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An Aesthetic Deontology: Accessible 
Beauty as a Fundamental Obligation 
of Architecture 1

Christian Illies and Nicholas Ray

Introduction
Recent years have seen an explosion of  interest 

in the intersection of  ethics and aesthetics, 
especially pertaining to literature, cinema, and now 
architecture. The idea of  an ‘intersection’, especially 
when construed as ranging over ‘values’, while 
fruitful, has perhaps limited the field. This paper 
presents an alternative view, grounded in the idea 
of  a general deontology, with moral and aesthetic 
duties forming discrete but interconnected parts of  
such a deontology. More concretely, we argue for an 
“Obligation to Accessible Beauty.”

After having clarified what architectural beauty 
amounts to (section 1), we will outline the argument 
for such an obligation (section 2). It will be based 
upon the moral demand to respect human beings 
and thus to serve their basic needs, and the need 
for beauty is one of  them. The obligation is 
strengthened further by the fact that architecture 
is in the public realm (and therefore unavoidable 
for people). The notorious subjectivity of  beauty 
does not count against this argument because it is 
agnostic towards any one ideal of  what a beautiful 
building consists in. It only requires that the 
architect give beauty due consideration in her design 
deliberations. While the Obligation to Accessible 
Beauty is universal to humanity, its satisfaction can 
be local for any culture.

To conclude, we will discuss how this aesthetic 

While the 
Obligation to 

Accessible 
Beauty is 

universal to 
humanity, its 
satisfaction 
can be local 

for any 
culture

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obligation can be compared and weighed against other moral demands 
(section 3). Obviously, the suggested Obligation to Accessible Beauty 
is not a recipe for the avoidance of  moral conflict. But by seeing this 
aesthetic demand to be commensurate with other moral demands, the 
design problem becomes more tractable. We conclude that apparently 
irreconcilable demands have to be resolved by appeal to aesthetic 
solutions. A building’s design is always a synthetic response to varying 
requirements. Thus, when it comes to reconciling conflicting moral and 
practical demands in architecture, beauty, not morality has the last word. 
We explore further architectural consequences of  this view in our recent 
work, The Philosophy of  Architecture.2 Here, however, our concern is primarily 
with solidifying the philosophical foundation of  this project.

1. The Beauty of Buildings
1.1 Beauty as the Prime Distinction of Architectural Design

We begin with a claim that what distinguishes architecture from mere 
building is an intention to go beyond meeting a functional brief  or solving 
a problem. Nikolaus Pevsner famously declared that a bicycle shed was 
a building, whereas Lincoln Cathedral was a work of  architecture, which 
implies that a mundane building could not be beautiful, or, beautiful 
in the same sense as a cathedral.3 Against Pevsner, we agree with the 
generally held view that a distinction should not be based on scale, or on 
the modesty of  a building’s purpose. Whenever the craftsperson makes 
something with especial care, we claim, there is and should be an intention, 
even if  unacknowledged consciously, to make something that others can 
recognize as beautiful.4 There are several kinds of  beauty in architecture, 
and a simple utilitarian building might well share some, though not all, 
qualities with much more elaborate and considered structures. An over-
riding task of  the act of  building with this particular care might be 
described as that of  enabling people to feel ‘at home in the world’. This 
might entail a careful consideration of  the nature of  the context of  a 
building—its setting in a landscape, or in an existing village, town, or city. 
We are simply not satisfied with mere functionality; we expect architecture 
to aim at ‘more’. And it seems that fulfilling exactly this task, if  this is 
accepted, is the underlying purpose behind the various types of  beauty, 
described below, which we regard as the aims of  architecture.

1.2 Varieties of Beauty in Architecture
When we talk about “beauty” in architecture, we must be aware of  its 

complexity—there are different varieties of  beauty one can legitimately 
attribute to or expect of  architecture. We make no pretense to replicate the 
enormous literature that has accrued on those varieties: our purpose is to 
build the basis for a larger argument.5



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For convenience we might distinguish the 
following five types.

There is formal beauty which accounts for what 
moves us when architects manipulate volumes to 
create memorable spaces—such as the Pantheon 
in Rome, which is based on a sphere, and which 
few visitors are unaffected by. Related notions 
of  architecture as a spatial art, or as primarily the 
plastic manipulation of  form (as Le Corbusier 
sometimes claimed), and the careful articulation of  
surfaces enter here.6

Formal, or compositional, beauty can be found 
in other works of  art, such as sculptures and 
pictures, but functional beauty is a quality found in 
the design of  useful products, such as implements, 
and architecture. Such objects, and those of  
(engineering) design, sometimes have a beauty 
inherent in their efficient workings.7 When buildings 
and urban spaces serve functional criteria in elegant 
ways (such as the beautiful drainage system in St 
Mark’s Square in Venice), they give a particular 
satisfaction not achieved by purely decorative 
objects devoid of  use.

Formal and functional beauty can be found in 
many non-architectural artifacts. But architecture is 
almost always related to a particular location: it is 
situated in a context, which renders it capable of  
exhibiting contextual beauty. Architecture theorists 
speak of  the “murmur of  a site,”8 of  architecture as 
an ‘art of  the ensemble’, and more. The ways that 
effective architecture relates to its setting, whether 
urban or rural, and whether by seeking to blend 
in with it or stand out from it, is one of  its most 
obvious characteristics, and most often a cause of  
criticism when people feel a wrong decision has 
been made. Put positively, contextual fit (especially 
with regard to cultural context) can co-account for 
a building’s beauty.9

There is also time related beauty. Given the 
endurance of  much architecture, the way in which 
a building succeeds in doing so can be a factor in 
the satisfaction it gives. Its age can bestow aesthetic 
pleasures; materials may display weathering effects 

When it comes 
to reconciling 

conflicting 
moral and 
practical  

demands in 
architecture, 

beauty, not 
morality, has 

the last word.

