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Matthew Lipman’s Model Theory of the Community of Inquiry 

 
Darryl M. De Marzio 
 
 
 

Introduction 
 

n an earlier publication, titled, “What Happens in Philosophical Texts,”1 I present what I refer to 
as Matthew Lipman’s model theory of the philosophical text.  I argue there that the distinctive 
form of Lipman’s own philosophical novels—the curricular flagship of the Philosophy for 
Children program—lies in how they perform a modeling function, in the sense of being both a 

model of and a model for philosophical thinking. In addition, I attempt to locate through this 
theoretical rendering the place that Lipman’s novels occupy in the history of written philosophical 
discourse, and argue that the novels are simultaneously retrospective and futuristic: harkening back to 
a time when philosophical texts served as a technology with which we form our philosophical 
thinking, rather than as an exposition to which, as readers, we are merely exposed; and, at the same 
time, I suggest that Lipman’s novels point toward a hoped-for future in which narrative discourse 
might once again establish a position of priority over exposition in the development of philosophical 
curriculum. 
 

Throughout this inquiry into the theoretical foundations of Lipman’s philosophical novels I 
became more and more struck by the extent to which Lipman relies upon the notion of a model and 
of modeling to account for the pedagogical importance of these otherwise peculiar texts. Lipman’s 
philosophical novels teach philosophical thinking and participation in a community of inquiry by 
presenting, in narrative and contextualized form, models of philosophical thinking and community of 
inquiry. They are not intended merely to dramatize philosophy, or to make philosophy more 
developmentally appropriate, nor to provide a classroom community with a set of problematic 
situations about which to inquire. Rather, Lipman’s philosophical novels contain within them an 
educational trajectory—they aim to be formative, not simply informative. 
  

In this paper I seek to extend the aforementioned work by exploring Lipman’s use of the notion 
of a model to account for his rendering of the community of inquiry. In likewise fashion, I wish to 
present a model theory of the community of inquiry (CI) as Lipman both understood CI, as well as 
the way in which he developed CI as a teaching and learning practice. While my ambition in this 
paper is somewhat modest—I seek mainly to recapitulate Lipman’s theory of CI and to highlight the 
significance of CI’s modeling function, and in so doing will rehearse points which many students of 
Lipman and CI are already well aware—I believe that the upshot of the discussion will be a 
recalibration of the received view of Lipman’s theory of community of inquiry, a view which tends to 
see CI primarily as a needed environmental condition for the development of reflective educational 

I 



 

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practice. Rather, what I believe Lipman’s model theory will show us is that community of inquiry is a 
model of reflective educational practice for the development of a more salutary community. As 
Lipman puts it in a seldom cited, but I believe crucial essay which I will turn to shortly, “it is inquiry 
that makes for community and not community that makes for inquiry.”2 
 

While Lipman’s reference to the modeling function of the philosophical novel is substantially 
developed in several of his writings, most notably in the chapter, “Teachers and Texts: The Springs of 
Inquiry,” in the first edition of Thinking in Education,3 the notion that the community of inquiry itself 
serves as a model is developed much less coherently, with just few references sprinkled throughout 
Lipman’s work. In fact, if we were to turn to Lipman’s framing of CI in its barest most essential 
outline-form, as he transcribes in both editions of Thinking in Education, and also in Natasha: 
Vygotskian Dialogues, we see that the initial step in the process of forming a community of inquiry is 
“The Presentation of the Text,” where the text functions as “a model, in story form, of a community 
of inquiry”.4 It would seem, then, that it is the text itself that serves as the model of and for the 
community of inquiry, a model that the community utilizes toward achieving its own formation, but 
that the community of inquiry itself does not follow or reflect any modeling function of its own. 
 

I was mainly convinced of this perspective—that according to Lipman, it is the text, and in a 
somewhat weaker sense the teacher too, that serve as models of and for the community of inquiry, but 
that the community of inquiry itself is not a model—until I came across a passage in the seldom cited 
piece that I alluded to earlier, titled, “Pixie and the Relationship Between Cognitive Modeling and 
Cognitive Practice,” a chapter Lipman wrote for an edited collection of essays on the philosophical 
novel, Pixie. There he writes the following: 
 

But if the model is a novel, what happens to the live teaching in the 
actual classroom—isn’t he or she supposed to be the model of thinking 
for the live pupils, and of thinking about thinking and all those other 
good things as well? My own opinion is that classroom teachers have 
seldom been in a position to provide their pupils with a model of 
inquiry into inquiry or learning to learn, nor is it essential that they 
think they need to be in such a position. The responsibility for such 
modeling can be appropriately delegated to the novel and the 
classroom community of inquiry.5 

 
Now, in addition to the clear declaration that Lipman makes about delegating the responsibility for 
the modeling of thinking and ‘all those other good things’ to both the text and the community of 
inquiry—a statement that I will unpack in greater detail in what is to follow—is the seemingly striking 
opinion that it is inessential for the teacher to serve as such a model. 
 

