VANISHING NATION: DISCUSSING NATION’S REPRODUCTION IN POST-SOCIALIST 

SLOVENIA

Duška Knežević-Hočevar

ZRC-SAZU, Ljubljana

© 2004 Duška Knežević-Hočevar All Rights Reserved
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Introduction

The mid-19th century historical debates on the 
political inception of the Slovenian nation 
featured numerical “smallness”1 as the most 
indicative characteristic of the Slovenian 
population. Despite many other attributes, 
mostly described as “favorable” – e.g. cultural 
and religious homogeneity, language 
uniformity – the early builders of the national 
discourse understood this smallness as a 
“serious political disadvantage” (cf. Cvirn 
1995: 73; Domej 1995: 87, 92). This assertion 
was further implicated in many historical 
attempts to reinforce the Slovenian statehood, 
be it in the framework of politically 
differently conceptualised Yugoslav states2 or 
finally in the 1990s, in the period of 
establishing an independent Slovenian state. 

In this article I argue that the public 
interpretations of fertility behavior in the
period of consolidating the Slovenian 
independent state uncritically espoused a 19th

century concept of national population. The 
classic concept was used mostly in 

                                                          
1 According to Public Censuses of the 1931 and 
the 2002, the numbers of declared Slovenians are 
1,397,650, and 1,948,250 respectively.
2 In chronological order, the Yugoslav states were: 
the State of Slovenians, Croats and Serbs, 
established in October 1918; the Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenians, constituted a month 
later; the Kingdom of Yugoslavia from 1929; the 
Democratic Federative Yugoslavia from 1945; the 
Federative Republic of Yugoslavia from 1946, and 
in 1963 established the Socialist Federative 
Republic of Yugoslavia.

discussions on nationalism as a political 
philosophy and it referred to a people with 
shared linguistic, cultural, historical 
experience, material conditions, and descent; 
organic ties to peoples’ territory and 
environment were considered peoples’ natural 
rights to such places (Kreager 1997: 155).  
The imperative that such “natural wholes” had 
to be “home-produced” (Kreager 1997: 156) 
and re-produced is also characteristic for post-
socialist rhetoric on production and renewal 
of “biological Slovenians.” Moreover, the 
ideological notions of the “ancient past of the 
Slovenian nation” have corroborated those 
interpretations on declining fertility in 
Slovenia that had adopted the central 
assumption of the classical theory of 
demographic transition.3 The theory was 
firmly grounded in the notion that each and 
every country successfully moves from a pre-
industrial to a post-industrial state of 
demographic equilibrium, i.e. from the state 
of the population’s high fertility and high 
mortality to a state of the decline of the 
population growth. Evolutionary-designed 
demographic theory was also convenient for

                                                          
3 Szreter (1993: 661) asserts that demographic 
transition in its classic theoretisation was a general 
theory, stipulating that a strong population growth 
initially occurred in the period of industrialisation 
because fertility remained uncontrolled and at a 
high rate, while mortality declined due to 
improved food supplies and living standards. The 
latter were seen as the consequence of 
improvements in agriculture, transport, 
manufacturing, and progress of the medical 
sciences.

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commentators on the “transitional orientation” 
of the new Slovenian state from the “primitive 
Balkans” to the “civilised Europe”.

The “smallness” of the nation’s body

A clearly conveyed idea of Slovenian 
statehood, authored by a handful of Slovenian 
intellectuals in 1848, considered of prime 
importance the project of constructing the 
Slovenians as a “historical nation.” According 
to historian Cvirn (1995: 73), after 1848, 
German political writings had successfully 
launched the argument that the Slovenians 
represented only a minute particle of 
humanity which was doomed to extinction –
i.e. to submergence in the sea of German-ness 
- precisely because of its smallness, cultural 
backwardness, and notably because 
Slovenians were obstructing Germans in their 
spatial expansion towards the Adriatic sea.

