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Power, Pedagogy, and the “Women Problem”: Ameliorating Philosophy 

 

Hilkje Charlotte Haenel 
 
 

ABSTRACT: Being a member of a minority group makes it harder to succeed in academic philosophy. 
Research suggests that students from underrepresented groups have a hard time in academic philosophy 
and often drop out instead of pursuing a career in philosophy, despite having the potential to become 
excellent philosophers. In this paper, I will argue that there is a specific way of thinking about traditional 
conceptual analysis within analytic philosophy that marginalizes underrepresented groups. This has to do 
with what kinds of analyses we philosophers think are worthy of conducting and with who we think are 
worthy of pursuing such analyses. I will then show why this is particularly worrisome for the profession of 
philosophy as an institution geared towards the love of knowledge and argue that it should be in our 
interest as philosophers to find ways to prevent this marginalization of underrepresented groups. Finally, I 
will provide an example of how to do philosophy differently that does not exclude members of 
underrepresented groups and suggest ways in which the teaching of analytic philosophy can directly counter 
the discriminatory practices of academic philosophy. 

 

n philosophy, especially analytic philosophy, there are certain minority groups who are neither 
represented by the subject matter nor presented with the same possibilities for advancing in the 
field. “Women” are one of those minority groups.1 Being a member of such a minority group 

makes it harder to succeed in academic philosophy. Furthermore, research suggests that students of 
underrepresented groups have a hard time in academic philosophy and often—despite having the 
potential to become excellent philosophers—drop out instead of pursuing a career in academic 
philosophy. This is worrisome for at least two reasons: (1) It prevents particular students from 
flourishing in philosophy and from gaining knowledge, and (2) it contributes to the narrow scope of 
philosophical research and slows down the process of making epistemically sound philosophy. First, 
by marginalizing those students that are members of minority groups, analytic philosophy harms 
those students. It structurally prevents some students from gaining more knowledge and flourishing. 
Second, by contributing to the high dropout rate of students that are members of minority groups, 
the scope of philosophy excludes underrepresented topics (those topics of interest to minority 
groups). Furthermore, it should be in the interest of all philosophers to strive for good philosophy. 
However, by excluding some students—those that have the potential to become excellent 
philosophers—academic philosophy slows done the process of delivering good philosophy. Thus, as 
analytic philosophers, we should address the marginalization of minority groups in philosophy and 
find a way of teaching and doing philosophy that prevents this marginalization. 

In the first section, I will argue that there is a specific way of thinking about traditional 
conceptual analysis within analytic philosophy which is discriminatory against underrepresented 
groups when combined with the set-up of academic philosophy.2 This has to do with which analyses, 

I 



 

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we (as philosophers) think, are worth conducting and who, we think, are worthy of pursuing these 
analyses. (Section 1) I will then show why this is particularly worrisome for the profession of 
philosophy as an institution that teaches the love of knowledge. (Section 2) Further, I will show that 
there are ways to do philosophy differently that do not exclude members of underrepresented groups. 
For example, Sally Haslanger’s contributions to the topic—if understood correctly—suggest a way of 
doing analytic philosophy which is not discriminatory and which can even help fight discriminatory 
practices.  (Section 3) Finally, in the last section, I will suggest a couple of ways in which the teaching 
of analytic philosophy can directly counter the discriminatory practices of academic philosophy. 
(Section 4) 

1 

   There is a specific way of thinking about traditional conceptual analysis within analytic 
philosophy which marginalizes underrepresented groups when it is combined with the specific set-up 
of academic philosophy: the predominantly white, male, and middle class teachers, the aggressive 
debating styles, etc. This has to do with which analyses, we (as philosophers) think, are worth 
conducting and who, we think, are worthy of pursuing these analyses. One central focus of so-called 
analytic philosophy is and always has been a certain way of doing conceptual analysis.3 Unfortunately, 
this traditional conceptual analysis is nearly perfect for dismissing any views that do not hold on to 
beliefs of objective truth and a priori thinking. Let me explain. Traditionally conceptual analysis was 
taken to be what Williamson famously describes as “armchair-thinking”. In his words,  

The traditional methods of philosophy are armchair ones: they consist of 
thinking, without any special interaction with the world beyond the chair, 
such as measurement, observation or experiment would typically involve. 
(2007: 1)  

The idea is roughly that we can simply sit back and arrive at an analysis of the concept in question by 
a priori thinking. This hypothesis is constituted by two claims:  

(1) the semantic internalism claim: the (objective) truth or right analysis of a concept in question can 
be known through introspection;  

(2) the intensional definition claim: there is an intensional definition for the concept in question. 