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in pleasing ways, and so on.10

Finally, there is intellectual beauty. Just as elegant solutions are accomplished 
in mathematics or in the fugues of  J.S. Bach, architecture can give rise 
to aesthetic pleasure because it exhibits the solution to a complex set 
of  technical problems. This also pertains to the considered deployment 
of  proportional systems, as in Lutyens’s Liverpool Cathedral and war 
memorials.11 Buildings are complicated artifacts, and some of  them can be 
admired as intellectual achievements over and above their formal beauty. 
Furthermore, some would claim the Pantheon is an aesthetically moving 
work of  architecture not just on account of  its satisfactory form, as noted 
above, or its intellectually satisfying geometry, but because as a work it 
reflects deep trans-cultural meanings: the building’s volume represents the 
world. This is perhaps a spiritual rather than intellectual type of  beauty.12

The different types of  beauty can be in correspondence, but they also 
create a tension. It would seem that it is quite possible to have a formal 
beauty that is not functional, or particularly rigorous intellectually: this 
would be evident in a sculpturally compelling structure that was maybe not 
very useful, such as Zaha Hadid’s fire station for the Vitra organization. 
Buildings can also be formally beautiful, and work well, without being 
particularly satisfying in the third way: these might be “romantic” works, 
such as Neuschwanstein, the castle built by Ludwig II, that depend to a certain 
extent on the associations that are summoned up. But a building such 
as Neuschwanstein can be criticized if  it is not also skilfully composed—
in such cases, it degenerates into mere kitsch. And a laboratory building 
that was rigorously worked through as a design, and also functioned well, 
would not necessarily be beautiful formally, even though at various periods 
architects have argued that we ought to find such buildings beautiful. Any 
building aspiring to beauty must represent some kind of  reconciliation of  
these different types of  beauty. This aspiration to beauty is what architects 
should aim at, or so we will argue.

2. Aesthetic Deontology
2.1 The Obligation to Beauty

We began by claiming that the intention to make something beautiful 
is what distinguishes architecture from mere building, even though some 
have argued that aesthetics should have nothing to do with architecture. 
Hannes Meyer, who succeeded Gropius as the director of  the Bauhaus, 
famously stated that architecture is a “technical, not an aesthetic process.”13 
According to Meyer, architecture can do without beauty: its essence is the 
creation of  a functional space, its worth is merely ‘what it does’ and how 
well it does that. Here, beauty is a luxury, not a demand. Alternatively, 
beauty might arise naturally, or even necessarily, as Functionalists claimed, 
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In contrast to either of  these two positions, we 
argue that beauty, in the senses described above, 
is the prime goal and obligation of  architectural 
design. We shall refer to this claim, and the moral 
obligation behind it, as the ‘Obligation to Beauty.’14

There are different ways to argue for this claim, 
depending on the kind of  ethical theory one 
presupposes. In Aristotelian mode, any human 
practice aims at some result, this being the implicit 
goal of  the activity. We practice the flute in order 
to play it better; we make each sculpture not only 
for itself, but also in order to improve as sculptors. 
Similarly, the result of  good artistic practice, that is 
to say the practice of  the art or craft of  being an 
architect, will be a product with aesthetic quality. 
And if  it is the aim of  architects to practice their 
craft to the highest standard they are able to achieve, 
then architects must strive for aesthetic quality. 
Otherwise it would remain opaque as to why we 
should regard an aesthetically successful building as 
‘good architecture’ in a wider sense.

But the Obligation to Beauty can also be 
supported by a moral argument of  a different variety, 
one motivated by a concern for human well-being. If  
we (morally) must promote human well-being, then 
this includes all human needs and desires.15 After 
all, that is why buildings should be functional—
because as vulnerable, dependent animals, we need 
a safe and warm and healthy place to live. But we 
need more: we also have a fundamental need for 
a pleasing place where we can happily live. As the 
20th century Dutch architect Aldo van Eyck put 
it: “Architecture need do no more, nor should it ever 
do less, than assist man’s homecoming...”16 While it is 
conventionally thought of  as supplemental, beauty 
is (on this view) actually essential to human well-
being, for our emotions and our feeling at home, 
otherwise it would be inexplicable why most people 
spend so much time and money decorating their 
homes. The simplistic anthropology of  an architect 
like Hannes Meyer, with his list of  ‘motives’ from 
1928, is ludicrously reductive.17 Humans need 

Humans need 
more: they 

deeply long 
for beauty.

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more: they deeply long for beauty, a desire that is probably genetically 
embedded.18 Any appropriate notion of  well-being will therefore support 
the claim of  beauty being a necessary goal of  architecture.

