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Recognition, Tolerance, Respect and Empathy

María del Rosario del Collado

After working for the last nine years with children at a private primary school in Mexico City in order 
to build communities of inquiry, an essential methodology of the ‘Philosophy for Children’ (P4C) 

Program of Dr. Matthew Lipman and Dr. Ann Margaret Sharp, I have perceived the difficulty that pupils have 
in respecting ideas from their own schoolmates and friends. Since respect is an integral component of successful 
communities of inquiry, lack of respect in the classroom is a serious problem. To incorporate the methodology 
of the Philosophy for Children Program is not an easy task.  It requires that students are conscious of themselves 
and others as worthy of respect, unique and irreplaceable as individuals.

I believe that implementing an educational proposal like the one expressed by Lipman makes sense and 
is deeply significant; however, this approach must be supplemented by work from complementary disciplines, 
especially psychology and its tradition of Humanistic Psychology, with thinkers like Abraham Maslow, Carl 
Rogers, and Rollo May.    

According to Client-centered therapy, as developed, for example, by Carl Rogers (1961), we have summarized 
the following six characteristics:

1. People  are worthy, unique and irreplaceable beings, holding a special capacity to be self-conscious and to 
take decisions toward self-development.

2. People are considered as biological-psychological-social-spiritual beings, recognizing their structure as a 
unit composed of body and spirit.  People are beings who, on the one hand, are subject to physical 
and biological laws of nature, but on the other hand, are in need of other beings so they can transform 
themselves. This is to say that human beings are connected to each other and have a natural tendency to 
seek their self-fulfillment in material, intellectual, emotional, social and spiritual needs.

3. People are self-conscious beings capable of self-directed behavior. They recognize in themselves the capacity 
to perceive their own existence through their perception of the environment, know their capacity for 
introspection and self-consciousness, and have the possibility to modify the idea they have of themselves 
and their attitudes, and to direct their own actions toward what they find pleasing, which entails the 
possibility of controlling their emotions. People respond to reality depending on the way they perceive it. 
And when they are conscious of this reality, people need not automatically react to it, but instead handle 
it in relation to their own judgments.

4. Each person recognizes him or herself as someone who has the possibility of positive behavior and who 
can act toward self-development.

5. People are beings who develop better in a favorable environment.
6. Finally, the human being is a social being. This is to say that the human being could not recognize and be 

conscious of herself without the presence of other human beings, so it can be said that she is a being in 
connection with others, and that is why interpersonal relationships are so important for her. This goes 
along with the proposal to build communities of dialogue, as the human being gets to discover herself and 
develops herself through other human beings.

As we have observed in the implementation of the P4C Program at the primary educational level of my school, 



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especially in regard to the building of Communities of Inquiry, there are a number of previous conditions that 
need to be in play in order to generate this style of educational community.   Children who have no experience 
recognizing the importance of thinking about, and feeling for, themselves as persons, or perceiving others as 
persons similar to themselves, will be unable to build a community within the classroom that can create critical, 
creative and caring thinking.

From our work in different groups, we realized that it is very important that young students perceive others as 
persons. However, in order to recognize the dignity and importance of other persons, students must first recognize 
their own dignity, which brings us to the concept of ‘Recognition.’ Only when someone has an experience in 
which she recognizes her own dignity, can she then move to the next level of recognizing the importance of 
others. Consequently, when attempts are made to form communities of inquiry, it is important that teachers do 
not assume that students have discovered their own sense of dignity; if this previous work of self-discovery has 
not been undertaken, students can hardly be expected to perceive the other’s importance.

I suggest as an initial step toward building communities of inquiry, that teachers perform exercises that 
enable students to discover, and so recognize, their own significance as unique persons of value. Once I discover 
myself as someone important, I can come to see the need to silence my own expectations and assumption in 
order to listen better to others who are equally as important.

As a second step toward building communities of dialogue, we have to understand the concept of ‘Tolerance.’ 
The values dictionary of Hector Rogel defines tolerance as follows: “The attitude of someone, who is willing not 
to repress the conviction of others, especially those of a religious or moral kind, even though they seem to him 
false or deserving to be rejected, neither prevents their expression.”  However, taking an attitude of tolerance 
does not mean that one needs to either approve of such convictions or be indifferent toward what is right or 
wrong.  

