

































































Contextualizing Community of Inquiry as a Democratic Educational Environment within a Wider View of Other Progressive Educational Approaches


63 

 

ANALYTIC TEACHING AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRAXIS VOL.37, ISSUE 1 (2016) 

  

 
Contextualizing Community of Inquiry as a Democratic 
Educational Environment within a Wider View of Other 

Progressive Educational Approaches 
 

Richard Morehouse 

 
Abstract: This paper takes a three-pronged approach to answering the question regarding the 
relationship between democracy and community of inquiry and other progressive pedagogies. First, a 
definition of a democratic educational environment will be provided within the larger context of 
democracy in general. Next, I will explore a number of democratic educational environments within a 
community of inquiry framework. Then, community of inquiry and Dewey’s theory of democracy are 
examined together. This background leads to an overview of what a democratic community of inquiry 
looks like. I end by replaying the major themes of this paper. 
 

In its perfect sense, democracy “is not a fact and never will be.” Nonetheless, without a guiding 
idea we would never engage in the work to eliminate the “restrictive and disturbing elements” 
which prevent a fuller flowering of democratic life. 
[Citing John Dewey in The Public and Its Problems, 1927 (Boisvert, 1998, p. 57)].  

 

Democracy as seen through Dewey’s definition of freedom and equality 

his paper addresses three questions regarding democracy and community of inquiry: (1) 
what is democracy, (2) what constitutes a democratic educational environment, and (3) 
how are democracy and community of inquiry integrated. The discussion of democracy 

looks in some detail at liberty and equality. The last issue we will explore here examines other 
examples of democratic education and provides a closer examination of community of inquiry 
in theory and practice. 

Perhaps the hardest of the three questions to answer relates to defining a democratic 
educational environment. Within the definition of democratic educational environment, the 
term “democratic” is the one that is the most problematic. The reason for the difficulty is the 
complex and differing views of democracy itself. A way of beginning to address the joint problem 
of democracy and democratic education is by stipulating that democracy is defined as a process 
and not as a product, and maybe even more so as an ideal, something implied by Dewey’s caveat 
regarding the definition of democracy, seen in the above quote. Seeing democracy as a process 
serves two purposes. First, it narrows the definition of democracy making it an activity and 
therefore a more useful concept for understanding individuals and groups engaged within 
communities: local, regional, and national. Second, democracy as a process and an ideal, as we 
will see later, is consistent with Lipman’s (1980) understanding of a community of inquiry as an 
educational practice. Thus, we can at least get at what is supposed to occur in a community of 
inquiry, even if not all individual elements actually do occur in all inquiries. 

T 



64 

 

Democracy  

Dewey sees democracy as primarily a mode of associated living (Boisvert, 1998). This 
definition is essential to understanding the importance of both freedom and equality within a 
democratic society. Briefly, democracy, according to Dewey, is a way of living together that is 
characterized by a mutually created communication experience. “This means that the primary 
responsibility of democratic citizens is concern with the development of shared interests that 
lead to sensitivity about repercussions of actions on others” (Boisvert, 1998, p. 57). Dewey’s 
process definition is in contrast with the commonplace definition of democracy as a form of 
government, or legislative processes. Dewey is not primarily concerned with democracy as a form 
of government. Dewey is concerned with the way individuals live their daily lives in the company 
of others. It is from this Deweyan perspective that we will examine democracy and community 
of inquiry.  

Democracy as a process involving conjoint communication experiences is built on two 
pillars that support democracy as a process: freedom and equality. Again, these concepts demand 
specific definitions. Freedom and equality, from Dewey’s perspective, are also defined as 
processes. These processes are not defined, however, in the typical way one would associate with 
discussions of democracy.  

Freedom  

Understanding John Dewey’s key concepts of freedom and equality is essential to 
understanding what it means to act democratically and what the role of education is within a 
democracy. Dewey examines freedom by re-visiting John Locke. Dewey argues that Locke and 
other Enlightenment writers, in arguing against the monarchy, saw the rest of the world as 
consisting of well-educated and privileged individuals much like themselves, rather than as the 
immigrant workers of the newly industrialized 19th century. What this meant in practice is that 
Locke defined freedom as the lifting of constraints. From his perspective, as a well-educated, 
middle class professional, all one needs to be free was to lift the constraints of oppressive laws or 
oppressive rulers. However, this definition of freedom is limited to those who have certain 
abilities and who attain a certain status. Dewey gives an example that I will paraphrase: If I speak 
English and French, all I need to be free to speak French is that there be no law that prevents 
me from using my language skills. However, if I speak only English, it is an empty statement to 
say that I am “free” to speak French. Therefore, in addition to seeing freedom as the lifting of 
constraints, Dewey also taught that freedom was related to growth. This conception of freedom 
as an ability that may be in need of development is essential to understanding Dewey’s democracy 
(that is, a mode of associated living), and eventually to understanding democracy within a 
community of inquiry.  