My sense, however, is that this is a much more modest and familiar appraisal of the role of the 
teacher in the light of Lipman’s understanding of the modeling function of the community of 
inquiry.  Indeed, the teacher is seldom expected to serve as a model of inquiry precisely because, as is 



 

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the case in more traditional educational landscapes, reflective inquiry is seldom expected to be 
practiced. But in a community of inquiry it is not the sole responsibility of the teacher qua teacher to 
model for the community its inquiry procedures. Rather, that modeling function can be taken up by 
the text—if it is so designed—as well as the community itself.  To reiterate, this is not to say that the 
teacher can never model inquiry in CI, but that insofar as the teacher does serve such a function it is 
because the teacher is a full-fledged member of the inquiring community, and not because the teacher 
has a special and distinctive status as a model of inquiry. As Lipman says, “We should be wary of 
ascribing all the modeling for higher-order thinking to the teacher…True, the teacher does serve as a 
model, but not as a model for reasoning procedures. I think rather that the teacher provides the 
model of someone who transcends rather than rejects right-wrong answers in the sense of caring more 
for the process of inquiry itself that for the answer that might be right or wrong at a given time.”6 
 

The point to the above discussion concerning the limited extent to which the teacher serves as a 
model is to underscore the more important point which I want to make, and that is that the 
community of inquiry, along with the philosophical text, are the primary models of inquiry and 
philosophical thinking. In what follows, I shall attempt to make clear what Lipman’s understanding 
of a model and the function of modeling is and how the notion, when applied to the community of 
inquiry, carries with it profound educational and social significance. For Lipman, modeling is itself a 
significant activity that any healthy community of inquiry actively engages, so that community of 
inquiry itself functions as a model of the very inquiry procedures and social relationships which it 
engenders.  In addition, I seek to show how for Lipman it is mainly the practice of inquiry modeled 
by the CI which becomes a model for the formation of a more salutary community life, rather than 
that the practice of community which the CI models functions as the model for the formation of 
inquiry.  
 

Lipman’s Notion of a Model 
 

As one might have detected thus far, I have been using the term ‘model’ more or less 
interchangeably in two main ways—one being what might be called a noun-sense, in which the term 
‘model’ refers to a thing, in the sense of a replica, or a smaller-scaled version of an original, and 
perhaps, ‘more-real’ object; the other sense of model being a verb-sense, in which an object is fashioned 
or formed in some intentional manner.  The difference here is between a model of something or other, 
and a model for some state of affairs. This manner of usage, I argue, is consistent with the 
understanding Lipman employs throughout his writings, and reflects a distinctive understanding of 
the notion so as to contrast it with other possible uses of the term.  As I hope to make clear, this is no 
mere argument in semantics but rather a crucial point to be clear on as it helps clarify the educational 
and social significance of Lipman’s theory and practice of community of inquiry. 
 

Initially, it will be helpful to turn, albeit briefly, to Lipman’s view of the philosophical novel in 
order to better tease out these two senses of the notion ‘model’. First of all, then, what are the 
philosophical novels a model of?  They are a model of their own schematic mode of organization. The 
novels are narratives, but like most works of fiction they are composed schematically rather than 



 

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conceptually in that they arrange and organize states of affairs in a more organic and dynamic way so 
that, as Lipman puts it, “every detail counts and adds to the quality of the whole”.7 Conceptual 
organization, in contrast to the schematic mode, tends to arrange facts and states of affairs in a static 
way, as when, for example, a biographer assembles the details of a person’s life according to the 
concept of chronological time in which decade increments, the 1950s, the 1960s, and so on, serve as 
chapters. Lipman’s novels are arranged schematically according to cognitive tools and inquiry 
procedures, such as relationships, in the case of Pixie, or the rules of formal and informal logic, as in 
the case of Harry Stottlemeier’s Discovery. In this way, the novels are models of the schemata of thinking, 
the stuff that there is to learn from reading the novels. 
 

