper & row publishers. bourgeault, g. (2012). éthique professionnelle et réflexivité: quelle connivence? in m. tardif, c. borgès & a. malo (eds.) le virage réflexif en éducation. où en sommes-nous 30 ans après schön (pp. 107-120). brussels: de boeck. cuypers, s. & ishtiyaque, h. (2006). education for critical thinking: can it be non indoctrinative? educational philosophy and theory, 38 (6), 723-743. daniel, (1992, reedition 1997, 1998). la philosophie et les enfants. les modèles de lipman et de dewey. brussels: éditions de boeck université. daniel, (2002, reedition 2012). les contes d’audrey–anne. quebec city: le loup de gouttière. + teachers’ manual: (2003, reedition 2006, 2009). dialoguer sur le corps et la violence : un pas vers la prévention. quebec city: le loup de gouttière. daniel, (2013). relativism: a threshold for pupils to cross in order to become dialogical critical thinkers. childhood & philosophy, 9 (17) http://www.periodicos.proped.pro.br/index.php/childhood/issue/view/64 daniel, (2018). grounded theory. a research method for advancing the comprehension of p4c’s processes. childhood & philosophy, 14 (29), 307-328. http://www.e-publicacoes.uerj.br/index.php/childhood/article/view/30423/22954 daniel, & auriac, e. (2011). philosophy, critical thinking and philosophy for children. educational philosophy and theory, 43 (5), 415-435. daniel, & delsol, a. (2005). learning to dialogue in kindergarten. a case study. analytic teaching, 25 (3), 23-52. http://www.viterbo.edu/analytic/table1.htm daniel, & fiema, g. (2017). dialogical critical thinking in children. knowledge cultures, 5 (4), 4265. daniel, & gagnon, m. (2011). a developmental model of dialogical critical thinking in groups of pupils aged 4 to 12 years. creative education, 2 (5), 418-428. daniel, & gagnon, m. (2012). pupils’ age and philosophical praxis: two factors that influence the development of critical thinking in children. childhood & philosophy, 8 (15), 105-130. daniel, & gagnon, m. (2016). dialogical critical thinking with 5 to 12 year old pupils: a continuous epistemological development. in g. gibson (ed.) critical thinking: theories, methods and challenges (pp. 45-76). new york: nova science publishers inc. http://www.periodicos.proped.pro.br/index.php/childhood/issue/view/64 http://www.e-publicacoes.uerj.br/index.php/childhood/article/view/30423/22954 http://www.viterbo.edu/analytic/table1.htm analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 78 daniel, lafortune, l., pallascio, r. & sykes, p. (1996, reedition 1999). les aventures mathématiques de mathilde et david. quebec city: le loup de gouttière. + teachers’ manual: (1996, reedition 1999, 2004). philosopher sur les mathématiques et les sciences. quebec city: le loup de gouttière. daniel, lafortune, l., pallascio, r., splitter, l., slade, c., de la garza, t. (2005). modeling the development process of dialogical critical thinking in pupils aged 10 to 12 years. communication education, 54 (4), 334-354. dewey, j. (1960). how we think. a restatement of the relation of reflective thinking to the educative process. lexington, ma: d.c. heath and company. ennis, r. (1996). critical thinking. upper saddle river, n. j.: prentice hall. fabre, m. & gohier, c. (eds.) (2015). les valeurs éducatives au risque du néo-libéralisme, rouen (france): presses universitaires de rouen et du havre. facione, p. (2011). critical thinking: what it is and why it counts. insight assessment, 1, 1-28. freire. p. (1974). pédagogie des opprimés. paris: maspéro. honneth, a. (2004). la théorie de la reconnaissance : une esquisse, revue du mauss (23), 133-136. kpazaï, georges (ed.) (2018). la pensée critique expliquée par des didacticiennes et des didacticiens de l’enseignement supérieur. montreal: jfd éditions. kwak, duck-joo. (2007). re-conceptualizing critical thinking for moral education in culturally plural societies. educational philosophy and theory, 39, 460-470. lenoir, y. (2016). quelles seraient les finalités éducatives scolaires dans le monde actuel?, opening conference of the forum synergie 2016, hotel admiral radisson, toronto, november 30, 2016. lipman, m. (1988). critical thinking – what can it be? educational leadership, 46 (1), 38-43. lipman m. (1991), thinking in education. cambridge: cambridge university press. lipman, m. (2003). thinking in education. cambridge: cambridge university press. lipman, m., sharp, a.-m., oscanyan, f. (1980) philosophy in the classroom. philadelphia: temple university press. martin, e. (2016). l’université globalisée. transformations institutionnelles et internationalisation de l’enseignement supérieur. montréal: iris. mejia, a. & molina, a. (2007). are we promoting critical autonomous thinking? a discussion on conversational genres and whether they can help us answer this question. cambridge journal of education, 37 (3), 409-426. peters, m., smith, m., smith, g. (2002). use of critical interactive thinking exercises in teaching reproductive physiology to undergraduate students. journal of animal science, 80 (3), 862-865. phan, h. (2016). the use of critical reflection to facilitate optimal best: a theoretical positioning for consideration. in g. gibson (ed.). critical thinking: theories, methods and challenges (pp. 99119). new york: nova science. rorty, r. (1989). contingency, irony and solidarity. new york: cambridge university press. rorty, r. (1991). objectivity, relativism and truth: philosophical papers. ny: cambridge university press. sen, a. (2012). l’idée de justice. paris: flammarion. smith, v. & szymanski, a. (2013). critical thinking: more than test scores. ncpea international journal of educational leadership preparation, 8 (2), 16-26. taylor, c. (1992). grandeur et misère de la modernité. montreal: bellarmin. thayer-bacon, b. (2003). relational “(e)pistemologies”. new york: peter lang. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 79 torff, b. (2006). expert teachers’ beliefs about use of critical-thinking activities with high-and low-advantage learners. teacher education quaterly, 33 (2), 37-52. unesco. (2015). repenser l’éducation. vers un bien commun mondial? paris: unesco. velmovska, k. & bartosovic, l. (2016). developing critical thinking skills in physics classes. in gibson (ed.), critical thinking. theories, methods and challenges, (pp. 1-45). new york: nova science publishers inc. winstanley, c. (2008). philosophy and the development of critical thinking. in m. hand and c. winstanley (eds.), philosophy in schools (pp.105-118). new york: continuum international. vygotsky, l. (1985). pensée et langage. paris: éditions sociales. address correspondences to: marie-france daniel associate professor école de kinésiologie, faculté de médecine, université de montréal (quebec, canada). email: marie-france.daniel@umontreal.ca analytic teaching and philosophical praxis analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 84 learning morality through literary mimesis lisbet svanøe introduction n immanuel kant’s critique of practical reason [kritik der praktischen vernunft] (hereafter: kpv), kant in the second book’s second part “methodology of pure practical reason” [”methodenlehre der reinen praktischen vernunft”] wonders why “the educators of the youth” have not “made use of this propensity of reason to enter with pleasure upon the most subtle examination of the practical questions that are thrown up”1. this could be done by teaching through the biographies of ancient and modern times with the view of having at hand instances of duties laid down, in which, especially by comparison of similar actions under different circumstances, they might exercise the critical judgment of their scholars in remarking their greater or less moral significance2 (kpv, aa:155). in other words, kant wonders why teachers do not use exemplary historical narratives in order to help students to form their latent practical reason—and hence morality—as this seems to be a self-evident possibility. but why does he think so? how can these narratives contribute to the moral education of young people? how can comparisons and judgment of narratives turn into practical reason and not solely remain theoretical knowledge? and how can narratives from the past form students to act morally in both the present and the future? these are the questions this essay pursues. this essay works with the hypothesis that the narrative to some extent functions as ethical habituation understood in an aristotelian way, i.e. a habituation that through imitation takes place over time. because the narrative is timely on an existential level, i.e., that it compresses time in the quasi-practical life represented by the narrative, a whole life from cradle to grave or extensive periods of life can be lived through in a relatively short period of physical time. if the reader is able to put her 1 ”diesem hange der vernunft, in aufgeworfenen praktischen fragen selbst die subtilste prüfung mit vergnügen einzuschlagen”. the german quotes from kpv are translated from the e-book: kant, immanuel, critique of practical reason, trans. thomas kingsmill abbott, the floating press (2009) 2 ”die biographien alter und neuer zeiten in der absicht durchsuchten, um beläge zu den vorgelegten pflichten bei der hand zu haben, an denen sie vornemlich durch die vergleichung ähnlicher handlungen unter verschiedenen umständen die beurteilung ihrer zöglinge in tätigkeit setzten, um den mindern oder gröβeren moralischen gehalt derselben zu bemerken.” i analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 85 or himself in the position of the narrative’s characters the experiences of the protagonists will to some extend transfer to the percipient. in order to examine the hypothesis, this article will firstly unfold the threefold mimesis developed by paul ricœur in the first volume of his time and narrative [temps et récit]3 (hereafter: tn) in order to investigate kant’s intuition of the importance of the narrative to moral education. it seems plausible that ricœur’s threefold mimesis and his understanding of the narrative can function as a mediator between the past and the future and as a changing and formational element to human action. however, secondly, this article will critically inquire into the formational character of the threefold mimesis by discussing works of peter kemp, martha nussbaum and others. the mimetic process and ricœur’s rooting in the aristotelian concept of mimesis seems to be problematic as the actions of a narrative’s protagonists can be morally tainted and therefore might not be suited for imitation in the pursuit of moral education. furthermore, it seems that an ontological imperative is presupposed in the theory. ricœur’s threefold mimesis ricœur’s threefold mimesis (mimesis i, ii and iii) is developed from the greek understanding of mimesis which amongst others aristotle introduces in the poetics. mimesis here is not solely a concept that describes the characteristics and structure of the tragedy but is an actual action. the action is to imitate—not to reproduce—the positive reality (matter/material/nature) in a composition that represents a fable, i.e. a narrative with a quasi-reality (ricœur, tn, 56ff). in other words, mimesis is a craftmanship that through a medium as, for example, the metric language in aristotle’s works recreates human experiences in a new context and with artistic expression in order to show the world in a new and different way from the ordinary appearance. in his article “la place de l’œuvre dans notre culture” from 1957 concerning not only literary artwork but art in its whole, ricœur very shortly and precisely explains the interconnection between the positive reality and the creative process of the artist in this way: everyone of these materials – from the rock to the clay – demands subjection and patience: “obey nature in order to command it!” that is the motto of the craftsman and the artist.4 (103) this means that the artist is subjected to nature, i.e. all things that can be experienced in the world, as a starting point for her or his art. hereafter (s)he in the creative act processes and masters nature so that (s)he can give it a new expression and meaning. this creative act which the percipient is made 3 as i unfortunately do not read french, i have read the works of ricœur in german and the page numbers refer to zeit und erzählung and “der ort des kunstwerks in unserer kultur”. the translations into english are made by me. 4 jedes dieser materialien – vom stein angefangen bis hin zum ton – erfordert unterwerfung und geduld: ”der natur gehorchen, um ihr zu befehlen!”, das ist die devise des handwerkers und des künstlers. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 86 part of by reading, listening to or looking at a piece of art illuminates the intimate and confidential grasp the artist has on her or his material when (s)he gives it a form that can express an idea (ricœur, ”la place”, 103), a theme or even a “thought” as ricœur calls it in time and narrative (110). hence the artist, firstly, starts in the experienced world, secondly, imitates the experienced world and gives it surplus meaning and thirdly, shares the experienced world and the creative process with a percipient. accordingly, in this article ricœur already anticipates the understanding of the threefold mimesis in the narrative which is thoroughly developed in time and narrative. the threefold mimesis unfolds in the three stages, mimesis i, ii and iii, which are interconnected. mimesis i mimesis i, the prefiguration, is a primary understanding of practical life—the world of actions— which delivers the material to a narrative. it is a necessary element in order for the percipient to understand the narrative. without connection or without being subjected to the real world that carries strings of meaning, symbolic resources and a timely character the narrative would become meaningless (kemp 35, ricœur, tn, 90). all narratives are in the end “doing” and “undergoing” (ricœur, tn, 92) which means an imitation of the partly active and partly passive experiences we have with and in the real world. an understanding of the narrative presupposes the capability of realising the symbolic meaning of actions, i.e., a capability of realising the meaning of actions reaching beyond the merely physical expression, namely the meaning that connects the action and the actor with motives and circumstances. this capability is, according to ricœur, a practical reason shared by the author and her or his audience that presupposes an understanding of good and evil that creates sympathy or antipathy with the protagonists and their actions (ricœur, tn, 90ff). in kant’s words, it presupposes a latent practical reason—the seed to a practical reason. this means that the narrative is not ethically neutral. it can’t be, according to ricœur, as neutrality would terminate the ancient function of art which is “[…] to build a laboratory in which the artist in a fictional mode can perform an experiment with values”5 (ricœur, tn, 97). but although art is not ethically neutral it is without ethical judgment. the author creates and shows us a world of doing and undergoing in a certain form—the form of a narrative. (s)he communicates through a configuration but without judging. mimesis ii mimesis ii, the configuration, is the creative process, the activity and craftsmanship, that creates a quasi-reality in what is conceived as the real literary work, i.e. the palpable text in front of us. mimesis ii furthermore is the centre of gravity in ricœur’s hermeneutic analysis of the “processes […] through which a work of art lifts itself away from the opaque background of life, doing and undergoing in order to be passed on by an author to a reader who assimilates it and hereby changes 5 ”ein laboratorium zu bilden, in dem der künstler im modus der fiktion ein experiment an den werten vornimmt […]” analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 87 [her/]his actions” (ricœur, tn, 88). mimesis ii, that is, has a communicative ability that can guide the reader from a before to an after, i.e. from mimesis i to mimesis iii. the communicative role of the configuration and the composition of a narrative is to be understood in three ways: firstly, it communicates the interconnection of singular events either as or in a narrative and hereby changes plurality into unity. a movement of changing something “from … into” that characterises the communication between the plural events and the unified narrative (ricœur, tn, 105). according to ricœur this means that the narrative becomes an intelligible totality (tn, 106), i.e., has a theme or expresses an idea through a certain form. one might say that the narrative creates order in something that can seem random or chaotic and accordingly creates meaning as the events contribute to the unity of the narrative. very much like this the composition, secondly, unites heterogenous factors like the protagonists (actors), intentions, means, interactions and unexpected results in one single plot and, thirdly, unites heterogenous time factors in a synthesis of chronological and non-chronological time. the chronological time expresses itself through the consecutive events of the narrative whereas the non-chronological time is the connection between the events in the narrative and a timely totality. this is where the time of the narrative becomes a compressed time which ricœur expresses through a heideggerian concept of innerzeitigkeit, i.e., a kind of being-in-time as a break with the linear conception of time (tn, 101ff). time in this sense does not mean to measure time from one point to another but being in a “now” (kemp, tf, 40) where the “now” expresses the timely totality of the narrative that includes the percipient and therefore can affect her or him existentially. the configuration is not a simple enumeration of events. mimesis ii on the contrary is a reflexive action that creates a significant and manageable totality that we do not meet in the real world. the composition of events gives the reader “the sense of an ending” as it is in the end of the literary work the totality of the narrative can be realised. this means that the end is already anticipated in the beginning or vice versa the beginning in the end (ricœur, tn, 108f). the linear time is “turned upside down” and the impossible coexistence of past, present and future is sublated. the narrative is as aforementioned expressed through a certain form which is constituted in the configuration by schematisation and a tradition. ricœur compares the configurative action to kant’s conception of the productive imagination as it is described in critique of pure reason [kritik der reinen vernunft] (hereafter: krv): imagination is a transcendental ability and in the same way as it is capable of connecting reason and perception in a priori synthetic judgments (kant, krv, aa:145) the composition of the narrative connects the theme or the “thought” and the perceivable version of circumstances, characters, events, revolutions etc., in a schema so that the percipients are made able to recognise the synthesis (ricœur, tn, 110). the schematisation is expressed in the traditional characteristics of the narrative which means the living dissemination that happens in an interplay of innovation and sedimentation. the sedimentation consists amongst other things of the formal characteristics of the narrative that have survived generations through tradition whereas innovation happens through a renewal of the genres (kemp, tf, 47f). both schematisation and the traditional characteristics are significant to the reader analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 88 so that (s)he can follow the narrative and enable mimesis iii. these certain features make the narrative both recognisable and realisable. mimesis iii mimesis iii, the refiguration, is the process wherein the narrative obtains its full meaning by stepping back into the time of doing and undergoing, i.e., into the time in which humans can have experiences. hence mimesis iii is the intersection of the configurative world of the text and the actual world of the reader which is to be entered through the act of reading (ricœur, tn,112ff). refiguration is in its own way a resume of configuration as the reader follows the creative process of the author whilst reading but is at the same time a fulfilment of the configuration and the text. the reader adds the necessary judgment that synthesises the plurality of the narrative into unity by playing with narrative limitations and building inferences between text and reality. hereby the reader becomes the last bearer of the refiguration and recreation of the world of “emplotment” (ricœur, tn, 121f). the act of reading therefore becomes a creative activity—or even a joyful play. in the aforementioned article “la place de l’œuvre dans notre culture”, ricœur calls the creative process (mimesis ii) a “play” in which the percipient is invited to play along when the created work is read (mimesis iii). the play is a cost-free moment where the percipient can devote heror himself to the moment—(s)he simply is “freed from calculations of usefulness for a while”6 (ricœur, “la place”, 106). as the function of art is “[…] to build a laboratory in which the artist in a fictional mode can perform an experiment with values” (ricœur, tn, 97) it means that we in the act of playing or reading can experiment with values cost-free as we are located in a quasi-reality and not in the real world. hence the creative act of reading becomes a “learning game” where the emotions and passions evoked by our experiments are translated into imaginary actions that let us get to know our real emotions and passions without having to experience them in reality. in fact, “[w]e can die for our heroes without dying”7 (ricœur, “la place”, 106). in mimesis iii we thus get closer to the hypothesis that the narrative is a habituation and that the narrative, using a term invented by the psychoanalyst donald winnicott, can be called a transitional object in potential space (40ff). potential space is a concept that describes the fictional world that lies in between an individuals’ inner and personal subject world and the surrounding and outer object world. potential space is a kind of sanctuary wherein the individual can maintain and process experiences in a symbolic form in order to subsequently be able to master experiences in a better way in the outer world (austring & sørensen, 108). in this way mimesis iii reminds of a katharsis—a cleansing of feelings—which is what mimesis, according to aristotle, aims towards (aristotle 1449b; kemp, “tid og fortælling” 125). 6 ”eine zeitlang vom nützenkalkül befreit” 7 ”wir können sterben für unseren helden, ohne selbst zu sterben” analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 89 we must assume that physical time is sublated in the potential space and solely consists of existential time; i.e., an innerzeitigkeit and a “now”. the linear time in mimesis ii was sublated in a similar way which means that a fusion of before and after can happen—a fusion of mimesis i and iii. the linearity is furthermore blurred out by the fact that the mimetic process is to be understood as a spiral process so that experiences pass through the same “point” of consciousness many times but on higher and higher levels so that the reader’s realisations are increased and processed on every level— this is one of the explanations why it can be satisfying to read a novel more than once. moral education–ethical habituation? “reading for life” by martha nussbaum is written as a review of w.c. booth’s the company we keep: an ethics of fiction but besides relating to the concepts of booth nussbaum includes her own attitudes and reflections towards how literature can be understood in an ethical critique of it.8 she questions if and how literature can actually be ethically or morally guiding. nussbaum recognises booth’s understanding that the relation between a book and its reader is a kind of friendship defined in an aristotelian way, i.e., “a relationship based on trust and affection, in which we pursue our ends in a social way, sharing to a large extent, the friend’s activities, desires and values” (nussbaum, 235). but exactly this affection or sympathy can contribute to the fact that we forget to judge ethically when confronted with controversial content as we surrender ourselves to a work and sympathise with protagonists who might be morally tainted. we are, so to speak, lured away from the moral world (nussbaum, 237ff). nussbaum’s views put, on one hand, focus on the fact that moral education and hence moral judgment does not emerge as a result of friendly literature reading alone. on the other hand, nussbaum recognises that it is possible to speak of ethical habituation through literature if we recognise the aristotelian concept of ethics wherein friendship plays a major part in the formation of character (nussbaum, 234). according to kemp in the world citizen [verdensborgeren] (hereafter: twc) ethics in an aristotelian and hence character-building understanding is both “a given setting and a task that has to be solved – both practical reality and an ideal that hasn’t yet been realised” (kemp, twc, 129).9 this means that literature provides accumulated examples of the end and ideal of ethics, i.e. “the good life”. the task of the reader becomes to judge which of these examples can lead to actions that strive towards the ideal. in this way, the narrative becomes an experience ethics that makes the reader realise which actions “work” and (s)he thus can acquire and habituate through imitation. therefore, one could say that literature is formational in that sense that it changes the individual by giving her or him new perspectives, firstly, of heror himself through the play with values, and secondly, of the world through the composition of a quasi-reality. hence the individual acquires a new ground for her or his actions in practical life and reality. 8 booth, w.c., the company we keep: an ethics of fiction, berkeley: university of california press, 1988 9 ”en given indstilling og en opgave, der skal løses – både praktisk virkelighed og et ideal, der endnu ikke er blevet virkeliggjort” analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 90 kemp furthermore states “that the creation of a narrative is based on the experience of an already realised ethics”10 (twc, 132) which ricœur emphasises in his assertion that the narrative is never ethically neutral but builds on an interhuman practical reason without necessarily judging the actions it presents. but this does not solve the problem that the reader according to nussbaum can be lured away from the moral world exactly because the narrative does not judge. couldn’t we easily be intrigued by and wish to imitate the morally tainted lifestyle of a protagonist? the judgment and assessment of the work seems to presuppose that the reader is already ethically habituated in the practical world (kemp, twc, 148ff) or presuppose that, as ricœur thinks, an ontological imperative “one should treat others as one would like others to treat oneself” does exist (kemp, ibid., 157). therefore, if the mimetic process should influence practical life in an ethical sense it is presupposed that the moral law or a conception of ”the good life” is already present, i.e., that it is not something that has yet to be developed. exactly because of this presupposition there is a weakness in ricœur’s thesis of the threefold mimesis if we compare it to modern literature. the thesis remains, despite its further development from aristotle’s mimesis, still deeply rooted in the conception of mimesis as the creator of mythos. this creation is not the creation of a random narrative but of the tragedy. the tragedy is, according to karsten friis johansen’s article “about aristotle’s poetics” [“om aristoteles’ poetik”], defined as a narrative about “elevated themes – spoudaia” (42) wherein the author describes “the significant actions of good people” (42) in an idealised form that imitates the actions in a densified quasi-reality that is supposed to resemble praxis. praxis is according to aristotle a targeted action that defines human existence where the end is “the good life”. by imitating “the significant actions of good people” the tragedy is definitely not morally indifferent (friis johansen, 43) but lays out guidelines for how one should act and judge—it “gives us insight into how specific kinds of moral agents act” (schweiker, 29)—and hence has a preconceived attitude towards what the outcome of acquiring the tragedy should be. nussbaum quotes booth for writing that in some cases the act of reading involves “loss of life […] in deciding to spend several hours that way” (234), because the content of a literary work can be so limited that it cannot contribute to the development of the individual either morally or in other ways (234f). this means that we cannot assume that the intention of modern literature is to communicate either the conception of “the good life” or that it contains an implicit categorical imperative. this complicates the assumption that a percipient gains an ability to act and judge from literature. it seems that we once again run aground in a circular reasoning where the premise is that a minimum of ethical habituation, moral education or development of the practical reason is necessary before the act of reading. although we might not solve the aporia it does not mean that the ability to judge morally is not refined through the act of reading. even though a work does not explicitly lay out moral guidelines it can still have a changing effect on its readers. in her memoir reading lolita in tehran azar nafisi 10 ”at fortællingen bliver til på basis af erfaringen af en allerede virkeliggjort etik” analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 91 expresses it quite clearly: “[…] a novel is not moral in the usual sense of the word. it can be called moral when it shakes us out of our stupor and makes us confront the absolutes we believe in” (129). a well composed and well written literary work can, despite morally tainted protagonists, provide perspectives, reason and judgement that society and its habits do not provide. in contrast to society, the work creates a universality that transcends both geographic and cultural borders. hence it opens to a perspective that understands humans as part of a meta-sociality created exclusively from being human. as the material for the narrative is provided by the experienced world of the author neither the reader nor the work loses its rooting in the real world. on the contrary, in mimesis iii both can maintain the rooting and re-establish the connection to practical life. the acquisition of this kind of literature is a pedagogical task that develops judgment over time— however shortened and compressed in the narrative—and requires teachers who take the role as “wise elders” who choose suitable literature and teach a reflexive reading of it. exactly this role is what kant misses in the “educators of the youth” who should develop and refine the practical reason of their students through exemplary narratives and hence ensure their moral education. the pedagogical task as we cannot find an ethical ground zero, we must—whether we think of it as an empirically or metaphysically founded phenomenon—accept the idea that all human praxis already contains practical reason. this means that also teaching praxis is influenced by it and that the teacher, in other words, is subject to tradition and habit. that teaching literature does not become mere affirmation, or a passing of certain norms and rules, however, is supported by ricœur’s emphasis on the fact that tradition is living innovative communication (tn, 110). hence, teaching the process of reading and acquiring is supposed to open to the possibility that norms and rules are changeable. in this way teaching, education and formation can be perceived as mimetic processes in themselves. the teacher represents prefiguration (mimesis i) because of her or his prior understanding of the world and the narrative, instruction represents the configuration (mimesis ii) by showing the world and the qualities of the narrative in a certain form whereas the students represent refiguration (mimesis iii) by participating and co-creating in the tuition. in the world citizen kemp describes how the mimetic process happens or ought to happen in the relation between teachers and students. he emphasises the innovative element in that “the teacher has something to offer the student, something (s)he can imitate” but that the teacher by involving and making demands on the student is also capable of “making the student an independent successor” (kemp, twc, 217) that in the future is able to read and judge literature on her or his own. hence, teaching literature means teaching dialogically where the teacher and the narrative present possible interpretations of the world that the students can acquire in cooperation with their own perspectives and hence create and communicate new possible perspectives on how to act and how to renew the world. in this process it is the responsibility of the teacher to choose literature that through dialogue can make students reflect on what “a good life” is or on how individuals can take part in creating “the good life”. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 92 the objective moral law—the categorical imperative—is without doubt what kant considers the touchstone in a narrative of the moral value of the human actions presented in it. a verification of them is supposed to refine the ability of the students to reflect and judge (kant, kpv, aa:159f). but development and refinement of judgement alone is, according to kant, not enough in order to integrate morality in experiences and actions in practical life. the real integration does not occur before the individual has realised her or his duty to obey the moral law. a duty that is completely freed from human drives and inclinations (kant, ibid., aa:160). put differently it means morality is integrated when the individual realises that (s)he is not subjected to external determination but has the internal freedom to act morally. precisely this realisation of freedom and authority might be exactly the experience that can transcend to practical life and therefore be the most important experience the individual can make through the literary work. when we engage in the act of reading, we follow the plot, place ourselves in the circumstances of the protagonists, and at the same time reflect on the possible good or bad actions (s)he could/should have chosen. therefore, we realise the freedom we have to asses and judge our own possible actions in both the present and future practical life. this freedom of will is essential to our decisions about what kind of persons we want to be—which character we want to have—whatever circumstances we are placed in. and that is what teaching literature can communicate. references aristotle , poetikken (335-323 bc), frederiksberg, det lille forlag, 2004 austring, bennyé d. & merete sørensen, æstetik og læring, københavn: hans reitzels forlag, 2006 friis johansen, karsten, ”om aristoteles’ poetik”, den blå port, 35 (1996): 37-52 kant, immanuel, kritik der praktischen vernunft (1788) in die drei kritiken, köln: anaconda (2015) --kritik der reinen vernunft (1781) in die drei kritiken, köln: anaconda (2015) kemp, peter, tid og fortælling – introduktion til paul ricœur, birkerød: forlaget sommer (2015) --verdensborgeren, københavn: hans reitzels forlag (2013) nafisi, azar, teaching lolita in tehran – a memoir in books, new york: random house (2003) nussbaum, martha c., “reading for life” in love’s knowledge – essays on philosophy and literature, oxford: oxford university press (1990) ricœur, paul, ”der ort des kunstwerks in unserer kultur” in hähnel, m. (ed.), memoria und mimesis, dresden: verlag text & dialog (2013) --zeit und erzählung – band 1: zeit und historische erzählung, münchen: wilhelm fink verlag (1988) schweiker, william, “beyond imitation: mimetic praxis in gadamer, ricœur, and derrida”, 68, 1 (1988): 21-38 winnicott, donald w., playing and reality, new york: tavistock publications (1982) address correspondences to: lisbet rosenfeldt svanøe, independent scholar master of arts (education) in philosophy of education, aarhus universitet, dpu, 2017 email: l_svanoe@hotmail.com mailto:l_svanoe@hotmail.com analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 77 the importance of continuing the heritage of lipman's philosophical fiction: writing stories for the contemporary world maria miraglia abstract the aim of this contribution is to argue for the continuing effectiveness of the lipmanian novel, and the usefulness of producing new stories in the lipman style. while the use of philosophical texts created by lipman and sharp is still significant from a pedagogical point of view, recalibrations are needed to address new educational emergences. going back to the pedagogical aims that moved lipman in the construction of philosophical stories and to the intentions behind the creation of such a literary genre, i will suggest that the lipmanian novel represents a device for recovering the dialogical origins of the western philosophical tradition through a reappropriation of the orality that is said to have characterized socratic dialogue in its original form —beyond the representation made of that dialogue from plato onwards which served as a literary expedient, designed to expose and clarify theories already previously defined (cosentino, 2017). instead, lipman’s stories place dialogue, although embedded in writing, as close as possible to orality, and thereby recover the authenticity of the inquiry that the early greek philosophers are reputed to have put in the field with their questioning. as such, the philosophical novels of lipman and sharp represent the best device for achieving both the pedagogical purposes of p4c and the authenticity of dialogical philosophical inquiry. however, while continuing the novelistic form that he initiated, we should remain mindful of the need to construct storysettings in which we can clearly identify the connections between the fictitious community of inquirers as represented in those stories —which is the lipmanian trademark— and the complex, emergent, shifting frames of reference of the contemporary world. to illustrate this, i offer an example of the construction of an ad hoc curriculum within the framework of the european project peace (philosophical enquiry advancing cosmopolitan engagement) —a specific project designed to provide a particular understanding of cosmopolitanism that seeks to generate a “reflective loyalty to the known and reflective openness to the new” (hansen, 2011, p. 99) through communal inquiry prompted by a philosophical text. i will examine the aims and purposes that led to the construction of this text, and how it attempts to remain as faithful as possible to the lipmanian model, while updating its themes and frames of reference. key words: matthew lipman, dialogue, philosophical stories, cosmopolitanism. or several years, lipman’s stories have been used worldwide as a stimulus for philosophical dialogue within the community of philosophical inquiry (cpi). we know that for lipman dialogue is the focus of the very conception of philosophy for children (p4c), not only because of its use in his philosophical narratives but also because of the way the discussion that takes place in the cpi is conceived. dialogue is central to the building and transmitting of knowledge. it has a fundamental role in its function of developing complex thought, the means of which is the philosophizing itself that can only be realized through dialogue. f analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 78 the structure according to which lipman’s stories are built is mirrored in the p4c session. the characters that set up the stories are as close as possible to the real children to whom the stories are addressed, speaking their language and experiencing their daily routine. a destabilizing situation breaks the linear course of everyday life: it puts the characters in front of a problem, something that had not been taken into consideration until that moment. it is necessary to consider it, weigh it, discuss it, examine its various interpretations, find an agreement however temporary it may be. it generates perplexity and perplexity generates doubt, doubt questions, which will bring out the epistemic positions of each character. the confrontation consists of a dialogue, through which the characters give life to a sincere research that will develop throughout the narrative, opening up possible constructions of meaning. there is no position more valid than the others, there is no privileged conclusion, and everything can always be questioned: the characters develop research paths through which they bring into play critical, creative and relational abilities, share points of view, build their own thinking on that of the others, agreeing, when necessary, to change their beliefs. similarly, the children in the real community of research are faced with a destabilizing situation introduced by the stimulus-text, which encourages the formulation of the questions collected in the agenda and paves the way for the discussion plan, in which, through dialogue, the children confront, investigate, research, bring into play the same tools suggested by the text. thinking is distributed among the members of the community of research, enhancing at the same time the individual and the community of which s/he is a part. the stories, in this way, constitute a model that inspires the research process of the children engaged in the session, implicitly providing examples of questions, heuristic proceedings, investigative attitudes and behaviors. the “dialogued writing” activates the community of research constituting “an extension (a realization?) of that within the story, which serves in some way as a paradigm” (cosentino, striano & oliverio, 2011, p. xxviii).1 lipman’s stories are skillfully constructed in such a way as to inspire philosophical dialogue within the cpi through which the thinking abilities that the curriculum aims to develop are exercised. furthermore, they constitute a kind of presentation of the methodology, in the sense that they open the ceremony of the session, functioning as a model for the cpi. in fact, if the stories of the curriculum serve as a model for the community of research, not only for what they want to model but also for how (de marzio, 2011), then these stories have to be constructed in such a way as to shape the philosophical dialogue that hopefully will take place within the cpi. the exercise of reading the model, in which the dialogues of the fictitious community are reproduced, and the dialogue that will develop in the real cpi, constitutes the means to realize the educational purposes of p4c. through this exercise, dialogue will be interiorized and with it the forms that characterize it: the inference, the mutual request for clarification, and the attack on superficial thought that take place in the common space are some of the elements that build the attitude to critical investigation (lipman, sharp & oscanyan, 1992, p. 78). however, for dialogue to take place and involve all the members of the cpi, it is necessary to internalize the conditions needed for its implementation; therefore, it is important that the community be the place where mutual 1 the english translations of the quoted texts are mine. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 79 respect is exercised among its members (lipman, sharp, oscanyan, 1992, p. 79), a fundamental prerequisite for the ability to listen to one another, without which there can be no real dialogue. in addition: a research community is a deliberative society characterized by multidimensional thinking. this means that its deliberations are not reduced to simple chats and conversations: they are dialogues governed by logic. the fact that they are logically structured does not prevent them, however, from providing a scenario for a creative representation” (lipman, 2005, p. 278). as we know, lipman developed a special curriculum, consisting of short stories suitable for different age groups in which the tradition of western philosophy is not taught to students in a systematic or conceptual way, as would be expected in an expository text, but it is conveyed through schemes and translated into a type of text that is a perfect balance between an expository text and a narrative text (de marzio, 2011). in the stories lipman performs a reterritorialization of the philosophical tradition, thanks to which he triggers a movement that turns philosophy inside-out when he retrieves the question, the generating source of the cognitive investigation, from that primordial scene that philosophers must have inhabited before building their theoretical systems (oliverio, 2015). from that scene lipman also recovers the dialogue, which is supposed to have been the way of philosophizing that characterized the meetings of philosophers at the time of socrates. the model for making philosophy is the great solitary figure of socrates, for whom philosophy was not an acquisition, nor a profession, but a form of life. what socrates teaches us is not to know philosophy, nor to apply it, but to practice it. it challenges us to recognize that philosophy is, as a doing, as a life form, something that any of us can imitate (lipman, sharp & oscanayan, 1992, p. 30). this is how dialogue, when it takes possession of the space within the community of research, brings to light that way of understanding philosophy, as a form of life, as a practice. and the stories represent it and shape it when, in the fictional world of its characters, the routine is interrupted by an event, as banal as it is extraordinary, in the face of which the characters can do nothing but question and give life to a philosophical dialogue through which philosophy itself is made, is practiced. however, in order to reproduce the authenticity of the philosophical dialogue that took place at the time of socrates, lipman had to operate a movement that went beyond what dialogue, as a literary genre, represented from plato onwards. nevertheless, it is true that the tradition of that world was handed down to us by plato, who crystallized in writing the dynamic movement of orality that characterized the socratic philosophising. dialogue: literary expedient or heuristic necessity? if we consider how dialogue has been used in the philosophical tradition from plato onwards (think for example of cicero, galileo, berkeley, etc.), we realize that this was mostly a literary analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 80 expedient to expose theories already packaged, a strategy that allows the treatment in a less tedious way of a system that the philosopher already possesses accomplished in his mind. take, for example, the three dialogues of berkeley (2007 [1713]). it is clear that the author’s concern is to expose the doctrine of esse est percipi. the discussions between philonous and hyla are nothing more than a way of affirming the philosopher’s theses and refuting the contrary ones that are expressed by hyla. this latter is none other than the alter ego of berkeley-philonous, who possesses the truth which he demonstrates consistently making use of the rational method. hyla often falls into contradiction, is in many places superficial, and often has to change his mind and go back on his own positions. there is no authenticity of the exchanges, the ground is already drawn, the relationship between the two is asymmetrical. no «written» dialogue is the fruit of the authentic research of the dialoguers. [...] in fact, the dialogue games are already played before the dialogue is written and, as in all other cases, they are already played in the author’s head. even in the case of plato, the interpreters who adhere to the «theory of the spokesman» reduce the dialogue to a literary artifact that has to do with the form of speech, but not with the substance of thinking […because] the writing proceeds with a logic not comparable to that of orality (cosentino, 2017, pp. 12-13). however, beyond this, we have to recognize that plato is the first and indispensable reference when we speak “of the dialogic form as an instrument of philosophical communication” (trabattoni, 2012, p. 105). plato, in the same way as socrates, condemned writing, as expressed in the famous passage of phaedrus, in which the pharaoh, addressing the god theut, inventor of the alphabet, shows the faults of writing: it will generate, instead of wise people, dreamers, filled with doctrines expressed by others (fedro, 275 a-b). however, the need to defend the memory of his master against the accusations that led him to condemnation by the athenian democracy, and to pass on his true doctrine against the “socratic” interpretations of the megarians, cynics and cyrenaics, prompted plato to seek a literary form that was as close as possible to orality. from then on, dialogue becomes a literary genre and moves further and further away from the authenticity of research. in fact, according to trabattoni, plato did not make a conscious choice between literary genres, simply because at the time there were no genres codified as such, but rather chose, discarding other alternatives, a particular form of writing.2 indeed, insofar as the very term “philosophy” acquires only with plato that completeness and fullness of meaning which will then maintain throughout the history of western thought, it is fair to say that philosophy as we understand it today is born, with plato, in dialogue form (trabattoni, 2012, p. 111). however, if we want to know why plato chooses that form to express philosophy, we could answer by asking what thinking means for plato; and the answer, according to trabattoni (2012, pp. 113-115), is 2 there was, for example, no treatise as we know it, but there were forms in which writing was expressed; think, among others, of democritus' prose or of empedocles' verses. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 81 that for the philosopher thinking is dialoguing with ourselves. so, it is the real movement of thinking that is embedded in the dialogue.3 dialogue is a way of verifying the truth or falsity of our assertions, through a process of affirming or denying, until, when we arrive at some conclusion, it is interrupted and judgment is formed. and dialogue, in the form of thinking or acting in the community of dialoguers, is the only form of knowing, because we cannot have any certainty about some things that do not fall directly under our senses4, but we can try to remember what the soul holds of what it saw when it was disembodied: dialogue is the only means that can help dispel the mists of memory. this, however, does not guarantee the achievement of absolute truth, but we will have to settle for a series of final approximations, always contestable and subject to review: [d]ialogue has the task of replacing an eternally elusive absolute truth with persuasion, which is as reasoned and as solid as one wishes but which is nonetheless provisional and subject to new doubts and new arguments. […] for plato it is far better the condition of the disembodied soul, in which the direct vision of the intelligible in its pure evidence is not weakened by the mediation of logos, assertion and judgment, with all the inevitable uncertainty that goes with every act of judgment. for plato dialogue, together with the rhetorical/persuasive precondition that is inherent within it, is the only way in which the truth can appear to mankind: where it is clear that it will always be a provisional, questionable, approximate truth (trabattoni, 2012, p. 116). dialogue, then, for plato becomes the privileged instrument through which the resolving role of homologia is carried out, that is, the agreement among the dialoguers, who, unable to reach the truth because the demonstration alone is not enough, need a common, albeit momentary, understanding of the problems dealt with. the choice in favor of dialogue is explained in plato, in other words, by the same reasons on which his preference for oral rather than written communication is based: namely, the awareness that no human speech can contain a definitive or incontrovertible truth, but it can only represent a provisional agreement among dialoguers valid and true in the absence of any evidence to the contrary. orality and dialogue, therefore, are recommended for philosophical use because in philosophy no one has strong enough arguments to exclude the possibility that his current convictions, however plausible and well argued, may be denied in the future (trabattoni, 2012, p. 119). dialogue, in this way, functions as a means to compose the distance between orality and writing. furthermore, it is a literary form that lends itself rather to, 3 to give a few examples of other explanations of why plato chose the style of dialogue, some scholars have assumed that the use of dialogue was a device to assert plato’s philosophical system, rather than socrates’; others have seen the assertion of the skepticism of socratic philosophy that would be easily expressed through the dialogues, since they give the opportunity to put arguments and counter arguments without ever reaching a conclusion. 4 here trabattoni’s reference is to the doctrine of reminiscence. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 82 a conception of philosophy as research and a conception of knowledge as a process that continually poses and proposes problems and, only through the confrontation and collaboration of the individuals who participate, manages to establish the meanings and values of human life (casertano, 1986, pp. 118-119). now, if we amend the structure of plato’s dialogue from the metaphysical demands of his philosophical doctrine, we can recognize some of the elements that characterize the dialogue of lipman’s stories: a) the focus is on research; b) knowledge is understood as a process; c) there is no trace of an absolute truth; d) the agreement among the dialoguers can always be questioned. therefore, the operation carried out by lipman is to recover the philosophical dialogue and reshape it into a new form, a way of translating the philosophical tradition going beyond the literary structures that it had assumed from plato onwards. the polyvocality of the exchanges between the characters in the stories reproduces a way of reasoning and questioning and giving meaning to things, which, although it is crystallized in writing, reproduces a movement as close as possible to orality. it does not allow a single epistemic interpretation or position to prevail over the investigation carried out: the narrative is in this way a means of conveying a way of doing, that is, of practicing philosophy. the originality of the lipmanian realization lies in reproducing that type of orality in a double movement: on the one hand (and paradoxically), with the writing of the stories —that reproduces that research and that process that characterize the dialogue among the fictitious characters of the stories— and, on the other, the dialogue, the real one, the acted one, that will have to be implemented (animated by the same research and the same process that the story models) among the real children of the cpi. in this way, the traditional text has given way to the philosophical narrative, a work of fiction that consists, as far as possible, in dialogue, so that the annoying voice of the adult narrator is eliminated (lipman, sharp & oscanyan, 1992, pp. 24-25). in fact, when this annoying storyteller creates children’s literature, children are being put on the stage responding to certain characteristics, which bring into play certain mental acts, but that reflect the idea that the adult has of how a child should be or how s/he should become. in most childhood stories the children represented are happy or unlucky, beautiful or ungainly, obedient or disobedient, but it is rare that they appear thoughtful, capable of analysis, critical or speculative […] a curriculum that aims to make children think about their own situation and life must also represent children who reflect both on their own lives and on the world around them (lipman, sharp & oscanyan, 1992, p. 356). the children, left alone without the supervision of the adult, become the real protagonists of the narrative, and with their thoughts and reflections bring into play an open, sincere dialogue, a true tool of research. the text thus constructed guarantees the stimulus of the inquiry it models. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 83 every single part of the text is imbued with philosophical ideas “so that it is rare for a child to read a page without stumbling upon a problem, controversy or perplexity” (ivi: 24). it is true that very often facilitators use different materials to stimulate the investigation of the cpi (videos, paintings, music, texts of various kinds); but it is assumed that this is done by experienced facilitators, who have internalized the methodology in such a way as to know how to choose the appropriate material and how to manage it so that it functions as a spring for the inquiry. personally, i think that it is not advisable for teachers who are in training or are novices to use texts other than those of lipman, because these are a consolidated guarantee of the stimulus to reflection. almost fifty years after the publication of the first story, lipman’s stories are still used around the world and continue to be the medium through which the cpi is formed and consolidated, making it possible to implement the pedagogical aims of which the p4c methodology is a harbinger. limitations of lipman’s curriculum however, we have to recognize that there are some limitations related to lipman’s stories. the first, and perhaps most obvious, concerns the transposition of stories into specific geographical contexts. in a brief presentation of p4c in thinking, lipman and sharp (1988, p. 3) state that in that year the materials of the curriculum had already been translated into 15 languages. translating the curriculum into another language involves the implementation of some measures to adapt the story to the particular context in which it is translated. it is lipman himself who points out (santi, 1999, p. 56) that, in the operation of translation, it is important to adapt the texts to the cultural context of reference, adapting the values, languages, and lifestyles of the country in which the story is used; otherwise, the children’s process of identification with the characters of the text, which is a necessary condition to achieve an engaging dialogue, will not take place. however, this is not the only point to highlight. in fact, there are some other aspects which we should be aware of when we use lipman’s stories. as waksman and kohan argue in fare filosofia con i bambini (2013, pp. 57-65), it must be recognized that the texts are not as neutral as is claimed in the reconstruction of the philosophical tradition. this is in fact the history of western philosophy that is dealt with in the stories (mostly presented according to a pragmatist perspective) and this does not go beyond the nineteen seventies, excluding de facto a large part of the contemporary philosophical tradition. however, also some significant aspects of european philosophy of earlier times, such as those relating to the frankfurt school, seem to be absent from the curriculum. moreover, the claim of the universality of the problems dealt with cannot fail to take account of the fact that the groups of children and their families are representative of a well-defined social class and the questions they raise are likely not to be relevant to children living in conditions of economic and social hardship. for example, the question that begins the first episode [of lisa]: “can we love animals and at the same time eat them?” proposes the question of coherence: if we consider that it is not correct to kill animals, why do we eat them? the question may be significant for urban analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 84 middle-class american children of the 1980s but not for children (american, argentine or wherever it is) for whom what they eat is not a free choice (waksman and kohan, 2013, p. 63). nor can we ignore some stereotypes (especially in stories addressed to teenagers) that feature in the description of the characters: moms are often busy at the stove while dads are represented sitting in an armchair reading the newspaper; the boys embody analytical (harry) or critical (tony) thinking skills; mark is a rebellious protester while his sister maria is docile and obedient; and lisa and suki represent intuitive and creative thinking. many of the criticisms and limitations so far described are due to the historical epoch in which the stories were written, and nothing should detract from their genius and the fact that they are fundamental to shape the behavior and the critical, creative and caring attitude of the children who take part in the cpi. however, precisely because the stories have this function, we must be very careful that the stimulus activity gives the possibility to touch the minds and hearts of all the children to whom it is proposed and allows them to identify with the characters of the stories and their problems. then, we should add that the historical and social contexts have changed since the 1980s-1990s: now social media have powerfully entered the lives of children (especially due to the pandemic); the phenomenon of migration has increased and involves a large part of the world, and many migrants are unaccompanied minors who are fleeing war and poverty; and climate change has become a serious problem and is one of the causes of migration. these are all phenomena that cannot be excluded from philosophical reflection. as we have already argued, lipman’s stories are the best device to achieve both the pedagogical purposes of p4c and the authenticity of dialogical philosophical inquiry. for this reason, it is important to continue the novelistic form he initiated but we should remain mindful of the need to construct story-settings in which we can clearly identify the connections between the fictitious community of inquirers as represented in those stories —which is the lipmanian trademark— and the complex, emergent, shifting frames of reference of the contemporary world. recalibrations are needed to address these and other new educational emergences. the peace curriculum: an example of updating the lipmanian heritage the european project peace (philosophical enquiry advancing cosmopolitan engagement project number: 527659-llp-1-2012-1-it-comenius-cmp) was a specific project designed to foster inclusion among children at risk of poverty and marginalization. it was carried out between 2012 and 2015 managed by the department of humanities of the university of naples federico ii. it involved four international partners (italy, austria, spain and israel) in the creation of a new curriculum, according to the lipman model, in order to promote a cosmopolitan frame of mind in children between the ages of 8 and 14. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 85 in this context, cosmopolitanism is not intended as repurposing the philosophical tradition of the past5 but it has to do with a contemporary frame of reference that sees cosmopolitanism go beyond the mere multicultural matrix to reflect critically on the bonds that the current globalized social context brings into being. to promote social inclusion in a historical moment in which women and men leave their countries of origin and arrive in foreign places, driven by the search for better economic and/or political conditions, it is necessary to construct and implement educational paths aimed at building a new syntax of reality and a new grammar of thinking (beck, 2004). the meeting between different cultures generates the formation of new cosmopolitan societies that interact in a world that is both local and global, in which it is desirable to build an education to cosmopolitanism that through critical reflection seeks to generate a “reflective loyalty to the known and reflective openness to the new” (hansen, 2011, p. 99). cosmopolitanism seen in this light is understood as “a method through which to theorize the transformation of subjectivity in terms of a relationship with the self, with the other and with the world” that generates the creation of a third space that drifts “neither from the native cultures nor from the culture of the other, but from the interaction of both” (delanty, 2009, p. 11). in the direction of a reflective education to cosmopolitanism the european project peace met the methodology of p4c. the cpi is the best place in which to explore the loyalty to one’s own experience and the possibility of an openness to the new. it is the place where thinking discerns horizons of meaning and investigates them in their prismatic facets. this is the place where the four cs of p4c (critical – creative – collaborative – caring, intended as the four main features of thinking) meet the fifth c of cosmopolitanism (oliverio, 2017). the stories and the handbook produced during the project are divided into three units and addressed to three age groups. each unit consists of two stories: • 1° unit: 8-10 years (tina & amir – ella) • 2° unit: 10-12 years (hanadi christian) • 3° unit: 12-14 years (in and out of the park – www.whatisyourname.com) the first unit was created by the austrian partners, the second by the spanish and the third by the italians. israel did not participate in the writing of the stories but aided in supervision and who took responsibility, among other things, to test the stories in mixed communities of palestinian and israeli children, translating some of the materials into arabic. the whole curriculum has been translated into the three languages of the consortium and into english. the manuals for each story have been combined into a single text so that teachers can have at hand various possibilities to develop and integrate exercises and discussion plans, adapting them to different age groups. the main leading ideas, in fact, recur in all the stories because they are 5 cosmopolitanism has ancient roots that develop from diogenes of sinope (who described himself as a citizen of the cosmos), passing through the stoic idea of a political cosmopolitanism based on moral virtues and love for humanity (cf.: delanty, 2009) up to the enlightenment universalism and the kantian idea of a "league of nations" (kant, 1995 [1795]). http://www.whatisyourname.com/ analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 86 constructed, according to lipman’s model, with a spiral movement that achieves greater degrees of complexity as you move from one age group to another. for the writing of the stories the affective and cognitive skills that the educational project wanted to foster in children and the leading ideas focused on issues related to the cosmopolitan framework of thinking were identified. both formed the basis on which we built the stories and manuals. below is a scheme of the cognitive and affective abilities and of the leading ideas identified: cognitive skills affective skills ❑ problematizing • reflexive thinking about one’s own assumptions • identifying, assessing, and using multiple perspectives (even conflicting ones) • recognizing and being attentive to different points of view • learning a better understanding of problems • ability to ask good questions ❑ conceptualizing • understanding the meaning of words used in everyday life • showing a clearer use of language • identifying moral values • contextualization • establishing relationships • universalizing ❑ reasoning • making good judgments • conditional reasoning • anticipating the consequences • causal thinking • utilizing moral imagination: generating new possibilities (i.e., the third space) • explaining oneself to others • distinguishing between good and poor reasons ❑ self-oriented skills: • showing self-awareness • having confidence: becoming aware that one’s own thoughts are valuable and that everyone has unique ideas • developing self-resilience • being appropriately assertive ❑ relational skills • manifesting tolerance, and becoming open-minded • expressing cordiality • being cooperative: engaging collaboratively to advance a deeper inquiry with others • having flexibility • showing empathy analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 87 leading ideas unit 1 (age 8-10): tina and amir, and ella: the foundation is cosmopolitanism as a concept and way of being in the world. • cosmopolitan relationships (empathy, understanding, tolerance, different perspectives, diversity, caring), and reflexivity in critical reflection on one’s own subjectivity as an orientation to the self, other, and world • language/cultural translation (communicating and meaning-making) unit 2 (age 10-12): hanadi and christian: the foundation is cosmopolitanism as a culture and ethics; (what ought we to do?) • local and global (loyalty) multiple overlapping spheres of engagement, breaking down notions of inside/outside, internal/external, the dynamic relationship of openness and loyalty • individual and community • tradition – customs – social rules – habits • human rights unit 3 (age 12-14): in and out the park and www.whatisyourname.you: the foundation is cosmopolitanism as a cosmopolitan politics. (how ought we to live as a society?) • truth • justice (universalism generalization, particularity, theories of justice) • friendship, social networks, gangs (subjectivity as essentially relational, multiple overlapping spheres of engagement) each partner then developed additional leading ideas for each unit that formed the scaffolding for the story building. for example, the leading idea of human rights has been extended to the leading ideas of children’s rights and rights and duties; the leading idea related to social networks has been added to the ideas of space, virtual space and real space; and the leading idea of justice has been expressed as right and wrong, distributive justice, instrumental justice and the rule of the majority. all the leading ideas and the cognitive and affective abilities, together with the philosophical tradition of reference, have been inserted in a scenario that represents a cosmopolitan frame, understood as an environmental and theoretical context in which the characters have taken shape. retracing the tradition of lipman’s stories, the peace stories were built according to the following steps: • research of the themes that make up the leading ideas • research of different epistemic positions on a topic • problematization of the themes • transposition of the leading ideas into a narrative • formulating a destabilizing problematic situation • problematization of the situation analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 88 • dialogue: a) philosophical question b) plurivocality (translation of the epistemic positions of the philosophical tradition into contextual language) • age of the target audience (characters are the same age as the target audience) • cosmopolitan context (most likely close to that of the target audience) • language (the ordinary language that the target audience would use) the fictitious children were designed to embody all those qualities typical of the characters in lipman’s stories (reflexivity, predisposition to research, openness to the others’ points of view, etc.) but they also play the role of children who are faced with everyday issues that can arise from the encounter between different cultures, whether they are represented by conflict or by a curiosity towards a different perspective. thus, the story of a child waiting for the arrival of her relatives from iran becomes an opportunity to reflect with her friends on the use of the hijab (ella); or the conflict that arises between boys and girls competing for the use of a football field for a championship provides an opportunity to reflect on belonging and origin, children’s rights and gender equality (christian); or, again, the episode of a theft committed in the school attended by the characters of the story, for which a roma boy is accused, constitutes the spring to reflect on tolerance and prejudice (in and out the park). here are some examples of how the issues in question have been developed: isabell, who just came round the corner, looked curious and listened while dina talked about her relatives. so she went on telling us: “you know, my family from iran is very religious, when they are here in austria the women don`t go without a scarf (hijab), not even if it is as hot as today. and whenever a man is walking up the stairs in our house, my aunt and my cousin put the scarf around their head tightly. i don`t care.” “i think they have to accept that they are in another country now and rules here are different than in iran,” isabell said. “of course they obey the rules here, but...” dina said. “headscarves will not hurt anybody, so why should people not be able to wear a hijab?” i asked. “my mother said muslim women have limits and rights that they believe in. it is part of their religion and you have no right to mess around with other people`s religion. if you are a christian would you like people to tell you to take off the cross? isn’t it the same thing?” dina asked (ella, pp. 25-26). “come on! let’s go to the playground,” says bochdan. a tanned boy named josé asks my new friend, “are we going to set up a football team to play in the school league this year?” “i don’t think so. we don’t have anywhere to train,” answers a boy named mohamed. “what do you mean we don’t? we could train on the courts at the sports center,” says bochdan. “you can forget those courts, you know they won’t let us in,” says mohamed. “you’re wrong, we can use the courts. those courts are for all the kids in the neighborhood and we are kids from this neighborhood, so those courts were built for us. the problem is the ecuadorians are always there and there are more of them than us. and they are stronger. they are the ones who won’t let us train there, but it’s just not fair,” says josé. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 89 “but they are from our neighborhood too, so they could say that it’s their right to play on the courts too,” bochdan replies. “they are foreigners,” says josé, “because they weren’t born here.” “i wasn’t born here either and i feel like this is my home,” mohamed answers, slightly annoyed, “and the same thing goes for raul who is from another neighborhood. i’m both moroccan and from this neighborhood and don’t you talk about your ‘village’ in extremadura? i think we can be from several places at the same time.” […] “what’s up?” asks chema. “two girls have signed up for the league,” kevin answers nervously. “and? what’s the problem?” chema responds. “what do you mean? the probleeeeeeeem?” his words don’t come out well. or maybe, the ideas don’t come out. “it’s one thing is to have them as an audience, watching the game, but it’s a different thing to have them playing with us!!” “and me?” says silvia, angrily. “do you have any problem with me? either you don’t know what you are saying, or you’ve had a problem with me since i started playing, and you didn’t want to tell me.” “with you it’s not the same … you’re different,” answers kevin, a little unsure of himself, “you are one of us, and you’ve been here since the beginning” (christian, p. 28 and 37). everybody was in the park, including mario. jensika wanted to hug him tightly and make him understand that, as long as they were together, he didn’t have to fear anything, not even the charge of robbery, but she restrained herself and just said hello and that she was sorry about the rumours. “who cares?” mario said. “if i listened to all the stupid things they usually say i’d be consumed with rage. i don’t give a damn.” “indeed,” mariella said, “those people don’t know what tolerance means.” “tolerance?” mario laughed. “i don’t want to be tolerated.” “mario, what do you mean?” mimmo didn’t understand. “tolerance is the basis of civil life. for example, it is tolerance towards different religions or cultures that makes us live in peace and allows us to study in the same school with rahma and jensika. it makes us know cultures different from ours.” “yes, but this is not the point. first of all, we aren’t living in peace today, and it doesn’t seem to me that the islamic religion is tolerated...” “that’s right,” rahma interrupted him. “yesterday in class we read the newspaper article on that boy who died in syria. he was italian but had decided to convert to islam and, for this reason, was investigated by the italian political police. why should the police be interested in a person only because he converted to islam?” “because of the whole september 11th incident,” mimmo affirmed. “ok, but if you convert to islam, it doesn’t necessarily mean that you are a terrorist! i’m islamic, ok, even if i’ve decided not to wear the veil and all the rest, but that is my religion, so am i a terrorist too?” “this is the same mentality that affirms that all roma people are thieves,” mariella said. “for this reason, i insist that we all should learn to be tolerant,” mimmo claimed. “still with this story,” mario snorted. “you’re speaking from the other side of the fence. go to a foreign country and then you’ll see what it means to be tolerated. sometimes, i assure it’s really humiliating. you feel as if you were a disabled person and people pity you. i want to be known, loved, and appreciated for what matters” (in and out the park, pp. 25-26). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 90 the stories were then tested by teachers and educators (already trained in p4c) who participated in a training course organized by the department of humanities of the university of naples federico ii. this was a valuable experience because the trainers helped the authors to verify if the texts worked in the creation of a cosmopolitan community of inquiry, giving advice on which were the most effective passages and which needed to be improved. the curriculum is still used in many italian schools and educational contexts and is entirely downloadable, free of charge, from the website https://peace.kinderphilosophie.at/. conclusion retracing the motivations that prompted lipman to use the dialogue in his stories in order to recover the authenticity of philosophical research —that we imagine inhabited the scene of philosophers at the time of socrates— this contribution has tried to highlight the originality of the lipmanian curriculum, but also its limitations, suggesting new recalibrations of the original design. the peace curriculum is an example of how, following lipman’s tradition and teaching, this wonderful tool can be updated and adapted so that it can be addressed to contemporary children. engaging in the creation of new stories, trying to remain as faithful as possible to the system created by lipman, means, on the one hand, broadening the philosophical reflection, updating its themes and reasoning, and, on the other, understanding how to meet the new educational challenges that contemporary society imposes on us. there is a need, now more than ever, to create inclusive communities, in which the perspectives of different cultures are compared. however, it is also very important to bring out opportunities in which to reflect on the use of new technologies that impact with increasing urgency on the lives of educators and students, providing children and young people with spaces of meaning in which to build awareness of their use. for this reason, it is desirable to create new stories inserted in new frames of reference through which to reach children of all social and cultural backgrounds and to widen the range of situations in which the fictitious children of the stories act. this does not mean renouncing or abandoning the work of lipman and sharp. on the contrary, this would certainly be the best way to keep alive their heritage. bibliography beck, u. (2005). lo sguardo cosmopolita. roma: carocci. berkeley, g. (2007 [1713]). tre dialoghi tra hylas e philonous. parigi, s. (ed.), opere filosofiche, 283 -405. torino: utet libreria. casertano, g. (1986). storia delle filosofie. napoli: il tripode. cosentino, a. (2017). il dialogo filosofico come strumento di ricerca. nòema. 8(1), 9-19. cosentino, a. oliverio, s. & striano, m. (2011), la scrittura filosofica: uno strumento per educare il pensiero al movimento dell’indagine. cosentino, a. oliverio, s. & striano, m. (eds.), il risentimento della mula. racconti e strumenti per l’indagine filosofica. napoli: liguori. https://peace.kinderphilosophie.at/ analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 91 delanty, g. (2009). the cosmopolitan imagination. the renewal of critical social theory. cambridge: cambridge university press. de marzio, d. (2011). what happens in philosophical texts: matthew lipman’s theory and practice of the philosophical text as model. childhood & philosophy. v.7, n. 13, jan./jun, 29-47. hansen, d.t. (2011). the teacher and the world. a study of cosmopolitanism as education. london and new york: routledge. kant, i. (1995 [1795] per la pace perpetua. un progetto filosofico. merker, n. (ed.), stato di diritto e società civile, 175-214. roma: editori riuniti. lipman, m. (2005). educare al pensiero. milano: vita e pensiero. lipman, m. sharp, a. m. & oscanyan, f. s. (1992). la filosofìa en el aula. madrid: ediciones de la torre. lipman, m. & sharp, a. m. (1988). philosophy for children: a traditional subject in a novel format. thinking, v. 7, s2-s5. oliverio, s. (2015). lipman’s novels or turning philosophy inside-out. childhood & philosophy. v. 11, n. 21, jan-jun, 81-92. oliverio, s. (2016). philosophical inquiry and education as cosmopolitanism. https://www.pedagog.uw.edu.pl/fckeditor/userfiles/file/inpe%202016/concurrent/oliverio.pdf (last viewed on february 5th). peace curriculum. https://peace.kinderphilosophie.at/. platone. fedro, giannantoni, g. (ed.) (1971) opere complete. bari: laterza. santi, m. (1999). conversazione con mattew lipman. a. cosentino (ed), filosofia e formazione. 10 anni di philosophy for children (pp. 47-60). napoli: liguori. trabattoni, f. (2012). dialogo. https://www.academia.edu/2264454/dialogo (last viewed on february 5th). waksman, v. & kohan, w. (2013). fare filosofia con i bambini. napoli: liguori. address correspondences to: maria miraglia, phd student at dsu (dipartrimento studi umanistici) of the university of naples federico ii (italy) email: maria.miraglia@unina.it https://www.pedagog.uw.edu.pl/fckeditor/userfiles/file/inpe%202016/concurrent/oliverio.pdf https://peace.kinderphilosophie.at/ https://www.academia.edu/2264454/dialogo mailto:maria.miraglia@unina.it on becoming both less and more open-minded analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 34 on becoming both less and more open-minded lena green introduction first encountered philosophy for children (p4c) in the late 1990s. i am not a philosopher, but as an educational psychologist fascinated by the notion of learned intelligence, i was eager to explore any educational intervention that claimed to improve students’ thinking. there is literature since the 1980s (doidge, 2007; feuerstein, feuerstein & falik, 2010; perkins, 1995), which argues that intelligence is not fixed but modifiable, that we can actually change the way our minds operate and in doing so may also change our brains. the p4c curriculum seemed a promising intervention strategy with this in mind. as a once-upon-a-time english teacher i loved the idea of using fiction not only to engage and motivate, but also to model a form of thinking (reasoned dialogue as a respectful community of inquiry) that might change how students perceived their own relationships with knowledge and with others and how teachers perceived their role in the classroom. my introduction to p4c involved a month at montclair state university, new jersey, where i studied the p4c materials, experienced my first mendham retreat,1 and was fortunate enough to meet and have a few conversations with matt lipman himself. i went back to mendham more than once and have published research involving p4c in books and journals. although i have no formal background in philosophy, my work already focused on cognitive development, an area in which philosophy and psychology share an interest, albeit from different perspectives. i was granted permission to train teachers in p4c and worked with prospective and practicing teachers during my years as an educational psychologist and professor of educational psychology at a south african university. this paper addresses two issues that have puzzled or concerned me from time to time during the years that i have been involved with p4c. these are: the boundaries of the practice of p4wc and the boundaries separating the disciplines that inform the p4wc movement—in particular, the boundaries between philosophy and the disciplines of education and psychology. i will argue that the movement would benefit from becoming somewhat less open to a wide range of interpretations of practice and somewhat more open to insights from related disciplines. 1 the institute for the advancement of philosophy for children, co-founded by matthew lipman and ann margaret sharp at montclair state university, runs annual, residential p4c workshops at a retreat house in mendham, new jersey. i analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 35 acronyms the acronym p4c (philosophy for children) stands for the name of the comprehensive school curriculum and pedagogy developed by matthew lipman and his colleague ann margaret sharp, which was designed to guide and support teachers trained to introduce philosophy lessons to their pupils. the acronym pwc (philosophy with children) refers to any form of philosophy practiced with children. p4wc (philosophy for or with children) emerged subsequently to cover a range of philosophical practices with children that includes, but is not limited to, the original lipman and sharp curriculum and, indeed, sometimes includes similar community of inquiry practices with adults. these acronyms will be used throughout the paper. the context materials development back in cape town with my newly purchased collection of manuals and story texts, i took the bold step of offering training to the entire staff at one primary school. the teachers who volunteered gradually became more interested, and a few introduced community of inquiry sessions regularly. one of these teachers commented after a number of weeks, “they [her students] have learned to disagree graciously,” and she was moved to write an article entitled, “i discovered a gold mine in my classroom” (kearns, 2004). i soon became aware that it would take more skill than i possessed—and much longer than a few brief training sessions—to turn teachers into philosophers. however, if teachers elsewhere could, with the aid of the p4c materials, give lessons that began to address philosophical questions as a classroom community of inquiry, surely i could use the manuals and original stories to demonstrate and model for teachers the practice of p4c, even if the original story texts would have to be adapted for children in local classrooms. many p4c practitioners in different parts of the world have recognized the need for contextually relevant texts and created new stories and other materials to use as starting points for inquiry, some more sophisticated and comprehensive than others. i initiated a small project (green, 2008) to create short “snapshots” of classroom life that would appeal to local school children, encourage inquiry, and be perceived by teachers as relevant to the curriculum they were required to follow. with the help of a volunteer group of experienced teachers to whom i had introduced p4c, i created short, simple narratives modelled on the original p4c material, but set in local classrooms. the teachers provided the contexts and incidents, and i suggested how they might incorporate some potentially challenging philosophical issues. the stories were eventually printed in booklet form, together with simple manuals developed with the aid of a researcher at the institute for the advancement of philosophy for children (iapc) at montclair state university. at the end of the project booklets and manuals were distributed to the teacher-participants’ schools. follow-up with teachers indicated, however, that there was no space for regular philosophy lessons in the prescribed new curriculum (at that time a challenge for many teachers), so the story booklets tended to be used mainly in conventional reading lessons. the “philosophy lessons,” which were never a priority with education authorities, gradually ceased to happen, although i observed a analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 36 few of the teacher-authors successfully integrating the notion of collaborative inquiry and a few basic thinking moves into their language teaching. i doubted, however, whether one could say that they were “doing philosophy” with their classes or that i had consistently modelled “what philosophers do”, in the short sessions when teachers were available for training or support. at the time i was not sure that this mattered. if i could motivate teachers to adopt a more respectful, inquiry-based pedagogy and work towards collaborative, reasonable classroom communities it would be worth doing, although it was far from all that p4c aims to achieve. i learned a great deal but it is unlikely that there was any long-term effect on the children. the intervention with teachers was too short and, as lipman noted in an interview, “…unless the results of such an intervention are reinforced, they’ll wash out” (brandt, 1988, p. 35). working with prospective teachers subsequently, for a number of years i offered, with the help of a colleague, a compulsory annual module introducing p4c to final-year education students. the four to five-week module included various pedagogical activities such as powerpoint presentations, video demonstrations, and short “thinking” exercises, but a central focus was on having our students experience a different kind of learning situation—one that they could later replicate in classrooms. as the “teacher” of these students i hoped to model how they might experiment with p4c during their teaching practice sessions in schools. i used the p4c storybooks and manuals to plan our weekly three-hour sessions, aiming to keep as close to the basic p4c lesson format as possible. it was already clear to me that the content of the p4c stories would be unfamiliar to most south african schoolchildren and the reading level too difficult for many, so the locally developed materials described above were supplied to students for classroom experimentation during their practical teaching sessions. i was pleased to discover, however, that certain of lipman’s stories worked well with young adults about to enter the teaching profession. extracts from the storybook entitled harry stottlemeier’s discovery (lipman, 1982), designed for older primary school children, appealed to our students. year after year, with different students, lively inquiry was generated by the chapter about a boy who was in trouble at school because his parents’ religion did not permit him to salute the national flag. an extract in which the girls at a sleepover discuss what a “mind” might be was another successful starting point. i soon realized, as i am sure others have done, that i would have to modify the classic “plain vanilla” lesson structure. the entire class of final-year education students was involved in choosing questions to inquire about, but the inquiry itself was often undertaken by separate small groups. it took too long and was too disruptive to push tables to one side—and move 80 or more students, their chairs and their bags into the closest we could come to a circle—in a classroom that hardly contained them. moreover, many students hesitated to speak in front of such a large audience. we settled for the occasional “whole group” inquiry but more often divided the class into twelve small groups of six to eight students. as facilitator/trainer the challenge was to visit each group briefly, while remaining alert to what was going on elsewhere in the room. the group inquiries were more successful once we had created some structure. every group was given a set of cards on each of which was written a word such as question, opinion, agree, disagree, connection and reason. the instruction was that any student who wished to contribute to the analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 37 inquiry must hold up and display one or more of these cards to indicate to the others in the group what kind of contribution was being offered. students engaged enthusiastically with this activity, although it took careful monitoring to encourage the quiet or confused groups, remind the noisy ones to stay on track and tactfully challenge one or two students whose attention appeared to be elsewhere. groups presented brief feedback at which time everyone was encouraged to notice similarities and differences in the groups’ conclusions and comment on any new questions that had emerged. sometimes students sat in two parallel circles, only the inner one being permitted to speak. the outer group’s responsibility was to notice examples of agreeing, disagreeing, making connections, etc., and to give process feedback to their peers at the end of the session. our research (green, condy & chigona, 2012; green & condy, 2016; condy, green & gachago, 2019) suggested that these students had begun to develop as a community of inquiry, had become more thoughtful and could dialogue reasonably even when discussing a real-life controversial situation. a planned project to follow up on their careers as teachers failed to materialize owing to funding constraints. i have described the attempt to create materials and the classes with students in some detail because i want to argue that what i was doing was a fairly typical example of how practitioners outside the north american education context adapt the original p4c materials and practice to suit different contexts. most practitioners who have had adequate training do so, i think, fairly successfully. as sutcliffe (2003, p.75) comments, “teachers within different educational systems absorb the practice in different ways,” citing studies in the uk that suggest the community of inquiry approach holds good across different teachers’ interpretations, although he recommends more and better research. i wondered at times whether or not i was “doing philosophy” with our students, but i do not believe that i wandered so far from the original that an observer might say, “this is not p4c.” working with young adolescents when i started philosophy clubs for young people in my private practice as an educational psychologist it was not long before i was aware that, despite the name, i might not be “doing philosophy.” over time i worked with several small voluntary groups of young adolescents who, for a variety of reasons, were unhappy in conventional schools. my aim was to use p4c to offer a positive experience of intellectual activity during which participants could safely enjoy exploring the content and process of their own thinking and, hopefully, become more inclined to think carefully themselves and to attend carefully and respectfully to the thoughts of others. any changes of this nature were likely to make social and academic life in school less difficult for them and to help them develop more positive self-concepts. the philosophy clubs met weekly but the sessions i planned using the p4c curriculum as a guide frequently turned out differently. was i “doing philosophy” when i discarded my carefully planned inquiry with a group of teenage boys in favour of sean’s urgent need to tell us about how he had unexpectedly found his bedroom decorated with condoms by his father? i eventually managed to nudge the discussion towards what it means to be a parent but only when our time was almost up. was i “doing philosophy” when i agreed that a group of excitable teenagers could inquire “under aliases”, each choosing to speak on behalf of a soft toy that in other circumstances they would certainly have despised as “babyish”? we had started off as a community inquiring about loyalty, analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 38 wondering under what, if any, circumstances it could be right to betray a friend, but the inquiry only took off when the group became a community at one remove as they spoke enthusiastically for the teddy bear, or somewhat grubby pink rabbit, or other cuddly toy, that each insisted on holding. were they expressing their true opinions, or perhaps creating for themselves the opportunity to try out different perspectives safely, or just playing? in retrospect i might have intervened to probe the prevalent assumption that all opinions were equally valid, but at the time i preferred not to interrupt a pleasing level of engagement, even by those who were usually silent. what about my sessions with the twelve-year-old who had suffered a head injury in a motor vehicle accident? he seldom spoke directly to me. what he really liked was to speak on behalf of each of a “community” of four dolls, to whom i had to address my questions and comments. did it perhaps help him to concretize and separate different thoughts rather than hold them all in mind at once? there was no way of knowing, but at least he spoke. the question of boundaries how far may one stray before one’s practice stops being p4c, or stops being philosophy? the question is important to me because i believe it is an issue that it would be valuable to discuss with beginning practitioners. i would not wish to encourage false claims to be “doing philosophy” or to make such claims myself, or to unintentionally mislead about the meaning of “philosophy.” at one point i asked a professor of philosophy how i might judge whether or not i was “doing philosophy”, hoping to be offered some criteria. unless i misunderstood, the answer was that only i would be able to tell, a challenge about which i continue to wonder. in the case of the philosophy club groups i was probably very close to, if not beyond, the dividing line between members and non-members of the extended family of p4wc practitioners. i was integrating certain aspects of p4c into my professional practice because i perceived their value, but i think i was stretching the concept of “doing philosophy,” and i suspect that this might be true of many teachers. as daniel (2021, pp.10–11) writes, “if dialogue and critical thinking are not actualized in classroom discussions, then the approach loses its specificity, its meaning, its purpose.” she does add, however, that her research found that “during p4c sessions, philosophical dialogue did not manifest itself as soon as pupils began exchanging with peers. rather, it manifested itself after months, even years, of philosophical praxis” (daniel, 2021). although with time our sessions might have become more philosophical, i could not avoid bringing to my “philosophy” sessions the values and practices of a different discipline and profession. the same would apply to teachers, and to other professionals who work with children and adolescents. we are all likely to integrate the notion of “doing philosophy” with children with what we already know and believe, to assimilate and accommodate and create new schemas, as piaget would say. in addition, therefore, to the necessary context-related modifications that i have discussed earlier, there are likely to be different interpretations of p4wc by teachers and others, even by those trained in the p4c approach, as well as among philosophers with different orientations who choose to work with children. the concept of “family resemblances” is attractively inclusive, but it makes it difficult to gain a sense of the limits of what may justifiably be labelled p4wc. this might not have been an issue when the carefully structured p4c curriculum was first introduced and philosophizing with children was a new concept. the practice was at that time firmly located within traditional schooling in the analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 39 united states, and the training and mentoring of teachers originally envisaged by lipman (1987) was much more substantial than schools, at least in the south african context, are able to fund and sustain. variations in the practice of p4wc are inevitable. since certain variations may have negative consequences for participants and/or for the reputation of p4wc, it would be really helpful to follow up on the suggestions made by cosentino in 2010 in an email sent to the community of icpic (international council of philosophical inquiry with children) members. he wrote: “it is clear that ‘philosophical’ has an indefinite number of possible meanings,” and he concluded that “…we [the icpic community] must point out and separate the ties that mark the borders of our activity (and that we consider imperative) from the aspects we think [to] be modifiable” (cosentino, a., personal communication to icpic members, 2010), and made valuable suggestions about how this might be done. i may have missed further inquiry about this topic, but it seems that, over ten years later, the boundaries of the practice of p4wc remain remarkably unclear. if this is simply the nature of philosophy it may be one reason why schools have trouble inserting it into the curriculum. some training implications the quality of teachers’ philosophizing will surely depend on the modelling and guidance received during training and, ideally, monitoring and support thereafter. moriyon (personal communication emailed to members of the icpic, 2020), mccall (2009) and murris (2000) emphasize the need to equip teachers with philosophical background. moriyon sees it as a major problem that “most of the teachers in primary and secondary education don’t have any philosophical background” (moriyon, 2020). it very much depends, of course, on what is to be understood by “philosophical background.” if there is no widely accepted description of the meaning the p4wc community has chosen to assign to the word “philosophy” we cannot know what background in philosophy it would be appropriate for teachers, or other non-philosophers, to possess. i surmise, however, that experiencing a particular way of engaging with knowledge is more important than familiarity with the work of the great philosophers. murris (2000, p.45) has proposed that only philosophers are capable of doing philosophy with children because only they possess the background in philosophy to be able to influence an inquiry by introducing substantive questions of the kind philosophers would ask and to model “the kind of behavior s/he would like the children to internalize”. i would, however, modify murris’ statement and conclude that some individuals who are not trained philosophers can engage participants in a form of philosophical inquiry, at least some of the time, if they have received quality training and have access to quality resources. i cannot believe that experienced language, history, science, mathematics and other teachers would not raise “philosophical” questions pertaining to their subjects with their students, (although they might not recognize them as such) or that experienced teachers of young children would never acknowledge the potentially philosophical questions asked by their pupils. they might, however, have some difficulty in remaining open to multiple answers. the views of the above authors suggest that only philosophers should train p4wc practitioners. i acknowledge that there have been times when i have been unable to come up with a relevant analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 40 substantive philosophical question on the spur of the moment but i imagine this might sometimes be true even of philosophers. i should like to argue that academics involved in teacher education should be actively encouraged to become both practitioners and trainers capable of modelling p4c or pwc in their teaching. it has been my experience that it is easier, for a variety of reasons, to convince those about to enter the teaching profession that this different form of education is of enormous benefit than to persuade established teachers. if the value of p4wc is not well established through modelling at the pre-service level the kind of philosophy in schools that p4wc training offers is frequently perceived to be just one more strategy in a teacher’s repertoire. teachers teach as they have been taught (britzman, 1991). they need to experience a different pedagogy long enough to recognize its value and begin to internalize it. p4wc’s relationship with the disciplines of psychology and education i have argued above for a clearer indication of the boundary beyond which practice may no longer call itself p4c or p4wc. in this section of the paper i suggest that the p4wc community be less inclined to respect some other boundaries, namely those between philosophy and the related disciplines of psychology and education. it would be in everyone’s interests if the p4wc community were more open to engaging with theory and research in education and developmental psychology. “there is much to be gained in the development of educational thinking by going beyond one’s front door, and ‘taking cuttings’ from other people’s gardens” (clough & corbett, 2006, p. 26, cited by d. thompson in an article about inclusive education). firstly, there exists a vast and growing literature on school improvement and the facilitation of change in education. many admirable educational initiatives have not proved sustainable, one example being the dalton plan (van der ploeg, 2013), which offered students choices and encouraged them to be independent learners. founded by helen parkhurst in the united states and popular for a time, it spread to other countries in the 1920s or 1930s, but was not widely adopted in the united states or in the united kingdom. according to the literature, it is generally believed that one important reason for the failure of interventions to survive is the fact that they were not whole-school initiatives supported by leadership at school level and beyond. the thinking schools movement, active in several countries, may not in all ways support the ideals of p4wc, but it offers a good example of a well-planned whole school approach. familiarity with the achievements and challenges of other attempts to establish different values and practices within traditional schools could provide valuable insights for the p4wc community. secondly, there is at this time considerable interest in teacher development and the notion of teacher professional learning communities (plcs) (carpenter, 2017; harris and jones, 2010; tam, 2015). it would make sense to introduce p4wc to teachers by suggesting it as an appropriate strategy to structure the process of such teacher collaborative communities, which is something that many teacher groups initially find difficult. dempster (2009, p. 7) maintains that “good quality data about students’ learning and performance should be coupled with disciplined dialogue if improvement actions are to be realistically grounded,” but carpenter (2017, p. 1069) comments that there is “little consensus on what educators actually do in a plc,” although some protocols have been suggested. if, as green and collett (2020) claim, the need for teachers to monitor their own thinking and reasoning analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 41 processes and to engage respectfully with others is implied by such protocols, p4wc would be an ideal approach. as baumfield (2017) argues, community of inquiry pedagogy is a desirable practice for teacher education generally, whether or not it can be said to be philosophy. “we cannot advance thinking unless we put teachers in the position to be thinkers themselves…” duffy (1994, p. 22). thirdly, it seems unfortunate that philosophers continue to argue vehemently against developmental psychology generally, and piagetian theory in particular, when developmental psychologists have, since the 1980s or early 1990s questioned and tended to reject certain of piaget’s assumptions and to replace the “deficit” conception of childhood challenged by matthews (2009) with a more flexible understanding of children, as the quotation below (from a very thorough and detailed examination of research on children’s thinking) illustrates. it does seem to be clear that piaget painted far too negative a picture of children’s thinking in the pre-operational stage (beilin, 1992; vuyk, 1981), and we might prefer a model of cognitive development which described more pre-school competence and (perhaps) a less complete later stage competence.… (meadows, 1993, p. 210) aspects of vygotskian theory—including the notion of scaffolding, the importance of language and the role of more knowledgeable others—have been current in education for more than thirty years, although, i admit, not always applied insightfully in schools. ideas about genetically fixed intelligence and invariant predetermined stages of development may still be found in older textbooks and may linger among uninformed policy makers and older teachers, but cognitive developmental theorists currently tend to be more interested in the modifiability of human intelligence at any age and the conditions under which this is possible (feuerstein, feuerstein and falik, 2010; feuerstein, klein & tannenbaum, 1991). there are programmes available that address the explicit teaching of various facets of thinking in different ways, from which p4wc might gain insights. for example, the work of hyerle (1996) on visual tools for thinking might suggest ideas for community of inquiry sessions. p4wc is a very auditory experience, depending a great deal on concentration and memory, and practitioners might benefit from some ideas about visual aids based on an understanding of thinking processes. the emphasis in developmental psychology has changed from a theory of invariant stages in the development of innate “intelligence” to theories of learned intelligence as explained, for example, by green (2017) and perkins (1995). from the 1980s onwards there has been significant interest in ways of mediating and enhancing “intelligence”, spearheaded by the foundational work of reuven feuerstein and in the possibility, now well supported by research, that the human brain is capable of changing itself in response to experience (doidge 2007; falik, 2019). it is frequently recommended that metacognitive awareness (the ability to notice and name one’s own thinking processes, as distinct from the content of one’s thought) is actively taught because it makes possible the building of a conscious repertoire of “thinking tools” to be selected appropriately in response to cognitive demands. in the case of the feuerstein (1991) approach, specific criteria describe the kind of learning environment that facilitates successful acquisition of thinking skills, and some of these criteria resonate with the characteristics of a community of inquiry (haywood, 1993). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 42 i do not deny that from the 1980s educationists in the united states and elsewhere have overinterpreted the work of piaget, and that subsequent policy makers have been, and may remain, slow to revise their thinking. this is not, however a reason to dismiss or ignore the more recent ideas of cognitive developmental psychologists. if p4wc is to change education it would be both possible and strategic to align where it can with the theory and research about thinking and learning that are currently circulating in education. for example, it might help the internalization of thinking moves to emphasize naming and recognizing them during dialogue, although obviously not to the extent that meaning is lost. fourthly, it would strengthen the case for p4wc in schools if research highlighted how some of the findings and issues related to p4wc resonate with findings and issues reported in education journals, and with the aims of curriculum developers. although certain curriculum aims are likely to conflict with the aims of the p4wc movement, there are some areas of convergence. many recent curricula stress the importance of “critical thinking” and “dialogic teaching”, although these are also concepts with very flexible boundaries that it would be valuable to clarify. substantial research demonstrating the successes over time of p4wc in relation to these specific educational aims would be highly persuasive. it is my general impression, and my own experience, that one problem with p4wc research is that it often produces exciting short-term qualitative results that researchers do not, for whatever reason, follow up over time. school administrators and curriculum planners are influenced by evidence of successful student achievement, but achievement need not be assessed only in terms of academic results in the form of grades. substantial evidence of improvement in critical, creative, caring or collaborative thinking as a result of practices that it is possible for teachers to replicate would be persuasive. it is true, of course, that like many important educational outcomes, the hoped for “results” will be difficult to measure in any reliable way, or invisible unless circumstances happen to call for them. there are challenges here to identify contextual factors that may influence success, develop ingenious research designs and have the patience to monitor longitudinal studies. a review of how other educational programs are researched might suggest directions and help avoid pitfalls. conclusion my first conclusion is that integrating personal experience and theory in an academic paper is a difficult project, especially if it involves thinking about years of practice. having written the paper, i do not believe it mattered whether or not i was “doing philosophy” with my philosophy club groups, apart from the fact that i had publicly labelled our activity as “philosophy”. it did matter when i was training teachers. i needed to ensure that i conveyed to them the kind of practice that would be expected if they chose to “do p4wc” in their own classrooms. i did not have the background to be able to choose among forms of philosophy, but i was able to follow the guidelines of the p4c curriculum and draw on my experiences at mendham. it helped that community of inquiry pedagogy has much in common with ideas in psychology about how best to mediate thinking. i do believe, however, that guidelines about what doing philosophy is not (for example, telling children what to think, which i have observed) would be useful for beginning practitioners and for trainers who may not have a comprehensive background in philosophy. i have learned that there are innumerable analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 43 answers when one asks what philosophy is. besides such cognitive considerations the recently published work on the ethics of doing philosophy with children (kennedy & kohan, 2021) suggests a number of ethical criteria that it is to be hoped would already be incorporated in the general ethical requirements for schools and teachers, the application of which in p4wc contexts may have special significance and require vigilance and self-examination. these are matters that should be the subject of inquiry during training. with regard to philosophy for children itself, i regret the fact that lipman’s story texts are often rejected in favour of other starting points. although i understand the reasons for this, something important is lost when children are not offered a fictional model of a different type of school conversation. a story appeals to the imagination and models in a different manner to the experience of a collaborative, inquiring classroom, which may be a once-a-week event if the teacher is not part of a whole school initiative. it has been claimed that at one time the values of one part of russian society (presumably those who could read and had the leisure to do so) were shaped by the social norms that people read about in novels, which suggests what might be accomplished. i am not familiar with the latest work of the iapc, but i hope that serious attention is being given to updating the p4c curriculum and materials, taking into account the digital environment of most schoolchildren, and the fact that books are not the only form that stories can take. i am inclined to think that an updated p4c curriculum—perhaps simplified, or a similar one set elsewhere—would be a “safer” and more coherent option for schools than expecting teachers to identify appropriate sources and plan curricula themselves. i would even go so far as to make the heretical suggestion that a first level of training might concentrate on community of inquiry pedagogy and a few basic thinking moves, leaving the issue of philosophical questions for later. it would be a different matter if resident philosophy teachers able to support teachers were appointed at every school. with regard to training of teachers in p4wc i refer briefly to the education context with which i am familiar. the national curriculum is very full and teachers are required to follow it closely. philosophy classes, or a significantly different pedagogy, would need the approval and support of the education authorities. it was only when bloom’s taxonomy became mandatory in assessment planning that most teachers in state schools began to engage with the notion of levels of thinking. there have been some p4wc training initiatives with teachers and schools but their impact is very limited and research has shown that interventions at an individual level seldom result in system change. i have concluded that, if p4wc is to have a major impact on education, the ideal strategy would be to introduce it in teacher education and build a cadre of teachers well trained to implement community of inquiry pedagogy. unless prospective teachers are regularly exposed to a different pedagogy they are likely to teach as they themselves were taught. the implications are challenging. imagine an education faculty whose default teaching mode is dialogic inquiry—unlikely, i know, and even more so in the context of a pandemic that limits face-to-face communication. training would be necessary and, ideally, some professors would eventually become trainers themselves. i believe, however, that modelling at the level of teacher education is the most likely strategy to produce widespread change in teaching. the ability to connect p4wc with some of the ideas already valued by education professors might be a starting point for collaborative inquiry, for example, around the notion of “critical thinking”. there is a movement in higher education in south africa, and probably elsewhere, to develop interdisciplinary communities of practice to address issues of social justice, and analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 44 this movement might welcome a different mode of engagement with students and with colleagues. i do not imagine it would be productive, however, to begin by criticizing and undermining what individuals consider to be their professional expertise. finally, i acknowledge that my views arise out of experiences in the context of an education system in transition, a transition that has yet to achieve transformation. i continue to believe that, despite challenges and imperfections, p4wc could play an important role in influencing the direction of change in conventional schools, which, it seems, will survive worldwide in the foreseeable future, by both enabling more effective learning and modelling a different form of human society. references beilin, h. (1992). piaget’s enduring contribution to developmental psychology. developmental psychology, 28(2) pp. 191–204. baumfield, v. m. (2017). changing minds: the professional learning of teachers in a classroom community of inquiry. in: m. r. gregory, j. haynes and k. murris (eds.), the routledge international handbook of philosophy for children. london: routledge. brandt, r. (1988). on philosophy in the curriculum: a conversation with matthew lipman. educational leadership, 46(1). britzman, d. p. (1991). practice makes perfect: a critical study of learning to teach. albany: state university press. carpenter, d. (2017). collaborative inquiry and the shared workspace of professional learning communities. international journal of educational management, 31(7) 1069–1091. https://doi.org/10.1108/ijem-10-2015-0143 condy, j, green, l. and gachago, d. (2019). exploring being human today: equipping teachers for diversity. in: g. maré (ed.), race in education (pp. 41–67). stellenbosch: african sun media. https://doi.org/10.18820/9781928480150 clough, p. and corbett, j. (2006). cited by d. thompson in: whole school development: acknowledging wider debates. in j. cornwall & l. graham-matheson (eds.), leading on inclusion: dilemmas, debates and new perspectives (pp. 45–57). london: routledge. daniel, m. f. (2021). in the footsteps of matthew lipman: dialogue among peers and dialogical thinking. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis, 41(1). dempster, n. (2009). leadership for learning: a framework synthesizing recent research. canberra, australia: australian college of educators. available at: https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/143858458.pdf. accessed 5 april 2021. doidge, n. (2007). the brain that changes itself. new york: penguin, usa. duffy, g. g. (1994). in j. n. mangieri and c. c. block (eds.), creating powerful thinking in teachers and students (pp. 3–25). fort worth, texas: harcourt brace college publishers. falik, l. (2019). the relationship of cognitive modifiability to cognitive plasticity: from the feuerstein perspective. in t. oon-seng tan, c. bee-leng and i. yuen-fun wong (eds.), advances in mediated learning in 21st century education (pp. 73–96). singapore: cengage learning asia. feuerstein, r., klein, p. s. and tannenbaum, a. j. (eds.). (1991). mediated learning experience, theoretical, psychosocial and learning implications. london: freund. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 45 feuerstein, r., feuerstein, r. s. and falik, l. h. (2010). beyond smarter: mediated learning and the brain’s capacity for change. new york: teachers’ college press. green, l. (2008). cognitive modifiability in south african classrooms: the stories for thinking project. in o. tan and a. seng (eds.), cognitive modifiability in learning and assessment: international perspectives (pp. 137–153). singapore: cengage learning. green, l. (2017). philosophy for children and developmental psychology. in: m. r. gregory, j. haynes and k. murris (eds.), the routledge international handbook of philosophy for children, (pp. 37–45). abingdon: routledge. isbn 978-1-138-84767-5 green, l. and collett, k. (2021). teaching thinking in south african schools: selected school leaders’ perceptions. south african journal of education, 41(2). https://doi.org/10.15700saje.v4in2a1893 green, l., condy, j. and chigona, a. (2012). developing the language of thinking within a classroom community of enquiry: pre-service teachers’ experiences. south african journal of education, 32(3). green, l. and condy, j. (2016). philosophical enquiry as a pedagogical tool to implement the caps curriculum: final year pre-service teachers’ perceptions. south african journal of education, 36(1). doi: 10.15700/saje.v36n1a1 140 harris, a. and jones, m. (2010). professional learning communities and system improvement. improving schools, 13(2): 172–181. haywood, h. c. (1993). a mediational teaching style. journal of cognitive education & mediated learning, 3(1) 27–38. hyerle, d. (1996). visual tools for constructing knowledge. alexandria va: association for supervision and curriculum development. kearns, k. (2004). i discovered a goldmine in my classroom. cognitive education in southern africa, 11(1). kennedy, d. and kohan, w. (eds.). (2021). some ethical considerations of practicing philosophy with children and adults. childhood and philosophy, 17. leithwood, k., harris, a. and hopkins, d. (2020). seven strong claims about successful school leadership revisited. school leadership and management, 40(1) pp. 5–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/13632434.2019.1596077 lipman, m. (1982). harry stottlemeier’s discovery. montclair, nj: iapc. lipman, m. (1987). preparing teachers to teach for thinking. philosophy today, 31(1) pp. 90–96. matthews, g. (2009). philosophy and developmental psychology: outgrowing the deficit conception of childhood. in h. siegel (ed.), the oxford handbook of philosophy of education, pp. 163–176. oxford: oxford university press. mccall, c.c. (2009) transforming thinking. philosophical inquiry in the primary and secondary classroom. london: routledge. meadows, s. (1993). the child as thinker. the development and acquisition of cognition in childhood. london: routledge. murris, k. (2000) the role of the facilitator in philosophical inquiry. thinking, 15(2) pp.40-46. perkins, d. (1995). outsmarting iq: the emerging science of learnable intelligence. new york: simon & schuster. south african council for educators. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 46 sutcliffe, r. (2003). is teaching philosophy a high road to cognitive enhancement? educational and child psychology, 20(2) pp. 65–79. tam a. c. f. (2015) the role of a professional learning community in teacher change. a perspective from beliefs and practices. teachers and teaching, 21(1) pp. 22-43. thompson, d. (2012). whole school development – acknowledging wider debates. pdf available from thompson,d. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/301685352_whole_school_development__acknowledging_wider_debates [accessed 25 january 2022]. van der ploeg, p. (2013). dalton plan: origins and theory. deventer: saxion dalton university press. address correspondences to: lena green extraordinary professor, faculty of education university of the western cape, south africa email: lgreen@mweb.co.za analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 128 book review seen and not heard: why children's voices matter. jana mohr lone rowman & littlefield price: kindle $30.00, hardcover $ 75.26, paperback $32.00 isbn 978-1-4758-4324-8 review by richard morehouse ne reading of seen and not heard: why children's voices matter may be that it is a plea for epistemic justice. according to jana mohr lone, epistemic justice allows someone to be heard and capable of imparting knowledge to others. epistemic justice for children is one of many themes explored throughout the book; each chapter will highlight one or more themes to entice potential readers to read this seen and not heard closely. seen and not heard is organized into an introduction and seven chapters (not heard, childhood, friendship, political voices, happiness, death, and listening1). epistemic justice, or its lack, is just one of the themes that i think the reader will internalize as they read lone's work of praxis. the reader will also appreciate the breadth and depth of jana mohr lone's reading. it is inspiring without being intimidating. seen and not heard begins by inviting the reader to imagine the benefits of widely recognizing children as independent thinkers capable of seeing clearly and contributing to our understanding of the world. instead of listening to and learning from children, all too often, we "love youthfulness, but we demean children. we minimize their thoughts and feelings as fleeting or trivial or amusing, and we fail to appreciate the deeper ideas behind what they say" (p. 11). the devaluing of what children say with such statements as "oh, that's so adorable" provide an example of what has become known in philosophy as epistemic injustice. classroom discussions about topics of importance and interest may be a way to allow space for children to talk to each other; if we allow ourselves to hear what children say to each other, opportunities for us to learn from them become available. to evaluate children by what they say, rather than by how old they are, is to obtain understanding. the child deserves a chance to grapple honestly with different ideas and concepts in the same way that we would value adults who also struggle to understand their world and their experiences. to deny a child of such opportunities is the definition of epistemic injustice. hearing children is one step. understanding them is another story. in a section called "understanding children," lone recites one story of children who enacted a play that "took the part of the woodland animals" (p. 17). the adult audience showed their appreciation for the children's effort 1 when referring to a chapter heading, italics will always be used. o analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 129 by laughing at the children's representations of their animals. one of the children explained that they did not think their representation was funny. i have myself been guilty of the same inability to recognize what the children were trying to convey. thankfully i have images seared in my mind of professional actors representing cats and lions, giraffes, and hyenas2 on stage to know how some little sense of these young actors and cats better understand why the adult response might be very (unintentionally) hurtful. hearing sometimes means taking the perspective of the other. to hear a young person means that one is willing to consult with her: to accept her voice as the author of her thoughts. it means to listen to a child's voice as one would listen to the voice of an equal, that is, as an authorial and thoughtful peer. listening to them requires that we are willing to relinquish our adult presumptions regarding our superior knowledge and experience. the recognition that a child has his own unique expertise and experience allows the adult to hear another speaker, a child's voice. we might approach an exchange with a child's awareness that we might have something to learn from them (p. 28). the uniqueness of children's voices discussed above led to a look at several questions from a child called kayla. kayla asked her classmates, "what is a child? when do you become an adult?" four children offer their answers to that query. jana mohr lone reflects on the questions and the initial students' responses by turning to saint augustine's reflection on time. i will leave it to the reader to delve into lone's ruminations. instead, i wish to highlight one of lone's habits of mind or thinking patterns, as john dewey might say. one of the first habits is to take a child's question as non-trivial, not quickly and definitively answered, and deeply philosophical. the more difficult habit (at least as i experienced it repeatedly during this work) is the ability to stay in the moment of the child's question and the children's responses while reflecting or perhaps seeing/hearing the question/discussion as richly philosophical. these habits/patterns of thinking are one of the treats gained from seen and not heard. as with all well-written books, one of the pleasures for this reviewer is the privilege of observing the author think aloud. another example of lone's ability to think with the child and philosophically is in the section called "a time of its own." the focus of the excerpt is, to quote jason, "people think adults are more trustworthy than kids." lone first presents the student's (ashely) comments [children offer genuine opinions and children can keep secrets] about what might make children more trustworthy. next, lone turns to hannah arendt's the human condition to illustrate the depth of ashley's comments that others might think are childish responses. to aid the reader in understanding the depth of ashley's remark, lone counterposes two questions raised by arendt. these are questions that are often conflated: "what we are" [our age, for example] and "who we are" [our unique personal identity]. by providing the reader with this conceptual bridge, the reader can understand the depth of ashley's thinking (pp. 32-34). this chapter also explores imagination in counter distinction with knowledge. it draws examples from political theory, science fiction, and developmental psychology to deepen our understanding of children's thoughts on the value of imagination (pp. 42-47). 