The demand for tolerance is based on the person’s liberty to, under his own judgment, decide what is true 
or false, what is good or bad; it is also based on the indisputable fact that people can be mistaken. Therefore, 
tolerance is demanded by the principle of justice, which implies the recognition of someone’s right to their own 
beliefs.  In being tolerant we respect the person’s capacity to formulate judgments. However, tolerance has its 
limits, specifically when tolerance itself becomes an issue, or in other words, the extent to which a person has a 
right to act according to his thoughts.

A person’s rights are not unlimited, since they are limited by other person’s rights; neither individuals nor 
communities are obliged to accept actions carried out in the name of freedom of conscience that clearly impact 
the rights of others. Additionally, we believe an important corollary of this view is the principle that no one 
can be legally forced to do something against his own conscience, taking liberty of conscience as a fundamental 
human right. 

Looked at from a more positive point of view, tolerance deals with “the frank acceptance of other human 
beings as equally respectable, allowing this other person to be as he is.”

Virgilio Ruiz declares that “recognition and respect for others as persons belong to tolerance, not only 
because their human dignity but it is assumed that they put all their effort to pursue truth and welfare.” (Ruiz, 
2005 p.41)

Ruiz provides an expanded concept of tolerance that makes clear its importance in the building of communities 
of dialogue, since a spirit of tolerance is needed within such communities that allow people to express themselves 
while building and consolidating their own thoughts.

Additionally, Ruiz mentions that the idea and practice of tolerance is directly related not only to the personal 



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development of the individual, but also to two of the most important principles of modern democratic States: 
the principle of equality and principle of liberty. These principles are deeply integrated into the Philosophy for 
Children Program and how it is structured.

For most authors, tolerance is a positive concept that refers to that attitude through which ideas, beliefs and 
behaviors different from one’s own, are allowed. Thus, it is understood that toleration also implies respecting 
other persons and their ideas. The theorist Todorov explains this point as follows:

Evidently, I can only be tolerant toward other humans if I postulate from the beginning, that all of us 
share the same human essence and therefore I suggest that others deserve the same respect. We must 
recognize that men are equal in order to admit that at the same time they are different. Tolerance 
based on equality should not face any limit and in a reciprocal way, any unequal discrimination is 
condemnable. Ruiz, 2005, p. 42)

Ruiz explains that he who is tolerant does not expect self-confirmation, either through a violent conversion or 
bettering of others; rather, his main concern would be a coexistence based on equality and mutual understanding. 
In order to achieve this, we require: “the capacity to listen…and to seriously take others into account, besides 
acquiring the attitude to learn through new situations and new information.” (Ruiz, 2005, p.172)

As mentioned in international documents like UNESCO’s Letter of Tolerance, (UNESCO, 1995) the struggle 
against intolerance requires education and it is precisely the process of building communities of dialogue that we 
will enable us to build such privileged spaces and transform individuals.

Another complex concept that is related to notion of tolerance is that of ‘Respect.’ Although this is a very 
familiar term, it seems that its full meaning has been lost on many people.  We consider it important to unpack 
the full meaning of respect as we build our communities of dialogue.

Everybody uses the word respect, yet if we compare the scholarship dedicated to this moral value as opposed 
to others like love or justice, it does not appear sufficiently studied. Josep M. Esquirol mentions that respect 
comes from how we look at the world.  Respect is an ethical attitude that directly links us to things, and the 
world itself, in which we find a close relationship between the world and ourselves; it is an attitude of the subject 
toward someone or something deserving of respect.  In thinking about what the word “respect” means, we also 
need to consider what kind of entities deserve respect, and the many things in the world worthy of respect.

We have perceived in the communities of dialogue that respect is an essential attitude that enables one to 
participate and get in touch with other members of the group.

I think that respect is a very common term, one that may even be part of many people’s daily vocabulary. 
Everybody uses it, knows its meaning, and understands that respect for other people and for certain things, is a 
good example of moral behavior (Esquirol, 2006, p. 11). It is also helpful to see respect as a virtue; instead of the 
‘courageous’ or ‘wise’ person, we could consider the person as ‘respectful.’ 

