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Philosophical Education and Transcendental Tolerance 

 
 

Markus Tiedemann  
 

 

 
n this article I would like to address a challenge that is intensively discussed in Europe, 
namely the so-called dilemma of teaching values. How to win children, pupils, students or 
even citizens for values like tolerance, human rights or democracy without dogmatism –

without ignoring the free use of reason? 
 

Very principal positions are involved in this discussion. You need to be a universalist to insist 
that there are global values for all reasonable creatures. Communitarists deny this possibility. From 
their point of view, even the “Sapare Aude” is a cultural construction, and normative universalism has 
a tendency to become neocolonialism. One might perceive this attitude to be informed by tolerance, 
but we should also be aware that it belongs to the main line of the argument in Samuel P. 
Huntington’s Clash of Civilisations. Huntington is a ‘cultural relativist’. According to this conviction, 
people cluster around the values and the symbols of their incidentally accrued cultures. One of the 
‘key’ formulations of Huntington’s claims is that values like human rights are perhaps ‘unique’ but 
not ‘universal’ (comp. Huntington, 1996, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, p. 
513).  
 

In 1995, two years after the publication of Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilisations’, the 
UNESCO proclaimed its explanation of tolerance. It reads as follows: 
 

Article 1: Meaning of tolerance 
1.1 Tolerance is respect, acceptance and appreciation of the rich diversity of our world's cultures, our forms of 

expression and ways of being human. It is fostered by knowledge, openness, communication and freedom 
of thought, conscience and belief. Tolerance is harmony in difference. It is not only a moral duty, it is also 
a political and legal requirement. Tolerance, the virtue that makes peace possible, contributes to the 
replacement of the culture of war by a culture of peace. (comp. UNESCO, 1995, Declaration of 
Principles on Tolerance). 

      In this context, the UNESCO puts high hopes in school education in general, and 
philosophical teaching in particular. This is why the program ‘Philosophy, a School of Freedom’ 
(comp. UNESCO, 2007, Teaching Philosophy and Learning to Philosophize) was started. In some parts of 
the world, philosophical education and the support of tolerance via this subject are already common. 
Barbara Bruening proved in 1998 that the subject and its pedagogic goals are established all over 
Europe (Bruening, 1998, Ethikunterricht in Europa. Ideengeschichtliche Traditionen, curriculare Konzepte 
und didaktische Perspektiven in der Sekundarstufe I). In many of the Romanic nations, ‘Philosophy’ is an 
obligatory school subject. Other nations offer comparable efforts under the umbrella of ‘Critical 

I 



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Thinking’. In the Federal Republic of Germany, Paragraph 7, 2 of the constitution confirms that 
religion is to be a regular subject at school. Consequently, ‘philosophy’ and ‘ethics’ have mostly been 
offered as mere alternatives to the religion courses. In recent years, however, the availability of 
philosophical education has massively increased. The German Federal State of Berlin has, for 
example, introduced obligatory ethics in the schools’ curriculums for all, by public referendum.  
 

   The integration of refugees as well as citizens from Muslim cultures has pushed this 
development as well.  In 2015, Klaus Goergen has convincingly pointed out the potential of bringing 
together young people of various cultures and origins in a normative discourse (Goergen, 2015, Ethik 
für alle? Plädoyer für ein Pflichtfach Philosophie/Ethik, in: ZDPE 2/2015, pgs. 91-98). Moreover, there is 
empirical evidence that philosophical education has a beneficial impact on critical thinking skills and 
increases the appreciation of controversial arguments. The proof began with Lawrence Kohlberg and 
was confirmed by the research of Georg Lind in Europe and Latin America (comp. Kohlberg, 1984, 
Essays on Moral Development: Vol. 2. The Psychology of Moral Development; Lind, 2016, How to Teach 
Morality: Promoting Deliberation and Discussion, Reducing Violence and Deceit).   
 
          But, what exactly can philosophical education contribute to the cultivation of tolerance? 
Essentially, two models of tolerance education can be differentiated: 
 

   The first model represents contentual tolerance education. What is communicated here is a 
‘canon’ of behaviour and ways of life to be tolerated and accepted. 
 