The idea that we can arrive at an analysis of a concept while sitting in our armchair implies that, first, 
there is such a concept (in my head), and, second, that we neither have to do empirical research nor 
have to engage with the things denoted by the term in question to know it. I think the first claim is 
rather obvious. It would not make sense for me to sit in my armchair doing philosophical analyses, if I 
did not believe that I could arrive at some truth doing so. Furthermore, I do not merely believe that I 
can arrive at some truth doing so, but that I arrive at the truth doing so. Thus, not believing in some 
form of semantic internalism would render my philosophical analysis ad absurdum. Semantic 
internalism broadly is the theory that an individual can have access to knowledge claims by reflection. 



 

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In other words, semantic internalism assumes that concepts are in the head and that through 
reflection I can gain access to the concept in question. Therefore, according to semantic internalism, 
my specific social position as an individual has no implications for my analysis, the world around me 
does not influence the meaning of the concepts. 

What about the second claim, namely that there is an intensional definition for the concept in 
question? In comparison to an extensional definition—the meaning of a concept is given by specifying 
its extension, that is, by specifying all objects that fall under the concept—, an intensional definition 
describes a definition that gives the meaning of a concept by specifying its necessary and sufficient 
conditions. While giving an extensional definition works best by actually “looking” at the extensions 
of the concept and therewith often involves some form of descriptive analysis, intensional definitions 
can be given by mere introspection. If I sit in my armchair for an a priori analysis of some concept in 
question, I use my intuitions and experiences to come up with the best possible intensional definition 
of the concept in question. So far, so good. However, again, the claim needs to be stronger: I need to 
be convinced that my result is not just any definition. For example, a definition should not only have 
meaning for myself, while someone else’s analysis yields some other definition of the concept. This 
implies that I have to believe that I, as the analyst, do not bring my personal history or social 
positioning into the analysis. Why do I need to be convinced of this stronger claim? Because again, 
thinking that whatever my analysis yields is totally arbitrary—taking a relativist stance—renders my 
analysis ad absurdum. There would not be any impact of my thinking except for wasting my time. 
Thus, taking both claims into account—the semantic internalist claim and the intensional definition 
claim—implies that I take a stance of aperspectivity. Thus, the argument goes, if I am not conditioned 
by my social position, then I should accept intensional definitions; and if I do not have any impact on 
the observations I make, then I should believe in semantic internalism. (cf. Haslanger 2012: 70) 

There are many arguments for why this practice is particularly marginalizing for minority groups 
in philosophy when combined with the current set-up of academic philosophy.4 Let me raise only two 
here. First, the view that the best analysis can only be provided introspectively (i.e., while sitting in an 
armchair) indicates the method of “reflective thinking.” Imagine the following “armchair-thinking”-
scenario, in which philosophy professor A wants to know what X is: A, being convinced by the 
armchair-method, sits down in his comfortable rocking chair and starts thinking about some 
intuitions he has about X and about different cases and principles related to X. Luckily, after a while 
he reaches a reflective equilibrium and can give a definition for X. What about these intuitions he so 
accurately considers? Obviously he does not conduct any empirical research or talk to anyone—he is 
all on his own in his rocking chair (except for his clumber spaniel but the dog is not of much help). 
The intuitions he considers and on which he bases his answer are therefore his own. Unfortunately, 
not everybody has the same intuitions. (cf. Antony 2012, Buckwalter and Stich 2010, Nisbett et al. 
2001, Weinberg et al. 2001) And by ill luck, the philosopher is a male, white, heterosexual, able-
bodied, and middle class person with academic upbringing and background. Contra the semantic 
internalism claim, his intuitions reflect his person and his social situation. Epistemic knowers—in this 
case, the philosopher—are situated knowers. (cf. Anderson 1995a and 1995b, Code 1991, Jaggar 1983, 
Scheman 1995) Philosophers come to have the intuitions they have because of their socio-historical 



 

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position. Most philosophers are similar to our armchair-philosopher in their social position and 
therefore many answers philosophy has given reflect male, white, heterosexual, abled, and middle 
class ideas.5 This makes it very hard for anybody not fitting in this frame of the philosopher to 
succeed or even to be heard at all.  