The all-European “national revival” activated 
not only Slovenian intellectuals in their efforts 
to bring into force the idea of Slovenia as a 
political entity of the hitherto dispersed 
Slovenian speaking population in the 
Empire’s historical lands, but it also 
substantiated the creation of a new orientation 
in Slovenian historiography – the construction 
of national history (Kos 1985: 11). In their 
enthusiasm for bringing to light everything of 
the greatest significance for the Slovenian 
national past, the heralds of Slovenian 
longevity even developed a specific type of 
scholar – the patriotic historiographer who 
should not be preoccupied only with the 
national history, but also had to study the 
language, folk ways, and customs of the 
people, and who had to be a poet and a 
national agitator at the same time (Kos 1985: 
11). Davorin Trstenjak was the first who 
explicitly mentioned the numerical smallness 
of the Slovenian nation:

The Slovenian nation is meagre in 
number. Hundreds of years of 
inconvenience heavily disturbed it. All 
disasters notwithstanding, in the face 
of other bigger nations having 
vanished from the world scene, it still 
remains safe and sound.” (Trstenjak 
1863: 234; author’s translation)

The size of the national population has been 
an unavoidable topic in most “domestic” 
studies on Slovenian population and related 
themes ever since. The numerical smallness of 
the Slovenian nation was not only a 
statistically verified fact in Austrian censuses; 
furthermore, many Slovenian scholars have 
focused on discovering the reasons for such 
an alarming national situation, or have even 
tried to invent measures for its improvement. 
According to the archaeologist Niederle, the 
main reasons for such a seemingly precarious
national situation were on the one hand, the 
Slovenian emigration abroad, and on the other 
hand, the errors of statistical data collected in 
the Empire. Small numbers notwithstanding, 
Slovenians should not fear radical decline if 
they only know how to strengthen the national 
consciousness in people, and improve their 
civilisation within their political territory – the 
Carniola (cf. Niederle 1911: 117-118). 
Similarly, the argument of one of his 
contemporaries, Mačkovšek, was that the 
Slovenian lowest population increase among 
the Austrian Slavs was due to their Alpine 
country, poor economy, emigration, and 
territorial losses. He argued for a just national 
struggle for the return of the lost millennial 
Slovenian settlement lands (Mačkovšek; in: 
Niederle 1911: 246, 250).

These first “Slovenian” interpretations of the 
official statistics on the national populations 
within the Empire were accompanied by 
appeals for eliminating such a threatening 
decrease of the Slovenian population, 
propagated by medical doctors and 
eugenicists in the 1920s and 1930s. According 
to these scholars, the numerical smallness of 
the Slovenian nation was not its only 
disadvantage; they considered that the quality 
of the “national organism” and the “national 
health” also needed to be brought under 
scrutiny. Of particular concern was the 
alleged basic biological characteristic of a 
nation – its persistent “rebirth and 
replacement” (Zalokar 1918: 6). The statistics 
on fertility, mortality, and migration were
consulted and analysed with regard to various 
environments and areas settled by Slovenians. 
The one single purpose of these efforts was to 

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diagnose and improve the circumstances for 
the sake of a better “quality of national 
posterity” (Zalokar 1918: 7). Many questions 
pertaining to “reproduction” turned out to be 
worthy of study in the “nation’s perspective,” 
provided that they helped change the status of 
Slovenian people into a sovereign nation.

Scholars in different scientific disciplines 
have systematically tracked the demographic 
movements in Slovenia since the end of
World War I. The first basic study on the 
historical development of the Slovenian 
population since the 18th century was 
published in 1936. In his effort to determine
and evaluate the proper number of Slovenians 
in their scattered historical lands of settlement 
across different periods, Fran Zwitter assumed 
that the development of the population should 
always be studied as “an integral part of a 
holistic historical development” (Zwitter 
1936: 88). His appeal was of singular 
importance also in the context of the ensuing 
studies conducted during the period of 
Socialist Yugoslavia (e.g. Šifrer 1963; 
Vogelnik 1965), which uniformly interpreted 
the trend of fertility decline among Slovenians 
in accordance with the paradigm of 
modernization, and the theory of demographic 
transition. Fertility decline was taken to be a 
typical characteristic of the “developed”, i.e. 
“western” countries, and thus a positive sign 
of an ongoing “progress” of human 
civilization. Yet the commentators of the 
population movement did not question the 
linear and evolutionary conceptualised theory 
of demographic transition; they uncritically 

and somewhat automatically applied the 
theory on “domestic ground.”

