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In Defense of Moderate Moralism

CHRISTOPH BAUMBERGER

The practice of  architectural criticism is 
supercharged with ethical evaluations. We praise 
certain works of  architecture for their sustainability, 
their inspiring and enlivening character, their 
encouragement of  an autonomous and satisfying 
life for their users, or their contribution to the 
peaceful cohabitation of  different social or ethnic 
groups. We criticize other works for the harm they 
cause to the environment, for their negative impact 
on the health or well-being of  human beings, for 
the morally reprehensible attitudes they convey or 
the morally despicable functions they serve. Such 
assessments of  architectural works are of  an ethical 
nature, or at least possess an ethical dimension. I 
take this feature of  architectural criticism seriously 
and wish to address two questions1: Do ethical 
assessments of  architectural works have any bearing 
on their value as works of  architecture? And how 
is the ethical value of  an architectural work related 
to its aesthetic value? The answers I defend are, 
roughly, that the ethical value of  an architectural 
work has a bearing on its architectural value, and 
that the ethical and aesthetic value of  such a work 
have a bearing on each other. More precisely:

1) A work of  architecture will in some cases 
be architecturally flawed (or meritorious) due 
to the fact that it has ethical flaws (or merits).

2) A work of  architecture will in some cases 
be aesthetically flawed (or meritorious) due to 
the fact that it has ethical flaws (or merits).

3) A work of  architecture will in some cases 
be ethically flawed (or meritorious) due to the 

moderate 
moralism claims 

that the relations 
between the 

ethical value and 
the aesthetic and 

architectural 
value Are 

invariant and 
symmetric.

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fact that it has aesthetic flaws (or merits).

In claims 1 to 3, “work of  architecture” is to be understood in a very 
broad sense, including works of  artistic as well as of  everyday architecture, 
and buildings as well as other elements of  the built environment, such as 
bridges and squares.2 Such a broad notion of  an architectural work suits 
my purpose since buildings and other elements of  the built environment 
can – regardless of  whether they are artworks or not – be judged from an 
ethical as well as from an aesthetic point of  view, and it certainly makes 
sense to assess their overall value, what I call “architectural value”.3 The 
questions about the relation between ethical, aesthetic and architectural 
value arises thus for architectural works in the broad sense. Moreover, this 
broad notion is of  great importance since our built environment contains 
much more than buildings, and most of  what it contains are not (or, at 
least, are not typically considered to be) artworks.

In this article, my main concern is to defend claims 1 to 3. In my 
argument I will mention particular works of  architecture, but any detailed 
examination of  specific works is beyond the scope of  this article and will 
have to wait for another occasion. Before I defend my three core claims 
(sections 2 to 4), I first further specify the proposed view these claims 
substantiate, distinguish that view from opposing views and explain what 
is at stake in holding the view (section 1).

1. Moderate moralism

Claims 1 to 3 define what I call moderate moralism with respect to 
architecture. It is a form of  moralism for two reasons. Firstly, it claims that 
there is some ‘interaction’ between ethical assessments of  architectural 
works and their aesthetic and architectural assessments, where claims 1 
to 3 define the nature of  that interaction. This distinguishes moderate 
moralism from autonomism, which holds that ethical flaws or merits are 
never aesthetically and/or architecturally relevant; either because it makes 
no sense to morally evaluate works of  architecture (radical autonomism), 
or because the ethical assessment and the aesthetic or the architectural 
assessment of  an architectural work never interact (moderate autonomism). 
Secondly, moderate moralism claims that the relations between the 
ethical value and the aesthetic and architectural value are invariant and 
symmetric, i.e. positive ethical qualities are always associated with positive 
aesthetic and architectural qualities and negative ethical qualities are 
always associated with negative aesthetic and architectural qualities. This 
distinguishes it from contextualism, which agrees with moderate moralism 
that the ethical value of  a work of  architecture can have a bearing on the 



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aesthetic and architectural value, but takes it to be a 
contextual matter whether an ethical flaw or merit 
is aesthetically and/or architecturally meritorious or 
defective. According to contextualism, the relations 
between ethical, aesthetic and architectural values are 
complex and invertible, i.e. negative ethical qualities 
can in certain cases be associated with positive 
aesthetic or architectural qualities, and vice versa. In 
this respect, moderate moralism is more demanding 
than contextualism.4  What makes it nonetheless a 
moderate form of  moralism is that it does not claim 
that ethical assessments of  architectural works and 
their aesthetic and architectural assessments always 
interact.