2 anyone who has seem one of the life theatre productions of cats or the lion king will not see children’s representation of animals in the same light. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 130 friendship close attention to the "deeper ideas behind what they say" is the hallmark of this work and many of her other books.3 this chapter begins with "children's conceptions of friendship," which explains how children define the word for themselves. lone skillfully introduces jean piaget's quote about play being "the child's work," observing that a part of the work of play is negotiating the ups and downs and the ins and outs of friendships. a series of subsections ("the obligations of friendship," "reciprocity in friendship," “popularity and self-image," and "loneliness and solitude") lone explores some of the ways that children intuitively and sometimes articulately understand and connect with the friends that they have. chloe's comment explores what is in part of the connection between the influence of others in shaping who one is. chloe: but it is hard to think you're cool if there's no one to hang out with you because it's hard to think you're cool if it's just you. you still can be cool, but you kind of have to be more involved with other people to feel cool (p. 75). lone sights sherry turkle's alone together (2011) and her comments on self and others. turkle argues that the ability to be alone enables the possibility of solitude. solitude is 'being alone with one thought, with oneself. solitude makes space "so that you can reach out to other people and form real attachments" (p. 80). the student in this chapter shows some of the complex and interrelated components of friendship. political voices given the timbre of the political conversation in today's often anonymous yet public discourse, i entered this chapter with some hesitation. i was pleasantly surprised and much informed by what i read. the first subheading, "fairness," also surprised me in two ways: 1) fairness was a richer vein of discussion than i expected, and 2) fairness provided a broad and diverse menu for deep and searching conversations on a variety of topics ranging for "political participation" to talking about gender and race. in a particularly riveting multi-paged discussion about race, the students respond to a provocative statement made by one of the students, josh. josh suggests dividing the world into two halves. one side for white people and one side for black people. this recommendation to solve the race problem initiated silence and looked to the facilitator for an answer. the facilitator and author of this work writes, "aware that this might be treacherous ground, i reminded myself of my intention to trust the children as much as possible, i continue the discussion” (p. 197). jenna: that's a pretty dramatic suggestion. what do you all think about this idea?" (p. 198). 3 the philosophical child, 2015; philosophy and education lone & burrough, 2015: plato was wrong: footnote in doing philosophy with children, 2012: philosophy and education lone and israeloff, 2012. https://www.amazon.com/philosophical-child-jana-mohr-lone/dp/1442217332/ref=sr_1_2?crid=lxk09efre608&dchild=1&keywords=jana+mohr+lone&qid=1629833468&sprefix=jana+mohr+%2caps%2c198&sr=8-2 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 131 the simple invitation to the class to take up a potentially provocative question illustrates the facilitator's faith in the style, and skill, of not judging or dismissing the suggestion by a student. jena's response provides a new and deeper understanding of the idea of a "teachable moment." the entire chapter may be read as a commentary on the saying "all politics is local" if we are aware of the complexity of that simple statement. this statement ought to be understood in a context that implies that politics is pervasive, ubiquitous, omnipresent. happiness moving from race to happiness may appear as a jump from the serious to the trivial, but the depth of discussion is substantial. one of the charms of this chapter (and the entire book) is that it conjures up thoughts, memories, conjectures, and speculations brought about by the confluence of selected authors and classroom examples—two moments of happiness for me were reading two remarkably different quotes in this chapter. the first is a quote from virginia wolfe. happiness is in the quiet, ordinary things. a table, a chair, a book with a paper-knife stuck between the pages. and the pedal following from the rose, and the light flickering as we sit silent. -from the waves (lone, 2021, p. 111). the second quote comes from john stuart mill—"it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied" (p. 119). these quotes "tickled" different veins of happiness. wolfe made me smile seeing a bloomsbury intellectual sitting quietly as she enjoyed her surroundings and anticipating cutting open the next page in an unread book. mills' quote made me chuckle at the implied image of the pig. the children's discussions were as diverse and insightful as those of wolfe and mill. they were an extraordinary joy to read. i will not spoil the pleasure for the reader. death "in my experience, given the opportunity, children are eager to broach the subject [death] and to participate in the conversation about it" (p. 138). "in my experience" is a leitmotif for this work. it speaks humbly and quietly of the author's generous spirit. it is on full display in this chapter on death. in a class of 11and 12-year-olds, isabel, says: i think death doesn't make life meaningless. i think death is actually what makes life meaningful. it's death that makes one want to cherish life. if we lived forever, there would be a 100 percent chance that eventually you would do everything you can do in life, and life wouldn't have any meaning (p. 148). as a person who turned 80 this year, this rings true. however, so far, the future seems endlessly open to new experiences while at the same time i cherish scheffler's "temporal scarcity" (p. 143). as lone writes, "mortality imparts intensity and poignancy on our days, sharing all our endeavors and projects” (p. 149). the insight of the children and the reflections on their comments will enrich the readers and analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 132 inspire teachers to engage their students in this discussion or, at a minimum, not to discourage students who bring up the topic of death. lone writes about children's conversations and the stories they tell, the narratives of their lives, which includes stories of death and dying. "the stories we tell ourselves and others, the stories others tell us, expand our understanding of others, and the stories others tell us, expanding understanding in the world and each other" (p. 155). stories we tell ourselves, especially those we tell in the company of others, encourage deep discussion like the ones presented in this book and help create the communities that shape us. listening the subtitles of chapter seven ("what does it mean to listen?" "listening to children, "curiosity," "openheartedness and receptivity," and "silence, and the "ethics of listening" can be seen as the bullet points on a powerpoint presentation on how to listen. "curiosity" is the bullet point for listening that i point to here. we need to be curious about what everyone has to say if we wish to hear them truly. curiosity is an attitude, an orientation toward leaning into a conversation. reading lone's presentation of curiosity, i am reminded of the times i exhibited curiosity at small meetings in conversation with people i came specifically to learn from what they had to say. how intently i listened, sometimes taking careful notes. i also remember times when i all but ignored what others had to say. like the quote of winnie the pooh cited at the beginning of listening, "it may simply be that (i had) a small piece of fluff in (my) ear" (p. 157). taking that fluff out of one's ears requires an effort to listen, a willingness to learn, and placing oneself in an equal position. curiosity is a learned attitude that requires practice and is a prerequisite to listening. at the beginning of the last chapter (listening), lone observes the relationship between writing about listening. "but it wasn't until i started writing that i recognized that the children's words would determine the course of the book, and at the focal point, all along the way would be listening to what they had to say" (p. 157). a qualitative study of children thinking aloud might be another way of capturing lone's statement about seen and not heard. i end the review with this observation to encourage other collectors of children's stories to think about them as qualitative studies. lone even describes a methodology for conducting a qualitative inquiry. reading, rereading, listening to the recordings, transcripts, and notes of my conversations with children illuminated the fundamental idea grounding my work over the past two decades; the importance and joy of listening to children. i began wondering about what it really means to listen and what is involved in genuinely listening to other people in general, and to children in particular (p. 158). seen and not heard: why children's voices matter is required reading for all of us who work in education at whatever level. additionally, it is also an exciting read. address correspondences to: richard morehouse, emeritus professor of psychology, viterbo university (la crosse, wi). email: remorehouse@viterbo.edu mailto:remorehouse@viterbo.edu charles peirce and the community of philosophical inquiry analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 1 charles peirce and the community of philosophical inquiry maughn rollins gregory we individually cannot reasonably hope to attain the ultimate philosophy which we pursue; we can only seek it, therefore, for the community of philosophers. charles s. peirce, 1868 (5.265) introduction ince the american philosopher charles sanders peirce (1839-1914) originated the idea of a ‘community of inquiry’ to describe and promote the norms of scientific inquiry, that idea has been used to characterize a wide variety of educational programs, academic disciplines, and institutional, governmental, and political practices. the first purpose of this essay is to establish that the precise phrase ‘community of inquiry’—which does not occur in peirce’s writings—was coined in 1978 by matthew lipman (1923-2010) and ann margaret sharp (1942-2010), who were also the first to adapt the idea to an educational program, namely, philosophy for children. many contemporary scholars who use the phrase ‘community of inquiry’ do not mention peirce. some (particularly those writing on education) attribute the idea to john dewey; few acknowledge lipman and sharp. of those who do attribute the notion of a community of inquiry to peirce, most— including lipman and sharp—do not offer any detailed account of which aspects of his thinking are relevant to their projects. the second purpose of this essay, therefore, is to provide a summary of what peirce meant by the idea—how he conceived of community in relation to inquiry—by explaining what i take to be the five most important elements of his theory of inquiry and three different roles of a community in relation to that theory. i hope to encourage scholars who have reason to use the idea of a community of inquiry to more carefully consider which aspects of peirce’s thought we do and do not employ, and to consult peirce’s writings in doing so. in adapting peirce’s idea of a community of inquiry to educational, civic, and other contexts, scholars inevitably draw on other sources. in designing their protocol for children’s philosophical practice lipman and sharp drew on many other philosophers and educational psychologists. however, many contemporary scholars of philosophy for children who write about the community of inquiry in that context do so in a way that does not reflect a familiarity with lipman and sharp’s scholarship, let alone a familiarity with peirce. the third purpose of this essay, therefore, is to provide a summary of the first iteration of the community of inquiry written by lipman, sharp, and frederick s. oscanyan and to remark on how it does and does not derive from peirce. i believe that a deeper familiarity with the origins of the ‘community of philosophical inquiry’ in the scholarship of peirce, lipman, sharp, and oscanyan will illuminate important aspects of contemporary theory and practice in this field and clarify points of disagreement and debate. s analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 2 genealogy of a phrase in his autobiography matthew lipman recalled that in writing his first philosophical novel for children, his aim was: to write a text that would allow both teachers and children to engage simultaneously and openly in inquiry at the same time in the classroom […] and in that way consolidate the classroom into a single community containing both children and adults engaged in a single inquiry. about ten years later, borrowing a phrase invented by charles peirce, i would call such a group a community of inquiry. (2008:109) from the early 1970s until their deaths just five months apart in 2010, lipman and sharp collaborated on developing both a theory and a protocol for the ‘community of inquiry’ as the standard method of practicing ‘philosophy for children,’ as they conceived and pioneered that educational endeavor. both lipman and sharp acknowledged the american peirce as the originator of the idea (see lipman, 1998:278; 2008:109; sharp 1991:37n13, 1995:141), though the precise phrase ‘community of inquiry’ does not occur in peirce’s writings.1 nor does the phrase occur in the writing of interpreters of peirce before lipman and sharp began using it.2 such writers used various other phrases to highlight particular aspects of peirce’s insight into the social dimension of inquiry—none of which appear in peirce’s writings—including “community of scientists” / “scientific community” (buchler 1939/1966; goudge 1950; hollenbach 1973; potter 1967), “community of minds” (fisch 1939; goudge 1950; hollenbach 1973), “community of investigators” (fisch 1960; knight 1958; moore 1961; murphey 1961; smith 1965; turley 1977), and “community of inquirers” (bernstein 1965; hollenbach 1973; potter 1967; rescher 1978; smith 1965; thompson 1952). peirce himself makes one mention of “the scientific communion” (2.220, 1903) and “the community of philosophers” (5.265, 1868).3 since lipman and sharp invented their protocol for classroom philosophical dialogue, the phrase and idea of a community of inquiry has been widely used to characterize a variety of pedagogical approaches (see, e.g., bacon and matthews 2014; garrison et al 2010; goos 2004; stover and pollock 2014). tellingly, most of these scholars credit the idea to dewey, many do not mention peirce, few acknowledge lipman, and none (other than those whose work is related to philosophy for children) credit sharp. before and since lipman and sharp’s contribution, peirce’s notion of the relationship of community to inquiry has been used to explain the epistemology of academic disciplines (see appleby, hunt, and jacob 1994; haack 1995; seixas 1993) and the normative status of institutional, governmental, and political practices (see barber 2003; rutherford 1990; shields 2003; talisse 2004). few of these scholars cite lipman or sharp, because most of them derived their understanding of the notion directly from peirce and the secondary literature on him. nevertheless, it 1 this is confirmed by a digital search of peirce’s collected papers. 2 though i cannot claim to have read every book and article on peirce before 1978, i conducted an exhaustive digital and manual search of scores of those books and articles. 3 references to peirce’s works are standardly abbreviated as the volume of his collected papers (cp), followed by paragraph numbers. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 3 is significant, and has never before been acknowledged, that lipman and sharp were the first to coin the precise phrase ‘community of inquiry’. in addition to peirce, lipman and sharp attributed their understanding of the community of inquiry to the tradition of socratic dialogue, john dewey’s epistemology, logic, and political theory, and justus buchler’s theories of human judgment and of discussion as a method of ‘query’. lipman also drew on the constructivist psychology of jean piaget and the social psychology of george herbert mead and lev vygotsky (see lipman 1996). sharp drew on the work of a number of feminist, ecological, and religious writers (see gregory and laverty, 2018). however, the notion of a community of inquiry came to lipman and sharp directly from peirce, albeit through dewey and buchler.4 it is surprising, therefore, that while they both wrote extensively on dewey, neither lipman nor sharp wrote much about peirce in relationship to the community of inquiry.5 in order to trace the influence of peirce on lipman and sharp i will first offer an analysis of the role of community in peirce’s theory of inquiry. peirce on inquiry and community in order to clarify the relationship of community to inquiry in peirce’s philosophy i will first describe what i take to be the five most important elements of his theory of inquiry: anti-intuitionism, fallibilism, the belief-doubt-inquiry-belief cycle, the logic of inquiry, and self-correction. i will then explain three different roles of a community in relation to that theory: semiosis, corroboration, and criticism. the cornerstone of peirce’s epistemology, including the necessity of a community to make advances in knowledge, is his refutation of the human capacity proposed by many medieval and modern philosophers of intuitions of self-evident empirical or rational truths, unmediated by human cognition. but then, if none of our cognitions is a direct intuition of reality, each is an inference. one of peirce’s most important contributions is his recognition that for thought to be inferential, it must be semiotic. to begin with, he argued, our very perceptions are, themselves, inferences that employ signs to interpret the “firstness” of an “unlimited and uncontrolled variety and multiplicity” of sense data that is “peculiar and idiosyncratic [and] predominant in feeling” (1.302, 1894).6 in representing an object or event, a sign interprets it as being of a certain kind, belonging to a certain general class and having certain general characteristics, though every object and event is capable of multiple 4 sharp studied peirce and dewey in her doctoral work at the university of massachusetts, amherst. lipman enjoyed conversations and correspondence with dewey in the 1950s. his 1953 doctoral dissertation for columbia university, published in 1967 as what happens in art, was an extension of dewey’s aesthetics. buchler’s doctoral dissertation, published in 1939 as charles peirce's empiricism, was the first extensive study of peirce following the publication of peirce’s collected papers. buchler began teaching at columbia in 1942 and in 1952 he hired lipman, then a doctoral student, to teach in the general education program at the columbia college of pharmaceutical sciences, where he eventually became a full professor and chair of the department of general education (see lipman, 2008: 83). during that time, lipman also spent “ten years or so […] specializing […] in buchlerian metaphysics” (2008: 114), publishing several articles that buchler commended. 5 sharp’s essays on peirce (1995a, 1995b) treat his theory of agapism or “evolutionary love.” 6 for a treatment of peirce’s theory of the inferential nature of sense perception and its relation to the similar theory of friedrich nietzsche, see gregory 2001. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 4 interpretations by virtue of the various sign-concepts that may be applied to it. thus, “the sign stands for something, its object [...], not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which i have sometimes called the ground of the representamen” (peirce 2.228, 1897). moreover, every interpretant sign calls for interpretation of itself by other signs. “there is no exception […] to the law that every thought-sign is translated or interpreted in a subsequent one, unless it be that all thought comes to an abrupt and final end in death” (peirce cp5.284, 1868). in this sense, every sign is inherently vague. peirce coined the term ‘fallibilism’ to name his conviction that all cognition—including perception, memory, and reasoning—and, therefore, all inquiry and knowledge—is susceptible to error.7 in the first place, because all cognition is inferential, it is necessarily hypothetical and provisional, in that it is contingent on past cognitions and is open to being revised or abandoned if not confirmed in subsequent experience. peirce recognized a number of sources of human fallibility, one of which is the necessarily partial and limited nature of human cognition, no matter how skilled and technologically enhanced. another is the inevitability of ordinary misperception, miscalculation, and fallacious reasoning, as well as hallucination and mental illness. a third source of human fallibility are the subtle, often unconscious psychological and emotional motives including anxiety, self-interest, pride, group loyalty, and ideology, that make it difficult to perceive, remember, and reason in an impartial manner. these human proclivities motivated peirce to proclaim his famous “first rule of reason”: upon this first, and in one sense this sole, rule of reason, that in order to learn you must desire to learn, and in so desiring not be satisfied with what you already incline to think, there follows one corollary which itself deserves to be inscribed upon every wall of the city of philosophy: do not block the way of inquiry. (1.135, 1899) importantly, peirce’s fallibilism is neither a kind of skepticism nor of relativism. it is a refutation of the possibility of unshakable foundations for knowledge, and, therefore, of knowing that any of our beliefs is final. it is to accept “that while holding certain propositions to be each individually perfectly certain, we may and ought to think it likely that some one of them, if not more, is false” (peirce cp5.498, 1905). yet, it does not follow that we can or ought to doubt any of our beliefs in the meantime. genuine doubt, like genuine belief, requires reasons. against descartes’ recommendation of the method of universal doubt, peirce argues that “it is possible that propositions that really are indubitable, for the time being, should nevertheless be false” and that, in any case, “genuine doubt cannot be created by a mere effort of will, but must be compassed through experience” (5.498, 1905). this is so, because peirce adopted the scottish philosopher alexander bain’s concept of ‘belief’ as not merely a favored proposition about the world but one on which we are prepared to act, to which peirce added the notion of ‘habit’: 7 peirce appreciated the paradox of his position: “if i must make any exception, let it be that the assertion that every assertion but this is fallible, is the only one that is absolutely infallible” (2.75, 1902). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 5 the essence of belief is the establishment of habit, and different beliefs are distinguished by the different modes of action to which they give rise. if beliefs do not differ in this respect, if they appease the same doubt by producing the same rule of action, then no mere differences in the manner of consciousness of them can make them different beliefs, any more than playing a tune in different keys is playing different tunes. (5.398, 1878) peirce took doubt to be the catalyst for identifying error: not as a protocol for testing our beliefs against what seem to be self-evident truths, but as the felt sense that a belief has led us into an unexpected and precarious relationship with reality, which moves us to inquire: doubt is an uneasy and dissatisfied state from which we struggle to free ourselves and pass into the state of belief while the latter is a calm and satisfactory state which we do not wish to avoid […]. the irritation of doubt causes a struggle to attain a state of belief. i shall term this struggle inquiry […]. the irritation of doubt is the only immediate motive for the struggle to attain belief. it is certainly best for us that our beliefs should be such as may truly guide our actions so as to satisfy our desires; and this reflection will make us reject any belief which does not seem to have been so formed as to insure this result. but it will only do so by creating a doubt in the place of that belief. with the doubt, therefore, the struggle begins, and with the cessation of doubt it ends. hence, the sole object of inquiry is the settlement of opinion. (5.372-375, 1877) based on his own, extensive research into the history of science, peirce was the first to theorize the logic of scientific inquiry in terms of three distinct types of inferences: deduction, induction, and ‘abduction’ or inference to the most likely explanation, which was one of his original contributions to logic. however, peirce came to understand the import of the three types of inference as not primarily logical—a matter of demonstrating three different ways of moving from premises to a warranted conclusion—but practical—a matter of three different kinds of tasks to be performed in an inquiry. inquiry consists in comparing the predicted observations from a conjectural explanatory thesis with actual observations. peirce understood science as just inquiry by means of the abductive-deductiveinductive method into any area in which the inquiry is bound to be constrained by something external to human cognition (the natural world, historical evidence of the past) and which, therefore, will result (and has been shown to result) in the convergence of opinion within the community of qualified experts. the results of inquiry in the physical science are more reliable than the results of inquiry in other disciplines only because science deals in an exceptionally precise way with variables that are quantifiable to extreme degrees. peirce argued that even though human cognition is fallible and there is no possibility of testing our beliefs against intuitions of self-evident truths, the scientific method of inquiry distinguishes truth from error over time because it is ‘self-corrective’. he wrote that “one of the most wonderful features of reasoning and one of the most important philosophemes in the doctrine of science [is] that reasoning tends to correct itself, and the more so, the more wisely its plan is laid. nay, it not only corrects its conclusions, it even corrects its premises” (5.575, 1898). while abduction, deduction, and induction function in tandem in an inquiry, peirce credits induction as the engine of self-correction. this is because he understands induction as not merely generalization from particular cases, but the analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 6 repeated testing of that generalization into the indefinite long run, in which process the generalization, if not confirmed, is modified or corrected in accordance with the results. the word ‘self’ in the phrase ‘self-correction’ signifies that it is we, the inquirers, who correct our own beliefs, as opposed to being corrected by an external authority (including the authority of supposedly self-evident empirical or rational truths). to say that inquiry is self-corrective or that it has the power of self-correction is just to say that inquiry is the means by which we identify our cognitive mistakes and limitations. on a mundane level, as individuals, we continually revise our understandings, beliefs, and opinions—as well as our desires, values, and habits of action—in light of new experience. communities of inquirers—especially communities of historical, mathematical, scientific, and other disciplinary inquirers—likewise continually correct what they uphold as disciplinary knowledge. this sketch of peirce’s theory of inquiry makes intelligible three indispensable roles that community plays in it. the first is semiosis: the establishment of the semiotic matrix within which inquiry operates. although inquiry is, in many cases, a mundane process carried out by individuals in the course of ordinary experience, our abilities, both to make sense of our experience and to selfcorrect that sense, depend on our employment of complex semiotic systems acquired, at first, unreflectively, by our participation in sociocultural communities. communities of inquiry, even more so, employ shared semiotic systems to communicate and collaborate. the second role of community in peirce’s theory of inquiry is corroboration. because individual cognition is fallible (including observation, memory, calculation), it cannot be sufficient to verify propositions of fact. nor, for the same reason, can repeated observations by the same observer ever be sufficient. consequences deduced from conjectural hypotheses must be such as can be observed by anyone, and propositions of fact are only verified when their consequences have been widely corroborated by the relevant community. in this regard, the goal of the community of inquiry is to see what kinds of inter-subjective agreement can be reached, uncoerced by any forces beyond the methods and findings of the inquiry itself. thus, for peirce, “reality is the dynamical reaction of certain forms upon the mind of the community” (6.612, 1893). importantly, corroboration of findings across a community of inquirers—including such strategies as replicated experiments and the triangulation of sources—requires that those findings be arrived at independently and in a variety of contexts, with minimal collaboration among the inquirers in order to avoid undue influence, one to another. in contrast, the third role of community in inquiry—mutual criticism, which includes elaboration and refinement as well as correction—requires close collaboration. peirce declared that “the conception of an argument or inference as a process [is] only entitled to those designations by virtue of its being a subject of logical criticism” (2.26-27, 1902).] because all thought is inferential it is both inherently vague and therefore susceptible to clarification and elaboration, and fallible, or susceptible to correction and even abandonment. individuals can and routinely do find reasons to refine, extend, and correct their own prior arguments; but a community can do so with incomparable efficacy. all the factors that make cognition fallible make it more difficult for us to recognize bias and error in our own thinking than in that of others. it is for this reason that we must rely on the perspectives and experiences of others to correct our belief-habits. “[t]he progress of science cannot go analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 7 far except by collaboration; or, to speak more accurately, no mind can take one step without the aid of other minds” (peirce 2.220, 1903). peirce himself participated in a number of professional organizations and discussion societies, including the metaphysical club (see menand 2001), which provided opportunities for public disputation, peer review, the solicitation of diverse views, and other mechanisms for facilitating mutual criticism among communities of peers. thus, peirce observed: coming down to the more immediate and more pertinent causes of the triumph of modern science, the considerable numbers of the workers, and the singleness of heart with which […] they cast their whole being into the service of science lead, of course, to their unreserved discussions with one another, to each being fully informed about the work of his neighbour, and availing himself of that neighbour’s results; and thus in storming the stronghold of truth one mounts upon the shoulders of another who has to ordinary apprehension failed, but has in truth succeeded by virtue of the lessons of his failure. (7.51, 1902). for peirce, not only claims to empirical knowledge but beliefs of every kind are warranted by their confirmation and efficacy in experience (ordinary and scientific), rather than by their unerring derivation from intuited truths; and they are more warranted, the more and different kinds of arguments and evidence they can martial, accepted by the relevant community. peirce captured this notion by juxtaposing the metaphor of a chain with that of a rope, in the same passage where he applied his theory of inquiry to philosophy: philosophy ought to imitate the successful sciences in its methods, so far as to proceed only from tangible premises which can be subjected to careful scrutiny, and to trust rather to the multitude and variety of its arguments than to the conclusiveness of any one. its reasoning should not form a chain which is no stronger than its weakest link, but a cable whose fibers may be ever so slender, provided they are sufficiently numerous and intimately connected. (5.265, 1868) the ‘community of philosophical inquiry’ developed by lipman and sharp was both a protocol meant to operationalize peirce’s recommendation for philosophical inquiry and a pedagogical device intended to initiate young children and schoolteachers into that enterprise. in the following section i summarize their first iteration of the idea and remark on how it derives from, and moves beyond peirce. lipman, sharp, and oscanyan on the community of philosophical inquiry in his quasi-autobiographical philosophical novel natasha (1996), the character representing lipman mentions peirce in reply to a question about his own intellectual influences: “for me, the pivotal figure has always been dewey. earlier than dewey, of course, there was the founder of the american school, charles peirce” (1996:7-8). however, peirce is not mentioned in lipman’s university textbook discovering philosophy (1969). nor, for the first few years of their collaboration, did lipman or sharp use the phrase ‘community of inquiry’. their first use of the idea appears in the first edition of philosophy in the classroom, which they co-authored with oscanyan, then in the philosophy analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 8 department at yale university. there, they describe the characters of lipman’s philosophical novels as being “committed to […] communal inquiry” (1977:70) and write of a “community of children” becoming a “community of inquirers” (1977:126), though without citing peirce. chapter seven of that book, titled “logic for children,” contains a section titled “nonformal logic,” which is explained as the good reasons approach [which] uses normative rules, principles which govern two types of procedures: looking for reasons, and evaluating reasons found.[...] [g]ood reasons logic [...] uses normative principles which put general constraints on the sorts of reasons that can be put forth in support of an action or opinion.[...] these principles divide into two main classes, those which bear on the process of inquiry by which reasons are arrived at, and those which have to do with evaluating resultant reasons. (1977:125). after stipulating that “an inquiry can concern anything at all: a source of curiosity, bother, delight, perplexity, interest, irritation, intrigue,” (1977:125) the authors present five principles for how reasons are legitimately arrived at in an inquiry, and five principles or standards for evaluating those reasons. these passages are historically important, because the authors assert that, “taken together, these standards and the group of restrictions on the process of inquiry outline how to transform a class of pupils into a community of inquirers who participate in shared dialogues” (1977:128). because the book is no longer in print and difficult to locate, i quote the passages that deliver those principles here in their entirety. these are the principles for identifying reasons in an inquiry: impartiality: the process of inquiry ought to be impartial, avoiding looking at the situation in question with bias or prejudice, or in ways which ignore the comments or suggestions of others. seeking for reasons should be done in a fair manner, so that all concerned have a voice in results. objectivity: the process of inquiry should be objective, avoiding preconceived versions of the results to be gained, and staying with the relevant implications wherever they may lead. an inquiry is objective if it meets with the approval of the relevant community of inquirers, but not if it violates their sense of what counts as reasonable. relevance: the reasons obtained in the process of inquiry must be relevant to the issue in question, they should relate to the purpose of the inquiry. every inquiry has some aim or goal, and this ought strongly to influence what is counted as significant and what not in the search for reasons. respect for persons: the process of inquiry should be conducted in a style which avoids injuring or embarrassing anyone. since each person is a source of significant reasons, any process of inquiry which deeply disturbs someone so as to place them outside the scope of the ongoing inquiry eliminates a potential source of information and inevitably distorts the process itself. search for further reasons: the process of inquiry should be conducted in such a way as to invite other members of the community of inquirers to search for further reasons, if they find that they are not satisfied with its results. this requires that whatever process be used, it be sufficiently open-ended so as to invite further inquiries rather than discourage them or shut them off. (1977:126) analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 9 and these are the principles for evaluating reasons in an inquiry: generality: a good reason is a reason expressed in general terms. to see that a reason is a good one, one should be able to see what it would mean to use that reason in situations other than the context in question. this requires that a reason cited must apply to a variety of situations, hence that the reason itself be stated in terms sufficiently general to give it breadth of application. universality: a good reason is a reason for every member of the community of inquirers. they may not all agree that it is a good one, but each can see for him or herself whether it applies to the action or opinion in question, and when they agree that it does this standard applies. publicity: a good reason is a reason known to every member of the community of inquirers. as in the case of universality, this does not mean that everyone has to think it’s a good reason, or even that it is worth considering. but they can know of it and so have a chance to react to it, and when this is the case the standard applies. order of conflicting claims: if there is a conflict within the community of inquirers as to which reasons are good and which are bad, a good reason will be a reason which imposes an order on the competing claims, showing how in the given situation certain of the views expressed are better reasons, and others worse. this may not completely resolve the conflict, because even after the good reason has been accepted a disagreement may remain among members who proposed the more reasonable views. but a reason which refines a disagreement and perhaps resolves itis a good one. finality: no reason is a good one which does not meet one or more of the above standards, and every reason must be evaluated, or at least be open to evaluation, by the members of the community of inquirers. there is no higher court of appeal, nor higher standards in evaluating reasons. (1977:128) although these ten principles were clearly derived as much from dewey, buchler, john rawls, and others, as from peirce, nevertheless, lipman, sharp, and oscanyan were unequivocal in holding them up as the framework for a community of inquirers: a close look at each of the principles will show that they can only be understood in the context of a community of inquirers who take part in shared dialogues. it is not just that the principles only make sense given such a community; they are a part of its structure and outlook. (1977:129-130) paradoxically—though not necessarily a contradiction—the authors claim that, while the implementation of the ten principles brings about a community of inquirers, the establishment of such a community is conducive to learning how to implement the principles: analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 10 as to nonformal logic, it is wise to avoid thinking that the children will not learn it at all unless it is made a separate topic of instruction. embedded as it is in the procedures of dialogues, simply encouraging a class to become a community of inquirers can be a very effective way of getting across some of its main ideas. (1977:136) though peirce is not acknowledged in the 1977 book, many of these principles can be traced to his theory of inquiry. his anti-intuitionism is reflected in the principle of objectivity, which stipulates that “an inquiry is objective if it meets with the approval of the relevant community of inquirers, but not if it violates their sense of what counts as reasonable.” that “what counts as reasonable” is not a matter of intuition is reflected in the principle of the search for further reasons, which recommends that members of the community should search for further reasons if they are not satisfied with the results of the inquiry, rather than consult supposedly infallible intuitions. the same principle is the only indication by the authors of the fallibility of inquiry. both the principles of objectivity and of the search for further reasons are also indications by lipman, sharp, and oscanyan that an inquiry advances by means of self-correction. however, as an educational practice, the community of inquiry is necessarily different from inquiry conducted by a community of experts (see seixas 1993, gregory 2002). on the one hand, lipman, sharp, and oscanyan’s principle of finality articulates peirce’s conviction that “there is no higher court of appeal, nor higher standards in evaluating reasons” above “the community of inquirers” (1977:128). on the other hand, they qualify that principle with the understanding that, while children can be peers with their teachers in terms of philosophical thinking, they also rely on their teachers as experts of the procedures of inquiry. thus: [i]t is the teacher who, through questioning, can introduce alternative views with the aim of always enlarging the students’ horizons, never letting complacency or self-righteousness take precedence. in this sense, the teacher is a gadfly, encouraging the students to take the initiative, building on what they manage to formulate, helping them question underlying assumptions of what they arrive at, and suggesting ways of arriving at more comprehensive answers. (1977:60) as a teacher [you] can help them, when they seem to be groping, by suggesting connections and possible implications or consequences of their ideas. you can attempt to put their thoughts into some kind of context which will make their thoughts more meaningful to them [...]. (1977: 52) this is the idea behind lipman and sharp’s injunction that the philosophy teacher must be “pedagogically strong but philosophically self-effacing” (lipman 1988:183; sharp 1992:167). the role of the teacher as facilitator of disciplined inquiry is also central to the theory, first presented in the 1977 book, that the philosophical text, the teacher, and the community of inquiry all function as cognitive models that help children understand the procedures of inquiry, participate in enacting them, and acquire them as personal dispositions. thus, “the teacher [...] becomes a philosophical model for the children in the classroom which confirms the children in their freedom to think for themselves” (1977:12). it is because the classroom community of inquiry has this pedagogical structure analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 11 that “these procedures of the community, when internalised, become the reflective habits of the individual” (lipman and sharp 1978:88).8 peirce’s notion of inquiry as being prompted by doubt occasioned by a problematic experience and ending in a revised belief more adequate to it is dramatized in the first chapter of lipman’s first philosophical novel for children, harry stottlemeier’s discovery (1974). lipman, sharp, and oscanyan make no reference to peirce’s conception of inquiry as the process of moving from doubt to belief, apart from opining that “as long as our beliefs are effective in dealing with the problems that we face in life, there is no reason for us to give them up” (1977:77), and that “while no belief need be final, the aim of discussion and inquiry generally, is to move towards a tentative settlement by arriving at answers and beliefs that are serviceable and satisfying” (1977:78). the authors do, however, recommend that a science teacher not “deny the student the right to doubt the outcome of a scientific inquiry,” and that they “make clear [...] that the ‘facts’ which he [sic] teaches rest upon evidence which is always retrievable or in some fashion demonstrable,” so that science education does not become “indoctrination” (1977:90). lipman, sharp, and oscanyan take quite a different approach from peirce’s to the logic of inquiry. rather than focusing on abduction, deduction, and induction as inter-dependent, mutually necessary and sufficient procedures, they introduce “formal” and “nonformal” inferences in the manner of a variety of tools to be selected and used depending on what is needed to advance the inquiry. the authors equate deductive inference with formal logic, which they describe as “rulegoverned thinking,” explaining that “the rules of which it is composed are structural, putting specific constraints on the kinds of inferences permitted in terms of the internal structure of sentences” (1977:110). they explain “nonformal” inference in these terms: a nonformal inference thus states a reason which stands in a certain relationship to the action or opinion at the focus of inquiry. there are many such relationships within the scope of nonformal logic, such as inductive, analogical, explanatory, action-guiding and authoritative inferences. this list is by no means complete, but it does represent the major types of nonformal inferences. (1977:133) the authors’ description of an inductive inference as providing a “generality [that] projects beyond the evidence base cited in the specific cases” (1977:131) are in line with peirce’s understanding, and their description of explanatory inferences as providing “answers to the question, ‘why did that happen?’, or ‘why does this take place?’" (1977:132) is clearly derived from peirce’s concept of abduction. it is obvious that lipman, sharp, and oscanyan did not agree with peirce’s conviction that “philosophy ought to imitate the successful sciences in its methods” (5.265, 1868). in contrast, they discuss the relationship of philosophy to science this way: 8 lipman’s groundbreaking use of social learning theory, as delineated by mead, dewey, lev vygotsky, and jerome bruner, is beyond the scope of this essay, but it is as central as peirce’s theory of inquiry to the theory and practice of the classroom community of inquiry he developed with sharp. the power of cognitive modeling through social interaction has been verified in numerous empirical studies conducted by contemporary educational psychologists (see reznitskaya and gregory, 2013). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 12 [w]herever there is a threshold of human knowledge, those who think about that particular subject area can only grope and cast about speculatively in an effort to understand what is there. gradually, as methods of investigation of the new subject area are developed, as methods of observation and measurement and prediction and control are perfected, the period of philosophical speculation is replaced by one of scientific understanding. in this sense, philosophy is the mother of all sciences, for as philosophical speculation becomes more rigorous and substantiated, as measurement and experimentation and verification begin to occur, philosophy turns into science. (1977:89) however, lipman, sharp, and oscanyan took seriously peirce’s metaphor of the cable or rope whose strength derives from the number and connection of its fibers, as an important illustration, not only of anti-intuitionism but also of the roles of community in inquiry. with regard to semiosis, the authors emphasize both that children have sufficient linguistic acumen to engage in philosophical discourse and also that acquiring new meaning is among the primary purposes of that discourse: philosophical discussions can evolve out of a great many of the demands children make for the meaning of an idea. (1977:89) [t]he masses of information [children] acquire would be useless did they not have dispositions to process it so as to discover its relevance and meaning. (1977: 37) [p]hilosophy is concerned to clarify meanings, uncover assumptions and presuppositions, analyze concepts, consider the validity of reasoning processes, and investigate the implications of ideas and the consequences in human life of holding certain ideas rather than others. (1977:88-89) it is when the [philosophical] concepts are analyzed and related to the students’ own lives that they begin to take on more and more meaning. (1977:68) what i have called the corroborative role of community in inquiry is reflected in lipman, sharp, and oscanyan’s principle of universality, according to which “a good reason is a reason for every member of the community of inquirers. they may not all agree that it is a good one, but each can see for him or herself whether it applies to the action or opinion in question, and when they agree that it does this standard applies” (1977:128). unlike peirce, they were not concerned that close collaboration in an inquiry would undermine the participants’ ability to make judgments sufficiently independent that a convergence of those judgments would constitute their justification. for lipman, sharp, and oscanyan, the chief role of community in philosophical inquiry is that of mutual criticism—including clarification, elaboration, and correction. this explains their detailed description of the role of the teacher in facilitating the inquiry. it also explains the importance of their principle of publicity, according to which, “a good reason is a reason known to every member of the community of inquirers. [t]his does not mean that everyone has to think it’s a good reason [...]. but they can know of it and so have a chance to react to it” (1977:128). similarly, their principle of respect for persons cautions that “since each person is a source of significant reasons, any process of inquiry which deeply disturbs someone so as to place them outside the scope of the ongoing inquiry analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 13 eliminates a potential source of information and inevitably distorts the process itself” (1977:126). this idea is elaborated in the article that features the first use of the precise phrase ‘community of inquiry’, “some educational presuppositions of philosophy for children,” co-authored by lipman and sharp for the oxford review of education—again without citing peirce:9 [t]he variety of thinking styles in the classroom, coupled with a variety of backgrounds, values and life experiences, can contribute significantly to the creation of a community of inquiry. furthermore, shared inquiry comes to be seen as the positive counterpart to thinking for oneself. when widely different approaches to problems are openly accepted, then invidious competition diminishes and the inputs from the different participants are welcomed. (1978:86) many of the other principles for providing and evaluating reasons in a philosophical dialogue are meant to be applied in the course of the dialogue, not only in each participant’s own thinking but in response to the thinking of others. the principle of impartiality, for instance, recommends “avoiding looking at the situation in question with bias or prejudice, or in ways which ignore the comments or suggestions of others” (1977:126), yet this is nearly impossible to do without the benefit of critical evaluations of one’s own statements by others in the community. the principle of generality requires that a good reason “must apply to a variety of situations”—something, again, that requires ideas from multiple perspectives. it would not be an overstatement to suggest that the procedures and tools of the classroom community of inquiry developed by lipman, sharp, and oscanyan in 1977, and further interpreted, developed, and reconstructed by lipman and sharp in the years following, are a sophisticated elaboration of what i have called peirce’s theory of mutual criticism as one of the roles of community in inquiry. their significant differences from peirce are, first, that, like buchler and, in fact, building on his theory (1954), lipman, sharp, and oscanyan take discussion, by itself, to be a sufficient instance of inquiry. thus, they explain that, the method of discovery for each of the children in [lipman’s] novels is dialogue coupled with reflection. this dialogue with peers, with teachers, with parents, grandparents and relatives, alternating with reflections upon what has been said, is the basic vehicle by which the characters in the stories come to learn. and it is how your students will likewise come to learn by talking and thinking things out. (1997:60) second, they revise peirce’s notion of a community of experts into a pedagogical device in which “the teacher is an authority figure primarily in the sense of being the arbiter of the discussion process” (1977:83) without determining the outcome. third, no doubt prompted by dewey’s democratization of communal inquiry as a method of problem-solving among non-experts, they assert that even young children are capable of engaging productively in such inquiry. their work thus constitutes a significant contribution, not only to educational theory but also to peirce studies. 9 the first direct reference to peirce in relation to philosophy for children is a list of five essays by him in the bibliography of the second edition of philosophy in the classroom (1980:310). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 14 references appleby, joyce, lynn hunt, and margaret jacob (1994) telling the truth about history. new york, ny: w.w. norton. bacon, karin and philip matthews (2014) inquiry-based learning with young learners: a peirce-based model employed to critique a unit of inquiry on maps and mapping. irish educational studies 33(4):351-365. barber, benjamin (2003) strong democracy: participatory politics for a new age. berkeley, ca: university of california press. bernstein, richard j. (1965) action, conduct, and self-control. in richard j. bernstein (ed.) perspectives on peirce, 66-91. new haven: yale university press. buchler, justus (1939/1966) charles peirce's empiricism. new york: octagon books. -----(1954) “what is a discussion?” journal of general education 8(1):7-17. fisch, max h. (1939) charles sanders peirce. in max h. fisch and paul russell anderson (eds.) philosophy in america: from the puritans to james, 447-451. new york: d. appleton-century. -----(1960) some general characteristics of american philosophy. in seizi uyeda (ed.) basis of the contemporary philosophy: essays in the philosophical analysis, 473-477. tokyo: waseda university press. garrison, randy, terry anderson, and walter archer (2010) the first decade of the community of inquiry framework: a retrospective. internet and higher education 13:5–9. goos, merrilyn (2004) learning mathematics in a classroom community of inquiry. journal for research in mathematics education 35(4):258-291. goudge, thomas a. (1950) the thought of c.s. peirce. new york: dover. gregory, maughn rollins (2001) the perils of rationality: nietzsche, peirce and education. educational philosophy and theory 33(1):23-34. ----(2002). constructivism, standards, and the classroom community of inquiry. educational theory 52(4):397-408. gregory, maughn rollins and megan jane laverty (2018) in community of inquiry with ann margaret sharp: childhood, philosophy and education. new york: routledge. haack, susan (1995) evidence and inquiry: towards reconstruction in epistemology. hoboken, nj: blackwell publications. hollenbach, ruth (1973) charles s. peirce on “community”. the american review 7:169-185. knight, thomas s. (1958) charles peirce. new york: twayne publishers. lipman, matthew (1974) harry stottlemeier’s discovery. montclair, nj: institute for the advancement of philosophy for children. -----(1988) philosophy goes to school. philadelphia: temple university press. -----(1996) natasha. new york: teachers college press. -----(1998) teaching students to think reasonably: some findings of the philosophy for children program. the clearing house 71(5):277-280. -----(2008) a life teaching thinking. montclair, nj: institute for the advancement of philosophy for children. lipman, matthew, ann margaret sharp, and frederick s. oscanyan (1977) philosophy in the classroom. montclair, nj: institute for the advancement of philosophy for children. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 15 -----(1980) philosophy in the classroom [revised edition]. philadelphia: temple university press. menand, louis (2001) the metaphysical club. new york: farrar, straus and giroux. moore, charles c. (1961) american pragmatism: peirce, james and dewey. new york: columbia university press. murphey, murray g. (1961) the development of peirce’s philosophy. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. peirce, charles sanders (1931-1935) collected papers of charles sanders peirce, vols. 1-6, ed. charles hartshorn and paul weiss, and (1958) vols. 7-8 ed. arthur w. burks. cambridge: harvard university press. -----cp1.302 (1894) the manifestation of firstness (§2, chapter 2, phenomenology). -----cp2.18-78 (1902) different methods of logic (§3, chapter 1, general and historical survey of logic). -----cp2.227-229 (1897) ground, object, and interpretant (§1, chapter 2, speculative grammar). -----cp5.264-317 (1868) some consequences of four incapacities. -----cp5.358-387 (1877) the fixation of belief. -----cp5.388-410 (1878) how to make our ideas clear. -----cp5.497-501 (1905) pragmaticism and critical common-sensism (chapter 2, unpublished papers). -----cp7.49-58 (1902) science. (§1, chapter 1, scientific method). potter, vincent g. (1967) charles s. peirce on norms and ideals. worcester, ma: the university of massachusetts press. rescher, nicholas (1978) peirce’s philosophy of science: critical studies in his theory of induction and scientific method. notre dame, ia: university of notre dame press. reznitskaya, alina and maughn rollins gregory (2013) student thought and classroom language: examining the mechanisms of change in dialogic teaching. educational psychologist 48(2):114133. rutherford, malcolm (1990) science, self-correction and values: from peirce to institutionalism. in mark a. lutz (ed.) social economics: retrospect and prospect. cham, ch: springer, dordrecht. seixas, peter (1993) the community of inquiry as a basis for knowledge and learning: the case of history. american educational research journal 30 (2):305-324. sharp, ann margaret (1991) the community of inquiry: education for democracy. thinking: the journal of philosophy for children 9(2):31-37. -----(1992) a letter to a novice teacher: teaching harry stottlemeier’s discovery. in ann margaret sharp and ronald f. reed (eds.) studies in philosophy for children: harry stottlemeier’s discovery, 16572. philadelphia: temple university press. -----(1995a) peirce, feminism and philosophy for children. in ronald f. reed and john p. portelli (eds.) democracy and education, 139-158. calgary: detselig enterprises. -----(1995b) habit in the thought of charles s. peirce. critical and creative thinking: the australasian journal of philosophy for children 3(1):43-47. shields patricia m. (2003) the community of inquiry: classical pragmatism and public administration. administration & society 35(5):510-538. smith, john e. (1965) community and reality. in richard j. bernstein (ed.) perspectives on peirce, 92119. new haven: yale university press. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 16 stover, sheri and sean pollock (2014) building a community of inquiry and analytical skills in an online history course. international journal of teaching and learning in higher education 26(3):393-403. talisse, robert b. (2004). towards a peircean politics of inquiry. transactions of the charles s. peirce society 40(1), 21–38. thompson, manley h. (1952). the paradox of peirce’s realism. in philip p. wiener and frederic h. young (eds.) studies in the philosophy of charles sanders peirce, 133-142. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. turley, peter t. (1977) peirce’s cosmology. new york: philosophical library. address correspondences to: maughn rollins gregory, [https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4293-5798 montclair state university gregorym@montclair.edu professor of educational foundations, montclair state university director, institute for the advancement of philosophy for children vice president for personnel, american federation of teachers local 1904 coordinator of research, icpic: international council for philosophical inquiry with children https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3a%2f%2forcid.org%2f0000-0003-4293-5798&data=04%7c01%7cjjhoward%40viterbo.edu%7c317d23840f2f452e9ba908da04fef11c%7c6b9fc982e8d74958976cb08441cc9b0b%7c0%7c0%7c637827790274870881%7cunknown%7ctwfpbgzsb3d8eyjwijoimc4wljawmdailcjqijoiv2lumziilcjbtii6ik1hawwilcjxvci6mn0%3d%7c3000&sdata=avrtjeqwpnillj0hhtp2fkcd6h8hoguqg5vsw55gch4%3d&reserved=0 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there is nothing else for schools to do so far as students’ minds are concerned. thinking is not only the aim of education for dewey, however, but the means of achieving it. this is not because it is the method to be preferred. rather, as dewey understands it, thinking is method so far as intelligent learning is concerned. in ‘thinking as method’ i examine these extraordinary claims and show how dewey’s own discipline of philosophy provides a model for them. n democracy and education, john dewey introduces the topic of thinking in education with the following resolute passage: no one doubts, theoretically, the importance of fostering in school good habits of thinking. but apart from the fact that the acknowledgement is not so great in practice as in theory, there is not adequate theoretical recognition that all which the school can or need do for pupils, so far as their minds are concerned…is to develop their ability to think.1 it is important to note that dewey almost immediately goes on to make similar remarks about thinking in relation to methods of teaching and learning: the sole direct path to enduring improvement in the methods of instruction and learning consists in centring upon the conditions which exact, promote and test thinking. thinking is the method of intelligent learning, of learning that employs and rewards mind.2 this claim is all the more striking once you realise that dewey is not recommending thinking as the method to adopt, as if it were the one most suited to the purpose. rather, he says that “thinking is method, the method of intelligent experience in the course that it takes.”3 in sum, then, developing the ability to think is to be the sole aim of school education as well as the method of getting there. we need to know in more detail what dewey takes thinking to be, if we are to really make sense of its identification with “the method of intelligent learning” or of “intelligent experience in the course that it takes”. only then will we be able to understand what is involved in the idea that thinking must reign over aim and method in education. working out what this amounts to may also be aided by seeing how, in more recent years, dewey’s home discipline of philosophy 1 john dewey, democracy and education (new york: macmillan, 1966), p. 152. 2 ibid., p. 153. 3 ibid. i analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 2 has been reconstructed in such a way as to supply a generic model of thinking applied to the classroom. it has the additional benefit of providing us with a more contemporary illustration of dewey’s conception of aim and method. i should make it clear at the outset that my aim here is not to vindicate dewey’s sweeping claims, but to see what they involve and to underline their continuing relevance to thinking about pedagogy. more is to be gained from recovering what is of lasting value in his ideas than from trying to defend them up to the hilt. the development of thought dewey was inclined toward the idea of a recapitulation of the historical development of thought in the development of the individual.4 he claimed that thought passed through a succession of stages in its history and that such modes of thought can also be seen in the development of the individual. these stages can be traced by considering the extent to which society has insisted on certain verities or welcomed doubt and open inquiry. at the one end, we have a society based on settled beliefs and fixed ideas that are meant to regulate conduct, discourage doubt and ward off uncertainty, while at the other we find the constant challenge to knowledge claims that we find in science and in an open and inquiring society. along the way, dewey alights on discussion as the social source of departure from a world of fixed ideas. there comes a time, he says, when ideas inevitably come into conflict with one another, and produce uncertainty in regard to belief and conduct. this calls for a different attitude of mind. it favours dialogue over dictates and sows the seeds of reflection both in society and the individual. indeed, dewey suggests that dialogue and discussion aimed at resolving such conflicts, or finding a way forward, is the means by which reflection is born. while social in origin, this mode of thought becomes internalised, forming a habit of mind in the individual: no process is more recurrent in history than the transfer of operations carried on between different persons into the arena of the individual’s own consciousness. the discussion which at first took place by bringing ideas from different persons into contact, by introducing them into the forum of competition, and by subjecting them to critical comparison and selective decision, finally became a habit of the individual with himself. he became a miniature social assemblage, in which the pros and cons were brought into play struggling for the mastery— for final conclusion. in some such way we conceive reflection to be born.5 if true, this theory has considerable educational implications for both theory and practice, as we will see. for now, however, let us simply note that, on dewey’s account, it marks a new stage in the development of logical thought.6 4 see ‘some stages of logical thought,’ in dewey’s essays in experimental logic (new york: dover, 1954), pp. 116138. dewey’s account of the history of thought might be criticised these days as excessively eurocentric, but we may set that aside for present purposes. 5 ibid., p. 123. 6 while dewey is here concerned with the development of what he calls ‘logical thought’, his conception of the logical is so wide-ranging that it encompasses the whole field of what he elsewhere takes to be thinking in education. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 3 from here, dewey proceeds to mark out two further stages of development. first, we have the kind of thinking that attempts to resolve problems and give meaning to experience by reasoning with reference to established principles. this marks the difference between a mere exchange of views and rational discussion. if there are general principles, bodies of law, or tenets of faith, upon which the parties can agree, then disagreement or uncertainty about particular cases may be resolved by appealing to them. we see this in ancient societies that developed bodies of law or incorporated organised religions. indeed, we may say that the rise of the rule of law, both civic and religious, marks a turning point in the history of thought. this method of resolution is still in evidence today, of course. for illustration, we need look no further than our courts of law, where the determination of a case involves an examination of its particulars with regard to the relevant laws. in more narrowly logical terms, this is the kind of thinking associated with syllogistic reasoning and such things as geometrical proof from axioms. aristotle and euclid are obvious touchstones for this in greek antiquity, but the deductive mode of logical thought is very much with us still, including in formal education. mathematics, in particular, is a core area of school education that provides an extensive training in deductive reasoning. beyond deduction or proof from first principles, dewey finally comes to the development of inductive reasoning from evidence, associated with the growth of science. the role of inductive reasoning in science has since become a matter of controversy, but that need not detain us here. the fundamental shift concerns the primacy of experience, rather than of first principles, axiomatic truths, or dogma, in the quest for knowledge. even though subjecting ideas to the test of experience was nothing new, the extensive development of scientific methods of investigation and discovery raised it to heights undreamt of before the modern age. while science in all its variety has advanced these methods in sophisticated ways, dewey’s ultimate concern is with the cultivation of this mode of thought in everyday life. given the role of education in the cultivation of thought, nowhere is this concern more pressing than in the kind of thinking to be developed in schools. in dewey’s day more than our own, knowledge acquisition in school education was essentially a matter of “quiescent acceptance”—a form of knowledge transfer reminiscent of the first of dewey’s four stages in the development of thought. to this, dewey opposed the educational method of gaining knowledge though active investigation, or inquiry-based experiential learning—a mode of knowledge acquisition in keeping with the age in which he lived. it is important to note that these so-called stages of development are to be understood as a matter of growth rather than of outright replacement as one stage succeeds another. that is as true of society as the individual. social stability would be threatened if everything were constantly open to question. discussion remains commonplace in both formal and everyday settings. issues and problems are still resolved by reference to rules and principles. as for the individual, even the quintessential scientific researcher, whose working life is dedicated to empirical investigation, will still have settled attitudes and beliefs, carry on discussion about sundry matters, and engage in deduction. having said this, dewey clearly believed that a mind unschooled in the mode of thought that crystalised in scientific method was a poor fit for the modern world. this becomes all the more apparent when we turn to his views about thinking in education. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 4 the nature of reflective thought having looked at dewey’s conception of thought from a developmental point of view, let us see how thought is supposed to operate as “the method of intelligent experience in the course that it takes.” this is the form of thought upon which dewey’s educational aims and methods turn, with other kinds of thought being merely ancillary. so, we had better be clear about its nature. dewey wrote extensively about this mode of thought. the main work is his monumental and much neglected logic: the theory of inquiry.7 for our purposes, however, we could not go past the book on this topic that he wrote with education in mind, entitled how we think.8 this work is still of considerable educational value more than 100 years after it was written. i will take the opportunity to highlight some of its lessons in the next section, but first let us explore the conception of thought on which the book centres. dewey calls it ‘reflective thought’ and defines it as the “(a)ctive, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in light of the grounds that support it, and the further conclusions to which it tends.”9 we can easily discern the kinds of activities involved in reflective thought as thus defined. first, there are the characteristics of being active, persistent and careful in the consideration of some matter. activity here does not mean merely that thinking is going on, but suggests an energetic or lively engagement; persistence implies a determination to keep at it until the matter has been adequately dealt with; and carefulness connotes being attentive and meticulous in the manner of its consideration. this is the way in which the facts of the case are to be sought for, studied, and reviewed. we can also immediately see that reflective thought is highly inferential. on the one hand, there is consideration of the grounds upon which the belief or knowledge in question is based. logically speaking, these supply the premises on which the proposition before us is taken to depend. consideration of them involves judging both their reliability and the degree of support they lend to the conclusion. on the other hand, attention is paid to that proposition’s implications, what it signifies, leads to, or suggests. of special note in this direction of inference are those consequences that must attain for the proposition in question to be sustained. they offer both the prospect of further support and the potential for rejection. beyond this, dewey claims that there is an underlying pattern to episodes of reflective thought, regardless of the context in which they occur. it is the pattern of thinking that we need to nurture in the classroom in order to satisfy his educational objectives. in the simplest terms, reflective thought begins with (i) a felt difficulty that (ii) leads to an analysis of the problem, is followed by (iii) suggestions for its resolution, (iv) reasoning about their implications, and then (v) testing this against experience or a wider knowledge base, so as to find a way forward and resolve the difficulty. let us look briefly at each phase of this process. 7 john dewey, logic: the theory of inquiry (new york: henry holt, 1938). 8 john dewey, how we think (buffalo, ny: prometheus books, 1991). 9 ibid., p. 6. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 5 (i) the first thing to notice is that reflective thinking does not occur unless there is something that we feel the need to reflect upon. doubts as to the truth of some matter, concern arising from an unforeseen problem, the feeling that there is an issue with a proposal, uncertainty as to what course of action to take—these are among the familiar ways in which felt difficulties arise. if we do not have doubts, are not aware of problems or issues, or are blind to the possibility of alternatives, then we are not motivated to reflect. (ii) it is always possible for people to respond to these concerns in other ways. doubts may be met by appeals to authority, problems downplayed, issues set aside, and actions undertaken from habit or on impulse. if we are to reflect on these things, however, then we need to be clear about the difficulty that confronts us. why has the doubt arisen? what exactly is the problem or issue? what is causing uncertainty in this situation? in other words, rather than dismissing our concerns or shutting off inquiry, we need to suspend judgment, stay our hand, and analyse the matter. (iii) from analysis, we turn to the question of how to respond. how are we to resolve this doubt? what solutions might there be to this problem? how could we best resolve the issue? what alternatives are open to us? while analysis provided conditions that any proposed response will need to satisfy, this phase of reflective thought consists in coming up with ideas that look to fill the bill. it consists in ferreting around, seeing possibilities, or following up leads, in order to firm up suggestions. (iv) in order to more clearly see what suggestions amount to, we need to reason about them. if we are to determine whether a suggestion is true, a solution sound, or an alternative acceptable, as the case may be, then we need to know what it implies. a suggestion may look to bolster a belief, but turn out to depend on unjustified assumptions when we consider it more closely. something that appeared to be a genuine solution to a problem may have serious problems of its own, which we would likely have discovered if only we had thought the matter through more carefully in the first place. what seems to be the best alternative may, upon further consideration, turn out to have unwanted implications that change our minds. (v) the evaluation of suggestions, to which i have just alluded, represents a further phase of the process of reflective thinking. it involves such things as checking whether the implications of our proposals or hypotheses are consistent with what we already know, as well as gathering further facts that bear upon the issue. it some cases it will turn on the outcome of experiments in carefully controlled conditions. in everyday life as in science, all such efforts are directed at resolving the matter to which we have responded. after all, that is the aim of our inquiries and the reason we go to such pains in the first place. educational implications having outlined dewey’s account of the development of thought and described the process of reflective thinking, in which it has its flowering, let us turn to their educational implications. dewey’s account of the development of thought underscores its social basis. nowhere is this clearer than in the role that he assigns to discussion. the suggestion that the historical origins of reflective thought lie in discussion, and that it is the root of reflection in the individual, could analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 6 hardly be of greater educational significance. if true, discussion should be a prominent feature of school education, particularly in the early years. it is worth noting that this internalisation of social practices by the individual, is of a piece with vygotsky’s well-known claims about children’s development. according to vygotsky: every feature of the child’s cultural development appears twice: first on the social level, and later, on the individual level; first between people (interpsychological), and then inside the child (intrapsychological)…. all the higher psychological functions originate as actual relations between human individuals.10 while dewey’s hypothesis takes us into familiar educational territory, it is the internalisation of a particular form of social discourse that interests us here. on the inter-psychological level, we are dealing with collective deliberation and decision-making in which the participants contribute their ideas and subject them to critical comparison. on the intra-psychological level, this transforms into a way of thinking in which the individual looks at things from different points of view, or considers various possibilities, in attempting to address issues or problems and evaluate ideas. the educational task, then, is to make collective deliberation so integral to teaching and learning that it establishes this habit of mind in the individual. the attempt to do this must contend with other forms of discourse that have traditionally dominated interaction in the classroom. in their narrowest form, they involve the teacher as the dominant speaker, with student response limited to answering a teacher’s question or making requests for assistance. more broadly, they are characterised by the ubiquity of teacher-student interactions, and the dearth of exchanges between students. these traditional forms of interaction are appropriate so long as the teacher is primarily the conveyor of set material, but not when the development of reflective thought comes to the fore. appropriate forms of discourse need to be methodically integrated into teaching practice for it to take hold. to focus on collaborative inquiry is not to downplay the idea that education is essentially concerned with attaining a knowledge of subject matter. on the contrary, it is to call for more robust engagement with it. to raise questions about some matter, explore its problems and issues, see what its particulars assume and imply, and explore related concepts and ideas, is to treat the subject as something to be thought about and not just so much stuff to be committed to memory. given time constraints, of course, there is going to be an inevitable trade-off between depth of understanding and the amount of material that can be covered. even so, to sacrifice depth of understanding on the altar of accumulated information is a travesty of education and an insult to intelligence. at its extreme, it is to adopt quiz-show criteria as a standard for education. the same is to be said for modes of thought that predate the ascendence of modern ways of thinking. of particular note is the emphasis traditionally placed on deductive operations in mathematics. there is no question of neglecting deduction, but rather of ensuring that it feeds 10 l.s vygotsky, mind in society: the development of higher psychological processes, edited and translated by m. cole, v. john-steiner, s. scribner and e. souberman (cambridge, ma: harvard university press, 1978), p. 57. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 7 into reflection. that may be anything from students using it to deal with practical problems embedded in their studies, to application to both experimental and theoretical problems in the science curriculum. to treat mathematical operations as tools for thought is to appeal to “the method of intelligent experience in the course that it takes.” it is the antithesis of teaching them as operations to be carried out as if the student were to do nothing more than simulate a computational device. this observation about mathematics has parallels in other subject areas when it comes to developing students’ powers of reflective thought. if the danger in teaching predominantly logical subjects like mathematics is the neglect of application to a wider domain of investigation, then those concerned with proficiency of performance, as in the early years of reading and writing, can all too easily concentrate on the development of technical proficiency to the neglect of reflection. if the development of skilled performance in such things is not a matter of thoughtful engagement, says dewey, then it “makes the subjects mechanical, and thus restrictive of intellectual power.”11 dewey reinforces this point by making a claim about the tie between the way that skills are acquired and their subsequent use. “practical skill, modes of effective technique, can be intelligently, non-mechanically used,” he tells us, “only when intelligence has played a part in their acquisition.”12 this may be overstatement on dewey’s part, but the general tenor of the remark is well-taken. dewey also points to the danger in other subjects of amassing information to the neglect of thought and judgment. again, this is not to downplay the need for students to be informed. students ignorant of some matter can no more adequately think about it than they can make informed judgments. “but there is all the difference in the world,” says dewey, “whether the acquisition of information is treated as an end in itself, or is made an integral portion of the training of thought.”13 it makes an enormous difference to pedagogy, of course, but dewey’s point is really another variant of his thesis about the relationship between acquisition and use. according to dewey, information must be acquired with the aid of intelligence if it is to be used that way. that is a bold claim, but dewey could settle for a lesser one. schooling that concentrates on the acquisition of information coupled with scant attention to the capacity to think about it will produce a markedly different outcome in the capacity to use that information in a context that calls for more than recall. that hypothesis is pretty much guaranteed to be true. as dewey notes, it is no more possible to have students investigate every proposition that comes before them than to impart all the information that may be relevant to a subject. it is rather that, in designing and implementing a curriculum, we need to blend these things together in such a way as to ensure that we develop the ability to think. to keep the outlines of that outcome in clear sight, we could hardly do better than focus our minds on dewey’s own summation of it, according to which it is the office of education “to cultivate deep-seated and effective habits of discriminating tested beliefs from mere assertions, guesses, and opinions; to develop a lively, sincere, and open-minded preference for conclusions that are properly 11 dewey, how we think, p. 51 12 ibid., p. 52. 13 ibid. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 8 grounded, and to ingrain into the individual’s working habits methods of inquiry and reasoning appropriate to the various problems that present themselves.”14 a great deal more could be said about the educational implications of dewey’s account of thought. in the limited time available here, however, it is better to supplement these brief remarks with an illustration of classroom practice that will give concrete form to what has been said so far. i am referring to a program of philosophy for children, which has diversified in many ways as it has spread around the world, but was begun by the philosopher and educationalist, matthew lipman, who knew dewey and was inspired by him. philosophy as a model the guiding idea behind lipman’s work is that of the classroom as a community of inquiry. in more familiar terms, it involves inquiry-based teaching and learning in which students think about subject matter collaboratively. while lipman’s model of inquiry is primarily drawn from philosophy rather than science, his treatment of the inquiry process resembles dewey’s and the tools of inquiry that he introduces are sufficiently generic to find a place in almost any school subject. on the community side, the community of inquiry centres on discussion. emphasis is placed on class discussion, but lipman also makes frequent use of small group discussion and discussion in pairs. dewey never thought of using philosophy to help place thinking at the heart of school education, and it is lipman’s great insight that dewey’s home discipline could be reconstructed for that purpose. while he must be given the credit for having worked this out in both theory and practice, the debt to dewey is evident. it is no coincidence, for example, that lipman’s most extensive treatment of thinking, thinking in education, takes its title from the chapter on that topic in democracy and education.15 the book is a sustained attempt to show how dewey’s quest can be realised. the debt is also freely acknowledged in lipman’s autobiography, a life teaching thinking,16 with lipman being drawn to philosophy by reading dewey and then seeking out his guidance in new york late in dewey’s life when lipman came to columbia. for present purposes, however, we may focus on the practical workings out of dewey’s quest in lipman’s philosophical novels and the voluminous teacher’s manuals that he and his colleagues developed to accompany them.17 these formed the basis of the workshop programs that he and his colleagues at the institute for the advancement of philosophy for children ran for decades and used to promulgate philosophy for children around the world. the novels are driven by dialogue and discussion between children, which is stimulated by philosophical problems and issues that arise in their everyday lives. in thinking about these things together—by asking questions, examining the evidence, coming up with ideas, and reasoning about them— lipman’s fictional characters provide a model for children in the classroom. the novels also 14 ibid., pp. 27-28. 15 matthew lipman, thinking in education (new york: cambridge university press, 1991). 16 matthew lipman, a life teaching thinking (montclair, nj: iapc, 2008). 17 lipman’s novels include harry stottlemeier’s discovery, pixie, kio and gus, elfie, lisa, suki and mark, each coming with an extensive manual to guide their use in the classroom. for publication details and a brief description of most of these works, see my article on “philosophy for children” in oxford bibliographies. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 9 include scenes from the classroom, providing lipman with the opportunity to depict the teacher as a co-enquirer, prompter and guide, who helps children to explore issues and ideas, rather than presenting them with cut-and-dried material. inquiry’s basic pattern: dewey lipman stimulating initiating suggesting reasoning & analysis evaluating concluding figure 1 formulating problems, issues and questions implications assumptions meanings initial problematic situation ideas conjectures hypotheses evidence criteria counterexamples conclusion resolution implementation c re at iv e p h as e c ri ti ca l p h as e the teacher introduces stimulus material students raise questions and set agendas students make initial suggestions in answer to a question students explore ideas and implications of their suggestions students evaluate their suggestions in light of reasons and evidence students reach conclusions and reflect on them analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 10 that lipman’s model of thinking and its development in the individual is primarily social, takes us back to vygotsky, and that influence cannot be denied.18 even so, when confronted with lipman’s work, we cannot help but think of dewey’s claim about discussion being the origin of reflective thought and of the pattern of inquiry outlined in how we think. let us return to the latter, setting the pattern of inquiry formulated by dewey alongside the process of classroom inquiry to be found in lipman (see figure 1). i will provide some illustrations along the way. just as dewey says that inquiry begins in a problematic situation, lipman has the teacher stimulate inquiry by introducing a chapter or section of a philosophical novel seeded with issues and problems in situations with which students can identify. here’s a snippet from pixie: anyhow, my chin was resting on my hand, and my elbow was on the desk. i don’t know how long i sat like that, but it must have been a long time. all of a sudden, i remembered i was in class. and then i realized something funny. do you know what? my arm had gone to sleep. i still can’t figure it out. if all of me was awake, how could part of me be asleep? it was asleep, all right. i couldn’t use it. it just sort of hung down off my shoulder. i couldn’t even feel it, except maybe a little tingle. have you ever had your arm go to sleep? isn’t it weird? it’s like it doesn’t even belong to you! how could part of you not belong to you? all of you belongs to you! but you see, that’s what puzzles me. either my body and i are the same, or they’re not the same. if my body and i are the same, then it can’t belong to me. and if my body and i are different, then who am i? it’s beginning to sound like i’m the one who’s some sort of mystery creature!19 for dewey, the inquirer next needs to identify the problem or issue and see what needs to be asked about or looked into if an adequate solution or resolution is to be found. for lipman, the critical step in this phase of classroom inquiry is question formation. a question here is a probe into a problem domain. to ask such a question is to put your finger on a problematic aspect of the situation that will direct the course of inquiry. this may be done as a whole class, or in small groups, as befits the situation, and results in students setting their agenda. how could part of you not belong to you? (roberto, nathan, ryan) is your arm being asleep like you being asleep? (ebony, ross, liam) what does it mean to say that you belong to yourself? (jay, andrew, anne, sophie) are we the same thing as our bodies? (natalie, dan, amber) could there be a person who had no body? (mike, abbey, rachael) are you still you when you go to sleep? (seth, roger, naomi) could pixie have a different body and still be pixie? (daniel, alan, banjo) who am i really? (elspeth, dorothy, clair) depending on the case, the class may be asked to explore connections between their questions, to identify underlying themes or issues, or to vote on which question or group of questions they would most like to discuss. 18 see matthew lipman, natasha: vygotskian dialogues (new york: teachers college press, 1996). 19 matthew lipman, pixie (montclair, nj: first mountain foundation, 1984), pp. 5-6. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 11 lipman is well aware that teachers may need to supplement student’s questions in order to more fully explore matters. his manuals are full of discussion plans on almost every conceivable topic devised for that purpose. many of the questions in the sample above circle around the question of what makes you the person that you are, and here is a set of supplementary questions that the teacher could use to extend that discussion, if necessary. discussion plan what is it that makes you you? 20 would you still be you if a. you had a different name? b. you had a different face? c. you had a different body? d. you had a different mind? e. you had different fingerprints? f. you had different parents? g. you were born and raised in china? h. everyone in the world thought you were someone else? once the investigation into these matters gets underway, both dewey and lipman recognize that we enter into a cycle of making suggestions and evaluating them by way of evidence, reason and analysis. this is to say that the exploration and evaluation of suggestions in an inquiry is not usually a single step-wise sequence. it tracks backwards and forwards as suggestions encounter difficulties and fresh suggestions are made. moreover, episodes of reasoning, analysis and the pursuit of evidence may come to the fore at almost any time in the conduct of inquiry. in the classroom context, discussion may reveal that the very question being addressed is in need of clarification, for example, or a suggestion might employ a concept that needs to be better understood before we can evaluate it. again, an argument against a suggestion may be immediately forthcoming, or students might not alight on crucial implications until the discussion is well underway. similarly, while students may present their evidence in making a suggestion, it can take a good deal of digging around for relevant facts to emerge. the thing that matters here is not so much the ordering of these things, but the fact that they serve interlocking functions in evaluating a suggestion. lipman is mindful of the fact that reasoning and analysis are skilled performances and that students need a good deal of practice to develop those skills. his manuals are replete with exercises to help develop conceptual and reasoning skills. let me extend the text from pixie for a few more lines to give the context for an example of conceptual exploration: afterwards, when i talked to isabel about it, she said, “pixie, you worry too much. look, there’s really no problem. your body belongs to you and you belong to your body.” “sure,” i said, “but do i belong to my body in the same way that my body belongs to me?”21 20 matthew lipman and ann margaret sharp, looking for meaning: instruction manual to accompany pixie (lanham, ny: university press of america, 1984), p. 23. 21 matthew lipman, pixie, p. 6. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 12 here’s the exercise, where lipman takes up the word ‘way’ and has students try to discern its uses in varying linguistic contexts: exercise ways22 match the way that the word “way” is used in the expressions on the left with the phrases on the right. finally, here’s an example of a reasoning exercise. it relates to confusion about family relationships that arises a little later in pixie: exercise inferring family relationships23 1. if mary is the sister of alex, is alex the sister of mary? 2. if carl is the older brother of gwen, is gwen the older sister of carl? 3. if debbie is frank’s niece, is frank debbie’s uncle? 4. if toby is edgar’s cousin, is edgar toby’s cousin. 5. if some of your cousins are boys, does that mean that a. all your cousins are boys? b. some of your cousins are girls? 22 lipman and sharp, looking for meaning, p. 26. the influence of wittgenstein on meaning and use is evident here. those who have an eye for it will be able to detect a wide variety of philosophical views and ways of working in lipman. 23 lipman and sharp, looking for meaning, p. 90. 1. as the president arrived, the police made way for him. 2. ed said, “jim’s nice, but i don’t like some of his ways.” 3. the baby screamed, and his mother said, “he just wants to have his way.” 4. jack said, “the way up the mountainside is very rough.” 5. china is a long way from chile. 6. within a few minutes, the ship was under way. 7. “well,” jill exclaimed, “that sure is the way of the world.” 8. “you skate your way,” said joanne, “and i’ll skate mine.” 9. frank said, “you go this way, cindy, and i’ll go that.” 10. “out our way,” said marie, “the weather’s real bad.” a. a means of passing from one place to another, such as a road or path b. forms of conduct c. the usual or customary manner in which things happen d. a method or manner of doing something e. direction f. an opening, as in a crowd g. a district, region or area h. the beginning of a movement, as of a train being “under way” i. wish or desire j. distance analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 13 c. none of your cousins are girls? d. none of the above? 6. there are two brothers. mike and luke jones. each has a sister. does that mean there are two brothers and two sisters in the family? 7. if you are your mother’s oldest daughter, must your sister be your mother’s youngest daughter? 8. if you are an only child, does that mean that your father’s father is your only grandfather? 9. if you are the youngest of 20 children, does that mean that you have sisters? 10. are your grandmothers related to one another? in coming to the final phase of the inquiry process, l should take the opportunity, however belated, to draw attention to a difference between lipman and dewey that could hardly be overlooked. the essentially verbal nature of lipman’s approach to classroom inquiry is obviously at variance with dewey’s use of practical activity. anyone acquainted with dewey’s laboratory school at the university of chicago will be aware of his reliance on workshops where students’ inquiries largely approach problems hands-on and work with materials to address them. the results here often take physical form. in lipman’s case, the outcome of an inquiry is more likely to be a better understanding of an issue, appreciation of a different point of view, or having changed one’s mind about something on the basis of reason and evidence. dewey’s insistence on application in the training of thought is of a piece with his resolve to connect what happens in school with the life of the child and the society beyond it. i mention this because lipman also went to some lengths to connect what children discuss in the classroom with their lifeworld. this is to say that, in the wider scheme of things, the outcome of lipmanstyle inquiries is not simply an intellectual training for academic purposes, but one that has more general bearings on their conduct beyond the classroom. so, the contrast with dewey is not so great as it may seem. in sum, we can see that lipman has followed dewey very closely. he has adhered to dewey’s vygotskian thesis that reflection grows out of discussion and, more broadly, to the idea that thinking and inquiring together is the means by which students learn to think and inquire for themselves.24 looking at the overall educational outcome, it would be reasonable to sum up by saying that lipman’s project is clearly a deweyan one. although a mere after-word here, it is to those who have projected a line from dewey through lipman into the contemporary world of education that we must turn in order to appreciate the extent to which philosophy for children has carried the torch for dewey. this is not the place to even begin to give an account of the extensive literature that comes out of this movement. the best i can do is to point to a selective survey of the literature as a starting-point for anyone who is interested.25 beyond that, are the numerous organisations and countless schools and individual classrooms around the world where his influence is felt. through adaptation and creative reworking, the movement that has grown out of lipman’s work is evidence that dewey’s quest to place thinking at the heart of school education is still alive and well. 24 it is typical of lipman that even strengthening exercises like the ones above are meant to involve discussion. 25 see philip cam, “philosophy for children,” in oxford bibliographies. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 14 references cam, philip. philosophy for children. oxford bibliographies. https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195396577/obo9780195396577-0387.xml?rskey=n6ktfh&result=1&q=philosophy+for+children#firstmatch dewey, john. logic: the theory of inquiry. new york: henry holt, 1938. dewey, john. essays in experimental logic. new york: dover, 1954 (originally published in 1916). dewey, john. democracy and education. new york: macmillan, 1966 (originally published in 1916). dewey, john. how we think. buffalo, ny: prometheus books, 1991 (originally published in 1910). lipman, matthew. pixie. montclair, nj: first mountain foundation, 1984. lipman, matthew. thinking in education. new york: cambridge university press, 1991. lipman, matthew. natasha: vygotskian dialogues. new york: teachers college press, 1996. lipman, matthew. a life teaching thinking. montclair, nj: iapc, 2008. lipman, matthew and sharp, ann margaret. looking for meaning: instruction manual to accompany pixie. lanham, ny: university press of america, 1984. vygotsky, l.s. mind in society: the development of higher psychological processes. edited and translated by m. cole, v. john-steiner, s. scribner and e. souberman. cambridge, ma: harvard university press, 1978. address correspondences to: dr. philip cam honorary associate professor, school of humanities and languages, university of new south wales, australia email: p.cam@unsw.edu.au https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0387.xml?rskey=n6ktfh&result=1&q=philosophy+for+children#firstmatch https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0387.xml?rskey=n6ktfh&result=1&q=philosophy+for+children#firstmatch analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 16 thinking about childhood: being and becoming in the world claire cassidy and jana mohr lone ixteen-year-old climate change activist greta thunberg is currently a conspicuous presence in news bulletins. she is conspicuous less because she is vocal about global climate change than because she is a teenager. although welcomed to speak to the united nations, many in power have vilified her because she is young. while she does not profess to be an authority and suggests that we pay attention to scientific experts, she has been criticized for not being an expert, for being “melodramatic,” and for being too young to be taken seriously. national review editor rich lowry writes: there’s a reason that we don’t look to teenagers for guidance on fraught issues of public policy. with very rare exceptions — think, say, the philosopher john stuart mill, who was a child prodigy — kids have nothing interesting to say to us. they just repeat back what they’ve been told by adults, with less nuance and maturity. thunberg’s experience illustrates clearly the traditional view of children as lacking knowledge, authority, power, and, indeed, status. as lone (2012) notes, childhood and adolescence is often acknowledged as being significant in our lives, but “this does not seem to lead adults to take young people’s experiences very seriously” (p.3). lone (2018) draws our attention to the fact that it is not what children say that is considered to be unworthy of attention, but the fact that they are children. many people articulate the concerns expressed by thunberg, and if they are not children, what they have to say tends to be met with far greater receptivity. this is a simple example of the epistemic injustice children experience (fricker, 2007; murris, 2013; lone, 2018) and the epistemic privilege adults possess (kennedy, 2010), and points sharply to children’s subordinate social status. doing philosophy with children aims to address the epistemic injustices that children encounter, in part by cultivating philosophical spaces within which children’s voices are dominant. in philosophical dialogues with children, it is the children’s ideas and questions that shape the progress of the inquiry, opening up new areas of philosophical investigation. children are acknowledged as independent thinkers, capable of seeing clearly and contributing in valuable ways to our understanding of our shared world. yet despite the growth of philosophical inquiry with children around the world, for the most part philosophy continues to be viewed within the discipline as an adult-only endeavor, based in large part on acceptance of an adult/child binary that understands children as insufficiently developed for engagement in philosophy (see, for example, murris, 2000; cassidy, 2007; lone, 2018). as philosophers begin to interrogate this binary more closely, exploring the meaning of “child” and “adult,” there is a growing interest in fostering philosophical dialogue with children about the nature of childhood and the adult/child distinction. s analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 17 beings and becomings traditionally, children have been understood as “human becomings.” that is, they are seen as in the process of becoming fully human, as opposed to adults, who are understood as stable and complete human beings. the notion that children are always in a state of preparation for their pending adulthood is a well-trodden argument in the field of sociology (jenks, 1996; hallett & prout, 2003; james & james, 2004; cook, 2009; rysst, 2010; prout, 2011; alderson, 2013), and was generally accepted until relatively recently. this view has not been limited to those writing in relation to child/childhood as a social construction. stables (2008), for example, drawing on aristotle, explores the way in which children’s potential has been a primary factor in determining how they are perceived and treated in society. this view is more firmly entrenched due to the influence of developmental psychology, which emphasizes children’s development through stages (matthews, 1994; cassidy, 2012; murris, 2016). this developmental stage theory supports what matthews calls a ‘deficit model’ of childhood (matthews, 2008). that is, we think of children as possessing underdeveloped cognitive, emotional, and social faculties, able only to become full human beings when they reach adulthood. with increasing attention to the philosophy of child and childhood, complementary considerations and questions arise in relation to what children are, what their place is in society, and the relationships they hold within and with society (see, for example: kennedy, 1992, 2006; cassidy, 2007, 2012; kohan, 2014; murris, 2016, 2017; gheaus, calder & de wispelaere, 2018). arguments pertaining to children’s status have largely focused on the extent to which childhood is a state in its own right or is just a transitional phase, requiring special treatment. often this special treatment is determined by adults on the basis of who and what the child might become (betzler & bleisch, 2015; giesinger, 2017), and is designed both to protect them and to prepare them for reaching full adult status (cassidy, conrad, daniel, figueiroa-rego, kohan, murris, wu & zhelyazkova, 2017). this binary view of the adult/child distinction creates and perpetuates limits on children’s agency and participation. the binary view of the distinction between adults and children is being challenged in diverse ways. as some researchers have noted, changes in the past century or so have called into question the conception of adults as stable and complete, and of childhood as “a journey toward a clear and knowable destination,” because adult life no longer predictably involves permanent jobs and relationships and so is far less stable than it was in the past (lee 2001, pp. 7-8). moreover, an ongoing discussion examines the relative merits of conceptions of childhood that rest on: (1) an understanding of the child as “being,” where the child is an independent social actor engaged in constructing his or her own childhood; (2) an approach that sees the child as “becoming,” where child is understood primarily as an adult in the making; and (3) a construction of the child as both “being and becoming,” where the child is both an active social agent and developing into a future adult (qvortrup, 1994; prout, 2005; uprichard, 2008), and examines whether our conceptions of children might apply equally to adults. the sense that we are all in a state of becoming (see, for example, lee, 2002; kennedy, 2006) has growing traction, with the result of a ‘weakening of the boundaries between childhood and adulthood’ (prout, 2011, p.5). increasingly, we are urged to consider children in relation to others, to stop thinking about the essence of child/childhood to reflect instead upon “children’s relational encounters with the world” (spyrou, rosen & cook, 2019, p.7). this ontologizing, notes spyrou et al. (2019), allows us to shift away from seeing children as bounded individuals, beings who can be analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 18 examined independently from the world. in viewing them as both being and becoming, like adults, we can consider the diversity of children’s relations, actions, and interactions in the world in which they find themselves. such a perspective enables us to focus not on what child is, but on “how childhood is done” (ibid., p.8). this shift is indeed laudable, though it still seems to position child as other to adult. it could be argued that, regardless of the understanding of childhood employed, only children can “do” childhood, and that childhood can only be enacted under the systems, structures, and strictures imposed by the dominant adult society. the notion of children in relation is not novel, since positioning one group as other necessitates a relational positioning of some kind. however, it could be suggested that the child in relation repositions her, not as “vulnerable victim” (ibid., p.10), but as one with social and moral agency, and understands that there is not one “childhood,” but a diversity of childhoods, with children as active agents from the beginning of their lives. in order to adopt this stance, it requires that childhood is seen as networked and that children do not simply interact but intra-act with others (spyrou, 2019). barad’s (2003, 2007) notion of intraaction recognizes the connectedness of individuals and understands agency as emerging through a network of relationships, rather than seeing agency as the possession of individuals. instead of a linear consideration of child and childhood, with children directed towards adulthood and as separate from adults, the idea of a network suggests that all – children and adults – are “a multiplicity of becomings in which all are incomplete and dependent” (prout, 2011, p.8). this sense of children-in-relation supports a drive towards recognizing them as central to global, economic, and political understanding, where they are actors in and with the world they inhabit. while empowering children, it has the potential “to transform adulthood as well” (kennedy, 2010, p.69). in order to facilitate this transformation, the view of children as irrational, uncritical, undersocialised, and lacking in competence needs to be addressed (cassidy, 2007, 2012; kennedy, 2010; tisdall & punch, 2012). children, says kennedy (2010), are marginalized as a result of our not hearing what they have to say or in dismissing their judgement. lone (2012) echoes this with her proposition that children’s questions are not taken seriously. indeed, spyrou et al. (2019) draw attention to any hesitancy or reluctance to “let go of the foundational distinction from developmental psychology and the individualized, monadic child which carries or holds agency unto itself” (p.7) by resisting the sense of children in a state of becoming. seeing both children and adults in the state of both being and becoming allows for a difference of degree rather than a difference of kind, and understanding that we are all active social agents and are constantly developing and changing. in acknowledging adult becoming, we might see children as “hybrid actants,” where childhood is formulated by recognizing that “people and things… flow in and between different settings and that all may play a part” (prout, 2011, p.11). while prout may be correct that this allows us to garner a better understanding of childhood, it may also, as kennedy (2010) suggests, allow us to understand ourselves better. it may even help us better understand one another and in-relation to others. epistemic injustice and philosophical dialogue much of the distinction made between children and adults is situated within the status of “knower” (lone & burroughs, 2016). those who are “epistemically privileged,” as lone and burroughs (2016, p.10) describe them, are afforded credibility as “knowers,” and their voices are heard. traditionally, children have been epistemically undervalued and silenced, and, of course, some children are more epistemically privileged than others. for example, children of color, children from analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 19 low-income backgrounds, immigrant and refugee children, and girls from all races and backgrounds face greater obstacles than other children in being acknowledged as knowers. lone (2018) calls the inability or unwillingness to listen to children, based purely on the basis of their age, “a form of epistemic injustice” (p.53). lone (2018) and others (see, for example: cassidy, 2007, 2017; biesta, lawy & kelly, 2009; kohan, 2014; bartels, onstenk & veugelers, 2016; lone and burroughs 2016) note the scope of issues affecting children and their lives, about which children have much to say. kennedy (2010) describes the adult as a “hermeneutic being,” one who is “a ‘reader’ of life and the other, and the reader is by definition an interpreter. the interpreter must interpret because he is removed from the situation” (pp.14-15). the “reader” appears to be different from the “knower.” in addition to being rejected as a knower, the child is also often denied status as a “reader,” despite being at a remove from the world of action. through intra-action, both children and adults can come to know and to read. the reading, though, may not arise as a consequence of being wholly “removed from the situation,” but from being in-relation with others through dialogue. these dialogues, one might propose, are shared encounters with and amongst oneself and others. it is through communal dialogue, notably philosophical dialogue, that kennedy (2010) asserts as “an ideal location for adults to make good on the child’s epistemic privilege, to recognise a speech other than their own, to face a culture that ‘represents our other selves,’ to live the other side” (p.21). through philosophical dialogue, it may be possible to engender a “philosophical being-in-the-worldwith others” (murris, 2017, p.187). in order to move to this state, we need to let go of some of the ideas and assumptions we hold dear, something, says murris (2017), which tends to be more of a challenge to those who are older because they may be more fixed in their ideas. current research suggests that children’s openness to the world and minimal expectations about the way things should be leads them in some settings to be more flexible thinkers and better problem solvers (land, 2011). kennedy (2010) recognises the power of critical thinking, or philosophical dialogue with children, as important in “redefining the child as knowing subject” (p.20). this, he says, facilitates a positive adult-child relationship with dialogue at its core. he urges that in authentically engaging with children in dialogue “we listen for an excluded knowledge” (p.75). acknowledging what children have to say supports the sense that they are important members of the world and that enabling such dialogue provides opportunities for “conversations that matter” (applebee, 1996, p.20). these conversations allow us to make sense of the world in which, and of which, we are a part. dispositions to engage in conversations that matter must be cultivated, in both children and adults. if this process begins early in our lives through philosophical inquiry with children (see, for example: lipman, 2003; lone, 2012; kohan, 2014; cassidy, 2017) then this “can lead to reflective deliberation about meaningful and important questions” (lone and burroughs, 2016, p.16). cassidy (2016) asserts that deliberation is necessary if a healthy democracy is to be supported, where the “plurality of ideas and beliefs, where values and assumptions can be challenged” (cassidy, 2016, p.511). disagreement is welcome in philosophical dialogue because it helps us to understand ourselves and others. learning to disagree and being open to being disagreed with is an element of philosophical dialogue that pushes us to see ourselves in-relation. indeed, lone and burroughs (2016) hold that engaging in such dialogues supports the formation of identity. in considering murris’ (2017) philosophical being-in-the-world-with-others, the formation of identity reaches beyond the child, beyond the individual, and into the wider realm where we find ourselves in-relation. certainly, one’s individual identity is important, but we do not exist in isolation, our identity is shaped by being in-relation, and philosophical encounters may be significant intra-actions in shaping those relations. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 20 through developing philosophical sensitivity (lone, 2012), we come to reflect on how things are, as well as how they might be. an approach that enables us to question and challenge what is presented, that encourages us to consider alternative ways of being-in-relation-in the-world through a philosophical imagining may also allow us to realise new relations and systems to enable their growth. so, rather than the child being treated as other or as less than a knower, it may be possible to be and become together through philosophical dialogue, where all are potentially “knowers.” inviting children into a philosophical way of life requires the development of a “reflective habit of mind” (gazzard, 1996, p.14), which considers the kind of world in which we live and would like to live (cassidy, 2016). spyrou et al., (2019) urge us to reflect on our scholarship, asking us, “which child, children, and childhood do we bring into being… and which do we preclude?” (p.5). these are important considerations, particularly if adults largely control children and their childhoods. indeed, it is not only their “doing” of childhood that seems to be constrained by the world in which children find themselves. we might suggest that it is also their very imagining of childhood, their being and becoming in-relation to others that can be limited by dominant adult voices that shape not only what children do but what they think about childhood and/or ways of being in the world. childhood and the adult/child distinction when children are asked about their childhood or being a child, this tends to be focused on their experiences and these are presented as a narrative (cassidy, conrad & figueiroa-rego, 2019). in cassidy et al.’s (2017) study, the children saw themselves in-relation to others, but mainly in terms of their own becoming and as individuals interacting with others – adults. they also seemed to see themselves as individuals on their own paths. often what we know or hear of children’s views is filtered or mediated by the adult “knower” (roberts 2000: bucknall 2014). philosophical dialogue with children allows us to engage with children and come to some understanding of their thinking, their reasoning and potentially also their way of being in-relation to others. these dialogues allow for an exploration of children’s ideas, assumptions, understanding, and the connections they make between ideas (cassidy et al., 2019). rysst (2010) and others argue that adults tend to see children from an adultist perspective, particularly in relation to physical development or maturation and sexuality. adults think about children through a lens that comes with the baggage, or, some might say, knowledge, gleaned from their being in the world. children, as rysst demonstrates, do not necessarily think of themselves as adults often do. it may, therefore, be helpful to engage with children philosophically about their ideas, their views, and their being in the world. indeed, we may usefully engage philosophically with children about what they think it means to be a child. in doing so, we may learn that they see the adult/child relationship very differently from what we might expect, or have already asserted the sense that we are all in a state of becoming in the world and in-relation with the world. having some sense of this may help us to engage with one another to reflect upon “the dialectical reconstruction of the adult-child relation” (kennedy, 2010, p.22), should such a reconstruction prove necessary. kayla: what is a child? when do you become an adult? crystal: at 18. max: i don't know. i mean, you are always someone's child, right? and if you're a parent, you are always going to love your child and think of them as your child, no matter how old they are. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 21 tyler: i think that childhood never stops. i mean, we are always in childhood. we become who we are in childhood. when you're an adult, you're just an older child. nathan: i agree. we are always the same people we were when we were born. baby to death, still the same person. madison: when you think about it, childhood and adulthood are just ideas people thought of and then they put boundaries around these names to create something that isn't actually real. there really is no such thing as “being a child” or “being an adult.” they're just labels. we're all people. in this conversation with ten-year-old children in seattle, washington, the children articulate their sense that there is no bright line between being an adult and being a child. tyler concludes that “childhood never stops,” because “we become who we are in childhood.” and the adult we become is still that child, both being and becoming. the children point out that the characterization of various stages in life in general, not just in childhood, involves social construction. as madison says, “when you think about it, childhood and adulthood are just ideas people thought of and then they put boundaries around these names to create something that isn't actually real.” the children question the adult/child binary, recognizing that it does not accurately reflect their experiences and ways of being in the world. although kohan (2018), when discussing with children what they thought about childhood and child, makes clear that he was not seeking “to analyse children’s concepts of childhood or philosophy” (p.96), he begins his dialogues with the children by asking them to ‘think about themselves; in short: to define and understand themselves’ (kohan, 2018, p.98). whether articulated or not, thinking about and understanding oneself is likely to be in-relation to others. the eight-yearold children respond to the question. though not always stated explicitly, they seem to see themselves as being in-relation to others. they describe playing with friends and having teachers, features that easily suggest the child in-relation. they also identify as important various elements of their lives such as “being obedient,” a clear relational behaviour, though one that situates the child as having a lesser status. they note that they do not have responsibilities or concerns such as money, like their parents, and their sense of childhood as being a preparation for life – adult life – is evident. they speak about having to “go through childhood” (p.106), “learning to face life… learning to face life also means learning how to become adult” (p.111). the notion of becoming is clear through the children’s responses, although there does not seem to be a sense here that adults and children may be in the act of mutual becoming. it is also possible, of course, that further interrogation of the meaning of “adult” and “child” might have led the children to question the adult/child binary. the adult/child binary is particularly pronounced in part of kohan’s dialogue with the group when the children say, “being a child means having more energy than adults, having more imagination than adults and thinking about the essentials that adults cannot think about” (p.112). it may be that older people do have less energy or that they do not exercise their imaginations in the manner in which children do, but the suggestion that adults cannot think about certain “essentials” because they are adults is noteworthy. it is unclear whether the children mean that adults do not have the time for this, or that they have simply become unable to think about “essentials.” kohan prompts the children to say more about what these essentials are, to which they respond: “love, fantasy, play and many other things. they are the most important things” (p.112). they extend the notion of “taking an interest in the essential” to include “wonder.” they also suggest that children love more strongly, but that both adults and children love, particularly one’s parents. part of the loving of a parent is that “they help you, you then learn how to do adult things” (p.114) and when mothers are old women, the “essential” of love is still there. being in-relation to one’s mother is not analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 22 unexpected, nor is the role that some adults play in preparing or supporting children in their becoming, but that maternal love – and the child’s love for the mother – remains essential over time may suggest a more nuanced understanding of being in-relation, one in which both parties continue to become because the relation evolves. one of the children in seattle observes, if you're a kid, you're not just preparing to be an adult. as an adult you will be really busy and not have much time to pay attention to the good things. but when you're a kid, you have a lot of time to talk to friends, play, be in nature, and other things like that. in a 2017 study, children ages four to ten from seven countries (brazil; bulgaria; canada; china; portugal; scotland; and switzerland) participated in philosophical dialogues about their understanding of children and childhood (cassidy, et al., 2017). there is much that the dialogues have in common with one another, with the main themes being that the participants see children as different from adults. adults, they claim, have more responsibility, have to work and provide for children, and have the power and opportunities to buy what they want or to mete out punishment to those considered weaker, such as children. children, on the other hand, have fun and play, while adults do not. the children state that adults have greater freedoms in terms of doing and being where they want. they highlight that children’s freedoms are curtailed somewhat by adults, but some of the children recognize that adults may similarly have limited freedom due either to responsibilities or work superiors. family is perhaps the most obvious example of the children seeing themselves inrelation. some children mention their relative lack of power in terms of having to do as their parents say or in being punished. they reference their relationships with their parents in terms of interactions such as being offered support for the completion of their homework or parents setting chores for children. in all of the examples of relationships that the children offer, even the positive ones, adults seem to set the agenda. indeed, they tended not to see themselves in-relation beyond with family and teachers. similar remarks were made in conversations about childhood with eight to eleven-year-old children in seattle, washington, where the children all begin with the assumption that there are substantial differences between being an adult and being a child. children, they contend, “learn things more easily,” are “more dependent on other people,” can “see more possibilities,” are “less disappointed by life,” and have “more free time,” “bigger imaginations,” “less freedom,” and “less worries and responsibilities.” adults, on the other hand, they maintain, “have to take care of other people,” are “more independent,” “more realistic,” and “less imaginative,” and have “more choices,” “superior knowledge about some things,” “more responsibilities,” and “more freedom.” all of the children talk about “growing up.” many of them characterize the period of childhood as being a special time in one’s life, with others acknowledging that, though important, childhood is not always enjoyable. the children clearly consider childhood to be transient, with the dominant view being one that understands childhood as a time of preparation for adulthood, a time of development. in the seattle conversations, when the children are asked if they would rather be an adult or a child, many say that they prefer being children. they note that they have time to spend with family and friends and to get to know many people, time to play and be in nature, and time to pretend. other children respond that they would prefer to be adults. “when you’re a child, and something bad happens, or if life is really hard for you, it's harder than it is for adults. an adult has lived for a while and has had lots of experiences, and knows people who've gone through a lot of things. but when you're a child and something bad happens to you, it's much harder.” “i would want analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 23 to be an adult because i wouldn’t have to live with people who don’t love me.” “i would want to become an adult because i could take care of myself and not have to rely on adults who make bad decisions.” these responses focus on the relative lack of power the children experience, and the enhanced control over their lives that they anticipate having as adults. future questions when we ask children to think about what it means to be a child and their experience of childhood, to some extent even these questions might be understood as positing some form of adult/child binary. the adult/child distinction is, of course, a lived one for children – in school, at home, and in their communities, children’s experiences of the adult/child divide is such that it can be difficult to step outside of it in order to assess it critically. children are labelled as “becomings” in a multitude of ways; adults frequently instructed them that they must “grow up” and need to learn certain things in order to succeed as adults. despite the intent that philosophical dialogues be open, the questions asked and/or their current relations with adults and one another may limit children’s philosophical imagining. of course, this is true for everyone, in every philosophical space, but there are particular forces at work in the unequal social positioning of adults and children that can serve to inhibit philosophical dialogues with children that are led by adults. it is important that these dialogues work to cross the adult/child divide, in order to address the inequitable power dynamics and relations between children and adults. kennedy (2010) asks, “if children will inhabit a world that their parents can only imagine, how can adults prepare them for it?” (p.72). the simple answer may lie in philosophy, where children can engage imaginatively, as a community, with questions that are important to them and their lives, facilitating insight into their own and others’ thinking, and thereby enlarging the range of accessible perspectives (lone, 2012). in acknowledging children as serious participants in the world, where dialogue between adults and children becomes the norm, we may come to “live with our children in mutuality” (kennedy, 2010, p.79), and to move beyond socially constructed barriers that limit our thinking and our relationships. ten-year-old madison notes, “there really is no such thing as being a child or being an adult. they’re just labels.” rejecting boundaries fashioned by others, we may deconstruct “unduly fixed and static…unhelpful dichotomies” (tisdall & punch, 2012). in so doing, our relationships, formed through meaningful intra-actions that may include philosophizing together about shared concerns, can evoke alternative ways of being. in fact, one such alternative way of being may be recognition of the continually reflecting, evolving, and becoming we all, adults and children, experience. references alderson, p. (2013). childhoods real and imagined. abingdon, oxon.: routledge. barad, k. (2003). posthumanist performativity: toward an understanding of how matter comes to matter. signs: journal of women in culture and society 28(3), 801-831. barad, k. (2007). meeting the universe halfway: quantum physics and the entanglement of matter and meaning. durham: duke university press. bartels, r., onstenk, j. and veugelers, w. (2016). philosophy for democracy. compare: a journal of comparative and international education 46(5), 681–700. biesta, g., lawy, r. and kelly, n. (2009). understanding young people’s citizenship learning in everyday life: the role of contexts, relationships and dispositions. education, citizenship and social justice 4(5), 5–24. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 24 betzler, m. and bleisch, b. (2015). familiäre pflichten in kontext der familienethik. einleitung. in m. betzler and b. bleisch (eds.). familiäre pflichten. frankfurt am main: suhrkamp. bucknall, s. (2014). doing qualitative research with children and young people. in a. clark, r. flewitt, m. hammersley, and m. robb (eds.). understanding research with children and young people. london: sage, 69-84. cassidy, c. (2007). thinking children. london: continuum. cassidy, c. (2012). children’s status, children’s rights and ‘dealing with’ children. the international journal of children’s rights 20(1), 57–71. cassidy, c. (2016). promoting human rights through philosophy with children. international journal of children’s rights 24(3), 499–521. cassidy, c. (2017). philosophy with children: a rights-based approach to deliberative participation. international journal of children’s rights 25(2), 320-334. cassidy, c., conrad, s-j. and figueiroa-rego, m. (2019). research with children: a philosophical, rights-based approach. international journal of research & method in education, doi: 10.1080/1743727x.2018.1563063 cassidy, c., conrad, s-j., daniel, m-f., figueiroa-rego, m., kohan, w., murris, k., wu, x. and zhelyazkova, t. (2017). being children: children’s voices on childhood. international journal of children’s rights 25(3-4), 698-715. cook, d.t. (2009). editorial: when a child is not a child, and other conceptual hazards of childhood studies. childhood 16(1), 5–10. fricker, m. (2007) epistemic injustice: power and the ethics of knowing. oxford: oxford university press. gazzard, a. (1996). philosophy for children and the discipline of philosophy. thinking 12(4), 9–16. giesinger, j, (2017). the special goods of childhood: lessons from social constructionism. ethics and education 12(2), 201-217. gheaus, a., calder, g. and de wispelaere, j. (eds.). (2018). the routledge handbook of philosophy of children and childhood. london: routledge. hallett, c. and prout, a. (eds.) (2003). hearing the voices of children. abingdon, oxon: routledge falmer. james, a. and james, a. (2004). constructing childhood: theory, policy and social practice. new york: palgrave macmillan. jenks, c. (1996). childhood. london: routledge. kennedy, d. (1992). the hermeneutics of childhood philosophy today spring, 44–58. kennedy, d. (2006). the well of being. childhood, subjectivity, and education. albany: suny press. kennedy, d. (2010). philosophical dialogues with children: essays on theory and practice. lewiston, ny: the edwin mellen press. kohan, w.o. (2014). philosophy and childhood: critical perspectives and affirmative practices. new york: palgrave macmillan. land, g. (2011). the failure of success. tedx tuscon, tedx video. lee, n. (2001). childhood and society: growing up in an age of uncertainty. buckingham and philadelphia: open university press. lone, j.m. (2012). the philosophical child. lanham, md: rowman & littlefield publishers. about:blank analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 25 lone, j.m. (2018). philosophical thinking in childhood. in a. gheaus, g. calder and j. de wispelaere, (eds.). the routledge handbook of philosophy of children and childhood. london: routledge. lone, j.m. and burroughs, m.d. (2016). philosophy and education: questioning and dialogue in schools. lanham, md.: rowman and littlefield. lowry, r. (2019, september 24). don’t listen to greta thunberg. national review https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/09/greta-thunberg-climate-activist-united-nations/ matthews, g.b. (2008). getting beyond the deficit conception of childhood: thinking philosophically with children. in m. hand and c. winstanley (eds.). philosophy in schools. london: continuum. matthews, g.b. (1994). the philosophy of childhood. cambridge, mass.: harvard university press. murris, k. (2000). can children do philosophy? journal of philosophy of education 34(2), 261-79. murris, k. (2013). the epistemic challenge of hearing child's voice. studies in philosophy and education 32, 245–59. murris, k. (2016). the posthuman child: educational transformation through philosophy with picturebooks. london: routledge. murris, k. (2017). the posthuman child: iii. in d. kennedy and b. bahler (eds.). the philosophy of childhood today. exploring the boundaries. lanham, md: lexington books. prout, a. (2011). taking a step away from modernity: reconsidering the new sociology of childhood. global studies of childhood, 1(1) 4-14. prout, a. (2005). the future of childhood. abingdon, oxon: routledge. qvortrup, j. (1994). childhood matters: an introduction. in j. qvortrup, m. bardy, g.b. sgritta, and h. wintersberger (eds.). childhood matters: social theory, practice and politics. aldershot: avebury. roberts, h. (2000). listening to children: and hearing them. in p. christensen, and a. james (eds.). research with children. perspectives and practices. london: falmerpress, 225-240. rysst, m. (2010). ‘i am only ten years old’: femininities, clothing-fashion codes and the intergenerational gap of interpretation of young girls’ clothes. childhood 17(1), 76–93. spyrou, s. (2019). an ontological turn for childhood studies? children & society, 33(4), 316–323. spyrou, s., rosen, r. and cook, d.t. (2019). introduction: reimagining childhood studies: connectivities… relationalities… linkages… in s. spyrou, r. rosen and d.t. cook (eds.). reimagining childhood studies. london: bloomsbury. stables, a. (2008). childhood and the philosophy of education. an anti-aristotelian perspective. london: continuum. uprichard, e. (2008). children as ‘beings and becomings:’ children, childhood and temporality. children & society, 22(4), 303-313. address correspondences to: dr. claire cassidy reader, deputy head of school school of education, faculty of humanities and social sciences university of strathclyde about:blank analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 1 (2020) 26 lord hope building 141 st. james road, glasgow g4 0lt claire.cassidy@strath.ac.uk dr. jana mohr lone founder and director of the university of washington’s center for philosophy for children box 353350 seattle, wa 98195-3350 and mohrlone@uw.edu mailto:claire.cassidy@strath.ac.uk about:blank analytic teaching and philosophical praxis analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 55 lipman and socrates: a dialogue antonio cosentino esidents of the green hill retirement community spent christmas as best they could, each with their ailments, each with their old age. they received visits from relatives and friends, some more than others. several even received gifts. but the festive atmosphere is now behind them. today the usual routine is back, with the same things repeating in the usual fashion. in the afternoon, mat and a small group of friends gather for their philosophical meeting, as had become custom. they always assemble in the library, a cosy intimate space with few books but a lot of light, thanks to the large windows overlooking the garden. every time they meet, they arrange the armchairs in a circle, and mat gives each participant a copy of a text. they read it out loud little by little and from there are inspired to choose the topic to address. today they want to return to a theme that often comes up in their dialogues. indeed, the festive holiday break has left them with feelings and moods that really make them think. they want to explore questions about the meaning of life and death, and they all participate with great interest and engagement. when it is almost dinner time, mat closes the session by saying, “dear friends, today was a rather demanding session. i feel tired but satisfied. we really went all the way on a topic that interests us old people most: what comes after, if anything at all.” sarah echoes him, “we agree. if it all ends here, it ends in a peaceful sleep; if, on the other hand, there is another life after death, we can continue our inquiries and philosophize together as we please. what could be better?” jordan, wanting to make a joke like a learned philosopher, adds: "asclepius is waiting for more roosters!" most of the participants had already gotten up and there was no time to ask jordan about these enigmatic words. the group was walking towards the dining room where piano notes of a chopin ballad could be heard. mat, however, didn’t follow them. he stayed a little longer in the chair; he felt very tired. his enemy, the parkinson’s, that has plagued him for so many years, was making him weaker every day, and now, without realizing it, he fell asleep where he was and entered a dream. he found himself in a large white cloud in motion. a kaleidoscope of images appeared before him, one after the other, overlapping, fading into each other with great speed. he could recognize a few faces here and there: wynona and teri, and with them karen and will when they were still r analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 56 children. and many faces of other boys and girls too, children he had met in school. among and behind them, he saw some portraits of teachers and colleagues that he could hardly recognize. they were all twirling around, appearing for a moment and then were immediately replaced by other figures. some were hard to make out but had names: elfie, harry, pixie, kio, gus… and then, images of st. marguerite's retreat house, of the institute, and his own study. he was also there himself. the cat, too, in its usual spot on the sofa, and ann was there saying something to him. suddenly the cloud began to darken, swallowing the images and covering everything around it. in an increasingly swirly movement, it quickly moved away towards the horizon, taking everything away in its path. at that moment mat woke up. he looked around, but the green hill retirement community was gone. he couldn’t tell if he was still dreaming. now he was in a lovely garden. a soft light filtered through from the branches of majestic trees, laying its rays on large green lawns crossed by long avenues, where human figures walked without making any noise. a most profound stillness reigned in that place. mat felt relaxed and light, in good shape. looking around, he saw that one of those figures from earlier was coming towards him, with a big welcoming smile. “you must be mat, the newcomer… it's a pleasure to have you with us. you know how it is… here we are still the same. it’s not that we are bored, but we are quite perplexed.” “perplexed? why?” “what concerns us is that, of all those who come from the living world, nobody has the qualifications to join us. but you, dear mat, apparently have them.” “i'm starting to understand something, but not quite. can i ask who you all are? and also, based on what credentials would i deserve to be part of your group?” “you know, when socrates died, he promised himself that, if he had an afterlife, he would have dedicated even that to inquiry by dialoguing with friends on, let's say, philosophical issues. we are all here. i am crito of alopece.” “crito… how lucky i am! so, the one i see in the middle must be socrates…” “yes, it’s really him. here we continue to appear as we did when living, even if, of course, we no longer have a body.” “and the others? who are the others?” “they are all those who have practiced philosophy by dialoguing and putting their face to it, taking on all the risks of the undertaking. over there with socrates are apollodorus, critobulus, hermogenes, aeschines, antisthenes, ctesippus, simmia, and terpsion. in the other small group nearby are xenophon, aristodemus, simon the shoemaker, and then phaedrus, phaedo and… in short, all the athenian disciples and some others who joined, like epictetus, for example. but let's get closer. you will recognize all of them. do you understand now why you are here with us?” analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 57 “i think so. i, too, believed in the value of philosophical dialogue and the practice of orality as joint inquiry… but tell me, crito, what are the topics you generally investigate? i suppose that we don't have the same problems here as we did in the city. i already notice, for example, that we don’t have communication problems. i have the impression that our thoughts meet and recognize each other on the fly, without the need to utter words.” “i see that you’re beginning to settle in. you will discover many other differences. now, please, let's go see the others so that everyone can greet and welcome you as you deserve.” “and plato? is he also with all of you?” “you know, when plato got here, he was very surprised and rather disappointed. he expected a different world, a kind of illuminated sky full of eternal forms with souls who, whirling in the void, would be blessed with the contemplation of pure ideas, a place where inquiry would end with the final possession of the full, eternal truth.” “is it not so?” “no, it’s not the case. what’s eternal is only inquiry. even in this other world, truths are contained within discourses, in their intersection and support of each other, in their rubbing.” “in the end, how did it go with plato?” “after the initial disappointment, he resigned himself to the evidence and he continued to do what he usually did in life (apart from writing), that is dialeghestai.” “and what about his relation to socrates, what can you tell me?” “dear mat, i say that we have definitely moved on from that question. it is closed once and for all! here there are no conflicts, and nobody lies. plato explained that he had decided to write the dialogues that his master was making in the city only to preserve their memory for future generations." “but, did he also explain to him why in his writings he put also different things than what socrates had really said?” “of course, mat. but this is water under the bridge… here, we’ve arrived now. let's go see socrates. he’s waiting for you.” in mat's eyes, socrates looked exactly as he had always imagined him based on the iconography he knew. in a way it was like watching a movie, with the only difference being that now he could communicate with him. meanwhile socrates went towards him and greeted him with these words: “mat, my friend, you are welcome in the garden of the sokratikoi!” analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 58 “socrates, if i could, i would be extremely enthusiastic to have you present here! for me you have been a such an influential master...” “emotions are dangerous and, fortunately, we are free from them in this place. we are also free from the masters. here we all have equal dignity.” “socrates, you taught us this during your life with your words 'i know that i know nothing'.” “yes, this is true. i tried to make people understand the importance of this principle, but with mortals it is almost impossible.” “i think we agree that there is only one path: philosophizing together.” “of course, we all agree on this, but you see how many we are… we are too few, don't you think?” “you know, socrates, i have spent my life teaching thinking, but i started with children, from the age of 5 or 6, hoping that, if they start young, maybe…” meanwhile a small group had formed around socrates and mat and everyone was tuned into the thoughts they were exchanging. at that point xenophon intervened, commenting: “be careful, mat. don't let plato hear of this project of practicing philosophy with younger children. he always thought differently on this subject, you know.” everyone was very curious, and phaedrus said: “i'd like mat to tell us about philosophy with children. it seems like a very intriguing topic to me. socrates, you too have had some experience with teenagers during your life.” “to tell you the truth,” mat replied, “i first thought that even the youngest children were capable of philosophizing having made a comparison between the questions all children ask adults, and the questions socrates asked his fellows athenians. to me it seemed like these were the same kind of questions, that is, ‘illegitimate’ questions.” “do you mean,” phaedo intervened, “that they were considered illegitimate by the athenians for socrates to ask just as they are by adults for children to ask?” “yes, exactly. children, too, are like gadflies: they ask questions that adults find annoying. but you will all agree that it is with these kinds of questions that one begins to philosophize. i had a further similarity in mind: socrates was silenced by hemlock; children are silenced by indifference or by discipline.” feeling as if he were called to participate, socrates said: analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 59 “i like to be compared to children and their desire to ask ‘illegitimate’ questions, as you called them, mat. however, in this regard, a question would come to my mind: in your opinion, am i like a child because i philosophize, or do i philosophize because i am like a child?" mat felt slightly confused about this question, but at the same time he was completely sure that he was in the presence of socrates. then he gave this answer: “and you, socrates, what do you think?” “if we're sharing the premise that philosophizing begins with asking ‘illegitimate’ questions, then, tell me, mat, was i asking those questions for the same reasons that motivate a child? or must we assume that the reasons are different?” “different, without a doubt.” “therefore, now we must investigate the reasons for this difference…” “do you mean, socrates, that we must understand the reasons for the difference between the child's reasons and the philosopher's ones?” “i see you are following me closely… now, tell me, my friend, could a child avoid asking his questions or is he constrained to, in a sense, by his age?” “i would say he is constrained by his limited experience as well as by his need to understand the world.” “and will we say the same thing for the philosopher or something different?” “something different, socrates.” “we must say, therefore, that a child is not a philosopher just as a philosopher is not a child. does this conclusion seem correct to you? “correct, without a doubt, socrates.” “so, dear mat, see if you agree with this difference: children really are the way they are, philosophers act as if. i am capable of irony, they are not.” “that’s right, socrates. i agree.” “despite this, you’re right to hold that even children, for their reasons, can practice philosophical dialogue, as long as they are sufficiently able to speak and communicate.” at that point, many asked mat questions to find out more about his philosophy with children program, and the conversation went on. when it seemed like everyone learned enough, socrates made a proposal: analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 60 “i would like to ask mat to give us a demonstration of his way of doing philosophy, as he did with children. please, mat, choose which of us should answer and start asking questions.” “to tell you the truth, i'm not used to asking the questions, not like you, socrates. moreover… dialogue, as i proposed it, is never between just two people.” “in what sense?” epictetus asked, and added, “if i had admitted several people at the same time to my philosophical clinic, the discussions would have become confused and disorganized.” in support of epictetus, socrates said: “i, too, believe that speaking one at a time, agreeing on who questions and who answers, is an indispensable rule for philosophical dialogue.” plato had arrived shortly before but had remained a bit aloof listening in with a somewhat indecipherable expression. it was then that he intervened with the calm and serenity that befits the place where they were: “in my opinion, if the dialogue aims to discover some truth, it cannot be done in any other way. it is the philosopher who, by pressing the interlocutor with his maieutic questions, leads him towards the awareness of his ignorance and, from that, towards the truth. we all remember how socrates did with meno's slave.” socrates was a little perplexed by plato’s words, but then, with the utmost calm and serenity, he said: “thinking back to that scene as you described it, i must say that i was not behaving like a gadfly but like a towing ox, with that poor boy struggling to double the area of a square… up to a certain point in our path he arrived at things by himself, but, since he realized that the solution could not be doubling the length of the side, i did nothing but drag him almost by force towards the truth, the one i had in mind but not he.” after that plato added: “it would have been well done if my doctrine of recollection had proved true…” and socrates: “but, now we know how things stand. so, dear mat, would you like to explain better how you understand philosophical practice?” “we must experience it in order to understand it better, but i'll try to summarize what i did by saying that, in essence, i bet everything on the community of inquiry. in other words, this is it: a philosopher causes a dialogue to start, vouches for its seriousness and its value, orchestrates it during its execution, facilitates the most critical passages. eventually, the sense of community increases, together with the energy directed to inquiry. in such a social and intellectual environment, the conversation moves in all directions so that everyone can both ask and answer, contributing to the analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 61 advancement of a common logos.” at this point he was interrupted by socrates who remarked: “dear mat, in doing so, isn't there a risk that everyone will express his or her own doxa or even the first thing that comes to mind without anyone examining it? and that the final result turns into a mere showcase of opinions?” “i admit, socrates, there is this risk, especially when the narcissism that always rages among mortals becomes particularly aggressive. it is precisely because of this that the gadfly must turn himself or herself into a facilitator. that is, favouring the passage from the showcase of opinions to the construction of a polyphonic dialogue, rising from the public space of the ‘between’.” “tell me one more thing, mat. do you think that, instead of refuting a doxa directly and personally as i have always done, it is preferable to wait for a self-criticism to which everyone would submit, comparing his or her belief with those of the other interlocutors?” “precisely so: by comparing and contrasting the manyfold beliefs, and with the wise and observant support of the facilitator… the results begin to be seen when the participants in the dialogue are transformed into a community of inquiry, wherein both social and intellectual relationships are kept alive, and knowledge arises ‘as a result of continued application to the subject itself and communion therewith, [and] it is brought to birth in the soul on a sudden, as light that is kindled.’ i'm sure that someone will be in high spirits recognizing his own words.” hearing this quotation from his seventh letter, indeed plato seemed to show signs of a smile. in any case, he made his way, joining the group that had gathered around mat, whose words had aroused curiosity and several comments. mat did not want to dodge socrates’s invitation for him to give a demonstration of his philosophy with children. so, after gaining everyone’s general attention, he said: “i consider it a great reward to have been welcomed into the garden of the sokratikoi. in life i learned a lot from socrates, and i developed his teachings in my own way as required by the times and places in which i lived. but i see that something profound brings together all of us, here where differences of space and time do not count. it will be a great joy for me if you all take part in this circle of thought. let us therefore unite to perpetuate the practice of philosophical dialogue indefinitely and everywhere.” address correspondences to: antonio cosentino president of scientific committee crif (centro di ricerca sull'indagine filosofica [italian centre for pfc]) university of verona. email: cosentino.ntn@gmail.com analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 32 phenomenology as a voice of childhood barbara weber “i believe nature can be cruel, it’s mad at us. but also nature includes us. and we are cruel to ourselves. -thomas, 12 “when i can feel my body, i can feel the world. maybe my body is also the world … am i the world?” rania, 10 years hen we conducted a qualitative study about “nature” with german and canadian children in 2014, we began the community of inquiry with seemingly simple questions that engaged with the children’s sensations, feelings and associations.1 we asked: “what is the first thing that comes to your mind, when you think of “nature”?” and as a follow-up question: “can one smell, taste, hear, see nature? if so, how?” here is how one group of children responded: nate, 15 years: “... one can‚ switch off one’s brain when i think about nature, for example, when sitting on the lake, to feel the nature, for one hour to not think about all the terrible things, all the problems of mankind.” liza, 12 years: “so, i really enjoy nature, for example when i go for a walk with my parents and listen to the birds singing, this i really enjoy.” rick, 11 years: “most of the time peace and sometimes like shock.” […] patrick, 10 years: “so, i can imagine that one can be excited; [… for example] lightening is nice and bright and beautiful; that is to say when one looks at it from somewhere safe. but when you are not somewhere safe then it is not only beautiful ... i mean, it is still fascinating, but when you are standing there in open nature, then you are also afraid, i think.”2 in this example, the questions by themselves were not ostensibly philosophical, however, the excerpt shows that they immediately triggered philosophical topics like ‘beauty and terror’, ‘happiness’ and ‘the good life’. these sensual experiences then led into more complex philosophical deliberations regarding the topic of nature. 1 together with professor dr. eva marsal from the university of education in karlsruhe, germany. 2 in order to maintain anonymity, all children’s names were changed. w analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 33 1. philosophy for children and its critics: introducing ideas and questions one of the oldest criticisms against ‘philosophy for children’ has been that children are too young to engage in abstractions, critical thinking and logic. and indeed, p4c has often been reduced to a critical thinking program where logic is at the forefront of competence development. this constrained and one-sided understanding of what “counts” as philosophy (especially in north america) has led to much criticism of p4c in germany (and many other european countries). it portrays philosophy as an abstract discipline with an ‘ugly’ or ‘cold’ face. and this misconception of philosophy as mere sophism, as the hostile competition of viewpoints or pure logic, is not new. in “of the education of children,” the french renaissance philosopher and educator michel de montaigne writes: “it is very wrong to portray her [philosophy] as inaccessible to children, with a surly, frowning, and terrifying face. who has masked her with this false face, pale and hideous? there is nothing more gay, more lusty, more sprightly, and i might almost say more frolicsome. she preaches nothing but merry-making and a good time. a sad and dejected look shows that she does not dwell there.”3 thus, when we are trying to address the question whether or not children are able to engage in philosophical dialogues, what we need to ask first is: what kind of “philosophy” are we talking about? do we interpret philosophy in the direction of either a “frowning face” or a “gay and merry making countenance”? and because philosophy encompasses such a long history and wide variety of traditions, the german philosopher ekkehard martens writes: “what we lack [within the p4c tradition] is a widely arranged and open, yet thorough philosophical foundation, which will act against and prevent an inflationary, nebulous, and for children harmful ‘philosophizing around’ without any aim, purpose or method.”4 but, instead of creating a unified or universal definition of what philosophy is or ought to be, martens suggests to speak about “philosophy as a cultural practice” that embraces a variety of traditions and should be taught to everyone, just like reading, writing or arithmetic. and in order to develop some initial criteria to identify traits of philosophy in thinking, writing, acting and speaking, martens suggests distinguishing between philosophical topics (or questions), philosophical attitudes, and philosophical methods: a. by philosophical questions he refers to questions that go beyond those that have an obvious answer or can be solved by means of empirical research. they often doubt common beliefs or touch upon the existential layers of life.5 3 michel de montaigne, the complete works of montaigne, translated by d. m. frame (stanford, california: stanford university press, 1958), 118. it should be mentioned that indeed some philosophical topics are more severe or existential then others. yet, philosophy is always practiced among friends and not among enemies. 4 ekkehart martens, philosophieren mit kindern: eine einführung in die philosophie (stuttgart: reklam publisher, 1999), 7. this quotation is a ‘word to word translation’ from the original german text by b.w.: „woran es jedoch mangelt, ist eine breit angelegte und gründliche philosophische fundierung, die einem inflationären, für die kinder schädlichen, weil vernebelnden herumphilosophieren entgegenwirken könnte.” 5 see martens, philosophieren mit kindern, 9-12. a classic example here are the four well-known fundamental questions by the german philosopher immanuel kant: what can i know?, what ought i to do? what may i hope?, who is a human? (see: immanuel kant, kritik der reinen vernunft (hamburg: meiner verlag, 1998/1781). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 34 b. with philosophical attitude martens describes character traits, for example: the readiness and courage to follow uncommon or unusual ways of thinking, tolerance for the kind of irritation caused by unexpected ways of thinking as well as willingness to continuously question one’s beliefs and actions.6 c. finally, going back to plato’s socratic dialogues, martens unfolds five philosophical methods, namely phenomenology, hermeneutic, dialectic, logic and speculation.7 however, he does not narrow them down, by associating each of them with a specific philosopher or historical time. rather, he sees them as different ways of solving a problem through thinking, dialogue or practice. this means that all five methods may occur within one philosophical dialogue or alternatively that the dialogue only concentrates on one method at a time. in this article, we will build on martens and argue that—while critical thinking and logic are very important aspects of the p4c pedagogy—they are not the only valuable parts of philosophical dialogues with children. just as the history of philosophy is not all about logic, but rather includes other philosophical traditions like phenomenology, hermeneutics, dialectics, speculation and even physical practices (like meditation), so do philosophical dialogues with children include many facets, stages and layers that all have their specific value, depth and beauty. for this chapter we will focus on phenomenology, in an effort to support montaigne’s rather optimistic statement about philosophy: i.e., that it offers us a space to explore concepts, ideas and experiences in a playful manner and with all our senses. furthermore, phenomenology allows children (especially very young children) to begin their philosophical dialogues with their sensual and immediate perceptions of the world. the starting point for our argument and reoccurring figure of speech will be immanuel kant’s (1781) famous statement in his critique of pure reason: “thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.”8 yet, by referring to the french phenomenologist maurice merleau-ponty and his notion of the “i can,” we will explore in more detail why and how intuitions and concepts are anchored in our embodiment. in a parallel argument, this chapter suggests that children are still more grounded in an immediate sensual experience of the world that is on the one hand closer to “the things themselves,” yet on the other hand might also be more blind, to borrow from kant’s vocabulary. conversely, adults might have a more elaborate vocabulary, yet they are in danger of reducing the complexity of a phenomenon by relying too much on their conceptualized view of the world. 6 ekkehart martens, “can animals think? the five most important methods of philosophizing with children,” thinking: the journal for philosophy for children, vol. 18, no. 4 (2007): 12-3. 7 ekkehart martens, methodik des ethikund philosophieunterrichts: philosophieren als elementare kulturtechnik (hannover: siebert publisher, 2003). martens indicates that one might find more philosophical methods within the history of philosophy. in addition, each method has variations in the way it is practiced. thus, the five methods he developed are examples and should not be seen as complete. 8 immanuel kant, kritik der reinen vernunft (hamburg: meiner publisher, 1998/1781), aa iii, 75/b 75. it should be emphasized that this sentence is only used as a ‘figure of speech’. this is not the place to go into any scholarly detail about the relationship between this statement and the phenomenological approach. http://www.korpora.org/kant/aa03/075.html analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 35 on this theoretical basis we suggest that by using phenomenology in a cpi, children and adults are encouraged to go back to the things themselves through the medium of the body. the goal is to cultivate and refine both our perceptions and our concepts. this refinement appears to be a dynamic twofold process because it entails: a. sensitizing our perceptions in order to go beyond our conceptbased beliefs and dive into the actual experience of a phenomenon and b. elaborate our existing vocabulary by speaking about our freshly gained experiences with others. by doing so, we continuously refine and recreate our ways of perceiving, speaking and thinking. this article will end with an example of a cpi on the topic of friendship in order to show what a phenomenological exploration of a concept might look like in practice. however, it is important to stress that we do not argue to ‘only’ use phenomenological approaches. rather we aim to show how concepts function as doors to different perspectives, experiences and realities, and we hope to encourage cpi facilitators to become more playful with both our perceptions and our usage of concepts. 2. a brief story of phenomenology 2.1 on perceptions, concepts and embodiment very generally speaking, phenomenology is the attempt to gain insight through an immediate description of what we perceive as well as how the perceived datum affects us. edmund husserl, the german founder of the phenomenological school of thought, claims that our consciousness is directed towards an object and thus consciousness is always consciousness of something: “the notion of an absolute reality is as absurd as the notion of a round square. reality and world are just titles for specific sensory units, namely that something makes sense in relationship to our senses […]”9 and because our consciousness is always directed towards the world with an intention, the things around us are only ever being disclosed in the light of these intentions. or in other words, we never see the things “in themselves,” naked to our gaze.10 within this context husserl introduces the concepts noema and noesis: noesis is the intentionality of the person that discloses something as something and noema is the disclosed object through this intentionality.11 this means our intentionality functions like a light that we shed onto the objects around us and make them appear to us as something. our intentionality also means that the singular perceptions (cogitationes) are being unified around our consciousness. consequently, within the phenomenological tradition of thought there is no ‘absolute observer perspective’, but rather consciousness and world are ramified through the body. the intertwining of perceptions, concepts and embodiment will serve as the backbone of our article’s 9 edmund husserl, ideen zu einer reinen phänomenologie und phänomenologischen philosophie. erstes buch: allgemeine einführung in die reine phänomenologie (tübingen: max niemeyer publisher, 1913), 134. translated from the original german edition by b.w. 10 at the heart of husserl’s phenomenological approach is his criticism of premature scientific conclusions that tend to simplify or reduce the actual complexity of phenomena. 11 see edmund husserl, ideen zu einer reinen phänomenologie und phänomenologischen philosophie. erstes buch: allgemeine einführung in die reine phänomenologie (halle/saale: meiner publisher, 1913). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 36 argument.12 2.2 merleau-ponty on the intertwining of body, consciousness and world—from the ‘i think’ to the ‘i can’ in his famous work the phenomenology of perception, merleau-ponty states: “consciousness is being at the thing through the medium of the body.”13 this simple sentence already entails his later concept of flesh (chair), which elaborates on the intertwining of senses, meaning and world: we are visible beings who see, we are feeling beings who can be felt by others, and we are embodied beings who understand the world through the medium of the body. or as merleau-ponty says himself in his last and unfinished work the visible and the invisible: “one can say that we perceive the things themselves, that we are the world that thinks itself or that the world is at the heart of our flesh. […] there is a ramification of my body and a ramification of the world and a correspondence between its inside and my outside, between my inside and its outside.”14 a newborn is not yet aware of her body. her arms and legs do not yet belong to her; that is, she does not “indwell” her body. however, through double-sensation—by feeling her own body with her hands, like by biting into her finger and feeling the pain, then biting into a toy and not feeling any pain—the child learns to distinguish her own body from the world, while exploring the world through her body. in order to understand the acquisition of language in young children, merleau-ponty elaborates on kant’s intertwining of concepts and perceptions, while emphasizing on the body’s role. he says that we enact our senses (perceptions) by putting the objects to the uses that disclose their specific sense (meaning). this idea is based on his notion of the “i can.” he writes: “consciousness is originarily not an ‘i think that,’ [in the sense of descartes’ cogito] but rather an ‘i can.’[…] vision and movement are specific ways of relating to objects and, if a single function is expressed throughout all of these experiences, then it is the movement of existence, which does not suppress the radical diversity of contents, for it does not unite them by placing them all under the domination of an ‘i think,’ but rather by orienting them towards the inter-sensory unity of a ‘world.’”15 merleau-ponty’s notion of the “i can” is the enactment and actualization of meaning through the medium of the body. thus, it can entail anything from “i can ride a bike” to “i can pick a flower” to “i can hunt.” in this sense, the “i can’” lies at the heart of any concept formation because we do not know, learn or discover concepts abstractly, but rather discover them through our bodily engagement with the world and with others. “language takes on a sense for the child when it creates a situation for him.”16 for example, we learn the concept of a flower while going for a stroll and smelling it with our family. within the same context, we might also learn that some plants belong to the category of flower, but that there are also other plants called mushrooms, trees and so forth. each concept functions like a 12 of course, husserl’s original thoughts had significant influence on many thinkers and traditional philosophical topics and offers a wide variety of ways to learn from and bring them into a philosophical community of inquiry. 13 maurice merleau-ponty, phenomenology of perception, translated by donald a. landes (london, new york: routledge publisher, 2012/orig. 1945), 168-9. 14 maurice merleau-ponty, the visible and the invisible, translated by alphonso lingis (evanston, illinois : northwestern university press, 1968), 136. 15 merleau-ponty, phenomenology of perception, 139. 16 ibid., 423. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 37 joint that we place into the perceived world around us in order to distinguish one thing from the other: for instance, we learn to perceive the leaf as different from the branch, the branch as different from the tree, the tree as different from the giraffe eating the leaf, and so on. yet, these concepts are only filled with meaning to the degree that they are tied to our bodily projects—we can use a leaf as a boat that floats on the river or we use a branch to make fire or pick flowers to make a bouquet. only through these bodily enactments of the projects to which they are tied (in the form of “i cans”) do these concepts become filled with meaning and create a grid that we place onto the perceived world around us. generally speaking, then, the pragmatic sense of things is given by their purpose in relation to our projects. and we have projects because we are dependent on the world—that is, on the things in it that we need like food, shelter and cultural objects. the goal of our various practical projects is to provide us with these things. in accomplishing these projects, we determine how the world appears to us. as james mensch, a phenomenologist and merleau-ponty scholar, writes: each project, when successful, exhibits those aspects of the world that are required for our purposes. the water of a stream, for example, is seen as water to drive my mill when i use it for this purpose. it can also appear as water to drink or to wash or cook with, depending on my particular needs. this determination of the appearing of the world and, hence, of its sense is also a determination of the way we appear to ourselves. we become the person who has accomplished these projects. the sense of our embodiment as an ”i can” is correlative to such projects. the co-constitution of the sense of this “i can” and the sense of the world disclosed through such projects places us within the world.17 consequently, the embodied “i can” ties the notion of intentionality back to the body. now, in all our language acquisition, from learning to pick the right fruit to eat or the right flower to make a bouquet, to learning how to ride a bike or drive a car, we do not learn concepts in isolation, by ourselves, but rather as part of a pattern of our bodily engagement with other people who form our social environment and disclose the meanings of the concepts to us. in a similar way we learn about the different meanings and functions of the natural and cultural objects that surround us. an example here is paper: it can be used as a surface to draw and write on or as material to start a fire or to make a paper airplane, and so on. as mensch writes: each new use enriches our sense of what is meant by the word, “paper.” behind this is, in fact, a multiple correlation: the components of a word’s meaning are correlated to the ways in which the object it designates can appear, which are correlated to its instrumental character, that is, to the purposes we can put this particular object to. such purposes themselves are correlated to our specific projects. to the point that such projects are common, each of these correlated elements will also be common. the common meaning of an expression will point back to the common usage of an object as means for a given 17 james mensch, embodiments: from the body to the body politics (evanston, illinois: northwestern publisher, 2009), 79. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 38 goal. thus, for everyone who uses paper to start a fire, the meaning of the word “paper” will include the fact of its being combustible.18 the word “paper” then is the abstraction of all the things i can do with the flat sheet. and each of them has a meaning for me as an embodied being (as an “i can”), which is why embodiment and concept formation are intertwined. turning now to the role of our perceptions (intuitions) within this process, here, merleau-ponty sees the body not as an obstacle that is standing between the world and us, but rather as a “vehicle to the world.” he writes: it is that the thickness of the flesh between the seer and the thing is constitutive for the thing of its visibility as for the seer of his corporeity; it is not an obstacle between them, it is their means of communication. […] the thickness of the body, far from rivaling that of the world, is on the contrary the sole means i have to go unto the heart of the things, by making myself a world and by making them flesh.19 merleau-ponty, in line with husserl’s detailed critique of the scientific reduction, warns us against making precipitated conclusions. an example here is the perception of colors: when we look at the wall and see it as greyish-yellow instead of white, we might think that our eyes are misleading us because we just see the wall as yellow while in reality, it is white. in this example the whiteness of the wall is an abstraction since in actuality the wall does not have any color at all; rather, what happens is that the sunlight hits the wall. some aspects of the light are being absorbed by the surface properties while others are reflected and returned to our eyes. thus, our body is not misleading us. we are not seeing despite our body, but rather the wall color is being actualized through the medium of our body. in other words: the color, light and eyes are intertwined. returning to kant’s statement about concepts, we understand now that while concepts do make us see something as something, they also reduce the complexity of our perceptions and make us blind to other aspects of the world. for example, once we learn that the wall is actually white, we might find ourselves only seeing it as white while abstracting from all other nuances—that in some lighting, the wall might appear blue, yellow or shades of grey. this process of abstracting and constraining our perception becomes evident when engaging philosophically with young children. since early childhood, our perceptions are still open to the naked appearance of objects. consequently, children might see more details (or “so-ness”), yet might not be able to conceptualize what they see (or “whatness”). in the following dialogue excerpt, a five-year-old girl is wondering about a similar topic regarding experience, concepts and the intersubjective reality of what we see: arielle: “i think one always has to be two people in order to know if something is really there or if it is only in our head.” facilitator: “why do you think that?” 18 ibid. 19 merleau-ponty, visible and invisible, 135. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 39 arielle: “well, if i see the clouds up there, then how do i know if i only see them in my head or if they are really there, outside of us? in the end, i can only see them, but not touch them.” facilitator: “okay ...” arielle: “i just wish i could draw like fritz hoerauf [a contemporary german painter] then i could paint exactly what i imagine in my head. otherwise no one ever knows what i am thinking.” facilitator: “well, you can try to explain in words …” arielle: “no, this won’t work, because if i think of a ‘red bed’ then you will never exactly know which ‘red’ i am thinking of, nor will you know which kind of ‘bed’ i am thinking of. the only way i could show you what i think of is by drawing it exactly how it is in my head.” facilitator: “are you saying that the words you use are different from your actual imagination or the object you see out there?” arielle: “well, yes … you see, if i was a computer, i could send the picture in my head as a file to you … i could copy it for you. hm, but then … maybe then you would no longer perceive it as my image; rather you would be filled with the image and the image would erase your own perceptions.”20 the other side of kant’s statement regards thoughts without contents—when a person’s words and concepts lose their meaning or are not filled with any intuitions. for example, for someone in a wheelchair the meaning of “i can go for a hike” has become abstract. children are very aware of the abstractness of language. for instance, at the end of a cpi during which children talked about life after death, they had time to write or draw into their reflection journal. one girl drew a ladder that reached up into heaven. a girl sitting next to her commented that she needed to draw an elevator or escalator as well, because otherwise someone with a wheelchair would not be able to get into heaven. the complete loss of any “i can” leads finally to the reduction of the body to a nonfunctioning object and eventually its death. yet, if the decrease of intuitions and ignorance of concepts comprise a downward spiral that leads to a flattening of experience and eventually the loss of life, then reversely, the refinement of concepts and sensitization of our perceptions is an upward spiral that deepens our experience and increases our liveliness. in order to show how refinement of concepts and sensitization of perception go hand in hand, the example of a wine connoisseur is very useful: young adults who drink wine for the first time may find it tastes mainly sour and notice little difference between a complex and precious wine versus a simple and shallow one. yet with experience and a refinement of vocabulary—such as starting to read bottle labels or studying a wine aroma wheel they will learn to distinguish notes of hay or citrus in a white wine or hints of leather, tobacco or chocolate in a red wine. the process at work is an interlacing of language and perceptions: it is through concepts that we start to disclose those aspects of our environment and vice versa, creating new language for the things we disclose through our perceptions. 20 the dialogue originally happened in german and was translated into english by the author of this paper. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 40 another well-known example is the word water and the word ‘snow’ as explained by linguist and anthropologist franz boas in his handbook of american indian languages. he talks about inuit people having multiple words for snow, stating: to take again the example of english, we find that the idea of ‘water’ is expressed in a great variety of forms: one term serves to express water as a ‘liquid’; another one, water in the form of a large expanse (‘lake’); others, water as running in a large body or in a small body (‘river’ and ‘brook’); still other terms express water in the form of ‘rain,’ ‘dew,’ ‘wave,’ and ‘foam.’ it is perfectly conceivable that this variety of ideas, each of which is expressed by a single independent term in english, might be expressed in other languages by derivations from the same term. another example of the same kind, the words for ‘snow’ in eskimo, may be given. here we find one word, aput, expressing ‘snow on the ground’; another one, qana, ‘falling snow’; a third one, piqsirpoq, ‘drifting snow’; and a fourth one, qimuqsuq, ‘a snowdrift.’21 and while for us a snowy landscape might just appear white and flat, people who grew up in this environment and learnt different concepts for snow’ will actually see these differences. seeing such differences is key to their survival and will shape the “i can”—that is, how they actualize their identity with regard to their environment and perceptions. 3. the frivolous play with concepts and the sentient body: phenomenological traits in a cpi as we have seen, our perceptions of nuances are intertwined with the refinement of concepts— both are grounded in our “i can”. thus, our perceptions can be cultivated, sensitized and expanded through a refinement of concepts and vice versa. however, every vocabulary, every way of speaking about the world, is contextual, situated and fragmented. it never captures the totality of what is. there is no bird’s eye perspective, or pensée du survol. we only ever disclose one glimpse, one aspect, one angle—just like how shedding light on one side of an object casts the other side in shade. in this sense, phenomenology can be seen as a complementary approach to kant’s famous imperative sapere aude, meaning to have courage to use our own reason. using phenomenology in a cpi, the starting point could be understood as having the courage to use our own senses. this dynamic two-fold process takes the immediate bodily experiences and perceptions as a starting point in order to disclose ever more nuances of a phenomenon. these experiences are then shared through dialogue. and by engaging with others, in listening and speaking, we create and refine our own language so as to keep up with our and others’ experiences. here, concept formation creates a kind of second layer of awareness that deepens our experience. and by placing our concepts and attached beliefs in suspension, new ways of speaking and bodily enactments can emerge. 21 franz boas, handbook of american indian languages (washington: g.p.o., 1922), 3. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 41 3.1 a phenomenological cpi in action many phenomenologists have tried to cultivate a phenomenological perspective by developing and using concrete exercises, such as detailed observations, descriptions of natural phenomena, or the focused use of one specific sense for the exploration of an object—for instance, describing a table solely through smell. for our purposes, the goal is far simpler. in this section, we will describe a philosophical dialogue with a group of teenagers on the topic of friendship in the hopes of revealing how a cpi can take a phenomenological turn rather than remain a mere critical thinking or dialectical exercise. the dialogue starts with a short introduction of aristotle’s three forms of friendship in book three of his nicomachian ethics. in the text, he distinguishes between friendships based on utility, pleasure and goodness of character. aristotle argues that the first two kinds of friendship are founded on superficial qualities and generally not long lasting. on the other hand, friendship based on goodness of character is the best kind because these friends love one another for whom they are and not for what they stand to gain from one another. following this reading, the teen participants complete a short philosophical exercise using different examples of friendships: their facebook friends, their peers, their dog, their mom, an invisible friend, a barbie doll, a tree in the garden, god, themselves. they are asked to consider if each of these examples could be considered friends and why. after dialoguing on the subject, the teens came to the conclusion that none of the examples could be ruled out in and of themselves, but rather that the reasons depended on the particular situation as well as on the exact meaning of the classification “being a friend.” this placed the concept of friendship in suspension and led into a moment of aporia, that is, of not knowing how to move forward. and it is this moment that brought the group back to the concrete ‘things themselves’—in this case, to concrete examples of friendship. they were asked to each think of three friendships in their own life: one that counts as their best friendship, one as an unusual friendship and one as a past friendship. the teens described how each friendship is unique but also what still makes them classify that relationship as a friendship. after this exercise, the dialogue takes an unexpected turn: considering the uniqueness of each friendship example makes the teens aware of how manifold, nuanced and deep each of the examples are. their concept of friendship was too narrow, appearing like an empty shell from which the actual experience had broken free. now their memories and perceptions were meandering around and diving into each aspect of the relationship. it felt like a moment of no return where new concepts, words and descriptions had to be found in order to match the richness of their experiences. a critical thinking exercise would probably have taken the opposite direction, asking about necessary and sufficient criteria that eventually would have ruled out the one or other example to which they referred. of course, there were moments when they tried to find common criteria that would fit all their examples, though that was not the sole purpose. in this sense, we should consider how critical thinking and phenomenology complement each other: critical thinking works on the precision of concepts and arguments, while phenomenology dives into the complexity of the phenomenon at hand and leads to a refinement of our perceptions by exploring what is different or specific. this enables a group to penetrate and push through the concept of friendship in order to see its nuances, helping them realize that each relationship is absolutely unique and cannot be compared to any other. in other words: each friend is irreplaceable. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 42 4. summary: the cpi as a playground of concepts in this article, we tried to show how we each live within the world through the medium of our body. we act upon the world by finding new shapes, forms and concepts through which we indwell the world and understand ourselves in relation to it. for the infant psychoanalyst donald w. winicott, creative play symbolizes the effort to be both connected with the sensuous world and simultaneously constructing concepts and interpretive structures that lift the continuous stream of being within the world of ideas and reason. for him the notion of play is so central because when we play we become creative—we acquire reality in an act of passive perception and active form-giving.22 in other words: our playing with the world is intertwined with our playing with concepts. through this process, reality becomes our reality. further, as he writes, “it is in playing and only in playing that the individual child or adult is able to act creatively and to use the whole personality, and it is only in creativity that the individual discovers the self.”23 we interpret the world and give it a shape, and this is the reconstructive force appropriated by children who play with reality. a very basic example is the creative use of objects by younger children, who use, for example, a table as a cave or a fork and a spoon as puppets. in a phenomenological cpi, children can play with words, concepts and meanings and thus create their own interpretations of reality, while adults are encouraged to abandon their old or leaned habits and concepts in order to re-enter the realm of possibilities and creativity. thus, the phenomenological cpi may be described on the one hand as the intertwining of an inner sensuous perception of things and, on the other, as the recreating of a shared reality with others. dialogue of this type therefore has great value, as illustrated by the words of a youth participant in our nature study: chanelle, 13 years: “i think at the beginning we had a lot of different ideas and by the end we could come up, not necessarily with one agreement, because there is never one right and there is never one wrong… i just really like how everyone had different ideas and tried to think of different perspectives. because without thinking about perspectives a lot of people do not feel included, because you are not engaging them in what they think. so i liked that, and i think one of the reasons the conversation works is because people […] elaborate and build on other people’s ideas but also, kind of are not stuck on one or their only their own idea and so it was a whole bunch of ideas and we were able to find a common in each one.” references aristotle. nicomachean ethics. translated by crisp, roger. cambridge: university press, 2000. boas, franz. handbook of american indian languages. washington: g.p.o., 1922. husserl, edmund. ideen zu einer reinen phänomenologie und phänomenologischen philosophie. erstes buch: allgemeine einführung in die reine phänomenologie. tübingen: max niemeyer publisher, 1913. kant, immanuel. kritik der reinen vernunft. hamburg: meiner verlag, 1998/1781. martens, eckehart. philosophieren mit kindern. eine einführung in die philosophie. stuttgart: reklam publisher, 1999. 22 donald winnicott, playing and reality (new york: routledge publisher, 2005), 72. 23 winnicott, playing and reality, 73. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 43 - methodik des ethikund philosophieunterrichts: philosophieren als elementare kulturtechnik. hannover: siebert publisher, 2003. - “can animals think? the five most important methods of philosophizing with children.” thinking: the journal for philosophy for children, vol. 18, no. 4 (2007). merleau-ponty, maurice. phenomenology of perception, translated by donald a. landes, london, new york: routledge publisher, 2012 (orig. 1945). - the visible and the invisible. translated by alphonso lingis, evanston, illinois : northwestern university press, 1968. mensch, james r., ethics and selfhood: alterity and the phenomenology of obligation. ny: albany, 2003. - embodiments: from the body to the body politics. evanston, illinois: northwestern publisher, 2009. montaigne, michel de. the complete works of montaigne. translated by d. m. frame. stanford, california: stanford university press, 1958. winnicott, donald. playing and reality. new york: routledge publisher, 2005. address correspondences to: barbara weber, associate professor and chair of the interdisciplinary studies graduate program, university of british columbia, canada. email: barbara.weber@ubc.ca mailto:barbara.weber@ubc.ca analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 26 the impact of philosophy for children (p4c) on middle school students’ empathy, perspective-taking, and autonomy: preliminary outcomes mahboubeh asgari, jenna whitehead, kimberly a. schonert-reichl, & barbara weber abstract: philosophy for children (p4c) hopes to cultivate democratic dialogue as well as critical, creative, and caring thinking; the latter of which has been associated with students’ social and emotional competencies (secs) like empathy and perspective-taking. yet, empirical, randomized studies on the effectiveness of p4c on students’ secs and sense of autonomy are scant. this paper reports findings from a pilot randomized controlled trial (rct) assessing preliminary outcomes of the impact of an p4c approach on middle school students’ secs and their feelings of autonomy and classroom supportiveness. ten classrooms of 6th to 8th grade students (n = 233) were randomly assigned to either receive the intervention or serve as controls. the p4c sessions were facilitated by two experienced p4c educators for one 90-minute session once a week for 8 weeks. outcome analyses revealed no significant differences between p4c and control students on self-reported classroom supportiveness, empathy, perspective-taking, or altruism, however, p4c students were significantly lower on classroom autonomy and teacher-rated secs at post-test, compared to controls. person-centered analyses revealed higher post-test empathy among p4c students who were rated by teachers as having higher secs as compared to students rated low on secs at pre-test. taken together, these findings provide preliminary evidence of the impacts of this type of program for early adolescent students. keywords: philosophy for children, autonomy, empathy, perspective-taking t the beginning of the philosophy for children (p4c) movement in the 1970’s, its founder matthew lipman wanted to give children the opportunity to think, reflect, and reason together. he proposed that the power for resolving conflict lies in being able to see a situation and the world from another person’s viewpoint (lipman, 1982, 2003), by calling one’s own thinking and feeling into question. his pedagogical pursuit evolved around the cultivation of the “3 c’s”, namely critical, creative, and caring thinking (lipman, 2003). in the years to follow, his research companion ann m. sharp (2009) theoretically explored and unfolded the notion of caring thinking as well as its strong link to reasonableness. in 2009, she writes that while all three types of thinking are equally important, they are interdependent and that they “manifest themselves in continual transaction with each other. […] it is the mastery of caring thinking that is crucial in motivation and sustaining the dialogue in communal inquiry, while at the same time providing for the education of children’s emotions” (p. 411). lipman (2003), likewise, has always seen caring thinking in connection to critical and creative thinking. consequently, and while the idea that reasonableness, empathy, and perspectivetaking are interconnected is not new within the field of p4c (e.g., lim, 2006; murris, 1992; sharp 2009; weber, 2013), both its theoretical and empirical exploration has lagged behind. something that has been lamented, for example by costa-carvalho and mendonca (2016) when they write: “[…] important a analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 27 aspects regarding the inter-relationship among reasonableness, emotion and community have not been sufficiently theoretically addressed.” (2016, p.127). furthermore, previous educational research has identified a number of teachers’ instructional behaviors that can foster students’ perceived autonomy such as actively listening to students, allowing students to work in their own way, providing time for students to talk, being responsive to studentgenerated questions, and making perspective-acknowledging statements (reeve & jang, 2006). because those are core elements of a philosophical community of inquiry (lipman, 2003), the question arises whether p4c might have a positive impact on students’ perceptions of autonomy. a sense of autonomy has been identified as a fundamental psychological need, contributing to motivation and well-being (ryan & deci, 2017). particularly for children and adolescents, perceived autonomy has been shown to be related to more active engagement and success in school and generally more positive emotions in the classroom (patrick et al., 1993). the primary aims of this study were twofold. first, we sought to investigate the impact of p4c on middle school students’ secs (social and emotional competencies) as well as their perception of autonomy in their classroom. second, given that research has found that “one size does not fit all” (durlak et al., 2011; wanless & domitrovich, 2015) when it comes to the benefits of classroom-based programs that promote students’ social and emotional learning (sel), we also examined whether some middle school students benefitted from p4c more than others by exploring individual differences with regard to students’ secs at pretest in relation to intervention outcomes. philosophy for children and social and emotional competencies many studies on p4c pedagogies have focused primarily on its impact on students’ academic achievement (gorard et al., 2015) and engagement (lancaster-thomas, 2017), or cognitive skills, such as reasoning (fair et al., 2015; moriyon, 2000; murris, 1992; topping & trickey, 2007a), improvement of scientific thinking (sprod, 1997), critical thinking and social skills (hope, 1988), and language comprehension (tian & liao, 2016). there are also important theoretical and qualitative studies as well as p4c practitioners who suggest that through exploring philosophical concepts and personal stories in a community of inquiry, children are expected to engage each other in affective communication and facilitate empathic modes (gardner 2011; schertz 2007; sharp 2009; weber, 2013). but few randomized, quantitative studies have examined the impact of p4c on students’ secs (e.g., empathy) or feelings of autonomy and supportiveness in their classrooms (o’riordan, 2015). with respect to the few empirical studies that have explored the impact of p4c pedagogies on students’ secs, such as empathy and altruism, results have been mixed (schleifer et al., 2003; youssef et al., 2016). for example, in a study that examined the impact of a philosophical community of inquiry program with 280 6th grade students (ages 10 -12), youssef et al. (2016) found no significant differences between intervention and control groups on students’ prosocial behavior and emotional well-being. conversely, in a study of 39 five-year-old children, schleifer et al. (2003) found that children in the p4c group improved significantly more in empathy from baseline to post-test than those children in the control group. considering most research on p4c pedagogies has involved younger children and has primarily focused on the impact of these programs on cognitive outcomes, more research is needed to analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 28 investigate the potential effect of p4c approaches on students’ social and emotional competencies, particularly during other developmental stages, such as early adolescence. early adolescence and middle school contexts early adolescence is considered a transitional phase in development (steinberg, 2016). fundamental changes occur in almost every sphere of life during this period—intellectual and cognitive changes, physical changes due to puberty, and social and emotional changes (blakemore & mills, 2014; steinberg, 2016). these changes lead to increased challenges, such as heightened self-consciousness (rankin et al., 2004; takishima-lacasa et al., 2014), but also development in other important abilities, such as theory of mind—the ability to consider others’ thoughts and feelings (dumontheil, 2015; flynn et al., 2015; thijssen et al., 2015). early adolescence is a time in the life cycle that is characterized by an increasing need for autonomy and belonging (ryan & deci, 2017; van ryzin et al., 2009). however, studies have shown that early adolescents report fewer opportunities for choice and connection in middle school and high classrooms compared to elementary school classrooms (eccles & roeser, 2011; feldlaufer et al., 1988; woolley & bowen, 2007). eccles and colleagues (1993) have posited, in their stage-environment-fit theory, that it is this mismatch between students’ needs during this developmental stage and the opportunities afforded to them in their various contexts, that can contribute to many of the challenges that early adolescents experience, such as decreased school engagement and increased school dropout. in contrast, as illustrated by self-determination theory (sdt; ryan & deci, 2017) and demonstrated by a plethora of studies, when early adolescent experience support for their autonomy and competence they have better motivation, achievement, and emotional adjustment (roeser et al., 1998; ruzek et al., 2016; ryan & deci, 2017). students with a greater sense of autonomy in schools also have better school outcomes such as classroom engagement, persistence, enjoyment, and achievement (e.g., miserandino, 1996; patrick et al., 1993). therefore, early adolescence is a pivotal time to investigate the types of programs and pedagogies that can either buffer the frequently observed decline in perceived autonomy or promote greater perceived autonomy among students. method the p4c intervention most p4c approaches are based on the ground-breaking work of pioneers matthew lipman and ann m. sharp during the 1970s. at the core of most p4c approaches is the philosophical community of inquiry (coi), which allows students to view others’ perspectives and observe conflicting ideas. it encourages students to empathize with others, give reasons for their thinking, and readjust standpoints, while calling their own thinking and feeling into question (lipman, 2003). p4c approaches usually involve the reading of philosophical novels or exposure to other stimuli (e.g., paintings, children’s books, poems, philosophical aphorisms), developing discussion topics, questions, and rules, and discussing those questions (weber & wolf, 2017). during classroom discussions, children have the opportunity to think, reflect and reason with others, see others’ analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 29 perspectives, and learn that the power of understanding lies in being able to see a situation and the world from another person’s viewpoint (lipman, 2003). duration this p4c intervention was implemented in participating classrooms for one 90-minute session once a week for 8 weeks. originally, we had planned a minimum of 16 weeks of implementation and sessions twice per week for 45-minutes each. this arrangement was not possible due to an ongoing teacher-strike in schools. facilitators two external facilitators, who were trained and experienced in facilitating p4c dialogues, implemented the intervention in the participating classrooms. during the sessions, classroom teachers remained in the classroom as observers but were told not to participate or influence the discussions. although one teacher decided to listen to the discussions, most teachers attended to their own work. each facilitator had an assistant facilitator (also experienced in p4c pedagogies) accompanying them during the sessions who wrote the key points of the discussions on the board, observed the classroom discussions, and took notes. both facilitators were actively involved in the preparation and design of the program together with the principal investigator (pi) of the study, an expert in p4c. the pi oversaw the design of the lessons to ensure that the lessons followed the principles of this pedagogy. both facilitators had backgrounds in philosophy and education, were experienced in facilitating communities of inquiry, and had teaching experience with children in schools and other educational institutes. during the program, the facilitators were in communication with one other and shared their thoughts and experiences regarding the sessions while both were communicating with the pi as well. the lessons were designed following the coi pedagogy as developed by lipman and sharp. sessions format creating and cultivating a community of inquiry (coi) was central. therefore, each session included the following five stages: (1) the facilitator presented a stimulus, usually a narrative with philosophical themes; (2) students formulated questions; (3) students dialogued about the questions as the facilitator modeled various skills of inquiry during the discussion (e.g., presenting a position, making connections, asking for clarification, giving reasons); (4) students did relevant philosophical exercises and activities to deepen their inquiry; and (5) students engaged in a reflective practice (e.g., writing of a journal, sharing last ideas). students always sat in a circle facing one another during these sessions. each of the 8 sessions had a dialogue component, which usually was around 40 to 50 minutes long. we did not focus on empathy, perspective-taking or autonomy related topics specifically, but rather wanted to see if the coi in itself would have an effect on those social-emotional competencies. moreover, it was important that the adolescence chose questions that were important to them. table 1 shows an overview of the 8-week outline. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 30 table 1: week 1 introduction meaning of a safe and warm community students develop ‘rules’ for the classroom coi week 2 the storybook frederick by leo lionni (2011) the role of people in their community the importance of making contribution to a community week 3 distinguishing between open and closed questions the story of ed sheeran (“ed sheeran,” 2014) week 4 students develop questions in small groups weeks 5, 6 & 7 coi on the questions developed by the students week 8 what is friendship? end of the program’ party meta-reflection assessment of the program design of 8-week implementation the first session started with a discussion around the concepts of safety, warmth, and inquiry. the concept of community ball—using a physical ball as a tool to facilitate turn-taking in discussion and identifying the present speaker—was also explained. the students were invited to autonomously create guidelines for their discussions collaboratively and democratically (e.g., we listen carefully and quietly to what someone is saying; we think about what we just heard; we respect each other’s ideas.) the nature of community was also explored utilizing the thoughtful story of frederick by leo lionni. the distinction between closed and open questions was cultivated through multiple examples and activities. this prepared the students for the next session in which they formulated their own open questions. it was important to us that the questions related to the students’ lifeworlds and truly mattered to them. all the questions were then written on the board and categorized. then, everyone voted for their favorite question. three questions with the highest votes were picked to be discussed during the upcoming weeks (table 2). even if a question was not chosen, it was still attended to, so no child thought that their question was not important. the facilitators worked with the pi to develop a lesson plan for the three questions selected by the students. to return to the topic of community, the analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 31 discussion in the final week of the intervention was dedicated to the concept of friendship. at the end of the intervention, there was a short dialogue about the p4c approach and students were asked to reflect about how the discussions and activities had been going for them, whether students were supporting each other in discussions, and how they could better connect or improve their collaborative thinking. table 2: questions developed by the students in p4c grades sample questions generated by students grade 6/7 what is the meaning of life? is life too short?  how do we trust what we see? did unicorns ever exist? why do we feel emotions? why do we name things?  grade 7/8 is the world made from evolution or creation? if there is an end to space, what’s after that?  what is power? what is worth doing? what if i could live forever? what is the value of life? how do we know something is real? what is friendship? each session, as mentioned above, contained a stimulus, philosophical exercises, discussion plans, activities, and reflective journal writing. the stimuli included storybooks, video/movie clips, pieces of art such as painting, and the like. there were some exercises in each session that would engage students in more exploration of the topics/questions. at the end of each session, the students did reflective journal writing by answering the following three questions in the notebooks provided for them: • what did you learn from today’s dialogue? • what is your understanding of ‘[the topic]? • what is one big question you still have? depending on how the discussion went during each session, the facilitators asked students to meta-reflect upon the coi. these questions would involve how well the students listened to each other, how they transitioned from one topic to another, and/or how well they collaborated and built upon each other ideas. this iterative process was designed to make their coi stronger each week as well as to cultivate a sense of ‘ownership’ over the quality of their thinking and dialoging together. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 32 evaluation of the p4c intervention to investigate the impact on students’ social and emotional outcomes, a randomized controlled trial (rct) was conducted, in which half of the classrooms had p4c implemented in their classrooms and half served as comparisons, which means they had no intervention program running during those weeks. all participating students and teachers were asked to complete written surveys before and after the implementation of the p4c pedagogical intervention. participants the study included a total of 233 6th to 8th grade students (meanage = 12.60, sd = .86; 45% female) recruited from 10 classrooms in one middle school located in a public-school district serving approximately 32,000 students in a suburban, predominantly middle-class community near a large western canadian city. the p4c (intervention) group included 124 students (meanage = 12.64, sd = .89) and the comparison group included 109 students (meanage = 12.49, sd = .89). with regard to language background, 79% of the students reported that english was the first language they learned at home. for the remaining students, 12% reported that their first language was of east asian origin (e.g., korean, japanese, mandarin), and 9% indicated multiple additional languages (e.g., spanish, punjabi). this range of language backgrounds in the sample is reflective of the cultural and ethnic diversity of the canadian city in which this research took place. analyses indicated that the students did not differ across study conditions on baseline demographic characteristics, suggesting that the randomization process was successful. of the students recruited for participation, 98% received parent/guardian consent and 91% completed both baseline and post-test surveys. none of the participating students had received a p4c-based intervention prior to this study. procedure prior to the start of data collection, research assistants visited each classroom and gave a 15-min presentation in child-friendly language to describe the study and answer any questions the students had. following, they provided students with parent/guardian permission slips to take home. students were informed that their participation was voluntary and that there would be no consequences if they chose not to participate. only students with signed parental/guardian consent participated in the study. after baseline data collection, five classrooms were randomly assigned to receive the p4c implementation and five classrooms were randomly assigned to serve as controls. trained research assistants administered the questionnaires once prior to the implementation of p4c (baseline) and again after the program implementation had concluded (post-test). the surveys were read aloud during a 30-min class period to control for any differences in reading ability. students were assured that all their answers would be kept confidential, and that peers, parents, or teachers would not be able to access their responses. teachers stayed in the classroom during administration but were advised not to walk around and/or look at the students’ surveys. teachers also completed student analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 33 behavior checklists (see measures section below for more detail) for each of their participating students, both at baseline and post-test. measures outcome measures students completed a battery of measures at baseline and post-test that included demographic questions and that assessed their perceptions of their classroom context, namely autonomy and classroom supportiveness, as well as dimensions of prosociality—operationalized by measures of empathy, perspective-taking, and altruism. teachers also completed behavioral ratings of students’ social and emotional competence. demographic information. students were asked to complete a demographic questionnaire in which they were asked to provide information about their gender, birth date, grade, first language learned, and family composition. classroom context: autonomy and classroom supportiveness. students reported on their own sense of support in their classrooms through questions about how much their classmates care, help, and get along with each other. they also reported how much autonomy they felt in their classrooms by how involved they are in decision making and setting classroom rules (battistich et al., 1997). specifically, students’ perceived autonomy in the classroom and classroom supportiveness were assessed via the 10item student autonomy and influence in the classroom (e.g., “in my class students have a say in deciding what goes on”) and the 14-item classroom supportiveness subscales (e.g., “my class is like a family”) from the sense of classroom as a community measure (battistich et al.,1997). students responded to the autonomy scale using a 5-point likert-type scale ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (always) and the classroom supportiveness scale using a 5-point likert-type scale ranging from 1 (disagree a lot) to 5 (agree a lot). previous research has shown evidence for the validity and reliability of this measure (battistich et al., 1997). in the present study, internal consistency as assessed via cronbach’s alpha was adequate at both baseline and post-test, for autonomy (.83 and .85, respectively) and classroom supportiveness (.72 and .72, respectively). empathy and perspective-taking. students’ empathy and perspective-taking were assessed via the empathic concern (6-item) and perspective-taking (7-item) subscales of the interpersonal reactivity index (iri; davis, 1983) that has been modified for children (schonert-reichl et al., 2012). the empathic concern scale assesses the tendency to feel concern for other individuals (e.g., ‘‘i often feel sorry for people who don’t have the things i have’’), whereas the perspective-taking subscale measures the tendency to consider things from others’ viewpoints (e.g., “sometimes i try to understand my friends better by imagining how they think about things”). students rated each item on a 5-point likert-type rating scale ranging from 1 (not at all like me) to 5 (always like me). supportive evidence for the construct validity and reliability of the empathic concern and perspective-taking subscales of the iri has been obtained in previous research (davis, 1983; schonert-reichl, 1993). in the present study, cronbach’s alphas for the empathy subscale were .89 and .82 for the perspective-taking subscale at both time points. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 34 altruism. students reported their altruistic behavior by responding to five modified items from the altruistic behavior questionnaire (developmental studies center, 2005) using a 4-point likert-type scale ranging from 1 (never) to 4 (many times). in the present study, altruism was operationalized as students’ reports of helping others in distress (e.g., hurt, sad) (developmental studies center, 2005). students were asked to think about (“since the start of this school year …”) how often they had done behaviors such as “i helped someone who was hurt” and “i cheered someone up who was feeling sad.” previous research has shown evidence of good internal consistency ( = .82) for the full scale (developmental studies center, 2005). in the present study, internal consistency of the five items was assessed via cronbach’s alpha and was good at both baseline ( =.84) and post-test ( =.82). social and emotional competence (sec). the construct of social and emotional competence (sec) was assessed via a composite of teachers’ ratings of their students’ empathy, helpfulness, prosociality, emotional awareness, and acceptance by peers (kam & greenberg, 1998). specifically, teachers reported on their students’ sec related to prosociality (i.e., empathy, compassion, self and social awareness) by completing six items of the social and emotional competence subscale of the teacher social competence rating scale (kam & greenberg, 1998) for each of their participating students, both at baseline and post-test. the canadian province in which this study took place includes social and emotional competencies as part of the provincial curricular objectives (see https://curriculum.gov.bc.ca/competencies/personal-and-social/personal-awareness-andresponsibility). therefore, teachers at schools in this province are well versed and practiced in responding to questions about their students’ sel and classroom context. example items were “shows empathy and compassion for other’s feelings” and “provides help, shares materials, and acts cooperatively with others” and were rated on a 5-point likert-type scale, ranging from 0 (almost never) to 5 (almost always). previous research has provided evidence of the validity and reliability of this full scale (kam & greenberg, 1998) and good internal consistency has been found with samples of early adolescent students (schonert-reichl & lawlor, 2010). internal consistency of the six items was assessed via cronbach’s alpha and was high in this study, both at baseline ( = .93) and post-test ( = .94). findings the findings are presented in two sections. the first describes the preliminary intervention effects; the impact of p4c on students’ prosociality and classroom context. the second section takes a personcentered approach to investigate the interaction between students’ baseline sec and the p4c intervention on classroom context and students’ prosociality. program outcomes intervention effects a series of analyses of covariance (ancovas) were conducted to investigate post-test differences between the intervention and control group on outcomes related to student prosociality (empathy, perspective-taking, altruism) and the classroom context, while controlling for demographics such as age, gender, and baseline scores on the outcomes. cohen’s d is provided as a measure of effect size, whereby d = 0.2 is considered small, d = 0.5 is medium, and d = 0.8 is large (cohen, 2013). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 35 prosociality. results from a series of ancovas, controlling for age, gender, and baseline scores, indicated no significant differences between intervention and control groups on empathy, f(1, 228) = .10, p = .76, d = .05, perspective-taking f(1, 228) = .47, p = .49, d = .11, or altruism, f(1, 228) = .14, p = .71, d = .03 (see table 5 for means). there was, however, a significant difference between groups on teacher-rated sec, with the control group being rated by their teachers as higher in sec at post-test than the p4c group students, f(1, 225) = 4.93, p = .03, d = .29. specifically, the control group did not change significantly in sec from preto post-test, while the p4c group declined. classroom context. after controlling for age, gender, and baseline perceived autonomy scores, a significant difference was found between intervention and control group on student-rated autonomy at post-test, f (1, 228) = 8.89, p = .003, d = .29. as can be seen in table 5, students in the p4c group reported lower autonomy than students in the control group at post-test (i.e., after the p4c intervention). moreover, as illustrated, the intervention group declined in autonomy from baseline to post-test, while the control group remained relatively unchanged. there was no significant difference between intervention and control students on classroom supportiveness, f (1, 226) = 2.41, p = .12, d = .21. both intervention group and control group students reported a decline in classroom supportiveness from baseline to post-test (see table 5). differential effects: teachers’ reports of social and emotional competence at baseline p4c outcomes. to further unpack the impact of the p4c intervention and to investigate the potential influence of students’ baseline sec on the effectiveness of the p4c program, a k-means cluster analysis was used to create profile clusters of students based on their standardized (baseline) teacher-rated sec scores (milligan & cooper, 1988; steinley, 2004, 2006). k-means cluster analysis sorts cases into clusters that minimize differences among members of each cluster, via an iterative process using squared euclidean distances from initial cluster centers (beauchaine & beauchaine, 2002; denham et al., 2012; matsuba et al., 2007). a two-cluster solution provided the best statistical and conceptual fit, by maximizing distance between cluster centres and providing distinct groups with adequate n in each cluster for subsequent analyses. one hundred and nine students were assigned to the first group labeled low teacher-rated sec (mean scores below 50th percentile) and 129 students were assigned to the second group which was labeled high teacher-rated sec (mean scores above the 50th percentile) sec (see table 6 for means). an ancova validated a significant difference between clusters on the cluster variable, teacher-rated sec (see table 6). a series of ancovas were conducted, with dimensions of classroom context and prosociality as the dependent variables, experimental condition and teacher-rated sec cluster as independent variables, and age, gender, and baseline scores as covariates. no main or interaction effects were found on students’ post-test reports of classroom supportiveness, perspective-taking, altruism or teacher-rated sec. with respect to students’ reports of empathy, a significant interaction was found between experimental condition and teacher-rated sec, f(1, 223) = 6.89, p = .009, d =.35. specifically, for students with high teacher-rated sec at baseline, the students in the p4c group reported significantly analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 36 higher post-test empathy scores (m = 3.67, se = .06) than students in the control groups (m = 3.48, se =.07), f(1, 223) = 3.94, p = .048, d = .17. in contrast, for students with low teacher-rated sec at baseline, the p4c group had lower empathy at post-test (m = 3.48, se = .08), compared to controls (m = 3.67, se = .08), f(1, 223) = 3.04, p = .08, d =.16. discussion the purpose of this pilot study was to investigate the impact of the p4c intervention program on students’ secs and autonomy in a middle-school classroom context. we were also curious to explore the potential differential effect of p4c on students with different baseline secs. in other words, is p4c more effective for some students over others and/or does it need to be coupled with prerequisites? despite some students feeling as though they learned about perspective-taking and acceptance, there were no significant differences at post-test between students in the p4c and control groups on students’ reports of their own empathy, perspective-taking, or altruism, after controlling for gender, age, and baseline scores. indeed, these findings align with some previous research that has found no differences in prosocial behavior following a p4c intervention (trickey & topping, 2006; youssef et al., 2016). there was, however, a significant difference in teacher-rated sec at post-test, with the p4c group being rated by their teachers as having lower sec than the control group. these results are in contrast with previous research and suggest additional research is needed to investigate the impact of p4c on students’ prosociality, particularly from the teachers’ perspective. findings indicated there was no difference between p4c and control groups on classroom supportiveness at post-test, however, there was a significant difference between groups on student-rated autonomy at post-test, with students in the intervention group reporting lower levels of autonomy in their classroom than students in the control group. this result was contrary to what we expected from the implementation of the p4c. however, after taking a closer look at the autonomy survey items, it seems that they might assess students’ overall feelings of autonomy at school and not just within the p4c program (e.g., “in my class i get to do things that i want to do,” “in my class the teacher and students decide together what the rules will be,” “the teacher in my class asks the students to help decide what the class should do”). moreover, students’ perceived sense of autonomy has been shown to decline in the transition from elementary to secondary school, with students feeling they have fewer opportunities to participate in decisions, less choice and less self-management (eccles & roeser, 2011). a program like p4c was assumed to buffer this decline by intentionally providing students with opportunities to exercise their autonomy. instead, however, this program may have drawn attention to the mismatch between the autonomy early adolescent students yearn for at this developmental stage and the lack of opportunities provided in middle school contexts to enact this important competency. p4c programs have been described before as a “trojan horse” (vansieleghem & kennedy, 2011). vansieleghem and kennedy (2011) wrote: “this is to suggest that the discursive form that characterizes philosophy for children— communal dialogue in an ideal speech situation—is inherently subversive of the goals of biopower, and as such represents a sort of trojan horse wheeled into the ideological state apparatus of western schooling” (p. 179). and it is for this reason that p4c practitioners have discussed whether it is even analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 37 ethical to engage students in p4c, especially when children live in oppressive societies where they have not much choice or possibilities to change their environment (ghazinejad & ruitenberg, 2014). however, more research is needed, which incorporates qualitative investigations with students, to truly unpack these findings regarding p4c and students’ perceived autonomy. the finding of a significant interaction between intervention condition and teacher-rated sec clusters on student empathy is notable. specifically, for students rated by teachers as having high sec at baseline, the p4c group reported higher post-test empathy than the control group. in contrast, for students with low baseline teacher-rated sec, the results were the opposite. these findings may imply that a minimum level of social and emotional skills and competencies is needed to effectively engage with and benefit from p4c approaches. however, more research is needed to investigate this further. limitations we recognize that concepts like empathy, perspective-taking, and autonomy are highly complex phenomena. with a combination of self-report measures and teacher observations we attempted to capture internal reflection on the subscale questions as well as observable behavior. nonetheless, we realize that this is just a small aspect. additional qualitative data would give even more insight into each child’s cultivation of feeling and thinking as well as how those are interlaced. furthermore, the mix of instruments and the revision of instruments might have affected our outcomes and needs to be addressed in further research. another limitation of this study was that the duration of the implementation was only 8 weeks rather than the intended 16-weeks (45-minute sessions twice per week), due to an unanticipated districtwide strike. given that most studies of p4c pedagogies that have found positive results conducted the interventions for a longer period of time (collins, 2005; topping & trickey, 2007b), the shortened duration in the present study may have contributed to the limited findings. however, findings are equivocal about the ideal length of sel interventions and programs targeting prosocial outcomes (durlak & dupre, 2008), with some studies indicating that a longer duration is not necessarily better or more effective (botvin, 2000). it is possible that a longer implementation period could have allowed us to reach out to those students who were less engaged, as it takes time to cultivate a coi with a larger group (e.g., collins, 2005; fair et al., 2015; topping & trickey, 2007b) and takes some students time to develop the abilities and courage to participate in these discussions. nevertheless, more research is needed to determine whether the shortened length of the intervention indeed impacted the findings. finally, the large class size of the participating students (n ~30) may have created less opportunity for them to share and participate in the discussions, resulting in students’ varying engagement levels. participation in the community of inquiry is an important part of philosophical inquiry approaches (lipman, 2003) and studies that have found positive results have typically had smaller groups (e.g., gardner, 1998; lipman & bierman, 1980). it is possible that the large groups of participants in each class in this study might have contributed to the limited findings. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 38 conclusion and future directions the exposure to the p4c program resulted in lower student self-reports of autonomy, however, it is unknown whether this was a true iatrogenic effect or if it reflects, as posited, an increase in students’ critical awareness of their own thoughts and feelings as well as the thoughts and feelings of others, and more understanding of their sense of freedom and classroom autonomy. additional research, utilizing focus groups or interviews with students, is needed to further investigate these nuanced effects among early adolescents. moreover, results indicated that sec may act as an important prerequisite to gaining benefits from p4c approaches. future studies are needed that investigate the effects of implementing philosophical or moral reasoning programs such as p4c in combination with sel programs and practices that perhaps more explicitly teach social and emotional competencies. taken together, the present research emphasizes the need for continued investigations of the use of p4c approaches with students in middle school. references battistich, v., solomon, d., watson, m., & schaps, e. 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(2016). how teacher emotional support motivates students: the mediating roles of perceived peer relatedness, autonomy support, and competence. learning and instruction, 42, 95-103. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.learninstruc.2016.01.004 ryan, r. m., & deci, e. l. (2017). self-determination theory: basic psychological needs in motivation, development, and wellness. guilford publications. schertz, m. (2007). avoiding ‘passive empathy’ with philosophy for children. journal of moral education, 36(2), 185–198. https://doi.org/10.1080/03057240701325308 schleifer, m., daniel, m. f., peyronnet, e., & lecomte, s. (2003). the impact of philosophical discussions on moral autonomy, judgment, empathy and the recognition of emotion in fiveyear-olds. thinking: the journal of philosophy for children, 16(4), 4-12. https://doi.org/10.5840/thinking200316410 schonert-reichl, k. a. 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(2015). cortical thickness and prosocial behaviour in schoolage children: a population-based mri study, social neuroscience, 10(6), 571-582. https://doi.org/10.1080/17470919.2015.1014063 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.learninstruc.2016.01.004 https://doi.org/10.1080/03057240701325308 https://doi.org/10.5840/thinking200316410 https://doi.org/10.1177/019874299301800306 https://doi.org/10.1007/s12671-010-0011-8 https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1007/s12310-011-9064-7 https://doi.org/10.5840/thinking199713215 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17103-1_6 https://doi.org/10.1348/000711005x48266 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0037386 https://doi.org/10.1080/17470919.2015.1014063 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 42 tian, s., & liao, p. f. (2016). philosophy for children with learners of english as a foreign language. journal of philosophy in schools, 3(1), 40-58. topping, k. j., & trickey, s. (2007a). collaborative philosophical enquiry for school children: cognitive effects at 10–12 years. british journal of educational psychology, 77(2), 271-288. https://doi.org/10.1348/000709906x105328 topping, k. j. & trickey, s. (2007b). collaborative philosophical inquiry for school children: cognitive gains at 2-year follow-up. british journal of educational psychology, 77(4), 787–96. https://doi.org/10.1348/000709907x193032 trickey, s., & topping, k. j. (2006). collaborative philosophical enquiry for school children: socioemotional effects at 10–12 years. school psychology international, 27(5), 599-614. https://doi.org/10.1177/0143034306073417 van ryzin, m. j., gravely, a. a., & roseth, c. j. (2009). autonomy, belongingness and engagement in school as contributors to adolescent psychological well-being. journal of youth and adolescence, 38, 1-12. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10964-007-9257-4 vansieleghem, n. & kennedy, d. (2011). what is philosophy with children – after matthew lipman? journal of philosophy of education, 45(2), 171-183. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.14679752.2011.00801.x wanless, s. b., & domitrovich, c. e. (2015). readiness to implement school-based social and emotional learning interventions: using research on factors related to implementation to maximize quality. prevention science, 16(8), 1037-1043. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11121-0150612-5 weber, b. (2013). philosophieren mit kindern zum thema menschenrechte. [philosophizing with children about human rights]. germany/freiburg: karl alber publisher. weber, b., & wolf, a. (2017). questioning the question: how to cultivate philosophical questioning in a community of inquiry. in m. gregory, j. haynes, & k. murris (eds.), the routledge international handbook of philosophy for children (pp. 74-82). routledge publisher. woolley, m. e., & bowen, g. l. (2007). in the context of risk: supportive adults and the school engagement of middle school students. family relations, 56(1), 92-104. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-3729.2007.00442.x youssef, c., campbell, m., & tangen, d. (2016). the effects of participation in a pfc program on australian elementary school students. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis, 37(1), 1-19. appendix table 3 additional teacher feedback about the p4c program question sample responses which parts of the process of the [p4c] program did you feel had the most positive effect on your class? “discussion based on video clips and the process of generating questions for discussion” “discussion was engaging with good topics” https://doi.org/10.1348/000709906x105328 https://doi.org/10.1348/000709906x105328 https://doi.org/10.1348/000709907x193032 https://doi.org/10.1177%2f0143034306073417 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.2011.00801.x https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.2011.00801.x https://doi.org/10.1007/s11121-015-0612-5 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11121-015-0612-5 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-3729.2007.00442.x analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 43 “i think the discussions were interesting however wasn’t completely sure how thing were impacting the students empathy” “the opportunities for all students to share & be heard. the facilitators worked hard to make contact with each student each session.” please provide any additional comments that you think might be important for us to know as part of this evaluation. “so many other factors influence the children at school, at home, etc. i don’t know to what extent participating in the study raised their overall empathy or whether other factors came into play.” “they seemed to enjoy the discussions and ideas, but i don’t know if there were any effects beyond class time.” table 4 students’ open-ended feedback on the p4c program questions sample responses is there anything else that you learned about in the p4c program? “almost everyone has different emotions” “be kind to your friends and help them” “everything is the way it is for a reason” “how to see things from other people’s perspective” “i already knew everything they were teaching” “i had learned about acceptance and how people think, act and speak” “i learn how to treat others with respect, share opinions” “i learned a little about why we need emotions” “i learned that people can be brave and scared at the same time” “i learned that we are all philosophers” analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 44 what did you like best about the p4c program? “being able to learn more about my friends” “everything, literally” “how we got to listen to each other share and the journals we wrote in” “how we got to open up and tell about ourselves” “i liked asking big questions” “i liked how they accepted everyone” “talking about death” if you were going to talk about the p4c program to other children, what would you say? “be open to talking” “don’t judge” “[p4c] can learn things and it also can make you think deeply about questions” “it’s a program where you talk and discuss a lot” “it’s boring, but you learn some stuff” address correspondences to: mahboubeh asgari, ph.d. canadian mental health association, bc division vancouver, bc, canada asgarim@gmail.com jenna whitehead, ph.d. youth development instrument (ydi) implementation coordinator simon fraser university burnaby, bc, canada jenna_whitehead@sfu.ca barbara weber, phd interdisciplinary studies graduate student university of british columbia (vancouver campus) vancouver, bc, canada barbara.weber@ubc.ca kimberly a. schonert-reichl, phd novo foundation endowed chair in social and emotional learning department of psychology university of illinois at chicago chicago, il, usa reichl@uic.edu mailto:asgarim@gmail.com mailto:barbara.weber@ubc.ca mailto:reichl@uic.edu analytic teaching and philosophical praxis analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 59 dialogue and writing philosophy marc bobro clov: “what is there to keep me here?” hamm: “the dialogue.” (samuel beckett, endgame) introduction ialogue combines the greek dia (“across”) with logos (“word” or “speech”) to mean a mutual exchange of meaning across space and time. a dialogue involves two or more entities in communication with each other, taking turns in some physical or conceptual space that separates and distinguishes these entities. the discipline of philosophy is no stranger to the dialogue form. philosophers certainly read many dialogues in their training and still assign them for students to read, including: plato’s dialogues, boethius’ consolation of philosophy, galileo’s dialogue concerning the two chief world systems, george berkeley’s three dialogues between hylas and philonous, david hume’s dialogues concerning natural religion, ludwig wittgenstein’s philosophical investigations, and john perry’s recent a dialogue on personal identity and immortality. however, philosophers today rarely write dialogues themselves or ask students to write them. philosophy has veered away from the form. straight, expository prose is now the standard for philosophical writing in and out of the classroom.1 here i argue for its return, especially when it comes to student papers in philosophy.2 to be clear, this is not an argument that dialogues should outright replace other forms of philosophical writing, but rather for their inclusion. then i talk about how to write a dialogue. finally, i give an example of a student-written dialogue and offer some commentary. but first let us begin with the varieties of dialogues, because, while all have their place in philosophical writing, it is important to keep them distinct when crafting a writing assignment that incorporates dialogue. different types of dialogue in a series of articles and books on argumentation and critical thinking, douglas walton provides a useful taxonomy and exegesis of the different types of dialogue. these are the six basic types of dialogue, which walton divides according to its overarching goal: to persuade another character that 1 the best contemporary books on writing philosophy—e.g., feinberg, doing philosophy, and edwards, writing to learn—do not refer to the dialogue form at all. 2 i would also argue that philosophers should employ the dialogical form more often. i wrote portions of dialogue in a published paper on leibniz and once wrote and presented a dialogue on descartes’ account of immortality at a philosophy conference. i had a colleague do the reading with me. d analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 60 some particular proposition is true, to inquire as to whether a particular proposition or thesis is true, to negotiate over items of value, to seek information from one or more of the other characters, to deliberate over the best way to solve a practical problem, and finally, to win at all cost. with some restrictions, one and the same dialogue can have more than one of these goals. all can arguably be used by philosophers and can be featured in philosophical writing assignments. persuasive dialogues employ arguments that attempt to show or prove to at least one other participant that some thesis is true. at least two characters in such dialogues have commitments, in other words, propositions that they hold to be true at the start of the dialogue. but, as such dialogues proceed, characters typically retract some of those commitments. they are getting persuaded, in other words. “as the various speech acts of asserting, questioning, and so on are brought forward in turn by the participants, propositions are added to or deleted from the participants’ commitment sets” (walton, 31). most of the famous dialogues mentioned above are persuasive dialogues, or at least involve some form of persuasion. similar to persuasive dialogues, inquiry dialogues also attempt to show or prove that some thesis or particular proposition is true or that there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate the truth or falsity of a thesis or proposition. but departing from persuasive dialogues, “in the inquiry, the whole intent is to minimize or even eliminate the possibility of retraction of commitments as the dialogue proceeds” (walton, 70). where a persuasive dialogue can seem frustrating—a two steps forward, one step back kind of feel—there is a kind of inexorability about the inquiry dialogue. once a proposition has been established there is no looping back to make sure that all of the participants are ready to move on to the next step in the argument. the goal is to advance with new propositions being derived and thus useful for the rest of the dialogue. the focus is on the logic of an argument for a proposition or series of propositions rather than how a view came to be held in a kind of autobiographical fashion. imagine spinoza’s ethics written in dialogue form. it is modeled after the demonstrative proof style of euclid’s geometry, proceeding from definitions and axioms, which are then used to derive propositions which remain true and useful for the remainder of the text. the first part of wittgenstein’s philosophical investigations can be read as an inquiry dialogue. the goal in a negotiation dialogue diverges significantly from both persuasive and inquiry dialogues. the truth or falsity of propositions is the primary focus of the latter two, whereas “the issue in a negotiation dialogue is not truth or falsity, but rather money or some kind of goods, economic resources, or other items of value that are at issue” (walton, 100). this may seem utterly antithetical to the goals of a philosophy paper. but i can envision some negotiation dialogues working in a philosophical context, for some negotiations have the special goal of “wise agreement,” in which “the legitimate interests of each side to the extent possible, resolves conflicting interests fairly, is durable, and takes community interests into account” (fisher and ury, 4). because there is a focus in interests, as opposed to positions, an effective negotiator may need to empathize with the other participants. and since empathy and empathy-related phenomena are important in understanding social and moral philosophy, crafting a negotiation dialogue that involves empathy on the part of at least one character can be a useful exercise for students, especially in an ethics class. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 61 in a dialogue where the main goal is to seek information, there is an exchange between two or more participants, one or more of whom has specific information that another participant desires or needs. it can come in the form of an interview, a solicitation for advice, or consultation with an expert. walton describes this kind of dialogue as “asymmetrical in nature, yet highly collaborative, and non-adversarial” (walton, 126). some philosophical dialogues have certainly adopted this as a goal. in leibniz’s dialogue new essays on human understanding, the character, theophilus, tries to understand the philosophical system of the character philalethes, who represents john locke, by going through, section by section, locke’s own essay concerning human understanding.3 i can also see this as a useful way of writing dialogue for students. consider a class on existentialism where students are assigned to write an imaginary dialogue between a reporter and simone de beauvoir, with the purpose of understanding the relationship between her existential ethics of freedom and second-wave feminism. deliberative dialogues have the goal of solving a practical problem shared by the characters. “they discuss different ways of proceeding or propose solutions, and they divide into factions or points of view, each arguing that one of these proposed lines of action is the prudent course to pursue” (walton, 151). while there will be disagreement and argument, such dialogues do not come across as adversarial, since “the aim is for them to come to agreement on a line of action or policy they can implement together” (walton, 151). so, imagine two or more characters in a dialogue engaging in a debate over peter singer’s work on world aid. however, their goal is not to determine whether his claim that those not living in poverty have a duty to help those living in poverty is true—perhaps they are already convinced that it is true—but rather to figure out the most efficient and equitable way to donate. finally, let us look at eristic dialogues. such dialogues probably mirror more closely the common usage of the word ‘argument’. for in ordinary language, “argument” often “includes the idea of a quarrel, a kind of angry or adversarial verbal exchange based on a conflict between two parties (perceived or real)” (walton, 178). walton notes that “with the exception of the ancients (notably plato and aristotle) logicians of the past have pretty well expunged eristic dialogue from their concept of the argument” (walton, 178). so, in a dialogue that values careful, reasoned argument, eristic dialogue has little place. but eristic dialogue still has a place, at least when it comes to learning philosophy. imagine a two-part assignment where the first part reveals two characters seeking victory in argument, by using any and all means, including fallacies, obfuscations, and rhetorical devices, to confound the opponent and win. then a second part where the characters are not allowed such means. further, let us be honest here. philosophers like to think of themselves as purely objective seekers, not of winning arguments, but of finding the truth, or at least coming to some agreement with others. but in practice, philosophers sometimes engage in heated, eristic exchanges, namely, quarrels. should philosophy teachers totally ignore this side of their discipline? which kinds of dialogue from the above list are best suited for the philosophy classroom? that depends on the philosophy instructor’s approach to philosophy. since reasoned argument is often considered the “bread and butter” of philosophical investigation, and philosophy is often taught by 3 yes, it has a goal of persuasion—leibniz is trying to show that his own system makes more sense than that of locke’s—but it is nonetheless undoubtedly also intended as an exegesis of locke’s essay concerning human understanding. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 62 learning and analyzing arguments, and the seeking of truth—whether about it is the truth about reality, the right thing to do, or the correct interpretation of a philosophical work—is often the goal of philosophical argument, persuasive and inquiry dialogues are naturally suited to such an approach to philosophy. but philosophy does not always just concern itself with reasoned argument and the seeking of truth. as shown above, dialogues that seek information, negotiate, deliberate, and even express emotions can also be appropriate, depending on what the philosophy instructor is trying to accomplish. why use the dialogue form? all of the above varieties of dialogue can be featured in philosophical writing assignments, but should they be? here i argue for an affirmative answer. i have been assigning dialogues for many years, ever since i began teaching my own classes in graduate school. i hesitate to speak for other disciplines, but the dialogue (in all of its forms) is particularly suited for philosophical writing, especially when it comes to having students learn and practice philosophy. here are three reasons why. first, philosophical writing should value alternate interpretations, opposing viewpoints and perspectives, other disciplines, and any experience or detail that has any chance at knowledge or truth. inspiration and ideas can come from any and all sources. if you devalue the views of others, simply because these views do not align with your own, why should others who have such views discourse with you? so many beginning papers are too one-sided, written “under a banner,” so to speak. thesis papers can perpetuate this one-sidedness, especially when the instructor demands that the student write with feigned confidence. assigning dialogues, especially of the persuasive, inquiry, negotiation, and deliberative varieties, is a way of making a paper much less one-sided, without simply commanding, “don’t write so one-sided!” writing a dialogue compels the author to determine and articulate what each side will most likely say in response to each other. a conversation between two people naturally brings out the reasons one holds a particular position, which is very important in any philosophy paper. in fact, because the dialogue form is naturally suited for giving reasons for holding certain positions, it can help in both writing a good essay as well as gaining further understanding of the topic. if the dialogue structure is not what the final philosophy paper calls for, i would still recommend writing a dialogue as a draft and then “translate” it into the assigned format. second, whether or not any knowledge or agreement has been reached, it should become evident that it is not you or your agenda that is the most important feature of your piece of writing. it is rather the issue under discussion or problem to be solved, and sometimes even knowledge or truth.4 philosophical writing should, at least sometimes, challenge the reader to question their own assumptions, views, and prejudices; it should undermine the security and surety the reader may feel. the dogmatic reader should feel especially uncomfortable. this does not mean that the reader is wrong. it is just that the reader should feel unsure at some point in their reading of the paper. bertrand russell put it aptly: “dissipate certainty.” the dialogue form—especially of the persuasive, 4 i recognize that this might sound old-fashioned to ears that have soaked in structuralist and other postmodern thought, but the pursuit of truth still guides much of philosophy. it is certainly taught this way in most philosophy departments. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 63 negotiation, deliberative, and eristic varieties—naturally renders all sides on an equal standing, initially at least.5 philosophical writing should also challenge the author. in other words, the virtue of humility applies not only to a person’s character but also to philosophical writing. dialogues are great in delaying your judgment. do not rush a philosophy paper. and if your judgment never arrives, it is fine to end a dialogue at an impasse (aporia). when learning philosophy, it is probably best not to pressure yourself into taking a confident stand anyway. it is premature for that. philosophical questions are notoriously difficult, with some debated for thousands of years. why should you be expected to have a firm belief with regard to justice, beauty, determinism, the structure of reality, etc.? realistically, how many students are aware of the debates talked about in a philosophy class before taking the class? writing dialogues is a great way of having students debate a topic without committing themselves to any one position. information-seeking and inquiry dialogues, or even persuasive dialogues where the author simply attempts to persuade while making no claims to actually finding the truth, function particularly well in this respect. regarding the third reason to write in dialogue form, i need to make a distinction that is commonly made in some disciplines—e.g., literature, film studies, and rhetoric—but less so in philosophy. there is the diegetic, which refers to the implied world of the work; that is, the setting, characters, words, sights, events, and sounds that “belong to the narrative.” then there is the nondiegetic. this refers to the elements “outside the narrative,” such as the narrator, background music, opening credits or closing credits, and introduction or conclusion. the audience is aware of these non-diegetic elements, but the characters of the work are not. much of philosophy today has no diegetic elements; or, to put it another way, there is typically no distance between what is happening on the page and the reader. it is often written as if the author and the reader are working together to address some philosophical debate. any “distance,” for instance, in terms of clarity of communication, is unintentional. importantly, too, what is written today in philosophy typically is not intended to capture just one way a philosophical debate could go. it is supposed to offer what the author considers is the best or most comprehensive way to address a debate. but dialogues capture one take of a philosophical debate, that in real life could have gone in different ways, with no intention of it being the best or most comprehensive take. consider an analogy. beethoven’s compositions, especially in the cadenzas, were actually transcriptions of his own improvisations. by looking at the transcriptions themselves, in isolation, we cannot tell that they capture only one version of beethoven’s playing that would change every time he played. we tend to think that “classical” music is all planned out in advance—like a typical essay is—but beethoven himself was known for his improvisational abilities on piano. his published cadenzas were just one “take.” listening to beethoven live, one never knew what one would hear. for publication and posterity, he would notate his cadenzas, but only one of the many versions. this frustrated him because it was not representative of his actual playing and musicality. this is analogous to a good philosophical conversation. it’s not about it going one and only one way. 5 i would argue that the least successful of plato’s dialogues are the ones that seem to portray socrates’ interlocutors on a lower intellectual plane. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 64 philosophy as practiced by philosophers in real time does not have a prescribed path; it can go in various, sometimes surprising, ways. plato, and others who wrote in dialogue form, aimed to capture in writing what it feels like to engage in philosophy. this is the diegetic. a discourse written in standard essay format will never fully capture this experience, just as a transcription of an improvised passage, will never capture what it is like to listen to beethoven’s playing. by writing dialogues— whether they are persuasive or eristic—students create or recreate naturally for themselves what often happens in philosophy. so, three reasons to assign dialogues have been given and defended: (a) dialogues naturally allow various positions to be considered, (b) dialogues compel a delay in judgment and accordingly help foster a sense of intellectual humility, and (c) dialogues reflect philosophical praxis. i want to add a couple of supplementary points about the writing of dialogues. first, i prefer philosophical writing that emulates the spoken word and its usual simplicity, directness, and personality. any complexity and subtlety that it carries should be in the content of the concepts involved and the paper’s logical development, not in its choice of words. dialogue, being basically a conversation, is better suited to emulate the spoken word than is the standard essay format. maybe it is for this reason that even the term is more welcoming. “dialogue” has all sorts of positive connotations. google the term; it always references something positive. more traditional formats do not. “essay,” “paper,” “defense,” and “thesis,” do not tend to excite the student. but “dialogue” can. writing one can be fun. the student may actually want to write the paper; it is a different and creative way to write a philosophy paper. indeed, sometimes a change in format or structure alone helps overcome the bad habits students have picked up, but in a new and enjoyable way. and the dialogue form greatly increases the chances of papers varying, with the vast possibility of different characters and settings. few teachers, if any, enjoy the prospect of reading papers that are very similar to each other. there is one important caveat: some students balk at writing dialogues. by the time they take a philosophy class, they may have developed fears regarding “creative writing.” interestingly, some of the blame for this lies at the hand of teachers themselves. in a popular college textbook on writing, the authors write: “many creative writing teachers are inclined to feel that writing good dialogue is a gift. you have it or you don’t. you were born with an ear for dialogue or you weren’t” (skwire & skwire, 115). whether or not this is actually true—and i have my doubts6—i have two replies. first, writing philosophical papers in dialogue form need not be thought of as “creative writing.” such a term usually gets applied only to fiction writing. so, the kind of standards applied to “good dialogue” here do not necessarily translate to philosophical writing. second, even so, anecdotally, far fewer students have a fear of writing dialogue than those who fear writing standard essays. second, dialogue is a tried and true form of philosophical writing. this is not to say that it is the only tried and true form, or that it is superior overall to other forms. the dialectical, give-and-take, less 6 from my experience, people certainly learn writing at different rates, but given time, the gap between the “born good” writers and the “learned to be good” writers becomes so diminished as to become negligible. the distinction therefore amounts to a self-fulfilling prophecy. so even if the authors of this writing textbook are correct, they shouldn’t tell students this. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 65 one-sided approach that i have articulated above can certainly be achieved outside the dialogue form. my argument has been to show that dialogue, in its varieties, is naturally suited to achieve those goals and easier for students to fulfill. here, i want to emphasize that it has some serious provenance. some famous philosophical dialogues are mentioned in the introduction, but the dialogues of plato perhaps set the best example. plato certainly agreed that the dialogue form is well suited for philosophical discourse. all of the varieties of dialogue that walton discuss manifest themselves in plato’s dialogues. there are characters who attempt to persuade socrates, and of course socrates spends ample time trying to persuading them. but also, there are characters who seek information from socrates. socrates too seeks information from others. think of his famous recounting in the symposium of what he learned about love from diotima. there is inquiry-extended investigations with no retractions. there are negotiations and deliberations where the goal is not primarily the truth, but of coming to agreements and solutions to practical problems. there is of course quarreling as well—characters who seem to say anything to simply win a debate. given that it is so suited for philosophical discourse, it might be surprising to learn that in plato’s dialogues we find everything we expect from great literature: symbolism, suspense, allusion, humor, references to other works, and unforgettable characters. we also find drama, comedy, tragedy, biography, autobiography, and social commentary. there are lampoons of personalities such as aristophanes, himself a lampooner. plato’s portrayals of these, plus socrates of course, are so good and complete that it is effectively impossible to distinguish plato’s depictions from the historical. plato, the person himself, is curiously hard to pin down too. this is due in no small part to the fact that he chose to write dialogues exclusively. moreover, beyond the rare reference, plato’s dialogues never include himself as a character, and so he never speaks to us directly. he is, in effect, the playwright and manager who loiters backstage behind the characters. even if he did render himself a character, we would not know if that portrayal of himself is accurate. a dialogue between two or more entities can be housed within one person.7 “philosophy is the mind’s dialogue with itself,” writes plato in the theaetetus. since the central character of his dialogues, socrates, did not write anything down, plato’s dialogues may be more himself dialoguing with himself by asking questions and trying to answer them or by setting up several different frames of reference, and comparing and contrasting them. perhaps it is plato himself examining his own assumptions in order to understand himself and challenge his preconceptions of the world. famously, plato has socrates assert in the apology that “the unexamined life is not worth living.” the dialogue itself is a way to examine oneself. since we do not know which views from which characters actually represent plato’s own views, it is tempting to think that one or more characters are being used as mouthpieces for his own ideas. but even concerning the famous platonic forms, it is not easy to find a passage where this theory is unequivocally endorsed and championed. in fact, the most explicit mention of the forms—located in plato’s parmenides—is followed by a series of objections to them. 7 the ancient greeks had a tendency to represent thought as an internal dialogue. now, we do not have direct and authoritative access to all of our mental states, so internal dialogue can also be a way of articulating or guessing at mental processes, e.g., motivations, that are not necessarily conscious. euripides’ medea is a perfect example. see gill, personality in greek epic, tragedy, and philosophy, 59. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 66 dialogue structure students of philosophy have all read dialogues, but in writing one what do you need to do? it is not as simple as transcribing a conversation. do not try to emulate a real life conversation, for often these are disjointed, jumping from one topic to the next. during breakfast at a las vegas hotel, i once overheard a conversation between four people that managed in less than 15 minutes to cover 4 totally different topics: meat processing, bowling, working at walmart, and alien abduction. it was fascinating to listen in—at least it had this going for it—but the conversation moved very quickly between one subject to the next; there were no logical transitions. though this conversation was not dull, real life conversations certainly can be. to write dialogue that both flows and is interesting, look at the transcripts of good plays and of course plato himself. the best dialogue has been said to be an artistic rendition of how we speak, but i would also add it needs to have some sort of logic to it. consider the following advice from a book on writing: “after you become used to the imaginary-dialogue technique and develop your confidence in using it, you will notice that a dialogue will often gather enough momentum to require little conscious direction from you. it will, in a sense, direct itself. when this happens, don’t worry. it is a good sign, an indication that you have fully engaged your imagination and given yourself to the intellectual exchange with your imaginary opponent. let the dialogue continue; what develops will usually be very useful. if it begins to turn away from the important concerns involved, just steer it back again” (ruggiero, 2015). i have two points to make in response. first, letting your imagination run may not, and probably will not, result in an “intellectuel” exchange. and even if it does, it will probably be of little use in answering a philosophy prompt. perhaps the result will be eristic, but even the eristic dialogues of plato have a kind of logical structure to them. the above advice is much better suited for the kind of conversational dialogue found in fiction. second, the suggestion that dialogues can simply write themselves is perhaps the worst kind of advice that student writers are given. it is analogous to telling a beginning piano student, “just let your fingers float over the keyboard. relax. and now play!” stream of consciousness playing (or writing) is suitable only for the trained and experienced. and, even then, it may not be the best advice. in your dialogue you can include anything you want for the sake of clarity, logic, and completeness. so even movie dialogues are not the place to look. film is usually about showing, not telling. inner dialogue is eschewed. what the character actually thinks is often left up to the viewer’s interpretation. in philosophical writing, for the most part, the aim should be clarity and comprehensiveness. some great philosophy is vague of course, as in philosophical novels, poetry, and parables. but this is one aspect of great philosophy that probably should not be mimicked by undergraduates. as mentioned previously, a dialogue is an exchange between two or more characters (or perhaps even one person and their conscience, or a “better self”). often the characters are listed at the beginning of the dialogue, but sometimes they can just appear in the course of the dialogue. an introductory sentence or paragraph is usually helpful. in other words, offer a narrative at the start to introduce the characters (and perhaps the scenario). consider this title and introductory paragraph to analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 67 a dialogue i received 20 years ago. unfortunately, i do not recall the exact wording of the prompt, but it had something to do with st. anselm’s proof for god’s existence. title: “in the purgatory known as bakersfield, there isn’t much to do, but to question the existence of god, and hang out in denny’s bar” setting: “suppose that on the way to los angeles in a beat-up old ford taurus two twenty-somethings break down in bakersfield, the result of the car’s transmission having fallen out while cruising at a hundred and ten miles per hour. the momentum from the car’s velocity is enough to carry them into a nearby rest-stop, where a more than benevolent tow-truck driver awaits to tow their ford to the nearest mechanic, for a more than ample fare. the circumstances of the moment send desmond and leo spiraling off into a philosophical inquiry concerning the nature of god and the questioning of his existence, to which the tow-truck driver occasionally chimes in.” after reading the title and setting, i wanted to read further, and not only to hear what the author had to say about anselm’s proof for god’s existence. that’s the non-diegetic. i also wanted to see what desmond, leo, and the truck driver would say regarding god. that is the diegetic element. stoking the attention of an experienced professor who has assigned and graded thousands of papers on god’s nature and existence is not easy to achieve. the paper did not disappoint either. how does one proceed after the title, setting, and list of characters? make each character in your dialogue hold a different position. keep the characters consistent. if, for instance, one of your characters initially thinks that machines cannot think, you do not want to put arguments into their mouth that claim machines can think, unless of course they change their mind in the course of the dialogue. give your characters unique voices if they represent different philosophical points of view. this is not accomplished simply with their names. calling your characters “wittgenstein” and “popper” will not render their relationship compelling unless you make it so. it is also important that there be some disagreement between at least two of the characters. a dialogue with characters just patting each other on the back is boring. to be compelling, even an inquiry dialogue needs disputants, in other words. moreover, at least two of the disputants should be reasonably intelligent. to my mind, for all of the virtues of plato’s dialogues, sometimes you get the sense that socrates is just so much smarter than those he is in conversation with. when this occurs, the reader can feel sorry for them. plato was an accomplished wrestler himself and socrates may have dabbled. what socrates does by dialoguing with others is to wrestle with and slip free from certain premises and ideologies. think like a group having a conversation, instead of an individual pushing an agenda. this conversation does not have to be chaotic and confusing. all characters in such dialogues are liable to change as they proceed. one character begins a dialogue with another by stating a view or by asking a question. another character, in lieu of this new information, is changed by it and then formulates a response. the first character’s response has a similar effect on the second, who is changed, and so on. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 68 importantly, as in all philosophy papers, whether it is persuasive, inquiring, seeking information, negotiating, deliberative, or even eristic, you need to ensure that you answer the essay prompt. this will include some preparatory work before you go ahead and write your dialogue. in particular, this will require analyzing the essay question and some initial planning. most essays have an introduction, main body, and conclusion. a dialogue is no exception. let me clarify. it should have elements that resemble these things, but it is significantly different. a dialogue typically does not tell the reader exactly what will come next, but you as the author should lead them through it so they can follow what you are saying. ensure that your reader knows what is going on—that there is a clear train of thought throughout the dialogue. remember your goal; in other words, do not just have the characters ramble on. sure, make the dialogue funny or entertaining if you wish, but ensure that what the characters say is important. and make sure it is clear to your reader what the ending position is. do the characters agree? do they agree to disagree? have they made a new discovery? and so on. or, is the ending just an impasse? that is fine, too. example of a student philosophical dialogue title: “nowledge”8 setting: father majd arrives in heaven, having lost his life pushing a young man from a bus; entering a small chamber, he meets (in awe) his maker. text: god: welcome to heaven, child; i’ve been expecting you for a long time now. i can tell you’re nervous. don’t be. hmm. you’re probably wondering why you were brought before me, and so suddenly. well, let me make that clear: every soul enters the pearly gates unready, and needs first ask me such questions as will prepare them to join the heavenly hosts. so ask, and i will answer, and the last clouds will be wiped from your consciousness. majd: why, lord, i hardly know what to ask. this is such an honor. never did i suppose that i would have such an opportunity to find answers. g: now you have it. so what’s your first question? you’re not quite fit of mind to live in paradise for all time, but soon you will be. m: let me think. my life has been spent trying to understand you. so starting there, what was your meaning just now? when you said you were expecting me? commentary: the dialogue here has the goal of seeking information. majd desires to learn from god. but we do not know yet the specific subject of discourse. note the title. it’s not a misspelling, but rather an allusion to knowledge in the present or “now.” g: was i not clear? i’ve awaited this moment of reunion with you since your birth; more expectantly while your final hour was drawing nigh. 8 i thank _______ for permission to use his dialogue. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 69 m: quite so? i mean only that all my teachers back on earth assured me that—well—even one as i could surprise even you. g: ha. well, that you never have, child. nor did they, nor anybody. now this perturbs you? m: yes, lord. my death was not an act of fate; i chose it. deliberating for a moment, and without compulsion, i saved that man’s life, knowing that i might die. g: that you did; you chose your death, bravely, and as few would. m: indeed. but were my act made freely, how could you have expected it? was it just another link in a chain of causes? am i a pawn of predetermination? commentary: the subject of the prompt is now clear. the author takes quite a long time to make it clear, but because of the length of the paper, it is worth it. g: no. i gave you that power of deliberation—and never once have i acted in vain. vain, indeed, it would be were i to give you this power while your every choice was merely necessitated by the past. furthermore, i know you don’t doubt this; every man’s belief is proven by regret, pride, and other such feelings. m: i agree, lord. all of that would be quite in vain, as would your punishment and reward for souls, were our choices to act rightly or wrongly predetermined. yet, were they not, how then do you possess foreknowledge of them? if my act to give my life for another had been free, as you say it is, then how could it be known? were it free, it would be uncertain until the moment i made the choice. obviously this would be impossible to predict, until the moment of decision. g: perhaps i cannot do what you consider impossible. yet i was expecting you, that was no lie. so how? m: i once visited a man in prison; his fate was to be on the morrow decided by a jury. i prayed for his sinful soul, and he guiltlessly told me his sins in detail. g: i say, what gumption. tell me, child, what was the worst? m: that is surely for you alone to judge, my lord. but i’ll say the one that matters here: he regularly went to oracles seeking prophecies—and yet the man was fearful of the coming dawn. i put this to him. how could he still be afraid when—in his mind—he had recourse to your divine foreknowledge. the oracles, and you, already knew the outcome of the trial. so what was to fear? i asked. either his guilt or innocence was already necessitated by your foreknowledge. g: certainly. had i true knowledge of tomorrow, then if anything happens besides what i know will, i would have been wrong. his reply? m: he said i had the whole thing wrong. it wasn’t for predictions that he went to oracles; he went for advice. foreknowledge would be categorically impossible, even for you; the actions of free agents cannot be predetermined. such would be no more logically permissible than making twice two five. commentary: first, there is a nice example, originally given by alexander of aphrodisias, that raises an important objection to divine foreknowledge. the examples ties an abstract difficult subject to a concrete situation. with philosophy, this is difficult, but so very important. second, the writing is impressive, with consistent characters and voice. not only is the writing clear but also it stylistically matches the setting and context. do you find yourself treading the edge of the diegetic and the non-diegetic? analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 70 g: the man was no fool. for actions to be free, they must be so until decided upon, and therefore are beforehand uncertain. why then did he come to oracles? m: as i said, for advice. while, it would be impossible for the outcome of this trial (a contingent truth) to be known with certainty, you can have knowledge of every possibility. thus, through the oracles, you are supplicated for advice. you know if x happens, z will follow; yet regardless of your advice, y may be done instead. in this way, you don’t know the future actions of free agents with certainty, only as contingent possibilities, until they are actualized as certainties. as further proof, he gave his own story as an example. he’d lived a life of crime, had made a career of it; yet one day decided to change his ways. his oracle’s steadfast advice was to leave that very week. so he did. in his haste, however, he left a breadcrumb trail. within a month his associates found him, and, confronted, he’d been forced to kill one of them. for this he was arrested, imprisoned, tried, and executed. g: i see the point. such an end would not have befallen him had the oracle not made such a prediction, and, in his mind, i knew exactly what would happen to him. in that way, i knew that in giving him this prediction i would sentence him to death; and thus i too am guilty of such a horrible thing. commentary: here we find another objection to divine foreknowledge. again, it is one that alexander raised. what follows is alexander’s “solution.” we also see that this dialogue involves the elements of persuasion. god is attempting to persuade majd that alexander’s view is mistaken. m: as i said, his erudite solution was that you knew not the outcome, because it was contingent on such things as you could not possibly be certain of. it was then merely advice that you gave; it was an attempt, so to speak, at giving him the best result, which he in his faulty choices forfeited. strangely, his oracle then entered the cell and said he was mistaken. she did know with certainty what would happen; this doesn’t impose necessity upon those events, rather they impose necessity upon her foreknowledge. but i only laughed. that is no distinction great enough to rescue free agency. g: i understand resolutely, but they’re both quite wrong. you’ll understand shortly, and the only thing required is that i show you that, quite frankly, they and you hold a sinfully conceited view that places the lord your god on your level of consciousness. commentary: this is the first clear reference to boethius, whose view in the consolation of philosophy is that human consciousness and thus knowledge is distinct from divine consciousness and knowledge. it also becomes clear that boethius’ own answer to the problem of divine foreknowledge is represented here by god. the reference to sinful conceit perhaps does not mirror boethius’ text, but within the frame of this dialogue where there is a bit of liberty with the characters, i am ok with it. m: do i? is it that you are capable of the impossible, and can know with certainty the conditional? g: regardless of that, you mistake my form of knowing for your form. to begin with, understand that a thing is not what it is, but is how it is perceived, and thing may be perceived in many ways. let me continue your allegory of myself to you further, in order to show you in how many ways a thing may be differently understood: does even the most basic, immobile life have the power of sensation? m: indeed, they do. they have empirical experience at their disposal. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 71 g: and what of those higher animals, gifted with motion? you’ll agree, no doubt, that they have more. higher animals have imagination. by this i mean they may expand upon simple sensation and may even conceive of their own good, their own interest and disinterest. commentary: the explanation of imagination here is unsatisfying, though to be fair it is not crucial to the prompt. m: and men, if i may interject, have something still more. we were gifted by you with another way of looking at the world: reason. g: if by that is meant that i gave you the power of abstract thought, of seeing universals, then assuredly. you may see among men the general quality of being a two-legged creature. commentary: language is not inclusive here, but the context and setting perhaps justifies it. perhaps, but then again, although the debate harkens back to medieval times, the setting of the dialogue is contemporary. remember the bus paper? so i would recommend “humans” instead of “men.” the capital you and your in reference to god is a nice touch—unnecessary, but reminds us that although the subject matter has ancient roots, it perplexes christians to this day. m: then what, if i may hazard a question, if not a guess, is the nature of your level of consciousness? g: good, child. good. mine is of understanding; i perceive the simple forms behind things. now this you’ll never grasp. but let a further comparison suffice for my purposes. neither sensation nor imagination will grasp how reason sees things. suppose, then, that the two were together to say that their understanding is correct, and yours false? you’d say no, “mine is the superior, yours is the lesser, and it’s the fault of your own inferiority that you can’t see this.” m: undoubtedly, lord. their grasp of the universe renders them incapable of regarding the universals that i see. yet their stupidity in no way limits me. so, and i am merely thinking aloud, neither does mine yours? g: indeed, you’re now getting it. you see in another way i am not like you; i am eternal. you exist in time, i do not. by this i mean more than just that i am without beginning or end. rather, i fundamentally do not exist in time. i am atemporal, so to speak. i do not travel through time, from past to future. m: so this is your solution? you are atemporal; your seeing my future actions imposes no necessity upon them, because to you they are not future events. g: quite so. strictly speaking, the gift of foreknowledge would be logically impossible. i lack such a thing. what i have is providentia which may be said to be more equivalent to seeing through space than through time. after all, to me there is no past, nor future, only the eternal present. to me all things in all times are laid out at once, and i perceive them as one; no distinction exists between your birth and death. i know them both at once, but you know them one at a time. m: it becomes clear. you knew the prisoner’s verdict, but in so doing imposed no necessity upon it. to say that you did could be likened to the ludicrous assertion that my physically seeing the man in his cell imposed upon him the necessity of being in that very cell. i saw him there because he was analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 72 there; you saw that he would be executed because he was executed—though perhaps my language is itself too temporal. g: right. i see that he is executed, or perhaps that is being executed. regardless, i do not travel through time, from past to future. i exist in the eternal present. i do see the future, because to me it is merely what is. m: well, then i’m glad to finally arrive. i hope the wait wasn’t too long. g: ha. you were already here—already are. commentary: this paper makes a simple comparison and contrast between alexander and boethius very compelling and memorable, in the form of a dialogue that involves both information-seeking and persuasion. a very abstract, and in the wrong hands, boring topic comes alive and even ends with a bit of humor. conclusion machiavelli wrote that as he sat reading ancient authors he would ask questions of these authors and they would answer him: “evenings i return home and enter my study, and at its entrance i take off my everyday clothes, full of mud and dust, and don royal and courtly garments. decorously attired, i enter in to the ancient sessions of ancient men. received amicably by them, i partake of such food as is mine only and for which i was born. there, without shame, i speak with them and ask them about the reason for their actions, and they in their humanity respond to me” (grudin, 67). if machiavelli transcribed one of his imagined dialogues with these long-dead thinkers, he would have written a dialogue. and in fact, his art of war is a philosophical dialogue. my student, who wrote his paper on alexander and boethius, was effectively, even if not literally, in dialogue with these ancient thinkers too. writing about philosophy in this way brought this student very close to other philosophers and their subject-matter—in this case, divine foreknowledge—much more so than if he had written about divine foreknowledge in standard essay format. the reader of the student’s dialogue—me—certainly enjoyed the paper more than i would have otherwise. dialogue is good for not only the student, but also the teacher.9 references blanshard, brand. on philosophical style. bloomington and london: indiana university press, 1954. edwards, anne michael. writing to learn: an introduction to writing philosophical essays. mcgrawhill, 2000. feinberg, joel. doing philosophy: a guide to the writing of philosophy papers. 5th ed. wadsworth, 2014. fisher, roger and william ury. getting to yes. 2nd edition. new york: penguin, 1991. gill, christopher. personality in greek epic, tragedy, and philosophy: the self in dialogue. oxford: clarendon, 1996. grudin, robert. on dialogue: an essay in free thought. houghton-mifflin, 1996. 9 i wish to thank ______ and two anonymous referees for this journal for their helpful comments. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 40, issue 2 (2020) 73 nightingale, andrea wilson. genres in dialogue: plato and the construct of philosophy. cambridge university press, 1995. ruggiero, vincent ryan. the art of thinking: a guide to critical and creative thought. 6th ed. longman, 2001. skwire, david and sarah skwire. writing with a thesis: a rhetoric reader. 8th ed. harcourt, 2001. smith, justin e.h. the philosopher: a history in 6 types. princeton & london: princeton university press, 2016. walton, douglas. the new dialectic: conversational contexts of argument. university of toronto press, 1998. address correspondences to: marc bobro, ph.d professor & chair, philosophy dept. santa barbara city college email: mebobro@pipeline.sbcc.edu mailto:mebobro@pipeline.sbcc.edu analytic teaching and philosophical praxis analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 109 book review thinking, childhood and time: contemporary perspectives on the politics of education. edited by walter omar kohan and barbara weber lexington books, 2020 229 pages price: hardback $ 100.00, kindle $45.00 review by richard morehouse s i sat to read this book and write a review of it, i planned to read the whole text quickly and then go back to a thorough and careful reading. after reading the first chapter, i changed my approach. i already had my pencil out, and the marginal notes had begun to grow. so, i reoriented my approach and read slowly and carefully. with that strategy in hand, i will start the review by first providing an overview of each of the two sections of this work. in their introduction, kohn and weber state that the book is an interdisciplinary and interparadigmatic exploration of children and childhood. many anthologies are interdisciplinary; few are interparadigmatic. the authors’ disciplines are many but easy to tick off: educationists, philosophers, political scientists, early childhood theorists, educational foundation experts, atelierista, and pedagogists. the paradigms within which these authors work include modernism, postmodernism, humanism, posthumanism, hermeneutics, and phenomenology. this mixture of disciplines and paradigms is, in part, what makes this work so engaging, informative, and challenging. to grasp this scholarly work’s breadth and depth, the reader needs to be open to expanding their knowledge base, viewing information through new conceptual lenses, and rethinking once solidly held points of view. the editors state that exploring the otherness of the child and childhood is their overall topic for the book. citing hannah arendt’s notion that “every child brings a new beginning into the world, we asked: how can educators be more responsive to the otherness that children and childhood offer?” two ideas provide the overarching themes of thinking, childhood, and time. first, childhood’s otherness is to be affirmed and embraced rather than seen as disrupting adulthood’s normative a analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 110 development. two, childhood needs to be recognized as a source of human natality.1 in the introduction the authors wrote, “…this book focuses on how this paradigm shift in our understanding of children and childhood affects educational practices: how can we educate responsibility in the face of these core transformations regarding the way we think and relate to childhood?” (3). part one: phenomenological exploration of time, thinking, and embodiment part one, “phenomenological exploration of time, thinking, and embodiment,” has six chapters. this section of the work, the child’s view of time, is inspired by phenomenology. each of the authors provides new insights that can potentially impact teaching and learning and offer a fresh look at the child and time. part two: decolonial and poststructuralist perspectives on the politics of education is even more diverse than part one. decolonialism and poststructuralism are related but different areas of study. the connectivity and disconnection of decolonialism and poststructuralism become evident when looking at child and childhood specifics. near the beginning of chapter one, “childhood and the genesis of time,” james mensch references st paul’s statement regarding our “putting away the things of childhood,” including the child’s sense of time as pre-numerical. “can our earlier sense of time be so easily abandoned? can this sense be ignored or denied in our educational practice? from a phenomenological perspective, this hardly seems possible. to do so would be to abandon a still functioning layer of selfhood” (11-12). maintaining a layered sense of time and the layers of development more generally are explored in this chapter and in some of the chapters that follow. the idea of layering of experiences, or our interpretation of experiences, husserl calls genetic phenomenology. genetic analysis “focuses on how the various elements, such as the apprehension of temporality determined perceptual data, their interpretation, and the resulting visual presence comes about” (11). it is the temporality of events that is mensch’s focus. is there a parallel, mensch asks, between event-time and clock-time? mensch’s examination of husserl’s idea of protention (anticipation of a future event) and retention (the remembering of a past event) by looking at how the child understands the world through reaching out and grasping an object of desire. the articulation of the role of anticipation, memory, and time, by exploring the young child’s grasping activities, provides new insight for my understanding of ‘genetic phenomenology.’ james mensch connects this with our sense of time beginning in our earliest years, that is, that time is measure by an event: an event takes place, and then another event follows. “time is determined by the order of events” (mensch, 2020, 19). this understanding of time changes with the advent of school, wherein a clock determines time. but as mensch states, this “event time” also stays with us throughout life; it is one of the layers of our understanding of time. as a current adult example, think about what has happened during the pandemic; we have lost the rhythm of our days, as we have lost the pattern of events. thus, the loss of time events has to some degree changed how we 1 natality refers to belonging to a world characterized by plurality and is a politic in that each revolution is a new beginning. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 111 know what time it is or what day it is, so we need to consult a calendar or check our watches more frequently. our sense of being-in-the-world shapes our selfhood. this being-in-the-world is shaped in part by a layered understanding of time. the different layers of our sense of self and time are not sealed off. given this, we do not have to choose between them or reject one in favor of the other. all are present, in this copresence makes possible the empathy that allows us to reach the child at the level he occupies (27). this awareness of the layered nature of time is essential to our understanding of the child and childhood. “a phenomenological journey into the human condition of education” is the subtitle of barbara weber’s chapter, “child and time.” weber begins with immanuel kant’s observation that time cannot seem for the outside and that space is conceptualized from inside of us. weber divides her chapter into two primary sections: 1) the first explores time from merleau-ponty’s approach to how children explore time. merleau-ponty understands time as a “field of presence” and “situational understanding.” in this section weber goes on to challenge the implicitly accepted perspective that childhood is something to be “expired.” weber, following merleau-ponty, understands time as something that one “falls into” rather than something to be sensed. falling into brings to mind a body, our body. weber continues the discussion of how we (our embodied self) experience the world when she writes, “perception is always already turned towards the world, we make sense of things in our environment through the bodily relationships that we formed2” (33). piaget’s examination of a children’s view provides a familiar background against which to then look at merleau-ponty’s phenomenological perspective on time. as i understand it, piaget imposed a metric understanding of time as he observed and experimented with children’s understanding of it, rather than examining how the child might understand time as experienced. i think it is fair to say that piaget took his adult experiences of time and then looked to see how a child might come, in stages, to match that adult understanding. merleau-ponty, on the other hand, argues that “time does not exist for us, but it is consciousness that makes us experience our existence in time” (38). in his critique of “piaget’s child,” merleau-ponty argues that the child is not egocentric but rather that the young child and the world are one; therefore, the young child is not egocentric. the child lives in a world where the world and the self are one; that notion of the ‘me’ does not yet exist (38). the child’s oneness experiences are illustrated by her experiencing the environment, including time, as being a part of her being—thus, time is now. this sense of time should not be discounted or undervalued but should be appreciated when seen in the child and re-experienced in us as adults. 2 mensch in the previous chapter writes about husserl and makes similar connection between the body’s importance to understanding in his discussion of the grasp. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 112 weber’s chapter is rich in practical application and philosophical understanding, wherein we have an opportunity to see her as an observer of children and a consummate educator and philosopher. ‘thinking like a girl: scout as a philosophic, androgynous child in to k ill a mockingbird”, as explored by peter costello in chapter three, provides a penetrating view of scout’s becoming. costello affords a deeper and more nuanced look at this often read and seen story.3 costello follows an earlier scholar. iris maron young’s lead in “throwing like a girl: a phenomenology of feminine body comportment motility and spatiality” by rejecting biological differences between the sexes as the sole and insufficient approach to explain differences in children’s bodily experience (51). instead, with simone de beauvoir and merleau-ponty, young emphasizes the notion of the situation and works from childhood onward “to describe the modalities of feminine bodily existing existence for women situated in contemporary advanced, industrial, urban, and commercial society” (51, [young 1980, 139140]). what costello adds to this understanding of the role of scout’s movements and thoughts is an insight into scout’s sense of herself as we vicariously see her moving invisibly around maycomb. in the novel, scout’s movements and thoughts are judged by the people around her, including the reader of the book, as someone who might become a ‘girl.’ the reader learns along with scout how her experiences are regulated by the gaze of the characters in the novel (54). during the novel’s course, scout enacts her transformation through her vulnerability and uses the limits she discovers in atticus’ formulation as formulations of her experience. as scout passes between and among the people of macomb, she observes what they say and do. “… she thus assembles tools to help her explore her own experiences. she is even able to discover the limitations of her own family and to reflect on how her own emotions propel her beyond them” (58). how does costello illustrate scout’s becoming a girl, becoming a self, become manifest? he does this by showing how she interacts with four important women (calpurnia, miss maudie, miss rachel, and aunt alexandra). scout becomes who she is in the process of becoming through what she calls experiments, or what philosophers call thought experiments. these gedankenexperiments enable observations that potentially lead to change and growth. scout used these experiments intentionally, but whether used knowingly or not, these thought experiments are vital parts of human development for many young people. in the last paragraph of this chapter, costello states one reason teachers might wish to read to kill a mockingbird and why this type of analysis might work in other texts. the successful classroom text will, perhaps like the novel, to kill a mockingbird, so irritate or promote identification that those children who read and discuss it will discover something new. they will discover themselves always already in process with it, always already taking up the next text as a partner, moving towards its quarters, dancing with it, singing with it, bringing it home to a new place (72). 3 to kill a mockingbird 40th anniversary addition has been widely read (1999) and often watched (1972) and a broadway play (2018). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 113 “listening, phronein, and the first principles of happiness” by pablo muruzábal lamberti begins by examining the pedagogical meaning of phronein. his essay is built around an understanding of the role of attic drama.4 socrates, among others, praised greek theatre and the power of the spoken word. lamberti seeks to reclaim the space of the spoken word as he explores the meaning of phronein—“to be a particular disposition of the mind”—and how that disposition is essential to expanding rational thinking into the area of listening and practical wisdom. sophocles and antigone have an instructive role in the articulation of the practice of listening. this examination leads him to aristotle’s nicomachean ethics and erasmus. put in present-day wording, what philosophy teaches, is learning from attitudes of mind and experiences of others, with the added benefit of running no risk of personal harm. kreon’s inability to listen becomes a central theme of lamberti’s article. antigone and to kill a mockingbird play different and symbiotic roles in the “good life. lamberti uses antigone as an excellent vehicle for philosophically engaging with specfic issues, learning to listen to others as a part of this learning process, which may prevent one from thinking too quickly about complex situations and avoiding thinking dogmatically or thinking without listening (89). like scout’s experiments in to kill a mockingbird, antigone provides a philosophical voyage of self-discovery. in “thinking and the play of being” by michael bonnett (chapter 5), paulo freire’s concept of “conscientization” is given recognition. adding to that perspective, bonnett makes a case for a metaphysical standpoint in addition to an epistemological one. metaphysics, as bonnett sees it, is a type of deeply embedded culture. it frames our outlook and way of relating to all around us and conditions us to the extent that this metaphysical structure profoundly affects our ability to think differently, to question cultural structures in any radical way (93). bonnett’s argument is organized around three points. first, the anthropocene names the world’s current status; human activity is responsible for the world’ geological and climate level. second, it is highly questionable whether our current ways of thinking, which led us into the situation, can lead us out of our condition. third, we need to find a replacement way of thinking, which instills within us a different relationship with the cosmos and the natural world (94). the “play of being” is bonnett’s replacement for our current way of thinking. to oversimplify, the “play of being” is to attend sufficiently to the world around us, particularly the natural world, to be in the moment, to become a part of the unfolding of this moment. bonnett’s last heading of his chapter is entitled poetic thinking. eric fromm in to have or to be captures this move from our current thinking to the “play of being” in this poem by goethe. i walked in the wood all by myself, to see nothing that was in my mind. 4 attic drama, the phrase, if not the concept, is new to me – though based on an article published in 1898, not to the rest of the world (haigh, 1898). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 114 i saw in the shade a little flower stand, bright like a star, like beautiful eyes. i wanted to pluck it, but it said sweetly, is it to wilt, that i must be broken? i took it out with all its roots carried it to the garden at the pretty house. and planted it again, in a quiet place, now it sprouts. and blossoms forth. (goethe cited in fromm 1976). annalisa caputo’s chapter, “philosophia ludens for children: a proposal to play and think,” ends part one. caputo argues that there are two images of childhood. 1) childhood is something to be outgrown, something to be left behind, or 2) childhood is lost innocence, lost creative spirit that we might wish to, but cannot, reclaim. this dichotomy leads to different answers to the question of children’s philosophy. the first view leads to the idea that p4c is impossible, while the second leads to the belief that only children can do philosophy. the resolution to the either-or dilemma is found in walter kohn’s statement, “cuándo se empieza a pensar con otrzs,” which i roughly translate as “begin to think with the other” (106). i have clumsily stated my version of this idea as “to think with other people’s ideas.” the idea of thinking with the other as it relates to this chapter has two applications: 1) when working with children, their otherness is to be ‘thought with’ not ‘thought to,’ and 2) children can relate to people in books as well as to other children or adults. philosophers, living or dead, in-person or in books, are included. caputo writes that thinking with otherness is part of an italian educational tradition that values the teaching of philosophy as an academic subject. the overall goal and approach to this teaching and learning style are to use the methods of engaging children in ideas that originated within the history of philosophy and examining them with hermeneutics’ tools. “because philosophy is also a search for answers. together. in dialogue. where inevitably the first dialogue is with the thinkers who came before us, and therefore, with the history of philosophy” (110). to underscore that premise, caputo states that any philosophical discussion with children or young people starts with the statement of a philosopher’s ideas or what she or he was working to understand. in making this point, she emphasizes the value of books in her discussion of analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 115 the “magic box.” the magic box’ is a teaching tool for philosophical discussions. it contains many things, including palettes, colors, masks, sheets of paper, etc.). but before taking any other tools out of the box … we always pull books out of the box. yes, books” (110). with that background, which is only partially developed in this review, caputo goes beyond the rigid lipmanian root to articulate some new experiments and research. at one point, caputo describes some critical element of the training of philosophers or graduate philosophy students in a teaching philosophy with children. in our first workshop, our mentors were gadamer (and his ontological game theory) and aristotle (and his idea of metaphysics as work with questions: which starts from what is the closest, and reach the highest and most complex issues). in the second workshop, we were guided by the philosophers of difference: particularly levinas and derrida. in the third workshop, on the theme of the untimely, our guide was undoubtedly nietzsche, but also the romantic cities of plato, campanella, and thomas moore (111). this paragraph is perhaps an exemplar of the challenges and the possibilities of engaging children with philosophical ideas in a new application of lipman’s work. caputo’s essay ends part one. like all the other chapters of this section, her chapter is jammed with new ideas and perspectives that will engage readers. i hope this summary will pull the reader deeper into this chapter and this section of thinking, children, and time. seven chapters await the reader as we embark on part two: decolonial and poststructuralist perspectives on the politics of education. part two: decolonial and poststructuralist perspectives on the politics of education david kennedy’s chapter introduces part two of thinking, childhood, and time. it is entitled “becoming child: wild being and the post-human.” kennedy’s opening sentence continues the book’s overarching theme, ‘what do children teach adults” (119). the below quote is an example of how children teach adults; if we attend to children’s experiences, we learn what we fail to see in ourselves. in what follows, i want to explore the lived temporal experience of embodiment of infantia in the interest of locating the transitional zone between the virtual and the actual that is the space of becoming other, and which paradoxically, is also the space of self-actualization, or singularity (119). kennedy develops his examination of three understandings of time to create a space for a hermeneutic exploration of becoming. the analysis of identity and singularity appears to be at the intersection of time and infinity. to set up this intersection, kennedy looks closely at three meanings of time: aion, chronos, and kairos. aion is einstein’s “now” and is associated with heraclitus’ view of childhood and play (120-121). to play is to experience now. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 116 chronos is the greek word for time, but kennedy argues that chronos is not just linear, clock time. chronos is also the unfolding of the cycles of birth and death, the seasons (cause and effect, planting and harvesting, etc.). “it is chronos itself that equips us, that builds the structure of awareness whereby we escape it” (22). kairos is an interruption of clock time, whereas chronos is usually translated as an opportunity or fulfillment of time. it is a moment that appears out of nothing, almost a rebirth in that it is as that time that one is entirely in the moment5. the concept of becoming child intensifies the evolutionary implications, which recognizes childhood as a form of life wherein the child is an interlocutor, corresponding to changing cultural institutions and education institutions (125). childhood is time at the juncture of all beginnings (127). we hold conflicting themes of symmetry and a mathematical perfection of time while simultaneously hoping, fearing, a desire to become the other (127-128). but the seeking of space between self and the other, time and eternity, is our hope for becoming. in his chapter, “paulo freire and the childhood of a philosophical and educational life,” walter omar kohan begins by exploring philosophy and friendship. citing giuseppe ferraro, kohan first points to the idea that philosophy can be interpreted as a love of wisdom, or friendship of wisdom, and as the wisdom of friendship (131). as philosophy and friendship are connected, so too are philosophy and education. philosophy and education are based on a shared concern about the world. when a friend and her interlocutor engage the world together, the dialogue is fluent; when there is no friendship, no philosophical or educational conversation is possible (132). paulo freire, kohan argues, is an educational philosopher in a precise sense. it was not his philosophical ideas per se that was most significant. still, his life was a path of philosophical questioning that led to the liberation of himself and others. living a philosophical life is living an educational life, and that living is what would liberate others from oppression (133). freire’s mission was to give voice to the oppressed and hear their voices and hear them as “other” and different and perhaps resonant with his voice. to give “voice” to another is to allow them to speak and to be heard. all persons need to be given voice.6 freire’s voice and the voices that resonated with it have been heard throughout the world. freire’s lived philosophy was so influential that it has led the current pollical establishment in brazil to purge “the ideology of paulo freire from brazilian education” (134). freire’s vision of childhood was a central tenant of his life path. freire taught that play and curiosity should be experienced all through life, a vision, which according to kohan, he practiced. however, the willingness to be childlike has not found fruitful ground in the current brazilian 5 while kennedy does not make this comparison, it appears to me to be similar to the idea of the sabbath, that is, to life as though at the end of time. “the sabbath symbolizes a state of complete harmony between man and nature, between man and man. by networking – it is to say, by not participating in the process of nature and social change – man is free from the chains of nature and from the chains of time, although only for one day a week” (fromm, 1951, 245). 6 a similar voice can be heard in the writings of carol gilligan, especially in a different voice (1982), joining the resistance (2011) and why does patriarchy persist (gilligan and snider, 2018). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 117 establishment; it has flowered in other places. yet, kohan and freire encourage us as educators and philosophers to continue to be childlike, to live “as if’ a philosophical life path were possible. “democratic child’s play: natality, responsible education, and decolonial praxis” is the title of chapter nine. toby rollo writes from the perspective of a political scientist. rollo continues the theme of characterizing the traditional view of childhood as “the absence of full capacities of reason and speech as well as learning through play and creative experiment” (145). rollo, however, poses a different view: childhood is not a phase to be gradually grown out of but is instead a mode of being and potential we possess throughout life. secondly, liberal democratic politics means more than reasoned speech. it can also be demeaning and embody ineffective play in creative environments, or what rollo refers to as “inactive agency” (146). with these two points in mind, rollo set the stage for exploring the decolonization of childhood. decolonization, in rollo’s view, begins when we recognize that play and creative experimentation are embodied experiences and ought to be acknowledged as modes of political agency in a democratic society (146). play and experimentation are two critical modes that allow forward movement without the destruction of earlier being, thinking, and doing. rollo adopts jerome bruner’s (1966) concepts of enactive (embodiment), iconic (imagistic,) and symbolic (linguistic) as ways of characterizing change. these changes he calls the layers, rather than stages, of development.7 notably, the enactive mode does not disappear but continues to inform the child’s thinking and actions. the enactive mode becomes a part of the iconic layer. eventually, both the enactive and iconic layers become integrated with the symbolic layer. all layers can interact with one another, but one layer may also be more dominant than other layers. rollo goes on to ask: how should a liberal and democratic tradition approach agency? what is essential for this discussion is that agency is exercised by saying, representation, and action. liberalism and democracy are not equivalent. liberalism is most concerned with the rational pursuit of the selfinterest of the individual. concerning agency in democratic practice, “we exercise in their political demand so long as it is a form of persuasion rather than in coercion and is enacted under conditions of equality in reciprocity rather than hierarchy in unilateral command” (148-149). according to hannah arendt8, political activity is manifested in speech; therefore, one-third of the population, namely children, is excluded from political participation. this privileging of speech is one element that allows for colonialism. as a counterargument to arendt, rollo suggests that the problem stems from the exclusion of children’s voice. rollo indicates that the model of democratic parenting might show a way forward to counteract the one-sidedness of excluding children. if children can persuade parents, and vice versa, an opening is provided for children’s voices. the democratic parenting paradigm may be a model for the decolonization of the many stifled or underdeveloped voices. “education must be rethought to exclude a developmental paradigm that presupposes literacy and other forms of competency that are unavailable to some with intellectual disabilities” (157). 7 this approach, while not opposed to piaget’s developmental theory, is more consistent with lev vygotsky and kieran egan. 8 it is important to note that rollo credits much of the thinking in this essay to have originated in the writings of ardent. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 118 karen murris’s chapter “posthuman child: de(con)structuring western notions of child agency” builds on her book the posthuman child: educational transformation through philosophy with picturebooks (2016) as well as her other works in this area. she argues in this essay that the “[p]osthuman child is an opportunity to make a quantum leap, rather than trying to catch up with the west or leapfrogging development” (163). the figuration of posthuman child as natureculture phenomenon relocates agency from inside the body to relational mutual agency, from thinking contained in a mind (or brain) to thinking in movement, from individualized actions to ‘messy’ entanglement in worldly relations and invites all to be fully present in the thick ‘now-time’ [barad 2-17] (163). she further argues for rethinking chronological time and the processes that have led to racial differentiation that underlies our modern understanding of child, and which are used to justify the child as savage and intellectually and emotionally primitive. de(con)struction involves the radical thinking of intentionality and agency celebrated in western thought. defection is a form of de(con)structure that includes integrating quantum theory with an intra-action of poststructuralism. this methodology provides for a queer reading9 of agency, time and the child by which variables of age, gender, and class, are seen as an individual person’s properties. citing barad (2017), murris states that posthumanism does not mean “after” or “following” human but rather it is a condition, a critical attitude, and an ambivalent and ambiguous internal relation to modernity. in lyotard’s phrasing, the posthuman is “an inability to put one’s faith in a grand narrative.” within this matrix, a different sense of time operates, a now-time. the application of de(con)constructionist methods afford an ontological, epistemological, and ethical problematizing of agency within a child-centered education (174). the de(con)constructionist methodology presented in this chapter helps to create a space for in which “postdevelopmental perspectives on child/hood do not separate nature ontologically form culture” (175). cristina delgado vintimilla writes chapter eleven, “rational openings for the otherwise: thinking community as what is not …” presenting the views of a pedagogista. a pedagogista is a concept developed with a reggio emilio tradition. it is devoted to thinking about pedagogical possibilities, working with teachers to improve their abilities and students’ learning outcomes. what does it mean to create a life with others in an educational context? (178). this question is closely connected with the issue of how to define an educational community. uncovering the meanings of relations, making common, and pedagogical thought in early childhood education is the task she sets for herself (180). community of/within education is hoped for, a desire for an elusive entity. part of the reason that community is elusive is that “the very act of defining a community is what prevents it from becoming” (182). 9 queering is to not give a fixed, stable or referential context but it is the ethical -political practice of radical questioning of identities and barriers. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 119 something happens when we attempt to bestow substance on community or even when we speak about it, in efforts to define or clarify what community (or relations) “really” mean. it is as if such efforts would always fail. to the pedagogical imaginaries of communities, this failing might induce greater frustration, a sense of failure, disappointment, or even paralysis. …. as soon as community becomes an object of definition, its definition fails. … this is the very impasse at the heart of defining community (182-183). vintimilla writes that many of her students don’t see an “impasse to the idea that community is always changing.”10 as a counterpoint, she states, “the root of community refers to a nothings-of-substance, of its deficit or constitutive absence” (184). is community an undefinable dichotomy, that is, singularity (otherness) or commons (likeness)? as i have struggled to wrap my mind around this essay, i kept thinking about albert camus’s short story, jonas or the artist at work (1957). the story ends with a dying artist, jonas, who completes a final canvas after long isolation. it is a mostly blank canvas with one word in the middle. the word can be read as solitary or solidary; another translation says the terms are independent or interdependent. while this reference to the camus short story may not aid the reader looking for a summary of the chapter, camus’s short story has been running through my head since i read vintimilla’s chapter. i have concluded that the problem of seeing/grasping a concept and defining it are intrinsically related, and the oneness and togetherness are linked in similar way that community and individuality are connected, that is, community and the individual are not opposites but are united in their difference. iris berger and adrienne argent wrote the penultimate chapter, “life as a pedagogical concept.” the authors experiment as they jointly construct a concept of life in and outside of a classroom as the experience/lesson unfolds in two narratives as children work/play with blocks. their narrative explorations bring together ideas from practice, philosophy, anthropology, place, artist, friends, children, and materials11 and the kibitz with colleagues and co-researchers. among their colleagues, the authors work with an atelierista12 and a pedagogista. the reader may need to reorient herself about early childhood education and maybe education more generally to fully grasp what iris berger and adrienne argent have served up to us. this reorientation was also necessary for the reviewer. suppose you are not familiar with the reggio emelia school in italy or the approach as it has been implemented worldwide. it may help in understanding 10 a variety of similar discussion on the nature of a ‘community’ within communities of inquiry has been much discussed in nacci and icpic papers and meetings. 11 in both chapter ten and eleven, the authors draw on methods and approaches adapted from the regio amelia approach to education. 12 an atelierista is a studio teacher that welcomes children's ideas and ongoing projects. she or he is a sort of “artist-inresidence” with a goal of aiding children as they figure out and explore many different ways to do things through art expression. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 120 this chapter to view one or more videos or immerse oneself in some films13, books14, and materials from this tradition. this chapter presents two looks at life as a pedagogical concept. essential to understanding life as a pedagogical concept is understanding the difference between extensive concepts and intensive concepts. “extensive concepts act as labels or as something that has already been legitimated as such; whereas intensive concepts emerge as an event, a force – a newness – they require us to do something” (196). berger and argent present any conceptual/practical reorientation that affords experimentation with the notion of life as a pedagogical concept (198). they present to the reader two vignettes entitled “tracing the life – line of wooden blocks -1” and “tracing the life – line of wooden blocks – 2.” the two narratives are the backdrop for four conceptual/practical movements. these movements afford a vehicle for a pedagogy in early childhood education that moves (1) from observation to living, (2) from intention to attention, (3) from othering to togethering, and (4) from discovering to creating (196). the stated goal of this chapter is “to open a new perspective on what it is to be alive” for young children and the adults who are “alive” with them. not only do berger and argent accomplish their goal, but also managed to enriched the life of this reviewer. essential to this enrichment was the quality of the two phenomenological vignettes. these vignettes were so well written that when i started to write about his chapter, i had to reflect for a moment as to whether i read stories or if i had seen a film of them. chapter thirteen, “nature, culture, and education,” is written by juliana mercon. while some of us may be living in the anthropocene (the current geological age dominated by human activity that conditions climate and environment); mercon argues that our period might be called the capitalocene. the capitalocene is a world dominated or closely intertwined with an intersection of political, economic, environmental, and cultural entities that create crises (enrique leff, 2004). as mercon develops her argument, she follows a foucauldian genealogical approach, wherein the emergence of values and social identities morph into genuine power relationships (210). she presents her anarcheological exercise for the invention of other times in a four-step sequence. mercon, citing kelley (2014), defines anarcheology as a “non-history of thought”—this reviewer might characterize it as a thought history of what might have been. step one in this nonhistory of thought is to assume universals do not exist. “de not admit the a priori of existing things. … question, for instance, notions of’ ‘nature’ and ‘culture’” (211). 13 i have chosen one short film as a way to provide a minimal information to understand the reggio emelia program https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fyx_ags-dju 14 this books provides a more comprehensive look at how the reggio emilia approach works – edwards, c.p., gandini, l. and forman, g.e. eds., 1998. the hundred languages of children: the reggio emilia approach--advanced reflections. greenwood publishing group and wurm, j., 2005. working in the reggio way: a beginner's guide for american teachers. redleaf press. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fyx_ags-dju analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 121 tampa (1994) argues that when we ask how humans perceive nature, we presume both that nature is objective in that humanity is one. nevertheless, not only are notions of nature and humanity highly variable cultural constructs, but they are also inexistent in many societies. what power relationships would thus sustain the view according to which there is only one nature in one humanity (212). this move takes us to step two. mercon asks us to question the dichotomy of nature/culture. he also asks the reader to denaturalize and culturize nature. the third step is to naturalize culture, reintegrate humans into non-human communities, and times of affinities and potentia. naturalist culture allows a necessity of interconnection and the generation of novel entities (213). in understanding what allows for interconnectivity, spinoza’s comparison between the camel and the packhorse is instructive. spinoza argues that what makes the camel and the packhorse related is how each is affected and how they are affected; that is, the significant aspect is their relational and dynamic nature more so than any supposed interiority or physicality (214). if one takes this perspective, one can be led to three possible leaps. first, it is possible to look at the world through our feeling and attitude’s, thereby imagining the formation of a society not reduced to human and other animals. second, imaging thinking among and across species, affording a more complex power relationship, and a broader expression of politics is possible. third, creating an ecopolitical experience allows us to include different intraand inter-specific societies whose traditions in norms would enable us to think of them as cultures (213). the fourth and final step is to invent an ecopolitical education that cultivates a body of thinking. mercon’s chapter is a re-thinking nature, culture, and education. as such, it has provided this reviewer with an understanding of the journey the editors and authors have taken as they explored the many avenues and venues of thinking, childhood, and time. chapter thirteen ends thinking, childhood and time: contemporary perspectives on the politics of education. i found this work complex, compelling, and occasionally frustrating. on the one hand, i would have liked to know more about how it was put together because there were many implicit thematic connections throughout the book, yet none of the authors cited, referred back, or made explicit connections with one another. while there is some value in allowing the reader to draw connections (this reader, for example, found it a valuable activity); i suspect it might also be a frustrating experience. a closing chapter by the editors would have also been valuable for this reviewer, and i think for many readers. on the other hand, the time spent contemplating, making connections, and seeking application to the brilliant ideas presented in thinking, childhood, and time was time well spent. this work will be read and taught for years to come. address correspondences to: richard morehouse, emeritus professor of psychology, viterbo university (la crosse, wi). email: remorehouse@viterbo.edu mailto:remorehouse@viterbo.edu analytic teaching and philosophical praxis analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 27 a model of philosophical discussion in the classroom philip cam abstract a general conception of discussion and its relation to the development of reflective thinking is applied to philosophical inquiry in the classroom. consideration of what makes a discussion philosophical is used to reveal the kind of thinking involved and then set within a model of discussion for the classroom designed to engage students in it. it is shown how a range of questioning, conceptual exploration, and reasoning tools can be introduced within that framework that will improve students’ capacities to think both critically and creatively. eing asked to write something on my contribution to philosophy in schools presents a dilemma. my interests have ranged from creating books of philosophical stories for children with accompanying exercises and activities, to writing books for teachers and running workshops, as well as spending a good deal of time writing about issues in educational theory, with its decidedly academic appeal.1 it is not easy to sum all that up, except perhaps to advocate this mixture of theory and practice in the message that i would like to pass on. to rework immanuel kant: without educational practice, we would have nothing to theorize about, but without theory we would have no considered idea of what education is all about. educational theory without practice is empty, but educational practice without theory is blind.2 this may cover the general tenor of my remarks, but i must fill them out with something in particular. since i have long been interested in the ways in which thought and speech operate in collaborative philosophical inquiry, i have chosen to focus on it. that will give a somewhat theoretical cast to the essay, but let me immediately point out that i will treat it as continuous with the question of how to make the most effective use of these operations in the classroom. in going back over this territory, i hope to provide a serviceable map of the terrain for teachers who lead children into it. i am going to start with a general conception of discussion and its connection with reflective thinking and then home in on what makes a discussion philosophical and the kinds of thinking that it involves. i will go on to apply these general conceptions to philosophical inquiry in the classroom and show how various cognitive operations and speech acts function within it. from this i will extract a kit of tools for use in questioning, conceptual exploration and reasoning, which can be used to strengthen educational outcomes. 1 i have included only a couple of these works in the references. a complete list of books and articles can be found on my website https://www.philipcam.com 2 “without sensibility no object would be given to us; and without understanding no object would be thought. thoughts without content are empty: intuitions without concepts are blind.” immanuel kant, critique of pure reason, a 51, b 75. b about:blank analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 28 discussion and the development of reflective thought we may think of a discussion as a deliberative conversation that addresses a question or problem in a systematic way. let us consider the terms of this definition. first, we have conversation, which is a verbal exchange between two or more people. conversations include the exchange of such things as news, opinions, observations or ideas on one or more topics. sometimes the conversations we engage in are deliberative. in these cases, we take pains to examine things and think them through. we may do so when planning a course of action, say, or coming to a considered judgment. when a deliberative conversation is sufficiently focused and structured to become a systematic examination of a problem or question, it is what i am calling a discussion. the connection between deliberative conversation and individual deliberation has often been drawn. it is at least as old as plato. in the theaetetus, he has socrates suggest that “the soul when thinking appears to me to be just talking—asking questions of herself and answering them, affirming and denying”, it being a “conversation which the soul holds with herself in considering of anything” (plato, theaetetus 190a). it has also informed conjectures as to the origins of reflective thought. here is john dewey: no process is more recurrent in history than the transfer of operations carried on between different persons into the arena of an individual’s own consciousness. the discussion which at first took place by bringing ideas from different persons into contact, by introducing them into the forum of competition, and by subjecting them to critical comparison and selective decision, finally became a habit of the individual with himself. he became a miniature social assemblage, in which the pros and cons were brought into play struggling for mastery—for final conclusion. in some such way we conceive reflection to be born (dewey, 2004, p. 123). when it comes to the development of reflective thought in the individual, it is worth recalling that this idea is but a special case of the central proposition of vygotskian developmental psychology, that cognition, in all its higher forms, is an internalization of social interactions: every feature in the child’s cultural development appears twice: first on the social level, and later, on the individual level; first between people (interpsychological), and then inside the child (intrapsychological). this applies equally to voluntary attention, to logical memory, and to the formation of concepts. all the higher psychological functions originate as actual relations between human individuals (vygotsky, 1978, p. 57.). the educational implication of these remarks is clear. if we want students to develop the ability to think about things for themselves, we need to place a premium on discussion. to take just a couple of points by way of illustration: having students engage in the give-and-take of reasons in discussion is the forerunner of individuals coming to explore the pros and cons of suggestions that arise in their own minds. considering different people’s viewpoints during discussion helps to seed the habit of students looking at things from different perspectives in their own thinking. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 29 having defined what i mean by discussion, connected it with the capacity for reflection, and drawn attention to the educational role that it may play, let’s now turn to what makes a discussion philosophical and the kinds of thinking that it involves. philosophical discussion and the kinds of thinking it involves as with discussion more broadly, philosophical discussion addresses problems or questions, and we may begin to say what makes a discussion philosophical by looking at their general characteristics. open a standard introduction to philosophy and you will find problems and questions regarding such things as knowledge, existence, society, morality, aesthetics, and religion. as a general procedure, the problems of philosophy are tackled by addressing the questions that they raise. to take a couple of traditional examples: there might be an attempt to resolve the mind-body problem by addressing the question whether mental states can be identified with states of the brain; or again, the problem of freewill and determinism might be addressed by starting with the question of what it means to say that a person could have done otherwise. while philosophy’s problems and questions vary widely in their subject matter, they all have to do with abiding human concerns. what constitutes knowledge and how it differs from belief and opinion, for example, concerns us all, and is no small matter, given the claims to knowledge constantly pressed upon us. this extends to the scope and propriety of all our attempts to gain knowledge of the world through science, religion, literature and art. the same point can be made in regard to the moral and legal realms. the question whether we should judge a person’s actions by their intention, by their consequences, or some other standard, has a profound bearing on judgments made in everyday life, as well as within institutions such as the law. it is important to note that these matters cannot be settled simply by an appeal to the facts, or any kind of scientific method. this is not to say that such means are irrelevant. the results of psychology and brain science are certainly relevant to the mind-body problem, for example, but their bearing cannot be judged without a good deal of analysis and argument. similarly, it is just possible that physical indeterminacy at the quantum level may have implications for thinking about the wellsprings of freely chosen human action, but there is no shortcut from physical theory to a settlement of that perennial problem. this does not mean that, beyond consistency with what we otherwise know, one response is as good as another. as in many things, our responses can be clear-headed and insightful, or muddledheaded and obtuse. even when they have attained the status of received opinions, however, they remain open to challenge; and accepting the settled opinions of previous generations on such matters can mean living with outdated ideas. the once widely accepted view that the mind is an entity metaphysically distinct from the body has come to be contentious, to say the least, as has the oft accompanying belief that human beings have a free pass to intervene, as it were from the outside, in the causal fabric of the world. this brings us to two ways in which philosophical problems and questions typically call for a response. one is that they invite conceptual investigation. aside from straightforwardly conceptual analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 30 questions, which are common in philosophy, the need for conceptual exploration characteristically extends to the terms in which philosophical problems and questions are posed. thus, we need to be clear about what we understand by the mind, or mental states and processes, in order to bring the available evidence to bear on the mind-body problem. in regard to the suggestion that quantum indeterminacy may help us to solve the problem of freewill and determinism, how clear is it that the conception of freely choosing to do something can be made sense of in terms of indeterminacy? unless the terms in which our questions and problems are stated are in good order conceptually, we will not make much progress. the other thing that philosophical problems and questions usually demand is a good deal of careful reasoning. tracking down the implications of theories and suggestions to see how they fare is no less a matter of methodical investigation than it is in scientific inquiry. the claim that consciousness might be a physiological process occurring in the brain, for instance, needs to meet a good number of objections, which have, in fact, produced a considerable literature. again, only a good deal of careful argument from physical theory via physiological psychology to what we know about the wellsprings of human action could have any hope of making a convincing case for quantum indeterminacy to underwrite free action in an otherwise deterministic world. given this, it should come as no surprise that philosophy has done a great deal to develop these two methods of investigation. conceptual exploration is at least as old as plato’s dialogues, while systematic attention to reasoning goes back to aristotle. these things have developed over the history of philosophy and become fashioned into conceptual and logical tools that have widespread application, not just in philosophy. this is a point of particular interest. in my view, it is their wideranging utility that strongly commends them when it comes to general education. after all, education is not just a matter of acquiring subject knowledge, but of learning to think about it. it is an apprenticeship in learning to use the tools of thought to do the job that they are designed to do. although they are fit for general use, the best way of acquiring these tools is to engage in philosophical inquiry, where their application is front and center. bearing in mind what was said about the connection between discussion and the development of reflective thought, it is to philosophical discussion in particular that we should turn. this is the way to develop general thinking capabilities that can be applied across the curriculum. before moving on, i should draw attention to the attitude appropriate to philosophical matters. while i have been focusing on the character of philosophical problems and questions, philosophical inquiry depends upon treating them in a philosophical way. after all, it is possible to adopt a different stance to the kinds of problems and questions with which philosophy deals. one might regard such matters as answered by appeal to authority, for example. depending on the case, that might mean falling back on received opinions, religious teachings, parental values, or looking to the teacher for the ‘right answer’. adopting a philosophical attitude to some matter is appropriate where that enables us to see it as it should be seen—that is to say, as open to discussion and the application of philosophical method. while other problems and questions call for other attitudes, such as the scientific and the aesthetic, analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 31 knowing when to adopt a philosophical attitude is primarily a matter of being able to recognize philosophical problems and questions through the characteristics mentioned above. application to the classroom in order to understand how the tools of philosophical inquiry operate, it is best to place them in the context of their use. for us, that means philosophical discussion in the classroom. whatever complexities and messiness might appear on the surface of any such discussion, we should not lose sight of its underlying form. let us examine it briefly, setting out the steps in the process and the means being employed at each stage. stimulating establishing an agenda suggesting reasoning & analysis evaluating concluding john dewey says that inquiry begins with a felt difficulty that arises in a problematic situation, whether in everyday life or in intellectual pursuits (dewey, 1991).3 whatever the subject under discussion in the classroom, this is likely to require the teacher to introduce some suitable stimulus 3 dewey’s account of inquiry in how we think is a reworking of his understanding of scientific inquiry, aimed at teachers. my account is itself a reworking of dewey for the purposes of philosophical classroom discussion. for an overview of dewey’s model, see especially pp. 72-78 of how we think. problems or issues and questions concerning them implications assumptions evidence criteria counterexamples initial problematic situation ideas conjectures hypotheses conclusion resolution implementation __ __ __ __ _c re at iv e ph as e_ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ _c ri tic al p ha se __ __ __ _ the teacher introduces stimulus material students identify problems or issues and raise questions for discussion students consider some matter and make suggestions students evaluate their suggestions by analysing them and exploring their implications students make conclusions and reflect on them analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 32 material. that is to say, material that problematizes something in the curriculum with the aim of stimulating dewey’s “felt difficulty” in order to motivate inquiry. a problem or issue is one thing, its articulation is another. having become aware that there is something worth looking into, the first step in dealing with it is to identify the nature of the problem, or say what is at issue. after all, we need to know what we are inquiring into. failure to understand the nature of the problem or to see what is at issue is a sure-fire way of going wrong. apart from being integral to inquiry, it is important for students to be able to identify problems for themselves, and not have teachers and textbooks forever set them, as if they came ready-set outside the artificial confines of the classroom. as mentioned earlier, the standard way to begin inquiring into a problem or issue is to see what needs to be asked about in order to deal with it. such questions are probes into a problem domain. raising questions and getting them into good order is therefore part of establishing an agenda for discussion in the classroom. questions demand answers, but not in the way that questions asked by teachers normally do. for one thing, the answers must be searched for among the possibilities that present themselves. this means that students’ beginning attempts to answer the questions that frame their inquiries should be viewed as suggestions, rather than as providing the answer. suggestions can take many forms, such as floating an idea, voicing an opinion, making a proposal, or forming a hypothesis. we may come to suggestions right off the bat or after having surveyed the ground, noting things that may help us in our quest. even when we proceed directly from a question to a suggestion, there will be reasons in the background. students who make a direct move of this kind can expect to be asked to provide reasons to back up what they say. in other words, it is assumed that the student has already latched onto some facts or features of the case and has those in mind when making the suggestion. this brings us to the complex business of reasoning and analysis. these activities ultimately aim to evaluate suggestions by analyzing ideas, scrutinizing assumptions, drawing out implications, raising counterexamples, and bringing fresh evidence to bear. most of the tools of philosophical inquiry come into play here. reasoning involves both inference-making and the assembly and evaluation of argument. analysis encompasses a whole host of operations from classifying, distinction-making and defining, through comparing and contrasting, to exploring the criteria that govern the application of complex concepts. the complexity involved in exploring and evaluating suggestions is also partly due to the fact that it is not usually a single step-wise sequence. it is likely to track backwards and forwards as suggestions encounter difficulties and other suggestions are made, or we deliberate over the merits of competing points of view. there can also be inquiries within inquiries, adding further to the complexity. even so, like fractals, they replicate the same process. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 33 the outcome of classroom philosophical inquiry may take many forms. having weighed competing suggestions, we may have come to a decisive judgment. alternatively, there might be no agreed conclusion, but merely progress toward one. it may be that the issue is better understood, or simply a realization that we don’t know something we thought we did. socratic discovery of ignorance can be the beginning of wisdom. although both critical and creative thinking recur throughout such an investigation, we may consider the first phase up to and including the making of suggestions as predominantly creative, while the second phase, which involves reaching conclusions through the process of reasoning and analysis, is decidedly critical. thus, successful stimulus materials are likely to engage the imagination and provoke thoughts and feelings that awake us to issues and problems and begin to raise questions in our minds. these things are more creative than critical in mood, and that continues on when suggestions spring to mind, or we brainstorm ideas. by contrast, reasoning as to the logical implications of a statement, bringing evidence in support of a suggestion, or presenting a counterexample to a claim, are critical in mood, as are such things as categorization, distinctionmaking, definition, and analytical comparison. i do not mean to overplay this division of inquiry into critical and creative phases. in philosophy, very little critical thinking occurs without at least a modicum of creative thinking, and vice versa, with much of the work bearing a critical face on one side and a creative one on the other. the articulation of some idea requires the critical choice of vocabulary, for instance, and quite possibly self-correction in the process. while creative in tenor, the act involves critical oversight. similarly, even something as obviously critical as mounting an argument against a claim involves the construction of an argument, which is an act of creation. developing the tools of thought in the classroom in what follows, i will attempt to flesh out aspects of the scheme presented in the previous section, restricting myself to the topics of questions and questioning, reasoning, and conceptual exploration. while much could be said about the means to be employed in other phases of inquiry, homing in on these three areas will allow me to concentrate on the most essential tools of thought that students will acquire. questions and questioning let us begin with questions into a problem or issue that form the agenda for discussion. our word problem has its roots in the greek term πρόβλημα, formed from πρό (before) and βά̆λλω (throw), the meaning of the whole being that a problem throws something before you. it forms a hindrance or an obstacle to be cleared away. of particular interest is the fact that in aristotle’s logic a problem takes the form of a question as to whether a statement is true. that is, a problem throws a question before you as to the truth or otherwise of a given statement. we might say that the statement is problematic in the sense of being questionable. let us, then, regard a problem as throwing questions before us that we must try to answer if we are to address the problem aright. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 34 earlier i made some remarks on the character of philosophical questions, but let me come at them again from the perspective of the classroom. first, philosophical questions ask about things that matter to us, but to which we do not have settled answers. that must apply in the classroom, if we are to motivate inquiry. in this respect, they stand in contrast to all those teacher’s questions that presuppose their answers and to which students are all too often unresponsive. secondly, they invite a search for answers and are therefore open to various responses. this encourages creative and divergent thinking and consideration of different points of view in the classroom, which is enhanced by the fact that the inquiry is collaborative. thirdly, we are looking at the kinds of questions for which the tools of philosophy are designed—questions whose possible answers compete for justification by appeal to reasoning and analysis. in the classroom, therefore, they provide a golden opportunity for students to learn to analyze ideas and reason well. it should not be assumed that students will be able to construct such questions without training. interventions are needed. for example, it can be extremely helpful for students to learn to distinguish between questions according to their response demands. this can involve seeing that one question demands discussion, while another would be better addressed by consulting a reliable source, or that it will need some admixture of the two. sometimes it will be to recognize that whatever answer you give to the question is really a matter of personal preference and that arguing about the matter is inappropriate or in vain. in the instances of special interest to us, it is a matter of seeing that no answer will suffice without the support of a carefully reasoned case. learning to be a good questioner is largely a matter of learning by doing, but carefully targeted exercises and activities can set students on their way.4 this brings us to the kinds of questions that are directly connected with the use of a whole raft of philosophical tools. so far, we have been looking at the questions that form the agenda of an inquiry. a great deal of questioning also arises throughout an inquiry. since inquiry is by nature a form of questioning, this is hardly surprising. typical questions in the classroom include ones like the following: what are you saying? why do you think so? what’s supposed to follow from that? what sort of thing is that? why isn’t it the same? these questions ask us to use the tools at our disposal to think about what is being said, by clarifying, giving reasons, and inferring, classifying, and making distinctions, in the cases just given. while the subject matter of philosophy is intrinsically of value in a child’s education, we are looking at it here through the lens of cognitive development. by constantly inviting such questions, philosophical discussion is an ideal vehicle for the development of critical and creative thinking. so long as the teacher is able to guide students to make appropriate moves in their thinking by asking such questions, and encouraging students to ask and address them, as discussion proceeds, i can think of no better means to that end. it is not possible in such a brief survey as this to give a detailed account of all the tools in the philosopher’s kit. as indicated earlier, i have chosen to concentrate on elementary tools used for 4 see my philosophical inquiry, chapter 2, for a detailed discussion of questioning and exercises and activities to support its development. on response demands, in particular, see pp. 17-20, 43-4, as well as use of the question quadrant, pp. 20-23, 45-7. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 35 questioning, conceptual exploration and reasoning. as we move on from discussing questions and questioning, however, i would like to say something about why-questions and reason-giving. it is so basic to philosophical discussion in the classroom that it is worth singling out. why-questions call for a reason and the giving and examination of reasons is an essential part of the inquiry process. some why-questions seek an explanation, while others ask for a justification. the former questions are emblematic of scientific inquiry, as the latter are of philosophy. even then, we need to distinguish between different kinds of justification. sometimes we seek justification for some action or societal state of affairs, which we may call social justification, while on other occasions we seek reasons to justify some statement or claim, which is logical justification. why-questions of logical justification are the ones of particular interest here. to attempt to justify a statement or contention is to reason about it, and reasoning about propositions is the bread-and-butter of philosophical inquiry. reasoning let us begin by thinking about reasoning in terms of its basic operations. just as addition and subtraction are the basic operations of arithmetic, logical justification and inference are the basic operations of reasoning. here is an example: justification: it isn’t fair to give some people more opportunities than others because fairness involves everyone having the same opportunities. inference: fairness involves everyone having the same opportunities. therefore, it isn’t fair to give some people more opportunities than others. i have italicized the words ‘because’ and ‘therefore’ to mark these operations.5 let us look a little more closely at what they involve, beginning with logical justification. in terms of language use, it involves logical relations between statements, where one or more statements are used to support another statement. from a cognitive point of view, it involves a relationship between judgments, where one or more judgments is used to justify another. i say this in order to point out that engaging students in logical justification shifts their attention from the relations between the things they are talking about to include the relations between their judgments and between the statements that they make. in so doing, it draws attention to their thinking. similar remarks apply to inference. inferences involve logical relations between statements, where one statement, the conclusion, is said to follow from one or more other statements, which are its premises. in terms of cognition, an inference involves a judgment that, in accepting the premises, we should accept the conclusion. we may grant the inference without assenting to the premises, of course, but when we judge the premises to be true, we have what is called an argument from the premises to the conclusion. as with logical justification, inference-making and argument represent a 5 i recommend sticking to these two words in the beginning stages of paying attention to reasoning. some teachers of young children prefer to use the word ‘so’ instead of ‘therefore’ to introduce inference-making, but ‘so’ has so many other uses—isn’t that so? we might not use terms like ‘justification’ and ‘inference’ with young children, but we need to clearly distinguish between these operations. instructions such as ‘give a reason’ and ‘draw a conclusion’ will do just fine in combination with ‘because’ and ‘therefore’. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 36 shift from unselfconsciously thinking about our subject matter, to include awareness of the operations used in thinking about it. to use a word that has become fashionable in education, the shift is metacognitive. the import of this becomes clear if we extend the comparison with arithmetic. children add on things and take them away long before they learn to enumerate. coming to think about such actions in arithmetic terms involves a metacognitive shift in which the basic operations of addition and subtraction are consciously applied to them. the utility of this arithmetic overlay is obvious and we make early and thoroughgoing efforts to ensure that children become numerate. children also move from judgment to judgment and one statement to another without thinking about the logical relations between them, and educational intervention is necessary to establish proficiency in justification and inference. while the value of logical literacy is no less obvious than in regard to numeracy, it is an educational scandal that our efforts have not been commensurate. let me make two more points about the comparison with basic numeric operations. first, as piaget long ago pointed out, such operations are reversible (piaget, 1970). numerical addition has its reverse in numerical subtraction. we can add 4 to 5 to get 9, for example, and subtract 4 from 9 to return to 5. similarly, with logical operations. x because y, has its reverse in y, therefore x. you simply change the logical operator from ‘because’ to ‘therefore’ and reverse the order of the statements.6 secondly, elementary numeric operations exist within the systems of operations that characterize mathematics. logic is no different. its operations belong within systems, from elementary operations of justification and inference like those illustrated here, to propositional calculus, syllogistic logic and other forms of predicate calculus, the logic of relations, and so on, generally encountered only at the tertiary level. the same is true of mathematics, of course, with the difference being that students encounter a good deal of mathematics at the primary and secondary level, but seldom much logic—and it shows! justification and inference assume significantly different forms and take on different roles in inquiry. in its traditional deductive form, reasoning is a truth-preserving operation. the standard way of expressing this is to say that valid deductive reasoning logically guarantees the truth of the conclusion given the truth of its premises. it is logically impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. deductive operations guarantee their results provided that you don’t make mistakes, just as you’re guaranteed to get the right result in arithmetic if you don’t make mistakes. while we make use of deduction within philosophical inquiry, it is less clear that it is deductive in its overall logical form. one possible argument runs as follows: according to karl popper (popper, 2002), scientific inquiry takes the form of hypothesis and test. to be testable, a scientific hypothesis must be falsifiable, in that, if certain conditions c fail to be met, then the hypothesis h can be shown to be false by deductive reasoning. crudely put, the reasoning is this: if h then c. but not c. therefore, not h. alternatively, if h survives the test, it lives to fight another day. philosophy is not science, of course, but it might be argued that the same logic should apply to it, if it is to deal with 6 by the way, while secondary students are familiar with . ˙ . as the shorthand for ‘therefore’, they are unlikely to know that ˙ . ˙ is the shorthand for ‘because’. that makes one symbol the inverse of the other. the folks who devised that arrangement knew what they were doing! analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 37 substantive matters. this way of looking at inquiry places the formation and choice of hypotheses outside its logical framework. before agreeing to do that, however, we need to consider how hypotheses are formed and chosen for further consideration. this is bound to be mixed, but let’s consider detective work, for the sake of argument. observation of a crime scene and the questioning of witnesses may provide clues as to suspects worthy of investigation. here, various pieces of evidence combine to form, not a proof, but a circumstantial case as to the identity of a culprit. the inference from the evidence to the suggestion that s is the culprit is strong enough to be worth following up, but is no logical certainty. the inference is what we call an inductive one.7 guided by this, we might say that inquiry has both inductive and deductive phases.8 although i cannot argue the case further here, let us apply this pattern to philosophical inquiry in its most generalized form. it is important to note that this overall framework is consistent with the occurrence of both inductive and deductive reasoning moves at various points within it. the deductive move already mentioned in relation to popper is known as modus tollens, but it is only one move among many within the systems of elementary logic that may occur. nor should we overlook the use of deductive reasoning in employing special purpose devices such as counterexamples, and necessary and sufficient conditions. in regard to inductive operations, consider arguments from analogy. it might be argued, for example, that learning to think well involves the acquisition of skill, much as in learning a trade. so, just as you must learn to use the tools of a trade in order to be proficient in it, you need to learn how to use the tools of thought in order to think well. how is this argument meant to work? from the fact that the two cases are comparable in a significant respect (acquisition of skill), and that one has a certain further feature (mastery of the tools of the trade), it is inferred that the other will exhibit that feature as well (proficiency in the use of thinking tools). the argument is suggestive, but the fact that they share one feature does not prove that they share the other. if they do so, it is not out of logical necessity. such an argument clearly involves an inductive inference.9 again, consider thought experiments. they are an argumentative device that asks us to imagine a scenario or situation and draw a conclusion from it. a favorite of mine comes from john locke in his discussion of personal identity. locke asks us to imagine that the soul of a prince has come to inhabit the body of a cobbler, whose own soul has just departed. do we now have the prince or the cobbler? locke is betting that you will choose the prince and then draw his conclusion.10 i particularly 7 further inquiries into the hypothesis regarding s may well take the deductive form indicated above. it may be that, were s to be the culprit, then c must be the case. if further inquiries show that c is not the case, then s is removed from the list of suspects. 8 for this view of the logic of inquiry, see dewey (1991), esp. pp. 81-2. for an extensive and more complex treatment of the matter, see dewey (1938), chapter xxi. 9 under one way of analyzing the argument, it also includes a deductive step. for an introductory account of the analysis of arguments from analogy, see my philosophical inquiry (2020), pp. 124-5. 10 see john locke, an essay concerning human understanding, chapter 27, § 15. this thought experiment is not actually a stand-alone argument in locke. he employs it to forward an argument for distinguishing, as he puts it, the same man from the same person. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 38 like this example because it reminds me of the fairy-tale of the frog prince, where it is a good bet that the young readers will side with locke. there is no hint of deduction here. i haven’t the space to say more about reasoning, but we already have a decent list of reasoning operations and devices for use in the classroom: the basic operations of logical justification and inference, deductive reasoning, inductive reasoning, counterexamples, necessary and sufficient conditions, argument from analogy, and thought experiments. if students can acquire even a basic proficiency with them, they will have gone a long way to fulfilling the promise of philosophy in schools to raise the bar on reasoning in school education.11 conceptual exploration as we did with reasoning, let us tease out the relevant operations. they may be divided into the categorical and the comparative. categorical operations include such things as classification and division, conceptual opposition, categorical distinction-making, definition, and the construction of metaphor. comparative operations include making comparisons of quality and comparisons of quantity, ordination, making comparative distinctions, and drawing analogies.12 let’s begin with classification and division. to classify something is to assign it to a class. thus, to say that cinderella is a young woman is to assign her to the class of young women. she is also a fairy-tale character, of course, which places her in an entirely different class, along with the big bad wolf and rumpelstiltskin. likewise, to say that consciousness is a state of the brain represents a dramatic shift in classification from the traditional view that it is a state of the soul. division involves dividing things of some kind into various sub-kinds, as in dividing cutlery into knives, forks and spoons, or dividing the mind into its various faculties. similarly, we may divide ethical theories according to whether they are based on actions or based on virtue. both division and classification generally admit of hierarchies of classes. thus, we may further divide the class of spoons into, say, tablespoons, dessert spoons and teaspoons, just as we may divide action-based ethical theories into those that are teleological and those that are deontological. once again, the comparison with addition and subtraction is instructive. grouping things together and separating them form a pair of operations much like adding them on and taking them away. when formalized, the latter actions become basic numeric operations, while the former become basic conceptual operations. the one is as indispensable in learning to think conceptually as the other is in learning to think mathematically. it is worth pointing out that classification and division also form a pair of reversible operations, like addition and subtraction, or logical justification and inference. we can divide spoons into their 11 for a more detailed account of these and other reasoning tools, together with associated exercises, see philosophical inquiry, chapter 4. see also my twenty thinking tools (2006). 12 it is an interesting and significant fact that categorical conceptual operations are related to deductive reasoning, while comparative operations have connections with inductive reasoning. unfortunately, we do not have the space to explore that here. for a more detailed account of conceptual operations and related exercises and activities for the classroom, see philosophical inquiry, chapter 3. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 39 various kinds, for instance, and then gather them all together again just as spoons; or divide and subdivide ethical theories into their various kinds and then classify them together again just as ethical theories. students need to learn to apply these operations both separately and in combination. take conceptual opposition for an example of elementary use. when we say that bad is the opposite of good, for example, we set up opposing categories. to say that to be kind is good, for instance, is to classify that conduct in the same way that we did for cinderella. metaphor is the same. john locke says of the mind in its initial state: “let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas”. here the mind, in its original condition, is classified as a tabula rasa.13 for combination, consider distinction-making. categorical distinctions involve a combination of classification and division. it is easy to overlook the combination because distinction-making concentrates on differences, and therefore on division. still, to draw a distinction is to make a division between things in some category, and it is best to be clear about this by first classifying the things that we are going to divide. an obvious way of distinguishing between daggers and swords, for instance, is to say that the former has a short blade, whereas the latter has a long one. more fully, however, a dagger is a short double-bladed weapon, whereas a sword is a long double-bladed weapon. that is to say, they both belong to the category of double-bladed weapons (classification), which differ in being either longor short-bladed (division). distinction-making illustrates the fact that classification and division are the building blocks of other categorical operations. definition follows suit. we might define a dagger as a short doublebladed weapon, and in doing so we cite the category to which it belongs (double-bladed weapon) together with the feature that divides it from other things of that kind (being a short one). all categorical operations involve classification, division, or some combination of the two. let’s now briefly consider comparative operations. in their most basic form, they deal with differences of degree with regard to some characteristic of the things being compared. comparisons of quality provide obvious examples. if one person is said to be more reliable than another, for instance, then they are being compared in the degree to which they possess a certain quality: reliability. comparisons of quantity are also like this, as when we say that michelle has let us down less often than danny, or that swords were used more frequently than daggers in medieval battles. comparisons generally involve two-way relations. consider more and less in the examples just given. if michelle has let us down less often than danny, then danny has let us down more often than michelle. if swords were used more frequently than daggers, then daggers were used less frequently. similarly, if one performance is better than another, then the other is worse; if one course of action promotes happiness to a greater extent than other alternatives, then those alternatives promote it to a 13 an essay concerning human understanding, book ii, chapter 1, § 2. if it had been said that we should conceive of the mind as like white paper, we would have had an analogy, of course, which is conceptually comparative rather than categorical. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 40 lesser extent. these basic conceptual operations lend themselves to iteration. consider ordination. students vary in mathematical performance, for example, and it would not be at all difficult for their teacher to place a selection of them in order in terms of how well they do. thus, student b’s performance is better than a’s, c’s better than b’s, d’s better than c’s, and so on. so far, that’s just variation in the quality of their performance, but it is the kind of thing that we can easily quantify, as indeed we do. you need look no further than their end of year marks in mathematics. numerical comparison is as common in science as is the comparison of qualities and nonnumerical quantification in the arts and humanities. it should therefore come as no surprise that comparative operations in philosophy are overwhelmingly qualitative, and seldom mathematical when quantitative. one example will serve. when, in the field of ethics, a philosopher thinks about what makes an action right, it is almost certain to be a question of what properties or qualities an action should have for the concept of right to apply to it. john stuart mill, for instance, says that an action is right insofar as it maximizes utility, which he conceives of as happiness. that is to say, the action should have the attribute of promoting happiness, and do so to a greater extent than any alternative.14 quality and non-numerical quantity are combined in this conception. this example is particularly to the point about the difference between the humanities and science, because mill is following jeremy bentham, who attempted to give utility a mathematical treatment with the utile as its unit. in doing so, he tried to convert a philosophical conception into one fit for social science. while some distinctions are conceptually categorical, as we saw, others are comparative. for instance, we might explain to a young child that tortoises and turtles are different from one another by saying that one is far smaller than the other. here the distinction is obviously comparative. we might have said that one is little while the other is big, of course, which would have been categorical. i mention this because we often face a choice between a categorical and a comparative way of conceptualizing things, if only we realize it, and it can sometimes matter which choice we make. that’s one reason among many for attending to conceptual literacy. like metaphors, analogies can be captivating. it is common for people to be struck by an analogy, which goes on to guide their thinking, even though its basis is unexamined. we are more inclined to scrutinize an analogy when it seems somehow inapposite. when it comes to conceptual exploration, however, a focus on the basis of comparisons is an aid to both critical and creative thinking. the ability to analyze an analogy, and say what makes it work or not, is a critical thinking skill, both in the study of literature and more generally; and sensitivity to the basis of comparisons is a source of creative thinking when it comes to students making figurative use of language. 14 while ‘greatest’ is a superlative, talk about the greatest happiness it is still a comparative conceptualization. the action producing the greatest happiness is the one that produces greater happiness than all those actions with which it may be compared. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 41 one final point. it would be a mistake to leave you with the impression that conceptual exploration involves nothing more than the simple application of categorical and comparative operations. as a remedy, let me say a word about complex concepts. i have in mind concepts like friendship, fairness and freedom. the criteria that govern the application of these concepts tend to vary from one case to another, the cases being related by nothing more than what the 20th-century philosopher ludwig wittgenstein called a family resemblance. in other words, they are not defined by a common set of criteria. some cases may be quite analogous to others, but others far less so, and their differences may be more of interest than what they have in common. this complexity means that the application of the concept is often contestable. we are all familiar with uncertainty and even open disagreement on occasion as to whether someone is truly a friend, some outcome is fair, or what it means to be free. the same applies to most of the concepts with which philosophy deals. concluding remarks questioning, reasoning, and conceptual exploration, are hardly exclusive to philosophy, but the kind of questions with which it deals, its careful attention to reasoning, and the fact that conceptual exploration is central rather than ancillary to its efforts, means that philosophy combines all the basic ingredients needed for teaching students to think well in ordinary language in a way that marks it out from other disciplines. it is as well to acknowledge that philosophers and philosophical traditions differ in the emphasis that they place on one or other of the things we have been examining. for instance, some see philosophical inquiry as concerned primarily with establishing the truth about the things into which it inquires. others see it as more concerned with the development of ideas that help to give meaning to our existence. these differences obviously make a difference to the kind of discourse in which they engage. those who regard philosophy as a quest for meaning are likely to emphasize conceptual exploration, while those dedicated to the pursuit of truth are more likely to expend their efforts on reasoning. still, regardless of its emphasis and variety, philosophical inquiry remains an amalgam of the ingredients presented here. this completes our survey of philosophical discussion in the classroom. i am all too well aware that i have touched only lightly on features of the terrain that deserve far more detailed treatment than space allows here. let me use the opportunity, then, to encourage you to follow these matters up, either in the works to which i have referred, or those of your own choosing. provided you do so with an eye to converting what you find into classroom practice, your efforts will be richly rewarded. references cam, p. (2006). twenty thinking tools: collaborative inquiry for the classroom. melbourne: australian council for educational research. cam, p. (2020). philosophical inquiry: combining the tools of philosophy with inquiry-based teaching and learning. lanham, md: rowman & littlefield. dewey, j. (1938). logic: the theory of inquiry. new york: henry holt and company. dewey, j. (1991). how we think. buffalo, ny: prometheus books. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 42 dewey, j. (2004). some stages of logical thought. in essays in experimental logic. mineola, ny: dover publications. piaget, j. (1970). genetic epistemology. new york: columbia university press. plato, theaetetus 190a. https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1726/1726-h/1726-h.htm popper, k. (2002). the logic of scientific discovery. london: routledge. vygotsky, l. s. (1978). mind in society: the development of higher psychological processes. cambridge, mass: harvard university press. address correspondences to: philp cam, school of humanities and languages, university of new south wales. sydney, australia email: p.cam@unsw.edu.au about:blank analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 32 how can rationality empower children? anne brel cloutier f you had superpowers, would you use them to help yourself or to help the world? when asked this question, this 10 year-old girl made the following deduction: “since i am part of the world, if i do something to help the world, then i am helping myself.” she avoided the false dilemma fallacy in which you have to choose between only two options. she was able to reason in such a way as to produce a third option without compromising the first two. this is not only a logical deduction, but also the type of reasoning that the world arguably needs for positive progress on environmental and political issues. once people understand that helping the world is helping humanity and that they are, themselves, part of humanity, they might feel that is it their duty to do whatever they can to help the world.1 some might assume that children are too young to have rational thoughts and that philosophy might be more likely to confuse them than achieve any good. in more traditional views of education, the goal is for them to learn facts, rules and techniques. some may fear that asking them to put things in perspective or challenge the foundations of their knowledge could lead to relativism and cause harm to their development. a possible cause may be the theoretical work of jean piaget, the first psychologist to study reasoning from a logician’s point of view as well as the first to conduct studies on rationality based on direct observations of children. his theory on the development of rationality claims that children are not born logical and that logical reasoning only appears progressively in adolescence. though his theory has been criticised on numerous fronts, the false belief about children being illogical has remained strongly anchored in our conceptions of rationality.2 in this article, we will argue that since piaget, many advancements have been made in psychological studies about reasoning. even though some parts of his theory are still very helpful to understanding the development of rationality, it is a mistake to view children as illogical beings. on the contrary, they happen to be logical at a very young age, as our argument and examples will show. educational psychologist david moshman offers a new reading of piaget’s work by explaining the development of rationality at a metalogical level, not only in childhood but in adulthood as well. metacognition is the mental act of thinking about thinking and is a fundamental cognitive process for the development of reasoning. 1 this example is drawn from a summer philosophy camp run in july 2014 by brila (www.brila.org), an educational charity based in montreal, canada. the participant’s name has been omitted to protect her privacy. 2 moshman, 1998-a. i http://www.brila.org/ analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 33 first, we will briefly summarize the main theories of reasoning, introducing moshman’s pluralist rational constructivism theory. 3 on his view, rationality develops through our increased metacognitive understanding, which occurs during peer interactions. we will therefore argue that the community of philosophical inquiry (cpi) method that forms the basis of the philosophy for children (p4c) program, when practiced with a special focus on metacognition, can constitute the perfect pedagogical approach to put moshman’s theory into practice. a close examination of some of the behaviours that occur in a cpi can link to his theoretical approach of rational development: in p4c, not only do we regularly witness children expressing rational and logical thoughts, but we also see how the cpi’s metalogical aspects offer multiple strategies that can help foster their development. these metacognitive and metalogic strategies come from observations of children practicing p4c dialogues, from which adults could greatly benefit too. developing rationality: from piaget to moshman—logic and metalogic piaget’s contribution to the psychology of reasoning is significant. he was the first to combine logic and psychology, and the first to understand reasoning as developing during childhood through understanding rather than the mere memorizing of facts. according to piaget, we are born without logical capacities. at first, children do not have access to their cognitive operations—for example, the conservation of quantities. at four or five years old, children will perceive a flattened piece of dough as bigger than its original form, only because it seems larger. the same thing occurs with liquids: a single amount of juice presented in two different glasses will be interpreted as different because of the appearance of the glasses. at this age, children do not understand the transformation, even if it occurs in front of them.4 they therefore tend to explain the transformation by reference to magic. this clash between the phenomenon and their interpretation represents a logical contradiction. at first, children do not even realize the contradiction, but at about five or six, they start to sense a cognitive conflict. this conflict is essential to their development: it will motivate them to work toward understanding the origins of the contradictions. different factors help children develop this understanding: maturity, repeated experience and social transmission. they repeat the operation until they finally understand the transformation that occurred—this is the condition for them to acquire reversibility, or the capacity to think through steps in reverse direction. however, they must be mature enough to possess the operational structure required for understanding and they need help from their social environment to be confronted to their contradictions. balance between all these factors will eventually resolve the conflict; children then complexify their structure of understanding, acquiring a higher level of logical skill.5 as we will see in moshman’s reading of piaget, the principles of conflict and self-regulation are key to ensuring deeper levels of reasoning. piaget identifies four stages of logical understanding, the highest of which is acquired at adolescence and remains optimal in adulthood—namely, the formal operational stage. this aspect of his theory is problematic since subsequent research has shown that children are able to accomplish logical 3 moshman, 2004. 4 see inhelder, sinclair & bovet in piaget, 1974. 5 piaget, 1974. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 34 tasks at an earlier age than piaget predicted.6 moreover, adult rationality is hardly always optimally logical: psychologist peter wason developed a selection task to detect logical fallacies that most adults cannot avoid committing, namely the affirmation of the consequent. this logical fallacy consists in understanding a conditional (a implies b) as if it were an equivalence (a equals b). the conditional “if a, then b” does not imply that if b (the consequent) occurs, then a (the antecedent) will occur too. in contrast, for the equivalence “a equals b,” when b occurs, a will occur too. applied to children, this selection task could take the form, “if you want dessert, you have to eat your vegetables.” empirical studies show that children will understand that in order to get dessert, they must eat their vegetables, but also that even if they ate their vegetables, they do not have to eat dessert (affirming the consequent does not imply that the antecedent will occur). in this case, they will eat dessert only if they want to, but eating the dessert is not part of the rule, only eating vegetables is. this task has the same logical form as the wason task, but with different content. if the development of reasoning consists in the acquisition of logical skills, then some empirical studies would prove that kids have a logical understanding while wason’s selection task shows that adults do not.7 would logical understanding drastically drop with age? this does not seem entirely accurate. to explain these variances in logical understanding, moshman points to the distinction between logic and metalogic. logic requires us to be able to make simple inferences in familiar contexts, whereas metalogic requires us to be able to think and coordinate multiple inferences in unfamiliar contexts. we may be able to make valid logical inferences at a very young age, but reasoning is not restricted merely to capacity of making inferences.8 children are perfectly capable of making logically valid inferences; they just do not know it yet. the development of reasoning requires awareness of inferences and explicit metalogical thinking. for moshman, reasoning begins with logic and progresses without a final maturity state. reasoning begins with the capacity to make inferences, then develops into the capacity to apply these inferences to specifics goals—what moshman calls thinking. thinking then develops into the ability to coordinate different inferences, thus creating new knowledge—what he calls reasoning. reasoning is thinking with epistemic prudence, that is, with concern for accuracy and adherence to appropriate inferential norms. 9 6 hawkins & al., 1984; markovits & al., 1989. 7 a version of his selection task consists of showing four cards, each holding a letter on one side and a number on the other side. since we can only see one side of each card, the subject sees cards with an a, a 7, a b and a 4. the experimenter gives a rule to the participant: ”if there is an a on one side, there is the number 4 on the other side.” then, the participant is asked which card must be turned over to make valid or invalid the rule. most of the participants choose to turn over the “a” card (which is correct) and the “4” card (which is a fallacy). in fact, in order to verify if the rule has been respected, one must turn over the “7” card, to make sure that there is no “a” on the other side since the rule applies to what is behind a “a” cards, but doesn’t mention anything about what is on the other side of a “4” cards. this selection task, when presented to adults is rarely correctly solved, even with subjects having a iq higher than average (in « regression in reasoning? » (wason, 1969), one of the participants who failed at the selection task admitted being a member of mensa, the international high iq society.). this demonstrates that logical reasoning is neither relative to age nor to competencies. 8 logical tasks correctly performed by young children are presented in familiar context, whereas correctly performed selection tasks, like wasons’, appear in a formal context that requires a fully developed understanding of logical inferences, in order to make predictions and to coordinate diverse possibilities. 9 moshman, 2004, p. 224. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 35 theories of human reasoning evolutionist theories claim that we evolved with heuristics: although these have assured our survival, they have not always been logically correct. we reason in an adaptive rather than a logical way.10 this does not mean we never think logically, only that we sometimes make mistakes. we can acknowledge this as a step in the right direction, given some cognitive science and psychological theories offer an ameliorative view claiming that even if we produce incorrect answers, we have the capacity to correct them.11 evolutionary dual process theories offer a developmental view of reasoning where even if the biases and heuristics are really difficult—and in some cases, impossible—to avoid, we have the capacity to control them. 12 reasoning comes from two essential processes that generally fall into two groups of proprieties. the first type, called system 1 (s1), generates heuristics, automatic and unconscious processes and do not require a lot of cognitive effort. a second type, called system 2 (s2) includes processes that are analytic, controlled and conscious, and require a lot of cognitive effort. reasoning comes from heuristics that made us evolutionarily adapted, but not to the present time where evolution has moved too fast for us to adapt. social, technical and scientific evolution grows a lot faster than the selection of our genes. this would explain why we are not necessarily adapted in such a way as to always provide good reasoning. s1 processes come from our evolution and even though they sometimes produce good conclusions, they are responsible for our mistakes too. s2 processes are more recent and they give us the capacity to control and correct s1 processes.13 for example, if one produces a logically invalid deduction, s2 processes can evaluate the answer and create a new one until the good answer is achieved and the task can then be successfully completed. in order to use s2 processes, one needs to possess adequate knowledge to produce logical answers. however, biases coming from s1 processes are deeply anchored in our reasoning; therefore, we cannot eliminate them, we can only inhibit them. this is why good learning consists not only in acquiring knowledge, but also in practicing strategies and developing awareness about possible biases that can come from s1 processes. but having strategies without knowing when to use them is pointless.14 we must learn how to detect situations in which they are needed. thus, practicing epistemic prudence is as important as knowledge and strategies.15 epistemic prudence consists in restraining ourselves from asserting with certainty when we do not hold enough information to conclude. generally, this behaviour is observed when there is a possibility that one might have to override heuristic responses. in neuroscience, brain imaging shows that repeating rules does not help us avoid biases. we must be alerted to the possibility of bias in order to detect and override it.16 identifying mistakes and 10 gigerenzer & goldstein, 1996, cosmides, 1989. 11 stanovich, toplak & west, 2008 in beaulac & robert, 2011. 12 dual process theories conceive reasoning as coming from two different systems in which different processes override others, allowing us to correct our incorrect answers. see: evans, j.st. b.t. & k. frankish, 2009 ; stanovish & west, 2008. 13 samuels, 2009 in evans, j.st. b.t. & k. frankish, 2009 p. 131. 14 ibid, p. 687. 15 beaulac & robert, 2011. 16 houdé et moutier, 1996. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 36 strategies to avoid them helps us achieve better results when solving tasks, with the success rate rising from 10 to 90 per cent.17 we believe that from a dynamic cognitive point of view, neuronal activities can be produced by epistemic prudence, meaning once it is internalized, it becomes an automatic alert. in this article, we would like to suggest that metacognition is the procedure of coordination to override s1 processes. first, we need epistemic prudence to activate s2 processes; then, reflective reasoning—consisting of monitoring and coordinating inferences—results in overriding s1 processes toward a more thoughtful answer. we view the actual activation of s2 as a metacognitive process. for moshman, reasoning is much too complex to be reduced to only two different processes. however, we will see that his constructivist theory of rationalist pluralism suggests that peers’ interactions is an effective way to put into practice cognitive strategies and epistemic prudence as part of a collective and internal metacognition act. rationalist pluralist constructivism for both moshman and piaget, rational development begins in conflict. when faced with a contradiction between a phenomenon and its representation, children feel a discomfort that motivates them to understand what is missing in their reasoning. to find equilibrium, they must seek to understand the nature of the contradiction. only then will they be able to achieve more complex forms of reasoning. piaget’s experiments show that a more complex understanding structure can be achieved much faster when children repeat the operations by themselves.18 similarly, for moshman, children can achieve more complex reasoning by repeating the operation, but this recurrence can be understood as a metacognitive reflection on the reasoning experience. the development of reasoning progresses through explicit metacognitive reflections on their own inferences to make them clearer and more understandable.19 we build our own metacognitive theory at a very young age, even if it is not fully conscious at first. though we understand a metacognitive act as a conscious one, as children, we are able to understand how behaviours may impact our environment, even if we do not consciously view it as metacognitive understanding. this comprehension is therefore the tacit starting point of children’s own metacognitive theory construction. making an inference does not require metacognitive awareness, yet inferring that “when i do this, that will happen” and acting accordingly constitute a form of metacognitive theory. since a theory is simply the active use of knowledge to predict and explain empirical phenomena, developing our own metacognitive theory then consists in being able to build our own knowledge structure—it is a growing capacity to theorize and act on our own cognitive behaviours. the more we understand our thinking and organize it in reasoning structures, the more complex our comprehension structures will become. thus, metacognition increases our level of reasoning, giving us more control on further reasoning—and our rationality development depends on it.20 17 ibid. 18 piaget, 1974, p. 59. 19 moshman, 2004. 20 schraw & moshman, 1995, p. 356. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 37 by becoming aware of our inferences, we are able to coordinate and control them appropriately. for moshman, awareness and control of our inferences take place most often in social interactions: when we interact, we must justify ourselves and this justification process requires making our argument explicit. as he writes, “reflection and coordination, moreover, often take place in the context of social interaction, and especially peer interaction.”21 moshman’s theory of rational development is based on a dialectic constructivist account, which holds that the construction of reasoning results from an interaction between external factors—like learned strategies and social environment—and internal processes—like maturation. for moshman, metacognition depends both on the social environment and internal factors, so they complete each other, making both of them fundamental and richer. internal construction explains metalogical comprehension, giving the capacity to understand foundations of logical strategies and to have a richer grasp on their integration and coordination. in the same way, external factors may help learners to have a better metalogical understanding, thus helping them to coordinate and reconstruct their thoughts at a deeper level. control and coordination of inferences is a conscious metacognitive process made possible by three factors: cultural learning, individual construction and peer interaction.22 through social learning, children internalize conceptions about the nature of cognition. individual construction is a spontaneous attitude towards learning, in order to use strategies in an efficient way.23 self-regulation, for example, could be an internal process used to improve their comprehension of their own cognition. when dialoguing in social contexts, we interact to justify ourselves, so that we may understand each other better. in order to be better understood, we must make our argument clear to others, but first of all, to ourselves. most of the time, it is while arguing that we realize the weaknesses and strengths of our arguments, making dialogue crucial not only to being well understood but also to becoming aware of our own inferential processes as a metacognitive act. 24 social interactions bring about the need to understand our own reasoning and others, to combine them and coordinate them toward a shared reality. empirical studies have shown that collective thinking leads to better and more sophisticated answers.25 dialogue generates better understanding of problems and better clarification of concepts, therefore facilitating the resolution of sophisticated tasks. however, let us imagine a situation where a child is dialoguing with her tutor. there is a very low possibility that she will doubt his conclusions since he has epistemic authority. in order to question her reasoning, she would need to interact with peers she deems as equals in terms of rational skills. 21 moshman, 2004, p. 233. 22 schraw and moshman, 1995, p. 362. 23 ibid., pp. 363-364. 24 moshman, 2004, pp. 233-234. 25 for example, the rate of success rises from 9% to 75% for wason selection task in collective thinking (geil & moshman, 1994 in schraw & moshman, 1995, p. 364). in this specific experiment, in order to make sure that the group was not relying on a group’s expert, some data reveal good results for groups that found the good answer collectively without anyone having found it individually. this shows the importance of a level of equality between participants. for an adequate coordination and reflection process, inferences must be understandable for every member of the group. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 38 reasoning is much more complex than applying mere logical rules—it requires dialectical reasoning, or the ability to reflect on inferential diversity. dialectical reasoning represents a mindful and intentional effort to reconstruct our own rules, principles, intuitions and conceptions in order to achieve coherence and conceptual progress. we may define dialectical thinking as the deliberate coordination of inferences for the purpose of making cognitive progress. thus, the development of dialectical reasoning involves increasingly explicit knowledge about the nature of cognitive development, and increasingly deliberate efforts to further that process.26 since metacognition acts on itself, there is seemingly no limit to its development. moreover, since awareness of mind begins at around three years old, the development of metacognitive understanding can start early in life and continue into adulthood.27 cpi as a pedagogy to foster logical reasoning in light of the aforementioned theories, let us briefly summarize how logical reasoning works in five steps: • learning adequate knowledge and strategies for logical answers. • being alerted about the risk of being mistaken by possible biases. • practicing epistemic prudence by doubting when we are not sure of an answer. • thinking about our way of thinking, reviewing the information through a critical use of dialectical reasoning—that is, metacognition. • correcting our mistakes when applying appropriate procedures toward an appropriate answer. in this section, we will argue that the cpi method used in p4c is well suited to put the reasoning process into practice, because: i) its curriculum includes logical rules and procedures; ii) its dialogical approach regularly creates confrontations between different ideas and viewpoints, highlighting possible errors; iii) it fosters epistemic prudence, and iv) it constitutes in itself a metacognitive process. if practiced with metacognitive development in mind, p4c therefore stands a good chance of contributing to the development of logical reasoning, helping children grow in their capacity to apply appropriate procedures and arrive at appropriate answers. logic in education and p4c in the learning process, being open-minded is important in order to accept new information, but accepting too much without any process of doubting may lead to epistemological dogmatism. questioning the information we receive is a necessity in order to protect ourselves from indoctrination. on the other hand, too much doubt can put us in a state of uncertainty, even when facing facts and empirical truth, thus risking epistemic relativism. two types of logical errors are 26 moshman, 1998-a, p. 961. 27 schraw & moshman, 1995. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 39 possible in reasoning: fallacies, where we add too much information to the conclusion, and suppression of valid inferences, where we doubt too much and are not able to conclude anything. reasoning logically is being able to open our mind to information with enough doubt to prevent fallacies and enough rules to prevent relativism. this is why logic is an important tool in education: it helps to open minds for learning while protecting children from indoctrination. this is not a way of insisting that children learn logic, but rather that the metalogical aspect of dialogue can enhance logical reasoning. children who become progressively aware of the particular rules of reasoning and their impact on thoughtful expression gain a greater appreciation for the importance of developing thinking skills.28 a study by robert & al. shows that p4c has a positive impact on the development of logical reasoning.29 metacognitive and logic strategies in the p4c curriculum can help facilitators to guide and redirect children to enhance their thinking and help them develop their rationality on their own, while paying attention to the mental acts required to do so effectively. p4c and epistemic prudence learning the rules of logic is not, as we have seen, sufficient to reasoning logically. children must also be able to detect possible biases by becoming more alert and epistemically cautious. the robert & al. study shows that children who have been practicing p4c for several years present significant signs of epistemic prudence.30 doubting plays an important role in p4c inquiry in the development of logical awareness. in a cpi, children are not evaluated for their answers but for their capacities to inquire and question their own claims as well as those of others for the benefit of the inquiry. as p4c theorists michel sasseville and mathieu gagnon write, doubting is a very important activity in a community of inquiry. to enter a community of inquiry is to make the decision to put one’s beliefs in check, that is, to accept that they may be questioned. for this to happen, it is important that we have the attitude of someone who, in the face of what they believe to be true, right or good, is willing to question some or all of their beliefs.31 when doubting, children practice honest thinking, as they are not trying to convince others but rather striving to find the most valid and reasonable answer together. inspired by socio-constructivism, which views knowledge as generated from collaboration and mutual aid,32 cpi dialogues represent a rationalist epistemological work of co-construction, that is, the children confront each other’s ideas in order to collectively evaluate arguments while building their 28 p4c’s curriculum provides logical tools, among others, lipman’s novel harry stottlemeier’s discovery, for example, tells the story of children who discover the rules of logic by themselves by learning to avoid generalizations and other common logical mistakes. also, exercises are included in the facilitator’s guidebook in order for children to practice logical notions seen in the story, such as deduction and avoiding fallacies. 29 robert & al, 2009, p. 21. 30 a difference of more than 10% was noted among children who practiced p4c, compared to children who did not. 31 sasseville et gagnon, 2012, p. 117. 32 sasseville & gagnon, 2012, p. 85. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 40 own knowledge.33 peer interactions raise objections and divergent interpretations about reality, thus engaging children in multiple reflections and negotiations, encouraging them to modify their own conceptions of knowledge.34 in time, children participating in a cpi become more aware of their active role in knowledge construction, notably the importance of collaborative thinking and responsibility for justifying philosophical positions. p4c and metacognition peer interactions in a p4c setting, epistemic prudence favours metacognitive thinking in children since they must give reasons for the claims they make. this justification process contributes to metalogical thinking, requiring them to review their inferences and argumentation in order to evaluate them. when making their inferences explicit during a cpi dialogue, children gradually become aware of what an argument needs to be valid while group dynamics allow them to combine a diversity of inferences that improve one another, leading to more sophisticated forms of reasoning. as moshman writes, in social contexts we may find ourselves challenged to justify our conclusions, and thus to recognize and justify our inferences. we may also be challenged to understand the inferential paths that led others to alternative views, and to coordinate those inferences and conclusions with ours.35 this is precisely what children are doing in a cpi: they acknowledge their own reflection processes and strategies to improve the inquiry, motivating them to excel from a cognitive point of view. the goal of this practice is not to reach consensus but to cultivate autonomous thinking— children are not only working to find thoughtful answers, but also to determine ways to achieve such answers.36 in the words of p4c co-founder lipman, the improvement of thinking involves reflection. […] reflective thinking is thinking that is aware of its own assumptions and implications as well as being conscious of the reasons and evidence that support this or that conclusion. reflective thinking takes into account its own methodology, its own procedures, its own perspective and point of view.37 a cpi practice requires children to think about their thinking, therefore activating a metacognitive process of self-correction toward the mindful application of thinking strategies. if an 33 prevalent knowledge would be objectivist epistemology, where it consists in directly and empirically observable facts, like a large proportion of what children learn at school, for example. however, subjectivist epistemology has an important role to lay in the construction of knowledge since individuals acquire information according to their cultural and social specificities. nevertheless, a radical subjectivism could lead to epistemological relativism. rationalist epistemology requires to evaluate, criticize and justify different standpoint without asserting one single truth, therefore is more complete and support better inferences than objectivist and subjectivist taken separately. it links one to the other, building a more adequate theory of knowledge. (moshman, 2004, p.224) 34 sasseville & gagnon, 2012, p. 86. 35 moshman, 2004, p. 233. 36 sasseville, 2009, p. 5. 37 lipman, 2003, p. 26. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 41 argument is not valid, they must work to understand where it fails in order to correct it. when cpi dialogues emphasize awareness of reasoning processes, they therefore offer children the opportunity to develop their rationality, thereby collectively achieving more rigorous and coherent multidimensional thinking. the group dynamics enable children to think out loud without being afraid of making mistakes. unlike traditional education that implores children to think before speaking, in p4c, speaking is viewed as a thinking-aloud strategy: children help each other detect mistakes and determine how to correct them. this approach challenges the dominant educational paradigms, depicting mistakes not as a source of shame but as useful tools for learning and for accepting human imperfection. metasubjective objectivity we often associate objectivity with proven facts and rigorous justification, whereas subjectivity is usually linked to emotions, individual perceptions and unjustified thoughts. generally, subjectivity is opposed as objectivity. however, moshman’s conception of rationality is a systematic interaction of both. rationality is a form of objectivity that emerges from the reflective reconstruction of our subjectivity. since our perceptions come from our senses, and we interpret them with our personal conceptions, they are in part subjective. on the other hand, the objects we perceive are parts of an independent reality regardless of our perceptions. thus, for a more objective conception of reality, we must be aware of our different ways of perceiving. since our perceptions reflect our subjectivity, but are supported by actual reality, conscious reflection about our subjectivity helps to increase its objectivity. as a result, our conceptions are built from subjective perceptions, but supported by real facts. metasubjectivity consists in having reflective thoughts about our subjectivity. therefore, interactions between metasubjective thoughts and objective facts create meta-subjective objectivity.38 metasubjective objectivity represents our self-reflection on our interactions with our environment, whether between subjects and objects or between subjects. the plurality of perspectives generates conflicts that motivate metasubjective reflections, thus increasing metasubjective objectivity.39 the collision of ideas in a cpi is important as it constitutes a conflict that triggers an active process of dynamic reflection that is then deepened by collaboration through multiple cognitive acts. a cpi setting is the perfect environment to practice metasubjectivity as it invites children to exchange ideas about topics that matter to them and justify their positions by making their arguments explicit. the cpi curriculum is also full of cognitive tools that help children in their argumentation, such as giving reasons, examples and counterexamples, formulating comparisons and analogies, etc. these mental acts help children improve their thinking so as to reach more complex thinking levels as they co-construct their own knowledge. 40 38 moshman, 1994. 39 this meets piaget’s theory on cognitive conflict and the need to find balance in solving contradictions. 40 the curriculum in p4c contains guidebooks that help teachers and facilitators to recognize these mental acts as they occur in discussions. they also provide philosophical guidelines to make sure that dialogues reach concepts that involve thinking rather than maintaining episodic discussions. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 42 mental acts in p4c dialogues, children learn to detect the various mental acts that are at play rather than have them imposed by adults.41 this bottom-up educational approach teaches children how to think rather than what to think, helping them become aware of how they can improve. by labelling mental acts as they occur during cpi dialogues, facilitators help to make arguments and strategies explicit to children.42 in the dialogue excerpt below, we underline three different mental acts that also consist in metalogical strategies: • pointing out assumptions enables a better understanding of assertions as they examine their foundations.43 making these implicit premises explicit leads to a better understanding of what works in the argumentation and what does not. therefore, it makes it easier to correct logical mistakes while also reinforcing beliefs in correct claims. • identifying consequences requires thinking about the implications of a claim, thereby developing a better understanding of causality. as a metalogical strategy, understanding that there is a distinction between implication and equivalence is crucial to avoiding the affirmation of consequents and the negation of antecedent fallacies. the practice of identifying consequences allows for a better understanding of what an implication is. • finding counterexamples is a metalogical strategy that prevents the induction fallacy, which is one of the logical fallacies that occurs the most and almost inevitably leads to prejudice. counterexamples consist in generating alternatives, thus engaging deeper reflections before concluding. giving children the opportunity to challenge their own presuppositions with counterexamples helps them understand the incoherence of prejudices. in this dialogue excerpt, participant 2 points out participant 1’s assumption, but in doing so, he denies the antecedent fallacy: participant 1: “a wealthy parent will provide a good future for his children.” participant 2: “i disagree! you’re saying that a poor parent won’t take care of his kids as well as a rich parent will?” following the dialogue, participant 1 prevents participant 2 from committing the denial of antecedent fallacy by identifying the true consequences of his thoughts: participant 1: “no, that’s not what i’m saying. but when you are wealthy, you can provide a house, food and education to your children.” 41 tens of mental acts and behaviours have been listed in sasseville & gagnon, 2012. 42 a recent study on expert dialogic facilitation suggests that facilitator moves like paraphrasing, locating, distilling, probing reasoning and identifying warrants help to clarify the inquiry process by underlining the argumentative features of children’s philosophical contributions. accordingly, it seems that facilitation moves that emphasize metacognitive are most effective at improving children’s reasoning. (see, oyler, 2015.) 43 gagnon, 2005, p. 41. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 43 then, participant 2 gives a counter-example pointing out participant 1’s assumptions about wealth: participant 2: “but a person can also be wealthy and not take good care of his children at all.” participant 3: “i am agreeing with both of you. being wealthy does not mean that you will necessarily take good care of your children, but at least you could afford it.” when asked to give reasons, participants had to work on making the arguments explicit and accentuate their logical structure. for that to happen, they tried to review every step of their thought process and make the steps clear enough so that they could be explained to other participants. the reconstruction of an argument is a metalogic strategy that helps to gradually understand the distinction between premises and conclusions—and that the latter results from the former. participant 1: “cars are a bad invention.” facilitator: “why do you think that?” participant 1: “well, they cause accidents and they pollute.” participant 2: “but they also help people to travel easily.” participant 1: “i agree, but if traveling easily involves people getting hurt and the environment getting damaged, then it does more damage than good. and if it makes more damage than good, then it’s a bad invention.” making analogies is a metacognitive strategy that enables the development of abstract thinking by comparing actual situations to other situations, and in extracting the concept underlying them to apply them to both. explaining abstract concepts in a more accessible way can help children to understand them better. facilitator: “what is intelligence?” participant 1: “having good grades at school, i guess.” participant 2: “it could also be making new discoveries, like darwin and galileo did!” participant 3: “that’s true. and they did not make their discoveries in school.” participant 4: “but at their time, intelligence was not the same as today. galileo was put in jail and we had proof of his intelligence with facts only years later.” participant 5: “i think that intelligence is like cars: models can always improve with new technology.” facilitator: “are you saying that new technologies are to a car what proof and facts are to intelligence?” participant 5: “yes, that’s it… they both improve and continue to move forward with time.” the fishbowl these mental acts are only some of what we can observe in p4c. participants put them into practice and regularly identify them as they move through the dialogue. however, identifying mental acts as they get used is not an easy thing to do. lipman noted that we teach young children to recognize animals and colours by showing them pictures. in the same way, it should be possible to teach children—as well as adolescents and adults—to recognize a variety of mental acts by clearly analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 44 identifying them when they occur.44 thus, when participants activate a metacognitive process, it is not necessarily explicit. the fishbowl practice in p4c is an effective way to make the process explicitly metacognitive. fishbowls consist in dividing a class of students in two subgroups: the observers and the participants. observers have to keep silent during the whole dialogue. they observe if mental acts are indeed made or not, and note whenever they are, linking them to their context. here is an example of the metacognitive processes involved in the fishbowl practice: participants during the cpi: -mateo: “dogs are dangerous; a dog bit my sister.” -john: “well, my neighbour’s dog is a good dog; he never bites anyone.” lucy, as an observer, takes note of john’s counter-example. when the cpi dialogue is over, observers are asked to share their observations with the rest of the group: -lucy: “john gave a counter-example when he mentioned his neighbour’s dog.” by explaining the counter-example, lucy is making it explicit to herself and to others. meanwhile, john thinks about the way he was thinking earlier and realizes that when he was giving his neighbour’s dog as an example of a good dog, he was, in fact, giving a counter-example so mateo could understand that not all dogs are dangerous. here again an explicit metacognitive process is triggered: by listening to observations of the dialogue in which they participated, children are invited to think about their argumentation strategies. then, in the next cpi dialogue, the roles are reversed: participants become observers and vice versa. participants who have already been observers tend to argue differently: their observation helped to make them more conscious of their own intellectual moves. in the same way, participants who become observers consciously realize what they have been asked to do in the cpi. both lucy and john will be more aware of what a counter-example is and will even be able to name it explicitly as they discuss: –lucy: “i have a counter-example for what mary just said about…” why should rationality be a goal in education? p4c contains a broad range of metalogical and metacognitive strategies that contribute to the development of logical reasoning. we have seen that doubting is an important feature of inquiry, helping to develop epistemic prudence and that, when coupled with many other metacognitive factors and the collective nature of cpi dialogue, it can foster dialectic thinking and logical reasoning. this makes it useful across the disciplines from science and mathematics to language acquisition. studies in reasoning from the fields of psychology and neuroscience offer insights into possible avenues to improve our imperfect minds—hypotheses that may lead to a paradigm shift in our 44 lipman, 2003, p. 142. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 45 relationship to knowledge and education. a society that only promotes education for technical ends and labour skills misses out on the pedagogical value of rationality. as moshman writes, democratic self-government operates best if citizens are capable of making rational political decisions. promotion of rationality, then, serves a variety of personal, community, and governmental purposes and is thus an important goal of education.45 as citizens, if we do not possess the tools for reflective thinking, we risk maintaining a subjective position towards our knowledge, which reduces our potential for civic contribution beyond workforce integration. it is therefore as crucial that children learn reasoning skills as literacy and numeracy skills. otherwise, society may retain power dynamics that privilege the reasoning of a small elite, whose decision making might not benefit the entire community. a democratic society should be composed of individuals capable of autonomous political choices. to encourage rationality will not only lead to better social choices, but also to genuine political engagement in a democratic system. by promoting rationality, p4c is primed to contribute to this change. bibliography beaulac, g. et robert, s. (2011). « les théories de l’éducation à l’ère des sciences cognitives : le cas de l’enseignement de la pensée critique et de la logique ». les ateliers de l’éthique. 5(2). cosmides, l. (1989). « the logic of social exchange: has natural selection shaped how humans reason? studies with the wason selection task ». cognition. 31, 187-295. evans, j.st.b.t. et k. frankish, dir. (2009). in two minds. dual processes and beyond. new york : oxford university press. gagnon, m. (2005). guide pratique pour l’animation d’une communauté de recherche philosophique. québec : pul. gigerenzer, g., goldstein, d. g. (1996) « reasoning the fast and frugal way: models of bounded rationality ». psychological review, 103(4), 650-669. hawkins, j. & pea, r.d., glick, j. and scribner, s. (1984) « "merds that laugh don't like mushrooms": evidence for deductive reasoning by preschoolers ». developmental psychology. 20(4), 584-594. houdé, o. et s. moutier. (1996) «deductive reasoning and experimental inhibition training: the case of the matching bias». current psychology of cognition. 15. 409-434. lipman, m. (2003). thinking in education, newyork: cambridge university press. lipman, m., sharp, a. m., oscanyan, f., s. (1982), guide d’accompagnement de la découverte de harry, trad: marie-marthe ménard-markiza aqpe, ulaval. lipman, m. (1994). la découverte de harry, trad. de michel haguette, cecm. markovits, h., schleifer, m., & fortier, l. (1989). « development of elementary deductive reasoning in young children ». developmental psychology, 25(5), 787-793. moshman, d. (2004). « from inference to reasoning: the construction of rationality ». thinking and reasoning, 10, 221-239. 45 moshman, 1990, p. 343. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 46 moshman, d. (1998-a). « cognitive development beyond childhood ». handbook of child psychology: cognition, perception, and language, (5e éd). 2, 947-978. moshman, d., & geil, m. (1998-b). « collaborative reasoning: evidence for collective rationality ». thinking & reasoning. 4, 231–248. moshman, d. (1994). « reason, reasons, and reasoning: a constructivist account of human rationality ». theory & psychology, 4, 245–260. moshman, d. (1990). rationality as a goal in education in « educational psychology review ». 2(4), 335-364. oyler, j. (2015). expert teacher contributions to argumentation quality during dialogue. dissertation, monclair state university, nj. piaget, j. (1974) contradiction et conservations des quantités dans « recherches sur la contradiction », paris: puf, 51-65. robert, s., roussin d., ratte, m. et t. guèye. (2009) évaluation des effets du programme de « prévention de la violence et philosophie pour enfants » sur le développement du raisonnement moral, rapport présenté à la traversée. montréal. sasseville, m. & gagnon m. (2012). penser ensemble à l’école, des outils pour l’observation d’une communauté de recherche philosophique en action. québec : pul. sasseville, m. (2009) la pratique de la philosophie avec les enfants. 3e éd. québec : pul. schraw, g. & moshman, d. (1995). « metacognitive theories ». educational psychology review. 7(4), 351-371. stanovich, keith e., west, richard f. (2008) « on the relative independence of thinking biases and cognitive ability ». journal of personality and social psychology, 94, (4), 672–695. wason, p. c. (1969) « regression in reasoning? ». british journal of psychology, 60(4) 471-480. address correspondences to: anne brel cloutier doctoral candidate, department of philosophy, université du québec à montréal, email: annebrelcloutier@gmail.com mailto:annebrelcloutier@gmail.com philosophizing with children's literature: a response to turgeon and wartenberg analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 59 philosophizing with children’s literature: a response to turgeon and wartenberg darren chetty, maughn rollins gregory, megan jane laverty introduction ith the maturation of a field comes the opportunity and the responsibility to reflect on its sources, its areas and directions of development, debates among its proponents, and critiques originating from inside and outside the field. while early proponents of philosophy for children supported each other in the face of misunderstanding and misapprehension, differences inevitably arose among them, not only concerning materials and methods, but also concerning the very meanings of philosophy, childhood and education. these differences remain among contemporary scholars, educators and practitioners, who continue to engage in robust debates about how to research and practice philosophy with children and adolescents and how to theorize its foundational concepts. understanding and sustaining both the practical and theoretical aspects of these debates and their intimate relation to one another is critical to the ongoing vitality and growth of this movement. the more we strive to understand the merits of rival interpretations and the critical value they provide for our own, the more we increase the quality of scholarly argumentation, engage meaningfully with scholarship in related fields, and protect our community of scholars and practitioners from debilitating schisms. with a view to promoting such scholarly argumentation, in this essay we consider issues addressed by wendy turgeon and thomas e. wartenberg in their essay, “teaching philosophy with picture books” in the second volume of analytic teaching and philosophical praxis (attp) devoted to original essays by “veterans” of the philosophy for children movement (volume 41, issue 1, 2021), guest edited by susan gardner.1 we agree with turgeon and wartenberg that the question of what kinds of materials are best suited to philosophizing with children continues to be an important topic of research and of debate in our field and, while we appreciate their insights, we characterize the terms and the nature of the debate differently. in doing so, we challenge some of their arguments, as well as their representations and interpretations of certain scholars in the field. in addition, because they review another of the most important current debates in the field—systemic racism in children’s literature, in academic research, and in the politics of philosophical dialogue with children—we present an account of our position. we acknowledge that our familiarity with philosophy for children scholarship is limited to that which is written or translated in english and are therefore not aware of contributions about these issues published in other languages. 1 for this essay, we also draw on wartenberg’s new book thinking through stories: children, philosophy and picture books (2022) in which he expands on some of the ideas explored in the article with turgeon. with this book, wartenberg raises new criticisms of curricular philosophical novels, which we do not address here. w analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 60 philosophizing with children’s literature as with other practitioners and scholars in our field (kennedy 1992; matthews 1976; murris 2022; sprod 1993), turgeon and wartenberg defend “the use of picture books in philosophical inquiries [as] fundamentally sound and an excellent path to encourage children to engage in philosophical enquiry” (2021:96). while the focus of their scholarship is picture books, many of their arguments apply more broadly to children’s literature and even to children’s popular media.2 they argue, for instance, that using picture books “gives the children entrance into a genuine philosophical topic by presenting problematic examples for them to discuss through the engaging lens of a narrative” (2021:107-108). indeed, the relationship between narrative and philosophical thought has been widely theorized by cora diamond (2010), martha nussbaum (1992), and others.3 therefore, while turgeon and wartenberg are correct to highlight the philosophical value of narrative, that value does not distinguish picture books from other forms of adult’s and children’s media, including the philosophical novels and stories of lipman and many others (e.g., bowen 2006, camhy 2007, 2015, daniel, 2002, eyre, 2007, gaarder 1994, kennedy, 2012, 2019, kohan and vigna 2013, michaels 2007, montero 2017, reed, 1989, sharp 2000a, 2000b). nor is “the delight that children have in being read aloud to” (2021:107) a unique feature of picture books. elsewhere, wartenberg emphasizes that picture books are “charming and enjoyable,” with “entertaining narratives” (2022:36). another advantage identified by turgeon and wartenburg (that is also not unique to picture books) is that they are familiar to parents and teachers who may be unfamiliar with philosophy. this is a significant advantage, particularly in light of the “wide range of [web-based] materials” they cite that support using specific picture books in philosophical inquiry (2021:106). turgeon and wartenberg note that the images in picture books stimulate children’s imagination (see 2021:99), and that “[m]any stories include a whimsical use of pictures to suggest such a second narrative as a supportive and enhancing account of the verbal story or perhaps even a sub/contra-text [...] for philosophical inquiry” (2021:103). these insightful remarks indicate the need to theorize how images, as well as narratives, can have philosophical meaning. wartenberg has written on this topic (2006) and on philosophy in film (2007) (another kind of image). joanna haynes and karin murris (2012; see also murris 2016, 2022) have advanced our understanding of how images in picture books work in the context of philosophical inquiry. we note that some stories and novels written as stimulus texts for philosophy for children have been illustrated (e.g., sharp 2000; cam 1998), though not (as yet) with high-value artwork. turgeon and wartenburg conclude: “our position is not that one method for engaging children in philosophical inquiry is better than the other, but that each has important virtues as well as 2 turgeon and wartenberg do not explain how they distinguish picture books from other formats of children’s literature. elsewhere, wartenberg distinguishes “three basic types of illustrated books: illustrated novels, picture books, and comics, of which graphic novels are a particular kind,” and indicates that illustrated novels are “generally intended for adult consumption” (2022:53), though he also states that his “approach” uses both “picture books and also chapter books” (2022:41). it seems clear that turgeon and wartenberg understand picture books to be books for younger children in which illustrations play an integral, rather than an incidental function. 3 interestingly, matthews and lipman came to see the power of narrative to engage students in philosophical inquiry at about the same time: matthews delivered “philosophy in children’s literature” as a lecture in 1973 (later published in 1976) only a few years after lipman piloted harry stottleemeir’s discovery in 1972. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 61 drawbacks” (2021:96). while we agree that different kinds of texts have different virtues and drawbacks for use in philosophizing with children, we disagree that there is a difference of methods or approaches here—a ‘lipmanian approach’ and a ‘picture books approach.’4 it is commonplace in educational discourse to distinguish curriculum—the materials used to teach a subject matter—from pedagogy—the method used to teach it. in the case of philosophy for children, the subject matter is philosophy and the pedagogy is philosophical inquiry. indeed, the web-based resources turgeon and wartenberg cite are pedagogical resources for how to inquire philosophically with almost any stimulus text. they assume that in defending the use of picture books, they are defending a distinct approach to philosophizing with children. to defend that assumption, more would have to be said about how picture books necessitate a unique pedagogical approach (which might, then, disqualify some of the web-based resources they cite). indeed, the fact that elsewhere, wartenberg uses the lipman/sharp phrases “a community of philosophical inquiry” (2022:80) and “a classroom community of inquiry” (2022:81)—without attribution—to describe philosophical discussions using picture books, indicates that this is not a different approach. turgeon and wartenberg are more correct when they cite different “approaches to the use of picture books” (2021:103). if the issue raised by turgeon and wartenberg is about curriculum rather than pedagogy, it has to do with how different curricular materials support philosophical discussion, rather than with the merits of different approaches to philosophizing with children. moreover, by positioning themselves as defending an approach, turgeon and wartenberg make it seem as if all picture books qualify as useful resources for philosophical inquiry, which, of course, is not the case.5 once it is accepted that many picture books can be useful in philosophical inquiry with children and adolescents—a moot point if our reading of the literature is correct—other, more significant considerations come into focus. philosophy for children facilitators are then called upon to select materials based on their philosophy content and their appropriateness for particular educational contexts, such as whether they contain images or messages that are problematic in terms of race, class, gender, and sexuality, and whether they offer diverse representation among those categories.6 the fact that many proponents of doing philosophy with children’s literature have published guides for its use in philosophizing with children, including matthews,7 sprod (1993), turgeon (2020), wartenberg (2009), and others, is another indication that using children’s literature is not a unique approach. however, these guides do point to an important difference in philosophy for children programs: whether and how teachers and others without academic preparation in philosophy are meant to facilitate children’s philosophy. without commenting on this broader issue, turgeon and wartenberg acknowledge that: 4 elsewhere, wartenberg describes this distinction as between “two fundamental approaches,” one pioneered by lipman and one by matthews (2022:42). 5 wartenberg disagrees, stating categorically that “there are no picture books that cannot be used by creative facilitators to initiate philosophical discussions” (2022:106). 6 lipman’s curricular novels have been justly critiqued for containing gender stereotypes, for instance, that “moms are often busy at the stove while dads are represented sitting in an armchair reading the newspaper; the boys embody analytical (harry) or critical (tony) thinking skills; mark is a rebellious protester while his sister maria is docile and obedient; and lisa and suki represent intuitive and creative thinking” (miraglia 2021:84; see also wartenberg 2022). 7 see matthews’ curriculum series wise owl: talking and thinking about children’s literature at https://www.montclair.edu/iapc/wise-owl/. https://www.montclair.edu/iapc/wise-owl/ analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 62 most teachers at the pre-college levels are not themselves well versed in philosophy, its concepts, and tools of analysis. using children’s literature may be difficult without a lot of support, either in terms of guiding documents that highlight potential philosophical avenues for discussion or the presence of an experienced p4c [philosophy for children] practitioner who can help shape the dialogue, along with the teacher. (2021:104)8 this problem has received considerable attention in the field (see, e.g. gazzard 2012, gardner and weber 2009). laurance j. splitter and sharp argue, for instance, that with the proper disciplinary preparation, students and teachers can develop “an awareness of the philosophical dimensions inherent in the material in question” (1995:185). in summary, the benefits of picture books identified by turgeon and wartenberg are not unique to picture books, but apply to most forms of children’s literature and media, including curricular philosophical novels; and the question of what to use in philosophizing with children is a curricular and not a pedagogical matter. in relation to the latter, the method turgeon and wartenberg describe for philosophizing with picture books is one that applies equally to other curricular philosophical stories and novels: one of the basic tenets of philosophy for children is to let the children determine the direction the discussion is to take. the idea is to encourage the children to explore their own ideas through interactions with their peers. in order to do this, the teacher needs to be self-effacing, that is, they must refrain from putting their own ideas into the mix or shutting down an avenue of inquiry because it was not what they had planned. there remains a strong role for them as the discussion’s facilitator [...]. (2021:104) we see this as more evidence that turgeon and wartenberg have not identified a distinctive approach; rather, they have expressed a preference for using picture books over other suitable curriculum materials. the philosophy for children founders on philosophical texts gareth b. matthews a significant shortcoming of turgeon and wartenberg’s essay is that it gives short shrift to the legacy of the late american philosopher gareth b. matthews (1929-2011), who was the first to write about philosophy in children’s literature—including picture books—and to experiment with using 8 on this point, splitter and sharp argue that, “even though some might believe that approaching philosophical issues through picture books and novels is easier than working from purpose-written materials, we suspect that it is more likely to be the other way around. in most countries today, teachers are not trained in the art and craft of philosophical inquiry. to explore the philosophical dimensions of literature—and to teach children to do the same—requires an expertise that cannot be taken for granted, especially given the complexity of a good piece of literature” (1995:185). elsewhere, wartenberg acknowledges that “in my earlier book [2009/2014] i asserted that anyone could facilitate elementary-school philosophy discussion [...]. but i was not saying that a facilitator did not need to have any philosophical knowledge in order to facilitate a philosophical discussion. i only claimed that they could find all the information they needed in my book because it presented detailed analyses of a set of picture books i suggested using, including a discussion of the philosophical theses put forward in each picture book” (2022:75, emphasis in the original). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 63 children’s books to initiate philosophical conversations with children and with his university students (see laverty and gregory 2022a; murris 2022). these experiments led to matthews’ 1973 lecture, “philosophy and children's literature,”9 his “thinking in stories” column, in which he reviewed philosophical children’s stories,10 and his teacher guides wise owl: talking and thinking about children’s literature.11 wartenberg featured material from matthews wise owl series on the innovative website “teaching children philosophy” he developed at mount holyoke college.12 matthews created his own website “philosophy for kids!,”13 including his “philosophy startup kit for schoolkids.” these websites, in turn, became the model for the website “philosophy and children’s literature” at the university of washington center for philosophy for children.14 matthews’ use of children’s stories to prompt philosophical dialogues became a compelling alternative to lipman’s curricular philosophical novels, and has become the predominant approach to philosophy for children. in addition to originating the use of children’s literature for children’s philosophy and creating the first curricular guide for doing so, matthews initiated philosophy in children’s literature as a field of scholarship. over four decades, he published extensively in this new field (see e.g., 1976, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1994, 2004, 2005, 2009), and today there is a secondary literature on his work (see carlisle 1992; cavell 2008; gregory and laverty 2022a; haynes and murris 2012; johansson 2011; kennedy 1999, 2010; kidd 2020; murris 2022; wartenberg 2008). matthews’ legacy in theorizing and promoting philosophy in children’s literature has been extended by practitioners and scholars who learned from his example, including sara goering (2007), jana mohr lone (2022), peter shea (2022), and wartenberg himself.15 regrettably, turgeon and wartenberg diminish matthews’ contribution to the observation that, “early on gareth matthew[s] used familiar children’s stories like [arnold lobel’s] frog and toad readers to explore rich philosophical topics like friendship, loyalty, and self-image” (2021:102). the only other attention turgeon and wartenberg give matthews is to take issue with the charge made by morteza khosronejad and soudabeh shokrollahzadeh that matthews and wartenberg are “instrumentalists” regarding children’s books. however, they misconstrue that charge as having to do with “focusing solely on the storyline itself, paying insufficient attention to the images and the story they might tell” (2021:102). in fact, while khosronejad and shokrollahzadeh do make that latter charge, their concern about instrumentalism is different: that because the founders of philosophy for children lacked a theoretical understanding of children’s literature, including picture books, they used children’s literature merely as an instrument for doing philosophy, which had both a negative effect 9 matthews subsequently presented the essay to the american philosophical association and published it in the journal metaphilosophy in 1976. 10 see www.montclair.edu/iapc/thinking-in-stories. by wartenberg’s (2022) definition of ‘picture book,’ virtually all of the fifty-eight children’s books matthews reviewed for the “thinking in stories” column were picture books. 11 see www.montclair.edu/iapc/wise-owl. 12 the site was redesigned by, and is now hosted by the prindle institute for ethics at dupauw university. see https://www.prindleinstitute.org/teaching-children-philosophy 13 see www.philosophyforkids.com. 14 see https://www.philosophyforchildren.org/resources/questions-library. 15 in his new book, wartenberg credits matthews with introducing him to philosophy for children and acknowledges that “i saw myself as carrying on in his footsteps” (2022:51). he also credits matthews with being the first to propose using commercially published children’s books to philosophize with children (2022:41). http://www.montclair.edu/iapc/thinking-in-stories http://www.montclair.edu/iapc/thinking-in-stories http://www.montclair.edu/iapc/wise-owl http://www.montclair.edu/iapc/wise-owl https://www.prindleinstitute.org/teaching-children-philosophy/ http://www.philosophyforkids.com/ https://www.philosophyforchildren.org/resources/questions-library analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 64 on children’s appreciation of, and attitude toward literature, and a limiting effect on the founders’ ability to theorize philosophy for children itself.16 khosronejad and shokrollahzadeh do not, in fact, charge either matthews or wartenberg with this kind of instrumentalism. they explicitly state that “contrary to lipman, who instrumentalizes children's literature, considering it a 'springboard', [... c]hildren's fictions [sic] for matthews is authentic literature” (2020:8). indeed, khosronejad and shokrollahzadeh credit matthews with discovering “a new genre in children's literature named by him 'philosophical whimsy'” (2020:8). as kenneth b. kidd put it, matthews “preferred materials that playfully stage philosophical issues to materials that explicitly model philosophical processes (e.g., harry stottlemeier’s discovery) or introduce philosophical thinkers (e.g. kierkegaard and the mermaid)” (2020:41). elsewhere, wartenberg describes a unique approach to philosophizing with children that matthews developed as a research fellow at the school of epistemics at the university of edinburgh. matthews conducted philosophical dialogues with children that began with original, philosophical story-beginnings he wrote, which he then completed based on the children’s dialogue and shared with them to evaluate (see matthews 1984; burdick-shepherd and cammarano 2022). noting that these stories resemble lipman’s novels in consisting of dialogues among children about traditional philosophical issues, wartenberg claims that “the problem with both of these philosophers’ procedures is that they limit the range of potential issues that children cannot [sic] discuss in their philosophy sessions to those that are widely acknowledged as philosophical in the analytic tradition of philosophy” (2022:45). while it is a mistake to categorize lipman as an analytic philosopher, we agree that any philosopher’s background and field of research will necessarily inform—and therefore limit— their preference for, if not their recognition of, certain kinds of philosophical issues (see kohan and cassidy 2022, laverty and gregory 2022, murris 2022). of course, this applies to philosophers who recognize philosophy in picture books no less than to those who write curricular philosophical stories (matthews famously did both); and as wartenberg allows, the latter can very well include philosophical issues from a variety of philosophical traditions, as evidenced by the curricular philosophical novels of david kennedy (2012, 2019). matthew lipman lipman’s views on the educational uses of literature were complex and evolved over the course of his life. as turgeon and wartenberg observe, he “believed that philosophical novels written with the express purpose of engaging children in philosophical discussions were better suited than picture books to the task of introducing philosophy into elementary school classrooms” (2021:96). one misgiving lipman had about children’s books in general was his impression that they disrespect children, in failing to portray the poignant problematicity of children’s experience. in his estimation, “children are thought to inhabit a world whose security is ensured by adults, a world into which the 16 this is also the crux of khosronejad and shokrollahzadeh’s critique of lipman. turgeon and wartenberg, however, attribute the critique to lipman himself. they claim, without reference, that a “‘lipmanian’ argument against using [picture books] notes the danger of ruining an imaginative story by treating it in too utilitarian a manner, say, by mining it for philosophical ideas. literature should not be used for philosophical discussions, the argument goes, because that is not its ‘job.’ the function and beauty of literature will be lost if it is used simply as a jumping off tool for philosophical discussion” (2021:96) lipman made no such claim that we can discover. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 65 threat of problematicity does not intrude, with the result that, under such circumstances, active thinking on the child’s part is hardly necessary” (1988:186-187). believing that “the image of the child that children’s literature projects has much to do with the image of themselves that children internalize” (1988:187), lipman concluded that children should see themselves mirrored in “stories of thoughtful, sensitive children acting courageously or in ways that show profound care and concern” (1996a:35). defending his own philosophical novels for not including “kidnapers or extra-terrestrials or downhill racers,” he explained that “these romantic, otherworldly characters or events in which we all love to dwell are ways of defying or escaping the inevitable necessity of making judgments” (1996a:32-33). lipman was rightly concerned that “the more remote the models are from actuality, the more difficult it is to identify with them (1996a:34).17 nevertheless, as matthews recognized, fantasy, science fiction, dystopian fiction, and counterfactual historical fiction often raise thought experiments, moral dilemmas, and other philosophical perplexities ripe for inquiry (see gregory and laverty, 2022b). lipman’s claim that children’s literature does not portray either the complexity and problematicity of children’s experience or children’s capacity to inquire, reason, and make judgments that improve their circumstances, may well hold of a great deal of children’s media today; it may have been true to a greater extent in 1988, when he made that observation, and it was likely quite true of the books he read as a child. most media for children is, after all, produced for, and shaped by the market economy, the interests of which are often in tension with literary and artistic concerns; and much of what is commonly regarded as of high quality (including many ‘classics’) is riddled with racial, gender, and class biases (see nel 2017).18 still, lipman’s claim is certainly false with respect to the market as a whole. describing what he calls “the philosophical turn” in children’s literature, kenneth b. kidd notes that “children’s literature is drawing nearer adult fiction, resembling such in complexity and aesthetic sophistication [and] also drawing nearer adult critical discourse” (2020:8). kidd observes that while “children’s literature can be narrowly prescriptive [...], much of the time it is imaginative, expansive, and surprising in its strategies of engagement and cultivation” (2020:4). he is confident, further, that “contemporary children’s literature often models and invites critical engagement” (2020:12). indeed, as turgeon and wartenberg point out, “characters in certain picture books are depicted as engaged in philosophical discussions” (2021:97). lipman’s own recognition of the philosophical sophistication of some children’s literature is reflected in his commissioning matthews to write the “thinking in stories” column, for thinking: the journal of philosophy for children. nevertheless, lipman did not believe such literature could sufficiently model the processes of philosophical inquiry for children. for lipman, because children are capable of skillful thinking and collaborative inquiry, they deserve to be educated in exemplary methods for 17 thus, reflecting on her students’ experience with one of lipman’s novels, a sixth-grade teacher in washington, d.c. recognized that “areas that have to do with the kinds of concerns they have to deal with in their own lives manage to surface often when analyzing this book” (harris 1991:73). 18 wartenberg seems unaware of this problem. while claiming, correctly, that “picture books [...] have the potential to counter problematic views children imbibe from popular culture” (2022:69), he does not suppose that picture books are an important part of children’s popular culture and that a great many of them communicate ‘problematic views’. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 66 doing so. he theorized that narrative texts are more effective for that purpose than expository texts that explain those processes. indeed, lipman seems to have had matthews in mind when he wrote: children are, some people have gone so far as to claim, "natural philosophers." establish a free and benign environment, and children will naturally engage in higher-order thinking. models of such thinking are not required. i doubt that there is much evidence to support this claim. we are led, then, to consider the alternative thesis, which is that modeling is needed in order to elicit higher-order thinking from children. (1991:218-219)19 as turgeon and wartenberg point out, the need for such modeling was the reason lipman invented the genre of the curricular philosophical children’s novel, that should “provide models of inquiry, models of cooperation and models of caring, sensitive individuals [that] demonstrate the feasibility of such an ideal children's community” (lipman, sharp, and oscanyan 1980:170). lipman developed a unique theory of how a curricular novel that combines narrative and expository formats, as well as conceptual and schematic modes of organization, can provide many kinds of cognitive modeling, including logic, mental acts, dialogue, and philosophical themes (see lipman 1991:212-225, 1996a). with regard to logic, lipman designed novels that employ two distinct models of logic. one, exhibited through a progressive discovery of rules explicitly stated, is that of a deductive system of formal logic. the other consists of a kind of ‘good reasons’ approach [which] emphasizes the seeking of reasons for opinions, actions, and beliefs, together with the assessment of the reasons given.” (lipman, sharp, and oscanyan, 1977:109-110, emphasis in the original) lipman also sought to dramatize education that involves recursiveness: “things like thinking about thinking and inquiry into inquiry and learning to learn. and with recursiveness, children are in a position to assume [...] more responsibility for their own education” (1996a:29, emphasis in the original). yet, he also intended his novels to “indicate to [readers] the occasions on which logical thought is appropriate and those on which non-logical thought might be preferable” (lipman, sharp, and oscanyan, 1980:176). another kind of cognitive modeling lipman’s novels provide is the depiction of children employing diverse mental acts and thinking styles. thus, various characters in the novel harry stottlemeier’s discovery are meant to consistently demonstrate “wondering (harry stottlemeier), thinking in formal logical patterns (tony melillo), intuitive or hunch-like thinking (lisa terry), seeking and enjoying explanations (fran wood), being sensitive to the feelings of others (anne torgerson), and 19 as nussbaum observed, “lipman [...] thinks that children can profit early on from highly specific attention to the logical properties of thought, that they are naturally able to follow logical structure, but that it usually takes guidance and leading to help them develop their capacities” (2010:73). kenneth b. kidd makes a similar observation: “especially for matthews, the child is not merely a capable practitioner of philosophy but rather the most exemplary one. lipman is not as rhapsodic about the child as matthews [...]. all children are curious, lipman believes, and all children can think philosophically. matthews, however, courts a romantic understanding of the child as natural philosopher [...]” (2020:32). wartenberg also views children as “natural-born philosophers” (2022:17,33,112). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 67 thinking creatively (mickey minkowski)” (lipman, sharp, and oscanyan, 1980:147). lipman noted that “it is literature that introduces us to the depicted performance of specific mental acts. jane austen’s characters infer, presume, speculate, guess, and consider” (1988:186-187; 1991:238). central to lipman’s novels is that they offer models of dialogue, [...] both of children with one another, and of children with adults. they are models that are non-authoritarian, anti-indoctrinational, that respect the values of inquiry and reasoning, encourage the development of alternative modes of thought and imagination, and sketch out what it might be like to live and participate in a small community where children have their own interests yet respect each other as people and are capable at times engaging in cooperative inquiry [...]. (lipman, sharp, and oscanyan, 1980:105) one fifth-grade teacher in washington, d.c. observed this kind of modeling in real time: [lipman’s] stories were interesting and a challenge to the students, for it gave them an opportunity to compare themselves with some of the characters in the story who were in the same age range as themselves. it gave them an opportunity to observe how these characters were inquisitive [...]. they were able to see how these children continuously explored the how?, what?, when?, where?, and who? of situations in the story. the stories enabled the students to investigate, observe and understand that it's normal to think and read as the characters did in the story. (harris 1991:53) nussbaum similarly observed that lipman’s “series of books—in which complex ideas are always presented through engaging stories about children figuring things out for themselves—show again and again how this attention to logical structure pays off in daily life,” (2010:73-74) and that “the series as a whole takes students to the point where they might begin to work through plato’s socratic dialogues on their own” (2010:75-76). wartenberg suggests that the modeling of philosophical dialogue is “another reason for using picture books to teach children philosophy” (2022:71). he notes that “stories that model a philosophical discussion, such as virtually all of arnold lobel’s frog and toad stories, are helpful in this regard because children can take from the character’s interactions an initial understanding of how to take part in a philosophical discussion” (2022:111). wartenberg acknowledges that this is what lipman refers to as ‘modeling’, but implies that picture books do it better, though his thinking on this point is difficult to follow: “i was critical of [lipman] for not explaining how such modeling was supposed to work to get children to understand the nature of philosophical dialogues. the difference is that in discussing bravery through “dragons and giants” [lobel 1979], children come to see both frog and toad as engaged in the very same type of activity as they are” (2022:71). quite a different order of modeling lipman intended his curriculum to perform was to reconstruct important themes, debates, and positions from the history of (western) philosophy—not as authoritative, but as resources for exploring children’s philosophical questions. as darryl de marzio notes, in lipman’s novels, the western tradition “is not presented as a series of historical epochs (e.g., ancient philosophy, modern philosophy, post-modern philosophy), or a series of systems analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 68 of thought (e.g., idealism, rationalism, empiricism), or an orientation to the major figures of philosophy (e.g., plato, descartes, kant)” (de marzio, 2011:42). rather, as lipman put it, “such a curriculum would represent central themes from the history of philosophy but would be translated into ordinary language.[...] it would also be sequential, so that successive stages would amplify old themes and introduce new ones, present new points of view, and provide for a critical look at other disciplines” (1988:183).20 in his new book, wartenberg acknowledges that “lipman’s novels make good choices for teachers with little or no philosophical background but a desire to incorporate philosophy into their classrooms” (2022:44-45). however, he criticizes lipman’s novels for being “designed to raise very specific philosophical problems for the children to discuss [which] seems to go against his own recommendation to allow the children to discuss what they want,” and because “the philosophical issues that lipman includes in his novels are ones that he recognizes as distinctly philosophical” (2022:45, emphasis in the original). these criticisms are not against being directive in introducing children to traditional philosophical problems—which applies to the use of children’s literature as well as to curricular philosophical novels, and which wartenberg explicitly recommends: “one reason that i start the discussion with a preselected question is that this ensures that the initial question is a philosophical one. it also allows the facilitator to be better prepared” (wartenberg 2022:79). rather, wartenberg here critiques the apparent contradiction in lipman’s embedding philosophical issues from western philosophy in his novels while insisting that children’s philosophizing begin from their own questions. following john dewey’s lead, lipman’s novels foreground the aesthetic, ethical, political, and other philosophical dimensions of ordinary experience, and provide a variety of perspectives on those dimensions from the western canon. children are thus introduced to these predetermined areas but are invited to raise questions about anything that puzzles or interests them. the manuals that accompany lipman’s novels contain resources to support multiple avenues of inquiry the children may pursue. lipman believed that the more children come to recognize these philosophical dimensions in their own experience, the more they will inevitably raise questions about them—as they will in recognizing the scientific, religious, and other dimensions of their experience. granted, providing children access to questions, concepts, and debates from a philosophical tradition as part of their cultural heritage is not an aim of all, or probably most practitioners or theorists of philosophy for children today. but for those who uphold this aim, it makes a difference in the selection of materials to be used with children. as splitter and sharp expressed this aim: [w]e emphasise that philosophy for children aspires to be a philosophy curriculum in the classroom, and not merely a timeslot for providing teachers and students with opportunities to 'do philosophy' in an ad hoc and unstructured manner.[...] [f]ew would seriously suggest that a curriculum in [mathematics, science or history] could consist of a 20 in his 1969 university textbook discovering philosophy lipman printed selections from philosophers in thematic sections, each of which ended with a fictional dialogue written by lipman, between two of the philosophers in the section. lipman could not and did not claim that his curricular philosophy novels represent the entirety of western philosophy, and he has been justly critiqued for omitting significant aspects of that tradition, such as the frankfurt school (see waksman and kohan 2013). it is important to note, however, that, in keeping with many professional philosophers in europe and north america at the time (and to a lesser extent, today), lipman used ‘philosophy’ to mean western philosophy exclusively, which largely neglected women and non-white philosophers, and often ignored racial justice when considering justice. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 69 random collection of stories which might generate some discussion of a mathematical, scientific or historical nature. our primary argument is [...] that serious philosophical inquiry [...] is more likely to bear fruit when [...] students are given the opportunity to engage philosophy as a discipline and a curriculum. we must face the reality that if we want to bring a sense of structure, continuity, comprehensiveness, and even profundity to philosophy in the classroom, finding a collection of philosophical themes and concepts within the pages of a picture book or novel is unlikely to do the job. (1995:187) here splitter and sharp acknowledge that their argument for a philosophy curriculum in no way disqualifies the use of children’s books in thinking and talking philosophically, though they relegate such books to a secondary role. the attempt to initiate children into philosophy as a discipline— characterized by certain kinds of questions, methods of inquiry, cognitive and social practices, and a history of ideas—rather than to merely provide children the opportunity to philosophize, is the most important contrast between the approach initiated by lipman and sharp and that initiated by matthews. apart from the philosophical novel, lipman also believed that children learn how to be reasonable from other models—all of which apply to philosophizing with picture books—including the sound pedagogical judgments of teachers21 (especially judgments that facilitate children’s reasoning), the behaviors of other children in a community of inquiry, and the cognitive interactions of the child’s family upbringing (see lipman, 1991:218-291; 1996a:31-33). significantly, lipman’s theory of the text, the family, the teacher, and the community of inquiry as cognitive models derives from his study of social learning theory, as delineated by george herbert mead, john dewey, lev vygotsky, and jerome bruner. as lipman observed, “one of the advantages of holding a social theory of cognition is that it provides a role for cognitive modeling as part of the learning process” (1996a:33). indeed, the power of cognitive modeling through social interaction has been verified in numerous empirical studies conducted by contemporary educational psychologists (see reznitskaya and gregory, 2013). this is not to say that lipman’s theory of what constitutes reasonableness, or his theory of the role of cognitive modeling in education for reasonableness is unproblematic. nor do we claim that lipman’s novels ideally operationalize the kinds of modeling recommended in his theories. here we simply indicate the nature and the complexity of these theories, which turgeon and wartenberg do not address. nor do they take issue with lipman’s position that helping children to become more thoughtful (reasonable, imaginative, and morally sensitive) is among the primary purposes of engaging children in philosophical practice. their only disagreement with lipman concerns his position that using stories that model thoughtful children is the ideal way to do so. however, the objections they raise to this position are rhetorical and anecdotal: can’t children learn to be thoughtful from their interactions with each other in philosophy discussions even if the stories they read do not provide a model of such 21 “[t]eachers can begin to view themselves as co-learners, co-searchers for more sufficient and comprehensive answers, always willing to listen to anyone ("even a child") who might have fresh and original insights about human concerns. the teacher then becomes a philosophical model for the children in the classroom which confirms the children in their freedom to think for themselves, to create new and fresh alternatives when confronted with problems of prime importance” (lipman, sharp, and oscanyan 1977:12). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 70 thoughtfulness? we see no reason to deny this possibility [...]. and indeed, we have found that the children we have worked with using picture books do become more thoughtful as a result of their interactions with their peers under the guidance of a facilitator. (2021:97) it is significant that turgeon and wartenberg here attribute children’s learning to be thoughtful to the pedagogy of well-facilitated philosophical dialogue. indeed, they point to the aspects of that pedagogy highlighted in social learning theory. for lipman, the philosophical content of a children’s story (literary or curricular) and the pedagogical practice of a community of philosophical inquiry are both necessary for the kind of learning he had in mind. regarding the former, there is clearly much more to lipman’s theory of the narrative text as cognitive model than turgeon and wartenberg relate. this is fair enough, given the scope of their essay; however, it is unfair that they imply that lipman took the efficacy of his novels as “self-evident” without any theoretical or empirical justification.22 regarding literary standards, turgeon and wartenberg opine that “the philosophical novels that lipman wrote are not great works of literature” (2021:97). kidd observes similarly and in greater detail that “lipman’s novels in dialogue compare unfavorably to contemporary children’s literature, as well as to the classics that matthews champions. harry stottlemeier’s discovery is deadly earnest and not whimsical in the least. most children would find it hard going, and it never took off as literature” (kidd, 2020:47). of course, this criticism is not universal. and as turgeon and wartenberg allow, lipman “was open about [his novels] not being great works of literature, but that was not his goal” (2021:97). notably, the philosophical children’s novels by gaarder, kennedy, sharp, and others have not drawn similar criticism. nor can wartenberg’s categorical praise of “[t]he charm and wonder so evident in picture books” (2022:60) be substantiated by a review of picture books currently published. we now move to consider turgeon and wartenberg’s engagement with critiques of lipman by murris, khosronejad and shokrollahzadeh. turgeon and wartenberg paraphrase murris’s critique that “lipman prioritizes a very specific notion of philosophy, academic analytic philosophy, thereby failing to do justice to his own goal of creating genuinely reflective children” (2021:98). regarding the latter, what murris in fact argues is that: with lipman’s and therefore p4c’s epistemological and ontological roots in plato’s rationalism and american pragmatism, his preference for anglo-american philosophy is understandable and justifiable. but his selection of what to include and exclude in [his] p4c curriculum has turned some philosophers (e.g. in germany), who otherwise might have been interested in [his] p4c curriculum, against it.” (2016b: 67) significantly, murris (2022) makes the same critique of matthews’ selection and analysis of philosophical children’s literature. as turgeon and wartenberg note, however, “there are recent examples of specifically written ‘philosophical novels’ which are linked to alternative models of philosophy, such as phenomenology and continental philosophical [sic] in general” (2021:98). 22 “lipman’s assertion about the advantage of using expressly written philosophical novels is not entirely justified. it is not at all self-evident that the most appropriate way to teach young children to philosophize is to have them read novels in which the characters are shown engaging in philosophical discussions” (turgeon and wartenberg, 2021:97). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 71 turgeon and wartenberg also cite murris’ observation that “lipman’s novels start with the ‘abnormal’ child, the thinking child—the adult philosopher’s child” (2016b: 63). they somewhat misconstrue her to mean that “the children depicted in lipman’s novels are not ordinary children who are acting the way children normally do” (2021:98), whereas murris’s argument is broader and more radical, and includes children’s literature: not only [lipman’s] philosophical novels, but also existing children’s literature, perpetuate many adults’ assumptions about who and what children are and is therefore never politically innocent. texts written for children are not only didactic when they encourage children to behave like sensible or thoughtful adults, but in an even more dangerously subtle way, [when] they legitimise and encourage children to behave in a way that— according to some—is ‘natural’ to children. (2016b:63) neither is murris’s concern, as turgeon and wartenberg put it, that there is “a tendency within education to ignore the real child as a person and substitute some model from psychology or educational theory [that] fails to honor the very real capabilities of children to reflect on their experiences” (2021:98). rather, she is concerned that most stories for children—those by lipman as well as those in children’s literature, including picture books—are written and used by adults in such a way as to prevent children from challenging the messages they convey about what it means to be a child. for that, murris contends, teachers need to know how to invite children to “meta-think” about the story—something that “cannot be modeled by a text itself as each text requires a ‘stepping-out’, a critical reflection on the narrative itself in ad infinitum. whether this text is a philosophical novel from the p4c curriculum, or a picturebook makes no significant difference when engaging in the meta-thinking” (murris, 2016b:75). cleary, murris is here addressing pedagogy rather than curriculum, and while turgeon and wartenberg do not address this argument, we agree with murris and kidd that certain texts, including comics, graphic novels, and picture books are more likely to “unsettle expectations about form and content as well as child-adult relation” (kidd, 2020:54). another argument for preferring children’s literature to lipman’s novels is attributed by turgeon and wartenberg to khosronejad and shokrollahzadeh, who are said to argue that “lipman’s position implicitly limits philosophy to logical/rational discourse and misses the rich depths of the role of imagination in making meaning” (2021:98).23 in the first place, we note that khosronejad and shokrollahzadeh make no such claim. in fact, they interpret lipman to “suppose the tradition of writing purposefully philosophical narratives as encouraging rather than pre-empting children's imagination” (2020:5). second, we note that the bulk of khosronejad and shokrollahzadeh’s critique—that in spite of his intentions, lipman’s novels fail to engage children's imagination—is their own summary of haynes and murris (2012), whom turgeon and wartenberg neglect to cite on this point. third, because this is a response essay to turgeon and wartenberg, we do not take up the argument as presented by khosronejad and shokrollahzadeh or haynes and murris here. instead, we suggest that lipman’s rejection of the false dichotomy between logical rigor and imagination (see lipman, sharp, and oscanyan 1980:99) was a major theme of his early work in deweyan aesthetics 23 turgeon and wartenberg, however, defend lipman by stating that “exploring how language works and what concepts are is a primary activity of the young child and lipman’s approach does focus on this” (2021: 98). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 72 (1967), his philosophical novel suki (1978) which foregrounds aesthetic experience, his early championing of creative thinking as a necessary component of higher-order thinking (1991), and his extensive writing about moral imagination (e.g., lipman, sharp, and oscanyan, 1980). given this, we are puzzled that turgeon and wartenberg relay khosronejad and shokrollahzadeh’s argument as unproblematic. to conclude, turgeon and wartenberg offer no evidence that there was anything like an “admonition of lipman and his followers not to use picture books in elementary school philosophy discussions” (2021:102).24 a more accurate summary of lipman’s view would be that while many children’s books prompt and sustain children’s philosophical thinking in worthwhile ways, most do not portray children thinking and dialoguing in such a way that can be a model of collaborative philosophical inquiry, and most of those that raise philosophical questions do not attempt to represent different positions about them from the philosophical tradition. ann margaret sharp and laurance j. splitter turgeon and wartenberg attribute to splitter and sharp the “claim that the pictures and illustrations in children’s books foreclose the cognitive options of the children engaged with them. the idea is that the illustrations in picture books do ‘work’ that is properly left to the children themselves by filling in the text with images that the author and illustrator deem appropriate” (2021:98). it is well known that lipman’s novels were published without illustrations—a decision he, sharp, and oscanyan explained by stating that, “to [provide illustrations] is to do for children what they should do for themselves: provide the imagery that accompanies reading and interpretation” (1980:36). to that end, lipman’s novels for younger children provide spaces for children to create their own illustrations. both the fear of stifling children’s creativity and the invitation to invite them to create their own illustrations are tied to lipman’s recognition that young children, in general, have an acumen for art unparalleled by most adults. coincidentally, lipman and matthews were both inspired to recognize children’s philosophical acumen in part by their experience of children’s art (see lipman 2008; matthews 1994). nevertheless, wartenberg may be correct to suppose that lipman lacked “an acquaintance with or theoretical understanding of picture books and the logic of the relationship between their texts and images” (2022:55). turgeon and wartenberg claim, without reference, that “the omission of pictures on the lipman/sharp novels has drawn criticism on the grounds that children expect and want pictures; otherwise they will find the books boring or not engaging,” but acknowledge that, “in our experience children are astonishingly tolerant of the lack of pictures in the lipman novels” (2021:99).25 they nevertheless accuse “the lipmanians” of an inability to come to terms with the wonderful illustrations that grace the pages of picture books. it seems inconceivable that anyone who has read books by dr. seuss (theodore geisel) and looked at his wildly imaginative drawings could think that a child’s 24 elsewhere, wartenberg claims that “lipman opposed using picture books to introduce young children to philosophy” (2022:51). 25 however, wartenberg acknowledges: “i have never used lipman’s novels in my work with children” (2022:43). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 73 imagination would be stunted by seeing the image of a star bellied sneetch or the cat in a hat. (2021:99) of course, a good deal of the artwork in children’s media is not wonderful, but insipid and banal without being provocative in any helpful way, as well as biased in terms of race, class, gender, and sexuality. to this point, lynn gluek and harry brighouse argue that such works condescend to children when they “‘dumb down’ language, content and even image” (2008:130). turgeon and wartenberg cite splitter and sharp’s 1995 book, teaching for better thinking: the classroom community of inquiry, without quotation, for the “lipmanian” stance on artwork in children’s books; however, the treatment of the issue there is considerably more nuanced than turgeon and wartenberg indicate: [t]he characteristic display of beautiful drawings in [children’s picture] books can be a mixed blessing if it induces an expectation, on the part of otherwise imaginative children, that the author has already determined the visual nature of characters and contexts. if we think of drawings as serving a similar function to texts in stimulating inquiry, we would argue, by analogy, that a good philosophical drawing is one which raises or reflects, rather than settles, a question or puzzle. (1995:186) while we agree with splitter and sharp that not only the quality of the artwork but the way it raises or settles philosophical questions is an important consideration, we agree with turgeon and wartenberg, haynes and murris, and khosronejad and shokrollahzadeh, that the artwork in picture books, graphic novels, and other stories for children can be as philosophically meaningful as their texts, and that high-quality artwork in children’s media is more likely to stimulate than to hinder children’s imagination. race and children’s literature turgeon and wartenberg rightly raise the problem of racism in children’s literature but suggest that this problem is being self-corrected. numerous scholars argue, to the contrary, that, as a multimillion-dollar industry in pursuit of profits, children’s publishing remains a site where biases and racist assumptions are reproduced (see klein 1985; naidoo 1992; ramdarshan bold 2019; sandso’connor 2008, 2017; sims-bishop 2007; and thomas 2019). we believe that racist, sexist, heteronormative, classist, and other forms of bias that “hide in plain sight” in children’s literature (nel 2017:10) and curricular philosophical novels are among the most important and complex issues confronting the philosophy for children community today.26 to date, sexism has received some sustained attention by philosophy for children scholars (see, e.g., field 1995; sharp 1994, 1997; sharp and gregory 2009). racism, however, is rarely given attention in this community, with the notable exception of a succession of journal articles beginning with chetty in 2014.27 that scholarly exchange is the focus of a section of turgeon and wartenberg’s essay, though they do not share their own 26 we do not harbor “the concern that picture books inherently present a misleading picture of complex social issues,” as wartenberg claims, without reference (2022:86). wartenberg is further mistaken in stating that chetty “is not sanguine about the possibility of using picture books to discuss race with young children” (2022:87) and that chetty believes that all “picture books either simplify major complex issues or de-historicize them” (2022:92). 27 further examples of writing related to philosophy for children and racism include rainville 2000, vigliante 2005, reedsandoval 2019, elicor 2020, and kronsted & wurtz 2021. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 74 perspective on racism. in what follows, we offer our stance on what we take to be the most important points of that exchange. perhaps the most contentious issue regarding racism and philosophy for children is whether theorists and practitioners in the movement ought to have a considered philosophical stance on racism. by this we mean a stance that is informed by an engagement with socio-historical knowledge of racism and how it relates to the context in which one is working and the materials and methods that one is employing. this would include the ways that western philosophy, while largely avoiding racial injustice as a subject of study, has also been implicated in the emergence of racial taxonomies used to justify the exclusion of people designated as ‘nonwhite’ from the category of persons (see, e.g. mills 1997). people who have a considered philosophical perspective may disagree with each other on any number of racial issues, but are more likely than those who do not, to recognize and resist racism when it manifests. we believe it is important that people who practice and theorize philosophy for children have a familiarity with contemporary scholarship in the philosophy of race in order to be sensitive to the ways that race and racism are relevant to the texts (commercial and curricular) and the norms of discourse we adopt in that practice, and to avoid the kinds of missteps that can make philosophy for children an inadvertent site of the production of racist ideology.28 ‘color-blind’ children’s stories turgeon and wartenberg credit lipman with trying to make the gender and ethnicity of characters in his novels ambiguous, which, they suggest, “facilitates [...] a more porous and open identification between readers and the characters in the novels” (2021:99). however, we doubt the effectiveness and desirability of this approach. chetty (2008) highlights that only one character in harry stottlemeier’s discovery, fran wood, is explicitly raced and that she is described as “a girl and black too” at the moment when two boys “tease” her (lipman 1974/1982:11). because the other characters in lipman’s novels are not identified racially or ethnically (except, perhaps, by their last names), they are often assumed to be white. indeed, as early as 1989 a teacher in the united states described a fifth-grade session where a group of children raise the question of whether harry is white and conclude unanimously that he is (see harris 1991:62). the common practice in anglo-american literature of identifying the racial or ethnic identity of only black and racially minoritized characters leads to other characters being read as white—by readers of color as well as by white readers—unless told to do otherwise. observing this phenomenon in literary discourse, toni morrison writes that “[t]he world does not become raceless or will not become unracialized by assertion. the act of enforcing racelessness […] is itself a racial act” (1991:46). chetty has recounted that many of his second-grade students in a racially diverse school agreed with one student’s pronouncement that “stories have to be about white people” (2016b:96). race and representation in children’s stories turgeon and wartenburg note that “there are many contemporary picture books that feature non-white protagonists,” characterizing this as a “trend that will defang any criticism of picture books 28 for an overview of philosophy of race, see zack, 2017; for examples of philosophy, race, and the classroom, see applebaum 2010, blum 2012, harris 1991, and yancy and del guadelupe davidson 2014. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 75 based on the absence of non-caucasian characters” (2021:99 and note 14). in fact, work to redress the under-representation of racially minoritized people in children’s literature in the united states of america (usa) and the united kingdom (uk) has a long history. in 1919, sixteen years after publishing the souls of black folk, in which he argued that “the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color-line” (1903/1994:9), w.e.b. du bois announced the launch of the brownies’ book, “a little magazine for all children, but especially for ours, ‘the children of the sun’” (1919:286).29 while the brownies book ran for only 24 issues, it has been described by dianne johnson-feelings as “precipitat[ing] the development of the body of work now called african american children’s literature, in all of its subsequent manifestations and meanings” (1990:37). while subsequent progress has been made, due to concerted efforts by activists, parents, scholars, writers, and illustrators, racially minoritized people continue to be notably under-represented in children’s publishing in much of the english-speaking world.30 the relative lack of representation of black, indigenous and people of color (bipoc) people is by no means the only element of bias and racism in children’s literature. another is the frequent marginalization of bipoc literary characters in the stories in which they appear. in noting an increase in the number of books featuring black, asian and minority ethnic (bame) people, the centre for literacy in primary education identified ten ways that racially minoritized characters were marginalized in books published in the united kingdom, rendering those characters “visibly invisible” (clpe 2019:18).31 another element, and the most troubling, is racist depictions of raciallyminoritized people in many of the classics of children’s literature, including peter and wendy (barrie 1911) and little black sambo (bannerman 1899) (see chetty and karen sands o’connor, 2020). while most of these were not originally published as picture books (though picture books and films have since been produced), they demonstrate the need to expand our philosophical thinking about racism in children’s literature beyond the concern of whether or not racially minoritized people are represented, to considerations of how they are represented. to do so is not only to engage philosophically with the topic of racism in children’s literature; it is an important aspect of the kind of aesthetic and ethical interrogation and critique of that literature as a cultural product, that philosophers in and out of philosophy for children ordinarily conduct. race and the selection of children’s stories in his 2014 article, chetty suggests that “the recommendation of [certain] materials and the omission of more critical perspectives of race amongst recommended starting points and training 29 often described as a sociologist, du bois was also a philosopher and a contemporary of john dewey, though his work in spanning philosophy, childhood, racism and children’s literature has been largely neglected in philosophy for children scholarship. 30 see data on the representation of black, indigenous and people of color (bipoc) people in literature collected by the cooperative children’s book center at the school of education, university of wisconsin-madison (https://ccbc.education.wisc.edu/) and the annual surveys of ‘ethnic representation within uk children’s literature’ entitled reflecting realities by the centre for literacy in primary education (clpe, https://clpe.org.uk/) in the uk. 31 similarly, remarking on the fact that people of color are dramatically underrepresented in children’s literature in the genres of fantasy, science fiction, and dystopian novels, philip nel writes that “white children should not be the only ones encouraged to see themselves on a quest in an imaginary world, grappling with technology of the future, inhabiting mythological tales, or banding together to resist a dystopian regime” (2017:195). https://ccbc.education.wisc.edu/ https://clpe.org.uk/ analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 76 materials might constitute a form of ‘gate-keeping’ of philosophical thought” and that “the notion of ‘the gated community of enquiry’ might be illuminating in considering how p4c practitioners approach the subject of racism” (2014:14). drawing upon the work of the late caribbean-american philosopher charles mills, chetty analyzes david mckee’s picture books elmer (1968/1989) and tusk tusk (1978). wartenberg mistakenly accuses chetty of ignoring his own “doubts as to whether these books are actually about racism” and going on “to discuss them as if they did” (2022:87). in fact, chetty chooses these books only because they “have been recommended [...] by philosophy for children practitioners as starting points for philosophical enquiry into racism, multiculturalism and diversity” (2014:14). chetty notes that while racism is not actually depicted in either story, both are often read as “race fables”32 (2014:25): neither book speaks to structural inequality, which is historically situated and not arbitrary, and to how it positions groups as inferior and superior. they don't appear to portray oppression. consequently, the solutions they offer are very different from the kind of solutions often considered appropriate for addressing racism. elmer’s difference is celebrated and integrated into the group in a tokenistic way, whilst in tusk tusk the solution is toleration, co-habitation and miscegenation. because they don't discuss structural inequality, they don't open up for enquiry justice-based solutions like repair, redistribution or reconciliation.33 (2014:22-23) chetty (2014) raises concerns about inquiring about racism by use of allegorical children’s stories that retreat into theoretical abstraction and ignore relevant factual details.34 however, chetty’s interest is broader than to critique mckee’s books. his aim is to consider what their being recommended as ways into philosophizing about race—particularly in the context of a paucity of scholarship relating to racism and an alarming lack of philosophy for children scholars of color—suggests about prevailing understandings of race and racism among philosophy for children scholars. chetty reminds us that it is typically adults who select the stories used in philosophy for children sessions and that the story selected to some extent makes some questions more likely to be asked and others less so. we do not believe—as chetty has been taken to believe—that picture books should be used to teach children particular concepts or ideas, about race or any other philosophically complex concept.35 nor do we believe that facilitators should select picture books that confirm their own view of the 32 matthew orville grenby describes a fable as “a fundamentally didactic form, designed to draw in its readers through a compelling story and appealing, even cute characters and to teach important lessons through allegory” (2008:11). 33 while chetty takes care not to speculate about author intentionality, mckee has since said that elmer was inspired by ‘a racist incident’ (see jeffries 2012). 34 though critical of what he mistakenly takes to be a categorical condemnation of picture books that have been used to invite children to philosophize about race and racism on chetty’s part, wartenberg agrees with chetty’s actual thesis, in stipulating that his own “endorsement of picture books as allowing for successful discussions of difficult issues comes with the caveat that the books have to be chosen with care so that inappropriate conceptions of race and racism will not be supported” (2022:96). 35 rather than engaging with chetty’s detailed argument that tusk tusk is more didactic than haynes and murris acknowledge, murris asserts, without foundation, that he prefers to use picture books didactically (2015:60). in contrast, williams correctly observes that, “so far as chetty is concerned, i think a distinction should be made between wishing to bring certain matters to the attention of children and trying to control the agenda and the outcome. i think he wants to do the former” (williams 2020:9). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 77 world. however, we follow chetty (2014) in suggesting that this might be what is actually happening. if those who select picture books are unaware of the political dimension of stories, they are likely to take as neutral or universal stories that convey particular political ideas and norms. as the children’s literature scholar, jack zipes, recommends: i avowedly seek a political understanding of our notion of classicism and classical fairy tales, the process of selection, elimination and reward. the fairy tales we have come to revere as classical are not ageless, universal, and beautiful in and of themselves, and they are not the best therapy in the world for children. they are historical prescriptions, internalized, potent, explosive, and we acknowledge the power they hold over our lives by mystifying them (2006:11).36 in addition to fairy tales, we doubt that there can be such a thing as a picture book (or any other cultural production) that is politically neutral. race and the facilitation of philosophical discourse while it is commonly acknowledged that being aware of one’s positionality as an adult working with children is vital for facilitating philosophical conversations with children—and indeed for all educational practice—it is also necessary to extend this awareness of one’s positionality beyond age, to include how one’s racialised, gendered and classed identities, for example, might come to bear on the choices one makes inside and outside the classroom. turgeon and wartenberg appear to read williams (2020) as saying that a good facilitator can counteract or neutralize the political message of a children's story, so that any and every text is potentially appropriate for philosophical dialogue. however, williams’ point is narrower, and in agreement with chetty: that a good facilitator might create meaningful philosophical inquiry—around the issue of hatred, not historical racism—with a text like tusk tusk to prevent it from being miseducative about racism. we see turgeon’s and wartenberg’s response to williams as problematic for two reasons. first, in moving critical attention from the text to the role of the facilitator, they dismiss the importance of paying critical attention to children’s media (see nel 2017), thereby devaluing the very cultural product they seek to promote. second, turgeon and wartenberg imply (as williams and chetty do not) that a ‘good enough’ facilitator can use any text, no matter the content, which we reject on the grounds that no philosophical teacher, however accomplished, can completely neutralize the political content of a text. they write that “williams [...] acknowledges the concerns raised by chetty about either simplifying complex phenomena and ideas or dis-historicizing them but stops short of rejecting the use of such books in philosophizing” (2021:101). in fact, williams not only acknowledges, but agrees with chetty’s concerns:37 “chetty suggests there may be a limit to what popular picture books alone can 36 steve williams demonstrates, through careful citation, that murris misrepresents jack zipes as claiming that fairy tales are “universal, ageless, therapeutic, miraculous and beautiful” (zipes 2006:2, cited in murris 2016a:243-4). 37 in 2010, chetty and williams collaborated on a ‘philosophy for children and race’ online reading group, attended by a number of sapere trainers. at the time sapere courses did not include any readings by black or otherwise racially minoritized scholars or any readings relating to racism, though this was a topic teachers on sapere courses often asked about. chetty and williams along with christian albert, a black trinidadian british teacher, philosophy for children practitioner, and former colleague of chetty’s at a primary school in london serving a racially diverse community, created analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 78 achieve in supporting dialogue about complex social issues with historical dimensions. i agree” (williams 2020:5). in our view, there is more work to be done to understand the relationship among the complexities and challenges of facilitation, the inevitable political dimension of children’s stories and curricular materials, and the diverse positionality of children. the politics of scholarship in the philosophy for children community as chetty observes, racism is rarely given attention in philosophy for children materials and scholarship—a pattern he identifies as beginning with lipman’s harry stottlemeier’s discovery (chetty 2008; 2014). indeed, turgeon and wartenburg do not share what they themselves take racism to be. they write that “murris is critical of chetty for assuming that he knows what the appropriate theory of racism is and attempting to get children to come to accept it” (2020:100). it is not clear what turgeon and wartenberg make of this claim, or how murris has arrived at this conclusion. in fact, turgeon and wartenberg do not quote, summarize, or comment on chetty’s philosophical account of racism.38 while both his respondents are cited, his voice is effectively absent from the two-page discussion that he is identified as initiating. whatever the intention of the authors, this has the effect of readers encountering the voice of each of the scholars in this exchange about racism—wendy turgeon, thomas wartenberg, karin murris and steve williams—except for darren chetty, the only racially minoritized scholar among them. such a practice is in keeping with chetty’s notion of “the gated community of enquiry,” which he introduces in the elephant in the room (2014). the paper is described by david kennedy as critiquing “the central notion of the community of enquiry as an egalitarian safe space” as creating an uneasy paradox in the domestication of interruption, subtly gagging the potential voices of the members of silenced, marginalized and excluded groups, and gingerly ignoring oppositional counter-narratives” (2017:xiii). we suggest that turgeon and wartenberg’s paper can be viewed as an instance of this occurring in philosophy for children scholarship, which chetty and judith suissa (2017) argue, is itself a community of inquiry and one that has a formative role in philosophy for children training and practice. we believe the exclusion of any citation of chetty and of the black and other racially minoritized scholars he brings into conversation with philosophy for children scholarship (many for the first time) is to the detriment of this discussion. further, it is likely to be to the detriment of the community of philosophy for children scholars. when one fails to afford the same level of respect to a racially minoritized scholar, one communicates something significant to all racially minoritized scholars about how their work will likely be received, should it introduce new, critical perspectives. there are very few bipoc scholars in the philosophy for children community—shockingly few when one considers that ours is a pedagogy that regularly advocates dialogue across difference, a willingness a philosophy for children resource based on albert’s experience of struggling to find a recognizable black character he could dress as for the school’s celebration of world book day. the resource has been used with children, teachers and philosophy for children trainers in the uk to inquire into children’s literature, racial representation and education (see https://www.thephilosophyman.com/marksdilemma). 38 a reference to chetty’s published work was only added to turgeon and wartenberg’s article after chetty noted its absence in the article’s initial publication. https://www.thephilosophyman.com/marksdilemma analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 79 to listen, and epistemic humility. we believe it is vital to open the gates of the community of scholarship in philosophy for children to minoritized and junior scholars in our field. another aspect of the politics of philosophy for children scholarship is that over the past fortyplus years, philosophy for children scholars have paid little or no attention to the voices of bipoc—be it in philosophy, pedagogy and education, or children’s literature. over almost forty years, a number of books about philosophy for children have been published featuring black children on the cover while failing to cite a single black scholar within their covers.39 from a scan of much existing philosophy for children literature, it would be possible to conclude that while bipoc children are capable of philosophizing (in classrooms with white philosophy teachers), bipoc adults have little or nothing to offer those who philosophize with children. the common practice of making selections of starting materials that are authored only by white people is not a politically neutral practice. the lack of discussion about this practice amongst philosophy for children scholars is not neutral scholarship. the lack of racially minoritized philosophy for children scholars is not a neutral fact. the lack of citation of black and racially minoritized philosophers and scholars, and philosophers and scholars working on racism and its relation to philosophy and education is not neutral. that some fifty years after the emergence of philosophy for children, there are international conferences that include, at best, a handful of black and racially minoritized scholars is not a neutral fact. the monopolization of positions of authority by people racialized as white in the philosophy for children community is not neutral. the lack of interrogation as to what these facts collectively mean for the philosophy for children community as an epistemic community is not a neutral fact. conclusion in conclusion, our findings indicate that everyone involved in philosophy for children agrees with turgeon and wartenberg that picture books and children’s literature more generally are useful for intergenerational philosophical inquiry. however, the use of children’s books in itself does not constitute a unique approach to philosophizing with children. rather, the selection of materials for that activity depends on how we understand its nature and purposes. on the one hand, many of the pedagogical elements that lipman, sharp, kennedy, cam, and others wrote into their curricular philosophical children’s stories and novels can be found in some children’s literature, while, on the other hand, many of the benefits that turgeon and wartenberg and others have noted for children’s literature, including literary and aesthetic quality, are available to the curricular philosophical children’s story. in any case, the alternatives of philosophical children’s literature and curricular philosophical materials are not mutually exclusive. philosophers and educators should weigh the relative dis/advantages of different kinds of texts in deciding which ones to use to philosophize with children for different purposes. we have also reviewed a number of concerns about the use of children’s literature in philosophy for children. these include those addressed by turgeon and wartenberg, including that teachers, 39 see for example, lipman, sharp and oscanyan (1980); lipman (1988); sharp and reed (1992); sapere (2016). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 80 parents, and graduate students without a preparation in philosophy will struggle to select and use children’s literature to philosophize with children and that some children’s books are morally didactic. we have also reviewed the concerns articulated by lipman, sharp, and splitter, that children’s literature does not perform the multiple kinds of cognitive modeling necessary to introduce children to, and initiate children in philosophy as a discipline. finally, we have reviewed the concern raised by chetty that much children’s literature contains racial and other kinds of bias. we agree with turgeon, wartenberg, murris, khosronejad, and shokrollahzadeh that more work needs to be done on the part of philosophy for children scholars to draw from children’s literature studies. one of the benefits of doing so is that we can learn how critical race theory, indigenous theories, and queer theory (see kidd 2020) should figure in philosophical inquiry. because this essay is a response to turgeon and wartenberg’s essay, which itself recounted a number of other scholars writing in response to still others, we conclude with the observation that scholarly discussion, just like the classroom community of inquiry, is a site of knowledge co-creation. this insight obligates all of us to bring to scholarship in philosophy for children the same interpersonal care and academic rigor we bring to scholarship in other fields. while none of us can claim to do this perfectly, it behooves us all to beware the professional harm we may cause to others by not reading them carefully, not citing them appropriately, and ignoring their contribution, as well as the epistemic loss to the community when knowledge creators are marginalized in those ways. we are mindful that, given the lack of diversity among the philosophy for children founders and their contemporaries, racially minoritized scholars in the philosophy for children global community are often junior scholars. we hope they will be supported, mentored, and invited to make a home in the field. given that philosophy for children as a field has both advocated dialogic pedagogy across difference, and developed in a scholarly community that lacks racial diversity, we would be wise also to reflect on what our racially minoritized peers bring to our attention. we might also reflect on how, for many of us, our experience of dialoguing in racially diverse communities is limited to classrooms where, whatever our personal commitments, we find ourselves in positions of de facto authority. references applebaum, barbara (2010). being white, being good: white complicity, moral responsibility, and social justice pedadogy. plymouth, uk: lexington books. bannerman, helen (1899) little black sambo. london: grant richards. blum, lawrence (2012) high schools, race, and america’s future. cambridge, ma: havard education. bowen, jack (2006) the dream weaver: one boy's journey through the landscape of reality. new york: pearson/longman. burdick-shepherd, stephanie and cristina cammarano (2022) gareth b. matthews on the child as philosopher. in maughn rollins gregory and megan jane laverty (eds.) gareth 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[think with heraclitus. rio de janeiro, rj, brazil: lamparina editora. laverty, megan jane and maughn rollins gregory (2022) gareth b. matthews: a philosopher’s life with children. in maughn rollins gregory and megan jane laverty (eds.) gareth b. matthews, the child’s philosopher, 1-28. new york: routledge. https://doi.org/10.1177%2f14782103211062463 https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2014/jul/12/25-years-elmer-elephant-david-mckee https://www.researchgate.net/publication/336312912_dreamers_a_philosophical_novel_for_children https://www.researchgate.net/publication/336312912_dreamers_a_philosophical_novel_for_children analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 83 lipman, matthew (1967) what happens in art. new york: appleton‑century‑crofts. -----(1974/1982) harry stottlemeier’s discovery. montclair, nj: institute for the advancement of philosophy for children. -----(1978) suki. montclair, nj: institute for the advancement of philosophy for children. -----(1988) philosophy goes to school. philadelphia: temple university press. -----(1991) thinking in education (1st edition). new york: cambridge university press. -----(1996a) pixie and the relationship between cognitive modeling and cognitive practice. in ronald f. reed and ann margaret sharp (eds.) studies in philosophy for children: pixie, 28-36. madrid: ediciones de la torre. -----(1996b) natasha: vygotskian dialogues. new york: teachers college press. lipman, matthew, ann margaret sharp, and frederick s. oscanyan (1977). philosophy in the classroom (1st ed.). montclair, nj: institute for the advancement of philosophy for children. -----(1980). philosophy in the classroom (2nd ed.). philadelphia: temple university press. lobel, arnold (1979) frog and toad together. new york: harper collins. lofting, hugh (1920) the story of dr doolittle. london: frederick a. stokes. miraglia, maria (2021) the importance of continuing the heritage of lipman's philosophical fiction: writing stories for the contemporary world. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis 41(2):77-91. matthews, gareth b. 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(eds.) harry potter and philosophy: if aristotle ran hogwarts, 257-274. chicago: open court. -----(2005) children, irony and philosophy. theory and research in education 3(1):81-95, reprinted here. -----(2009) philosophical adventures in the lands of oz and ev. the journal of aesthetic education 43(2):37-50. mckee, david (1968 / 1989) elmer. london: anderson press -----(1978) tusk tusk. london: random house. michaels, j.c. (2007) firebelly. boston, ma: philosophragh. mills, charles, w. (1997) the racial contract. new york: cornell university press. montero, virginia trejos (2017) los gemelos: una historia para pensar [the twins: a story to think about] san josé, costa rica: pensarte. morrison, toni (2020) playing in the dark: whiteness and the literary imagination. new york: vintage. murris, karin (2015) posthumanism, philosophy for children, and anthony browne’s “little beauty”. bookbird: a journal of international children’s literature. 53(2):59-65. -----(2016a) the posthuman child: educational transformation through philosophy with picturebooks. abingdon: routledge analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 84 -----(2016b) the philosophy for children curriculum: resisting ‘teacher proof’ texts and the formation of the ideal philosopher child. studies in the philosophy of education 35(1):63-78. -----(2022) age-transgressive philosophizing with children’s literature. in m.r. gregory and m.j. laverty (eds.) gareth b. matthews, the child’s philosopher, 41-59. new york: routledge. naidoo, beverly (1992) through whose eyes? exploring racism: reader, text and context. stoke-on-trent, uk: trentham nel, philip (2017) was the cat in the hat black? the hidden racism of children’s literature and the need for diverse books. new york: oxford university press. nussbaum, martha (1992) love’s knowledge: essays on philosophy and literature. oxford: oxford university press. -----(2010) not for profit: why democracy needs the humanities. princeton university press. rainville, nell (2001). "book review: philosophy for children in native america: a post-colonial critique." analytic teaching 21(1): 65-77. ramdarshan bold, melanie (2019) inclusive young adult fiction: authors of colour in the united kingdom. london: springer. reed, ronald (1989) rebecca: a novel for children. fort worth, tx: analytic teaching press. reed-sandoval, amy (2019) "can philosophy for children contribute to decolonization?" precollege philosophy and public practice 1: 27-41. reznitskaya, alina and maughn rollins gregory (2013) student thought and classroom language: examining the mechanisms of change in dialogic teaching. educational psychologist 48(2):114133. sands-o’connor, karen (2008) soon come home to this island: west indians in british children’s literature. abigndon: routledge. -----(2017) children’s publishing and black britain, 1965-2015. london: palgrave macmillan. sharp, ann margaret (ed.) (1994) special double issue: “women, feminism and philosophy for children.” thinking: the journal of philosophy for children 11(3/4). -----(ed.) (1997) special issue: “second issue devoted to women, feminism and philosophy for children.” thinking: the journal of philosophy for children 13(1). -----(2000a) the doll hospital. melbourne, au: the australian council for educational research. -----(2000b) geraldo. melbourne, au: the australian council for educational research. sharp, ann margaret and maughn rollins gregory (2009) towards a feminist philosophy of education. thinking: the journal of philosophy for children 19(2/3):87-96. sharp, ann margaret and ronald f. reed (1992) studies in philosophy for children: harry stottlemeier’s discovery. philadelphia: temple university press. sims-bishop, rudine (2007) free within ourselves: the development of african american children’s literature. westport: greenwood press. splitter, laurance j. and ann margaret sharp (1995) teaching for better thinking: the classroom community of inquiry. melbourne, au: the australian council for educational research. sprod, tim (1993) books into ideas: a community of inquiry. moorabbin, victoria, au: hawker brownlow education. thomas, ebony elizabeth (2019) the dark fantastic: race and the imagination from harry potter to the hunger games. new york: new york university press analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 85 turgeon, wendy c. (2020) philosophical adventures with fairy tales: new ways to explore familiar tales with kids of all ages. lanham, md: rowman & littlefield education. turgeon, wendy c. and wartenberg, thomas e. (2021) teaching philosophy with picture books. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis 41(1):96-108. vigliante, tace (2005) "effective anti-racism education in australian schools: the need for philosophical inquiry in teacher education programs." critical and creative thinking: the australasian journal of philosophy in education 13 (1): 90-113. wartenberg, thomas e. (2006) beyond mere ‘illustration’: how films can be philosophy. journal of aesthetics and art criticism 64(1):19-32. -----(2007) thinking on screen: film as philosophy. london: routledge. -----(ed.) (2008) symposium on gareth b. matthews. metaphilosophy 39(1):1-65. -----(2009) big ideas for little kids: teaching philosophy through children’s literature. lanham, md: rowman and littlefield education. -----(2022) thinking through stories: children, philosophy, and picture books. new york: routledge. waksman, vera and walter o. kohan (2013) fare filosofia con i bambini: strumenti critici e operativi per il lavoro in classe con e oltre il curricolo «philosophy for children» [doing philosophy with children: critical and operational tools for classroom work with and beyond the "philosophy for children" curriculum]. naples: liguori. weber, barbara and susan t. gardner (2009) ‘back to the future’ in philosophical dialogue: a please for changing p4c teacher education. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis 29(1): 25-30. williams, steve (2020) philosophical dialogue with children about complex social issues: a debate about texts and practices. childhood & philosophy 16(36):1-28. yancy, george and maria del guadalupe davidson (eds) (2014) exploring race in predominantly white classrooms: scholars of color reflect. new york: routledge. zack, naomi (2017) the oxford handbook of philosophy and race. oxford: oxford university press. zipes, jack (1983) fairy tales and the art of subversion. abingdon: routledge. address correspondences to: darren chetty [https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8943-6876] lecturer (teaching), faculty of arts & humanities, university college london doctoral candidate, institute of education, university college london email: darren.chetty.14@ucl.ac.uk maughn rollins gregory [https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4293-5798] montclair state university professor of educational foundations, montclair state university director, institute for the advancement of philosophy for children vice president for personnel, american federation of teachers local 1904 coordinator of research, icpic: international council for philosophical inquiry with children email: gregorym@montclair.edu megan jane laverty [https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1621-0144] associate professor of philosophy and education department of arts and humanities teachers college, columbia university email: ml2524@tc.columbia.edu mailto:darren.chetty.14@ucl.ac.uk https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3a%2f%2fwww.montclair.edu%2feducational-foundations%2f&data=04%7c01%7cjjhoward%40viterbo.edu%7ca9eda8d0df6d4ac0b79508da11d434cd%7c6b9fc982e8d74958976cb08441cc9b0b%7c0%7c0%7c637841900363039995%7cunknown%7ctwfpbgzsb3d8eyjwijoimc4wljawmdailcjqijoiv2lumziilcjbtii6ik1hawwilcjxvci6mn0%3d%7c1000&sdata=5ft8ylu3ajw48%2fm6fdbdlyggpwutegebgu0ltnvk7p4%3d&reserved=0 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https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3a%2f%2fwww.icpic.org%2f&data=04%7c01%7cjjhoward%40viterbo.edu%7ca9eda8d0df6d4ac0b79508da11d434cd%7c6b9fc982e8d74958976cb08441cc9b0b%7c0%7c0%7c637841900363196216%7cunknown%7ctwfpbgzsb3d8eyjwijoimc4wljawmdailcjqijoiv2lumziilcjbtii6ik1hawwilcjxvci6mn0%3d%7c1000&sdata=octzdxfxrqcrczfimciicwphzzipk1bli7nh%2botixy0%3d&reserved=0 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 15 from neutrality to intentionality: notes for a philosophy of liberation for/with children erick j. padilla rosas o a person familiar with both philosophy for and with children and the philosophy of liberation, that the two would fit nicely together would seem obvious. however, the literature on how philosophy for/with children (p4wc) can contribute to decolonization is scarce. drawing on various philosopher-educators and the tradition of liberation philosophy, particularly amy reedsandoval's (2019) article entitled “can philosophy for children contribute to decolonization?”, this research paper explores what it means to engage in the philosophy of liberation (pl) and decolonization for and with children. since not all children are the same, especially when one takes into consideration varying degrees of economic, social, and even geopolitical inequality, this research is relevant to developing an intentional decolonizing p4wc that prepares young people for a world in which the coloniality of power and knowledge (quijano, 2000) is pervasive. introduction from the age at which they begin to speak in a sophisticated way and formulate complete sentences, children can engage in philosophical conversations. by “philosophizing,” here, we mean thinking about the nature of and pondering reality. in so doing, one begins to formulate an understanding of the world, a reading of it (freire, 2005). it is in this power to examine the nature of reality, the everyday, where pl and philosophy for/with children1 (p4wc) meet. the philosopher of liberation, enrique dussel (1985) writes, philosophy, when it is really philosophy and not sophistry or ideology, does not ponder philosophy. it does not ponder philosophical texts, except as a pedagogical propaedeutic to provide itself with interpretive categories. philosophy ponders the nonphilosophical; the reality. but because it involves reflection on its own reality, it sets out from what already is, from its own world, its own system, its own space. the philosophy that has emerged from a periphery has always done so in response to a need to situate itself with regard to a center in total exteriority. (p. 3) by "exteriority,” dussel (1985) means that “philosophy of liberation is postmodern, popular (of the people, with the people), profeminine philosophy. it is philosophy expressed by ("pressed out from") the youth of the world, the oppressed of the earth, the condemned of world history" (preface). pl is 1 throughout this paper, i will refer to philosophy for children, p4c or philosophy for/with children, depending on the concept used by the author i am discussing. personally, i will use philosophy for/with children (p4wc) when referring to the movement in general. t analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 16 postmodern because it criticizes western modernity and is not sustained by the exclusion of its own origins, peoples, cultures and lived cosmologies that have contributed historically and existentially to the very formation of modernity (dussel, 2018, p. 20). pl, moreover, is expressed from and takes into consideration the oppressed, discarded, and excluded of this world because it is precisely their exclusion, rejection, and oppression that has allowed their non-existence and lack of capacity to understand reality to be justified. therefore, central to pl is to understand the world, its history, from a non-eurocentric lens and to be active in avoiding contributing to the fetishism of the coloniality of power and knowledge that lies upon the dominant european ideology. from the beginning of modernity, bartolomé de las casas (1484-1566) was already reading his world and describing the atrocities that were being committed during colonization in the americas against the nations that already existed and lived in the lands now "discovered" by the eurocentric ego conquiro (dussel, 1985). the three ways the conquistadors used to extirpate the native nations were 1) unjust, cruel, bloody, and tyrannical wars, 2) murdering the adult males, and 3) dominating the children and women (dussel, 1985, p. 9). in this way, those who remained alive had to submit to slavery, sexual domination, and pedagogical domination. the latter allowed, especially children—but not only them— to be "civilized," or rather, europeanized. in this way education, reason, was used as an instrument of ideologization. it can well be affirmed that we are still living the consequences of pedagogical domination in our globalized world. this is largely because education is and will continue to be an instrument of domination if it is not intentional in making education an instrument of liberation. throughout this essay, we will see how philosophy for/with children is in its essence liberating, particularly in a sense of this term that connects with pl. despite the different definitions that have been presented to p4wc, disagreements and agreements about its definition are products of the very porous and rhizomatic nature of the concept itself. critiques of p4wc must be seen from the same philosophical lens that seeks to make philosophy and education for/with children practices that do not perpetuate domination and the very silencing of the voice, reason, and existence of children themselves. explaining what p4wc is and what it is not can better guide us to see how liberation philosophy and p4wc not only complement each other, but even share philosophical ideals. in substantiating the above claims, this paper addresses four questions: 1) what is and what is not p4wc, 2) what are some of the criticisms it has received, 3) are there decolonial critiques of p4wc, and 4) what, if anything, does pl have to do with p4wc. what is and what is not p4wc? philosophy for children (p4c) emerged in the 1970s in the united states initiated by matthew lipman. as vansieleghem and kennedy (2011) state, in the late 1970s there was a growing interest in critical thinking that was based on the conviction that reasoning is a necessary element of any profound educational reform (p. 173). the introduction of philosophy into the content of schooling, therefore, presented the opportunity for curricular and pedagogical innovation in the practice of schooling. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 17 with the publication of his philosophical novel harry stottlemeier's discovery (1974), lipman laid the foundation for the development of the philosophical novel for children. with this novel, lipman sought to introduce children to engagement with critical dialogue about philosophical issues, with the goal of stimulating the same type of dialogue among groups of students (vansieleghem & kennedy, 2011, p. 173). in this way, community of inquiry was put into practice where the stimulation of communal critical thinking led to improved thinking in the individual. as margaret sharp (1991) argues "a community of inquiry is characterized by dialogue that is fashioned collaboratively out of the reasoned contribution of all participants" (p. 31). such dialogue uses reason to achieve discussion of issues such as logic, epistemology, aesthetics, and politics. however, students learn to oppose weak reasoning and to build on strong reasoning always in a context in which dependence on and respect for others is vital. in this way, philosophy is practiced by children in community. it is fundamental for p4c to be practiced and developed in community. in communion and dialogue with others, it is possible to ensure that education is not only about transmitting a body of knowledge, but also about equipping children with the skills and dispositions they need to create new knowledge and make better practical judgments (margaret sharp, 1991, p. 34). hence, since its beginnings, p4c rejects a banking pedagogy (freire, 2005), where the educator counts the material, and the students receive it. such a pedagogy fails to recognize that the purpose of education should be to bring forth responsible, moral, and upright people who are capable of making wise judgments about what is right and wrong, appropriate and inappropriate. communal dialogue, then, becomes an inescapable means of education and community of inquiry, valuable in its own right, while giving rise to the traits essential to a morally discerning person (margaret sharp, 1991, p. 34). already in the early seventies, gareth matthews (1984) was also contributing to the development of the proposal of p4c by questioning traditional education for being limited to the transmission of knowledge and undervaluing the voice of the child. in fact, matthews (1984) proposes a symmetrical relationship between the adult and the child, where the child is an equal thinking partner. thus, instead of speaking of p4c, matthews (1984) proposes that it be called "dialogues with children." in this way, the name itself hints that children do not receive philosophy from their instructors or teachers, but are themselves the ones who invent it. hence, p4c theorists and practitioners have begun to use terms such as "philosophy with children" (pwc) or even "philosophy for and with children", emphasizing that it is children who do philosophy, not those who receive it. as reed-sandoval (2019) explains, philosophical discussions practiced in communities of inquiry 1) emphasize dialogue and communication, which can be verbal, written, artistic, and/or physical; 2) maintain a sustained focus on one or more fundamental philosophical questions; 3) questions and ideas are generated by the students/children/youth themselves; 4) the adult facilitator is there to guide and support and does not lecture or become overtly directive (p. 6). thus, p4wc overcomes a hierarchical education, where students must blindly do what the teacher says, and overcomes a trivialized and reductionist notion of children's critical reasoning and meaning-making abilities. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 18 what have been some of the criticisms of p4wc? as ideal as the philosophy program for and with children may seem, it has received criticism. most of the time, these criticisms are ill-founded and/or uninformed. in their defense of the program, murris et al. (2008) summarize in four points what p4c is not: 1) p4c is not philosophy "lite," 2) it is not antidialogical, 3) it is not therapy, and 4) it is not primarily a "truth-seeking" process (p. 1). these four characteristics of what is not p4c are based on critiques of philosophy for children by scholars in the field of philosophy of education, broadly defined. what is a cause for concern about the criticisms is that, for the most part, they come from the unedited individual information and expressions available on websites, classroom resource materials, an occasional dvd of classroom practice, and even a newsletter published by p4c's national charity, s.a.p.e.r.e. (murris et al., 2008, p. 2). as the commentators to the critiques assert, the critics, except for nancy vansieleghem, have ignored a rich literature on p4c of over forty years and have created their own account of p4c, after which they have expressed their own weak or erroneous conception of what p4c is. this without clarifying whether what they criticize is the approach of lipman and sharp (iapc), of the s.a.p.e.r.e. variant, of the philosophy foundation, of some version practiced outside the anglo-saxon west, or of any attempt at pre-university philosophy. we shall see. hand (2008) thinks that p4c is a watered-down version of analytical academic philosophy. that is, instead of taking into consideration the dialogical, political, social, and meta-reflexive dimension of the program, hand (2008) reduces p4c to a conceptual analysis of this type of philosophy (murris et al., 2008). murris et al. (2008) urges hand (2008) "to stop insulting children and to regard dialogical engagement with the rich tradition of p4c as a unique opportunity for both philosophers of and in education to reflect on the aims and purpose of both, education and philosophy" (p. 3). p4c is also said to be anti-dialogical. according to vansieleghem (2006), p4c has presented a new 'common' approach that overcomes the teacher-centered model of domination with an approach based on critical thinking skills (p. 180). in this case, it is rationality that erases the asymmetrical power relationship between teachers and students. this approach, vansieleghem (2006) argues, does not liberate the child because it puts critical thinking above dialogic practice. by focusing on critical thinking, "dialogue can only function with the means inherent to the prescribed scenario" (vansieleghem, 2006, p. 180). then, one does not listen to the self or the other, but to the voice of reason. murris et al. (2008) respond to this criticism, denouncing that vansieleghem's (2006) argument wrongly assumes that the goal of the community of inquiry is agreement. this ends up excluding those not included or assimilating them to the totality of the rational. however, murris et al. (2008) assert that p4c is "active, evaluative, and infinitely receptive" (p. 4). agreement, if it is reached, must be the product of consensus, not the imposition of reason. after all, for there to be a dialogue with the other, to include and listen to them, the capacity for critical reasoning is necessary. here we could demonstrate that excluding, dominating, silencing the other is only an unethical act and, therefore, antiphilosophical. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 19 the third criticism of p4c is that it is not therapy. in the dangerous rise of therapeutic education, ecclestone and hayes (2009) argue that there has been a therapeutic practice that some practitioners of p4c have made famous that promotes an enthusiastic and uncritical emotional well-being among children (p. 33). this ends up creating and reproducing a vague notion of what communities of inquiry are. furthermore, while some practitioners of p4c engage in better ways of discussing specific philosophical issues, other educators are steeped in pedagogies of "feeling good about oneself and others," "being respectful," "empathetic," and disagreeing in "appropriate" ways (ecclestone & hayes, 2009, p. 33). this ends up creating the community of inquiry in a therapeutic, rather than philosophical, circle. murris et al. (2008) agree with ecclestone and hayes (2009). the so-called "therapeutic turn" in p4c ends up undermining parenting and fostering dependence on emotional support in children (p. 4). furthermore, the therapeutic turn trivializes and ritualizes children's thinking. murris et al. (2008), therefore, stress that the solution to the exclusively therapeutic turn in p4c must be resolved through the training and education of good quality p4c practitioners. the fourth and final criticism discussed by murris et al. (2008) is that p4c is not primarily a "truthseeking" process. judith suissa (2008) perceives that philosophy practiced with children sometimes focuses on truth rather than meaning. this occurs because in emphatically seeking to obtain truth (i.e., valid and invalid arguments), questions of "what does it all mean," "what is it for" are not accommodated (p. 139). she argues that this shift from truth to meaning is especially important for older children between the ages of 14 and 18 who already have a fund of knowledge they have acquired throughout life. therefore, suissa (2008) argues that if the philosophy practiced in schools focuses only on critical thinking, this philosophy runs the risk of failing to address the questions of meaning in human life, as john dewey advocated. murris et al. (2008) argue that suissa (2008) is wrong to argue that p4c proceeds from a mere process approach, focusing too much on truth criteria. they explain that a little study of lipman's work would enable suissa (2008) and other critics of p4c to see that the program is also concerned with creative and sympathetic thinking and reasonableness. this means that the premises, reasons, and arguments presented in communities of inquiry are not only based on multiple and diverse perspectives but are also tested for their strength and relevance in the very debate in the community of inquiry. in this way, the analysis of philosophical concepts practiced in p4c helps to develop the "philosophical ear," to discern the philosophical in the everyday and to find its meaning (murris et al, 2008, p. 4). it is there in the listening and discussion of the philosophical content of the non-philosophical reality that the ethical, political, social, and aesthetic dimensions of human experience find a place and attention in p4c. as we have learned in this session of critiques and responses, practitioners of p4wc find themselves operating in a heterogeneous, porous, and rhizomatic field. just like the meta-philosophical question of "what is philosophy?" or "what is pl?" the question of what p4wc is resists an unequivocal answer with which all scholars who practice or study p4wc agree. this is entirely normal, since like any concept or definition, it is permeated by 'conceptual porosity.' susan buck-morss (2009) uses the concept of porosity to recognize that the concepts we use as theorists, philosophers, historians, and analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 20 writers never fully encompass the whole they are trying to explain and introduce. moreover, when we try to capture and explain concepts such as ‘nation,’ ‘race,’ and ‘civilization’ we are inevitably faced with the reality that we can only capture a partial aspect of the concept since it always “travel across cultural binaries, moving in and out of conceptual frames and in the process, creating new ones” (buck-morss, 2009, p. 111). all concepts, therefore, always present an unembraceable and existentially dynamic reality. trying to fit them into historical narratives, theoretical definitions, and philosophical reflections is to use violence to present a single story of a complex and compound reality. in this porosity, the rhizomatic nature of the practice of p4wc also operates. murris (2016) argues that pwc is "a rhizomatic intra-active pedagogy bringing about an epistemological change, a shift in power, and requires an unlearning of didactic teaching practices (p. xiii). pwc is rhizomatic because as deleuze and guattari (1987; 2013) rightly propose, the 'rhizome' is knowledge constructed as nonhierarchical that sprouts and navigates in any direction and flexible and dynamic enough to act in other directions, places, and contexts (murris, 2016, p. 12). consequently, practitioners of p4wc are epistemologically different when it comes to defining the program. it would therefore be a mistake to propose an essentialist definition of p4wc that does not do justice to the porosity and rhizome of the practice, the program, the conception of philosophy, as well as the performance and development of the inquiring community itself. moreover, it would be erroneous to assert that p4wc does not accommodate a community of inquiry inspired by the decolonizing project of pl. that task was embarked upon by amy reed-sandoval (2019) with her article entitled "can philosophy for children contribute to decolonization?" in the next section of this article, we will see that to make a philosophy of liberation for/with children, it is necessary to have the intentionality to address the coloniality of knowledge and power that permeates and threatens the very movement of p4wc. without intentionality, we could be complicit in an oppressive system of domination and exclusion. are there decolonial critiques of p4wc? as rainville (2001) states, when we speak of community of inquiry in p4wc, we must address the issues of inequality that some children carry with them when they arrive in the classroom or space where the philosophy session is to take place. although the p4wc program is highly interactive and opens the door for a rhizomatic intra-active pedagogy to be practiced with children, rainville (2001) proposes that we should scrutinize pwc as a program, just as we should be doing with all modern democratic institutions (p. 66). that is, if we live in a world where the coloniality of power and knowledge permeates the world-system, we must be highly sensitive and critical to recognize the structures of sin and domination that also threaten p4wc. decolonial theorist aníbal quijano (2000) with his concept of "coloniality of power and knowledge," differentiated what is "colonialism" from "coloniality." as reed-sandoval (2019) explains, while ““colonialism” refers to the imposition, establishment, and perpetuation of formal colonial regimes over indigenous populations; the term "coloniality" refers to the various social, political, economic, and epistemic legacies that continue to exist in the aftermath of formal colonial regimes” (p. 2). "the coloniality of power and knowledge," in turn, describes the totalization and systematization of coloniality as the remnants of colonization, which produced racist political, economic, and epistemic systems of domination and exclusion that make it difficult to even imagine a world without coloniality analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 21 (reed-sandoval, 2019, p. 2). hence, the need for decolonization. however, decolonization is a process. that is, it cannot be achieved overnight. the best we can do is to lay the foundations and provide the conditions that will allow future generations to be less colonized than the present ones. this is why the education of children plays an important role. reed-sandoval (2019) clearly agrees with the goal of epistemic decolonization of marginalized groups, especially when the children in question are racialized, gendered, colonized, and subaltern bodies (grosfoguel, 2007). for this reason, it is imperative to develop a philosophy of liberation for/with children. this philosophy cannot be ostensibly neutral. as kohan (1995) presents in "the origin, nature and aim of philosophy in relation to philosophy for children," matthew lipman and margaret sharp understood that educators must be neutral and impartial in the classroom. this is to maintain objectivity among the students. however, how can one be impartial in the face of injustice or neutral in the face of coloniality? if we do not act against injustice and the coloniality of power and knowledge, we end up being entangled by it. if, as rainville (2001) argues, pwc does not consider the treatment that native/indigenous students often receive within a white majority, then it is overlooking the impact that society, politics, and the world-system have on these students. among a white majority, native/indian students may feel that no one will take into consideration or care about what they have to say (rainville, 2001, p. 69). especially, if issues of race and racism are intentionally left untouched. the issue of racism is unlikely to arise organically in contexts where the white majority is especially protected and privileged by the coloniality of power and knowledge. reed-sandoval (2019) recognizes like rainville (2001) and kohan (1995) that a neutral and impartial philosophy neither decolonizes nor liberates. moreover, pwc must question the very ideal of democracy. as kohan (1995) and rainville (2001) acknowledge, the united states, like other western "democracies," has perpetuated injustices against peripheral countries. this is without recognizing that within democracies, there are second-class citizens against whom the system can legally discriminate. thus, it is necessary to study the same community of inquiry from a decolonial lens. in this way, it can be emphasized that the fact that a space is democratic does not mean that all those involved feel invited. this is due to systemic structures of the coloniality of power and knowledge. therefore, we need a philosophy of liberation for/with children that does not ignore the coloniality of power and knowledge and that manages to imagine a world without coloniality. what, if anything, does pl have to do with p4wc as beorlegui (2010) states in his book historia del pensamiento filosófico latinoamericano, it would be misleading to affirm that liberation philosophy is a "movement without fissures, whose members already had a clear and common problematic, methodology, philosophical presuppositions, etc. on which their philosophizing would be based" (p. 670). therefore, to label pl as marxist and/or revolutionary, or as a purely populist discourse on latin america, or to label it as christian philosophy would be to reduce it to orientations that describe "only some of the tendencies of the philosophy of liberation, and not the whole current" (beorlegui, 2010, p. 671). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 22 the preparation and development of the philosophical liberation movement was influenced by five matrices: 1) an economic matrix: dependency theory; 2) a pedagogical matrix: paolo freire's pedagogy of the oppressed; 3) a religious matrix: liberation theology; 4) an artistic and literary matrix: mexican muralism and the boom of the latin american novel; and 5) a philosophical matrix: the pioneering work of leopoldo zea and augusto salazar bondy (beorlegui, 2010, p. 677). from these five matrices emerged and continue to emerge thinkers who identify with the murdered and most disadvantaged, rejected and silenced of this world, to develop projects that liberate, protect, and include all possible types of lives and worlds. i argue that, inspired by the philosophical liberation movement, a conceptualized and intentionally decolonizing project can be developed to aid in the mission of liberating children. p4wc can be central to that task. as mohr lone (2021) states, "children contemplate the meaning of being human and think about social, political, and ethical problems. when adults consider these subjects, however, children's voices invariably go unheard" (p. 8). as a movement that seeks to liberate the child from this inequitable power dynamic, p4wc came to give voice to the silenced: the children. so, first of all, this movement is already recognizing and letting the other question us with their voice. this is fundamental, although not sufficient, to make a philosophy of liberation for/with children. p4wc acts as a pl when it enables children to understand and address the original sin of modernity. dussel (1973), inspired by bartolomé de las casas, maintains that "the original sin of modernity was to have ignored the sacred 'other' in the indian, in the african, in the asian, and to have reified it as an instrument within the world of north atlantic domination" (p. 193). that original sin continues to operate by killing, exploiting, ignoring, dominating, and controlling children, women, queer people, disabled bodies, the poor, the elderly, the undocumented, indigenous/native peoples, people of color, colonial subjects, and other beings that the dominant ideology of coloniality does not consider worthy of living, being loved, and protected. however, discussions of liberation philosophy for/with children need not always be about the original sin of modernity or the coloniality of power and knowledge. whenever the child questions, imagines, and explores the ethical, political, social, and aesthetic dimensions of human experience, he/she/they are exercising pl. precisely because they are questioning, exploring, imagining, they are opening themselves to the unknown, to the new. this openness is characteristic of the freedom that comes from the love of life (biophilia). as fromm (1964) argues, "if love for life is to develop, there must be freedom "to"; freedom to create and to construct, to wonder and to venture. such freedom requires that the individual be active and responsible, not a slave or a well-fed cog in the machine" (p. 57). in this way, the child is not only shown to be a philosopher (lover of wisdom) but also a biophile (lover of life). to achieve this, freedom, justice, and love itself expressed in gestures more than in ideas is necessary for the child as well as for the adult. and this because without love, there is no philosophy. practitioners of p4wc must also be lovers of life and wisdom if they want to practice decolonizing and liberating philosophy with their children. it is not enough for p4wc to promote diversity, equity, and inclusion of its facilitators. although this is extremely important. as reed-sandoval (2019) states, analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 23 having diverse educators has been shown to be beneficial for underrepresented, underserved, and students of color (reed-sandoval, p. 11). however, we need facilitators who love life and wisdom so much that they explore, question, and imagine a better world, a world without coloniality. facilitators who recognize that having a group of diverse children does not magically make inclusion happen. facilitators who are aware of their biases, their identities, their positionality and how these affects or could affect the community of inquiry. facilitators who recognize that silence is welcome and that forcing children to talk is a type of violence. facilitators who scrutinize the structures of oppression, domination, colonization, and death that permeate their curriculum. as reed-sandoval (2019) states, "p4c practitioners should scrutinize the eurocentrism that continues to characterize much of professional philosophy and the ways in which this may be impacting p4c classes" (p. 12). that is, we need to add literature for children that is intentionally diverse, inclusive, and equitable, written from a decolonial and liberation lens, from the global south, that does not focus disproportionately on telling a story from white, male, heterosexual, cisgender, christian, middleand upper-class perspectives. finally, we need facilitators who are willing to live what they teach, especially when their philosophy sessions seek to put decolonial and liberation pedagogies into practice. liberating intentionality in practice will be concretely based on moving from facilitator neutrality to intentional bias. as kennedy & kohan (2021) argue by endorsing the words of elicor (2019), "impartiality in the social context is a myth used by the "gated community" in the service oppression" (p. 12). this is largely because "our ideas, views, and opinions are not objective and independent, but rather the result of myriad social messages and conditioning forces" (sensoy & diangelo, 2017, p. 66-67). so, we must be intentional in practicing an informed bias toward the culturally and socially marginalized through a liberating p4wc. this philosophy will pay special attention to communities that are underrepresented, marginalized, and oppressed by the dominant culture and will not reinforce the monopolization of positions of authority by racialized people such as whites in the p4wc community. this monopolization has clearly not been neutral, as we all have biases, prejudices, and discriminations inherited through socialization. as chetty et al. (2022) state, for more than the forty years that pwc has operated as a program, it "have paid little or no attention to the voices of bipoc —be it in philosophy, pedagogy and education, or children's literature" (p. 78). i propose, therefore, that p4wc should move from neutrality to the intentionality of a bias towards the silenced and most disadvantaged. this bias will function as the "epistemic privilege to the oppressed" (stenberg, 2006) which interprets scriptural traditions and our world from the perspective of those "who have not yet named the world—the marginal, the silenced, the defeated" (welch, 1985, p. 34). this will not seek to change the open dialogic nature of the community of inquiry, nor the philosophical creation among the children themselves, but rather will impact the p4wc curriculum to engage in an inter-philosophical dialogue with the liberation philosophy movement and its thinkers, to strengthen the creation and development of new literature, novels, image-based stories, etc., aimed at children, and to familiarize the p4wc facilitators themselves with the decolonizing and liberating efforts that liberation philosophy has been making for over fifty years. as leopoldo zea (2017) states, "we have to be responsible for our attitudes because through them we not only commit to our own existence, but also commit to the existence of others" (p. 127). we educators have a special and vocational obligation to be responsible for our attitudes because through analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 24 them we stake our existence and that of our students and others. if we recognize, along with baldwin (2008), that education always occurs within a social framework designed to perpetuate societal goals (p. 17), then we have concluded that to create a better world, one cannot be neutral, passive, and indifferent. intentionality and commitment are needed, so that our students can be true lovers of wisdom and life. in this liberating intentionality must reside the philosophy of liberation for/with children. concluding remarks in this paper we have seen that p4wc and pl fit together very well if the former has an understanding of the coloniality of power and knowledge and the intentionality of contributing to the process of decolonization. intentionality biased in favor of the oppressed, silenced, and disadvantaged of this world is fundamental for not perpetuating the totalization of coloniality and for children to be able to think and imagine a world free of oppression, prejudice and death. achieving this would be ideal to develop a philosophy of liberation for/with children, which is necessary to lay the foundations and provide the conditions that will allow future generations to be less colonized than the current ones. references baldwin, j. m. (2008). a talk to teachers. yearbook of the national society for the study of education, 107(2), 15–20. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1744-7984.2008.00154.x beorlegui, c. (2010). historia del pensamiento filosofico latinoamericano: una busqueda incesante de la identidad (3a. ed.). publicaciones de la unive. http://public.ebookcentral.proquest.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=3214102 buck-morss, s. (2009). hegel, haiti, and universal history. pittsburgh, pa.: university of pittsburgh. chetty, d., gregory, m., & laverty, m. j. (2022). philosophizing with children’s literature: a response to turgeon and wartenberg. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis, 42(1), 59–85. deleuze, g. and guattari, f. (1987/2013) a thousand plateaus (transl. and foreword by b. massumi). london: bloomsbury. dussel, e. (1973). américa latina dependencia y liberación. fernando garcía cambeiro. dussel, e. (1985). philosophy of liberation (a. martinez & c. morkovsky, trans.). orbis books. dussel, e. (2018). anti-cartisian meditations and transmodernity: from the perspectives of philosophy of liberation (a. vallega & r. grosfoguel, eds.). amrit publishers. ecclestone, k., & hayes, d. (2009). the dangerous rise of therapeutic education. routledge. http://site.ebrary.com/id/10296875 elicor, p. (2019). philosophical inquiry with indigenous children: an attempt to integrate indigenous forms of knowledge in philosophy for/with children. childhood & philosophy, 15, 1–22. https://doi.org/10.12957/childphilo.2019.42659. freire, p. (2005). pedagogy of the oppressed (m. bergman ramos, trans.). continuum. fromm, e. (1964). the heart of man. harper and row. hand & c. winstanley (eds) philosophy in schools. continuum, pp 132-145. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 25 kennedy, d., & kohan, w. o. (2021). some ethical implications of practicing philosophy with children and adults. childhood & philosophy, 17, 01–16. https://doi.org/10.12957/childphilo.2021.61025 margaret sharp, a. (1991). the community of inquiry: education for democracy. thinking: the journal of philosophy for children, 9(2), 31–37. https://doi.org/10.5840/thinking19919236 matthews, g. b. (1980). philosophy & the young child. harvard university press. mohr lone, j. (2021). seen and not heard: why children’s voices matter. rowman & littlefield. murris, k. (2016). the posthuman child: educational transformation through philosophy with picturebooks. routledge. murris, k., bramal, s., egley, s., gregory, m., & haynes, j. (2009). what philosophy with children is not: responses to some critics and constructive suggestions for dialogue about the role of p4c in higher education. academia, 1–8. quijano, a. (2000). coloniality of power and eurocentrism in latin america. international sociology, 15(2), 215–232. https://doi.org/10.1177/0268580900015002005 rainville, h. (2001). philosophy for children in native america: a post-colonial critique. analytic teaching, 21(1). reed-sandoval, a. (2019). can philosophy for children contribute to decolonization. precollege philosophy and public practice, 1, 27–41. https://doi.org/10.5840/p4201811284 sensoy, ö., & diangelo, r. j. (2017). is everyone really equal? an introduction to key concepts in social justice education (second edition). teachers college press. stenberg, s. j. (2006). liberation theology and liberatory pedagogies: renewing the dialogue. college english, 68(3), 271–290. suissa, j. (2008) philosophy in the secondary school – a deweyan perspective; in: m. vansieleghem, n. (2006). listening to dialogue. studies in philosophy and education, 25(1–2), 175–190. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-006-0008-x vansieleghem, n., & kennedy, d. (2011). what is philosophy for children, what is philosophy with children—after matthew lipman? journal of philosophy of education, 45(2), 171–182. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.2011.00801.x welch, s. d. (1985). communities of resistance and solidarity: a feminist theology of liberation. maryknoll, ny: orbis. zea, l. (2017). philosophy as commitment (1952). in a. a. oliver (trans.), philosophy as commitment (1952) (vol. 1). oxford university press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190601294.003.0010 address correspondences to: erick j. padilla rosas marquette university ph.d. student, educational policy and leadership erick.padillarosas@marquette.edu mailto:erick.padillarosas@marquette.edu analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 106 dialogic pedagogies: defining and analyzing four types of dialogue in education ben kilby introduction he empirical research on dialogue-based pedagogies shows that they improve student outcomes and, thus, teachers should make more use of these methods (edwards-groves & hoare, 2012). however deeper analyses about whether certain modes of dialogue are better than others is under-researched, resulting in little information about which models best help teachers develop effective dialogic learning practices (howe & abedin, 2013, p. 325). some researchers have argued that there is a gap in the literature, as there has been little proper exploration of what constitutes effective classroom dialogue, with practical examples of how to structure discourse for learning lacking in classroom practice (myhill et al., 2005; mercer, 2010; edwards-groves & hoare, 2012; howe & abedin, 2013). edwards-groves and davidson (2020, p. 126) suggest that “developing a shared language and collective understandings about classroom talk and interaction among teachers, and with and among their students, largely remains taken-for-granted in practice.” howe and abedin (2013) suggest that this leads to a lack of understanding about models of effective dialogue and allows poorer forms of dialogic pedagogy to persist. alexander (2004) shares this concern that the most effective kinds of talk in classrooms are not widely practised. nystrand (1997) also discusses how different modes of classroom discussion engender particular epistemic roles for both teachers and students, which can constrain their thinking and contribute to disadvantage. in sum, “the quality of student learning is closely related to the quality of classroom talk” (p. 29). therefore, it is vitally important that we are able to demonstrate what kind of talk is most effective in the classroom. this paper identifies different kinds of dialogue-based pedagogies and, through conceptual analysis, articulates the notions of dialogue they assume and the educational implications of these different notions of dialogue. four types of dialogic pedagogy have been identified in the existing literature. although they may go by different names to different people, for consistency, this paper will categorise them as teacher-directed dialogue, mere conversation, adversarial dialogue, and exploratory dialogue, each of which will be described in its own subsection. empirical evidence for the value of dialogic learning there has been broad and diverse research undertaken to determine the impact of dialogic learning on students, and this comprehensive body of research indicates a significant positive impact. skidmore (2004, 2006) demonstrates how the quality of classroom dialogue is crucial to students’ learning, and the meta-synthesis of hattie (2020) ranks ‘classroom discussion’ as one of the teaching strategies with the most significant effect on student achievement. skidmore (2004) claims that not t analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 107 only can productive classroom dialogue produce a general rise in achievement, but it can also bridge the gap between higher and lower achieving students. students’ thinking (mercer & littleton 2007) and literacy (alexander 2006) have been shown to develop through dialogue when that dialogue is of a particular type, which is to say of the nature of exploratory dialogue discussed below rather than the other three dialogue types (michaels et al., 2008; anderson et al., 2011). students also develop meaningful understandings about concepts primarily through talk (edwards-groves et al., 2014). for example, swain and lapkin (1998) demonstrate that shared meanings are better remembered when they were produced in dialogic exchange. analysing what is typical in classrooms, alexander (2001) reports that interrogatory whole-class talk is the dominant teaching method internationally. this has been the case for over one hundred years, since the research of stevens (1912) reported that teachers predominantly ask questions which require students to recall textbook knowledge. flanders (1970) utilised a systematic observation research methodology that led to the ‘two-thirds rule,’ which states that what happens in classrooms typically follows the pattern of: two-thirds of the time is dedicated to talk, two-thirds of that time is the teacher talking, and two-thirds of teacher-talk is made up of monologic talk and recitation questions. this leaves little room for more productive kinds of talk. galton et al. (1999) replicated this research 30 years later and found that the two-thirds rules is now closer to three-quarters, and smith et al. (2004) found similar numbers at 74%. nystrand et al. (2003) found that in 1151 observations, only 6.69% could be described as dialogic in nature. further research by nystrand (1997) also reports that recitational patterns of discourse are “overwhelmingly prevalent,” have a negative effect on learning, and are associated more strongly with low-achieving classes and students. more recent studies also show a similar pattern of teacher dominated talk (vaish, 2008; wangru, 2016). in a metanalysis, howe and abedin (2013, p. 334) find that this pattern is highly visible within most classrooms. the most recent research continues to demonstrate that exploratory dialogue rarely occurs in classroom practice (davies et al., 2017; howe & mercer, 2017; wilkinson et al., 2017). nystrand (1997) ponders why this approach to teaching continues to be so prevalent when it fails to either improve student outcomes or engage student interest. this kind of unproductive talk is what is categorised in this thesis as teacher-directed dialogue. talk-types in schools teacher-directed dialogue students are often engaged in talk that is primarily teacher-centred. this involves students in a watch-listen-repeat model of learning (swan, 2006). this type of dialogue allows few opportunities for students to actively contribute to the discussion and rarely engages with higher order thinking skills (tinzamann et al., 1990). it is structured to convey factual information to students, is instructive rather than investigative, and it embraces authoritative methods of talk such as lecturing and teacher questioning (gillies, 2006; edwards-groves et al., 2014). f. hardman (2020, p. 142) explains that this kind of talk consists of “closed teacher questions, brief student answers, superficial praise or criticism, rather than diagnostic feedback, and an emphasis on recalling information rather than genuine exploration.” analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 108 this type of dialogue also includes a pedagogical form commonly known as irf/ire, standing for teacher-initiated question, student response, teacher follow-up or evaluation (sinclair & coulthard, 1975; mehan, 1979). this form of classroom talk is highly visible and commonplace in education worldwide (edwards & westgate, 1994; alexander, 2001), cazden (2001) even refers to this as the ‘traditional’ classroom structure. the f/e in the irf/e pattern only evaluates compliance in rote memorisation and repeating information (tharp & gallimore, 1988; j. hardman, 2020). wegerif (2020, p. 14) describes teacher-directed dialogue as knowledge that, instead of being connecting to living relationships, is something that is stored in books and transmitted into brains. cazden (2001) describes this as a strategy suited to areas of the curriculum that require an understanding only of factual knowledge. these are areas of learning that require students to learn and memorise by rote, for example, learning that the capital of australia is canberra. cazden (2001) warns that there is a danger in the prevalence of irf/e in classrooms reducing the curriculum to just those aspects that can be memorised by rote. rather than using this strategy only in the service of learning that is suitable to be learned by rote, the type of learning that occurs is determined by what fits the irf/e pattern. skidmore (2016a, p. 92) criticises it for being restricted to learning that is axiomatic and repeatable. this discourse pattern is not collaborative or interactive and can create closed talk and restrict understanding amongst students (leva, 2015, pp. 8-9). research has demonstrated the constricting effect that this teacher-directed talk has on students’ learning (edwards & mercer, 1987; edwards & westgate, 1994). cazden (2001) reiterates that this form of classroom talk is not suited to deeper learning about complex concepts, and therefore its prevalence marks a danger that learning about complex concepts is not being effectively undertaken or is not happening at all. howe (2010, p. 48) even states that open inquiry dialogue is “inconceivable” with teacherdirected dialogue being used as a pedagogical strategy. therefore, the prevalence of teacher-directed dialogue suggests a lack in the exploration of deep and complex concepts. wegerif (2020, p. 23) acknowledges that there are different pedagogies required for different learning objectives. the irf/e sequence of classroom talk may help facilitate certain kinds of valuable learning. for instance, where a teacher initiates an irf/e sequence, they ask a question to which they already know an answer and students have the opportunity to test whether their thinking aligns with their teacher’s. however, open dialogic talk is a valuable pedagogy across all kinds of learning objectives (scott et al., 2006). langer (2016) demonstrates that students who are taught the ‘universally correct’ ways of doing things fail to be able to adapt these procedures to different contexts and reapply them creatively. she goes on to argue that everything should be taught with a variety of perspectives involving debate, rather than rote learning traditional ways of doing things. the justification for this comes from the idea that being taught the best way to do something is insufficient. competing perspectives are required, even if they are inadequate, so that learners can better understand why one way is better than another (phillipson & wegerif, 2016; marton & häggström, 2017). this links with research on student metacognition that posits that students benefit when they reflect on the ways they think, not just about the correctness of their thinking (mercer & dawes, 2008; lefstein, 2010; reznitskaya & gregory, 2013; van der veen et al., 2017). on the pedagogical value and limitations of teacher-directed dialogue, alexander (2001) states that irf/e patterns of classroom interaction appear to add pace to the learning by eliciting short responses for students, but fail to extend their thinking. skidmore (2016c) lends weight to this, claiming that an analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 109 over-reliance on irf/e patterns creates a uniformity in students’ thinking because of the limitations set on students’ responses. it reduces knowledge to the successful display of the facts that the teacher wants to hear at any given time. therefore, teacher-directed dialogue is limited in its value in a way that more open dialogic talk is not. mere conversation approaches that move classroom talk beyond recall and recitation often aim to engage students in exploring personal meaning and connection to the concepts under discussion (mercer & dawes, 2008; leva, 2015). mercer (1996) describes this as ‘cumulative talk,’ characterised by speakers building positively but uncritically on what others have said. he describes it as neither argumentative nor collaborative and without serious considerations. conversation is important to learning. brown (2007) describes the notion that learning happens independently from explicit instruction by an act of becoming in child development. this suggests that students process ideas through their relationships with others, an interactive process that mediates how ideas are presented to students, with communal discussion enabling them to form connections to ideas in personal and meaningful ways (fisher, 2009). markova (2003) states that “to be means to communicate, and to communicate means to be for another, and through the other, for oneself.” research also demonstrates that students rarely talk to each other about school-based topics, so mere conversation is a way to enable that talk to occur (galton et al., 1980; galton, 1999). mere conversation allows students to engage in reciprocal student-to-student interaction which is not teacher-directed. howe (2010, p. 189) states that this talk is more productive than adversarial dialogue (see next section) and also has fewer opportunities for withdrawal. leaning on the notion from vygotsky (1978, p. 57) that “all higher functions originate as actual relationships between individuals,” saavedra and opfer (2012) remark that collaboration is not an outcome but a necessary condition for learning, and the model of conversational-discussion-as-learning supports student achievement. vygotsky (1978, p. 57) asserts that the development of children takes place, firstly, on a social level between people which he describes as interpsychological, then, secondly, on the individual level inside the child, described as intrapsychological. allowing students to engage socially in cognitive processes supports their thinking according to this theory of psychological development. harris (1998, p. 241) simply states that “to children in school, the most important people in the classroom are other children.” therefore, the student-to-student talk that mere conversation produces is educationally worthwhile, albeit insufficient. the move from teacher-directed to conversational talk shifts the focus from teacher-centred to student-centred discussion in some positive ways, but it is still not representative of the highest quality educational dialogue. howe (2010, p. 79) states that “the expression of contrasting opinions cannot be sufficient in its own right to precipitate growth. children must also resolve differences in a productive fashion.” leva (2015, p. 53) asserts that for classroom talk to be constructive it needs to include negotiation and evaluation. if negotiation and evaluation are not features of the discussion, then it will be merely conversational idea-sharing, which leva (2015) says is much more common. alexander (2001) and edwards-groves et al. (2014) acknowledge the importance of using the best kinds of talk for learning purposes, and while mere conversation gets students involved in the talk, it analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 110 does not engage them in deeper levels of thinking. moreover, where the conversational discussion is still controlled by the teacher, even though students are engaging in much of the talk themselves, it fails to be collaborative or reflective, which are integral features of productive classroom discussions (stremmel & fu, 1993; myhill, 2006). allport (1954) also suggests that a focus on a shared or superordinate goal allows for more productive talk than students merely engaging in free talk. in her article ‘inquiry is no mere conversation,’ gardner (1995) details a model of teacher facilitation of classroom dialogue that is not teacher-centred, but at the same time does not allow a completely open free conversation dictated to by the idea-sharing of students. therefore, while mere conversation provides some additional benefits to teacher-directed dialogue, it fails to constitute all the features of the most productive forms of classroom discussion and there is still some work to do to get to a conception of best practice in dialogic pedagogy. adversarial dialogue adversarial dialogue is focused on a critical and competitive type of communication. it is primarily concerned with sound reasoning and argumentation. this type of dialogue involves exposing viewpoints and arguments to extreme opposition, whereby a defender will have to muster all the evidence possible to support their view against a real or imagined adversary. this type of dialogue is most conspicuous in school debating competitions. baker et al. (2020) describe how debating societies were founded from the tradition of ritualistic religious training. from this tradition comes a dogmatic approach to dialogue, where strict adherence to a view is encouraged, and the goal is to persuade another person to side with you while doing little critical reflection yourself. osborne (2010) claims that reasoned argumentation of the kind present in adversarial dialogue is pivotal to scientific practice and intellectual inquiry. indeed, the critical analysis in this form of dialogue is valuable in many aspects. mead (1934) describes how students need to learn not only how to persuade specific others, but to argue in terms of ‘what anyone would think.’ this is wherein lies the value in adversarial dialogue. it has some features of productive dialogue, notably the criticalanalytical aspects. baker et al. (2020, p. 76) claim that argumentative interactions may have educational value because they force students to contest views with reasoned analysis. students have to explain, examine, and construct counterarguments for views that contribute to thinking better than discussion that is peaceful and placid, which is more likely to move the discussion towards facile acceptance. dialogue that has the central tenet of providing reasons for arguments has a significant positive impact on cognition and student achievement (kuhn et al., 2008; crowell & kuhn, 2014; trickey & topping, 2015). this kind of reasoned argumentation has been theorised by kuhn and crowell (2011) as ‘dialogic argumentation’ and by resnick et al. (2017) as ‘accountable talk’. the cable project, focused on investigating collaborative argumentation dialogue, has researched this kind of talk extensively and found that it has a positive effect not only on student cognition and achievement, but also socio-emotional factors as well (andriessen & coirier, 1999; andriessen et al., 2003; baker et al., 2013; baker et al., 2020). reasoning and justification in dialogue have also been shown to provide academic benefits in a number of other studies (o'connor et al., 2015; van der veen et al., 2017; muhonen et al., 2018). this critical examination and reasoning is beneficial to dialogic learning, and while the argument-focused methods and projects mentioned above are not analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 111 necessarily examples of adversarial dialogue in the same way that debating is, there is a risk that being too argumentatively focused will lead to adversarial dialogue. adversarial dialogue is justified by the claim that any “position ought to be defended from, and subjected to, the criticism of the strongest opposition” (moulton, 1983, p. 153). if that evaluation is not adversarial in nature, then it is assumed to be weaker and less effective (p. 154). alston and brandt (1974, pp. 9-10) suggest that a person engaged in this kind of dialogue is “more adept at tearing down than at building up, and he delights in reducing his interlocutors to confusion.” this hyper-critical element forces interlocuters to work within a scheme that requires them to tear down and criticise ideas; that requires them to constantly think of objections and counterexamples; and that requires them to attempt to undermine any and all ideas that are presented for evaluation. mercer (1996) calls this disputational dialogue, characterised by disagreement, individualised thinking, and short exchanges of assertions. freidman (2013) denotes the adversarial mode as consisting of objections and counterexamples to which the best responses are refutations, then more objections and counterexamples in a cyclical motion of unending competitive attacks where “all that matters is the gladiatorial skirmish.” this suggests that the aggressive nature of adversarial dialogue creates an atmosphere that is inhospitable for anyone who has not been “raised to fight or enjoy combat” (p. 28). while this argumentation has in adversarial dialogue value, there are also many drawbacks. this type of dialogue is espoused as being the pinnacle of rational reasoning and argumentation insofar as it demands that all ideas presented by speakers are subject to rigorous critical analysis. however, where it falls short is in not allowing a collaborative exploration, whereupon building and strengthening ideas through dialogic processes is valued as highly as the critical deconstruction of those ideas through dialogue. this criticality leads to narrow perspectives dominating dialogue. wegerif and scrimshaw (1997) show that when a child dominates the discussion other children tend to withdraw, become quiet and subdued, or participate marginally. this narrowness of ideas and marginalisation of other students due to the lack of collaborative discourse is where adversarial dialogue fails to be adequately productive as a dialogic pedagogy. it fails to be conducive to diverse and pluralistic dialogue in a way that contributes to progress in ideation and thinking (cf. golding, 2010). exploratory dialogue as exemplary dialogue exploratory dialogue is presented in this section to be the most productive form of classroom discussion. the concept of exploratory talk comes from barnes (1992, 2008), but has undergone many additions and reviews since then. the use of this concept also refers to what is known as ‘thinking aloud’. exploratory dialogue, rather than talk, emphasises the interactive nature of the communication, rather than the individualised notion of ‘thinking aloud.’ there are a variety of terms used to address the features of classroom interaction that is being labelled here as exploratory dialogue. these include dialogic instruction (nystrand, 1997), dialogic enquiry (wells, 1999), dialogic teaching (alexander, 2001), accountable talk (resnick et al., 2017), inquiry dialogue (reznitskaya & wilkinson, 2017), and quality talk (wilkinson et al., 2010). in this thesis, exploratory dialogue will be the commonly used term to describe a specific kind of classroom interaction that draws on many different theories and will be explained in this section in full. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 112 in terms of structure, wegerif (2020, p. 21) describes three moves within exploratory dialogue: opening, widening, and deepening. opening involves enabling space for relationships within the participants in the dialogue that makes it possible to “shape the attention of the other.” this move opens a question, problem, or idea that allows ideas, perspectives, and beliefs to shape the dialogue. in a way, it is a specific version of a prompt. it is specific in that it is a prompt that enables this divergent pluralistic dialogue. an example is: ‘eating meat is wrong’. this opening move creates the space for divergent opinions within a pluralistic discussion. speakers can discuss their agreement or disagreement and reasoning in response. the second move is widening. this widens the concepts in the discussion by actively seeking out a diverse range of perspectives through asking what everyone thinks. this widening involves incorporating views from outside the perspectives of the specific people in the dialogue. for example, in a class with no indigenous students, an imaginative or speculative perspective of what an indigenous voice might have to say about the topic could be considered. the third move is deepening. this is a deepening of the way in which the topic is reasoned about. this might look like students identifying assumptions that have been made in the dialogue so far, such as ‘we are assuming that non-human animals have inner lives in the same way as humans when we claim that we should not eat them’. the widening move aims to expose students to a breadth of perspectives, while the deepening move aims for them to explore the depth within those perspectives. these moves contrast with the previous three dialogue types. teacher-directed dialogue does not aim at either breadth or depth through widening or deepening moves. the teacher wants the singular correct answer so that the class can memorise it and move on. mere conversation may have some breadth, but no depth. it fails to deeply and critically analyse perspectives and only involves the sharing of opinions. it also does not consider perspectives from outside the dialogue, such as the indigenous perspective example mentioned earlier. adversarial dialogue does not have the breadth, because each side of the argument has their narrow position as fixed and immovable. there may be multiple perspectives within the discussion as a whole (i.e., two opposing sides), but this is not breadth in the same way because there is no purposeful consideration for other perspectives, nor is it the case that speakers are open to changing their minds. as for depth, there is only one-sided depth. the aim of adversarial dialogue is to persuade your way to victory, therefore there is a deep critical analysis, but it is only of the oppositional view and not of one’s own view. barnes (1992) uses the vygotskyian concept of inner speech to suggest that learning should be transformational rather than merely additive. by this, he means that dialogue should produce a transformation in a learner that facilitates an inner dialogue based on the ideas that are presented by others during discussion. this inner dialogue is what counts as critical thinking and is specifically developed in conversation with others. in contrast, teacher-directed dialogue is merely additive because it gifts students with new knowledge, but not a way to apply, contextualise, or modify that knowledge in innovative ways. nystrand (1997) similarly says that exploratory dialogue builds a completely different kind of relationship between teacher and student, whereby the teacher’s role is to structure talk in order to facilitate students’ production of knowledge, and the students’ role is to think, not simply to remember. in this way, students’ knowledge is being moulded and transformed as the dialogue progresses, rather than merely adding fact upon fact to a bank of ‘things’ that students ‘know’. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 113 bakhtin (1981, p. 293) distinguishes between what is being described here as teacher-directed and exploratory dialogue through an understanding of the ownership of ideas and concepts. in exploratory dialogue, students are able to take ideas and concepts and make them their own; utilise and deploy them for purposes suited to the context and in unique and creative ways. he claims that this kind of dialogue reveals “newer ways to mean” (p. 346). “if an answer does not give rise to a new question from itself, it falls out of the dialogue” (p. 168). this directly contrasts with teacher-directed dialogue where the teacher already has the answers and is not interested in new interpretations, questions, or understandings. skidmore (2016b, p. 31) discusses this idea from bakhtin by stating that when students are limited to an understanding of a concept that asks them to reproduce it in an identical form to which it was presented to them, the concept remains someone else’s and not a genuine psychological tool that they can use. only when students are able to construct new meaning from a learned concept, incorporating their point of view, questioning the interpretation, or presenting something new can we be confident that they have a strong grasp on the concept in a way that demonstrates an emerging understanding of the domain of knowledge that they are studying. thus, in exploratory dialogue, instead of teachers telling students what they need to know and remember, they stimulate thinking with ideas that launch students into knowledge construction using reasoning, perspective sharing, and critical analysis (stein et al., 2008). exploratory dialogue challenges students’ thinking with speculative and process questions that encourage them to reflect, reason, explore, and re-examine ideas. speculative questions encourage more depth, and might include, ‘can you give me an example?’, ‘are there any other connections to [previous idea]?’, or ‘do your reasons support your conclusion?’. process questions address the procedure of the inquiry and might include, ‘do you agree or disagree?’, ‘could you explain in your own words?’, or ‘what do you mean by that?’. this kind of dialogue empowers students to participate in a pluralistic dialogue and construct meaning for themselves through owning the ideas and concepts under discussion. mere conversation focuses on perspective sharing and adversarial dialogue focusses on criticising ideas, exploratory dialogue moves beyond these towards dialogue as a form of knowledge construction (kovalainen & kumpulainen, 2005; edwards-groves et al., 2014) (fisher, 2009). personal meaning and ideas can be constructed and shared, but more so, the meaning and the thinking behind them is shared through dialogue, enabling the construction of group understanding (leva, 2015). the collaborative nature of the dialogue exposes students to multiple perspectives, while also building mutual understanding through the process of thinking together and thinking collaboratively (mercer & dawes, 2008; fisher, 2009; boyd & galda, 2011). this enables knowledge construction as students are actively processing the exchange and there are opportunities to connect ideas through dialogue (blumenfeld et al., 1991; stremmel & fu, 1993; konings et al., 2005; osberg & biesta, 2008; myers & nulty, 2009; french, 2012). this kind of talk encourages students to socially construct understandings (nachowitz & brumer, 2014), and in order to do this they must build on each idea shared rather than merely hearing them out or searching for criticisms to tear them down (edwards-groves & hoare, 2012). producing effective classroom discussion is not as simple as monitoring who talks and how much. instead, the extent to which students are treated as epistemic agents (co-constructors of knowledge) is a greater predictor for quality dialogic learning and improved student outcomes (skidmore, 2016c). pauli and reusser (2015) demonstrate a positive association between coanalytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 114 constructing knowledge and student attainment in mathematics. research has long demonstrated the importance of active dialogue to cognitive development (trevarthen, 1979; bråten, 1988; resnick et al., 2018). common features of exploratory dialogue include an open exchange of ideas, joint inquiry and construction of knowledge, multiple voices, and respectful classroom relations (littleton & mercer, 2013; haneda, 2017; khong et al., 2019; j. hardman, 2020). a key benefit of exploratory dialogue is that students reformulate knowledge in various contexts due to the diversity and pluralism in the dialogue. students test and apply their understanding of new concepts so that they become familiar with their use. skidmore (2016b, p. 33) contrasts this with teacher-directed dialogue, suggesting that when instruction takes place using recitational methods, the knowledge acquired by the students is static and gets quickly discarded outside of the specific context in which it was learned. in exploratory dialogue, students move away from the recitation and reproduction questioning that takes place in teacher-directed dialogue (young, 1991). curricular content is retold from the students’ perspectives and applied and contextualised in various ways. the teacher talks with, rather that talks at, students, emphasising the varying perspectives and ideas that the students have to offer (skidmore, 2016b, p. 35). alexander (2001) distinguishes between dialogue and conversation by suggesting that dialogue utilises purposeful questioning, structure, and the pursuit of shared inquiry goals. he suggests that dialogue is the main way in which teachers are able to remove themselves from the habit of treating students as empty vessels and allows them to see students as competent thinkers in their own right. this is the kind of teaching that is “collective, reciprocal, supportive, cumulative and purposeful” (p. 29). one of the ways that exploratory dialogue aims to achieve purposeful meaning making is by attending to the individuality of student voices in the discussion. it emphasises different and unique voices interacting with each other in pursuit of knowledge and understanding, but never being reducible to a single authoritative voice (skidmore, 2016b, p. 34). wells (1999, p. 174) describes the meaning potential of shared language, which allows students to work towards achieving goals within their discursive social interaction. in an educational context, these goals are generally going to be skill development and a greater conceptual understanding of a topic. alexander (2001, p. 527) details how this common understanding is achieved through joint activity and shared conceptions. it incorporates the social conversation with the cognitive inquiry to demand a specific kind of talk emerge. more than responding with perspective sharing, exploratory dialogue affords students the time and space to think for themselves in relation to others, augmenting understanding (leva, 2015). hedges and cullen (2005) describe this as intersubjectivity, where a cognitive, social, and emotional exchange occurs between members of a learning community. these exchanges facilitate the communal interaction in dialogue to further the knowledge and understanding of all speakers. vygotsky (1978) uses the notion of thinking as internalised self-talk, and thus, dialogue with others enables this internal thinking dialogue to become reasoned through the communal exchange (stahl et al., 2014). carless et al. (2011, p. 397) also delineate how the most successful interactive exchanges require shared and negotiated meanings and expectations. it is a process of shared inquiry into a concept of learning that takes place in the form of a dialogue (wells, 1999; linell, 2009). the concept of polyphony, or multiple voices and perspectives as part of a dialogue is important to exploratory dialogue (bakhtin, 1984). through this multiplicity of voices comes the notion of an epistemological framework that is used to construct shared knowledge through dialogue with a specific group (mercer, analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 115 2000). skidmore (2016a, p. 95) explains that the richer one’s discursive space, “the wider this person’s access to whatever forms of life the society and its culture have to offer and the greater her ability to collaborate with others.” by this, he means that the greater diversity in dialogues that a person can participate in will open up their minds to a wider array of ideas, perspectives, and beliefs. this is of benefit in an educational context because a goal in education is to broaden the minds of students so that they can see, think, and create beyond their limited classroom context. following bakhtin (1984, p. 26), exploratory dialogue should be “profoundly pluralistic.” this connects with wegerif’s idea of widening. in practical terms, this means ensuring that the discussion does not focus too much on trying to come to a universal consensus or find the ‘correct’ answer. pluralistic views on topics are encouraged, and the value in the dialogue comes from the understandings and interpretations between diverse viewpoints. “if one is open in a dialogue and listens closely, there is no final position but always a voice from outside the current consensus knocking on the window with a new perspective, asking to be heard” (wegerif, 2020, p. 18). skidmore (2016b) says that this is the idea of “no single viewpoint being superior to any other.” the teacher must provide the space for plurality to emerge, encouraging divergent thinking for interaction within the discussion. this interaction allows the consideration of multiple perspectives. the emphasis is placed not on the view in and of itself, but on ensuring that the reasoning a student uses to justify a particular view is made explicit (p. 39). this contrasts with teacher-directed dialogue where the teacher is looking for a specific correct answer. instead of searching for specific answers, exploratory dialogue seeks the reasoning behind any answer. it is through this examination of reasoning that learning can develop in an effective way. this is the case even where there is, in fact, a single correct answer. for example, where a student says that 1 + 1 = 3. the focus is not on the incorrect answer of 3, but on the reasoning that led the student to think that the answer was 3. a critical communal examination of the reasoning will not only reveal an error in reasoning but also address potential misconceptions in student thinking. this is something teacher-directed dialogue cannot do, as this form of interaction will state that this is the incorrect answer and restart the irf/e sequence with another student until the correct answer is achieved. visible student reasoning in discussion adds meaning, purpose, and contextuality to discussions, exploring uncertainties and original ideas. it enables students within the dialogue to evaluate, decide, and apply their own criteria to analyse the knowledge in question. conclusion the importance of classroom dialogue for student achievement and wellbeing is well known. this paper contributes to the depth of understanding in the different kinds of dialogic pedagogy that teachers can employ. notably, the role of exploratory dialogue is emphasised as having a strong positive impact on students. this kind of dialogic engagement provides teachers with an avenue to empower their students toward becoming critical, creative, caring, and collaborative thinkers, as well as good human beings. in practice, the pedagogical work required of teachers is to be aware of the ways that they structure talk for optimal student learning and engagement. being sensitive to the pedagogical moves that are inclusive to all students is necessary for high achievement. this collaborative discussion analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 116 should still be critical, analytical, and full of disagreement, making it a productive academic dialogue. but it does not have to be competitive and argumentative. there are many pedagogical models that teachers can access to ensure this efficacy, including dialogic instruction (nystrand, 1997), dialogic enquiry (wells, 1999), dialogic teaching (alexander, 2001), accountable talk (resnick et al., 2017), inquiry dialogue (reznitskaya & wilkinson, 2017), and quality talk (wilkinson et al., 2010), and philosophy for children (murris et al., 2016). teachers should also be aware of those features of other, less effective, dialogue types so that they can avoid falling into those traps. dialogic pedagogy is of lesser quality when it is in fact monologic and teacher-directed, when it is more conversational ideas-sharing without criticality, and when it is strongly adversarial without collaboration or reflection. these dialogue types will fail to provide the most beneficial classroom experience. teachers should be accountable for how effective their teaching is to enable all students to participate, succeed, and excel. references alexander, r. j. 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(2015). the role of dialogue in philosophy for children. in l. b. resnick, c. s. c. asterhan, & s. n. clarke (eds.), socialising intelligence through academic talk and dialogue. aera. vaish, v. (2008). interactional patterns in singapore’s english classrooms. linguistics and education, 19(4), 366-377. van der veen, c., de mey, l., van kruistum, c., & van oers, b. (2017). the effect of productive classroom talk and metacommunication on young children’s oral communicative competence and subject matter knowledge: an intervention study in early childhood education. learning and instruction, 48, 14-22. vygotsky, l. s. (1978). mind in society: the development of higher psychological processes. harvard university press. wangru, c. (2016). on teacher talk from the perspective of dialogue theory. cross cultural communication, 15(5), 38-46. wegerif, r. (2020). introduction to the theory of dialogic education. in n. mercer, r. wegerif, & l. major (eds.), the routledge international handbook of research on dialogic education. routledge. wegerif, r., & scrimshaw, p. (1997). computers and talk in the primary classroom. multilingual matters. wells, g. (1999). dialogic inquiry: towards a sociocultural practice and theory of education. cambridge university press. wilkinson, i. a. g., reznitskaya, a., bourdage, k., oyler, j., glina, m., drewry, r., nelson, k. (2017). toward a more dialogic pedagogy: changing teachers’ beliefs and practices through professional development in language arts classrooms. language and education, 31(1), 65-82. wilkinson, i. a. g., soter, a. o., & murphy, k. p. (2010). developing a model of quality talk about literary text. in m. g. mckeown & l. kucan (eds.), bringing reading researchers to life: essays in honor of isabel l. beck. guilford press. young, r. (1991). critical theory and classroom talk. multilingual matters. address correspondences to: ben kilby monash university, department of education, melbourne, australia email: benjamin.kilby@monash.edu http://www.intranet.ebc.edu.mx/.../aprendizaje_colaborativo_130212.pdf http://www.methodenpool.uni-koeln.de/koopunterricht mailto:benjamin.kilby@monash.edu where are we now: effect-studies and the rise of diversity in philosophy for children analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 47 where are we now? effect-studies and the rise of diversity in philosophy for children pieter mostert “i like the scientific spirit—the holding off, the being sure but not too sure, the willingness to surrender ideas when the evidence is against them: this is ultimately fine—it always keeps the way beyond open—always gives life, thought, affection, the whole man, a chance to try over again after a mistake—after a wrong guess.” -walt whitman et me start with a lengthy quotation from lipman’s manifesto “where we are now” (lipman, 1986), claiming that enough research has been done to assert that philosophy for children1 has a positive effect on ‘higher order thinking’. 35 years later, i want to add a question mark and ask, “where are we now?” in my attempt to answer this question, i will focus on three issues that have been raised over the years and that keep returning in conversations about whether, as an international community, we are doing the research we should do: (1) although commonly named ‘philosophy for children’, there is a wide variety in the actual ‘programmes’ that students are involved in; (2) in most effect-studies only a rudimentary description is given of the actual teaching and learning activities; (3) there is a wide variety in understandings of philosophy. a critical analysis of these issues leads me to a set of recommendations for effect-studies in the near future.2 back to 1986 in 1986 matthew lipman opened his overview of “where we are now” with a manifesto: the national assessment of educational progress has urged that ‘higher order thinking skills’ of american students be systematically and significantly strengthened. likewise, the rockefeller commission on the humanities has emphasized that elementary and secondary education must focus upon the building of conceptual skills and must simultaneously intensify and enrich student awareness of our cultural heritage. the philosophy for children program helps meet both these needs by fostering the improvement of reasoning skills, starting with the early elementary grades, and by having children engage in logical dialogue with regard to such traditional philosophical concepts as ‘right’, ‘fair’, ‘good’ and ‘true’. 1for lipman, “philosophy for children” refers to the programme as developed at his institute for the advancement of philosophy for children (iapc) at montclair state university. in this article i use it as a generic term. 2 in this article i focus on effect-studies of the cognitive domain, because the outcomes of these studies are commonly used as the evidence that philosophy for children brings clear benefits for the students involved. l analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 48 the success of philosophy for children in meeting these objectives is reported upon here. its effectiveness as a tool for improving various aspects of cognitive performance, including reasoning ability and ideational creativity, is evidenced on a variety of measures of skills. ‘higher order thinking’ is confirmed as being not only a definite feature of early childhood cognition, but also as one that can be taught by this particular method. improvements in academic performance, moreover, suggest that the program is indeed a vital component of humanities education. furthermore, the improvements generated in reasoning by way of philosophical inquiry are shown to have their impact ‘across the disciplines’ at an early age. (p. 32) the success of the philosophy for children programme the international community has embraced lipman’s manifesto. there is a widely received view, that by now enough research has been done in order to claim that philosophy for children has a positive effect on the cognitive abilities across the disciplines. tricky and topping summarise this view in their systematic review of research: “unlike many educational methods, p4c has relatively good quality and quantity of evidence for effectiveness” (trickey and topping, 2004, p. 377). the acronym p4c—currently replaced by p4wc, emphasising the ‘for’ and the ‘with’ equally—is understood to refer to the philosophy for children “programme”. effect-studies focus on the “effectiveness of philosophy for children programmes”; see for example yan, walters, wang and wang (2018). this way of speaking is not so much of a problem in a single study: “the programme” refers to the intervention as described in the research report. but what if a good number of reports show evidence of effectiveness, but refer to interventions which display a wide variety in the content and implementation of “the programme”? what can we conclude then? the introduction of a philosophy for children programme in a school is a complex intervention. it consists of a whole ‘package’ of changes in the usual routines of a particular school: new study materials, new learning activities, new classroom arrangements, new kinds of interaction among students and between students and teachers, new teachers or newly trained teachers, presence of researchers and visitors from other schools, interviews, and questionnaires, preand post-tests, newsletters, and social media posts for sharing experiences. philosophical dialogues don’t end at the end of the class. the introduction of philosophy for children creates a web of changes, of which some will have a bigger impact than others, depending on the specific context of a particular school. in this multitude of changes, it is not more than reasonable to ask the question: what is it that makes philosophy for children ‘effective’? today’s reality is that there is a wide variety of views and practices, and that only a minor part of these practices is covered by matthew lipman’s description in 1986, quoted above, that we facilitate “logical dialogue(s) with regard to traditional philosophical concepts”. over the years, the emphasis on formal reasoning skills (as shown and practised in lipman’s harry stottlemeier’s discovery) has shifted towards a broader approach of communicating, questioning and (higher order) thinking skills. this development in the international community of philosophy for children can be characterised as a shift of focus from drawing inferences to constructing arguments. so far, this has not led to a new kind of homogeneity of practice, as i will demonstrate later. for effect-studies the absence of such a analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 49 homogeneity constitutes a problem in the case of comparing studies which measure a certain effect but refer to different practices (‘interventions’), which have caused this effect. measuring effectiveness overall, there were only a few high-quality studies that fulfil the indicators of quality in this study to support the effectiveness of p4c. therefore, there is still much room for research to shed light on stronger evidence about the effectiveness of the programme. (ventista, 2017, p. 459) two obstacles ventista’s “stronger evidence” is within reach when we are able to solve two issues. one has already been mentioned above: the variety of what students are actually doing under the umbrella of “the philosophy for children programme”. the key-question here is: what constitutes a philosophical enquiry? two different answers, each representing a widely shared view within the international community, can exemplify this variety. tricky and topping (2004) answer the question with “a routine classroom philosophical enquiry in terms of nine steps” (p. 369; for a more elaborate exposition of their view, see topping, tricky and cleghorn, 2019). mccall and weijers (2017), on the contrary, defend “the primacy of philosophy”, as they call it: the side benefits of practising philosophising, such as developing communications skills, listening skills, patience, tolerance of difference, and respect for others, could all be achieved in other ways. but we propose that the deep understanding of what underlies individual and collective human life can only be achieved by philosophising. it is our experience that internationally the emphasis in pwc [philosophy with children] has shifted from the core benefits of philosophising to attention to the side benefits. and we think that the loss of the primacy of philosophy in pwc is a huge loss for the children. (p. 91) the lesson to be learned here for future effect-studies is, as oyler (2019) recommends, to provide detailed information about, as he calls it, the “dosage” of activities: in which kinds of activities were the students (and teacher) involved and to which intensity? such information would clarify what in a particular study is meant by “the programme.” the other obstacle to achieving stronger evidence is the variety in training the teachers have received before they start facilitating philosophical enquiries: “the amount of training and experience of the teacher who applied p4c could influence its effectiveness. unfortunately, most of the papers did not include this information or, when it was included, they were always considered experts. thus, this variable was not analysed as a moderator” (garcía-moriyón, rebollo and colom, 2005, p. 16). so, we do not know how much of the measured effects can be attributed to training and experience, in comparison to the effect caused by the programme itself. we do know that when teachers have improved their own inquiry skills, they feel more competent and confident in facilitating the development of the inquiry skills of their students (see nichols, burgh and fynes-clinton (2017). fair, haas, gardosik, johnson, price and leipnik, (2015, p. 34) share the following observation: analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 50 additionally, the teachers who included the sessions weekly were excited to see the students so engaged and eager to share their thoughts and listen to opinions of others. the teachers who did not include the sessions in their weekly routine shared that they did not feel comfortable with the open discussions and felt a lack of control in the classroom. similar outcomes have been recently found by sindberg jensen (2020). in 2004, tricky and topping discussed this phenomenon under the heading of implementation integrity: the degree to which an intervention is implemented as designed. after an analysis of ten different effect-studies one of their conclusions is that “implementation integrity may be highly variable” (p. 374). the lesson to be learned here is that effect-studies should provide specific information about the training (and mentoring) the teachers receive, not only about what kind of training and how much of it, but—more importantly—whether and how it has changed their teaching practice. process and outcome reznitskaya (2005) takes us one step further. if we want to claim that a certain effect is the result of a specific process, it is not enough to offer a general description of this process. part of the research should be the systematic examination of the classroom dialogues. otherwise, the relationship between the dialogic properties of interactions and the individual gains in reasoning is being assumed, rather than established”. <…> also, outcome-type studies are typically designed to form an overall opinion regarding the success of a program, rather than to understand the underlying mechanisms of cognition. such studies provide little information about the particular components of p4c practice and their relative contributions to the acquisition of intended skills. thus, outcome-type research is ineffective for advancing our understanding of socio-cultural influences on learning and for providing p4c practitioners with specific, empirically-tested instructional strategies. (p. 10) she advocates the use of the “argument schema theory” [ast]: using ast as a theoretical framework, a p4c discussion can be assessed in terms of exhibiting various elements of an argument schema, including, reasons, counter-arguments, and rebuttals. this approach will help to make examinations of p4c discussions more systematic, methodologically sound, and grounded in an articulated theoretical orientation. (reznitskaya, 2005, p. 8) the programme and the test effect-studies rely on the use of one or more tests or assessments. different studies choose different tests. again, there is a variety within the international community of philosophy for children. is that a problem? not really, until yan, walters, wang and wang (2018, p. 27) observe: “specifically, those studies conducted in non-western countries have higher effect sizes than the western ones.” the authors present several possible accounts of this phenomenon, but leave it open to the informed reader to select the most likely one. the most plausible account, to my understanding, is the relation between the programme and the test. in the three main non-western studies (lam, 2012; marashi, 2008; othman and hashim, 2006) ‘the programme’ is the iapc analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 51 programme and ‘the test’ is the new jersey test of reasoning skills (see shipman 1983), a test which was specifically designed to test the reasoning skills as taught in the iapc-programme. in all other studies tests have been used which bear no close relation to ‘the programme’. in their meta-analysis, garcía-moriyón, rebollo and colom (2005) address this close relation: “the new jersey test of reasoning skills was designed as one p4c proxy measure. unsurprisingly, greater effect sizes were observed for that test. such practices [an intimate connection between what is taught and what is tested, pm] must be avoided as far as possible.” (p. 21). on the other hand, in the same study the authors conclude that “a serious obstacle to comparing the accumulated evidence of the past 30 years (…) arises from the difficulties involved in reaching an accepted definition of reasoning skills” (p. 15). given this situation, a number of effect-studies have turned to tests which are not specifically tailored to measure philosophical thinking but are widely accepted and respected. the meta-analysis by yan, walters, wang and wang (2018) shows that cat / cogat [cognitive abilities test] is the most commonly used test. one of the reasons for using such a test is that, if a philosophy for children programme makes a difference in the test score, and this is usually achieved within a limited period of time—in most studies the intervention is less than a year—one knows for sure that such a programme is powerful: it has the potential to raise the level of performance in cognitive abilities. strategically, demonstrating such an effect may be necessary for philosophy for children in order to be taken seriously, as a valuable addition to the curriculum and as new perspective on teaching. above that, using such a test will help to identify in which areas the performance has improved, for example: “all of the gain in the cat scores comes from the verbal subscale. there was very little difference between treatment and control groups in terms of quantitative, non-verbal, and spatial elements of the cat” (gorard 2015, p. 4). but we can’t deny that there is a tension between what’s asked and rewarded in such tests and the aims of philosophy for children. for example, in such a test one of the questions may be: “all questions have an answer. given this, which of the following statements is not possible? (a) …, (b) …, (c)…, (d) the professor discussed a number of questions which don’t have an answer”. the only answer for which the test awards points is (d), but philosophically speaking, the word that turns this question into a philosophical one is the word ‘possible’: what does it mean when one says that statement (d) is ‘not possible’? and is ‘having an answer’ not an ambiguous statement? do questions ‘have’ an answer? the question from the test could serve as a stimulus for a rich philosophical enquiry, but the students’ ability to analyse the different arguments for and against the ‘possibility’ of what the professor is doing is not an object of the test and is therefore not rewarded. “not under any thinking skills intervention” so far, effect-studies have been understood to be studies which assess the effect of a specific intervention in comparison to a classroom situation without this intervention. this is understandable, as the common context is that of a school in which a philosophy for children programme is newly introduced. the effect of this programme is assessed by comparing students who took part in the analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 52 programme with students who did not. briefly stated: the effect = ‘treatment a versus no treatment.’ there is, however, another type of effect-studies. in these studies, two approaches are compared, in order to find out about differences in effects and effectivity. this is the common format of research in, for example, medical treatments: is protocol or medicine a more effective than protocol or medicine b? in the realm of philosophy for children there are only a few of these effect-studies. a recent example is worley and worley (2019) on teaching critical thinking and metacognitive skills. an earlier example is othman and hashim (2006). interestingly, yan, walters, wang and wang (2018) have excluded this study from their meta-analysis with the following reason: “the study conducted by othman and hashim (2006) was excluded because the experiment’s control group was still participating in another thinking skills intervention. this study compared p4c to another thinking programme (the reader response program). thus, the control group is not neutral. the control groups in all the included studies were not under any thinking skills intervention” (p. 20). in a strict sense this may have been the case: the students in the control group were not involved in another programme of which one of its aims is to improve thinking skills. but in a wider sense, isn’t education by definition a “thinking skills intervention”? reading, writing, listening, memorising, repeating, answering—for a student it is hard to practise them without applying thinking skills. schools organise all kinds of learning activities which involve thinking skills, like improving reading skills, developing learning strategies, and practicing memory training techniques. all in all, it is hard to imagine a control group being ‘neutral.’ the lesson we learn here is that for an effect-study it would not be enough to provide a detailed description of 'the intervention’. it should also contain a similar description of ‘the programme’ of the control group. reflecting on the use of the word ‘intervention’, we can learn another lesson, namely that an effect-study should make its arguments explicit for the duration of the programme / intervention as object of the study. it may be that the effects of a longer delivery of the programme are different from the effects of a shorter version. studying long-term practices of having philosophical enquiries may also reveal specific conditions which are favourable or even necessary for a solid implementation and establishment of a philosophy for children programme. see for example lord, dirie, kettlewell and styles (2021), who report: the trial started in october 2016 with programme delivery from september 2017 to july 2019. <…> of the 75 intervention schools, after two years from commencement, a substantial minority (35 of 75 schools) were not implementing p4c at the expected level. of these, six did not implement p4c at all due to other priorities and/or senior leader turnover. the evaluation suggests that it takes time for teachers to become confident with, use and embed the p4c approach and this could have impacted the outcomes. (p. 6) understandings of philosophy “an accepted definition of reasoning skills” in 2005 garcía-moriyón, rebollo and colom envisaged that the international community would be “reaching an accepted definition of reasoning skills” (p. 15). we have not reached that point analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 53 yet, and it may remain a wish for quite a few more years. why? basically, because there is (and will remain) criticism from two opposing sides: any list of reasoning skills will be both too narrow and too wide at the same time. it will be too narrow because such a list will focus on individual reasoning activities. hence the popularity of “21st century skills”, with much emphasis on communication and collaboration. but, as these critics say, as long as we restrict ourselves to ‘reasoning’ and ‘skills’, our scope will be too narrow. isn’t philosophy about wondering, exploring, reflecting, and finding out? david velleman reflects on his life as an academic philosopher and addresses his colleagues in the introduction to his new book, “on being me”: academic philosophers who read this book will say, ‘but there are no arguments!’. let me be the first to say it: there are no arguments. there are only observations […]. for many years i thought the arguments were meant to convince the readers, but i found myself oddly unconcerned when few if any readers were convinced. i finally realized that i have all along been reporting on personal explorations. (velleman, 2020, p. xii–xiii) on the other side the criticism stands that a list of reasoning skills (and a fortiori critical thinking skills and 21st century skills) will be too wide because the listed skills are only for a part specifically philosophical. many are general, in the sense that they are practised in all kinds of other learning activities, from historical reasoning to coding for computers, from mathematical reasoning to chess. participating in philosophical enquiries may contribute to the development of these ‘general’ skills, but many other learning activities come with similar claims. understandings of philosophy and its impact in a thorough literature review of articles about the teaching and learning of philosophy in primary and secondary schools, bowyer, amos and stevens describe how they were able to identify ten different understandings of what philosophy is: (1) a foundational concept, (2) thinking—a skill, a disposition, a practice, (3) a method or process, (4) a tool or instrument, (5) a creative task, (6) inquiry, (7) search for truth, (8) non-dogmatic teaching and hence the emancipation of thought, (9) communal activity, (10) a way of life (bowyer, amos and stevens, 2020, p. 41). the authors demonstrate how these views are embedded in specific educational practices. in a second literature review the authors apply the same method to all the answers of the question “what does philosophy do?”. they focus on the claims in the literature about the impact of philosophy in the classroom and show how these claims can be categorised in two distinct types: the first claim is that philosophy improves academic and cognitive abilities, where the idea of ‘cognition’ is captured by forms of reasoning that can be tested and measured. the evidence for improvement in academic and cognitive abilities takes the form of iq scores, cognitive abilities test (cat) and school academic assessments, including normreferenced tests of reading, reasoning, and other curriculum-related assessments. the second claim is that engaging with the world philosophically promotes the art of living well together. it is argued that philosophical engagement is a collaborative endeavour, aimed at cultivating understanding through respectful interactions that are open to exploring, questioning and challenging aspects of the world. (bowyer, amos and stevens, 2021, p. 71) analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 54 the authors mention a number of tests which can be used to substantiate claims of the first type. some of them have been discussed here. regarding the claims of the second type, the authors’ view is that “the evidence for this work of philosophy is based on testimony from teachers, principals, parents and students themselves.” (bowyer, amos and stevens, 2021, p. 74) few attempts have been made to create a theoretical model for ‘philosophical engagement’ per se. one of them is the phd thesis by rondhuis (2005), which is devoted to the design and empirical validation of a general model of what she calls “philosophical talent”. this study is one of the very few studies which combine a thorough analysis of the philosophical activity, the development of a conceptual model and an extensive effect-study of philosophical discourses among children and adolescents. in her research project philosophical talent, the key-question “which features signify philosophical quality?” is answered as follows: six indicators for philosophical quality were distinguished, correlating with six thinking patterns or attitudes representing specific philosophical qualities or aspects of them. each indicator covers a group of linguistic expressions. these indicators are: 1. indecisive thinking, 2. openness, 3. tentative behaviour, 4. epistemic position, 5. reasoning quality, and 6. anecdotal quality. (rondhuis, 2005, p. 58) for a concise presentation of her research, see rondhuis (2006), also rondhuis and van der leeuw (2000). effect-studies in the near future in his presentation on “philosophy and the cultivation of reasoning”, lipman clearly stated: there are many ways in which philosophy can be taught to school children from kindergarten through high school. it does not have to be done the way we at the institute for the advancement of philosophy for children have done it, but we can only report our own experience.” (lipman, 1985, p. 37) the international community of philosophy for children demonstrates how philosophical dialogues can be done in different ways, with a wide variety of aims and topics. there is no reason to assume that this diversity will lessen in the future. we will have to live with it, but it presents a number of specific challenges to future effect-studies, as we have seen. the following recommendations are offered for further consideration. they should be read in addition to, not in competition with other recent proposals for future research, like reed-sandoval and sykes (2017, p. 223– 224). (1) effect-studies should contain a detailed description of both the intervention and of the programme of the control group. this should include detailed information about the ‘dosage’ of activities: in which kinds of activities were the students (and teacher) involved and to which intensity. under the umbrella of icpic, a special interest group on research should be created in order to draft a format for such a description. researchers complete it for their specific studies and add it to their reports. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 55 (2) effect-studies should be specific about the training (and mentoring) the teachers receive, not only what kind of training and how much of it, but—more importantly—whether and how it has changed their teaching practice. (3) an international initiative should be launched for the development of a common framework for the description of philosophical activities within philosophy for children. confidence that this can be done may be derived from other, much larger but nevertheless successful, international efforts to develop a common framework, like the cefr standard, the common european framework of reference for languages, and for levels of education the nqf, the national qualifications framework. (4) more effect-studies should be done outside the context of schools. part of the diversity within the philosophy for children is that it is no longer exclusively done within the setting of a school but is seen as a community-based activity; see lockrobin (2019). (5) more effect-studies should focus on non-cognitive effects, as they are particularly relevant within the understandings of philosophy as a creative task, as communal activity, and as a way of life (as described by bowyer, amos and stevens, 2020). (6) there should be a better balance between effect-studies focusing on effects in terms of general cognitive skills and studies which focus on progress in philosophical thinking specifically. (7) it’s time to move towards studies which assess the effects of long-term practices of having philosophical enquiries. the arguments for the relevance of a philosophy for children programme have always positioned such a programme as a permanent part of the curriculum. effect-studies which show the effects of short-term interventions do not provide much support to these arguments. it is time to correct this imbalance. acknowledgements i want to thank pablo lamberti, griet galle and the journal’s reviewer for their valuable suggestions. in my role as a ‘veteran’ i cannot write about philosophy for children without paying tribute to my late colleague karel van der leeuw. with him i attended the iapc summer school in 1983. there the first outline of our joint phd thesis took shape, devoted to the teaching of ‘doing philosophy’. in 1988 we presented it in its final form, the product of years of intense dialogues. a year later, we founded the dutch centre for philosophy for children. in 2015 karel died; i write this article in commemoration of his contribution to philosophy for children. references bowyer, l., amos, c. and stevens, d. (2020). what is ‘philosophy’? understandings of philosophy circulating in the literature on the teaching and learning of philosophy in schools. journal of philosophy in schools, 7(1), 38–67. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 56 bowyer, l., amos, c. and stevens, d. (2021). what does philosophy do? understanding the work that philosophy does: a review of the literature on the teaching and learning of philosophy in schools. journal of philosophy in schools, 8(1), 71–103. colom, r., garcía moriyón, f., magro, c., and morilla, e. (2014). the long-term impact of philosophy for children: a longitudinal study (preliminary results). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis, 35(1), 50–56. fair, f., haas, l., gardosik, c., johnson, d., price, d. and leipnik, o. (2015). socrates in the schools from scotland to texas: replicating a study on the effects of a philosophy for children program. journal of philosophy in schools, 2(1), 18–37. garcía-moriyón, f., rebollo, i and colom, r. (2005). evaluating philosophy for children: a metaanalysis. thinking, 17(4), 14–22. gorard, s., siddiqui, n. and huat see, b. (2015). philosophy for children: evaluation report and executive summary. millbank, england: educational endowment foundation, 45 p. lam, c.-m. (2012). continuing lipman’s and sharp’s pioneering work on philosophy for children: using harry to foster critical thinking in hong kong students. educational research and education, 18(2), 187–203. lipman, m. (1985). philosophy and the cultivation of reasoning. thinking, 5(4), 33–41. lipman, m. (1986). where we are now. thinking, 6(4), 39–50. lockrobin, g. (2019) relocation and repopulation: why community philosophy matters. in: fulford, a., lockrobin, g and smith, r. (eds), philosophy and community: theories, practices and possibilities. london, england: bloomsbury, 15–37. lord, p., dirie, a, kettlewell, k. and styles, b. (2021). evaluation of philosophy for children: an effectiveness trial. evaluation report. millbank, england: education endowment foundation, 125p. mccall, c.c., and weijers, e. (2017). back to basics: a philosophical analysis of philosophy in philosophy with children. in m. rollins gregory, j. haynes, and k. murris (eds.), the routledge international handbook of philosophy for children (83–92). london: routledge. nichols, b., burgh, g. and fynes-clinton, l. (2017). reconstruction of thinking across the curriculum through the community of inquiry. in m. rollins gregory, j. haynes, and k. murris (eds.), the routledge international handbook of philosophy for children (245–252). london, england: routledge. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 57 othman, o. and hashim, r. (2006). critical thinking and reading skills: a comparative study of the reader response & the philosophy for children approaches. thinking, 18(2), 26–34. oyler, j. (2019). methodological integrity: the role of philosophy in educating for complex aims. paper presented at the dialoguing democracy conference, galway, ireland reed-sandoval, a. and sykes, a. (2017). who talks? who listens? taking ‘positionality’ seriously in philosophy for children. in m. rollins gregory, j. haynes, and k. murris (eds.), the routledge international handbook of philosophy for children (219–226). london, england: routledge. reznitskaya, a. (2005). empirical research in philosophy for children: limitations and new directions. thinking, 17(4), 4–13. rondhuis, t. (2005). philosophical talent: empirical investigations into philosophical features of adolescents’ discourse. rotterdam, the netherlands: veenman, 213 p. rondhuis, t. (2006). philosophical quality of children’s thinking patterns. thinking, 18(3), 18–24. rondhuis, t. and van der leeuw, k. (2000). performance and progress in philosophy: an attempt at operationalisation of criteria. teaching philosophy 23(1), p. 23–42. shipman, v. (1983). the new jersey test of reasoning skills. totowa nj, usa: totowa board of education. sindberg jensen, s. (2020). the art of facilitating philosophical dialogues from the perspective of teachers. educational studies, doi: 10.1080/03055698.2020.1835612 trickey, s. and topping, k. (2004). ‘philosophy for children’: a systematic review. research papers in education, 19(3), 365–380. topping, k., trickey, s. and cleghorn, p. (2019). a teacher’s guide to philosophy for children. london, england: routledge, 179 p. velleman, j. (2020). on being me: a personal invitation to philosophy. princeton, usa: princeton university press, 91 p. ventista, o. (2018). a literature review of empirical evidence on the effectiveness of philosophy for children. in: duthie, e., garcía moriyón, f. and robles loro, r, (eds), family resemblances: current trends in philosophy for children (pp. 450–471). madrid, spain: anaya. whitman, w. (2019). walt whitman speaks: his final thoughts on life, writing, spirituality and the promise of america. ed. b wineapple. new york, library of america. prepublication in: the new york review https://doi.org/10.1080/03055698.2020.1835612 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 58 of books, 66(7), april 18. retrieved from: https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2019/04/18/waltwhitman-alone/ worley, e. and worley p. (2019). teaching critical thinking and metacognitive skills through philosophical enquiry: a practitioner’s report on experiments in the classroom. childhood and philosophy, 15(32), p. 1–34. yan, s., walters, l, wang, z and wang, c. (2018). meta-analysis of the effectiveness of philosophy for children programs on students’ cognitive outcomes. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis, 39(1), 13–33. address correspondences to: pieter mostert, dorchester, england. the philosophy foundation, london. email: pmostert@xs4all.nl https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2019/04/18/walt-whitman-alone/ https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2019/04/18/walt-whitman-alone/ analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 61 p4c and playfulness: are games and playfulness important for communities of philosophical inquiry?1 jason taylor “the very essence of playfulness is an openness to anything that may happen” john cleese n the summer of 2011—the third year in which eurekamp2 provided programming—i sat in the shade of one of the rare maple trees on the university of alberta campus, casually eating my lunch while 2 of the 40 or so children played in the dirt beside me. it was a wednesday of our third week that year—at the time eurekamp offered four weeks of camps for children in the grades 1 through 9; we welcomed nearly 150 children that year—and so the children had already had a few days to acclimate to one-another socially, to be encouraged to ask questions about a range of activities, and to really listen to what other children were saying. the two—one boy, one girl—were both 6 years old (our youngest participants) and were pensively pushing sticks into the dirt. then, as if it were obvious, the little boy said aloud3: noah: i wonder how people counted before there were numbers. abby: what do you mean “before there were numbers”? numbers are real! there have always been numbers. noah: no, god made them. abby: no, god didn't make numbers. they go 1-2-3-4. he can't make them go 1-2-3-5, so he didn't make them. noah: why not? god made godzilla, so he can make numbers go “1, 2, 3, 5”. abby: but godzilla is cooler than god. i mean, like, he wrecks cities and stuff… we do not have to look very hard to see interesting themes and genuine philosophical questions arising entirely naturally (for 6 year olds!) in areas philosophers would identify as metaphysics and 1 the author wishes to thank anonymous reviewers of analytic teaching and philosophical praxis for their helpful comments on earlier drafts; gratitude is due, also, to natalie fletcher, for her assistance with earlier drafts, and to the youth from brila who agreed to play at some of the eurekamp activities discussed below. 