2.2 The Obligation to Accessible Beauty
If  we endorse this second moral argument, and if  the aesthetic quality, 

or beauty, of  a building responds to a moral requirement for promoting 
well-being, then something important follows: the beauty that the 
architect must strive for must be accessible. Not only do people have 
strong views about building, they also articulate them forcibly, and this 
gives us reason to believe that they understand what it is that they object 
to and what they enjoy.19 Architecture’s status as a public art entails moral 
requirements not adherent to other art forms. Whereas we do not have 
to pick up a prize-winning novel, or listen to a highly-praised piece of  
music, it is impossible to avoid the buildings all around us. Thus people 
will always be confronted by architecture and their desire for beauty will be 
frustrated if  the architecture they experience is banal or ugly. (To be sure, 
there are many ways of  satisfying the human need for beauty but because 
architecture is in an important way inescapable, any ugly architecture will 
be a frustration of  this need, whether or not we are able to experience 
beauty in other areas.)

There is therefore an onus on architecture to communicate in a way 
that, while it may be appreciated on many levels, is accessible, rather than 
conceived in a private language that only the cognoscenti can appreciate. 
Architects frequently tend towards forming sub-cultures that find certain 
forms and materials (like bare concrete) beautiful, which the general 
public may find ugly and unfriendly. But to the extent that buildings are a 
form of  public art, used and seen by many, they must also be capable of  
satisfying the aesthetic desires of  many. An exclusively elitist concept of  
beauty would not do so and is thus not the morally required beauty. As 
Fontaine’s fable tells us, we need to ensure that people with a variety of  
capabilities can enjoy the good food we prepare.20

Yet, such accessibility needs a pinch of  salt. What is accessible is not 
simply given. It often seems that it is a part of  architects’ Obligation to 
Beauty to expand the aesthetic expectations of  their clients. If  they did not 
do so, people could be condemned to a banal repetition of  conventional 
buildings. Thus the best architecture might well assist in a re-definition 
of  what we generally call the beautiful. The idea of  an accessible beauty 
can therefore be seen as a dialogue between the architect, or her building, 
and the public: whilst it is arrogant for architects to say that people must 
learn to understand their buildings, it is clear that public taste develops 
and moves on, so that inspiring works of  architecture broaden the area 
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architects, therefore, to judge carefully the aesthetic 
accessibility of  the buildings they propose, and this 
is applicable for each of  the five different types of  
beauty we identified above.

2.3 Challenging the Obligation to Beauty
Is there really an aesthetic obligation of  the 

variety we propose? Some would claim that the 
requirement that architects should create aesthetic 
quality (let alone beauty) in their designs is pointless, 
impossible, or even dangerous. Here are four 
objections.

Firstly, one might object that our characterization 
too easily subscribes to the formalist conception of  
the aesthetic sense and does not accurately record 
how people experience a building. Much of  the 
way we experience architecture is intuitive. We 
are “enveloped” in the experience of  a work of  
architecture, as Walter Benjamin observed21; we do 
not usually stand in front of  it analyzing its divisions 
into coherent and incoherent parts. In this sense, 
experiencing a group of  buildings is like a walk 
through a forest, or the exploration of  a cave, and 
could more readily be subjected to psychological 
analysis than conventional aesthetic descriptions.

Secondly, even if  there can be some objectivity in 
the differing experiences people have of  buildings, 
the way buildings are appreciated is inevitably 
culturally conditioned: members of  certain 
castes in India may be more likely to enjoy the 
rich texture and overwhelming detail of  a Hindu 
temple, whereas Europeans of  an analogous class 
prefer the plain abstraction of  Mies van der Rohe’s 
Barcelona Pavilion. The attempt to find universal 
qualities of  beauty (desirable intricacy, or perfection 
of  proportion) would therefore be quite futile.

Thirdly, our appreciation is not only conditioned 
by cultural origin, but also by time. As our 
technology progresses, forms which were previously 
impossible or uneconomic to construct become 
possible. In the past, for example, only limited 
spans were achievable, so intermediary columns 
were necessary, and it was natural to adopt some 

It is a 
principal 

moral 
task for 

architects  
[...] to judge 
carefully 

the aesthetic 
accessibility 

of [their] 
buildings.

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conventions to decorate them. But now, we might not need columns (in 
a traditional sense) at all. Structures could arise, and warp and twist like a 
piece of  landscape, and the conventions of  architectural form are revealed 
for what they always were—products of  the technological limitations of  
their time.

We can also, fourthly, raise the more fundamental objection whether 
we should aspire to make beautiful buildings at all. Isn’t cultural beauty a 
dangerous camouflage of  a rather grim reality? It might be more truthful 
to the purposes that they serve, and the conditions of  their production, 
that buildings should be ugly. In his analysis of  the relationship between 
aesthetics and political interests, Theodor Adorno argued that all cultural 
products, including architecture, were extended instruments of  capitalism, 
necessarily putting those who experience them into the position of  passive 
consumers. “Beauty” in this reading is particularly dangerous, because it 
obscures the brutal face of  reality, that is a system of  capitalist exploitation 
and instrumentalization. “Ugly” art, in contrast, will be a more truthful 
revelation of  the real conditions of  society. His observations of  1944 
anticipate the feelings of  many in the last seventy years.22

These objections are paradigmatic for the aesthetic debate on architecture 
and aesthetics. They correspond to fundamental philosophical theories: 
aesthetic subjectivism would claim that any aesthetic experience remains 
subjective and no general judgements can be made about aesthetic qualities. 
Aesthetic culturalism is the basis for the second and third objection; it sees 
aesthetic judgements as being cultural in origin and shaped by an epoch or 
time. Again, any promotion of  beauty seems futile from this perspective, 
at least if  it aims at more than the preferences of  a group at a certain time. 
The fourth critique is a variation of  ‘ideology-critique’ that the Frankfurt 
School developed; here theories are debunked according to the motives or 
interests that they serve implicitly or explicitly.

