Analytic teaching and philosophical praxis ANALYTIC TEACHING AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRAXIS Volume 34, Issue 2 (2014) 47 Caritas and Experience-based Learning: Teaching Love to Filipino College Students Bernardo N. Caslib, Jr. Abstract: In this paper, I argue that love, specifically Thomas Aquinas’ notion of caritas, can be taught by employing experience-based learning. I attempt to present a strategy that I’ve employed in my own classes in a university in the Philippines: by taking students to an institution for abandoned elderly, lessons in class are concretized in a real-world situation. Composed of three steps: meaning making, paradigm-shifting and self-understanding, Provenzo’s road map of learning was followed. This was implemented through classroom discussion, immersion, and writing reflections, respectively. Using my students’ statements on things they have learned throughout the process, I have proved that this technique effectively bridged a 13th century concept with a concern that this generation is in need of fuller understanding, love. Introduction rew Leder, in his chapter in the book ‘Teaching Philosophy’1, introduces the notion of experiential learning: teaching by exposing students to out-of-classroom learning experiences that are intended to enrich these learners’ cognizance of usually distant, abstract concepts. He recognizes that teaching and subsequently, learning of students may be achieved by connecting concepts with real-life situations. He cites teachers who have provided “experiential examples in class”2 to facilitate better learning and better understanding of lessons by students. He suggests, however, that rather than just providing examples in class that mimic students’ actual experiences, we teachers could “design experiences for our students that provoke further philosophical reflection.”3 Leder relays how he employs this strategy in his teaching Asian Philosophy: by allowing students to visit institutions such as a home for people with AIDS, he allows his students to grapple with the intricacies of topics in his course such as “personal identity, self-body relationship, karma, death and reincarnation, suffering and techniques for mastering and transcending it, compassion, interdependency, the caste system...”4 among others. Through exposing students to circumstances that provide them deeper insights into life in general, they are able to appropriate concepts better in their own lives and in their general understanding of the world. Even as he thinks that this technique is pedagogically sound, Leder admits of questions and challenges that this method faces. One of these is its applicability in the realm of Western Philosophy. Leder says, “And while these techniques may be suited to Asian Philosophy are they adaptable to topics in Western thought?”5 This paper is an attempt to respond to this. In this work, I attempt to present a version of an experience-based learning strategy that I have employed for quite some time in my own classes6 in the university where I teach. I claim that this medium successfully complements classroom lectures on a particular variety of love, Aquinas’s notion of Caritas. This type of love, he D ANALYTIC TEACHING AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRAXIS Volume 34, Issue 2 (2014) 48 elucidates, is based primarily on man’s rational faculty and not on his senses alone. In this paper, I first talk comprehensively about Thomas Aquinas’s concept of love in the Summa Theologica. This shall be the groundwork upon which I present a way love can be taught and how an out-of-classroom activity makes the learning experience richer for my students and how this technique becomes potent in bridging a 13th century concept with a concern that this generation is arguably in need of fuller understanding: love.7 Thomas Aquinas and Love For Thomas Aquinas, there are two kinds of love, amor and caritas. Amor refers to the love that is produced by the sensitive part of the soul. According to Aquinas, beings in the world that have sensitive souls just like animals and humans are prone, foremost, to sensitive love or amor. Aquinas’s vocabulary owes its origin to Aristotle’s tripartite distinction of the kinds of soul. “The soul enlivens in three ways, cumulative like the point, line, plane series in geometry. The nutritive soul is simplest, involved in feeding, growth, and reproduction. It is the soul in plants and simple animals. Most animals in addition have sensitive soul to sense and respond to the environment and enable desire and movement. The rational soul occurs only in humans.”8 When a lion senses a prey to feast on, this is the working of its sensitive soul and a manifestation, properly speaking, of amor. Because of this amor, a passion, the lion does everything in its powers just so it can catch its intended victim because to it, the prey is attractive. It is beautiful. It is good. This is no different from a man who likes a particular woman. Amor starts off in this man, by his seeing or rather, using Aquinas’s term, apprehending the beautiful qualities that this woman has: qualities that appeal to this man’s appetite. This sensitive apprehension, meaning apprehension through senses, starts off the loving process. I do not think that this kind of love can be subjected to teaching. Since this love hinges on the randomness of what appeals to a particular being’s senses, it varies from person to person, and its subjectivity deters us from teaching it. Furthermore, the fact that it relies on the sensitive soul alone proves that intellect, or the capability to learn and be taught, cannot be employed. But Aquinas introduces another kind of love: caritas. This shall be the concern of this paper in its attempt at showing that love can be taught. Aside from Amor, any Thomist