




































AGAINST METHODISM: A SOCIO-HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF SCIENCE 

Lukman Ademola LAWAL 

 

Abstract 

The received view of science is that of an objective enterprise which possesses the rational 

methods of inquiry which produce knowledge that is based on factual experience. Science 

claims to be the most reliable inquiry into the nature of reality; due to the supposed 

supremacy of the so called ―scientific method‖ over those of other intellectual endeavours. 

However, the idea of ―method‖ in science is itself a source of controversy to philosophers of 

science over the years. Indeed, scientists themselves do not bother so much about matters 

of methodology and as such, there is no unanimous agreement amongst scientists of the 

specific method which determines the techniques and procedures guiding their inquiry into 

nature. This notwithstanding, there have been several formulations of the scientific 

method as evident in the works of some scientists and philosophers of science alike over 

the years. The method of induction which was first explained by Aristotle was elaborated 

by Francis Bacon and later prepared the groundwork for logical empiricism and modern 

empirical science. Inductivism later became challenged by Karl Popper who declared that 

science only progresses by ―conjecture and refutation.‖ This paper argues in line with the 

socio-historical and pragmatic conception of science advanced by the likes of Thomas 

Khun, Paul Feyerabend, Richard Rorty among others that the scientific enterprise is not 

guided by a definite method, but by certain arbitrary activities that are relative to socio-

cultural backgrounds. The paper further contends that the very idea of science is not to be 

viewed solely from a Western perspective, which gave birth to the appellation 

―Western Science,‖ rather it should be seen in the light of the systematic attempts by every 

society and culture to understand, explain and predict their natural environment. 

Keywords: Science, Empiricism, Socio-historical Method, Inquiry 

 

1. Introduction 

Science has crafted for itself an identity, which is that it serves as the paradigm of 

rationality and as the sole model of truth. It also prides itself as possessing the most 

powerful problem-solving tools of objectivity and rationality. However, one fundamental 

question that bothers philosophers of science is: what exact method, if any, is responsible 

for the tremendous successes recorded by science in the past two to three centuries? Peter 

Medawar (the Nobel prizewinning scientist) attempted to respond to the above question 

when he contends that even scientists themselves do not have a unanimous agreement 

upon a specific scientific method that guides all scientists in carrying out their inquiries on 

natural  phenomena.  Thus,  in  the  words  of  Medawar,  scientists  ―are  not  in  the  habit  of 

thinking about matters of methodological policy. Ask a scientist what he conceives the 

scientific method to be, and he will adopt an expression that is at once solemn and shifty- 



Lawal Against Methodism: A Socio-Historical … 

 

eyed: solemn, because he feels he ought to declare an opinion; shifty-eyed, because he is 

wondering how to conceal the fact that he has no opinion to declare‖ (Medawar, 1984: 80). 
 

Furthermore, and in allusion to the thoughts of Medawar, scientists are of the habit of 

regarding disciplines such as political science, theology, education, and even philosophy 

as  pseudo-sciences  (false  sciences)  or  as  falling  in  the  class  of  the  so  called  ―irrelevant 

disciplines‖, but they (scientists) themselves  are unable to  state  with precision, ―what  it 

means to be scientific.‖ Moreover, if we do not have a clear-cut understanding of the 

specific methods, principles and techniques that aid scientists in going about their 

everyday inquiries, then we obviously cannot make much sense of the very idea of 

science. However, only a few scientists have shown interest in the methodology of 

science, as such; thereby leaving the conceptualization and critical evaluation of the idea 

of scientific method to philosophers of science. This explains Richard Feynman‘s claim 

that:  ―Philosophy  of  science  is  about  as  useful  to  scientists  as  ornithology  is  to  birds‖ 

(Nola & Sankey, 2007: 2). 
 

In view of the foregoing, the task we set out to achieve in this paper is to attempt a 

succinct clarification of the very idea of ―scientific method‖, while also delving into some 

of the key issues and concepts involved in any discussion of scientific method. This paper 

would examine contentious debate in the philosophy of science about whether there exists 

or not a method of operation in the sciences. 

 

2. The Very Idea of “Scientific Method” 

As hinted above, science is supposed by its practitioners (particularly of the positivist 

orientation) to be the paradigm of rationality, but the methodology and techniques of 

operation that have aided its success have not bothered scientists themselves so much. 

