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Book Review 

 

Gareth Matthews, The Child’s Philosopher  
 
Edited by Maughn Rollins Gregory and Megan Jane Laverty   
Routledge, Copyright Year 2022 
300 pages 
Hardcover $128.99, softcover $49.94, ebook $39.16 
ISBN 9781138342736 

 
 

Review by Wendy C. Turgeon   
 
 

 
 his new book from the Routledge series, Philosophy for Children Founders, is a masterful 
and completely engaging account of the impact Gareth Matthews had on the movement(s) 
loosely labeled “Philosophy for/with Children.” I was familiar with Matthew’s three main 

books, Philosophy and the Young Child (1982), Dialogues (1984), and Philosophy of Childhood (1996) but I 
discovered in this volume a wealth of new reflections about Matthews’s work, his own carefully crafted 
arguments and connections to Greek philosophy, and thirdly, how his legacy lives on in the 
scholarship and practice of his “philosophical descendants.” 
 

The first thing to note is the lengthy section of quotes from early readers who advocate for this 
text; renowned philosophers, educators, administrators, P4C practitioners, and authors from around 
the world comment on the value of this collection of carefully crafted essays. While most books come 
with a couple of endorsements from scholars in the field, this one conveys a level of genuine 
enthusiasm and engagement from widely diverse academic areas. They invite the reader to take it 
seriously and demonstrate how wide is his audience. 

 
The two editors have organized the text into five sections:  Matthews on philosophy and 

children’s literature, on children’s philosophical thinking, his approach to being a Socratic teacher of 
a particular sort, his astute criticism of developmental psychology, and finally, his introduction to the 
new field of philosophy of childhood. Each section opens with an essay that explores how Matthews 
approaches the topic at hand.  The authors of these essays often knew him personally and the warmth 
of their relationship comes through their account, but they always take a careful look at his 
extraordinary strengths and sometimes misses in each account. Each contributor is an acknowledged 
scholar and recognized practitioner in doing philosophy with children. These authors hail from 
around the world, signaling the impact of this one pioneer in child philosophy. Following the 
introductory essay in each section are two or three essays by Matthews himself, chosen from his many 
books and articles, including an interview as the final excerpt. 

T 



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What is particularly striking about this volume is the interconnectedness of the essays. The 
invited authors reference one another’s work here as well as the included writings by Matthews.  This 
creates a seamlessly integrated text that draws the reader into a living conversation among all 
contributors. Unfortunately, as Matthews passed away in 2011, he cannot join in the conversation 
except through his published work.  I can imagine him patiently wanting to engage and respond to 
each author.  
 

Before entering the five thematic sections on Matthews, the reader will encounter two important 
“doors” to pass through. Editors Gregory and Laverty have collaborated on an introduction which 
shares the life and scholarship of Matthews, and details his impact  through three channels:  how 
children’s literature captures “philosophical whimsy” (Matthew’s own word), his unique approach to 
philosophy for children as contrasted with the Lipmanian approach, and thirdly, his development of 
the field of philosophy of childhood, especially in opposition to the denigrating effects of 
developmental psychology which privileges the adult (often male) experience as normative. This 
opening essay will serve to orient the readers who may not be familiar with Matthew’s work but also 
will assist those who are so familiar to stand back and appreciate the shape of Matthew’s thinking 
about philosophy and about children. A quick perusal of their sources at the end of their piece will 
serve to guide novice readers into the significant work published in philosophy with children. 

 
The second introductory essay, “Time and place for Philosophy,” is by the noted philosopher, 

Stanley Cavell. Cavell opens with an account of his long-term relationship with Matthews and their 
shared interest in human reflection and how one stage of life connects to another in terms of thinking 
both in process and content. In this essay, he ranges across open topics such as teaching, the child as 
proto-philosopher/scientist, and Wittgenstein’s contributions to these questions. What Cavell’s essay 
contributes to this volume is the important commentary that we must be cautious about assuming we 
understand children, adolescence, even adulthood simply because we have (most likely) lived all three 
“stages of” or passages through these regions of human experience. He also demonstrates the 
seriousness with which we must take the work of Matthews and not corral it into a ghetto of 
“philosophy with children” as if that had no relevance for the larger philosophical community. 
Matthews himself, as a respected scholar of ancient and medieval philosophy, worked hard within 
professional philosophical circles to signal the importance of childhood and philosophy by children 
for all of us. Cavell hits that message home.  
 

