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Socratic Philosophizing with the Five Finger Model: 

The Theoretical Approach of Ekkehard Martens 

 
 
 

 
ABSTRACT: Socratic Philosophizing is an open process of thinking that follows a net of 
methods. Martens develops his Five Finger Model in accordance with Socrates and the 
history of philosophy. Philosophizing within the community of inquiry is characterized by 
attitudes of curiosity, openness, and the willingness to make oneself understandable as 
well as to understand the other person in return. There are five core philosophical methods 
that assist in making such philosophizing successful: Phenomenology, Hermeneutics, 
Analysis, Dialectics and Speculation. These five methods are understood as reflective 
operations which are learned in an elementary way and practiced step-by-step: 
(phenomenological) to be able to describe something exactly, (hermeneutial) to 
understand oneself and others, (analytical) to clarify in a conceptual and argumentative 
way how something is understood), (dialectical) to ask and to disagree, (speculative), to 
fantasize how something could be understood. Marten’s Five Finger Model builds on these 
methods in order to help children build broader and distinct questions through 
philosophizing. To illustrate this we will present an interactive game that can be used to 
introduce the teaching themes of Who am I?, Partnership, Tolerance, and Foreign 
Cultures. The game is called “Distance and Closeness.” The game was evaluated afterward 
using the framework of the five finger method. 

 

hat am I actually doing? And what do I want to reach with it? These questions are, 
according to Friedrich Nietzsche, “the most personal questions of the truth.” Martens 
takes them as his starting point in order to show the necessity of instructing children 

to think. Following Kant’s and Nietzsche’s call to orient oneself through thinking, Martens places 
the question of truth as an anthropological constant at the centre of education. It is possible to 
take aim at questions of truth with the reasonable and elementary thinking of every person, 
including children. For instance, Socrates would philosophize with a wealthy boy, Lysis, about 
what parental love means, even when his parents would not allow him to ride in his father's 
chariot and hold its reins in a race, although they loved him (Plato, Lysis, 208a). 

 

     Socratic Philosophizing is an open process of thinking ahead between dogmatic ideology and 
arbitrary thinking, and follows a net of methods which can not only be adopted in conversations 
and discussions, but also within texts, images and games. In Plato’s early dialogues (e.g. Laches: 
Dialogue about learning to fence as an education tool to become brave) the following methods 
can be observed: 

o The heart of the discussion is built upon concrete personal and social experiences  

o Problematic experiences of the conversational partners are accented  

o Central notions of argumentation are clarified  

o The clarification of questions occurs in a controversial discussion of thesis and antithesis, 
and opens into a synthesis or preliminary answer  

W 

Eva Marsal 



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o The thoughts are pervaded by metaphors and thought experiments  

 

THE FIVE FINGER MODEL OF EKKEHARD MARTENS 

 

     Martens develops his Five Finger Model in accordance with Socrates and the history of 
philosophy. “Reflecting in cooperation” and “elementary philosophizing” within the community 
of inquiry are characterized by attitudes of curiosity, openness, and the willingness to make 
oneself understandable as well as to understand the other person in return. Besides, it becomes 
easier in the community of inquiry to self-correct and make one’s own argumentation stronger. 
For this process to occur, philosophical methods exist that can assist in making philosophizing 
successful: Phenomenology characterizes looking; Hermeneutics includes understanding; 
Analysis relates to deepening; Dialectics construes the back and forth or pro and contra nature 
of discourse; and Speculation involves imagining.  

 

     These five methods are understood as reflective operations which are learned in an elementary 
way and practiced step-by-step: To be able to describe something exactly (phenomenological), to 
understand oneself and others (hermeneutical), to clarify in a conceptual and argumentative way 
how something is understood (analytical), to ask and to disagree (dialectical), to fantasize how 
something could be understood (speculative) (Martens, 2010). 

 

PHENOMENOLOGICAL: 

 

 To observe and describe something in an accurate and differentiated way.  

 For example: what was the story about? What attracted your attention? Describe what did 
X do, say, feel, and think, etc.? 