Secondly, the novels are also models of the history of philosophy. Similar to the manner in which 
the texts serve as models of cognitive tools and inquiry procedures, arranged schematically rather than 
conceptually, the history of philosophy is also arranged according to its themes and modes of 
thinking, rather than say historical epochs, systems of thought, or the major figures of the tradition. 
When in Elfie, for example, the title-character wonders whether or not she is actually thinking at a 
given moment, she replies, “Dummy! If you can wonder, you must be thinking!  And if you’re 
thinking, then…you’re for real.”8 Here we have in the text a clear appropriation, not of the concept of 
the Cartesian cogito, but of the manner of thinking peculiar to Descartes and the philosophical 
tradition. Following the first manner of being a model of the cognitive tools and inquiry procedures 
of philosophical thinking, Lipman’s novels are also a model of the history of philosophy in this sense. 
As models, the texts therefore are the reflections and embodiments of the rational and creative 
thinking that Lipman envisioned as operative in the full-fledged philosophical community of inquiry. 
 

But what are the texts models for in the verb-sense that I describe above? I believe Lipman answers 
this at least provisionally when he writes that the philosophical text ought to be: 
 

[A] work of art that has a specific job to do—to be consummatory in 
providing the experience upon which reflection will take place, and to 
be instrumental in providing trails leading toward that reasonableness 
and judiciousness that are characteristic of the educated person.9 

 
Here we can see that what is at stake in the engagement with such a philosophical text is the 
experience and the formation of the reading subject, not the truth value of the propositions 
contained therein, or the exposition of the author’s thinking. The philosophical text is therefore a 
model for, as Lipman puts it, the practice and development of reasonableness and judiciousness. It 
does not inform us of philosophical thinking, but works to form us in philosophical thinking. 
 

Before explaining how this double sense of ‘model’ is applied to the community of inquiry, I 
want to be sure that the notion, at least in Lipman’s rendering, is precise and does not imply other 
senses in which the term might be employed. By determining the contours of the notion of a model 
we should be able to get clearer on Lipman’s understanding of CI so that we can begin to critique the 
view that CI is primarily an environmental condition or structural situation in which philosophical 



 

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inquiry can be free to take place. I am suggesting, then, that when we talk about the community of 
inquiry model in a Lipmanian manner we must remain within the contours of the double sense of a 
model of and a model for, and that the notion of a model as a kind of deep educational structure in 
which we may have, for example, a “traditional model”, a “reflective model”, and so on, will weaken 
and thin the significance of the model and the modeling function in our understanding of CI. 
 

The notion of an educational model in the structural sense suggests a foundation or 
configuration that would allow for certain educational practices to take place. In this way, when we 
think of a community of inquiry, and in particular, a classroom community of inquiry, we can assume 
that there is a larger system or structure inside of which that specific community would operate, for 
example the school system itself, or perhaps even the larger social structure. Now we may refer to this 
structure as a model, as in when one argues that classroom communities of inquiry require a reflective 
model of education to flourish.10 But I question whether we can refer to the community of inquiry 
itself as such a deep structural model, or if instead CI is a collective discourse phenomenon that 
occurs in concert with, or in spite of, the structural model that may surround it. 
 

When Lipman refers to the community of inquiry as a model he does not employ the notion in 
the structural sense, though he does acknowledge the existence of such structural models. Instead, he 
employs the notion strictly in the noun and verb senses that I describe above and in accordance with 
the idea of being a model of a state of affairs and a model for a state of affairs. The question to turn to 
now is what, precisely, does the CI model? 
 

The Community of Inquiry as a Model 
 

Lipman gives us our initial indication when he writes the following: 
 

In any community of inquiry, children will use other children’s 
behavior as models for their own. Each child’s conduct is seen as 
exemplary. If one child is silent, the others may be likewise. If one child 
asks a question, the others may again do likewise. These behaviors 
gradually become normal practice within the community.11 