Alan Chalmers, in the introduction to the third edition of his work, What is this thing 

called science? expresses that: 
 

Science is highly esteemed. Apparently, it is a widely held 

belief that there is something special about science and its 

methods. The naming of some claims or line of reasoning or 

piece of research ―scientific‖ is done in a way that is intended to 

imply some kind of merit or special kind of reliability. But 

what, if anything, is so special about science? What is this 

―scientific    method‖    that    allegedly    leads    to    especially 

meritorious or reliable results? (Chalmers, 1999: xix). 



Aquino Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 1(1), 

 

For the purpose of conceptual clarification, Robert Nola and Howard Sankey in their co- 

authored work, The Theories of Scientific Method, trace the origin of the word ―method‖ 

to Ancient Greek methodos, which according to them ―has its roots in the idea of being 

crafty or cunning. Later for the Greeks it came to mean ―the pursuit of knowledge‖ or ―a 

way of enquiry‖ (literally, ―way of pursuit‖)(Nola & Sankey, 2007). In Modern times, the 

common understanding of the word, ―method‖, is that of a way of carrying out an activity 

in  accordance  with  a  plan  or  set  out  procedure.  According  to  Isaac  Sheffler,  ―scientific 

method‖  ―is  the  way  techniques  are  selected  in  science;  that  is,  the  evaluation  of 

alternative courses of scientific action‖ (Sheffler, 1963: 5). This definition already contrasts   

the   term   ―scientific   method‖   with   ―scientific   technique‖.   This   makes   it imperative 

to draw a distinction between both terms. Scientific technique is the particular way of 

applying a scientific tool or way of undertaking a scientific course of action. It involves 

how a scientific course of action or research program is being carried out, while scientific 

method refers to the rules of decision that guide the scientist on which particular technique 

to employ. Put simply, methods are the rules of making choices, while techniques are the 

choices being made. 
 

One must acknowledge the fact that the distinction between scientific method and 

scientific technique is difficult to spell out. However, there is a more technical sense in 

which the concept of ―scientific method‖ is employed, to refer to the general procedures for 

carrying out research in the sciences. This is the sense in which Arthur C. Danto construes 

the term. For him, scientific method consists in ―(a) explaining natural processes through 

identification of the natural causes responsible for them and (b) testing any given 

explanation with regard to consequences that must hold if it is true‖(Danto, 1972: 448). 

This  conception  of  ―scientific  method‖  has  received  wide  acceptance  from  scientific 

theorists, including Morris Cohen and Ernest Nagel who endorse it as the ―most assured 

technique man has yet devised for controlling the flux of things and establishing stable 

beliefs‖ (Cohen & Nagel, 1934: 49-50). 
 

There are certain identified procedural stages that are followed in the practice of scientific 

methods. However, scientists are not unanimous about the specific number of such stages. 

This is what Robert Nola and Howard Sankey both recognize as the different 

methodological  practices  within  the  sciences,  which  they  list  out  as:  ―observational 

practices, material practices in experimentation and mathematical practices.‖ For them, 

―they are part of the proper use of acquired skills and abilities embodied in our knowing 

how to observe, how to experiment and how to calculate‖ (Robert Nola& Howard 

Sankey,2007: 13). This shares similarity with the three phases of scientific method listed 

by  A.  D‘Abro,  namely;  the  ―observational  stage‖,  ―the  experimental  stage‖  and  ―the 

mathematical stage‖(D‘Abro, 1951: 77). 



Lawal Against Methodism: A Socio-Historical … 

 
3. Rules of Inference in Scientific Practice 

There are two commonly recognized rules of inference that aid scientists in arriving at 

conclusions or generalizations, namely: the inductive rule of inference and the deductive 

rule of inference. It was Aristotle who first explained how induction works in science in 

his Organon. He explains the principle of induction as a way of getting knowledge of the 

universal by making inference from our knowledge of particulars. In his NovumOrganum, 

Francis Bacon also discussed the importance of induction in the sciences. As shall be seen 

in the following section in this paper, Isaac Newton also appeals to the method of 

induction in his account of the rules of scientific method, which are clearly stated in Rule 