My use of  the terms in italics differs from their 
usage within the recent debate on the relationship 
between art, aesthetics and morality.5 This is 
partly due to the fact that I deal with architecture 
whereas the recent debate is focused mainly on the 
representational arts, such as literature and painting. 
The main difference is that moderate moralism or 
(as Berys Gaut calls it) ethicism is usually defined 
only by a claim regarding the influence of  the 
ethical on the aesthetic, i.e. by a claim of  type 2. 
In particular, it does not involve anything which 
corresponds to the distinction between aesthetic 
and architectural value, and thus no claim of  type 
1. The value of  a piece of  literature or a painting is 
its aesthetic or, maybe, artistic value, but the value 
of  architectural works in my broad sense is, as we 
will see, not exhausted by their aesthetic value, and 
it cannot generally be identified with their artistic 
value since most buildings and other elements of  
the built environment are not artworks. Moreover, 
moderate moralism as it is usually defined does not 
include any claim regarding whether the aesthetic 
value of  a work has a bearing on its ethical value. 
But this question, addressed in claim 3, is especially 
pressing in the case of  architecture since due to their 
public character architectural works unavoidably 
affect people’s well-being. Hence my version 

My version 
of moderate 

moralism is more 
ambitious than 

the view is often 
characterized.

“

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of  moderate moralism is more ambitious than the view is customarily 
characterized as being.

Whether architects should regard themselves as moderate moralists 
has important implications for how they should conceive of  their 
profession. If  moderate moralism is correct about the relation between 
ethical, aesthetic and architectural values, then ethical considerations 
belong to the core of  architecture and must play a crucial role in design, 
planning and construction processes. Architects cannot dismiss ethical 
criticisms of  their works as irrelevant or misguided in principle. Moreover, 
they cannot defend ethical flaws of  their works by arguing that these flaws 
contribute to the aesthetic worth of  the works, as would be possible if  
contextualism were right; at most, they can argue that the ethical flaws in 
question are neither aesthetically nor architecturally relevant.

Before I turn to claims 1 to 3, here is what I mean by ethical, aesthetic 
and architectural values of  works of  architecture. Firstly, I construe the 
ethical in a wide sense, according to which it concerns normative questions 
regarding what is morally right or wrong, as well as evaluative questions 
regarding the good life. Thus the ethical value of  an architectural work 
includes its positive or negative contributions to the good life and the 
well-being of  people, as well as its promotion or violation of  moral rights 
or duties. Secondly, the aesthetic is also to be understood in a wide sense, 
according to which it concerns questions regarding aesthetic experiences 
and properties (aesthetic questions in a narrow sense), as well as questions 
specifically regarding artistic architecture, for instance, about artistic style, 
expression, genre and art-history. Beside its capacity to yield aesthetic 
experiences (aesthetic value in the narrow sense), the aesthetic value of  an 
architectural work with art-status thus also includes, for example, stylistic, 
expressive and art-historic qualities, which contribute to the artistic value 
of  the work. Aesthetic value cannot generally be identified with artistic 
value since we can aesthetically experience buildings and other elements 
of  the built environment which are not artworks. Such structures can thus 
have aesthetic value (in the narrow sense) even if  they do not have artistic 
value. Finally, I construe architectural value as the total value of  a work 
of  architecture as such. It includes all qualities appropriate to consider 
when evaluating an architectural work. Aesthetic properties are certainly 
among these qualities, but even in the case of  architectural works with art-
status they do not exhaust them. Thesis 1 claims that at least some ethical 
properties should also go into an overall evaluation of  an architectural 
work. I leave it open which further properties or values constitute 
architectural value, but it seems likely that utility,6 durability, social values 



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and cognitive values are also among the qualities 
that should be considered in an overall evaluation 
of  a work of  architecture. Architectural value can 
thus not be equated with the aesthetic or the artistic 
value of  an architectural work.

2. Ethical value and architectural value

Claim 1 states that architectural value partly 
depends on ethical value in such a manner that 
a work of  architecture will in some cases be 
architecturally flawed (or meritorious) due to the 
fact that it has ethical flaws (or merits). This might 
seem uncontroversial if  the architectural value 
represents the total value of  an architectural work. 
However, autonomists raise two objections against 
this first thesis. According to the first objection, 
we morally assess people (their actions, motives, 
intentions and characters), but it makes no sense 
to morally evaluate artifacts such as architectural 
works. Moral evaluations of  such works, so the 
objection goes, are based on a category mistake 
since moral criticism assumes moral responsibility 
and thus moral agency, but architectural works have 
no mental states and can thus not be moral agents.7

However, such artifacts as laws and 
constitutions, for instance, are also subject to moral 
evaluation. Hence, there is no general objection 
against artificial products of  human activity being 
subject to ethical assessment. Moreover, a closer 
look at critical practices reveals that we can and do 
morally evaluate architectural works.8 Firstly, we 
morally evaluate such works with respect to their 
planning, design, and construction processes. A 
building can, for instance, be ethically criticized 
due to a violation of  moral rights during its 
construction phase, at least in certain instances.9 
Secondly, we morally evaluate architectural works 
with respect to their impact on the environment. 
A building can, for instance, be ethically criticized 
due to its disproportionate emission of  pollutants, 



