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The Problem of the Relationship between Philosophi-
cal and Theological Wisdom in the Scholasticism of 

the 13th and early 14th Centuries
Severin V. Kitanov

The Ominous Wisdom of Aristotle, The Philosopher

In the first ordinary question of the secular Oxford theologian Henry of Harclay (ca. 1270–1317), a ques-
tion dealing with the possibility of accurately predicting the second coming of Christ, we read the following 
account of a story told by Alexander Neckham (1157–1217), a Christian theologian and Abbot of Cirencester 
(ca. 1212):

We should also look at the remarkable story Alexander Neckham tells in his second book of 
On the Nature of Things, in the chapter called ‘On the Jealous’. It concerns the evidence for 
Antichrist’s coming. He writes that Aristotle, the Philosopher, when about to go the way of the 
flesh, gave instructions that all of his subtlest writings were to be placed with him in his tomb, 
so that they could be of no use to those who came after him. When he was alive, he fortified a 
place for his tomb with his own hands so that to this day no one has been able to enter it. This 
place, Neckham writes, will be given over to Antichrist when he comes. Antichrist, then, will 
work wonders by means of the cunning inventions (per ingenia subtilia) to be found in Aristotle’s 
writings, so much so that the foolish will take him for God. At that time, if anyone were to know 
where Aristotle’s tomb was and were to see it lying open, that person could (if the story is true) 
argue that Antichrist had come. [Transl. by Edwards & Henninger]1

The story Henry of Harclay narrates is an excellent illustration of the ambiguity characteristic of the attitude 
of thirteenth-century university professors toward Aristotle’s recently discovered legacy. On the one hand, one 
recognizes the immense respect and admiration for Aristotle’s intellectual acumen. On the other hand, one 
senses the enormous tension between Aristotle’s intellectual universe and the Christian worldview. Alexander 
Neckham’s2 association of Aristotle’s most sophisticated writings with the deviousness of the Antichrist creates 
the double impression of Aristotle as an individual of profound but ominous insight.

Once Aristotle’s philosophical writings became an established part of university education,3 Christian schol-
ars faced the difficult challenge of reconciling Aristotle’s intellectual world with the claims of Christian doctrine. 
Aristotle had distinguished between philosophical (sophia) and practical wisdom or prudence (phronesis). Broadly 
speaking, prudence involves the know-how requisite for performing adequate actions in different realms of hu-
man endeavor. In the narrow sense, prudence is moral wisdom, i.e. the knowledge of the principles conducive 
to a good and fulfilling human life and the expertise in applying those principles to the varying circumstances 
of human existence.4 In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle calls philosophical wisdom an intellectual virtue and 
defines it as the product of both science (epistêmê) and intuitive grasp or understanding (nous). In the Metaphysics, 
Aristotle links philosophical wisdom with the study of the first principles and highest causes. Christian scholars 
had to show that philosophical wisdom is insufficient on its own and that a higher form of wisdom is required 
in addition to philosophical wisdom.5



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Thomas Aquinas is the prime example of the attitude according to which theological wisdom complements 
and completes philosophical wisdom. For him, natural human reason is powerful but limited. The wisdom ac-
quired through the study of Sacred Scripture can assist the human intellect in the pursuit of absolute truth. In 
fact, some of the truths of faith fall within the domain of human reason and can be examined independently of 
Scripture. Revelation provides the additional supernatural dimension to truth as known by human reason. This 
dimension transcends the natural light of reason and it is yet indispensable for a complete account of reality.6

As witnessed by some of the theses of the famous 1277 Parisian Condemnation, Aquinas’s generous interpre-
tation of the relationship between philosophical and theological wisdom posed some insurmountable concep-
tual problems, e.g. regarding the compatibility between the biblical doctrine of creation in time and Aristotle’s 
hypothesis of the eternity of the universe.7 Moreover, some scholastics questioned the very existence of wisdom 
other than that associated with the practice of philosophy. Thesis 182 of the condemned propositions, for in-
stance, asserts that “one does not know anything more by the fact that he knows theology.”8

It is difficult to imagine a more radical assault on the value of theology as an independent theoretical disci-
pline than the claim that the knowledge of the theologian, and not just any self-professed theologian but the well-
trained university theologian, amounts to nothing more than what one might come to know by natural means 
alone. At the heart of the mistrust of theology’s independent status was the conviction that theology, as a purely 
theoretical discipline, does not and cannot satisfy Aristotle’s requirements for it to be called wisdom. We can, 
therefore, ask: What Aristotelian requirements did theology fail to meet for it to be justifiably called wisdom, 
and if theology can be called wisdom in some sense, how did Christian theologians conceive of the relationship 
between theological and philosophical wisdom?

