




































































Analytic Teaching and Philosophical Praxis


ANALYTIC TEACHING AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRAXIS VOLUME 41, ISSUE 1 (2021) 

  
 

62 
 

 

In the Footsteps of Matthew Lipman: Dialogue among 

Peers and Dialogical Thinking 

 
 
Marie-France Daniel   
 
 

Introduction 
 

  
atthew Lipman was a great philosopher and a great man; a man deeply committed to the 
Philosophy of Education and to the worldwide advancement of the Philosophy for 

Children (P4C) approach he developed. His philosophical approach adapted to children sparked 
tremendous changes in the way philosophers engaged in philosophy and educators regarded child 
education.  
 

Based on Lipman’s work, my innovation was to adapt P4C first to mathematics (Daniel et al., 
1996), and then to violence prevention among children (Daniel, 2002). However, the legacy I would 
like to focus on in this paper concerns my years of research on the concepts of philosophical dialogue 
and critical thinking. In the mid 1980s, when I was facilitating P4C sessions together with teachers 
from Quebec and elsewhere, I noticed the teachers would sometimes confuse conversation with 
dialogue, and simple thinking with philosophical or critical thinking. On my side, I was able to 
observe that pupils were discussing during the P4C sessions, but I was not able to ensure that they 
were dialoguing in the Lipmanian sense of the term; and even though I was able to observe that the 
pupils were thinking, I was questioning whether their thoughts were spontaneous or reflective.  
 

My questioning was justified since the concepts of dialogue and critical thinking are the essence 
of Lipman’s approach. If dialogue and critical thinking are not actualized in classroom discussions, 
then the approach loses its specificity, its meaning, its purpose. During the 1980s and 90s, many 
educators and philosophers ignored and even rejected P4C; they claimed it was a “waste of time” both 
for pupils and teachers, or an “insult” to “real” philosophy. That is why, during that period, I 
undertook empirical studies on the impacts of P4C on the discursive and cognitive development of 
children, in Quebec and in other countries. 
 

The first section of this paper relates to discursive development in children; it centers on the 
concept of dialogue. I present five types of exchanges that emerged from the analysis of children’s 
discussions when they are engaging in philosophical praxis, illustrating each type of exchange with 
examples. 

 

M 



ANALYTIC TEACHING AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRAXIS VOLUME 41, ISSUE 1 (2021) 

  
 

63 
 

The second section of the paper focuses on the cognitive development of children, seeking to 
provide some answers to two research questions: Are pupils in kindergarten and primary school 
capable of mobilizing critical thinking when they philosophize? Further, are age and schooling 
sufficient for the development of critical thinking in adolescents? The results are presented in three 
parts: a) a theoretical description of a new concept, named Dialogical critical thinking, that emerged 
from analysis of discussion transcripts (its components and its scaffolding movement through 
philosophical praxis), b) empirical findings concerning philosophizing children, c) current empirical 
findings concerning non-philosophizing adolescents.  
 

The final section of the paper is a general discussion of the research results and the P4C 
approach. 

 
1. Philosophical Dialogue 

 
From the philosophers of antiquity, we know that philo-sophia is either an internal deliberation or 

an external dialectic. Its praxis can be either self-reflective or dialogical.  
 

Lipman and Sharp consider that, if left unshared, whatever one constructs in isolation remains 
latent. They wrote that dialogue within a community of peers is the reflective method that best represents 
the path of philosophical inquiry. Philosophical dialogue is an active and a critical method of 
communication. It differs from conversation in that it calls upon complex cognitive and social skills, and 
in that speaking and listening include reciprocity, tolerance, respect, and surpassing of oneself in a quest 
for meaning and valid justifications. Dialogue presupposes a horizontal relationship (versus hierarchical) 
between two or more people who are united in a community of inquiry (Lipman, Sharp, Oscanyan, 
1980). 
 
Philosophical Dialogue: A Typology of Exchanges 
 

Do pupils spontaneously engage in dialogue when they participate in a P4C session, or is dialogue a 
competency that requires apprenticeship? And if apprenticeship is required, how does it develop in the 
classroom? Thanks to a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) research grants, and 
to a team from Quebec (Professors Louise Lafortune and Richard Pallascio), I qualitatively studied 
transcripts of exchanges within groups of philosophizing pupils aged 9 to 12 years and, subsequently, 
within groups of pupils aged 4 and 5 years. To ensure the objectivity of our analyses, data was collected in 
different cultural, pedagogical and linguistic contexts (Quebec, Australia, Mexico and France).  
 

Results indicated that during P4C sessions, philosophical dialogue did not manifest itself as soon as 
pupils began exchanging with peers. Rather, it manifested itself after months, even years, of philosophical 
praxis. Whether pupils were 9 to 12 years old (Daniel et al., 2005) or 4 to 5 years old (Daniel & Delsol, 
2005), philosophical dialogue unfolded according to a similar typology of exchanges. In the following 
paragraphs, I discuss the five components of this learning process: anecdotal, monological, non-critical 
dialogical, quasi-critical dialogical, and critical dialogical exchanges. 
 



ANALYTIC TEACHING AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRAXIS VOLUME 41, ISSUE 1 (2021) 

  
 

64 
 

What we refer to as an anecdotal exchange was observed in most groups of pupils just beginning 
P4C praxis; in other words, when pupils “talk” without co-constructing their ideas or allowing themselves 
to be influenced by the interventions of their peers. They speak in an “I” / “my” voice and specifically 
address the teacher rather than their peers. They do not attempt to understand the concept that is the 
agenda for the day, nor do they try to identify a common goal; instead, they relate anecdotes and personal 
experiences linked to the question’s subject. 

Example from an exchange between 5 year-old children at the beginning of the school year: 
Teacher: What difference is there between a doll and a person? 
Pupil 1: The other day, my friend had a doll. It walked. It even had a little fork and it could eat. 
 Pupil 2: My doll talks.  
Pupil 3: I’ve seen a doll that could pee. 

Example from an exchange between pupils aged 9 to 10 years old at the beginning of the     
school year: 

Teacher: In the story, why doesn’t Ramon like math exams? 
 Pupil 1: I become nervous during exams.  
Pupil 2: Because sometimes, I, because I worry. 
Pupil 3: Because I am nervous.  

To help pupils move beyond an anecdotal exchange, teachers can ask them questions that try to 
evoke a generalization from their statements. For example: “Can what you’re saying about yourself be 
applied to all children? Can it be applied to everyone?” or “Can what you say about your dog be applied to all 
dogs? To all animals? To all living beings?”  