   The second model can be designated as transcendental tolerance education. It provides no 
obligatory content, but attempts to promote the condition of possibility for discernment and 
tolerance. At its core, this approach revolves around a ‘reorientation’ in attitudes and ways of 
thinking, understood as the clarification and explanation of terminology and categories, as well as 
dealing with open-ended questions and cultural conflicts.  
 

   A presentation of explicit norms may be indispensable still. This applies to instructions in legal 
affairs as well as to the integration into already existing social and cultural circumstances. If you wish 
to play soccer with us, you have to accept the offside rule. Whether this rule is good in itself, is not up 
to debate. 
 

   Philosophical reflection is, however, a priori untied to specific results. This is what the dilemma 
of teaching values is all about (comp. Martens, 1996; Tiedemann, 2015, Ethische Orientierung in der 
Moderne – was kann philosophische Bildung leisten, in: Handbuch Philosophie und Ethik. Bd. 1: Didaktik und 
Methodik). Matthew Lipman’s community of inquiry as well as Gareth Matthew’s discourse 
communities are committed to the principle of rationality. Content beliefs are not the goal of the 
process. (Lipman, 1980, Harry Stottlemeier’s Discovery; Matthews, 1984, Dialogues with Children). 

 
‘We love young people who say straight out what they mean, as long as they think on lines like us’.            This 
remark by Mark Twain shows that it requires courage to establish real philosophical education. 
Philosophy is not the administrator of a carefully selected set of ideas, it is the call to thinking for 
ourselves and the cultivation of that very habit. The radicalism of the philosophical ‘Sapere Aude’ 



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manifests itself in its principle of incompatibility with normative requirements.   
 

Whoever postulates that philosophical reflection necessarily leads to a primacy of democracy, 
human rights and humanism, is wrong. Philosophical argumentation struggles for consistency. 
Sympathy or Political Correctness are no criteria for quality. Of course, antidemocratic drafts can be 
supported by substantial arguments. Just look at the history of philosophy! Not many of the great 
figures have been convinced democrats. 
 

Is Plato’s idea of the Philosopher King inacceptable for school education because it is 
antidemocratic? Should a pupil who, after intelligent reconstruction and critical reflection, aligns him- 
or herself with Plato, receive a ‘bad’ grade? Certainly not. A dogmatic canon of values and the essence 
of philosophical education are incompatible. A philosophical accomplishment can be measured by 
the quality of its argumentation and not by its adherence to ‘political correctness’. 
 
 But what effect does transcendental tolerance education produce? I do see five benefits. The 
first benefit is the explanation of categories, terminology, and differentiations. 
 

Kant’s differentiation between knowledge, opinion, and faith might be a good example (Kant, 
1781, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, pg. 532 ff.). Whoever understands the nature of these levels of 
episteme develops a robust immunity to dogmatism. I can entertain a position without being 
convinced of it myself, and any statements of faith are only justified for the believer. Only knowledge 
is based on arguments that everyone must accept. To understand how little knowledge we have and 
how limited our reason is, is one of the most important foundations of tolerance.  
 

In any truth that gets not possession of our minds by the irresistible light of self-evidence, or 
by the force of demonstration, the arguments that gain it assent are the vouchers and gage of 
its probability to us; and we can receive it for no other, than such as they deliver it to our 
understandings. (Locke, 1689, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding)   
 
A second benefit is to counteract the inflationary and thus worthless application of the term 

‘tolerance’. Even the Latin root ‘tolerare’ shows the necessity of having to bear or suffer an unlovely 
issue. According to Rainer Forst, tolerance always requires rejection as well as higher-order arguments 
that demand acceptance (Forst, 2012, Toleranz im Konflikt: Geschichte, Gehalt und Gegenwart eines 
umstrittenen Begriffs).   
 