Certitude with respect to First Principles as the Starting Point of Philosophical Wisdom and the Possibility 
of a Scientific Theology9

In both his Nicomachean Ethics and Metaphysics, Aristotle characterizes wisdom (sapientia) as the highest and 
most certain of all the sciences. In Book VI of the Ethics, Aristotle describes wisdom as the knowledge of divine 
things and as the most certain, crown-science.10 In Book I of the Metaphysics, Aristotle defines wisdom as the sci-
ence of the first and highest causes.11 The wise man, according to Aristotle, governs and is not governed.12 The 
wise man knows all things universally; he knows the most difficult things, has certitude, is capable of providing 
an account of the origin of his own knowledge, and masters the supreme and most autonomous science.13 Later 
on in Metaphysics, Book VI, Aristotle associates philosophical wisdom with the science of first philosophy (or 
metaphysics), which deals with the causes and principles of beings as beings.14 Aristotle also calls metaphysics the 
most enjoyable and divine of the theoretical sciences.15 For a brief moment in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, the specula-
tive study of being as being becomes a theology, i.e. a study of God. This occurs in Metaphysics, Book XII, where 
Aristotle introduces the concept of the unmoved mover and discusses the life of God.16

Aristotle’s various characterizations of metaphysics gave rise to differing scholastic conceptions of the genu-
ine object of metaphysics as a science: the first and highest causes, being as such, God and the separate intelli-
gences.17 Because of Aristotle’s association of philosophical wisdom with the practice of metaphysics and because 
of Aristotle’s categorization of metaphysics as the supreme and most autonomous science, Christian theologians 
attempted to incorporate metaphysics into the study of theology and met, as a result, with the difficulty of trans-
forming theology into a scientific discipline in the Aristotelian sense of the term. The most formidable objection 
to the enterprise of justifying the scientific status of theology was based on Aristotle’s requirement of certitude 
with respect to the first principles and causes. Aristotle’s requirement meant that one can never be mistaken with 
respect to the starting points and first causes of one’s scientific investigation.18

But can theology meet Aristotle’s certitude requirement in order to be called science and wisdom in the 
Aristotelian sense? Thomas Aquinas argued that since theology is based on divine revelation and not natural hu-



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man reason alone, theology is rightfully called the highest wisdom.19 He attempted to handle Aristotle’s certitude 
requirement by postulating the existence of a higher science, that of God and the blessed, to which theology 
in this life is subordinate and from which it derives the certitude of its own principles. The truths of Christian 
doctrine, according to Aquinas, are not evident in the light of natural reason, but they are nevertheless certain 
because they are evident to God and those who see God face-to-face in heaven.20 The obvious philosophical 
problem with Aquinas’s account of theology as a scientific discipline and a form of wisdom is that, regardless of 
its indebtedness and proximity to Aristotle’s model of the subalternation of the sciences in terms of the deriva-
tion of their first principles, Aquinas’s account rests upon the assumption that there is indeed a science of God 
and the blessed which guarantees the credibility of theological doctrines and the reliability of the theological 
method.21 One may ask how one assumption can give any more credibility to another assumption if it is possible 
that the initial assumption is false. In other words, how can one have certitude with respect to one’s starting 
points in theology in this life if it is uncertain whether there indeed is any higher science – the theology of God 
and the blessed – capable of providing the lacking certitude.

Philosophical Wisdom in the Service of Deductive and Declarative Theology

The thirteenth-century debate over the relationship between theological and philosophical wisdom gave rise 
to two competing conceptions regarding the place of philosophical wisdom in the actual practice of theology in 
the context of university education. These conceptions are known under the titles of “deductive” and “declara-
tive” theology and can be understood, at least indirectly, as emerging from an inherent ambivalence in the medi-
eval scholastic view of philosophy as a servant (ancilla) with respect to theology – ancilla in the sense of famulatus 
(“submissive service”) and ancilla in the sense of subalternatio (“lower in priority”).22 According to “deductive” 
theology, philosophical wisdom allows one to derive conclusions from the articles of faith in harmony with 
strict scientific procedures. The approach can be traced to the writings of William of Auxerre (ca. 1150–1231) 
and Aquinas, but the Dominican theologian Godfrey of Fontaines (ca. 1250–ca. 1306) was among its most 
prominent representatives. According to “declarative” theology, philosophical wisdom amounts to no more than 
aiding one’s comprehension of the mysteries of faith and deepening one’s belief. The model of “declarative” 
theology, also called “defensive” or “persuasive” theology, was inspired by Aurelius Augustine. The Franciscan 
theologian Peter Auriol (ca. 1280–1322) was among the most well-known exponents of this type of theology.23

Both approaches depart from Aquinas with respect to what it means for theology to have certitude. Godfrey 
of Fontaines distinguished between certitude of evidence (objective certitude) and certitude of conviction (psychologi-
cal certitude) and argued that Aquinas was mistaken in calling theology a science in the strict sense of the term 
because that implied that theology has both kinds of certitude. For Godfrey, theology is a science in an improper 
sense only, viz. in the sense that it studies the loftiest subject matter and in the sense that it is more evident to the 
theologian than to the simple believer.24 But whereas deductive theologians conceived of the theological method 
in the narrow sense of making proper inferences from the principles of faith, declarative theologians understood 
the theological method as also involving the clarification of theological concepts and terms, on the one hand, 
and the explication and defense of essential Christian doctrines, on the other.25

Philosophical and Theological Wisdom as Autonomous and Mutually Exclusive Realms

Especially problematic from the point of view of Christian theology was the theory that theology and phi-
losophy constitute two independent and mutually exclusive realms of inquiry. This theory was associated with 
the Muslim philosopher Ibn Rushd or Averroës (ca. 1126–1198), whose many commentaries on Aristotle served 
as a powerful tool for the study and incorporation of Aristotle’s philosophy in the Latin West. But Averroës was 
not only a commentator. He also wrote several philosophical treatises aimed at expounding and defending Ar-
istotle’s philosophy against the criticism of Muslim theologians and the syncretism of Avicenna’s philosophical 
system. The key to understanding Averroës’ view of the place and role of philosophy in relationship to the prac-
tice of Islam is The Decisive Treatise (Fasl al-maql), which explored the relationship of “parentage” (ittisal) between 