The following five sections explore the themes mentioned above. Part One begins with an essay 
by Karin Murris whose own work in children’s literature is well known. While she offers a masterful 
account of Matthew’s use of children’s literature to explore problematic issues and enjoy philosophical 
whimsy, she offers a thoughtful critique of both why Matthews contributions are so very important 
but also where they might fall short. She brings in her own research on the ways in which childhood 
has been colonialized and objectified so as to deny the child agency or assume what that agency can or 
should be. While remaining a staunch advocate for using children’s stories, she reminds us to be 
watchful for the ways we adults can shape the reading to suit our fixed conceptual understandings of 
what childhood is. Matthews, using primarily Western/American stories, may have missed 
opportunities to problematize the reading of the stories and the importance of the images that usually 
accompany them. Despite her caveat, she offers a clear portrait of Matthews’ groundbreaking work 



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promoting children’s literature as genuinely philosophical and entertaining seriously the ideas of 
children as thinkers. Following her introductory essay are three reprints by Matthews which explore, 
in turn, the naturalness of the philosophical impulse for (many) children as captured in the stories 
they enjoy, a range of examples of traditional philosophical questions (thinking about causality, 
religion, meaning of life, ethics) as captured in popular children’s stories, and finally, three of his 
columns on stories and how they exhibit opportunities to explore such questions. 
 

Part Two focuses on Matthews’ view of the child as philosopher. This indeed is the opening 
essay by Stephanie Burdick Shepherd and Cristina Cammarano. The opening dilemma is the debate 
over whether philosophy for children must be grounded in a philosophical tradition with clearly 
trained philosophers leading the path or whether anyone can do philosophy with children using 
regular language through engagement with narratives. They depict Matthews as countermanding this 
conflict through his own work and writings. They present three key points:  an awareness of the 
philosophical tradition allows one to recognize the child as philosopher; the tradition can offer those 
wonderful puzzles captured by adult philosophers for children to ponder; and thirdly, seeing the child 
as a philosopher returns philosophy to the idea of a mode of living, not simply an academic subject 
available to few (p. 87). In their essay, they walk the reader through Matthews’ reasons for why he 
claims that children are natural philosophers, and they follow that up with a careful look at some 
critiques of his approach, generally weighing the arguments in favor of Matthews. Matthews does not 
deny that there are some differences between what adult and child philosophers are doing but we are 
presented with reasons not to see these as adversarial or even as moving towards some normative 
standard so much as being complementary. One of the ideas the authors introduce and focus upon is 
the power of philosophy to “allow for the cultivation of an emerging grandparent self as well as an 
eternal child-self” (p. 99). In some ways I am reminded of Murris’ warning not to segregate human 
experience into categories but to be more fluid and open. Burdick Shepherd and Cammarano end 
their review with an honest consideration of the challenge that doing philosophy with children could 
be detrimental to them. But here too Matthews has considered this and reminds us that children, like 
adults, have different experiences and following their lead, rather than some age-developmental chart, 
is the honest way to acknowledge their genuine curiosity and thoughtfulness.  
 

The paired essays by Matthews explore Matthews’ experience with a discussion with seventh 
graders on holiness sparked by a reading of Leviticus and the Euthyphro and a delightful foray into 
ancient philosophy (excerpts from Lucretius, Plato, and Zeno) and how young people offered cogent 
and startling creative resolutions to these classic quandaries. I was particularly struck by the young girl, 
Anna, who responded to the ring of Gyges story: “…but then, with a magic ring like that some of us 
would also do some good things we might not otherwise do” (p. 117). I have never had an 
undergraduate offer that more positive point of view about humankind!  
 

In the third part of the text, the theme is the nature of the Socratic teacher, a term often used 
but with many different interpretations. Peter Shea, former student and lifetime friend of Matthews, 
offers a personal portrait of Matthews as teacher. Matthews himself distinguished between Socratic 
instruction (asking questions in shared ignorance) and Socratic elenchus (the drawing out of answers 
by a skilled and knowledgeable mentor (p. 128). Shea offers an insightful contrast between the 
approaches of Matthews and that of Lipman. While Lipman’s curriculum is designed to have children 



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offer the questions and set the discussion agenda, Matthews was more directive with a determined 
path for exploration set by him. Shea points out that the two scholars may have had different 
audiences in mind in terms of making the argument for the value of philosophy. For Lipman, it was 
the educators who would welcome critical thinking as a worthwhile goal while for Matthews his 
audience was philosophers who would be skeptical of the nature of the discussion as genuinely 
philosophical.  Building upon Matthews’ dedication to ancient philosophy and his careful reading of 
Plato, Shea goes on to explore how Matthews adopts and adapts the Socratic “midwife” analogy to his 
own work with children.  The next urgent point Shea makes is the impending death or at least 
marginalization of philosophy in academia and how Matthews approach reminds us that philosophy 
has the “power to nourish the soul” (p. 136). The recent movements of philosophy into public life 
underscore the ways in which philosophy needs to come out of the ivory tower and serve both the 
greater good but also the very personal needs of people hungry for and searching for meaning. Here 
he mentions the fine work of the two editors of this entire text (Gregory and Laverty) to this end. The 
Socratic message that philosophy is learning how to live towards death gains new urgency in our 
pandemic-encompassing and divisive world. Shea references the opening essay by Cavell throughout 
his own contribution and offers us ways to see the ongoing complexity of how philosophy presents 
itself throughout one’s life. Shea’s essay is particularly rich in offering some comments which help the 
reader both navigate the admittedly dense Cavell opening piece and also appreciate the differences 
between Lipman and Matthews.  At times, I see him as a bit unjust to the work of Lipman but I 
respected his analysis of their differences. For example, Lipman does address the value of closure in a 
discussion.  
 

