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Ancient Wisdom and the Modern 
home
Mark Jensen

In the discipline of  architecture, we can 
distinguish at least three different questions related 
to autonomy. First, we can ask about the autonomy 
of  the concepts and judgments made by architects 
and philosophers of  architecture. Does architecture 
possess conceptual frameworks and principles of  
judgment that are logically independent of  other 
disciplines, such as ethics, aesthetics, engineering, 
and politics? Second, we can ask about the 
autonomy of  the architect herself  in her practice. 
Are her designs constrained by persons and factors 
outside of  her control? Finally, we can ask about the 
autonomy of  citizens who live in spaces designed 
by architects. What possibilities or constraints are 
actualized by the design of  a space for those who 
dwell in it?

Hidden among these questions are two 
different conceptions of  autonomy. The conception 
presupposed by the first question is concerned with 
the independence of  architecture as an area of  
theoretical investigation. A discipline is autonomous 
when it can be carried out independently of  other 
disciplines. A discipline that lacks autonomy is one 
that depends on other theoretical domains for its 
investigation. The conception presupposed by the 
second and third questions, however, is concerned 
with the autonomy or freedom of  the people 
involved, both architects and those who occupy 
their dwellings.2 Here, an architect is autonomous 
or free to the extent that her designs are within 
her control; an occupant is autonomous or free to 
the extent that she faces no external constraints 

the conception 
presupposed by 
the second and 
third questions, 

however, is 
concerned with 

the autonomy or 
freedom of the 

people involved, 
both architects 

and those who 
occupy their 

dwellings.

“

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in attempting to live according to her own rational plan.3 The problem 
for architects and occupants who lack autonomy is not dependence on 
something else but rather a restriction on their freedom to access their 
respective goods.

My aim in this paper is to explore this second conception. Is it possible 
that we as designers and occupants – are not realizing all of  the goods that 
could be available to us? Do current practices in residential architecture 
restrict the freedom of  designers and occupants? It is my view that we 
have good reasons to answer these questions in the affirmative. In order 
to vindicate my judgment, I will develop a critical approach grounded in 
the anthropological, social, political, and architectural analysis of  Aristotle. 
Central themes in Aristotle’s thought, especially his accounts of  eudaimonia 
(happiness), arêtê (virtue), and phronêsis (practical wisdom), have been 
rehabilitated by contemporary moral philosophers and find support among 
contemporary moral psychologists.4 Insofar as Aristotle’s thought in these 
areas retains theoretical and practical significance, it seems possible that 
other aspects of  his thought, especially his accounts of  the oikos (house) 
and the polis (city-state), are worthy of  renewed attention as well.5 To be 
clear, my primary aim in this paper is not interpretive: while the reader will 
gain some insight into Aristotle’s views on the topics in question, my aim 
instead is to develop a critical approach to architectural practice that draws 
upon some of  the compelling aspects of  Aristotle’s thought.

Aristotle’s recent rehabilitation among moral philosophers was 
motivated by worries about the reigning Enlightenment orthodoxy.6 
Similarly, the best way to appreciate the appeal of  an account of  freedom 
in architectural practice based on Aristotle will be to begin by drawing 
a contrast with the Enlightenment. This discussion occupies Part 1 of  
the paper. In Part 2, I develop my critical standpoint. Finally, in Part 3, 
I point out ways in which our contemporary architectural and urban 
planning practices inhibit the realization of  important goods and sketch 
some avenues for improving the current state of  affairs in accord with 
my approach. I also return to the distinction between the two different 
conceptions of  autonomy that I laid out at the very beginning, arguing 
that my exploration of  the second question has implications for how we 
think about the first.

