Anthropology of East Europe Review 

VISION IMPAIRED: THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF EVERYDAY LIFE IN CROATIA 

Daphne Winland 

York University 


The January 2000 elections in Croatia 
produced an almost tangible (albeit short-lived) 
feeling of buoyancy reminiscent of the euphoria 
surrounding independence from Yugoslavia in 
1991. The processes that have characterized this 
recent political shift from the authoritarian and 
ultranationalist regime of the late Franjo Tudjman 
and the HDZ, to the present center-left coalition 
are symptomatic of the political and socio­
economic uncertainty that has characterized the 
fledgling state since 1990.1 Since the early 1990's 
ethnonationalism has been the prism through 
which much commentary and analysis on the 
former Yugoslavia has been filtered. This comes 
partly in response to the self- evident realities of 
ethnic conflict and political rhetoric in the region, 
but more so, it marks the rush to fashion a new 
conceptual geography of Eastern Europe. The 
continual upheaval in the region has produced a 
large body of literature and commentary primarily 
focussed on or informed by concerns with (ethnic) 
nationalism in Croatia. In Croatia, much of the 
scholarly attention since independence has 
focussed on the numerous impacts of war (e.g. 
displacement and trauma, reintegration and 
minority issues), and on recovery and nation 
building (e.g. processes of democratization and 
civil society, political and economic integration 
into the EU). This paper draws attention to the 
need for more research into issues of emergent 
identities in Croatia as well as the politics of 
representation by focussing on some of the 
nuanced ways in which Croatians have been 
(re)negotiating the cultural logics of being and 
belonging in the face of socio-political changes in 
the rapidly transforming Croatian state.2 

The Context: Croatian Independence and its 
Aftermath 

Croatian independence has, as in many post­
communist successor states, inevitably created the 
conditions for radical and often convulsive 
changes in the social, political and economic fabric 
of society. Despite having emerged from the 
shadow of communist rule, Croatia remains 
saddled with numerous problems, many of which 
have been exacerbated by a legacy of policy 
decisions of the late Franjo Tudjman and his ruling 
party, the HDZ (Uzelak, 1998). These "growing 
pains" have been characterized by a "democratic 

deficit" evidenced in documented cases of, for 
example, violations of human rights (Karatnycky 
et aI, 1997), the suppression of freedom of the 
press (Thompson, 1994, Perusko- iEulek, 1999), 
the expansion (and abuse) of constitutional and 
presidential powers (Sekulire and Sporer, 1997), 
and Croatia's interventionist (and some even say, 
imperialist) pro-Herceg-Bosna policy. Major 
discrepancies have existed between state rhetoric 
concerning guarantees of civic freedoms and 
minority rights and the actual development and/or 
enforcement of existing legislation in these areas.3 

Ethnonationalism quickly became the dominant 
rubric through which Croatian identity was 
configured by the new state (Malesevire and 
Uzelak, 1997: Hayden, 1992). This is epitomized, 
for example, in the exclusionary criteria of the 
Law on Croatian Culture and Citizenship (Hayden, 
1996): the acceptance of Croatian culture, 
proficiency in Croatian language and Latin script, 
and exemptions for Croatian diaspora returnees 
and their descendants. There are no similar 
provisions for those who are not members of the 
Croatian ethnonation (defined as substance rather 
than citizenship ).4 Cultural policies are generally 
neoconservative in orientation reflecting state 
commitment to those cultural activities that are 
considered to be supportive ofnational identity 
and cohesion. Research institutes in Croatia 
receive government grants to carry out research 
and offer programs on Croatian cultural heritage 
and history and state-run television and radio also 
regularly broadcast programs featuring regional 
folklore, customs and religious celebrations. The 
rapid process of language fragmentation (ie. from 
Serbo-Croatian to Serbian, Croatian or Bosnian) 
has meant calls for a return to Croatian literary 
forms (reavakian, kajkavian and stovakian) and 
regional dialects. 