 

     The Greek word, phenomenon, in its literal translation means “what appears.” Socratic-
Aristotelian methods emerged from the concrete experience of something that was always self-
evident suddenly becoming problematical. Now these problematic phenomena are to be 
examined accurately. It is thanks to the emphasis on phenomenology that philosophical thinking 
does not become stuck in the abstract, but always has a reference to concrete experiences. In this 
method, what is real precedes what is purely imagined.  

 

     Thus Bernhard Waldenfels, a leading representative of the newer phenomenologists, 
propagates a “return to the things themselves” and, in a variation of Kant’s sapere aude, says “Have 
the courage to make use of your senses!” (1992, p. 13). For Waldenfels phenomenology is 
philosophy “from below,” liberation from the bonds of preconceptions, traditional reservations 
and methodological constraints, which stands in opposition to the systematic thinking of neo-
Kantianism, in which the constructs are formed “from above.” 

 

     However, the central problem of phenomenology is the question, “What are the things 
themselves?” The epistemological or defining question, “What is X?” can be translated 



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phenomenologically as “How does something reveal itself to me as X?” The most important 
elements of a non-ontologically understood phenomenological method are double reduction and 
the bodily dimension of knowledge.  

 

     The first step of the double reduction is phenomenological reduction, e.g., observation and 
description free of prejudice and theory. With a flower, that would be the awareness of one’s own 
feelings and experience, e.g., mediated naiveté. With the second step an eidetic reduction occurs: 
the “thing itself” appears not as an essential form (Husserl) which can be intuitively grasped, but 
is, according to Waldenfels (1992, p. 15), a kind of regulative limiting concept: “It isn’t that the 
object is simply one and the same, it reveals itself to be the same in the interchange between the 
given and the intentional” (Waldenfels, 1992, p. 15). This leads to the following set of 
considerations: 

 proximity/distance  

 the expected/the imagined 

 what is evaluated/dealt with/aspired to 

 cultural influences 

 

     The bodily dimension of knowledge occurs through the senses. In the example of “recognizing 
flowers” (Berger and Luckmann, 1995, p. 11f) the bodily dimension of cognition is given by the 
fragrance as well as the feel and the uses of the flower. 

 

     Martens summarizes the epistemological position as follows: “We can only really recognize 
something as something if we first eliminate all theoretical patterns of explanation and instead 
describe the phenomenon as thoroughly as possible in the variety of its appearances and also pay 
attention to how we access it in terms of our life-world, its physicality and problem orientation” 
(Martens, 2010, p. 72). 

 

HERMENEUTICAL: 

 

 To understand somebody. How you or another person understand or regard something. 

 Show empathy: “How did X feel?” etc. 

 

     Literally translated, the Greek word (gr. Hermeneutike techne) is, “the art of Hermes,” which 
means, “the art of interpreting” (Martens, 2010, p. 75) and connects the divine with the human 
word, and the writer with the reader of the text. The application of the hermeneutical method 
consists of reading texts, understanding and interpreting the message of a text outside of its 
context.  Therefore, the original aim of hermeneutics is the understanding of content, which can 
be difficult to decode. Everything can be seen as a text that has to be decoded, for example, that 
of our own feelings and the facial expressions of our opponents. Hermeneutics is about the 
improvement of one’s own interpretation as well as foreign interpretations as believable 
arguments (Aristotle). 

 



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     Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) was mainly concerned with the sense of hermeneutics 
as method; he was moved by the question how the reader could understand a text. According to 
Martens, for Schleiermacher the method of understanding was a “psychological process of 
intuiting the intentions of the author from the total context of his text and his life” (Martens, 
2010, p. 75). 

  

     Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) expanded upon this view. According to Dilthey, hermeneutics 
was a method of understanding the interrelationships of meaning and therewith a special method 
of the humanities in contrast to the sciences, the latter giving priority to explanation instead of 
interpretation. 