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the way of life advocated by the Qur’nic Law (shari‘a) and the wisdom (hikma) pursued in philosophy.26 According 
to Averroës, the Law recommends the use of rational analysis and encourages philosophical reflection.27 There 
cannot be a genuine opposition between religious (or revealed) and philosophical truth.28 If a specific Qur’nic 
text contradicts established philosophical doctrines, the scholar ought to apply the means of figurative commen-
tary to get to the true meaning of that text.29 If the scholar, presumably the qualified judge of difficult questions, 
makes an interpretive mistake, he is excused according to the words of the Prophet insofar as he has at least made 
a personal effort (ijtihad) to solve the conceptual problem posed by the Qur’anic text.30 Most importantly, how-
ever, because of its character of a universal revelation, the Qur’an makes possible different levels of comprehen-
sion of one and the same Truth in agreement with different levels or degrees of education. The most educated 
men, those trained in Aristotelian syllogistic logic, are capable of penetrating the symbolic veil of the Qur’anic 
text and grasping its unifying meaning.31

Thirteenth-century Latin followers of Averroës (also known as Latin Averroists) were not familiar with the 
complex analysis of the relationship between Muslim Law and philosophy in Averroës’ Decisive Treatise and 
believed that he had advocated the theory of double truth. According to this theory, there is no genuine unity 
between theological and philosophical wisdom. One could speak as if from two different perspectives or points 
of view: that of the theologian and that of the philosopher. These two perspectives are incompatible, and so what 
the theologian considers true is regarded as false by the philosopher and vice versa.32 The figures associated with 
the theory of double truth were Siger of Brabant (ca. 1240–ca. 1284) and Boethius of Dacia (fl. ca. 2nd half of the 
thirteenth century). The teachings of these two Parisian thinkers and some unknown members of the Arts Fac-
ulty were the primary target of the 1277-Condemnation.33 The separation of faith and reason is especially evident 
in the writings of Boethius of Dacia. Boethius did not actually deny the truth of Christian revelation. He only 
attempted to impose clear boundaries on what humans can know by natural means alone.34 One of the most 
important aspects of Boethius’s thought, however, is the view that the philosophical lifestyle, which involves the 
rational investigation and pursuit of truth, is the most fulfilling and enjoyable way of life. This is not to say that 
a human being has no higher supernatural end beyond the reach of the present life. It does mean, however, that, 
in this life, there is no more fulfilling and happy life than that of the philosopher.35

Philosophical Wisdom as a Fool’s Wisdom

In the aftermath of the 1270 and 1277 Parisian Condemnations, Christian scholars were much more ap-
prehensive about the project of establishing a Christian philosophy through a straightforward synthesis of the 
claims of Christian revelation with the demands of Aristotelian metaphysics and syllogistic logic. Christian 
thinkers attempted to show the limitations of Aristotle’s philosophy by pointing out areas where the Aristotelian 
conceptual apparatus was ill-equipped to deal with fundamental insights peculiar to the Christian worldview. A 
good example is the Franciscan theologian and philosopher, John Duns Scotus’s attempt to re-cast Aristotle’s ac-
count of the process of moral deliberation in terms of the relationship between the human intellect as a merely 
natural power incapable of self-determination and the human will as a fully rational, self-determining power.36

One of the most remarkable developments pertaining to the problem of the relationship between theologi-
cal and philosophical wisdom concerns the application of Aristotelian syllogistic logic to principal Christian 
doctrines such as the belief in the Trinity and the Incarnation. Protecting the integrity of theological discourse 
required either excluding these doctrines from the domain of Aristotelian syllogistic logic altogether or modify-
ing the art of syllogistic demonstration by means of special rules applicable solely in the context of belief. I focus 
mainly on the view according to which Christians are bound by special rules of faith. According to this view, the 
authority of Scriptural and Ecclesiastical Tradition and not natural reason as such is the final arbiter in matters 
of faith.37 Christians ought to respond to arguments against faith by using the rules of the logic of faith (logica 
fidei). In essence, this view implied that – ordinary logic aside – the theologian obligates himself to principles 
governing an imaginary logical game in which one ought to accept whatever follows from given premises taken as 
true and reject all consequences incompatible with these premises.38 The English Dominican theologian Robert 



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Holcot (b. ca. 1290–d. 1349), whom I shall discuss in more detail, was among the main advocates of the logic 
of faith. But the roots of this view can be traced to the writings of the most well-known medieval logician, the 
Franciscan theologian and philosopher William of Ockham (b. ca. 1285–d. 1347/49), who maintained that the-
ology begins with premises and involves consequences which are not open for debate, but whenever a theological 
problem arises that is not immediately related to the official doctrinal formulations of the Church, the problem 
is to be examined according to the rules of ordinary reasoning.39

Robert Holcot was both a Dominican friar and a follower of William of Ockham. H.G. Gelber notes that 
“Holcot’s education took place in the wake of William of Ockham’s career at Oxford and of the beatification of 
Thomas Aquinas.”40 Holcot’s thought presents therefore an excellent study case for exploring early fourteenth-
century scholastic attitudes to the relationship between theological and philosophical wisdom. Furthermore, 
Holcot wrote a substantial and widely circulated commentary on the Book of Wisdom.41