1. Autonomy and the Enlightenment Tradition

In the Western Enlightenment tradition, autonomy is self-governance. 
The autonomous person is ruled by her reason; she is not controlled by 
the internal influences of  passion and appetite or the external influences 



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of  custom and culture.7 Understood in this way, 
autonomy lies at the heart of  the liberal tradition 
of  Western individualism. It is the only legitimate 
basis for political authority.8 It is the proper 
achievement of  mature people in mature societies.9 
With their correlative respect for the autonomy of  
others, mature autonomous citizens are reasonable, 
democratic, tolerant, and just.10

Despite its many virtues, the Enlightenment 
account of  autonomy strikes many of  us as too 
thin. In the first place, there is little explanation for 
how it is that we as individuals and groups achieve 
autonomy. Apart from notable outliers such as 
Locke’s discussion in Some Thoughts Concerning 
Education, Rousseau’s meditations in Emile, and 
Mill’s personal reflections in his Autobiography, little 
attention is paid to the specific task of  cultivating 
autonomous people. In the philosophical tradition, 
mature, autonomous citizens are typically taken 
as given. The problem here is of  course that real 
people are not like this. We were children once; we 
are adults now; and we will be senior citizens later. 
Human life is a succession of  stages with different 
challenges, standards, and requirements for self-
governance at each stage. An account of  autonomy 
that leaves out this dimension is not adequate.

In the second place, the account of  autonomy, 
especially in its Kantian and neo-Kantian versions, 
is tied to an account of  self-governance that appears 
to be too abstract. For Kant, the autonomous 
person is the person who makes moral judgments 
on the basis of  a universalization procedure.11  

It seems to me, however, that moral judgments 
cannot be made on the basis of  a universalization 
procedure alone. Moral judgment also requires a 
pre-deliberative canon of  norms including ideals, 
functional descriptions, principles, practices, and 
habits. To be sure: I’m not defending a particular 
account of  the pre-deliberative canon. My point 
is merely that the contents of  a good life marked 

do current 
practices in 
residential 

architecture 
restrict the 

freedom of 
designers and 

occupants?

“

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by excellent moral judgment cannot be determined on the basis of  an 
impartial rational procedure alone.

The implication of  these concerns, it seems to me, is that we need a 
more robust account of  autonomy. This not to reject the Enlightenment 
tradition altogether: several aspects of  the tradition seem to be correct. 
For example, autonomy of  the sort that matters to us is a condition that 
human beings achieve when things are going right for us – it is a mark of  
human flourishing. It is something we achieve in varying degrees. In this 
way, autonomy is not a necessary or basic characteristic of  the human 
condition; it is instead something that we must figure out how to get for 
others and ourselves.

2. Autonomy and Aristotle

Aristotle begins with a very different understanding of  human 
flourishing and a correspondingly different account of  self-governance. 
In developing my approach, I will focus on three specific aspects of  
his analysis: (i) his account of  the fundamental unit of  human life, (ii) 
his account of  the good life in community, and (iii) the way he employs 
the “doctrine of  the mean” in the context of  architecture. These three 
elements will give us tools sufficient to sketch an account of  freedom 
sufficient to sustain a critique of  contemporary architecture – especially 
contemporary home design and construction.

2.1 The Fundamental Unit of Human Life

The concept of  the “fundamental unit of  human life,” is the concept 
of  the proper starting point for an investigation into the human species 
from the perspective of  philosophical anthropology. Finding this 
fundamental unit requires some care: we can err too small by focusing on a 
component and err too big by focusing on an aggregate. Aristotle regards 
the household as the fundamental unit of  human life and identifies its 
elements with a quote from Hesiod. The household includes: “a house, a 
wife, and an ox for the plow.”12 Abstracting a bit, let’s call these elements 
(i) one’s residence, (ii) one’s intimate relationships, and (iii) one’s tools for 
one’s work.13

We should notice immediately the contrast between Aristotle’s starting 
point and that of  the Enlightenment. Aristotle does not begin with the 
abstract rational individual. He begins instead with a person in context. 
From Aristotle’s perspective, the Enlightenment approach that begins 
with the bare individual is bound to fail in the same way that the biologist 



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is bound to fail who attempts to make sense of  
ants by starting the investigation with a single ant 
confined to a specimen jar. The component part is 
mistaken for the whole unit.