The vision for the new Croatian republic 
promulgated by the Croatian political leadership 
has blended ethnonationalist rhetoric with 
principles of social authoritarianism centered 
around the discourse of traditional (Catholic) 
morality and the preservation of the Croatian 
nation from the dangers of cultural decline. The 
essence of Croatianess has thus been constructed 
as ethnically "pure," systematically eliminating 
references to the complex historical, socio-cultural 

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Anthropology ofEast Europe Review 

and political conditions that have, over the years, 
marked the physical and conceptual terrain of 
Croatian identity. Metaphors of nation, 
Catholicism, family and the "Croatian way" have 
become the centerpieces ofCroatian political and 
religious programs. Among the desired qualities of 
the New Croatian are traditional family values, 
exalting motherhood as a vocation, espousing pro­
life values, fiercely attacking gay/lesbian lifestyles 
and relationships and vilifying feminism (personal 
communication, Ela Grdinire , Judge, County 
Court, Zagreb and LEGALINA Project, Zagreb 
and Maja Mamula, Counsellor, LEGALINA 
Project) .5 For example, a recent headline 
(December 20, 1999) in the pro-government 
newspaper Vjesnik laments the continued use of 
"abortion as a method of birth control." Although 
contemporary political (and some intellectual) 
discourses on Croatian identity often valorize 
Croatian culture and heritage in the interest of 
promoting a distinctively Croatian national 
identity, there is also a large body ofcommentary 
and research from vocal critics both within and 
outside the country. Unlike the largely state-owned 
broadcast media there is a popular, often critical 
independent and sometimes irreverent press (Feral 
Tribune, Novi List, Globus, Slobodna Dalmacija). 

While the decidedly ethnonationalist 
project of the state (during the 1990's) provides an 
indispensable backdrop to the examination of 
identity and nation-building strategies. Here 
however, I focus neither on the official 
perspectives of the state's numerous and often 
self-selected interlocutors nor on its detractors and 
critics, but rather on Croatians I have worked with 
who have not been directly linked to political, 
academic, social justice, media or like institutions 
and interests. My goal here is to illustrate how 
identities continue to be socially constituted and 
contested through the gaps and silences of official 
(nationalist) discourses. 

Croatian Politics of Representation on the 
Ground 

Quite apart from the plethora of 
measurable macro-level indicators of ethnic 
attitudes in Croatia typical ofpolitical and 
economic analyses (both inside and outside of 
Croatia), are the cultural politics of everyday life. 
For example, identity struggles have been based 
less on the most heavily cited ethnic and national 
criteria (i.e. self-identification as a Croat, Serb, 
etc.) than on a complex combination of factors 
reflecting the "hypermobility of postmodern 
capital and ideas" (Mishra, 1996:424). These 

include the largely worsening socio-economic 
conditions, shifts in class boundaries and relations 
and the changing significance of regionalism and 
locality as well as the continuing and ubiquitous 
presence, involvement and scrutiny of numerous 
external interests (international economic, political 
and humanitarian agencies, Croatian diasporas, 
etc.). These, combined with the devastating and 
disruptive effects of war, have had a tremendous 
impact on the politics of identity and 
representation for Croatians in the new state. The 
examples below illustrate both reactions to elite­
directed discursive closure on Croatian identity 
(e.g. the "good Croatian") and the invocation of 
various cultural logics in the creation and 
reaffirmation of a sense of belonging. 

Croatianess and/or Locality 

What became almost immediately 
apparent over the course of this research was the 
centrality of cultural logics, forms and practices to 
Croatian efforts to make sense of their lives and 
struggles amidst enormous changes. For example, 
although nationalism often stimulates the search 
for identity, it is often contained and mediated 
through subnational categories such as region and 
community and in local traditions and experiences. 
Locality and memory and their contingent socio­
cultural manifestations and expressions have 
always been and continue to be central to Croatian 
configurations of identity. Being a Trogirani, 
Dalmatiani or even a "snob from Zagreb" (the 
latter, a term of derision among Dalmatians), has 
as much or even greater quotidian significance for 
Croatians than the often strident nationalist 
pronouncements of politicians and others. The war 
in Croatia and the former Yugoslavia has 
irrevocably changed the demographic 
characteristics of many communities, especially 
rural ones, and has inevitably fomented and 
exacerbated the Serb-Muslim-Croat axis of hate. 
However, I found that the rhetoric of ethnic 
homogeneity is not as widely accepted or practiced 
as Croatian nationalist ideology would suggest. 
Locally-specific cultural logics, memories and 
practices continue to inform and mediate responses 
to often chaotic changes and challenges faced by 
Croatians. Recent research on the integration of 
Croatian refugees from Bosnia and Voivodina into 
communities in Croatia confirms the 
predominance of regional over nationallY­
constituted Croatian identities and the problems 
associated with these efforts (see JEapo JEmegare , 
1999, Grbire , 1997). The significance oflocality as 
the primary factor in assessing the past, present 
and the future was clearly evoked in numerous 