There has been a considerable debate about how to interpret Holcot’s views regarding the relationship be-
tween faith and reason. Earlier twentieth-century scholars had taken Holcot to be a skeptic. The growing consen-
sus is that he was not a skeptic.42 It is easy enough to show why Holcot gained the reputation of being a skeptic. 
Holcot was deeply interested in circumscribing and differentiating from each other the realms of theological and 
philosophical wisdom. In one of the questions belonging to Holcot’s first Quodlibet, we find an enlightening 
treatment of whether Catholics ought to concede contradictory propositions. The treatment is contained in the 
first article of a question titled: “Whether this [proposition] ought to be granted – ‘God is Father and Son and 
Holy Spirit.’” Holcot lists ten instructions regarding what a Catholic ought to accept and/or reject. He says, for 
instance, that a Catholic ought to concede statements contrary to reason, and, more precisely, statements with 
unknown truth value.43 Furthermore, only the Vicar of Christ on earth, that is the Pope, has the authority to 
determine what ought to be granted or not.44 A Catholic should not endeavor to demonstrate the truth of the 
articles of faith through natural reason but only by means of authority, revelations, or miracles.45 A Catholic 
should not attempt to respond scientifically to the arguments of heretics and philosophers unless those argu-
ments are formally incorrect. A Catholic cannot in principle demonstrate the falsity of the premises of heretical 
or philosophical arguments because doing so requires demonstrating the truth of the articles of faith, which is 
beyond the ability of the wayfarer (viator) in this life.46 Most importantly, Holcot states that a Catholic ought 
to respond to arguments contrary to faith on the basis of spiritual rules. He gives the example with Anselm of 
Canterbury’s rule which stipulates that one ought to grant the unity of the Trinity in syllogistic discourse unless 
the identity of the persons is undermined as a result of a given syllogistic argument. In the latter case, Holcot 
says, one ought to accept the premises of the argument and deny the conclusion.47 Ultimately, a Catholic ought 
not to use any logic in conceding or rejecting propositions and consequences pertaining to faith unless the 
Church has so determined. Natural logic, Holcot states, cannot handle satisfactorily the subject matter of faith 
(credibilia). A case in point, according to Holcot, is the following expository syllogism (i.e. a syllogism involving 
singular premises)48:

(P1) This thing is the Father.
(P2) This thing is the Son.
(C) Therefore, the Father is the Son.

One should not accept the conclusion of the syllogism although the argument is formally impeccable.49 In re-
sponse to the objection that it is pointless for a theologian to learn logic,50 Holcot states that the study of logic 
in theology is useful mainly for the purpose of defeating sophistical arguments.51

What can we tell about Holcot’s understanding of the relationship between theological and philosophical 
wisdom on the basis of the aforementioned directives pertaining to the use of logic in theology? We might be 
tempted to infer that Holcot was indeed highly skeptical with respect to what natural reason can achieve in the 
realm of theology. In the prologue to his Wisdom commentary, Holcot indeed states that “the strength of the 



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secular sciences does not exceed the power of human reason whereas the strength of the most sacred theol-
ogy, which ensues from the authority of the first truth, exceeds the power of any given [human] intelligence.”52 
Moreover, there is no room for a philosophical practice apart from the practice of Christianity. The Church has 
absorbed the ancient wisdom of Plato, Pythagoras and Aristotle. Compared to Christ, the wisdom of the phi-
losophers is foolishness.53 Does all this mean that one ought to embrace Christianity blindly? Oberman explains 
that Holcot’s aim is not to eliminate or negate reason altogether but, rather, to humble reason’s pretensions to 
absolute certitude in matters of faith. Reason can only supply probable and insufficient grounds for belief in 
God. Reason, however, is an indispensable tool for any genuine effort (facere quod in se est) to come to terms with 
the divine. Revelation presupposes the use of reason even though the complete grasp of the divine is beyond the 
reach of reason.54

A Probabilistic Natural Theology – Concluding Unscientific Postscript

One may ask in the end whether, and if so, to what extent did scholastics achieve the sought for synthesis 
between theological and philosophical wisdom? Before I attempt to answer this question, I should like to make 
two important points. My first point is that the conflict between Christian theology and the philosophy of Ar-
istotle involved more than a mere opposition between dogmatic adherence to the authority of Scripture, on the 
one hand, and the rigor of Aristotle’s scientific criteria. Christian theologians were also deeply influenced by 
the Augustinian view of the mind as deficient and in need of direction through divine illumination. In essence, 
then, the confrontation between Christian theology and Aristotelian philosophy was a confrontation between 
two very different systems of thought – the Augustinian and the Aristotelian – with their incompatible standards 
of truth and rationality.55

My second point is that prior to the arrival of Aristotle in the West twelfth-century thought shows strong 
continuity with the ancient Platonic ideal of philosophical wisdom as the speculative pursuit of eternal and 
immutable reality, on the one hand, and self-knowledge as the best form of therapy in this life, on the other.56 
From the perspective of the Platonic ideal, wisdom encompasses both an objective dimension – the knowledge 
of what is unchangeable – and a subjective dimension – the knowledge of oneself.57 Under the influence of 
Aristotle, thirteenth and fourteenth-century scholastics conceived of wisdom as primarily an objective or epistemic 
mode.58 At the dawn of the Renaissance, however, we find in the writings of theologians such as Meister Eckhart 
(1260–1328) and Nicolas of Cusa (1401–1464) a serious effort to revitalize the Platonic ideal of wisdom as the 
unifying horizon of the objective understanding of first truths and self-knowledge.59