Let us turn to the first objection. It is obvious that a universal demand 
for architectural beauty like the one above only makes sense if  a generally 
shared understanding of  what beauty amounts to is possible.23 Thus at 
least a mild form of  aesthetic objectivism is presupposed by our argument. 
Following Kant, we hold that “judgements of  taste” can make a claim to 
general (Kant would say “universal”) acceptance—in face of  a building 
like the Pantheon, we consider some aesthetic judgements as the ones 
everyone should make.24 This objectivism seems to go hand in hand with 
an aesthetic cognitivism, i.e., the view that aesthetic judgements can be 
(more or less) correct or wrong and that we can meaningfully reason 
about whether they are. After all, even an analysis of  types of  beauty as 
suggested above only makes sense if  the aesthetic is not entirely outside 
the reach of  reason. However, this does not mean that aesthetic judgments 
are entirely independent from the subject and its way of  experiencing the 



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world. In his defence of  objectivism, Frank Sibley25 
rightly points out that aesthetic judgements cannot 
be inferred directly from non-aesthetic features of  
an object, but require response-dependent features, 
that is properties which need the response of  
the experiencing subjects for being instantiated: 
“taste, perceptiveness, or sensitivity, of  aesthetic 
discrimination or appreciation” lie at the heart of  
aesthetic judgments.26 For example, we cannot talk 
meaningfully about the ‘harmonious proportions of  
the Pantheon (or its color) without some experience of  
this harmony (or color). We will therefore base our 
argument on a moderate objectivism that includes 
the foundational role of  experiences. Following 
Elisabeth Schellekens’s distinction between an 
aesthetic perception and an aesthetic judgement, we 
presuppose that aesthetic perceptions provide “the 
experiential grounding of  an aesthetic judgement,” 
but that aesthetic judgements are the result of  a 
“rational process” which “relies on the possibility 
of  appealing to an object’s salient features in order 
to check whether our aesthetic perception is well 
grounded.”27

The essential role of  the subject’s experience 
explains why aesthetic subjectivism and the 
reference to individual intuitions will always have 
a strong appeal. Aesthetic subjectivism is right in 
emphasizing the possibility of  irreducibly subjective 
aesthetic experiences or intuitions—we only have 
to remember Peter Eisenman’s notable dislike 
of  Chartres Cathedral28—but regarding aesthetic 
judgements merely as subjective expressions of  
preferences explains too little. Aesthetic subjectivism 
leaves many aspects of  these judgements, like the 
striking convergence of  aesthetic judgements over 
time and between cultures, underdetermined. A 
“reasonable objectivism” (to use Schellekens’s 
term) will have to allow for subjective perceptions 
and even for impenetrable idiosyncrasies. But it will 
also acknowledge (at least some) aesthetic features 
of  buildings and other artifacts that more generally 
evoke aesthetic appreciation. Furthermore, 
reasonable objectivism finds empirical support by 

Isn’t cultural 
beauty a 

dangerous 
camouflage of 

a rather grim 
reality?

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many psychological experiments that contradict the strong subjectivist 
claims. There seem, for example, to be hard-wired preferences for 
certain facial features. There is also a striking cross-cultural agreement 
(at least amongst so-called “informed” and “educated” people) about the 
aesthetic quality of  many artworks or buildings. To be sure, any reasonable 
objectivism has to account for a great variety of  aesthetic preferences—
but it will do so within a framework of  generally acknowledged aesthetic 
qualities. And it is these qualities, their analysis and promotion, with which 
we are concerned.

The second and third objections are based upon the observation that 
the understanding of  beauty is neither homogenous amongst people 
nor unchanging over time. In Renaissance times, Medieval architecture 
was derogatorily baptized “Gothic” by classicizing Italians who blamed 
Gothic tribes for having sacked Rome and having created a barbarian 
style of  building—while A.W.N. Pugin and other Romanticists of  the 
19th century celebrated its beauty and dreamt of  a (Neo)Gothic world. 
If  ‘beauty’ is an ever-changing concept, does it make sense to demand the 
design of  ‘beautiful’ buildings? Indeed it does, and the arguments above 
support the demand to strive for architectural beauty within the given 
cultural context. This culturally specific notion of  beauty is implied by a 
practice which is always part of  a cultural context (like building a railway 
station for a society with a certain infrastructure, tradition, life-form, etc.). 
Similarly, when we ground the demand for beauty on the promotion of  
human well-being, the aesthetic experiences of  a culture and time must 
be taken into account; it is an essential part of  people’s identity, and thus 
well-being, to be situated in a certain culture and tradition. That is why 
we specified the aim as an accessible beauty. In other words: the demand 
indicates an ideal whose realisation can look rather different in different 
situations. Some features of  a building will be required in most contexts 
(such as a careful design of  details), others will be specific for a certain 
culture and time (such as the use of  a certain style), and others can be 
highly specific to the situation (the “murmur of  the site”). The demand to 
strive for beauty does not come with an elaborated list of  forms that must 
be globally applied, but asks for sensitive artistic reflection about what 
constitutes beauty in a particular case. This will include an anticipation of  
the aesthetic responses of  the beholders. But because of  the (intended) 
survival of  most buildings over time, the architect should aim at those 
forms that transcend the fashions of  the day and are likely to be accessible 
for users and beholders of  generations yet to come.29 (Not an easy task, 
but then, good architecture is a demanding art and not a simple craft.)