  

      On the other hand, Martin Heidegger (Sein und Zeit) and his student Hans Georg Gadamer 
(1900-2002) in Wahrheit und Methode (1960) understood hermeneutics as a branch of philosophy. 
For them the goal of hermeneutic philosophy is the interpretation of the understanding of being 
which distinguishes humans in their existence from everything else that exists. Thus Gadamer 
developed the hermeneutic method as a process of understanding, i.e., as a process of the 
“dialectic of question and answer” (Gadamer, [1960] 1990, p. 271). In this process, we have 1) 
the preliminary sketch, 2) the understanding of the text, and 3) the fusion of horizons that 
alternate among themselves. That is, we read a text with our expectations, understand its 
individual statements in the context of the whole, and understand the whole from the individual 
statements. This process is called the “hermeneutic circle” (Martens, 2010, p. 76). However, 
according to Dilthey, intuitive understanding is only a heuristic principle, not a sure method of 
cognition, since the verification of hypotheses is lacking. 

 

ANALYTICAL: 

 

 To conceptually verify with arguments what somebody intimates.  

 Describe the arguments of X? Why does X think that way? What are the reasons of X?  

 

     Taken literally, the Greek word (gr. analysein) translates to abrogation, and liberation. At the 
same time, it is about disintegration of conceptual and argumentative difficulties and perplexities. 
This aim is the prime action of philosophy: The clarification of sentences in contrast to simply 
holding sentences. Wittgenstein writes in the Tractatus logico-philosophicus (1921). “Philosophy is not 
a doctrine, but an activity [...] Philosophy should [...] clarify thoughts and draw clear boundaries” 
(Wittgenstein, 4.112). 

  

     The model for contemporary analytical philosophy was Socratic philosophizing as a 
conceptual-argumentative “giving account” through “what-is-that-questions” (Martens, 2010, p. 
80). Socrates already had this exemplary function in ancient times: Aristotle, like Socrates, refers 
only to the logical form of concepts to clarify them. From Socrates Aristotle learned “intellectual 
midwifery,” e.g., the recourse to “logical, conceptual, or linguistic-analytical techniques,” and thus 
achieved a distinction between pseudo-knowledge and knowledge that is well-grounded (Aristotle, 
1935, XXX 4). 



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     Analytical philosophy’s claim is to clarify central concepts and arguments of everyday and 
scientific language. Analytical philosophy today represents a linguistic turn: that is, the 
philosophical problems are understood exclusively as linguistic; it is not what exists that is 
investigated, but language about what exists. Through this, as Wittgenstein explains in 
Philosophical Investigations, the functioning of language games can be understood. Martens 
develops this process further: “If one analyzes more precisely the way designations such as 
“intentional,” “considered,” “spontaneous,” or “responsible” are attached to the concept 
“freedom,” or that freedom can be understood as “freedom from” or “freedom to,” then one-
sided or distorted examples of usage can be corrected, not through recourse to an ideal linguistic 
meta-rule, but to experiences of intrapsychic phenomena (Bieri, 2001)” (Martens, 2010, p. 83). 
The solution to the philosophical problem is thus found through insight into the language game. 

 

DIALECTICAL: 

 

 The act of talking back and forth, disagreeing with one another and arguing about 
contentious issues  

 Do you agree with X, Why or why not?   

 

     The dialectic (gr. dialektike techne), is the art of discussion which means “to runaway of the 
logoi” (Martens, 2010, p. 85) ultimately leading to comprehension through endlessly talking back 
and forth. 

 

The process of the dialectic back-and-forth includes the following elements:  

 

 phenomenological experience of the external facts  

 one’s own moral feelings  

 hermeneutical discussion of texts concerning the problem at hand  

 one’s own interpretation of the meaning of experiences 

 persistent interrogation of the problem at hand  

 a feeling for what is humane 

 

     The interaction of these factors leads to insight concerning how the problem might best be 
resolved. For Heraclitus, being itself is dialectically structured in the sense of internal 
contradictions and tensions. Heraclitus clarifies this by pointing out these pictures: “We step and 
do not step into the same rivers; we are and are not.” (Fragment 49a) or “Cold things become 
warm, and what is warm cools; what is wet dries, and the parched is moistened” (Fragment 126) 
or: “What opposes unites, and the finest harmony stems from opposing tones, and all things 
come about by strife.” (Fragment 8). Heraclitus mirrors the experience of contradictory, tension-
filled phenomena in natural occurrences or personal/social life situations.  