Given my two provisos regarding the complexity of the actual historical context, I suggest that medieval 
scholastics failed to fully synthesize theological and philosophical wisdom. This failure, however, was in some 
sense inevitable given the nature of such an ambitious enterprise. Scholastic theologians in general believed 
that theology is in a unique position insofar as it provides a corrective with respect to philosophy’s claim to be 
the master discipline in virtue of philosophy’s genuine concern with wisdom. Medieval scholastics had to claim 
this corrective function for theology as a theoretical discipline insofar as they maintained that theology begins 
with revealed knowledge, which, by definition, cannot be erroneous. From the point of view of philosophy as 
the master discipline, however, theology is inescapably problematic insofar as it demands adherence to proposi-
tions that may be ultimately false. It would be entirely anachronistic, nevertheless, to suppose that the medieval 
scholastics operated with a conception of philosophy as a fully autonomous discipline, a discipline independent 
of any other, and especially independent of theology. This kind of conception, in essence based on assumption, 
is more characteristic of the modern “secular” understanding of philosophy,60 some elements of which are of 
course latent in medieval scholasticism as witnessed by the 1277 Parisian Condemnation of Latin Averroism.

Most importantly, if, as James F. Anderson points out, “Christianity is true, philosophy is not absolutely 
autonomous; there is a higher science possible to man: a science based not on naturally known principles, but 
on principles revealed by God. If such a science – theology – exists, philosophy is necessarily inferior to it in the 



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very order of science.”61 Suppose a philosopher granted the possibility of there being a science higher than phi-
losophy and abandoned the dogmatic insistence on philosophy’s wholly independent status (and, according to 
Anderson, “[i]t is impossible to maintain the absolute autonomy of philosophy without denying that theology is 
a science […]”62), how can the scholastic theologian attempt to make a case for the truth of Christian convictions? 
Perhaps the very best a theologian can do is showcase the plausibility of revealed truths by means of a probabilistic 
natural theology. This kind of theology insists that natural reason can indeed provide good although not defini-
tive grounds for belief in the existence of God. A contemporary proponent of this view is Richard Swinburne. 
According to Swinburne, natural and revealed theology can only differ in the degree of the probability of their 
proofs. Any evidence in support of the claim that God exists makes it more probable that God has indeed re-
vealed Himself, and, similarly, any evidence in support of the truth of specific revealed doctrines (the Trinity or 
the Incarnation) makes it more probable that God exists.63

Finally, one might also think of the possibility of a natural theology in terms of testing the belief in God’s 
existence through the method of counterexample and holding on to this belief in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary. One may thus be certain that God exists but not in the sense that it is impossible for one to be wrong. 
Moreover, one may claim certainty with respect to revealed truths at least insofar as one can show that these 
truths are not logically impossible.64

Given then that the pursuit of wisdom as an all-comprehensive and complete account of reality as such (i.e. 
knowledge of reality as if sub specie aeternitatis65) is not an entirely contradictory, and, so, meaningless project, 
and given that the theologian and philosopher are interested in the same kind of wisdom and that both keep an 
open mind, it should in principle be possible to show whether or not theological and philosophical wisdom do 
indeed converge. All one can say in the end is that if theologians and philosophers are equally motivated by the 
desire for truth and wish to unravel the ultimate mystery of reality, they are bound to work together toward an 
ever more increasing understanding of the absolute foundations of reality.66

Endnotes
1 Henry of Harclay, Ordinary Questions, ed. by Mark G. Henninger, SJ, English translation by Raymond Ed-

wards & Mark G. Henninger, SJ, Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi XVII (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008), Q. 1, n. 83, p. 63.

2 Unlike at Paris, where the public and private teaching of Aristotle’s libri naturales and Metaphysics was for-
bidden up until about 1240, Oxford scholars began commenting on Aristotle’s writings early during the 
thirteenth century. Alexander Neckham was the first English scholar who applied natural philosophy in 
theology. See Fernand Van Steenberghen, Aristotle in the West: The Origins of Latin Aristotelianism, transl. by 
Leonard Johnston (Louvain: Nauwelaerts Publishing House, 1970), 108. See also Monica Asztalos, “The Fac-
ulty of Theology,” in A History of the University in Europe, Vol. 1, ed. Hilde De Ridder-Symoens (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 409–441, at 426.

3 The translation process of Aristotle’s works of natural philosophy (libri naturales) and those of his Arabic com-
mentators had begun in the second quarter of the twelfth century. In 1210, ecclesiastical authorities at Paris 
imposed a ban on the public and private teaching of Aristotle’s natural philosophy. The ban was eventually 
lifted (ca. 1240) and Aristotle’s libri naturales entered the curriculum of the Parisian Faculty of Arts. Aristotle’s 
metaphysics followed suit. See Asztalos, “The Faculty of Theology,” 420–422. See also Van Steenberghen, 
Aristotle in the West, 66–77, 108–109.