2 eurekamp was founded in 2009 by john simpson, rob wilson and the author; its last summer of operation was 2017. it aimed to merge the pedagogical approach to p4c developed and defended by the iapc with play and games. the result was a large collection of distinct week-long programs directed at youth as young as 6 years (grade 1) to as old as 14 years (grade 9); each five-day camp program had distinct themes which engaged youth, inviting them to take up various interrelated philosophical ideas. the highest enrollment eurekamp saw was 350 youth (in 2016). 3 these and all other names are pseudonyms to protect the privacy of the children involved. i analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 62 philosophy of religion: noah is clearly curious about whether numbers are necessary entities—he thinks they are not: they are created (by god); and abby clearly thinks that such a position is not possible. to support her objection, abby relies on an argument with unstated assumptions, drawing into question the extent of god’s omnipotence: because created things could have been created differently (one assumption), and because it is impossible for numbers to be ordered differently (another assumption), it follows that numbers were not created by god. though this interaction arises from noah’s independent thought during a lunch hour (which are informal and unplanned), its nature is typical of the kind of dialogue that arises from the planned activities and games featured at eurekamp. during later parts of the same discussion—which were not actively tracked—there was a playful contention about the greatness of godzilla as eclipsing the greatness of god with various appeals to features of god(zilla) that appeared to tip the scales one way or the other. in other words, they collaborated to present and evaluate various properties of each as candidates for establishing their implicit claims. the unfolding of this part of the discussion actually sparked our interest in responding to the assumption that playfulness and the use of games are unsuited for philosophical inquiry; we hope here to suggest that view is mistaken. it is by reflecting on experiences at eurekamp that we aim in this discussion to establish two related claims: first, that the features of games provide fertile grounds on which long term philosophical engagement can be fostered; and second, that the attitude of playfulness is a happy bedfellow for the attitude and dispositions that dialogical inquiry is designed to foster in both participants and facilitators. in other words, we hope to show how the incorporation of play—qua games and qua the disposition of playfulness—into various activities, approaches, and iterations of p4c promises to enrich the cpi experience. to the extent that this demonstration is plausible, it can be understood as an argument that games, play, and playfulness should be incorporated. to establish the article’s arguments, we will look at some of the literature on games (specifically that literature discussing the importance of rules) and playfulness (specifically that literature that presents playfulness as “responsive openness”) in an attempt to extract some features of those concepts which will help to theorize more carefully about the (admittedly anecdotal) insights drawn from eurekamp experiences. we shall try to draw both from the literature on the philosophy of sport, as well as the literature from the philosophy of education—including john dewey’s claims surrounding experiential learning and the “forked road of doubt,” as well as tim sprod’s more recent concerns about seeing the results of cpi dialogues applied to everyday life. games, the importance of rules, and philosophical engagement in this section we shall examine some literature on games to try to establish the claim that the features of games provide fertile grounds on which long-term philosophical engagement can be fostered. we shall start by canvassing seminal work by bernard suits who captures one central understanding of games. suits establishes that a game is defined by its rules in at least two ways: first, the aim of the activity, the purpose of the game, are set out by the game’s rules which establish the winning conditions; second, rules define the very activity in which participants are involved. in his words, “to play a game is to engage in an activity directed towards bringing about a specific state of analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 63 affairs, using only means permitted by the rules, where the rules prohibit more efficient in favour of less efficient means, and where such rules are accepted just because they make possible such activities” (suits, 1978, pp. 34). thus, for example, winning a soccer game requires scoring more goals than our opponent, and what it means to “score a goal” is defined by the rules.4 moreover, if we were to change the rules we would be changing the game: if we allow players to pick up the ball and run with it down field, the players are no longer playing soccer.5 importantly, the limits which rules place on players are embraced by the players for the sake of the game. no doubt competitors realize that it would be easier to get a soccer ball to some set point on the field if they picked it up; nevertheless, players accept those rules and do so just for the sake of taking part in the game. recent authors have called this feature the “autotelicity” of games.6 autotelic activities are pursued “as ends in themselves,” (suits, 1977, pp. 178) or, in other words, as “intrinsic, noninstrumental, self-contained enterprise[s]” (meier, 1995, pp. 121). we can illustrate how this discussion applies to eurekamp by examining one game, clayorama. clayorama—a game which is feely available on the internet—is played as follows: each participant is given an equal amount of modelling clay and instructed to build a creature of any shape and size, just as long as its construction allows it to be moved without falling apart. the creature is named by participants and is assigned statistics by an impartial party who is explicit about the rationale for the assignments made. thus, the more legs the creature has the further it can move; the more arms, more attacks; whether it has “ranged” attacks with fewer hit-points, or no ranged attacks but full hit-points; etc.7 children then pit these creatures in battle against one another. coupled with dice rolling (and a little luck), ultimately only one creature is left standing victorious. the losers are crushed with screams (literally) of agony (not literally) as the modelling clay gods (campers) flatten the creatures. the philosophically interesting aspects arise when eurekamp facilitators allow players to play a second round with newly created creatures. during this second round we allow children to make new creatures who will be assigned characteristics in the same manner, but we inform them that creatures 4 suits (1978, pp. 44-45) distinguishes between ‘pre-lusory goals’ and ‘lusory goals’. a pre-lusory goal is one describing a state of affairs without reference to the ends of a game. thus, a pre-lusory goal might be maneuvering a puck past a certain line, or running a certain distance as fast as possible (e.g., 400 meters); the lusory goal in these cases, would be, respectively winning the hockey game by outscoring one’s opponent or winning the race. 5 of course, there are stronger or weaker commitments to this second claim regarding the constitutive nature of rules for a game. on strong accounts, any change whatsoever (no matter the magnitude) constitutes the creation of a new game (even though we might be inclined to speak as though the game is the same); weaker accounts allow that only some rule changes produce new games (e.g., just changes in the ‘central’ or ‘core’ rules). for more on this issue, known in the literature as a question of “formalism”, see d’agostino et al. (1995). the author ascribes to the weaker view, though no claims made here depend on that stance. 6 see, for example, carlson (2013). a quick note that carlson (2013) addresses the nature of ‘play’ not ‘games’; the author recognizes the slide from ‘games’ to ‘play’, and makes it despite the fact that bernard suits (1978) has gone to some length to try to distinguish play and games in ways that show games are not a subspecies of play. while some of what suits says is interesting, it is pertinent to bear in mind the objections raised to this account (cf. morgan (2008) which strongly suggest that his line is too firm. 7 various rule versions can be found online. the following link has been cited as “the original”: http://www.portcommodore.com/dokuwiki/lib/exe/fetch.php?media=larry:gaming:clayorama.pdf. links to a full list of characteristics as well as a full set of rules for clay-o-rama can be found at https://boardgamegeek.com/boardgame/9300/clay-o-rama. original rules can be found in dragon magazine issue 125. http://www.portcommodore.com/dokuwiki/lib/exe/fetch.php?media=larry:gaming:clayorama.pdf https://boardgamegeek.com/boardgame/9300/clay-o-rama analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 64 will be randomly assigned to participants. so, even though a child creates a creature, they may (very likely) end up fighting the battle with someone else’s creation. though there are many adjustments to clayorama that might be made, this variant for the second round of playing often prompts an inquiry on fairness.8 in the six years that we have run this activity at least one child every year chooses to make a character that has a poor attack value, low life points, or little to no ability to move: they choose to make a character which suffers from some obvious deficiency. during cpi sessions, they reveal their reasoning to be (similar to) the following: stanley: well, there are 16 other [players], so it’s really unlikely that i will have to use my creature. if i get paired up against [my creature], it’s better for me if it’s weaker. and it’s really likely that i will have to fight it. and, i’d rather fight a weak creature than a strong one so i should make a weak one. of course, either because of the odds or because of the will of facilitators, creatures often do end up with someone other than those who made them, so playing the game nearly always results in some discontent, expressed mid-game, or in cpi sessions. here is an example of one complaint: hina: but my creature is terrible. it can hardly move and it has only one very weak attack; everyone else has way more. i don’t have a chance. i didn’t choose this creature and it wasn’t as fun this time. depending on the severity of the complaint, we stop the contest mid-game to address the concerns, which when distilled can be understood as a question about fairness. note though that the commitment to addressing the question of what makes something fair seems to arise from the child’s commitment to the game of clayorama (as defined by the rules) and the larger context of the activity of random character assignment. that is, it arises from the child’s acceptance of the game’s autotelicity. the goal of clayorama is not intrinsically valuable: maneuvering and rolling better than one’s opponent such that one’s opponent is the first to have his life-points reduced to zero is not something that has value in and of itself; it is not even something that makes much sense outside the confines of the rules of the game. yet, by committing to the playing of the game, children “buy in” to the game and thus are especially concerned with the lived experience of unfairness that arises when confronted with the task of playing with a deficient creature. the rules, and commitment to them, promise to set the grounds for commitment to p4c-style inquiry. (more on this in the next section.) 8 those with a philosophical background will notice the analogue to john rawls’ (1971) musings on the principles of justice. rawls asks us to consider which principles of justice we would accept, if we were to choose them from a position of self-interest, but where we are unaware of the place we will fill in that society. thus, he asks us to consider principles of justice from the original position, behind the veil of ignorance. at eurekamp, we put participants in the clay-o-rama original position of choosing how to build a creature, behind the playdoh-creature veil of ignorance—not knowing which creature one will be assigned. note that the choice campers often make to create a weak creature parallels the exact choice that rawls’ says the rational observer would not make from behind the veil of ignorance. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 65 engagement and dewey on doubt to deepen our understanding of the value of games for fostering engagement in cpi sessions, we can draw on john dewey’s “forked road of doubt” which we take as one way to understand the theoretical underpinning for p4c. in cpi sessions, philosophical questions arise from a point within the experience of the stimuli which can be identified as moments of “forked roads of doubt” (deans, 1999, pp. 16-7). here we allude to the first stage of john dewey’s (1938) five stage learning model of reflective inquiry, which suggests that educators provide experiences that see students i) experience some form of doubt, ii) offer tentative interpretations of the experience, culminating in a hypothesis, iii) (re-)consider the facts at hand for further clarification, iv) adjust the hypothesis formulated and v) test and apply the firmed hypothesis as appropriate (deans, 1999).9 for our purposes here, the role of doubt in this process needs to be emphasized. for dewey, learning begins when the agent is snapped from her daily habit; she goes about her day, expecting things to unfold as she has seen them unfold before. when sequences diverge from those expectations—when her non-reflective state is broken—she can interpret that divergence, examine it, and hypothesize about differences in ways that help her to understand it. as dewey says, doubt arises with the occurrence of “jars, hitches, breaks, blocks… [that occasion] an interruption of the smooth straightforward course of behavior” (dewey, 1949, pp. 315). ultimately, successful hypothesizing (in communities of philosophical inquiry, for instance) will allow her to modify what she expects, her habit, and thus learn from the experience.10 as we see it, in the story-approach to p4c which are typical of historical approaches (e.g., those using the iapc novels) the doubt raised is constrained within the stimulus-story. thus, children are invited to experience doubt but they do so one step removed from the experiencing subject—a kind of “second-order doubting.” it is not the child who first wonders whether she can love animals and eat them, but lisa; it is not the participant’s experience of the teasing—that visceral, phenomenologically rich experience—which prompts the query on its difference from bullying, but the fictional character, sam, from the picture book leonardo the terrible monster. in this sense, the doubt arises from an experience which is fundamentally grounded in the vicarious; it is a vicarious experience around which our discussion is based and from which it is drawn. and, while answers to questions prompted by stories are often linked quickly to the children’s experiences as they personalize the question, the source of the doubt and of the question is vicarious. any engagement with the question—however strong—seems then to have to combat the “once removed” nature it acquires from its source. the situation, we suggest, is notably different with the use of games and other activities as stimuli. in light of this discussion, games might change the p4c experience for children, adding to the wrinkles of engagement. first, an activity stimulus like a game has the capacity to move children beyond—or perhaps better, into—the vicarious experience. while with the story-based approach the 9 from our perspective the entire proposed model is one that captures the cpi process, with the question formation ‘hidden’ between steps one and two, and the inquiry captured by stages two through four. 10 this is comparable to what gregory (2007) says regarding the inquiry process. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 66 pertinent happening, which gives rise to the moment of doubt, is essentially a happening to someone else, with the activity-based approach children take part directly in, and are committed directly to the outcomes of, the activity that gives rise to the central question. the child’s commitment to the autotelic features of the game firmly grounds the discussion. they do not merely read about harry discovering (or inventing!) his rule; they do not merely witness a potential case of unfairness. instead, they invent the rule (or discover it!) themselves; they feel the unfairness it as it is evoked from the game to which they have committed. insofar as this is true, we can say that the “forked road of doubt” is a lived forked road of doubt: the experience of doubt is no longer vicarious, but felt and sometimes vividly (as anecdotes suggest), just because of the commitment to the activity from which it arises. admittedly, in the case of fairness in clayorama, there appears to be a spectrum of experiences. the child who is given the statistically deficient character (and perhaps the child who created the creature in question) will be confronted with stronger visceral feelings (generally) than those who did not. and, while those who face off against the poor character might share some of the discontent because of their capacity to empathise, it seems reasonable to suggest that they will feel the unfairness less than the slighted participant. insofar as this is true, it would seem that the experience is a vicarious one (to some extent) for some and not others. nevertheless, this spectrum seems at least in part to depend on the actual activity and how it unfolds. so, for example, if the creature creation process was riddled with randomness (as would be present were the counselor to assign statistics randomly) it would seem to be more likely to produce the required impetus in more (if not all) participants who had committed to the aims of the game. moreover, it is not clear that this concern undercuts the general point being made—namely, that there is something significantly different about the experiences (for some) which lead up to inquiry, even if it clarifies that these experiences themselves sit on a spectrum.11 one way to further cash out these differences is as follows: with the more traditional story-based approach it is often the case that children can be confronted with some dilemma while nevertheless unproblematically choosing to continue to read more of the story, ignoring the dilemma. they are confronted with an interesting point—invited to consider it—but are not obligated to do so. yet, with the activity-based approach typical to summer camp programs, the immediacy with which these objections arise is so compelling that completion of the game is often no longer an option: the very pursuit of the game itself is called into question and it cannot be completed satisfactorily without addressing the concern that has reared its head.12 while primarily a phenomenological claim about how stimuli are experienced, this lived doubt— or so we speculate—might serve to bridge the gap between what tim sprod has called “discourses of justification” and “discourses of application” (sprod, 2001, 155). discourses of justification are discussions wherein participants puzzle through largely conceptual troubles on an issue while paying 11 here i would like to thank jordan sifeldeen for insisting that i take these issues seriously. 12 of course, this line of argument reveals a pressing issue which needs to be held firmly in view when using activity-based stimuli: we are dealing with actual feelings as the impetus for philosophical discussion, so care has to be taken when employing activity-based approaches. thanks to our friends at brila—including their youth board—for reiterating the importance of this point. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 67 careful attention to the guiding ideals of dialogue.13 participants “attempt to redeem a contested norm, a highly abstract, generalized principle which, ignoring questions of application, can gain consensus” (sprod, 2001, 107). discourses of application, however, are those conversations that arise when participants take the conclusions of the former discourses and aim to apply them in the real world. with questions of application, children must begin to weigh how their conclusions might fit into less than ideal circumstances; that is, how the justification fits the real world, rather than merely the insulated atmosphere of the inquiry. living the experience which gives rise to a dialogue anchors the ensuing discourse of justification into the discourse of application. in the case of clayorama, no response to the question “what makes a game fair?” can pass muster without applying directly to the game from which it arose. if it fails to make sense of that phenomenon, if it does not fit with the “icky-goo” of the real-world particularities, the conclusions to the discourses of justification rarely have merit for the children. in the face of the objection “but clayorama was already equal when we started so equality can’t be what counts as fairness!” is a driving, central concern to participants that simply cannot be ignored when a child proposes that equality is fairness.14 the second way in which games can change the p4c experience arises from the muchemphasized role that rules play in games (in the previous section). rules create artificial structures— arbitrary confines—within which children are actors or agents. and, when agents actively flout those confines, or act in ways that reveal they have a different understanding of those confines, this gives rise to moments of doubt. flouting the rules breaks the propensity—or habit—that children quickly develop to act within the rules of the game: an opponent (or sometimes a teammate) seems to understand the confines differently, so differently that it is becomes impossible to carry on without addressing this seeming divergence in understanding. or, even more jarring, there are cases where others might simply refuse to accept the rules of the game entirely: my opponent rejects the presumed autotelic feature of the game. playing requires “buying in” to the game, thereby accepting the limitation of one’s own actions to the less efficient means of completing the task just for the sake of the game. without this, there can be no game at all. anyone who has experienced, in grade school perhaps, another’s active resistance to a proposed game can likely recall the disturbances produced as the resistor actively flouted the rules in play. with such actions, the resistor makes an implicit call for justification of the value of the game itself. in our experience, this is often the most engaging feature that arises from considerations of rules.15 13 sprod discusses two ideals, drawing from habermas: “[1] universal moral respect (everyone has a right to be included in the discourse) and [2] egalitarian reciprocity (there is an equal right to make assertions, ask questions of others, introduce new subject matter, call the validity of claims into question and so on)” (2001, 61). 14 this cannot be ignored in two senses: first, participants in a cpi are compelled to respond to the complainant just because the concept of fairness is up for debate; second, they cannot be ignored because the circumstances and properties of the game (i.e., its ‘autotelicity’) are also up for debate. 15 simpson (2013) references one such example of a youth at eurekamp who resists the activity that had the campers building bat houses. the off-hand comments, which rejected the value of the activity, grew into a larger discussion about what obligations, if any, we have to care for the environment. (simpson, however, uses the example to illustrate the importance of a kind of inquiry—what we have termed ‘micro-philosophy’—which is typical of an informal learning environment.) analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 68 in both ways, we can see how the edifice of games helps to address a concern noticed by dewey— namely that we need to establish “conditions that will arouse and guide curiosity; [we need to set up] the connections in things experienced that will on later occasions promote the flow of suggestions, create problems and purposes that will favor consecutiveness in the succession of ideas” (dewey, 1933, pp. 56-7). these conditions, the rules, are the kind of structures that, because they require commitments by the participants to even have the game commence (i.e., are autotelic), lend themselves very easily to the impetus needed to drive dialogue to deep meaningful levels (i.e., bridge the justificationapplication gap).16 play and activity-based philosophy in this section we shall turn our attention towards the concept of play to explore its importance for cpi sessions. our exploration will focus on the disposition of playfulness, rather than the act of playing, to distinguish our discussion from the preceding section on games. the hope will be to draw out how infusing p4c with the attitude of playfulness can improve the practice of cpi with children. as an attitude, playfulness indicates a particular disposition towards the activity we are undertaking: given that we can play in a variety of situations (e.g., we can play at work), and given that we can work at tasks that might prima facie appear to be prime grounds for play (e.g., professional athletes work at their craft, despite that most of us play at them), it should be clear that playfulness is more a matter of our stance towards an activity than of the particularities of any activity itself. and yet, though playfulness is importantly linked to a desire to have fun, it is not merely this desire. instead, “it is a mode of comportment towards things, a mode of being-in-the-world which, although not utterly peculiar, is nevertheless different from our mode of comportment when we consider ourselves to be not playing” (hyland, 1980, pp. 88). when we are not playing, we toil, work, or strive; we rest or recuperate. each of these involves a stance that is in many ways different from being playful.17 one important feature of playfulness is captured by what drew hyland (1980) has called “responsive openness” (1980, pp 90).18 when we are “open,” we have an increased sensitivity and awareness of what might otherwise go overlooked. the open soccer player is acutely aware of the size of the pitch, the movement of other players, and the variations in the pitch itself, all of which are constitutive of how the match unfolds. new opportunities continually present themselves as others are closed off and he is aware of these opportunities to the extent that he is open. 16 participants can actually resist dialogue in similar ways as they resist games. this is perhaps more likely in informal learning contexts such as at summer camp programs, especially when participants are often signed up by their parents and do not have full understanding of the nature of the eurekamp programming. nevertheless, even those situations of doubt (perhaps better described as ‘active resistance’) can be harnessed successfully. one instance arose at eurekamp where one youth asked “why are we having all these discussions, anyways?”. what followed was a very productive inquiry session on the value of thinking with others, which even managed to change the resister’s mind. 17 of course, we are not asserting that these are incompatible with the attitude of playfulness. we can play at our work, for instance; and when we do, dispositions from both stances will overlap. 18 we echo, here, hyland’s insistence that this not be understood as a formal definition of ‘play’. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 69 the modifier “responsive,” however, indicates that mere openness is insufficient as an understanding of playfulness:19 instead, “i [also] have to be capable of responding to that openness in a way called for by the situation” (hyland, 1980, pp. 89). if possibilities present themselves but the soccer player is unable to take advantage of any of them, as hyland says, the athlete can hardly be taken to be playing the game of soccer (hyland, 1980, pp. 90). in fact, in that case, he is not much different than an alert spectator of the game. importantly for both our purposes as well as a general understanding of playfulness, it is this capacity to respond to the openness which grounds our success as individuals who play: “my success as a player, my very status as a player, demands that i respond as best i can to whatever possibilities my openness to the game elicits” (hyland, 1980, pp. 90). it is perhaps fruitful, then, to picture responsive openness as both an awareness of the challenges, puzzles, or queries with respect to the aim of the activity that we are currently undertaking, as well as a capacity (to try) to respond to the unfolding situation that one faces. each situation we approach playfully presents a task, a bar to be cleared, a marker to pass which implicitly asks us to confront it as we become aware of it and in relation to our overall aims. to see how this might apply to p4c, consider an activity from eurekamp we have dubbed imagineering. in imagineering, we task children with using all or some provided equipment to produce a novel or unique activity or game. typical equipment includes things you might (at least peripherally) associate with games—like baskets, tupperware containers, over-sized cardboard tubes, balls, and pylons—but also items which, at first glance you would not, such as bubble wrap plastic, a lemon, cardboard boxes, a household plant, and the like. after working in small groups to create their project, participants are tasked with finding a way to pitch it to others—a process which includes explaining the rules (if any), purpose (if any), and use of the items (if any). children then take part in the most popular creation. this activity has resulted in the creation of competitive games with clearly defined win conditions (like “wide games” resembling capture the flag or team-bowling20) as well as cooperative tasks where the groups struggle together to make something semi-permanent that is also a piece of art.21 the direction of the cpi following imagineering is dependent on the type of activities that the children make. thus, unlike clayorama (for example) we do not have preset themes we anticipate discussing after the activity. however, we can often predict them: sometimes the cpi explores whether a proposal really counts as novel (either because it closely resembles some other game already in existence or because two sub-groups created something very similar to one another); or the cpi explores the value of playing games in general; or the cpi explores how we can effectively articulate the aim of a game to others (which usually arises because the creators of the task had something in 19 in fact, mere openness might even be a detriment in some cases. consider, for instance, the issue of home-field advantage: presumably it is this heightened awareness which plays a role in allowing the home-field crowd (putatively) to influence play on the field in favour of the home team. 20 a “wide game” is one which uses a field or large space. these are games like capture the flag, soccer, or hide-and-go-seek. 21 we occasionally assign to groups labels or roles with primary and secondary objectives that need to be fulfilled in the creation of the novel item. thus, one group might be “capitalists”, another “engineers”, or another “pacificists”. this, obviously, changes the approach and results fairly significantly. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 70 mind when relaying it, but that something was not properly conveyed, which lead to something dramatically different than intended); or, finally—given the way the groups may have worked or failed to work together—it has prompted a larger dialogue about teamwork and leadership. it should be clear that imagineering provides ripe grounds for fostering and exercising the disposition of playfulness. when presented with a pool noodle, a house plant, and medium-sized tupperware bin, for example, a child is asked to have an increased sense of openness to these objects, to her group’s suggestions, and even to her surroundings. she is asked to be creative in how these might be implemented in the fulfillment of the task she has been given, including how the very nature of the task might be interpreted. moreover, the group’s success at advocating for the game or task that they have created hinges on their capacity to capitalize on their own openness to the objects, presenting them in a novel and compelling light to others. and, the task’s successful presentation depends on the openness of others to the proposal that each group puts forward. playfulness, as a disposition adopted during the period when the stimulus is experienced, is crucial. we should, however, look beyond the importance of the stimuli as a source of playfulness to consider its role as an attitude during a cpi dialogue. in brief, we want to suggest that playfulness qua responsive openness is a characteristic which, when it is embodied, can be very beneficial to the cpi for both participants as well as facilitators. broadly speaking, one larger purpose of implementing the cpi is to foster in participants a set of dispositions related to thinking. consider just two authors on the issue: lipman (1991, pp. 15-25) speaks of the cpi as fostering creative and critical thinking in a shared social context with a special interest in developing higher-order thinking skills, whereas sprod (2001, pp. 21-43) speaks of using the cpi to develop the five aspects of reasonableness, including critical, creative, committed, contextual and embodied thinking. for both, successful development of the respective skills requires dialogue with other thinkers: in dialogue with others, children are able to engage with ideas, arguments, and perspectives to which they might otherwise not have had access. sometimes they are even able to think through questions and issues which they would not have been able to think through on their own.22 to be playful in a cpi is to be responsively open to the content of the dialogue. it would be to see examples, arguments and perspectives presented by others in the dialogue as salient or important in ways that other mind-sets (e.g., one of work) might prevent. to be playful would be to view the content of each person’s contributions as presenting a challenge, task, or bar to be considered and addressed; to be worked with and built upon; to be assessed and represented. each sets some standard; and, as players in the dialogue it is our task to meet that challenge in ways that are consistent with achieving the goal of the inquiry, determining reasonable belief. thus, success as a participant in the dialogue requires that we respond in the best ways possible, insofar as those challenges are ones which somehow contribute to determining what is most reasonable to believe. in this light, children should aim to advance the dialogue by taking those examples, stances, and proposals as serious attempts to examine the quality of the position(s) under consideration in our mutual pursuit of reasonable belief. 22 lev vygotsky (1962) labels this conceptual space the ‘zone of proximal development’. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 71 we can see responsive openness in the following cpi session, which followed a session of imagineering. during that activity, one group of children created a fictional machine called ‘the upcycler’ which received the most votes for the best creation. that machine “takes recycling and makes something new”.23 as the children considered their reasons for their votes, the conversation turned to discussion of the criterion for their choices. emily: well i chose the upcycler because there’s never been a machine that can recycle things like this […] and it could be possible [… to make] in 20 years. […] it’s a good reason to make it! it’s a good cause. facilitator: okay so for you it’s not just that it’s innovative, it’s that it’s, one, the most possible and, two, the best cause. thank you! you can pick someone else to speak. […] marie-eve: i chose the upcycler as well because with all the other inventions, it’s just convenient. it’s convenient for the consumer, the person buying it, but it’s only for that one person and it doesn’t actually contribute to something bigger than just that one person using it. facilitator: so, for you what makes it stand out from all the other inventions is that it is for a bigger cause than just the one consumer’s convenience. salman: hmm... well now i changed my mind... i am choosing the upcycler now too because i agree with emily and marie-eve, and because i can do upcycling too so i know it is possible.24 in this instance, salman is responsively open to the contributions of emily and marie-eve to such an extent that their contributions are legitimate answers to the question of which invention is the best. these are so legitimate in fact that when coupled with his genuine commitment to the discovering reasonable belief he is persuaded to change his own view (presumably reevaluating the weight or force of his own reasons) about what counts as best. for p4c facilitators, playfulness can also serve a useful role as they strive to gain insight into the over-arching process of the dialogue.25 during facilitator trainings on successful dialogue, one point stressed at eurekamp is that facilitators are not always able—at first pass at least—to discern what a child intends by her comment or to perceive how her contribution fits into the overall structure. it might be, for instance, that she is not really answering the question; instead, she is recounting an anecdote. however, as often happens in dialogue with all ages (not just the very young), our initial impression of what is being said or of how some contribution fits into the overall scope of the dialogue, can be 23 the dialogue which follows was recorded by friends at brila, who agreed to run the activity and share the results for this chapter. 24 in fact, as this dialogue progressed the discussion became so complex, with a number of competing incompatible criteria to which the children appealed, that eventually all the children’s votes were moved off their original placements. 25 we distinguish the participant role from the facilitator role roughly along these lines. the participant strives primarily to add content in an attempt to answer the question and learn what is reasonable to believe. the facilitator, on the other hand, focuses her contributions on the process—clarifying contributions, connecting participants, asking for reasons, etc. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 72 mistaken. an attitude of responsive openness would combat the inclination that some facilitators and participants have to shut down or discount proposals of this nature. it would encourage a view that takes each contribution to be a candidate for serious consideration as an attempt to advance the conversation. and, while some will eventually be ruled out, discarded, or deemed to be off topic, the attitude that helps to lend these prima facie plausibility is one that p4c facilitators ought to have. alternatively, a facilitator who is responsively open to the dialogue finds herself more willing to follow the discussion where children want to take it, rather than direct it towards questions of answers that she herself has already deemed worthy of acceptance or consideration. one instance of this kind of failure to show appropriate responsive openness to the dialogue occurred at eurekamp in the summer of 2013. working with a group of grades 1-3 attending eurekamp’s art-camp, one facilitator used the dot by peter h. reynolds (2013), to prompt discussion after over-hearing one child claim that he (that camper) could not draw. the story features a girl named vashti who laments a similar shortcoming: she is not able to draw either! encouraged by her teacher, vashti puts a simple dot with a felt pen in the middle of a blank page; the teacher asks vashti to sign the picture and then hangs it on the wall after framing it. vashti, inspired, explores all the different ways to draw dots—big; small; different colors; dots made of dots; and dots made by not drawing a dot, but by drawing everything but the dot. after reading the book to about 20 children, a dialogue started. as the conversation unfolded, the children began to talk about dots and different ways to draw them—including the controversial “drawing the dot by drawing everything but the dot”. as the discussion progressed there was some question about whether this ‘not-drawing’ both counted as drawing, but also counted as drawing a dot; the group sat in (what was perceived to be) quiet contemplation about this issue. then, the facilitator interjected in ways which were neither open nor responsive to the dialogue: she gently asked “can i ask a question? did you notice that the teacher asked vashti to sign the picture? [the children assented.] do you think that makes it art?”. here the facilitator proposed a shift towards a new question that, independently, might have been a great discussion question given that it asked the youth to assess whether the act of signing was a legitimate “art-making” criterion, but which had not registered as relevant to the children involved. this move changed the entire tenure of the dialogue to that point. from here the conversation became something of a forced reflection and interchange from the children. the responses tried to address the shift in focus, but it was clear that they were still hung up on the previous “non-dot drawing” issue—often voicing opinions about that concern in ways that were unconnected to the previous child’s comments, who herself had tried diligently to address the facilitator’s new question. of course, the insistence by the facilitator here illustrates a lack of playfulness—a lack of responsive openness—to the issue that was central for the children. given this, the children quickly became restless with the shifting back and forth of the conversation between topics; they seemed to find the facilitator’s requests to connect responses to the previous speaker a hindrance, given the bifurcation of the discussion’s focus. as such, the discussion fizzled as a direct result of the lack of the appropriate playful disposition in this instance which, were it present, might have helped the facilitator to engage in the topic that the children were themselves more interested. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 73 playfulness and philosophy as a “serious business” as a way of concluding, let us revisit the underlying assumption of the current discussion, viz., that playfulness and games are inappropriate for p4c. in light of the above discussion, we can see the sketch of a possible objection which roughly is that to include playfulness and games within an inquiry process—either as a stimulus or as a larger attitude adopted when approaching an inquiry question—is a prescription which invites danger. playfulness and games are not happy bed-fellows with the p4c approach, the objection might run, because they fail to take the cpi method as seriously as it should be taken. consider playfulness: to be playful in dialogue might seem to imply a kind of flippancy towards others and the content of the dialogue itself. as the objection might run, cpi dialogue is serious business: children are tasked with determining reasonable beliefs from among all the hypotheses on the table and finding reasonable beliefs is no playground undertaking; it is serious business for serious interlocutors. thus, playfulness is not for dialogue. there are other ways to express this concern. for instance, objectors might see the call for playfulness as a call for too much creativity. playfulness, as a free flow attitude inseparable from the notion of responsive openness, invites a sort of randomness from children. in the comic calvin and hobbes, when calvin participates in calvinball, he is playful with hobbes to the extent that they are open to the drastic changes and challenges that the other proposes while seeking to counteract that change to their own advantage.26 for instance, hobbes may run the football in for a touchdown and declare it as such, but is met with calvin’s clever retort that the rules dictate touchdowns be scored in alternating ends throughout the game; thus, hobbes has just given up six points, not earned them. hobbes, of course, quickly notes that winning the game requires having the fewest points—not the most—on tuesday, today. and so, the (so called) playfulness would continue. returning to cpi, we can see that this kind of creativity is not desirable in dialogue: we do not desire this kind of randomness, no matter how creative. we do not want to invite any and all contributions. instead, we require a more careful serious disposition than this type of playfulness admits, which bears in mind the ends of dialogue. thus, the assumption and coupling objections are pressing and need to be addressed if the current position is plausible. and we can begin to find a foothold by first noting that even if we accept the proposed objection, it does not extend so far as to undercut the points made about games which primarily highlight the usefulness of their autotelic nature and of the restrictions of rules, both of which promise to engage children more fully in cpi sessions.27 still, the objection itself presumes that playfulness is itself incompatible with a recognition of seriousness or gravitas. in our view, this assumption is mistaken. adopting an attitude of playfulness need not open the door to rampant creativity. an analogy here might be helpful: the athlete (professional, collegiate, or recreational) who playfully undertakes her sport need not be, ipso facto, 26 if you are unfamiliar with the details of calvinball see http://calvinandhobbes.wikia.com/wiki/calvinball; or, better, read some calvin and hobbes! 27 in fact, if games are played—that is, if they are approached playfully—we might even make the case that such occurrences are likely to make engagement even stronger, given the role that playfulness has in producing the phenomenon of immersion in an activity. for more on this, see hyland (1980). http://calvinandhobbes.wikia.com/wiki/calvinball analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 74 flippant with respect to that undertaking. nor, it should be noted, is she wise to give free reign to her creativity, trying any shot she can conceive of in any particular instance. though playful, she must seriously, and within set confines, consider all the options that her playful disposition makes salient to her; she genuinely weighs each possible response as a viable option to pursue in seeking a successful athletic outing. and, she does so with due consideration of the rules and purpose of the game itself. in this way, her creativity ought to be bound by the confines of game and thus limited from the problematic form of rampant creativity. without this recognition she would be being flippant, not taking seriously the standards for success at that pursuit; she would be being destructively creative. thus, while she might toy with options creatively, her focus is on making successful athletic moves with respect to those options which are realized through her playfulness. so too in dialogue. rampant creativity as a result of playfulness is not what is being encouraged in this instance. children must always consider the participant proposals on hand from the perspective of success in dialogue—finding reasonable belief. in other words, it would seem that flippancy arises from a sense of openness that is not at the same time responsive to the goals of the pursuit in question. it is with responsiveness that playfulness becomes something different than mere flippancy towards the act. thus, it would seem that those in cpi dialogue are only flippant if they flout the full sense of what it means to be playful. if they are merely open but non-responsive, then they are not taking the dialogue itself seriously. and, of course, inquirers who are open but not responsive are not uncommon. in our experience both at the university level implementing p4c methodology as well as in the setting of eurekamp, we have had very smart children who played the role of devil’s advocate, testing each idea just to see how robust it is, or how versatile another child is at accounting for the deluge of counter examples to proposals.28 but, again, these inquirers are open without the appropriate responsiveness to the aim of inquiry: reasonable belief. if all of this is correct, the implications for p4c in general seem to be that practitioners in traditional classroom settings can gain important insights from informal learning contexts that infuse their p4c methods with games and an attitude of playfulness. these additions promise to enrich the cpi dialogue experience in ways that will may perhaps generate more engagement on the part of children.29 28 the most striking case arises from the author’s practice in the university setting where one astute first year student, early in the year, loved inquiry sessions as a means to “play the game” of philosophy. but for him the aim of “the game” was not reasonable belief, because he took there to be no wrong answers (a common plight of first year philosophy courses). instead, he wanted only to flex his philosophical capacities on ideas (and perhaps others). to his credit, as the year progressed, his approach changed and he strove with the group to identify reasonable beliefs; and, he subsequently went on to be a very valuable facilitator at eurekamp for a few camp seasons. 29 indeed, if the forgoing is correct then the argument can be seen as one which supports the call for further empirical research to determine if the theoretical suggestions track expectations in the practical unfolding of the program. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 75 references carlson, chad. (2013). “exploring the depths of play: re-calibrating metaphysical descriptions and re-conceptualizing sources of value.” sport, ethics and philosophy, 7(3): 342-355. d’agostino, f., fraleigh, w. and morgan, w. (1995). philosophical inquiry in sport, (2nd ed.). champaign: human kinetics. deans, thomas. (1999). “service-learning in two keys: paulo freire’s critical pedagogy in relation to john dewey’s pragmatism.” michigan state journal of community service learning (fall): 15-29. dewey, john. (1933). how we think. new york: heath. dewey, john. (1938). experience and education. new york: macmillan company. dewey, john. (1949). knowing and the known. boston: beacon press. dewey, john. (1980). the middle works, 1899-1924. volume 9: 1916. gregory, maughn. (2007). “a framework for facilitating classroom dialogue.” teaching philosophy, 30(1): 59-84. hyland, drew. (1980). “the stance of play”, journal of the philosophy of sport. 7: 87-99. meier, k.v. (1980). “an affair of flutes: an appreciation of play.” journal of the philosophy of sport, 7. lipman, mathew. (1975). harry. institute for the advancement of philosophy for children, mont clair state college. lipman, mathew. (1976). lisa. institute for the advancement of philosophy for children, mont clair state college. lipman, matthew. (1991). thinking in education. cambridge: cambridge university press. morgan, william. (2008). “further words on play.” journal of the philosophy of sport, 35: 120-141. rawls, john. (1971). a theory of justice. harvard university press. reynolds, peter. (2013). the dot. candlewick press. simpson, john. (2013). “creating engaging philosophy summer camps.” philosophy in schools: an introduction for philosophers and teachers, chapter 5. s. goering, t. wartenberg, and n. shudak, (eds.) routledge. sprod, tim. (2001). philosophical discussion in moral education: the community of ethical inquiry. routledge press. suits, bernard. (1977). “words on play.” journal of the philosophy of sport, 4(1): 117-131. suits, bernard. (1978). the grasshopper: games, life and utopia. university of toronto press. vygotsky, lev. (1962). thought and language. cambridge, ma: mit press wartenberg, thomas. (2007). thinking on screen: film as philosophy. new york/london, routledge. wartenberg, thomas. (2009). big ideas for little kids: teaching philosophy through children’s literature. lanham: rowman and littlefield education. wartenberg, thomas. (2013). a sneetch is a sneetch and other philosophical discoveries: finding wisdom in children’s literature. oxford: wiley-blackwell. weber, barbara. (2011). “childhood, philosophy, and play: friedrich schiller and the interface between reasons, passion and sensation.” journal of philosophy of education, 45(2): 235-250. willems, mo. (2005). leonardo the terrible monster. hyperion books. wilson, rob. (2012). “collaborative inquiry out of school: philosophy boot camp, or the endless summer?”, keynote address, federation of australasian philosophy in schools associations, biannual meeting, university of wollongong. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 76 worley, peter. (2010). the if machine: philosophical enquiry in the classroom. london: bloomsbury press. address correspondences to: jason taylor, independent scholar email: jason.dale.taylor@gmail.com mailto:jason.dale.taylor@gmail.com analytic teaching and philosophical praxis analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 80 philosophy for children, the uncrc and children’s voice in the context of the climate and biodiversity crisis susan lyle abstract: this paper is written in the context of my commitment to supporting children and young people’s voices in education and the importance of global education at this time of climate and biodiversity crisis. right now, a youth movement is growing across the world that is calling on adults to listen and take action for their futures. i argue that p4c has an important role to play in supporting teachers and children to consider the moral issues facing humankind now. i report on my personal journey into p4c and argue the case for p4c to support children’s voices and classroom dialogic engagement. i provide an overview of my research and work in two areas. first, working in wales, uk, i carried out research for the welsh government on their policy to make the 1989 uncrc (united nations convention on the rights of the child) statutory in schools. this work identified barriers to the uncrc in common discourses about children that could be summarized as “citizen in waiting” and the continued presence of historical narratives articulated by teachers that see the state of childhood as a deficit. these attitudes towards children and childhood impacted teacher capacity to support pupil voice, a central component of the uncrc and p4c. secondly, i report on evidence from the philosophy for children in schools project in schools in south wales. findings suggest p4c can be a catalyst for challenging asymmetrical relationships between teacher and student and can support pupil voice. the practice of p4c was instrumental in shifting teacher attitudes away from deficit models of the child towards positive models and valuing of pupil voice. over 25 years engaging with p4c in classrooms has convinced me that p4c has the capacity to animate the voice of the child and in so doing can challenge deficit models of the child held by many teachers. at a time when it is the young who are leading the way in telling adults they have a moral imperative to address the existential threat of climate and ecological breakdown, our very survival may depend on our capacity to take the voice of the child seriously. introduction s i sit to write this paper the united nations secretary-general antónio guterres is giving a major speech. he is talking about the climate crisis as the top priority for the 21st century, emphasizing how humanity’s mishandling of our planet’s environment has caused a collapse in biodiversity, spreading deserts, and oceans reaching record temperatures. guterres says: “humanity is waging war on nature. this is suicidal.” a analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 81 the catastrophic impact of climate change and biodiversity loss will have the most effect on future generations, and young people across the world are responding. in 2018, 15-year-old swedish activist, greta thunberg sparked a global movement of school-age students when she started her school strike for climate outside the swedish riksdag (parliament). by march 2019, her weekly vigil had inspired a growing international movement when more than one million strikers took part in over 2,200 strikes organized in 125 countries across the globe. in the un general assembly last year, she spoke for youth and in the bbc reith lectures of 2020 mark carney, former governor of the bank of england and before that canada, quoted greta: you’ve stolen my dreams and my childhood with your empty words and yet i am one of the lucky ones. people are suffering, people are dying, entire ecosystems are collapsing, we are in the beginning of a mass extinction and all you can talk about is money and fairy tales of eternal economic growth. how dare you. we will not let you get away with this, right here, right now, is where we draw the line. the world’s waking up and change is coming whether you like it or not. greta has inspired children and young people (cyp) to issue political and ethical challenges to adults as they raise questions around our duty to stop human-induced climate change and loss of biodiversity. they call for intergenerational justice and want us to examine concepts such as equality, human rights, collective rights and the historical responsibilities for climate change, all of which are grist to the mill for p4c practitioners. i will argue that at this time of climate and biodiversity crisis, young people need the opportunity to engage in p4c to learn how to enquire together into this most important issue for their future. i believe p4c has an important role to play in supporting cyp to consider the climate and biodiversity crisis and examine the moral issues facing humankind as a result (lyle, 2018). this brings me to my focus for this veteran’s edition. my work in p4c since 1996 includes research that suggests there are many barriers to cyp being listened to and taken seriously which i discuss in this paper. however, there have also been important steps in the right direction since the united nations convention on the rights of the child (uncrc) (1989). this international vision of children as human beings with rights, fully worthy of the moral and intellectual respect due persons, requires society to re-examine its responsibilities towards them and reflects the expectation that changing the legal status of this group will lead to a change in our moral attitudes towards cyp. the uncrc provides a sound articulation of the rights of the child informed by a model of the child as agentic and competent. a key barrier to the acceptance and implementation of the uncrc is the perceived differences between children and adults in relations of power, a topic that has grown in interest and importance in p4c in recent years. if teachers are to see children as social actors and participants whose opinions are valid and important, they need to see children as complex, socially constructed beings (kennedy, 2006; macnaughton et al, 2007; james, 2007; stables, 2008; wall, 2010). i will argue that p4c is a pedagogic practice that can support the uncrc as it can show teachers children’s capacity for rational thinking and empathic engagement, essential if we are to listen to their voices. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 82 the discussion in this paper takes place in the context of wales. wales is the first country in the world to put the uncrc at the heart of its policies, practice and ethos and involves a paradigm shift in the status of children (freeman 2012). it presents the “citizen child” (doek 2008) who is entitled to consideration in his or her own right despite lack of formal capacity and political influences. according to the uncrc, adults should promote the best interests of the child and recognize that this will be different in different cultural contexts (article 3), but that in all contexts the child’s voice must be taken into account (article 12). implementation will depend on how politically and socially acceptable the rights of the child are to the adult population; unless it is firmly rooted in the social policy that the adult population supports, it will remain rhetoric. children, however, are not waiting for change as they call for adults to listen to them and take action on the climate crisis. my journey into p4c i first qualified to teach in 1975 and began my teaching life as a history teacher in a secondary school in the uk (age range 11-18). i have also taught in further education and been an advisory teacher for english as an additional language and intercultural education. in 1985, i established a development education centre in wales where i led a team of ten to develop curriculum materials on global education. in 1990, i joined the university as a teacher educator until retirement in 2012. throughout my career i have had two key interests. first, how to develop pedagogy capable of engaging students’ interest in serious global issues including social inequality, racism, pollution and environmental destruction. those of us working in global education are not only interested in curriculum content, however, we also want students to effectively acquire the skills, attitudes and values relevant to “living responsibly in a multicultural, interdependent world” (fisher and hicks, 1985:8). secondly, my interest focused on how to challenge the institutionalized asymmetrical relationship that traditionally exists between adults and children in school, where the teacher’s voice is valued over the child’s. i identify power relationships between teachers and learners as a major stumbling block to genuine dialogue in classrooms. i sought to provide opportunities for children to talk, and for their voices to be taken seriously. the pedagogy of global education emphasizes collaborative and cooperative learning approaches that i had incorporated into curriculum materials (see, for example, lyle and roberts, 1987) and i decided to research my own practice and completed a phd in education entitled: ‘how children, aged 9-11 make meaning through talk’ (lyle, 1998). as i was engaged in my phd, in 1996 i attended a workshop introducing philosophy for children at a world studies conference. i was intrigued and wanted to know more. i decided to train as a p4c practitioner with sapere in the uk and completed levels 1-3 over the next 2 years whilst practicing p4c in primary classrooms. i extended my phd data collection to include p4c. i collected data from nine classes of children (aged 9-11) engaged in p4c. my analysis of the children’s collaborative talk in the whole class setting of the community of enquiry changed my understanding of whole class teaching. p4c moved dialogue in classrooms from monologic to dialogic and privileged the children’s rather than the teacher’s voice. p4c had given me access to an approach which can successfully challenge the role of teacher as sole authority in the classroom. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 83 i was consequently drawn to lipman’s (1988) proposal that serious thought, helped by serious discussion, is the way in which children or adults can adapt to living in a pluralistic society where change is the only certainty. i relished lipman’s challenge to the notion of teaching as the work of a skilled technician required to transmit pre-packaged information, skills and values selected by someone else. i embraced the community of enquiry (coe) that allows children and young people (cyp) to subject ‘knowledge’ to careful scrutiny, to question why their world is as it is and consider how it could be improved. lipman (2003) proclaimed that mastery of basic skills and acquisition of information is not enough: children need to understand concepts and develop the ability to analyze and apply ideas and principles. he recognized that this requires an effort which is emotional as well as cognitive. the affective and the rational therefore have important parts to play during enquiry. i was already committed to dialogue as an instrument of instruction; through dialogue, children learn how to argue rationally as they try to deepen their understanding of issues that they themselves raise through their own enquiry. like lipman, i was also committed to stories as starting points for enquiry and had used exercises to develop critical, creative and collaborative thinking similar to those found in the lipman manuals to accompany his philosophical stories. my research with small collaborative groups of children had identified narrative understanding as the primary meaning-making tool (lyle, 2000) and its power to reflect the structure of human lives and help us enter into the lives and experiences of others. i already knew the power of stories to generate imaginative thinking and empathy. i was excited by lipman’s views about the kind of thinking which goes on in the community of enquiry. his emphasis on the exploration of values and therefore children’s moral development resonated with my own interest in global education and the role of dialogue as a means to approach the truth. i had been exploring the roots of dialogic meaning-making as a concept in classroom practices and making the case for dialogic classroom practices as an approach to classroom interaction. i found p4c to be a dialogic approach with transformative potential for children’s learning. its approach to pedagogy enables teachers to value pupil voice and promote reflective learning amongst practitioners (lyle, 2008a). as i delved into the theory and practice of p4c, i realized i had found a way to explore moral values, so important in the context of global education, with children. as ann sharp (1995) cofounder with lipman of the p4c movement, suggests, an additional aim of p4c is to improve the world. she claims that its pedagogical tools can be used to help teachers educate for “global ethical consciousness.” sharp’s (1995) own investigations led her to highlight the importance of ‘empathetic imagination’; being able to imagine oneself in different situations and conditions now, in the past and in the future, and the ability to empathize with others. sharp claims that empathetic imagination can help us call our ideas and values into question. in sharp’s (2007) work, i could see the crux of the p4c approach: the creative use of imagination requires emotional understanding, whilst the exercise of critical reflection involves the exercise of rational understanding (for a review of sharp’s work see gregory and laverty, 2017). following lipman (2003) philosophers have called for ‘moral imagination’ (fletcher, 2016:141): the capacity to “visualise contexts they have not encountered and broaden the moral lens through which they approach and assess their lived experience.” through the analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 84 global climate movement, young people are already working together to develop an ethical consciousness, to articulate the kind of world they want to live in, and identify moral issues that affect us all. as i embarked on my phd, i identified a dearth of research on imagination. one explanation for this may be that imagination is clearly associated with the non-cognitive and therefore not regarded as relevant to serious learning. i found the work of philosopher kieran egan inspirational as he seeks to place imagination as central to our understanding of children’s learning. egan (1991) argues that the key strategy for developing the imagination is narrative. he claims that any event or behavior only becomes intelligible by finding its place in story. in sum, we are a storying animal; we make sense of things commonly in story forms; ours is a largely story-shaped world (ibid). egan also points out that our manner of making sense of our experience is profoundly mediated by our emotions. how we feel about, and feel during, the sequences of our lives are of central importance. so, the affective connection is also the story connection. whenever our emotions are involved, so too is a narrative, a story, or story fragment, that sets the context and the meaning. so, like lipman, egan sees the role of the story as fundamental to our sense-making (egan, 1992). furthermore, egan believes imagination to be a necessary and neglected component of rational, cognitive activity; for egan, “cognitive activity” that lacks imagination and affective components is, “desiccated and inadequate” (1992). egan (1983; 1991) explores the distinction made between reason and imagination in education, pointing out how they are erroneously seen as discrete entities. this division is reflected in a curriculum in which science and mathematics are commonly taken to deal mainly with reason, and the arts with imagination, to the neglect of the latter. egan argues passionately against this position and calls upon educators to take imagination seriously. it would be a mistake to assume that egan does not value knowledge, rather he wants us to recognize that there are a number of ways of `knowing’ the world. in schools, knowledge is most often presented as secure, certain, and therefore fails to encourage open-mindedness and understanding of other views. like lipman and sharp, egan wants children to learn to reason and become reasonable, emphasizing cognitive development and emotional intelligence. i could see that p4c was a way to harness children’s imagination to increase their understanding of the world, combining critical (rational) and creative (affective) thinking. in a coe (community of enquiry), participants should actively seek to understand each other’s points of view. concepts such as trust and respect for the democratic principles on which the community is based are actively practiced through the pedagogical processes built into the p4c program. teachers are required to treat the children’s views with respect. children have to take turns, listen to each other, ask questions, ask for reasons, challenge each other’s beliefs and ideas and be prepared to self-correct. in this way they learn how to live with pluralism and to see issues from a variety of perspectives present within the community. in considering what to do in an imaginary or real situation they come to understand the importance of exploring reasons for their ideas. over time, they become better at distinguishing good reasons from poor and, in the process, learn how to justify how they think and feel. p4c seemed to offer a powerful tool for helping children develop a greater understanding of themselves and their own world, as well as the global community. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 85 children’s voice having argued the case for the pedagogic approaches of p4c to support a curriculum that wishes to include the climate and biodiversity crisis, i now consider the status of children’s voice in school settings. as part of its commitment to the uncrc, the welsh government (wg) commissioned a review of the research literature on learner voice and with colleagues i produced a briefing paper for educators (lyle, hendley and newcombe, 2010) as part of the teaching and learning research programme in wales. we concluded that when genuine opportunities for participating in learning are provided, there are many benefits for children and young people and their teachers. however, as rudduck and flutter (2007:1) point out, the traditional exclusion of young people from the processes of dialogue and decision-making is founded upon an outdated view of childhood that “fails to acknowledge young people’s capacity to take initiatives and reflect on issues affecting their lives.” state school has bound into its structures a thick set of class-based assumptions about power and control which is deep-rooted and will be difficult to eradicate as they are part of the “takenfor-grantedness” of institutional life (ibid:10). therefore, although the benefits of pupil participation are well researched, making this a reality will require major change in policy and practice which the welsh government has set out to address (see lyle, 2014 for discussion of these policies). in sum, welsh national policy provides a framework for teachers and schools who wish to promote learner voice that should make the implementation of p4c easier. a key barrier to the acceptance and implementation of the uncrc however, is the perceived differences between children and adults in terms of relations of power. children’s position as dependent on adults makes it easy to impose the culture of adults on them. measures introduced by the welsh government will be meaningless unless adults accept their obligation to children and young people. teachers form part of the interpretive community who have the power to subvert meaning to their own priorities (torbin, 2010), and aspinwall and croke (2013) found baseline knowledge and understanding of the uncrc to be low. fitzpatrick (2013) argues that we cannot legislate for the removal of injustice—saying it should happen, does not make it so. this raises many questions about what is at stake in this call for recognition of children’s rights and how it is to be balanced with adult authority. answers depend on how one defines children and can be fraught with anxiety for teachers. recently philosophers have begun to problematize the concept of childhood that underlies traditional approaches to childhood education (kennedy and kohan, 2017). the ethical climate prevalent in schools impacts children; we therefore need to understand the network of rules or norms that sustain current attitudes and values (campbell 2003). research into pupil voice i was employed by the welsh government (wg) to train key education stakeholders in pupil participation to ensure that the uncrc, in particular article 12 (the child who is capable of forming his or her own views has the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child) is analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 86 understood and taken seriously by schools. during that training, it became evident that there was widespread skepticism about the wg’s policy and resistance to its implementation in schools. barriers to the implementation of the uncrc were identified during 12, one-day training programs with teachers, head teachers, local authority advisors, providers of continuing professional development, initial teacher educators and school governors. data were collected during the training for the purpose of evaluating the training program and included field notes by the trainers, documentary evidence generated during training activities and questionnaires completed at the end of the training. all the data were collated for reporting to wg and were examined to identify key barriers to the uncrc to help inform future training. it is worth taking a look at those barriers as they are also barriers to the adoption of p4c in classrooms. barrier 1: immaturity a key barrier is the view that rights for children are not appropriate. participants expressed the view that adults are in a better position than the child to assess the interests of the child. narratives that cast children as incompetent and too immature to be involved in decisions about their lives were sometimes legitimated by reference to article 3 of the uncrc, “the best interests of the child” to justify adult decision-making in children’s lives. this was seen to override article 12, which seeks to prioritize children’s voices. adults commonly assumed children are incapable of forming their own views because they are not old enough; therefore, age is a key objection to the uncrc in schools, especially in the early years and infant classroom (age 4–7). children are seen as ‘developing’ suggesting that developmental psychology has a powerful influence on educationalists, which limits their expectations of children. the assumption that children should be taught in a developmentally appropriate way that is assumed to fit the majority of children appears to constitute a major barrier to the uncrc. there is considerable evidence that under the sway of developmentally appropriate practice, teachers frequently assume children cannot exercise their rights as they are developmentally inappropriate (james 2007). furthermore, the notion that childhood is an apprenticeship for adulthood with the assumption that there will be “an arrival”, “an age of majority”, when the rights and status of citizenship will be conferred is commonly held (james, jenks, and prout, 1998). macnaughton (2005) likens the discourse of developmental psychology to a “regime of truth”, which was widely accepted by adults in our training. the dominant discourse of child as “citizen-in-waiting” is an attitude that works against the uncrc and by implication, p4c. barrier 2: narratives of childhood as well as a developmental approach to childhood, there was evidence that historical narratives about children were present in educators’ thinking and informed arguments about immaturity. the view of children as ‘innocent’ was expressed and used in argument for the withholding of knowledge from children under the guise of protecting them. adults were seen as gatekeepers who should protect children from information that they consider too difficult for them to deal with. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 87 in contrast, some children were seen as unruly and needed to learn ‘how to behave’ and be taught ‘how to be good.’ such children were regarded as potentially disruptive and subversive to the process of participation. both views of children as ‘innocent’ and ‘unruly’ can support the notion of adults as protectors of children and knowledge gatekeepers. this has the effect of shielding children from participation as active citizens and impacts on the provision made for them. a third objection to the uncrc was the existence of a given curriculum that ‘had to be covered.’ this revealed a tabula rasa approach to children, believing that it was the teacher who had to ‘deliver’ a fixed curriculum to children who would remain ignorant if this was not done. the requirement that children should have choice over topics to be discussed or that teachers should follow the children’s interests was felt to be in conflict with teaching a set curriculum. these expressed views suggest that many aspects of the welsh curriculum that prioritizes children’s voice will be seen as inappropriate by many teachers. it also raises the question of how we imagine, construct, or understand the ‘c’ in p4c and what this might indicate about society’s values and adult-child power relationships (john, 2003: 201). barrier 3: power relations teachers’ positions of power, authority and responsibility for children emerged as a concept in discussion of the uncrc. a key barrier to the implementation of the uncrc is the dominance of the teacher’s voice at the expense of students’ own meaning-making voices. the power relationship between teachers and learners is likely to be a stumbling block to participatory practices in classroom settings. the implementation of the uncrc was seen as a threat to traditional boundaries between adults and children. a key objection came from those who saw teachers as authority figures that should not be challenged. similar to lundy’s findings (2007) when investigating children’s participation in decision-making, training participants frequently made statements that made it clear that ‘adults know best’ and deserve to have their views and authority respected. participants expressed the view that many teachers are used to occupying a position of authority that has traditionally been exercised in an authoritarian manner and often find it difficult to imagine, let alone implement, an alternative approach. the asymmetrical valuation of adults and children and teachers’ conceptions of what is due to them as adults clearly influences how they respond to the uncrc. the children’s commissioner for wales also found evidence of this barrier: it is clear that some adults are confusing respect with fear and obedience, perhaps hankering after some bygone age when children were fearful of adults. it seems equally clear that many more adults are unwilling to think about how they might earn the respect of the young. they seem to expect automatic respect in a way that they do not from fellow adults. (ccfw, 2004–5) such attitudes do not bode well when children are pleading with adults to listen to them and take action to stop the climate crisis. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 88 assumptions and implications of findings from pupil voice training narratives of children as ‘innocent’, ‘unruly’, ‘blank slate’ or ‘developing’ limit children’s participation in society and are deficit models of the child and therefore unsupportive of the uncrc and by implication the practice of p4c. the implications of such views are wide-ranging, as dahlberg and moss (2005) point out, by protecting children from the world in which they exist or providing a pre-determined developmental curriculum, adults deny children their right to seriously engage in that world. the presence of deficit narratives of childhood is also widely discussed in the literature (for example in philosophy, kennedy 2006; stables 2008; wall 2010; in anthropology, james 2007 and sociology, james, jenks, and prout 1998; dahlberg and moss 2005). although the existence of the barriers discussed above is thought by the senior educators consulted to be widespread, they by no means represent the only views expressed (there were indications of different narratives of childhood that adults hold that could support the uncrc). the wg is aware of these deficit attitudes towards children: they [children] are not a species apart, to be alternatively demonised [unruly/disruptive/evil] and sentimentalised, [innocent] not trainee adults [citizens-inwaiting] who do not yet have a full place in society ... children and young people should be seen as young citizens, with rights and opinions to be taken into account now. wag (2004:4) attitudes towards children impact on classroom practice. the evidence from classroom observational research from the mid-1970s onward in countries all over the world has produced a consistent picture: schools and classrooms are full of talk, but little collaborative talk between learners (alexander 2005; lyle 2008b). it is generally accepted that what is now seen as a monologic style of discourse structure between teacher and pupils known as the irf (initiation/response/feedback) (sinclair and coulthard 1975) is a fundamental feature of all official talk in classrooms, constituting around 60% of the teaching/learning process. there is widespread agreement, based on a large number of studies, that the irf still provides the basis of teaching by direct instruction and enables teachers to stay in control of events and ideas in lessons. its effect is to emphasize the asymmetrical nature of relationships between teachers and students and the epistemological dominance of the teacher, something the uncrc and p4c seeks to challenge. the irf supports the traditional power relationships of the classroom which tend to reproduce a pedagogy based on the transmission of pre-packaged knowledge. dialogic discourse styles favored by p4c have to compete against this dominant form of classroom interaction. it follows that implementing a change from the traditional classroom to one that values dialogue is not a simple matter (lyle 2008a). against this background, i led the philosophy for children in schools project (p4cisp) in 64 schools and monitored teacher and pupil responses to p4c. i turn now to evidence from that research that illustrates the power of p4c to challenge asymmetrical relationships in classrooms. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 89 philosophy for children in schools project the university-led p4cisp (2006-2012) involved training all staff in 64 primary schools to introduce p4c into their classrooms by following the sapere level 1 training course (for information see: https://www.sapere.org.uk/). the primary schools are located in a range of different socio-economic contexts. in wales, schools are judged to be poor or affluent by the number of pupils receiving free school meals. schools in this study ranged from 6-48% free school meals and therefore were representative of schools as a whole. research into the impact of p4c was carried out by teachers enrolled on post-graduate degrees, either as part of their action research assignments (ma), their ma dissertation or phd thesis (munromurris, 2017). other research studies were carried out by seven teachers seconded from school to take up posts as research fellows for six-week periods and by one teacher who was seconded to the university for a year. each of these teachers engaged in collecting data from a total of 26 schools on the impact of p4c. in addition, an independent evaluator was employed for six weeks to visit eight schools to observe p4c in action and interview children (boyce, 2008). as the lead researcher, i also collected case study data from one school over one year and took responsibility for carrying out a thematic review of all the data collected. data collection techniques are mainly qualitative and include interviews with head teachers, teachers, teaching assistants and local education authority advisors; non-participant observations of p4c enquiries in schools; focus group interviews with children and preand post-testing of children using standardized tests. the entire data-set is therefore large and specific aspects of the research have been examined for the purpose of preparing papers. publications include a theoretical paper arguing that p4c is a dialogic pedagogy (lyle 2008a); investigation of leadership approaches in seven schools who have successfully embedded p4c across the school (lyle and thomas-williams 2011); a case study investigation into the impact of p4c on children who were under-attaining in literacy in one school (lyle and jenkins 2010), the impact of p4c on the development of pupil voice and participation (casey 2011), the impact of the uncrc and attitudes to childhood (lyle, 2014), the impact of p4c on a year 7 (aged 11-12) class and their teacher over one year (munro-murris, 2017) and a dvd to illustrate practice (journey into children’s minds, 2009). more generally, the research carried out by teacher-researchers set out to investigate the impact of p4c on children’s engagement in learning from the perspective of adults and children. data were collected using observation, interviews and focus groups. each set of data was analyzed by the teacherresearchers carrying out the research and reports were prepared. i carried out a thematic review of the total data corpus which informs the discussion that follows. my goal in carrying out an interpretative analysis of the wider data-set was to theorize the significance of the patterns emerging in relation to p4c practice. the research took place in schools that had embraced p4c as a pedagogic tool and were sympathetic to the uncrc. most teachers saw p4c as a practical way of implementing the wg requirement to promote pupil voice in the classroom. i report on just two themes that emerged from the data analysis as most relevant to the importance of listening to young people protesting on climate change: narratives of childhood and power relationships. both themes illustrate how the adoption of p4c can successfully challenge deficit analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 90 narratives of children and asymmetrical power relationships between adults and children identified earlier (lyle, 2014). theme 1: narratives of childhood many teachers who had implemented p4c embraced a participatory narrative of children as competent and agentic; they saw children as active citizens and wanted to support children’s practice as citizens of today rather than ‘citizens-in-waiting.’ a competency narrative has its roots in sociology that defines children as, “social actors who shape their identities, create and communicate valid views about the social world and have a right to participate in it” (macnaughton, hughes, and smith, 2007). teachers who articulated this view of the child are more likely to embrace p4c as a practice because it seeks to promote children’s democratic involvement in communities of enquiry. they wanted to consult children about curriculum and saw their views as both valid and important. findings from an independent evaluation of eight schools indicate that p4c can also be a catalyst for attitudinal change, for example, “involvement in p4c enquiries has helped me re-evaluate the way i see the children”; “[p4c provides] an insight into their [children’s] world and what it means to be young now”; overall, “teachers of the oldest and youngest pupils said that the experience had enabled them to see into their pupils’ worlds and to understand what it means to be a child or young person at this time” (boyce 2008). this was also found in a study of one teacher and her year 7 (age 11-12) class over one year (munro-murris, 2017). our research suggests the participatory practice of p4c has the power to shift teachers’ narratives of childhood away from the deficit narratives of ‘immature’, ‘incompetent’, ‘innocent’, ‘unruly’, ‘blank slate’ or ‘developing’ identified during training for the uncrc as discussed above, towards a competency model, which suggests it is an important pedagogical tool that can support the uncrc. teachers who accepted children as social actors and participants generally found p4c a supportive pedagogic tool. the actual process of implementing p4c in their classrooms was a major factor in supporting this model of childhood and reinforcing it; in interviews many teachers spontaneously expressed their “surprise and amazement of what small children are capable of” (boyce 2008). “my teachers have been surprised at the depth of thought of young children” (head teacher, james and watts, 2009). theme 2: power relations we found that teachers’ attitudes and relationships to authority were relative to their engagement with p4c. schools that had successfully embedded p4c over a period of a year or more held a different attitude to authority than that identified during the uncrc training. following mathews (1994), the concept of rational authority rather than authoritarian approaches to teacher/child relationships is seen as an essential aspect of behavior management in some p4c schools. for matthews (1994:123) children are, “people, fully worthy of both the moral and the intellectual respect due persons”; therefore, rational authority is based on respectful relationships between all adults and children in the classroom and school. it acknowledges a teacher’s responsibility for the well-being of the children in their care, acknowledging that sometimes they will make decisions on behalf of the child, but expect such decisions to be justifiable, as teacher-researcher brindley (2013) analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 91 found, “actions taken must be based on good reasons, which the children can understand and will benefit from”. extracts from head teacher and teacher interviews support this, for example, “we used to have a lot of behaviour problems; we don’t now. philosophy is part of the definitive drive to address the culture of the school” (james and watts, 2009). the practice of p4c challenges many of the assumptions that underpin traditional power relationships between adults and children and, by implication, requires that such relationships change. evidence of the capacity of p4c to challenge authoritarian attitudes and promote rational authority comes from the teacher and student interviews: “[in p4c] we respect each other’s views, and children know that the teacher has not got the answers – ‘cos we are very bossy aren’t we, as teachers – but not in p4c” (teacher, james and watts 2009). “in p4c i can express my opinion and the teacher doesn’t argue back” (student, james and watts 2009). this has implications for the quality of pupil/teacher relationships in schools. summarizing her independent evaluation of eight schools, boyce (2008) claims: “pupil teacher relationships were excellent, with warm, professional teachers and respectful, confident pupils ... it would appear that p4c will flourish where the overall school ethos supports its values.” many teachers were aware of the importance of being responsive to children through listening to them (biesta, 2004) and recognized the learning that comes from the practices engaged in, for example: “p4c has given me a framework, ‘cos i wasn’t doing it before, and i didn’t really like class discussions or group discussions. i didn’t, i always seemed to end up telling them off. but this way we follow the procedure and it just seems to work. it is quite, quite miraculous really. you just follow the rules and you, you won’t go wrong.” students also frequently made comments to show how much they valued p4c where they listened to others and were listened to. the following quotations from pupils are typical of their comments and are replicated time and again in our data: “the teacher gets to know me better in p4c.” “you can hear other people’s side.” ”[p4c] helps you to be more open-minded. [you] need to see someone else’s point of view.” “we get to know each other better” pupils talking, james and watts (2009) the research data strongly suggests that p4c provides a model that supports pupil voice which is valued by students and teachers alike and can be a catalyst for challenging asymmetrical relationships between teachers and those taught. conclusion cyp are calling on adults to take their fears for the future of our planet seriously. when adults fail to recognize the importance of young people’s lived experiences and concern for the future, they are unlikely to do this when children give testimony about climate change. work by fricker (2007) discusses the impact on people when they are not heard and argues they are harmed as a person and analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 92 experience epistemic injustice. therefore, despite the uncrc becoming, “the benchmark and rallying call” for young people to be validated as full human persons (wall, 2017:62), the reality is that young people continue to be understood through deficit discourses in much of society, including in many schools (lansdown, 2001). consequently, rather than being recognized as rights-holders with agency, young people continue to be understood as other and less than adults (lundy, 2007; freeman, 2012; fitzpatrick, 2013; munro-morris, 2017). consequently, the ideas and experiences of young people continue to be generally overlooked in a society that values adult over child (murris, 2013a). hope lies in the considerable evidence that: “the p4c movement is a way for adults and educators to act as allies and combat prejudices against young people” (vitale and miller, 2020:9). murris’ (2013b) work with p4c calls on teachers to develop ‘epistemic trust’ in their students. munromorris’ (2017) study found that the practice of p4c in the classroom offered a good opportunity to track changes in the epistemic lives of teachers and students. munro-morris (ibid) also found engaging in p4c supported teacher critique of their practice and beliefs about the child. p4c could therefore provide a real opportunity for teacher continuing professional development to support pupil voice. how we view the concept of child is an important concept to explore for adults and children alike (lyle, 2017). global climate change will seriously reduce the quality of life of future generations and threatens a mass sixth extinction of plants and animals. the environment has finally become one of the main issues of global concern as the world has experienced extreme fires and massive flooding. a major shift in public opinion has occurred (for example, in the eu, 60% think climate change is one of the most serious problems facing the world, stamford news, 2018) and this new awareness has undoubtedly been influenced by the ‘fridays for future’ movement led by greta thunberg that inspired an estimated 9.6 million school students in 261 countries to participate in school strikes. young people are crying out for public discussion of ethical issues that include what the duty of human beings are to other forms of life, our duties to future generations and to those in poverty, what has been called ‘climate justice.’ fridays for future called for “justice for all past, current and future victims of the climate crisis” (the guardian, 2019). if we fail to take their call for climate justice and equity seriously as greta thunberg says, “we will never forgive you.” p4c can help young people make sense of justice in the context of the environment, and adults understand how to incorporate children’s perspectives in classrooms. over 25 years engaging with p4c in classrooms has convinced me that p4c has the capacity to animate the voice of the child and in so doing can challenge deficit models of the child held by many teachers. at a time when it is the young who are leading the way in telling adults they have a moral imperative to address the existential threat of climate and ecological breakdown, our very survival may depend on our capacity to practice epistemic justice by confronting adult prejudice and take the voice of the child seriously. climate justice is set to become a key issue in philosophy and p4c can lead the way in the classroom. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 1 (2021) 93 references alexander, r. 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(2018) education for sustainable development and global citizenship through philosophical enquiry: principles and practices. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis 39 (1): 1-12. macnaughton, g. (2005) doing foucault in early childhood studies: applying post-structural ideas (contesting early childhood). london: routledge. macnaughton, g., p. hughes, and k. smith. (2007). rethinking approaches to working with children who challenge: action learning for emancipatory practice. international journal of early childhood 39 (1): 39–57. matthews, g. (1994). the philosophy of childhood. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. munro-morris, l. (2017). an examination of philosophy with children as a materialdiscursive practice in a year 7 classroom. unpublished phd, university of wales, trinity st. david. murris, k. (2013a). reading the world, reading the word: why not now bernard is not a case of suicide, but self-killing. perspectives in education, vol. 31(4): 85-100. murris, k. (2013b) the epistemic challenge of hearing children’s voice. studies in philosophy and education, vol. 32(3): 245–259. rudduck, j., and j. flutter. (2007). improving learning through consulting pupils. london: routledge. sharp, a.m. (1995) philosophy for children and the development of ethical values. early childhood development and care. 107 (1): 45-55. sharp, a.m. (2007) education of the emotions in the classroom community of inquiry. gifted education international. 22(2-3): 248-257. sinclair, j. m., and r. m. coulthard. (1975). towards an analysis of discourse. oxford: oxford university press. stables, a. (2008) childhood and the philosophy of education: an anti-aristotelian perspective. london: continuum. stamford news, (2018) https://news.stanford.edu/2018/07/16/poll-shows-consensus-climate-policy remains-strong/ the guardian (2019) climate crisis and a betrayed generation. available at: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/mar/01/youth-climate-change-strikers-open letter-to-world-leaders torbin, j. (2010.) seeking to persuade: a constructivist approach to human rights treaty interpretation. harvard human rights review 23: 1–50. united nations general assembly. (1989). united nations convention on the rights of the child. accessed december 8, 2013. http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/44/a44r025.htm vitale, s. and miller, o. (2020). combatting epistemic violence against young activists. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis, 40(2): 1-16. wall, j. (2010) ethics in light of childhood. washington, dc: georgetown university press. wall, j. (2017) children’s rights: today’s global challenge. rowman and littlefield. wag (welsh assembly government). (2004). children and young people: rights into action. cardiff: welsh assembly government. address correspondences to: dr susan lyle, dialogue exchange, wales, uk. email: sue.marilyn.lyle@gmail.com https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/mar/01/youth-climate-change-strikers-open-%0b%20%20%20%20%20letter-to-world-leaders https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/mar/01/youth-climate-change-strikers-open-%0b%20%20%20%20%20letter-to-world-leaders analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 45 adult picture books as liminal spaces: exploring some inventive invitations to philosophical reflection wendy turgeon n thinking children and education, matthew lipman edited a broad collection of essays from the iapc journal thinking. eva brann’s essay “through phantasia to philosophy review with reminiscences” opens with the tantalizing challenge to distinguish children’s literature from adult literature. a number of criteria are examined. • are children’s books written specifically for children? • are children’s stories written exclusively by adults? • are they only about children or only children’s books have children featured in them? • are there topics that only appear in children’s books? • are children’s books always gentle and safe? • do only children’s books have pictures? all of these proffered criteria fail since we can find books that appeal to adults as much as to children (alice in wonderland, for example), children appear in stories aimed at adult readers (the turn of the screw), topics of violence and love are present in children’s stories, they can disrupt and upset (roald dahl books), and many adults books also include illustrations. the genre of “comic book” appeals to many adults as well as to children and some are clearly for adults only (certain examples of manga comics are blatantly erotic.) so, what can we point to as a sign that this book is “for children?” it appears as if the best definition is that we know one when we see it. children’s books are clearly marked off in libraries and in bookstores and often the markers used are lots of illustrations and few and simple words. but pinpointing a criterion that clearly sets them apart from adult stories proves to be elusive. and when the philosophy for children movement inserted children’s literature into the philosophical arena, the borders became even more porous. books that seemed easy to designate as children’s books were presented as offering serious and conceptually challenging ideas for adults as well as for children. the writings of gareth matthews, thomas wartenberg, philip cam, peter worley, among many, guide us into realizing the conceptual richness and philosophical potency of even the simplest picture book. for those who might dismiss “kiddie literature” as simplistic and banal for the adult, brann’s essay serves as an eye-opening corrective to such glib categorizations on both fronts. i analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 46 however, there is a new “genre” of literature that is aimed explicitly at adults and children, or sometimes simply at adults, which follow the formula of the picture book: the inclusion of a simple text accompanying provocative images, and sometimes images alone. on the surface they may seem best suited for the “children’s section” of a bookstore or library. but we discover that their linguistic and visual simplicity can fool us into thinking that the content itself is simplistic. and in many cases, they are directly inviting the adult reader to view their own experiences through the lens of a child. they appear to be growing in number and it can be hard to classify them easily, just as we find it difficult to define a “children’s book.” one might find them grouped with graphic novels but in some ways, they appear to be their own genre. these books openly adopt a façade of being “children’s stories” but in fact offer directly to adults visual and conceptual invitations to think deeply about genuine metaphysical issues. this paper offers a tour of a collection of such books and why they can provoke deep philosophical reflections for adults—and in some cases for children as well. in the visually rich picture book, stormy night, michelle milieux1 shows a young girl getting ready for bed, kissing a parent good night, and climbing into her bed… only to embark on a journey of questions. she wonders about infinity, life on other planets, from where do humans come. she muses over questions about the nature of self, animals, bodies, her emotions, future, and on and on it goes. meanwhile a storm rages outside. each page includes a simple sentence with these astonishing huge questions, accompanied by line drawings that capture her imaginations in fanciful representations. in many ways her nighttime musings offer the reader the full spectrum of the human dilemma. as lightning flashes across the sky and page, she implores her dog to stay with her. fears assail her: fear of being alone, war, robbers, and the always present monsters. is there a soul? god? she confronts the idea of death and the fear of losing all her memories. what if she lived forever? as she finally goes to sleep with her dog nestled next to her, the storm abates, and she happily sleeps. an adult reading this story will recognize all the worries and reflections of their childhood as well as their present adult self. these metaphysical questions continue to haunt us. this can be read along with a child where an exploration of each, or some, of the questions can generate a lively interchange of ideas as well as allow for the expression of genuine fears and concerns but with opportunities to both voice them and reflect thereon. but one could also use each question as a prompt for philosophical meditation within one’s self. one would be hard pressed to classify this as for children or for adults. it is for humans. charles mackesy offers a charming book which is written in cursive (so maybe a bit of a challenge to read!) along with lovely and suggestive images. entitled the boy, the mole, the fox and the horse2. this story seems likewise to defy classification as for children or for adults. it is more directive in conveying its messages. the small boy is also full of questions and in this story, the animals serve as foil to his uncertainties as they speak with him. “is there a school of unlearning? the boy asks. the mole tends to see the solution to everything as cake, but they discuss how important kindness is, how to confront fear, beauty, forgiveness and the search to find home. “i think everyone is just 1 stormy night, michele lemieux, kids can press, 1999. 2 harper one, 2019. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 47 trying to get home,” says the mole. the fox is mostly silent but after the boy and mole rescue him from a trap he follows along, sharing their comradery. images vary from black and white to beautifully colored washes of the characters wandering around the forest and meadows as they continue their conversation. after meeting the horse, the questions continue in earnest. being brave, strong, vulnerable, and accepting being ordinary is fine: “the greatest illusion is that life should be perfect.” now the outside world interrupts the friends when on a page the boy asks if he is seeing the moon, but the response is that it is a teacup stain. we are reminded that we are here, reading a book, perhaps with a cup of tea in our hand. almost all of the classical virtues and socratic concepts are mentioned and addressed in simple responses: curiosity, love, gratitude, and the threaded theme of kindness. yes, the book ends with warmhearted advice to accept one’s self and see love as the guiding force in living one’s life. reading this book alone or with others can generate some thoughtful challenges to some of these platitudes but readers will also find the creatures endearing and the communication among such diverse species an imaginative invitation into thinking about our relationships with ourselves and the world around us. we are not journeying alone. how does each character express their view of the world and share that vision with the boy? the boy is full of questions and perhaps the characters have too many pat answers, but then again, maybe those very answers need to be sounded. the text a serious thought by jonas taul3 features a little boy who goes to bed and like the girl in our first story, he spends the night pondering a myriad of fundamental questions. now, this text is more provocative and the accompanying drawings on each page help unpack his reflections as he experiences: • dangerous thoughts • admirable thoughts • questionable thoughts • beautiful thoughts • frightening thoughts • thoughts that reach far and wide however, these vague ideas, hinted at in the whimsical pictures, are followed by more sustained concerns about how the earth is just a tiny ball in space and the boy an insignificant speck on his planet. how small and insignificant he is! in the morning he tries to talk to his father but like most of us adults, he was too busy. the little boy goes out for a walk and at some point realizes he is lost in the middle of a woods. a cat finds him, and he follows the cat; as they walk along he encounters a hedgehog, frog, and ants. each creature is living their lives fully engaged and not worrying, seemingly, about their insignificance. our boy realizes that he too is real and important. here we find a small boy pondering the meaning of life, his life, in the scope of the universe. and here also animals offer him a lesson in reflection. there is the journey out and the return home. this is a classic fairy tale trope as our hero starts off into a foreboding world not knowing what will happen and along the way he learns valuable lessons from these animals. the opening pages, in 3 groundwood books, 2020. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 48 particular, could generate some wonderful discussions in terms of exploring the kinds of ideas that visit our minds in any given day. what is it to be significant? why is size so important? this book seems very suited to read with children and use as a prompt for some serious philosophical explorations. but the little boy is really all of us, isn’t he? the artistically crafted book the forest by ricardo bozzi4 features cleverly designed pages with cutouts, embossed surfaces, and beautifully colored images of the forest. described as the “journey of life,” it parallels childhood into old age. each embossed white page has the face of a baby, young child, young adult and ends with an old man. as the person ages, they move from carefree exploration and play into the realization that others are in the forest, they form alliances, friendships, and in some cases enmities. they get bruised and scratched by branches but then may come on a clearing and see the blue sky above. as they find themselves climbing upward they will ultimately come on to a ravine into which they will fall. what lies beyond? “some say a grove of young pine trees”—precisely where they started out. this text may be more of a challenge to problematize since it is so clearly paralleling the trajectory of a human life through the metaphor of roaming through a forest. but each page invites the reader to stop and think how the simple text may in fact translate into the rich dense experiences of we humans. finding one’s self in this forest may offer readers an opportunity to stop and ask what it is they seek and why? and who is on this journey with us? the next book to consider is by olga tokarczuk and joanna concejo, the lost soul.5 this exquisite picture book offers a morality tale inviting us to take note of time, to slow down, to allow one’s “soul” to inhabit a life. the story warns us not to rush onward, abandoning one’s soul behind in the cacophony of modern living which is too often focused on accomplishment, material possessions, and our obsession with a man-made world. the majority of the written story occurs on one page, followed by pages of beautiful yet somewhat eerie drawing of a cottage in the woods, animal presences, and the passing of time in the quiet. the man has rushed through his life career building and constantly moving around the world. when he wakes up one morning and discovers that he has forgotten who he is, he visits a doctor who advises him to find a place of his own and “sit there quietly, and wait for your soul.” for souls move slower than bodies and too many people have left their souls behind in the rush to join the booming and buzzing world around them. the protagonist takes his advice and moves to a small cottage. the following pages are mostly images of time passing as the man grows older, his hair and beard longer as the sign of the passage of time. then a parallel series of images appears of a small child sitting in a café; the man continues to sit quietly at his table, accompanied only by mysterious deer, a cat, and a growing plant. the child makes his way on a journey (note the common theme of “journey” among our texts) until he peers into the window of the cottage and the man and child gaze out at the reader from a double page, each reflecting the other. the story ends with the “two” of them living together in the peace and 4 illustrated by violeta lopiz and valerio vidali, enchanted lion press, 2018. 5 seven stories press, 2017; translated into english by antonia lloyd-jones from the polish original, 2021. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 49 timelessness of the natural world, marked only by the growing vines and flowers that ultimately consume the cottage. so, this story is a story told through images with only a setup of text. there are no questions here, only provocations of reflection about how we spend our time, what it means to be a self/soul, how we can lose ourselves in busyness. each illustration suggests another story that invites unpacking. who are the dancers outside the cottage? why that deer who shrinks into toy size inside the house? what do the plants tell us about life, about ourselves? what role does childhood play in our adult lives and how can we relate to our lost selves? perhaps this book, despite its deception appearance, is really only for adults. or is it? jean-pierre weill has created a large format book, the well of being6, and included the subtitle of “a children’s book for adults” as a recognition of how his text mimics the format of a picture book but is intended for the adult reader. each page offers a simple line of text accompanied by a suggestive watercolor. weill credits saul steinberg, the cartoonist, “for showing me how imagery approaches the written language,”7 but in truth every one of the books referenced in this article does precisely the same thing. clearly inspired by jewish mysticism and history, weill asks the reader, shown waiting for a train, to go on a conceptual journey. is life a meaningless concatenation of material causality? or is there a primal source, the titular “well of being?” the author strings a bead on a string to start the “journey.” finding this well of being is challenging at best, as images of auschwitz and a man falling from the world trade center building powerfully show. but well-being is a choice we make and it can free us to enjoy the world and those around us but when we lose sight of it, we spiral downward, cut off from others and from ourself. continuing the metaphor of threading a bead on a string, weill adds a second bead to signal a reflective move: consider the immediacy of childhood and the innocence of being at one with the world… until we discover we can do wrong, fail, lack sufficiency or be defined by what we are not. the final bead asks us to see our life not as at the mercy of forces outside of ourselves but as emanating from within. we must become aware that the stories we have woven have come from ourselves and we can change them: when we become aware of our own thinking, we awaken.”8 interestingly, the following text of coming to accept one’s self and living in the moment are accompanied by images of the man and a child. if we go this route we are “drinking at the well of being.”9 while there is no mention of a god, the author’s accompanying notes highlight the connections to his jewish faith tradition. one could read this story through a theological lens but it is entirely possible to focus on the personal agency and goal of self-reflective choice as to how to navigate the world, perhaps even as a nod to positive psychology and theories of well-being so popular today. as a guide for philosophical reflection and discussion, each stage from despair, doubt, discovery, affirmation can open up avenues for questions and an unpacking of each image. man’s 6 call of the shofar publishing, 2013. this phrase, “the well of being” may come from heidegger but is also the title of david kennedy’s book on the philosophy of childhood. see david kennedy’s the well of being, state university of new york press, 2006. 7 weill, on the title page. 8 ibid., p. 154 and 156. 9 ibid., p. 180 and 182. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 50 inhumanity to man is clearly evidenced and yet the tenor of the work is that of hope and goodness. two of the most striking illustrations are the drawing that the young child makes on the wall of a garden, a deer, and simply a beautiful scene which is followed on the next page by the “reality:” blotches of paint all over the wall. the mother’s anger is not entirely misplaced, although we feel for the child who saw his creation as beautiful only to have it condemned as a mess. this event seems to parallel the fall in the garden of eden. this book might be an important artifact for older children, teens, to explore since they can so easily identify with feeling out of place, as failures for not fitting in or living up to parental expectations. but this text is also in the group of highly didactic stories with a theme to be conveyed and accepted. nevertheless, some of the best philosophical prompts are morality tales that we can problematize and question the conclusions offered. the final book to consider is called the river10, by the italian artist allesandro sanna. punctuated only four times with a short text which introduces each season, this story is told mostly in images. the four seasons of the po river are captured in watercolor ribbons, four to each page, that seem to suggest a story, or stories that take place as the season moves along. reading images with only a hint of what we are being told allows the reader/viewer to engage their own imagination in deciphering a story within each season. it centers on a small town, a house out in the country, and a series of events like circuses, autumn floods, the experience of the birth of a calf in a frosty winter barn, springtime love and marriage, and during high summer the circus again with an escaped tiger. the painter confronts the tiger who becomes his “muse.” the tone of each image varies dramatically from serene, to threatening, to excitement, to tense, to exuberant. in some ways the artist/author captures the trajectory of human life. sharing these picture stories with others could invite some intriguing retellings or alternative narratives. unlike some of our other examples above, this text seems neutral in terms of offering a specific point of view or moral. here the challenge is studying each watercolor to try to interpret what is it telling us, or what it might tell us with multiple directions possible. one can also step back and reflect on the power of the image, art, to convey ideas, suggest points of view, question what we see, think, feel. this text in particular could be a delight to explore as offering story prompts that include questions, challenges, the big concepts of what it is to live a life. conclusion the selection offered here is limited but what we find is a blurring of lines between children’s books and adult stories, and particularly stories and philosophy. practitioners of doing philosophy with children, young people, and adults will find these stories as offering yet another source of rich reflective opportunities. as with many stories, the challenge may be to problematize ideas presented but one can do that and still not “destroy” the text or dishonor the story itself. perhaps the most noticeable aspects of these examples are the common themes of journey, the presence of animals as guides or provocateurs, and the stream of classic philosophical questions that we find from the presocratic philosophers and socrates in ancient greece and the long tradition of western philosophy, to the sages of first millennial bce china or india, and in the mythic and philosophical traditions in many indigenous societies. as humans we question things. these books caution us to avoid 10 enchanted lion books, 2014; translated by michael reynolds. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 43, issue 1 (2023) 51 dichotomizing stories into child/adult categories, instead embracing an invitation to reflect together on the quintessential human enterprise as a search for meaning. works cited bozzi, ricardo. the forest. illustrated by violeta lopiz and valerio vidali. enchanted lion press, 2018. brann, eva, “through phantasia to philosophyreview with reminiscences.” as found in lipman, matthew, editor. thinking children and education, dubuque, iowa: kendell hunt publishing co., 1993. the cited article runs from p. 287-297 mackesy, charles. the boy, the mole, the fox and the horse. harper one, 2019. milieux, michelle. stormy night. kids can press, 1999. sanna,allesandro. the river. translated by michael reynolds. enchanted lion books, 2014. taul, jonas. a serious thought. groundwood books, 2020. tokarczuk, olga and joanna concejo. the lost soul. translated by antonia lloyd-jones from the polish original. seven stories press, 2021. weill, jean-pierre. the well of being. call of the shofar publishing, 2013. address correspondences to: dr. wendy turgeon st. joseph’s university, new york email: turgeon@optonline.net philosophical teaching-and-learning and the valuing of virtues analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 17 philosophical teaching-and-learning and the valuing of virtues roger sutcliffe abstract: this piece maintains that, despite 50+ years of successful practice and development, philosophy for children (henceforward, p4c) is undervalued—but that, suitably re-presented, it may yet become the most important agent of educational change of the 21st century: a change that is essential, if not existential, given the challenges facing humanity. the recommendation is to present p4c not so much as a specialised practice, but rather as the basis for a general pedagogy, suitable for teachers of any subject or age. this pedagogy is given the name ‘philosophical teaching-and-learning’ (ptl), because its 6 interweaving strands draw on the tradition of philosophy itself—as well as on p4c practice. the article gives an overview of, and rationale for, the pedagogy, then focuses particularly on the 6th strand—‘virtues-valuing’—as being the most encompassing, but also the most exigent. if every teacher, pre-service and in-service, were introduced to p4c and then committed to developing these strands—especially the 6th one—in their teaching, humanity might just have the makings of an educational system fit for purpose. preface: the 4cs of the modern apocalypse? – a personal view having spent the larger part of my life in what may come to be seen as the heyday of human social and technological progress, i have not given much thought to the ancient christian metaphor of the 4 horsemen of the apocalypse, representing conquest, war, famine and plague. but there are now 4cs threatening human civilization: consumerism, and its various exploitations; conspiracy theories, and diminishing trust in governance and international institutions; climate change, and environmental degradation; and covid, and possibly worse pandemics. the parallel is striking, even if it does not persuade one to believe they are all part of a divine plan. and how should humanity face these threats? how should we educate the young people who will have to deal with their worst consequences? i don’t believe that more stem (science, technology, engineering and maths) is the solution, though, if these subjects are taught wisely, they may be part of it. frankly, i don’t believe that philosophy, as usually taught, is a big part of the solution either, despite its root meaning and purpose, ‘love of wisdom’ and ‘pursuit of good life’. the challenges are so great and complex that no single educational intervention will provide the panacea. so, i’m certainly not going to claim that p4c (philosophy for children / communities) is all that is needed. but i do think it contains the potential for a significant leaven(ing) of education. the potential lies in its leading to a greater emphasis on the education of skills and of dispositions or virtues (personal, social and intellectual qualities or strengths) that would, more than anything else, give the young people of today the best chance of living flourishing lives into the 22nd century. and analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 18 the most important skills and dispositions are ones that can be related not just to the practice and principles of p4c but to those of philosophy itself. i hope to demonstrate this in a moment but, given my reference to 4cs above, i should more immediately reference the 4cs of p4c: creative, critical, caring and collaborative thinking. these, of themselves, could provide an excellent framework to leaven the teaching of stem and all other subjects, but they essentially point towards general modes or ‘moods’ of thinking, rather than towards specific pedagogical approaches. my demonstration, by contrast, evinces a powerful pedagogical approach, consisting of 6 ‘strands’: inquiry, concept-construction, dialogue, reasoning, reflection and virtues-valuing, which are drawn from p4c and the philosophical tradition, but are also consonant with some of the key developments in education in the late 20th and early 21st century. together, these strands make up the pedagogical framework that i call ‘philosophical teaching-and-learning’ (ptl).1 drawing inspiration from p4c four of the six strands were actually pointed to by ann margaret sharp in her fine account of the aims of p4c: “philosophy for children aims not only to strengthen good reasoning, inquiry and concept-formation2 but to cultivate an intellectual and social virtue. another way of saying this is to say that philosophy for children aims at the cultivation of wisdom” (sharp, a.m., 1993, the ethics of translation, p. 11). here we see explicit reference to: reasoning, inquiry, concept-formation and cultivating virtues. to these i have added: dialogue and reflection. i believe these strands are as characteristic of p4c as the 4 identified by sharp. its core practice—community of inquiry—is driven by public dialogue and is rich in private reflection. the six strands are inherently philosophical but, indeed, i hold all six to be characteristic of the practice of philosophy itself since its inception in ancient greece. socrates was not the first, nor the only, philosopher to be continually questioning, and to see reasoning as essential to the pursuit of inquiry; and philosophers down the ages have provided some of the best examples of dialogue and reflection about important concepts. 1 i usually abbreviate this to ‘philosophical teaching’, but the full, hyphenated phrase of ‘teaching-and-learning’ is not an affectation. it reflects the belief that one can hardly separate good teaching practice from good learning practice: that the practices modelled and encouraged by a philosophical teacher—inquiry, concept-construction, dialogue, etc.—are the very practices that a philosophical learner internalises so as to become, in effect, a self-didact. see john hattie, visible learning, p. 245: ‘the aim is to help students learn the skills of teaching themselves – to self-regulate their learning.’ 2 i have preferred the phrase ‘concept-construction’ because it points to the constructivist theory of learning, which ptl espouses. but, in case that word sets off alarm bells, i would emphasize that the best framing is that of co-construction, whereby good instruction by the teachers is integral to good construction by the learner. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 19 granted, many of them may have failed consistently to practice many of the virtues they might have been advocating. but it seems to be a common human trait to value a general way of being without quite living up to the particular virtues that it requires. whether or which, a good deal of philosophizing, ancient and modern, sound and silly, has been directed towards the concept, if not the practice, of virtuous action and living. the six strands are also inherent in good teaching and good learning from another point of view, a good deal of teaching also involves each of the 6 strands to some extent. surely, indeed, every teacher worth the title tries to promote: • questioning / inquiry (though they may well have a tendency to prioritise their own questions above their students) • knowledge and understanding / concept-construction (though they may prioritise the presentation of brute facts rather than the complex formation of student comprehension) • student articulation and responses / dialogue (though they may prioritise written communication to the detriment of oral) • argumentation / reasoning (though they may need to be more analytical—even critical—of student thinking than they are) • review and metacognition / reflection (though they may need to be yet more focused on the processes, as well as the content, of student learning) and most, if not all, of them surely try to nurture healthy virtues3 (or qualities or strengths) for learning and life. the lively educational discourse around ‘qualities of character’, such as resilience, self-control, optimism and conscientiousness,4 as well as ‘growth mindsets,’5 bears witness to that. the pity of it is that whereas such qualities were once consciously conceptualised as ‘virtues’, that concept —and the very word itself—is less commonly used nowadays, and may even be consciously avoided. an important part of the project of ptl is to rehabilitate the concept in educational, if not ordinary, discourse. 3 at this point, i should acknowledge that the concepts of ‘virtues’ and ‘virtuous’ are problematical and contestable, both within the tradition of philosophy and in society at large. but this piece is not the place to address the problems. so, for now, i propose a simple working synonym for ‘virtue’, namely ‘strength’ (especially of character and mind), which is close enough to its root meaning in latin and old french https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=virtue. 4this list is taken, but slightly adjusted, from an influential book: tough p. (2012) how children succeed. boston: mariner books. ‘resilience’ is a more common and accepted version of what tough called ‘grit’. 5this concept—essentially the belief that intelligence and intellectual capacity is not fixed and can grow with effort and application—was proposed in dweck, c. s. (2006). mindset: the new psychology of success. new york: random house. https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=virtue analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 20 the six strands constitute a modern, holistic framework but before focusing on the need for a better valuation of virtues, there are two, more important, points to be made about the six strands: that they correlate with six of the most significant developments in late 20th / early 21st century education; and that they complement each other. this is quite a claim, of course, but here is the mapping: inquiry correlates with inquiry-based learning (ibl)—the ‘constructivist’ pedagogical approach that is, for example, at the heart of the most successful international curriculum, the international baccalaureate6. there is, as hinted at in footnote 2, an increasingly polarised and politicised dispute around the value of inquiry-based learning, as compared with that of ‘direct instruction’ (sometimes associated with a ‘core knowledge curriculum’). one does not need, however, to enter into this discourse to appreciate that it is verging on the perverse to think of inquiry as inimical to the development of knowledge. the very purpose of inquiry—especially philosophical inquiry—is to develop better understanding, based on sound knowledge. equally obvious, good teaching would be useless if learners could not construct their own sense of it; whilst, on the other hand, learners would struggle to make sense of their random observations and experiences if they were deprived of intelligent instruction. concepts are also central to the ib curriculum, but curricula in general are paying more attention to the key role that concepts or ‘big ideas’ play in mastery of different subjects. for example, ‘big ideas that shape the world’ is a telling expression introduced to the ‘big picture of the curriculum’7, a seminal document created for the new labour government and the english curriculum (qca, 2007). the concept maintains its centrality in the english school inspection handbook:8 ‘teachers consider the most important knowledge and concepts pupils need to know and focus on these.’ there is not a generally recognised term for this focus on big ideas or concepts, but ‘concept-centred curriculum’ captures it quite well. dialogue in teaching-and-learning was the burning idea in paulo freire’s radical work, pedagogy of the oppressed (1968), which still influences formal as well as informal education to the good.9 a more recent pedagogical approach, based on socio-psychological research and gaining traction in the uk and beyond, is ‘dialogic teaching’.10 neither approach is quite the same as the communities of inquiry approach in p4c—slightly different concepts of ‘dialogue’ are at play—but there is much commonality. reasoning can be understood as a merely formal practice—nothing other than logical argumentation—but the concept and practice of reasoning in p4c has always been wider, richer and 6 the ib, coincidentally, was conceived at around the same time as lipman was conceiving p4c – the late 1960s. 7 it continues to be of worldwide influence via the work in 20+ countries of the curriculum foundation https://www.curriculumfoundation.org/. 8 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/school-inspection-handbook-eif/school-inspection-handbook 9 https://www.bera.ac.uk/blog/the-continued-relevance-of-freires-pedagogy-of-the-oppressed 10https://www.educ.cam.ac.uk/research/programmes/camtalk/dialogic/ https://www.curriculumfoundation.org/ https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/school-inspection-handbook-eif/school-inspection-handbook https://www.bera.ac.uk/blog/the-continued-relevance-of-freires-pedagogy-of-the-oppressed https://www.educ.cam.ac.uk/research/programmes/camtalk/dialogic/ analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 21 more humane. its development has parallels with that of the critical thinking movement, though importantly lipman complemented the idea of critical thinking with that of caring (or ‘valuational’) thinking, and ann margaret sharp related the practice especially to critical feminism (1993) and ethical global education (1995). reflection is so fundamental to good educational (and professional) practice that pretty much every developed theory of education values it, whether the approach is conventionally ‘instructional’ or ‘constructivist’—or even radically ‘child-centred’. whilst, again, one cannot point to a single approach or movement known as ‘reflective’ pedagogy or education, the notion of ‘reflective teaching’ is now widespread in teacher education. perhaps, in turn, the ideal of the ‘reflective learner’ will assume ever greater importance in a world that has suddenly recognised the dangers to young people’s mental health of too much pressure and not enough ‘time to think’ and ‘time to be’. (the growing practice of mindfulness in schools is a welcome antidote to such pressure, but of course mindfulness is only one instance of the wider, richer concept of reflection; metacognition—roughly, ‘thinking about thinking’—is also rightly coming more to the fore.) finally, virtues-valuing is related, of course, to that aspect of education that comes and goes in fashion, but (rightly) never disappears: moral education. whether we are talking of the moral agenda of adults (often hidden, even from themselves), or the more explicit teaching of generally accepted values in schools, moral development (and, sadly, moral damage) will always be inherent in educational systems. but the case for educators to nurture healthy attitudes, principles and practices in young people only grows in a world of competing ethical and political claims. the values-based education11 movement is one of many modern approaches to this challenging yet vital task. but a good starting point for any such approach is to focus on—and value!—virtues. any single one of these above-named pedagogical approaches is worthy of mention, if not study, in any teacher education course. but given that ptl references and, to some extent, draws on them all, it could well be the best starting point for every such course—at least those that properly aim to give aspiring teachers, of whatever subject or speciality, a broad review of best modern practice. the ptl (six strand) framework has its own originality and integrity it is important to emphasise, though, that the ptl framework is not merely a pointer to other established practices. whilst it draws on those practices—just as it draws on p4c itself—it has an integrity of its own, because it presents a fresh, and at times radical, account of each of the strands, not least drawing attention to how they support or interweave with each other. this is not the place for a full account, but here is an outline. inquiry is a broad concept and can be practised in different ways and contexts—with more, or less, integrity. even purported ‘inquiry-based’ teaching can lack integrity. if all the questions in a session derive from the teacher, or from a planned curriculum, students will not be inspired to propose and pursue their own inquiries. curiosity—which should be a habit for life—is stunted in the 11 www.valuesbasededucation.com http://www.valuesbasededucation.com/ analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 22 very environment where it should be cultivated. the p4c approach, made even more of in ptl, is precisely to give students the opportunity—indeed, the encouragement—to ask their own questions. this is why ptl actually prefers the notion of ‘inquiry-inspired learning’ rather than ‘inquiry-based learning’. the concept of ‘concepts’ is widely mistaken, even in the ib curriculum, to be mainly, if not entirely, to do with abstract nouns. classic examples—anger, beauty, culture, democracy, education, freedom, etc.—are deemed especially ‘philosophical’. to its credit, p4c considerably extended the range of concepts that are deemed fit for philosophical inquiry, but ptl extends the range even further, to include all the concepts, big and small, that appear in every subject. by this account, learning about the world, whether through science, history, music or even sport, is a matter not just of learning new facts, but of continually expanding the schema, or conceptual frameworks, by which we make sense of the world. every new piece of information (or, for that matter, misinformation) changes how we think of the world—our concept of this, that or the other—even if only to a minor extent. understanding the centrality of concepts and finding ways of helping students construct them are key foci of ptl. dialogic teaching was referenced earlier, but the approach taken in ptl is both more deeply rooted—in philosophical construction of the concept of dialogue—and more expansive. in short, it is explicit and emphatic in maintaining that dialogue is a reciprocal and moral process: teachers and learners are in a relationship whose success depends on responsiveness and mutual interests. the ptl approach to reasoning is also expansive and humane—more so than many critical thinking programs. lipman introduced the concept / practice of caring thinking precisely to balance an over-emphasis on ‘rational’ argumentation and rhetoric—an emphasis espoused by the sophists in ancient greece, and which socrates himself argued against. recent socio-psychological research into cognitive bias reinforces the broader appreciation of the relationship between thinking and feeling that ptl encourages. as indicated earlier, reflection is another rich concept / practice that every good teacher values. but this richness is often reduced to simple review of ‘content’ of learning. the slogan is ‘review, review, review’, but it is the quality of review that counts as much as the quantity. this is why ptl turns attention to reflection on the cognitive and affective processes involved in ‘deep’ learning—in short, on metacognition and self-management. the former is considerably assisted by thinking moves a – z: metacognition made simple,12 a comprehensive scheme for teaching and managing thinking. how the ptl strands thread through the curriculum as indicated, there is scope for every teacher and learner to develop their practice of each of the strands, but perhaps a couple of examples of their use in specific subjects would be useful. (be advised, however, that we are talking here about small steps in teaching and in learning, not systematic programs that have been the subject of large-scale research.) 12 sutcliffe, r., buckley j., and bigglestone t. (2019) thinking moves a – z, dialogueworks: london. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 23 inquiry: a simple generic step is to establish the kwl routine—what do we know? what do we want to know? and what have we learnt? —at the beginning and end of a topic but with two important additions. the first is for each student to have a question book for recording the ‘want to know’ questions of the class. the second is to extend kwl to kwls—what do we still want to know? —so that questions are recorded at the end of topics as well as the beginning, signalling the value of ongoing or lifelong learning. no matter that not all questions can be answered within the timetable constraints! the message is that there is always more to learn. this routine can be used to good effect in most subjects, but is specially relevant to the sciences and geography (‘worlds to explore’) and to it. an even more significant addition would be the co-construction by teacher and students of an ‘essential question’13 (sometimes described as a ‘big’ question) for each topic. such questions are not run-of-the-mill (but respectable) ‘want to know’ ones, as might easily be triggered by spencer kagan’s q (question) matrix,14 and there is certainly an art to constructing them. however, any teacher or student familiar with p4c would recognise their nature, and after a little induction and modelling by the teacher the very co-construction of such questions by students would develop their curiosity, just as it does in p4c. the value of the questions goes well beyond that, though, since they become both motivators and measures of meaningful learning throughout the exploration of the topic. they serve this purpose in any subject, but in my view are particularly valuable in history and social sciences. dialogue: again, there have been few attempts to develop systematic subject-based programs that give special emphasis to dialogue.15 the positive results that alexander’s ‘dialogic teaching' approach had on student mathematical attainment, for example, were due to changes in the pedagogy rather than any significant change in the content of the curriculum. but that points precisely to the value of improving dialogue wherever one can in the classroom. to give a specific example in maths, however, here is an extract from a web blog by maths teacher amir saei titled, ‘dialogue and mathematical understanding what is it?’ i gave the class a starter of calculating the midpoint of 8 and 11. then i asked students to provide some answers to the whole class. student a answered 9.5. i asked him to explain his answer, he told me “you just add 8 to 11 and then divide by 2”. when i asked why that is the midpoint he could not explain. at no stage, did i inform him or the class if his answer was correct. student b answered 9. again, i asked him to explain his answer. he said: “the distance between 8 and 11 is 3. the midpoint is equal in distance from both 8 and 11. 3 divided by 2 is 1.5 so the midpoint is 9.5.” the student ended up providing the correct answer. 13 essential questions are the vital ingredient in an approach to teaching and learning called ‘understanding by design’, created by mctighe and wiggins. they deserve more space than can be given here, but it is enough to say that they constitute an almost perfect way of transferring the skill of asking philosophical questions into productive practice within a ‘knowledge-based’ curriculum. 14 wiederhold c., kagan s. (1998) cooperative learning and high-level thinking: the q-matrix, hawker brownlow education pty ltd 15 one that approaches a systematic program is thinking through geography (2005) stevenage: badger publishing. but many modern approaches to mathematics talk about the importance of student dialogue and expression of their thought processes. here, for example, is a web article titled, ‘discussion is a key step towards maths mastery’: https://www.headteacher-update.com/best-practice-article/discussion-is-a-key-step-towards-maths-mastery/221726/ https://www.waterstones.com/author/chuck-wiederhold/1215909 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 24 if i can put it this way, the student, encouraged to enter into dialogue, literally talked himself into understanding. similar points apply to the other strands: they have not been converted into grand programs to be promoted in specific subjects; they simply provide separate foci for selfdevelopment, encouraging and expanding repertoire of generic strategies and devices, small and large, for improved teaching and learning. the sixth strand, however, should be construed as rather more than that. it certainly provides another focus for self-development, but effectively brings the other five strands together, as well as extending their scope. how the virtues-valuing strand consummates the other strands this is best shown by relating the other strands to the intellectual virtues that they most obviously develop: curiosity and attentiveness (through inquiry), creativity and thoughtfulness (through concept-construction), communicativeness and open-mindedness (through dialogue), criticality and reasonableness (through reasoning), considerateness and reflectiveness (through reflection). the importance of such virtues for progress in life, as well as at school, is surely obvious, and they should be cultivated in education (including teacher education) at all levels. that is the logical conclusion of the growing argument for educators to focus as much on developing skills as on increasing knowledge. but there is little value to young people in either skills or knowledge if they do not have the motivation and the mind to apply them. cognitive skills, particularly, need to become dispositions or habits of mind—intellectual virtues—which, along with other virtues, should be among the ultimate aims of education. that was surely what john dewey was suggesting when he wrote: “if we are willing to conceive education as the process of forming fundamental dispositions, intellectual and emotional, toward nature and fellow men (sic), philosophy may even be defined as the general theory of education”16 (dewey, 1933: 358). how the 21st century is beginning to catch up with dewey if we step back a moment, we can observe that there has been talk in the business world for many years about coming to terms with ‘the information age’ or the ‘knowledge economy’. already, though, the knowledge age is giving way to the data economy and the (artificial) intelligence age, with an even greater imperative to adjust the aims in curricula and the pedagogies for achieving them. the challenge to teachers might have been conceived, within the old educational framework, as trying to balance an increasing emphasis on skills, attitudes and aptitudes with an ever-growing human knowledge base. the big picture of the curriculum, indeed, pointed the direction by establishing 3 ‘foci for learning’ in what i call the ask framework: attitudes and aptitudes; skills; and knowledge and understanding. (it was in the 3rd focus that waters talked about ‘big ideas that shape the world’.) since then, two highfliers, one from business and the other from academia, have addressed this imperative in similar ways. 16 dewey, j. (1933) democracy and education: an introduction to the philosophy of education. new york: macmillan. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 25 the world economic forum, and 21 lessons for the 21st century at the 2018 world economic forum, jack ma (of alibaba), talking about how to transition from 19th and 20th century education to 21st century (not to mention 22nd century) education, said: “we cannot teach our kids to compete with machines;”17 and he put forward 5 foci of his own for future education: • value • believing • independent thinking • teamwork • care for others he did not explain or justify these foci, and the second seems very much in need of explanation, but the others seem good for lifelong learning—indeed, for life as well as learning. meanwhile, yuva noah harari had been developing his own 21 lessons for the 21st century18. after an analysis / synthesis of the ever-accelerating developments in human societies, he turned his attention to the role of education in helping people, young and old, meet such challenges. “besides information,” he said: most schools also focus too much on providing pupils with a set of predetermined skills such as solving differential equations, writing computer code in c++, identifying chemicals in a test tube or conversing in chinese. yet since we have no idea how the world and the job market will look in 2050, we don’t really know what particular skills people will need. we might invest a lot of effort teaching kids how to write in c++ or how to speak chinese, only to discover that by 2050 ai can code software far better than humans, and a new google translate app enables you to conduct a conversation in almost flawless mandarin, cantonese or hakka, even though you only know how to say “ni hao”. his recommendation?— “many pedagogical experts argue that schools should switch to teaching ‘the four cs’—critical thinking, communication, collaboration and creativity. more broadly, schools should downplay technical skills and emphasise general-purpose life skills.” the gift of the 4cs of p4c, especially caring thinking for those familiar with the 4c model of p4c (critical, caring, collaborative and creative thinking), harari’s list19 looks like a strong endorsement. but a significant difference is lipman and sharp’s proposal of, and preference for, caring thinking—rather than communication or any other c. 17 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rht-5-ryrjk&t=12s 18 harari, yuval noah. 21 lessons for the 21st century. spiegel & grau (2018), p. 262. 19 this list can also be found in trilling, b., & fadel, c. (2009) 21st century skills: learning for life in our times, josseybass/wiley, p.49 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rht-5-ryrjk&t=12s analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 26 it was in 1995 that lipman published his masterful article, ‘caring as thinking,’20 which added a whole new dimension, not just to philosophy for children, but potentially to the entire curriculum. in short, he added the essential value(s) dimension (cf. ma’s list). in the article, lipman asks, “what aspect of higher-order thinking is especially concerned with the dimension of values?” (p. 6) his answer is, of course, is ‘caring’ thinking, which he considers as important as, if not more important than, the conventional doublet of ‘critical and creative’ thinking. if i were to take one shot at a summary of his construct, it would be that it is as non-sensical to say, ‘i care about x, but i do not value x’, as it would be to say, ‘i value x, but i do not care about it’. or, put even more simply, ‘to care is to value and to value is to care’. in lipman’s own words: “without caring, higher-order thinking is devoid of a values component. if higher-order thinking does not contain valuing or valuation, it is liable to approach its subject matters apathetically, indifferently, and uncaringly, and this means it would be diffident even about inquiry itself” (p. 12). this is not, i think, simply to say that inquiry—and higher-order thinking in general—needs to be done carefully if it is to be done well. (that is a message that many a p4c practitioner has taken to heart, emphasising that caring thinking involves taking care in what you think and say, and not just taking care of other people and their interests. actually, of course, the latter could be said to entail the former.) it is, i think, to say that inquiry itself is an expression of care: that we should perceive care in inquiry as well as promote care about inquiry. that, at any rate, was the sentiment i expressed myself in an article, titled ‘is philosophical inquiry virtuous?,’21 which i wrote comparatively early in my acquaintance with p4c. philosophical inquiry, i maintained, springs from a deep care, somewhat in the sense of worry22 about things, to understand the nature of the world, including the people around oneself. i take this need—to make sense of things—to be the very driving force of philosophy and philosophical inquiry; and insofar as inquiry (of any sort) helps meet this need, i take it to be virtuous23 (and, for that matter, philosophical). it is virtuous in the minimum sense of conducing to better understanding of the world—a necessary condition of judging and acting well. but, insofar as making sense of ‘things’ includes, as it regularly does in communities of philosophical inquiry, making sense of each other—recognising others’ concerns, interests and perspectives—it has the virtue of inducting participants into a moral community. ann sharp and laurance splitter put it this way (1995): “the classroom community of inquiry is much more than a tool for the teaching of thinking. it is a form of life for the children who participate in it… a form of ethical practice in which care, trust, respect and good thinking are equal partners” (p. 20). 20 m. lipman, “caring as thinking,” inquiry: critical thinking across the disciplines, volume 15, issue 1, autumn 1995. 21 r. sutcliffe, “is philosophical inquiry virtuous?” thinking, volume 12.1, 1994. 22 ‘care’ derives from old english carian, cearian "be anxious or solicitous; grieve; feel concern or interest," https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=care 23 to say that a practice is virtuous is not, of course, the same as to qualify a person who practises it as virtuous. the bar for that description is much higher, though i am not sure it is easy to define it. someone may practise various virtues without being virtuous in the round. https://www.pdcnet.org/collection-anonymous/browse?fp=inquiryct https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=care analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 27 this is the sort of classroom that is needed in a world where neighbours are divided and neighbourhoods despoiled; and—it is time to shout it! —no practice comes close to p4c in its capacity to create it. before reiterating this point, i will just elaborate a little on the vv (virtues-valuing) strand of ptl, since this is the strand that explicitly and most effectively focuses on the moral or ethical dimension of p4c and philosophical inquiry in general. differentiating fundamental dispositions—the psiq framework dewey’s characterisation of some dispositions as ‘emotional’ needs a little refinement, especially in the light of modern, often ‘psychological’, ways of thinking about human beings and behaviours. they might now, for example, be correlated with ‘emotional intelligence’, or separately labelled as intra-personal (or ‘character’) and inter-personal (or ‘moral’) dispositions or habits, or virtues or strengths. in ptl, the preferred categorisation of the different sorts of dispositions or virtues (loosely based on aristotle’s distinction between moral and intellectual virtues) is personal, social and intellectual qualities (or psiqs). this not only trips off the tongue, but also reduces the unease some people have with language such as ‘character’, ‘moral’ and ‘virtue(s)’. there are, of course, hundreds of words we use for such virtues or qualities, and differentiating them further is a challenging task for philosophical teachers or schools, who periodically revisit and reprioritise their ‘set’ of values and virtues. so ptl has a recommendation for three core qualities or virtues in each category: • personal24: courage, confidence, commitment25 • social: compassion, collaboration, consideration26 • intellectual: curiosity, criticality, creativity27 the virtues-valuing strand (and therefore practice) of ptl encompasses these and the many other behaviours and conscious goals or values that different people—but especially teachers—may espouse, 24 the jubilee centre for character and virtues — https://www.jubileecentre.ac.uk/ —labels this category ‘performance’ virtues, giving examples of confidence, motivation and teamwork. apart from confounding an inter-personal virtue (teamwork) with intra-personal ones (confidence and motivation), this categorisation also has unfortunate connotations with ‘putting on a performance’, either in a self-advancing sense, or in a self-denying sense. so, the preferred category in the psiq framework is that of ‘personal’ virtues even though, admittedly, the whole set of virtues might equally be regarded as ‘of the whole (or rounded) person’. but this narrower category of ‘personal’ can simply be focused on intrapersonal virtues, sometimes thought of as strengths of character or the ‘inner’ person. 25 there could be slightly more nuanced entries into this list—for example, i might have favoured self-respect over confidence, fortitude over courage, and resilience or thoroughness over commitment. but the list has been carefully constructed with a number of criteria, including ease of understanding and recollection. 26 the same goes for this list: i might have favoured empathy over compassion, or respect over consideration. 27 and for this list, e.g. reasonableness, judiciousness or good judgement over criticality. incidentally, with criticality and creativity in this category, and collaboration as a social virtue, it might be wondered why three of the 4cs of p4c are represented in this list, but not care or caring thinking. the simple answer to this is implicit in my earlier remarks about caring and valuing, and the ‘gift’ of caring thinking. to be explicit, this list represents some fundamental virtues to be valued. but since care underpins all valuing, and it amount to a ‘super’ virtue—or perhaps i should say the fundamental virtue. there is, of course, much more to be said about this, including the relationship between care and appreciation or gratitude, but i must postpone it to another time and article. https://www.jubileecentre.ac.uk/ analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 28 so that it arguably amounts to a complete account of the purposes of education. relating the psiqs to p4c and to the curriculum in general in what sense(s), though, can the psiqs be described as ‘core’ virtues or values? one sense is that they bear comparison with the set of values that matthew lipman, founder of p4c, listed as inherent in p4c practice. from the very start, articulated the aim of p4c as: “the aim of a thinking skills program such as p4c is … to help children become more thoughtful, more reflective, more considerate and more reasonable individuals.”28 thoughtfulness, reflectiveness, considerateness, reasonableness—these are paradigms of virtues. later, in 1991, in a recorded interview,29 he was invited to talk about ‘the values’ of p4c and he listed the following: open-mindedness, curiosity, fairness, tolerance, respect, attentiveness, persistence, seriousness, collaborativeness, and democracy. as well as calling them values, lipman gave them the nice designation, ‘commitments’; but all of them, save the last,30 are of course classic virtues. the virtues in the core psiq list that lipman does not mention specifically are the personal ones (care, courage and confidence) and a social one (compassion). there are just two things to say at this point without going into a detailed discussion of which virtues are core to p4c, or what other candidates there might be for the recommended core in the psiq framework. the first is that this framework, like the ptl one of which it is a part, results from a systematic analysis and evaluation of p4c and of broader educational objectives emerging in the last 50 years, in a way that lipman’s earlier writing and later, spontaneous, interview were not. it may not be perfect or to everyone’s taste, but it is presented in good faith, and in the belief that such a framework is desirable and even necessary if the project of valuing virtues more in education is to be realised. the second is that each virtue chosen as ‘core’ naturally has its justification, but the framework as a whole is much more important than the justifications of its elements. a general justification for them is that they all play a vital part in what anyone would regard as ‘success’, not only in learning but also in life. this is especially true, though, of the intra-personal qualities. without the fundamental virtues of commitment (the will to do something), courage (the heart to do it, which underpins determination, persistence, grit, resilience, or any other fashionable quality of character) and confidence (the belief that one can do it) an individual is going to struggle to attain their personal goals—or even to set any goals in the first place. it is well appreciated, of course, that social virtues are also vital to a fulfilling life for all but the most happily hermitic. and it may hardly need emphasising that cognitive / intellectual virtues are essential for any successful project, not least in relation to school and to lifelong learning. 28 lipman, matthew (1977) philosophy in the classroom, temple university press, p. 15 29 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uunzxrklkki 30 democracy is a value—an ideal state of affairs, albeit one hard to define—not a virtue in itself, and one that may have fallen into some disrepute or at least disuse. but, insofar as the ideal remains desirable, it surely calls for a range of virtues to be exercised, not least respect and tolerance. put another way, as we have recently and ironically seen in the usa, it is threatened by the opposite of virtues: vices such as arrogance, anger, etc. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uunzxrklkki analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 29 this, then, has been a general justification of the core psiqs, and i hope it might be enough to persuade teachers (and parents and carers) to give more consideration to their value in the daily and future lives of the children in their care. such ideal attitudes and behaviours—such virtues—are among the most vital and urgent for young people (but also their elders!) to develop, and, as i said before, p4c cultivates them like no other practice. but, curiously, this is a message that is still not getting through to most curriculum designers and managers. p4c is admired but undervalued let’s look back a little to get some perspective on this. p4c was launched 50 years ago with lipman’s publication in 1971 of ‘harry stottlemeier’s discovery’31. since then, plenty of evidence32 has accrued that lipman’s program, and its various spin-offs, help young people achieve conventional educational targets in areas ranging from literacy and numeracy, to reasoning and creative thinking. it also contributes, in less measurable ways, to their confidence, patience and self-esteem33. many teachers can also attest to its constructive impact on their pedagogical, and even practical, development. achievements of this sort are rightly valued today by educational leaders and curriculum developers, and many of them have indeed become explicit aims in the rhetoric of various curricula. yet it remains the case that only a small minority of leaders have invested in p4c, despite its being a clear pathway to any and all of these attainments. p4c is not embedded in any large-scale school systems, nor properly represented in any significant curricula. it is undervalued and underachieving. its potential to stimulate and support a healthy shift of focus in education remains largely unfulfilled. there may be many reasons for this, including the very title, ‘philosophy for children’, which could suggest that it is a ‘subject’ (over)simplified for pre-secondary ‘delivery’. other reasons might include the perception that it is ‘just talk’, and ‘not connected with the main curriculum’, etc. these all misrepresent the practice, of course, but it clearly has not been presented to best effect. i conclude, then, with the belief that it should be re-presented as the foundation for the wider implementation and development of a pedagogy fit for the 21st century—ptl. to this end, i propose an ambitious 5– 10 year plan for p4c to become central to any healthy school and educational system. p4c as foundational, and philosophical teaching-and-learning as transformational first, given the capacity of p4c to cultivate 4c thinking and psiqs in general, p4cers should campaign for p4c to be an entitlement for every young person: at least one session per week, conducted by a trained p4c facilitator. this is easy to program into elementary school timetables, and not so difficult for secondary schools either: each department in turn could run one p4c session (or week) focussed on a philosophical (typically, ethical) dimension of their subject. this would amount to one or two sessions per department per term. 31 lipman, matthew. harry stottlemeier's discovery (nj: iapc, 1974). 32 the best collation of evidence can be found on the website of the institute for the advancement of philosophy for children (iapc), beginning on this page: https://www.montclair.edu/iapc/research-in-philosophy-for-children/researchon-cognitive-skills/. 33 www.educationendowmentfoundation.org.uk/projects/philosophy-for-children https://www.montclair.edu/iapc/research-in-philosophy-for-children/research-on-cognitive-skills/ https://www.montclair.edu/iapc/research-in-philosophy-for-children/research-on-cognitive-skills/ http://www.educationendowmentfoundation.org.uk/projects/philosophy-for-children analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 30 second, obviously this proposal would ultimately require all teachers at all levels to be trained in p4c. individual schools could arrange this on a rolling basis over a number of years. meanwhile, p4c training should be mandatory for all those in teacher education colleges. third, as well as focussing on the development of skills and virtues in dedicated p4c lessons, schools should encourage all their teachers, i.e., of every subject and age, to become more philosophical in their approach / pedagogy.34 if they have trained in p4c that incorporates the ptl framework, this would be a natural extension into all their lessons. fourth, for those teachers who may never have the opportunity to train in and practice p4c, it remains possible for them to develop as philosophical teachers, if they set, monitor and achieve simple goals within their general teaching, asking themselves the following questions, using metacognitive vocabulary from the thinking moves a – z: 1. inquiry: am i encouraging my students / children to formulate more and better questions in p4c, and in other lessons? 2. concept-construction: am i helping my students to keyword big ideas in p4c, and in other lessons, and connect them with previous learning and experience? 3. dialogue: am i helping my students to listen and respond thoughtfully to each other’s ideas in p4c, and in other lessons? 4. reasoning: am i modelling careful explanation and justification for what i say and do, and calling on my students to do the same, in p4c and at all other times? 5. reflecting: am i creating enough opportunities for my students to think back and weigh up, privately and publicly, in p4c and in other lessons? as to virtues-valuing, this requires rather more detailed guidance than can be condensed into this piece, but here are a few general pointers. firstly, let me reiterate that some people (not just philosophers) publicly espouse some ‘values’, whilst privately, and actually, valuing something quite different, or even opposite. part of my argument for better valuing of virtues is that many curricula rhetorically espouse certain values, such as ‘balance’ or ‘deep learning’, but their systems of implementation practically hinder the attainment of such ideals. in effect, those responsible for the systems do not sufficiently practice the virtues necessary to realise their professed values. this may partly be due to their failure to recognise the fundamental importance of virtues—a failure which this article and the ptl project is hoping to turn around. but partly, of course, it may be due to pressures which divert them, or partly to simple weakness of will, from which we all suffer. 34 presenting p4c as a general pedagogy, with the name ‘philosophical teaching-and-learning’, does not detract from, nor denigrate, the expertise of teachers in any given subject. one can be a philosophical science teacher, or a philosophical history teacher, etc. but it does offer a sense of ‘value-added’: a philosophical science teacher will be a better science teacher for being philosophical. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 31 the same might be said of those, including myself hitherto, who in their promotion of p4c have held up certain values, especially virtues, but in practice have not valued them sufficiently. i maintain again that to value is to care and, furthermore, to care is to act. so, we need consciously and systematically to value, cultivate and celebrate virtues. it is very important, then, to keep one’s eyes / mind on the task in hand, and this is not the least reason for constructing a clear list of your own— preferably balanced between personal, social and intellectual virtues—that you consciously aim to nurture. here, then, are other simple suggestions, directed mainly at teachers: • make your list known to your students, perhaps even displaying it publicly. • be honest that it is aspirational—for you as much as for your students. • find time to talk about the behaviours that might be associated with those virtues, best of all in dedicated inquiries. (these can be linked with curriculum topics, especially notable characters in history or literature, or even in science.) • commend actions of your students that seem to display particular virtues—especially if they are part of a habitual pattern that you are trying to nurture. • remember the adage that virtues may be ‘caught not taught’—and that consistently practicing the virtues yourself (kindness, say, or composure)—may be as important as ‘teaching’ them. but be kind on yourself, too! • finally, consider joining my online course: ‘whole school values, whole person virtues.’ i end with a note of caution (to myself, as much as to others). there is another generally recognised problem with the curriculum: that if the focus of assessment is too narrow or its mode too inhumane, fine ambitions in the curriculum may come to little. the more holistic and more humane the ambitions, the greater the danger from assessment that is not fit for purpose. assessment, in other words, should not become the enemy of advancement. but again, i urge optimism, balanced with realism. systems can and do change. we must try to effect changes in the assessment of the curriculum, as well as in the curriculum itself. it cannot be beyond the wit of humankind to find a humane and fair way of assessing, or just validating, the sort of qualities that we all know are needed to meet the challenges of the 4cs of the modern apocalypse (and probably many other challenges besides). science and the arts may provide some of the means to meet those challenges, but philosophy provides the best practice and development of the necessary wills, skills and virtues. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 32 references dawes, l., english j., holmwood r., giles g., mercer n. (2005) thinking together in geography. stevenage: badger publishing. dewey, j. (1933) democracy and education: an introduction to the philosophy of education. new york: macmillan. dweck, c. s. (2006). mindset: the new psychology of success. new york: random house. freire, p. (1968) pedagogy of the oppressed. new york: herder and herder. harari, y.n. (2018) 21 lessons for the 21st century. new york: spiegel & grau. hattie, john (2008). visible learning: a synthesis of over 800 meta-analyses relating to achievement. new york: routledge. lipman, matthew (1974) harry stottlemeier's discovery new jersey: iapc. lipman, matthew (1977) philosophy in the classroom. philadelphia: temple university press lipman, m. (1995) caring thinking. inquiry: critical thinking across the disciplines, volume 15, issue 1, autumn. lipman, m. (2008) a life teaching thinking. new jersey: institute for the advancement of philosophy for children, montclair state university. mctighe, j. and wiggins, g. (2013) essential questions: opening doors to student understanding alexandria usa: ascd. sharp, a.m. (1993) the ethics of translation. critical and creative thinking vol 1.1. sharp, a.m. (1993) feminism and philosophy for children: the ethical dimension. thinking vol. 11, 3 & 4. sharp, a.m. (1995) the role of intelligent sympathy in educating for global ethical consciousness. keynote speech at icpic conference, melbourne. splitter, l.j. and sharp, a.m (1995) teaching for better thinking. melbourne: australian council for educational research. sutcliffe, r., buckley j., and bigglestone t. (2019) thinking moves a – z: metacognition made simple. london: dialogueworks. http://www.amazon.co.uk/thinking-together-geography-lyn-dawes/dp/1844244202/ref=sr_1_1?ie=utf8&s=books&qid=1225477080&sr=1-1 http://www.amazon.co.uk/thinking-together-geography-lyn-dawes/dp/1844244202/ref=sr_1_1?ie=utf8&s=books&qid=1225477080&sr=1-1 https://www.pdcnet.org/collection-anonymous/browse?fp=inquiryct https://www.google.fr/search?tbo=p&tbm=bks&q=inauthor:%22laurance+j.+splitter%22 analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 1 (2022) 33 sutcliffe r., and lewis l. (2017) teaching philosophy and philosophical teaching. in m. rollins, j. haynes, and k. murris (eds.) the routledge international handbook of philosophy for children. abingdon: routledge. sutcliffe r. (1994) is philosophical inquiry virtuous? thinking, volume 12.1 tough p. (2012) how children succeed. boston: mariner books. trilling, b., & fadel, c. (2009) 21st century skills: learning for life in our times. hoboken, nj josseybass/wiley. university of cambridge faculty of education (2021) what is dialogic teaching? available at: https://www.educ.cam.ac.uk/research/programmes/dialogic/whatis.html. accessed on 28th june, 2021. values-based education (2021) account available at: https://valuesbasededucation.com/. accessed on 28th june, 2021. waters, m. (2007) the big picture of the curriculum. uk government. available at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmchilsch/memo/natcurric/ucm 34b02.pdf. accessed 28th june, 2021. wiederhold c., kagan s. (1998) cooperative learning and high-level thinking: the qmatrix. cheltenham, australia: hawker brownlow education pty ltd. address correspondences to: roger sutcliffe, director www.dialogueworks.co.uk email: rogersutcliffe@outlook.com https://www.educ.cam.ac.uk/research/programmes/dialogic/whatis.html https://valuesbasededucation.com/ https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmchilsch/memo/natcurric/ucm34b02.pdf https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmchilsch/memo/natcurric/ucm34b02.pdf https://www.waterstones.com/author/chuck-wiederhold/1215909 http://www.dialogueworks.co.uk/ analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 1 imagining the ineffable: elucidating tacit knowing through deliberate imagining natalie m. fletcher introduction ichael polanyi famously stated that “we can know more than we can tell,”1 but is it possible to know more than we imagine? or, on the contrary, does imagining play a role in elucidating what we feel we know but cannot fully express? in this article, i will argue that imagining can elucidate knowledge by helping us to name and color in the contours of the fuzzy but existentially significant aspects of our phenomenological experience. specifically, i will claim that if we initiate deliberate imagining, as a conscious, flexible process of meaning-making, we may be in a better position to express the ineffable qualities of our tacit knowing, notably through interpretive acts of meaning-generation that are affectively charged. to start on a metaphorical note, this article deals with concepts that cannot stand still. concepts like imagination, tacit knowledge, affect and embodiment imbue richness and texture into our mental landscape—that vast expanse of intertwined knowledge, memories, beliefs and feelings that make up the scenery of our mind—but they do not stick around long enough for our direct contemplation; if chased, they move in so many different directions that it seems only definitional dizziness can ensue. in some sense, these concepts all share an ineffable quality, one that has alienated many theorists and rendered the prospects of the obscured illuminating the obscure hard to fathom. after all, how can that which is tacit itself elucidate tacitness elsewhere? accordingly, putting these restless concepts in relation is no easy task, and the connections and demarcations this article proposes will likely not satisfy all readers, but will hopefully lessen the conceptual fidgeting. to begin, in the first section, i will present some of imagination’s lovers and haters from intellectual history and a handful of key criteria garnered from the interdisciplinary contributions of contemporary imagination theory. the subsequent sections will examine tacit knowledge from major theoretical frameworks in an effort to reveal a relative subspecies of tacit knowing that deliberate imagining can help elucidate through immersive philosophical exploration. finally, in the concluding section, i will briefly outline why formal education should be concerned with the process of elucidating relative tacit knowing through deliberate imagining, notably through the community of philosophical inquiry (cpi) pedagogical model. i. under heated observation: construals of imagination the concept of imagination is like a wild animal in captivity: if observed from too close when confined, it appears not to behave like it might in a natural setting. studies done in a vacuum, or detached from the everyday context of living, have painted pictures of imagination that seem removed 1 plane, 1967, 4. m analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 2 from how many of us would describe our everyday imaginative activities. for instance, we can undergo experiments of imagining specific objects under increasingly complex circumstances to learn about our capacity to produce diverse mental images on command. one example from imagination theory involves starting with a simple visualization of a cat, followed by a more complicated visualization of the same feline with the added supposition that his parents have left him behind to tour france.2 yet such an orchestrated process, while illuminating in some senses, will not necessarily enhance our understanding of the ways our imagination quietly colors our perspectives and worldviews in the background of our thought by invoking our memory and orienting our reasoning. on the other hand, if imagination is studied unrestrained in its natural habitat—that is, in our phenomenological experience—it seems almost too vast to behold, assigned traits and behaviours so disparate that it appears contradictory and implausibly heterogeneous, responsible for sparking everything from our greatest scientific innovations to our finest poetry. as phenomenologist edward casey remarks, imagination has been “cast into exceedingly diverse roles, ranging from that of mere understudy to that of the leading character in the drama of the mind” and as a result has “come to promise more than it can possibly deliver.”3 with such a diversity of characterizations, imagination becomes difficult for us to spell out, making our knowledge of its functionings in some sense tacit despite the abundant attempts—not all of them charitable—to provide a unified picture. educational philosopher kieran egan has attributed this vagueness of imagination to the “compound of residues of various meanings people have had of it in the past...due in part to its complexity but also in part to its containing a number of elements that do not sit comfortably together.”4 given such difficulties, in this section, i will consider some of these conflicting elements by briefly surveying historical impressions of imagination, then narrowing in on features that can contribute to defining the kind of deliberate imagining i will be associating with the elucidation of tacit knowledge. historically, imagination has not enjoyed the noblest reputation, being routinely equated with fantasy and frivolity. plato infamously dismisses imagination as an inferior faculty prone to deceiving us through shadows of reality that can lead our reason astray and result in corrupting artistic pursuits like poetry, which excites our passions and distorts our values.5 in greek mythology, the rebellious prometheus, titan god of forethought, is described as stealing fire from mount olympus to fuel the imagination of humans, enabling creative pursuits once strictly reserved for the divine, then suffering eternal punishment chained to a rock where he is visited daily by a liver-eating eagle.6 similar conceptions of imagination as a symbol of resistance to holy command and spiritual upheaval permeate judeo-christian traditions, resulting in its being branded as profane and relegated to realms of the occult.7 2 this example is offered by dominic gregory to suggest that our mental imagery is not largely imagistic—some additional supposition-like information can be imagined without contributing anything more to the imagined image. gregory, 2016, 99. 3 casey, 1976, 19, 1. 4 egan, 1992, 9. 5 book vi of the republic in jowett, 1999: 258-264. 6 adapted from aeschylus’ prometheus bound in blackie, 1850: “the secret fount of fire / i sought, and found, and in a reed concealed it; / whence arts have sprung to man, and life hath drawn / rich store of comforts. for such deed i suffer / these bonds, in the broad eye of gracious day, / here crucified.” 7 egan, 1992, 13, 16-17. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 3 in the hands of 17th century philosophers of science, imagination has not fared better, with bacon describing it as a mere pleasure of art with no scientific potential,8 and descartes viewing it as “nothing more than to contemplate the figure or image of a corporeal thing,”9 engendering “blundering constructions” and “misleading judgments” that negatively affect our knowledge acquisition.10 in the field of psychology, freud has conflated imagining with acts like fantasizing, daydreaming and hallucinating, attributing it no special role besides “constructing composite images”11 that express our inner desires and drives, whereas piaget confines it to a phase of “symbolic play” and make-believe in child development that evolves into fuller cognitive capacities with age.12 on these accounts, it is as if imagination is being analyzed in a captive state from too close a range, with theorists focusing on the ways its image-creation can distract us through flights of fancy that distance us from what matters, revealing our hubris and immaturity. however, this perspective neglects the broader potential of imagination to assist with meaning-making by offering new modes of envisioning. in contrast, theorists that offer a wider lens of analysis have tried to pinpoint some of imagination’s essential qualities without straying too far from the significations we tend to attribute to it in our lived experience. kant’s account of imagination distinguishes between reproductive and productive types, arguing that the former works to mentally represent items that are not currently accessible to our senses and help to name them, whereas the latter involves the spontaneous “free play” of ideas toward our greater understanding of experience, notably through artistic expression and aesthetic appreciation. for his part, hume maintains that the imagination facilitates our generation of ideas—which he understands as images—to connect with our impressions of the world, thereby helping us understand our experience and build knowledge accordingly.13 these mental representations have an emotional counterpart since, as he writes, “the imagination and affections have a close union together...nothing which affects the former can be entirely indifferent to the latter.”14 romantic thinkers push this emotional connection further, extolling imagination’s capacity to draw on our feelings to freely express and shape our thoughts, with coleridge viewing it as a “mediator between reason and understanding,”15 and wordsworth referring to it as “reason in her most exalted mood”16 —a vital source of personal meaning. from an existentialist standpoint, imagination is associated with the very formation of selfhood: sartre claims it is through imagination that “consciousness discovers its freedom”17 and shapes identity. in the words of sartrean scholar jonathan webber, “we can imagine the world or any part of it being different from the way it in fact is. this ability is necessary to motivate changing the world.”18 8 francis bacon in spedding et al., eds., 1864-74, 406. 9 rené descartes in tweyman, ed., 1993, 53. 10 rené descartes in haldane and ross, eds., 1931, 7. 11 freud, standard edition, iv, 324. 12 piaget, 1962, 212. 13 warnock, 1976, 15, 26. 14 hume, 1896, 424. 15 warnock, 1976, 94. 16 william wordsworth in de selincourt and darbishire, eds., 1940-1949, 192. 17 kearney, 1988, 227. 18 webber, 2004, xxvi. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 4 last but not least, dewey’s wide angle perspective on imagination points to its far-reaching effects: for him, “all conscious experience has of necessity some degree of imaginative quality.”19 because it couples meanings from our previous experiences with our current lived circumstances, imagination can be seen as “the conscious adjustment of the old and the new”20—a faculty required for any human production, from engineering and technological invention to the artistic realm where it thrives best. on these accounts, it is as if imagination is being studied in the wild where it has free rein. its energy appears boundless and positive, though it needs harnessing to enable productive endeavors like idea generation, emotional expression, identity formation and aesthetic innovation. and so, from the pages of intellectual history we are left with the “compound of residues” described by egan, which have paved the way for a handful of assorted, contestable criteria in interdisciplinary contemporary imagination theory—as the following paragraphs will strive to itemize. in recent accounts, imagination is described as the “action of forming ideas or mental images”21 which are multi-sensory and “can cover visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory, etc., imagery.”22 this process can be active or passive, conscious or unconscious, but any visualization it enables will lack the “phenomenal oomph”23 of perceiving objects in real-time through the senses. we can envision abstractedly or in an “egocentric visualized space”24 from a particular perspective: either we are the subjects of the imagined scene or we envisage the scene from a set vantage point—like from the side or up above—as if viewing it as spectators.25 when we visualize objects and circumstances coming together to form a state of affairs, we are imagining-that, whereas when we envision ourselves experiencing something we have not undergone—the actions, thoughts, feelings that might be involved—we are imagining-how.26 the contents of our imaginings can also be non-imagistic, that is, not involve any visualized images: we can “talk quite properly of imagining reasons, differences, dilemmas and lies, of imaginary wants and happiness, of imaginable caution and torment, of imagining what, why and how...yet none of this is imageable.”27 moreover, imagination is seen as distinct from belief, although it shares some of its motivational force. we can imagine x without having to believe it since “we intend our beliefs to be true, while we have no such intention regarding our imaginings.”28 yet while our imaginings are not true, they are nonetheless experienced as real: “the contents of imaginings are fictional propositions in the trivial sense that they are to be imagined, not in the ordinary sense that they are a species of falsehood.”29 19 dewey, 2015, 283. 20 ibid, 283. 21 dominic gregory, “imagination and mental imagery” in kind, 2016, 97. 22 bruce nanay, “imagination and perception” in kind, 2016, 125. 23 ibid, 128. 24 ibid, 125. 25 gregory, in kind, 2016, 125. 26 casey, 1976, 42-45. 27 white, 1990, 28 neil sinhababu, “imagination and belief” in kind, 2016, 120. 29 kieran and lopes, 2003, 4. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 5 compared to other faculties of the mind, imagination is characterized as uniquely accessible: “it is nearly always available to us as an alternative to whatever else we may be doing at a given time, whether it be perceiving, remembering, reflecting, or whatever,” and with enough concentration, we can freely choose what and how we want to imagine.30 in terms of focus, then, imagination is concerned with possibility—it explores the possible without assuming its realization, making it “a fallible guide.”31 still, some argue that “the patently impossible cannot be imagined”32 since our imaginings are composed of pre-existing knowledge. within that repertoire, however, the capacity to be imaginative entails “being inclined and able to conceive of the unusual and effective”33 to enrich human endeavor. on current ontogenetic accounts, imagination through pretend play is no longer seen merely as a phase, as piaget has suggested, but rather as “the first indication of a lifelong mental capacity to consider alternatives to reality,”34 one that can enhance our decision-making skills by enabling us to think through the implications of possible courses of action. imagining possibility also lays the foundation for our empathic dispositions: when faced with an uncertain future, we need to “envisage possible but perhaps non-actual states of affairs...imagine how [our] tastes, aims and opinions might change and work out what would be sensible to do or believe in the circumstances” and we can use our “ability to imagine in order to yield an insight into other people without any further elaborate theorising about them.”35 by extension, imagination has sociopolitical dimensions since it can empower us to envision the world differently for ourselves and others—it makes possible “a view of society as an ongoing process of self-constitution through the continuous opening up of new perspectives in light of the encounter with the other.”36 engaging with the imaginary further helps us to resist problematic social codifications—it is “both a medium of experience and an interpretation of that experience in a way that opens up new perspectives on the world.”37 for present purposes, it is worth keeping in mind these historical impressions and varied criteria of imagination theory, but focus our attention on a few key features of what i call deliberate imagining. as casey asserts, in terms of our phenomenological experience, “imagination as a fixed faculty is indeed dead...but imagining is very much alive.”38 so rather than define imagination as a faculty, this article will focus instead on imagining as “a particular flexibility which can invigorate all mental functions,”39 to borrow from egan. more specifically, i will define deliberate imagining as a conscious, flexible process of meaning-making that occurs in our mental landscape but in response to 30 casey, 1976, 6. 31 ninan, in kind, 2016, 276. 32 vendler, 1984, 105. 33 barrow, 1990, 108. 34 further, paul l. harris argues “that the capacity to imagine alternative possibilities and to work out their implications emerges early in the course of children’s development and lasts a lifetime.” harris, 2000, 28, xi. 35 heal, 2003, 13. 36 delanty, 2009, 13. 37 ibid, 15. 38 casey, 1976, 3. 39 further, egan argues that “imagination is an intentional act of consciousness rather than a thing in consciousness; it is one way in which our consciousness works, rather than a distinct part of it that might be studied separately.” egan, 1992, 36. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 6 an actual phenomenological experience, and that is purposefully initiated to assist with achieving a particular goal, notably bringing to light what is tacitly known. this imagining process is pre-critical—it is concerned with exploring possibility in the here and now but not yet making judgments about the meanings it seeks to elucidate, whether they be ethical, political or societal.40 in the words of maxine greene, its role “is not to resolve, not to point the way, not to improve. it is to awaken, to disclose the ordinarily unseen, unheard, and unexpected.”41 further, deliberate imagining can be considered an aesthetic practice in a wide sense, without requiring artistic pursuits—our case study will be immersive philosophical exploration—since, to draw on affect theorist ben highmore’s conception of aesthetics, it is “primarily concerned with material experiences, with the way the sensual world greets the sensate body, and with the affective forces that are generated in such meetings.”42 and this practice, as we shall see, is not only embodied and affectively charged but may also be supportive of agency. in keeping with this section’s metaphor, throughout the rest of the article, i will strive to observe deliberate imagining “in the wild” in that i will be concerned with real phenomenological encounters of tacit knowing, and i will try not hold the imagining process captive by imposing, as dewey put it, “a ghostly metaphysics irrelevant to actual aesthetic experience.”43 yet i will also attempt some gentle taming of deliberate imagining by considering ways to make planned use of its elucidation powers for educative purposes. ii. accessing the ineffable: relative tacit knowing in an environment where formal, propositional knowledge is privileged, tacit knowing can be unfairly perceived as an invasive alien species threatening the stability of our epistemological ecosystem. it can seem unnecessarily messy and unappealing—even dangerous—to consider the notion of an embodied, incommunicable type of knowing that operates below the surface of intelligibility and defies the language and codification systems we establish to facilitate knowledge exchange. why spend time trying to illuminate that which will never allow itself to be fully verbalized or transmitted, and risks irreversibly muddying the epistemic waters? moreover, if we have oblique access to this tacit knowing, the urge to discover what we already know seems like a paradox, and a rather useless one at that. yet, in my view, this kind of perspective reflects an outdated understanding of what ought to count as knowledge—as pedagogues timothy leonard and peter willis note, “we never know ‘just the facts,’ for they are mediated by myriad versions and visions.”44 varied examples suggest that we have access to unspoken knowings that significantly impact our phenomenological experiences yet do not lend themselves well to the kind of direct, accurate 40 elsewhere, notably in a chapter of the routledge handbook of the philosophy of imagination, i have written about the moral and political dimensions of imagination but this essay will focus on pre-critical imaginative activity. 41 greene, 1995, 28. 42 highmore seeks to recover a lost sense of aesthetics as concerned with “creaturely, experiential life” rather than only art theory: he asks: “anyone interested in the history of aesthetics must be faced with this odd predicament: how does a form of inquiry that was once aimed at the entire creaturely world end up as a specialized discourse about fine art? how did an ambitious curiosity about the affects, the body, and the senses end up fixated on only one tiny area of sensual life-beauty and the sublime?” in gregg and seigworth, 2010, 121-122. 43 dewey, 2005, 306. 44 leonard and willis, 2008, 1. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 7 descriptions we have come to expect from our knowledge bases. such examples vary from humor and artistic taste to business savvy and the application of moral concepts, as well as especially embodied activities like dance, surgery or woodworking. in this section, i will examine tacit knowing from the perspective of the concept’s originator, scientist and philosopher michael polanyi, as well as through the categories of tacit knowledge proposed by sociologist harry collins. this examination will seek to to show how this species of knowing may destabilize our epistemological ecosystem for the better, recognizing the fuzzy but existentially significant ways we draw on our conceptual and sensory information to interpret our circumstances. for polanyi, tacit knowledge is part of what he calls the “ineffable domain” of knowing which designates those things “that [we] know and can describe even less precisely than usual, or even only very vaguely.”45 weaving issues of language and embodiment with the human drive for discovery, his theory offers the now famous example of bicycle riding as an illustration of a tacit type of knowing that enables us to operate successfully in a certain task without having to operationalize it—we can know how to proceed but not how to clearly express the particulars involved. according to polanyi’s theory, tacit knowledge remains intact and largely unproblematic to us until we attempt to explain it and find ourselves hitting a wall of linguistic limitations, realizing it eludes articulation despite our embodied grasp and genuine valorizing of it. in his words, “to assert that [we] have knowledge which is ineffable is not to deny that [we] can speak of it, but only that [we] can speak of it adequately”—it therefore lurks low in the “domain of sophistication” presided by propositional types of knowledge that are more readily codifiable.46 on polanyi’s account, language includes not only words spoken and written but also all other symbolic representations from mathematic equations and geographical maps to diagrams and graphs.47 we make sense of linguistic communication largely because many of our words connect to our experiences of embodiment: as he argues, “to a disembodied intellect, entirely incapable of lust, pain or comfort, most of our vocabulary would be incomprehensible,” since so much of it refers “to living beings, whose behavior can be appreciated only from an experience of the drives which actuate them.”48 while formal knowledge cooperates better with language than its tacit counterpart, polanyi insists that all our knowing retains an element of vagueness since “we remain ever unable to say all that we know…[and] we can never quite know what is implied in what we say.”49 and so, our tacit knowledge should not be discounted despite its reluctance to be made explicit since it comprises the personalized repository of conceptual and sensory information that compels us to problem-solve and innovate, notably in the sciences, where polanyi focuses much of his theorizing. in his estimation, “originality must be passionate.”50 human inquiry is fuelled by the inexact, unspecifiable but fervent knowings that help us intuit problems worth solving far before we have established what precisely we hope to discover. for polanyi, it is our imagination that strives to fill the 45 polanyi, 1962, 91. 46 ibid, 95. 47 ibid, 81. 48 ibid, 104. 49 ibid, 99. 50 ibid, 151. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 8 gap between what we tacitly know in intuition and what we seek: “it will be persistent, deliberate, and transitive; yet its whole purpose is directed on ourselves; it attempts to make us produce ideas…and the action induced in us by this ransacking [of our brain] is felt as something that is happening to us…we are actually surprised and exclaim: aha! when we suddenly do produce an idea.”51 whether the knowing is stored in our muscle memory or in our sensory responsiveness, we apprehend tacit knowing through and within our bodies, via imagination, and according to polanyi it has “existential meaning”52 for us; what we understand about it is personally significant even if not easily explicable. while sociologist harry collins agrees that tacit knowledge is important, in response to polanyi’s theory, he underscores what he deems a key distinction between tacit knowledge being inexplicable and inexplicit—the former suggests it cannot be explained whereas the latter hints only that it is not plainly expressed.53 in his view, the tacit is “made mysterious by its tension with the explicit”54 : it is because as humans we insist on talking things through that our tacit knowing seems problematic to us; animals do not share our concern. to help with demystifying this explicable-explicit tension, collins proposes three categories of tacit knowledge. first, relational tacit knowledge refers to knowing that is explicable but not made explicit for various reasons: for instance, it may intentionally be kept secret (an elite society wanting their agenda to remain classified); it may unintentionally be kept hidden (an employee leaving out procedural steps, assuming his colleagues are more informed than they are); or it may simply be unrecognized (a specialist not being aware of the important knowhow she routinely applies in her work). in theory, relational tacit knowledge can be explained but due to constraints of time, tradition and incentive, its complete elucidation is logistically unlikely: “any one piece of relational tacit knowledge can be made explicit, because the reason it is not explicit is contingent on things that can be changed.”55 second, somatic tacit knowledge refers to knowing that is explicable in principle by scientific means but in practice is hard to grasp because of our bodily limitations. for collins, polanyi’s bicycle example fits best in this category because the process is in fact explicable; it is just that we have difficulty translating the explanation (involving angles, equilibrium, laws of gravity, etc.) into action through our bodies due to the nature of our brain and its information acquisition—in such cases, we are dealing with “knowledge that is tacit because of our bodily limits.”56 in contrast, a computer could be trained through artificial intelligence to implement such complex principles and act in accordance with them. third, collective tacit knowledge refers to social knowing that we have not determined how to make explicit because it involves the intricacies of socialization across particular contexts, including assimilation and application of rules, practices, mores, values and conventions—or the “cultural fluency” resulting from social immersion. in these instances, according to collins, “to 51 polanyi, “creative imagination” in krausz et al, eds., 2009, 159. polanyi’s offers a rather broad description of imagination as constituting “all thoughts of things that are not present, or not yet present—or perhaps never to be present” and argues that “the imagination must attach itself to clues of feasibility supplied to it by the very intuition that it is stimulating; sallies of the imagination that have no such guidance are idle fancies.” ibid, 155, 160. 52 polanyi, 1962, 94. 53 collins, 2010, 4. for collins, “the tacit is that which has not or cannot be made explicit”—his definition thus includes the inexplicable along with what is difficult or unlikely to be expressed. ibid, 85. 54 ibid, 85. 55 ibid, 98. 56 ibid, 101. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 9 understand how these things are to be done we have to engage with social life.”57 here, the prime example would be riding a bicycle but in traffic, which adds myriad factors whose interpretations will vary from one context to another thus requiring a social embeddedness to properly “know” how to proceed—something a machine could not do with our current technology.58 though imagination could arguably play a role in illuminating the explicable-explicit tension in all three categories of tacit knowledge that collins identifies, i want to focus on the collective form. specifically, i will focus on how, as individuals, we “borrow”59 from this socially owned knowledge to make sense of our phenomenological experience—a process that stands to be greatly elucidated by deliberate imagining as the next section will strive to show. examples of collective tacit knowledge seem to center on socially embedded knowing regarding performed acts: beyond the bicycling example, collins describes the skills required for improvised dancing in public, noting that “social sensibility is needed to know that one innovative dance step counts as an improvisation while another counts as foolish, dangerous or ugly, and the difference may be a matter of changing fashions, your dancing partner and location.”60 yet, as i seek to argue in this article, the challenges of cultural fluency seem to also apply to interpretive acts conducted in our mental landscape in response to the performed acts we witness—we draw on collective tacit knowledge to make sense of how socialization is enacted in befuddling ways that give us an itch for elucidation. it may not be clear whether the itch is felt by others too but at the phenomenological level that does not matter since we experience it as problematic. as polanyi notes, “nothing is a problem in itself; it can be a problem only if it puzzles and worries somebody.”61 so the question becomes: for whom is this kind of knowing ineffable?62 for instance, some might find the intersubjective intricacies of justice obvious to explain because these do not present interpretive hurdles for them—political philosophers who have thought extensively about the topic’s myriad manifestations and associated levels of cultural fluency will be able to verbalize what they know in the face of, say, crimes against humanity, which may not be true of a young child whose comparatively limited but no less profound encounters with justice and attempts to interpret them remain genuine problems of articulation.63 in this sense, from my perspective, though fed by “the rich 57 ibid, 120. 58 ibid, 123. 59 as collins notes, when it comes to collective tacit knowledge, “we can only ‘borrow it’: it is not our property but is social and collective.” collins, 2010, 30-31. 60 ibid, 123. 61 polanyi, 1962, 129. 62 carroll asks a similar question when he dismisses the banality argument against the morally educative potential of literature: “conclusions that might appear utterly banal or obvious for experts in ethics may not be banal or obvious to nonprofessional audiences…what the philosopher discounts as trivial may in fact be revelatory for the plain reader and, for that very reason, can have a fair claim to being informative and educative for the intended audience.” carroll, 2002, 10. 63 fuzzy but existentially powerful concepts like justice present particular challenges for articulation. as polanyi writes, “we must use the word ‘justice’, and use it as correctly and thoughtfully as we can, while watching ourselves doing it, if we want to analyze the conditions under which the word properly applies. we must look, intently and discriminatingly, through the term ‘justice’ at justice itself, this being the proper use of the term ‘justice’, the use which we want to define.” polanyi, 1967, 122. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 10 layers of meaning from our collective history,”64 the degree to which this tacit knowing in interpretive acts is ineffable is relative to the person experiencing it based on her present mental landscape, yet it is felt as existentially worth elucidating because it points to something significant but fuzzy in her phenomenological experience. as moral philosopher mary warnock argues, this “sense that there is always more to experience, and more in what we experience than we can predict” is felt as very real to us, and the yearning for elucidation, notably through imagination, imbues our lived encounters with purpose.65 iii. elucidating imaginatively: tacit knowing unfolded through interpretive acts at last we arrive at a fine-tuned version of our original question: how can deliberate imagining elucidate our relative tacit knowing? if we think of the elucidation as taking place in our mental landscape—which combines not only our personalized repository of fluid conceptual and sensory information, but also socially owned knowledge on extended loan, so to speak—we can begin to see how deliberate imagining can elucidate our relative tacit knowing by helping us to name and color in the contours of those fuzzy but existentially significant aspects of our phenomenological experience. i want to argue that deliberate imagining, as a conscious, flexible and pre-critical process of meaningmaking, can facilitate carefully constructed interpretive acts—notably figurative language constructions and thought experiments, as we will soon see—with the aim of unfolding tacit meanings existing within our mental landscape. when effective, these interpretive acts can become what i call arresting aesthetic encounters: they seize elements of our embodied knowing with affective force and bring them to the surface of intelligibility, illuminating both details and context—in dewey’s words, they “concentrate and enlarge an immediate experience.”66 in this section, i will strive to illustrate this process of elucidation and its affective force with an example of immersive philosophical exploration, then elaborate on two interpretive acts that are typical of this exploration: figurative language constructions and thought experiments. by way of illustration, let us consider an example from personal experience that i think reflects the elucidation features considered so far. elsewhere, in an article inspired by merleau-ponty and by my own experiences with collaborative philosophical dialogue, i introduce the notion of body taunting to describe what takes place when disagreement is communicated nonverbally in antagonistic ways that contradict voiced arguments, through the combined “vocabulary” of flesh—gestural, postural, physiognomic, kinetic expression—used to provoke, dismiss, intimidate or alienate.67 this process of naming and coloring in my extremely fuzzy but very existentially significant phenomenological experience can appropriately be described as a case of deliberate imagining purposely initiated to elucidate my relative tacit knowing. after undergoing repeated instances of what i only later dubbed as “hostile interventions of body language” during philosophical dialogues, i tried to express for myself 64 collins, 2010, 30-31. 65 warnock calls this sense “the feeling of infinity.” she argues that “our experience is significant to us, and worth the attempt to understand it...without some such sense, even at the quite human level of there being something which deeply absorbs our interest, human life becomes perhaps not actually futile or pointless, but experienced as if it were.” warnock, 1976, 202-203. 66 dewey, 2005, 285. 67 fletcher, 2014, 11. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 11 and a few friends the affective intensity of what felt like a disingenuous incongruity between verbal and corporeal language on behalf of some of my co-inquirers—their dialoguing bodies seemed to be communicating something different than what they had voiced, resulting in mixed signals that were estranging to me and (i sensed) to others as well. in terms of the relative degree to which my tacit knowing was ineffable, since i am decidedly not an expert in body language or group dynamics, i had comparatively little to draw on in terms of cultural fluency in this area, although i knew something was amiss. on some level, i was drawing on collective tacit knowledge regarding what counts as socially acceptable in the context of intellectual conversations among adults, including appropriate gestures, delicate dealings with disagreement, cultural sensitivity, and subtle but palpable effects of gender disparities, to name but a few. yet my attempts to articulate this profound but messy phenomenological experience betrayed the coherence it enjoyed in my mental landscape; that is, until an arduous brain ransacking reached a polanyi-esque “aha!” moment of elucidation through imagining. indeed, it was only when i started to engage in figurative and counterfactual thinking through interpretive acts enkindled by my deliberate imagining that i had the impression this particular knowing of mine was being elucidated. taken together, my imagining of possibly useful labels and analogies—zeroing into potential significations and zooming out again—represented an arresting aesthetic encounter: it seized those elements of embodied knowing i was trying in vain to articulate and morphed them into the concept cluster of “body taunting” that approximated the experiences i had, then was further validated by some “aha!” moments in others who shared in my newly found elucidation. the small but personally meaningful social critique resulting from this precritical, flexible imagining process reflected what greene describes as “the creation of new interpretive orders as human beings come together not only to ‘name’ but to change or to transform their intersubjective worlds.”68 it is worth noting that in all likelihood, this process of elucidating our tacit knowing through deliberate imagining is, more often than not, highly affectively charged. why? affect is what motivates our itch for elucidation by shrouding a given situation in confusion, wonder, curiosity, and the like, so that we experience it as problematic and put our imagining to work. to be clear, affect in this sense is not merely a synonym for ‘atmosphere’ or ‘emotion,’ as colloquial descriptions might suggest—it denotes “impersonal intensities that do not belong to a subject or an object,”69 “forces of encounter…[that] need not be especially forceful,”70 “vivacity of context,”71 and “vital forces insisting beyond emotion” that “arise in the midst of inbetween-ness: in the capacities to act and be acted upon.”72 affect is indeterminate, pre-individualized and volatile,73 yet it is also “sticky”—“it preserves the connection between ideas, values and objects” and explains “how we are touched by what we are near.”74 so when our phenomenological experience confronts us with enactments of social knowing 68 greene, 1995, 61. 69 anderson, in gregg and seigworth, eds., 2010, 161. 70 gregg and seigworth, eds., 2010, 2. 71 massumi, 2002, 220. 72 gregg and seigworth, eds., 2010, 1. 73 wissinger, in clough and halley, eds., 2007, 238. 74 ahmed, in gregg and seigworth, eds., 2010, 30-32. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 12 that we find hard to interpret, the affects of that situation travel into the process of deliberate imagining that we initiate to elucidate what we have witnessed, then intermingle with the affects already connected with our collective tacit knowledge, and continue to resonate throughout the interpretive process. in this sense, no matter what emotions are subsequently evoked in our bodies, “the atmosphere is already angled; it is always felt from a specific point.”75 returning to the example of body taunting, the affects of hostility and antagonism that sparked the imaginative process entwined themselves with the fervor of wanting to label the felt incongruity which itself carried affects of chaos and bewilderment—all tinged with affects of estrangement and even righteous indignation culled from socially owned knowledge.76 in short, in the process of imaginative elucidation, affect can be described as what spurs our recognition of our relative tacit knowing so that we may get to a point where it is no longer ineffable to us. once spurred into immersive philosophical exploration, certain imaginative interpretive acts become especially useful to our elucidation process. first, figurative language constructions draw on our imaginative resources to manage the fuzziness of phenomenological experience by at once clarifying and clouding it—as warnock puts it, while “our imagination is at work tidying up the chaos of sense experience, at a different level it may, as it were, untidy it again.”77 one the one hand, when we attempt to explain our tacit knowing and find ourselves hitting a wall of linguistic limitations, figurative devices like metaphors and analogies help to provide a circuitous but often more existentially satisfying route to express what once felt ineffable. their aim is not precision but meaning generation that is intersubjectively compelling—as polanyi notes, “in order to describe experience more fully, language must be less precise.”78 as interpretive acts, they encourage us to imaginatively align two things that are distinct but comparable in some intuitive way, testing the comparison’s worth by extending it along various avenues across different contexts. in so doing, we change that which we are trying to name and color, and our tacit knowing is transformed—metaphors and analogies become “actual carriers of knowledge” and “the basis for the transfer of tacit knowledge,”79 because they “create novel interpretations of experience by asking the listener to see one thing in terms of something else...and create new ways of experiencing reality.”80 a time-tested case is myth: as an allegorical device, it is a prime example of collective tacit knowledge elucidated by imagining so that it can be borrowed by individuals and put to use in their own phenomenological experience—it endures because of what egan calls an “affective tug;”81 the vivacity of its affects survives through time and interweaves with our imagining’s drive to interpret meaning. the aforementioned myth of prometheus powerfully demonstrates this contribution to our cultural fluency. yet at the same time, figurative language constructions can be destabilizing: since we cannot coimagine—our imaginings never coincide exactly—the best thing we can do through metaphors and 75 ibid, 37. 76 borrowing from brian massumi, if affect is intensity, then “emotion is qualified intensity...it is intensity owned and recognized.” massumi, 2002, 88. 77 warnock, 1976, 207. 78 polanyi, 1962, 89. 79 fock, in göranzon et al., eds., 2006, 103. 80 donnellon, anne et al., 1986, 48. 81 egan, 1992, 32. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 13 analogies is “put together what [we] know in new ways and begin to express what [we] know but cannot yet say.”82 in these circumstances, ambiguity is not a failing since the imprecise explanations that figurative language offers may be more honest than some forms of explicit knowledge, recognizing the messiness of phenomenological experience and accepting the by-product of tacit residue. it is no coincidence that metaphors and analogies are used liberally throughout this article to grab hold of concepts that pose a flight risk. as products of deliberate imagining about the mystifying character of tacit knowledge, what they might end up elucidating is the extent to which tacit knowing is indeed obscure but profoundly integrated into our everyday context of living, and thus worth our conceptual attention. importantly, they try to convince us of imagining’s potential for knowledge elucidation, making us see that “the more energetic and lively the imagination, the more are facts constantly finding themselves in new combinations and taking on new emotional colouring as we use them to think of possibilities, of possible worlds.”83 under imagining’s tutelage, figurative language constructions elucidate our tacit knowing by awakening us to new but unfinished meanings. second and similarly, the imaginative interpretive act of thought experiments can help to unfold and reconfigure tacit meanings existing in our mental landscape. understood as imaginative hypotheticals deliberately devised to probe a concept and its implications, thought experiments elucidate the fuzziness of phenomenological experience by “reconfigure[ing] our conceptual commitments, thereby rendering our concepts newly meaningful,” to borrow from aesthetics philosopher noel carroll, and as such we can “regard them as productive of knowledge, since they make what in some sense is already known accessible and salient.”84 when well-constructed and sensorially detailed, thought experiments become arresting aesthetic encounters because of the affectively charged, creative world-making they encourage in us by invoking our tacit knowings, enabling us to move from actualities to possibilities and back again—to “see as” in the words of paul ricoeur.85 thanks to imaginative fuel, the specificity of details they provide helps to concretize concepts for us, involving our bodies affectively in the visualizing of what could happen if the hypothetical obtained—“we feel in ourselves some of the affective aspects of the scene”86 —so “although the world-frames of imaginative presentations lack the depth, breadth and persistence of the perceived world, they do present themselves as evanescent constellations of specific imagined contents, as momentary mini-worlds of imaginative experience.”87 if we imagine, for instance, a world without imagination, the myriad elements of our pre-factual and counterfactual thinking can evoke strong emotional reactions because of what we already know to be the case in our social interactions (by appeals to our collective tacit knowledge), and due to the affects sticking to the atmosphere of our endeavor—at times consternation at the possibility of the hypothetical coming true, other times playfulness with the freedom of imagining different scenarios. in thought experiments, imagining flexes its muscles. as egan writes, 82 richards, 1936, 89. 83 egan, 1992, 50. 84 carroll says that thought experiments “rely upon what competent users of a concept already, in some sense, know in order to clarify our understanding.” carroll, 2002, 7-8. 85 egan, 1992, 18. 86 warnock, 1976, 169. 87 casey, 1976, 51. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 14 the flexibility that is central to imaginativeness seems to enable the imaginative person to conceive of a wider than normal range of states or actions that do not exist or that do not follow by literal extrapolation from current states or actions or from conventional representations of states or actions. in conceiving an indeterminate range of such states or actions the imaginative person can hold them in the mind, consider potential implications, assess their appropriateness, scan their features, selecting whichever might be most unusual and effective.88 this complex imaginative thinking is crucial because it sheds new light on our existing tacit knowing, and may even contribute to our shaping and moulding the collective tacit knowledge that governs so much of our intersubjective exchanges. indeed, by painting alternative possibilities that engage us affectively, thought experiments, as imaginative explorations, “suggest the contingency of the reality we are envisaging,”89 and can move us to challenge the contents of our cultural fluency. moreover, in both cases of immersive philosophical exploration—figurative language constructions and thought experiments—we can often benefit from a “reflective afterlife”90 that continues to color in the contours of the concepts and phenomena we have sought to name, bringing a creative philosophical literacy to our everyday context. we gain new understanding through imaginative “readings” of our tacit knowings. through examples of immersive philosophical exploration, we can already start to see the educative powers of deliberate imagining with respect to our tacit knowing. in closing, it is worth briefly reflecting on a few specific reasons why formal education should be concerned with this imaginative process of elucidation, namely: to prevent “affect aliens” and to increase agency by personalizing knowledge. we have seen how deliberate imagining—as a conscious, flexible and precritical process of meaning-making—can facilitate carefully constructed interpretive acts “in the wild” of our actual, day-to-day phenomenological experience, to help unfold the tacit meanings of our mental landscape, but this process may also be adapted to thrive “in captivity” within a school setting. with some gentle taming of deliberate imagining into a pedagogically useful aesthetic practice, we can envision some planned uses of its elucidation powers for educative purposes. first, formal education should be concerned with elucidating tacit knowledge by imaginative means so as to prevent students from becoming “affect aliens,”91 a term coined by sara ahmed to designate individuals who are estranged by the prevailing affects of their context. for our purposes, affect aliens are in a sense forced to exist on the margins of collective tacit knowledge because it does not represent what they find meaningful. ahmed’s examples of “feminist kill-joys, unhappy queers, and melancholic migrants”92 can be translated to the realities faced by students whose difference may preclude their sense of belonging at school and surface in the form of resistance, warranted as it may be. relative to their current mental landscape, such students may find that what they know to be morally wrong or problematic in a classroom that, say, privileges whiteness or heteronormativity, is 88 egan, 1992, 14. 89 greene, 2013, 30. 90 carroll, 2002, 12. 91 ahmed, in gregg and seigworth, eds., 2010, 29-30. 92 ibid, 30. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 15 extremely ineffable to them, notably compared to the politicized adults that ahmed references, but their phenomenological experience is no less existentially profound. here, the kind of immersive philosophical exploration we have been considering could help engage students imaginatively with their tacit knowing so as to awaken them to new but unfinished meanings and move them to challenge the cultural fluency of their school so they do not get affectively alienated from their educational experiences. in this case, pre-critical deliberative imagining can pave the way to the more critical envisioning that we associated earlier with empathy and socio-political engagement. on a related note, formal education should also be concerned with the imaginative process of elucidation so conceived to increase the agency of students by helping to personalize their knowledge. by focusing on the tacit knowing relative to students in their present circumstances, we can give them a chance to voice what they find fuzzy but significant in their phenomenological experiences— regardless of whether we as educators share in their itch for elucidation or have already figured out our own articulations. as a result, they may become better acquainted with themselves as knowers and become more active participants in their knowledge construction. as epistemologist ingela josefson writes, “there is a tacit knowledge in every word we say. a person’s language is a fingerprint of her meeting with the world; it is loaded with the individual fabric of life that has given concepts meaning.”93 for instance, what students are able to communicate through thought experiments can help them figure out what matters to them in light of tacit knowings they already have, all the while giving these a new coloring. as development psychologist paul harris writes, “the landscape of reality may look different after they return from an excursion into the counterfactual world.”94 iv. educative elucidation: deliberate imagining of the tacit at school but how might this process of elucidation happen in schools? educational theorists douglas thomas and john seely brown have proposed that we cultivate students’ imaginative engagement by creating “a bounded learning environment that strikes a balance between constraint and freedom, and exercises based, for example, on ‘what if’ questions that allow the imagination to flourish.”95 many pedagogical methods are likely to contribute to such a learning environment, and to these ends, pedagogical pluralism is probably worthwhile.96 but let us briefly consider the community of philosophical inquiry (cpi) as one viable approach. as conceived by co-founders matthew lipman and ann margaret sharp, the cpi aims to develop responsible, relational agency through multidimensional thought (or combined critical, creative and caring thinking), by challenging youth to confront the contestable questions they deem central to their lives and seek reasonable judgments through structured group dialogue.97 if used specifically with deliberative imagining in mind, this model can purposefully integrate thought experiments and narratives rich in figurative language to encourage youth to pinpoint fuzzy but significant elements of their tacit knowing that they would like 93 göranzo, 2006, 44. 94 harris, 2000, 118. 95 thomas and brown, 2012, 54. 96 although beyond the scope of this particular article, it would be important to examine the possible downsides and dangers of this kind of approach, notably with respect to issues of neurodiversity and different learning styles. 97 for more on the nature of the cpi as method, please see matthew lipman’s thinking in education (cambridge, ma: cambridge university press, 2003). analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 41, issue 2 (2021) 16 to elucidate. given its philosophical commitments, the cpi can also easily offer youth the challenge of crafting effective metaphors and analogies that extend the breadth of their mental landscape through imaginative world-making, while problematizing their repository of conceptual and sensory information toward new meanings and knowings. this potential has not only educative but also epistemological potential for childhood. it stands to reason that youth’s mental landscape likely contains more tacit elements given they are generally less experienced and language-savvy than adults—they might “know” a lot more than they can explain yet the fuzziness of this knowing still stands in the way of its transformation into concerns and commitments despite its felt importance. powerful philosophical concepts like justice (as we have seen) as well as freedom, power and identity may present particular challenges for articulation, which is why the cpi is such an interesting candidate for a collaborative practice of deliberate imagining that enables youth to illuminate their tacit knowings with others in a purposeful way. such envisioning can act as a useful stand-in for the experiences that youth have yet to encounter—they can deliberately imagine in their mental landscape through a kind of deweyan “dramatic rehearsal” in which possibilities can be tested without the “irrevocable” consequences of “an act overtly tried out,” until they live out the real thing, so to speak. in contexts where formal, propositional knowledge tends to be privileged, children’s tacit knowing risks being unfairly neglected in part because they draw on sensory, affective information to interpret their circumstances—that is, the often-confusing adult world they will eventually inherit but currently experience as newcomers. yet this very freshness in the face of philosophical concepts carries with it possible tacit knowings that could greatly contribute to knowledge production if only these could be elucidated. in this light, deliberate imagining could contribute not only to youth’s education but also to their emerging agency—thereby fighting against their epistemic exclusion—by helping them to spell out concerns and commitments that may otherwise seem ineffable to them despite their personal significance. if successful, the cpi and its collaborative interpretive acts could become arresting aesthetic encounters for youth that are 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(2012) “cultivating the imagination in a world of constant change.” forum futures. tweyman, s., ed. (1993). rené descartes: meditations on first philosophy. new york: routledge. vendler, zeno. (1984). the matter of minds. oxford: clarendon press. warnock, mary. (1976). imagination. london: faber and faber. webber, jonathan, tr. (2004). “philosophical introduction.” in the imaginary. london: routledge. white, alan r. (1990). the language of imagination. oxford: blackwell. wiltsher, nick and aaron meskin. (2016). “art and imagination.” in the routledge handbook of the philosophy of imagination, edited by amy kind. new york: routledge. address correspondences to: natalie fletcher, affiliate professor, department of philosophy, université de montréal, email: natalie.malo-fletcher@umontreal.ca mailto:natalie.malo-fletcher@umontreal.ca book review: maughn rollins gregory and megan jane laverty's "gareth matthews, the child's philosopher" analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 2 (2022) 86 book review gareth matthews, the child’s philosopher edited by maughn rollins gregory and megan jane laverty routledge, copyright year 2022 300 pages hardcover $128.99, softcover $49.94, ebook $39.16 isbn 9781138342736 review by wendy c. turgeon his new book from the routledge series, philosophy for children founders, is a masterful and completely engaging account of the impact gareth matthews had on the movement(s) loosely labeled “philosophy for/with children.” i was familiar with matthew’s three main books, philosophy and the young child (1982), dialogues (1984), and philosophy of childhood (1996) but i discovered in this volume a wealth of new reflections about matthews’s work, his own carefully crafted arguments and connections to greek philosophy, and thirdly, how his legacy lives on in the scholarship and practice of his “philosophical descendants.” the first thing to note is the lengthy section of quotes from early readers who advocate for this text; renowned philosophers, educators, administrators, p4c practitioners, and authors from around the world comment on the value of this collection of carefully crafted essays. while most books come with a couple of endorsements from scholars in the field, this one conveys a level of genuine enthusiasm and engagement from widely diverse academic areas. they invite the reader to take it seriously and demonstrate how wide is his audience. the two editors have organized the text into five sections: matthews on philosophy and children’s literature, on children’s philosophical thinking, his approach to being a socratic teacher of a particular sort, his astute criticism of developmental psychology, and finally, his introduction to the new field of philosophy of childhood. each section opens with an essay that explores how matthews approaches the topic at hand. the authors of these essays often knew him personally and the warmth of their relationship comes through their account, but they always take a careful look at his extraordinary strengths and sometimes misses in each account. each contributor is an acknowledged scholar and recognized practitioner in doing philosophy with children. these authors hail from around the world, signaling the impact of this one pioneer in child philosophy. following the introductory essay in each section are two or three essays by matthews himself, chosen from his many books and articles, including an interview as the final excerpt. t analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 2 (2022) 87 what is particularly striking about this volume is the interconnectedness of the essays. the invited authors reference one another’s work here as well as the included writings by matthews. this creates a seamlessly integrated text that draws the reader into a living conversation among all contributors. unfortunately, as matthews passed away in 2011, he cannot join in the conversation except through his published work. i can imagine him patiently wanting to engage and respond to each author. before entering the five thematic sections on matthews, the reader will encounter two important “doors” to pass through. editors gregory and laverty have collaborated on an introduction which shares the life and scholarship of matthews, and details his impact through three channels: how children’s literature captures “philosophical whimsy” (matthew’s own word), his unique approach to philosophy for children as contrasted with the lipmanian approach, and thirdly, his development of the field of philosophy of childhood, especially in opposition to the denigrating effects of developmental psychology which privileges the adult (often male) experience as normative. this opening essay will serve to orient the readers who may not be familiar with matthew’s work but also will assist those who are so familiar to stand back and appreciate the shape of matthew’s thinking about philosophy and about children. a quick perusal of their sources at the end of their piece will serve to guide novice readers into the significant work published in philosophy with children. the second introductory essay, “time and place for philosophy,” is by the noted philosopher, stanley cavell. cavell opens with an account of his long-term relationship with matthews and their shared interest in human reflection and how one stage of life connects to another in terms of thinking both in process and content. in this essay, he ranges across open topics such as teaching, the child as proto-philosopher/scientist, and wittgenstein’s contributions to these questions. what cavell’s essay contributes to this volume is the important commentary that we must be cautious about assuming we understand children, adolescence, even adulthood simply because we have (most likely) lived all three “stages of” or passages through these regions of human experience. he also demonstrates the seriousness with which we must take the work of matthews and not corral it into a ghetto of “philosophy with children” as if that had no relevance for the larger philosophical community. matthews himself, as a respected scholar of ancient and medieval philosophy, worked hard within professional philosophical circles to signal the importance of childhood and philosophy by children for all of us. cavell hits that message home. the following five sections explore the themes mentioned above. part one begins with an essay by karin murris whose own work in children’s literature is well known. while she offers a masterful account of matthew’s use of children’s literature to explore problematic issues and enjoy philosophical whimsy, she offers a thoughtful critique of both why matthews contributions are so very important but also where they might fall short. she brings in her own research on the ways in which childhood has been colonialized and objectified so as to deny the child agency or assume what that agency can or should be. while remaining a staunch advocate for using children’s stories, she reminds us to be watchful for the ways we adults can shape the reading to suit our fixed conceptual understandings of what childhood is. matthews, using primarily western/american stories, may have missed opportunities to problematize the reading of the stories and the importance of the images that usually accompany them. despite her caveat, she offers a clear portrait of matthews’ groundbreaking work analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 2 (2022) 88 promoting children’s literature as genuinely philosophical and entertaining seriously the ideas of children as thinkers. following her introductory essay are three reprints by matthews which explore, in turn, the naturalness of the philosophical impulse for (many) children as captured in the stories they enjoy, a range of examples of traditional philosophical questions (thinking about causality, religion, meaning of life, ethics) as captured in popular children’s stories, and finally, three of his columns on stories and how they exhibit opportunities to explore such questions. part two focuses on matthews’ view of the child as philosopher. this indeed is the opening essay by stephanie burdick shepherd and cristina cammarano. the opening dilemma is the debate over whether philosophy for children must be grounded in a philosophical tradition with clearly trained philosophers leading the path or whether anyone can do philosophy with children using regular language through engagement with narratives. they depict matthews as countermanding this conflict through his own work and writings. they present three key points: an awareness of the philosophical tradition allows one to recognize the child as philosopher; the tradition can offer those wonderful puzzles captured by adult philosophers for children to ponder; and thirdly, seeing the child as a philosopher returns philosophy to the idea of a mode of living, not simply an academic subject available to few (p. 87). in their essay, they walk the reader through matthews’ reasons for why he claims that children are natural philosophers, and they follow that up with a careful look at some critiques of his approach, generally weighing the arguments in favor of matthews. matthews does not deny that there are some differences between what adult and child philosophers are doing but we are presented with reasons not to see these as adversarial or even as moving towards some normative standard so much as being complementary. one of the ideas the authors introduce and focus upon is the power of philosophy to “allow for the cultivation of an emerging grandparent self as well as an eternal child-self” (p. 99). in some ways i am reminded of murris’ warning not to segregate human experience into categories but to be more fluid and open. burdick shepherd and cammarano end their review with an honest consideration of the challenge that doing philosophy with children could be detrimental to them. but here too matthews has considered this and reminds us that children, like adults, have different experiences and following their lead, rather than some age-developmental chart, is the honest way to acknowledge their genuine curiosity and thoughtfulness. the paired essays by matthews explore matthews’ experience with a discussion with seventh graders on holiness sparked by a reading of leviticus and the euthyphro and a delightful foray into ancient philosophy (excerpts from lucretius, plato, and zeno) and how young people offered cogent and startling creative resolutions to these classic quandaries. i was particularly struck by the young girl, anna, who responded to the ring of gyges story: “…but then, with a magic ring like that some of us would also do some good things we might not otherwise do” (p. 117). i have never had an undergraduate offer that more positive point of view about humankind! in the third part of the text, the theme is the nature of the socratic teacher, a term often used but with many different interpretations. peter shea, former student and lifetime friend of matthews, offers a personal portrait of matthews as teacher. matthews himself distinguished between socratic instruction (asking questions in shared ignorance) and socratic elenchus (the drawing out of answers by a skilled and knowledgeable mentor (p. 128). shea offers an insightful contrast between the approaches of matthews and that of lipman. while lipman’s curriculum is designed to have children analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 2 (2022) 89 offer the questions and set the discussion agenda, matthews was more directive with a determined path for exploration set by him. shea points out that the two scholars may have had different audiences in mind in terms of making the argument for the value of philosophy. for lipman, it was the educators who would welcome critical thinking as a worthwhile goal while for matthews his audience was philosophers who would be skeptical of the nature of the discussion as genuinely philosophical. building upon matthews’ dedication to ancient philosophy and his careful reading of plato, shea goes on to explore how matthews adopts and adapts the socratic “midwife” analogy to his own work with children. the next urgent point shea makes is the impending death or at least marginalization of philosophy in academia and how matthews approach reminds us that philosophy has the “power to nourish the soul” (p. 136). the recent movements of philosophy into public life underscore the ways in which philosophy needs to come out of the ivory tower and serve both the greater good but also the very personal needs of people hungry for and searching for meaning. here he mentions the fine work of the two editors of this entire text (gregory and laverty) to this end. the socratic message that philosophy is learning how to live towards death gains new urgency in our pandemic-encompassing and divisive world. shea references the opening essay by cavell throughout his own contribution and offers us ways to see the ongoing complexity of how philosophy presents itself throughout one’s life. shea’s essay is particularly rich in offering some comments which help the reader both navigate the admittedly dense cavell opening piece and also appreciate the differences between lipman and matthews. at times, i see him as a bit unjust to the work of lipman but i respected his analysis of their differences. for example, lipman does address the value of closure in a discussion. again, the two following essays by matthews himself illustrate the points offered in shea’s commentary. the essay entitled “socratic children” was particularly insightful as a way to read plato’s understanding of and use of socrates throughout his dialogues, early into late period. as plato had socrates reject doing philosophy with young people in the republic, it is intriguing to read matthews’ interpretation of the return of the ‘child’ in the later dialogue, the theaetetus. this argument is further expanded in the second matthews article, “whatever became of the socratic elenchus?” both of these readings are rich in analysis of the evolution of plato’s own philosophical thinking as well as building a case for doing philosophy with young people. the following section, part iv, tackles matthews’ views on developmental psychology. here our introductory essay is by noted scholar and practitioner, jen glaser. piaget’s developmental schemes for cognition have an iron hold on educators to this day. even as psychologists have backed off full endorsement, educators treat developmental stages as truth and use them to design everything from testing to “age-appropriate” book labeling. i have always appreciated matthews careful analysis and critique of piaget as found in two chapters in his text philosophy of childhood, and glaser’s essay here brings out clearly how effective and comprehensive matthews’ challenges are. she separates them into two groups: critiques on piaget’s methods and on his theory. psychologists themselves have mounted some serious challenges to piaget’s methods but here matthews’ focus is presented as highlighting the ways in which piaget ignores or redefines data that challenges his cognitive model. when it comes to the actual theory, the critique zeros in on the relationship between language and thought, that is— which comes first. while piaget assumes “that children’s words are necessarily inadequate to convey analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 2 (2022) 90 their world of thoughts”, matthews argues “that young children only acquire concepts as they become inducted into a language community” (p. 171). glaser then introduces kohlberg who developed a popular theory of moral development, inspired by piaget’s schemas for cognitive growth. it is worth noting that piaget himself rejected any developmental model for moral development in the one book he wrote on this topic but kohlberg’s model has also taken hold of the educational community and continues to be taught as if it were fact. matthews offers another devastating analysis of those alleged stages of moral development and if accepted, the conclusion would seem to be that no one acts morally before adulthood, if even then! the genuine danger of either developmental theory (for cognition or moral thinking) is that it privileges the higher stages as norms and any stage prior to those high ones are defined by their inadequacies. aligning children with “primitive cultures,” as piaget and kohlberg do, reveals the blatant western bias that alas, too often still operates in terms of our understandings of and appreciation for different ways of living. glaser goes on to detail matthews’ alternative approach to ethical growth through dimensions, not stages, and she skillfully applies these to cognitive growth as well. i found that section of her essay to be particularly creative and thoughtful. in this section, glaser’s article is followed by an extensive critique of piaget’s cognitive theory and kohlberg’s moral development theory by matthews himself. he introduces his model for moral growth as across the four dimensions of choosing paradigms, offering defining characteristics, exploring the range of cases that fall under a particular moral concept, and the judgement among varying competing moral claims (pp. 193-194). in his later writings, he will add the dimension of moral imagination. the main problem with kohlberg’s schemas, as matthews details it, is the unavoidable conclusion that any moral reason given before the higher stages is really premoral. i would claim that in these early stages “right” means simply doing what i want, avoiding punishment, or garnering praise and acceptance. none of these really capture the idea of doing what is right because it is right. kohlberg’s emphasis on universalizability and impartiality leans in a clearly kantian direction and were justifiably critiqued earlier by carol gilligan who claimed that another approach to ethical decisions would focus on care and familiarity with the individuals involved. at the very least, we do not consider our obligations to others as completely equal in that i owe more care and concern to my family and friends before total strangers—not that such allows me to discount those strangers. the second essay by matthews, “children, irony, and philosophy” considers the claim by ellen winner (notably associated with howard gardner and his work on creativity in young children) that young children cannot understand the cognitive complexity of irony. but matthew’s rejoinder is that many children’s stories clearly ask of their readers to appreciate irony in terms of what is said can be understood contrarily. perhaps children do not get sarcasm where the speaker intends the listener to hear her words as implying the opposite, but they certainly can appreciate the many examples where the speaker in the story says one thing but we know the opposite to be true. one of my favorite examples of this kind of irony is found in the picture book, boodil my dog (pija lindenbaum, 1992), where the narrator praises her bull terrier for his courage, caution, and other virtues, all of which is completely belied by the images of said boodil demonstrating the exact opposite of each attributed virtue. children get the irony on every page. matthews uses his favorite series of stories by arnold lobel, the frog and toad collection, to demonstrate how often irony comes into play and how his analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 2 (2022) 91 collaborative young philosophers get the humor. he also offers several other examples of children’s stories that use irony to drive their message. the final section of the text invites the reader to explore how matthews created and shaped the field of “philosophy of childhood.” the title of the opening essay, by walter omar kohan and claire cassidy, “philosophy of childhood or children?” hints at their line of questioning. they trace how matthews himself began to think about philosophy of childhood as a distinct field in philosophy and they review his initial set of “desiderata” or goals for such an area and then offer how he reshaped his criteria along his normative claims (see pp. 216-217). along with some of the other contributors to this volume, kohan and cassidy point out the influential role that his work in ancient philosophy and the analytic bend that matthew uses in his own philosophical analysis of concepts play in how he approaches the crafting of this new perspective within philosophy. they take the reader through each “desiderata” or criteria for a philosophy of childhood as outlined by matthews, both unpacking his own thinking but also offering their own commentary that, to some extent, his views are culturally limited to anglo-american methods of doing philosophy—perhaps a quite important point. they end with an acknowledgement of the burgeoning interdisciplinary studies of childhood as well as the continental european traditions that have begun to consider “childhood” beyond children and indeed the notion of multiple childhoods. (this parallels to my mind the move from second to third wave feminism when we realized not all women have the same experiences, needs, or interests.) while their accounts of some new directions are brief, the reader will find enlightening, inspiring, and provocative their overview of such recent and alternative views of childhood from david kennedy, lyotard, agamben, deleuze and guattari, as well as the extensive work by kohan himself, and karin murris with her notion of the posthuman child. this essay serves as a perfect pointer to indicate the next steps beyond matthews’ groundbreaking work on philosophy of childhood and signal the rich heritage of ideas and questions generated by matthews. the first matthews excerpt illustrates precisely the trajectory of his own thinking about philosophy of childhood as charted by kohan and cassidy. he ends his account with the claim that he is suggesting “a mirror image model that will invite the sharing of perspectives and the enrichment of both adulthood and childhood alike” (p. 245). following this is the short introduction by matthews and susan m. turner to their edited volume of essays on the ways in which some western philosophers have depicted children and childhood. this volume is essential for an excellent overview of (some) of the ways in which the recognized giants of the western philosophical tradition have reflected their own culture’s attitudes towards children and how they crafted their own theory of human nature. the final essay by matthews in this volume is an interview with susannah sheffer in which he eloquently advocates for the rights of children to be heard, to be taken seriously and with respect. but the last word in this volume is by jana mohr lone, an american theorist and practitioner of philosophy with children. she shares her personal relationship with matthews as instructor and ultimately mentor as she began her career in precollege philosophy. she echoes the constant theme offered in each essay of how influential matthews was, how inspirational as philosopher and as a person, and finally how passionately he advocated for children. i would add that his advocacy sounds out in a society which professes to be all about “family values” but in fact denigrates and dismisses the analytic teaching and philosophical praxis volume 42, issue 2 (2022) 92 child in both policy and practice. the warmth of her astute observations offer a fitting book end to the opening introduction by gregory and laverty. to close this book review, i would highlight the index provided—always an excellent way to explore specific themes or references throughout all of the articles. finally, i would like to reiterate the holistic nature of this book. each contributor is actively engaged with the others in weaving together a rich accolade to matthews, while at the same time, maintaining a critical stance to invite further work in this field. i found this to be the most impressive aspect of this volume and attribute it to the work of the two editors, gregory and laverty, both experienced leaders in running a “community of inquiry.” i can easily imagine gareth matthews would entirely approve and, if he were with us, would eagerly enter into the conversation. address correspondences to: wendy c. turgeon, st. joseph’s college-ny email: wturgeon@sjcny.edu