3 and Rule 4 of his Principia, Book III. However, David Hume came to hold a fierce 

attack against the method of inductive inference in science. The deductive rule of 

inference, as against induction begins from making inferences from a general proposition 

or statement, then narrowing it down to particular propositions. The deductive system 

proceeds from the universal to the particular. The logical deductive rule of inference is 

therefore the method of drawing particular conclusions from general principles or laws as 

being common in the sciences. Both induction and deduction are methods of inference 

being used commonly by scientists in day to day scientific activities. In the philosophy of 

science, the both methods have been put under scrutiny as they require justifications as to 

how reliable they are in leading scientists to accurate conclusions or generalizations. 

 

4. Formulations of Scientific Method in the History of Science 

Principles or rules that guide scientific thought and practice can be traced down to earlier 

formulations by the likes of Rene Descartes, Isaac Newton and Duhem. It is presumed that 

the principles or rules of scientific methodology formulated by the aforementioned 

influenced later theorists of scientific method like Karl Popper and Imre Lakatos. Rene 

Descartes proposed an early theory of scientific method in his Discourse on Method. He 

projected the aim of science as being the attainment of certain or indubitable truths or 

knowledge. This is evident in his rules 1 and 2. Rule 1 states that: ―The aim of our studies 

should be to direct the mind with a view to forming true and sound judgements about 

whatever comes before it.‖ Rule 2 states that:―We should attend only to those objects of 

which our minds seem capable of having certain and indubitable cognition‖ (See Rene 

Descartes, Discourse on Method).However, certainty has come to be criticized as an aim 

for science, since most scientific theories are specified with a degree of error, thereby 

making certainty too high an objective for scientific theories to meet. In his rule 3, 

Descartes set out to construct a line of demarcation between science and pseudo-science, 

by stating that: ―Concerning objects proposed for study, we ought to investigate what we 

can clearly and evidently intuit or deduce with certainty, and not what other people have 

thought or what we ourselves conjecture. For knowledge (scientia) can be attained in no 

other way‖ (See Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method).Here he secludes conjectural and 

untested beliefs from science and claims that only that which is certified by our intuitions, 



Aquino Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 1(1), 

 

testing and inferred by valid deductions qualify as scientific knowledge. In his rule 4, 

Descartes endorsed the idea of methodology in scientific practice, by making the claim 

that ―we need a method if we are to investigate the truth of things.‖ He then proceeded to 

clarify his idea of method in science, expressing that: ―by ‗a method‘ I mean reliable rules 

which are easy to apply and such that if one follows them exactly, one will never take 

what is false to be true … but will gradually and constantly increase one‘s knowledge‖ 

(See Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method). 
 

Isaac Newton on his part helped lay down the platform for inductive inference in scientific 

reasoning, as being evident in his rules 3 and 4 of his Principia, Book III, ―The System of 

the World‖, as follows: Rule 3: Those qualities of bodies that cannot be intended and 

remitted (i.e. qualities that cannot be increased or diminished) and that belong to all bodies 

on which experiments can be made, should be taken as qualities of all bodies universally. 

Rule 4: In experimental philosophy, propositions gathered from phenomena by induction 

should be considered either exactly or very nearly true not withstanding any contrary 

hypotheses, until yet other phenomena make such propositions either more exact or liable 

to exception (Newton, 1999). 
 

In Rule 3, Newton was particularly concerned with how to make generalizations from 

particular instances of experiments being carried out. Put in other words, he wanted to be 

assured of the plausibility of attributing properties assigned to particular objects being 

experimented to other objects elsewhere on earth or in other possible worlds. The essence 

of his Rule 4 is to affirm the status of science as an essentially experimental philosophy or 

enterprise.  For  him,  whatever  is  not  ―deduced  from  the  phenomena‖,  or  inferred  from 

experimentation should be discarded as mere ―hypothesis‖ and as such, unscientific. Emile 

Duhem is one who weighs against Newton‘s adoption of the principle of inductive 

inference, claiming that there is bound to be a contradiction in inference from premises to 

conclusion when taking such rules seriously. This he expressed in the following words: 

―we  have  recognized  that  it  is  impossible  to  construct  a  theory  by  a  purely  inductive 

method. Newton and Ampere failed in this‖ (Emile Duhem, 1954). 