National press on Slovenian fertility

The assumption that the public discussion on 
Slovenian statehood of the 1990s adopted the 
anachronistic notion of the national 
population not merely as a historical and 
cultural phenomenon but as a “natural” fact 
was tested by reviewing and analysing press-
clippings from the Journalist documentation 
Delo, the most extensive journalist archive in 
Slovenia. I analysed 177 articles (the folder 
Natality) published between 1970 and 2000. I 
first sought to find discernible time patterns in 
the press interpretations on fertility in 
Slovenia, and consequently identify the 
constructed image of the national population. 
The hypothesis was that following the 
declaration of independence in 1991, the 
Slovenian popular press paid more attention 
to the fertility issue then before, and that this 
issue was represented in a specific way. The 
decrease in the fertility coefficient was no 
longer interpreted as a statistical fact 
confirming the notorious assumption of the 
theory of demographic transition, according to 
which low fertility values of a given 
population are typical for the “developed 
European populations.” Quite on the contrary, 
the slow population growth in Slovenia was 
conveyed alongside the concern for the 
“biological threat to Slovenians”.

The reviewed articles show the following 
picture:

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Figure 1: The percentages of articles on fertility in Slovenia by the years and decades

__________________________________________________________________________

There is every indication that the nation’s 
reproduction is the privileged topic of the 
consolidation of the independent Slovenian 
state. Nearly two third (66.6%) out of the 
total analysed material belongs to the 1990s 
in comparison with the 1980s (22.5%) and 
the 1970s (6.4%). Yet, the characteristic 
interpretations of the fertility issue per single 
decade show the following observations.

The 1970s: declining births - a syndrome 
of “progress”

The most salient characteristic for the 
reporting on fertility in the 1970s is the 
apparent small number (one per year) of 
articles compared with the subsequent 
periods. All articles focus on the decreasing 
fertility in Slovenia and the reasons for it are 
explained in two significant ways: as a proof 
that the level of cultural and economic 
development that has been attained (i.e. 
responsible parenthood, legal abortion, 
increased number of employed women, etc.) 
in the Socialist Republic of Slovenia is 
similar to that in the “developed Europe;” or 

in the negative sense, stressing the 
shortcomings of such progress as the self-
centered and negative ideology of 
consumerism. Typical observations were: 

Regarding low infant mortality we 
are among the most developed 
countries in Europe. (Delo, 24 May 
1969)4

We have sufficient evidence to be 
satisfied that with the cultural and 
economic level attained we created 
in people a higher responsibility for 
children: as it is in the countries of 
similar growth, parents decide to 
have one child only once they secure 
good living conditions. (Delo, 24 
December 1972)

The “economic and cultural progress” also 
represented the main frame of interpretation 
of the fertility situation in Slovenia within 
the Yugoslav federation. It was pointed out 

                                                          
4 All quotations are the author's translation.

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time and again that the fertility decline in the 
most developed federal republic in 
Yugoslavia leads to a smaller proportion of 
its inhabitants in the total population of 
Yugoslavia. In this regard the typical 
comparison among the Yugoslav republics 
usually took the following turn: 

The truth is that people from poorer 
regions have more children than 
those with higher incomes… In 
Slovenia only 15.8 infants are born 
per 1,000 inhabitants, a reason for 
concern particularly because we are 
a small nation… Regarding births, 
Kosovo takes the first place in 
Yugoslavia; here, the growth of 
population is the most noticeable: 25 
infants per 1,000 inhabitants!” 
(Tedenska tribuna, 21 February 
1973)

In the 1970s, the fear of the imminent 
disappearance of Slovenians was only 
sporadically mentioned. More frequent and 
characteristic were references to surveys, or 
to research reports produced by individual 
experts (half of all the articles). In their 
reporting, the journalists usually emphasized 
those research results that showed optimistic 
projections: the Slovenians with their low 
fertility statistics follow the economic trends 
of the “developed world” (Delo, 27 October 
1973); Slovenians are not endangered 
because the gross reproductive coefficient 
still remains 1.1, which implies that the 
“biological reproduction” is more than 
secured especially when compared to 
Vojvodina or Croatia with coefficient value 
below 1 (Delo, 27 October 1973). 