Freedom as a lack of constraints, according to Dewey, was a simplistic concept that not 
only leads to a misunderstanding of democracy, but also, more importantly, to a 
misrepresentation of the human condition. Dewey suggests that there is no such thing as a 
completed self who only requires the elimination of extraneous conditions to reveal a full and 
complete human being. Rather, we are open-ended creatures, shaped and influenced by the 
cultures we inhabit, the languages we speak, and the relationships into which we enter.  

Classic liberals, beginning with Locke, were wrong to conceive of freedom as something 
that exists antecedently and can be made manifest by the simple removal of restrictions. Rather, 
freedom is a capacity that may be developed through time and in conjunction with the aid of 
others. Freedom as the growth in power of effective action cannot emerge in a context where 



65 

 

one is merely free from interference. Indeed, increasing “effective” freedom often requires others 
(mentors, teachers, and colleagues) and, paradoxically, constraints in the form of discipline, 
effort, and practice (Boisvert, 1998, p. 620).  

Freedom is practiced where one has the skills needed to be free, to make choices, to act 
effectively on the world. To act on the world is not to act in isolation from others but in concert 
with others. Freedom also requires sensitivity to the way our actions have repercussions on 
others. The reason we need to be sensitive to the way our actions affect others is because our 
actions also reflect back on ourselves. We are, after all, creatures who shape the culture we 
inhabit, the languages we speak, and the relationships we enter into. The shaping of the self is a 
process that takes place within a community; a community that is also shaped by many selves.  

Dewey believed that the realization of a democratic life is a challenge requiring constant 
effort and attention. It cannot be reduced to the slogan “Leave me alone.” Instead of demanding 
a mere loosening of constraints, freedom requires self-scrutiny of our actions, especially the 
potential impact of what we do on fellow citizens.   

Equality  
 

Dewey has a unique understanding of equality, one that at first blush seems 
counterintuitive. Dewey sees equality as a form of individuality. He points out that even casual 
observers will notice that we are not equal, either by birth or by position in society. Further, if 
equality in its traditional meaning were to be achieved, it is not what most of us on reflection 
would wish for. A short story by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr. called Harrison Bergeron provides an 
interesting case study for what that type of equality would mean in practice. Vonnegut’s trop is 
to set his story around the rebellion of a ballet dancer required to wear heavy weights, in his case, 
very heavy weights, because he is extremely physically talented. These weights are intended to 
make him equal to all the other ballet dancers who are less talented. This fictional example points 
to why Dewey does not advocate equality in the traditional sense of the word. Dewey celebrated 
difference, uniqueness, a sort of inequality. What Dewey criticized is a single standard to judge 
all individuals. In an open society that values equality we must, according to Dewey, have a variety 
of measures for excellence, not one measure that we are all judged by.  

The idea of using only one standard of evaluation also works against our contemporary 
sense of identity as individuals and as groups or communities within the larger society. Charles 
Taylor in his essay called the “Politics of recognition” (1992) argues that one of the main themes 
of western societies is the recognition of the “self’ as unique or equal in Dewey’s sense of the 
word.1 Consistent with Dewey’s perspective, Taylor argues that identity is formed in 
communication communities or in dialogue. “The genesis of the human mind is in this sense 
not monological, not something each person accomplishes on his or her own, but dialogical” 
(Taylor, 1992, 32). The self is a creation of the community and not an individual act of volition. 
Even though the self, the individual human mind, is created in dialogue, humans still strive for 
a sense of recognition as individuals and as members of unique groups.  

The demand for recognition  
 

... is given urgency by the supposed links between recognition and identity, where 
this latter term designates something like a person’s understanding of who they 
are, of their fundamental defining characteristics as a human being. This thesis 
of identity is party shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the 
misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real 
damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them 



66 

 

a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves (Taylor, 1992, 
p. 25).  
 

This desire for recognition (for individuals as well as for groups) is achieved by creating 
a system that values uniqueness. Dewey calls this type of uniqueness “equality,” while Taylor 
writes about dignity as his expression of recognition based on uniqueness and equality.  

To re-emphasize the point, equality correlates with difference. Dewey’s perspective on 
equality is based on all individuals being members of communities. A community can only 
prosper if each member contributes to the community from her unique perspective with her 
unique abilities. To somewhat overstate the case, if we were all equal with regard to our talents 
and abilities, we would all make the same contribution to the community, severely limiting and 
weakening it.  

Equality is a manner of regarding others, which refuses any absolute scale by which to 
judge them. People are equal in the sense that life offers multiple contexts within which to 
evaluate others. Democratic equality is postulated on the denial of any single, a-temporal 
universal context for judgment (Boisvert, 1998, p. 68). Equality, like freedom, is a creation of 
community. It denotes effective regard for whatever is distinctive and unique in each, irrespective 
of physical and psychological inequality. Equality is not a natural possession. Rather it is a 
byproduct, that is, a fruit of the community that comes about through action directed by the 
character and quality of the community (Boisvert, 1998, p. 68).  