Forst identifies and establishes three components which are indispensable for the very 
definition of tolerance. The first, he designates as the ‘rejection component’. In order to be able to 
tolerate anything at all, the practices involved have first to be seen as false or disruptive. Anything else 
would be approval or indifference, and would therefore render any debate superfluous. Intuitive 
rejection does not get in the way of tolerance but is rather the base requirement for the possibility of 
its existence. The second component, according to Forst, is the ‘acceptance component’. This includes 
the reasons why certain practices are personally considered improper or bad, but still have their 
justification. Rejection remains, but there is an understanding of opposing arguments and the 
limitation of one's own evidence. The third component is the ‘refusal component’, which always 



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intervenes when higher-order arguments justify or demand a refusal.  
 

This applies to reciprocal and intersubjective justification.  It is the same for both: those who 
claim tolerance, and those who reject tolerance. Both are obligated to explain their reasons in 
discussions. Only those arguments will be acknowledged which can be communicated reciprocally or 
intersubjectively. ‘We always did it like that’ or ‘I do not want that’ are, in fact, no arguments at all. Any 
school pupil mastering the basics of syllogisms will understand that normative conclusions can 
normally not be drawn from one premise alone. 
 

Provided the arguments are sufficiently convincing, the dispute is settled. In the case of 
‘tolerance’, a tendency to a rejection of the disputed issue remains. The argument by itself is accepted, 
but that which was argued to be accepted remains rejected.  
 

A third benefit lies within the discussion of concrete cases and cultural conflicts. May a 
hijacked aircraft be shot down? Is the circumcision of boys inacceptable without medical necessity? 
Are burkas a sign of cultural diversity or an attack on liberal society? Should ‘continuing embryonic 
research’ be permitted? Should a liberal-democratic nation be allowed to impose obligatory healthcare 
insurance upon its citizens? How voluntary may marriages be? Are honour and respect benefits that 
need to be earned, or is everyone entitled to them? When and where can public religious ceremonies 
be tolerated? How much tolerance should the organisation of public schools exercise when it comes 
to foreign traditions. May an individual be a citizen of a democratic and an undemocratic nation at 
the same time?  
 

In philosophical classes queries like these can be discussed without being tied to cultural or 
religious traditions. An example: if a teacher were to display a burka-attired woman on the blackboard 
of a classroom in Berlin, Germany, and asks the pupils to give an opinion, a rapid division would very 
soon occur. One half of the class would probably say that they see a religiously devout woman living 
her pursuit of happiness. The other half of the class might argue that this woman is the victim of 
oppression and needs help. It is not the job of philosophical education to settle this question, but to 
train exact description and the use of categories. For example, none of the class sees a woman. 
Regarding someone in a burka, at most you can see a human figure. Moreover, categories like 
‘personal freedom’, ‘citizen obligations’, ‘structural violence’, or ‘shame’ can help to find and justify 
one’s opinion, or at least to understand the reasons for disagreement. Identifying reasons opens a 
door for reciprocal respect despite controversial positions. Ideally, discussions like these help to 
increase the acceptance of difference, and to question prejudices.  
 

The next benefit is to understand that tolerance needs to be limited. Otherwise it turns into 
nihilism. There is a lot of struggle surrounding terms like ‘multiculturalism’, a ‘multicultural society’ 
or ‘cultural pluralism’ and so on. From my point of view, these debates are quite boring. At the end 
of the day, the interesting question is whether cultural diversity should be limited or not. 
 

To equate such limitation with intolerance is a gross simplification. It is also a question of 
priority between individual and collective rights. Is cultural tradition a value in and of itself? Who is 
going to protect the individual from its own community? Pascal Bruckner calls the representatives of 



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an unlimited multiculturalism “anti-racist racists”. Bruckner speaks of a ‘Paradox of Multiculturalism’. 
All the various communities are granted the same treatment, but not their members, because they 
lose the right to break away from their own traditions (comp. Bruckner, 2007, Enlightenment 
fundamentalism or racism of the anti-racists?, pg. 58). 
 