Let us turn to Adorno’s objection. Is there something vicious about 
creating beauty in an ultimately ugly world? Obviously, one might question 
his Marxist absolutism about capitalism and doubt whether we can simply 



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identify the free market as inherently evil (especially 
if  we cannot easily point to a compellingly successful 
alternative). But we can accept his political analysis 
here, for the sake of  argument, and look at his 
fundamental thesis about the intention behind the 
creation of  beauty and about the way the experience 
of  beauty affects us. Both seem highly speculative. 
There’s evidence that even in the most straightened 
circumstances people aspire to decorate their 
dwellings. If  the lights of  (Robert Venturi’s) Las 
Vegas, as much as the skyline of  Beijing, were 
created to manipulate people’s feelings, it is by 
no means obvious why beauty must always be a 
strategic move to deceive others. But  although 
there are situations in which it serves to encourage 
the acceptance of  an unjust political situation, 
aesthetic experiences can equally well produce an 
increased level of  awareness or sensibility to the 
world and, for example, its fragility. It can thereby 
increase our ability to change it for the better. 
Friedrich Schiller famously argued that art and the 
aesthetic impulse allow the individual to transcend 
inner and outer constraints, thus increasing his or 
her freedom. There is no compelling reason why we 
should let Adorno’s single-sided ‘ideology-critique’ 
delegitimate the desire for beauty.

In summary, these more general objections, 
according to which an Obligation to Beauty 
presupposes a questionable aesthetic objectivism, 
or even promotes a dangerous ideology, do not 
seem to carry much weight. The subjective/
objective debate is only a marginal concern to the 
aesthetic deontology that is outlined in this paper. 
Most importantly, the Obligation to Beauty is not 
committed to a single version of  beauty—even as 
a universal imperative it allows us to embrace some 
particularist insights. 

3. In Search of a Prime Imperative of Architecture
If  beauty is one moral obligation for architects, 

we can certainly identify others: we briefly turn to 
this expanded field of  moral duty, before examining 
deontic conflicts (that is, conflict among the 

The demand 
to strive for 

beauty does not 
come with an 

elaborated list 
of forms that 

must be globally 
applied

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‘expanded field’ of  moral and aesthetic duties for architecture) and their 
possible resolutions. We will end this section by searching for a prime 
imperative of  architecture that might help to solve these conflicts.

3.1 Moral Obligations and Conflicts
Building entails a complex set of  activities, involving many agents and 

artifacts, and ranges from design and construction to a completed edifice 
that may remain as continuous reality. Without any claim to finality, this 
creates (at least) the following reasonable moral demands30: (1) Duties 
arising from professional behavior; (2) Duties arising from what a building 
is (designed) for, and pertain to its use, good architecture, independently 
from the moral discourse31; (3) Moral duties pertaining to the impact of  
the building on individual users: their health, safety, and general well-being, 
including their psychological well-being; (4) Moral duties arising from the 
impact of  the building on the natural (non-man made) environment; (5) 
Moral duties pertaining to the influence on human behavior, individually 
and collectively; (6) The cultural or symbolic meaning that buildings 
express and communicate, by means of  choices in form, materials, colors, 
aesthetic style, and the like.

To this we would add (7) moral imagination—that is the faculty which 
anticipates moral answers to complex challenges by portraying a possible 
and better life-form, society, or world. Moral imagination requires an 
abstraction from one’s particular situation, an awareness of  the values and 
principles on which one currently acts—as much as an openness to change 
and the anticipation of  different and new ways to deal with current and 
upcoming challenges (e.g., a library that suggests an ideal of  scholarship, 
a chamber for debate which supposes a society to which we aspire).32 This 
demand is different from the others in that it is not an obligation but, 
rather, a luxury (or technically supererogatory): although not all buildings 
need to inspire our moral imagination, some buildings must do so.

Again, buildings might satisfy some, and not all, of  these moral demands, 
and often the satisfaction of  one moral demand will be in conflict with 
another. To give an example: environmental concerns or even safety can 
clash with the cultural meaning of  a building.33

This typology might make it easier to analyze questions (and demands) of  
moral relevance; however, for several reasons things are more complicated. 
First, things are more complicated because we have to distinguish between 
what is objectively good or bad and what is subjectively moral or immoral. 
The first relates something to a universal ethical standard; in this sense 
slavery was always as wrong as it is now. When we talk about the subjective 
morality of  the agent, however, we contextualize his or her knowledge of  
norms and values. Even an antique slave-owner could then have been a 
subjectively moral person, simply because he could not have known better 



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at the time. That difference is relevant for both the 
brief  and design areas: we can ask whether a brief  
is acceptable (objectively right) and also whether 
the architect was justified (subjectively moral) in 
accepting it. As we have illustrated above, we can 
ask the same question in the area of  design. The 
answers in both cases can be different and the 
historical context will become relevant in helping 
come to appropriate judgements.

Secondly, things are so complicated because 
clashes often occur between different types of  
demands, like aesthetic, moral or functional ones. 
They sometimes cohere without conflict (it is, for 
example, as much a moral, a legal, and a functional 
requirement that engineers design structurally 
stable buildings). But often they pull in different 
directions. For example: we might ask whether 
the gates between the first, second, and third class 
passengers on the Titanic were morally acceptable, 
though they were demanded by the etiquette of  
its time. It is therefore no surprise that some of  
the finest buildings (that respect the Obligation 
to Beauty) are erected by blatantly ignoring some 
fundamental moral demands.