Neither freedom nor equality are given at birth, or even guaranteed by a legal system or 
a constitution except within large political bodies (e.g., national or provincial institutions). While 
constitutional and legal guarantees are essential for the workings of democratic governments, 
Dewey is more concerned with democracy as practiced in communal settings from 
neighborhoods to community groups to individual classrooms. Without democracy at these 
levels, democracy within a national context is empty; it is a sham.  

Democratic educational environments 

Given the above discussion of freedom and equality as essential elements of democracy, 
it follows that a democratic educational environment is one that promotes growth in freedom 
and equality. The key elements of a democratic classroom, then, is to encourage the training of 
students in freedom and equality. Pupils may not need to learn explicitly the uses of these two 
key terms, but it may help teachers if they understand in their practice that pupils cannot be 
given freedom or equality directly; they must be prepared to assume them.  

A brief exploration of preparing for freedom might be in order. It is not too far out of 
line to think of freedom as an art. An art is “a skill at doing a specified thing, typically one 
acquired through practice” (Apple Dictionary, Version 2.1.3 [80.4]). Dewey views freedom in 
this light.  

Is it possible to teach freedom in the classroom? To answer this question, we need to go 
back to our definition of freedom as the ability to act in one’s own interest while being aware of 
one’s actual and potential influence on others. In theory and practice this means that pupils 
need to learn metacognitive skills. They need to learn to think about the potential impact of 
their actions on others. This is a learnable and developmental skill. Robert Selman calls this the 
skill of perspective taking (2007). Selman’s skill of perspective taking provides teachers with some 
guidance on how to aid students in seeing things from the point of view of another. As a student 
moves from a perspective of seeing only his or her point of view to a reciprocal self- reflective 
point of view, and then ultimately to an in-depth societal perspective, the awareness of the 



67 

 

consequences of one’s behavior on others increases (2007). Engaging students in discussions in 
which they present arguments and counterarguments helps them see more than their own 
perspective. Being able to see things from another’s point of view is also one of the centerpieces 
of Dewey pragmatism. Specifically, the examination of consequences is implicit in seeing how 
one’s point of view includes the consequences of one’s own behavior. We will see later how the 
community of inquiry is a good place to take roles and examine consequences. The important 
point here is that this metacognitive skill of role taking is one teachable element of the art of 
freedom.  

Freedom, as the ability to take effective action, implies some other learnable skills. 
Argument, I suggest, is one of the key skills of effective action within groups or communities. 
Deanna Kuhn’s The skills of argument (1989) and Education for thinking (2005) are good sources 
for understanding how we can learn and teach this skill. Kuhn shows the similarities and 
differences between rhetorical and dialogical arguments, claiming that the similarities far 
outweigh the differences. Both types of arguments have the same structure: premise, support for 
premise, counter arguments, and rebuttal. The difference between the types of arguments is that 
in the case of dialogical arguments, the counter argument comes from the opponent, while in 
the rhetorical argument the counter argument is supplied by the writer of the argument. In a 
rhetorical argument, the writer must have an implied opponent with a stated counter argument, 
or the writer’s presentation is not an argument. 

This is but one skill that develops freedom for a pupil. A closely related skill tied up with 
the freedom “to do,” or the freedom to act within a community, is the skill of inference making 
with regard to consequences of your actions or the actions of others. The ability to make good 
inferences is a skill that can be learned. With regard to inferring the consequences of an action, 
this skill is best learned in discussion within a classroom setting where one’s fellow students’ 
perspectives can be brought to bear on individual inferences. If we think about speech as action, 
many skills can be learned in a classroom discussion.  

This concern for understanding through discussion would be an academic and moot 
point if the things learned in discussion were not usable in other situations. This leads to the 
question of transferability. Transferability is the application of skills and knowledge in new 
settings and to new information. Two elements of transfer will be explored. First, the traditional 
area of transfer, namely, what skills are learned and then transferred to a new setting. David N. 
Perkins and Gavriel Salomon (1988) explore the traditional understanding of transfer. The 
second area to be explored relates to the hidden curriculum, that is, what is the unintentional 
message students learn from the method of instruction. It will be argued that one learns that 
knowledge is tentative and learning is on-going from discussion oriented classes and that lecture 
classes teach a static version of knowledge and present learning as an accomplishment rather 
than as a process.  

Perkins and Salomon outline two types of transfer: low-road transfer and high-road 
transfer. Low-road transfer is the type of transfer that occurs when I use the skills learned in 
driving a car to drive a truck. This type of transfer occurs in skills that are “over-learned” and in 
situations that have many surface similarities. Low-road transfer happens automatically. High-
road transfer occurs in situations that do not have surface similarity (applying problem solving 
skills learned in math class to a new problem in social studies) and occur intentionally 
(Morehouse, 1992). To what extent is high-road and low-road transfer likely to happen in a 
discussion approach to teaching knowledge acquisition and knowledge production skills?  