It is a sad example of negative dialectic. The heart of racism is to reduce the individual to its 
affiliation with an ethnic or cultural group. Moreover, there is also a differentiation between 
‘persecution racism’ and ‘neglect racism’, or between active and passive racism.  Recent German 
history produced the cruelest persecution racism – the ‘Holocaust’. The human rights of millions 
were violated, regardless of individuality, only because they belonged to a certain demographic. The 
rule of persecution racism says: ‘We violate your human rights, because you belong to a certain group of 
people.’ In order to prevent such barbarism from ever rising up again, tremendous efforts were made, 
especially in Europe, not to discriminate on racial or cultural grounds. This is of course a desirable 
development. The problem is that unlimited tolerance for cultural groups can undermine the 
individual rights of their members. Again, individuals are reduced to their group affiliation. The rule 
of the neglect racism says: ‘We will not protect your human rights, because you belong to a certain group of 
people.’  
 

The struggle for higher-order arguments as the basis of tolerance leads to the fifth benefit of 
philosophical education: the debate around ethical cosmopolitanism and rules like human rights.  

Even the UNESCO argues for limited cultural tolerance on the basis of human rights:  

1.2 Tolerance is not concession, condescension or indulgence. Tolerance is, above all, an active attitude 
prompted by recognition of the universal human rights and fundamental freedoms of others. In no 
circumstance can it be used to justify infringements of these fundamental values. Tolerance is to be 
exercised by individuals, groups and States (comp. UNESCO, 1995, Declaration of Principles on 
Tolerance). 

Nevertheless, such a proclamation is far from being a legitimisation. The fact that the majority 
of nations signed the declaration of human rights is a proper contractual argument. Nevertheless, it 
loses its binding quality with every generation that did not actively ratify the contract.  

The idea of cultural relativism radically challenges universal ethical values. Since it is 
impossible to imagine values to be independent of social contexts, Alasdair MacIntyre (MacIntyre, 
1981, After Virtue) argues that they have no universal claim. Huntington expresses this point of view 
much more radically. Values such as democracy, human rights, and freedom of speech are unique, 
but represent no ‘universal’ culture (comp. Huntington, 1996, pg. 513). Any such consensus could at 
best be achievable within an already disappearing small group of academic elites, which Huntington 
calls the ‘Davos Culture’ in reference to the World Economic Forum held annually in Davos, 
Switzerland (comp. Huntington, 1996, pg. 78). The hope, however, that sooner or later identical 
universal cultural values will be generated in all cultural spheres, is decidedly denied. Huntington 
sends a clear denial to the cosmopolitans of the ‘enlightenment’. Progression in the cultural spheres is 
primarily of a demographic, technical, and military, but not of an ethical nature. 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alasdair_MacIntyre


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A philosophical community of inquiry must not ignore these positions. Moreover, it is to be 
accepted that they might be right and need to be heard and analyzed. Nevertheless, this does not 
mean that the defense of universal values like human rights has failed.    

"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their 
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” 

Unfortunately, it is not that easy. The binding effect of human rights may be quite natural for 
most of us, but it is not self-evident. Ludwig Wittgenstein argued that to doubt makes sense only if 
certain things are not to be doubted (Wittgenstein, 1969, On Certainty). But even if this remark is to 
be accepted, it does not nullify the lack of proof. Reasonable people must use the unconstrained 
constraint of the better argument (Habermas, 1987, Theory of Communicative Action). Philosophical 
education makes students understand that there is no ultimate justification, which does not mean, 
that ‘anything goes’ (Feyerabend, 1978, Science in a Free Society). We still have to be ‘conscientiously 
endeavoured to think about our beliefs coolly, rationally, impartially, with conceptual clarity and with 
as much relevant information as we can reasonably acquire.” (Regan, 2004, The Case of Animal Rights, 
pg. 134). 

