Selected Papers of AoIR 2016:  

The 17th Annual Conference of the  
Association of Internet Researchers 

Berlin, Germany / 5-8 October 2016 
 

 

Hews,  R.  (2016,  October  5-­8).  High  profile  criminal  trials,  social  media  conversations  and  juror  prejudice:  
Understanding  media  regulation  in  the  digital  age.  Paper  presented  at  AoIR  2016:  The  17th  Annual  
Conference  of  the  Association  of  Internet  Researchers.  Berlin,  Germany:  AoIR.  Retrieved  from  
http://spir.aoir.org. 
 
 

HIGH-­PROFILE  CRIMINAL  TRIALS,  SOCIAL  MEDIA  CONVERSATIONS  
AND  JUROR  PREJUDICE:  UNDERSTANDING  MEDIA  REGULATION  IN  
THE  DIGITAL  AGE  
 
Rachel  Hews  
Queensland  University  of  Technology,  Brisbane,  Australia  
  
Governments  and  courts  around  the  world  are  increasingly  concerned  about  the  
potential  for  social  media  conversations  to  cause  juror  bias  and  jeopardise  the  right  of  
an  accused  to  a  fair  trial  (Bartels  &  Lee,  2013;;  Johnston  et  al.,  2013;;  Keyzer,  Johnston,  
Pearson,  Rodrick,  &  Wallace,  2013;;  Wallace,  Keyzer,  Johnston,  Pearson,  &  Rodrick,  
2013;;    Hannaford-­Agor,  Rottman  &  Waters,  2011;;Tait,  2011;;  Thomas,  2010).  
Information  that  might  prejudice  an  ongoing  trial  may  be  spread  through  social  media  in  
a  way  that  is  not  as  easily  controlled  as  information  disseminated  through  mainstream  
media.  The  rise  of  social  media  enables  prejudicial  comments  made  by  individuals,  
including  comments  as  to  a  person’s  perceived  guilt  or  innocence,  to  reach  a  much  
larger  potential  audience.  There  are  significant  fears  that  even  small  numbers  of  highly  
prejudicial  posts  on  social  media  could  influence  a  jury  if  those  posts  are  made  to  a  
large  audience  or  widely  amplified  by  other  users.  It  is  also  possible  that  the  collective  
weight  of  low-­level  prejudicial  information  on  social  media  may  work  to  influence  juries.  
The  increasing  prevalence  of  social  media  accordingly  raises  important  questions  about  
the  potential  for  unregulated  prejudicial  information  to  influence  juries  and  the  outcome  
of  trials.  
  
As  a  discrete  case  study,  we  used  digital  methods  to  investigate  Twitter  conversations  
during  the  high-­profile  murder  trial  of  Gerard  Baden-­Clay  (R  v  Baden-­Clay  (2014)  QSC  
154).  We  undertook  a  discourse  analysis  of  tweets  during  the  trial  to  assess  the  
prevalence  of  prejudicial  conversations,  identify  the  main  actors  involved  in  publishing  
and  amplifying  (or  suppressing)  prejudicial  information,  and  understand  how  users  
engage  with  that  information  (Robson,  2002).    We  then  used  these  findings  to  complete  
a  doctrinal  analysis  of  how  appropriately  the  sub  judice  contempt  doctrine,  which  
prohibits  the  publication  of  prejudicial  information  by  mainstream  media  during  a  trial,  
appears  to  be  operating  in  the  context  of  social  media.    
  