account of love cannot be complete without mention of another form of love: caritas or friendship. If love has a sensitive aspect, owing to the sensitive part of the soul that produces it, how about the rational aspect? Can men get past what the senses can provide? If a man is attracted to a particular woman, a specific version of the good for him; if this woman is appetitive for him and he recognizes this, thus leading to generation of amor, what makes him different from a lion who hunts down a prey which it apprehends as good? Building on Aquinas’s own example, if a man loves a particular wine because it is good for him, what makes this love different from a dog’s when it would not leave its territory because the latter has been good to the former? What may explain a love that does not seemingly approach what is beautiful? In his monumental book, Man’s Search for Meaning9, Viktor Frankl relates his thoughts, musings, and experiences in a concentration camp during World War II. In one of his more poignant pages, he writes, “We who lived in concentration camps can remember the men who walked through the huts comforting others, giving away their last piece of bread. They may have been few in number, but they offer sufficient proof that everything can be taken away from man but one ANALYTIC TEACHING AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRAXIS Volume 34, Issue 2 (2014) 49 thing: the last of the human freedoms—to choose one’s attitude in any given set of circumstances, to choose one’s own way.”10 If humans tend towards the good, and love is about moving towards something that promises beauty and the good to the subject, what may make one give his “last piece of bread,” his good, for another man? What good and beauty is there in an act that seems contrary to self-survival? At a time of sheer difficulty and frustration, why is one man capable of moving towards others who are not torches of beauty but of ugliness, desperation, and literally, death? What might attract the subject when the object of love is clearly not an appetible? This seems to be the deficiency in an account of love that is anchored only on what is perceptibly beautiful and good. Thus, there is a need to delineate one that goes beyond what the senses apprehend, one that’s not limited and is unbounded. This is the love that is possible to teach and is worthy of such attempt. In Frankl’s mention of the last freedom that remains with man even until the very end, he names man’s capacity to choose how to act as this particular freedom. Is ultimate freedom in love found in amor? Is absolute freedom in love guarded by the senses, limited by the spell of what is overt, manifest, or tangible? If so, how could we explain Frankl’s firsthand experience of unconditional love void of the pursuit of beauty? Furthermore, how is it possible to explain a sustained love between two individuals until the twilight of their lives even when the initial beauty that incited the appetite between the two and which was apprehended formerly is no longer present? Could it be that there is much more than amor in man, and we are capable of much more than reacting to a stimulus, an appetible that takes the form of beauty and good? On the Characteristics of Caritas What makes one a friend? Normally, a person is a friend when one wishes his friend the good. When one extends loving benevolence and goodwill towards another, he is a friend. When two people share the same language, joking about the same thing even if others outside their friendship do not understand what’s funny, that is normally taken to be friendship. When the whole world collapses into the world created by two people, one normally thinks this is friendship. Friends are attracted towards each other because of each other’s goodness and beauty; but this, as opposed to a love of amor, is not solely based on what one perceives through the sensitive soul. Friendship sees beyond what the naked eye can see, the beauty that can only be illuminated in the real communion of two souls. Friendship hears not just what the auditory faculty allows but the throbbing of the deepest recesses of a person’s being. Aquinas asks in ST II-II, Q, 23, a. 1 whether charity is friendship. He says that “..not every love has the character of friendship but that love which is together with benevolence: when, that is, we love someone so as to wish good to him.”11 Recall that there is nothing in amor that promotes the target’s good. In fact, it is because of this good that one becomes an object of amor. Without this good, the object will cease to be an appetible. Friendship is different in the sense that it is not just based on the goodness of the appetible but also on its potential as a recipient of the good. This is what Aquinas meant when he says in the same response: If, however, we do not wish good to what we love, but wish its good for ourselves, (thus we are said to love wine, or a horse, or the like) it is not love of friendship, but of a kind of concupiscence. For it would be absurd to speak of having friendship for wine or for a horse, Yet neither does well-wishing suffice for friendship, for a certain mutual love is requisite, since friendship is between friend and friend and this mutual well-wishing is founded on some kind of communication. Accordingly, since there is a communication between man and God, in so far as He communicates His happiness to us, there must be ANALYTIC TEACHING AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRAXIS Volume 34, Issue 2 (2014) 50 some kind of friendship based on this same communication, of which it is written (I Cor.I. 9): God is faithful: by Whom you are called unto the fellowship of His Son. The love that which is based on this communication, is charity. And so it is evident that charity is the friendship of man for God. 12 