To understand what is learned and transferred in a discussion, the work of Marzano and 
colleagues (1989) will be used. These researchers list three skills that are used to acquire 
knowledge and four skills that are used to apply knowledge in a discussion. Oral discourse is the 



68 

 

conceptual space where knowledge acquisition and knowledge application overlap. The three 
skills that are involved in knowledge acquisition are: concept formation, comprehension, and 
principle formation. The four skills used in applying what has been learned are: composing, 
problem solving, decision-making, and research. Let’s look at each of these skills in turn after 
briefly orienting ourselves to Marzano and his colleagues’ understanding of oral discourse.  

Marzano and colleagues look to the inventive and creative nature of oral discourse to 
explore its central role in building and applying thinking skills. The individual, in speaking, puts 
non-linguistic thought “into words in an act of invention” that brings into existence for the 
individual, and perhaps for the listeners, new distinctions that did not exist before verbalization 
(Marzano, 1989, p. 62). Marzano’s understanding of conversation or discussion2 includes the 
elements of informing, persuading, regulation, generating or expressing emotions, acquiring 
information, and stimulating divergence. The first of the knowledge acquisition components is 
concept formation. In discussing concept formation, Marzano points out the difficulties of 
helping students learn concepts: some highly abstract concepts resist direct instruction. In other 
words, these concepts cannot be learned by pointing, identifying another instance of the concept, 
finding concepts in a new context, etc. (p. 36). Enter the classroom conversation or discussion.  

 

 
The concept of democracy is an example of a concept that cannot be taught directly. If 

some abstract experiences cannot be directly taught, then experiments, hands-on activities, life 
experiences, and discussions are the ways to indirectly teach and/or learn abstract concepts 
(Morehouse, 1992). In a discussion, students can generate examples, counter-examples, and 
model cases. They can explore and question assumptions, and then follow-up on the 
consequences of ideas (What follows from this?). These questions and probes can be taught by 
example and illustrated during discussions and during follow-up sessions and then applied to 
learning about abstract concepts.  

Principle formation follows from and builds on concept formation. Principles are 
relationships between and among concepts in a discipline. As principles connect concepts, it 
follows that conversation, that is, a connection between two or more people, is a reasonable way 
to acquire an understanding of relationships. Four kinds of principles are discussed: cause and 
effect principles, correlational principles, probability principles, and axiomatic principles. The 
Philosophy for Children materials present many examples of ways to develop these principles in 
classroom conversations.  



69 

 

Comprehension, the last of the components in the knowledge acquisition side of the 
circle, is meaning making. Comprehension is making sense of the world around us by observing 
it in its various forms. Whether the information comes from books, films, observing an 
experiment or listening to music, comprehension encompasses the pulling out of new 
information and the placing of it with what we already know to produce new meaning(s). Making 
connections creates meaning by exploring what Lipman and colleagues call whole/part and 
means-ends relationships. It is also closely related to Arendt’s idea of “inter-est.” That which is 
between persons in a conversation, that which is interesting, is what connects people. Many 
strategies are currently being researched that aid students in comprehension or meaning making. 
These strategies include summarizing, predicting, and generating questions. All the strategies 
begin with the idea of building on what the student already knows and applying that knowledge 
to the new situation. As Marzano and colleagues point out many, if not most, of the strategies 
for developing comprehension are found in oral discourse or conversation.  

These three processes are likely to be transferred to other situations if they are learned in 
the give-and-take of discussion. This chance of high-road transfer is greater if the cases are varied, 
that is, if concept formation, principle formation and comprehensive discussions have occurred 
in science classes, social studies classes, and language arts classes. Additionally, if these thinking 
processes are taught in a discussion format (and some research has indicated that they cannot be 
taught in a lecture format), this would seem to encourage students to be tentative in their 
conclusions, and to see learning as on going.  

The four knowledge production or application processes taught in a conversational or 
discussion format are presented next. These processes are even more likely to encourage and 
instill the characteristics of tentativeness and life-long learning.  

Problem solving, broadly considered, should include the ability to figure out restricted, 
narrow puzzles and enigmas, as well as fuzzy, undefined, open-ended issues and mysteries. 
Problem solving usually involves a general set of procedures, such as, defining the problem, 
breaking it into parts, exploring causes, and using metaphors and analogies. While these points 
can be presented in a lecture or a book, to be understood they must be examined, attempted, 
and reapplied ideally in a group setting. The conversation of a group of students will, under the 
watchful eye of the instructor, present solutions in a series of successively more helpful steps.  

Competing alternatives, whether conscious or unconscious, are what distinguish 
problem solving from decision making. Alternatives imply action to be taken after the choice is 
made. Decisions have consequences, whereas problems have solutions. If groups make decisions 
together, they also share the consequences of the decision. Therefore, it is important that 
decision-making discussions are conducted only after the group has had some time to use 
discussion to form concepts, to form principles and to develop comprehension. In the process 
of these activities, the group becomes a community aware of the distinctive qualities of each 
member. They are thus in a better position to share responsibility for decisions.  