Although some demographers stressed that 
Slovenia had become an immigrant country 
for the first time in its history and that labor 
immigrants from other republics might 
contribute to the Slovenian national body 
(Tedenska tribuna, 21 February 1973), rare 
were those who addressed the 
“composition” of the population: “Every 
fourth employed person in Slovenia is not of 
Slovenian nationality; for the first time in 
the history of Slovenia, more people 

immigrate than emigrate” (ITD, 15 January 
1974).

A similar reflection can be extracted from 
the proposed action programs for the 
improvement of fertility in Slovenia that 
were reported on at that time; the proposed 
programs for the most part remained 
restricted to calls for separate and single 
measures. Most frequent among them were 
appeals for improving women’s 
reproductive health care in general, and for 
providing more suitable living conditions for 
young families, in particular; yet a holistic 
population policy was not clearly elaborated 
(Komunist, 24 November 1972; ITD, 15 
January 1974; Delo, 7 June 1977).

The 1980s: “We are a mere million”

Significant for this period is the 
transposition of issues: more attention was 
given to “catastrophic” consequences of the 
fertility decline in Slovenia and strong 
appeals were voiced for urgent, holistic 
population measures. The reported reasons 
for fertility decline were assumed widely 
known and taken for granted as such. Those 
that pointed out the historical achievements 
of economic growth in most European 
societies were repeatedly mentioned. 
Fertility decline in Slovenia was mostly 
interpreted as an inevitable consequence of 
the gradual restriction of planned births and 
was still consistently explained in two 
contexts, the Yugoslav and the European.

However, in comparison with the previous 
decade when the “side effects” of belonging 
to the “developed world” were particularly 
exposed, a series of new alleged reasons for 
fertility decline were invented including 
inappropriate attitude towards life (the non-
ethical right to abortion); labor immigrants 
from the other Republics of Socialist 
Yugoslavia in the 1970s; and last but not 
least, the absence of a holistic population 
policy. These putative reasons were 
portrayed as the main culprits of an 
imminent national catastrophe and often 
exposed in headlines: “Slovenians are 
aging” (Večer, 14 July 1984); “Simple 
reproduction is endangered” (Teleks, 10 

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January 1985), “We are a mere million” 
(Teleks, 10 January 1985); “We are a 
greying society” (Delo, 26 February 1987); 
“Is the nation passing away?” (Nedeljski 
dnevnik, 19 April 1987); “The roots of the 
nation are seriously sapped” (Nedeljski 
dnevnik, 7 May 1989); “Euthanasia is 
unnecessary among Slovenians” (Delo, 12 
December 1989). Moreover, they were 
corroborated by the statistical evidence and 
population projections showing the 
declining number of births.

The most salient newly identified reason for 
the low fertility in Slovenia in the 1980s was 
the labor immigration from the Yugoslav 
Republics. The birth rates among the 
immigrants allegedly led the experts into 
underestimating the seriousness of the threat 
of the “vanishing of Slovenians.” While at 
first the population experts cautiously 
pointed to the fact that the higher population 
growth in Slovenia in the last two decades 
compared to the average growth in 
Yugoslavia was attributable to the influx of 
immigrants (Delo, 12 June 1982; Večer, 14 
July 1984), later on, at the end of the 1980s, 
they more and more openly conveyed their 
concern for the vanishing of “Slovenian 
culture and identity” (Dnevnik, 19 
November 1988).

A similar logic was incorporated into the 
very reasoning on the need for a population 
policy. The experts’ calls for a holistic 
population policy were not primarily 
founded on the paranoid notion of the 
“extinction of Slovenians” but were rather in 
line with the social consequences of low 
fertility in Slovenia. However, it seems that 
they could not completely avoid the slippery 
ground of defining the criteria for 
membership in the national population 
despite their appeals for urgent population 
measures, mostly as part and parcel of an 
entire socio-economic growth of the nation-
state (Nedeljski dnevnik, 19 April 1987). 
Some journalists took nearly for granted the 
assumption that immigrants were not a 
solution because they would allegedly make 
the Slovenian identity gradually disappear. 