Caritas therefore involves certain prerequisites, on the basis of this part of the Summa. First, benevolence; as caritas allows a person to extend himself and go out of the province of his own good to wish good with all sincerity for another person. A friend is someone who looks after the welfare of his friend. This is clearly in stark comparison with concupiscence whose primary characteristic is its being drawn to an object that can satisfy its own needs and wants, or its own good. Second, friendship involves mutual love. One normally finds claims of friendship between a man and an animal: say, a dog. Aquinas does not think this is possible because friendship is only possible between two men who are capable of loving each other and who wish each other goodness. Owing to its absence of a rational soul, an animal does not have the rational faculty to wish someone good. A dog can probably endear itself to a man only in so far as it sensitively apprehends the good that the man brings it. Caritas allows for going beyond what the friend, the lover, can do to benefit the other friend or the object of love. This capacity to transcend the measuring of benefits in the world is only found in humans. The third characteristic of caritas is its being built on a stable ground, communication of happiness between friends. God communicates His love to man in so many ways, one of which is his sending His Son to save mankind. Despite his unworthiness, man is loved by God deeply. One does not experience this love through his sensitive faculty. It is through his intellectual faculty that man communicates with God. Aquinas concurs: Man’s life is twofold. There is his outward life in respect of his sensitive and corporeal nature, and with regard to this life, there is no communication or fellowship between us and God or the angels. The other is man’s spiritual life in respect of his mind, and with regard to this life there is fellowship between us and both God and the angels. 13 This is the perfection of love, caritas, for Aquinas. But can friendship be directed among man? Can man love others with the love of caritas? Aquinas thinks this is possible. We can duplicate the love of God for man by channeling our love for God to others. Aquinas thinks we can love a person in two ways: first in respect of himself, and in this way friendship never extends but to one’s friend; secondly, it extends to someone in respect of another, as, when a man has friendship for a certain person, for his sake he loves all belonging to him, be they children, servants, or connected with him in any way. Indeed, so much do we love our friends that for their sake we love all who belong to them even if they hurt or hate us. 14 Friendship is, then, more distributive. Unlike amor that involves only the lover and the bearer of beauty, the appetible; in caritas, the object of love may multiply the love given by the subject of love to those whom he, the object of love, himself loves. But how does this replication of caritas happen in the world? Can this be taught? ANALYTIC TEACHING AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRAXIS Volume 34, Issue 2 (2014) 51 On Teaching Caritas and the Use of Experience-based Learning Is it really possible to teach students how to love? In my classes, I try to infuse my students’ minds with the wisdom of the philosophers and their own takes in grappling with the complexity of love. Most college students come to my class with varying notions of love, none of which I am willing to dismiss as invalid. However, in my classes, one of my aims is to help my students systematize the way they understand the phenomenon of love, to balance the impressions that mass media, the internet, their societal norms teach them. I see that the most potent way to do this is to introduce them to the classical works in Philosophy. Roger Straughan in the book, ‘Can We Teach Children to be Good?’15 reminds us that “one can teach children a mass of information, without teaching them to use that information; and one can teach them how to do all sorts of things, without teaching them to do those things on appropriate occasions.”16 The danger in limiting teaching and, subsequently, just learning inside the classroom is that it often results in a limited amount of learning, often characterized by a cognitive understanding of concepts that do not necessarily translate to these concepts being applied in the students’ lives. Part of the reason is probably the lack of exposure to actual life experiences involving the said concepts. Indeed, application of ideas is vital in the process of educating. Straughan says, “Teaching to…must, therefore, play at least as important a part in moral education as teaching that… and teaching how…”17 Teaching to love is as important, if not more important, than teaching that love is this and that for a particular philosopher. Eugene Provenzo Jr. provides a “road map” for experiential learning activities in social studies and humanities. He states that there are three critical stages of effectively performing active learning inside and outside the classroom: meaning making, paradigm-shifting and self-understanding18; which I implemented through classroom discussion, immersion, and writing reflections, respectively. The teaching methodology I followed was based primarily on these three stages in order to maximize the students’ in-depth engagement with the complex issues mentioned, using relevant and applicable standards. Meaning making, the first step, seeks learners to understand the world around them better using pattern making and pattern perceiving. Through the use of metaphors and relationship webs, analogies are made for students to come to terms with notions in a very real and personal way. An example of such was given by Provenzo: A group of researchers (Ericsson, Chase and Faloon, 1980) worked with a college student on memorizing randomly generated digit strings. By chunking such numbers into meaningful combinations (e.g., telephone numbers, on in this student’s case, winning times for famous track races), the student was able to memorize up to seventy numbers in a row. Yet when presented with a series of randomly generated letter strings, the student did just as poorly (up to seven in a row) as before he had started practicing. Learning thus seems to be supported by generating ever-expanding frameworks for knowledge. We remember things, be it chess positions or random numbers, if they are meaningful to us. They are meaningful to us if they are framed within our prior knowledge and if they help us make sense of our present situation. 