Research done along these lines can be defined as scientific inquiry. The process has the 
following steps: describing phenomena, formulating hypotheses, and testing hypotheses. How 
can research be developed in classroom conversation? The answer is found in what comes before 
observation. Observation depends on having a theoretical construct in place in order that we 
have some context from which to observe. Karl Popper argues that it is absurd to say that we can 
start with a pure observation (1962). Therefore, I argue that while an observation may be done 
individually, the construct—the theory—on which and through which we observe can and perhaps 
should be developed in classroom conversation.  

Composing, the last of the knowledge production or application processes, is the 
development of a product—most often in schools, a written product. Writing, and other product 



70 

 

forming, has three steps: planning, translating, and reviewing. Surprisingly, many experts see 
discussion as an essential requirement for writing. Process writing3 may be understood to include 
conversations with at least several other students at each step of the re-writing process.  

Each of these four thinking processes is dependent on classroom conversation. 
Additionally, classroom conversations teach students about the tentativeness of knowledge and 
the on-going nature of learning. As conversations are always between distinct and equal persons, 
they are always open-ended. As they are always brought forth in tentative, incomplete statements, 
they encourage further exploration. 

An implicit commitment to partial solutions and to continued exploration is perhaps the 
most important aspect of classroom conversation. Tentative solutions and continued exploration 
are built into the nature of conversation between equals. Built into the human condition is the 
need to make what is distinct about ourselves known to others. The advantage of a lecture is its 
efficient delivery of information. Research and experience have indicated that classroom 
discussion—under whatever name—is one of the ways to teach thinking skills that will be useful 
in new situations. When the value of community building is added to the teaching of thinking 
skills it becomes even clearer that conversation needs to be an essential part of any classroom.  

If we follow Dewey’s definition of equality as the recognition of the uniqueness of each 
individual, then equality too may be seen as an art. For Dewey, it is not just that we are unique—
it is the recognition of that uniqueness that is of greatest importance to understanding how 
equality is developed. Freedom and equality reference abilities that allow us to contribute to the 
larger whole, and so should be seen skills to be practiced. To learn to listen to each person’s 
perspective is to practice equality. To recognize the contribution made by each individual to 
defining a problem or contributing to a solution is to practice equality.  

To paraphrase Raymond Boisvert (1998) in his chapter on democracy: A democratic 
classroom should be judged by the way that all of the pupils are able to develop their capacities 
and thus grow in effective freedom and genuine equality. A democratic classroom should be 
judged by the way that it encourages individuality, that is, the unique distinctive contributions 
its pupils are actually capable of making. Freedom and equality will then be a concrete present 
reality not a hollow echo from a mythical state of nature (p. 71–72).  

How are democracy and community of inquiry integrated? 

This part of the paper scrutinizes the theory and practice of CI within the context of a 
democratic educational environment and also provides a closer look at classroom practice. 

Community of inquiry and democracy in theory  

A working definition of community of inquiry is now in order. Lipman (1995) provides 
a good definition of a philosophical community of inquiry4. He states that a community of 
inquiry is a classroom “in which students can generate and exchange ideas, clarify concepts, 
develop hypotheses, weigh possible consequences, and in general deliberate reasonably together 
while learning to enjoy their intellectual interdependence” (p. 121). I begin with “learning to the 
enjoyment of intellectual interdependence” as it places all the other elements in perspective and 
stipulates the role of the teacher in a community of inquiry5.  

The seemingly innocuous phrase “learning to” is important, as communities of inquiry 
are not a given; they are built, that is, we learn to make communities of inquiry together. This 
point is consistent with Dewey’s idea about communities in general. Dewey states in The Public 
and Its Problems (1927) that community requires acting together toward an agreed upon good that 



71 

 

is consciously recognized and appreciated as a good by the group. Community also demands an 
effort by the group to sustain a recognized good. In a community of inquiry, we learn to recognize 
and appreciate common goods through the process of generating and exchanging ideas, 
developing hypotheses, weighing possible consequences, and deliberating reasonably together. 
(Lipman, 1995)  

Intellectual interdependence can also be learned. It is about people and ideas. While 
ideas are (in some sense) independent from the people who state them, in a community of 
inquiry we must pay attention to both the person and the idea in order to give full weight to 
equality, that is, the unique contribution of each person. 

Our exploration of interdependence begins with what Hannah Arendt calls interest. She 
defines interest as literally “inter–est” that is, “the space between” us. Interest comes about 
because we share a common framework as humans: the “web” of meaning. Arendt’s idea of 
interest is important to intellectual interdependence, to democracy, and to community of 
inquiry. A few words from Arendt will set the stage for the development of these points.  
 

... the subjective in-between is not tangible, since there are no objects into which it could 
solidify; the process of acting and speaking can leave behind no such results and end 
products. But for all its intangibility, this in-between is no less real than the world of 
things we visibly have in common. We call this reality the “web” of human relationships, 
indicating by the metaphor its somewhat intangible quality” (Arendt, 1958, p. 183).  
 
Arendt goes on to write that it is within these webs of meaning that we reveal who we 

are, that is, we tell our story through our actions in the world. A community of inquiry is also a 
“web” of meaning, a place where pupils’ stories are told; it is a community that remains intangible 
even as it is occurring. Stories shape and inform the community. These stories are not necessarily 
or primarily told as a narrative, but rather told as pupils speak their beliefs, their opinions, their 
critiques. These statements by students reveal not only what a person thinks, but also who that 
person is. “Sheer human togetherness” is what a community of inquiry strives to achieve. 