Again, the two following essays by Matthews himself illustrate the points offered in Shea’s 
commentary.  The essay entitled “Socratic children” was particularly insightful as a way to read Plato’s 
understanding of and use of Socrates throughout his dialogues, early into late period. As Plato had 
Socrates reject doing philosophy with young people in the Republic, it is intriguing to read Matthews’ 
interpretation of the return of the ‘child’ in the later dialogue, the Theaetetus. This argument is 
further expanded in the second Matthews article, “Whatever became of the Socratic elenchus?” Both 
of these readings are rich in analysis of the evolution of Plato’s own philosophical thinking as well as 
building a case for doing philosophy with young people.  

 
The following section, Part IV, tackles Matthews’ views on developmental psychology. Here our 

introductory essay is by noted scholar and practitioner, Jen Glaser. Piaget’s developmental schemes for 
cognition have an iron hold on educators to this day.  Even as psychologists have backed off full 
endorsement, educators treat developmental stages as Truth and use them to design everything from 
testing to “age-appropriate” book labeling. I have always appreciated Matthews careful analysis and 
critique of Piaget as found in two chapters in his text Philosophy of Childhood, and Glaser’s essay here 
brings out clearly how effective and comprehensive Matthews’ challenges are. She separates them into 
two groups:  critiques on Piaget’s methods and on his theory. Psychologists themselves have mounted 
some serious challenges to Piaget’s methods but here Matthews’ focus is presented as highlighting the 
ways in which Piaget ignores or redefines data that challenges his cognitive model. When it comes to 
the actual theory, the critique zeros in on the relationship between language and thought, that is—
which comes first. While Piaget assumes “that children’s words are necessarily inadequate to convey 



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their world of thoughts”, Matthews argues “that young children only acquire concepts as they become 
inducted into a language community” (p. 171).  

 
Glaser then introduces Kohlberg who developed a popular theory of moral development, 

inspired by Piaget’s schemas for cognitive growth. It is worth noting that Piaget himself rejected any 
developmental model for moral development in the one book he wrote on this topic but Kohlberg’s 
model has also taken hold of the educational community and continues to be taught as if it were fact. 
Matthews offers another devastating analysis of those alleged stages of moral development and if 
accepted, the conclusion would seem to be that no one acts morally before adulthood, if even then! 
The genuine danger of either developmental theory (for cognition or moral thinking) is that it 
privileges the higher stages as norms and any stage prior to those high ones are defined by their 
inadequacies. Aligning children with “primitive cultures,” as Piaget and Kohlberg do, reveals the 
blatant Western bias that alas, too often still operates in terms of our understandings of and 
appreciation for different ways of living. Glaser goes on to detail Matthews’ alternative approach to 
ethical growth through dimensions, not stages, and she skillfully applies these to cognitive growth as 
well.  I found that section of her essay to be particularly creative and thoughtful.  

 
In this section, Glaser’s article is followed by an extensive critique of Piaget’s cognitive theory 

and Kohlberg’s moral development theory by Matthews himself. He introduces his model for moral 
growth as across the four dimensions of choosing paradigms, offering defining characteristics, 
exploring the range of cases that fall under a particular moral concept, and the judgement among 
varying competing moral claims (pp. 193-194). In his later writings, he will add the dimension of 
moral imagination. The main problem with Kohlberg’s schemas, as Matthews details it, is the 
unavoidable conclusion that any moral reason given before the higher stages is really premoral.  I 
would claim that in these early stages “right” means simply doing what I want, avoiding punishment, 
or garnering praise and acceptance.  None of these really capture the idea of doing what is right 
because it is right. Kohlberg’s emphasis on universalizability and impartiality leans in a clearly Kantian 
direction and were justifiably critiqued earlier by Carol Gilligan who claimed that another approach 
to ethical decisions would focus on care and familiarity with the individuals involved. At the very 
least, we do not consider our obligations to others as completely equal in that I owe more care and 
concern to my family and friends before total strangers—not that such allows me to discount those 
strangers. The second essay by Matthews, “Children, irony, and philosophy” considers the claim by 
Ellen Winner (notably associated with Howard Gardner and his work on creativity in young children) 
that young children cannot understand the cognitive complexity of irony. But Matthew’s rejoinder is 
that many children’s stories clearly ask of their readers to appreciate irony in terms of what is said can 
be understood contrarily. Perhaps children do not get sarcasm where the speaker intends the listener 
to hear her words as implying the opposite, but they certainly can appreciate the many examples where 
the speaker in the story says one thing but we know the opposite to be true. One of my favorite 
examples of this kind of irony is found in the picture book, Boodil my dog (Pija Lindenbaum, 1992), 
where the narrator praises her bull terrier for his courage, caution, and other virtues, all of which is 
completely belied by the images of said Boodil demonstrating the exact opposite of each attributed 
virtue. Children get the irony on every page. Matthews uses his favorite series of stories by Arnold 
Lobel, the Frog and Toad collection, to demonstrate how often irony comes into play and how his 



