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The present issue owes its contributions 
to an international symposium held by 
the International Society for the Philosophy of  
Architecture, the society behind Architecture 
Philosophy. Hosted  over the summer of  2015 at 
the Wittgenstein House in Vienna, symposium 
speakers were able to literally demonstrate 
claims by pointing to the structure around them. 
The setting stimulated difficult conversations 
about Wittgenstein, architecture, and 
architecture’s Modernism. Entitled “Use-Value 
in Architecture: Reconceptualizing Buildings’ 
Functions,” the symposium raised a host of  
questions related to the notion of  function in 
architecture’s Modernist discourse and called 
upon Wittgenstein’s notion of  meaning as use 
to aid in its resolution:

Given the wealth of  new ways of  conceptualizing 
building, its practice, and its meanings, this call 
for papers prompts authors to reconceptualize the 
notion of  buildings’ functions in terms of  use, 
particularly as is described in Wittgenstein’s use 
theory.

By engaging one of  philosophy’s richest and 
most formidable postmodern thinkers-–Ludwig 
Wittgenstein-–the discourse surrounding function 
can move away from architecture’s Modernist 
paradigm that has largely defined how we think 
about and deal with questions relating to function. 
Wittgenstein-–who remains largely undealt with 
by the architectural discourse, but whose work 
has nevertheless had ample development from 

The discourse 
surrounding 

function can 
move away from 

the Modernist’s 
paradigm

“

”

USE-VALUE IN ARCHITECTURE: RECONCEPTUALIZING 
BUIlDINGS’ FUNCTIONS

CAROLYN FAHEY



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within the philosophical discourse-–provides genuine contributions to the 
understanding of  use and meaning. Specifically, the Wittgensteinian notion 
of  meaning as use moves the discussion away from mechanical or systematic 
notions grounded in scientific inquiry, and instead focuses analysis on the 
particular context or language-game within which a building partakes. 
Thus, the hope is to utilize Ludwig Wittgenstein’s theory of  meaning to 
achieve radically alternative analyses of  building’s use, thereby allowing 
for productive re-engagement with one of  architecture’s most fundamentally 
philosophical questions.1 

The symposium’s call simultaneously prompted thinkers to revisit 
questions relating to Wittgenstein’s philosophical significance within 
the architecture discourse. 

This special issue seeks to reinvigorate the discourse surrounding 
the Wittgenstein House, not so much with the interest of  canonizing 
the house, but rather as a means of  developing a working method for 
understanding the relationship between philosophy and architecture. 
The motivating factor—not coincidentally the primary purpose 
of  this journal and its society also—is a foundational question to 
understanding what architecture is, what its history is, and what it 
could, or rather, should be. 

Wittgenstein himself  participated in the design of  a mansion, 
known widely as the Wittgenstein House, making him one of  the 
few famous philosophers to have directly engaged in architectural 
design. Heidegger is also well known for having written on 
architecture, in his essay “Building, Dwelling, Thinking” but is not 
known for having engaged the design or construction processes so 
foundational to understanding architecture. In Wittgenstein’s case, 
it was not well-known that he had had any run-in with architecture 
until after Bernhard Leitner’s 1973 publication of  The Wittgenstein 
House. Previously, and to this day, Wittgenstein is best known as a 
philosopher who made substantive contributions to philosophy of  
language—ordinary language philosophy especially. When Leitner 
published his text, the architecture discipline momentarily turned its 
divided attention to the house at a time when the architecture was 
inundated with post-structuralist theories. Architects were intrigued 
by the possibility that a single person’s work could bridge between 
the disciplines of  architecture and of  philosophy and set out to 
understand how one’s person work could embody both. Yet, the 
methods these thinkers used to analyze the house were in keeping 
with post-structuralist methods, and the results were tantalizing 
acrobatic arguments at odds with Wittgenstein’s own philosophical 



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methods. Little traction was gained by the post-
structuralist attempts and since then few, with 
the exception of  Roger Paden’s Mysticism and 
Architecture and Nana Last’s Wittgenstein’s House, 
have attempted to re-conceive this terrain.2 

Starting off  the issue, Jochen Schuff ’s 
paper clears the field, so to speak, of  the 
existing literature. The matter-of-fact survey 
separates theoretical interpolation from what 
Wittgenstein said. To do so otherwise, I 
would argue, is to proceed in a decidedly un-
Wittgensteinian manner. His strict reading 
looks to David Macarthur’s recently published 
piece in Architecture Theory Review, as having 
repeated many of  the past attempt’s missteps.3 
As readers will see later in the issue, August 
Sarnitz’s paper draws a similar conclusion to that 
of  Schuff  albeit using original source material 
and recently translated empirical information 
on the house and the Austrian cultural context. 

Taking a staunch position, Schuff  seems to 
believe that everything written on the topic 
of  Wittgenstein’s philosophy of  architecture 
falls into the terrain of  un-Wittgensteinian 
extrapolation, and therefore should be 
discounted. It seems that much of  what has 
been produced in philosophical discourse on 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy would then also fall 
into this category, but it is unclear whether 
Schuff  would agree to such a parallel criticism 
of  philosophy. Schuff  does appear to shift 
into a moderate position with regards to what 
can be said of  Wittgenstein’s and architecture 
in the second half  of  his paper, wherein 
he does indulge in a few analyses of  the 
significance of  Wittgenstein’s remarks when 
considering architecture. The shift later in the 
paper suggests perhaps that his initial staunch 
position is more moderate. For me, although 
Wittgenstein is not himself  a philosopher 
of  architecture, that does not rule out the 

The matter 
of fact survey 

separates 
theoretical 

interpolation 
from what 

Wittgenstein said

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possibility that there is something of  philosophical significance on 
architecture Wittgenstein has said. 