The community of inquiry also reveals the “who” of a person as it unfolds. “This 
revelatory quality of speech and action comes to the fore where people are with others and 
neither for nor against them—that is, in sheer human togetherness” (Arendt, 1958, p. 180). 
Dewey’s idea of a community and Arendt’s idea of webs of meaning created by human 
togetherness are related in spirit and function. Both writers define humanness in terms of the 
way we come together. For both Dewey and Arendt, it is the way we come together that defines 
our humanness, each makes a similar case for defining humanness but from different 
perspectives. Dewey sees us functioning in community, while Arendt views webs of meaning as 
the way humans function as social beings. Both include an intangible sense of the good that is 
agreed on and committed to as key elements in defining this human coming together.  
 Dewey argues that we learn to be human. This learning occurs through the give-and- take 
of communication between the individual and distinctive members of a community. We 
understand and appreciate the beliefs, desires and methods of the community, and contribute 
to the use of our human resources and values (1927). In like manner, Arendt writes that action 
and speech are essential to our humanness. She argues that we cannot act in isolation—“to be 
isolated is be deprived of the capacity to act” (1958, p. 188). Dewey’s emphasis is on learning, 
and Arendt focuses on the human condition. Human plurality is an essential part of the human 
condition. She defines the human condition as having the twofold character of equality (the 
ability to understand each other) and distinctiveness (the uniqueness of each person). This 
definition of humanness implies learning from each other. Being with others and neither for 



72 

 

nor against others (Arendt’s phrase) is consistent with Dewey’s definition of democracy as the 
manifestation of community life 

Regarded as an idea, democracy is not an alternative to other principles of associated life. 
It is the idea of community itself. As Dewey put it, it refers to “…the tendency and movement of 
something that exists carried to its final limit, viewed as complete, perfected.” (1927, p. 148). 
Since things do not attain such fulfillment but are in actuality distracted and interfered with, 
democracy in this sense is not a fact and never will be. But neither, by the same logic, is there or 
has there ever been anything that is a completed community, a community unalloyed by alien 
elements.  

I hope that this short exploration of community of inquiry within Dewey’s understanding 
of democracy and Arendt’s work on action and speech make a case for community of inquiry as 
based on a theory of democracy. The case to be made now is whether or not a community on 
inquiry can achieve in practice what it purports to in theory. 
 
Community of inquiry and democracy: What might it look like? 
 

Rather than ask the rhetorical question “Is community of inquiry a democratic practice?” 
we will instead provide a model of what one might see in a community of inquiry classroom. It 
seems counterproductive and somewhat dishonest to ask a question that is inauthentic. To state 
my position clearly, I believe that community of inquiry, like democracy, is an ideal that can be 
approached but never fully achieved. I am using ideal as Dewey does when he writes that 
democracy “is an ideal in the only intelligible sense of an ideal: namely, the tendency and 
movement of something which exists carried to its final limit, viewed as completed, perfected.” 
(1927, p 148) So what might a community of inquiry classroom look like? To paint that picture, 
we will look to typical individual and group behaviors as well as the dispositions and orientations 
of individuals and the class as a whole.  

The physical organization of the classroom is likely to be the first thing that one notices. 
The desks will be in a circle and up to 20 pupils, along with the teacher, will sit around a large 
table. While this physical arrangement may seem to be a small and insignificant part of a 
community of inquiry, it is in fact quite important. If pupils see each other face-to-face, and the 
teacher becomes a part of the circle and does not stand apart, a sense of reciprocity and mutuality 
follows.  

David Kennedy writes about the discursive space within a community of inquiry that he 
says is “symbolized by the space of the circle which we make as we’re seated on the classroom 
floor or around a table” (1999). He sees the space created by the circle as allowing dialogue to 
occur with regard to posture, gestures, visual and phenomenological information as well as the 
actual words that are spoken.  

I like to visualize the center of the circle as the conceptual space (Arendt’s in-between 
that constitutes interest) as the place where the ideas being discussed reside. To appreciate this 
perspective, ask yourself where is the focus of a discussion when we are all sitting in rows facing 
the teacher? One possible answer is that the focus lies somewhere between the front row of desks 
and the teacher. While other perspectives are possible, at a minimum, the message of the “rows” 
arrangement is that of one to many (teacher to student) rather than one among many. In “rows” 
the exchanges of ideas is likely to be limited to teacher/idea/student/idea/teacher exchanges. If 
my metaphor of the “idea on the table” is a partial description of the place of an idea in a 
community of inquiry, then the dynamic of the classroom is altered in the direction student / 
idea / student / idea / teacher / idea, etc. While the classroom circle does not guarantee this 
dynamic, the “rows” arrangement clearly works against it.  