 

5. Scientific Method According to Logical Positivism 

Logical positivism is a 19
th

 Century movement which proposed a radical view of science 

and philosophy, thereby changing the entire outlook and perceptions of those two fields. 

Logical positivism gave rise to the bifurcation of human knowledge into two broad 

divisions, which include: knowledge or statements based on empirical verification or fact 

and statements that are true in virtue of their meanings or terms. The likes of Alfred Jules 

Ayer, Moritz Schlick, Carl G. Hempel, and others are considered as logical positivists, due 

to their quest of ridding philosophy of its metaphysical or non-scientific impurities. The 

movement of logical positivism or Modern empiricism proposed a criterion of 



Lawal Against Methodism: A Socio-Historical … 

 

meaningfulness, which applies to all intellectual endeavors, including philosophy, 

theology, science and the rest. For the positivists, it is important to seek the authenticity or 

credibility of every idea of claim before accepting such ideas, and this can be done by 

demanding for the original sense impressions from which the ideas were derived. 
 

The criterion of meaningfulness developed by the logical positivists is often considered to 

be a fall-out of the theoretical hypothesis developed by David Hume concerning the two 

criteria of significance, which involves seeking the impression from which every idea is 

apprehended, and also by distinguishing between the relations of ideas and matters of fact. 

Hume expresses this fundamental criterion of significance in the following passage: 
 

When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what 

havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume; of 

divinity or school metaphysics, for instance, let us ask, does it 

contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? 

No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning 

matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames 

for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion (Hume, 

1975: 165). 
 

The demarcation between knowledge that contains abstract reasoning (analytic statements) 

and knowledge that contains fact and existence (synthetic statements) in the above passage 

attributed to Hume gave solid grounds to the principle of significance and demarcation 

developed by the logical positivists, which is regarded as the verifiability principle. The 

verifiability principle or empirical verification implies that for any piece of knowledge or 

discipline to be regarded as being meaningful or significant, such knowledge must have to 

pass the test of empirical verification, and as such, must be in principle, verifiable by 

experience. The emphasis on empirical verifiability by the logical positivists implies that 

any discipline that is devoid of meaningful statements which are classified on the basis of 

their analytic and empirical features; are to be regarded as being irrelevant to the progress 

of human knowledge, and should therefore be jettisoned. The verifiability principle 

represents not only a tool of demarcation between science and pseudo-science, both also 

method of identifying and solving scientific problems generally adopted by the logical 

positivists.  This  is  more  affirmed  in  Moritz  Schlick‘s  contention  that:  ―the  meaning  of 

every proposition is finally to be determined by the given, and by nothing else‖ (Ayer, 

1959:   88-89).   The   ―given‖   mentioned   by  Schlick   implies   propositions   testable   by 

empirical evidence. 

 

6. The Critical Rationalism of Karl Popper 

A thorough-going antagonist of the principle of inductivism is Karl Popper, who considers 

every attempt to ground scientific practice on the foothold of inductivism a misguided 



Aquino Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 1(1), 

 

endeavour. KarlPopper is notable for his popular doctrine of falsificationism which he 

prefers as an alternative to inductivism. This, Alan Chalmers expresses in the following 

words:  ―Karl  Popper  was  the  most  forceful  advocate  of  an  alternative  to  inductivism 

which  I  will  refer  to  as  ―falsificationism‖  (Chalmers,  1999:  59).   Popper  associates  his 

principle of verificationism with his vision of a scientific method. Popper illustrates the 

idea of method in science in the following words: 
 

A scientist, whether theorist or experimenter, puts forward 

statements, or systems of statements, and tests them step by 

step. In the field of the empirical sciences, more particularly, he 

constructs hypotheses, or systems of theories, and tests them 

against experience by observation and experiment. I suggest 

that it is the task of the logic of scientific discovery, or the logic 

of knowledge, to give a logical analysis of this procedure; that 

is, to analyse the method of the empirical sciences. But what 

are these ‗methods of the empirical sciences‘? And what do we 

call ‗empirical science‘?(Popper, 1959: 3). 
 