 
Based on this passage, it would appear that the community of inquiry, by virtue of its constituent 
members, models behaviors. However, we must probe more closely to determine which specific 
behaviors are to serve as models of CI. After all, we know from the social theory of cognition, whether 
from early theorists such as Mead and Vygotsky, who heavily influenced Lipman, or more recent work 
by the likes of Bandura, that any social matrix will engender those social relationships in which the 
behaviors exemplified by the prominent members of the group are modeled and then, in turn, get 
appropriated by the newest members.12 We can therefore ask, focusing on the details of this passage 
from Lipman, whether the silent behavior of the child actually functions as a model in the community 
of inquiry if, in fact, such behavior becomes ‘normal practice within the community’? While such 
modeling may be a sign that social learning is indeed taking place, my sense is that such modeling 



 

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would not indicate especially that social learning within a community of inquiry is taking place.  
Similarly, if question-asking functions as a model, is it the sort of question-asking behavior that would 
indicate whether the community of inquiry is modeling the behavior, or would we be looking at some 
other social matrix? 
 

We must conclude that if we are to consider the community of inquiry as a model of certain 
behaviors, we need to be precise as to what those behaviors are. In this respect, much scholarly work 
has been dedicated to both detailing and actualizing those specific behaviors that would prevail in the 
community of inquiry. An excellent example of such scholarship was presented at the 1998 NAACI 
conference, in a paper by Maughn Gregory titled, “A Behavioral Pedagogy for the Community of 
Inquiry”.13 In this paper, Gregory makes an important distinction between virtues of inquiry and 
behaviors of inquiry. By way of a hermeneutical blending of both the virtue ethics of Aristotle and the 
semiotic pragmatism of Peirce, Gregory arrives at a definition of inquiry virtues as those “habits of 
cognitive behavior that are useful for rational deliberation.”14 Examples of such virtues would include 
habits such as impartiality, consistency, and reasonableness. But as Gregory is keen to point out, such 
virtues are not yet behavioral terms, but rather terms that describe dispositions to behave in certain 
ways which aim at furthering inquiry. So, in Gregory’s analysis, a cognitive virtue such as 
‘reasonableness’ stands for the disposition to engage in more specific behaviors, such as ‘giving and 
asking for reasons,’ and ‘using criteria’. 
 

With such an analysis in mind, an important question to raise at this point would be whether it 
is the virtue or the behavior that serves as a model? At first glance it would appear that there is not 
much of a distinction to make for it would seem a reasonable assertion to claim there exists models of 
virtues such as reasonableness, for example, and models of behavior, such as using criteria. However, 
a closer look at the manner in which models actually function, according to Lipman, should reveal 
that it is the behaviors and processes specific to the community of inquiry that serve as models, for 
the function of modeling entails that what gradually becomes normal practice or habit—that is to say, 
the behaviors themselves, and the virtue that stands for the disposition to engage in those behaviors—is 
what is ultimately being modeled. 
 

This modeling function—of gradually becoming habit—is what Lipman calls, following Vygotsky, 
the process of internalization.15  In this process, any sign or sign-system emerging externally, from the 
culture or social group, is transformed into an internal form within the individual’s cognitive 
structure, thus securing the further self-regulation of action and behavior of that individual.16 For 
Lipman, a vast series of characteristic behaviors of the community of inquiry thus serves as models 
which get internalized so as to become individualized self-regulating behaviors—for example, when 
members of the CI request of each other reasons for their beliefs, individuals will internalize such 
behavior and begin to reflect on their own reasons for belief and action.  Lipman writes, “And so with 
countless other cognitive acts and processes: They begin in each of us as adaptations of group 
behaviors. And since thinking is individual emulation of social norms and social conduct, the more 
rational the social or institutional conduct, the more rational will be the internalized reflection. A 



 

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community that has institutionalized patterns of criticism among its members prepares the way for 
those members to become more self-critical, self-controlled, and autonomous.”17 
 

Therefore, what the community of inquiry is a model of are those behaviors that, as Maughn 
Gregory puts it, are “useful for rational deliberation”. Strictly speaking, the CI is not a model of 
inquiry virtues, such as reasonableness or judiciousness, or even of affective virtues such as empathy 
and care, at least not until those models have been internalized so as to become habit and normal 
practice with the community. But does this suggest that the modeling function would therefore cease 
once a clearly defined set of inquiry-specific behaviors is internalized by each individual and so 
institutionalized within the community?  I think that such a suggestion would imply both that there is 
indeed such a limited set of inquiry-specific behaviors, as if altogether new behaviors, whether 
cognitive, affective, somatic, and so on, would no longer appear in the long run; and that each 
possible behavior could be so internalized by every individual that the community of inquiry would 
no longer in effect model those behaviors whenever they happened to manifest. While in principle it 
is the case that the modeling function could therefore cease, my sense is that if such a situation did 
emerge, the community of inquiry would lose its formative potency insofar as there would be no new 
behaviors to learn, no new way in which to be transformed behaviorally by the community itself. 
 