Second, embedded in this idea of the philosopher separate from his standpoint and epistemically 
neutral is the assumption that some people just “have it” while others do not. In other words, some 
have a talent for rational and reflective thinking and philosophy and others do not. I have met several 
senior professors who claimed to detect after a few minutes of conversation or after an hour of 
seminar who has a talent for philosophy and who does not. Unfortunately, there is still a bias towards 
attributing rational and reflective thinking to (white) men. (Haslanger 2008: 213 and 2012: 47) For 
example, Haslanger writes:  

[...] these ideals of rationality and rational selves have typically been defined in 
contrast to what are assumed to be characteristic features and capacities of 
women: Women are guided by emotion or feeling rather than reason; women 
are not capable of impartiality or abstract thought; women are more intuitive 
and closer to nature than men, and so on. (2012: 47)  

Professors are quicker in judging a person to be good in philosophy if they think that person is a  
(white) man. When I was an undergraduate student I took a class on philosophy of mathematics. 
There was one other woman among the twenty or so participants. In one of the first sessions the 
professor went to the blackboard and drew a square and a heart. Pointing at the square he said “this is 
how men do math,” pointing at the heart “and this is how women do math, which is why we stick to 
men’s skills.” That was in 2008. Haslanger describes the same experience:  

In graduate school, one of my teachers told me that he had “never seen a first 
rate woman philosophy and never expected to because women were incapable 
of having seminal ideas.” (2008: 211)  

We all employ stereotypes and schemas. In fact, we need schemas to organize and respond to the 
world quickly and go about our everyday business, but some of these stereotypes lead to 
discriminations and other lead to preferential treatment. In the case at hand, “we” attribute the 
desirable characteristic of being good in philosophy to (white) male students, while at the same the un-
desirable stereotype of not being fit for philosophy is attributed to female students.6 Note, that such 
attribution of stereotypes and/or biased judgement is not a conscious process, rather it is implicit; in 
other words, social behaviour is not always under conscious control. (Greenwald and Banaji 1995) 
Also, and quite obviously, it is only possible to judge someone as “being good in philosophy” if that 
person is not too shy and is forthcoming about their ideas. Both are attributes that men are (mostly) 
better at. That this is the case has to do with the fact that men already feel entitled to do philosophy; 
while as one of the few women in the seminars who are being openly told that we “don’t have what it 
takes to do philosophy,” we mostly feel like the odd ones out.7 



 

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2 

I have argued that the claims of semantic internalism and intensional definitions can be 
particularly marginalizing for philosophy students who are members of underrepresented groups 
when combined with the culture of male entitlement in academic philosophy. For example, in 2010, 
philosophy had a lower rate of female PhD-students than most of the physical sciences8—despite the 
fact that no fewer women than men take philosophy classes in college. Thompson et al. (2016: 1) 
write: 

In 2012 in the United States, for every 100 men graduating with a college 
degree, 141 women graduated. For decades now, more women have been 
enrolled in American universities than men. Yet, during these same decades, 
the proportion of women who major in philosophy has remained stagnant, 
hovering below one-third. So, while almost 60% of college graduates are now 
women, only 30% of philosophy majors are women […] With women getting 
just 30% of philosophy bachelor’s degrees, it’s no surprise that the ratio of 
women to men is so low among philosophy graduate students (30%) and 
professors (20.7%).9 