What we call a monological exchange was the type of exchange most often observed in P4C 
sessions. In this type of exchange, interventions are more generalized (“they” / “their” voice). Pupils 
reflect on the question they are asked; however, their thinking is oriented toward the search for a 
“correct” answer, one that satisfies them at the moment, or one that is likely to satisfy the teacher. 
When constructing their ideas, the pupils do not take their peers’ points of view into consideration; 
instead, they aim to add their own. 

Example from an exchange between 5 year-olds after several months of philosophical praxis: 
Teacher: Why do children get diseases?  
Pupil 1: Because sometimes they don’t get vaccinated. 
Pupil 2: Because sometimes they go outside without a scarf.  
Pupil 3: I know why you catch diseases in hospitals, it’s because people are sick, and they drop germs 
around. 

To help pupils move past a monological exchange and attain one that is dialogical, teachers can 
remind pupils that, in an exchange, one must first listen and try to understand the points of view of 
peers before expressing oneself: “Could you rephrase what X just said? How could you tie in your point of 
view with what was just said?” or “Who wants to help complete his or her idea? Who could add something to 
expand on X’s idea? Who can provide an example to clarify X’s point of view?” 
 

It was also observed that pupils exchanged dialogically after a few months of P4C praxis. An 
exchange is called dialogical when pupils begin to form a community of inquiry that is, when they 



ANALYTIC TEACHING AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRAXIS VOLUME 41, ISSUE 1 (2021) 

  
 

65 
 

actively listen to each other, question each other and build on their peers’ interventions to construct 
their own. Nevertheless, when analyzing transcripts, it became apparent that a dialogical exchange was 
not inherently philosophical or critical; it could be non-critical, quasi-critical or critical.  

Non-critical dialogue presupposes a process of reflection and co-construction of points of view, 
but in a manner that is predominantly convergent. In other words, non-critical dialogue builds on and 
enriches peers’ points of view—but without analyzing or evaluating them. This type of dialogue is 
greatly praised by today’s schools since it is non-conflictual and characterized by socially desirable 
values such as respect, open-mindedness and acceptance of differences.  

Example from an exchange between 5 year-old children: 
Teacher:( …) we will write actions that help your body heal. 
 Pupil 1: Wearing gloves (… helps your body heal).  
Pupil 2 to Pupil 1: Why gloves?  
Pupil 1 to Pupil 2: Gloves so you don’t catch a disease in the hospital.  
Pupil 2: And gloves are also useful to keep you from hurting your hands with splinters when you work.  

Example from an exchange between pupils aged 9 to 10 years: 
Teacher:  Why do you say geometry is an interesting subject?  
Pupil 1:  Because it is part of our daily lives.  
Pupil 2:  That’s true because at school, for example, we learn to measure figures and when we’re older 
and we will want to buy some land, we will know how much    land we have.  
Pupil 3:  I agree with Pupil 2. And also because with geometry, for example, architects can build schools, 
buildings and all, stores and all that we need in our lives like Pupil 1 said. 

Despite its dialogical nature, and notwithstanding the reflective thinking inherent in pupils’ 
points of view, a non-critical dialogical exchange does not contribute to an examination of peers’ 
points of view and is not enough to help young people initiate critical reflection about ideas, values, 
behaviours, traditions. Because of non-critical dialogue’s convergence, in some cases it may even 
reinforce negative biases, undesirable values, discrimination, and so forth. Therefore, teachers should 
encourage pupils to dialogue critically by asking questions such as: “Who can provide a counter-example? 
Who can bring some nuance to…? What are the advantages and disadvantages of x (action, tradition, value)? 
Among the reasons we have just mentioned, which one seems most appropriate, most useful to …? What would 
happen if everyone did this? Is this x (point of view, behaviour, rule, value, etc.) acceptable in every context? What 
could be the consequences of x (point of view, decision, behaviour, etc.) on you? On others? On society? These 
questions encourage pupils to transcend their initial thinking; they aim to create doubts and 
uncertainties in their minds; and when posed regularly, they are likely to motivate pupils to engage in 
a critical thinking process—one that should assist them in making enlightened choices. 
 

The critical dialogue learning process is complex; it takes time before it is established in a group. 
This is probably why we observed an intermediate dialogical exchange in classrooms, which we named 
quasi-critical dialogue. In a context of interdependence, some pupils are sufficiently critical to 
question peer statements, but others are not critical enough to hear their peers’ criticisms, or to be 
influenced by them.  

Example from an exchange between pupils aged 9 to 10 years: 
Teacher:  Can we speak of a perfect cube?  



ANALYTIC TEACHING AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRAXIS VOLUME 41, ISSUE 1 (2021) 

  
 

66 
 

Pupil 2:  I say maybe it’s possible to have a perfect cube, because if you take 4 squares and if you look at 
them, then with a blade, you take a little bit away…You keep on taking away little bits until they become 
equal…  
Pupil 3: At the end, you’re going to need instruments that are too small to do something.  
Pupil 4: You’d have to be lucky […].  
Pupil 3: No. I don’t think that if you measure the centimeters… After, you have to come to millimeters, 
then you come to hundredths of mm, then to thousandths of mm, you keep going like that. You’ll never be 
able to make a perfect cube if you measure […]  
Pupil 2: You could take geometry blocks.  
Pupil 5: Yes, but geometry blocks aren’t all equal. [… the makers] make them as equal as possible, the 
most perfect possible, but that doesn’t mean they’re perfect, perfect, perfect. They may seem perfect to us, 
but…  
Pupil 2: I say it might be possible to have a perfect cube. 

Questions such as: “How can X’s point of view be linked to yours? Would you like to modify or develop 
your point of view based on the points of view your peers have just shared?” encourage pupils to actively listen 
to peers, to self-correct, and help them understand that changing their point of view is an integral part 
of philosophical thinking (rather than demonstrating an error, as many pupils believe). It is also 
essential for a pupil to realize that a criticism is a “gift” given by one’s peers; it indicates that the 
pupil’s idea is sufficiently meaningful for others to set aside their own ideas and focus on that pupil’s 
idea in order to better understand the concept they are discussing. 
 

Finally, critical dialogue underlies a quest for inter-comprehension, which presupposes that 
pupils ensure they understand their peers’ ideas in order to co-construct common meanings and 
representations. When analyzing transcripts, the following characteristics of critical dialogue, which 
may be manifested to different degrees according to the pupils’ ages, came to light: explicit 
interdependence between pupil interventions, an inquiry process, research focused on construction of 
meanings (rather than on truth), calling into question the initial point of view (by way of criticism, 
questions, nuances), a search for alternatives, justifications of viewpoints, ethical concerns, and self-
correction. After a critical dialogical exchange, a transformation is observed in the group’s 
perspectives.  