In this sense, we might even consider—though I suspect that some behaviorists may object—that 
modeling itself is a behavior which is modeled within the community of inquiry. I am thinking here 
especially of those very intentional communities of inquiry that develop procedures for practicing 
inquiry–specific behaviors, such as assigning to specific members the making of specific inquiry 
moves—asking for reasons, offering counter-examples, etc.—so as to model those behaviors for others 
and to evaluate the degree to which the CI progressed or matured. If we agree that such procedures 
aim at generating models, then even the most advanced communities of inquiry may come to 
establish them and “come to think in moves that resemble [these] procedures”.18 Such communities 
of inquiry resemble Lipman’s philosophical novels in both the way they are intentional regarding 
their modeling function, as well as the way in which they model their own mode of organization—that 
is, as the novels are crafted schematically so as to model the schematic dimensions of philosophical 
thinking, so too would communities of inquiry with intentional modeling procedures be organized in 
accordance with the very behaviors they seek to model. 

 
To summarize, then, the community of inquiry is a model of inquiry-specific behaviors, even of 

modeling itself insofar as such a procedure would aim at facilitating the internalization of those 
inquiry-specific behaviors. But we are still far from grasping the meaning and import of Lipman’s 
claim that it is “inquiry that makes for community and not community that makes for inquiry.” It is 
my understanding that when we look at the community of inquiry as a model in the second sense that 
I describe above, in the verb-sense, as a model for, in which an object or state of affairs is actively 
formed and fashioned in some way, then I believe that we shall see how it is that the modeling 
function of inquiry-specific behaviors in the community aims at the transformation, not only of that 
particular community of inquiry, but of communal life generally. 
 



 

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In a passage from Philosophy Goes to School, Lipman writes the following: 
 

If we begin with the practice in the classroom, the practice of 
converting it into a reflective community that thinks in the disciplines 
about the world and about its thinking in the world, we soon come to 
recognize that communities can be nested within larger communities 
and these within larger communities still, if all hold the same allegiance 
to the same procedures of inquiry. There is the familiar ripple effect 
outward like the stone thrown in the pond: wider and wider, more and 
more encompassing communities are formed, each community 
consisting of individuals committed to self-corrective exploration and 
creativity.19 

 
Here Lipman draws an image of the classroom community of inquiry as a model, not so much as a 
model of larger communities still, but as a model for them. While it is indeed true that communities of 
inquiry provide opportunities for the appropriation of the larger culture, Lipman gives us the sense 
that it is the community of inquiry itself which can be utilized by other participatory communities.  
While participation in a community of inquiry ensures that models of inquiry-specific behavior are 
internalized by each member, this internalization is then intended to be projected outward and 
brought forth into subsequent participation in additional communities, serving as models again for 
their transformation. This is why Lipman, in addition to referencing the community of inquiry as a 
model for community life, often uses metaphors for CI such as seedbed, a nucleus, and a stone thrown 
in the pond. The idea is that more than just being a model of salutary communal life and democratic 
social practice, it is a model for the transformation of other participatory collectives into inquiring 
communities. 
 

This dimension of the community of inquiry as model for communal and social transformation 
underscores the need to be wary of the view that the community is solely the desirable environmental 
situation for the promotion of inquiry in Lipman’s rendering of CI. This is not to suggest that the 
environmental situation is insignificant, but that it is the inquiry, along with the behaviors which are 
modeled, that pave the way for the formation of communities of inquiry. The model theory of the 
community of inquiry therefore takes into account models of inquiry-specific behaviors as being 
models for the formation and transformation of community life in general. 
 

I would like to conclude by offering a brief framework of Lipman’s model theory, incorporating 
both the modeling function of the philosophical text and of the community of inquiry. In this 
framework, it is the philosophical text that serves as a model in narrative form of philosophical 
thinking and community of inquiry, which in turn, functions as a model for the formation of 
philosophical thinking and communities of inquiry. The community of inquiry, in turn, serves as a 
model of inquiry behaviors which are internalized and function as models for the transformation of 
communal life in general. Here we have a framework that maps the modeling dimensions of Lipman’s 



 

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Philosophy for Children program—from the text as model, to the community of inquiry as model, to 
the formation of reasonable and judicious communal life. 
 