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energy consumption, and waste of  resources. Thirdly, we morally evaluate 
architectural works with respect to their impact on individuals and society. 
A building can, for instance, be ethically criticized because it negatively 
influences the health, well-being, or behavior of  individuals, and because 
of  its negative social ramifications. Finally, we morally evaluate architectural 
works with respect to their functions, symbolic meanings, and forms. 
Clearly, such aspects can be ethically evaluated regarding their impact on 
human beings and the environment. However, there may be reasons for 
ethically evaluating them regardless of  their impact. Some functions seem 
to be ethically objectionable, regardless of  whether they actually impair 
any person’s well-being. The symbolic meaning of  a building that expresses 
morally abject attitudes seems to deserve a negative ethical evaluation, 
regardless of  its actual influence on people. And Nigel Taylor has argued 
that the form of  a building which has obviously not received requisite care 
is ethically objectionable, regardless of  how it actually influences the well-
being of  persons.10 The first three ways to morally evaluate architectural 
works determine their extrinsic ethical value, since such evaluations 
concern the conditions under which the works are developed, as well as 
their causal effects. The last one establishes the intrinsic ethical value of  an 
architectural work, since such an evaluation concerns features of  the work 
itself, regardless of  how it affects people and the environment. Within the 
debate about the relation between ethical and aesthetic values of  artworks, 
the ethical value is often restricted to the intrinsic ethical value which, 
in turn, is typically construed solely in terms of  the ethical features of  
attitudes that the artwork manifests.11 However, such a conception of  
ethical value is too narrow for architecture and rules out consequentialist 
considerations from the beginning.

Thus there are senses in which judging architectural works along ethical 
lines appears reasonable and is common practice. But how should such 
ethical judgments be interpreted? It has been argued that such judgments 
should be re-described as evaluations of  what is done through the works 
by those who have participated in their realization and maintenance, and 
can be meaningfully considered responsible for.12 According to this view, 
the ethical appraisal is primarily directed towards people who commission, 
design, construct or use an architectural work, and only obliquely towards 
the work itself. Others have argued that we can at least take particular moral 
assessments of  architectural works at face value if  we distinguish between 
moral responsibility and moral accountability. From such a perspective, 
an architectural work itself  can be morally accountable, even though it 
cannot be made morally responsible due to its lack of  moral agency.13 My 
answer to the first objection against claim 1 does not require any decision 



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as to which strategy is more promising.

The second objection against claim 1 grants 
that architectural works can be morally evaluated, 
but insists that the ethical cannot be architecturally 
relevant since some architectural works are 
good or even great works of  architecture, even 
though they are severely ethically flawed. Some 
(architecturally) great works are ethically flawed 
due to a violation of  moral principles during their 
planning and building phase; perhaps corruption 
was involved, or exploitation, or discrimination, 
forced labor, even the use of  slaves, as is the case 
for the Egyptian pyramids. Other great works are 
ethically problematic due to harm they cause to the 
environment, as is the case for minimally insulated 
modernist buildings with ecologically wasteful 
heating systems. Further great works are ethically 
deficient due to negative impacts on the health 
or well-being of  humans, either due to immoral 
intended use (as with the Roman Coliseum), or 
due to functional unsuitability (as in case of  Mies 
van der Rohe’s Farnsworth House, where comfort 
is sacrificed for the sake of  aesthetics). There also 
exist great buildings that are ethically flawed due 
to morally objectionable attitudes or views they 
express; an example is Giuseppe Terragni’s Casa 
del Fascio, which is often described as symbolizing 
fascist ideologies.14

This objection applies only to an extreme 
moralism, according to which architectural value 
is exclusively determined by ethical value. Such 
extreme moralism is implausible since we evaluate 
works of  architecture with respect to a wide variety 
of  qualities, such as their beauty, originality, site 
specificity, durability, functionality, or clarity. A 
moderate moralist should be a pluralist with regard 
to architectural value and acknowledge that, beside 
ethical values, architectural value also encompasses 
aesthetic, design, and use-values, as well as art-
historic, social and cognitive values, among other 



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things. Then he can hold that a building is architecturally flawed as it is 
ethically flawed, but that it has many architectural merits, which make it a 
good or even great work of  architecture overall.15

3. Ethical value and aesthetic value

The main argument for my second claim – that an architectural 
work will in some cases be aesthetically flawed (or meritorious) due to 
ethical flaws (or merits) – is that it best suits our evaluative practices. This 
can, for instance, be demonstrated with reference to the role functional 
considerations play in architectural criticism.