Example from an exchange between 5 year-old children at the end of one year of philosophical 
praxis: 
Teacher: Here is the situation: Jojo doesn’t like the candy her aunt gave her, but she eats it anyway because 
she doesn’t want to disappoint her aunt. According to you, is this a good solution?  
Pupil 1: I think it’s a good idea (…) because she won’t be sad.  
Teacher: Does anyone agree or disagree with Pupil 1’s idea?  
Pupil 2: I don’t agree (…) I would take the candy and drop it in the garbage and say I finished the candy 
(…)because I don’t want to eat mints I don’t like (…) This way, she won’t know I didn’t eat them.  
Teacher: Do you agree with the ideas that were just expressed?  
Pupil 3: I don’t agree with Pupil 2 because if my aunt gave me some candy I don’t like and I threw it away, 
when she throws something away, (then) she will look in the garbage and see the candy and she would be 
angry with me.  



ANALYTIC TEACHING AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRAXIS VOLUME 41, ISSUE 1 (2021) 

  
 

67 
 

Pupil 2: If we put them way, way, way down in the bottom and put some stuff over them and then close the 
lid ? 
Pupil 4: Well, I would eat them even if I don’t like them. If I really, really, don’t like them, (then) I’ll give 
them back to my aunt without telling her I don’t like them.  
Pupil 5: I have another idea. All you have to do is tell your aunt, “could you change the candies?” 

Example from an exchange between pupils aged 10 to 12 years after a few years of P4C: 
Teacher:  Last week, we looked at the order of animals and the order of maths, which ones you thought were 
higher. Can one of you (…) take up the discussion where we left off?  
Pupil 2:  I would place humans in fourth or third place or maybe second because I don’t think we deserve to 
go at the top for what we’ve done to all those animals and how we’ve had wars. And like animals don’t care, 
I mean they have wars sometimes but it’s when they need to be in the higher group to be respected more.  (…) 
So I think that animals are a higher level than humans but they respect other people and we tend to be selfish.  
Pupil 4: I think that humans are the only ones that can do math, because it’s like English: Humans invented 
English. And math is just like another language that we invented. We use it to understand things, to do the 
things we have to do well, to understand the reasons behind things. Like why the sky is blue and why we can’t 
float or fly.  So we invented maths to explain these things. (…) But the animals they just think sky and they 
don’t really think about it, because they’ve got one main instinct which is eat and reproduce.  
Teacher: And how does that affect the order of things?  
Pupil 4: Oh, well if it’s the order of how smart they are, I think humans would have to be at the top.  
Teacher: Humans would have to be. Why? What criteria are you using?  
Pupil 4: On how complex they are. And that we’ve got other intelligences, like I said yesterday, empathy and 
sympathy and stuff like that.  
Pupil 5: I agree because if I had to rank any of the animals in a higher order or whatever, I think I’d put 
humans on the top as well because (…) we do things for our own pleasure and usually we do them of our own 
accord. We usually do whatever we want because we’ve got better resources for it and we’ve created more 
things. It’s just our brain power is larger. I don’t know if it is but I think that our brain power is larger.  
Pupil 6: I disagree with Pupil 5 when he said they don’t build things. They build nests, they build burrows, 
they have got to work out how to build them, that’s not really easy. And they only kill what they need.  
Pupil 5: […] I think I sort of changed my mind. I sort of agree with Pupil 6 (…). Then there are like two 
different paradigms.  
Pupil 6: Yes, there is the intelligence to think how to make things and the intelligence of how to use these 
things. We are both the most stupid and the most intelligent. 

If society strives for responsible education (in the Deweyan sense of the term), it follows that 
critical dialogue must be further stimulated in schools and during P4C sessions. Indeed, this type of 
exchange implies a quest for equality and community empowerment; it underlies and encourages 
values such as cooperation and mutual support. In sum, critical dialogical exchange, practiced on a 
regular basis and from the earliest age, is likely to lead to a habit of dialogical critical thinking in 
children, without which democracy is likely to erode. The praxis of critical dialogue can be considered 
a form of protection against minority oppression, racial discrimination, sexism and other types of 
exclusion; it represents a means to transcend individualism and foster social commitment.  
 

In sum, while the typology of exchanges that emerged from our analyses was in line with 
Lipman’s and Sharp’s ideas, it focuses on the philosophical dialogue learning process in preschool and 



ANALYTIC TEACHING AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRAXIS VOLUME 41, ISSUE 1 (2021) 

  
 

68 
 

elementary school pupils. Empirical research has shown that dialogue is not spontaneous; that P4C is 
not a magical approach that simply requires providing pupils with a space-time in which to express 
their points of view in order to engage in dialogue. We maintain that teachers not only have the 
responsibility to help pupils acquire knowledge in language, arts, mathematics, history, and so forth, 
but they also have a responsibility to help them learn to engage in dialogue in a critical manner. In 
that sense, teachers must be vigilant during the facilitation of P4C sessions. To allow children to speak 
spontaneously about personal anecdotes and to unconditionally accept their ideas does not necessarily 
lead them to engage in a philosophical dialogue with their peers. Teachers must ask children 
challenging questions to nurture their active involvement in the dialogical critical process. 
 

2. Critical Thinking and Dialogical Critical Thinking in Children 
 

Given that speech is the manifestation of thought, it is when exchanges among pupils are of a 
dialogical critical nature that critical thinking is mobilized. In the following paragraphs, I address the 
concepts of critical thinking before discussing dialogical critical thinking (DCT).  

 
2.1. Critical Thinking: A Recognized Tool 

 
Influenced by Dewey and Vygotsky, Lipman considers that critical thinking occurs within and 

because of peer interactions. According to Lipman, individuals need critical reflection to help them 
differentiate, among all the information they receive, that which is most relevant according to their 
goals. His definition of critical thinking is based on three fundamental characteristics: the use of 
specific criteria; sensitivity to context; and self-correction. According to Lipman, critical thinking 
presupposes reasoning skills and creative craft (Lipman, 1988). In his later writings, Lipman focused on 
the concept of higher-order-thinking or complex thinking, which includes caring and metacognitive 
thinking (Lipman, 2003). 
 

