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    BOOK REVIEWS FOR ANALYTIC TEACHING AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRAXIS    Volume 34, Issue 2 (2014) 

 

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Book Review 

The Prudence of Love: How Possessing the Virtue of Love Benefits the 
Lover 

Review by Robyn Gaier   
 

The Prudence of Love: How Possessing the Virtue of Love Benefits the Lover  
Eric J. Silverman 
Lexington Books, a Division of Rowman & Littlefield, 2011 
Lanham, Maryland, United States 
211 pages 
ISBN: 9780739139318 
$29.95 U.S. Paper 

 
he book The Prudence of Love: How Possessing the Virtue of Love Benefits the Lover by Eric J. Silverman is a well-
written and engaging work that furthers the discussion about what it means to regard love as a virtue. Prima facie 
it may seem odd to speak about possessing the virtue of love since that entails that “love” is a noun rather than a 

verb. Since “love” is typically used as a verb, perhaps some clarification here is in order. Treating “love” as a noun does 
not negate its active role. So, for instance, when Silverman defines love in a Neo-Thomistic way as “a disposition towards 
relationally appropriate acts of the will consisting of disinterested desires for the good of the beloved and desires for 
unity with the beloved, held as final ends” (19), he bridges the gap in these two senses of the word “love.” Having a 
loving disposition and, hence, possessing the virtue of love, necessarily manifests itself in relationally appropriate acts 
according to Silverman.   
  
      It also may be initially puzzling to think that a loving disposition should benefit the lover, or that such benefits 
acquired through possessing a loving disposition should count in favor of seeking the virtue of love. Silverman is clear 
that his project “examines the benefits of love from the detached third-person perspective” and that, from this 
perspective, insights may be gained “into the nature of love and the source of love’s value” (5). So, it is not as if 
Silverman is seeking the motivational reasons as to why someone ought to care about developing the virtue of love but, 
rather, that the benefits of a loving disposition lack specificity in the relevant literature. Although it is often taken for 
granted that possessing the virtue of love is beneficial to the lover, exactly why this is so is less than clear. Silverman’s 
project, therefore, advances this ongoing discussion with careful reflection not only about the nature of love but also 
about well-being and the connections among love, well-being, and what it means to live an ethical life.  
 
     Silverman claims that the benefits of love he envisions are compatible with the three most popular theories of well-
being: hedonism, desire-fulfillment, and an objective list account of well-being. Hence, Silverman’s project has the 
advantage of being able to accommodate different accounts of what constitutes one’s well-being, and proceeds to argue 
how love may benefit the lover regardless of the theory of well-being assumed. Specifically, Silverman claims that there 
are five distinct ways in which someone possessing the virtue of love derives benefit. These five benefits, according to 
Silverman are that “love provides final ends that motivate enjoyable and beneficial activities, brings about psychic 
integration, motivates self-improvement, increases the lover’s epistemic goods, and makes relationships more 
harmonious, enjoyable, and tenacious” (93). Silverman then addresses some potential problems, or objections, that 
others might have with his Neo-Thomistic account of love. For instance, he addresses concerns about the proper objects 
of love and whether unloving or apathetic agents may derive the benefits he associates with possessing the virtue of love.  
 
     There are several complexities, however, with respect to understanding “the nature of love and the source of love’s 
value” (5). Although Silverman acknowledges such complexities, more than an acknowledgement is warranted to 
understand love’s nature and source of value. For example, love can be manifested in a variety of relationships within 
distinct domains including self-love, interpersonal love, and even impartial love (as in philanthropy). It is clear that 
Silverman focuses upon the virtue of love as it is manifested in interpersonal relationships – particularly close 

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interpersonal relations, such as family and friends. It is less clear, however, why this is so. Given Silverman’s definition 
of love and his acknowledgement of self-love, according to his definition (75) it seems as though possessing love as a 
virtue should be fundamentally regarded as manifesting itself in terms of self-love rather than in terms of the potential 
for loving interpersonal relationships. There are at least two main reasons in support of the need for greater attention to 
self-love within Silverman’s project.  
 