Such considerations are crucial for evaluations of  architectural works 
since architecture is essentially functional. It does not only deal with shapes 
and forms, but these shapes and forms must be arranged such as to provide 
a suitable framework for specific human activities. As I have pointed 
out, functional considerations have a bearing on the ethical evaluation 
as functional suitability of  an architectural work can influence the well-
being of  its users. We can, for example, praise a building ethically for 
spatial adequacy and user-friendliness. However, functional considerations 
frequently influence also the aesthetic evaluation of  an architectural work. 
It is widely assumed that we can, for example, aesthetically praise a building 
due to its functional beauty.16 A building can be functionally beautiful if  
it is, and also appears, fit for its function, since the expectations triggered 
by our knowledge of  its function appear to be satisfied. Thus many Art 
Nouveau residential buildings appear to offer a place suitable for living. A 
building can also be functionally beautiful if  it exhibits a pleasing tension 
with respect to its function, given that it fulfills its purpose yet shows 
some surprising features in relation to its functional category. Mies van 
der Rohe’s Boiler Plant at the Illinois Institute of  Technology, for instance, 
functioned well though its tower-like chimney and high clerestory windows 
made it look more like an early church. Finally, an architectural work can be 
functionally beautiful if  it is elegant with respect to its function, by meeting 
our expectations and fulfilling its function in efficient or ingenious ways. 
Robert Maillart’s Salginatobel Bridge, for instance, crosses a steep valley 
in a bold and elegant manner without employing unnecessary elements. 
In this way, functional adequacy (or inadequacy) can be an ethical as well 
as an aesthetic merit (or flaw) of  an architectural work. Hence, there are 
ethical merits (or flaws) of  architectural works that constitute aesthetic 
merits (or flaws). This is what 2 claims. 

In the remainder of  this section, I further defend my second thesis 
by addressing four objections. The Irrelevant Dimensions Objection insists 



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that not every ethical flaw of  an architectural 
work is aesthetically relevant: A building during 
construction of  which human rights of  workers 
have been violated, or a building which uses 
materials produced under inhuman conditions, 
may be ethically flawed, but it is doubtful whether 
such a building is consequently aesthetically flawed. 
This, however, is not an objection against my 
second thesis, since 2 only claims that ethical flaws 
or merits of  architectural works will in some cases be 
aesthetically relevant. Moderate moralism postulates 
only that an architectural work is aesthetically 
flawed (or meritorious) when it contains an ethical 
flaw (or merit) which is aesthetically relevant.17 
This raises the question whether there are general 
conditions of  aesthetic relevance with regard to 
architecture. It seems unlikely that there exist strict 
criteria, but we might hope to find symptoms of  
the aesthetic relevance of  ethical flaws or merits. 
As a rough idea, an ethical flaw or merit tends to 
be aesthetically relevant if  it is essentially connected 
to at least one main feature of  architectural works; 
frequently mentioned candidates for such features 
are (a building’s) form, function, structure, and 
meaning.18 An ethical flaw is essentially connected 
to such a feature if  the feature could not have been 
realized or maintained in morally legitimate ways, 
or if  the flaw consists of  ethically problematic 
aspects or effects of  this feature. A general account 
of  aesthetic relevance is certainly desirable, yet not 
necessary to argue successfully for 2.

Autonomists (as defined in section 1) often 
invoke another argument against 2: the Aesthetic 
Attitude Objection. It claims that ethical flaws or 
merits of  an architectural work are never aesthetically 
relevant because we adopt an aesthetic attitude when 
we assess works aesthetically, and this attitude is 
insensitive to moral considerations.19 The aesthetic 
attitude is generally characterized in terms of  
disinterested attention to the aesthetic object. It has 
been questioned whether such a specific aesthetic 



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attitude exists,20 but even if  it does, a dilemma arises. Either the aesthetic 
attitude is understood as precluding any appeal to functional considerations, 
or it is understood in some other way. In Jerome Stolnitz’s approach, for 
instance, disinterestedness requires a deliberate withholding of  concepts 
so that the very attempt to conceptualize an object in terms of  its function 
is incompatible with adopting an aesthetic attitude.21 If  the attitude is 
understood in these terms it is too narrow for capturing everything that 
is aesthetically relevant, since functional considerations are aesthetically 
relevant. Alternatively, the aesthetic attitude is understood in such a way that 
it may include an appeal to functional considerations. According to Glenn 
Parsons and Allen Carlson, for instance, disinterestedness only requires an 
object to be appreciated for its own sake rather than for some personal 
benefit it may signify, but this does not entail experiencing an object 
without applying any concepts to it.22 If  the attitude is understood in this 
manner it need not be insensitive to moral considerations, since functional 
considerations are ethically relevant. Hence, the aesthetic attitude is either 
too narrow or not necessarily insensitive to moral considerations.