These numbers are particularly worrisome for the profession of philosophy as an institution that 
teaches the love of knowledge. I contend that the fact that analytic philosophy marginalizes members 
of underrepresented groups is worrisome for at least two reasons: (1) It prevents particular students 
from flourishing in philosophy and from gaining a particular kind of knowledge, and (2) it 
contributes to the narrow scope of philosophical research and slows down the process of epistemically 
good philosophy. First, by marginalizing those students that are members of minority groups, analytic 
philosophy harms those students as subjects that come to the profession to learn. It structurally 
prevents some students from gaining more knowledge and flourishing, while it provides this 
knowledge to others. It is wrong to epistemically disadvantage a student due to her membership in a 
particular social group (say, the social group of women) that is underrepresented in philosophy. 
Furthermore, the marginalizing of said student not only prevents her from gaining knowledge, it also 
restricts her flourishing in general. By being marginalized in this way, she is restricted in developing 
her love of the subject, her own identity, and following the life path she has set out for herself. This 
can, furthermore, involve an economic disadvantage: dropping out of philosophy can lengthen her 
studies and thereby force her to pay more student tuition and get her to the job market later. It 
should be in the interest of any subject to not (unfairly) burden some of its students more than others 
and it should be in the particular interest of philosophy as an institution that teaches the love of 
knowledge to not (unfairly) restrict some of its students from flourishing in the pursuit of knowledge. 

Second, by contributing to the high drop-out rate of students that are members of minority 
groups, the scope of philosophy excludes underrepresented topics (those topics of interest to minority 
groups). Dotson (2012) argues that academic philosophy is not a productive environment for diverse 
philosophers. Rather, engaging in topics, methods, or philosophers that diverge from the canon is 
made hard at best in philosophy, if not impossible. Furthermore, members of underrepresented 



 

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groups in particular often have an interest in topics and methods that diverge from the canon of 
philosophy. Also, it should be in the interest of all philosophers to strive for bringing about the best 
possible philosophy. However, by excluding some students—students that have the potential to 
become excellent philosophers—the norms of academic philosophy slows down the process of 
delivering good philosophy. It excludes some voices that could play a significant role in bringing 
about the best possible philosophy. Discouraging some students (say, women) from advancing in 
academic philosophy will lead to talented philosophers not graduating, not getting a job, not getting 
their work read, etc. But, as Saul argues, to “get the best possible philosophy being done, we need the 
best philosophers to receive proper encouragement and good jobs, and to be working in 
environments where they can produce their best work.” (2013: 50) Some of these best philosophers 
might dropout of philosophy before they even have a chance to contribute to it. In other words, there 
are two reasons why we should work towards making philosophy more inclusive: for reasons of 
fairness and for the sake of philosophy. 

3 

I have argued that the claims of semantic internalism and intensional definitions can be 
particularly marginalizing for philosophy students that are members of underrepresented groups when 
combined with the culture of male entitlement in academic philosophy. And I have identified two 
reasons why this is particularly worrisome for academic philosophy: for reasons of fairness and for the 
sake of philosophy. Luckily, there is no reason to give up yet. By explicating Haslanger’s philosophical 
projects of conceptual analysis I will show that there are ways to do philosophy differently that do not 
exclude members of underrepresented groups.10 Haslanger’s contributions to the topic of conceptual 
analysis—if understood correctly—suggest a way of doing analytic philosophy which is not 
marginalizing and which can even help to fight unfair practices. 

In several papers Haslanger provides an insightful account of conceptual analysis within analytic 
philosophy. Broadly, she claims that we are mistaken in assuming that there is only one way of doing 
analysis and that, further, we do not need to accept traditional armchair philosophy. In other words, 
it is not the case that the (objective) truth or right analysis of the concept in question can be known 
internally or that there is an intensional definition for the concept in question. Instead, she argues 
that there are three different kinds of concepts:  

[manifest concept]: the concept we take ourselves to be applying;  

[operative concept]: the concept we are in fact applying; 

[target concept]: the concept we should be applying.  

Respectively, there are three ways of conducting conceptual analysis:  

[the internalist approach]: the question “what is X?” is answered by a priori methods and by reaching 
a reflective equilibrium that takes into account intuitions about the concept and its cases and 
principles.  



 

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[the descriptive approach]: the question “what is X?” is answered by considering what objective types 
our epistemic vocabulary tracks, i.e. it identifies paradigm cases for fixing the referent of the term and 
draws on (quasi) empirical methods to explicate the relevant kind or type to which the paradigm 
belongs.  