To  obtain  our  data  we  extracted  tweets  that  matched  the  date  range  of  the  trial  and  
associated  keywords  and  hashtags,  as  well  as  any  tweets  that  directly  referenced  those  



tweets,  from  the  Australian  Twitter  Collection.1  We  categorised  a  sample  of  these  tweets  
according  to  whether  their  content  contained  prejudicial  information  and  then  counted  
the  frequency  of  each  category  (Denzin  &  Lincoln,  2011).  The  coding  scheme  was  
informed  by  the  legal  principles  of  sub  judice  contempt.2  A  tweet  was  classified  as  
prejudicial  where  its  contents  contained:  statements  as  to  guilt  (Attorney-­General  (NSW)  
v  Radio  2UE  Sydney  Pty  Ltd  and  John  Laws  [1998]  NSWSC  28);;  statements  as  to  
innocence  (Director  of  Public  Prosecutions  v  Wran  (1987)  86  FLR  92);;  content  that  
criticized  or  disparaged  the  accused  (Director  of  Public  Prosecutions  v  Francis  (2006)  
95  SASR  302);;  information  about  confessions  (Attorney-­General  (NSW)  v  TCN  Channel  
Nine  Pty  Ltd  (1990)  20  NSWLR  368)  or  information  about  prior  convictions  (Maxwell  v  
Director  of  Public  Prosecutions  [1935]  AC  309). We  also  separated  tweets  from  
accounts  that  were  identifiable  as  professional  journalists  from  tweets  posted  by  other  
users.  We  made  this  distinction  so  that  we  could  understand  whether  media  
professionals—who  are  required  both  by  their  institutions  and  at  law  to  operate  within  
the  constraints  of  the  sub  judice  contempt  doctrine—converse  about  trials  in  a  different  
way  to  those  who  are  not  accountable  to  an  employer  or  who  may  not  be  aware  of  the  
law.    
  
This  paper  presents  a  useful  opportunity  to  develop  the  application  of  digital  methods  
for  legal  analysis  and  policy  reform  (Rogers,  2013).  Traditional  media  regulation  makes  
it  unlawful  to  publish  prejudicial  information  about  pending  criminal  trials  (R  v  Daily  
Mirror  (1927)  1  KB  845).  By  imposing  liability  on  those  responsible  for  publications  such  
as  journalists,  editors,  producers  and  proprietors  of  media  organisations  (New  South  
Wales  Law  Reform  Commission,  2003),  it  has  generally  been  possible  to  limit  juror  
exposure  to  prejudice  in  the  mass  media  and  thereby  preserve  juror  impartiality  (Ex  
parte  Auld;;  Re  Consolidated  Press  Ltd  (1936)  36  SR  NSW  596)  and  the  right  to  a  fair  
trial.  However,  the  decentralised  nature  of  social  media  makes  it  difficult  to  prevent  
prejudicial  information  from  being  published  on  the  internet.  To  date,  however,  legal  
analyses  have  generally  not  been  able  to  consider  the  extent  to  which  prejudicial  
information  does  actually  circulate  on  social  media.  While  this  study  is  limited  to  a  set  of  
tweets  posted  by  accounts  identified  as  Australian,  it  provides  an  opportunity  to  
examine  more  closely  how  discussions  about  ongoing  criminal  trials  actually  play  out.  In  
particular,  this  research  seeks  to  understand  how  potentially  prejudicial  information  
flows  on  these  networks,  given  that  a  substantial  proportion  of  the  discourse  continues  
to  be  dominated  by  news  from  mainstream  media  organisations.  It  seeks  particularly  to  
understand  whether  tweets  containing  prejudicial  information  are  highly  visible  or  not,  
rather  than  assuming  at  the  outset  that  social  media  will  likely  prejudice  ongoing  trials.  
In  this  context,  this  paper  then  develops  a  legal  analysis  of  the  operation  of  traditional  
media  regulation,  to  consider  how  well  adapted  it  is  for  regulating  prejudicial  information  
in  the  social  media  environment.    
  
     

                                                
1  This  research  is  supported  by  infrastructure  provided  through  the  Australian  Research  Council  funded  Tracking  
Infrastructure  for  Social  Media  Analysis  (TRISMA  LIEF  LE140100148).  
2  A  publication  will  be  in  sub  judice  contempt  of  court  where  it  has,  ‘as  a  matter  of  practical  reality,  a  tendency  to  
interfere  with  the  course  of  justice  in  a  particular  case’  (John  Fairfax  &  Sons  Pty  Ltd  and  Reynolds  v  McRae,  1955)  



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