There is an urgent need to foster critical thinking in pupils. Over the past decades, educational 
systems of industrialized western societies have been increasingly influenced by neo-liberal tendencies. 
School is no longer the focus for stimulating ideas. School is slowly becoming an instrument subjected 
to economic values such as efficiency, performance and individualism (among others, Lenoir, 2016; 
Martin, 2016). When individualism becomes radical, the concerns of individuals focus on “I”, “me,”, 
“my” and they focus on individual rights (Taylor, 1992) rather than on “we” or “our”, which value 
social responsibility (Rorty, 1989, 1991).  
 

UNESCO (2015) maintains that education, as a tool for social transformation, must surpass its 
current utilitarian and productionist purpose, which is essentially oriented toward learning to know 
and learning to do, and must focus on the development of learning-to-be and learning-to-live-together. 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child, ratified in 1990 by a majority of member countries, 
recommends the stimulation and development of children’s thinking to allow them to become 
citizens in their own right, that is, rational actors, which is central to the notion of human dignity.  
 

With this in mind, it is important that schools teach young people to question knowledge 
provided by society and data gathered from social media; teach them to oppose negative values and 



ANALYTIC TEACHING AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRAXIS VOLUME 41, ISSUE 1 (2021) 

  
 

69 
 

ideas and to argue dialogically with a view toward a common good; teach them to actively participate 
in the transformation of the common culture. In other words, in addition to transmitting cultural 
heritage, schools must teach youngsters to think in a responsible and critical manner about the 
information they are being taught, about their life experiences, and about the society in which they 
live.  
 

In sum, critical thinking is a competency that could and should be encouraged in schools. Yet 
most empirical studies on critical thinking are conducted among young adults attending college and 
university. Data are usually collected using quantitative methodologies, through individual interviews 
or written tests aimed at evaluating thinking skills (Winstanley, 2008) related to the rules of formal 
logic (Kwak, 2007).  
 

Unlike the current tendency to favour a type of critical thinking centered on the development of 
formal logic (among others, Kpazaï, 2018; Lenoir, 2016), Dialogical Critical Thinking1 (DCT) values 
social constructivist orientations, where critical thinking is considered an evaluative praxis that aims to 
develop critical consciousness. According to Freire (1970), critical consciousness is stimulated through 
a quest for plural meanings rather than a quest for a single truth, and optimally, it occurs within a 
context of dialogical interactions among peers.  
 
2.2. Dialogical Critical Thinking: Description of an Emergent Concept—its Components and 
Movement 
 

In order to assess to what extent preschool and elementary school children are able to engage in 
a DCT process, I conducted empirical research, thanks to two subsidies from the Social Sciences and 
Humanities Research Council of Canada, together with experts from various countries (Professors 
Louise Lafortune, Richard Pallascio and Mathieu Gagnon in Quebec; Laurance Splitter and Christina 
Slade in Australia; Teresa De la Garza in Mexico; and Emmanuèle Auriac-Slusarczyk in France), within 
groups of philosophizing pupils aged 4 to 12 years who came from different cultures (Quebec, 
Ontario, Mexico, France, and Australia) and who expressed themselves in different languages (French, 
English, and Spanish).  
 

Analysis of the groups of pupils’ exchanges concerned the “form” of their discourse (e.g.: Is this 
statement a counter-example? Does it include a justification?) that is, the manner in which pupils’ 
meanings and representations were constructed and expressed. The analysis did not focus on the 
“content” or the matter of their discourse (for methodological details, see: Daniel, 2018; Daniel et al., 
2005; Daniel & Gagnon, 2012). 
 

Firstly, in analyzing transcripts of pupils’ exchanges, we observed that DCT involved more than 
just logical reasoning and creative thinking; it manifested itself through four thinking modes: logical, 
creative, responsible and metacognitive; each of these modes reflects a different facet of pupils’ 

                                                 
1 We named it “dialogical” critical thinking (DCT) because, within the context of P4C, critical thinking develops through 
pupils’ dialogical exchanges. 
 



ANALYTIC TEACHING AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRAXIS VOLUME 41, ISSUE 1 (2021) 

  
 

70 
 

thinking. Logical thinking reflects coherence of ideas and arguments. Creative thinking questions 
certainties and leads to cognitive disequilibrium, the first step toward critical thinking. Responsible 
thinking demonstrates a balance between the right to express oneself and the responsibility to do so 
with empathy; it reflects the fact that pupils root their argumentation in a negotiation process with a 
view toward a common good. Metacognitive thinking illustrates a reassessment of one’s own 
opinions, beliefs and biases (and those of the community of inquiry) in order to improve them. 
 

Subsequently, we noted that each of the four thinking modes could be mobilized by pupils in a 
simple or a complex manner. For example, giving one’s own opinion is simpler than producing a 
negotiated argument (logical); providing a specific example is simpler than co-constructing divergent 
relationships with peers (creative); talking about a personal behaviour is simpler than assessing social 
values (responsible); and narrating a particular task one has just accomplished is simpler than making 
an evaluative judgement that leads to self-correction (metacognitive).  
 

As the following description of epistemological perspectives will indicate, epistemological 
sophistication occurs through processes of decentering and abstraction. In other words, 
epistemological sophistication occurs progressively as pupils learn, through dialogical praxis, to 
transcend their own individual experiences and begin to generalize these experiences in order to think 
about situations that relate to their peers and to the world that surrounds them. The process of 
increasing sophistication in DCT was made operational via six epistemological perspectives2—from the 
simplest to the most complex—which refer to the groups’ representations of themselves and of the 
world they live in. Following is a summary of these six epistemological perspectives. 
 

Egocentricity is characterized by the expression of concrete units (vs. relationships) tied to 
personal and specific experiences (e.g.: me, my…). Post-egocentricity is expressed through specific and 
concrete units tied to close relatives (e.g.: my brother…). Pre-relativism is manifested through units 
situated in a familiar environment; it shows the beginnings of generalizations (e.g.: friends…); points of 
view are not justified. Relativism implies simple and convergent relationships (not mere units) with 
peer statements; these relationships are grounded in a somewhat generalized experience of known 
others and it also presupposes simple reasoning or an attempt at justification (e.g.: I agree with … 
because children…). Post-relativism is manifested through divergent relationships that are anchored in 
the generalized experience of distant others and relationships imply more accomplished reasoning and 
are justified by “good” reasons (e.g.: I don’t agree with… because people… nevertheless…). Intersubjectivity 
is manifested in conceptual and evaluative relationships related to a common good; in 
intersubjectivity, pupils participate in negotiated argumentation and in the transformation of 
perspectives; they categorize behaviours into values and engage in correction in pursuit of the 
community’s better understanding (e.g.: I am questioning our criteria… I wonder if… maybe… 
humans/societies… if/then… because on one hand/on the other hand… I changed my mind…). 
 