Aristotle’s more inclusive starting point lays the 
groundwork for our account of  human freedom. 
The extent of  one’s freedom will depend on the 
degree to which one achieves success appropriate 
to one’s residence, relationships, and work. For 
example, as physical beings, we require shelter from 
the elements in the world that threaten our bodies. 
As developmental beings, we require relationships 
with more mature people to help us grow. And 
as dependent and aspirational beings, we need 
avenues through which we can work to meet our 
unmet needs. Together, it seems right to say that 
the degree to which we are free depends in part 
on the degree to which we have found success in 
building a dwelling, establishing a social network, 
and finding meaningful work.14 Contrapositively, 
to the extent that these three tasks are challenges 
for us, our freedom is constrained and our lives 
are characterized by a kind of  servitude. In other 
words, the idea of  self-governance for Aristotle is 
one that presupposes natural dependence on others 
and modifications to the environment.

This insight is not especially profound; we 
might regard it as a philosophical adaptation of  
Maslow’s hierarchy of  needs.15 However, it seems 
to me that the relationship between these three 
elements of  basic human life and human freedom 
is more complex. It is also the case that freedom, 
at least to some degree, is necessary in order to 
achieve a degree of  success in these three elements. 
In other words, these elements, together with 
freedom, are symbiotically related. For example, 
in order to secure a residence that will enable my 
family to flourish, I require successful work. And 
in order to secure successful work, I require a 
secure residence in which or from which to do it. 



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And both of  these observations presuppose that I can make choices with 
respect to my residence and my work that are free from the constraints 
that would keep me from making reasoned choices that reflect my own 
moral, philosophical, or religious account of  the good life in the context 
of  my community.

We can conclude then that the Aristotelian account of  freedom begins 
holistically and in situ. To be a human being is to be located in a place, 
intimately connected to others, and involved in work. Autonomy in the 
more robust sense that I am developing here both requires and enables 
success with respect to these basic elements of  human life. One is free to 
the extent that one can pursue one’s account of  the good life.

2.2 The Good in Community

While Aristotle regards the household as the fundamental unit of  
human life, he does not regard it as the complete focus of  an investigation 
into human affairs. By itself, a household is not self-sufficient. On his 
view, households are naturally organized into villages and a group of  
villages together constitutes a city (polis).16 Only when we build a city do 
we achieve a self-sufficient human community, and, in turn, the proper 
focus for a comprehensive investigation.17 In other words, to understand 
and then evaluate human affairs we cannot but make reference to the city. 
Villages, households, and citizens are all constituents of  a city in their own 
fashion; their activities cannot be understood without reference to the city 
as a whole.

Now to say that a city is constituted by its citizens is not to say that a 
city is simply composed of  citizens. If  that were so, the good of  the city 
could be measured purely in terms of  the individual success and failures of  
its citizens. Instead, the good for the city is a common good. It is achieved 
when each of  the citizens in the city performs his or her specific function 
well. Consider Aristotle’s claim about the chief  good at the beginning of  
the Nicomachean Ethics:

And since it [political science] uses the other sciences concerned with action, and 
moreover legislates what must be done and what avoided, its end will include 
the ends of  the other sciences, and so this will be the human good. For even if  
the good is the same for a city as for an individual, still the good of  the city is 
apparently a greater and more complete good to acquire and preserve.18

As Aristotle will explain in more detail, the function of  the citizen is 
given not only in terms of  her function in the context of  the fundamental 
unit. Citizens’ also have functions attached to their roles in the village, 



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and in turn, their roles in the city.19 In Aristotle’s 
ideal constitution, the government assigns these 
roles according to citizens’ stages and capabilities. 
It seems to me that we need not follow him in 
assigning these roles involuntarily, but we must 
follow him in recognizing that the obligations 
associated with excellent citizenship extend beyond 
one’s obligations in the household. 

We must take care in describing the relationship 
between the household and the city in much the same 
way that we took care in describing the relationship 
between the constituent elements of  the household 
and the freedom of  the individual. The flourishing 
city is certainly one in which all of  the households 
are flourishing as well. But it does not follow that 
a city of  flourishing households is sufficient to 
realize a flourishing city. In other words, the success 
of  individual households in achieving their private 
goods does not guarantee the achievement of  all 
of  the common and public goods associated with a 
flourishing city. Insofar as citizens identify with the 
good not only of  their household but also of  their 
city, citizens’ pursuits will include a range of  private, 
public, and common goods. As always, the starting 
point for these pursuits will be citizens’ dwellings, 
relationships, and work. As a result, our final 
account of  these elements must be further tailored 
to suit the further goods that these elements both 
require and enable. Importantly, free citizens are 
not defined in terms of  the absence of  government 
interference.20 Instead, free citizens are those who 
are enabled by the city to accomplish their good and 
who, at the same time, enable the city to achieve its 
common and public goods. 