[the ameliorative approach]: the question “what is X?” is substituted by the question “what is the 
point of having X?”, i.e. which concept could actually do the best work for us?11 

Only the internalist approach, resulting in the manifest concept, uses the methods popularly and 
strongly associated with analytic philosophy, namely a priori methods. The descriptive approach, 
yielding the operative concept, takes up some ideas of externalism and empirical research methods. 
This approach is therefore in less danger of being marginalizing than the first. But it is the 
ameliorative approach, yielding the target concept, that I want to focus on as an example of doing 
analytic philosophy, which is not marginalizing and which can even help to fight unfair educational 
practices. 

Haslanger’s ameliorative inquiry diverts from the aforementioned armchair philosophy in two 
ways: (1) it is a distinctly normative conceptual analysis. It starts with a particular set of goals that a 
group should hold and asks what the concept of F-ness should be given those goals. The resulting 
concept of F-ness is the target concept of F. Such an inquiry is normative because it asks what the 
concept in question should be and because it aims at particular goals. And (2) ameliorative inquiry 
need not be in line with our intuitive understanding or our use of the concept in question; it can be 
revisionary. In other words, ameliorative projects have a particular epistemic subject that normatively 
engages in conceptual analysis; it not only affirms the situated position of the philosopher, but takes 
her to be invested in particular projects and analyses.  

In response to Haslanger’s ameliorative project, the armchair philosopher could argue12 that 
firstly, amelioration is contextualized and secondly, contextualized amelioration is not a new project, 
but rather what many philosophers in the past have done. The question “what is the practical task of 
concept X?” is trivially and truly answered by saying that it enables us to talk about X. But the ‘us’ is 
not unique and neither is this a normative question. The concept X should not enable us to talk 
about X, it simply provides the opportunity to do so. Therefore, we need to talk about contextualized 
amelioration: in particular contexts we adjust concepts to our practical purposes of the speaker and 
her audience. However, this is not a new idea. Normative considerations shaped the tradition of 
analytic philosophy all along. The armchair philosopher could then think, for example, that Frege, 
Wittgenstein, and Carnap were all ameliorators. This would led the armchair philosopher to propose 
that amelioration is indeed universal amelioration in so far as Haslanger’s considerations of 
amelioration are involved in all philosophical analysis. The idea that there can be three different ways 
of engaging in conceptual analysis is mistaken, rather, armchair philosophy as an introspective 
endeavor always has an ameliorative aspect—however, this ameliorative aspect is far from being 
normative. 



 

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Now there is some truth to these ideas, but they misunderstand Haslanger’s underlying point. In 
my understanding, Haslanger explicitly develops a way to engage in conceptual analysis that takes 
seriously our social positions and our normative investment in certain topics as philosophers. She 
argues for a particularly normative way of doing philosophy. But she does not say that ameliorative 
projects are motivated in the sense that, for example, Wittgenstein motivated his linguistic turn. 
Without question he adjusted concepts to our practical purposes. However, Haslanger implies more 
than this. Ameliorative projects in her sense have a political motivation, which can be seen by the 
examples she uses. One of those examples is the concept of woman. In analysing that concept 
Haslanger aims at showing that women are a genuine type (instead of a gerrymandered or random 
collection of individuals). The thought is that providing such a concept can be useful in showing what 
is wrong with patriarchal oppression of women. This is clearly a normative motivation for the analysis 
and it is a motivation that derives from her own social position—it is a topic she is deeply invested in. 
(Haslanger 2012, Haslanger 2006)  

To please the armchair philosopher, we could say that there are two distinct ameliorative 
projects. We can adjust concepts to our practical purposes, or we can adjust concepts to our 
normative purposes. The two projects are similar in so far as they are based on specific considerations. 
But they differ in that the first is mainly unreflective: we are driven by the aim of arriving at some target 
concept in question and our socialisation, biases, and so on push us towards a certain adjustment of 
the manifest and/or operative concept that has the benefit of being practically more useful. The 
second is deliberate: we are driven by the aim of arriving at some target concept that fulfils some 
specific normative purpose and in line with our normative aim we adjust the manifest and/or 
operative concept. It is this deliberate way of doing ameliorative analysis that can help strengthen 
minority groups in philosophy. The ameliorative project—when understood properly—involves being 
practically engaged and normatively aware, and as such it is the ideal replacement for the “armchair 
model” of conceptual inquiry that can lead to the marginalization of underrepresented groups. 