Closely associated here, as reflected in the above passage, are ‗methods of empirical 

sciences‘ and the conception of what ‗empirical science‘ is. For Popper, the falsifiability 

principle is the criterion of demarcation of what falls within empirical science and what 

fails to. This principle is also closely identified with his idea of ‗logic of discovery‘ which 

is the scientific method. The scientific method therefore aids us in understanding what 

science is. Popper expresses the link between his principle of demarcation 

(falsificationism) and his idea of scientific method in the following passage: 
 

In accordance with my proposal made above, epistemology, or 

the logic of scientific discovery, should be identified with the 

theory of scientific method. The theory of method, in so far as 

it goes beyond the purely logical analysis of the relations 

between scientific statements, is concerned with the choice of 

methods – with decisions about the way in which scientific 

statements are to be dealt with. These decisions will of course 

depend in their turn upon the aim which we choose from 

among a number of possible aims. The decision here proposed 

for laying down suitable rules for what I call the ‗empirical 

method‘ is closely connected with my criterion of demarcation: 

I propose to adopt such rules as will ensure the testability of 

scientific statements; which is to say, their falsifiability 

(Popper, 1959: 27). 



Lawal Against Methodism: A Socio-Historical … 

 

However, Popper does not conceive of the idea of scientific method in terms of rules of 

discovery, or rules of justification of hypothesis or theory or principles for ascertaining the 

truth of a theory. For him, the aim of science should not be the attainment of truth, nor 

should scientific theories be judged or evaluated on the basis of meeting the criterion of 

truth. Rather, scientific theories can only serve as approximations of truth. Alan Chalmers, 

expressing Popper‘s idea of methodology, puts it thus: 
 

Falsificationists freely admit that observation is guided by and 

presupposes theory. They are also happy to abandon any claim 

implying that theories can be established as true or probably 

true in the light of observational evidence. Theories are 

construed as speculative and tentative conjectures or guesses 

freely created by the human intellect in an attempt to overcome 

problems encountered by previous theories to give an adequate 

account of some aspects of the world or universe. Once 

proposed, speculative theories are to be rigorously and 

ruthlessly tested by observation and experiment. Theories that 

fail to stand up to observational and experimental tests must be 

eliminated and replaced by further speculative conjuctures. 

Science progresses by trial and error, by conjectures and 

refutations. Only the fittest theories survive (Chalmers, 1999: 

60). 

 

 

It is not appropriate to consider a theory as being true following Popper‘s line of 

reasoning, but what we can say about a theory is that it is the best available confirmation 

of observed experience that is available to us and is more reliable than the previous 

theories. What according to Popper, can be considered as method in the empirical sciences 

are succinctly expressed by Jack Aigbodioh as ―continuous efforts on the part of scientists 

to refute or falsify existing theories on the basis of some possible or conceivable 

observations‖ (Aigbodioh, 1997: 25). What scientists should be preoccupied with therefore 

is the activity of fixing truths and beliefs and trying to prepare them for acceptance or 

justification. On the basis of these central assumptions, Popper goes on to give two 

examples of rules of scientific method: 
 

Rule (1): The game of science is, in principle, without end. He who decides one 

day that scientific statements do not call for any further test, and that they can be regarded 

as finally verified, retires from the game. 



Aquino Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 1(1), 

 

Rule (2): Once a hypothesis has been proposed and tested, and has proved its 

mettle, it may not be allowed to drop out without ‗good reason‘. A ‗good reason‘ may be, 

for instance: replacement of the hypothesis by another which is better testable; or the 

falsification of one of the consequences of the hypothesis (Popper, 1959: 32). 
 

Underlying these rules of method given by Popper is the falsifiability thesis which is the 

rule of demarcation of science from pseudo-science. Falsificationism simply states that a 

theory which is not falsifiable does not belong to empirical science. Therefore, any theory 

which claims to be compatible with all observable facts is not falsifiable and therefore 

unscientific. Such theories never go wrong as they always find ways to accommodate any 

instances  of  change.  According  to  Chalmers,  ―Popper  drew  the  moral  that  genuine 

scientific theories, by making definite predictions, rule out a range of observable states of 

affairs in a way that he considered Freudian and Marxists theory failed to. He arrived at 

his key idea that scientific theories are falsifiable‖ (Chalmers 1999: 60). 
 