                                                 
2  In our work, the analysis of “groups’ epistemological perspectives” differs from that of “individuals’ epistemological 
postures” (as used in cognitive psychology). Epistemological perspectives rather refer to “relational epistemologies” (Thayer-
Bacon, 2003) since our analysis are situated within the P4C context, which is essentially a social approach. 



ANALYTIC TEACHING AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRAXIS VOLUME 41, ISSUE 1 (2021) 

  
 

71 
 

Finally, our analyses showed that epistemological sophistication in pupils’ DCT does not occur 
linearly or sequentially as maintained by traditional models of critical thinking. Instead, it progresses 
as a “scaffold”; it is marked by a recursive process (see Vygotsky’s zone of proximal development, 
1985). Recursiveness means that continuous interactions occur between epistemological perspectives. 
During these interactions, the thinking extends and draws back; it attempts a leap into the unknown 
and regains a foothold in what is known; it gradually integrates the representation of the generalized 
“we/they” without permanently leaving the comfort of the possessive “I” and the well-known “you”. 
Integration follows verbal interactions with peers and is linked to a transformation of comprehension. 
 

Taking into account DCT’s recursive process is of great importance in research and in pedagogy. 
It reflects (and allows recording of) not only the group’ predominant epistemological perspective (i.e.: 
the group’s actual competency), but also the group’ competencies that are about to be left behind and 
those that are about to emerge (if stimulated by the teacher).  
 

Dialogical Critical Thinking: Empirical Results Concerning Philosophizing Children 
 

The developmental model that emerged from the analysis of exchanges was subsequently used as 
a grid to analyze pupils’ exchanges (see Daniel, Gagnon, Auriac-Slusarczyk, 2017). 
  

Concerning the four thinking modes inherent in DCT, our main findings were as follows (for 
details, see Daniel & Gagnon, 2012): 
 

i) Pupils were able to engage to different degrees in all four modes of thinking, and their age 
did not affect the percentage in which these modes were mobilized.   

ii) Logical thinking was predominant in most groups, whether pupils were 5 or 12 years old.  
iii) The creative thinking mode was the second most-used by pupils. Analyses showed that 

creative thinking was often a complement to the logical thinking mode. When pupils were unable to 
justify their point of view by giving a “good reason”, they provided an example. 

iv) Responsible thinking was much less mobilized in P4C sessions. Responsible thinking 
required teacher stimulation. Pupils, whether they attended preschool or the end of elementary 
school, were not inclined to analyze the consequences of their words or actions on their own; they did 
not tend to evaluate the values and principles that guide our actions.  

v) Metacognitive thinking was scarcely mobilized in the groups. This mode of thinking also 
required teacher motivation. Pupils were not inclined to notice peer mistakes or to self-correct for self-
improvement purposes. 

 
 Regarding progress on epistemological levels (without differentiating among thinking modes), 

our main findings were as follows (for details, see Daniel & Gagnon, 2011): 
 

i) Even groups of preschool children were able to engage in the DCT process when they 
experimented with P4C. The epistemology of these 4 and 5 year-old children was not confined to 
egocentricity, but was able to reach pre-relativism, a more complex epistemology, in 62% of pupil 
interventions (see Table 1).  



ANALYTIC TEACHING AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRAXIS VOLUME 41, ISSUE 1 (2021) 

  
 

72 
 

ii) The epistemology of groups of pupils in preschool and elementary school progressed with 
age and schooling (although these factors did not influence mobilization of thinking modes). In 
groups of preschoolers, the predominant epistemology was situated in pre-relativism (62% of pupil 
interventions); in groups of first graders, the predominant epistemology was also situated in pre-
relativism, but by a stronger percentage (68% of interventions); in groups of fifth graders, the 
predominant epistemology was more complex as it was situated in relativism (41% of pupil 
interventions). Percentage results revealed by the scaffolding or recursive process also illustrated the 
influence of age and schooling on pupils’ epistemological progression: in preschoolers, 20% of pupil 
interventions were situated in post-egocentricity; in first graders, 20% of pupil interventions were 
situated in relativism; in fifth graders, 27% of pupil interventions were situated in post-relativism (see 
Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Predominant Perspectives within the Scaffolding Process  
 
                              GROUP/ 
EPISTEMOLOGY 
 

PRESCHOOL 1st GRADE 5th GRADE 
 

Egocentricity 13% 6% 0% 
Post-Egocentricity 20% 6% 7% 
Pre-Relativism 62% 68% 25% 
Relativism 5% 20% 41% 
Post-Relativism 0% 0% 27% 
Intersubjectivity 0% 0% 0% 
 

iii) Pupils who experimented with P4C for two years mobilized complex epistemologies 
(related to relativism, post-relativism, and intersubjectivity)3 in 68% of pupil interventions while those 
who had no experience with philosophical praxis manifested complex epistemologies in 18% of 
interventions. Without any P4C praxis, pupil epistemologies remained simple (related to 
egocentricity, post-egocentricity and pre-relativism) in 82% of interventions (see Table 2).  

 
Table 2. Grouping of Perspectives in Fifth Graders With and Without P4C 

Epistemological 
perspective 

Fifth grade (2 yrs. P4C) Fifth grade (without P4C) 

Simple 32% 82% 
Complex 68% 18% 

 

As shown in our findings, age and schooling were important factors in influencing pupils’ 
epistemological progression. Were these two factors sufficient to stimulate the development of DCT 
in adolescents, or was a dialogical approach like P4C necessary? To answer these questions, we 
                                                 
3 Epistemologies are considered complex when they underly complex thinking skills and are considered simple when they 
underly simple thinking skills. Based on Bloom’s taxonomy, there is a consensus in the literature on associating 
enunciation, identification, memorization, etc. with simple thinking skills, and analysis, reasoning, divergent relationships, 
argumentation, synthesis, evaluation, etc. with complex thinking skills (among others: Smith & Szymanski, 2013). 



ANALYTIC TEACHING AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRAXIS VOLUME 41, ISSUE 1 (2021) 

  
 

73 
 

analyzed manifestations of DCT in non-philosophizing adolescents. The following results have not 
been previously published. 
 