4 See John Kekes, Moral Wisdom and Good Lives (Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 1995), 16–17.
5 The main issue here concerned the epistemic status of theology with respect to Aristotle’s understanding of 

science. See Asztalos, “The Faculty of Theology,” 423–424.
6 Thomas Aquinas on Faith and Reason, ed., with introductions by Stephen F. Brown (Indianapolis/Cambridge: 

Hackett Publishing Company, 1999), 114–115. See also Asztalos, “The Faculty of Theology,” 423–424.
7 For a concise discussion and essential bibliography regarding the Parisian condemnations of 1270 and 1277, 

see John F. Wippel, “The Parisian Condemnations of 1270 and 1277,” in A Companion to Philosophy in the 



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Middle Ages, ed. by Jorge J.E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone, Blackwell Companions to Philosophy 24 (Mal-
den, MA/Oxford, UK/Carlton, Victoria, AUS: Blackwell Publishing, 2006 (hardback 2003)), 65–73. For the 
errors associated with Aquinas, see Stephen F. Brown and Juan Carlos Flores, Historical Dictionary of Medieval 
Philosophy and Theology, Historical Dictionaries of Religions, Philosophies, and Movements 76 (Lanham, 
MD/Toronto/Plymouth, UK: The Scarecrow Press, Inc. 2007), 316.

8 See Brown and Flores, Historical Dictionary, 314.
9 My discussion focuses primarily on the problem of reconciling theology and philosophy as theoretical or 

speculative disciplines on the basis of Aristotle’s criteria for science. I do not talk about the problem of rec-
onciling the purely theological concept of wisdom as a gift of the Holy Spirit and the Aristotelian concept 
of wisdom as an acquired intellectual habit. I also do not talk about the medieval scholastic discussion of the 
problem of defining wisdom as both understanding and science (which is basically the problem of the identity 
of wisdom as a virtue). For a discussion of these particular problems, see Risto Saarinen, “Wisdom as Intel-
lectual Virtue: Aquinas, Odonis and Buridan,” in Mind and Modality: Studies in the History of Philosophy in 
Honour of Simo Knuuttila, ed. by Vesa Hirvonen, Toivo J. Holopainen and Miira Tuominen, Brill’s Studies in 
Intellectual History 141 (Leiden/Boston: E.J. Brill, 2006), 189–198, esp. 191–192.

10 Jacqueline Hamesse, Les Auctoritates Aristotelis: Un florilège médiéval, étude historique et edition critique, Phi-
losophes Médiévaux XVII (Louvain/Paris, 1974), p. 240, n. 113: “Sapientia est cognitio rerum divinarum 
habens caput inter omnes alias scientias.”; n. 114: “Sapientia est certissima omnium aliarum scientiarum.”

11 Hamesse, Les Auctoritates Aristotelis, p. 115, n. 11: “Sapientia est scientia primarum et altissimarum 
causarum.”

12 Hamesse, Les Auctoritates Aristotelis, p. 116, n. 13: “Sapientis non est ordinari, sed ordinare oportet, id est 
sapientis est regere et non regi.”

13 Hamesse, Les Auctoritates Aristotelis, pp. 115–116, n. 12: “Sapientem oportet scire omnia in universali et scire 
difficillima et habere scientiam certiorem et scire reddere causas ipsorum quae scit et habere scientiam quae 
subordinet alias scientias subservientes et habere scientiam quae sui ipsius sit causa et non alterius.”

14 Hamesse, Les Auctoritates Aristotelis, p. 126, n. 143: “Metaphysica considerat causas et principia entium in 
quantum entia.”

15 Hamesse, Les Auctoritates Aristotelis, p. 127, n. 147: “Tres sunt partes philosophiae speculativae, scilicet natura-
lis, mathematica et divina, id est metaphysica.”; n. 150: “Theoricae scientiae, id est speculativae, aliis scientiis 
sunt delectabiliores et metaphysica theoricis.”

16 Aristotle’s unmoved mover or God has little to do with the gods of Greek polytheism and with the idea of a 
supreme, benevolent, creative, omnipotent, and omniscient deity at the heart of Christian monotheism. Ar-
istotle’s prime mover is a theoretical construct meant to provide a solution to the problem of the beginning 
of movement in the physical universe. See Adam Drozdek, Greek Philosophers as Theologians: The Divine Arche 
(Aldershot, U.K./Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007), 182–183. See also Mary Louise Gill, “First Philosophy in 
Aristotle,” in A Companion to Ancient Philosophy, ed. by Mary Louise Gill and Pierre Pellegrin, Blackwell Com-
panions to Philosophy 31 (MA/Oxford, UK/Carlton, Victoria, AUS: Blackwell Publishing, 2009 (hardback 
2006)), 347–373, at 368–369.

17 See Joël Biard, “God as First Principle and Metaphysics as a Science,” in The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern 
Metaphysics and Modal Theory, 1400–1700, ed. by R.L. Friedman and L.O. Nielsen, The New Synthese Histori-
cal Library 53 (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), 75–97, at 76–80; Severin 
V. Kitanov, “1200-luvun aristotelismi,” Keskiajan filosofia, toim. Vesa Hirvonen & Risto Saarinen (Helsinki: 
Gaudeamus, Helsinki University Press, 2008), 47–64, at 52–53.

18 Andreas Speer, “Certitude and Wisdom in Bonaventure and Henry of Ghent,” in Henry of Ghent and the 
Transformation of Scholastic Thought: Studies in Memory of Jos Decorte, ed. by Guy Guldentops and Carlos Steel 
(Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2003), 75–100, at 83.

19 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 1, a. 6, resp.
20 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 1, a. 2, resp.
21 I have in mind the deductive approach, according to which the theologian derives conclusions from the arti-

cles of faith.
22 According to S.F. Brown, the term “subalternatio” could be taken to affirm the superiority of revealed truth 



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in relation to philosophical truth but it could also be interpreted as allowing for the development of an 
independent scientific discipline. See Stephen F. Brown, “Theology and Philosophy,” in Medieval Latin: An 
Introduction and Bibliographical Guide, ed. by F.A.C. Mantello and A.G. Rigg (Washington, DC: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 1996), 267–287, at 273–274.