73 

 

Some of the behaviors likely to be seen in a community of inquiry classroom include 
“building on, shaping and modifying one another’s ideas” (Splitter & Sharp, 1995, p. 18). It is 
of vital importance that the topic for discussion is seen as a problem by the participants. If it is 
the teacher’s problem alone, a community of inquiry is hard to establish. While occasionally the 
teacher poses a problem, however, if this problem is to be engaged, it must become the classes’ 
problem. This is why, in the Lipman approach, the class generates leading ideas, rather than 
stipulates which ideas are to be discussed. “Ownership” of the ideas is essential in a community 
of inquiry. The students and the teacher will ask questions, pose hypotheses, and offer 
explanations that are directed toward a tentative solution to the agreed upon problem. A 
community of inquiry is shaped by the problem(s) it poses. While this problem may be redefined, 
expanded, or narrowed by the discussion, it remains in the “center of the table,” at the center of 
the discussion.  

It is the central location of the problem at the metaphoric center of the table more than 
anything else that frames a community of inquiry. For example, if a community of inquiry is 
“self-correcting,” it is the problem that mediates the self-correction. An example might help. One 
possible place where a self-correction might need to take place is with regard to what counts as 
evidence. But the question of what counts for evidence is different depending on what type of 
problem one is addressing. If the problem relates to how people think about a problem (say, their 
opinion on a parliamentary decision), information from a pole is a legitimate source of 
information. However, if the problem relates to how a parliamentary decision ought to be made, 
then an opinion poll may not count as evidence—a different set of criteria are required depending 
on whether the problem is defined as moral, or as procedural.  

To further illustrate the “idea on the table” perspective, David Leat of the University of 
Newcastle-upon-Tyne presented a paper at the 8th International Thinking Conference called 
“Brains on the Table: Diagnostic and formative assessment through observation6.” His paper 
focuses on how students can see a verbal problem in terms of its parts, asking students to create 
a story taking different slips of paper that would allow them to solve the problem. The small 
groups were observed by teachers to gain insight into how students think about geography 
concepts. This assessment activity nonetheless illustrates the metaphor of keeping ideas on the 
table. In Leat’s activity students literally move pieces of paper on a table to construct a story, 
sorting relevant from irrelevant information and organizing the information to find the problem 
and to solve it narratively. Imagine a group of four or five students moving slips of paper around 
the table as they make a case for placing the paper in one area rather than in another area. As 
students manipulate the pieces of paper and argue for each placement, they engage in a very 
observable community of inquiry. 

By making a method of assessment observable, elements previously invisible may become 
visible. The “brains on the table” activity is important to a community of inquiry as it makes 
tangible what a community thinking aloud might look like. This activity also illustrates self-
correcting as we observe students making tentative choices that are later revised, which helps the 
problem solving to proceed. We cannot correct what we cannot see. Lipman (Lipman, Sharp, & 
Oscanyan, 1984) make a simple but brilliant observation: thinking becomes visible when we talk 
(or write). It is by making thought visible that improvement in our thinking abilities can be 
improved. “Brains on table” is another way to make thinking visible.  

To further aid in making a community of inquiry discussion visible we should also pay 
attention to processes by asking questions such as:  
 

• Who speaks when and to whom?  
• What discussion moves are made and by whom?  



74 

 

• What activities foreshorten discussion and which enliven it?   
• Who helps move a “stuck” discussion forward and what techniques are used?  

 
In Natasha, Lipman (1996) presents an outline called “Forming a philosophical community of 
inquiry.” A few of Lipman’s points will be highlighted to underscore the democratic elements of 
a community of inquiry: (1) The class discovers that the text is meaningful and relevant, and 
appropriate for their consideration; (2) students initiate questions and the teacher recognizes the 
specific contribution of each student; (3) students and teacher make a decision regarding where 
to begin the discussion and the joint discovery of the problematic through discussion; and (4) 
the articulation of disagreements and the quest for understanding may be made by students or 
the teacher. These points were highlighted to show that there exists at least a theoretical 
consistency between Dewey’s ideas of democracy, freedom, and equality and Lipman’s 
understanding of community of inquiry as a form of democratic education.  
 

Da Capo 
 

What I have tried to do in this article is to connect some of the key ideas of John Dewey 
and Hannah Arendt, and to a lesser extent Charles Taylor, to Matthew Lipman’s understanding 
of democracy, freedom, and equality as exemplified in a community of inquiry, and thus, to a 
wider understanding of a democratic educational environment. Implicit in all the works on 
community of inquiry is the goal of meaning making. Lipman (Lipman, Oscanyan, & Sharp, 
1980; Lipman, 1996) sees meaning making as the heart of the community of inquiry. The 
product of meaning making is an outcome of communal attempts at understanding each other 
and the world and therefore creating a conceptual space for democratic participation in a 
community. Meaning making can only happen in a mutually created communication experience, 
that is, in a community of inquiry.  