Current Empirical Findings: Epistemological Perspectives in Non-philosophizing Adolescents 
 

Through a quite recent subsidy from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of 
Canada, we initiated a research project in 25 classrooms situated in France, Morocco, and Quebec. 
Participants were aged 10 to 19 years and attended classes from the fifth grade in elementary school to 
the end of college4.  
 

Prior to data collection, these young people had received no explicit training associated with 
critical thinking or with P4C5. We used the model of the developmental process of DCT to analyze 
their exchanges relating to the topic “What does it mean to be free?”. The one-hour exchange was 
facilitated in the P4C manner. To illustrate the analysis results, we use the example of the groups of 
pupils in Quebec6: 
 

i) The epistemology of these young people did not progress significantly during nine years of 
schooling, despite increasing age and growth in knowledge acquisition (see Table 3). 

ii) The predominant perspective in 7 of the 9 groups was situated in pre-relativism. Relativism, 
which is more complex, was predominant in only two groups, appearing in 35% of pupil 
interventions in the first year of secondary school, and in 50% of interventions in the fifth year of 
secondary school (see Table 3). As a reminder, and as illustrated in Table 1, relativism was the 
predominant perspective of philosophizing fifth graders (manifested in 41% of interventions). 

 
Table 3. Predominant Epistemologies in Non-Philosophizing Children and Adolescents 

          Grade/ 
Epistemology   

Gr. 5 Gr. 6 Sec. 1 Sec. 2 Sec. 3 Sec. 4 Sec. 5 Coll. 1 Coll. 2 

 

Egocentricity 1% 6% 6% 6% 7% 2% 1% 5% 4% 

Post-
egocentricity 

28% 14% 25% 23% 11% 22% 4% 14% 15% 

Pre-relativism 53% 54% 34% 44% 42% 40% 35% 34% 45% 

Relativism 17% 25% 35% 27% 36% 33% 50% 33% 33% 

Post-relativism 1% 2% 1% 0% 3% 3% 10% 13% 5% 

                                                 
4 In Quebec, children from fifth and sixth grades in elementary school are 10 to 12 years of age; pupils from secondary 1 to 
5 are aged 13 to 17 years; and students from college 1 and 2 (pre-university) are aged 17 to 19 years.  
5 Although students from “college” in Quebec (and its equivalent “lycée” in France and Morocco) were attending 
traditional philosophy classes during data collection, we considered the groups to be non-philosophizing pupils, since these 
classes were delivered as lectures (rather than through dialogical praxis), and because their content as well as the teaching 
strategies used were not explicitly oriented toward the development of philosophical/critical reflection. 
6 Results from data collected in France showed a quite similar profile (Daniel & Fiema, 2017).  



ANALYTIC TEACHING AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRAXIS VOLUME 41, ISSUE 1 (2021) 

  
 

74 
 

Intersubjectivity 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 

iii) The clustering of all manifested epistemological perspectives (to take into account the 
recursive process of DCT) from every group of non-philosophizing pupils indicated that, in 8 of the 9 
groups, epistemologies were simple (see Table 4). Of note is that with two years of P4C, 68% of 
philosophizing elementary school pupils’ epistemologies were situated in the complex epistemological 
perspectives (see Table 2).  
 
Table 4. Grouping of Perspectives in Non-Philosophizing Children and Adolescents 

         Grade/ 
Epistemology 
 

Gr. 5 Gr. 6 Sec. 1 Sec 2 Sec. 3 Sec. 
4 

Sec. 5 Coll. 
1 

Coll. 
2 
 

Simple 
 

82% 74% 65% 73% 60% 64% 40% 53% 64% 

Complex 
 

18% 27% 36% 27% 39% 36% 60% 46% 38% 

 
Concerning these last results, it might be useful to add that, in the DCT model, simple 

epistemological perspectives are not a-critical. They are part of the thinking process itself, in adults 
and children alike. According to Dewey (1960), it is not possible for a person to have precise 
representation of a new concept right from the start. Individuals clarify and refine their representation 
when their thinking goes back-and-forth between their specific experience and the new concept they 
are attempting to grasp, or when, from time to time, they go back to the safety of acquired beliefs, 
rather than remaining in the discomfort of critical thinking. 
  

Yet this Deweyan consideration does not mean that simple epistemological perspectives should 
be accepted as the outcome of the thinking process of adolescents during their pre-university 
schooling. A philosophical education, using an approach such as P4C, is strongly recommended since 
it proved to enable pupils aged 10 to 11 years to reach complex epistemological perspectives. 

 
Discussion 
 

According to Lipman, Sharp and Oscanyan (1980), a dialogue is considered philosophical when 
the pupils, rather than merely relating personal anecdotes, inquire with their peers about the 
meanings of concepts, listen carefully to each other, give their opinions and justify them with good 
reasons, identify similarities and distinctions, give counter-examples, discover relationships between 
means and ends, share constructive criticisms, self-correct, and so on. Thus, the objective of the 
dialogue within a community of philosophical inquiry is not situated in intra-subjectivity, but rather 
in inter-subjectivity. It aims to stimulate pupils to reflect critically with their peers on concepts, 
principles, and situations related to their experiences and their world. 
 



ANALYTIC TEACHING AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRAXIS VOLUME 41, ISSUE 1 (2021) 

  
 

75 
 

The values implicitly contained within P4C dialogue are, among others, respect for oneself and 
others, genuine communication, human rights, critical reflection, personal and social responsibility, 
and engagement within one’s community. These values converge toward those advocated in the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (American Bar Association Center on Children and the Law, 
1990).  
 

Articles 3 to 5 and 12 to 15 of the Convention state that pupils should not be taught what they 
should do in a given situation, but rather they should learn to deliberate together, within a democratic 
and respectful context, in order to determine adequate behaviors to adopt and to assume their 
respective consequences.  
 

Furthermore, Articles 12 to 15 and Article 17 of the Convention explicitly advocate children’s 
right to autonomous, critical and responsible exchanges with their peers. In these articles, the 
Convention recognizes that children have information to convey, experiences to share and ideas to 
communicate. In other words, it recognizes that children are not mere citizens-to-be, but full citizens; 
they are rational agents and they have rights. The Convention on the Rights of the Child asserts that 
society and its institutions must provide autonomy and freedom to children in order to assist them in 
fulfilling their social role as children, pupils and citizens, and in order to be capable of facing the 
challenges of daily life.  
 