Some justified this thesis with allegedly 
“western reasoning:”

Considering previous experiences 
and reactions of western European 
authorities on immigration from the 
“South”, this solution is not popular 
at all. A majority of European 
countries tackle the low fertility 
problem with a calculated population 
policy. (Teleks, 10 January 1985)

It was reported time and again that for 
maintaining the natural regeneration of the 
Slovenian population, every woman should 
give birth to 2.2 children. In this respect the 
majority of criticism and comments 
pertained to the living conditions in 
Slovenia, ranging from the poor conditions 
for employment of young people, lack of 
suitable housing, day nurseries and 
kindergartens, to the calls for a prolonged 
maternity leave (one year), and financial 
rewards for families with more than two 
children. However, the reporting on both, 
the holistic population policies and the 
single measures for improvement of the 
living conditions for people in Slovenia, 
increasingly, though implicitly, related to 
ethnic Slovenians only.

The 1990s: against the “reproductive 
laziness” of Slovenians, and for the 
“efficient surveillance over migration”

Nearly seventy percent of press material 
accumulated was produced during the third 
decade under consideration, the period of 
consolidating the sovereign Slovenian 
nation-state. Of special interest is the year 
1990 when the so-called professional bases 
for population policy were created and 
reported on. The measures addressed 
“autochthonous” Slovenians, people born in 
Slovenia, and immigrants who had worked 
in Slovenia for at least five years and had 
obtained permanent residence permits 
(Teleks, 1 February 1990). However, it was 
stressed that the policy was not intended to 
attract non-Slovenians to come to Slovenia 
nor to encourage so-called nationally mixed 
marriages (Teleks, 1  February 1990). The 
policy proponents suggested that the expert 

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reports that served as a basis for immigrant 
policy should also be articulated. As the 
President of the committee of experts 
working on the Slovenian population policy 
in 1990, put it: “We anticipate measures that 
will not attract a major influx to Slovenia 
but will stimulate increased reproduction of 
the Slovenian population” (Teleks, 1 
February 1990). It was also reported that big 
families should become a norm again, 
therefore some authors of the expert 
documents proposed a special tax for non-
parenthood, a measure allegedly well known 
abroad (Jana, 14 February 1990).

These propositions were met with 
substantial disapproval, particularly from the 
public. Almost fifty percent of total press 
clippings in 1990 conveyed critical views. 
Most critics openly pointed to the non-
scientific, demagogic character of the 
proposed assumptions. The dilemma – why, 
for whom, and in what circumstances the 
fertility decline is a problem at all - was 
exposed for the first time (Delo, 5 April 
1990). The majority of reviewers of the 
expert platform characterized its content as 
predominately driven by the electoral 
concerns. They insisted that the experts’ 
suggestions for the improvement of fertility 
in Slovenia was a step back not only to some 
oversimplified notions of socialist ideology 
but also to premises clearly belonging to 
naturalism and mercantilism, and therefore 
“toward the Middle Ages” (Mladina, 16 
February 1990):

Emphasizing the quantity of people 
instead of their quality is typical for 
socialism, which is a society of 
goods exchange and therefore blind 
for fetishism of goods and also 
money as the specific good… Such 
population naturalism cannot grasp 
that over two hundred years, four 
hundred thousand Slovenians may 
be of more value than two or three 
million on this day (Teleks, 15 
February 1990).

Last but not least, surfaced the comments 
pointing to the anti-pluralist orientation of 
the proposed population measures:

This project is clearly directed 
against the plurality of the society, 
against the different life-styles of 
communities, and therefore against 
the autonomy of women… The 
Slovenian development will 
obviously rest on a kind of specific 
man-enterprising and woman-
housekeeping” (Večer, 24 February 
1990).