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Anthropology of East Europe Review 

interviews. The use ofethnicity as a marker was in 
some cases used to underscore the similarities 
between people who would be, in the language of 
ethnic nationalism, bitter enemies, i.e. Serb and 
Croat. For example, while in Knin, I spent some 
time with a local Croatian and his Serb friend 
visiting from England who had returned (after 
fleeing during the war) to visit his few remaining 
(elderly) Serb relatives. In the time I spent with 
them, they were busy (re )creating a (familiar) 
cultural space built on shared experiences, 
memories and opinions. For example, on one 
occasion, the better part of several hours was spent 
discussing their disdain for the "ignorant" and 
"uncivilized" Bosnian Croats who had resettled in 
Knin after the war in Bosnia. According to the 
Croatian: "We can sell them any old garbage and 
call it wine. They don't know the difference". 

This sentiment is clearly reflected in 
Croatian opinions and attitudes concerning 
intraethnic relations in Croatia. For example, some 
of the most negative comments I encountered 
concerned not Serbs and Bosnian Muslims but 
Bosnian Croats from Herzegovina and (overseas) 
diaspora Croatians, the two groups most valorized 
by the Tudjman government and by Croatian 
nationalist elites for their ethnic "purity" and 
patriotic fervor. Croatians, for example, have 
generally responded negatively to the huge influx 
of Herzegovinian Croats into Croatia and to what 
is widely regarded as their corrupting influence on 
Croatian politics and the economy. Herzegovinian 
Croats have been a major presence in Croatia since 
the war, not just as refugees (from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina) but as new members of the political 
and business elite. But while complaints about 
taxation subsidies and corruption among them 
abound, most emphasize the deep cultural divide 
that exists between them. The Croatian overseas 
diaspora also invites a certain degree of scorn and 
disdain from homeland Croatians. What comes 
through in the responses of Croatian nationals I 
have interviewed is resentment and ambivalence 
toward the diaspora for a variety of reasons. These 
include the purported retention by diasporic Croats 
of a vulgarized and romanticized ethnic culture 
and obsolete political ideals, their exploitation of 
investment opportunities of questionable benefit to 
homeland Croatians and meddling in Croatian 
internal political affairs (Winland, 1998).6 One 
informant asked: "Are these returnees the best and 
the brightest that diaspora has to offer?" 

The "Good Croatian" 

Since 1991, discourses on identity in 
Croatia have often invoked the highly charged 
question: What is a "good Croatian?" While 
several key indicators have been proffered (e.g. 
patriotism, (Catholic) religiosity), the bulk of 
Croatian opinions I have recorded point to a 
preoccupation with those characteristics that may 
label one as a "bad" Croatian. For example, 
Croatians who are not solidly behind efforts to 
reimagine the new Croatian state in ways that 
valorize selected elements of the Croatian past and 
present have been variously referred to by some as 
"unpatriotic," "unCroatian," "Yugonostalgic," 
"Yugo-zombies" or as "enemies of the state" (the 
latter two characteristically have been directed at 
vocal critics like Siavenka Drakulire and Dubravka 
UgreSire by official or elite circles). In response to 
my queries concerning views on state efforts to 
shape post-independence Croatian identity, most 
either directly or indirectly mentioned the issue (of 
the "good Croatian") and treated it either 
dismissively (as inconsequential in their day to day 
lives) or as a source of concern. For those who did 
not subscribe to these visions of the new ("good") 
Croatian, they felt that, at some level, others may 
and this sometimes affected how they dealt with 
people (acquaintances, employers, coworkers, 
etc.). This was most often expressed as having to 
think about the consequences of publicly 
condemning nationalist discourses, for example, 
the possibility of being overlooked for promotions 
at work. It is, however, important to note that the 
Croatians who commented on this facet of 
Croatian identity politics pointed out that there is a 
distinction between the nationalist discourses and 
images promoted by the government and a more 
general, less political and arbitrary sense of 
patriotism and pride. Most had been deeply and 
personally affected by the war and stated that they 
felt a strong sense of pride in being Croatian quite 
distinct from nation-building rhetorical strategies. 
The state has thus expended a great deal of effort 
to provide fixed parameters for the discourse of 
Croatian national identity. At the level of 
interpersonal communication however, the effects 
of this effort were manifested in a certain level of 
suspicion, caution or ambivalence for many who 
have rejected, been uncomfortable espousing these 
forms of self-representation, or who were 
concerned about the consequences of being viewed 
or labeled a "bad Croatian." My current research 
focuses on the impact of the recent social and 
political changes on the emergence of new 
discursive spaces and forms. 