In agreement with the Convention on the Rights of the Child and with the P4C approach, our 
research results show that even young children have the capacity to express themselves in a respectful 
and critical way, and that this capacity develops through the praxis of dialogue within a community of 
inquiry. This is why I argue for the need to provide preschool children with the opportunity to 
dialogue critically with their peers on situations and concepts related to their world—rather than 
waiting for children to acquire a higher level of maturity before beginning this praxis. Children four 
and five years old take lessons in music, dance, language arts and more, and the appropriateness of 
such apprenticeships is never questioned. Why then should children not exercise their ability to 
dialogue critically within a community of inquiry as early as preschool?  
 

The second section in this paper shows the need to introduce P4C in the classroom in order to 
stimulate the development of DCT in young pupils. According to Lipman, (1988, 1991) it is essential 
to stimulate critical thinking in pupils, as it protects individuals from being brainwashed into 
believing what others want them to believe without having the opportunity to inquire for themselves. 
 

Although Lipman considers that there is continuity between critical and creative thinking, as 
they permeate each other in the formation of judgments, in his earliest works he points out the 
discontinuity between these two forms of cognitive processing. Critical thinking, he writes, involves 
reasoning and critical judgment and it seeks truth, while creative thinking involves artistry, craft, and 
creative judgment and seeks meaning (Lipman, 1988, 1991). In his later works, Lipman emphasizes 
the concept of higher-order thinking, which presupposes complex thinking—that is, more complex 
than critical thinking alone, as it involves both critical and creative thinking. And Lipman adds caring 
thinking (which means valuing, appreciating, and focusing on what is respectful, valuable and 
meaningful), as well as metacognitive thinking (which means being aware of one’s assumptions, 



ANALYTIC TEACHING AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRAXIS VOLUME 41, ISSUE 1 (2021) 

  
 

76 
 

methodology, procedures and perspectives, as well as being conscious of the implications—the reasons 
and evidence that support the conclusions) (Lipman, 2003). 
 

The DCT model that emerged from analysis of pupils’ exchanges consists of four thinking 
modes (logical, creative, responsible and metacognitive) and it reveals an increasing sophistication in 
the manner in which the pupils’ representations and meanings are co-constructed during exchanges 
within a community of inquiry. In this sense, the DCT model is more than a concept, it is a 
developmental process that clearly illustrates the pupils’ progression within the philosophical praxis. 
This progression in thinking can be observed through six epistemological perspectives that operate 
according to a scaffolding movement (vs. a linear progression, as in Piaget’s and Kohlberg’s models). 
This means that, during philosophical dialogue, pupils’ thinking moves back and forth between 
simple and complex epistemological perspectives. An explanation of this recursive process can be 
found in the works of Pragmatist philosophers such as Bayles (1966), Dewey (1960) and Rorty (1989, 
1991) who maintain that our actions and judgments are determined by our interactions with others, 
and, reciprocally, as persons, we are the starting point of judgments, initiatives, and representations 
which will influence others and society. 
 

Regular praxis with the attitudes and cognitive skills related to DCT becomes a tool to defeat the 
indifference of individuals regarding situations and principles, and to favour involvement in one’s 
society. Social involvement implies that individuals show an interest in what others think, say or do; 
that they dare to dialogue critically, that is, to question, oppose, argue and negotiate in order to 
improve the common good. Thus, mobilizing DCT becomes an individual social responsibility, and 
social responsibility represents a part of the requirement for human dignity as promoted by UNESCO 
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
 

It is essential that kindergartens and primary schools value and promote critical dialogue and 
DCT in children. As shown by our current findings, if adolescents have not already integrated the 
habit of critical dialogue or thinking critically at a young age, when they are confronted with the need 
to analyze a situation, fact or principle, they have a tendency to take refuge in passivity or, in other 
words, to choose recognition, description or explanation, rather than evaluation. Indeed, DCT not 
only calls on complex thinking skills, but also on intellectual attitudes such as courage, humility, open-
mildness. If these attitudes are not exercised early on, chances are that, when eventually needed, their 
mobilization might be blocked by other elements of an emotional dimension such as risk aversion, 
fear of the unknown or of confrontation, aversion to effort, and a desire to self-protect and hold onto 
one’s beliefs.  
 

Conclusion 
 

In conclusion, walking in Lipman’s footsteps led us to conduct empirical research that revealed 
a typology of exchanges inherent in the apprenticeship of philosophical-critical dialogue. Also, walking 
in Lipman’s footsteps led us to expanded on the concept of critical thinking to make the components 
and the recursive movement of the DCT process operational.  
 



ANALYTIC TEACHING AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRAXIS VOLUME 41, ISSUE 1 (2021) 

  
 

77 
 

The research results demonstrate that critical dialogue and DCT are not innate, nor do they 
develop spontaneously with age and schooling. They rather are fundamental competencies that should 
be stimulated in children as early as kindergarten.  
 

A comparison between the manifestations of DCT in pupils who benefited from P4C praxis and 
those who had not benefited from such praxis showed that P4C is a meaningful tool for mobilizing 
and developing critical competencies in pupils.  

 
 

References 
 
American Bar Association Center on Children and the Law. (1990). UN Convention on the Rights of 

the Child. USA. 
Bayles, E. (1966). Pragmatism in Education. New-York: Harper & Row Publishers. 
Bourgeault, G. (2012). Éthique professionnelle et réflexivité: quelle connivence? In M. Tardif, C. 

Borgès & A. Malo (eds.) Le virage réflexif en éducation. Où en sommes-nous 30 ans après Schön (pp. 
107-120). Brussels: De Boeck. 

Cuypers, S. & Ishtiyaque, H. (2006). Education for critical thinking: Can it be non indoctrinative? 
Educational Philosophy and Theory, 38 (6), 723-743. 

Daniel, (1992, reedition 1997, 1998). La philosophie et les enfants.  Les modèles de Lipman et de Dewey. 
Brussels: Éditions De Boeck Université. 

Daniel, (2002, reedition 2012). Les contes d’Audrey–Anne. Quebec City: Le Loup de Gouttière. + 
Teachers’ Manual: (2003, reedition 2006, 2009). Dialoguer sur le corps et la violence : un pas vers la 
prévention. Quebec City: Le Loup de Gouttière.  