3.2 The Difficulty of a Reconciliation
A well-known difficulty of  any clash of  normative 

demands is that there are quantitative issues, which 
are calculable with reasonable precision, and 
qualitative issues, which are not amenable to the 
same kind of  measurement. How these demands 
should be balanced against each other is hard to 
decide, in particular if  the very idea of  “balancing” 
is biased towards quantifiable issues. This is a 
general problem, but is endemic for architecture 
because it is partially an art form and partially a 
functional thing—which makes it particularly open 
to expectations from both the measurable and the 
unmeasurable sides. And even within the same 
type of  demand, for example the aesthetic one, we 
have measurable and unmeasurable components. 
Whereas visual comfort, or the use of  materials 
that are warm to the touch, may be matters that can 

moral 
imagination [...] 

anticipates 
moral answers 

to complex 
challenges

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be quantified, whether the aesthetic quality of  a conjunction of  particular 
sets of  forms is quantifiable remains questionable.34 In a similar way, we 
could say that it is easy to measure whether we have or have not met some 
ethical demands; but there are others that are less objectively measurable. 
We are therefore faced with a complex of  categorically different criteria 
even within the same type of  demands. 

These demands are not hierarchically ordered in an obvious way: we 
cannot simply argue that only those buildings that perform satisfactorily 
in all measurable ways get themselves into the category where they can be 
judged in incommensurable ways, because we can all think of  buildings that 
fail in some measurable way, but are nevertheless highly regarded for good 
reasons.35 That a building is successful technically, on the other hand, is no 
guarantee that it is going to be of  a high architectural standard.

What makes things even more complicated is that there can be 
conflicting demands of  other types. We have seen that the Obligation to 
Beauty is a moral demand, but morality demands a respect for multiple 
demands. Budgetary prudence, for example, could be a reasonable 
criterion for a client commissioning architects, and the constraints that 
lead to that demand could be quite precisely measured—if  the client is a 
charity, say, with a limited budget. To complicate matters even more, full 
moral obeisance is not guaranteed to be the best course of  action. At least 
in hindsight, we know that many acknowledged masterpieces were only 
achieved because architects were in some sense irresponsible with their 
client’s money in the service of  a greater ideal—namely creating a work 
of  architecture that transcended its immediate context—which we would 
find hard to quantify.

So the resulting picture is highly complex: we have tensions between 
different types of  demands (moral, aesthetic, economic) and between the 
quantifiable and unquantifiable. Because the different demands are deeply 
interwoven, we cannot even have a trade off  on the level of  quantifiable 
demands, because there can be (more or less) quantifiable moral demands 
to obey unquantifiable normative demands of  other types (e.g., to be 
economically responsible)—and unquantifiable moral demands to obey 
quantifiable demands of  other types (e.g., for flexible buildings).

Architecture has not come up with a timeless solution to the tensions 
between different demands and their clash seems an ongoing theme 
of  architectural self-reflection.36 Few areas of  human activity face so 
many and such different demands—and that is possibly the reason it is 
particularly hard in the case of  architecture to find truly unifying, well-
balanced reconciliations rather than biased compromises that give too 
much weight to some demands at the expense of  others.



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3.3 In Search of a Prime Obligation for Architecture
If  ethics can neither reconcile different demands 

a priori, nor hope for an objectifiable trade-off, what 
could do this work? It is tempting to attempt to 
prioritize the different types of  demands. What, in 
the end, is the highest obligation?

One the one hand, it seems that much, or even 
all demands have a moral basis. Remember that the 
strongest argument for the architect’s obligation 
to create beauty is itself  a moral reason. And moral 
demands can also be seen as grounding other types 
of  requirements, for example functional ones: to 
build efficiently, safely, and economically is also a 
way of  respecting other humans, their resources (or 
the resources of  future generations), and so forth. 
However, it is not clear what exactly follows for 
this priority in time; in particular, it does not imply 
that the Obligation to Beauty must, in the end, be 
sacrificed for other moral demands. On the other 
hand, architecture can be regarded as a way of  
overcoming normative tensions by suggesting an 
ultimately aesthetic solution. It must always result in a 
particular design that in some way or other bridges 
between conflicting demands. And a successful 
resolution to conflicting duties will be, as stated in 
the beginning, an intellectual achievement that can 
give (intellectual) beauty to a building. Thus, when 
it comes to reconciling conflicting demands in a 
building, beauty, not morality, seems always have 
the last word. To put it another way, apparently 
irreconcilable demands have to be resolved by 
appeal to aesthetic solutions.