23 Brown and Flores, Historical Dictionary, lx–lxiii; Stephen F. Brown, “Declarative Theology After Durandus: 
Its Re-Presentation and Defense by Peter Aureoli,” in Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early Fourteenth 
Century, ed. by Stephen F. Brown, Thomas Dewender, and Theo Kobusch, Studien und Texte zur Geistesge-
schichte des Mittelalters 102 (Leiden/Boston: E.J. Brill, 2009), 401–421, at 406–407 and 417–421; Stephen 
F. Brown, “Declarative and Deductive Theology in the Early Fourteenth Century,” in Was ist Philosophie im 
Mittelalter? Qu’est-ce que la philosophie au Moyen Âge? What is Philosophy in the Middle Ages? Akten des X. Inter-
nationalen Kongresses für mittelalterliche Philosophie der Société Internationale pour l’Étude de la Philoso-
phie Médiévale 25. Bis 30. August 1997 in Erfurt, hrsg. von Jan A. Aertsen und Andreas Speer (Berlin/New 
York: Walter de Gruyter, 1998), 648–655, at 648–649.

24 Brown and Flores, Historical Dictionary, lvii–lix; Brown, “Declarative and Deductive Theology,” 650.
25 Brown and Flores, Historical Dictionary, lxi–lxii; Brown, “Declarative Theology After Durandus,” 415–416; 

Brown, “Declarative and Deductive Theology,” 650–651.
26 See Roger Arnaldez, Averroes: A Rationalist in Islam, transl. by David Streight (Notre Dame, IND: University 

of Notre Dame Press, 2000), 79.
27 Arnaldez, Averroes, 80–81.
28 Arnaldez, Averroes, 82.
29 Arnaldez, Averroes, 82–83.
30 Arnaldez, Averroes, 87–88.
31 Arnaldez, Averroes, 88–89.
32 I should note in this connection that Parisian arts masters were required until the 15th century to swear obedi-

ence to a statute stating that any questions pertaining to faith ought to be determined according to faith, not 
according to reason, and that one is not allowed to discuss arguments contrary to faith. See Asztalos, “The 
Faculty of Theology,” 424.

33 Brown and Flores, Historical Dictionary, 43–46.
34 Brown and Flores, Historical Dictionary, 59–60.
35 Pierre Hadot, What Is Ancient Philosophy?, transl. by Michael Chase (Cambridge, MA/London, U.K.: The 

Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002), 262. See also Andreas Speer, “The Vocabulary of Wisdom 
and the Understanding of Philosophy,” in L’Éboration du Vocabulaire Philosophique au Moyen Âge, Actes du 
Colloque international de Louvain-la-Neuve et Leuven 12-14 septembre 1998 organisé par la Société Inter-
nationale pour l’Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale, édités par Jacqueline Hamesse et Carlos Steel (Louvain: 
Brepols, 2000), 257–280, at 275–276.

36 See S.V. Kitanov, Beatific Enjoyment in Scholastic Theology and Philosophy: 1240–1335 (Ph.D. diss. University of 
Helsinki, 2006), 245–247.

37 Whether the final arbiter in matters of faith ought to be the pope himself or a general council was by no 
means a settled question in the scholastic middle ages. The doctrine of papal infallibility was not formulated 
definitively until 18 July 1870 at Vatican Council I. The roots of the doctrine, however, can be traced back 
to fourteenth-century scholastic authors. For the origin and history of the doctrine of papal infallibility in 
medieval scholasticism, see Brian Tierney, Origins of Papal Infallibility 1150–1350: A Study on the Concepts of 
Infallibility, Sovereignty and Tradition in the Middle Ages (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1972).

38 Hester Goodenough Gelber, It Could Have Been Otherwise: Contingency and Necessity in Dominican Theology 
at Oxford, 1300–1350 (Leiden/Boston: E.J. Brill, 2004), 183–185. See also Michael H. Shank, “Unless You 
Believe, You Shall Not Understand”: Logic, University, and Society in Late Medieval Vienna (Princeton, NJ: Prin-
ceton University Press, 1988), 74–79.

39 S.V. Kitanov, “Peter of Candia on Beatific Enjoyment: Can One Enjoy the Divine Persons Separately from 
the Divine Essence?”, Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum 35:1 (2006): 144–166, at 159–161.

40 Robertus Holcot, Exploring the Boundaries of Reason: Three Questions on the Nature of God, ed. by H.G. Gelber, 
Studies and Texts 62 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1983), abstract page.



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41 Kimberly Georgedes, “Robert Holcot,” in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, 609–610, at 609.
42 See Holcot, Exploring the Boundaries of Reason, 2. For a discussion of Holcot’s supposed skepticism, see Heiko 

Augustinus Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism (Grand 
Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1967), 238–243.

43 Holcot, Exploring the Boundaries of Reason, p. 31, lin. 10–12: “Circa primum articulum, dico primo quod 
Catholicus debet concedere illa quae sunt contra rationem, hoc est, aliquas propositiones de quibus non 
potest sibi constare utrum sint verae vel falsae.”