2.3 The Golden Mean

The “golden mean” is a central theme in 
Aristotle’s moral and political thought. In many 
activities and pursuits, we achieve excellence when 
we find the mean between extremes of  excess and 

The 
aristotelian 

account of 
freedom begins 

holistically 
and in situ.

“

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deficiency. Courage, for example, is the moral virtue concerned with our 
feelings of  confidence in the face of  a threat.21 Courage is found in the 
mean between excessive feelings of  confidence (the vice of  foolhardiness) 
and a deficiency of  feelings of  confidence (the vice of  cowardice).

Aristotle doesn’t say much about architecture. But the few comments 
he does offer on the subject reflect a more generalized application of  the 
doctrine of  the mean. First, with respect to the organizational plan for 
houses in a city, Aristotle says: 

Where private dwellings are concerned, the modern Hippodamean scheme of  
laying them out in straight rows is considered pleasanter and more useful for 
general purposes. But when it comes to security in wartime, the opposite plan, 
which prevailed in ancient times, is thought to be better. For it makes it difficult 
for foreign troops to enter and for attackers to find their way around. Hence the 
best city-state should share features of  both plans. This is possible if  the houses 
are laid out like vine “clumps,” that is if  certain parts and areas are laid out 
in straight rows, but not the city-state as a whole. In this way, both safety and 
beauty will be well served.22

Notice here that Aristotle is concerned with both form and function. For 
the purposes of  aesthetics, he regards straight rows as superior. For better 
defense, irregular arrangements make it difficult for invaders to succeed. 
While this discussion departs from Aristotle’s usual way of  employing the 
doctrine of  the mean, he is clearly following a middle path here between 
an extreme concern with aesthetics and an extreme concern with specific 
function. This moderate path will best achieve excellence in city planning.

Aristotle’s predilection for moderation can also be found in his 
reflections on residential design, at least by implication. In describing the 
design of  the city, he says, “…it should be large enough to enable the 
inhabitants to live a life of  leisure in a way that is generous and at the 
same time temperate.”23 Aristotle’s overall aim is to describe a happy city 
where the citizens live flourishing lives together. Flourishing citizens, in 
turn, are citizens who live excellently; living excellently, in turn, is a matter 
of  performing activities virtuously. It would be consistent with Aristotle’s 
argumentative approach, I think, to extend this remark to residential 
design. Residences should be big enough to enable citizens to be leisured 
(that is, free to pursue the liberal arts and the social virtues) but not so big 
as to encourage vices of  excess such as ostentatiousness and wastefulness.

In other words, happiness will not be found in a life preoccupied with 
maintaining one’s estate. Such a life would be similar to the hypochondriac 
or the germaphobe: people who’ve made an end out of  something that 
should rightfully be regarded merely as a means to an end. Residences for 



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Aristotle are the tools of  their occupants, not the 
purposes of  life for the occupants. The homeowner 
who does nothing with his life but work on his 
home misses out on the complete human good and 
contributes little to the common good. Interestingly, 
just as residences are not the ultimate ends of  their 
occupants, nor are residences the ultimate ends of  
their designers. Residences are designed and built in 
order to enable their occupants to pursue the good, 
including the individual, common, and public good. 
In this way, an architect is a good architect if  she 
designs and builds residences that accomplish these 
aims. She contributes to the common good of  the 
city. She is free qua architect insofar as she identifies 
with the common good of  the city, this good 
informs her practice, and she is not encumbered by 
external constraints on her practice. 