And there are good reasons to regard the justification of human rights to be unmatched. 
Concepts like those of Martha Nussbaum, Susan Neiman, Ottfried Hoeffe, John Rawls or Juergen 
Habermas are not final but very well founded. Martha Nussbaum talks of a vague but strong and 
resilient concept of ‘good’ (comp. Nussbaum, 1993, The Therapy of Desire. Theory and Practice in 
Hellenistic Ethics, pgs. 323-363). John Rawls uses the term of the ‘Overlapping Consensus’ (comp. 
Rawls, 1971, A Theory of Justice, pg. 340) This has nothing to do with the ‘imperialism’ of an ‘American 
Way of Life’, but with the condition of possibility of diversity and binding rules. Ottfried Hoeffe 
mentions a ‘transcendental exchange’, which, similar to Rawls’ ‘Veil of Ignorance’, constructs an 
intelligible decision-making situation. He argues on the basis of a minimalistic anthropology. How 
independent and divergent our cultural ‘imprint’ may be, we can certainly agree that we are bodily, 
purely rational, social, and political beings. Any intervention into such necessities will restrict our 
‘freedom of action’, and will thus prevent us from realising our understanding of a successfully led 
life. Any realization of cultural or individual difference presupposes the capacity to act. As ‘human 
rights’ seek to protect such a ‘capacity to act’ they do not endanger but guarantee diversity and 
disparity. “Transcendentality is that which one implicitly affirms, provided that one always seeks what 
one wills; transcendental means the circumstances, that one can have and pursue normal interests.”  
(comp. Hoeffe, 1996, Vernunft und Recht. Bausteine zu einem interkulturellen Rechtsdiskurs, pg. 77; 
translation by Tiedemann).  

The benefits of philosophical education are not to indoctrinate students with specific values. 
It's about the ability to argue, the insistence on reason, and the distinction of categories. These 
competencies are not only indispensable for any democracy; they are also the core foundation of the 
virtue of tolerance. Ekkehard Martens understands philosophical education as an elementary cultural 
technique of a human way of life (comp. Martens, 2003, Methodik des Ethik- und Philosophieunterrichts. 
Philosophieren als elementare Kulturtechnik). Julian Nida-Ruemelin talks of an ‘renewed humanism’ with 
rationalism, freedom and responsibility. The capability of educating reasonable, well justified 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evident
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/All_men_are_created_equal
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Creator_deity
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inalienable_rights
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Life,_liberty_and_the_pursuit_of_happiness
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Feyerabend


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convictions (rationalism), and the capability of leading an autonomous and free way of life (freedom), 
and, as a result,  the capability of becoming aware of and adopting responsibility (responsibility).  

The teaching of philosophy and ethics is a training for giving and taking arguments. Their 
aims are not to indoctrinate values, but to negotiate them on the basis of reciprocal argumentation. 
In this regard, ethics are more important –so the Dalai Lama– than religion (comp. Dalai Lama, 
2016, An Appeal by the Dalai Lama to the World: Ethics Are More Important Than Religion). Almost two 
decades ago, long before debates on integration and religious fanaticism arose, Hartmuth von Hentig 
formulated the following thoughts: “People are right who say: values are always at play in teaching; 
value concepts should be allowed to form anywhere; value judgments and decisions should always be 
made. But, there has to be one subject in the school curriculum in which the foundation of moral 
judgment/decision-making is clarified and its tenets brought to awareness. I call this subject 
‘Philosophy’” (comp. von Hentig, 1999, Ach die Werte! Ein öffentliches Bewusstsein von zwiespältigen 
Aufgaben. Über eine Erziehung für das 21. Jahrhundert, pg. 164).  
 

For the representatives of a conservative teaching of values, all of this may not suffice. From 
the position of didactical theory, transcendental tolerance education remains without an alternative. 
An imposition of ‘moral truths’ and philosophical education are not compatible with one another.   
 

With a little good fortune, an attitude is formed which Jules Lemaître (1853 - 1914) called 
“the philanthropy of intelligence”.  

  
Federico Mayor Zaragoza, Vice - Director of the UNESCO argues:  
Philosophy and Democracy urge each of us to exercise our capacity for judgement, to choose 
for ourselves the best form of political and social organisation, to find our own values, in 
short, to become fully what each of us is, a free being. Among so many dangers, we have no 
other hope. (Zaragoza, 1995, Memory of the Future, pg.12). 

 
I call this the goal of philosophical education of transcendental tolerance. 

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Address correspondences to: 

Prof. Dr. Markus Tiedemann 
Professur für Philosophiedidaktik und für Ethik 
Technische Universität Dresden, Institut für Philosophie 

            D-01062 Dresden 