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Anthropology of East Europe Review 

Conclusion 

Although Croatian nation-building efforts 
have provided the conditions (through 
ideologically-driven discourses and policy 
measures) for the creation of a Croatian national 
prototype, these efforts continue to have mixed 
results. Ambivalence, disdain, resentment, 
patriotism, optimism and pessimism, as well as 
confusion are among the sentiments and emotions 
that characterize Croatians' day to day reactions to 
the discursive strategies of nationalist elites. Thus, 
while critics like Dubravka Ugresire (1998) 
acerbically denounce the political and cultural 
perversions of the new Croatian regime and its 
elites (examples are plentiful, such as the 
fetishization of President Tudjman and a lucrative 
industry in kitschy Croatica), it is not clear that the 
success of strategies that have been unleashed in 
the name of Croatian nationalism and statehood 
are as ubiquitous as has been suggested (or 
feared). While it is true that Croatians have been 
inundated with nationalist ideology, many are still 
inherently suspicious ofor ambivalent towards 
state-driven messages and measures (through 
political, media, institutional and other channels), 
an attitude cultivated during the socialist era of 
Yugoslavia and reinforced during the past the 
years under the HDZ. While it is rare to find a 
Croatian without strong political convictions or 
opinions, I have found few that expressed their 
views using the exclusivist and nationalist rhetoric 
of the state. Most are concerned with the ways in 
which the war and changes since independence 
continue to affect their day-to-day lives. For 
example, many I spoke to are concerned about 
corruption, the collapse of the banking system, an 
unemployment rate (officially) hovering at 30%, 
the decline in the quality of health care and the 
high cost ofliving.7 

The following observations made over the 
course of my fieldwork perhaps further 
underscores the need for research that focuses on 
identity as lived experience. The images I recall 
most from the train and bus trips I took between 
Zagreb in the north and Split on the southern 
Dalmatian coast, were of the odd look of villages 
that had been under Serb control from 1991 to 
1995 in what was called the Republic of Serb 
Krajina. The widespread looting and burning of, 
first, Croatian (1991) and then Serb property 
(when in 1995, the 200,000 strong Croatian army 
captured Serb-held Krajina territory in "Operation 
Oluja" (Storm)), left a strange patchwork of 
destruction. Houses, some burned or demolished, 
stood alongside others that were unblemished, 

occupied and well maintained. These images 
invariably speak to a recent past of coexistence or, 
at the very least, mutual tolerance, reflecting 
histories, memories and locally specific logics that 
have been deeply shaken but can not be erased by 
the rhetoric of ethnic or national homogeneity. 

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not our goal to be set apart from our own 
people": A Failed Attempt at Firmer 
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Ethnologica Balkanica (3):121-139. 

Grbire , Jadranka. 1997. "Searching for the 
Familiar, Facing the Foreign: Dimensions of 
Identity of the Croats from Bosnia­
Herzegovina" Narodna Umjetnost 34(1):7-23. 

Hayden, Robert. 1996. "Imagined Communities 
and the Real Victim: Self-determination and 
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Hayden, Robert. 1992. "Constitutional 
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Karatnycky, Adrian, Alexander Motyl, and Boris 
Shor. 1997. "Croatia" in Nations in Transit 
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96-117. 

Keams, Ian. 1996. "Croatian Politics: the New 
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3(2):291-98. 