19 I usually teach four introductory Philosophy classes with an average of 30 students per class every semester, and the perennial concern is how these young Filipino kids will appreciate concepts and abstractions that, though obviously gems of wisdom, are not just historically distant but also geographically and culturally cut-off from their own milieu. In order to establish the process of meaning making, I try to relate my lessons to their prior ANALYTIC TEACHING AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRAXIS Volume 34, Issue 2 (2014) 52 experiences, and place examples in specific contexts as a way of transferring knowledge. I have mentioned endlessly in class that at a time when self-help gurus proclaim wisdom in matters of love, it pays to go back to the discourses that the classical world affords the present generation. We read works of Plato, Forms of Good and Beauty and their analogies to everyday objects; and how love is a perpetual attempt to reach the Forms. We go back to Aristotle and how friendship aims towards mutual goodness of friends, not very far from our perspective on true friendship in this era. We also read the Summa of St. Thomas Aquinas and revisit the difference between amor and caritas, using examples previously mentioned. After each discussion, I encourage each one to actively participate in sharing their personal accounts of past experiences in which these ideas are used or can be applied. In these classes, after the topic on love, I invite my students to partake in an interclass activity: a visit to a home for abandoned elderly called ‘Kanlungan ni Maria-Home for the Aged, Inc.’ (Mary’s Home) in Antipolo City, Philippines. For the visit, I enjoin my students to find suitable and willing benefactors who will help us finance our project especially for purchasing the goods such as medicines and supplies that we bring to the institution. The students spend a day in the institution interacting with the residents and even sometimes with the staff. Some students play board games with the residents whom they fondly call ‘lolo ’(grandfather) and ‘lola’ (grandmother). Others also help in feeding those who can no longer fend for themselves. While they while away their time, stories are shared, lives are bared, and realizations unfold. It is the second step, the paradigm shift, where they are exposed to an alternative environment much different from what they are accustomed to and enter genuine and difficult discussions, and so come to examine their uncontested assumptions and beliefs. Some of the students never even lived with old people, and the rest who do, have never bothered to reflect and share deep insights with them. After the activity, I ask each student to write a reflection paper regarding what they learned. I will cite relevant excerpts from their papers to show how effectively the second step has been executed: How much are you willing to do to show your love to other people? One example that shows this quality of love is our act of visiting and talking with the people at Kanlungan ni Maria. As we interacted and shared stories with the people at the Kanlungan, we willingly gave our time and effort to them. And we know we’ve done this out of charity and service. This is one of the best examples of applying what we learned in class about love. Through the act of serving and interacting with the old people at Kanlungan ni Maria, we showed actions that are synonymous to what we consider love in action. (RayTorres) What this student ably pointed out is what Aquinas claims to be the first ingredient in caritas: benevolence. The students learned to write solicitation letters, trying to seek the help of other people. Some managed to knock on every door of their respective condominium and apartment complexes to ask for financial assistance to raise the needed funds. Some even approached big companies in the Philippines to collect ample amounts of money or goods to purchase the medicines and supplies needed by the elderly in the institution. They did all these activities without expecting anything in return, with no promise of a corresponding grade incentive or reciprocation of their efforts by the residents of the home. For nothing certain in return, they went out of their comfort zones to contribute something for the benefit of these elderly people. Another student communicates how she saw loving without expecting any good in return. In her account she recalled a resident in the institution: Nanay (Mother) Bing lived the simple life of a teacher. She had a husband, yet did not have children. Eventually, she decided to take an orphaned boy under his wings. She treated this boy as her own, took ANALYTIC TEACHING AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRAXIS Volume 34, Issue 2 (2014) 53 care of him, loved him, sent him to school until he can stand on his own two feet. At present Nanay Bing is left in an elderly home, seemingly alone, and, for lack of better term, neglected and dismissed by the said son. And yet Nanay Bing continues to yearn