It is often the case that moral terms are not as clear as they could be. Quoting Josep M. Esquirol, he tells us 
about the well-known sentence of Marx: “The worker is more in the need of respect rather than bread,” where 
we find that the meaning of the word “respect” is close to “recognition.” The worker wants to be recognized 
as a subject, but as Esquirol emphasizes respect is something more than just recognition. Even though respect 
presupposes recognition, recognition does not necessarily presuppose respect. Consequently, Marx’s sentence 
may have been better expressed as “The worker is more in…need of recognition rather than bread” (Esquirol, 
2006, p.12).

Without recognition we can hardly expect to be respected. This relates to the point we made previously that 



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the person should first recognize himself if respect is to be possible.

To treat someone or something with respect means primarily to treat them with attention. If we look in many 
dictionaries we find that the word “respect” is equivalent or is a close synonym to terms like “consideration,” 
“deference,” “attention,” and “regard.”

The Castilian word “regard” (“miramiento”) can perfectly function as a synonym of respect: to treat someone 
with regard means having respect or attention for them. In German, the word “Achtung” means respect as well 
as attention. For Esquirol, this equivalence shows the medullar meaning of the term, namely, attention: the 
essence of respect is the attentive look as a condition for the possibility of respect. Esquirol explains that respect 
comes from the attentive look: “Not everything that we look [at] attentively ends up deserving our respect, but 
it can be said that some things that we look [at] attentively…can also end up being respected by us.” (Esquirol, 
2006, p. 13)

One place where looking attentively is very important is in the building and maintaining of communities of 
dialogue. Without the attentiveness of participants it is impossible to establish the minimal conditions needed 
to initiate dialogue.  Therefore, as Esquirol makes evident, the concept of respect is an essential attitude to 
develop in students who participate in the community of inquiry, which is an attitude grounded in how we look 
and pay attention.  As facilitators of communities of dialogue, we will have to discover exercises and practices 
that can help achieve a way of looking at others that shows our attentiveness, our desire to generate dialogue.

We can think of respect as a type of movement, but not in the sense of a mechanical or local movement. 
The type of movement expressed by respect is perhaps best understood with reference to Aristotle and his 
conception of movement as “dynamis.” This notion includes what could be called “life movement” or “eros;” for 
example, the encounter between two lovers is a kind of movement that surpasses both.  Similarly, respect is akin 
to a movement but one whose approach also keeps some distance, generating an approximate proximity while 
keeping distance between subjects. How we approach someone or something is a condition for appreciation; if 
the distance is considerable and the object we seek to appreciate cannot be perceived clearly, so neither can it be 
rightfully appreciated. Esquirol says: “I realize the existence of persons, situations and things by first approaching 
them; it is only through approximation [that] I can perceive their singularity, their value.” (Esquirol, 2006, 
p.58)

Given our consideration of respect outlined above, it seems that one can work towards creating respect in 
the community of dialogue by stressing its importance in the building of a respectful dialogue community, where 
everyone could participate in this dialogue without fear of exclusion. At the level of dialogue, respect exists in 
terms of whether we give due consideration to others as valuable, which is something we can convey in the very 
way we look at others. 

It is in classroom work where this look of consideration can be practiced and exercised.  The differences 
between members of the classroom, is something teachers are confronted with every day. However, these 
differences can be understood in different ways.  We can learn to recognize these differences and tolerate them, 
which enables participants to look attentively at their relationships with one another, making respect come much 
more easily. Such an atmosphere of mutual respect allows dialogue to come to life. And so the true meaning of 
respect comes to the fore as we recognize not only the differences between other members of the community, 
but also our own.

Through engaging in dialogue respectfully, we learn to live well, to pay attention to the world and others 
around us, to respect ourselves and see how this self-respect is inseparable from respect for others.  Thus, in the 
end, engaging in respectful dialogue allows us to see that it is other human beings who, through their distance 
and differences, help widen our own perceptions of ourselves and the world.



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Finally, I would like to explore one more concept, that of ‘Empathy.’ I believe this notion not only helps 
facilitate acceptance and respect, for ourselves and others, but can also help deepen our discovery of ourselves 
and others as persons.  Although the concept of empathy has received some attention from the perspective 
of philosophy, I approach the term largely from the perspective of therapy and the creation of therapeutic 
environments. 