A third objection against my second thesis has been put forward 
by contextualists (as defined in section 1). They claim that ethical flaws 
of  works are sometimes aesthetic merits at the same time.23 One major 
argument for this view is the Immoral Function Objection. As we have 
seen, an architectural work may be aesthetically meritorious when it is 
functionally beautiful. However, an architectural work can be functionally 
beautiful with respect to an immoral function. In such a case, the work is 
aesthetically meritorious due to the fact that it is ethically flawed. Thus, the 
ethical flaws of  architectural works may be in some cases aesthetic merits. 
An argument along these lines has been put forward by Andrea Sauchelli. 
His example is the Basilica of  Saint Peter in Rome. A critic of  Catholicism 
might argue that it has the immoral function of  promoting an ideological 
worldview that harmfully influences moral education. However, the critic 
might, at the same time, appreciate the ingenuity and adequacy of  the 
Basilica’s design to the end of  fulfilling this immoral function. The critic 
might argue that the Basilica is functionally beautiful with respect to an 
immoral function, thus illustrating a building’s ethical flaw that at the same 
time is an aesthetic merit.24 In such cases, though, it is not the ethical flaw 
as such that promotes the aesthetic merit. The aesthetic merit is based on 
the function, not on the immorality. In contrast to a comedy that achieves 
its humor by means of  the immorality of  its point of  view, the Basilica 
does not succeed aesthetically due to its immoral function, but due to a 
function that just happens to be immoral. Hence the example does not 
establish any particular connection between aesthetic value and immorality.



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Sauchelli himself  ponders such an answer to 
his objection against moderate moralism.25 This 
may indicate that we should construe his objection 
as an instance of  another objection against 2, i.e. 
the Inseparability Objection.26 According to moderate 
moralism, some moral flaws are aesthetic flaws, so it 
seems that the removal of  such moral flaws should 
lead to aesthetic improvement of  the work – but 
this is not the case. An aesthetically commendable 
feature of  an architectural work (e.g., its functional 
beauty) may depend on its moral flaws (i.e., having 
an immoral function). Hence removing the moral 
flaw (replacing the immoral function by a morally 
good one) would not necessarily aesthetically 
improve the work, since it might then no longer be 
functionally beautiful. However, as Gaut stresses, 
moderate moralism does not claim that removal of  
a moral flaw invariably leads to an aesthetically better 
work. Moderate moralism is formulated in terms of  
the pro tanto principle that an architectural work is 
aesthetically flawed when it contains ethical flaws; in 
other words, that ethical flaws of  a work diminish its 
aesthetic value.27 But moderate moralism does not 
hold that removing an ethical flaw must – all things 
considered – aesthetically improve the work. The 
reason is that removing the ethical flaw (namely, 
replacing the immoral function) might remove 
some other aesthetic merit depending on that flaw 
(namely, its functional beauty). Thus, moderate 
moralism agrees with contextualism that removing 
a moral flaw might not aesthetically improve 
an architectural work, all things considered, but 
moderate moralism insists that, when a work is 
ethically flawed, it is aesthetically flawed, too.28

Let me illustrate this claim by using the example 
of  the Farnsworth House. According to moderate 
moralism, the house is aesthetically flawed due to 
the fact that it is ethically flawed because of  its 
functional unsuitability. However, this claim does 
not imply that improving the user-friendliness of  
the house will improve it aesthetically. This will 

Moderate 
moralism does 
not claim that 

the removal of 
a moral flaw 

invariably 
leads to an 

aesthetically 
better work.

“

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hardly be the case since the house achieves its remarkable beauty precisely 
because it distills habitability to the breaking point. That many aesthetic 
qualities of  the house depend on its user-unfriendliness does, however, 
not imply that it is the ethical flaw which makes the house aesthetically 
appealing. The kind of  beauty the house exhibits may only be achievable 
at the cost of  the ethical flaw of  being functionally unsuitable, but the 
ethical flaw is not among the features that we aesthetically appreciate. (I 
here presuppose that not all beauty a building can have is of  a narrowly 
functional variety.) Moreover, the claim that the house is aesthetically 
flawed due to its ethical flaw is compatible with claiming that it is excellent 
from an aesthetic point of  view and a great work of  architecture. The 
aesthetic flaw constituted by its ethical flaw is clearly outweighed by other 
aesthetic merits of  the house.