The purpose of  this essay has been to identify 
accessible beauty as a fundamental obligation of  
architecture. Our argument could point towards 
the stronger thesis that this is in some way the 
prime obligation of  architecture. Though we would 
not claim to have reached that conclusion, which 
would require much more than this paper can 
contain; nevertheless, we hope to have indicated its 
possibility.

architecture 
can be regarded 

as a way of 
overcoming 

normative 
tensions

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ENDNOTES
1. This paper is a revised and condensed version of  our “Why Architects 
should design beautiful buildings,” in The Design Turn in Applied Ethics, eds. 
Thomas Pogge, Jeroen van den Hoven, and Seumas Miller (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012/2016), and builds on Christian Illies, 
“Schön ist gut! Ästhetisches Bauen als ethische Forderung,” (presentation, 
Symposium, Basel, Switzerland, March 7, 2013). We are grateful to Stefan 
Koller and Tom Spector for very helpful comments.
2. Christian Illies and Nicholas Ray, The Philosophy of  Architecture (London: 
Cambridge Architectural Press, 2014). Reviewed by Stefan Koller and 
Tom Spector below.
3. Nikolaus Pevsner, An Outline of  European Architecture (London: Penguin, 
1943).
4. By this phraseology, we recognize that, though this is a common and 
perfectly proper approach, it is not necessary to believe in “beauty” as 
an essence, or some kind of  Platonic ideal.  We can equally well say, in 
a somewhat Aristotelian mode, that the product of  good architectural 
practice should be buildings that people would conventionally find 
beautiful.
5. For an introduction to those issues, see Graham Gordon, “Architecture,” 
in Oxford Handbook of  Aesthetics, ed. Jerrold Levinson (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 561-569. See also Saul Fisher, “Philosophy of  
Architecture,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of  Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, 
September 9, 2015, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/architecture.
6. Goethe, who was acutely sensitive to architecture, emphasized its 
haptic nature in a conversation with Humboldt. See Johann Wolfgang 
von Goethe, Gedenkausgabe der Werke, Briefe und Gespräche. Bd 22 (Goethes 
Gespräche), ed. Ernst Beutler (Frankfurt: Artemis, 1964), 241. The classic 
text exploring the various ways in which architecture can affect us is Steen 
Eiler Rasmussen, Experiencing Architecture (Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press, 1959).
7.  See David Pye, The Nature and Aesthetics of  Design (Oxford: Berg 3PL, 
2002) for a full discussion of  functional beauty in product design.
8. See Rafael Moneo (presentation, Anywhere Conference, Yufuin, Japan, 
1992). Re-printed in El Croquis 20/64/98: Rafael Moneo 1967-2004 (2004): 
635-641. See also Francisco González de Canales and Nicholas Ray, Rafael 
Moneo: Building Teaching Writing (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
2015).
9. How contextual fit (and its relation to architectural beauty) is to be 
spelled out precisely is an open question. For a spirited defense of  a highly 
partisan position, see Roger Scruton, Beauty (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), 8-14.
10. See Mohsen Mostafavi and David Leatherbarrow, On Weathering: The 



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Life of  Buildings in Time (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1993).
11. See Dennis Radford, and Douglas Cawthorne, “Unlocking Lutyens: A 
Gateway to the Hidden Legacy of  John Pell and Sir Christopher Wren” in 
Architecture Research Quarterly 12, no.1 (2008): 69-85.
12.This could therefore constitute a further category.  Others would claim 
this is an overarching category transcending aesthetics, within which every 
other category is subsumed. The phenomenology of  Merleau-Ponty 
and the hermeneutic approach of  Gadamer can be read in this way. See 
Kenneth Frampton, A Genealogy of  Modern Architecture: Comparative Critical 
Analysis of  Built Form, ed. Ashley Simone (Zurich: Lars Muller, 2015), 18-
27.
13. Hannes Meyer, Bauen und Gesellschaft: Schriften, Briefe, Projekte (Dresden: 
Verlag der Kunst, 1980).
14. For a similar argument for beauty as a moral obligation see Martin 
Düchs, Architektur für ein gutes Leben: Über Verantwortung, Moral und Ethik des 
Architekten (Münster: Waxmann, 2011), 232-235.
15. Given such an inclusivist delineation of  ‘well-being’, this proposal 
differs from the first one, which (at most) relates to Aristotle’s more specific 
notion of  human well-being or ‘flourishing’ (eudaimonia). That said, the 
present argument could be reformulated for that restricted notion, though 
we do not pursue this eudaimonistic variant here.
16. Aldo van Eyck quoted in Herman Hertzberger, Aldo van Eyck, eds. 
Addie van Roijen-Wortmann and Francis Strauven (Amsterdam: Stichting 
Wonen, 1982).
17. Meyer’s list is as follows:

pure construction is the basis and the characteristics of  the new world of  forms. 
1. sex life 2. sleeping habits 3. pets 4. gardening 5. personal hygiene 6. weather 
protection 7. hygiene in the home 8. car maintenance 9. cooking 10. heating 11. 
exposure to the sun 12. services these are the only motives when building a house.

Meyer was quite optimistic that this would allow for a scientific process 
of  design:

this functional, biological interpretation of  architecture as giving shape to the 
functions of  life, logically leads to pure construction: this world of  constructive 
forms knows no native country. it is the expression of  an international attitude 
in architecture. internationality is a privilege of  the period. […] we examine 
the daily routine of  everyone who lives in the house and this gives us the 
functional diagram – the functional diagram and the economic programme are 
the determining principles of  the building project.