Finally, it’s not just the size of  the residence 
that has an effect on the extent of  our freedom. 
The design of  the residence can also have an 
effect. Aside from the studies that show that our 
environment can affect our mood and productivity, 
we know from our own experience that the nature 
and quality of  our surroundings can profoundly 
affect the vitality of  the talking, living, and working 
that we do in them. Together with an excellent 
architect and builder, we believe that we could 
construct for our household a space that could 
maximize the capabilities of  our household and 
thereby greatly increase the degree of  freedom with 
which we could achieve an excellent (and thereby 
happy) life in community with others.

2.4 A Model of Autonomy in Architectural Practice

Let us now synthesize the themes that we’ve 
developed above. First, consider the residence. 
At bottom, residences are tools: they are spaces 
designed to enable us to flourish in the context 
of  our relationships, our work, and our leisure. 
The good residence is one in which our freedom 

the homeowner 
who does 

nothing with his 
life but work 

on his home 
misses out on 
the complete 

human good and 
contributes 

little to the 
common good.

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is enhanced. At the same time, the design of  the residence must reflect 
the circumstances of  our household and its responsibilities with respect 
to the city more broadly. A good residence increases the freedom of  its 
occupants to pursue the good life in community. But like all of  our tools, 
we prefer those that do more than answer to our functional needs – we 
prefer those that answer to our functional needs in a way that we find 
aesthetically pleasing.

Next, consider the architect. We do not assume that every citizen 
will be a master of  design and construction. In the excellent city there 
will be division of  labor. Some citizens will be excellent at design and 
construction; the flourishing life is one in which they are free in the city 
to design and construct residences (etc.) that enable households and the 
city to flourish. Given what we’ve said above, the design and construction 
process must be a rational partnership. The architect brings expertise and 
experience to bear while the occupants bring aesthetic preferences and an 
account of  the particular goods and pursuits attached to their household. 
The ultimate aim of  the partnership is to produce a dwelling that conforms 
to the description above.

Finally, we must qualify this account by noting that, as human beings, 
there is no one perfect designed space in which we will be enabled to 
flourish for our entire life. At different stages in our life, we will have 
different functional requirements, together (perhaps) with developing 
aesthetic judgments. So either our residences must be flexible or our city 
must offer a range of  choices. Both of  these options involve the risk of  
limitations to our freedom.

3. Contemporary Architecture

3.1 A Critique of Current Practice

How does this ideal match up with our current realities? We should 
note first that this entire vision is available to the wealthiest members 
of  contemporary society. Architects and builders exist who could, in 
partnership with homeowners, design and build dwellings that reflect 
and enable freedom in this sense. I frame this first claim counterfactually, 
however, because in most cases those homeowners who can afford to 
realize this model fail to achieve it. They build without regard to the 
common and public good of  the community, seeking instead to isolate 
themselves in enclaves with other wealthy people. They also build large, 
wasteful, ostentatious homes that enable vice and inhibit virtue. At the 
same time, the socioeconomic realities of  contemporary markets act as 
disincentives to architects and builders to partner with middle and lower 



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classes in pursuit of  freedom in the sense I describe 
above.

Outside of  the wealthy, most of  us select from 
and live in residences that neither are the product 
of  genuinely autonomous architecture nor enable 
freedom for occupants. In the first place, many 
of  us cannot make significant alterations to our 
dwellings because we do not own them. Even in 
the United States, the ownership rate is below 
sixty-five percent.24 In the second place, even when 
we have some choice among possible houses or 
apartments, our options are nearly all one form 
or another of  mass housing. Mass housing is, by 
definition, designed without contact and therefore 
without input from those who will occupy it. To be 
sure: designers of  mass housing are constrained by 
the market – the market requires that they produce 
units that people will select among a range of  
choices. But since the architects of  mass housing 
must cater to a wide range of  people, they must 
produce designs that are suited broadly.

This problem could be overcome if  our building 
methods for mass housing permitted greater 
flexibility for configuration and reconfiguration. 
Unfortunately, our contemporary designs and 
building methods permit very little change on 
a macro level. Occupants can add furnishings, 
detailing, and color to a unit but they have little 
opportunity to create or adapt their main spaces to 
better match the distinctive aesthetic and functional 
characteristics of  their particular household. Macro 
level aesthetic and functional characteristics – the 
ways in which the beauty of  the unit as a whole 
might be tailored to match the household – are 
inaccessible without great cost. The autonomy of  
occupants is significantly constrained.