Lipman’s community of inquiry as an ideal is consistent with Dewey’s idea of democracy. 
Taylor’s concept of recognition and dignity and Arendt’s “inter-est” point to a beginning for 
elaborating an educational perspective on freedom and equality that incorporate the importance 
of human rights. Human equality, that is to say, the recognition of uniqueness and identity along 
with the development of the capacity for engagement in the world (freedom as defined by 
Dewey), are essential in a multipolar world of heightened individualism and, along with this, an 
unprecedented splintering of perceptions. More than ever before, we need to look for the 
acknowledgement, or rather the emergence, of a common substratum of values that would make 
economically, socially and culturally viable coexistence possible on a worldwide scale (Kim, 1998, 
p. 18). I would submit that this common stratum of values may come from a Deweyan sense of 
freedom (growth in a conversational community) and equality (valuing of our uniqueness within 
communities).  

While democracy has many meanings, if it has a moral meaning this is to be found in 
the ability to resolve that supreme test of all political institutions and industrial arrangements, 
namely, the contribution these institutions can make to the all-around growth of every member 
of society (Dewey, 1938, p. 186). Dewey’s statement about democracy as a moral concept should 
inspire us to continue our work as educators, seeing democracy in education as the starting point 
for building a human rights consensus and a more democratic world. Although a democratic 
educational environment is an ideal to aim for, we would do well to recognize that such a goal is 
never accomplished once and for all. 
  



75 

 

Endnotes 

1 Charles Taylor writes about authentic or individual identity in much the same way that Dewey writes about 
equality. 
2 I will use conversation and discussion interchangeable throughout this paper. 
3 Process writing is an approach to aid students in improving their writing skills by presenting their essays to fellow 
students for feedback. 
4 Lipman, Sharp, Splitter, Kennedy, Sasseville and others have recently included the word philosophic with 
community of inquiry. This paper will use the same working definition of community of inquiry but without the 
word philosophical both for easy of presentation and also to support the use of this approach in a wide variety of 
disciplines and classrooms. 
5 Intellectual interdependence is the hallmark of the theory of community of inquiry as well as its goal. 
6 This presentation was later published as “Brains on the table: diagnostic and formative assessment through 
observation” in Assessment in Education: Principles, Policy and Practice with Adam Nichols, June 2010. 
 
 
 
 

References 
 
Arendt, H. (1958). The human condition. Chicago, IL, USA: University of Chicago Press. 
Boisvert, R. D. (1998). John Dewey: rethinking our times. Albany, New York: The State University 

of New York Press. 
Dewey, J. (1927). The public and its problems. New York: Henry Holt and Company. 
Gardner, H. (1999). The disciplined mind: what all students need to know. New York, New York: 

Simon and Schuster. 
Gutmann, A.  (1992). The politics of recognition. In C. Taylor, Multiculturalism and the politics 

of recognition: essays by Charles Taylor with commentary. Princeton, New Jersey, USA: 
Princeton University Press. 

Kennedy, D. (2006). The well of being: childhood, subjectivity, and education. Albany, New York, 
USA: State University of New York Press. 

Kennedy, D. (1999). Thinking for oneself and with others. Analytic Teaching, 2. 
Kim, Y. (1998). Prospects for a universal ethics. New York: UNESCO. 
Kuhn, D. (2005). Education for thinking. Cambridge, MA, USSA: Harvard University Press. 
Kuhn, D. (1991). The skill of argument. New York, New York, USA: Cambridge University 

Press. 
Leat, D. (1999). Brains on the table: diagnostic and formative assessment through observation. 

Eight international conference of critical and creative thinking. Alberta, CA. 
Lipman, M. A. (1980). Philosophy on the classroom. Philadelphia, PA, USA: Temple University 

Press. 
Lipman, M. (1995). Education for violence reduction and peace development. In J. Portelli & 

R. Reed, Children, philosophy and democracy. Calgary, Alberta, Canada: Detsellig 
Enterprises. 

Lipman, M. (1996). Natasha: Vygotskian dialogues. New York, New York: Teachers College Press. 
Marzano, R. B. (1988). Dimensions of thinking: a framework for curriculum and instruction. 

Alexandria, Virginia, USA: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development. 
Morehouse, R. (1992). Conversation and cognition. In R. F. Reed, When we talk: essays on 

classroom conversations. Fort Worth, TX: Analytic Press. 
Perkins, D. N. & Salomon, G. (1988). Teaching for transfer. Educational Leadership, 46, 22-32. 
Selman, R. L. (2003). The promotion of social awareness: powerful lessons from the partnership of 

 



76 

 

 

developmental theory and classroom practice. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.  
Silver, P. (1978). Ortega as phenomenologist: The genesis of the meditations of Quixote. New York, 

New York USA: Columbia University Press. 
Vonnegut, K. (1965). Harrison Bergeron. In K. Vonnegut, Welcome to the monkey house. New 

York, New York, USA: Delacorte/Seymour Lawrence. 
 
 
Address Correspondences to:  

Dr. Richard Morehouse,  
Professor Emeritus,  
Praxis  Consulting  
115 5th Avenue South, Suite 409 
La Crosse, WI 54601 
remorehouse@viterbo.edu 
 

 
 