4. Aesthetic value and ethical value

Debates regarding relations between ethical and aesthetic values 
usually discuss whether the ethical value of  a work can influence its 
aesthetic value. The converse question – whether the aesthetic value of  a 
work can influence its ethical value – is rarely discussed.29 My third thesis 
affirmatively answers this further question; here is an argument:

P1) An architectural work is ethically flawed (or meritorious) when it 
impairs (or promotes) human well-being.

P2) Since living in an aesthetically appealing environment is essential 
to human well-being, an architectural work will in some cases impair 
(or promote) human well-being due to aesthetic flaws (or merits).

C) An architectural work will in some cases be ethically flawed (or 
meritorious) due to its aesthetic flaws (or merits). (Thesis 3.)

All three steps of  this argument are pro tanto claims. The influence of  an 
architectural work on the well-being of  human beings is not the only factor 
to determine its ethical value. For instance, the work can also be ethically 
flawed because it contributes to violation of  moral rights. And having 
aesthetic merits or flaws is not the only factor to determine whether a 
work promotes or impairs human well-being, or whether it is ethically 
meritorious or flawed. The work can, for instance, also promote human 
well-being and be ethically praiseworthy because it is structurally safe and 
suits its function. Furthermore, P2 and C are qualified as relevant in some 
cases, since not all aesthetic merits and flaws are sufficiently significant to 
be ethically relevant or have serious impact on human well-being.

This argument leaves three big questions to address. The first two 



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concern P1, the third P2. Firstly, whose well-
being should be considered in ethical evaluation 
of  an architectural work? For fairness’ sake, this 
must encompass all persons affected by the work. 
Due to their public character, architectural works 
affect even the well-being of  persons not directly 
involved in constructing or using them. Due to 
their durability, they affect people for a long time, 
often over many generations. Hence not only the 
well-being of  architects, workers, and users should 
be taken into consideration, but also the well-being 
of  neighbours and passers-by, for instance; and not 
only the current well-being of  people, but also their 
future well-being – even the well-being of  future 
generations.

Secondly, what does it mean to promote or 
impair the well-being of  affected human beings? This 
depends on the account of  well-being.30 According 
to a “desire-satisfaction” account, well-being lies 
in the satisfaction of  one’s informed desires, that 
is, desires one would have if  one were fully or at 
least sufficiently informed about one’s situation. It 
is likely that these desires include the desire to live 
in an aesthetically pleasing environment, as well as 
much more specific aesthetic preferences, which 
may vary across persons and cultures. The main 
problem with such accounts is that people may 
desire things that run counter to their own (and 
other people’s) well-being, and they may hold such 
desires even after being properly informed of  such. 
“Objective list” accounts, on the other hand, hold 
that well-being lies in possession of  all or most of  
the goods to be found on a list, which is objective 
in the sense that its items contribute to our well-
being even if  we do not desire them. Most lists 
proposed in the literature contain an aesthetic asset 
– “aesthetic experience,”31 for instance, or “the 
awareness of  true beauty.”32 A frequent objection 
to such accounts is that they ignore reasonable 
differences among people as to what well-being 
consists of. This objection can be accommodated 

The kind of 
beauty the 

house exhibits 
may only be 
achieveable 
at the cost 

of the ethical 
flaw of being 
functionally 

unsuitable, but 
the ethical flaw 

is not among 
the features 

that we 
aesthetically 

appreciate.

“

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to some extent by admitting that the listed goods can often be realized in 
very different manners. 

A third big question arises relative to subjective preferences, which 
include aesthetic propensities: Which qualities of  an architectural work 
count as aesthetic merits, and which are considered aesthetic flaws? This 
may vary with culture and age, but also within a culture during a certain 
age. There is, for instance, often a divide between the aesthetic assessments 
of  experts and those of  laypersons. Architects and architectural critics 
tend to find certain forms, materials and styles beautiful, which laypersons 
may find ugly and unfriendly; and laypersons tend to find buildings 
aesthetically appealing, which experts may criticize as banal or kitschy.33 
Taking aesthetic preferences of  laypeople as authoritative might lead to 
a banal repetition of  conventional structures; in many contexts, retro-
architecture which imitates a well-established and popular style of  
the past may be what best fits the aesthetic preferences of  the general 
public. Letting experts determine what is considered an aesthetic merit 
means adopting a paternalistic attitude. Both are undesirable stances. 
Since architectural works are part of  our living environment, aesthetic 
preferences of  people who use public spaces need to be taken into 
account in planning contexts as well as in political decisions regarding 
land-use. These aesthetic preferences, however, should not be regarded 
as simply given and unchanging, as laypersons may learn from experts 
who are more experienced in dealing with aesthetic questions. To navigate 
an intermediate course between uncritical satisfaction of  laypersons’ 
aesthetic requirements and a paternalistic approach demands dialogue 
between architects and the public, and presents an educational challenge 
to architects and architectural critics.34