Imre Lakatos came under the influence of Karl Popper, whose approach to science he 

finds interesting. Lakatos also drew influence from Kuhn‘s epic publication, The Structure 

of Scientific Revolutions. Although Popper and Kuhn proposed rival views of science, 

their views share much in common. Both Popper and Kuhn roundly reject positivism and 

inductivism, basing their accounts of the acceptance or rejection of the results of 

observation and experimentation in science on the background of theory or paradigm. 

Lakatos was careful not to follow the relativist dimension of Kuhn‘s account of science. 

Just like Kuhn, he considered scientific research or activity as taking place within a 

framework,  which  he  called  ―research    program.‖Lakatos‘s  major  task  was  to  modify 

Popper‘s notion of falsificationism while examining some of its deficiencies. Popper‘s 

falsificationism does not state it clear how to identify faults with scientific theories, that is 

which particular aspect of a theory should be held liable to revision. Popper only suggests 

that it is left to the discretion of the individual scientist to identify where the fault is within 

the theory. For Lakatos, science cannot progress that way, not all parts of a scientific 

theory are equal, rather, what we have are basic principles or laws which form the core of 

a theory and the less fundamental ones which only form the peripheral parts of the theory. 

The basic principles represent the defining feature of a science and as such are not to 

blame for any failure that occurs in the theory. What should be held responsible for any 

apparent failure within the theory are the less fundamental components. Alan Chalmers 

summarizes Lakatos‘ conception of science in the following articulation: ―A science can 

then be seen as the programmatic development of the implications of the fundamental 

principles. Scientists can seek to solve problems by modifying the more peripheral 

assumptions as they see fit. In so far as their efforts are successful, they will be 

contributing to the development of the same research program however different their 

attempts to tinker with the peripheral assumptions might be‖(Chalmers 1999), p. 131.Over 

time, the task of scientists is to continually fix the ―protective belt‖, that is, the sum of the 



Lawal Against Methodism: A Socio-Historical … 

 

additional hypothesis occupying the periphery in other to protect the hard core from 

falsification. In the words of Lakatos: 
 

Scientific research programmes may be characterized by their 

‗hardcore‘. The negative heuristic of the programme forbids us 

to direct themodus tollens at this 'hard core'. Instead, we must 

use our ingenuityto articulate or even invent 'auxiliary 

hypotheses', which form aprotective belt around this core, and 

we must redirect the modus tollensto these. It is this protective 

belt of auxiliary hypotheses which has tobear the brunt of tests 

and get adjusted and re-adjusted, or even completely replaced, 

to defend the thus-hardened core. A research programme is 

successful if all this leads to a progressive problem shift; 

unsuccessful if it leads to a degenerating problem shift 

(Lakatos, 1978: 48). 
 

Lakatos sets out guidelines for work within a research program, in terms of negative 

heuristics and positive heuristics. A heuristic is a set of rules or hints which serves as a 

tool in aiding invention or discovery. Making the essential distinction between negative 

heuristics and positive heuristics, Lakatos writes that: 
 

The negative heuristic specifies the 'hardcore' of the 

programme which is 'irrefutable by the methodological 

decision of its proponents; the positive heuristic consists of a 

partially articulated set of suggestions or hints on how to 

change, develop the ‗refutable variants‘ of the research- 

programme, how to modify, sophisticate, the ‗refutable‘ 

protective belt(Lakatos, 1978: 50). 
 

The negative heuristics help to specify what scientist are advised not to do, such as 

tampering with the hard core of the program. The positive heuristics of the program on the 

other hand specifies what scientists should do rather than what they should not do, guiding 

on how to protect the hard core by additional hypothesis which constitute the protective 

belt, which is in turn in need of constant modifications. What counts as the indicating 

factor of the merit of a research program is the extent to which it leads to novel predictions 

that are confirmed rather than falsified. When a research program leads to confirmed novel 

predictions, while retaining its coherence, it is said to be progressive, while a research 

program is degenerating when it fails to retain its coherence and at the same time is unable 

to yield novel predictions that are confirmed. The switch from degenerating research 

programs to the progressive ones represents Lakatos‘ own idea of a scientific revolution. 