For Meyer’s list and commentary, see Hannes Meyer, “Building,” Bauhaus 
Year 2, no. 4, quoted in Programs and manifestos on 20th-century architecture, ed. 
Ulrich Conrads, trans. Michael Bullock (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 
1975), 119.
18. Christian Illies, “The Evolution of  Autonomous Beauty. Sexual 



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Selection versus Natural Selection,” in The Many Faces of  Beauty, ed. Vittorio 
Hösle (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame Press, 2013), 133-168.
19. In technical terms this presupposes an “internalist” position for 
people’s belief  formation and justification. Subscription to “acceptance 
internalism” would seem a relevant position to hold where the judgment 
of  a ‘public art’ like architecture is concerned.  This question could be 
examined in greater detail, no doubt, as Stefan Koller has pointed out to 
us.
20. Vicious Mister Fox’ serves a delicious soup on a flat plate to Miss 
Stork. And though she is hungry, she cannot eat it with her long beak.
21. Walter Benjamin, “The Work of  Art in the Age of  Mechanical 
Reproduction,” in Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn 
(London: Pimlico, 1999).
22. Including Nathaniel Coleman, “Is Beauty Still Relevant? Is Art? Is 
Architecture?,” Architecture Philosophy 1, no. 1 (2014): 81-95. For Adorno, 
see Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, “The Culture Industry: 
Enlightenment as Mass Deception,” Marxists Internet Archive, last 
modified February 2005, https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/
adorno/1944/culture-industry.htm.
23. Here we get close to, without endorsing, an analogue in the aesthetic 
domain to a ‘categorical’ imperative in the moral domain. (On the 
difficulty of  pushing such an analogy too far, Bernard Williams, Philippa 
Foot, and John McDowell have written eloquently.) But as we now go 
on to explain, we steer clear of  brute categorization by recognizing 
cultural context. Contextualization to cultural specifics also endows a 
principled deontological framework with the means to absorb some of  the 
explanatory appeal of  what is presently known as moral ‘particularism’.
24. For a thorough discussion of  Kant’s aesthetics, see Paul Guyer, Kant 
and the Claims of  Taste (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
25. F. N. Sibley and Michael Tanner, “Symposium: Objectivity and 
Aesthetic,” Proceedings of  the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 42 
(1968): 31-54.
26. Frank Sibley, “Aesthetic Concepts,” Philosophical Review 68, no. 4 (1959): 
421.
27. Elisabeth Schellekens, “Towards a reasonable objectivism for aesthetic 
judgements,” British Journal of  Aesthetics 46, no. 2 (2006): 175.
28. Christopher Alexander and Peter Eisenman, “Contrasting Concepts 
of  Harmony in Architecture,” Lotus International 40 (1983): 60-68.
29. We say ‘most’ because many forms of  architecture—paper architecture 
and exhibition architecture like the Weissenhofsiedlung—can legitimately 
evade any obligation to enduring aesthetic relevance.
30. Most of  these categories are worked out in more detail in Illies and 
Ray, The Philosophy of  Architecture. The seventh category is a new addition. 



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For categories of  moral relevance see also Warwick A. Fox, “Architecture 
Ethics,” in A Companion to the Philosophy of  Technology, eds. Jan Kyrre Berg 
Olsen, Stig Andur Pedersen, and Vincent F. Hendricks (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2009), 387-391.
31. It should be added that the intended function does not have to be the 
function that the building realizes; see Don Ihde, “The Designer Fallacy 
and Technological Imagination”, in Defining Technological Literacy: Towards 
an Epistemological Framework, ed. John R. Dakers (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006).
32. For the importance of  moral imagination see Melissa Lane, Eco-
Republic: Ancient Thinking for a Green Age (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 
2011). See also Jane Collier, “Moral Imagination and the Practice of  
Architecture,” in Architecture and its Ethical Dilemmas, ed. Nicholas Ray 
(New York: Taylor & Francis, 2005).
33. See Nicholas Ray, “The Cambridge History Faculty Building: a case 
study in ethical dilemmas in the twentieth century” in Architecture and its 
Ethical Dilemmas, ed. Nicholas Ray (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2005).
34. For a discussion of  proportional systems, which sometimes make this 
claim, see P. H. Scholfield, The Theory of  Proportion in Architecture (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1958). The Finnish architect Alvar Aalto said 
his wooden furniture was more functional than the furniture designed by 
his contemporaries in the Bauhaus, which was metal-framed and cold to 
the touch.  But he acknowledged that scientific analysis “gave out” at some 
point: “The demands that the chair failed to meet – excessive reflection 
of  sound and light, high thermal conductivity – are actually merely the 
scientific names of  the elements that together make up the mysterious 
concept of  ‘comfort’.” See Alvar Aalto, “Rationalismen och manniskän” 
(presentation, annual meeting of  the Swedish Society of  Industrial Design, 
May 9, 1935), reprinted in Alvar Aalto, Alvar Aalto in his own words, ed. 
Goran Schildt (New York: Rizzoli International, 1998).
35. Le Corbusier’s famous Villa Savoye would be an example: it is impossible 
to waterproof  it.
36. Taylor and Levine for example, claim that the study of  the intersection 
of  architecture and ethics enables one to “achieve a more comprehensive 
understanding of  architecture and ethics than traditionally conceived 
by either moral philosophers or architectural theorists (particularly 
phenomenologists) alone.” The authors want to see aesthetic issues as an 
integral part of  the function of  a building: it would be impossible therefore 
to design a war memorial that was aesthetically successful if  it could also 
be seen as endorsing an immoral politics. But as we have observed there 
are well-known instances of  (what most people would consider to be) 
significant works of  architecture that were designed to serve autocratic 
regimes, or contain uses that we would hardly sanction today: the Alhambra, 



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or the Coliseum, or Terragni’s Casa del Fascio at Como.  According to the 
authors, the prospects for philosophical investigation are limited, in any 
case, since they “question the effectiveness of  philosophical enquiry, as 
commonly practised, for understanding moral values in relation to the 
built environment.” See William M. Taylor & Michael P. Levine, Prospects 
for an Ethics of  Architecture (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), 78.