Conclusion

I have proposed a broad notion of  architectural value which includes 
all qualities appropriate to consider when evaluating a work of  architecture. 
It is beyond dispute that aesthetic properties are among these qualities. 
My first thesis claims that at least some ethical properties are also among 
the qualities that should be considered in an architectural evaluation. My 
second and third theses concern relations between the ethical and the 
aesthetic value out of  the values involved in composing the architectural 
value. These theses claim that the ethical and the aesthetic value interact in 
such a manner that an architectural work will in some cases be aesthetically 
flawed (or meritorious) due to the fact that it is ethically flawed (or 
meritorious) and vice versa.35



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Endnotes

1. However, I do not take for granted that, every 
time architects or architectural theorists use morally 
supercharged terminology, the evaluation is of  an 
ethical nature. Since Vitruvius’ age, architects and 
architectural theorists have often used ethical terms 
in order to justify aesthetic preferences – e.g. when 
claiming that it be a moral duty to design buildings 
true to their materials, not hiding structural 
support, and expressing the spirit of  their period. 
See Maurice Lagueux, “Ethics versus Aesthetics 
in Architecture,” The Philosophical Forum 35 (2004): 
124-133.

2. “Work of  architecture” is often understood in 
a much narrower sense and reserved for works of  
artistic architecture, which are distinguished from 
mere buildings. Nikolaus Pevsner, e.g., opens his 
Outline of  European Architecture (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, [1948] 1957, 23), with the famous remark: 
“A bicycle shed is a building; Lincoln Cathedral is a 
piece of  architecture.”

3. What I mean by ethical, aesthetic and architectural 
values is further explained at the end of  section 1.

4. Technically, the difference between moderate 
moralism and contextualism is as follows. Moderate 
moralism takes the value relations to be invariant 
and symmetric; according to contextualism, they 
are complex and invertible.

5. See, e.g., Noël Carroll, “Moderate Moralism”, 
British Journal of  Aesthetics 36 (1996): 223-238; 
Berys Gaut, Art, Emotion and Ethics (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), ch. 3; Alessandro 
Giovannelli, “The Ethical Criticism of  Art: A New 
Mapping of  the Territory,” Philosophia 35 (2007): 
117-127. Giovannelli’s taxonomy has been adapted 
to architecture by Andrea Sauchelli, “Functional 
Beauty, Architecture, and Morality: A Beautiful 
Konzentrationslager?” The Philosophical Quarterly 62 
(2012): 128-147. 



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6. It could be argued that we should not be concerned with utility when 
evaluating a work of  architecture as such because a building’s usefulness is 
disturbingly malleable over time while other features such as its beauty may 
endure. (Thanks to Tom Spector for raising this objection.) However, I do 
not think that the variability of  a feature is a good reason not to consider 
that feature in an evaluation of  an architectural work. Furthermore, in 
evaluating a work, we should distinguish between its intended and its actual 
function. An architectural work may have fulfilled its intended function, 
even though it is no longer in use (as in case of  ancient temples), or it may 
function well, even though it did not fit the originally intended function (as 
in the case of  Zaha Hadid’s Vitra fire station).

7. Cf. Sauchelli, “Functional Beauty,” 138.

8. See Christian Illies and Nicholas Ray, “Philosophy of  Architecture,” in 
Philosophy of  Technology and Engineering Sciences, Vol. 9, ed. Anthonie Meijers 
(Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2009), 1199-1256; Warwick Fox, “Architecture 
Ethics,” in A Companion to the Philosophy of  Technology, ed. Jan Kyrre Berg 
Olsen, Stig Andur Pedersen and Vincent F. Hendricks (Chichester: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2009), 387-391.

9. Under which conditions can we say that the architectural work itself  is 
morally flawed in such cases? James Harold has suggested a counterfactual 
test for narrative artworks that can be adapted to architecture: The 
violation of  moral rights during the planning and construction phase of  
an architectural work influences its moral evaluation if  the same work 
could not have been realized without violating moral rights. See James 
Harold, “On Judging the Moral Value of  Narrative Artworks,” The Journal 
of  Aesthetics and Art Criticism 64 (2006): 259-270.

10. Nigel Taylor, “Ethical Arguments about the Aesthetics of  Architecture,” 
in Ethics and the Built Environment, ed. Warwick Fox (London: Routledge, 
2000): 163-206, here 201-205.

11. See, e.g., Gaut, Art, 6-9.

12. See Sauchelli, “Functional Beauty,” 138-139.

13. For the distinction between responsibility and accountability see 
Luciano Floridi and J.W. Sanders, “On the Morality of  Artificial Agents,” 
Minds and Machine 14 (2004): 349-379.