According to the psychology dictionary of Carlos Gisbert, “empathy” is defined as: “the emotional approach 
or instinctive knowledge of another person caused by his behavior or state, provoking a comprehension and 
acceptance attitude up to the point of sharing or even experiencing his/her feelings. This is where different 
individuals tend to regularly show reactions of empathy in various degrees.” (Gisbert, 1999).

Going deeper into this concept and analyzing it through the lens of humanistic psychology, such as the work 
of American psychotherapist Carl Rogers, we can easily see the value of empathy. 

 
The state of empathy or emphatic comprehension, is the right perception of the internal reference 
frame of another person with the meanings and emotional components in it, as if one were the 
other person, but never excluding the condition of ‘as if.’ Empathy implies, for example, to feel 
the pain or pleasure of another person as he/she feels it, and to perceive the causes for them as 
he/she perceives them, but always being conscious that either the pain or pleasure are his/hers. If 
this condition of ‘as if’ is absent, we face ourselves before a case of identification. (Rogers, 1998, 
p. 45)

This capacity to think and feel the internal life of another person as if it were our own, and yet do so 
without losing our own identity, appears to be a capacity that is indispensable for getting close to someone else. 
It is really only when we recognize the feelings, thoughts and experiences of others, that we can feel a personal 
identification with them.

Learning how to live in another’s shoes without forgetting ourselves is an essential aspect of empathy.  
Empathy is needed when engaging in Philosophy for Children and facilitating communities of inquiry, and it is 
needed not only by those who facilitate communities of dialogue, but also by those students who participate in 
them.  It is empathy that allows us to get into the other’s world and understand it, silencing our own thoughts 
to listen and perceive the views of others. 

The community of inquiry is that place in which we can perceive other persons while still being ourselves; it 
is precisely through our perceptions of what the other is and thinks that we can enrich our own perception. In 
the words of Marie-France Daniel (1998), “Once we recognize in [the] other person, similar needs like ours, we 
may wish to approach him/her to even see our own humanity.”

Empathy, then, is the capacity to feel and think as if we were some other person, but without forgetting our 
own identity in the process.  Having an empathetic attitude allows us to understand another’s point of view and 
situation, rather than just judging them from our own perspective. When we really understand someone, it does 
not matter if that person thinks like us or not. The important thing is that we can begin to comprehend his/her 
needs and reasons, which gives us the possibility of widening our horizons and our own perspective. 

In order to have empathy it is necessary that we learn how to be flexible. Being intolerant and strict will never 
allow us to listen and understand the other’s reasons. And that is why empathy without tolerance, a concept we 
discussed earlier, would be difficult to acquire or apply.

In México there is a series of programs related to the acquisition and spreading of values, such as, the “The 
Force of Values” Program (La Fuerza de los Valores). The slogan of the program seems to follow the values we 
have been exploring: “To see things under others’ perspectives, changes ours, and tolerance as well as acceptance 



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of differences grow.” (Albarrán Noriega, p. 13)  Even though I believe that Philosophy for Children is probably 
the program best suited to cultivate these values, as it encourages the child to not only model these values in their 
actions, but also to reflect on them and give them a meaning that makes sense within their own experience, it is 
an encouraging sign to see programs that celebrate values like tolerance.  

Our reflections on the meaning and role of the concepts of recognition, tolerance, respect and empathy, should 
make clear why these concepts are so integral to building a community of inquiry.  Moreover, we understand 
the rich complexity of these concepts and the way they underscore the moral dimension of being human.  We 
also realize the difficulty of trying to consolidate such attitudes in the moral education of students.  Moreover, 
we also need to recognize, as Mary France Daniel explains (1992, p. 247-268), that just as our understanding 
of human beings needs to be filled out by other disciplines like psychology and educational pedagogy that can 
understand our motivational and affective nature, so logic and the development of reasoning abilities are also 
indispensable from the first years of formal education, otherwise no serious work can be achieved in the moral 
education of our students.