     First, it might provide a better way for addressing the criticism that arises from love that becomes lost. An agent can 
only benefit from love manifested in an interpersonal relationship so long as the other person is alive and wills to be in 
the particular loving relationship. Consider, for instance, the emotional, psychological, and spiritual pain of grief. When 
one’s beloved passes away, grief may become unsurmountable. It is hardly a benefit or comfort for the lover to appreciate 
and to reflect upon what once was (138). Silverman hypothesizes, however, that the “overall benefits of the virtue of love” 
throughout one’s lifetime are “likely to outweigh the pain” of, say, a parent losing her child (139). But Silverman does 
not give support for his hypothesis and, in any event, there is no guarantee that the overall benefits of the virtue of love 
will outweigh one’s pain. To avoid such a scale, it might be helpful to think about the virtue of love not as essentially 
rooted in interpersonal relationships but, rather, as essentially rooted in self-love. The difficulty with grounding the 
virtue of love as essentially manifesting itself in interpersonal relations seems evident in the following passage. Silverman 
writes:  
 

[t]he person with the full virtue of love is better off than one with a single loving relationship 
that provides a small number of final ends that might be lost. Death can eliminate the 
possibility of achieving the final ends associated with any particular relationship, thus 
preventing those ends from providing meaningful activity. Furthermore, any particular 
relationship may fail for reasons outside of the individual’s control. If a person only has final 
ends from a single loving relationship, losing it can empty an entire life of meaning. In contrast, 
a loving person has many relationships that provide final ends including those with parents, 
children, spouses, friends, neighbors, co-workers, members of a shared faith, and fellow citizens 
(105).  

 
Silverman’s understanding of loving interpersonal relationships is, therefore, an ideal. A loving person will have an array 
of loving interpersonal relationships. But, because such many and varied loving interpersonal relationships are, at least 
in part, beyond the individual’s control, the benefits derived through the manifestation of the virtue of love in 
interpersonal relationships simply cannot be assured to the lover.   
 
     The second related reason for favoring an account of the virtue of love as manifested with a focus upon self-love 
rather than upon interpersonal relationships is that it neither alters nor loses any of the five benefits of love that 
Silverman notes. In fact, as I claim above, there might be ways in which self-love more accurately secures benefits for the 
lover simply by not making these benefits depend upon factors beyond the individual’s control. Self-love, when 
understood in terms of the Neo-Thomistic account of love, is understood as desiring both one’s ultimate good as well as 
one’s psychic integration. Both desires sill involve risks to the agent. Nevertheless, self-love may be a more promising 
path to take when trying to address the above worry –namely whether all of the lover’s benefits are lost with the passing 
of a beloved. Or, perhaps more pointedly, whether it is possible that the pain of the passing of one’s beloved outweighs 
the benefits that were had in the relationship.  
 
     Finally, perhaps more careful transitions between love as a noun and love as a verb would enhance Silverman’s 
project. For instance, Silverman writes “one distinct benefit of the reciprocal relationships love engenders is that they 
give the lover access to epistemic goods that are only available in such relationships” (128). Silverman is drawing 
attention to a benefit uniquely derived through reciprocal relationships. But his overall project is to discern how 
possessing the virtue of love benefits the lover, and there is a difference between possessing a virtuous disposition and 
participating in a reciprocal relationship that one could not possibly possess. Hence to acknowledge benefits of 
potential, or even likely, relationships of someone with a virtuous disposition is to acknowledge only potential, or even 
likely, benefits. Nevertheless, acknowledging likely benefits does not undermine Silverman’s project, which succeeds in 
furthering the discussion about the nature and value of love. Indeed, The Prudence of Love is a timely and clear work that 



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should be of interest to those wishing to deepen their understanding of both the philosophical and psychological 
underpinnings regarding the nature and value of love.  
 
Address Correspondences to: 
 
Dr. Robyn Gaier, Viterbo University, La Crosse, WI (rrgaier@viterbo.edu) 