Aquino Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 1(1), 

 
7. Reviewing Science Socio-historically 

As earlier discussed in this paper, science is widely acclaimed to be the paradigm of 

rationality and as well possessing the scientific method, which is said to be responsible for 

the achievements recorded by science over the past two centuries. It has also been brought 

to fore in this paper that the general procedures for carrying out research in the sciences 

that we may call the scientific method, lacks clear-cut procedural stages. How then can a 

method that lacks defined procedural stages be held superior to other methods of inquiry? 
 

The popular and rational image of science, that of being the paradigm of rationality and 

objective knowledge, and the possession of a powerful method of enquiry which is 

superior to other methods, as well as the Popperian notion of science as a system of 

falsification coupled with Lakatos‘ idea of science as a research program have all come 

under attack by Thomas Kuhn and his allies. Kuhn argues that neither logic nor 

observation, or any rational method plays a role in the account of theory formation. For 

him, science is not guided by any definite method but a system of arbitrary activities. As 

against the popular image of science as an intellectual engagement in constant pursuit of 

truth, Kuhn gives an account of scientific progress in terms of a shift in paradigms. 

Thomas Kuhn‘s 1962 publication, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, had a 

revolutionary implication for scientific practice and changed the popular outlook of 

science as a system of falsification and as a paradigm of knowledge. For Kuhn, science 

should not be regarded as the only paradigm of knowledge and model of truth. Kuhn‘s 

contention is that the scientific enterprise is not guided by a definable method but by a 

system of continual shifts from one paradigm to another. Kuhn clarifies his notion of 

scientific    paradigm    by   stating   that    they   are    ―universally   recognized    scientific 

achievements that, for a time, provide model problems and solutions for a community of 

researchers‖ (Kuhn, 1970: 10).A scientific paradigm incorporates a set of theoretical 

assumptions or axioms that are agreed upon or accepted at a given time by a ‗scientific 

community.‘ For Kuhn, the use of scientific paradigms by scientists to solve particular 

problems that arise in the scientific community is ‗normal science.‘ 
 

According to Kuhn, there comes a time, no matter how successful a scientific paradigm is, 

when it becomes incapable of solving the problems it encounters. The consequence of this 

is that new paradigms are developed to solve and accommodate the problems that were ab 

initio unresolved by the old paradigm. In this kind of situation, where there is a problem of 

choice between the former paradigm and the new paradigm, a scientific revolution is said 

to have taken place. This further leads us to Kuhn‘s notion of incommensurability, since it 

is assumed that there are no common grounds or ―common coordinate systems‖ on which 

to compare and choose between two paradigms. The choice of a better paradigm, (whether 

the old or the new) is not facilitated by an objective system or method. The notion of 

incommensurability is that two paradigms can be so different that they cannot be 

compared in any way. The implication of Kuhn‘s revolutionary philosophy for our 



Lawal Against Methodism: A Socio-Historical … 

 

discourse is that the idea of objective truth or knowledge should be rejected, since for 

Kuhn, there are no fixed sets of facts about the world that are paradigm-neutral. For Kuhn, 

beliefs, opinions, theories and hypothesis about the world are dependent on paradigms and 

can change when paradigms change. Theories are therefore relative to paradigms. This 

contradicts the notion of the universal excellence of scientific enterprise that stands 

superior to all other systems of inquiry. 
 

Paul Feyerabend, the renowned methodological anarchist, in his 1975 publication, Against 

Method, attacks the very idea of the superiority of science to all other forms of inquiry. 

His fundamental assumption is that there is no such thing as scientific method which 

represents the surest and most reliable system of attaining rational certainty and objective 

knowledge. Feyerabend expresses his distaste for the idea of the universal excellence of 

science and the superiority of its methods of inquiry. In articulating Feyerabend‘s 

contempt for Methodism in all forms of inquiry, John Preston has it that Feyerabend raised 

such questions as: ―What‘s so great about knowledge?‖ ―What‘s so great about science?‖ 

―What‘s  so  great  about  truth?‖  ―How  does  science  differ  from  witchcraft?‖  ―Does  it 

(science) provide the only rational way of cognitively organizing our experience?‖ ―What 

should we do if the pursuit of truth cripples our intellects and stunts our individuality?‖ In 

response to these questions, Feyerabend held no idea or no person sacred(Preston, 2002: 

183). For Feyerabend, philosophers and scientists alike should free their mindsets and 

open doors to ―ideas from the most disparate and apparently far-flung domains, insisting 

that this is the only way they can understand how knowledge grows.‖
27

(Jimoh, 2013: 183). 