14. See, e.g., Simona Storchi, “’Il Fascismo è una casa di vetro’: Giuseppe 
Terragni and the Politics of  Space in Fascist Italy,” Italian Studies 62 (2007): 
231-245.

15. Cf. Gaut, Art, 64-65.

16. See Sauchelli, “Functional Beauty.” In contrast to Sauchelli, I assume 



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that simply looking, without being, fit for function 
is not an aesthetic merit. A more elaborated 
treatment of  functional beauty should distinguish 
between intended and actual functions (see endnote 
6). For slightly different conceptions of  functional 
beauty than Sauchelli’s, see Glenn Parsons and 
Allen Carlson, Functional Beauty (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), and Larry Shiner, “On 
Aesthetics and Function in Architecture: The Case 
of  the ‘Spectacle’ Art Museum,” The Journal of  
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 69 (2011): 31-41.

17. Cf. Gaut, Art, 83.

18. The notions of  form, function and structure are 
widely debated and defined in very different ways 
within architecture theory; for a good overview, see 
Adrian Forty, Words and Buildings: A Vocabulary of  
Modern Architecture (London: Thames & Hudson 
2000). An in depth study of  the varieties in how 
and what buildings ‘mean’ is provided in Christoph 
Baumberger, Gebaute Zeichen. Eine Symboltheorie der 
Architektur (Frankfurt a/M: Ontos 2010).

19. Cf. Gaut, Art, 81-82.

20. See George Dickie, “The Myth of  the Aesthetic 
Attitude,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 1 (1964), 
56-65. For an overview of  the debate provoked by 
Dickie’s article see James Shelley, “The Concept of  
the Aesthetic,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of  Philosophy 
(Fall 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/
aesthetic-concept/.

21. Jerome Stolnitz, Aesthetics and Philosophy of  Art 
Criticism: A Critical Introduction (Boston, Mass.: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1960), 35.

22. Parsons and Carlson, Functional Beauty, 25.

23. Positions committed to this claim are 
sometimes labeled “immoralism.” See Matthew 
Kieran, “Forbidden Knowledge: The Challenge 
of  Immoralism,” in Art and Morality, ed. José 
Luis Bermúdez and Sebastian Gardner (London: 



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Routledge, 2003), 56-73.

24. Sauchelli, “Functional Beauty,” 143-144. He admits that in some cases 
(such as Nazi extermination camps) immoral functions are perceived as 
so hideous that we are unable to aesthetically appreciate these buildings as 
functionally beautiful in virtue of  their immoral functions.

25. Sauchelli, “Functional Beauty,” 146.

26. Cf. Gaut, Art, 59-60.

27. A pro tanto aesthetic principle specifies the contribution an aesthetically 
relevant feature makes to the aesthetic value of  a work, but it does not 
determine whether the work is aesthetically good, all things considered. In 
this way, the moderate moralist’s pro tanto principle that ethical flaws of  an 
architectural work diminish its aesthetic value leaves open the possibility 
that an ethically flawed work is aesthetically good overall. This will be the 
case if  the work has aesthetic merits which outweigh the aesthetic flaws of  
the work constituted by its ethical flaws (see the last paragraph of  section 
1).

28. Cf. Gaut, Art, 57-66.

29. While one could find historical examples, the matter is rarely discussed 
in the contemporary literature. An exception is Robert Stecker, “The 
Interaction of  Ethical and Aesthetic Value,” British Journal of  Aesthetics 45 
(2005): 138-150.

30. Cf. Ibo van de Poel, “Can We Design for Well-Being?” in The Good Life 
in a Technological Age, ed. Philip Brey, Adam Briggle and Edward Spence 
(New York: Routledge, 2012), 295-306. For the distinction between 
“desire-satisfaction” and “objective list” accounts of  well-being see also 
Philip Brey, “Well-Being in Philosophy, Psychology, and Economics,” in 
the same volume, 15-34. 

31. John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1980), 60.

32. Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1984), 499.

33. Cf. Robert Gifford, Donald W. Hine, Werner Muller-Clemm, D’Arcy 
J. Reynolds JR, Kelly T. Shaw, “Decoding Modern Architecture: A 
Lens Model Approach for Understanding the Aesthetic Differences of  
Architects and Laypersons,” Environment and Behavior 32 (2000): 163-187.

34. See Sabine Roeser, “Aesthetics as a Risk Factor in Designing 
Architecture,” in Ethics, Design and Planning of  the Built Environment, ed. 
Claudia Basta and Stefano Moroni (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), 93-105.



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35. I thank Stefan Koller, Tom Spector, and 
an anonymous reviewer for their constructive 
comments and suggestions.