I should make one last comment here. In response to my argument, some people might respond 
with the critique that such ameliorative analysis is still highly theoretical and academic and in no way 
a good practice to politically change the environment of philosophy. Maybe that is right. But I do not 
claim that doing ameliorative analysis should be the only thing we do. In fact, neither does Haslanger. 
She states that:  

Ideology critique of the sort I’ve described can help create conceptual space 
for such change, but thought can never replace action. (2012: 475)  

Ameliorative analysis can provide a space where we acknowledge our normative aims and where we 
can develop those concepts that are deeply important to us. In this sense, ameliorative projects help to 
tackle the unfair aspects of armchair philosophy as outlined above and it can diversify philosophy by 
making room for subjects and methods that lie outside of the traditional canon of philosophy. The 
concepts we employ and the terms we use create the world we live in as much as that world creates us 
and our language. So to end discrimination (in philosophy and elsewhere) we need to tackle our 
concepts and terms as well as the world we live in. To provide a flourishing context for all philosophy 



 

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students, we desperately need to change the set-up of academic philosophy as well as the way in which 
we engage in philosophical thinking.  

4 

I have argued that armchair philosophy—specifically the claims of semantic internalism and 
intensional definitions—can be particularly marginalizing for philosophy students that are members of 
underrepresented groups when combined with the culture of male entitlement in academic 
philosophy. And I have identified two reasons why this is particularly worrisome for academic 
philosophy: for reasons of fairness and for the sake of philosophy. On a good note, I have shown that 
not all projects of conceptual analysis contribute to marginalizing members of underrepresented 
groups, and I have provided the example of Haslanger’s ameliorative projects. As philosophers we 
should aim at diversifying the profession and a first step to do so is to change the way we engage in 
philosophical thinking inside and outside the classroom. I will conclude this paper by suggesting two 
strategies that we can adopt in the classroom to counter the marginalizing effects on those students 
that are members of underrepresented groups: diversifying the methods we teach and diversifying the 
discussion in the classroom. 

First, besides teaching the traditional armchair method, we can broaden our methods and 
include other ways to do conceptual analysis. These can include Haslanger’s descriptive and 
ameliorative inquiries, but also methods from experimental or critical philosophy; e.g., pragmatic 
analysis, critical analysis, standpoint analysis, and so on. If we want to teach our students a broad 
range of methods of conceptual analysis—and I have argued that we should—we can do so by: (a) 
choosing philosophical texts where different methods of conceptual analysis are employed; (b) 
showing the limits of, for example, the armchair method and asking students to come up with other 
ways to conduct philosophically fruitful analyses; (c) providing different examples that show that 
depending on the question we fare better with one analysis rather than another (e.g., intensional 
definitions are useful when we want to provide generalized accounts, extensional definitions are 
useful when we have a small and diverse sample of objects, etc.); and (d) showing students that what 
they assume to be a neutral perspective of investigation is usually a situated position. These and other 
tools can broaden the spectrum of possible conceptual analysis for students and show how their 
diverse perspectives can be beneficial for our philosophical engagement. In this sense we can diversify 
the methods we teach. 

Second, even when we present diverse reading material and diverse methods of conceptual 
analysis, students that are members of underrepresented groups participate in classroom discussions 
less than others. Besides diversifying the methods of philosophical thinking, we should also aim at 
diversifying the discussion we have with our students. Let me suggest the following tool by which we 
can encourage diverse participation without putting certain students in the spotlight: we can ask our 
students to send us one (or more) questions that engage with the assigned reading material before 
class. We can then read all questions before class and pick a couple of questions that are particularly 
interesting or engaging, always keeping in mind that the set of questions we pick should be by 
students from diverse social groups. When we start the discussion in the classroom, we can read the 



 

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questions we have picked beforehand to the class—highlighting the interesting and good ways they 
engage with the material. We can then ask the students who wrote the presented questions to 
elaborate on their thoughts before starting a discussion with everyone. This way, we encourage 
students from diverse social groups to participate in class, but we make sure that they are well 
prepared (they wrote a good question) and we give them a feeling of being good philosophers by 
stressing the good quality of the question before we make them talk—therefore providing them self-
confidence to speak up in class. 