In Feyerabend‘s writings, he opines that the history of science does not project a unique or 

unifying rational method of inquiry, but a series of opportunistic, chaotic, and inventive 

attempts made by a particular ―community‖ (whether social or intellectual) to cope with 

immediate problems confronting them. The background of his methodological anarchism 

is that rationality is not only peculiar to science. In the introduction to his Against Method, 

Feyerabend   writes   that   ―Science   is   an   essentially   anarchic   enterprise.   Theoretical 

anarchism is more humanitarian and more likely to encourage progress than its law-and – 

order  alternatives‖  (Feyerabend,  1975:  9).He  then  goes  further  to  write  that:  ―This  is 

shown both by an examination of historical episodes and by an abstract analysis of the 

relation between idea and action. The only principle that does not inhibit progress is: 

anything goes‖ (Feyerabend, 1975: 14). The summation of his anarchist thesis is that there 

are no fixed, universal and absolutely binding principles that guide in conducting the 

business of science or other modes of inquiry. 
 

The socio-historical account of the nature of science can also be explained from the 

perspective of African traditional cultural practices. This can be regarded as a cultural 

conception of science, which regards science as being predicated upon the cultural 

attempts to explain, understand and interpret the natural phenomena surrounding a group 



Aquino Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 1(1), 

 

of people. The cultural conception of science falls in line with what Robert Bishop aptly 

describes as the activity conception of science, when he characterized science ―as a mode 

of human activity by which we have progressively gained control over our environment‖ 

(Bishop,  2007:  9).  Bishop  further  notes  that  this  view  is  ―closely  connected  with  craft 

traditions, artisans and technology, and emphasizes that scientific practices grew out of 

our ordinary ways of coping with the world‖ (Bishop, 2007).The African conception of 

science is based on the African conceptual scheme which gives an ontological 

categorization of reality which is essentially driven by the three-valued trait in African 

thought system. This three-valued trait which obtains in African thought systems is being 

described  by  Jonathan  Chimakonam  as  consisting  of  the  ―physical,  the  non-physical  as 

well as the union of the two‖ (Chimakonam, 2012: 33). The union of the physical and the 

non-physical dimensions of existence in African thought systems represent a 

comprehensive interpretation of reality, which stands in contrast to the two-valued trait 

conception of reality often attributed to Western science. The two-valued trait bifurcate 

reality into the physical and the spiritual while giving utmost preference to the physical 

over the spiritual or metaphysical aspects of reality. This explains why Western scientific 

knowledge is regarded as being essentially based on the facts of existence devoid of 

metaphysical excesses. However, the African cultural perspective of reality gives 

preference to a fuller dimension of reality, while combining the physical, non-physical and 

the union of the two in a unified system of explaining, understanding and interpreting the 

African reality. 

 

8. Conclusion 

This paper began by drawing attention to the popular and rational image of science in 

which science is regarded as the most reliable system of inquiry that yields objective 

knowledge. Science is so regarded because there is believed to be a system or method of 

inquiry that guarantees success or accuracy of experimental results in the sciences. This 

method itself is however, not so much taken by scientists with utmost seriousness, as they 

mostly fail to characterize what should constitute the scientific method. 
 

Part of what we have been able to do in this paper is to help analyze the concept of 

scientific method itself, taking us down through the trajectory from the earlier 

formulations of principles or rules of scientific methodology to the more recent ones. As 

evident in this paper, any worthy discussion of scientific methodology should not be 

deemed complete without an account of the ongoing discourse in the philosophy of 

science about the very existence of a method of inquiry in the sciences. However, most 

scientists would want to reckon that there is a ―scientific method‖ that aids in carrying out 

operations in the sciences, but this position is currently a controversial one in the 

philosophy of science. 



Lawal Against Methodism: A Socio-Historical … 

 
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