Moral education requires the inclusion of the discipline [of] logic in this formation. Logic will 
complement imagination just as [well as] the affective and psychological dimension of the person…
But just as…logical reasoning can prove useful in some occasions, [technical] knowledge, sensitivity 
toward others, the opening of spirit and the imagination, may sometimes become more relevant. 
(Daniel, 1998, p. 61) 

I recommend we look at the cultivation of values like recognition, tolerance, respect and empathy in a similar 
interdisciplinary sprit, as necessary conditions for the moral education of the individual and the building of 
future communities of dialogue.

As Mary France Daniel explains in the quote above, moral education should not limit itself to instructing 
children in what society expects of them; rather we also need to cultivate sensitivity toward others, critical 
reasoning and logic, and the constructive use of imagination. Moreover, any moral education without practice 
will be incomplete, while the impact of any true moral education should be verifiable at the level of individual 
moral behavior and reflected at the level of sound moral judgments. The solution pursued by Philosophy 
for Children is to incorporate the distinctions discussed above, but do so primarily through the creation of 
communities of dialogue.

It is precisely by seeing these distinctions as conditions that need to be implemented in order to build effective 
communities of inquiry that we are best able to solve the continuing problems that beset moral education.  

For example, Michael Schleifer discusses the importance of communities of inquiry in cultivating empathy.  
Empathy, as Schleifer mentions, “is the faculty to imagine the experience lived by [another] person… We must 
help children to develop their capacity to comprehend, feel and share [the] joy as well as sadness of [their] 
neighbor. When we show empathy before a person’s joy, we also avoid jealousy.” (Schleifer, 2008, p.221)

Although there are some philosophers, educators and psychologists who think we should avoid putting too 
much emphasis on empathy, I strongly feel that empathy is something essential in the building of a community 
of dialogue.

Consequently, I fully agree with Schleifer when he writes: “a person really being someone with empathy, 
either an adult, a child, a psychologist, a professor or a friend, will always consider his/her neighbor’s needs…[as]  
inclusively [as] his/her own…”  And I also agree that empathy is not simply a competence or technique related 
to verbal and non-verbal expression, but is also related to cognitive and affective factors, and so perhaps is best 
seen as an attitude and as a moral concept.

Seen along these lines, empathy represents the capacity to “put ourselves in the place of others”, to comprehend 



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others, to consider the perspectives of others, which, in turn, helps us to interpret and decode their thoughts and 
feelings. And so, as Schleifer reiterates, empathy does not primarily refer to how we react to other people, like 
when we start crying because we see someone else cry. Neither is it is a simple projection or emotional contagion; 
instead, it is an attitude that has to do with being able to perfectly comprehend the point of view of the other, 
his/her thoughts, feelings and opinions, without losing our self-consciousness, our identity, or our own point of 
view.  This is a point that was also mentioned in our earlier discussion of Carl Rogers.

Consequently, we have to help children to understand the multiple facets of empathy and encourage them 
to consider points of view different from their own if we hope to build viable communities of dialogue. We need 
to help children to understand empathy as an ability that has been recognized as essential in developing moral 
judgment and in the acquisition of a moral behavior. As Schleifer emphasizes:

Children can apply the variations of the golden rule more efficiently, if they have acquired the 
necessary cognitive empathy. They will be more inclined to share and cooperate if they are able to 
show affective empathy, to read and comprehend other’s emotions, which of course means that 
they have learned to distinguish among their own emotions, to name them and comprehend them. 
Children will develop a true concern for their neighbor.” (Schleifer, 2008, p. 223)

Undoubtedly, it is a real challenge for those who facilitate communities of dialogue to not only consider the 
development of a child’s rational and cognitive abilities, but also participate in the construction of therapeutic 
experiences.  The latter demand seems to require the facilitator have some experience working in the application 
of therapeutic techniques and exercises, recognizing and defining emotions so as to be able to better detect their 
own feelings and those of others.  Such emotions can be discovered through tales, personal stories, plays, and 
so, which also enable the educator to make use of his or her own personal experiences, something that Schleifer 
thinks is important.  Through these types of exercises, we can consider another person’s feelings in a way that 
naturally promotes better self-assessment and a greater sensitivity toward others in the community of dialogue.