The 1990s were characterized by 
discussions on foreigners, which were 
represented in three significant ways:. 
firstly, as the likely candidates for filling in 
the imminently emptied-out Slovenian 
territory; secondly, as the “old,” former 
Yugoslav immigrants who came to Slovenia 
before its independence and who were 
denoted as the main culprits (together with 
their descendants “in proliferation”) for the 
fact that the spreading “reproductive 
laziness” of the autochthonous population of 
Slovenia was obscured (Delo, 23 June 
1993); and thirdly, as those belonging to the 
new wave of immigrants in 1993, mostly 
war refugees from the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
latter provoked excessive fears, especially 
among the reading public. Some individuals 
also voiced extremely alarmist tones: 

The late Yugoslavia had the 
infamous role as an accelerator of 
this Southern-style ‘multiplication’ 
[the Kosovars], and it is justly the 
first victim of the modern plague on 
two feet. Slovenians have renounced 
their own descendants to leave their 
territory to illiterate, uncultured, and 
lazy thieves” (Delo, 2 July 1994).

Such individual letters to the editor were not 
met with the number of counter-views 
comparable to 1990. Quite on the contrary, 
the key dilemma of whether to include the 
foreigners in the debates on population 
policy or not occupied the population 
experts throughout the 1990s. In line with 

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the commonsensical notion that the old 
economic immigrants from the former 
Yugoslavia enjoyed a wider range of rights 
than the Slovenians themselves, some 
argued for an effective surveillance over 
immigration waves and called attention to 
the fact that foreigners cannot be expected to 
“take care of Slovenians” (Delo, 7 January 
1995). A minority insisted that immigration 
is the solution for the fertility decline in 
Slovenia provided that the newcomers prove 
themselves able to integrate into the system. 
Yet nearly all, on cue with the xenophobic 
atmosphere in Slovenia, insisted on an 
“easier” and “cheaper” solution: investing in
“reliable natives” by means of stimulating 
their reproductive behavior. 

Conclusion

The promoters of the first Slovenian 
political entity, to paraphrase Šumi (2000: 
121), had sought to arrange diachronic and 
contextually diverse phenomena ex aequo to 
construct the great mythic monads: 
“Slovenian-ness,” “Slovenian,” and 
“nation.” The creators of the new Slovenian 
identity after 1991 adopted this romantic 
concept of the Slovenian nation, and 
automatically equated it with the concept of 
the “fully fledged” (Hroch 1996: 36) nation-
state. The analysis of the media discourse on 
declining fertility in Slovenia in the last 
three decades proves this observation. 

The review of the national press on fertility 
issues in Slovenia in the 1970s showed that 
journalists discussed the fertility decline in 
Slovenia within the framework of the theory 
of modernization and demographic 
transition. Interpreting the low fertility 
situation within the Yugoslav and the 
European contexts, the media produced a 
relatively autonomous image of the 
Slovenian community, either as the most 
developed Yugoslav Republic or as 
sufficiently comparable to many already 
“developed” European countries.

In the 1980s, however, the press represented 
the consequences of low fertility not only as 
a side effect of the process of modernization, 
but also as the result of an insufficiently 

conscious regulation of fertility trends in 
Slovenia. The calculated statistical 
indicators were to “lull” the experts in their 
estimation of a still non-alarmist fertility 
situation in Slovenia. In this regard, the 
press pointed to the labor immigrants from 
other republics of the former Yugoslavia, 
the segment of population that compared to 
the romantic concept of nation was not 
“naturally tied” to the community in which 
they either temporarily or permanently 
resided.

In the 1990s, the press rhetoric increased the 
menace of the numerical smallness of 
Slovenians to the point that the “real 
national substance” was endangered. The 
repeatedly reported disclaimers, like for 
example: “I am not a nationalist, but I am 
concerned for my endangered nation” 
(Slovenske novice, 17. 2. 1993), seem to 
have boiled down the official Slovenian 
ideology of trans-national European 
orientation to mere nationalistic values. 
Creating the positive self-presentation 
usually corresponded with a negative image 
ascribed to the others. Illustrative were the 
reports, which in the period of the 
dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia ascribed 
the low fertility in Slovenia to non-
Slovenians, notably to former Yugoslav 
labor immigrants and refugees from Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. Irrespective of the 
political orientation of the daily newspaper 
under review, the xenophobic attitudes 
towards foreigners reached their peak with 
the assertion that “foreigners cannot solve 
the problem of the vanishing of Slovenian 
population,” the diagnosis which also failed 
entirely to provoke any perceivable 
resistance in the public spheres.

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Archival Sources:

Novinarska dokumentacija Delo (The 
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(497.12) - Natality).

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