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collaborative young philosophers get the humor. He also offers several other examples of children’s 
stories that use irony to drive their message.  

 
The final section of the text invites the reader to explore how Matthews created and shaped the 

field of “philosophy of childhood.” The title of the opening essay, by Walter Omar Kohan and Claire 
Cassidy, “Philosophy of childhood or children?” hints at their line of questioning. They trace how 
Matthews himself began to think about philosophy of childhood as a distinct field in philosophy and 
they review his initial set of “desiderata” or goals for such an area and then offer how he reshaped his 
criteria along his normative claims (see pp. 216-217).  Along with some of the other contributors to 
this volume, Kohan and Cassidy point out the influential role that his work in ancient philosophy 
and the analytic bend that Matthew uses in his own philosophical analysis of concepts play in how he 
approaches the crafting of this new perspective within philosophy. They take the reader through each 
“desiderata” or criteria for a philosophy of childhood as outlined by Matthews, both unpacking his 
own thinking but also offering their own commentary that, to some extent, his views are culturally 
limited to Anglo-American methods of doing philosophy—perhaps a quite important point. They end 
with an acknowledgement of the burgeoning interdisciplinary studies of childhood as well as the 
continental European traditions that have begun to consider “childhood” beyond children and 
indeed the notion of multiple childhoods.  (This parallels to my mind the move from second to third 
wave feminism when we realized not all women have the same experiences, needs, or interests.) While 
their accounts of some new directions are brief, the reader will find enlightening, inspiring, and 
provocative their overview of such recent and alternative views of childhood from David Kennedy, 
Lyotard, Agamben, Deleuze and Guattari, as well as the extensive work by Kohan himself, and Karin 
Murris with her notion of the posthuman child. This essay serves as a perfect pointer to indicate the 
next steps beyond Matthews’ groundbreaking work on philosophy of childhood and signal the rich 
heritage of ideas and questions generated by Matthews.  

 
The first Matthews excerpt illustrates precisely the trajectory of his own thinking about 

philosophy of childhood as charted by Kohan and Cassidy. He ends his account with the claim that 
he is suggesting “a mirror image model that will invite the sharing of perspectives and the enrichment 
of both adulthood and childhood alike” (p. 245). Following this is the short introduction by Matthews 
and Susan M. Turner to their edited volume of essays on the ways in which some Western 
philosophers have depicted children and childhood. This volume is essential for an excellent overview 
of (some) of the ways in which the recognized giants of the Western philosophical tradition have 
reflected their own culture’s attitudes towards children and how they crafted their own theory of 
human nature. The final essay by Matthews in this volume is an interview with Susannah Sheffer in 
which he eloquently advocates for the rights of children to be heard, to be taken seriously and with 
respect.  

 
But the last word in this volume is by Jana Mohr Lone, an American theorist and practitioner of 

philosophy with children. She shares her personal relationship with Matthews as instructor and 
ultimately mentor as she began her career in precollege philosophy. She echoes the constant theme 
offered in each essay of how influential Matthews was, how inspirational as philosopher and as a 
person, and finally how passionately he advocated for children. I would add that his advocacy sounds 
out in a society which professes to be all about “family values” but in fact denigrates and dismisses the 



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child in both policy and practice. The warmth of her astute observations offer a fitting book end to 
the opening introduction by Gregory and Laverty.   

 
To close this book review, I would highlight the index provided—always an excellent way to 

explore specific themes or references throughout all of the articles. Finally, I would like to reiterate the 
holistic nature of this book. Each contributor is actively engaged with the others in weaving together a 
rich accolade to Matthews, while at the same time, maintaining a critical stance to invite further work 
in this field. I found this to be the most impressive aspect of this volume and attribute it to the work 
of the two editors, Gregory and Laverty, both experienced leaders in running a “community of 
inquiry.”  I can easily imagine Gareth Matthews would entirely approve and, if he were with us, would 
eagerly enter into the conversation.  
  
Address Correspondences to:  
Wendy C. Turgeon,   
St. Joseph’s College-NY 
Email: wturgeon@sjcny.edu 