It is no better for the architects and builders 
of  mass housing than it is for the occupants. In 
addition to having no direct connection to the 
eventual occupants of  the dwellings they design and 

a good 
residence 

increases the 
freedom of 

its occupants 
to pursue the 

good life in 
community.

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construct, they are rarely permitted to add furnishings, ornamentation, 
color, and other details to their products. In other words, they are not 
really permitted to finish designing and building a residence. Market 
forces require them to build residences that are incomplete from a design 
standpoint. Note that the problem here is not merely that of  not seeing 
a design plan through to its full realization. It is instead the problem that 
the architect is not permitted to fully design a residence. Since she does 
not know the occupant, even a fully designed but not fully built structure 
would fail to satisfy the needs of  a mass housing market that requires 
broad appeal. In this way, the architect too is constrained in her freedom 
with respect to the full use of  her expertise in service of  the good of  the 
community and its citizens. 

3.2 Elements of a Solution

It is possible that the problems I suggest above all reduce to problems 
of  economic class. Even in a flourishing capitalist economy with 
redistributive policies that create a broad and flourishing middle class, it 
might be that the kind of  freedom and flexibility that I defend is available 
only to the wealthiest members of  society. A more optimistic attitude 
would hold that with creative thinking, sound government policy, and 
motivated entrepreneurship we could make progress.

Supposing that my model provides an attractive starting point for 
rethinking contemporary practice, it seems clear that at least the following 
three improvements would need to be made. First, we need to increase 
the flexibility of  the residences that we design. Given that households and 
their needs are constantly evolving over time, we must design and build 
residences that can be more easily configured and reconfigured to fit 
the conditions necessary for a flourishing household. To be sure: some 
changes in the nature of  a household will require changing residences. 
But changing residences is highly disruptive to the household and ought 
to be minimized for the sake of  their pursuit of  the good. Second, we 
need to find ways to enable households to make use of  the full spectrum 
of  talent that architects and builders have to offer. Achieving a complete 
design offers benefits for both the architect whose full talents are utilized 
and the occupants whose dwelling will be better suited to achieving their 
goods. Finally, we must find a way to reduce the costs associated with 
flexibility and complete design in order to expand the possibilities for a 
wider segment of  the population. Insofar as greater numbers of  architects 
and occupants can better achieve their goods, the common good for the 
community is better achieved.



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3.3 Two Conceptions of Autonomy Revisited

At the outset, I noted that the autonomy of  
architecture as a theoretical discipline is different 
from the autonomy of  the architect and the 
occupant. The latter two forms of  autonomy 
concern the realization of  specific goods while the 
former concerns disciplinary independence. The 
critical perspective that I develop here implies that 
architecture qua theoretical or academic discipline 
cannot be independent. Architecture serves the 
good of  the city and thus stands subordinate to 
politics, broadly construed. Of  course, this follows 
only in the context of  the Aristotle-inspired ideal. 
If  cities and other forms of  community have no 
common good or telos, then architecture could 
be independent as a discipline. In a world of  this 
sort, there is no such thing as a building out-of-
place since there would be no organizing principle 
from which to render the judgment in question. But 
insofar as we still find ourselves making judgments 
of  this sort, we still find the Aristotelian perspective 
or something like it attractive.

Acknowledgement

The views expressed in this presentation are those 
of  the author and do not necessarily reflect the 
official policy or position of  the U.S. Air Force, 
the U.S. Department of  Defense, or the U.S. 
government.

Endnotes

1. An earlier version of  this paper was presented at the 
2nd International Conference of  the International 
Society for Philosophy of  Architecture: Autonomy 
Revisited, on July 11, 2014.

2. A discussion of  the concepts of  autonomy and 
freedom naturally invites the distinction between 
negative liberty and positive liberty.  (For the 

in a world of 
this sort, there 
is no such thing 
as building out-

of-place since 
there would be 

no organizing 
principle from 

which to render 
the judgement in 

question.