These two ways of diversifying the philosophical methods and the discussions in the classroom 
can help create a philosophical set-up that is inclusive for everyone in the classroom. It can therefore 
help counter the marginalizing effects of armchair philosophy. To sum up, I have argued that the 
narrow conception of armchair philosophy can be marginalizing for philosophy students that are 
members of underrepresented groups when combined with the culture of male entitlement in 
academic philosophy. I have, further, identified two reasons why this is particularly worrisome for 
academic philosophy: for reasons of fairness and for the sake of philosophy. However, I have also 
shown that not all projects of conceptual analysis contribute to marginalizing members of 
underrepresented groups and I have provided the example of Haslanger’s ameliorative projects. 
Finally, I have concluded this paper by suggesting two strategies that we can adopt in the classroom to 
counter the marginalizing effects on those students that are members of underrepresented groups: 
diversifying the methods we teach and diversifying the discussion in the classroom. Now we just need 
the will to do it.  

 

Endnotes 

 
1 For numbers concerning “women” in philosophy in the UK see Beebee, Helen and Jenny Saul 2011. 

Important essays about the discriminatory ideology of philosophy are Haslanger 2008 and Dotson 2012. 
2 By the “set-up of academic philosophy” I mean the fact that most lecturers in philosophy are white, male, and 

middle class, the aggressive debating style common to philosophical discussions, and so further. 
3 Even though other and more descriptive, normative, and experimental methods have gained importance in 

analytic philosophy, a priori philosophy still is the most common method with which analytic philosophers 

work. 
4 I am not going to consider outright hostility against minority groups (e.g., sexual abuse of female students in 

philosophy departments) or any reasons, which are not connected to the methodological claims given above. I 

can also not consider every argument for why academic philosophy in particular is marginalizing for 

underrepresented groups. For a good argument of why and how knowledge attribution in general is 

discriminatory, see Haslanger 2012: 344. 
5 See the following article for numbers of the overwhelming majority of white male philosophers in academic 

philosophy: https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/women-in-philosophy-do-the-math/?_r=0; 

accessed: April 30, 2017. 

https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/women-in-philosophy-do-the-math/?_r=0


 

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6 I use the terms ‘male’ and ‘female’ broadly in the sense that we physically judge some persons to be male 

while we judge others to be female; this is not meant as an endorsement of the binary gender system. For an 

overview of stereotypes and stereotyping see Blum 2004. For an explanation of schemas see Valian 1998. 
7 This issue is also connected to stereotype threat. Female students who believe in the “just having it”-myth are 

more prone to stereotype threat. Carol Dweck conducted a study on stereotype threat with math students. She 

concludes: “It looks, then, as though the view of math as a gift can not only make women vulnerable to 

declining performance, it can also make them susceptible to stereotypes, so that when they enter an 

environment that denigrates their gift, they may lose the desire to carry on in that field.” (2006: 6) This is not 

only true for math but also for (analytic) philosophy in general. 
8 See this chard: 

https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=ZGVmYXVsdGRvbWFpbnxhcGFjb21taXR0ZWVvbnR

oZXN0YXR1c29md29tZW58Z3g6NThlNmFiNTZjMTc5ZDE0Mw; accessed: April 30, 2017. 
9 See also Beebee 2013, Norlock 2012, and Paxton et al. 2012. 
10 This is, of course, only one side of the coin: to stop underrepresented groups from being marginalized in 

philosophy, we cannot merely tackle its methodological problems, but we have to take seriously the 

discouraging “set-up” of academic philosophy. For different arguments that take this into account, see 

Hutchison and Jenkins 2013.  
11 These three ways of conceptual analysis are taken from Haslanger 2006, see also Haslanger 2012: 223f., 342, 

367, 371, 386 and 395. 
12 Similar arguments were, for example, brought forward in a talk (“The Philosophical Significance of 

Ameliorative Projects”) by Herman Cappelen at an Arché workshop on Haslanger’s ameliorative projects in St. 

Andrews at the 15th October 2013. 

 

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ANALYTIC TEACHING AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRAXIS VOL. 38, ISSUE 1 (2017) 

  
 
 

28 
 

 

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Address Correspondences to:  

Hilkje Charlotte Haenel 
PhD Student at Humboldt-University of Berlin, Germany 
Email: hilkje.charlotte.haenel@gmail.com 

 

mailto:hilkje.charlotte.haenel@gmail.com