 



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     The modern representatives Hegel und Marx understand dialectics as the philosophy of being 
in which intellectual and social being is grasped in three steps, as thesis and antitheses leading to 
a synthesis.  

 

     The aim of dialectics as a process of dialogue consists in the clarification of controversial 
notions and arguments in a real process with other people. In this process, personal and shared 
conceptions should be considered and corrected. This is what Socrates meant by demanding: 
“Always give an account of yourself and others” (Martens, 2010, p. 86). That means “logon 
didonai;” one should not cling to arbitrary beliefs, but find good justifications for one’s position 
and beliefs. 

 

SPECULATIVE: 

 

 Fantasizing and speculating how to understand something totally different 

 What else could X be? How would you do X in the future? Which wish do you have with 
regards to X? 

 

     Philosophy often seems to be “crazy” and aimlessly speculative. For many such unusual, almost 
incomprehensible, abstract ideas and considerations are seen as sheer folly. Philosophers appear 
as other worldly, abstruse eccentrics who indeed define and argue in an acute way, but who do 
not really have anything practical and reasonable to say. “Speculation derives from the Latin word 
Speculari and means to explore something from a vantage point; that means in a positive sense to 
stand above the things.” Here the awareness we gain can appear as “a sudden light” (Martens, 
2010, p. 91).  

 

     In a broader sense speculative awareness is “intuition,” “bold formulation of hypotheses,” 
fantasy and creativity, which means the irreducible initial point or endpoint of philosophical 
awareness. For speculative philosophy, there is no method under which it can be subsumed in 
the narrower sense, for such restriction would stifle knowledge and not ignite “a sudden light.” 

  

     The speculative elements in philosophizing are “crucial experiences,” “magic moments,” 
creative coincidences, had by all the great philosophers, like Augustine, Descartes, Kant, 
Wittgenstein, Arendt, Popper, Nussbaum, etc. They are not easily available, but one can leave 
oneself open for them. With the help of Ekkehard Marten’s Five Finger Model (Martens, 2010, 
p. 11), children can learn to build broader and distinct questions through philosophizing. 

 

AN EXAMPLE FOR WORKING WITH EKKEHARD MARTEN’S FIVE FINGER 
MODEL: PHILOSOPHIZING ABOUT THE GAME “DISTANCE AND CLOSENSS” 

 



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     As an example I will show an interactive game as an impulse for philosophizing with the help 
of Ekkehard Marten’s Five Finger Model. The game is called “Distance and Closeness.” In it the 
class is divided into two groups, lined up in pairs in two rows about 2 meters apart. One partner 
slowly approaches the other and stops at the point where either party seems to begin to feel 
uncomfortable.  Applying Marten’s Five Finger Model opens up the rich experiences and beliefs 
such a simple game can elicit. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

      



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      The game was evaluated afterward using the framework of the five-finger method: 
phenomenological, hermeneutical, analytical, dialectical und speculative. To illustrate what the students 
got from the experience, here are some excerpts from the dialogues. 

 

On the phenomenological level, the children talked about their observations: 

K16: I was laughing a little, and so was my partner.  

K17: I paid attention, like, to how my partner’s expression looked and how she had her mouth.  

K 18: That you look your partner in the face, and how it looks and what he does.  

K 19: I was always looking into my partner’s eyes, and I really liked that. It was a lot of fun.  

 

     The players primarily observed their partners. They were most interested in the partner’s facial 
expression, which they tried to read, and not the body posture. The second step, self-perception 
and perception of the other, was developed hermeneutically. This second step is supposed to help 
the children develop reliable access to their own private inner world and minimize self-delusion 
and self-doubt about achieving such access. Insight about one’s own participation in the game, 
through the act of distancing and the interchange of perspectives, makes possible an access to the 
private worlds of others. 