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canonical paper, see Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of  Liberty,” in Four 
Essays on Liberty, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969.)  Insofar as my 
account has roots in Aristotle, it is best seen as part of  the positive liberty 
tradition.  However, it seems to me that the account I develop here can 
avoid the slippery slope to dogmatism and tyranny that was the chief  
concern of  Berlin.

3. For a contemporary discussion of  the idea of  a rational plan, see John 
Rawls, A Theory of  Justice, Revised Edition (Cambridge: Mass.: The Belknap 
Press of  Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 358-365.

4. See for example Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 3rd Edition (Notre 
Dame: Indiana, University of  Notre Dame Press, 2007), Rosalind 
Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 
and Daniel Russell, Practical Intelligence and the Virtues (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2009).  For virtue theory and moral psychology, see Nancy Snow, 
Virtue as Social Intelligence: An Empirically Grounded Theory (New York: 
Routledge, 2010) and Christian Miller, Character and Moral Psychology (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2014).

5. Some work has already been done to re-appropriate Aristotle for politics. 
See Aristide Tessitore, ed., Aristotle and Modern Politics: The Persistence of  
Political Philosophy (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of  Notre Dame Press, 
2002).

6. See for example MacIntyre, After Virtue, pp. 51-61.

7. See Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of  Morals, edited by 
Lara Denis (Orchard Park, NY: Broadview Press, 2005), pp. 98-102.

8. See John Locke, “Second Treatise of  Government,” in Two Treatises 
of  Government, Student Edition, edited by Peter Laslett (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), §99 (p. 333).

9. See Immanuel Kant, “Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment 
[1784],” translated by Thomas K. Abbott, in Basic Writings of  Kant, edited 
with an introduction by Allen W. Wood (New York: The Modern Library, 
2001), pp. 133-141.

10. John Rawls paints a thorough picture here. See Rawls, “The Idea of  
Public Reason Revisited,” in John Rawls, Collected Papers, edited by Samuel 
Freeman (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 573-615.

11. Kant, Groundwork, p. 81.

12. Aristotle, Politics, 1252b10.

13. Notice that I have framed my discussion of  our dwellings, relationships, 
and work as abstract types, rather than specific tokens.  In Aristotle’s Politics, 



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the specific tokens include a patriarchal marriage, 
and slaves (human tools) if  you have the money 
for them. We can accept the view that our thinking 
about human anthropology begins with dwellings, 
relationships, and work without being required to 
accept his specific account of  the household.

14. Recently, Andrew Ballantyne has argued that 
architecture must be concerned with the habits of  
the occupants in their everyday lives.  (See Andrew 
Ballantyne, “Architecture, Life, and Habit,” The 
Journal of  Aesthetics and Art Criticism 69(1) 2011: 
43-49.) On this point, Ballantyne and Aristotle are in 
agreement.  However, Aristotle and contemporary 
neo-Aristotelians might worry that Ballantyne’s 
appeal to pragmatism will not provide him with 
the normative justification that he needs for “an 
appreciation of  the fitness of  the match between 
place and the ethos…” (p. 48). They might suggest 
that a neo-Aristotelian approach would provide 
what he needs.

15. Abraham Maslow, “A Theory of  Human 
Motivation,” Psychological Review, 50(4): 370–396.

16. There is an excellent monograph on this 
relationship. See D. Brendan Nagel, The Household 
as the Foundation of  Aristotle’s Polis (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006).

17. Aristotle, Politics, 1252b27.

18. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Second Edition 
(Kindle Edition), translated and annotated by 
Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company), p. 2.

19. Aristotle, Politics, 1329a2ff.

20. Cf. Berlin, “Two Concepts…”  As I noted 
above (note 2), I am defending a version of  positive 
liberty.

21. Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1115a7ff.

22. Aristotle, Politics, 1330b25.

23. Ibid, 1326b30.



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24. Robert R. Callis and Melissa Kresin, “Residential Vacancies and 
Homeownership in the Second Quarter 2014,” U.S. Census Bureau 
News, http://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/files/currenthvspress.pdf.  
Accessed August 1, 2014.