Mijatovire, Antun. 1997. "Democratic Political 
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Perusko-LEulek, Zrinjka. 1999. Demokracija i 
Medija Zagreb: Barbat. 

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Pusire, Vesna. 1997. "Croatia's Struggle for 
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Pusire, Vesna. 1992. "A Country by Any Other 
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Dusko Sekulire and .tEeljka Sporer. 1997. "Regime 
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Thompson, Mark. 1994. Forging War: The Media 
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Herzegovina Avon: Bath Press. 

Ugresire, Dubravka. 1998. Culture o/Lies: 
Antipolitical Essays University Park, Pa: 
Pennsylvania State University Press. 

Uzelak, Gordana. 1998. "Franjo Tudjman's 
Nationalist Ideology" East European Quarterly 
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Winland, Daphne. 1998. "Croatians 'Here' and 
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Notes 

'Virtually all the recent attention has focussed on 
the national level political fallout of the election, 
assorted exposes and scandals and the 
disintegration of the ruling HDZ (which, according 
to Hrvoje Sarinic, a close ally of Tudjman, 
resembles "a pile of snow melting on the ground"). 
2 The research on which this paper is based was 
conducted during three field trips to Croatia 
beginning in the spring of 1997. 
3 For example, during Tudjman's regime, the 
government retained controlling interest (or 
influence) in several daily newspapers (e.g. 
Vjesnik), some weeklies and the country's only 
news agency, HINA. The most recent scandal in 
Croatia concerns the discovery of discussions 
between Tudjman and his domestic advisor, Ivire 
Pasalire involving control over Vereernji List, one 
of Croatia's largest dailies. The state-owned 

Croatian Radio and Television Enterprise (HRT) 
controls the only television source (HTV) with 
nation-wide coverage. Croatian media critics 
continually complain that political party interests 
influence the awarding of both radio and television 
licenses. Journalists who take a critical stance are 
threatened with legal action (Perusko- .tEulek, 
1999). In the area of minority rights, the 
government's record has lagged behind officially 
stated goals and achievements. 
4The return of Serb refugees to Croatia remains an 
explosive issue, particularly in the regions of 
Krajina and Eastern Slavonia 
5Feminist critics of government policies have 
pointed to a general increase in the vulnerability of 
women to domestic or other forms of abuse (not 
directly influenced by the war) in post-communist 
Croatia. See Slobodanka Bundalo "Images of 
Women in Croatian Daily Newspapers" Women's 
Informational and Documentation Centre, Croatia, 
1997; Silva Me)narire "Women in Croatia and 
Slovenia: a Case of Delayed Modernization" in 
Marilyn Rueschmeyer (ed.) Women in the Politics 
0/Post-communist Eastern Europe (New York: 
M.E. Sharpe Inc. 1994) 153-170. 
6 For example, in an interview with the 
independent newspaper, the Feral Tribune, in 
April 1997, a prominent Croatian sociologist 
referred to the Herzegovinian Croats as "Croatia's 
New Serbs" referring to the vilification of these 
newcomers by Croatian nationals. Herzegovinian 
Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, are 
allowed to hold Croatian passports and 
identification, vote in Croatian elections, have 
Croatian license plates, fly the Croatian flag and 
use Croatian currency (kuna). Many attribute their 
meteoric political and economic rise in Croatia to 
the influence of hard-line Herzegovinians in key 
positions in President Tudjman's government. One 
example of the influence of the now powerful 
Herzegovinian lobby in Croatia comes from the 
daily televised weather report, which displays a 
regional map demarcating each of the former 
Yugoslav republics with distinctive borders and 
colours, all with the exception of Bosnia­
Herzegovina. Although the official Bosnia­
Herzegovinian border (with Croatia) is displayed, 
western and northern sections of Bosnia are 
shaded in the same colour as the Republic of 
Croatia. 
7 A recurring theme in newspaper and television 
coverage since the January 2000 elections 
concerns the apportioning of blame for the decline 
in the standard of living on the HDZ and their 

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Anthropology of East Europe Review 

allies, many of whom are seen as largely 
responsible for engaging in or condoning 
corruption and war-profiteering. Government 
leaders and politicians endlessly point fingers at 
each other over their alleged corruption during the 
Tudjman regime. 

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