Endnotes 
 
1 Darryl Matthew De Marzio, “What Happens in Philosophical Texts: Matthew Lipman’s Theory and 
Practice of the Philosophical Text as Model,” childhood & philosophy 7, no. 13 (2011): 29-47. 
2 Matthew Lipman, “Pixie and the Relationship between Cognitive Modelling and Cognitive 
Practice,” in Studies in Philosophy for Children: Pixie, ed. Ronald F. Reed and Ann M. Sharp (Madrid: 
Ediciones De La Torre, 1996), 35. 
3 Matthew Lipman, Thinking in Education (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 212-25. 
4 Ibid, 241; also, Matthew Lipman, Thinking in Education, 2nd Edition (Cambridge University Press, 
2003), 101; and, Matthew Lipman, Natasha: Vygotskian Dialogues (New York: Teachers College Press, 
1996), 11. 
5 Lipman, “Pixie and the Relationship between Cognitive Modelling and Cognitive Practice,” 29-30. 
6 Lipman, Thinking in Education, 219. 
7 Ibid, 220. 
8 Matthew Lipman, Elfie (Upper Montclair, NJ: Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for 
Children, 1988), 2-3. [emphasis in original] 
9 Lipman, Thinking in Education, 221-22. 
10 See, for example, David Kennedy, “The Community of Inquiry and Educational Structure,” 

Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children 9, no. 4 (1991): 20-23. 
11 Lipman, Thinking in Education, 219. 
12 See, especially, G.H. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 

1934);  Lev Vygotsky, Mind In Society: The Development of Higher Psychological Processes, 

trans. M. Cole (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978); and, Albert Bandura, Social 

Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-

Hall, Inc.: 1986) 
13 Maughn Gregory, “A Behavioral Pedagogy for the Community of Inquiry,” Analytic Teaching 

19, no. 1 (1999): 29-37. 
14 Ibid, 30. 
15 Vygotsky, Mind In Society, 52-57. 
16 See, especially, the ‘Afterword’ by Arkady A. Margolis, titled, “A Comparison between the 

Philosophy for Children Approach and the Cultural-Historical and Activity Approaches: 

Psychological and Educational Foundations,” in Lipman, Natasha: Vygotskian Dialogues, 117-29. 
17 Lipman, Thinking in Education, 52. 
18 Ibid, 16. 
19 Matthew Lipman, Philosophy Goes to School (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), 20. 

 

References 

Bandura, Albert, Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory  

(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc.: 1986) 

De Marzio, Darryl M., “What Happens in Philosophical Texts: Matthew Lipman’s Theory and  



 

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Practice of the Philosophical Text as Model,” childhood & philosophy 7, no. 13 (2011): 29-

47. 

Gregory, Maughn, “A Behavioral Pedagogy for the Community of Inquiry,” Analytic Teaching 19,  

no. 1 (1999): 29-37. 

Kennedy, David, “The Community of Inquiry and Educational Structure,” Thinking: The Journal of  

Philosophy for Children 9, no. 4 (1991): 20-23. 

Lipman, Matthew, Philosophy Goes to School (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988) 

_______ Elfie (Upper Montclair, NJ: Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children,  

1988) 

_______ Thinking in Education (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 

_______ “Pixie and the Relationship Between Cognitive Modelling and Cognitive Practice,” in  

Studies in Philosophy For Children: Pixie, ed. Ronald F. Reed and Ann M. Sharp (Madrid: 

Ediciones De La Torre, 1996), 28-36. 

_______ Natasha: Vygotskian Dialogues (New York: Teachers College Press, 1996) 

_______ Thinking in Education, 2nd Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 

Margolis, Arkady, A., “A Comparison Between the Philosophy for Children Approach and the  

Cultural-Historical and Activity Approaches: Psychological and Educational Foundations,”  

in Lipman, Natasha: Vygotskian Dialogues (New York: Teachers College Press, 1996), 117-

129. 

Mead, G.H., Mind, Self, and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934) 

Vygotsky, Lev, Mind in Society: The Development of Higher Psychological Processes, trans. M.  

Cole (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978) 

 

Address Correspondences to: 
Darryl M. De Marzio 
Panuska College of Professional Studies 
University of Scranton 
darryl.demarzio@scranton.edu 

 

 

mailto:darryl.demarzio@scranton.edu