Nevertheless, whether any kind extrapolation is permitted, 
how much and when such extrapolation maybe permitted, or 
whether Wittgenstein’s remarks hold any meaningful application to 
architecture remains contested and will remain a heated point of  
debate in any discussion of  Wittgenstein in architecture. Whatever 
one’s position on the matter, Schuff ’s paper will be an invaluable 
starting point for those entering this field as he carefully surveys 
and delineates what Wittgenstein did say and what can arguably 
meaningfully be said, without transgressing into the terrain of  
liberal interpolation. 

Perfectly juxtaposed with Schuff  is August Sarnitz who argues 
that the Wittgenstein House demonstrates some of  Wittgenstein’s 
philosophical points using a standard approach to analyzing building. 
Sarnitz is unique in existing literature for not over-attributing 
meaning to the house, for grounding his attributions of  meaning 
directly in building analysis, and for analyzing the Wittgenstein 
House in light of  Wittgenstein’s own thinking as opposed to that of  
Loos or other fin de siècle thinkers in Vienna at the time.

Sarnitz provides an analysis of  the house, contextualizing it in 
Viennese Modernism and traditional Austrian building practice. He 
provides a foundation for understanding Wittgenstein’s engagement 
with building practice, and in doing so corrects the established 
understanding, and provides the basis for an alternative reading 
of  the house. Unique other accounts of  the house is Sarnitz’s 
ability to argue for both Wittgenstein’s status as an architect and 
his originality in this position. While the standard reading of  the 
house places it within Viennese Modernism, or amongst the likes 
of  Loos and Wagner, the reading typically views Wittgenstein as 
an intellectual member of  the Viennese Modernist movement. Yet, 
Sarnitz demonstrates Wittgenstein’s intellectual opposition to many 
of  the foundational positions of  Viennese Modernism. He shows 
us that the Wittgenstein House demonstrates a different take on 
the aesthetics of  utility then many of  his Austrian contemporaries. 
As such, many existing historical attributions of  the Wittgenstein 
House are at odds with Sarnitz’s characterization. 

The next paper explores what can be said of  architecture in light 
of  Wittgenstein, particularly as pertains to Wittgenstein’s theory 
of  meaning. Emre Demirel approaches the topic from within the 



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discipline of  architecture and reaches toward 
a philosophical statement. Demirel discusses 
Wittgenstein’s theory of  meaning as a means 
of  questioning the notion of  tradition in 
architecture. His theoretical position is 
demonstrated by examples taken from his native 
Turkey, which serves not only to evidence the 
theoretical position taken, but further develop 
the position by working through notions of  
representation and building analysis. 

Reidar Due’s paper runs counter to 
Demirel’s in the sense that his paper 
approaches the topic from within philosophy 
and reaches toward architecture. Due discusses 
the conceptual foundations underpinning 
segments of  architectural theory. He looks to 
the Wittgensteinian concept of  meaning as 
use in order to demonstrate the limitations of  
Hegelian notions of  architecture, the limitations 
of  which are for him the basis of  contemporary 
architecture theory. He then discusses the 
role of  ideologies in collective thought about 
building, so as to show the limitations of  
essentialist notions of  architecture as well as 
the limitations certain “categories”, as the 
author calls them, have on the way we think 
about building. Due’s categories run parallel 
to Adrian Forty’s analysis of  the role of  words 
in conceptions of  architecture, yet Due argues 
further effectively saying that these categories 
or words provide the basis of  conceptual 
formations.4 Due focuses on the role of  
the historian in constructing architectural 
ideologies, leaving the reader to ask whether 
ideologies are always so construed.

Hilde Heynen’s contribution takes a turn, 
looking to the disciplinary rift that has for 
decades, perhaps centuries, divided reflective 
thinkers. Heynen reviews the discourse 
defining text Aesthetics of  Architecture by Roger 
Scruton, marking its recent new edition. The 

SArnitz 
demonstrates 
wittgenstein’s 

intellectual 

Opposition 
to ... Viennese 

modernism

“

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review serves as a short position piece describing why philosophers, 
albeit not all, so consistently fail to engage architecture. Their 
methodological errors in the approach to a subject they know little 
appears the cause, and the seemingly lack of  engagement with 
building the symptom. Heynen provides a reasoned analysis as to 
why Scruton’s thinking has not resonated, in either the original or 
recent revised edition, with those in the architecture discipline. She 
argues that while Scruton provides a competently argued account of  
architecture, the characterization is too limited to be recognizable, 
perhaps intelligible, to those intimately studied in architecture’s 
discourse and practice. 

Endnotes

1. Fahey, Carolyn, March 1, 2015, “Use-Value in Architecture:
Reconceptualizing Buildings’ Functions,” International Society for the Philosophy 
of  Architecture, http://isparchitecture.com/events/call-for-papers/
2. See my Ph.D. dissertation for a detailed survey of  literature surrounding
the house and the limitations of  each contribution: Carolyn Fahey, The
Claim of  Architecture: a new Wittgensteinian reading (Newcastle upon Tyne:
Newcastle University, 2010).

3. David Macarthur, ‘Working on Oneself  in Philosophy and Architecture:
A Perfectionist Reading of  the Wittgenstein House’, Architecture Theory
Review 19.2 (2015).
4. Adrian Forty, Words and Buildings: a vocabulary of  Modern Architecture
(London: Thames & Hudson, 2000).

AP .  vol 2 . No 2 . 2017