Finally, I want to conclude my analysis of recognition, tolerance, respect and empathy, with some questions 
and practical considerations for further thought.  For example, how can we include some reflection on these 
concepts as a regular part of the class? Which texts, exercises, and discussion plans can facilitate the analysis 
and comprehension of these concepts and attitudes among primary school students? What challenges will we 
have to face when trying to develop recognition, tolerance, respect and empathy in the classroom? What other 
philosophical perspectives could aid us in implementing these concepts? What kind of material is best suited for 
facilitating these concepts and attitudes in the classroom? How can we improve our educational background to 
better incorporate these concepts philosophically? 

At least one key insight that could guide us in our struggle to incorporate recognition, tolerance, respect and 
empathy into the building blocks of communities of inquiry, is to remember the promise of such communities 
of inquiry. That continually searching for the conditions to healthy communities of dialogue is part of the very 
nature of this community, keeping open a space that empowers us to reflect on our own existence and the world 
around us, and where the ancient search for truth, goodness and beauty, is constantly renewed as sources for the 
future.  

References

Albarran Noriega, M.P. (2003). La Fuerza de los valores. México D.F.: Artax.

Bornstein, J.C. (2006). Redescribiendo la comunidad de investigación pensamiento complejo y exclusión social. Madrid:  
 De la Torre.

Brugger, W. (1983) Diccionario de Filosofía, Barcelona, 15ª edición: Herder.



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Daniel, Marie-France. (1992a). La philosophie et les enfants. Le programme de Lipman et le influence de Dewey.   
 Montreal: Logiques.   

Daniel, Marie-France. (1998a). La Educación Moral en la escuela primaria: tres modelos que hay que experimentar.  
 Crecimiento Moral y Filosofía para Niños. España: Desclée De Brouwer.

Esquirol J. M. (2006).  El respeto o la mirada atenta, una  ética para la era de la ciencia y la tecnología. Barcelona:  
 Gedisa.

Farre Martí, J. M, Lasheras, Perez  M.G. (1999). Diccionario de psicología. Dirección C. Gispert. Barcelona:   
 Océano.

González Garza A.M. (2008). EL Enfoque Centrado en la Persona Aplicaciones a la educación. México: Trillas.

García Moriyón F. (Ed.). (1998). Crecimiento Moral y Filosofía para Niños.  Bilbao: Desclée  Brouwer

Lipman, M. (1988). Pensamiento Complejo y Educación. Madrid: De  la Torre.

Mainou y Abad, V. (2004): El enfoque centrado en la persona. México D.F.: Cía. Editorial Impresora y    
 Distribuidora,  S.A.

Rogel H. (2003). Diccionario de Valores. México D.F.: Seminario Conciliar de México.

Rogers, C. (1991). Libertad y Creatividad en la Educación. México D.F: Paidós

Rogers, C. (1990). Psicoterapia Centrada en el cliente. México D.F. Paidós.

Rogers, C. (1961). On Becoming a Person. Copyrigth renewed 1989 by Carl Rogers. Introduction copyright 1995  
 by Peter D. Krammer, M.D.: Boston New York: Houghton Mifflin Company.

Rogers, C. (2006). El Proceso de Convertirse en Persona. 1ª ed. 1964. México D.F. Paidós.

Rogers, C. (1998). Terapia, Personalidad y Relaciones Interpersonales. Ediciones Nueva Visión. Buenos Aires.

Ruiz,  V. (2005). La Tolerancia. México. D.F.: Editorial Porrúa. 

Sharp, A. (1990). ¿Qué es una Comunidad de Investigación? Traducción de Juan Carlos Lago Bornstein. Aprender  
 a Pensar, Revista Internacional de Filosofía para Niños y Criancas. 2° Semestre. Madrid: De la Torre.

Schleifer, M., con la colaboración de Martiny, C. (2008). Valores y Sentimientos de los 2 a los 5 años como hablar de  
 las emociones con nuestros hijos. Barcelona: Claret SAU
 http://www.unesco.org/cpp/spdeclaraciones/tolerancia.htm(18/01/05)

Address Correspondences to: 
María del Rosario del Collado
Member of the Mexican Federation of Philosophy for Children.  
Mexico City.
e-mail: rdelcoll@yahoo.com.mx