 

      Central here is the question concerning the reasons why people felt what they did during the 
game. Two explanations predominated, one interactive: “I thought it was fun because you looked 
at your partner” (K 34), and the other situational: “I liked it that you did something you never 
did before” (K 37). Most of the children prefer to explain their positive feelings through recourse 
to the social experience; they interpret the friendly facial expression as permission to come closer: 

 

K 69: I could tell by the expression on my partner’s face that he was saying ok, I could come 
closer.  

K 70: So when you look someone in the eye, you have the feeling you can tell if he wants it or 
not.  

K 75: Because his eyes had a friendly expression, and it looked to me as if I could come closer.  

K 78: When my partner laughed I knew right away I could go one more step.  

 

     (K 88) takes this interpretation to be a general norm and applies it to her own situation: “I 
haven’t known Jana for very long yet because she skipped a grade, she skipped second grade, and 
I knew I could go further anyway because she laughed and then I laughed too, and then…” 

 

     The children who attribute the way they feel to the situational aspect either feel animated by 
the new experience, “I thought it was fun too, because we never did that, and then we laughed 
some too” (K 72), or else they feel unsure of themselves: 

 

K 85:  Because you never did this before, and then it’s kind of strange.  

K 86: You feel a little unsure of yourself sometimes. Should you go ahead or should you stop.  



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K 87: And because you feel nervous.  

 

      Since thinking and speaking are closely related, an important goal of philosophizing with 
children is the promotion of language ability. Because many of the children felt nervous, they 
worked out the range of meanings for this state of mind with the help of their experience. For 
example: 

 

K 112: Sometimes it depends on how nervous you feel. It could be that you’re nervous, that 
you’re happy. For example Maike and I, we’re in ballet, and we have a performance on Saturday, 
and we already did that last year, and we are happy, too, and nervous.  

K 116: With stage fright, you’re mostly nervous and mostly afraid about whether you’ll do it right 
or wrong.  

K 118: You don’t know if you should go a little closer or not, if the other person wants you to 
or….  

K 120: You’re kind of excited, too.  

K 122: You think… uh oh, should I go one step farther? What is the other person thinking? 
Should I go now?  

 

Together the children consider in what other contexts they could use the concept “nervous:” 

K 126: So for example, when you’re at a funeral you’re kind of nervous and sad, somehow.  

K 128: I went to see a film yesterday with my friends. While I was waiting for them I was nervous 
that they wouldn’t be coming anymore, because it was already five minutes before it was supposed 
to start.  

K 142: Sometimes I’m nervous because, like when it’s my parents’ birthday, what I want to give 
them.  

K 144: Before an exam you’re nervous, too.  

 

     The children came up with a wide spectrum for the concept “nervous”. The insecurity that is 
the basic feeling underlying the concept “nervous” refers to qualities of experience with an 
uncertain outcome or which can be designated as “hope for something” or “fear of something.”  

 

     With the help of the dialectic method, the palette of various opinions, positions, and states of 
mind can be surveyed. 

 

K 155: Some children, they think no, I don’t want that, and others, like Johanna and me, we got 
pretty close, and some have a bigger distance, because they think no, I don’t want to go any 
farther.  

K 156: I didn’t get so close because I thought my partner didn’t want me to come any nearer.  

K 158: I got really close because I’ve already known Maike for a long time.  

K 159: Since my partner was grinning so much I went farther.  



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K 161: My partner was about this far away and then I whispered to him, “You can come 
closer”….but he stayed where he was.  

 

     Almost all the reasons given for choosing a given distance relate to the relationship level 
between the play partners.  The signals received regulate the distance. However, some children 
don’t respond to non-verbal or even verbal (K 161) exchanges, but only pay attention to their 
own inner state of mind.  

 

The speculative method offers a multitude of impulses; for example, the transfer to the future: 

 

K 163: Maybe I would take look, if I think, yes, she looks pretty nice, and then maybe I’d talk to 
her.  