44 Holcot, Exploring the Boundaries of Reason, p. 32, lin. 32–p. 33, lin. 44.
45 Holcot, Exploring the Boundaries of Reason, p. 33, lin. 45–48: “Quarto, dico quod Catholicus non debet niti ad 

probandum vel ostendendum quod sic est sicut articulus dicit per rationem innitentem lumini naturali, sed 
tantummodo per auctoritates et revelationes vel miracula.”

46 Holcot, Exploring the Boundaries of Reason, p. 33, lin. 51–57: “Quinto, dico quod nec Catholicus debet niti 
ad respondendum scientifice ad argumenta haereticorum et philosophorum nisi sint argumenta peccantia 
in forma, quia hoc non est sibi possible, quia respondere scientifice ad argumentum peccans in materia est 
ostendere aliquam praemissam esse falsam, sed impossibile est Catholico ostendere quod oppositum articuli 
est falsum quia hoc esset ostendere ipsum articulum esse verum, quod est impossibile viatori de lege com-
muni.”

47 Holcot, Exploring the Boundaries of Reason, p. 33, lin. 58–62: “Sexto, dico quod argumentis factis contra fidem 
responderi debet per regulas Catholicas quae sunt spirituales in spiritualibus materiis secundum determina-
tionem sanctorum, sicut in materia de Trinitate dantur regulae quod omnia sunt unum in divinis ubi non 
obviat relationis oppositio, et concedere tunc debet praemissas et negare conclusionem […]”

48 For an account of this problematic expository Trinitarian syllogism, see Simo Knuuttila, “Validity and Logic 
in Late Medieval Thought,” in The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory, 1400–
1700, 121–142, at 126–127.

49 Holcot, Exploring the Boundaries of Reason, p. 35, lin. 102–p. 36, lin. 116.
50 Holcot, Exploring the Boundaries of Reason, p. 36, lin. 117–118: “Contra ista: si ista sunt vera, sequitur quod 

non sit utile theologo addiscere logicam.”
51 Holcot, Exploring the Boundaries of Reason, p. 36, lin. 119–123: “Dico quod sic, magis tamen ad responden-

dum et solvendum rationes sophisticas quam ad adducendum. Dicunt enim multi contra fidem et frivolas 
inducunt rationes, et ad tales sufficit ingenium per logicam informatam, unde Aristoteles, De pomo, et tamen 
eodem modo logica est necessaria, ut beatus a loco non legatur.”

52 Robertus Holcot, Super libros Sapientiae (Hagenau, 1494), prol., F, tertium principale: “Robur namque scien-
tiarum secularium non excedit potestatem rationis humane; sed certe robur sacratissime theologie est prime 
veritatis auctoritas que cuiuslibet ingenii vim excedit.”

53 Holcot, Super libros Sapientiae (Hagenau, 1494), prol., E: “Petra autem erat Christus, cui nullus hereticus nec 
philosophus comparatur, sicut in Ps. 140: ‘Absorpti sunt iuncti petre iudices eorum,’ [140(141):6] glossa. 
Iudices eorum sunt potentes et doctors qui de moribus iudicabunt. Plato, Pithagoras et Aristoteles absorpti 
sunt petre iuncti, idest, comparati Christo, per se videntur aliquid dicere, sed iunge et compara eos Christo, 
et nihil sunt, mortui iacent, et stulta est sapientia eorum, hec glossa.” See also Oberman, The Harvest of Me-
dieval Theology, 242.

54 See Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology, 243–244.
55 See Alasdair MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and Tradition, being Gif-

ford Lectures delivered in the University of Edinburgh in 1988 (Notre Dame, IND: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1990), 109–111.

56 Andreas Speer, “The Vocabulary of Wisdom and the Understanding of Philosophy,” in L’Élaboration du 
Vocabulaire Philosophique au Moyen Âge, édités par Jacqueline Hamesse et Carlos Steel, Rencontres de Philoso-
phie Médiévale 8 (Louvain: Brepols, 2000), 257–280, at 259–263.

57 Speer, “The Vocabulary of Wisdom,” 262.
58 Speer, “The Vocabulary of Wisdom,” 279.
59 Speer, “The Vocabulary of Wisdom,” 280.
60 See James F. Anderson, “Is Scholastic Philosophy Philosophical?”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 



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10:2 (1949): 251–259, at 257.
61 Anderson, “Is Scholastic Philosophy Philosophical?”, 257–258.
62 Anderson, “Is Scholastic Philosophy Philosophical?”, 259.
63 Richard Swinburne, “The Revival of Natural Theology,” Archivio di Filosofia 75:1–2 (2007): 303–322, at 

321.
64 I thank Ronald J. Glass for this suggestion.
65 The possibility of knowing reality as such characterizes philosophy in its pre-critical phase, prior to correla-

tionsim – the view that we can never grasp an object “in itself,” independently of or in isolation from its relation 
to the subject. See Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, transl. by Ray 
Brassier (London/New York: Continuum, 2008), 5.

66 I find especially supportive of my view Pope John Paul II’s admonition to philosophers and philosophy teach-
ers to “have the courage to recover, in the flow of an enduringly valid philosophical tradition, the range of 
authentic wisdom and truth – metaphysical truth included – which is proper to philosophical inquiry.” See 
John Paul II, Fides et Ratio: On the Relationship between Faith and Reason, Encyclical Letter to the Bishops of the 
Catholic Church (Boston, MA: Pauline Books & Media, 1998), 128.

Address Correspondences to:

Dr. Severin V. Kitanov
Assistant Professor of Philosophy
352 Lafayette Street
Salem State College
Salem, MA 01970
skitanov@salemstate.edu