intensely to meet her son again, most especially on her birthdays (notably the most important celebration of life of a person as an individual) and unite with him again regardless of his transgressions. Pointing out the example of the unconditional love of a mother for a child, for Nanay Bing to want union from her son again in the celebration of her life, it is shown that love is indeed vital in completing the meaning of one’s life. (Zia Katrin Ramos Dela Torre) The student that I quoted above came up with the realization that love can actually be mortifying because it does not just involve loving an object that will give the same love back. The rational faculty of man, just as Aquinas says, is capable of going beyond measurement of the object’s worthiness of love. How this is so? The students found out by communicating with a woman who is a perfect example of such a lover, one who does not assess her gains in love. The woman mentioned is fully aware that there is little to no chance that her son will actively do her good, nevertheless; she continues to love and yearn for him. She just loves him because she thinks her son is worthy of her love no matter what. Such a characteristic of love echoes not amor but caritas. Another student highlighted how she saw communication as a prime element in love. She went on saying: In Kanlungan ni Maria, I realized a lot of things about life. The old people staying there have been through a lot of ups and downs. We are lucky enough to have ample times to listen to their jokes, stories, and lectures. There was an immediate attachment and of course, fun. As a communication major, this is a clear example that language is a good tool to connect to one another. However, some of them were not able to speak with us anymore. Communication through language is no longer existent this time. Yet I know and I felt the same thing while simply staying beside Tata (Father) Ruben, and while playing sungka (mancala). There was happiness and I felt complete. (Arrianne May Estocapio) In the same way that love between God and man is mediated by communication, this student thought that the short bond she formed with the elderly amidst the difficulty in communication made her happy and complete. This is akin to what Aquinas meant about love between God and man being complete only through communication. At the end of the day, this love brings happiness, the zenith of the loving process. Exposure activities such as this do not just reinforce lessons inside the classroom; more importantly, they widen the world of the learner, as manifested in what my Korean student wrote: Through volunteer activity in Kanlungan ni Maria, I came to experience and develop love. I realized that extending love to others starts off from paying attention to others needs, getting away from ignorance. Before I went to the Kanlungan ni Maria, I was completely unaware and partly ignorant of the difficulties experienced by others. There, I was surprised by each of the nanay’s (mothers’) stories and became embarrassed of the fact that even after having lived in the same country with them for almost 6 years, I was not even aware of their situation. Nanay Bing told me that she does not have any family member with her now because both her parents died and her husband is also gone. Nanay Annie had inborn disease which did not allow her to stand from her birth. Moreover, she was abandoned by her parents and was raised in orphanage from when she was young. And all other nanays had their own stories to tell, each of which seemed very sad and gloomy. (Sarah Jeong) ANALYTIC TEACHING AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRAXIS Volume 34, Issue 2 (2014) 54 The idea of caritas being distributive, meaning it is inclusive, has also been realized by my students through the activity. These students who are adolescents are bombarded by media and information online about variations of love that focus on its exclusivity: that it involves two people who squirm in the presence of one another, who promise eternity in each other’s arms; but these same students are often disillusioned because of their experiences, when this same kind of love results in anguish or worse, depression. Having a firsthand experience in the act of caritas brings back their faith in love. That love is not exclusive and may be given, distributed and multiplied to as many people as one can is a comforting thought at a time when loving is almost always equated with utility. The last step, self-understanding, is characterized by “an ability for reflection, self-regulation, and critical thinking about our own beliefs and actions.”20 This was primarily the purpose of writing the reflection paper: for the students to initiate and engage themselves in the knowledge they were drenched in. Without this, the practical benefits that one could reap from the knowledge taught can all go to waste. Thus, the students in my class are encouraged to discuss and reflect on their immersion so they could engage on caritas not just when they are told to do so; rather, so they could find ways to perform caritas in opportunities within their daily lives. One student half-jokingly shared: Remarkably, I found new things I could look for in a boyfriend, or symptoms that I have to be aware of if it’s true love. I used to have a list of standards to prepare myself for finding my other half. Mass media made me yearn for superficial things in a partner like looks, money, or even intelligence. I never exercised my choice to choose for myself because I was predisposed and trained to “want” those standards. The immersion opened my mind to discussion and allowed me to rethink my ways. The intensity of love I felt and witnessed in Kanlungan ni Maria was quite too good be true, but now I have proof it exists. (Angela Balanza) The student, whether