K 188: For someone who doesn’t look so friendly, I’d ask if he…it could be that he’s having a bad 
day, or if he…  

K 192: If the person looks so angry, if he’s a tough guy or something. 

K 196: I’d wait first and see how he is or something. I’d see how he is in the schoolyard, if he 
fights with other children, then I wouldn’t talk to him.  

K 197: If maybe he’s having a day when he thinks it’s stupid, first I’d wait till the next day to see 
how he looks at me then.  

K 203: If you have a friend that you’ve known for a long time and know she’s a good friend, she 
can’t look so nice and friendly all the time.  

K 205: It could also be that the other person is really mad at you or someone else, then I’d ask if 
it’s because of me or if I can do something to make things better.  

K 207: Well if I got sent off to camp and didn’t have any friends there, and I’d see someone 
sitting there all alone with no friends, I’d go up to her and ask what her name is and so on.  

 

     The most important learning experience the children gained from this game was reflecting 
about the other person’s state of mind. For one thing, it became clear to them that one can draw 
conclusions from the facial expressions of others, about their willingness to be approached, but 
that the opposite conclusion should not be generalized. A “closed-off” expression would not 
necessarily indicate personal rejection, but could result from many other circumstances. The 
game encouraged the children to discuss in a multifaceted way the topic of approaching a play 
partner. 

 

REFERENCES 

 

Aristotle, (1935). Metaphysics, Volume II: Books 10-14. Oeconomica. Magna Moralia: Loeb 

Classical Library. Harvard University Press. 

Berger, P. L., and T. Luckmann. (1995). Modernität, Pluralismus und Sinnkrise. Gütersloh: 

Bertelsmann Stiftung. 



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Bieri, P. (2001). Das Handwerk der Freiheit: Über die Entdeckung des eigenen Willens. München. 

Carl Hanser. 

Gadamer, H. G. (1990). Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik. In: 

Gesammelte Werke: Bd 1. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.  

Heraclitus. (1991). Fragments. Phoenix Supplementary Volumes, XXII; Pre. T. M. Robinson 

(Translator, Ed.), Ca: Univ of Toronto Press.  

Marsal, Eva. (2008). “Didactic Implementation of Ekkehard Martens’ Five Finger Model. Example: 

The Unit ‘Who am I?/ Dealing with Capabilities.” Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for 

Children, Volume 18 (4), 19-22. 

Marsal, Eva and Takara Dobashi. (2007). “I and my family - Comparing the reflective competence of 

Japanese and German primary school children as related to the ‘Ethics of Care’.” Childhood & 

Philosophy, Volume 3 (6), 267-287.  

Martens, E. (2010). Methodik des Ethik- und Philosophieunterrichts: Philosophieren als elementare 

Kulturtechnik. (5th ed.) Hannover: Siebert. 

Nietzsche, F. (1999). Morgenröthe – Gedanken über die moralischen Vorurtheile. (1881). München: 

DTV. 

Plato. (1925). Lysis, Symposium, Gorgias. Translated by W. R. M. Lamb. Volume III, Loeb Classical 

Library, 166. Harvard University Press.  

Schleiermacher, F. (1977). Hermeneutik und Kritik. (1838). Manfred Frank (Ed.) Frankfurt:    

Suhrkamp. 

Waldenfels. B. (1992). Einführung in die Phänomenologie. München: Fink. 

Wittgenstein, L. (2014). Tractatus logico-philosophicus. (1921). Translated by C.K. Ogden C.K. 

International Library of Psychology, Philosophy, & Scientific Method. London: Routledge. 

Wittgenstein, L. (2009) Philosophical Investigations. (1953). Translated by G.E.M. Anscombe and 

P.M.S. Hacker. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. 

 

Address Correspondences to:  

Eva Marsal, Professor of Philosophy 
University of Education, Karlsruhe 
Bismarckstr. 10, 76133 Karlsruhe, Germany  
eva.marsal@ph-karlsruhe.de 

 