Daniel, (2013). Relativism: A Threshold for Pupils to Cross in order to become Dialogical Critical 
Thinkers. Childhood & Philosophy, 9 (17) 
http://www.periodicos.proped.pro.br/index.php/childhood/issue/view/64 

Daniel, (2018). Grounded Theory. A Research Method for Advancing the Comprehension of P4C’s 
Processes. Childhood & Philosophy, 14 (29), 307-328.  

         http://www.e-publicacoes.uerj.br/index.php/childhood/article/view/30423/22954 
Daniel, & Auriac, E. (2011). Philosophy, Critical thinking and Philosophy for Children. Educational 

Philosophy and Theory, 43 (5), 415-435. 
Daniel, & Delsol, A. (2005). Learning to Dialogue in Kindergarten. A case study. Analytic Teaching, 25 

(3), 23-52. http://www.viterbo.edu/analytic/table1.htm 
Daniel, & Fiema, G. (2017). Dialogical critical thinking in Children. Knowledge Cultures, 5 (4), 42-

65. 
Daniel, & Gagnon, M. (2011). A developmental model of dialogical critical thinking in groups of 

pupils aged 4 to 12 years. Creative Education, 2 (5), 418-428.  
Daniel, & Gagnon, M. (2012). Pupils’ age and philosophical praxis: Two factors that influence the 

development of critical thinking in children. Childhood & Philosophy, 8 (15), 105-130. 
Daniel, & Gagnon, M. (2016). Dialogical critical thinking with 5 to 12 year old Pupils: A 

Continuous Epistemological Development. In G. Gibson (ed.) Critical thinking: Theories, 
Methods and Challenges (pp. 45-76). New York: Nova Science Publishers Inc. 

http://www.periodicos.proped.pro.br/index.php/childhood/issue/view/64
http://www.e-publicacoes.uerj.br/index.php/childhood/article/view/30423/22954
http://www.viterbo.edu/analytic/table1.htm


ANALYTIC TEACHING AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRAXIS VOLUME 41, ISSUE 1 (2021) 

  
 

78 
 

Daniel, Lafortune, L., Pallascio, R. & Sykes, P. (1996, reedition 1999). Les aventures mathématiques de 
Mathilde et David. Quebec City: Le Loup de Gouttière. + Teachers’ Manual: (1996, reedition 
1999, 2004). Philosopher sur les mathématiques et les sciences. Quebec City: Le Loup de Gouttière.  

Daniel, Lafortune, L., Pallascio, R., Splitter, L., Slade, C., de la Garza, T. (2005). Modeling the 
development process of dialogical critical thinking in pupils aged 10 to 12 years. 
Communication Education, 54 (4), 334-354.   

Dewey, J. (1960). How we think. A restatement of the relation of reflective thinking to the educative process. 
Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company. 

Ennis, R. (1996). Critical thinking. Upper Saddle River, N. J.: Prentice Hall.  
Fabre, M. & Gohier, C. (eds.) (2015). Les valeurs éducatives au risque du néo-libéralisme, Rouen (France): 

Presses universitaires de Rouen et du Havre. 
Facione, P. (2011). Critical thinking: What it is and why it counts. Insight assessment, 1, 1-28.  
Freire. P. (1974). Pédagogie des opprimés. Paris: Maspéro. 
Honneth, A. (2004). La théorie de la reconnaissance : une esquisse, Revue du MAUSS (23), 133-136. 
Kpazaï, Georges (ed.) (2018). La pensée critique expliquée par des didacticiennes et des didacticiens de 

l’enseignement supérieur. Montreal: JFD éditions. 
Kwak, Duck-Joo. (2007). Re-conceptualizing critical thinking for moral education in culturally 

plural societies. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 39, 460-470. 
Lenoir, Y. (2016). Quelles seraient les finalités éducatives scolaires dans le monde actuel?, Opening 

conference of the Forum Synergie 2016, Hotel Admiral Radisson, Toronto, November 30, 2016.  
Lipman, M. (1988). Critical thinking – What can it be? Educational Leadership, 46 (1), 38-43. 
Lipman M.  (1991), Thinking in education. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Lipman, M. (2003). Thinking in Education. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Lipman, M., Sharp, A.-M., Oscanyan, F. (1980) Philosophy in the classroom. Philadelphia: Temple 

University Press. 
Martin, E. (2016). L’université globalisée. Transformations institutionnelles et internationalisation de 

l’enseignement supérieur. Montréal: IRIS.  
Mejia, A. & Molina, A. (2007). Are we promoting critical autonomous thinking? A discussion on 

conversational genres and whether they can help us answer this question. Cambridge Journal of 
Education, 37 (3), 409-426.  

Peters, M., Smith, M., Smith, G. (2002). Use of critical interactive thinking exercises in teaching 
reproductive physiology to undergraduate students. Journal of Animal Science, 80 (3), 862-865. 

Phan, H. (2016). The use of critical reflection to facilitate optimal best: A theoretical positioning for 
consideration. In G. Gibson (ed.). Critical thinking: Theories, Methods and Challenges (pp. 99-
119). New York: Nova Science. 

Rorty, R. (1989). Contingency, Irony and Solidarity. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Rorty, R. (1991). Objectivity, Relativism and Truth: Philosophical Papers. NY: Cambridge University 
           Press. 
Sen, A. (2012). L’idée de justice. Paris: Flammarion. 
Smith, V. & Szymanski, A. (2013). Critical thinking: More than test scores. NCPEA International  
           Journal of Educational Leadership Preparation, 8 (2), 16-26. 
Taylor, C. (1992). Grandeur et misère de la modernité. Montreal: Bellarmin. 
Thayer-Bacon, B. (2003). Relational “(e)pistemologies”. New York: Peter Lang. 



ANALYTIC TEACHING AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRAXIS VOLUME 41, ISSUE 1 (2021) 

  
 

79 
 

Torff, B. (2006). Expert Teachers’ Beliefs about Use of Critical-Thinking Activities with High-and 
           Low-Advantage Learners. Teacher Education Quaterly, 33 (2), 37-52. 
UNESCO. (2015). Repenser l’éducation. Vers un bien commun mondial? Paris: UNESCO.  
Velmovska, K. & Bartosovic, L. (2016). Developing critical thinking skills in physics classes. In Gibson  
            (ed.), Critical thinking. Theories, Methods and Challenges, (pp. 1-45). New York: Nova Science  
           Publishers Inc. 
Winstanley, C. (2008). Philosophy and the development of critical thinking. In M. Hand and C. 
Winstanley (eds.), Philosophy in schools (pp.105-118). New York: Continuum International. 
Vygotsky, L. (1985). Pensée et langage. Paris: Éditions sociales. 

 
Address Correspondences to:  
Marie-France Daniel 
Associate Professor 
École de kinésiologie, Faculté de médecine, Université de Montréal (Quebec, Canada). 
Email: marie-france.daniel@umontreal.ca 
 