she knows it or not, realizes that her freedom to choose for herself and not be swayed by other factors, like mass media, has led to the use of her own will. As mentioned earlier, the use of one’s decisive choices is a product of man’s rational faculty; one that does not merely rely on our senses. Although caritas has not materialized yet in the case of this student as she has not found a receiver of the action, she has learned to know its characteristics and how it can be truly achieved. With deepened insights, putting an idea into practice becomes inevitable. As philosophy is a very flexible discipline, what applies to a particular student does not translate to the exact same effect on another; thus, it was gratifying to see even some students benefit from the experience. Not only were their perspectives about love re- aligned, but also their lifestyles. Efficient self-understanding leads to a change in behavior, attitudes, and knowledge levels, as a particular reflection proved: I have a grandfather who lives far away from his wife, and I never truly understood why he always yearns for her even if she’s too old to not be cranky, wrinkled and forgetful. I found it confusing. But I was enlightened in our visit to the home for the aged; as I shared life stories with these people, I learned about a love that transcends time, a love that never expected anything, a love worth remembering. I was forced to rethink my relationship with my boyfriend, and ultimately, my relationship with my family. Often, I overlook what good they bring to my life and seldom appreciate the things they do for me. I found ways to keep ties strong and more importantly, real. (Miriam Miciano) ANALYTIC TEACHING AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRAXIS Volume 34, Issue 2 (2014) 55 Experiential learning, or even learning in general, cannot be proven efficient unless students are able to “see the ‘big picture’ rather than they are just given a set of disconnected facts, when they are engaged in learning rather than positioned as passive spectators, and when they believe that such learning leads to meaningful outcomes rather than to predefined and predetermined goals.”21 As so many of my students have understood the otherwise broad and complicated concept of caritas not only from a cognitive standpoint, but also through meaningful applications in their lives, I would deem my method of teaching through experiential learning quite successful. Without activities outside the classroom, abstractions in philosophy can be more confusing than clarifying. Exposure to real-life manifestations of love brings about increased understanding and educative benefits for students. Conclusion In this work, I have attempted to demonstrate that experiential learning is applicable even in studies of Western Philosophy, specifically in teaching about love, or a variation of it. Love is a human endeavor and as such can only be learned in the presence of, and through experiences with, other humans. The philosophical texts that aim to illuminate our minds from the dark shadows of confusion brought about by love and its complexities may help light up the way; but it is my firm belief that only through experience generated by participating in pedagogical activities outside the four corners of the classroom, will allow students to grasp love is in its entirety. Leder affirms the use of experiential learning in saying, “I have found that one of the most powerful ways to escape the classroom cave is to enter the many other caves our society constructs (ideally bringing our students with us) — the penitentiaries, homeless shelters, youth programs, hospices, senior centres, halfway houses — to humbly learn from the rich experience of those who therein dwell, and assist them, with whatever tools we have, in their own struggle for freedom.”22 I assent to this observation as I myself, as a teacher, have seen the potency of this approach for teaching. What better way to learn love than to experience it, and where else to experience love but outside the classroom, beyond those four walls that supposedly inform us but sometimes actually limit us as well. Indeed, love can only be apprehended in full freedom. Endnotes 1. Drew Leder, “Escaping the Cave: Experiential Learning in the Classroom, Community and Correctional Institutions,” in Teaching Philosophy, ed. Andrea Kenkmann. (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2009), 81. 2. Ibid., 82. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid., 83. 5. Ibid., 89. 6. The official course title is Philo 10: Approaches to Philosophy. 7. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 26, a. II res. 8. John Peterman, On Ancient Philosophy (Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2008), 171. 8. Viktor E. Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning (Boston MA: Beacon Press, 1959), p. 86. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid. ANALYTIC TEACHING AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRAXIS Volume 34, Issue 2 (2014) 56 11. ST II-II, Q. 23, a. 1, res. 12. Ibid. 13. ST II-II, Q. 23, a. 1, res. 14. ST II-II, Q. 23, a. 1, res. 2 15. Roger Straughan, Can We Teach Children to be Good? (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1982), 90. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid. 18. Eugene F. Provenzo, 100 experiential learning activities for social studies, literature and the arts, grades 5-12. (California: Corwin Press). 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid. 22. Drew Leder, “Escaping the Cave: Experiential Learning in the Classroom, Community and Correctional Institutions,” in Teaching Philosophy, 94. Address Correspondences to: Bernardo N. Caslib, Jr., University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City 1101Philippines jr_caslib@yahoo.com